The Possibility of Preemptive Forgiving
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forgiveness
rights
standing
complaint
Applied Ethics
Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics
Cognition and Perception
Cognitive Psychology
Law
Personality and Social Contexts
Philosophy of Mind
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Abstract
This essay defends the possibility of preemptive forgiving, that is, forgiving before the offending action has taken place. This essay argues that our moral practices and emotions admit such a possibility, and it attempts to offer examples to illustrate this phenomenon. There are two main reasons why someone might doubt the possibility of preemptive forgiving. First, one might think that preemptive forgiving would amount to granting permission. Second, one might think that forgiving requires emotional content that is not available prior to wrongdoing. If, however, preemptively forgiving is genuinely possible—as this essay hopes to illustrate—then this fact has implications for our understanding of both relational normativity and the nature of forgiveness.