Reciprocity, Matching and Conditional Cooperation in Two Public Goods Games
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experimental economics
public goods
voluntary contribution mechanism
weakest link mechanism
Economic Theory
Other Economics
public goods
voluntary contribution mechanism
weakest link mechanism
Economic Theory
Other Economics
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Abstract
Experimental and empirical evidence identifies social preferences and proposes competing models of such preferences. We find that participants match the contributions of others in the voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM). We also examine a game with different equilibria, the weakest link mechanism (WLM). Here, in contrast, participants match the minimum contribution of others.
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2005-04-01
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Economics Letters