Marketing Papers

Document Type

Journal Article

Date of this Version

7-1981

Publication Source

Management Science

Volume

27

Issue

7

Start Page

785

Last Page

801

DOI

10.1287/mnsc.27.7.785

Abstract

In this paper we analyze competitive decision-making situations in terms of their preference structures and posterior performance, through a Bayesian decision-theoretic framework. The setting is that of a two-by-two, two-person, non-zero-sum and noncooperative game which is repeated over time. The dynamic behavior of the competitors for different classes of games, as identified by their preference structures, is examined and a classification scheme is proposed for the purpose of unification. The competitors' dynamic behavior and posterior performance for some general classes of games is then derived, and the relationship to the results implied from game-theoretic considerations is discussed. Illustrative examples are given, too.

Copyright/Permission Statement

Originally published in Management Science © INFORMS

This is a pre-publication version. The final version is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.27.7.785

Keywords

games, noncooperative, decision analysis, sequential, utility/preference

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Date Posted:11 June 2018

This document has been peer reviewed.