Commandeering Empires: Egypt, Tripoli, and Tunis in the Age of Revolution, 1774-1835

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Abstract
This dissertation interrogates our conceptualizations of space, our understanding of the topographical borders of regions, and our historiographical depiction of the margins between imperial administration and local autonomy the Ottoman Maghreb. It does so by juxtaposing the history of corsairs, Bedouins, desert caravans and empires in turn-of-the-nineteenth-century North Africa. Further, it examines the horizontal connections among the North African provinces and their corresponding systems of governance. The central premise of this dissertation is that one cannot fully understand the policy and affairs of turn of the nineteenth century Egypt, or the Porte, without a firm grasp on the historical context of neighboring Ottoman Tripoli and Tunis.

Approaching this project with a regional lens allows this research to challenge the historiographical perception that North Africa was a periphery of the Ottoman world, and that its coastlines were the southern periphery of the Mediterranean region. Rather, it argues that for as incomplete as Mediterranean history is without a thorough examination of North Africa, North African history in turn cannot be understood without examining the Sahara and the region's connections with the Sahel. By reframing the concept of frontier space in our understanding of empire, this work takes zones of contact that have been traditionally seen as marginal and situates them at the center of the narrative. Changing this perspective allows us to better contextualize how Ottoman power structures ran both vertically between the imperial center, the periphery and beyond, but also horizontally—across the seas and the sands of North Africa, and across the divides of the provinces: Egypt, Tripoli, and Tunis. In doing so, this dissertation re-conceptualizes our understanding of what is ‘marginal’ and blurs the lines between the sea and the sand of African Mediterranean.

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COMMANDEERING EMPIRES: EGYPT, TRIPOLI, AND TUNIS IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION, 1774-1835

Mukaram Hhana

A DISSERTATION

in

History

Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania

in

Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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This dissertation is dedicated to my grandmother Amine, my aunt Layla and my mother Fayzeh—whose liveliness, fortitude and tenacity of purpose represents the very best of the matriarchy from which I descend.
This dissertation would have not seen the light of day if it were not for the support of countless individuals, organizations and institutions. My adviser, Eve Troutt Powell has been a tremendous guide. I would neither be a historian of North Africa if it were not for her training nor would the dissertation you are reading exist. Thanks is also due to Peter Holquist who pulled a reluctant graduate student of North Africa and the Middle East into the world of Russian imperial studies, and made her all the better of a scholar for it. I am also grateful to Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet, with whom I shared countless lovely coffees and chats long before she joined my committee and made my work all the more theoretically and thematically rigorous. I am indebted to Alan Mikhail, who in addition to his perennial encouragement became the point-person for my many questions on Egyptian-Ottoman history. This work is stronger for his patient advice and suggestions.

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ABSTRACT

COMMANDERING EMPIRES: EGYPT, TRIPOLI, AND TUNIS IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION, 1774-1835

Mukaram Hhana

Eve M. Troutt Powell

This dissertation interrogates our conceptualizations of space, our understanding of the topographical borders of historical regions, and our historiographical depiction of the margins between imperial administration and local autonomy the Ottoman Maghreb. It does so by juxtaposing the history of corsairs, Bedouins, desert caravans and empires in turn-of-the-nineteenth-century North Africa. Further, it examines the horizontal connections among the North African provinces and their corresponding systems of governance. The central premise of this dissertation is that one cannot fully understand the policy and affairs of turn of the nineteenth century Egypt, or the Porte, without a firm grasp on the historical context of neighboring Ottoman Tripoli and Tunis.

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**Index**
INTRODUCTION

CHARTING A NEW MAP FOR OTTOMAN NORTH AFRICA

This dissertation interrogates how human networks created the socio-political geography of turn of the nineteenth century North Africa. By focusing on regional and imperial connections, it argues that as historians of the Ottoman world, North Africa, and the Mediterranean we need to incorporate the new frameworks and methods developed in the field after the 1950s in our analysis of space and territory. The main objective of this research is to establish a new model for engagement, as well as a new imagining of space, and to build out the traditional binary model of “center” and “periphery,” within imperial studies. By tracing these networks across the span of various Ottoman provinces and ecologies, this work weaves together the social history of the Ottoman Maghreb and ties the histories of the distinct, yet interconnected, spaces such as, Istanbul, Tripoli, Tunis, and Cairo, together and interwoven with the spaces of Ghadames and Bomba and Constantine.

My cross-examination of these diverse spaces offers two important historiographical revisions. First, this framework stretches our historical imagination of North Africa beyond the coastlines of Tunis, Tripoli and Alexandria. It includes the inland connections that tie together the sea to the sands of the Sahel. Secondly, it establishes a new framework for how to understand the spaces of empire and frontier. Traditionally, Ottomanists and North Africanists studied the top-down interplay between an imperial center and a specific province. As a result, historians of Ottoman Egypt concentrated on the ties between the province and the Sublime Porte. Rather than pursuing a similar approach, I break down this historiographical paradigm by showing how social and political networks cut across the rigidity of borders and topography within the empire itself.
Effectively, this work maps a new bilateral axis for engagement in the region. It probes the historical viability of the east-west connections that crisscrossed through the provinces of Egypt, Tunis and Tripoli, and argues that the connections between the provinces demonstrated a far greater cohesion in the Ottoman Maghreb than is currently envisioned. Secondly, my research diagrams the north-south ties between the North African shores and the Sahel region. Typically, historians of the Maghreb have highlighted *either* the maritime world of the coastlines and the long-held practice of Mediterranean corsairing in the region’s relations with Europe *or* the land-based networks of trans-Saharan caravans, and the intellectual networks of the desert saints. I argue that both these vectors served as the infrastructural backbone for the multiple networks of the slave trade and, later, the transregional colonial resistance movements that found their roots in Islamic theological networks of North Africa. In doing so, this dissertation argues that Mediterranean history is incomplete without a thorough analysis of the North African provinces, Egypt among them, and that, in turn, North African history remains equally fragmented without a careful analysis of the African Sahel.

**Reflections on the Field**

In presenting a history of a region that has had a plethora of different methodological and conceptual lenses applied to it, I became curious as to why so many of my secondary sources were, in fact, so old. As I was making my way through the literature, I found that the cornerstone studies were not the books published in the 1980s, ‘70s or ‘60s, but rather voluminous studies produced in the 1920s and ‘30s. This realization struck me as surprising, especially when we take into consideration the massive body of work produced since World War II.
The Anglophone historiography of Egypt, and the Francophone studies of the Maghreb and the broader Mediterranean, are nothing if not vast and rich. Contemporary scholars, such as Khaled Fahmy, Virginia Aksan, Asma Moalla, and Daniel Panzac, as well as their predecessors, have contributed to, and indeed revised our methods and approaches to the history of Ottoman North Africa and the Mediterranean. Why then did I find myself going back, time and time again, to the interwar-period works of Henry Dodwell, Pierre Crabitès, and Georges Douin when writing this dissertation?

As I moved forward in my research, this sense of surprise increased. For instance, as I came across the autobiography of a Russian diplomat, who provided a detailed portrayal of Ibrahim Pasha, I realized that the source remained untapped by the Anglophone and Arabic historians of Egypt. Despite the author’s extended career in the Middle East and his service in official capacity both in Egypt and the Qajar court, I found it exceedingly delightful, if not peculiarly odd, that this account had never made its way into wider scholarship. However, the question remained hanging in the air until finally, in conversation with my adviser, I pointedly was asked the

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1 Aleksander Osipovich Dyugamel', general of infantry, member of State Council, Senator of Imperial Russia. Born 1801, died 28th May 1880 (Julian year). Son of a Privy Counsellor, he was born in Mitau (currently Latvia) to a wealthy aristocratic family of German origin and entered the Corps of Pages. He entered military service in 1820, in 1828-1829 he participated in the war against Ottomans and was awarded the rank of captain. In 1831 he fought against the November Uprising and also distinguished himself and received the medal 'for bravery' and the rank of colonel. In 1832 he entered general staff and in 1833 he was sent for his mission to Egypt. He subsequently became the plenipotentiary minister of the Qajar court in Tehran. In 1841, he returned to serve in the General Staff. In 1842 he served as a special envoy to Moldavia and Wallachia, and subsequently he was in the planning committee for the construction of road and waterways system in Russia. In 1847 he entered tsar Nicholas I's entourage and in 1849 he became General Lieutenant. Subsequently, he received the medal of St. Vladimir second-class, and White Eagle Order for excellent performance during his second mission to Moldavia and Wallachia. In 1851 he became a senator and in 1856 was awarded with the Order of St. Aleksandr Nevskii. In 1861 he became the general of infantry and the governor-general of Western Siberia, and in 1865 he became the commander of Western Siberian Military District. In 1866, on his own request, he was relieved of all his duties, but remained a senator and the member of State Council. In 1870, on the occasion of 50th year of service, he was appointed back to the General Staff. He died in his estates in May 1880.
same question that had loitered in the back of my mind for so long; and with the question, an answer began to crystalize.

**Trends in the Field**

The field of history, like many others, has its own trends and styles that shift in and out of fashion with the changing ages. The 1950s-’60s were a time of massive socio-political, ideological, and economic upheaval in the region of the Middle East and North Africa. The many manifestations of nationalism, be it *qawmiyya* and *wataniyya*, or the many more within, changed the history of the region, but also the ways we told the history of the region.

As momentous changes revised the political map of the Maghreb and led to the casting off the old colonial shrouds, the history of the region faced new demands from the public, interested in more contemporary models and approaches to the past. There was an air of newness and excitement in the region. The ‘great man’ narrative was largely out, reduced to the field of contemporary history about the dynamic politicos of the age, such as Nasser. As the states of the region gained and established their independence, the field of historiography turned its attention away from stodgy questions of empires, sultans, and war. These questions gave way to more contemporary and pressing issues: new political ideologies and emerging identities, be they modern Islamism of Qutbist inspiration, pan-Arab aspirations of *ba’athist* movement, anti-colonial and pro-independence movements of the FLN and the PLO, feminist pioneers such as Nawal El Saadawi and Fatima Mernissi, or even the socio-political inspirations resonating in the songs of Umm Kulthum or Fairuz. In this novel and robust intellectual context, the notion of writing a diplomatic history about a time of war long past became, much like the kings and the colonial influences that the
revolutions had so vehemently tried to uproot, entirely and appropriately outdated.

For the broader field of Middle Eastern and North African history, this was nothing short of groundbreaking. The change of perspective yielded many brilliant contributions to the literature of the field. Finally, the narratives of women, peasants, workers, Bedouins, and other central but nevertheless marginalized people were being told—or at the very least included—in the bigger picture. In fact, the framework of this wave of research, as well as the post-colonial, post-structural, post-modernist approaches that came afterwards, tied together by a general revisionist theme, remains very much the heart of the arguments presented here.

The questions that I ask in this dissertation and the methodology I employ in trying to decipher socio-political and economic idioms of the turn-of-the-nineteenth-century Ottoman Maghreb, in many respects originated and took shape within a context of great privilege: the high vantage point built by the secondary literature allowed me to look far enough as to explain the phenomena I have addressed in the present study. Nonetheless, the type of history that this dissertation tells is in fact, very different.

A Return to Old Questions

Put simply, the radical shift forward in the field of history from the 1950s onwards has had massive, broad-sweeping ramifications for our understanding of the Middle East, both with regard to the topics that were examined and re-interpreted, as well as the topics that were not. It is the humble contention of this introduction that the ‘old fashioned’ diplomatic approaches to the region need to be reexamined. That these bonds of regionalism still permeate and unify the region and can be seen in the movements as contemporary as the Arab uprisings in 2011. Can we, as Middle
Easternists, truly be surprised that shortly after Tunisians brought down Ben Ali, Egyptian took to Tahir to do the same to Mubarak? Or, that after the wave of revolutionary fervor that spurred Yemenis to take down Saleh across the Red Sea, inspired Qaddafi’s long-silenced dissidents to take to Green Square in Tripoli? Had not each of these four leaders embedded themselves and their governments in the discourse of a highly specific form of *wataniyya* nationalism, and had they not considered untouchable in the many years before 2011? Why then did they all come down so fast and more specifically, right after one another?

And in turn, was it not the subsequent power vacuum in post-Qaddafi Libya that allowed for the radicalization of Cyrenaica and the gradual trickle of Pan-Islamism over the border of the Western Desert? Did not the ties between of the *al-Harakat al-Islamiya al-Libiya* and al-Qaeda underscore the later radicalization of the Sinai’s *Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis*, an organization that pledged its commitments to the trans-regionally violent Islamic State of Iraq and Syria? Or, more to the point, that this organization only came into its own and found support in Egypt after the forced removal of the freely elected Muslim Brotherhood? While it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to delve into current affairs, I argue that it is simply no longer an option for my generation of scholars to underplay either the historical or contemporary effects of regionalism and the importance of cross-national ties among socio-political movements among the many, and varying spaces of North Africa and the Middle East.

**The Power of Connection**

To fulfill these objectives, this dissertation examines the structure of socio-political engagement across a wider geography than has typically been considered to
constitute Maghrebi space. By focusing on three specific provinces: Egypt, Tripolitania and Tunis, this dissertation is able to extrapolate on the specific nature on the provinces’ ties to one another. Furthermore, it also examined the region’s northern ties to their Mediterranean neighbors as well as its southern ties to the Central Saharan Sahel, and the spaces Bornu, Hausaland, and the broader Sudan.

However, imagining this space requires that we change the state of play on multiple levels. First, it is the contention of this dissertation that we have overly dissected turn-of-the-nineteenth-century Ottoman imperial space along borders that were yet to exist. The spaces of Tunis, Tripolitania, and Egypt were by no means as fragmented as we image them, nor were they insulated from one another by impermeable boundaries. Rather, this dissertation underscores the inter-provincial connections across the broader region, and the socio-economic, political and ideological interlinkages that tied the histories and peoples.

This is a critical point, since – by deconstructing the sharp boundaries within Ottoman North Africa – we are effectively reintroducing Egypt into the broader history of both the Maghreb and the Mediterranean. With this critical omission, our contemporary understanding of what made up “the Maghreb” and “the Mediterranean” that has long overlooked the maritime connections, as well as the socio-economic, and political ones that firmly embedded Egypt in the world of its Arabic speaking Maghrebi neighbors in the Ottoman Empire, has haunted our understanding of North African history. At the same time, by bringing Egypt back into Maghrebi space and history challenges our contemporary, post-colonial perceptions of space, which have led to compartmentalization of the region along imperial lines. As a result, Algerian and Tunisian history belong largely to the
Francophone literature, Egypt and the Hijaz—to the Anglophone, while Libya remains the preserve of Italian scholarship. However, these anachronistic divisions meant nothing to the North Africans of the early nineteenth century.

Secondly, by expanding our concept of the Mediterranean past beyond the mountains and coastlines described by Braudel, and by underscoring North African ties to the Sahel, we discover that it was never either the narrative of the sand or the one of the sea for the provinces of Ottoman North Africa.² Rather than dissecting the political and social context, in which North African political actors, corsairs, Bedouins, slave traders, Islamic theorists, and travelers operated, into two isolated vectors, this dissertation focuses on the role of Maghrebi provinces as a crucial nexus in the interwoven networks that linked the world of coastlines and the world of the interior.

**Historiography: Overview**

To say that the Mediterranean has been an important focus in modern historiography would be an understatement. From the works of Braudel and other scholars before him, the ‘Middle Sea’ has served as the primary locus for generating, developing, testing and positing several important historical hypotheses.³ In a collective volume, devoted to the sea from throughout the ages, David Abulafia applied the very notion to ‘Mediterraneans’ as an interpretive tool for global and comparative history. In it, he used this label to describe such disparate regions as East China Sea, as well as Central Asian and African deserts.⁴ Thus, the idea of the

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³ ibid.
Mediterranean, in many respects, could function as a shorthand for entangled history—as space that linked disparate regions, polities, and communities together and underscored the intricate ties of one space to another. After all, as Horden and Purcell argued, regardless of the nature of a particular microclimate, sheer necessity forced the engagement of various zones of the sea. Dependency demanded interaction, and required engagement across specific zones of the Mediterranean.\(^5\) However, not everyone agreed with this thesis.

In his book, *The Forgotten Frontier* Hess, an Ottomanist by training, read Braudel’s two-volume tome, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, and was wholly unconvinced by the *Annales* scholar’s notion of a regional cohesiveness. Braudel’s main premise, that there were historical connections among northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean by way of shared geography, terrain, climate and diet that stretched through *longue durée* and into the sixteenth century, became the foundation on which Hess built his antithetical response. For Hess, the sea was split, with the fault line running between Muslim and Christian domains. To frame his decidedly bifurcated world of socio-political division, he argued that throughout the sixteenth century, the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean had effectively turned their backs to one another along the divide of the coasts that separated Christian Europe and Muslim North Africa. Hess argued that “the process of historical change during the sixteenth century produced a new segregation of Mediterranean life”\(^6\) that ultimately allowed the Hapsburg monarchy of Iberia and the Ottoman deys of Algiers, as well as the sultans

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of Morocco, to isolate themselves from one another. Nevertheless, despite his premise of the historical isolation, Hess’s book remains important in the comparative approach it used in its analysis of sources from Rabat and in Simancas, even without a profound reliance on Arabic language materials.

A cursory look at the western historiography of North Africa during the Ottoman period shows that the representation of Southern Mediterranean has been largely overlooked within the broader historiographical narratives, of both the Ottoman world and the Mediterranean history. In regards to the Ottomanist works, this is especially true for the westernmost regencies of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli, which for over three centuries played a crucial role in projecting Sublime Porte’s naval power in the Mediterranean. However, a few monographs notwithstanding, the history of these provinces is prominently absent from general accounts of Ottoman history. Even the works specifically devoted to the Arabic speaking provinces of the empire have paid little to no attention to the developments in the Ottoman west.7

Instead, the prevalent perception of the three Maghrebi regencies has been one of isolated, largely independent communities, lacking interest in wider geopolitical developments and invested solely in revenue from the practice of corso. Meanwhile, the historiography of the Mediterranean region effectively isolated Egypt to the same extent that Ottoman work overlooked the North African provinces.

This piecemeal approach to the history of the region has subsequently had a profound impact on our conceptualization of the region. Scholars working within the field of Ottoman studies – both Anglophone and Turkophone – have generally privileged the ‘core’ provinces of the empire and the ‘view of the center’, while

underplaying the role of the Maghreb as a far-away, relatively detached region, overwhelmingly disinterested in the affairs of the Porte. In turn, for western, mostly French, scholars of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the dominant narrative also emphasized the region’s relative isolation and stagnation. By presenting Maghrebi rulers and communities as perhaps little more than maritime bandits, European historical narratives effectively justified and legitimized France’s colonial expansion and rule over the territories to the south of Mediterranean.

The wave of decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s, followed by the establishment of independent states of Algiers, Tunisia and Libya, brought a new wave of scholarship by North African historians, who challenged the dismissive discourse of North African history and recovered the local perspective as part of the broader ongoing nation-building efforts. However, while these studies have greatly contributed to deepening our knowledge of the history of the region, the main tenets of the ‘nationalist’ paradigm did not encourage a re-evaluation of close ties across the region or the imperial context of the pre-modern period. Rather, Ottomans became anachronistically considered as ‘foreign occupiers’ of the Maghreb, which led scholars either to denounce the Sublime Porte as yet another imperial power, or to underplay the region’s connection to the imperial center and the broader Ottoman world altogether. Paradoxically, in their efforts to reclaim North African histories as their own, North African scholarship indirectly reinforced the perception of the Maghreb’s isolation.

This trend has changed somewhat in the recent years, with authors such as Khaled Fahmy, Asma Moalla and Tal Shuval trying to reconnect the history of Maghrebi regencies into the wider narratives of the Ottoman polity. However, despite
the considerable amount of information that these studies have provided, they also
reinforce the “center-periphery’ binary within the field of Ottoman history. The
engagement between Cairo and Constantinople, Tunis and Constantinople, and
Algiers and Constantinople, are respectively analyzed, but the broader subject of the
provinces’ position in both North Africa and the Ottoman world falls away. Similarly,
the careful analysis of the vertical ties between center and periphery came at the cost
of the horizontal connections that bound the provinces together within the larger
region. Thus, the reintegration of regencies into the Ottoman ‘hub-and-spoke
network’ came at the expense of ignoring the entanglements within the region.

From the vantage point of Ottomanist historiography, most studies have
focused on the models of imperial governance and framed the relationship between
the Porte and the provinces as a binary relationship between the center and
peripheries. This approach took its most salient form in the Empire of Difference by
Karen Barkey, in which she outlined the structure of the Ottoman Empire as a ‘hub-
and-spoke network,’ with the imperial center in Istanbul brokering communication
and political power between otherwise unconnected territories and communities.8
According to the author, the virtuosity of the Ottoman state in managing its periphery
was crucial for the longevity of the imperial enterprise, which began to unravel once
the Tanzimat reformers set out to overhaul the administrative structure along the lines
of the nation-state. In this respect, Barkey taps into the wider paradigm of
historiographies of the empire, with similar lenses adopted by scholars of Qing China,
Russia and European composite monarchies.9 The same point of view made has

8 Karen Barkey, Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2008).
9 Dominic Lieven, Empire: The Russian Empire and Its Rivals, (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2002); Victor Lieberman, Strange Parallels, 2 vols. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003-
overwhelming been the adopted by Turkophone scholars.

When discussing the naval campaigns and the importance of the maritime world in the policies of the Sublime Porte, İdris Bostan’s work stands out. His studies, which mostly focuses on the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, highlights the importance of the Ottoman navy in the history of the Sublime Porte. Focusing exclusively on the Ottoman archival records of the tersane, Bostan analyzed the efforts of the Ottoman Porte to expand the fleet and maintain control of the Adriatic. While the Turkish author was mostly interested in the Ottoman corso of the ‘Golden Age,’ his work has also touched on the Ottoman role in the Italo-Turkish War of 1912, which ushered in the wave of Italian colonialism in the province of Tripolitania. Similarly, Orhan Kuloğlu has also addressed the topic of Ottoman Tripoli in the twentieth century. While the author’s interests lay within the sphere of political history under Ottoman rule (1832-1912), Kuloğlu also took the pains to highlight the role of Ottoman-Maghrebi connection. This dissertation builds on the research of these Turkophone scholars by examining the history of the political ties before the Ottoman reoccupation in 1835 and highlights the cross-regional ties, rather than limiting itself to the connection between a province and the imperial center.

**Historiography: The Dominancy of the Center and Periphery**


11 Orhan Koloğlu, 500 years in Turkish-Libyan relations (Ankara: SAM, 2007); Orhan Koloğlu, Osmanlı-İtalya Libya savaşında İtihatçılar, Masonlar, ve Sosyalist Enternasyonal (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 1999); Orhan Koloğlu, The Islamic Public Opinion during the Libyan War 1911-1912 (Tripoli: Libyan Studies Center, 1988).
Recently, scholars of the Ottoman world have increasingly underscored the point that an overemphasis of the relationship between the center and the periphery often leads us to overemphasize the perspective of the former, while depriving peripheral agents of their agency. It is true that early modern empires did not provide the level of horizontal integration on par with that of the nation-state, nor did they contribute to the emergence of national identities on a comparable scale. However, to assume that peripheral actors simply conformed to the ‘hub-and-spoke’ model imposed top-down by the imperial authorities would be a misrepresentation. Different arrangements existing between the Sublime Porte and the territories and communities under its control did not prevent the latter from forming their own, autonomous ties with other actors in pursuit of their political goals.

On the contrary, in some respects, these horizontal ties constituted an integral, albeit informal, part of imperial governance systems, facilitating procurement of resources, communication and defense.12 As Kerry Ward has pointed out in her analysis of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) and its networks of exile, even state-mandated networks could produce unintended consequences. Her study showed that the practice of exiling political and religious figures from Batavia to South Africa inadvertently contributed to the emergence of ties between the two loci of imperial power, a consequence that officials of the company did not expect, in effect establishing Islamic religious ties between South Africa and East India.13 At the same time, the position of Cape Town as a prisoner colony for the VOC enraged free

settlers and eventually led to the Dutch loss of South Africa to their British rivals. Thus, even if the imperial center struggled to keep the peripheries isolated, it could not prevent the emergence of alternative power networks that ran horizontally across provincial divides.¹⁴

This is especially important in the context of the last quarter of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, when the Ottoman imperial edifice faced enormous challenges, both foreign and domestic. The tremendous debacle in the course of Russo-Ottoman war of 1768-1774 had far-reaching effects on the empire’s position in Eastern Europe, with the loss of suzerainty over the Crimean Khanate constituting the biggest blow and effectively opening the ‘Eastern Question.’¹⁵ Even more importantly, the scale of the defeat in the eastern realms had grave consequences for the Porte’s reputation internally. Throughout the eighteenth century Baki Tezcan, Ariel Salzmann, Bruce McGowan and Karen Barkey have all pointed out that Ottoman society and institutions underwent a tremendous change where the provincial elites were increasingly involved in the empire’s system of governance.¹⁶ This transformation coupled with the losses of 1774 and the subsequent crisis of legitimacy allowed these newly empowered actors came to doubt the Porte’s ability to preserve the social and political order. Therefore by the last quarter of the eighteenth century the Sublime Porte had become increasingly dependent on the cooperation of the local

¹⁶ Baki Tezcan, The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Ariel Salzmann, Tocqueville in the Ottoman Empire: Rival Paths to the Modern State (Boston: Brill, 2004); Bruce McGowan, “The Age of the Ayans,” in An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, edited by Halil İnalcık and Donald Quataert, (Cambridge - New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Barkey, Empire of Difference, passim.
strongmen, such as Osman Pazvantoğlu Pasha and Ali Tepelenla Pasha, to maintain authority while the latter grew less responsive to the bidding of the imperial center.\footnote{Dina Rizk Khoury, “The Ottoman Centre versus Provincial Power-Holders. An Analysis of the Historiography” in \textit{The later Ottoman Empire, 1603-1839}, edited by Suraiya Faroqhi, Cambridge History of Turkey, 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006): 135–156.}

The crisis of legitimacy and coordination came at a critical point, when developments in Europe reshaped the geopolitical context of the Mediterranean. The French Revolution and subsequent continental conflicts that changed balance of power in Europe swept across the Mediterranean, overturned traditional alliances and posed new challenges for the Ottoman authorities, central and provincial alike.\footnote{Eric Hobsbawm, \textit{The Age of Revolution: 1789-1848}, (New York: Vintage, 1996).} The increased presence of British and French navies in the Mediterranean, as well as the emergence of new sea powers (such as the United States and Russia), cut deeply into the economic and political interests of the Porte, which itself was facing a time of reform under Selim III and its relationship with the Maghrebi regencies, and would endure even more change after the Congress of Vienna mandated an abolishment of the \textit{correo} in the early decades of the nineteenth century.\footnote{Daniel Panzac, \textit{The Barbary Corsairs: The End of a Legend, 1800-1820} (Boston: Brill, 2005).}

Napoleon’s landing in Alexandria in 1798 foreshadowed yet another, even more important watershed in the region: the rise of colonial idiom in European policies towards the North Africa. While the emergence of this new form of imperialism occurred in a piecemeal fashion, it was also, as Jennifer Pitts, fueled by the growth of an intellectual climate in favor of permanent occupation of the southern shores of the Mediterranean.\footnote{Jennifer Pitts, \textit{A turn to empire: The rise of imperial liberalism in Britain and France} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).}

Faced with these new challenges, the Ottoman provinces of North Africa were often left to their own devices and became reliant on one another in their sustained
viability. Their distance from Constantinople and slow communication constituted a serious obstacle in the period before space-time compression set in around the world, and while the ties between the regencies and the center remained intact, they were by no means the only ties present. Tripoli, Tunis, and Egypt faced diplomatic and military challenges of a different kind than that of the Ottoman imperial center. With the Porte fighting a losing battle against the Russian Empire in the Balkans and in the Caucasus, the elites of the North African provinces often found themselves on their own in dealing with fast-changing political climate—at least while officials in the center mulled over and implemented their response. Thus, the imperatives of political survival forced local elites to engage with their counterparts in other provinces and beyond, creating the web of grassroots diplomacy.

