Finance Papers

Document Type

Journal Article

Date of this Version

2017

Publication Source

Journal of Financial Economics

Abstract

The more the target knows about the bidder, the more difficult it is to pay with overpriced shares. Thus, under bidder opportunism, the fraction of stock in the deal payment is lower with better informed targets. We test this simple prediction using information proxies reflecting industry relatedness and geographic location specific to the merging firms. We find instead that public bidders systematically use more stock in the payment when the target knows more about the bidder. While inconsistent with opportunism, this is as predicted when bidders are primarily concerned with adverse selection on the target side of the deal. Moreover, tests based on exogenous variation in bidder market-to-book ratios, identified using aggregate mutual fund outflows, also fail to support bidder opportunism. Finally, "cash-only" targets and potential competition from private bidders appear to place significant external pressure on public bidders to pay in cash.

Copyright/Permission Statement

© 2017. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/

Comments

The article has not been published online yet in Journals website.

Keywords

Takeovers, payment method, mispricing, capital structure, industry relatedness, geographic location

Embargo Date

4-15-2019

Share

COinS
 

Date Posted: 27 November 2017

This document has been peer reviewed.