Finance Papers

Document Type

Journal Article

Date of this Version

3-2015

Publication Source

Computational Economics

Volume

45

Issue

3

Start Page

469

Last Page

500

DOI

10.1007%2Fs10614-014-9431-1

Abstract

Past work on tournaments in iterated prisoner’s dilemma and the evolution of cooperation spawned by Axelrod has contributed insights about achieving cooperation in social dilemmas, as well as a framework for strategic analysis in such settings. We present a broader, more extensive framework for strategic analysis in general games, which we illustrate in the context of a particular social dilemma encountered in interdependent security settings. Our framework is fully quantitative and computational, allowing one to measure the quality of strategic alternatives across a series of measures, and as a function of relevant game parameters. Our special focus on performing analysis over a parametric landscape is motivated by public policy considerations, where possible interventions are modeled as affecting particular parameters of the game. Our findings qualify the touted efficacy of the Tit-for-Tat strategy, demonstrate the importance of monitoring, and exhibit a phase transition in cooperative behavior in response to a manipulation of policy-relevant parameters of the game.

Copyright/Permission Statement

The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10614-014-9431-1

Keywords

tournaments, game theory, prisoner’s dilemma, interdependent security games

Embargo Date

3-29-2016

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Date Posted: 27 November 2017

This document has been peer reviewed.