Restricted Feedback in Long Term Relationships

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dc.contributor.authorDoraszelski, Ulrich
dc.contributor.authorEscobar, Juan F
dc.date2023-05-17T14:20:28.000
dc.date.accessioned2023-05-22T12:32:01Z
dc.date.available2023-05-22T12:32:01Z
dc.date.issued2012-01-01
dc.date.submitted2016-05-31T08:05:36-07:00
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies long term relationships, modeled as repeated games, with restricted feedback. Players condition current play on summary statistics of past play rather than the entire history, as may be the case in online markets. Our state strategy equilibrium framework allows for arbitrary restrictions on strategies. We derive a recursive characterization for the set of equilibrium payoffs similar to that of Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1986, 1990) [2] and [3] for perfect public equilibria and show that the set of equilibrium payoffs is the largest fixed point of a monotone operator. We use our characterization to derive necessary and sufficient conditions for efficient trade in a repeated product choice game where costumers condition their purchase decisions only on the last performance signal.
dc.identifier.urihttps://repository.upenn.edu/handle/20.500.14332/5174
dc.legacy.articleid1014
dc.legacy.fields10.1016/j.jet.2011.11.013
dc.legacy.fulltexturlhttps://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=bepp_papers&unstamped=1
dc.rights© 2012. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.source.beginpage142
dc.source.endpage161
dc.source.issue133
dc.source.issue1
dc.source.journalBusiness Economics and Public Policy Papers
dc.source.journaltitleJournal of Economic Theory
dc.source.peerreviewedtrue
dc.source.statuspublished
dc.source.volume147
dc.subject.otherrepeated games
dc.subject.otherrestricted feedback
dc.subject.otherproduct choice game
dc.subject.otherBusiness
dc.subject.otherEconomics
dc.subject.otherPublic Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration
dc.titleRestricted Feedback in Long Term Relationships
dc.typeArticle
digcom.contributor.authorDoraszelski, Ulrich
digcom.contributor.authorEscobar, Juan F
digcom.identifierbepp_papers/133
digcom.identifier.contextkey8664938
digcom.identifier.submissionpathbepp_papers/133
digcom.typearticle
dspace.entity.typePublication
upenn.schoolDepartmentCenterBusiness Economics and Public Policy Papers
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