This dissertation examines drivers of eviction in the US. Specifically, it highlights an understudied pathway through which a substantial share of eviction filings are resolved: tenant failure to respond. Across two chapters, I examine how court processes shape tenant outcomes and evaluate the effectiveness of low-cost interventions aimed at increasing response rates among tenants facing eviction. The first chapter estimates the causal effect of court appearance on tenant eviction outcomes, leveraging an institutional feature of Philadelphia eviction court that quasi-randomly pushes some late-arriving tenants into having their cases resolved in court. Tenants induced to appear by the instrument are 23 percentage points less likely to be formally evicted (relative to 99% of non-appearing tenants) and have 15 more protected days in unit post-judgment (relative to a 21 day average for non-appearing tenants). These effects stem from both increased case wins and negotiated agreements that offer flexibility and opportunities to ``pay to stay''. Court appearance does not affect the amount owed to landlords. Overall, reducing default judgments may be as effective as widely adopted, higher-cost eviction strategies like right-to-counsel. The second chapter examines whether low-cost informational interventions can reduce default judgments in eviction court and whether doing so leads to better outcomes for tenants. In an ongoing field experiment in Philadelphia, I randomly assign tenants to receive text messages designed to (1) remind them of their court date and (2) inform them of the benefits of appearing in court. Preliminary results suggest that up to 30% of default judgments may be attributable to information frictions. The observed reduction in default rates among treated tenants stems from both increased court appearances and higher rates of case withdrawals. Among non-withdrawn cases, the intervention reduces formal evictions within 30 days but does not affect the amount owed. 2SLS estimates indicate that court appearance itself reduces the likelihood of eviction within 30 days by 62 percentage points, relative to a baseline mean of 96%, highlighting the potential of any policy that reduces default judgments by increasing court appearance.