However, this dimension of North African history has been largely ignored by scholars, who instead focused on binary relations between the center and specific provinces. This is clearly the case in the studies of Egypt, one the most important of Ottoman provinces. While the historiography of Ottoman Egypt has recovered from the nationalist frameworks and recent work has highlighted its provincial ties to the Ottoman Porte and the Greater Syria region and the Hijaz, the connections with its western neighbors remain unexplored.

In regards to the remaining Ottoman Maghreb, the dominate paradigm shifts slightly. The three spaces of Tripoli, Tunis and Algiers have typically been subsumed under an umbrella category of the Barbary Coast, and the examination of the region has highlighted the practices of corso to the neglect of the inland histories. However, despite the trans-provincial classification of ‘Barbary’ a closer examination of the literature has revealed that studies of the western Ottoman Maghreb have ignored the
connections existing among the provinces, and addressed their developments either in isolation or, more recently, discuss their individual connections with imperial centers. Even more importantly, studies addressing the Mediterranean dimension of the Maghrebi existence and the provinces’ ties to the Porte tend to ignore the connections that bound Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli, with their respective hinterlands. As a result, the Maghrebi provinces emerge from the scholarship as narrow strips of land, sandwiched between the sea of water and the sea of sands, with no viable connection between them, with Maghreb being a region in a name only.

One of the most prominent examples of the tendency to underplay regional ties in favor of center-periphery relations can be discerned in Asma Moalla’s study of late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Tunis. While the author focuses on the connection between the Porte and the beys of the province, Tunis’ neighbors to the east and west are sidelined.\(^1\) Similarly, the studies on Ottoman Egypt rarely even mention the existence of Maghrebi provinces, not to mention analyzing their mutual ties.\(^2\) Of course, this does not mean that such a heuristic choice is in any way wrong, as the robust scholarship on Ottoman provinces has shown.\(^3\) However, it comes at a price of underplaying horizontal networks that straddled the administrative boundaries, thus creating an impression of a system imposed from top-down and overwhelmingly dominated by a hub-and-spoke model.

**Historiography: Diplomatic Ties**

The focus on vertical ties stands in a stark contrast to the evidence of many

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\(^3\) Ariel Salzmann, *Tocqueville in the Ottoman Empire: Rival Paths to the Modern State* (Boston: Brill, 2004); Khoury, “The Ottoman Centre versus Provincial Power-Holders,” passim.
sources, both from the Porte and the provinces, which suggest an interconnectedness of the provinces and the operation of grassroots diplomacy on multiple levels. This dynamic was further exacerbated by the development of the field of North African history. While diplomatic relations constituted the main object of study at the inception of modern historiography of the region, colonial context and conceptual limitations precluded the scholars — often without the knowledge of Arabic and Ottoman Turkish — from presenting a holistic picture of these ties. As a result, the analysis of the region’s ties with the world beyond the pale was restricted to the matters of bilateral relations with European powers and the Porte on the government level. The colonial division between French Maghreb and British-controlled Egypt only deepened this divergence and discouraged scholars from addressing the historical ties between the former Ottoman provinces. In turn, as the wave of decolonization swept through the region, the new generation of historians steered away from the themes of diplomacy and political history, shifting the focus towards cultural, economic, and social history.

This interplay between centrality and marginality was also prominent in the case of the Phanariot community, recently revisited by Christine Philiou. Despite the fact that the Greek Orthodox identity of this milieu removed its members from most positions of power, these influential families came to occupy key positions with the Ottoman system of governance, including those of dragomans of the Porte and the voievodes of the Danubian principalities. The Phanariot experience, which grew in scale during the late seventeenth century and continued beyond the Greek revolution of 1821, eludes traditional categorizations of centrality and peripherality. While socially marginal to the Muslim Ottoman elite, the Phanariot families constructed an
intricate nexus of political positions, which straddled between the northern fringes of the empire, the Porte itself, and the Aegean possessions of the sultan.\textsuperscript{24}

The relative abandonment of diplomatic topics in North Africanist scholarship means that the field was largely bypassed by the developments in the field of diplomatic and imperial studies that contributed to the expansion of the notion of diplomacy itself. As scholars have pointed out, the imperial structure of early modern polities blurred the boundary between the spheres of internal and foreign politics that we tend to take for granted.\textsuperscript{25} Thus, it is difficult to even establish, where did the imperial domains end, and precludes a clear differentiation of the spheres of domestic policy and diplomacy.\textsuperscript{26} At the same time, new generation of scholarship has brought to light a plethora of non-state actors, whose actions and political interests were also conducive to the expansion of cross-border and trans-regional political networks. While networks of religious scholars, corsairs, and Bedouins were not diplomatic actors in the strict sense of the world, their role and impact on the wider political landscape cannot be ignored anymore. This makes it incumbent for us to revisit the topics that have been effectively abandoned by mid-twentieth century and re-examine them in the context of new scholarship.

\textbf{Historiography: The North Africanists}

The emergence of such cross-provincial and cross-regional ties went beyond the sphere of diplomacy, but also brought a sense of common interests and identity

\textsuperscript{24} Christine M. Philliou, \textit{Biography of an Empire: Governing Ottomans in an Age of Revolution}, (University of California Press, 2011).
\textsuperscript{25} Naomi Standen, \textit{Unbounded Loyalty: Frontier Crossings in Liao China} (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2007).
throughout the region. This identity was not borne out, or rather – not only out, of religious solidarities or the sense of being subjects of the sultan or common language. Instead, the linchpin of this common identity of North Africa as a region stemmed from the land and the provinces’ peculiar position within the region and the wider net of political, intellectual and social ties that operated in the Mediterranean, imperial and African contexts. Thus, in order to understand the region properly, it is necessary to fix our vantage point in the Maghreb and avoid the center-oriented approach adopted in most studies.

Within the realm of Arabic-language historiography, it is important to keep in mind distinctions between North African approaches to region and western approaches to the region. This is to say, while the nationalist narrative looms large in the histories of the region, so too do the intellectual, anti-colonial, cultural threads that bound the regions of the Maghreb together. For example, in his three monographs on the on the historical relationship between Tripoli and and Egypt, Sāmiḥ Ibrāhīm ‘Abd-al-Fattāḥ delves into the historical outline of the trade relations between the two provinces under Ottoman administration, the relationship between the Karamanlı dynasty and the Mamluks and later Mehmed Ali, as well as the general governorship of the Ottoman Porte in the North African provinces. Throughout the three works, the author, much like Zā‘idi, Muhammad Rajab in his work on the relationship between Tripoli and Egypt during the French invasion, highlights the religious commonalities between the provinces.27

However, it is in this matter of the factors underpinning the social cohesion between the provinces that my work differentiates from the broader body of Arabic literature. This is to say, while common religious identity, and, to a lesser extent, languages are often used to highlight the cohesion between the North African provinces, this work instead adopt the approach proposed by Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet in her work on the importance of land and its representations in the formation of communal ties, be they nationalist or, in this case, regionalist. After all, while the ties between the North African provinces and the Porte were also reflective of a common religious ideology, the fact remains that the ties among the provinces themselves oftentimes superseded confessional ties common to the Ottoman, as well as the Safavid, empires. This approach stands in contrast to a pan-Islamist reading of Maghrebi history, adopted by Imḥammad Sa’īd Ṭawīl in his monograph, Bahriyya al-Ṭarābulusīyyah fī ʿahd Yūsuf Bāshā al-Qaramānlī, published in 2000. At the same time, the interpretive framework also diverges from Tawīl’s nationalist perspective, which often times conflating the matter of complicated matters by also conflating the spaces of Ottoman Tripolitania with the contemporary nation of Libya.

In western scholarship, the work of contemporary North Africanists is quite extensive, and has developed across the field in an overwhelming province-centric approach. For example, in the realm of Tunisian historiography, Montana, Oualdi, Moalla and Kalender’s research on the history of slavery, the political relations of the Tunisian Mamluks, the relationship between the Bardo and the Porte, and the role of households in the history of the Tunisian elite, have all contributed vastly to our understanding of North African history.
understanding of the socio-political and economic conditions of the province. My work builds on this literature by tying in several of the themes that the above-mentioned scholars focus on, and expanding it out into a regional sense. Thus, in this dissertation, I juxtapose Montana’s study on the history of slavery in Tunis with Wright’s analysis of parallel phenomenon in Tripolitania in an effort to contrast the regional trends and put together the printed primary sources that both use in an effort to better contextualize the regional practices of the slave trade and the trans-Saharan caravans.

In many respects, Kola Foyalan’s works stands out in regards to turn-of-the-nineteenth-century Tripoli, as well as in his pioneering insights into the relationship between Tripolitania and Bornu. His research, almost exclusively conducted in the British National Archives, was critical especially for providing a significant survey of Tripolitan political landscape in the period, as well the policies and consequences of its ruler, Yusuf Karamanli. However, while Foyalan’s work is notable for the amount of primary sources used, the research presented here supplements his conclusions by introducing both Ottoman and Arabic language sources into the discussion. In a similar vein, while political science studies by Ahmida and Vandewalle offer important insights into the political life of the province, their research approaches the early nineteenth century from the perspective of subsequent colonialism and

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independence, rather than treating the period on its own terms.33 Within the historiography, Minanwi’s work in The Ottoman Scramble for Africa delved into the historical connections between Tripolitania and the Sahel, specifically the Lake Chad Basin, and the Ottoman Porte’s efforts to expand their control into the region in the second half of the nineteenth century.34 My work expands on his argument by highlighting the historical ties between Tripoli and the Sahel before the 1835 Ottoman reoccupation of the province, and argues that regional forces, as well as Ottoman imperial commutation, were critical for the saliency of the ties between the two spaces throughout the nineteenth century.

In comparison with the Maghreb, Egypt has an extremely prominent role in the Anglophone historiography. The works of Hathaway, Baldwin, Fahmy, Mikhail, Hanna, and Winter, all underscore the connections between the Ottoman Porte and the province, while contributions by Crecilus brought to light the saliency of ties between the Egyptian Mamluks and their homeland in the Caucasus.35 In turn, Cole’s analysis of French mentalités during the 1798 French invasion offered important insight into

the perspective of Napoleon’s soldiers during the occupation. This work builds off this extensive body of literature by looking to tie together the connections not only Egypt and the Porte, but also the province’s place in the broader Mediterranean and Maghrebi worlds. For its diplomatic backbone, this dissertation has turned to the older histories of Douin, Dodwell, and Crabitès, which despite their age, all used the Egyptian sources on Mehmed Ali in their attempts to frame the vali’s engagement with both European imperial powers and the Porte. This dissertation builds off this framework, by incorporating Ottoman sources into the broader narrative, as well as western diplomatic reports that discuss the role of Egypt in broader imperial plans of the French state.

Sources and Approach

The arguments presented in this work constitute the product of extensive research in Ottoman, North African, British, French and American, as well as a handful of translated Russian, published and unpublished, primary sources. By using a broad compendium of sources, I was able to triangulate different perspectives of imperial centers, provincial actors, western diplomats, with those of North African chroniclers, political narratives and traveler accounts. Contrasting these different imperial and regional responses allowed me to approach the same historical events from a variety of standpoints, and gain a more holistic narrative into their political contexts.

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36 Juan Cole, Napoleon’s Egypt: Invading the Middle East (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2007).
For example, by turning to Ottoman, Tunisian and Tripolitan sources concerning the 1798 French occupation of Egypt, this dissertation is able to examine the power play behind negotiating regional logistics and alliances, the imperial competition among the British, the French and the Ottomans, as well as the influence of North African intelligence networks in shaping policies within the far-off imperial centers.

By using American captivity narratives to examine the Tripolitan experience of the First Barbary War, we are able to reincorporate the ramifications of the hostilities on the North African province, and are given insight into how the narrative of a war that is so top heavy from the American perspective, impacted the province of Tripoli. It is through American sources that we learn of the deep impact of the food shortages within the province, the degree of freedom that Americans were accorded in both the household of the bey, and the governmental milieu of his ministers and advisers. At the same time, these same sources provide us with an insight into the level of cooperation between the government of Tripoli and its Egyptian and Tunisian counterparts in the efforts to circumvent the American blockades.

Finally, by juxtaposing western and eastern European sources, and complementing them with the evidence provided by the personal correspondence between Ibrahim, Mehmed Ali Pasha, and the Porte, we are able to analyze the complex nature and political dynamics of the Egyptian governor’s relationship with the imperial center. As I will argue, especially after the Battle of Navarino, the existing tensions between Cairo and Istanbul led to a protracted rupture between Mehmed Ali Pasha and the government of Mahmud II.

These three examples are just a few of the contextualized vantage point that my
research in multiple archives offers the literature. Throughout this dissertation, I attempt to integrate these disparate threads of archival evidence, with particular attention given to the socio-political contexts of the North African provinces, and to weave a more holistic narrative of the Ottoman Maghreb during a time of war and political revolt.

Throughout the study, the objective is to highlight the bilateral axis that I argue mapped out the on the ground political engagement of, among others, emperors, sultans, and valis in the region of the Ottoman Maghreb.

**Chapter Outline**

The first chapter of this dissertation, ‘The Catalyst for Change’ examines the relationship between the North African provinces and the Porte vis-à-vis the maritime reforms of the Grand Admiral, Gazi Hasan Pasha, and how, after the massive losses in the Danube the Porte, attempted to reassert its authority over its remaining provinces. It is also in this section that I introduce the key actors that emerge, and re-emerge, throughout this dissertation, such as the authoritative Kapudan Pasha who introduced the reforms; Yusuf Karamanlı, the young governor of Tripolitania who evicted the corsair Ali Burghol, that had usurped his father’s post, and Hammuda Pasha, the governor of Tunis who ushered in an age of reforms.

In the second chapter, “The French Invasion in Context, 1798-1801 Reexamined,” we look at the North African role in the 1798 French invasion of Egypt. Throughout this section, we see that the dependence of European and Ottoman imperial powers on networks of the North African corsair navies and the supplies and resources of the provinces to manage the day-to-day needs of their invading troops. Lastly, it is in this chapter that we are able, through the records of Egyptian
chroniclers, to examine the role of North African elites, both within the city of Cairo and among the *ulama* within the walls of al-Azhar, in their efforts to better position themselves in regards to their French invaders.

Chapter Three, Corsairs and Caravans, Internal Struggles for Power, 1801-1814, examines the ramifications of the First Barbary War on the province of Tripoli. It is throughout this section that, with the introduction of the new American actors into the imperial struggles, we examine the close ties between the provinces of Tunis, Tripoli and Egypt. In this section, we also explore how North Africa political dynamics played out during the shifting power dynamics within the region: with the rise of Mehmed Ali as the governor of Egypt, and the shift in the attentions of Hammuda Pasha and Yusuf Karamanlı to the interior slave networks of the provinces.

Chapter Four, Transformations on Land and at Sea, builds off our initial exploration of the relationship between the provincial inland and the coastlines by examining how, after the Congress of Vienna and the sharp decline in the corsair campaigns, the governors of Tunis and Tripoli both turned their attentions inland in an effort to recoup their lost revenues. Further, it is in this section that we analyze how the government of Yusuf Pasha proactively looked east to the strategies and polices of Mehmed Ali in an attempt to both undermine the political ambitions of his rivals as well as to expand his reach and influence southwards in to the broader Sahel.

Chapter Five, ‘Mehmed Ali’s Egypt and the New Face of Old Empires: 1824-1829,’ provides an analysis of the impact that Egyptian *vali’s* desire to build a navy and expand his imperial reach to Crete and More had on the political dynamics of Ottoman North Africa following the end of the age of *corso*, and the decline in Algiers’ sway over the region. Moving on, we also re-examine the extent to which the last year of
Morean campaign influenced the relationship between the governor of Egypt and the officials of the High Porte. This chapter argues that in contrast to the dominant narrative in the historiography, Ibrahim Pasha did not leave the peninsula until nearly a year after the disastrous debacle of Navarino. Even then, the Egyptian commander abandoned his post only after the rations and repeated mutinies forced his hand to give up on his plans to take control of the peninsula.

Finally, in the epilogue and the afterward of this dissertation, we see how, Mehmed Ali looked, with the encouragement of the French government of Charles X, to fill the power vacuum left by a weakened Algiers. By the late 1820s, on the eve of the vali’s invasion of Syria, both British and French diplomats courted the governor, perceiving him as a crucial ally in the region. At the same time, during the succession crisis in Tripoli following the deposition of Yusuf Pasha in 1832, both European capitals looked to influence the contenders for the succession.

The themes of regionalism and regional networks binding together the three North African provinces run like a red thread throughout the course of the study. At the same time, they provide a point for departure for explaining the region’s connections with the wider world, be it the Porte, European neighbors to the north, as well as the southern expanses of the Sahel, providing a framework for the analysis of the Ottoman Maghreb as part of the turn-of-the-nineteenth-century world history.

**Imperial Models, Reimagined**

Different historians have approached the provinces of North Africa and its connections with the broader region, differently. In regards to the implementation of imperial models, the idea of mechanics still rules supreme. Whether it is Barkey’s hub-and-spoke, Mikhail’s argument for multiple centers within the Ottoman realms,
Philliou’s work on Phanariot minority communities and their increased integration and authority or the realms of the empire or Deringil’s analysis of Ottoman legitimacy vis-à-vis the empire’s Islamic, dynastic, and Istanbul-centered nature, the notion of the overwhelming draw of an imperial center still reigns supreme.\(^{38}\) A counterbalance to this focus on a core locus is Kashani-Sabet’s work on the frontiers of Qajar Iran and the importance of land in the definition the creation of identity.\(^{39}\)

The theme that ties all of these models together, however, is the notion of adaptability. While the approach to empires has always emphasized the malleable, and ever-changing nature of the governance and administration, our models have often turned to the world of abstract systems. Rather, this dissertation argues that we need to find inspiration in a different type of model. In fact, the very notion of imperial adaptability implies a life force that possesses its own mechanisms of defense and resilience. Therefore, rather than turn to the abstract nature of mechanics, this work argues that we could look to the environmental models on which so many different modalities of life are sustained.

Nature loves patterns. Whether looking at the basic framework of a tree, an acorn, a shell or even our own circulatory systems, there is an inherent cohesiveness and repetition in the patterns that are created, and recreated, over time. Whether it be the roots of a tree that spread as far as its plot will allow it or the capillaries with that connect various systems of the human body together, the patterns, while inherently simple on their own, are ever repeating and will reach as far as the space they are given allows. Therefore, perhaps as an alternative to the mechanical conceptualization

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of empires we can draw our patterns from nature and from fractals in our understanding of imperial models.

A fractal, by definition is a never-ending pattern, a small design and simple design, be it in the shape of an ‘o’ ‘y’ or ‘x’ that, through a consistent feedback loop, creates an ever-evolving network of forms on different scales and in different directions. It is through this simple design that nature functions, be it in the shape of a leaf or the formation of glaciers. Through its simplicity it becomes affordable, easy to create and maintain the system, and also enables the structure with the resiliency to withstand external or internal attacks. While it is beyond the scope of this introduction to expand in great lengths on the mathematical or indeed environmental nature of fractals, this dissertation humbly posits that these same regularities can be seen in both the administration of provinces as well as the intimate operation of households within the Ottoman realm.

After all, every periphery created a surrounding periphery of its own, and the overall connection of systems of administration and interconnectedness, worked, very much in paralleling patterns. While hub-and-spoke models tend to emphasize the top-down control of the center over the periphery, it goes without saying that the Sublime Porte was unable to maintain direct communication, not to say control, over peripheral actors of the vast empire extending all the way from the western limits of Algiers to the Persian Gulf in the east. Centralized rule over a plethora of political actors throughout such vast expanses is a difficult task even today, but it was a near possibility in the context of early modern world, before time-space compression set in.40 This challenge of governance haunted all premodern empires, despite the

center’s ideological and bureaucratic claims otherwise. The Ottomans were not exception to this rule, and while the Porte strived to show commitment to its role in managing state affairs and dispense justice, the effective reach of its authority depended on the cooperation of local elites.

As a result, imperial governance took the form of a web of networks, reminiscent of the fractal models, or of a central-place theory developed by Walter Christaller in the field of human geography. The circulation of resources, information and authority, took place along well-trodden corridors expanding from the center to the secondary hubs in the periphery; in turn, the latter mediated the communication with their own peripheries, following the models – albeit modified – set out by the imperial center. This is not to mean that these peripheral hubs acted as simple relay stations for the communication between the center and the periphery. Instead, their brokerage position allowed them to take advantage of the existing system for their own purposes, as well as construct their own political networks independent from the imperial authorities. From the Porte’s perspective, this structure of power was a double-edged sword: on the one hand, cooperation of peripheral actors was crucial for effective control of the ‘well-protected domains;’ on the other hand, it provided the periphery with resources that could be deployed to challenge the center’s authority.

Thus, the conceptualization of the imperial system of governance in terms of fractal-like structure provides us with more opportunities than a simple ‘hub-and-spoke’ model. Unlike the latter, which overemphasizes the agency of the center, which effectively imposes its will on the periphery, the metaphor of fractals allows us to examine the operation of imperial politics on multiple levels at the same time, thus avoiding the pitfall of ‘seeing like the state,’\textsuperscript{44} without losing track of the inherent interconnectedness between them. This framework allows us to explain the intricate web of connections that bound together both the Ottoman center to its periphery, North African provinces to each other, as well as different political and social actors within the bounds of particular provinces.

Conclusion

With this methodological framework in mind, the analysis that follows addresses the history of North African provinces during the turn of the nineteenth century as a fertile testing ground for a development of said model of imperial governance. In the pages that follow, this research strives to integrate different scales of analysis in order to include political actors operating on different levels, from Bedouin tribes to Ottoman viziers and European diplomats, all of whom had various goals and agendas, but, despite their obvious differences, they belonged to the interlocked web of networks and circuits that spanned throughout the region and beyond.

By attempting to integrate these connected histories, this dissertation sets out to provide a holistic depiction of the region’s political landscape at the moment of transition. As a result, the study straddles across traditional divides established in

historiography, bringing together different threads of scholarship and archival evidence. In order to do this, the vantage point is fixed on the North African provinces, thus, heuristically transforming the imperial periphery into the center of the narrative, in which different circuits of power and politics came together, creating an intricate web that spanned from ministerial cabinets of Paris, London and Istanbul to the Sahel towns of Kano and Ghadames. At the same time, by extending my analysis across early modern/modern divide, this research examines the continuities and watersheds in the history of the region at the critical juncture in time, when traditional imperial structure of the Ottoman Empire came to be increasingly replaced by the new colonial idiom.
CHAPTER ONE
THE CATALYST FOR CHANGE, 1774-1797

At the turn of the nineteenth century, Mediterranean waters were strewn with the oars of commercial vessels, the slow heave of imperial fleets, and the rapid glide of corsair cruisers. Heavily laden with the artifacts of empires, the sea’s waves carried on them the broader interests of emperors and sultans, the ambitious machinations of generals, and later, those of up-and-coming valis.

This opening chapter examines the historical relationship between the Ottoman center and the North African territories in the last decades of the eighteenth century. Beginning in 1774 allows us to examine the catalysts for reforms that began before Selim III’s assumption the sultanate in 1789, and in doing so, step away from the historiographical trope of the young sultan as the unique reformist of the age. Moreover, it provides us with an opportunity to investigate the socio-political behaviors and status quo of governance in the North African provinces during the decades prior to the equally debated 1798 French invasion of Egypt. Lastly, opening this study in 1774 questions the dominance of the early-modern/modern divide that reigns supreme in western historical scholarship.

At heart, this dissertation is a North African history. But it purposefully opens with a brief introduction of Catherine’s First and Second Turkish wars: the Russo-Ottoman wars of 1768-74 and 1787-1792, two conflicts that dominated Sublime Porte’s attentions and engulfed the lion’s share of Constantinople’s resources during the last decades of the eighteenth century.45 By then, the Ottoman Empire was fully embroiled in these two increasingly costly struggles with first her Russian, and then her Austrian, rivals. As the battles dragged on, the campaigns became increasingly

45 Aksan, Ottoman Wars, 1700-1870, Chapter 4.
burdensome, first financially and militarily, and later territorially and geopolitically for the Ottoman state. The Porte’s losses of the age were extensive and included the loss of the Crimea, first to independence, and then to Catherine II. This was a great blow to both the socio-political welfare and the general confidence of the empire, the ramifications of which catalyzed administrative as well as naval reforms within the Sublime Porte. Indeed, Ottomanists have argued that it shook the very workings of the High Porte, and the sultan’s imperial divan.

This background is critical for several reasons. First, one can trace changes in the interaction between the Sublime Porte and the North African provinces back to the second half of the eighteenth-century and the naval reforms of Abdul Hamid I. Secondly, the events of the mid-to-late eighteenth century are critical for understanding the transformation of the nineteenth-century North African world in part due to the emergence of a central figure: Kapudan i-Derya, Gazi Hasan Pasha. The Ottoman Grand Admiral, whose policies and directives would become extremely important in shaping the Porte’s relationship with North Africa to the point where his presence could still be felt in Ottoman strategies long after his 1790 death.

Moreover, the impact of the two wars with Russia on the internal functioning of the Sublime Porte and its diplomatic relations with the North African territories was quite extensive. While Selim III has been widely credited as the reformist sultan, one can actually trace the extensive naval modernization efforts to his predecessor Abdul Hamid I, who through the directives of Gazi Hasan transformed the face of the Ottoman maritime world after 1770.

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46 It is widely accepted within the Ottoman historiography that a large part of Selim III’s catalyst for reform came from the losses to the Russians. For further information see: Shaw, *Between Old and New*; introduction, Yildiz, “The ‘Louis XVI of the Turks’” passim; Philliou, *Biography of an Empire*; 19-30, and Aksan, *Ottoman Wars, 1700-1870*, Chapter 5.
The naval reforms, which were largely instigated by the massive losses at Çeşme, directly impacted the Porte’s relationship with the corsair navies of the North African provinces. This, in turn, influenced how Constantinople regarded its North African spaces overall. During this critical moment, we witness an evolution in the Porte’s diplomatic exchanges with the North African territories of Egypt, Tripoli and Tunis. The Grand Admiral played an important role in these transformations. As he spent the formative early years of his military and administrative career in Algiers, Gazi Hasan was quite familiar with the corso and the role it played in the North African provinces. Correspondingly, we also see how the Ottoman Maghreb looked to recalibrate their relationships with one another and with the Porte during this time of extensive overhaul. After all, political transformations were taking place in the Porte as well as in the provinces of Egypt, Tripoli and Tunis, which themselves in a state of political upheaval.

