Loo, Boon Thau

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2009 - 200912010 - 20111
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Author: Jia, Limin ×

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  • Publication
    Formally Verifiable Networking
    (2009-10-01) Wang, Anduo; Jia, Limin; Liu, Changbin; Loo, Boon Thau; Sokolsky, Oleg; Basu, Prithwish
    This paper proposes Formally Verifiable Networking (FVN), a novel approach towards unifying the design, specification, implementation, and verification of networking protocols within a logic-based framework. In FVN, formal logical statements are used to specify the behavior and the properties of the protocol. FVN uses declarative networking as an intermediary layer between high-level logical specifications of the network model and low-level implementations. A theorem prover is used to statically verify the properties of declarative network protocols. Moreover, a property preserving translation exists for generating declarative networking implementations from verified formal specifications. We further demonstrate the possibility of designing and specifying well-behaved network protocols with correctness guarantees in FVN using meta-models in a systematic and compositional way.
  • Publication
    FSR: Formal Analysis and Implementation Toolkit for Safe Inter-Domain Routing
    (2011-01-01) Wang, Anduo; Jia, Limin; Zhou, Wenchao; Loo, Boon Thau; Ren, Yiqing; Rexford, Jennifer; Scedrov, Andre; Nigam, Vivek; Talcott, Carolyn
    Inter-domain routing stitches the disparate parts of the Internet together, making protocol stability a critical issue to both researchers and practitioners. Yet, researchers create safety proofs and counter-examples by hand, and build simulators and prototypes to explore protocol dynamics. Similarly, network operators analyze their router configurations manually, or using home-grown tools. In this paper, we present a comprehensive toolkit for analyzing and implementing routing policies, ranging from high-level guidelines to specific router configurations. Our Formally Safe Routing (FSR) toolkit performs all of these functions from the same algebraic representation of routing policy. We show that routing algebra has a natural translation to both integer constraints (to perform safety analysis with SMT solvers) and declarative programs (to generate distributed implementations). Our extensive experiments with realistic topologies and policies show how FSR can detect problems in an AS's iBGP configuration, prove sufficient conditions for BGP safety, and empirically evaluate convergence time.