Bad Policy as a Recipe for Bad Federalism in the Regulation of Canadian Financial Institutions: The Case of Loan and Trust Companies

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Regulating Financial Institutions
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This article addresses the impact of substantive policy on federal arrangements in the regulation of Canadian loan and trust companies. It is argued that reliance on market-suppressing policies (flat-rate based deposit insurance and selective bail·outs of depositors in the event of institutional failure) has undermined the value of competitive federalism in this area, and has spawned highly contentious policy initiatives such as Ontario's Equals Approach. To redress the federalism problems in the regulation of loan and trusts, a useful starting point would be the enhancement of market forces in substantive policy. Here, it is argued that the commitment to secrecy regulation by financial institution regulators has impeded this enterprise.

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1993
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Reprinted from Osgoode Hall Law Journal, Volume 31, 1993, pages 543-587.
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