Date of this Version
The Journal of Finance
This paper analyzes how blockholders can exert governance even if they cannot intervene in a firm's operations. Blockholders have strong incentives to monitor the firm's fundamental value because they can sell their stakes upon negative information. By trading on private information (following the “Wall Street Rule”), they cause prices to reflect fundamental value rather than current earnings. This in turn encourages managers to invest for long-run growth rather than short-term profits. Contrary to the view that the U.S.'s liquid markets and transient shareholders exacerbate myopia, I show that they can encourage investment by impounding its effects into prices.
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article, which has been published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01508.x. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.
Edmans, A. (2009). Blockholder Trading, Market Efficiency, and Managerial Myopia. The Journal of Finance, 64 (6), 2481-2513. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01508.x
Date Posted: 27 November 2017
This document has been peer reviewed.