Since the U.S. Supreme Court ended judicial deference to federal agencies’ interpretation and application of ambiguous congressional statutes with Loper Bright v. Raimondo (2024), the process of administrative law is bound to change. An overworked federal judiciary already struggling to keep up with contemporary requirements is now tasked with full review and decision- making on federal regulations. If the amplified burden on the federal judiciary is the only substantive change, then the policy decisions made by the administrative agencies are deferred to the courts in a manner that forces “legislation from the bench.” Throughout this paper, I approach and evaluate two radical policy options that would restructure the federal administrative enterprise to align with the Chevron ruling. I explain the legal foundation for the current administrative review process and use it as the groundwork from which the proposed federal governance structure should lay. Because of these reasons, and to enable efficiency while maintaining the federal government’s responsibility to provide invaluable services to its citizenry, I evaluate what an enforcement-only system would look like in the total absence of federal agencies. I then depict what such a state would look like if rule-making was decoupled from rule-enforcement by severing the two responsibilities of the current bureaucracy. I conclude the latter is a more feasible option that would solve many governmental inefficiencies, but still require significant legislative, legal, and logistical planning to ensure that services provided remain consistent and constitutional.