Date of this Version
The Philosophical Review
This essay defends the possibility of preemptive forgiving, that is, forgiving before the offending action has taken place. This essay argues that our moral practices and emotions admit such a possibility, and it attempts to offer examples to illustrate this phenomenon. There are two main reasons why someone might doubt the possibility of preemptive forgiving. First, one might think that preemptive forgiving would amount to granting permission. Second, one might think that forgiving requires emotional content that is not available prior to wrongdoing. If, however, preemptively forgiving is genuinely possible—as this essay hopes to illustrate—then this fact has implications for our understanding of both relational normativity and the nature of forgiveness.
Originally published in The Philosophical Review © 2017 Duke University Press
This is a pre-publication version. The final version is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00318108-3772018
forgiving, forgiveness, rights, standing, complaint
Cornell, N. (2017). The Possibility of Preemptive Forgiving. The Philosophical Review, 126 (2), 241-272. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/00318108-3772018
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Date Posted: 20 June 2018
This document has been peer reviewed.