Finance Papers

Document Type

Journal Article

Date of this Version

2004

Publication Source

Journal of Economic Theory

Volume

114

Issue

1

Start Page

132

Last Page

152

DOI

10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00101-7

Abstract

In asymmetric information models of financial markets, prices imperfectly reveal the private information held by traders. Informed insiders thus have an incentive not only to trade less aggressively but also to manipulate the market by trading in the wrong direction and undertaking short-term losses, thereby increasing the noise in the trading process. In this paper we show that when the market faces uncertainty about the existence of the insider in the market and when there is a large number of trading periods before all private information is revealed, long-lived informed traders will manipulate in every equilibrium.

Copyright/Permission Statement

© 2004. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/.

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Date Posted: 27 November 2017

This document has been peer reviewed.