Legal Studies and Business Ethics Papers

Document Type

Journal Article

Date of this Version

4-2017

Publication Source

The Philosophical Review

Volume

126

Issue

2

Start Page

241

Last Page

272

DOI

10.1215/00318108-3772018

Abstract

This essay defends the possibility of preemptive forgiving, that is, forgiving before the offending action has taken place. This essay argues that our moral practices and emotions admit such a possibility, and it attempts to offer examples to illustrate this phenomenon. There are two main reasons why someone might doubt the possibility of preemptive forgiving. First, one might think that preemptive forgiving would amount to granting permission. Second, one might think that forgiving requires emotional content that is not available prior to wrongdoing. If, however, preemptively forgiving is genuinely possible—as this essay hopes to illustrate—then this fact has implications for our understanding of both relational normativity and the nature of forgiveness.

Copyright/Permission Statement

Originally published in The Philosophical Review © 2017 Duke University Press

This is a pre-publication version. The final version is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00318108-3772018

Keywords

forgiving, forgiveness, rights, standing, complaint

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Date Posted: 20 June 2018

This document has been peer reviewed.