Finally, looking at North Africa during the mid-to-late eighteenth century pulls the historiography of the eighteenth century Ottoman Porte southward. There is no question that a great deal of attention has been given to the impact of these two wars on the structure and functioning of the Ottoman Empire. However, the broader narrative and the consequences of Constantinople’s rivalries with its European rivals have not been examined in the context of the Mediterranean or the Porte’s western imperial domains. This is a critical omission in our historical understanding, since access to the Mediterranean Sea and to the region’s trade routes was long considered as a coveted prize for the various imperial centers—St. Petersburg included.

**Background**

In what are known in Russian circles as Catherine’s First and Second Turkish
wars,\textsuperscript{47} the Russo-Ottoman wars of 1768-74 and 1787-1792 engulfed the lion’s share of the Constantinople’s resources. By the late eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was fully embroiled in two progressively costly struggles with first its Russian, and then, its Austrian rivals. Eventually, the campaigns became increasingly burdensome, first financially and militarily, and later territorially and geopolitically for the Ottoman state. In fact, the ramifications of these two wars would go so far as to catalyze administrative reforms within the Sublime Porte. The loss of the Crimea to Catherine II of Russia was a great blow to both the socio-political welfare and the general confidence of the empire. It shook the inner-world of the High Porte and the loss of this geopolitically key peninsula was felt across the breath of the sultan’s ‘well protected domains.’

Hostilities concentrated along the Porte’s northern Danube borderlands and reignited the old conflict between St. Petersburg and Constantinople for control of the territory. The resulting Ottoman losses proved extremely costly for the Sublime Porte and transformed the topography of the empire’s holdings in southeastern Europe and the Black Sea region. Meanwhile, the Russian Empress had finally obtained access to warm water ports and grew more ambitious in her expansion efforts. Compounding the Porte’s troubles, Russian victories in the Danube region incited cries for independence across the broader Balkans.

The Russian Empire’s victory in the Russo-Ottoman war of 1768 was a hard-won one. Virginia Aksan has argued that the bravery of Ottoman frontline infantrymen was well chronicled in both Ottoman and even Russian accounts of the battles.\textsuperscript{48} Narratives abounded in the historical record about how in the Ottoman

\textsuperscript{47} Aksan, \textit{Ottoman Wars, 1700-1870}, Chapter 4.
\textsuperscript{48} ibid.
battalions’ efforts to defend the northern frontier, it became rather common for the sultan’s soldiers to fight to the last man standing. However, despite these noteworthy efforts, the naval losses of the 1770 Battle of Çeşme, which took Constantinople by surprise and eviscerated the sultan’s fleet, where further compounded by the 1774 Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, which granted the Crimean Khanate its independence, set the stage for the unraveling of the Porte’s political hegemony along its northern frontier. In fact, the events of these short years realized the empresses’ ambition for unhindered access to the Black Sea, and by extension Mediterranean trade routes.

Officially the terms of Küçük Kaynarca only required that Sultan Abdul Hamid I release the long-held vassal Tatar Khanate of the Crimea, which was accorded its independence. The realpolitik in the Crimea however, was quite different. Facts on the ground were such that Catherine’s influence over the territories and specifically over the Tatar Khan, Şahin Giray, set the foundation for the Russian annexation of the peninsula and surrounding lands in 1783. This allowed further Russian and Austrian expansion into Ottoman domains; so much so, that Austro-Russian military presence in Moldavia and Wallachia became increasingly run-of-the-mill by the mid-1780s.

By the outbreak of the subsequent Russo-Ottoman war of 1787, the pendulum of power swung strongly in Russia’s favor. Further advancing St. Petersburg’s growing influence in the Danube region was Catherine’s secret alliance with the Holy Roman Emperor, Joseph II, which made Austria St. Petersburg’s unwilling ally and

49 Aksan, *Ottoman Wars, 1700-1870*, Chapter 4.
51 Aksan, *Ottoman Wars, 1700-1870*, Chapter 4.
coopted the Habsburg Empire into the second war. Having lost the last of the Ottoman garrisons in Crimea in 1788 and the last protected domains of Braila in modern-day Romania,\(^{52}\) Constantinople’s prospects for maintaining control along its northern frontier continued to dwindle throughout the end of the decade. This narrative is well known by both Ottomanist and Europeanist scholars. However, this dissertation argues that the Danube was but only one front in the Porte’s ongoing struggles against Russia.

Inside the walls of the High Porte, tensions grew about how to respond to the looming threat of the empire’s territorial integrity. The loss of Crimea was a massive blow, undoubtedly—and the loss of the sultan’s navy made Russian victories all the more bitter for the imperial divan. Looking at the inner workings of the Porte’s high-ranking offices in the mid-1780s one can see a great deal of discord regarding how to best address Constantinople’s growing Russian problem. While the several of Abdul Hamid I’s advisers became increasingly hawkish in their outspoken support for another war with the Russia Empire, one notable figure stands out for his cautious stance against further hostilities with St. Petersburg: the well-respected Grand Admiral, Gazi Hasan Pasha.\(^{53}\) Fearing further losses in the Black Sea and in the Balkans, the admiral and was cautious to not feed into the rhetoric of war that had engulfed the majority of the sultan’s advisors and remained the strongest voice for diplomatic pragmatism throughout the mid-to-late decade.\(^{54}\)

Empress Catherine and the Holy Roman Emperor Joseph II further flamed the embers of war by staging a triumphant tour through the former Crimean Khanate in

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\(^{52}\) ibid.

\(^{53}\) Shaw, *Between Old and New*, 25.

\(^{54}\) ibid.
1787. This exhibit of political supremacy was seen as a humiliating blow is Constantinople. As the Russian empress increasingly thumbed her nose at Constantinople’s bitter losses and celebrated the soon to be established warm water ports of Sevastopol and Kherson, the sultan’s inner circle became even adamantly more hawkish in their rhetoric. Diplomatic wrangling grew progressively terse as their calls for war became overtly belligerent and grew even louder still in 1787 after Abdul Hamid I deployed Gazi Hasan Pasha to Egypt to thwart the Mamluk uprising. With the calming pragmatism of the admiral deployed to Cairo, the Ottoman Porte was ready to declare war on their Russian imperial rival by the summer.\textsuperscript{55}

The second of Catherine’s wars, the Russo-Ottoman war of 1787 began when an Ottoman naval detachment fired on Russian frigates off Ochakov in the Black Sea during their assault on Kilburun. Gazi Hasan immediately withdrew from Egypt to prepare himself and his men for the ongoing war effort. While the admiral was equipping the weakened remains of the sultan’s navy, the Porte immediately turned to its other resources in an effort to curtail the maritime losses of this new war with Russia. For North Africa, this meant the conscription of the provinces’ corsair navies and manpower. Tunis and Tripoli had previously been advised by the Grand Admiral’s maritime networks against attacking or commandeering Russian merchant ships in the Mediterranean. Gazi Hasan had been keen to curtail corsair attacks on Russian vessels in the tense years leading up to war. However, this was about to change.

**The Georgian from Algiers**

Cezayrli Gazi Hasan Pasha was a complex figure. A central member of Abdul

\textsuperscript{55} ibid.
Hamid I’s imperial council and a close confidant of the sultan, Gazi Hasan had nearly thirty-years’ involvement in Ottoman affairs. A well-known figure across the vast swaths of the sultan’s domains and his notables, the records of the admiral’s movements and policies can be traced across Ottoman, Levantine, North African, Russian, French, English, and Georgian archives in countless sources, as well as in many more languages. Even the admiral’s epithet al-Cezayrili, or the Algerian, reflected both the vastness of his travels and reach. After all, it spoke not of his native home of Georgia or his adopted city of Rodosto, the place of his youth and manumission, but rather the westernmost province where he cut his teeth in the Ottoman maritime world—Algiers.56

Records offer little insight into Hasan’s early years in Georgia, the details of his sale into slavery, through the deşirme child-levy, and his travel from the Caucasus to Rodosto. Historians working with Russian archival sources however have gleaned that he was born near the eastern Georgian town of Dusheti and that he was “a Georgianized Armenian with an excellent command of Georgian.”57 After arriving in Rodosto, the modern-day Turkish city of Tekirdağ that sits just northwest of Constantinople on the Sea of Marmara, Hasan was sold to a well-known Mevlavi merchant named Haci Osman Ağa, and his youth was recorded, at least in Turkish-language sources, as a relatively pleasant one. Known as plucky boy with a daredevil streak, Hasan was raised among the merchant’s family. The young boy developed a reputation for stubbornness, courage, and bossing around other children. Haci Osman, his owner, grew quite fond of the young boy and on several times forbade his wife

57 ibid.
from selling Hasan, claiming that the boy was “like a son” to him. Despite these claims within the Turkophone historiography, one could argue that the claims of familial affection were likely exaggerated. After all, the lady-of-the-house had clearly demonstrated she was more than willing to sell off the young slave.

When he turned seventeen the young man joined the janissary corps, where he fought in the Austro-Russian-Ottoman war of 1735 and where he proved his valor in the siege of Belgrade in 1738. Having established a name for himself as a brave ocak in the service of Mahmud I, Hasan secured connections through a maternal uncle, presumably in Georgia, to travel to the western-most Ottoman province of Algiers where he was received by the dey of the province. The young man chose to stay on in Algiers and eventually, became an important member of the governor’s inner-circle and was eventually appointed as bey of the western Algerian province of Tlemcen, an important coastal region with a rich maritime tradition.

Hasan grew increasingly knowledgeable about the rugged coastlines of the region and about the maritime practices and of the North African corso, as he became increasingly entrenched in maritime life of Algiers as well as the political practices of notables of the Maghreb. His time in Algiers would set the foundation for Hasan’s later work in the Ottoman admiralty. Moreover, it was a key moment in Hasan’s political life since he was simultaneously forging both critical alliances and rivalries with notable figures across the Maghreb and with the ruling family of Tripoli and the

59 ibid.
60 ibid.
province’s bey, Ali Karamanlı and these influential years would later influence his decisions as Grand Admiral.

Hasan remained in Algiers until a disagreement with the dey of the province forced him to flee and seek refuge elsewhere.63 Little is recorded about the quarrel, however it was likely political in nature as Hasan was forced to flee “the machinations of the pasha of Algiers.”64

He escaped via Oran to Spain. There, he was received kindly by Charles IV, and was eventually recommended to the king of Naples, and the latter’s emissary in Constantinople. It was this connection that opened the path for Hasan’s return to the Ottoman imperial center.65

After returning to Constantinople, Hasan enlisted in the Ottoman navy and became a galleon captain in 1760.66 He worked his way up the naval ranks exceedingly quickly. Within ten years, Hasan became Kapudan Pasha of the Ottoman fleet under Mustafa III and was honored with the title of gazi after his performance in the Battle of Çeşме.67 The circumstances surrounding the Battle of Çeşme and the defeat of the Ottoman fleet in westernmost Anatolia was caused by a tactical mistake on the part of Hasan’s predecessor, the Grand Admiral Mandalzade Hüsameddin Pasha. Mandalzade Hüsameddin decided to dock the fleet anchor side, a decision that allowed a small Russian squadron from the Baltic to advance before the attack with fire ships and incinerate the Ottoman flotilla.68 Hasan had fought bitterly with the

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63 ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 ibid.
66 ibid.
67 ibid.
admiral about this decision; Mandalzade Hüsameddin was adamant in his chosen tactic.

Afterwards, Sultan Mustafa III dismissed Mandalzade Hüsameddin and appointed Hasan as his new Grand Admiral of the Ottoman Admiralty. Hasan not only had vehemently opposed Mandalzade Hüsameddin’s tactical decision, proving his skill in naval formations during the battle, but his personal actions had won him the prestige of a war hero. After the ship under Hasan’s command caught fire—Hasan proceeded to rescue his men, and from there swam to safety back near the Dardenelles and “embarked on a daring manoeuvre,”\textsuperscript{69} that ultimately resulted in the recapture of Lemnos from Russian forces.\textsuperscript{70} It was this demonstration of bravery that earned him his \textit{gazi} title, an honorific that was even coveted by various sultans of the Sublime Porte.

Abdul Hamid I succeeded his elder brother Mustafa III in 1774. The new sultan took Gazi Hasan as a close confidant. Under his advice and suggestion, Abdul Hamid introduced several naval reforms led by the Grand Admiral. The backbone of these reforms called for the remodeling of the navy along western lines. The Kapudan Pasha looked to French shipbuilders, such as LeRoy and Durest to provide instruction on the construction of new sailing ships. The new Ottoman fleet was intended to match those of their European counterparts. Most importantly, these reforms included the replacement of traditional oared fleet that comprised most of the contemporary Ottoman vessels.\textsuperscript{71} As the Porte increasingly looked to its European rivals as the standard by which to improve both the fleet and the technical training for the new

\textsuperscript{70} ibid.
\textsuperscript{71} Shaw, Between Old and New; also see Zorlu, Innovation and Empire in Turkey., passim.
naval recruits and more established officers. 72 Baron de Tott, an Englishman and a convert to Islam in the court of the Sultan, alongside a Frenchman named Karmoran were tasked to establish a new mathematics school for naval officers in 1773. 73 Three years later, in 1776 Gazi Hasan himself established an engineering school for cadets in the imperial shipyard on the Golden Horn, and became the school’s first instructor. 74

Despite his impressive rise in power, Hasan never forgot his Caucasian origins or his early life in the Maghreb. In fact, his formative years had a long lasting effect in shaping his decisions as Kapudan Pasha. His Caucasian heritage and his connections with the North African maritime world of the corsairs would later become important considerations in his tactical decision making. His role in the region would go a long way shape Constantinople’s relations with both Egypt and Tripoli during his nearly twenty-year tenure as Grand Admiral of the Ottoman navy. By the mid-1770s Gazi Hasan looked to tighten the Porte’s reign on its naval officers as the admiralty looked to build a corps of salaried, experienced sailors. It is here that we see the first signs of Hasan’s ongoing apprehensions about the role of the corso in the Ottoman navy. Throughout the substantial collection Ottoman records on the naval reforms, there was no mention of any consultation with the various North African provinces or about any efforts to include the corsairs in the massive naval overhauls.

This is an interesting omission and is surprising on several levels. First, the Ottoman admiralty had typically turned to the corso for suggestions and advice

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72 Shaw, 153.  
74 Shaw, Between Old and New, 154.
regarding the sultan’s fleet. Long considered ocaks, or the equivalent of janissary infantrymen, corsairs were historically important figures in the Ottoman maritime world. As such, they maintained a certain cachet among Ottoman forces. Making their exclusion in the naval reforms even more striking was that Hasan himself had spent years in Algiers and was quite familiar with the North African maritime world. Further still, the snub was rather pronounced as it was historically customary for the Porte to turn to North African regarding maritime advice. North African corsairs oversaw the creation of the first imperial shipyards on the Golden Horn, and originally launched the Ottoman fleet—symbolically at least, the corsairs were the sultan’s gazi warriors against European Christendom at sea.

This omission was not merely than symbolic in nature. Rather, it can be interpreted as intentional omission on the part of the Grand Admiral within his broader set of reforms. Particularly since sailing ships— the model that Hasan was eager to introduce into his new fleet— had long been the favored vessels of the corso navies. While his reform marked an important tactical shift from the traditional oared vessels of the sultan’s navy and therefore required the extensive retraining for the vast majority of Ottoman mariners, handling the vessel had been old-hat for the fleets of the Maghreb. This was particularly true in regards to the shallop, a gun ship, which the corsairs had routinely used in the eighteenth century but had only been incorporated into the Russian and Ottoman fleets during the war of 1787. The compounded nature of corsair expertise, historical precedent, and the admiral’s own familiarity with the North African maritime world just made the silence even more

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75 ibid.
Before moving on, it is important to consider the term *corsair*, or sometimes *ocak*, that are frequently used throughout this text. For our work here, a corsair was the operator of an armed ship, owned by either an Ottoman governor or province, holding a state-sponsored commission or sanctioned the capture of any enemy merchant or shipping vessel, especially in the time of war or state-sponsored aggression. This classification entitled mariners to protection under Ottoman, as well as broader Mediterranean, imperial and maritime practices and distinguished them from the practice of illegal sea-robbery, or the classification of ‘pirates.’ In effect, Ottoman corsairs were privateers: authorized agents of the Ottoman state. Thus, making the Porte and Gazi Hasan’s exclusion of the fleets in the broader modernization efforts even more remarkable. Their overall omission from the reforms it was likely prompted by several factors.

First, Gazi Hasan’s difficult political relationship with the North African provinces could have played a role in the corsos’ exclusion. The Kapudan Pasha’s animosity towards Tripoli, and specifically the Karamanlı ruler, was well known in the diplomatic circles of the time. In 1786, the admiral went so far as to obtain a *firman* from Abdul Hamid I to oust the Tripolitan bey from power. However, the outbreak of rebellion among Mamluk grandees, under Murad and Ibrahim Bey in Egypt, effectively postponed the admiral’s attempts to remove Ali Karamanlı. Nevertheless, Hasan was undeterred. The admiral subsequently supported a

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77 ibid., 47.
78 Miss Tully, *Narrative of a ten years’ residence at Tripoli in Africa*, *Narrative of a ten years’ residence at Tripoli in Africa; from the original correspondence in the family of the late Richard Tully, Esq., the British consul. Comprising authentic memoirs and anecdotes of the reigning bashaw, his family, and other persons of distinction; also, an account of the domestic manners of the Moors, Arabs, and Turks*, (London: H. Colburn, 1817), 246.
Karamanlı rival, then still young Georgian corsair named Ali Burghol, in his efforts to annex the regency and expel the aged Karamanlı bey.

Further complicating matters between the Kapudan Pasha and North Africa governors could have been Gazi Hasan’s previous expulsion from Algiers. It seems unlikely that Gazi Hasan would turn to the dey of Algiers for guidance after the former’s abrupt exile from the regency in the 1760s. Gazi Hasan’s opinions of the Husaynid rule in Tunis are not recorded in the Ottoman historical chronicles. However, the rapprochement of his successor Küçük Hüseyin Pasha and the Tunisian delegation of 1795 implied that Gazi Hasan’s snub of the corso in the maritime reforms was at least intentional on the part of the Admiral.

Despite the overwhelming historical clues that point to an intentional exclusion of the corso governors, Gazi Hasan was nevertheless a political pragmatist. After all, Gazi Hasan was the only rationalist amongst the warmongering council of Abdul Hamid I in 1787 and had long favored a more tempered approach regarding of the ongoing hostilities with St. Petersburg. Even after the loss of Crimea, Hasan stood unique in his opposition to the impassioned cries for war. Therefore, if he was able to maintain such relative objectivity in regards to the Porte’s central imperial adversary—Russia then it seems unlikely that his distaste for the Tripolitan bey, Ali Karamanlı would have greatly influenced his strategies in the building of his new navy or that he would have allowed his personally complicated past in Algiers to interfere in the broader maritime reforms.

Nevertheless, the historical silence regarding the role of the corsairs in naval reforms of the 1780s remains striking. Other explanations could be rooted in the relative autonomy that the North African territories operated under in the years before
Çeşme. Gazi Hasan was one of Sultan Abdul Hamid I’s strongest supporters, and often served as the sultan’s enforcer of official policy. The Kapudan Pasha was routinely deployed in the name of the Porte to quell rebellions and turmoil in the provinces—much like his previously discussed 1787 trip to Egypt to thwart Mamluk uprisings. While, he was personally considered a stern man, and who did not tolerate either indecision or indiscipline kindly, Hasan was recorded as being remarkably and equally just both among his own men and the people of various provinces.\(^79\)

Al-Jabarti wrote of his arrival in Egypt, “cannons were fired to mark his arrival. The people were happy and full of joy and took him for the Mahdi of the age.”\(^80\) Al-Jabarti continued that Gazi Hasan was willing to quickly execute looters, regardless if they were Egyptian or his own men, if they participated in the pillaging of private homes or in other misconducts. In fact, al-Jabarti’s treatment of Gazi Hasan portrayed the captain as a severe but appreciated official and above all, a fair man. The chronicler went so far as to say “[i]f Hasan Pasha had died while still in Alexandria or Rosetta the people of the province would have died of grief and erected over his tomb a shine with a dome and enclosure as a place of pilgrimage.”\(^81\)

While Al-Jabarti’s description of Gazi Hasan is generous when compared to those of other figures, Mehmed Ali especially, the chronicler made clear that the Kapudan Pasha was not a man to suffer insurrection or disorder gladly. This characteristic, coupled with the Porte’s territorial losses would likely have put pressure on the sultan’s council to curtail in the independence of its other provinces, Balkan and North African alike. Therefore, the growing tensions in the High Porte

\(^80\) ibid.
\(^81\) ibid, Vol. 2, 241.
coupled with admiral’s likely aversion to the Maghreb’s relative freedoms, as well as the relative disorder of the North African provinces in the 1780s that underscored the admiral’s reluctance to include the corso in his broader maritime reforms—for fear of further dissent within the empire. Lastly, Al-Jabarti’s description of Gazi Hasan was very different from the one we will see in Tripolitan or other North African records discussed below.

The turn towards European shipbuilders and engineers in the maritime reforms of Abdul Hamid I were not singularly motivated by the high politics of the Porte or the decision making of the Grand Admiral. Rather, it was symptomatic of the gradual shift in the Ottoman Porte’s attentions and efforts to emulate their European imperial rivals. This trend towards westernization gained support in the mid-to-late eighteenth century, when sultans began to look west in an effort to ‘modernize’ their militaries. While this trend first began to crystalize in the naval reforms of Abdul Hamid I, it was later pushed much further by his successor Selim III and then again by Mahmud II in the Tanzimat reforms of the nineteenth century. However, this turn towards Europe was also a turn away from the traditional naval practices of the corso. This shift in the Ottoman Porte’s attitude about the Maghrebi ocaklar was quite evident in the records of the Ottoman state.

**Eastern Wars in Western Waters**

The decision to go to war with Russia in 1787 was a complicated one for the officials of the Sublime Porte. Gazi Hasan was extremely reticent to provoke Russia into war, for fear of additional losses after Çeşme and was doing everything in his power to limit the further heightening of tensions between the two powers. The Admiral’s cautious stance was well recorded in Ottoman documents. A close analysis
of the Ottoman Porte’s records within the Prime Ministerial Ottoman Archives of Istanbul indicated that, in fact, the only records regarding *corsa* activity from the period of 1781-1787 were dispatches reporting a *restraint* on the part of the North African provinces in regards to Austrian and Russian commercial vessels they encountered.\(^8^2\) This finding is supported by a naval dispatch, from the summer of 1787, immediately before the outbreak of war. The folio contained two signed pledges from the governors of Tunis and Tripoli and an update of their navies’ recent interactions with Russian trade ships in the Mediterranean.

The governors claimed that the provinces had abided with the Porte’s previous orders that *forbade* their fleets from attacking or commandeering any Russian trade ships. The governors wrote “up to now, our captains who ply the seas as corsairs on our behalf have not harassed or inconvenienced Russian ships and their captains when these have been encountered, nor have they attacked or seized any of their gear or equipment.”\(^8^3\) The timing of these documents is of particular interest: August 24, 1787. The Ottomans declared war on the Russians before the end of month. It seems the Admiral was doing everything in his power to prevent the outbreak of another war.

These assurances in the lead up to war highlighted the intricacy of the relationship between the Porte and the provinces and offer important insights into the nature of bonds between the two actors. By reading these pledges within the entire body of Ottoman *corsa* records from 1780s, one can see that a very interesting phenomenon was taking place. The documents, both written in the hand of the emissary Mehmed Ağa, provided the reader with various insights into how Porte

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\(^8^2\) C. HR Dosya No: 136 Gömlek No: 6778.
\(^8^3\) C. BH Dosya No: 214 Gömlek: 9965.
thought about its North African territories. First, we see that Constantinople immediately drew on all of various military and naval strengths, across the broad stretch of the empire, both east and west in an effort to first prevent a war, and then later to facilitate it.

By contrast, in a document from the very next month, from September we learn that corsair fleets were actively engaged in coordinated attacks against Russian and Austrian merchant ships off the waters of Trieste and Livorno. This second report depicted a synchronized attack by the three North African corsair provinces—Tripoli, Tunis and Algiers—against Russian and Austrian ships. This radical shift in position not only demonstrates the governors’ eagerness to comply with the Porte’s wishes and increase their own revenues at sea but also highlights the extent of the cooperation between the Maghreb and the Porte. The resurgence of “the old warring ways” in the Mediterranean were fully revived by the autumn of 1787.

It is quite telling that these two provinces, geographically central between the much larger territories Egypt and Algiers North Africa, and often overlooked in the historiography of the mid-to-late eighteenth century Ottoman Porte, were among the first to be drafted into the war effort in the east. The broader body of naval records from the period noted that if any chance meeting between the corsair fleets and Russian merchant ships in Mediterranean waters took place that the Russian ships could be attacked and that the cargo to be given to the captain and crew of the corsair ships. While the documents are worded such that if by chance their corsairs came across these ships, the underlying message was the Porte very much encouraged

84 ibid.
85 HAT Dosya No: 00022 Gömlek: 01030.
86 ibid.
87 C. BH Dosya No: 214 Gömlek: 9965.
wanted to limit Russian maritime expansion as much as possible.\textsuperscript{88} The rulers of the two provinces pledged their fleets’ assistance in curtailing Russian trade in Mediterranean waters and the signed commitments from the Tunisian ruler Hammuda Pasha and his Tripolitan counterpart, Ali Karamanlı have been preserved in the records of the Ottoman Porte. The agreements, which make to a sultanic \textit{firman} requesting assistance detail the respective fleets would attack and commandeer any Russian ships or cargo that they come across. The conditions of the agreement where such the ships would then belong to the Porte, but the cargo would go to the provinces.\textsuperscript{89} The Porte’s efforts to recruit the \textit{corso} proved fruitful, for all parties involved.

Similarly, communications from the Ottoman War Bureau concerning the direct attack of Russian trade ships in the Mediterranean indicated the extent to which the North African fleets were attempting to support the Ottoman war effort. Records from on July 15, 1788 involved the direct attack of a Russian ships by North African \textit{ocaks}. Algerian corsairs seized a vessel under the command of the Russian Captain Angel Stefan. The boat’s cargo, equipment, foodstuffs and crew where commandeered for not carrying the proper papers, while the captain and his crew were surrendered to the \textit{bey} of the province.\textsuperscript{90} Similarly, Ottoman marine forces, the “azab ocakları” from Tripoli confiscated the cargo and crew of another Russian ship as “restitution” for the Ottoman state.\textsuperscript{91}

These acts, on the part of North Africans but in in the name of the Porte, can be analyzed in the light of imperial aggression by proxy and is telling of the Porte’s

\textsuperscript{88} ibid.
\textsuperscript{89} Aksan, \textit{Ottoman Wars, 1700-1870}, 168.
\textsuperscript{90} C.HR Dosya No: 136 Gömlek No: 6777.
\textsuperscript{91} C.HR Dosya No: 136 Gömlek No: 6778.
relations with its North African provinces on many levels. First, it shows that Constantinople’s wars in the east directly impacted the region and were causal in their political dealings with even the westernmost provinces. Secondly, it demonstrated that the North African provinces responded positively to the Porte’s requests for support, thus showing that the relationship between periphery and Porte was not as estranged as previous literature has suggested. These two facts, taken together, show that the Ottoman Empire at the end of the eighteenth century was much more politically integrated than previously imagined.

These findings to indicate that the Porte was in continuous contact with the North African governors and had effectively used the *corso* to impede as much Russian trade as possible. They suggest that the Ottoman Porte adept at using North African skill to their benefit and that the Porte was practiced in leveraging the political distance between itself and its provinces—so as to not antagonize their imperial adversaries into open warfare. The more Russian and Austrian merchant ships looked to profit from the boom in Mediterranean trade, the more the Porte looked to the North African provinces, and namely, their corsair fleets to undermine their rivals’ commercial vessels in the region.

