Health Care Management Papers

Document Type

Journal Article

Date of this Version

2-2013

Publication Source

American Economic Review

Volume

103

Issue

1

Start Page

145

Last Page

177

DOI

10.1257/aer.103.1.145

Abstract

Many important issues in business-to-business markets involve price discrimination and negotiated prices, situations where theoretical predictions are ambiguous. This paper uses new panel data on buyer-supplier transfers and a structural model to empirically analyze bargaining and price discrimination in a medical device market. While many phenomena that restrict different prices to different buyers are suggested as ways to decrease hospital costs (e.g., mergers, group purchasing organizations, and transparency), I find that: (i) more uniform pricing works against hospitals by softening competition; and (ii) results depend ultimately on a previously unexplored bargaining effect.

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Date Posted: 27 November 2017

This document has been peer reviewed.