Private and Third-Party Randomization in Risk-Sensitive Equilibrium Concepts

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Departmental Papers (CIS)
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Computer Sciences
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Brautbar, Michael
Syed, Umar
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We consider risk-sensitive generalizations of Nash and correlated equilibria in noncooperative games. We prove that, except for a class of degenerate games, unless a two-player game has a pure Nash equilibrium, it does not have a risksensitive Nash equilibrium. We also show that every game has a risk-sensitive correlated equilibrium. The striking contrast between these existence results is due to the different sources of randomization in Nash (private randomization) and correlated equilibria (third-party randomization).

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2010-07-01
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2023-05-17T07:14:22.000
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Brautbar, M., Kearns, M., & Syed, U., Private and Third-Party Randomization in Risk-Sensitive Equilibrium Concepts, 24th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, July 2010, http://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/AAAI/AAAI10/paper/view/1847 © 1995–2011 Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence.
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