Scholarship at Penn Libraries

Document Type

Journal Article

Date of this Version

September 2000


In A Study of Spinoza's Ethics, Bennett provides an analysis of what he calls Spinoza's 'offical argument' of substance monism. The official argument is Bennett's interpretation of the demonstration of 1P14, and his criticisms of it are powerful ones. This paper addresses one aspect of Bennet's criticisms. A premise of the official argument is the conclusion of 1P5, that there cannot be two substances with an attribute in common. Bennett argues that 1P5 is insufficient to support 1P14. This paper argues that a correct understanding of Spinoza's version of the identity of indiscernibles reveals that 1P5 is sufficient to support 1P14 and Spinoza's argument for substance monism.


Published in Kinesis, Volume 27, Issue 2, Fall 2000, pages 25-50.

NOTE: At the time of publication, author Nicholas Okrent was affiliated with the University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill. Currently (March 2006), he is a librarian at the University of Pennsylvania Library.


Spinoza, Substance, Monism, Identity of Indiscernibles, Bennett, Jonathan



Date Posted: 19 June 2006

This document has been peer reviewed.