Health Care Management Papers
Document Type
Journal Article
Date of this Version
5-2012
Publication Source
American Economic Review
Volume
102
Issue
3
Start Page
498
Last Page
501
DOI
10.1257/aer.102.3.498
Abstract
We implement an empirical test for selection into health insurance using changes in coverage induced by the introduction of mandated health insurance in Massachusetts. Our test examines changes in the cost of the newly insured relative to those who were insured prior to the reform. We find that counties with larger increases in insurance coverage over the reform period face the smallest increase in average hospital costs for the insured population, consistent with adverse selection into insurance before the reform. Additional results, incorporating cross-state variation and data on health measures, provide further evidence for adverse selection.
Copyright/Permission Statement
Copyright © 2016 AEA
Recommended Citation
Hackmann, M. B., Kolstad, J. T., & Kowalski, A. E. (2012). Health Reform, Health Insurance, and Selection: Estimating Selection Into Health Insurance Using the Massachusetts Health Reform. American Economic Review, 102 (3), 498-501. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.3.498
Date Posted: 27 November 2017
This document has been peer reviewed.