Management Papers
Document Type
Journal Article
Date of this Version
2-2005
Publication Source
The Review of Economics and Statistics
Volume
87
Issue
1
Start Page
135
Last Page
147
DOI
10.1162/0034653053327595
Abstract
An unanswered question in the debate on public-sector inefficiency is whether reforms other than government divestiture can effectively substitute for privatization. Using a 1981–1995 panel data set of all public and private manufacturing establishments in Indonesia, we analyze whether public-sector inefficiency is primarily due to agency-type problems or to the environment in which public-sector enterprises (PSEs) operate, as measured by the soft budget constraint and the degree of internal and external competition. The results, obtained from fixed-effects specifications, provide support for both models. Ownership matters because, for a given level of government financing or competition, PSEs perform worse than their private-sector counterparts. The environment matters because only PSEs which received government financing or those shielded from import competition or foreign ownership performed worse than private enterprises. The results suggest that the efficiency of PSEs can be increased through privatization, through manipulation of the environment, or through a combination of both approaches.
Recommended Citation
Bartel, A. P., & Harrison, A. E. (2005). Ownership Versus Environment: Disentangling the Sources of Public-Sector Inefficiency. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 87 (1), 135-147. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/0034653053327595
Date Posted: 27 November 2017
This document has been peer reviewed.