Bank Lending and Relationship Capital

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Degree type
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)
Graduate group
Finance
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Credit Markets
Dynamic Contracting
Financial Frictions
Limited Commitment
Relationship Banking
Search Theory
Economics
Finance and Financial Management
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2016-11-29T00:00:00-08:00
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Abstract

I develop an equilibrium theory of bank lending relationships in an economy subject to search frictions and limited enforceability. The model features a dynamic contracting problem embedded within a directed search equilibrium with aggregate and bank-specific uncertainty. The interaction between search and agency frictions generates a slow accumulation of lending relationship capital and distorts the optimal allocation of credit along both intensive and extensive margins. A crisis characterized by a sizable destruction of lending relationships therefore leads to a significant contraction in credit and a slow recovery, consistent with the Great Recession. I calibrate the model to study aggregate and cross-sectional implications and analyze policies aimed at reviving bank lending.

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Itay Goldstein
Date of degree
2016-01-01
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