Attack-Resilient State Estimation in the Presence of Noise

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Departmental Papers (CIS)
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CPS Embedded Control
CPS Security
Computer Engineering
Computer Sciences
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Pajic, Miroslav
Tabuada, Paulo
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We consider the problem of attack-resilient state estimation in the presence of noise. We focus on the most general model for sensor attacks where any signal can be injected via the compromised sensors. An l0-based state estimator that can be formulated as a mixed-integer linear program and its convex relaxation based on the l1 norm are presented. For both l0 and l1-based state estimators, we derive rigorous analytic bounds on the state-estimation errors. We show that the worst-case error is linear with the size of the noise, meaning that the attacker cannot exploit noise and modeling errors to introduce unbounded state-estimation errors. Finally, we show how the presented attack-resilient state estimators can be used for sound attack detection and identification, and provide conditions on the size of attack vectors that will ensure correct identification of compromised sensors.

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2015-12-01
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2023-05-17T13:09:22.000
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Proceedings of the 54th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC 2015)(http://www.cdc2015.ctrl.titech.ac.jp/), Osaka, Japan, December 2015.
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