Goldstone Research Unit
Document Type
Journal Article
Date of this Version
12-2010
Publication Source
Review of Philosophy and Psychology
Volume
1
Issue
4
Start Page
499
Last Page
514
DOI
10.1007/s13164-010-0021-4
Abstract
Because reasoning allows us to justify our beliefs and evaluate these justifications it is central to folk epistemology. Following Sperber, and contrary to classical views, it will be argued that reasoning evolved not to complement individual cognition but as an argumentative device. This hypothesis is more consistent with the prevalence of the confirmation and disconfirmation biases. It will be suggested that these biases render the individual use of reasoning hazardous, but that when reasoning is used in its natural, argumentative, context they can represent a smart way to divide labor without loosing epistemic value.
Copyright/Permission Statement
The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13164-010-0021-4
Recommended Citation
Mercier, H. (2010). The Social Origins of Folk Epistemology. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1 (4), 499-514. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13164-010-0021-4
Included in
Cognitive Psychology Commons, Developmental Psychology Commons, Epistemology Commons, Neuroscience and Neurobiology Commons, Philosophy of Mind Commons, Philosophy of Science Commons
Date Posted: 11 March 2015
This document has been peer reviewed.