Management Papers

Document Type

Journal Article

Date of this Version

5-1994

Publication Source

Games and Economic Behavior

Volume

6

Issue

3

Start Page

445

Last Page

468

DOI

10.1006/game.1994.1026

Abstract

This paper reports the results of laboratory experiments in which subjects were presented with different two-person decision problems in both their extensive and normal forms. All games generated the same equilibrium outcomes. Our results indicate that the presentation of the decision problem significantly affects the strategy chosen. Surprisingly, these presentation effects were most prominent in the simplest games where differences in presentation would seem most transparent. It appears that subjects are much more likely to use (and fear) incredible threats when the problem is presented as a one-stage rather than as a multistage game.

Copyright/Permission Statement

© 1994. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

 

Date Posted: 27 November 2017

This document has been peer reviewed.