The Problem of Hylomorphism and Dualism in Avicenna: A Guide to Resolving Other Tensions
Penn collection
Degree type
Discipline
Subject
Ibn Sina
Soul
Hylomorphism
Dualism
Aristotle
Plato
Middle Eastern Philosophy
Arabic Philosophy
Psychology
Medicine
History
Ann Moyer
Moyer
Ann
Humanities
History of Philosophy
Intellectual History
Islamic World and Near East History
Medieval History
Other Psychiatry and Psychology
Philosophy of Mind
Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion
Funder
Grant number
License
Copyright date
Distributor
Related resources
Author
Contributor
Abstract
One of the greatest challenges posed to the student of Avicenna's psychology is whether he upholds a hylomorphic or dualistic conception of the soul. The hylomorphic position is the one espoused by Aristotle, in nuce that the soul is the entelecheia, or substantial form, of the body considered as matter. The dualistic position is that the soul is a separate substance that controls the body, itself also a substance. The goal of this essay is to determine the full complexity of Avicenna's position, by dissecting four of his great psychological works, each from a different point in his career: The Compendium on the Soul, The Origin and the Return, The De Anima from The Cure, and On the Rational Soul. Ultimately, we contend herein that the method we employ in solving this paper's central problem can serve as a guide to resolving other such problems in Avicenna's philosophy.
Advisor
Moyer
Elizabeth