Legal Studies and Business Ethics Papers
Document Type
Journal Article
Date of this Version
4-2017
Publication Source
The Philosophical Review
Volume
126
Issue
2
Start Page
241
Last Page
272
DOI
10.1215/00318108-3772018
Abstract
This essay defends the possibility of preemptive forgiving, that is, forgiving before the offending action has taken place. This essay argues that our moral practices and emotions admit such a possibility, and it attempts to offer examples to illustrate this phenomenon. There are two main reasons why someone might doubt the possibility of preemptive forgiving. First, one might think that preemptive forgiving would amount to granting permission. Second, one might think that forgiving requires emotional content that is not available prior to wrongdoing. If, however, preemptively forgiving is genuinely possible—as this essay hopes to illustrate—then this fact has implications for our understanding of both relational normativity and the nature of forgiveness.
Copyright/Permission Statement
Originally published in The Philosophical Review © 2017 Duke University Press
This is a pre-publication version. The final version is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00318108-3772018
Keywords
forgiving, forgiveness, rights, standing, complaint
Recommended Citation
Cornell, N. (2017). The Possibility of Preemptive Forgiving. The Philosophical Review, 126 (2), 241-272. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00318108-3772018
Included in
Applied Ethics Commons, Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons, Cognition and Perception Commons, Cognitive Psychology Commons, Law Commons, Personality and Social Contexts Commons, Philosophy of Mind Commons
Date Posted: 20 June 2018
This document has been peer reviewed.