Date of this Version
Past work on tournaments in iterated prisoner’s dilemma and the evolution of cooperation spawned by Axelrod has contributed insights about achieving cooperation in social dilemmas, as well as a framework for strategic analysis in such settings. We present a broader, more extensive framework for strategic analysis in general games, which we illustrate in the context of a particular social dilemma encountered in interdependent security settings. Our framework is fully quantitative and computational, allowing one to measure the quality of strategic alternatives across a series of measures, and as a function of relevant game parameters. Our special focus on performing analysis over a parametric landscape is motivated by public policy considerations, where possible interventions are modeled as affecting particular parameters of the game. Our findings qualify the touted efficacy of the Tit-for-Tat strategy, demonstrate the importance of monitoring, and exhibit a phase transition in cooperative behavior in response to a manipulation of policy-relevant parameters of the game.
The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10614-014-9431-1
tournaments, game theory, prisoner’s dilemma, interdependent security games
Vorobeychik, Y., Kimbrough, S. O., & Kunreuther, H. (2015). A Framework for Computational Strategic Analysis: Applications to Iterated Interdependent Security Games. Computational Economics, 45 (3), 469-500. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007%2Fs10614-014-9431-1
Date Posted: 27 November 2017
This document has been peer reviewed.