This is striking for several reasons. First, it demonstrated the eagerness of the North African provinces to coordinate strategic maritime attacks on behalf of the Porte. Both Tunis and Tripoli contributed three ships each to the broader Ottoman efforts in the Mediterranean, while Algiers’s offered five vessels. However, the *hatt* did not distinguish among the efforts the various provinces’ navies, nor does it outline any tensions among the various navies of Tunis, Tripoli and Algiers. This is

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92 ibid.  

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particularly notable because it shows direct cooperation between the provinces of North Africa in their efforts to support the High Porte and to cooperate with one another in the campaigns.

The historical context of this memorandum is quite significant. The 1780-90s was a diplomatic difficult time in the relationship between Maghrebi regencies and the Porte. Tensions between the respective administrations of Tunis and Tripoli and that of Constantinople were at a century-long high. Nevertheless, the North African regencies were eager to comply with the Porte’s requests. Moreover, the numbers of ships provided were significant, particularly given the naval conditions of the Tripolitan navy at the time, which was in a terrible state of disrepair. Thus, North African provinces played a much more critical and central role in the Ottoman Porte’s response to the hostilities with the Russian empire.

Lastly, these findings undermine two historiographically-accepted arguments in the literature. The first was presented by Rousseau in his Annales tunisiennes in 1832 and has since been echoed in the literature as recently as the 2004 monograph by Asma Moalla on the history of Ottoman-Tunisian relations. Both scholars claimed that starting from 1777, ten years before the declaration of the second of Catherine’s wars, both Tunisians and Algerians had effectively obfuscated peace treaties with Russia and then with Austria in an effort to pursue their own commercial interests. Rousseau wrote, “Trade had greatly suffered because of the attacks by [North African] corsairs, and they [Russia and later Austria] wanted to put an end to [North African] depredations, trying to negotiate peace with their masters.”93 This theory has

survived and in fact, thrived, within the literature. Scholarship has since adopted an assumption of North African maritime avarice against the growing Russian commercial presence in Mediterranean waters and until now remained largely unchallenged. In fact, Rousseau’s work, also was cited by Moalla, was used to support her assertions that Ottoman-Tunisian political relations had reached a nadir by the early 1780s because of the North African provinces’ insistence on attacking Russian vessels. ⁹⁴

Further problematizing this point was that the idea a North African regional indifference towards the Porte’s Russian problem in turn spurred the theory that the North African provinces were unaffected and uninterested in the Porte’s dealings with its Russian and Austria rivals. However, this was simply not the case. While Rousseau’s claimed the provinces refused peace with the Porte’s imperial adversaries, in what he presumed to be an effort by the North African provinces to increase their revenues via maritime, the records of the Ottoman War and Navy Bureaus indicated a zero rate of attacks on Austrian trade vessels from December 1781 until the 1787 entrance of Russia, and then Austria, into the war with the Ottoman state. ⁹⁵

These findings are critically important. First, they demonstrate that while excluded from the Grand Admiral’s broader maritime reforms, the North African corsair regencies were still willing to engage first the proactive restraint, and then later, the proactive assault on the Porte’s imperial rivals, thus demonstrating the North African provinces’ goodwill towards the larger ambitions and objectives of the

⁹⁴ Moalla’s argument was based on Rousseau’s records. Both argued that Tunis was not willing to participate in the broader Ottoman war efforts.
⁹⁵ BOA catalog searches for 1195 (Hc) onwards
Sublime Porte. Admittedly, from the North African perspective, the Porte’s tensions with Russia and Austria were correspondingly advantageous to the region’s governors post-1787. Since, the more trade ships their navies could capture, the more profit there was to gain for local administrators.

North African regencies continued to support the Ottoman efforts against the expansion of Russian merchant trade throughout the end of the nineteenth century. Moreover, the 1780-90s would just lay the groundwork for the boon in privateering, as well as diplomatic exchanges between the regencies and the Porte, which accompanied Bonaparte’s invasion of Egypt in 1798.

Transformations in North Africa

The history of the corso and North African extends back into the sixteenth century. Corsairs in the service of the expansionist sultan, Suleiman I, captured Maghrebi space in the middle of the century when Greek-born corsair-cum-Admiral Turgut Rais seized Tripoli in the name of the Porte in 1551. Tunis was similarly captured in 1574. Having conquered the territory from the Knights of Malta, Tripoli was put under direct Ottoman rule, and the region’s governors were appointed directly by Constantinople until 1709. At the turn of the eighteenth century however, direct Ottoman rule came to an end when the sitting beylerbey Mahmud, was deposed by the kuloğlu of the city under the charge of Ahmad Karamanlı.

Since the sixteenth century the power of the kuloğlular, the offspring of Ottoman soldiers and Tripolitan women, had grown within the administration of the province. So much so that by the early eighteenth century the administration of

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96 A close look at the records of the Ottoman Porte throughout the war show that the corsair ships in Mediterranean waters regularly attacked Russian trade and merchant ships. For further information see: HAT_00211_11352_00001, HAT_00186_08761_00001, C.BH 28/1338 Tarih: 23/Z /1204, HAT_00186_08772_00001 and HAT_00181_08278_00001.
Tripoli was under de facto kuloğlu control. It was with relative ease, and little protest from the Porte, that in 1711 a notable kuloğlu named Ahmad Karamanlı was able to supplant the Ottoman beylerbey Mahmud Ummais and declare himself bey of Tripoli. After acquiring a firman that legitimized his rule, Ahmad Karamanlı set the groundwork for his own dynastical order, and Karamanlı rule of Tripoli lasted from 1711-1836.

Ahmad ruled Tripoli for over thirty-five years. He extended his control into the southern territory of Fezzan, which had long maintained its autonomy from the Ottoman-controlled north, and to the eastern territory of Cyrenaica. He rebuilt the economic infrastructure of Tripoli by re-establishing the sub-Saharan trade networks, which had long been neglected by the Ottoman beylerbeys, and by encouraging Sephardi and Levantine merchants to settle in the province. While these early, prosperous years of Karamanlı rule helped cement the dynasty’s control over Tripoli, not all of Ahmad’s descendants possessed the bureaucratic acumen that marked these early years as ones of socio-economic growth and political stability for Tripolitania.

By the end of the eighteenth century, the economic and political administration of Tripoli was in shambles. The elderly bey Ali Karamanlı was slowly losing his grip on power and his navy in a state of disrepair. Ali Karamanlı ruled Tripoli since 1754. But with age and exhaustion he gradually succumbed to his vices. By the 1780s, the bey spent the majority of his days in his harem, often drunk, and grew increasingly negligent of the province. Time and age took a toll on Ali, who over the decade progressively senile and had abandoned his role in the divan altogether. The governor spent his days in the chambers of his favorite harim, with a woman know by the

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97 ibid.
98 Folayan, *Tripoli during the reign of Yusuf Pasha Karamanlı*, 3-5.
moniker of ‘Queen Esther,’ for her substantial sway in the court politics of Tripoli, and her hold over the aging bey.\footnote{Tully, Letters written during a ten years’ residence at the court of Tripoli, 1783-1795. Also see, Folayan, Tripoli during the reign of Yusuf Pasha Karamanlı, 3-5.} By the end of the decade Tripoli was continuously afflicted with frequent bouts of plague, famine, and endemic poverty—among all but the very highest merchant class. The aging pasha was effectively running the province into the ground.

The Porte and the Admiral Gazi Hasan foresaw these troubles. In 1778, Abdul Hamid I sent the Tripolitan bey an official warning that highlighted Constantinople’s concern over the general administrative negligence and ordered the Pasha to put the affairs of the province in order immediately.\footnote{Tripoli, FO 76/3, 261.} Ali was not spurred into action. The Porte grew even more dissatisfied with Ali’s failures, as diplomatic circles—both within and beyond Tripoli—began to speak openly about their fears of an imminent invasion.\footnote{ibid.}

Anxieties were only heightened after Abdul Hamid I appointed Gazi Hasan temporarily to the Grand Vizierate in 1786.\footnote{Mordtmann and Kuran, “Ḍjezāīrli GHāżi Hasan Pasha,” accessed Dec. 9th, 2014} Gazi Hasan, long regarded as an adversary of Ali Bey in Tripoli, was seen by diplomats in Tripoli as an imminent threat and feared Ottoman intervention would only worsen the socioeconomic conditions in the province and further jeopardize their own security.\footnote{Tully, Letters written during a ten years’ residence at the court of Tripoli, 1783-1795, 124.} Miss Tully, the sister of the British Consul Tully wrote to London:

June 18, 1786,
A courier from Tunis confirms the dreadful news…that the Captain Pacha had sailed from Constantinople with orders from the Grand Signior to depose the Bashaw of Tripoli. It is supposed that the dissensions in the Bashaw’s family, and the total neglect of the kingdom (arising from that circumstance) makes the Grand Signior fear that Tripoli may at last fall into the hands of
Unfortunately, the Grand Signior promoted to the rank of Captain Pacha, a Turk named Hasseen, who has been an avowed enemy of the Bashaw of Tripoli for many years. This man, with a large fleet is expected here from hour to hour. The Bashaw in the divan, this afternoon declared his intention of quitting the town to-morrow [sic], and of waiting at one of his palaces till the Turkish fleet arrives, and its destination is known.

And then again:

June 24, 1786,
Our apprehensions are for a time suspended. The Captain Pasha passed the harbor of Tripoli a few days since, and is for the present gone to Alexandria…But it is still affirmed he has a teskarra, or firman, with him for this unfortunate Bashaw.  

Gazi Hasan never docked in Tripoli. Discord in the east between the Ottoman Porte and Egyptian Mamluks pushed the admiral to Alexandria in an effort to curtail the ambitions of Ibrahim and Murad Bey, the co-ruling leaders. However, this was not for lack of Ottoman interest in the affairs of Tripoli. Tully’s letters offer several other insights into the state of Tripolitan affairs. First, it is quite clear that by the mid-1780s, the British diplomatic corps regarded Ali Karamanlı as an unfit governor. After abandoning the general governance of the province, his reaction to the threat of an impending invasion was one of capitulation. Rather than attempt to negotiate with or Gazi Hasan Pasha and his forces, Ali Bey immediately notified his divan of his intention to flee and desert the city that he had neglected in the last several years of his reign. Secondly, it is clear from Tully’s letters that the enmity between Gazi Hasan Pasha and Ali Karamanlı was long standing.

While the reasons behind this malice are unknown, it seems possible that Hasan Pasha’s twenty years in the divan of Algiers are the likely root of the acrimony

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104 ibid.
between the two men. Gazi Hasan was a noted statesman, diplomat and administrator. His detest for Ali Karamanli’s growing inability to govern was widely known in diplomatic circles, among Ottoman diplomats, and beyond. While Tripoli was ultimately spared a direct invasion by an Ottoman naval fleet, the enmity between Gazi Hasan Pasha and the Karamanlis would culminate, shortly after the kapudan pasha’s death in 1790, and cause a great deal of aggravation for the Porte that would lay the foundation for Tripoli’s alliance with France during the French invasion of Egypt.

**Tripoli and Tunis**

Foreign invasion, whether at the hand of a western imperial power, or at the hand of the Porte itself, was not the only concern for Ali Karamanli. His list of rivals had grown long throughout his long reign, as hostility to his continued rule grew ripe within the region, the province itself, and even among his own sons. Conditions took a turn for worse in 1782, when the young Hammuda Pasha officially succeeded his father as bey of neighboring Tunis. Ali Pasha unintentionally antagonized his young neighbor to the west by betting on the wrong horse during their previous decades struggle of Tunisian succession. The Karamanli pasha had supported one of Hammuda’s rivals within the Ibn Ali dynasty. Ali’s slight was not easily forgotten by the young Tunisian governor, who had a much more powerful army than his neighbor to the east.

Hammuda chose a dual course of action. First, he responded by regularly

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105 For information on Gazi Hasan Pasha’s time in Algiers see J.H. Mordtmann and E. Kuran. “Djezairli Ghazi Hasan Paşa” op. cit. I speculate that that the longstanding hostility between the bey of Tripoli and his counterpart in Algiers could have been a catalyst in the animosity between Hasan Pasha and Ali Karamanli. Particularly if there was a dispute over trade routes, for further cooperation, and at times competition between the North African regencies, see Daniel Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, passim.
instigating border skirmishes between the two provinces. While the “attacks from Tunis were indecisive”¹⁰⁶ they nevertheless contributed to the general sense of unease within Tripoli.¹⁰⁷ Ali Pasha’s inability to thwart even these minor skirmishes showed just how pervasive the sense of insecurity, and lack of confidence in the ruler was within the Tripolitan capital. Secondly, Hammuda Pasha further antagonized Ali’s authority as ruler of Tripoli by offering refuge and support to one of Ali Karamanli’s own dynastic rivals. Upon his assumption of the beylicate in 1754, Ali Karamanli assassinated his competitors within the extended Karamanli family. However, a Karamanli uncle, Mustafa, escaped the assassination attempt and fled the province. This rival, Mustafa lived in exile. However, his mere survival was a continuous threat to Ali’s rule of Tripoli. With the support of Hammuda Pasha, and Ali’s weakened hold on power, Mustafa once again became a new and viable threat.¹⁰⁸

The intrigue and mystery that surrounded ‘Mustafa the Pretender’ was enough to ignite the imagination and concerns of the diplomatic community within Tripoli. In turn, this threw Ali’s continued rule more into doubt and further undermined his authority. Miss Tully, the sister of the British Consul Richard Tully, wrote of the threat caused by ‘Mustafa the Pretender:’

> By private letters from Tunis, it is said that an expedition is fitting out, with the consent of the Grand Signior, to convey the Pretender to Tripoli. He is Tripolitan, who has lived at the court of Tunis for many years, and declares himself to be an uncle of the Bashaw's, who escaped out of seven who fell at his accession to the throne. This prince, if living, fled from Tripoli so very young, that it would be difficult for anyone here to ascertain his being the same person. ¹⁰⁹

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¹⁰⁸ Ibid.
¹⁰⁹ Tully, *Narrative of a Ten Years’ Residence at Tripoli in Africa*, 209.
It is not clear from Ottoman records if the Porte supported Mustafa’s claim to the beylicate of Tripoli or not. What is clear was that a compendium of forces, both external and internal, had gradually eroded any authority Ali Karamanlı claimed over the Tripolitan province. However, despite these open acts of aggression towards Ali Karamanlı’s continued rule, it was never Hammuda Pasha’s intention to flat-out remove the bey from power. Given the internal disarray of Tripoli in the 1770-80s and the superior military of the Husaynid dynasty of Tunis, Hammuda Pasha could have easily annexed Tripoli and claimed it as his own. However, no such threat ever manifested. Despite Hammuda Pasha’s willingness to undermine Ali Karamanlı’s authority within Tripoli, it was never his intention to depose the Karamanlıs as a dynasty from power. Rather, the Tunisian bey would eventually become one of Tripoli’s, and subsequent Karamanlı successors, strongest allies in the region.

Ali Karamanlı’s rule had become all but obsolete by the time of the 1787 letter that enlisted Tripoli’s support in the Porte’s effort against the Hapsburg and Russian empires. As Ali was abandoning his responsibilities, his eldest son, Hassan had effectively taken over the day-to-day running of the province. Hassan was well regarded and respected in diplomatic circles and among the subjects of the province. However, in the eyes of his father, Hassan was overreaching in his power.

Central to Ali’s concerns were that Hassan had developed his own private corsair naval fleet, which he docked in specially constructed shipyards, while the official Tripolitan navy sat in painful disrepair. The earnings of this small fleet

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110 ibid.
111 ibid.
112 FO 76/3 340-2.
were substantial, and Hassan was adeptly using the proceeds to curry favor and support among the tribal leaders in the province.\textsuperscript{113} It is likely that the three ships sent to the aid of the Porte in commandeering Russian ships off the coast of Italy were from Hassan’s personal navy. This, in addition to the respect he had cultivated among European consuls,\textsuperscript{114} effectively made Hassan the most immediate threat to his father’s rule.

In response, Ali Karamanlı took to favoring his youngest son, Yusuf, and allowing him the licenses of an heir apparent.\textsuperscript{115} This created a bitter rivalry between the two brothers, as Hassan the eldest was the expected successor to his father. Frictions between the brothers hit breaking point when Yusuf, and in turn Hassan, took to arming themselves, their servants and assistants within the castle walls of Tripoli. The rivalry between the brothers spilled over into the province’s administration when they began arriving with armed bodyguards to the regular meetings of the Tripolitan divan.\textsuperscript{116}

British and the French consular records from the era show the extent to which the province had suffered under the disarray of the 1770s and 1780s. Richard Tully, the consul of England, noted the vast confusion among the province’s diplomatic community in regards to who to meet with about official matters.\textsuperscript{117} It is notable that despite the extensive trouble within the province, the Karamanlis were still demonstrating good will and supporting the Porte’s policies against the Russians. Given that only one year had passed since the possible invasion of the province by

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{113} FO 76/3 348.
  \item \textsuperscript{114} ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{115} Folayan, \textit{Tripoli during the Reign of Yusuf Pasha Karamanlı}, Chapter 1.
  \item \textsuperscript{116} ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{117} FO 76/3 323, 325-7, 334, 336.
\end{itemize}
Gazi Hasan, the willingness of the province to dedicate three of the five viable ships remaining in its fleet showed its commitment to integration within the broader Ottoman world. 118

Dynastic troubles came to a head in July 1790, when Yusuf Karamanlı assassinated his eldest brother, Hassan, and set of fierce struggle for power between him and his remaining brother, Ahmad. In response, the elderly pasha, Ali removed from the city. Yusuf, in turn, responded by laying siege to his brother and father in the city walls, diverting the revenue of the caravan trade, and further devastated the already beleaguered city. 119

Given the extent to which Ali Karamanlı’s rule was challenged from within and beyond Tripoli’s borders, it is not long before the subjects of the province and the chief tribes of Cyrenaica and Fezzan began to revolt. The province constituted a union of three previously independent regions, namely: Tripolitania, Fezzan in the south and Cyrenaica to the west. Upon the establishment of the Karamanlı dynasty and the unification of southern and western provinces under Ahmad Karamanlı in the late seventeenth century, Tripoli became the effective center for the unified territory. However, the Bedouin chiefs were critical to the inland trade of the province, and important leaders with the various provinces had also grown weary of the ineffective rule of Ali Karamanlı. One particular revolt that is notable is the 1790 rebellion of Misrata, a city looking to gain more autonomy from Karamanlı rule.

Not long after this, Sidi Useph [Ali’s youngest son] gained the Bashaw’s [Ali’s] consent for the Bey [Ali’s eldest son, Hassan] and himself to be sent out with a strong force, aided by the Arab’s in the Bashaw’s pay, against the Mezerateens [the people of Misrata]. Sidi Hamet [Ali’s middle son] refused to

118 While I speculate that the ships that were used to track down Russian merchant vessels were from Hassan’s army, there is no record within Ottoman documents of the source of these boats. They are only referred to ask “Tripolitan ships.”
119 Folayan, Tripoli during the Reign of Yusuf Pasha Karamanlı, 147.
go; and Shaif Shafanassa, one of the most powerful the Arab tribes, sent a message to the Bashaw [Ali] that he would not see the Mezerateens ill-treated, and that if he sent a force against them, he would attack the princes and would bring the pretender, Mustapha, from Tunis, or one of the Beys of Egypt, to take the thrown.  

It is telling of Ali’s flimsy grip on the province that a tribal chief could directly oppose him, explicitly threaten his heirs, and support the usurper who undermined his claim to the beyliciate. After over twenty years as the governor, Ali became unfit to rule. His authority had been completely undermined. However, what is particularly poignant, and speaks to an underlying cohesion among the provinces was that in addition to the threat of reinstating Ali’s rival from within the Karamanlı family, Mustafa the Pretender, Shaif Shafanassa also threatened to produce one of the Egyptian Mamluks as a potential replacement to Karamanlı rule.

This reference showed a direct cooperation between the various important leaders within the broader Tripolitan province and the de facto rulers of Egypt, the Mamluk beys. For the Bedouin leader to suggest a Mamluk replacement in the same breath as a Karamanlı one is to infer to a very intimate political relationship between Egypt and Tripoli: one that could, potentially, have posed as a direct threat to the rule of the Tripolitan bey. The historical connection between Tripoli and Egypt was not lost Miss Tully, who continued “[t]he Beys of Egypt are considered the most likely persons to be deputed by the Grand Signior to replace or succeed the sovereigns in Barbary, as it is one of the ways of his promoting them and rewarding their services to the Sublime Porte.”

In addition to the internal recognition that a potential Mamluk ruler in Tripoli would have received from within the province’s political elite, the to replace the

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120 Ibid.
121 Ibid.
Tripolitan rulers with Egyptian ones was an option considered by the Porte. Such machinations point to a triangulation within the network of power in the Ottoman-North African world. Ali’s continued rule of Tripoli was in question, thus Tripolitans themselves looked to Egypt and the Porte as viable options to fill the void left by his weak position. Similarly, Constantinople looked to Egypt as a potential option to alleviate the power vacuum within Tripoli. This network shows clear and direct connections and cooperation among the rulers of Constantinople, the rulers of Egypt and powerful political leaders in Tripoli. Had the Ottoman Porte, as has been previously suggested in the historiography, been indifferent to North Africa or the day-to-day administration of the provinces, these options would not have been as prominent in the historical record. Further, if the autonomy of Tripoli was such that it was an independent region unto itself, uninfluenced by its immediate neighbors to the east or west or to that of imperial rule from Constantinople, the Ottoman Porte would not have directly warned Ali Karamanlı nor would it have directly intervened in the way it did within a few short years to follow.

**Tunis under Hammuda Pasha**

Tunis, much like her Tripolitan neighbor to the east, was struggling in its diplomatic relations with the Porte in the last years of the eighteenth century. Among the terms of 1774’s Küçük Kaynarca, the peace treaty that concluded the Russo-Ottoman war of 1768, Russia was to similarly settle peace with the three corsair regencies of North Africa. However, Tunis and Algiers both obfuscated. The provinces demanded excessive tribute amounts from Russia, arguing that minor slights in diplomatic protocol prevented them from concluding an actual peace.

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123 Ibid.
The relationship between Tunis and the Porte further soured after hostilities erupted between the Tunisian regency and Venice in 1782. Constantinople, by then, was fully embroiled not only in the ongoing struggle with Russia for power and territory, but also with the great fire of 1782. As Tunis and Venice went to war over the destruction of a Tunisian vessel and cargo in Malta, the city of Constantinople was engulfed in flames. The fire consumed over 7000 buildings along the Golden Horne and threw the city as well as the Porte into disarray. The impact of the fire was so far reaching within the city walls that Sultan Abdul Hamid himself personally took over administration the fire brigade to quell the losses as fast as possible.\textsuperscript{124}

Again, crises in the center directly impacted relations between the Porte and Tunis. It customary for the sultan to offer the traditional payment of \textit{i’ana} (assistance, militarily, financially or otherwise) when any of provinces went to war against European rivals.\textsuperscript{125} However, this support never manifested—symbolically or otherwise. In turn, Hammuda Pasha and the divan of Tunis became acutely aware of the slight by their Ottoman administrators. The nineteenth century Tunisian historian, Ahmad Ibn Abi Al-Diyaf (thereafter Bin Diya\textit{f}) referred back to this slight as a turning point in the provinces attitude towards the Porte.\textsuperscript{126}

Perhaps to return the snub, Hammuda Pasha distanced Tunis from the Ottoman sphere. During the 1789 coronation of the new Selim III, the Tunisian bey refused to send a congratulatory delegation to Constantinople to his pay respects. This was a “serious breach in the protocolary obligations of the \textit{walis} towards the sultan.”\textsuperscript{127} This

\textsuperscript{124} Finkel, \textit{Osman’s Dream}.
\textsuperscript{125} Moalla, \textit{The Regency of Tunis and the Ottoman Porte, 1777-1814}, 49-50.
\textsuperscript{126} This issue reflected concerns that were contemporary to Ahmad Ibn Abi Al-Diyaf’s time, since in 1835. See Ahmad Ibn Abi al-Diya\textit{f}, \textit{Ithāf ahl al-zamān bi-akhbār mulūk Tunis wa-‘ahd al-amān}, (Tunis: al-Dār al-Tūniṣiyah al-Jazā’ir : al-Sharīkah al-Waṭāniyyah lil-Nashr wa-al-Tawzi’, 1976).
\textsuperscript{127} Moalla, \textit{The Regency of Tunis and the Ottoman Porte, 1777-1814}, 49-50.
blatant refusal to attend to the new sultan, and extension undercut the province’s relationship with the Porte did not go unnoticed by Selim III or his inner circle in Constantinople. However, a young recruit of the Grand Admiral, Gazi Hasan Pasha, a Georgian corsair using the moniker Ali Burghol, would soon—albeit unintentionally—ameliorate some friction between the Husaynid governor and the Ottoman sultan.

**Same Training, Different Ethos: Another Georgian from Algiers**

The 1780s through early 1790s saw a great deal of disorder in the house of Karamanlı. While fears of Gazi Hasan Pasha’s arrival, armed with a *firman* denouncing the pasha and imposing Ottoman rule never manifested in 1786, it would not be long before the directives of Gazi Hasan would ultimately remove the Karamanlıs from power.

In 1793, with the patronage of Gazi Hasan, whose gravitas and political capital in Constantinople extended well after his 1790 death to disrupt Admiral Küçük Hüseyin’s early policies, a young Georgian by the name of Ali Burghol invaded Tripoli. The former Kapudan Pasha’s mentee, Burghol arrived in the city, *firman* in hand overthrew Ali Karamanlı, and claimed the province in the name of the Porte with very little resistance.

