A Framework for Computational Strategic Analysis: Applications to Iterated Interdependent Security Games

Loading...
Thumbnail Image
Penn collection
Finance Papers
Degree type
Discipline
Subject
tournaments
game theory
prisoner’s dilemma
interdependent security games
Business
Finance and Financial Management
Funder
Grant number
License
Copyright date
Distributor
Related resources
Author
Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy
Kimbrough, Steven. O
Kunreuther, Howard
Contributor
Abstract

Past work on tournaments in iterated prisoner’s dilemma and the evolution of cooperation spawned by Axelrod has contributed insights about achieving cooperation in social dilemmas, as well as a framework for strategic analysis in such settings. We present a broader, more extensive framework for strategic analysis in general games, which we illustrate in the context of a particular social dilemma encountered in interdependent security settings. Our framework is fully quantitative and computational, allowing one to measure the quality of strategic alternatives across a series of measures, and as a function of relevant game parameters. Our special focus on performing analysis over a parametric landscape is motivated by public policy considerations, where possible interventions are modeled as affecting particular parameters of the game. Our findings qualify the touted efficacy of the Tit-for-Tat strategy, demonstrate the importance of monitoring, and exhibit a phase transition in cooperative behavior in response to a manipulation of policy-relevant parameters of the game.

Advisor
Date Range for Data Collection (Start Date)
Date Range for Data Collection (End Date)
Digital Object Identifier
Series name and number
Publication date
2015-03-01
Journal title
Computational Economics
Volume number
Issue number
Publisher
Publisher DOI
Journal Issue
Comments
Recommended citation
Collection