Chinese accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001 forever altered the international economy as it marked the political-economic diversification of international trade negotiations and law. Before the implications of Chinese accession became apparent, scholars predicted that Chinese WTO membership would greatly affect the Organization. While this thesis agrees with this general sentiment, it insists that China’s effect on the WTO is not wholly negative or positive and requires a nuanced, sub-institutional assessment to understand. Qualifying and expanding upon scholars’ pre-2001 predictions, this thesis argues that for the most part, China did not proactively cause instances of institutional weakness and organizational ineffectuality. Rather, China’s behavior within the WTO illuminates the Organization’s inherent inability to handle political-economic diversity. Further, this thesis argues that the original dispute settlement rules and procedures created to handle China no longer apply uniformly to the Chinese economic situation. China exists in a liminal space between socialism and capitalism, and the WTO is still unable to fully and adequately handle this political-economic ambiguity.