The No No-Miracles-Argument Argument

Daniel J. Singer, University of Pennsylvania

Abstract

The No Miracles Argument is commonly used as a defense of scientific realism. I claim that the No Miracles Argument is begging the question because of the way it uses the notion of ``best explanation.'' I show this by giving a fundamental account of explanation, describing how these explanations can be compared, and showing that, in the case of the No Miracles Argument, the use of the notion of ``best explanation'' will entail a correspondence theory of truth. I also show that the first premise of the No Miracles Argument and a correspondence theory of truth entail realism. Hence, the No Miracles Argument is begging the question.

Discipline(s)

Philosophy

Suggested Citation

Singer, Daniel J., "The No No-Miracles-Argument Argument" 01 February 2007. CUREJ: College Undergraduate Research Electronic Journal, University of Pennsylvania, https://repository.upenn.edu/curej/62.