Finance Papers

Document Type

Journal Article

Date of this Version

2008

Publication Source

Journal of Banking and Finance

Volume

32

Issue

8

Start Page

1625

Last Page

1635

DOI

10.1016/j.jbankfin.2007.11.011

Abstract

We show how a high degree of commonality in investor liquidity shocks can diminish incentives for intermediaries to keep markets open and lead to market collapse, even without information asymmetry or news affecting fundamentals. We motivate our model using the perpetual floating-rate note market where two years of explosive growth – in which issues by high quality borrowers were placed with institutional investors and traded in a liquid secondary market – were followed by a precipitous collapse when market intermediaries withdrew due to large order imbalances. We shed new light on the trade-off between ownership concentration and market liquidity.

Copyright/Permission Statement

© 2008. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/.

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Date Posted: 27 November 2017

This document has been peer reviewed.