CUREJ - College Undergraduate Research Electronic Journal

The No No-Miracles-Argument Argument

Daniel J. Singer, University of Pennsylvania

Division: Humanities

Dept/Program: Philosophy

Document Type: Undergraduate Student Research

Mentor(s): Michael Weisberg

Date of this Version: 01 February 2007

This document has been peer reviewed.



The No Miracles Argument is commonly used as a defense of scientific realism. I claim that the No Miracles Argument is begging the question because of the way it uses the notion of ``best explanation.'' I show this by giving a fundamental account of explanation, describing how these explanations can be compared, and showing that, in the case of the No Miracles Argument, the use of the notion of ``best explanation'' will entail a correspondence theory of truth. I also show that the first premise of the No Miracles Argument and a correspondence theory of truth entail realism. Hence, the No Miracles Argument is begging the question.



Suggested Citation

Singer, Daniel J., "The No No-Miracles-Argument Argument" 01 February 2007. CUREJ: College Undergraduate Research Electronic Journal, University of Pennsylvania,

Date Posted: 06 June 2007

This document has been peer reviewed.




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