Denotationally cued interactional events: A special case

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GSE Faculty Research
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Educational Foundations
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Modern analyses of language use have come to focus as much on what we do with language as on what we say with it (e.g., Austin 1975 [1956]; Goffman 1974; Gumperz and Hymes 1972; Searle 1969; Wittgenstein 1953). With this shift to studying language's interactional functions has come an apparently simple question: how does a stretch of talk come to count as a particular type of interactional event? Answers to this question relied at first on the denotational functions of language. In the prototypical cases presented by Austin (1975 [1956]), an utterance signals an interactional event through the denotational value of certain predicating formulae. Uttered in appropriate circumstances, I promise both denotes and accomplishes a speech act.

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1997-09-01
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Reprinted from Semiotica, Volume 114, Issues 3/4, 1997, pages 295-317. Publisher URL: http://www.atypon-link.com/WDG/loi/semi NOTE: At the time of publication, author Stanton Wortham was affiliated with Bates College. Currently June 2007, he is a faculty member in the Graduate School of Education at the University of Pennsylvania. We have contacted the publisher regarding the deposit of this paper in ScholarlyCommons@Penn. No response has been received.
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