Little is known about the personal history of Ali Burghol. What we do know is that he was of Georgian descent, spent several years as a mariner in Algiers, eventually rose to *ra’is al-marsa*, captain of the marines, and familiarized himself with the broader region before he was exiled, for reasons unknown, in 1789.128 These three characteristics mirror exactly the early life and career of his mentor, Gazi Hasan

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Pasha before him. Making the task of tracing his early life more difficult, Ali Burghol is recorded under numerous names in different records. For example, in an acrostic piyyut, Khalfon gave the surname of the corsair as ‘Ali Gurgi, which translated to: Ali the Georgian. Various North African records have him recorded as Ali Cezayirli or al-Jeza’iri Effendi, as he seemed to, like his mentor before him, he adopted the epithet “the Algerian” because of his time in the province. Others still, such as al-Jabarti have him recorded as Ali Pasha al Tarabulsi, because he was successful attempt to supplant Karamanlı power in Tripoli. Further complicating matters, the British consul’s office at times referred to him as Ali Ben Zool. Most common however, is the moniker Ali Burghol, which is used throughout this dissertation. Interestingly, he earned the signature because he preferred to feed his men cracked durum wheat as the staple food in the regime. Al-Jabarti described him as “‘fair-complexioned, with an immense blond beard and mustaches. He spoke little Arabic. He loved pleasure and dissolute living’”\(^\text{129}\)

After his exile from Algiers in 1789, Burghol sailed to Constantinople with the hope of profiting from his connections in the Porte’s admiralty. Through his brother in law, who served as a kahiya, or a lieutenant, under Gazi Hasan, Burghol was able to gain access to some of the most influential figures in the Porte. There, he devised a plan to exploit the discord in Tripoli for his own gain and serve as the kapudan pasha’s emissary by removing Ali Karamanlı from power.\(^\text{130}\) As a fellow Georgian who had also spent time in the corso of Algiers, Ali Burghol quickly won the trust and patronage of Cezayirli Gazi Hassan Pasha. In turn, Burghol set about raising the funds to build a small army of men to invade the Tripolitian city and reclaim it for the


\(^{130}\) See Asma Moalla, The Regency of Tunis and the Ottoman Porte, 1777-1814, 45.
Al-Jabarti wrote of him:

Concerning “Ali Pasha (al-Tarabulsi), whose career has been narrated above in brief, he was Algerian in origin, of mamluk of Muhammad Pasha, ruler of Algeria. When Muhammad Pasha died, his son-in-law took his place and sent ‘Ali with a message to Husayn Pasha Kapudan. The brother (of ‘Ali Pasha) known as al-Sayyid ‘Ali, was a mamluk of the Ottoman government and held in high esteem by the Kapudan pasha, and was in charge of the flagship. The Kapudan pasha praised him highly, and awarded him the governorship of Tripoli, giving him firmans and weapons. ‘Ali Pasha went there, recruited troops and ships for himself, and made an attack on its ruler, who was the brother of Hammuda Pasha, ruler of Tunis. [Ali Pasha] waged war against him for some months, and finally got possession of the land through the collusion of its inhabitants, since they knew that he was the rightful ruler on behalf of the Ottoman state. Hammuda Pasha’s brother fled to his brother in Tunis. When “Ali Pasha took possession of Tripoli, he gave it over to his soldiery, and they committed deeds of pillage, rape, immorality, and whoring viler and more repulsive than those of the hordes of Tamerlane. He captured the ruler’s women, took them prisoner and had them dishonored by his soldiers. Then they demanded money from the people, and seized the property of the merchants, levied a tax on the inhabitants, and seized their property. 132

Al-Jabarti was correct. In July 1793, Ali Burghol docked in Tripoli, equipped with firman from Selim III, over 300 freshly hired mercenaries, “nine Greek, Turkish and Roman ships”133 and forced the abdication of Ali Karamanlı, without so much as firing a single rifle.134 The Tripolitan ruler surrendered immediately and, along with his son Ahmad, capitulated to the Georgian, fled the city walls, and sought refuge on the Tunisian island of Djerba where they received the support of Hammuda Pasha.135 Only Yusuf, the pasha’s youngest son, stayed to fight against Burghol and his forces. Yusuf continued his siege of Tripoli’s walls during Burghol’s tenure, simply shifting the target of his siege from his father to the Georgian corsair.136

131 ibid.
134 Folayan, Tripoli during the reign of Yusuf Pasha Karamanlı, 27-31.
135 Moalla, The Regency of Tunis and the Ottoman Porte, 1777-1814, 97-103.
136 ibid.
However, Ali Burghol did not stop at the conquest of Karamanlı-controlled domains. The same year Burghol took over Tripoli, he occupied the Tunisian-held island of Djerba. Long under populated and with scant military pretense, Djerba fell easily to the Georgian corsair. Records of Burghol’s occupation of the Tunisian island are chronicled in the records of Ibn Abi Al-Diyaf who retold how Burghol’s men occupied the island, and subsequently forced the local administrator, Hamida ibn Ayyad to fleet to Tunis, secured the Tunisian ammunition and supplies, summoned its population and “flourished a writ, which he pretended to have been sent by the sultan...”137

In response, Hammuda Pasha attacked. He sent an army of over ten thousand men, reinforced with two detachments of troops from the dey of Algiers, forced Ali Burghol’s troops out of Djerba and then Tripoli. Burghol, defeated fled the city as quickly as possible, to Egypt.138 Al-Jabarti described Ali Burghol’s narrative as it was retold to Egyptian audiences:

The deposed official [Ali Karamanlı] gathered a force together and returned to Tripoli and besieged it on all sides. Those of the town who regretted his departure and those who had suffered at the hands of ‘Ali [Burghol] Pasha rose with him, and when the later saw his defeat was imminent, he took to his ships with all the wealth and treasure he had amassed. He took hostage two handsome youths from among the sons of the notables and fled to Alexandria. Reaching Cairo, he took refuge with Murad Bey, who received him and showed him the greatest hospitality in his home in Giza. They became intimate friends. The cause of ‘Ali Pasha’s coming to Cairo and his not returning to the pasha [Gazi Hasan Pasha] was that he knew he had become hateful in the eyes of the government, for it was a rule of the Ottoman government that whenever they appointed anyone governor of a province and he was unsuccessful, they hated him, deposed him, and very often killed him, especially if he was wealthy.139

Unable to return to Constantinople, Burghol fled to Cairo, where another

137 ibid.
138 ibid.
139 ibid.
commander with Georgian roots, this time Murad Bey, received him warmly. In part because of his time in Egypt, and his familiarity with the Mamluks, Burghol would eventually become, albeit briefly, the governor of Egypt.

After Karamanlı rule was reestablished in Tripoli, Yusuf staged a quick and successful dynastic coup, overthrow his remaining brother Ahmad, and declared himself as the new bey. The circumstances around Ahmad’s overthrow were as peaceful as Burghol’s overthrow of their father a few years before. During an excursion out of the beylical palace, Yusuf simply locked his older brother out of the city walls and waited. Ahmad was offered a choice: exile or the governorship of the eastern city of Derna. Yusuf did not have to wait long. His brother chose the latter, but would ultimately flee the province altogether and seek refuge in Cairo with the same Mamluks what had offer sanctuary to Ali Burghol before him. The new governor, Yusuf Karamanlı, maintained animosity towards the Sublime Porte for its perfidious support of Burghol. 140 In revenge, Yusuf soon allied with the French Republic against the Porte.

Tunis and the Porte

To defend the future of his reign, as well as to justify his actions against Burghol—who was officially there under the Porte’s protection—Hammuda Pasha sent a delegation to Constantinople in 1795. Effectively, Hammuda Pasha had to account for reoccupation of Djerba and the removal of Ali Burghol from Tripoli in the eyes of the sultan he had snubbed just a few years’ prior: the young Selim III.

The delegation was led by Yusuf Sahib al-Tabi and included and the chronicler Ibn Abi Al-Diyaf’s father as a member of the mission. Tunisian records

140 Moalla, The Regency of Tunis and the Ottoman Porte, 1777-1814, 50-53.
from these accounts demonstrated how relations between the Porte and Tunis were soon improved based on the mutual admiration and respect the developed between the Tunisian Yusuf Sahib al-Tabi and Gazi Hasan Pasha’s replacement in the Ottoman admiralty, Küçük Hüseyin Pasha. Küçük Hüseyin Pasha was one of the closest allies of Sultan Selim III, and had married the sultan’s sister, Esma Sultan. Thus, he was critical in the new sultan’s attempts to reform the navy and the admiralty. Through the records of Bin Diyaf, we see how al-Tabi and Gazi Hasan’s successor were able to foster a much more amicable relationship with the Porte and with the Grand Admiral than had been established under the thirty-year long career of Gazi Hasan. Scholars familiar with Bin Diyaf have even gone so far as to suggest that the new Grand Admiral Küçük Hüseyin, having only recently been assigned to the head of the navy in 1792, resented having to endorse the young Ali Burghol, protégée of the since departed Gazi Hasan Pasha, in his expedition and direct occupation of Tripoli.

The new Grand Admiral Küçük Hüseyin’s personal feelings regarding the Burghol affair were not chronicled in the Ottoman records. However, the information provided in them offered context and suggested that the officials of the Porte were not particularly disturbed regarding Ali Burghol’s forced departure from Tripoli and Djerba. Working to Tunis’s favor was the difficult relationship between Selim and Gazi Hasan.\footnote{H. Z(J W. ) Hirschberg, A History of the Jews in North Africa: From the Ottoman Conquests to the Present Time, edited by Eliezer Bashan and Robert Attal (Leiden: Brill, 1974), 14. The Kafas of the sultans, etc.} Animosity between the powerful admiral, who was one of the most powerful and enduring political figures in history of the eighteenth century Ottoman Empire, and Selim stemmed back to the 1785. When, with the support of the Grand Vizier Halil Hamid Pasha, supporters of the young Selim made a move for the
sultanate. However, their efforts to supplant Abdul Hamid abruptly ended when word reached Gazi Hasan of the potential overthrow. In response, Gazi Hasan encouraged Abdul Hamid to isolate the young Selim, effectively cutting him off from contact with the outside world.\textsuperscript{142} Which lead to an acrimonious break between Selim, and later rumors of the sultan’s involvement in the 1790 death of the admiral.

Looking beyond the internal machinations of the Porte, Burghol’s behaviors after overthrowing the Karamanlıs was reason enough for his removal. In no way did the Georgian corsair make himself, or his rule of Tripoli, advantageous for Constantinople. From Ottoman sources we learn that while Tunis and Algiers were active in limiting the expansion of Russian trade in the Mediterranean during Burghol’s occupation from 1793-1794,\textsuperscript{143} Tripolitan ships had not been active in Mediterranean waters. In fact, the only mention of the Tripolitan naval activity was in a naval dispatch from the autumn of 1794, shortly after the exile of Burghol from Tripoli and the reinstatement of the Karamanlıs to the beylicate of Tripoli. The dispatch, which outlined the reinstatement of Sayid Ali, also mentioned Tripolitan participation in the capture of a ship with a Russian imperial ensign off the island of Chios.\textsuperscript{144} Moreover, western and North African records chronicle the destruction to the commercial and maritime infrastructure of Tripoli while under Burghol’s control.

Rabbi Avraham Khalfon, the religious leader of the Tripolitan Jewish community during the 1790s, described Burghol’s rule in Tripoli as a “reign of

\textsuperscript{142} Shaw, \textit{Between Old and New}, passim, and Yildiz, “The ‘Louis XVI of the Turks.’”

\textsuperscript{143} A close look at the records of the Ottoman Porte throughout the war show that the corsair ships in Mediterranean waters regularly attacked Russian trade and merchant ships. For further information see, HAT_00211_11352_00001, HAT_00186_08761_00001, C.BH 28/1338 Tarih: 23/Z /1204 , HAT_00186_08772_00001 and HAT_00181_08278_00001 Tarih: 29/Z /1205.

\textsuperscript{144} C. BH Dosya No: 10 Gömlek No: 503.
terror.” Burghol executed numerous subjects who were close to the Karamanlı family. Khalfon’s own son, David who was a prominent figure in the Tripolitan community, was slowly burned alive under Burghol’s orders.

Similarly, in her entry from August 17, 1793, Miss Tully, the sister of the British Consul of Tripoli, wrote of the rule of Ali Burghol, whom she addressed as the Turk Ali Ben Zool, “within the last few days the scenes here have been too shocking to relate, I therefore pass them over in silence.” She recalled in detail only one specific account of life under Ali Burghol. This account, related the fate of Ali Karamanlı's favorite harim, a women Miss Tully referred to as the Great, or at times “Queen” Esther. Ali Burghol had had her chained in the castle, and demanded 5000 sterling pounds to release her to her back to her family, as she was related to wealthy Jewish merchants in the province. This news reached the British diplomatic corps with the arrival of Esther’s (by Ali Pasha) son, who the bey had not taken with him to Djerba. Her son was only permitted to leave the castle in order to search among the diplomats and the Englishmen’s houses for a long chain to confine prisoners. Miss Tully continued,

On being asked for what purpose he could want it, he burst into tears, and said, his mother… was expiring in the castle, chained so tight with a chain that it was cutting through her wrists and ankles and that she must inevitable die from anguish if not immediately relieved; and that the inhuman Turks had agreed, if he [the son] found an easier chain, they would permit him to change it, but otherwise she must remain as she was.

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145 Abraham Khalfon as chronicled by Ha-Cohen, see H. Z(J W. ) Hirschberg, A History of the Jews in North Africa: From the Ottoman Conquests to the Present Time / Edited by Eliezer Bashan and Robert Attal (BRILL, 1974).
146 ibid. Accounts of the commercial role of court harim and the broader social terrors of Ali Burghol are preserved in the writings of Khalfon's original writings were copied into a manuscript written by Mordecai Ha-Cohen (1856-1920). This manuscript documents the ways in which the Jewish mercantile community leveraged its influence over the court through its relationship with the harim and singers.
147 ibid.
148 Ibid, 351.
Her family pleaded for time to raise ransom funds from Livorno. While her eldest daughter Mazaltov, who was also involved in the court of Ali Karamanli, had managed to flee to Malta, not much else is known of the history of Great Esther, or what happened to her after Yusuf claimed power. Several sources have identified her as Esther Arbib, the mother-in-law of Rabbi and chronicler, Avraham Khalfon, but that is the extent of the historical information available on her.\textsuperscript{149}

News of the havoc that Ali Burghol’s occupation caused on Tripoli in general and on Tripolitan trade and commerce in particular would have easily reached the Porte though merchant and diplomatic channels. Ali Burghol’s downfall in Tripoli and his expulsion from Djerba were of no great consequence to either the young sultan or his new grand admiral. Thus, the efforts of the Tunisian delegation in Constantinople had been extremely successful. Tunis and Hammuda Pasha were back in the good graces of the Porte and the Ottoman admiralty.

\textbf{Privateering, North Africa and the Porte}

In \textit{The Regency of Tunis and the Ottoman Porte}, Asma Moalla argued that the estrangement in diplomatic ties between Tunis and the Porte could be largely explained by looking west to Algiers. Moalla argued that Algiers effectively had pulled Tunis into its sphere of influence by the mid-eighteenth century and that the long history of antagonism between Algiers and the Ottoman Porte had spilled over into Tunis’s relations with Constantinople. It is true that Algiers, the most powerful of the corsair regencies and the most geographically removed of the Ottoman provinces, was powerful enough to draw other provinces under its influence and even indirect authority. However, Ottoman records indicate that diplomatic exchange between

\textsuperscript{149} \textit{ibid}, and Hirschberg, \textit{A History of the Jews in North Africa}, 156.

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Algiers and Constantinople was as intricate and multifaceted as those with Tunis and Tripoli.

Reading Ottoman documents on Tunis and Tripoli shows that, much like its eastern neighbors Algiers also maintained complicated ties, and a demonstrable interest in Ottoman Porte. For example, the hatt-i hümâyun from September of 1787 showed that Algiers provided five ships, in addition to the three from each Tunis and Tripoli, to Constantinople’s efforts against Russian merchant trade in the Mediterranean.\(^{150}\) However unlike the Karamanlı family in Tripoli Hussien Dey, who had ruled since 1765, was in charge of a significant army and an even more substantial navy. Thus, Algiers was not in a position to have to appease the Porte during a political crisis. Since, if relations were merely those of an antagonistic provenience simply looking to gain self-sovereignty from a far-flung imperial overlord, the dey could have easily dismissed the Porte’s request without any immediate repercussions.

Moreover, the Ottoman center historically recognized the comparative strength Algiers in the region, and used it to the Porte’s advantage. Algiers, the strongest of the three provinces, could sway the region and incite the other regencies into action.\(^{151}\) This is to say, that from the perspective of the Porte, up until the establishment of the Mehmed Ali’s rule in Egypt, discussions of Tunis and Tripoli were often included in discussions of Algiers. Given the common naval traditions among the three regencies, and that the turn of the nineteenth century saw a boom in corsair activities, it is not surprising that the Porte would often address matters of Mediterranean privateering

\(^{150}\) HAT Dosya No: 00022 Gömlek No: 01030. 
\(^{151}\) It is well known in the historical record that Algiers was the strongest of the Barbary regencies, both in regards to its military capabilities and its navy. For further information see, Panzac, *The Barbary Corsairs*, passim.
regionally, rather than by individual province. However, the willingness of the Ottoman center to look to Algiers to influence Tripoli and Tunis if anything highlights the continuity of diplomatic exchange between Algiers and the Porte. Nevertheless, it is interesting that the Ottoman Porte looked to first Algiers, and then to Egypt, as interlocutors for its relationship with the other North African provinces.

**Conclusion**

Ottoman relations with the North African regencies were at times difficult, fraught with tension and oftentimes quite conflicted. However, as this chapter has shown, the political bond between the imperial center and the provinces was continuously present at the end of the eighteenth century. North Africa was critical to understanding the full scope of how Constantinople operated and dealt with its imperial rivalries in the mid-to-late eighteenth century, when the Sublime Porte began reconsidering its administrative and military structure in light of the strategic territorial losses in the east. This chapter examined broad sweeping reforms that the admiralty was attempting to push forward in the Ottoman navy and the effect that these changes had on the provinces, which had long practiced, and indeed were economically reliant on, the long established tradition of the *corso*. Under Gazi Hassan’s directive, massive overhauls and extensive modernization efforts were taking place in the Ottoman maritime world after the losses of 1770. However, these reforms did not immediately imply that the Sublime Porte, or the admiralty, had turned its back on the tradition of corsaring. Rather, as seen throughout, Abdul Hamid I turned to corsairs to limit the boom of Russian trade in the Mediterranean.

Moreover, the wars and strategies of the mid-to-late eighteenth century Porte directly impacted the broader Ottoman maritime world. This research demonstrated
how broadly the ramifications of the Russo-Ottoman wars were felt across the empire and the extent to which Istanbul’s competition with St. Petersburg weighed on the vast realm of Ottoman domains. It was during the Russo-Ottoman war of 1787 that Gazi Hasan, and the Sultan Abdul Hamid I looked to resurrect the “old warring ways” of the North African corsairs. The regional navies, and the corsair ocaks of the various North African provinces had unprecedented local knowledge and regional expertise on the best maritime routes of the Mediterranean waters. The Ottoman Admiralty looked to benefit directly from their knowledge. However, the timing of the naval reforms which took place alongside Porte’s renewed reliance on the corsairs to limit Russian merchant trade in Mediterranean waters further complicated the attitudes of the Sublime Porte towards its North Africa provinces.

Ottoman officials and North African governors had a long and complicated history of diplomatic exchange. The region’s quasi-autonomy allowed a relatively substantial degree of independence from the Porte. More importantly that political distance served both the provinces and the Ottoman center. It allowed the Porte a certain political distance from the direct actions of the North African territories while allowing the governors the impression of greater autonomy in their districts. Both parties relied on this semi-autonomy to further their own interests. This was further heightened at the turn of the nineteenth century when Ottoman and North African interests often aligned. While shifts in power between the North African provinces and the Porte were complex and at time difficult, the exchanges made for a very entangled political interdependence.

152 C. BH Dosya No: 214 Gömlek No: 9965.
CHAPTER TWO
THE FRENCH INVASION IN CONTEXT, 1798-1801 REEXAMINED

As Bonaparte’s Armée d'Orient invaded Egypt during the summer of 1798, the assault represented the first western occupation of the Porte’s Mediterranean domain since the sixteenth century. It is not surprising then that a great deal of study has since focused on Egypt immediately before, during and after the invasion. However, as we shall see, 1798 was also an important year in the histories of neighboring Tunis and Tripoli, and placed a spotlight on the regional ties underlying socio-political systems in the southern Mediterranean. As Bonaparte turned to Tunis and Tripoli for logistical aid, his behaviors and strategies highlighted the interconnectedness of the provinces to one another as well as to the Ottoman Porte.

This chapter focuses on several aspects of the provinces’ relationship with Constantinople. Throughout, it explores the adaptable and oftentimes paradoxical relationship that the provinces of Tunis and Tripoli maintained with the Sublime Porte as well as the relationship that the two privateering provinces maintained with their eastern neighbor, Egypt. This chapter emphasizes that during a time of political crisis, as imperial paradigms of governance were shifting, it was the needs of the provinces that dictated the policies of the Porte, as well as other imperial centers. Temporally, this chapter traces the lead up to the French invasion of Egypt in the late-1790s, and examines the history of the region through the middle of 1801.

Tripoli under New Governorship

After seizing power on June 11, 1795, Yusuf Karamanlı became the ruler of a weakened, impoverished territory that lagged behind neighboring Algiers and Tunis in commercial status, regional power and in its official recognition by the Ottoman
Porte. The prominent merchant class, which had provided Tripolitania with critical economic revenues through commercial ties with Livorno, Malta and the broader region, had largely fled due to the administrative tempestuousness that came to define the rule of Ali Karamanlı, Yusuf’s predecessor, as well as a short-lived coup by the Porte-supported corsair, Ali Gurgi—Ali the Georgian, or as he was commonly known, Ali Burghol. Burghol’s “reign of terror” and specifically, his maltreatment of the Jewish mercantile community of the province was well chronicled in the North African memories of Rabbi Abraham Khalfon, an important figure in the province.

Many merchants relocated to various coastal cities across the Ottoman Mediterranean and, most notably, to Alexandria. In fact, a review of Alexandrine court records from the late eighteenth century shows a substantial increase in the number of Tripolitans buying and selling urban property in the coastal city and engaging in day-to-day legal activities within the city’s courts since 1750. Moreover, this number increased over time. It was likely that a great number of these merchants had fled to Egypt to avoid the disorder in Tripoli in the years prior to Yusuf

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153 Ali Karamanlı ruled Tripolitania since 1754. However, he had gradually succumbed to his vices and majority of his days in his harem, often drunk, and increasingly negligent of the province. Time and age took a toll on Ali and by the 1780s conditions were such that Tripoli was continuously afflicted with frequent bouts of plague, famine, and endemic poverty. By 1778, the Porte was explicitly concerned that Tripoli could be an easy target for occupation. In response to the reports, Abdul Hamid I sent the Tripolitan bey an official warning that highlighted Istanbul’s concern over the general administrative negligence and ordered the Pasha to put the affairs of the province into immediate order. The bey did not. The second warning came in 1786, when diplomatic channels warned Tripoli of the imminent arrival of the Grand Admiral Gazi Hasan, en route to Egypt and his interest in overthrowing Ali Pasha. While the threat never manifested in 1786, it was under the patronage of Gazi Hasan that Ali Burghol overthrew the Karamanlı family in 1793. After Burghol was ousted in 1794, Yusuf overthrew his brother Ahmed in 1795, and became the governor of Tripoli.

154 Ali Burghol, or Ali Gurgi was the Georgian mentee of the formidable former Kapudan Pasha, or Ottoman Grand Admiral, Cezayirli Gazi Hasan Pasha. Burghol rule over Tripoli lasted for eighteen months, from 1793-1794. He was recorded as “an ungodly and bloody…deceitful man” in an acrostic piyyut, or liturgical poem, by the Tripolitan Rabbi Abraham Khalfon after the gruesome immolation of his son David, and the mistreatment and painful shackling of the Great Esther, Ali Karamanlı’s favorite harim. While all the subjects of Tripoli were exposed to the corsair’s greed, the non-Muslim mercantile community was a particularly easy target for Burghol’s avarice.

155 DWQ, Sijillat Mahkamat Iskenderiya 415 (1183-4/1768-9).
Karamanlı’s 1795 assumption to power. In fact, sources from 1805 Alexandria specifically point to the exhaustion that Tripolitans felt at the continuous political crises of their province.¹⁵⁶

In an effort to consolidate power, strengthen Tripoli’s position in the region, and prevent another mercenary like Burghol from taking the city, Yusuf Pasha implemented a new set of reforms focused on sea power and economic growth. Among his first objectives was the re-fortification of the city walls and the construction of new sailing fleet. Within the year, the Tripolitan navy had effectively grown from three rickety corvettes to six armed vessels.¹⁵⁷ His reforms, which were a breath of fresh air after the dereliction of responsibilities by his father and the looting of the town by Ali Burghol, where fully supported by the members of the broader Tripolitan community, both the merchants and traders, as well as the powerful Bedouin leaders from across the province.

This approach served a dual purpose. It strengthened Yusuf’s position within Tripoli among the regency’s subjects and was a preliminary step in announcing the return of Tripolitania as a maritime force within broader North African and Ottoman worlds and was also an effective and rapid means of improving the territory’s long neglected economy. Yusuf’s strategy proved effective and the governor’s efforts as drew a great deal of attention. In his 26 July 1796 dispatch, the acting British Consul to Tripoli, Simon Lucas wrote:

… [O]ur present Bashaw, Youseph Caramanli who is about the age of 24 or 25, is daily increasing in power, and strength, particularly by sea…Being now peaceably fixed on his throne, and in the full enjoyment of the love and confidence of his subjects, his first thought was to collect some cruisers and to

¹⁵⁶ Eaton, The Life of the Late Gen. William Eaton… Principally Collected from His Correspondence and Other Manuscripts, Letter to Smith, Secretary of the Navy, 290.
¹⁵⁷ Ibid. For further information on the importance of the navy in Yusuf’s policies see Folayan, Tripoli during the reign of Yusuf Pasha Karamanlı.
repair his fortifications towards the sea, which are mounted with about 70 pieces of cannons... about the beginning of this last spring, he began his claims on all the Christian powers at peace with Tripoli...\(^{158}\)

Rebuilding Tripoli’s navy allowed the governor to strengthen the province’s economic position in two ways: first, a strong naval fleet allowed Tripoli to demand tribute—effectively protection money—from western governments. The practice of paying individual tribute to each of the North African provinces had been in effect since the sixteenth century. In return for the payment, a peace was established between the two parties. European governments effectively bought the security of their maritime commercial fleet, while North African corsairs targeted their cruisers towards less generous targets. As the Napoleonic Wars engulfed Europe however, and especially with Bonaparte’s Italian invasion, tribute payments were disrupted by the quick turnover of governments. For North Africa, this meant a substantial drop in incoming revenues. This coupled with the increased maritime activity, motivated North African fleets to revive the *corso*. Specifically, for Tripoli, Yusuf’s maritime upgrades allowed his corsairs to resume campaigns along the shores of Sicily, in Catania and Messina, as well as in the Aegean.\(^{159}\)

Tripolitan ships would routinely attack and capture non-Ottoman vessels very close to the Porte’s territory. Historically, orsairs traditionally operated as *ocaks*, a rank of military corps traditionally reserved for janissaries. The use of the term *corsair* or sometimes, *ocak* in this chapter echoes the Ottoman turn of the nineteenth century understanding of the term. In effect, a corsair was the operator of an armed ship, owned by an Ottoman governor or province, holding a state-sponsored...

\(^{158}\) FO 76/5 Lucas to Portland 26 July 1796.

\(^{159}\) Panzac, *Barbary Corsairs*, 86. The rulers of the North African eyalēts had struck an agreement giving each the exclusive plundering rights to a particular territory. Thus, the Karamanlis were the only North African province with the right to launch raids upon the towns mentioned above.
commission that was sanctioned by the Porte, which authorized the capture of all rival countries’ mercantile and naval vessels.

Within the world of the various North African fleets, this meant the provinces had a long established tradition of dividing up territories along the Mediterranean shores, with the lion’s share taken by the powerful Algiers. However, as Tripoli increased its maritime presence, it slowly began to sail in territories previously operated by only the better-equipped Algerian ocaks. Yusuf’s navy continued to grow and by 1797, Tripoli’s fleet had grown to eleven armed vessels. This relative boom in maritime influence continued through the years to come with the upheaval that followed the 1798 French invasion. By 1803, two years after the outbreak of the First Barbary War against the United States, Tripoli’s fleet had grown to nineteen vessels and even continued to grow throughout the end of the war. By 1805, boasting over twenty-four armed ships, Tripoli became “a new Algiers” in the world of Mediterranean maritime power. The years of chaos in Europe, the French invasion, the rise of English commercial interests in the region, as well as those of their former American colonies, served the young Tripolitan pasha’s efforts to rapidly expand his navy.

