A Laboratory Investigation of Multiperson Rationality and Presentation Effects

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Management Papers
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Behavioral Economics
Management Information Systems
Management Sciences and Quantitative Methods
Organizational Behavior and Theory
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Schotter, Andrew
Weigelt, Keith W
Wilson, Charles
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This paper reports the results of laboratory experiments in which subjects were presented with different two-person decision problems in both their extensive and normal forms. All games generated the same equilibrium outcomes. Our results indicate that the presentation of the decision problem significantly affects the strategy chosen. Surprisingly, these presentation effects were most prominent in the simplest games where differences in presentation would seem most transparent. It appears that subjects are much more likely to use (and fear) incredible threats when the problem is presented as a one-stage rather than as a multistage game.

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1994-05-01
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Games and Economic Behavior
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