Stockpiling Anti-viral Drugs for a Pandemic: The Role of Manufacturer Reserve Programs
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pricing
pharmaceutical products
pandemic
Business
Economics
Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration
pharmaceutical products
pandemic
Business
Economics
Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration
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Abstract
To promote stockpiling of anti-viral drugs by non-government organizations such as hospitals, drug manufacturers have introduced Manufacturer Reserve Programs which, for an annual fee, provide the right to buy in the event of a severe outbreak of influenza. We show that these programs enhance drug manufacturer profits but could either increase or decrease the amount of pre-pandemic stockpiling of anti-viral drugs.
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2010-05-01
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Journal of Health Economics
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At the time of publication, author Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. was affiliated with Johns Hopkins University. Currently, he is a faculty member at the Business, Economics and Public Policy Department at the University of Pennsylvania.