As Tripoli’s maritime power increased, the Porte began to pay more attention to the reforms in the province. In the spring of 1797, Selim III sent a gift of a two ships, equipped with twenty-four and thirty-six guns respectively, and a firman allowing Yusuf to use a standard, or tuğ, of two horse tails rather than Tripoli’s

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160 Panzac, Barbary Corsairs, map, 86.
161 Folayan, Tripoli during the reign of Yusuf Pasha Qaramanli, 27.
162 ibid.
163 For additional information see Folayan, Tripoli during the reign of Yusuf Pasha Karamanli, Chapter 1.
historical one: a symbolic gesture that elevated Tripoli’s status to that of Tunis and Algiers.\textsuperscript{164} This honor was of immense significance for the young leader – long considered the weakest of the North African provinces, Tripoli’s position in the Ottoman Empire had also been less influential than either that of Tunis, or the powerful Algiers, as evidenced by the less influential standard of the pasha. Effectively, the change symbolized the Porte’s recognition of Tripoli’s new position in the political constellation of Mediterranean and explicitly acknowledged and legitimized the governor’s position in the province.\textsuperscript{165}

The Ottoman Porte however, was not the only imperial power to recognize Tripoli’s increased geopolitical importance. Western powers also began consider Tripoli in their broader rivalries for control in the Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{166} In Paris, the Republican Directory was openly planning an invasion of Britain. However, as First Coalition troops landed on Welsh shores and panicked the Home Office in London, one of France’s top generals, Napoleon Bonaparte, was secretly mulling an invasion of another sort. Egypt—Bonaparte’s intended target—would be a handsome victory both economically and symbolically for the French Republic. Napoleon was pragmatic in the planning: an invasion of Egypt would disrupt British maritime commerce and undermine their trade with India, which was the Directory’s ultimate

\textsuperscript{164} For additional information on the symbolic importance of horse tails, see H. Gibb and H. Bowen, \textit{Islamic Society and the West: A Study of the impact of Western civilization on Moslem Culture in the Near East} (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 139-140. For a copy of the firman see doc. dated 12 Shawal/ mid-April 1797, Azis Samih Itler, \textit{Somali Afrikada Turkler}, (Constantinople, 1939): 335-6.

\textsuperscript{165} It is important to note however, that while the three corsair regencies: Tunis, Tripoli and Algiers used a two-horstail standard, Egypt—long since one of the most important and lucrative provinces of the empire—used a \textit{tuğ} of three horsetails. This is an important distinction to draw, because while Tunis and Tripoli played a compelling role in the operations and decision making of the Porte, the corsair provinces were not as critical as Egypt in the broader functioning of Ottoman Empire. After all, the Porte was much more dependent on Egypt for essential wheat, rice, and tax revenues than it had been on its neighbors to the west.

\textsuperscript{166} As seen above, British consuls kept a close eye on Yusuf’s efforts, and reported back to the Foreign Office.
aim, while remaining less costly and more likely to prove victorious than a direct invasion of England.\textsuperscript{167} To facilitate his objective, Bonaparte used a Maltese emissary, Saverio Naudi, or Xavier Naudi as he was called within the Directory, to recruit Yusuf Pasha’s alliance in Tripoli, to provide rations for troops after their departure from Toulon, as well as communication routes through the east of the province.

In return for Tripoli’s support, Bonaparte, by way of Naudi, promised financial reward, autonomy from the Porte, the imminent disbandment of the North African corsairs’ nemesis, the Knights Hospitallers of Malta, at times going so far as to promise independence for Tripoli.\textsuperscript{168} Bonaparte’s agent in this secret alliance is of particular interest. The son of a Maltese shoemaker, Naudi was forced to flee the island, first to Marseilles and later to Tripoli, where he continuously engaged in his daring and perilous behavior. Edward Blaquiere wrote of him in Tripoli:

Mr. Naudi’s history is simply as follows...while pursuing the trade of a watchmaker in Valetta, been concerned in the robbery of one of the churches, he was obliged to take refuge in Marseilles, from whence he was a second time driven away... Knowing [Tripoli] to be the receptacle of evil, he came and contrived to obtain the Bashaw's confidence... once ingratiated with his Highness, he soon became a principal actor in the civil and political atrocities of Tripoly [sic] and continues to play a most dangerous, as well as distinguished part in them...Exiled from Malta he is the avowed enemy of the British interest...It is also positively asserted, that many of the piratical acts committed by the cruisers at sea, may be traced to Mr. Naudi’s advice; in fact, he is execrated by all the inhabitants and considered by everyone here as the most dangerous subject in the Regency.\textsuperscript{169}

This intriguing character would prove so resourceful in his efforts, that he would later become the charge d’affaires for the Americans in Tripoli. After all,
loyalty was as malleable for the political actors as it was for the provinces in the turn of the nineteenth century Mediterranean. In the meantime, however, Naudi himself wrote of the condition of his exile in a 1798 letter to the Directory. After falling out with the French consul, and bored of being underutilized in Tripoli, Naudi politely complained that if his help was no longer needed in city, requesting that some measures be taken by Talleyrand, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in order that he may be granted a guarantee of good will [*testomonianza della sua benevolezza*] of which the most honorable prize would be to ‘obtain glorious French citizenship.’ Naudi claimed that such a request could only be made because of his devotion to the French nation, which he openly expressed in 1790, in his homeland of Malta, and had been unable to return since.

He then traveled across North Africa, becoming a consular jack-of-all-trades, simultaneously serving as a middleman for numerous diplomats, merchants, and traders—all while working as a watchmaker on the side. While his allegiance to the French nation could be questioned, we nevertheless learn that he was forced out of Malta in 1790 and that his time in Marseilles was brief. In fact, by 1794, Naudi’s position as an unofficial agent of sorts became more lucrative and he was serving as the French Vice Consul’s First Interpreter in Tripoli. During this time, Naudi entrenched himself in the French consular office and by the summer of 1796 was working ‘not without risk to himself’ on behalf of the French Republic in the province. His efforts were rewarded in a letter of introduction from the Consul of

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170 Letter from 18 Pluviôse, Year 6/7 February 1798, La Courneuve Microfilm “Records from Tripoli 1798”, 21-25.
171 Letter from 18 Pluviôse, Year 6/7 February 1798, La Courneuve Microfilm “Records from Tripoli 1798”, 21-25.
172 ibid.
Tripoli’s office to the Directory in Paris. In it, the consul asked that Naudi be named Vice Consul of the French Republic in Benghazi, as the port city could be used as a strategic point for the French campaign in Italy, and for Venice in particular. Naudi received the post and was transferred to Benghazi.\(^\text{173}\) By 1798 however, he had returned to the city of Tripoli. It remains unclear if the consul wrote to Paris in the hope of finally ridding himself of Naudi, who had ingratiated himself with diplomatic circles, won the wrath of the English consular office and made several adversaries in the city or if it was for purely strategic support in the east of the province.\(^\text{174}\) It is entirely possible that the extent of Naudi’s ambitions had won him enemies within the French diplomatic community of Tripoli. However, what we do know, from western and North African sources alike, was that Naudi was the one chosen by the consul’s office to negotiate with Yusuf Pasha on Bonaparte’s behalf.\(^\text{175}\) And, regardless of the actual, or affected, depths of Naudi’s fidelities to France, his efforts as intermediary proved effective. Yusuf Pasha agreed to aid the French in their Egyptian mission.

The Maltese middleman negotiated the following terms: in return for securing communication and supply lines through Tripolitan territory and into Egypt, as well as for supplying French troops in Malta with livestock, foodstuff and other provisions,\(^\text{176}\) Naudi promised Yusuf would be given a handsome monetary reward, various jewels and precious artifacts looted from the French royal palaces, the future disbandment of the Knights of Malta and further autonomy from the Porte. France was now equipped with the logistical resources it needed to invade Mamluk-
controlled Egypt.

**Egypt, Invaded**

On July 2, 1798, under the charge of Bonaparte, over twenty thousand Frenchmen docked in the coastal city of Alexandria, claiming the province for the French Republic, the ‘natural’ ally of the Sublime Porte.\(^{177}\) Turning his immediate attention to the de-facto rulers of the province, the general and his men looked to dislodge the Mamluk grandees from power behind the thin disguise of restoring authority to their ‘ally’ and ‘friend,’ the Ottoman sultan.

Egypt, a three-ıuğ province, one the wealthiest in the sultan’s empire, was under direct attack. The invasion of Egypt surprised Constantinople as much as it had surprised other imperial centers across Europe. Indeed, Finkel compared the French invasion of Egypt to the Russian fleet’s sudden appearance in the Aegean Sea and the subsequent 1770 naval losses at Çeşme, which had spurred the widespread Ottoman naval reforms under Gazi Hasan Pasha. She argued that the Porte simply was not expecting Egypt to fall to the Corsican general.\(^{178}\) However, the French ambassador to Constantinople had been informed of Bonaparte’s imminent invasion by the French Foreign Minister Talleyrand, and the Porte had grown suspicious in the weeks before Bonaparte’s arrival.

Nevertheless, the Directory was quite intent to keep news of their general’s plans out of British and as many North African hands as possible. After all, Bonaparte’s arrival at Alexandria had even surprised the majority of French soldiers; Cole noted that most of the general’s men boarded in Toulon without previous knowledge of their final destination. Needless to say, it surprised all the people on


\(^{178}\) Finkel, Osman’s Dream, 410.
Alexandrine shores as well. The Republican flotilla docked a few days after the arrival, and eviction, of the British fleet in Alexandria. The latter were turned away from the “sultan’s land”\textsuperscript{179} by the governor of Alexandria, Muhammed Kurayyim.

On Sunday, the 10th of Muharram of this year (June 24, 1798) letters came by messengers from the port of Alexandria reporting that on Thursday, the eighth, [June 22] 10 English ships came…They said they were English and had come in search of the French, who had set sail with a powerful fleet bound for an unknown destination: ‘We are not aware of their purpose, perhaps they will attack you and you will be unable to repel them and incapable of stopping them.’ Sayyid Muhammad Kurayyim did not believe what they said. Suspecting that this was trick, he answered them rudely. The English emissaries replied: ‘We shall stay on our ships at sea, guarding the harbor. We need nothing from you except provisions of water and supplies and food for which we shall pay.’ Their request however was not granted and they were told: ‘This is the sultan's land. Neither the French nor anyone else has access to it. So leave us alone!’ The English…went away and set sail to obtain supplies from shores other than Alexandria. ‘That God might determine a matter that was done,’ (8:44).\textsuperscript{180}

The renowned Egyptian chronicler, Abd al-Rahman Al-Jabarti’s wry use of Quranic scripture at the end of the quote was rather telling of his later experiences and impressions of the French and their habits during the invasion, and more importantly, of the destruction and turmoil that were to shortly follow. Having arrived in Alexandria, Napoleon’s fleet, like the British had warned Kurayyim, quickly overpowered the city’s defenses. By the following month, French troops had defeated Mamluk cavalrymen on the outskirts of Imbaba in Cairo. Egypt fell quickly into chaos.

**Seas and Sultans: The Ottoman Perspective**

Bonaparte had attempted to keep the details of his mission to Egypt as clandestine as possible. To aid the general in his effort, Talleyrand, the French Foreign Minister, became extremely evasive with the sultan’s ambassador in Paris,

\textsuperscript{179} Al-Jabarti, ‘\textit{Abd Al-Rahmān Al-Jabarti’s History of Egypt}, vol. 3, 1-2. 
\textsuperscript{180} Ibid.
Sayyid Ali Effendi. Talleyrand deflected the latter’s questions as much as possible in regards to Bonaparte’s intended mission and his gathering of troops in Toulon. This, in turn, meant that the information reaching Constantinople via official channels about the possibility of a French invasion was “at best confused.”

However, from French records it was clear that Talleyrand had written to Pierre Ruffin, the French emissary to Constantinople in early May of 1798 informing him of Bonaparte’s upcoming Egyptian occupation. Talleyrand argued that Bonaparte’s attack was directed at the Mamluks, not the sultan, and therefore should not result in a breakdown of diplomatic ties between Paris and Constantinople. He sent the letter on May 11, 1798. While these statements seem doubtful to modern-day scholars, neither Paris nor the Porte wanted a war with the other. Despite Ruffin’s attempts to keep news out of Ottoman hands, rumors were spreading.

By examining the Porte’s records, we see that on June 8, 1798, three weeks after Talleyrand’s letter left Paris and another three weeks before the French fleet docked in Alexandria, news had reached Selim III about the possibility of a French attack on Egypt. Officials in the high council had obtained news and reports of Napoleon’s proposed journey to Alexandria while the French fleet was still en route to Malta. In response, Ottoman authorities questioned Ruffin about the possibility of a French invasion. While Ruffin demurred, the high divan was nevertheless clearly aware of the possibility of an attack and made the sultan aware of the possibility. Why did the Porte not prepare better, or at least warn, Egypt of a potential invasion by

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182 Ibid.

183 HAT Dosya No:241 Gömlek No:13534.

184 HAT Dosya No:241 Gömlek No:13534.
the French? We may never be able to fully answer this question. However, what we
do know about the context of Ottoman-French relations at the turn of the century, as
well as internal dynamics of the Porte at the time, shed a clearer light on the position
of the Porte in the lead up to French invasion.

Constantinople’s main adversary in the previous decades was not republican
France, but rather imperial Russia. France on the other hand, had long been an ally to
the Porte. In his work on Napoleon, Dwyer went so far as to compare the
implausibility of the upcoming Russo-Ottoman alliance (with Great Britain) against
France “to Russia and the United States joining [forces] to fight China at the height of
the Cold War.”185 Admittedly, the Porte’s relations with revolutionary France was
much more amicable than with St. Petersburg. However, perhaps Dwyer’s claims
were slightly exaggerated, as they overlook the 1796 death of Catherine II, the
succession of her son Paul I, with his subsequent attempts at rapprochement with the
Porte. By 1798 diplomatic rumor mills were rife with French intrigues and admiration
for the rebel Osman Pasvandoğlu, an insurgent in Vidin who proactively agitated
against Ottoman control in the Balkans; and reports of his dealings with French
agents, by way of Russian officials in the region, always managed to reach
Constantinople.186 Paul was attempting to reframe Russians relations with the Porte.

It was not until September 11, 1798 over two months since Bonaparte’s troops
landed in Alexandria, long after news had reached the sultan, a full six weeks after the
British Admiral Nelson destroyed the French fleet at Aboukir, and after much urging
by both the English and Russian emissaries that the Porte finally declared war on
France. Ruffin, as well as the other members of the French diplomatic corps, were

185 Philip Dwyer, Napoleon: The Path to Power, 885.
186 ibid.
imprisoned in the fortress of Yedikule (Seven Towers.) Even then however, several important figures, such as the Grand Vizier, Cenaze Hasan Pasha, the Şeyhulislam, as well as other Europeanist reformers in the Porte remained vehemently opposed to the war with France.\(^{187}\)

Despite the relative disbelief that several Porte administrators maintained regarding the ongoing French aggression, the Ottomans were not the only officials to be taken aback by the behavior of their imperial counterparts. After all, Talleyrand himself wrote Ruffin, explicitly claiming that Bonaparte’s invasion was not against the sultan, but rather against the Mamluk governors of Egypt; and, more importantly, Bonaparte himself refused to believe the Porte’s declaration of war. By the end of October, the sultan’s \textit{firman}, or official decree, proclaiming war and calling on the Islamic obligation to fight against the invading French was being read in Friday prayers across Egypt. Still however, Bonaparte refused to accept the genuineness of the document.

Rather, the general wrote in his daily report from November 4\(^{th}\) that documents were forged by the Egyptian grandee, Ibrahim Bey, in an effort to rally the Egyptian people against the French.\(^{188}\) The general’s incredulity regarding the sultan’s war on the Republic would continue throughout the year. By mid-December, Bonaparte was still writing letters to the Grand Vizier in an attempt to intercede with the Porte.\(^{189}\) It seemed that for as disbelieving as the Porte was about the ongoing state of affairs in Egypt, French officials were right beside them in their utter denial.

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\(^{187}\) \textit{ibid.}

\(^{188}\) \textit{ibid.}, 3748.
propaganda efforts.

**Tunis and the Invasion**

Given the conflicting messages coming from both Constantinople and French forces in Cairo, the overall reticence of the sultan’s imperial council to declare war, and Bonaparte’s subsequent rejection of the Porte’s position, it was perhaps not surprising that the governors of Tunis and Tripoli were cautious and wary in their initial responses to the French invasion.

Records indicate however that the governor of Tunis, Hammuda Pasha, unlike his Tripolitan counterpart, had not been made aware by the Directory of Bonaparte’s plans for invasion. Upon being informed of the French mission in Egypt, the governor’s first response was to turn to the Ottoman center. Concerned for Tunisian trade with Europe and in the Levant, the bey immediately wrote to his agent in Constantinople. In turn, the bey’s representative informed him that upon the arrival of the French fleet, a squadron had left quickly for Constantinople, and that the Kapudan Pasha had been advised to leave Widdin (Vidin) immediately and to arm his ships.190 Devoize, the French consul to Tunis had originally hoped that Hammuda Pasha would support the French mission and, much like Tripoli, provide French troops with the livestock and provisions they needed in Malta and Egypt.191 However, this hope quickly evaporated as dissatisfaction and acrimony grew among the Tunisian elite towards French citizens in the province. Tunis, for as much as it relied on French ships to export her commodities and manufactured good, also had extensive commercial ties with Egypt. In fact, several of her merchants openly worried about

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191 ibid.
their investments in the province. Devoize, the French consul, wrote of the general tension, “day by day, the dissatisfied grow in number, and it rumored that over six-hundred Tunisian merchants have all their capital in Egypt.”192

Frictions were somewhat abated when Bonaparte released the North African captives from the Knights Hospitallers’ prisons in Malta in the summer of 1798. The general then asked the provinces to release any and all Venetian and Maltese captives they held. Bonaparte considered them to then be “subjects of France.”193 While the dey of Algiers quickly dismissed this request,194 Tunis’s Hammuda Pasha stood the most to gain from the prisoner exchange, as over four hundred of the six hundred released captives were Tunisian subjects. In response, he allowed for the release of sixty-four Maltese prisoners from his jails.195 Nevertheless, this was at best a temporary reprieve, as tensions continued to grow throughout the summer.

By September, the consul Devoize placed all French citizens in Tunis under curfew. They were ordered to return to the French national house, the fundouk, by nine in the evening so as to remain under guard throughout the night.196 By the end of the month, on September 25, an emissary from the Porte with three firmans, one for each of the provinces, “asking that they remain on their guard and defy the French who had invaded Egypt.”197 This forced an end to all French commercial activities in the province as it kept the Republic’s diplomatic circle behind their protected walls.

While sources indicate that Hammuda Pasha, unlike his Tripolitan counterpart,
was unaware of Bonaparte’s expedition, we also know from these sources that the intelligence networks of the North African *corso* were central to the various intelligence gathering resources of both European and, as we shall see below, Ottoman networks. In fact, Devoize, unlike Ruffin, his counterpart in Constantinople, was not privy to Bonaparte’s secret plans by way of the French Foreign Minister. Rather, the French consul to Tunis obtained news of the Egyptian expedition through information circulating among the province’s corsairs after the French fleet docked in Malta.

Immediately, Devoize began a flurried correspondence with the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Talleyrand, and attempted to keep the Minister abreast of news and information through the very same networks of Tunisian corsairs. The information relayed back to the Directory was so useful that Talleyrand wrote to the consul thanking him for efforts and urging him to continue to gather as much news as possible for Paris. Ben Tahar discussed the dependence of the Tunisians, as well as the French, on news from the corsair networks.

…[C]onsular correspondence suggests that the Tunisian government was regularly informed—maybe even better than the French government—about the situation in the Mediterranean. Without being masters of the Mediterranean, the Barbary corsairs, especially Tunisians, ‘that cover the sea,’ constituted a first class information network for the government of the Regency. The foreign policy of Hammuda Pasha Bey was indeed, as we know, largely determined by the information, which reached him through his representatives (wakil) in Alexandria, Izmir, Tripoli and Malta. Collected in all ports of the Mediterranean, the military and political information were used by the authorities in Tunis to guide their strategy with regard to any event likely to related to Tunisian interests.\(^\text{198}\)

\(^{198}\) Jamel Ben Tahar, “Les stratégies de la Régence de Tunis durant l’expédition d’Égypte,” 3/9; Talleyrand, Minister of Foreign Affairs, clearly recognize in a letter to Devoize, dated September 19, 1799: “Thank you for the news you sent me on the General Bonaparte and operations. I urge you to maintain the intelligences, to have Malta, Egypt and Levant, all the news we receive in this port. ”12. Original French text: « La suite des événements, telle qu’elle ressort de la correspondance consulaire, suggère que le gouvernement tunisien était régulièrement informé – peut-être même mieux que le gouvernement français – de la situation en Méditerranée.
Caution Turns to War

However, these early months of caution, tension and political ambiguity would soon change. Imperial centers, Ottoman, French and British alike needed the support of the provinces in order to actualize their political objectives. By the end of year, the Ottoman Porte had secured the support of both the beys of Tunis and Tripoli, and correspondingly governors responded positively and acted on the Porte’s requests. A dispatch submitted to the sultan in the winter of 1798 informed him that Tripoli had cast six corsair ships off her harbor in an attempt to target and intercept French packet ships and interrupt Bonaparte’s sea lines of communication. From this same document we learn of the Porte’s concern regarding a potential invasion of Tripoli, and the casting of two gunships and a frigate towards Toulon’s harbor, with the possibility of sending more vessels if necessary. The Tripolitan governor had responded positively to the Porte’s request for assistance.

In doing so, Yusuf Pasha demonstrated the paradoxical nature of his relationship with the Porte. On one hand, we have a situation where the governor clearly allied with the French in a planned invasion of neighboring Egypt, securing supply and communication lines through his territory. Yet, on the other, we see from Ottoman records that his fleet was actively undermining the same French communication lines that he was supposed to protect. Moreover, not only had he

Sans être les maîtres de la Méditerranée, les corsaires barbaresques, tunisiens notamment, « qui couvrent cette mer », constituaient un réseau d’information de premier ordre pour le gouvernement de la Régence. La politique extérieure de Hammûda pacha bey était du reste, on le sait, largement déterminée par les informations qui lui parvenaient de ses représentants (wakîl) à Alexandrie, Izmir, Tripoli ou Malte. Recueillis dans tous les ports de la Méditerranée, ces renseignements militaires et politiques étaient utilisés par les autorités de Tunis pour guider leur stratégie à l’égard de tout événement susceptible de toucher aux intérêts tunisiens. »

199 HAT Dosya No: 89 Gömlek: 3651
200 Ibid.
supplied six ships, which as we shall see below was the same number as his Tunisian counterpart, but he was willing to further employ his maritime fleet in the service of the sultan and was proactively sending reports to the Porte regarding the status of the ongoing Egyptian crisis.

While it was clear that the governor of Tripoli was effectively playing both sides of the fence during the French invasion, his efforts to do so are particularly interesting because he was under no obligation to help the sultan. After all, the Porte was hardly in a position to remove him from power if the Tripolitan bey refused to assist the Ottoman war effort. The high council was far too preoccupied with the occupation Egypt. Yusuf could have seized the opportunity— much like Osman Pasvandoğlu, his counterpart in the Balkans— to rebel against Selim III and act as the independent sovereign of Tripoli. However, the Tripolitan bey chose not to.

We also know from the Porte’s records that Tunis was active in the Ottoman war effort. The same report that notified Selim III of Tripolitan aid in limiting French communication lines also discussed the role of Tunis, and Hammuda Pasha’s involvement, in assisting the Porte. Much like his Tripolitan neighbor, the Tunisian bey was preparing six war ships, armed with his corsairs, to limit French tactical support to Bonaparte in Egypt. Additionally, we see that the bey of Tunis was gathering information, likely through the very same corsair intelligence networks, to send to Constantinople. Further, the beys of Tunis and Tripoli agreed that all documents, French parcels and letters would be sent directly to Constantinople.201 From Ottoman records preserved in Istanbul we can see that the Porte’s call for support from the two North African provinces— and more importantly the proactive

201 ibid.
reaction of Tunis and Tripoli to the requests—offers important insights into the ongoing political relationship between the Ottoman center and two of its western most territories. In an act of further solidarity with the Ottoman Porte, Tunis officially ratified its support on January 3, 1799 by declaring war on France.

To inform the French, Hammuda Pasha requested an audience with the Republic’s consul. Devoize met the governor on the Bardo Palace. The consul was accompanied by Hammuda Pasha’s former ambassador to France, Mohammed Khodja and provided an escort of fifty cavalrymen and two aghas to protect him from the insults or attacks of the people on the journey. Upon arrival, the French flag was lowered. French diplomats were placed under house arrest in their consular houses of the funduk. Hammuda Pasha, following Algiers’s lead, declared war on the French Republic. This official break in diplomatic relations was a significant shift for the French in the province. In the previous months, the bey had attempted to maintain a pragmatic relationship with the French, and even expressed a measure of contrition when notifying Devoize of his declaration. However, Hammuda Pasha remained quite loyal to his ties with the Ottoman Porte. In fact, more French citizens in Tunisia would ultimately be detained than any of their counterparts in Tripoli or in Algiers.

The French community in Tunis was held under house arrest for nearly eighteen months. This was exceptionally long given the one-month confinement of their counterparts in Tripoli and Algiers. However, in her treatment of the broader French-Tunisian relations throughout the Egyptian occupation, Moalla turned to two contemporary sources that echoed one another in their interpretation of Tunis’s role in the Ottoman war effort. Specifically, she cited Alphonse Rousseau’s Annales 202 Plantet, Correspondance des beys de Tunis, Vol 3, 28 August, 1798, 371-373. 203 Moalla, The Regency of Tunis and the Ottoman Porte, 1774-1814, 61.
tunisiennes, ou aperçu historique de la Régence de Tunis and the notable Tunisian chronicler, Bin Diyaf’s *Itḥāf ahl al-zamān bi-akhbār mulūk Tūnis wa ‘Ahd al-Amān* to argue that “the Regency had no active involvement in the war. No attacks were carried out by Tunisian corsairs against French ships during the war.”

French consular records as well as Ottoman imperial records mentioned above and in the following sections suggest otherwise. Records from the Sublime Porte indicate that Tunisian ships were actively engaged in Ottoman efforts against the French even before Hammuda Pasha’s declaration of war in January of 1799. In his published volume of French consular records with Tripolitan officials, Plantet also demonstrated otherwise. Writing on behalf of Bonaparte, Commodore Ganteaume wrote directly to Hammuda Pasha:

> The great, incomparable general Bonaparte… has restored the ties of friendship, which had existed for so long between Tunisia and France. Why then do your corsairs come every day to insult our flag, continue to capture our ships and those of our allies that carry subsistence meant for [our] armies? These last days [alone,] two transports carrying provisions for French [troops] on the island of Elba were caught in the Piombino channel. A small corvette of the Republic was [also] challenged head on at the same time and place. These hostilities must cease. I know […Bonaparte…] does not want to make war with you, because he is your friend and because his anger would be terrible for you and your country; but he wishes [his] respect be reciprocated; that you respect the flag of the Republic, that of its allies, its ships, and especially, that you no longer continue to take provisions intended for our troops.

