Does Disputing Through Agents Enhance Cooperation? Experimental Evidence

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dc.contributor.authorCroson, Rachel
dc.contributor.authorMnookin, Robert. H
dc.date2023-05-17T14:48:27.000
dc.date.accessioned2023-05-23T00:16:09Z
dc.date.available2023-05-23T00:16:09Z
dc.date.issued1997-06-01
dc.date.submitted2016-06-27T13:28:49-07:00
dc.description.abstractA distinctive characteristic of our mechanisms for conflict resolution is that litigation is carried out by agents chosen by disputing principals. Does the fact that clients choose lawyers to carry on their disputes facilitate dispute resolution or instead exacerbate conflict? The dominant contemporary view is that the involvement of lawyers magnifies the contentiousness of litigation and wastes social resources, prolonging and escalating the conflict in ways that enrich the legal profession but not the clients. But in a recent article, Ronald Gilson and Robert Mnookin suggest another possibility: by choosing lawyers with reputations for cooperation, clients may commit to cooperative litigation in circumstances where the clients themselves would not otherwise trust each other. Using the methodology of experimental economics, this article presents a test of their idea that, by choosing cooperative agents under well-specified procedures, principals may sustain more cooperation than they could on their own. Our experimental findings are consistent with the Gilson-Mnookin hypothesis.
dc.identifier.urihttps://repository.upenn.edu/handle/20.500.14332/42162
dc.legacy.articleid1060
dc.legacy.fields10.1086/467998
dc.legacy.fulltexturlhttps://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1060&context=oid_papers&unstamped=1
dc.source.beginpage331
dc.source.endpage345
dc.source.issue248
dc.source.issue2
dc.source.journalOperations, Information and Decisions Papers
dc.source.journaltitleThe Journal of Legal Studies
dc.source.peerreviewedtrue
dc.source.statuspublished
dc.source.volume26
dc.subject.otherOther Economics
dc.titleDoes Disputing Through Agents Enhance Cooperation? Experimental Evidence
dc.typeArticle
digcom.contributor.authorCroson, Rachel
digcom.contributor.authorMnookin, Robert. H
digcom.identifieroid_papers/248
digcom.identifier.contextkey8778213
digcom.identifier.submissionpathoid_papers/248
digcom.typearticle
dspace.entity.typePublication
upenn.schoolDepartmentCenterOperations, Information and Decisions Papers
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