In this dissertation, I study two questions related to contracting between firms, focusing on their strategic formation and effects on product offerings, firm profitability, prices, and consumer welfare. In the first chapter, I study the welfare impact of trade allowances, which are upfront payments from manufacturers to retailers before their products are placed on shelves. Trade allowances potentially motivate stores to offer more products by sharing costs with manufacturers (the "expansion effect''), benefiting consumers. However, they also lead stores to exclude some high-quality, low-cost products that pay low trade allowances (the "distortion effect''), which harms consumers. To quantify this trade-off, I construct a model, in which stores decide on both assortments and prices based on offers from manufacturers. I use stores’ revealed preferences to construct moment inequalities and quantify the magnitude of trade allowances. My estimates imply that in the U.S. yogurt market, trade allowances account for 14.8% of an average store’s wholesale payments. Counterfactual analysis shows that trade allowances increase the number of products offered by 2.4% but reduce consumer surplus by 1.0%. This finding suggests that the costs of distortion outweigh the benefits of assortment expansion. In the second chapter, I study exclusive contracts in the video streaming market. Streaming services can use exclusive contracts to differentiate content offerings and soften competition, while studios may leverage these contracts to negotiate higher license fees from streaming services. I investigate who gains and who loses from such contracts. I develop and estimate a structural model that incorporates bilateral negotiations between streaming services and studios, streaming services setting subscription prices, and consumer demand for subscriptions and titles. The findings reveal that the effect of exclusive contracts varies significantly across firms. Streaming services that lack in-house content (like Hulu) gain from exclusive contracts, while those with extensive in-house content (like Netflix) see minimal or even negative effects. For studios, exclusive contracts benefit small studios with weak bargaining power but harm large ones with strong bargaining power. Consumers lose from exclusive contracts due to reduced title distribution and higher subscription prices.