Departmental Papers (CIS)

Date of this Version


Document Type

Conference Paper


21st Safety-critical Systems Symposium (SSS'13), Bristol, United Kingdom.


Safety cases offer a means for communicating information about the system safety among the system stakeholders. Recently, the requirement for a safety case has been considered by regulators for safety-critical systems. Adopting safety cases is necessarily dependent on the value added for regulatory authorities. In this work, we outline a structured approach for assessing the level of sufficiency of safety arguments. We use the notion of basic probability assignment to provide a measure of sufficiency and insufficiency for each argument node. We use the concept of belief combination to calculate the overall sufficiency and insufficiency of a safety argument based on the sufficiency and insufficiency of its nodes. The application of the proposed approach is illustrated by examples.

Subject Area

CPS Theory

Publication Source

21st Safety-Critical Systems Symposium (SSS'13)

Start Page


Last Page



safety cases, safety argument assessment, Dempster-Shafer Theory



Date Posted: 15 January 2013