This explicit and detailed letter was sent directly to the governor of the Tunisian province and clearly indicated that his corsairs were in fact targeting both French supply and gunships. Therefore, based on both Ottoman and French records, this chapter argues that Tunisian corsairs did in fact participate in the broader Ottoman efforts against the French during the time of the Egyptian occupation. This

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204 ibid.
205 Commodore Ganteaume to Hammuda Pasha of Tunis on May 28, 1801. For full text of the letter, see Eugène Plantet, *Correspondance des beys de Tunis*, vol. 3.
letter was sent while the French were still in Egypt and before the Porte officially ceased its war efforts against France. The Tunisian attacks on French vessels took place after the Tunisian governor officially restored peace with the Republic, thus demonstrating that Hammuda Pasha’s system of alliances was much more complicated than previously imagined. Moreover, Commodore Ganteaume clearly indicated that the attacks from late May were not the only assaults on French ships on the part of Tunisian corsairs. It seems that Tunisian mariners, acting on the part of the bey, were intentionally targeting Republican vessels.

The attacks on French vessels were motivated by economic self-interest, rather than by an act of political solidarity with the Porte. However, given the ongoing hostilities in the Mediterranean Sea at the time, Tunin’s demonstrable assistance to the Sublime Porte throughout the invasion, Hammuda Pasha’s consistent communication with Constantinople during the crisis, Devoize’s growing despair at the conditions of French diplomats in the province, as well as the tacit, but flippant, disregard of the official French-Tunisian peace accord mentioned above, this chapter demonstrates that the reality of French-Tunisian alliance during 1798 was largely artifice.

One could argue that the delay in the compilation of both Rousseau and Bin Diyaf’s chronicles may account for some of this historical discrepancy. Rousseau’s work was first published in 1832. Bin Diyaf’s eight-volume chronicle was written after the fact, from firsthand accounts of sources that were familiar with the events. Bin Diyaf, a Tunisian reformist who came from a notable family and who had access and ongoing relationships with individuals at the highest levels of the province’s

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government before and after French occupation is widely regarded as historical chronicler of Tunis. As such, his claims have remained largely unchallenged in his accounts of events at the turn of the nineteenth century. Given the delayed time of their inscription, it is understandable that they would be more prone to historical error—as their narratives were recorded several decades after the events they described. While the merits of these sources and especially of Bin Diyaf, who is in still considered Tunisia’s national historian, are irrefutable and the chronicles are in of themselves an important historical record, their claims about the turn of the nineteenth century are not above critical analysis.

As Tahar and several others have noted, Bin Diyaf considered himself a reformer much in the vein of Egypt’s Rifa’a al-Tahtawi and his later counterpart Khair ul-Din al-Tunisi. In his writings, Bin Diyaf heralded Bonaparte’s Egyptian occupation as a watershed moment that introduced modernity to the region. While this view has since been largely dismissed, albeit relatively recently, as an orientalist trope in western academia, it nevertheless very much guided Bin Diyaf in his understanding of events and his framing of history. Therefore, I argue that he had a very specific reason for promoting a glossy, amicable interpretation of the historical relationship between Tunis and France, as he viewed the events with an (overly) generous gaze of ‘development.’ In fact, Tahar explicitly wrote:

For the reformers [like Bin Diyaf] ... the Egyptian expedition was the starting point of an [regional] awareness of the instrumental superiority of Europe to the whole of the Muslim world ... references to the glorious past of Islam and the present of the Europe led them to adopt the ideas of the French Revolution, including concepts of civilization and homeland. In contrast to the reformist ideology, the reaction of the contemporaries of the event, in this case the powers of Tunis, was to consider the French expansion in the Mediterranean as a danger and a threat to the regional balance. That efforts should be taken to preserve the interests of [Tunis] and those of a social class which had links and close ties with France as well as with Egypt and the Sublime Porte. Tunis
Powers were thus in a paradoxical position ... between 1798 and 1801.\textsuperscript{207}

When read alongside Colla’s analysis of the two-hundred-year commemoration of the invasion among Egyptian scholars within Egypt, we see a corresponding parallel in the subsequent interpretation of history. One where North African nationalists eventually took up the banner of the early reformists, such as Bin Diyaf, and “were willing to suppress some of the negative aspects of the French Expedition so as to construct an image of benevolent exchange.”\textsuperscript{208} Therefore, the post-colonial nationalist retooling of 1798 within Tunisian history has, much like its Egyptian counterpart, embedded the invasion within a framework ‘exchange’ and ‘insight’ rather than in the contemporary discourse of political threat and imperial bloodshed.

The well-argued premise of Moalla’s work was intended to deconstruct the Tunisian ‘autonomy thesis,’ which regarded the province is working largely independently of the Porte. Thus, the fact that she did not further challenge Bin Diyaf’s readings of Tunisian-French interactions is even more surprising, especially given her careful analysis of Hammuda Pasha’s extended incarceration of French citizens in Tunis and her extensive use of Plantet.\textsuperscript{209} However, she too struggled with her interpretation of Bin Diyaf and his historical accuracy. The author wrote, “[t]he

\textsuperscript{207} Ben Tahar, "L’expédition de Bonaparte vue d’Égypte," 161-2. Original French text « Pour les réformateurs… l’expédition d’Égypte était le point de départ d’une prise de conscience de la supériorité matérielle de l’Europe sur l’ensemble du monde musulman… référence au passé glorieux de l’islam et au présent de l’Europe, les conduisit à adopter les idées de la Révolution française, notamment les concepts de civilisation et de patrie. À l’opposé de cette idéologie réformiste, la réaction des contemporains de l’événement, en l’occurrence les Puissances de Tunis, fut plutôt de considérer l’expansion française en Méditerranée comme un danger et une modification de l’équilibre régional, dont il fallait tenir compte pour préserver les intérêts de la Régence et ceux d’une classe sociale qui avait des liens et des rapports étroits aussi bien avec la France qu’avec l’Égypte et la Sublime Porte. Les Puissances de Tunis se trouvaient ainsi dans une position paradoxe…entre 1798 et 1801. »

\textsuperscript{208} Elliott Colla, "Non, non! Si, si!": Commemorating the French Occupation of Egypt (1798-1801), \textit{MLN}, Vol. 118, No. 4, French Issue (2003): 1046.

\textsuperscript{209} Moalla, \textit{The Regency of Tunis and the Ottoman Porte}, 1774-1814, 58-62.
authority enjoyed by Ibn Abī’l Diyāf among contemporary historians explains why the version thus presented by him of a lip-service war declaration against France by the Tunisian authorities has been accepted without discussion.”210 It is only with access to Ottoman records, as well as the Tunisian and French sources that Moalla very successfully analyzed, that one can piece together a more holistic view of Hammuda Pasha’s interaction with the French and the Porte during the French invasion. In fact, this regional retooling of the French invasion, both within, and beyond the borders of Egypt, seeks in and of itself of a socio-intellectual thread that bound the three provinces, and the histories, of Tunis, Tripoli, and Egypt together.

**Tripoli and the Invasion**

It was perhaps not surprising that the covert alliance between Yusuf Pasha and Bonaparte did not remain secret for long. British forces maintained a sharp eye on the Alexandrine harbor and quickly turned their attentions back to Egypt after their previous expulsion by the city’s governor. After the destruction of the French fleet by British forces in August of 1798, the British were eager to remove French forces from Egypt and urged the Porte to declare war on France. By March 1799, through the very same Tunisian networks that Hammuda Pasha and Devoize were using in Tunis, Yusuf’s alliance with Bonaparte became widely known. Then British flag officer, Viscount Nelson, wrote to Tripoli:

> Reports have reached me from Tunis, and also by intercepted French letter from Malta, that your Highness has renounced the deference of the true [Muslim] faith, and joined in a new alliance with the French infidels, who are endeavoring to overthrow the Ottoman Empire…. I have, therefore, sent a ship to receive not only the contradiction of this report from your Highness’s own hand, but also an assurance that you will use every exertion for the destruction of that band of robbers, who have so wantonly attacked the Grand Signior in part of his Dominions where they thought to have found no opposition. I beg leave also to acquaint your Highness, that the French in Malta pretend

210 ibid., 61.
that your subjects will supply them with provisions: this I believe to be equally false with the other reports. As the subject of a Sovereign who is in the closest alliance with the Sublime Porte for the defence [sic] of the Ottoman Empire, and being also in alliance with your Highness, I shall anxiously wait your Highness’s answer; for should evil councilors have abused the goodness of your heart, I beg leave, with all respect, to offer the Victor of the Nile as the mediator between your Highness and the Sublime Porte: for it will be my duty to join with the Admiral of the Ottoman Fleet in chastising those enemies of the True Faith and of the Grand Signior, who have so much betrayed the trust your Highness hath reposed in them.  

This remarkable letter offers several insights into the contemporary events on the ground. Ut is clear that British officials, as well as their French counterparts, were reliant on the Tunisian corsair intelligence networks, so much so that a rumor of province’s alliance with the French was enough to cause concern among influential figures in the British navy. In effect, records indicate that all of the major imperial powers of the Mediterranean: Ottoman, English and French were reliant to varying degrees on corsair information. The letter reveals why Yusuf Pasha was perhaps so eager to align with the French in the first place: an alliance with revolutionary France would hoist Tripoli into the political considerations of the major maritime powers in the Mediterranean. If he was allied with one, then he effectively had the attention of the other, as well as that of the sultan in Constantinople. In response to the letter, Yusuf was quick to deny the allegations in a letter to Nelson, although he continued to supply foodstuffs to French forces during their occupation of Egypt.

The following month, in April 1799, Selim III sent Yusuf an elaborately crafted caftan and a firman that declared him “the generalissimo of all Ottoman troops

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212 Muhammad ʻAbd al-Karim al-Wâfî, Yûsuf Bashâ al-Qaramânli wa-al-ḥamlah al-Faransîyah ʻalá Mîṣr, 13, 103-121.
which likely assuaged whatever remaining insecurities the Tripolitan had in regards to the influential navies of Tunis and Algiers. The firman requested Tripoli’s aid in allowing the Porte’s ships, loaded with maritime and military supplies, to reach British Commodore Ball, who was in charge of the blockade against French forces in Malta. In return for the recognition from Constantinople, Yusuf confined the French consul as well as the entire French diplomatic corps in their residences in the city walls, effectively putting them under house arrest. This information is confirmed by British consular reports, on the 4th of July, 1799 Simon Lucas wrote “your grace that on the 29th of that this Bashaw ordered the French flag to be struck and declared war with that Nation in imitation of the other Barbary states, and on a visit which I made to him a few days after, he assured me that nothing but his love and regard for the English who he looked upon as the best”. By spring of 1799, all three of the regencies were officially at war with the French.

Shortly after declaring war on the French Republic, Yusuf Karamanlı leveraged Tripoli’s geopolitical centrality to further entrench the province within the Ottoman war efforts against his French ally. With Egypt occupied by French forces, the northern coastline of Tripolitania could be used as a strategic hub in Ottoman efforts to regain control of Egypt. The kapudan pasha, the Grand Admiral of the Ottoman fleet, Küçük Hüseyin, headquartered the Ottoman flotilla on the island of Corfu and looked to the North African provinces to supply local men for a standing army that was to be sent to Cairo. Derna, meanwhile, the small port-city on the

214 ibid.
215 ibid.
216 ibid. 4th of July 1799, 118.
217 ibid.; Shaw, Between the Old and New; HAT Dosya No :85 Gömlek No :3479 108
eastern end of the Tripolitan province, became the headquarters and training ground for this Ottoman army, which was comprised exclusively North African ground troops.\textsuperscript{218}

As the Ottoman Porte was attempting to assemble a new army in Derna, it called on Tripoli, Tunis and Algiers to supply Constantinople with men. The provinces looked to each other for the finally tally in the militants that each governor provided. While Yusuf Pasha promised the Porte 10,000 Tripolitan soldiers,\textsuperscript{219} he held back their deployment so as to see how many men his counterparts in Algiers and Tunis would provide before committing troops of his own. This caution had two motivations: first, he was reluctant to provide the sultan with more troops than his western neighbors. Second, he was interested to see how Tunis and Algiers were benefiting from the competing imperial interests in the region.\textsuperscript{220} Time and time again, Tripoli and Tunis turned to one another, as well as to Egypt and Algiers, to strategize their political decisions.

The continuous theme that emerged when analyzing Tripoli’s relation to the Porte, and the French occupation was that despite Yusuf’s seemingly clear-cut alliance with Bonaparte, after the actual arrival of French fleet in Egypt, the region’s \textit{realpolitik} took precedence. North African governors were concerned about a major shift in the regional power and how it would affect their territory and their shores. The \textit{bey} of Tripoli was as willing as the governors of Tunis and Algiers to provide the sultan with the manpower needed to fight the French with whom he had allied. This adaptable and at times conflicting system of alliances explains how the regencies of

\textsuperscript{218} ibid.
\textsuperscript{219} ibid, 28.
\textsuperscript{220} Ibid, 42-3.
Tripoli and Tunis negotiated their position within the world of much bigger empires across the Mediterranean and that alliances were far more flexible than previously imagined. This system of paradoxes operated in between Tripoli’s relations with the Porte, as well as its relationships among more influential provinces, such as Tunis and Egypt. However, very soon, despite Yusuf’s difficult ties to Constantinople, the region, and Egypt, his immediate concerns would focus on the eastern realm of his province and a different sort of threat—that of his deposed older brother, Ahmad.

After Yusuf Pasha overthrew his older brother Ahmad Pasha and assumed control of the province in 1795, the new governor offered his sibling a choice: exile or the governorship of the eastern port city of Derna. Ahmad Pasha chose the latter. However, while we know from British consular records that Yusuf assumed power “to the great joy of all his loving subjects,”221 historical records remain unclear about Ahmad Pasha’s historical trajectory. Abun Nasr wrote that rather than go to Derna, the deposed pasha diverted his ship first to Malta, and then traveled to Tunis where he remained under the protection of Hammuda Pasha until briefly returning to Derna in 1804.222 Again, in a moment of crisis, it was Ahmad Pasha’s sense of regionalism that underscored his decision to seek refuge in Tunis, under Hammuda Pasha.

It is difficult to precisely trace Ahmad Pasha’s movements after his exile. We know from American sources that by March 1802, the former governor had long since left his Tunisian exile and was in Malta.223 Sources also inform us that Ahmad Pasha continued to build support among Tripolitans throughout the course of exile, and

221 FO 161/10 Lucas to Messrs, Turnbull, Forbes & Co. June 20, 1795.
might have clandestinely traveled back to Derna in an effort to secure his base.\textsuperscript{224} By the time Ahmad eventually returned he “placed himself at the head of an army of Arabs at Derna and had gained some considerable advantages in the field over the army of [his brother.]”\textsuperscript{225} What is clear was that Ahmad Pasha remained closely tied to the community of Derna and looked to eastern Tripolitania for support.

This is particularly compelling since Derna was the headquarters and training ground for the Kapudan Pasha and his army of North African recruits. While Ottoman sources do not indicate an explicit effort by the Porte to recruit the deposed pasha into their campaign against the French during his earlier years of exile, we do know that Ahmad Pasha held a great deal of influence with the Ouwald Ali tribe near Derna, the same cavalrymen who Ottoman records indicate were actively recruited to fight against French forces outside Alexandria.\textsuperscript{226}

\textbf{Tunis, Tripoli and the Porte}

While both Bonaparte and Nelson had been eager to sway Tripoli to their respective war efforts, and while revolutionary France and Great Britain both relied on Tunisian intelligence in their various maritime efforts, these two powers were in no way the only imperial forces with a very sharp eye fixed on the North African coast. After the shock of the French invasion set in, Constantinople’s strategies also turned to North Africa in the wake of territorial occupation.

By examining Ottoman records of the invasion, we see that the Porte’s interest in and reliance on the North African regencies extended beyond the first, politically turbulent months of the French occupation. Throughout the conflict between

\textsuperscript{224} Ibid, 264.
\textsuperscript{225} Ibid, 265.
\textsuperscript{226} Ibid.
Constantinople and the Republic, we see that Tunisian and Tripolitan vessels were routinely involved in Porte’s efforts against the French. For example, on August 9, 1799 Selim III was notified of a communiqué from the Kapudan Pasha Küçük Hüseyin to the Grand Vizier, Kör Yusuf Ziyaüddin Pasha, regarding dispatching Awlad Ali cavalrymen to Alexandria to fight the French. Similarly, on October 5, 1799 a naval report that was copied to the sultan indicated that a Tunisian ship used by Ottoman forces in defense of Abukir Castle had been damaged in battle. In response the Ottoman customs official of Alexandria, Üsküdarlı Hüseyin allocated thirty silver coins from the reserve for damages. Meanwhile, military reports from the end of the month indicate that Yusuf Pasha’s officer continued to transmit information back and forth [gidip gelen] between the bey in Tripoli and the Ottoman Porte.

Ottoman records confirm details concerning the provinces’ relationships with the French after they declared war in the early days of 1799. In a war report from March 26, 1800 we see that the emissary of Tunis was detained, along with his translators and staff, in France. In response, Hammuda Pasha had his corsairs prepare the fleet. They were ordered that upon any contact with French ships, they were not to burn or sink the ships, but bring them to the provinces for the judgment of the bey.

From the Porte’s records we can see that Constantinople kept a very close eye on the maritime pursuits of the provinces themselves. The bey of Tunis had written to the Sublime Porte informing officials that he had warned his corsairs against

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227 HAT Dosya No:85 Gömlek No:3479  
228 C.BH Dosya No:209 Gömlek No:9742 and HAT Dosya No:1474 Gömlek No:16  
229 C.AS Dosya No:643 Gömlek No:27064  
230 C.HR Dosya No:54 Gömlek No:2655
approaching any English or Austrian ships off his waters.\textsuperscript{231} This report, which updated the center about the ongoing affairs of the Tunisian province, and was copied to the sultan, indicated that at the highest level of government, Ottoman officials were extremely interested in the affairs of the regencies. Similarly, in a war report from October 18, 1800 we learn that three Russian-owned ships were captured off the coast of Sardinia by Tunisian corsairs. While the Porte and St. Petersburg were allied in their efforts against the French, the vessels under discussion were not flying the Russian imperial ensign. Mehmed Reis, a captain for Hammuda Pasha, commandeered the ships and sailed back to the province. However, a Russian official traveled to Tunis to reclaim the ships and cargo. Rather than risk a diplomatic incident, Hammuda Pasha ordered that the Russian captain to be reimbursed for his loss and provided him with some updates, likely gathered from his corsairs, about trade in the region.\textsuperscript{232}

\textbf{Seas and Sand: Tripoli and Egypt}

The classic text on the Egyptian perspective of the French invasion has long been al-Jabarti’s chronicle, \textit{Ajā’ib al-āthār fi ‘l-tarājim wa-‘l-akhbār}. This work has been mined extensively for historical information on the Egyptian notables’ experiences of the invasion, and specifically for the Cairene scholar’s perceptions of the invading French forces. However, little work has contextualized this key text in the broader North African world. This is a curious omission as al-Jabarti made extensive mention of the role of North Africans and specifically, Tripolitans, in daily Egyptian life, as well as in various efforts against the invading French, and especially in regards to the close social, religious and intellectual ties among the provinces’

\textsuperscript{231} HAT Dosya No:164 Gömlek No:6848  
\textsuperscript{232} C:H.R Dosya No:113 Gömlek No:5647
elites.

In the first pages of al-Jabarti’s Volume III, which opens with the French docking in Alexandria, we see that news of the French invasion had just reached Cairo and the Mamluks, the province’s de facto governors, were preparing their attack. Upon receiving this news, Murad Bey, a Mamluk commander and a governor of Egypt, immediately began to prepare for battle with the French. He was joined in his efforts by two “intimate friends living with him in Giza:” Nasif Pasha and Ali Pasha al-Tarabulusi 233

Ali Pasha al-Tarabulusi accompanied Murad Bey, first in his battles against Bonaparte’s forces in Cairo and later in Upper Egypt, as a close confidant of the governor and, on several occasions, paid Egyptian and North African soldiers out of his own pocket to facilitate their efforts against the invasion.234 In a twist of fate, further interweaving the history of the provinces together, Ali Pasha al-Tarabulusi was none other than Ali Burghol, the Georgian corsair who had seized Tripoli from Karamanlı rule in 1793. The fact that he chose to fight with the Mamluks spoke to a sense of regional loyalty in the face of invasion. This is particularly important, since, Ottoman forces did not arrive on Egyptian soil until the late spring of 1801. Moreover, Burghol’s time with Murad Bey and their efforts against the French would not be the end of the former corsair’s ambition or days in power.

In fact, it is from al-Jabarti’s chronicle that we learn what happened to Ali Burghol after he was forced out of Tripoli by Tunisian forces in 1795. al-Jabarti’s quote is far too rich to not include in its entirety.

… he was Algerian in origin, a Mamluk of Muhammad Pasha ruler of Algeria. When Muhammad Pasha died his son-in-law took his place and sent

Ali with a message to [Küçük] Husayn Kapudan Pasha... the kapudan pasha praised him highly and awarded him the governorship of Tripoli, giving him firman and weapons. Ali Pasha went there, recruited troops and ships for himself and made an attack on its ruler, who was the brother of Hammuda Pasha, ruler of Tunis. He waged war against him for some months, and finally got possession of the land through the collusion of its inhabitants, since they knew that he was the rightful ruler on behalf of the Ottoman state. Hammuda Pasha’s brother fled to his brother in Tunis. When Ali Pasha took possession of Tripoli, he gave it over to his soldiery, and they committed deeds of pillage, rape, immorality and whoring viler and more repulsive than those of the hordes of Tamerlane. He captured the ruler’s women, took them prisoners and had them dishonored by his soldiers. Then he demanded money from the people, and seized the property of the merchants, levied a tax on the inhabitants, and sized their property. The deposed official gathered a force together and returned to Tripoli and besieged it on all sides. Those of the town who regretted his departed and those who had suffered at the hands of Ali Pasha rose with him and when the later saw his defeat was imminent, he took to his ships with all the wealth and treasure he amassed.

He took hostage two handsome youths from among the sons of the notables and fled to Alexandria. Reaching Cairo, he took refuge with Murad Bey, who received him and showed him the great hospitality in his home in Giza. They became intimate friends. The cause of Ali Pasha’s coming to Cairo and his not returning to the Kapudan pasha was that he knew that he had become hateful in the eyes of the government, for it was a rule of the Ottoman government that whenever they appointed anyone governor of a province and he was unsuccessful they hated him, deposed him and very often killed him, especially if he was wealthy. In 1207 (1792-3) [Ali Pasha] went on pilgrimage by way of al-Qulzum, and deposited his treasures with Rashwan Kashif, known as the kashif of the Fayyum, because of the relationship existing between them in their own country.

When he reached the Hijaz, and the pilgrims from Tripoli arrived, they saw him accompanied by the two youths [held hostage] and went to the Syrian amir al-hajj and told him about ‘Ali Pasha, [that he] has the two youths, and that he used them for shameful purposes.’ So, he sent off a troop of his retainers with them during a time when he was off his guard, and they trapped him in a careless moment and discovered him sleeping with one of the youths. The Tripolitans reviled him and cursed him, cut off his beard, and assaulted him with their weapons, wounding him severely. They insulted him and took the two youths from him, and almost killed him, had it not been for a troop from the forces of the amir al-hajj. Afterwards, ‘Ali Pasha returned to Egypt by sea, and stayed as the guest of Murad Bey for more than six years until the French arrived in Egypt. He fought on the side of the [Mamluks] and went into exile with them in Upper Egypt and beyond... Ali Pasha was fair-complexioned, with an immense blond beard and mustaches. He spoke little Arabic. He loved pleasure and dissolute living[.]

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Al-Jabarti’s retelling of the life of Ali Burghol provides us with some key insights into how the news of the former corsair circulated among the elite circles with whom Al-Jabarti interacted. This impression overlaps with the one presented in Ottoman and Tripolitan sources, while simultaneously differing in key components. First, in a manner similar to the chronicles in the Tunisian Bin Diyaf’s writings, we see how oftentimes, historical fact and legend are interwoven in the narrative of chroniclers when they are not themselves present during the history they were writing about.

For example, as noted previously, Ali Burghol was Georgian, not Algerian in descent. As al-Jabarti wrote, Burghol could have easily joined a Mamluk household while a mariner in Algiers; unfortunately, we do not know this for certain from the primary sources that remain. What we do learn from al-Jabarti was that Burghol chose, like Gazi Hasan before him, to quasi-adopt his Algerian training as a means of identifying himself. Perhaps it was an attempt to model himself after the notable Kapudan Pasha or perhaps having purported North African roots served another purpose. However, given the Georgian ties and patronage networks of several of the Egyptian Mamluks and Porte officials perhaps it was to distance himself from his Caucasian counterparts.

Regardless, it was first Gazi Hasan who took Ali Burghol under his protection while serving under Sultan Abdul Hamid I. Küçük Hüseyin only begrudgingly supported Ali Burghol’s mission to Tripoli because his predecessor’s name and support continued to hold sway after the admiral’s death. It certainly was not because Küçük Hüseyin “praised [Burghol] highly” that he or Selim III provided him with the
*firman* to oust the Karamanlı dynasty from power. However, the internal rupture in the Porte between the supporters of Gazi Hasan and the supporters of Küçük Hüseyin, was strongly felt across the provinces.

Moreover, Ali Karamanlı, then the bey of Tripoli, was not the brother of Hammuda Pasha in Tunis. The Karamanlıs descended from *kuloğlus*, the local administrators who were born of Ottoman janissaries and Tripolitan women. Meanwhile the Muradid dynasty of Tunis were the decedents of a Corsican renegade, Jacque Senti, who was captured and bought by the first dey of Tunis as a Mamluk during the sixteenth century and adopted the name Murad I. Lastly, Ali Burghol did not sever all ties with the Ottoman Porte despite his and his men’s debauchery during his rule in Tripoli. Rather, he eventually became a close confidant of the Ottoman Grand Vizier, Kör Yusuf before his eventual downfall at the hands of the Mamluk cavalrymen with whom he fought.

It is also worth analyzing Burghol’s repeated salvation by Murad Bey. Effectively, Murad offered the former corsair sanctuary twice: first, after the Georgian corsair fled Tripoli in 1795, and then again after he was attacked by the Tripolitan mob outside Mecca, each time after Burghol endured a brutal and humiliating defeat when his options were likely limited. What benefit the Mamluk grandee gained from repeatedly sparing Burghol’s life remains unknown. Al-Jabarti referred to the men as ‘intimate’ friends on several instances, but did not elaborate on how they knew one another. This is interesting since al-Jabarti was voracious in attacks against his adversaries and was not particularly fond of either of the men. In fact, he repeatedly laced his descriptions of both Murad Bey and Burghol with a great degree of

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236 *ibid.*
rancor. Nevertheless, his text remained silent and his description of Burghol’s relationship with Murad’s household—and at least in reference to the corsair’s time with the Mamluks—was quite evenhanded. In any case, we are left to wonder what political benefit they served one another, if they were distant relatives, lovers, childhood acquaintances, the strongest of allies or any combination there within; and more importantly, what the ruler of Egypt had to gain by keeping Burghol alive. While the records do not indicate an explicit reason for the depth of the relationship between the two men, it is clear that they was a sense of loyalty between them.

