A Design for a Security-typed Language with Certificate-based Declassification

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This paper presents a calculus that supports information-flow security policies and certificate-based declassification. The decentralized label model and its downgrading mechanisms are concisely expressed in the polymorphic lambda calculus with subtyping (System F≾). We prove a conditioned version of the noninterference theorem such that authorization for declassification is justified by digital certificates from public-key infrastructures.

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2005-04-01
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2023-05-16T23:26:45.000
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Postprint version. Published in Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Volume 3444, Programming Languages and Systems: 14th European Symposium on Programming (ESOP 2005), pages 279-294. Publisher URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/b107380
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