Many states around the globe, most particularly in Europe, have seen a resurgence of far-right populist parties in the years following the global financial crisis. In Central and Eastern Europe (C.E.E.), the domestic democratic backsliding exhibited by European Union Member States such as Hungary under the administration of Fidesz’s Viktor Orbán and Poland under the control of Law and Justice’s Mateusz Morawiecki have prompted many scholars and political observers to predict the worst for the European Union. However, while domestic sliding towards authoritarianism and a flouting of rhetorical norms is cause for alarm, the effect of right-wing populism on the supranational legal architecture of the European Union is drastically understudied. Through complementary comparative analyses of [1] the prosecution of non-compliant Member States over time and [2] a comparative case study of Poland and Hungary, this paper hopes to expand a contending view in the literature that is currently understated. The study concludes that the legal-institutional architecture of the E.U. is doing precisely what it was designed to do, and warnings of the demise of the European integration project in light of political trends in C.E.E. may be overstated.