In addition to the rich detail concerning Tripolitan officials, al-Jabarti’s chronicle also provides us with key insights into the history of elite Tripolitan scholars as well as common people in various neighborhoods in Cairo during the French invasion. For example, al-Jabarti made careful mention of the clergy of al-Azhar and their eagerness to establish contact with the French General. To facilitate this exchange, the clergy called upon a prominent Tripolitan merchant, Mohammed Effendi al-Faydali, to serve as their emissary with the French. In this moment of crisis, it is very significant that the clergy of al-Azhar turned not to an Egyptian, but to a Tripolitan to serve as their representative with the invading forces. I argue that this gesture represented the deep-seeded trust between Egyptians and Maghariba at the end of the eighteenth century and a well-established cultural and regional understanding between the elite of both provinces.

Al-Jabarti’s text cited several more examples of the close ties between Tripoli...

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238 ibid.
239 ibid.
and Egypt throughout the turn of the nineteenth century—well before and long after the French invasion. Another key example is that of Sheikh Abdullah al-Sharqawi, the prominent Egyptian notable, who was the newly appointed president of Egypt and the Grand Imam of al-Azhar. Al-Sharqawi was harboring Tripolitans in his personal home, because of the aid that they were supplying to Murad Bey.\(^{240}\) This not only won him the wrath of Bonaparte, but also caused his homes and personal property to be seized by French forces in Cairo.\(^{241}\) While the Tripolitan merchant had fled the capital by the time the French arrived to the sheikh’s home,\(^{242}\) it nevertheless caused a great deal of chaos among the difficult relations between the religious and political elite of Egypt and their French invaders. After all, from Bonaparte’s perspective, even the Grand Imam of the leading institution in Egypt was intimately allied with the Tripolitans and North Africans that French forces were fighting against in the south of the province.

However, al-Jabarti did not limit his discussions of Maghrebi people to the affairs of officials in Egypt. Rather, his chronicle is filled with accounts of the day-to-day affairs as well as the social disputes between Maghariba traders such as Hajj Muhammad ibn Qimuh al-Maghrebi and their Syrian counterparts, the narratives of Maghariba living in Cairo during the French occupation and their inability to return west because of the blocked roads, the experiences of Maghrebi pilgrims on their way to Mecca passing through Cairo, the presence of Maghrebi troops, and several other accounts of al-Jabarti’s own friendship with several sheikhs and scholars from al-Azhar.

\(^{241}\) ibid.
\(^{242}\) Cole, Napoleon’s Egypt, 197.
One particularly touching mention was al-Jabarti’s eulogy of the Shaykh Shamil Ahmad ibn Ramadan in Su’ud al-Tarabulusi, who al-Jabarti referred to as “the virtuous master, our very famous friend, the distinguished scholar, reciter of the Koran, from al-Azhar…. He assumed this position of sheykh of riwaq with sagacity and dignity. He was spoken highly of and became famous. He was a distinguished man, tall, of splendid appearance and cheerful. When he assumed the position of shaykh of the riwaq our friend shaykh Hasan al ‘Attar praised him in a qasida…”243

These examples listed above mention only a small percent of the North Africans who feature in Aja’ib. Indeed, al-Jabarti’s work is heavily peppered with anecdotes and narratives of several Tripolitans and Maghariba across the multitude of social classes in turn of the nineteenth century Egypt. While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to analyze each North African mentioned in al-Jabarti’s writings, it is worth stressing that the sheer quantity of North Africans mentioned, and the familiar tone adopted by chronicler in his writings imply the ties between the provinces were so strong that Tripolitan and Maghariba presence within Egypt was so significant that they were taken by al-Jabarti as what was normal, and utterly familiar in turn of the nineteenth century Egypt.

North Africa and the Broader Ottoman World

So far, we have examined the relationship and role of the provinces in the socio-political history of turn of the nineteenth century North Africa. Further, we have seen how prevalent the Maghrebi community was in daily Cairene life. Moving forward, it is also important to note that political relationships in the Ottoman realm were not solely bilateral between the rulers of Tripoli and of Constantinople, or

regional as we have seen among the provinces of Egypt, Tripoli and Tunis. Rather, the political crisis of 1798 highlighted North Africa’s relations with the broader Ottoman world, Syria, and specifically with Cezzar Ahmad Pasha of Acre.

Born in southern Bosnia, Ahmad had spent several years in the households of the Egyptian grandees, where he forged a reputation for his contentious and difficult character, as well as for his fierce loyalty. After slaughtering over seventy Bedouins in retribution for the murder of his Mamluk patron, he was called Cezzar—the butcher—and was soon forced to flee to Syria. Arriving in Beirut in 1770, he set about establishing a new army of Albanian, Syrian and North African mercenaries—and “turned Albanian to recruit warriors.” By 1798, Cezzar was firmly established as the governor of Acre and would be a critical component in the northern resistance that limited Bonaparte’s expansion into Ottoman Syria.

Having lost control of Egypt, first to Mamluk control and then to the French, Constantinople wanted to reclaim the province. However, the Porte was uncertain about how to best respond to the invasion. In 1799, the governor of Acre, Cezzar Ahmad Pasha, wrote to Selim III asking to be named serasker of Egypt and to be given the funds necessary to raise an army against the French. The sultan and the high council were open to his request and initially considered it as viable option for the continued occupation. However, after extended consideration, the Porte ordered Cezzar to defend the Syrian coastline but to not extend his forces into Egypt. Constantinople’s concerns of yet another overly ambitious regional leader who, like the Mamluks before him, would impinge Ottoman sovereignty won out. Rather, the

244 Aksan, *Ottoman Wars*, 230.
245 HAT Dosya No:140 Gömlek No:5832 and HAT Dosya No:157 Gömlek No:6547.
246 Aksan, *Ottoman Wars*, citation 40, 231.
Porte turned to the British in their efforts against the French.²⁴⁷

Ultimately, the imperial divan arranged for two missions to Egypt. The Kapudan Pasha, Küçük Hüseyin, commanded the first regiment. The second regiment was made up of the Sultan’s new nizam-ı cedid soldiers, trained under his new set of reforms, and were placed under the command of the Grand Vizier, Kör Yusuf Pasha.²⁴⁸ While Selim III was willing to remove the French by force with the aid of 10,000 English troops, the Porte remained optimistic that a more peaceable solution could be found with the French.²⁴⁹ Both missions arrived in Egypt in the spring of 1801.²⁵⁰ In addition to the troops from the Ottoman center, the Kapudan Pasha’s men rendezvoused with an attachment of Albanian and Macedonian reinforcements in the Mediterranean. Among these men was a young Kavalaran, conscripted by his uncle, second in command of 300 Macedonians, named Mehmed Ali. The reinforcements joined the roughly 25,000 Ottoman, Arab and Bedouin troops under the Grand Vizier that had marched through Gaza, and assembled in Alexandria.

However, before Ottoman troops arrived in Egypt, documentation from the Porte pointed to an interesting collaboration between the provinces of the Maghreb and the Mashriq. Here, I refer to an imperial order issued by the High Divan on September 3, 1798. The document discussed a coordinated response between Yusuf in Tripoli and Cezzar Ahmad in Syria. Yusuf supplied 2,500 armed soldiers from Fezzan, who were to rendezvous with Syrian forces north of Gaza and bulwark the Syrian leader’s resistance against the imminent French attack to the north of Egypt.²⁵¹

²⁴⁷ ibid.
²⁴⁸ Ibid, also see Fahmy, Mehmed Ali, 8-12.
²⁴⁹ Ibid., 10-13.
²⁵⁰ Aksan, Ottoman Wars 236.
²⁵¹ ibid.
It is worth noting, that these men were sent from North Africa before the *bey* declared war on France in the summer of 1799, and before the Porte began amassing troops. The cooperation between two provinces in the Mashriq and the Maghreb in an effort to limit French occupation of Ottoman domain is remarkable and spoke to a broader sense of collaboration between the provinces.

Similarly, in March of 1799, in a report to the sultan, we learn from Ottoman records that the local deputy in Manisa, in Anatolia, recruited 2,000 ground troops who were to rendezvous with gunners from Tripoli and march on Egypt. These reports to the sultan demonstrate the adaptable, contradictory relationship between Tripoli and the Porte. Having allied with Bonaparte, and exiled his older brother for blocking French communication lines through the eastern part of the region, Yusuf remained firmly within the Ottoman world and quite often supported Constantinople. Moreover, these coordinated efforts between officials beyond the immediate control of the imperial center during the time of invasion, not only demonstrate how decentralized power was within the Ottoman Empire but also point to a uniformity and far reaching military collaboration between geographically distant provinces of the empire. Unfortunately, few sources remain in modern-day Istanbul that can further elucidate how regional officials communicated and coordinated efforts together against the French invasion. Nevertheless, the ongoing cooperation between provinces was compelling particular since, the sultan and the high council were still weighing their response options in the Sublime Porte.

**Back in Cairo**

Having just arrived in Cairo, Ottoman forces under the Grand Vizier and Kapudan Pasha were immediately thrown into the battles and chaos of the French
occupation. Despite the anarchy, and infighting among the Mamluk households, the combined Ottoman and British forces were effective in unfurling the vestiges of French control in Egypt. Al-Jabarti dated the withdrawal of French forces to July of 1801.\textsuperscript{252} Peace treaties were signed by Ottoman and French emissaries on October 9, 1801.\textsuperscript{253} Even though the sultan withdrew the last of his troops the following winter, the Porte was determined to maintain authority over Egypt. However, after three years of French and British presence, and infighting among the Mamluks and various other officials, control over Egypt required the ability to fill a sizable power vacuum that the French officials in Egypt, Kleber and Menou, had left behind. To do this, Ottoman officials in Constantinople looked to officers whom they could trust and who had developed in their careers under the careful eye of their superiors in Constantinople. In addition to being knowledgeable of the internal workings of the Porte, they were expected to have a support base that came from the center of the empire.

Through his ties to the admiralty, Hüsrev Pasha, an Ottoman naval official of Georgian descent, was successfully appointed as the new governor of Egypt. Much like his mentor, the Grand Admiral, Küçük Hüseyin Pasha, Hüsrev was of Georgian heritage, and similar to Gazi Hasan Pasha before him, was purchased as a young man in the Caucasus, after which he became a slave in the imperial household of his mentor, the man who would later become admiral. In fact, Hüsrev rose to power through to the same patronage networks that had long secured the positions of many officials before him. With the proactive campaign on the part of Küçük Hüseyin, Hüsrev’s connections secured him the governorship of Egypt in 1801. However, his actually tenure in Egypt would not last for long.

\textsuperscript{253} Fahmy, Mehemd Ali, 15.
The Porte had not forgotten the disloyalty of the Mamluk households in the years before the French invasion. Moreover, infighting among the Mamluk grandees had weakened their alliances since 1798. By the spring of 1801, the households were in disarray. Murad Bey died that April from the plague. Meanwhile, Ibrahim Bey was in Syria attempting to attack the French from under Cezzar’s protection. This left the remaining cavalrymen and the collection of households in the charge of two grandees of Murad Bey’s house: Uthman Bey al-Bardisi and Muhammad Bey al-Alfi. Despite new leadership, internal wrangling and battles with the French took a toll on the households over three years.

By 1801, the households were extremely fragmented. The Porte attempted to take advantage of the frictions, and strike a fatal blow to the grandees and their hold over Egypt. However, despite several attempts on the part of the Kapudan Pasha and the new governor, which were largely thwarted by British officials who had alliances with the grandees, the households remained the biggest obstacle for direct Ottoman governance. In an effort to end their consortium on power, Hüsrev’s primary task as governor was to remove the beys from positions of authority. Al-Jabarti extensively chronicled the trouble Ottoman officials had in capturing, and holding, the grandees. For example, in an episode that was popularized among locals as the flippantly named the “expedition of the donkeys” Hüsrev Pasha, the Ottoman governor was unable to secure access to horses. He ordered his soldiers to gather around 3000 donkeys from Bulaq, Cairo, and Old Cairo in an effort to subdue the Mamluks. Ottoman troops were on donkeys for the battle. However, the grandees, well known for their prowess on horseback, dealt a swift and humiliating blow to the governor in the Delta and his men. Al-Jabarti described the event:
This fiasco caused an estrangement between the pasha and the army… the pasha [Hüsrev] ordered the soldiers to leave Cairo. They demanded their pay; he asked them by what right they deserved pay, since they had accomplished nothing. They, in turn refused to leave (Cairo) Muhammed Ali Sarcheshme was the most prominent man among them. The pasha tried to trap him, but with no success… The pasha left Cairo and fled to Damietta. This was the first appearance of the name of Muhammad Ali and from this time forward his importance increased…

Al-Jabarti’s description of Hüsrev’s attempts to subdue the Mamluks showed not only the futility of the governor’s efforts to wrangle control of the province away from the grandees, but also demonstrated his frustration in his thwarted attempts exercise control in the province. The new governor was in a bind; Constantinople wanted to control Egypt but had not supplied Hüsrev with the necessary manpower or resources required enforce the Porte’s policies. While he had some luck in successfully curtailing the rebellion in the capital, Hüsrev’s efforts across the province proved unproductive. He was reprimanded for his inabilities. After being defeated by his grandee rivals on the outskirts of Giza, the Ottoman governor was forced to flee Cairo. In the guise of protecting the people of Damietta, al-Bardisi followed Hüsrev to the port town, and subsequently captured him there. Defeated, the governor was now a hostage. The Mamluks demanded amnesty in return for his release. Hüsrev’s successor as governor of Egypt would be none other than Ali Burghol al-Tarabulusi, the same corsair who had conquered Tripoli.

Conclusion

The Ottoman, as well as western imperial, response to the French invasion of Egypt was reliant on the provinces of Tripoli and Tunis. We saw the paradoxical but intertwined ties among the three provinces and the Porte and examined how Tripolitan

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255 Fahmy, Mehmed Ali, 17.
reforms, under Yusuf Pasha, increased the provinces’ commercial status as well as the pasha’s influence within the Ottoman Empire and the broader region. We also analyzed the relative pragmatism that North African governors had in their relationship and alliances with both the Porte and Europe, and demonstrated that despite attempting to benefit, commercially and politically, from French and British interest in the southern shores of the Mediterranean, the governors of the provinces were actively supporting the Ottoman Porte. In doing so, the governors of Tunis and Tripoli were looking to maintain the regional status quo without cutting off their ties with either the Ottoman center or Europe.

The ties between the three provinces were exceptionally strong at the end of the eighteenth century. This chapter investigated the importance of the Maghariba community in the lives and affairs of contemporary Egyptian scholars, ulema and officials and explored the important role that Maghrebi people played in day-to-day Egyptian life. It has demonstrated the close ties between the Mamluks of Egypt and former officials of the region and compared primary source materials, and notably diplomatic records, to published chronicles of the time. In doing so we can see how chroniclers’ ideologies, and indeed personalities, impacted the histories they told. We saw how historical figures chose to be remembered, and the rich narratives that they told about their adventures and travels to the contemporaries of their time. Throughout this section, the ties that stand out the most prominently are the regional ones that oftentimes overlooked the demarcations of individual provinces, particularly in times of political crisis such as the French invasion of Egypt.
CHAPTER THREE
CORSAIRS AND CARAVANS, INTERNAL STRUGGLES FOR POWER,
1801-1814

By the summer of 1801, Yusuf Pasha was firmly in power in Tripoli. Egypt was in chaos. The governor of Tunis, Hammuda Pasha, was attempting to consolidate power within the walls of the Bardo and limit the influence of Algiers in his territory. In this chapter, we see how regional shifts in political authority, namely the decline of Algerian influence and the rise of Mehmed Ali in Egypt, began to change the balance of power in North Africa. Moreover, this chapter examines how the beys of Tunis and Tripoli began to shift their attentions away from the corroso and towards the inland networks of the trans-Saharan caravans and examine the ways in which the governments of Tripoli and Tunis attempted to navigate economic difficulties after the Congress of Vienna, how they attempted to expand their revenues streams inland and how they managed competition from their political opponents.

French forces left Egypt on July 3, 1801. British and Ottomans troops soon followed in 1803.²⁵⁷ As Hüsrev Pasha, the Mamluks, and various factions including Mehmed Ali’s Albanians were fighting for control of Egypt, Tripoli was going to war with the newly independent United States. While a great deal of ink has been spilt on the narrative of the First Barbary War, this historiography remains largely fragmented across the language divide. In doing so, both sets of literature, Arabic and Anglophone, have since become relatively sympathetic towards the role of the war in the formation of American and Libyan national histories and identities.

²⁵⁷ The period of French domination over Egypt thus lasted three years and 21 days. They seized Imbaba and Giza, and defeated the Egyptian amirs on Saturday the 19th of Safar 1213 (August 4, 1798). Their retreat and descent from the forts, the evacuation of Cairo and the end of their rule and domination took place on Friday night, the 21st of Safar 1216 (July 3, 1801.) Al-Jabarti, ‘Abd Al-Rahmān Al-Jabarti’s History of Egypt, vol. 3, 291.
I use the surviving historical records to extrapolate the impact of the First Barbary war on the people of Tripoli, the governance of the province, and the regional approaches and strategies that were used by Yusuf Karamanlı to ameliorate the province’s political conditions, to further his objectives well as those of Tripoli’s respective allies and look to see how this relatively minor conflict between two equally “petty” powers impacted the political trajectories of the provinces and the broader Mediterranean and Ottoman worlds.

**Tripoli at War**

With the 1783 Treaty of Paris, King George III recognized American independence. Thereafter, the United States was forced, as all other sovereign governments, to negotiate tribute rates and peace treaties with the North African provinces. No longer protected under the British naval ensign flown by His Majesty’s fleet, American merchant ships were open to attack by Ottoman, as well as other, privateers. The first vessel seized in North Africa, the *Betsey*, which was captured off Moroccan waters 1784. The crew was held in Tangier. The following year, the American vessels the *Dauphin* and *Maria* were similarly captured off the coast of Algiers. News of American captives in North Africa drew the attention, and the imagination, of popular readers in the United States, commercializing the genre of North African captivity narratives. The popularization and mass consumption of this category of literature has, as some scholars have argued, since become a touchstone in the rise of tension between the US and North Africa and broader Muslim world.²⁵⁹

However, despite these early captures, the increased number of skirmishes and

even rumors that Benjamin Franklin had been taken captive, by the time Jefferson took the presidential office in 1801 the new leader merely considered the ongoing conflict with the corsair regencies as a “sideshow” to the main act of the ongoing battles with the more powerful Britain and France.

Jefferson dismissed North African governors as “petty tyrants” of the region. But, as Lambert succinctly wrote “while the characterization of the Barbary States as ‘petty’ was largely correct, it must be noted that the United States in 1783 was an equally petty presence in the Atlantic world.” Lambert’s argument for the need for a clearer and more historically accurate perspective on the role of the United States in the global stage of the early nineteenth century, was entirely accurate. After all, the French, British, and Spanish were the mercantile giants of the turn of the century, not the Americans. Thus, it was from a position of regional disadvantage and political distraction that the young United States attempted to negotiate a foothold into Mediterranean trade.

Tripoli was also emerging from a position of political weakness and was distracted by more pressing crises of governance during the 1780s and early 1790s. Only one year after Yusuf Pasha assumed governorship, Tripoli and the United States finally negotiated the terms for peace, on November 4, 1796. Despite the seemingly endless diplomatic wrangling in the lead up however, the full sum of tribute remained unpaid by the United States. Folayan argued that the American refusal to recognize Tripolitan autonomy, preferring to defer to Algiers in its negotiations, was the pasha’s

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²⁶⁰ Lambert, The Barbary Wars, 7.
²⁶¹ ibid.
²⁶² ibid. He continued, “[t]he Moroccan and Algerine captures in 1780s exposed the United States as a weak confederation of minor, jealous states that had neither the will nor the power nor the treasury to protect its merchant ships.”
main reason to go to war. Thus, the rise of Tripoli within the Ottoman and Mediterranean world in the second half of the 1790s, and Yusuf Pasha’s repeated attempts to clarify his position with the newly independent American government fell on deaf ears, further frustrating the governor. James Cathcart, the US Consul to Tripoli wrote:

I am order’d by the Bashaw to inform you that you may wait for the answers to the letters from the Dey of Algiers and Bey of Tunis if you think proper, if not you may let it alone that he is an Independent Price and not be intimidated by Algiers, Tunis nor even the Grand Signore, that if we wish to be at Peace with him we must pay him for it and that he commands in his Kingdom as well as the Dey of Algiers does in his.

Rhetorical bluster aside, the quote offers important insights into how Yusuf imagined his role as governor and the position of Tripoli in the region. First, it spoke to the sense of trans-provincial cooperation that Yusuf looked to Tunis and Algiers to reaffirm his ‘independence,’ or at least, his right to negotiate peace independently with the United States. This measure spoke of an underlying sense of partnership among the North African provinces, as he could just as easily have suggested that the U.S. seek the affirmation of his right of negotiation from the Ottoman Porte, or even a European ally. Regardless, the request was amicably met by the governors of Tunis and Algiers, both of whom sent praise-filled letters to the Americans reaffirming Tripolitan tribute autonomy.

Thirdly, the phrasing of Chathcart’s note, ‘nor even the Grand Signore’ underlined that while the bey very much thought his province on par with Tunis and Algiers, he still maintained a deference to the authority of Istanbul, and inferred the strength of the Porte in relation in a display of vociferous affect.

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263 Folayan, *Tripoli during the reign of Yusuf Pasha Qaramanli*, 30-33.
264 Cathcart, *Journal of Negotiation and Ratification of the Treaty Between the USA and the Regency of Tripoli in Barbary*, 308, 28 February through 13 April 1799.
265 ibid.
Interestingly, this note was from the spring of 1799 and overlapped with the previously discussed firman that declared Yusuf “the generalissimo of all Ottoman troops in Barbary.” Thus, the exchange likely further peaked the governor’s ire towards to the young American states. In a conversation with his Algerian counterpart, Yusuf said of the Americans:

The Americans have revolted ... I am ready to make a mess of them ... Thanks to our fighting forces, all nations except the Americans respect us ... It is my binding duty to teach them their limits ... I recommend them to avoid such a sinister action ... They are relying on the British, but I don’t care at all about their role in this affair... 

Diplomatic relations ultimately failed on May 14, 1801, when the pasha declared war on the US. For two years, from 1801-1803, Tripoli and the United States remained locked in ongoing low-grade but nevertheless destructive clashes. American ships, such as the Philadelphia would blockade Tripolitan harbors and Tripolitan cruisers similarly attacking and destroying American vessels. Tensions worsened in 1803 when the same Philadelphia, which had been used in various American naval barricades, ran aground. Gunships under the command of the Tripolitan admiral Murad Ra‘is quickly captured the American frigate and took the crew captive.

It is worth noting that the vessel that captured the Philadelphia was none other than the previously mentioned Betsey, which itself had been captured twice, first in 1784 in Tangier and then again by Tripolitan corsairs in 1796. Rebranded the Meshuda, the schooner was under the command of the Scottish-born Peter Lysle, Captain of the Tripolitan marine. Lysle, who upon converting to Islam adopted the

266 James Cathcart, Tripoli: First War with the United States, (LaPorte: Herald Print, 1901) 15 April 1799, 25. 
267 The Italianization of the term ‘generalissimo’ to refer to regional leader was the term that western diplomats used in their correspondence with their home offices. It was not the Ottoman title. 
268 Kuloğlu, 500 years in Libyan Turkish Relations, 60.
name Murad after a renowned seventeenth-century corsair, was a formidable adversary to American diplomats and a fascinating if enigmatic historical figure.

Little is known of Murad Ra’is’s early life before he was hired as a deckhand for the Betsey while the ship was still docked in Boston in the 1780s. The American historian Tucker, who searched for records of Murad in 1960s Tripoli, London and Edinburgh to little avail, suggested that before arriving in the United States, Murad spent some time in North Africa, served with Mamluks (although Tucker did not specify in which province) and was purportedly fluent in Arabic.\footnote{Tucker, Dawn like Thunder: The Barbary wars and the birth of the U.S. Navy (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), 121.} Folayan claimed that at some point in his career, he avoided a court-martial for theft and mutiny aboard the British vessel the Hampden and that Murad declared his conversation to Islam in June 1794.\footnote{Folayan, Tripoli during the Reign of Yusuf Pasha Qaramanli, 28.} We also know was that he was born on a farm in either Perth or in Clydebank, Scotland, that he was fair-haired with a sandy beard, and a remarkably adept sailor. At some point between his days on the Betsey and his time in Yusuf’s divan, he seemed to have picked up a general distaste for Americans—or at the very least, the American consul to Tripoli, James Cathcart. Indeed the latter’s diplomatic correspondence was filled with countless complaints and rebuffs on the part of the admiral.\footnote{Cathcart, Tripoli, 260-341.}

Murad, it seemed, amused himself being a partner in the “drunken triumvirate who delighted in plotting ways to gall the Yankee consul.”\footnote{Bovill, Missions to the Niger, Volume 2, Part 4, Issue 123, 28.} The other two figures being Simon Lucas, the British consul to Tripoli, and an English doctor named Bryan McDonough. This rich detail into Murad’s antagonistic character suggested that the
triad’s aversion to the American consul was based largely on common British ties and a likely disdain towards a newly released British colony. This is to say that it did not underscore hostility between American and Tripolitan officials.\textsuperscript{273}

By the time he was boarding the Philadelphia, Murad’s days as a deckhand were long over. The corsair had risen from his previously humble position of ra’is in the Tripolitan Marine. Murad was also the son-in-law of the pasha, Yusuf Karamanlı. As the husband of the pasha’s daughter, Murad and became the governor’s close confidant and often played the role of intermediary on behalf of his father-in-law. While a great deal of historical research has focused on captivity and conversion in the North African regencies, it is nevertheless worth noting that this rather remarkable advancement of position was not entirely dependent on an individual’s willingness to adopt Islam. After all, Simon Lucas, the English consul to Tripoli and Murad’s colleague in the efforts to infuriate the American consul, James Cathcart, the aforementioned offended American consul to Tripoli, as well as William Eaton, Cathcart’s counterpart in Tunis all served as their respective government’s emissaries.

\textsuperscript{273} Allison, The Crescent Obscured, Chapter 1-2. American emissaries routinely complained in their reports that British agents were coopting North African officials in their efforts to undermine American attempts at political autonomy. After all, the expression ‘if there were no Algiers it would be worth Britain while to build one’ was a common idiom among American diplomats, after Franklin claimed to have overheard it while in London. However, this American sensitively towards British imperial influence nevertheless overly undermined North African political autonomy as well as underscored the newcomer’s inexperience in dealing with the diplomatic norms of the nineteenth century Mediterranean. James Madison from Thomas Jefferson, 25 April 1786. “Jefferson was as skeptical as Franklin in thinking that the British secretly enjoyed the Americans’ dilemma and had no inclination to help their former colonies. Franklin claimed he had heard of a saying among London merchants “that if there were no Algiers it would be worth England’s while to build one.” The bribe required by the Algerian emissary was “between two and three hundred thousand guineas.” Jefferson mentioned to Vergennes his suspicions regarding English complicity in the piracy, but the Frenchman thought this unlikely “on account of the scandal it would bring on them’.” (Boyd, Papers of Jefferson, IX, 568; Dumas Malone, Jefferson and the Rights of Man [Boston, 1951], 27–30, 50–58) http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-09-02-0003 accessed October 2, 2016. Americanist historians familiar with the period have argued that American diplomats believed, naively, that the North African regencies would have (or at least should have) shared or respected their ideological notions of American post-colonial liberties and free trade, see, Lambert, The Barbary Wars, for more information.
and had all been taken captives in their earlier lives in the region.

Moreover, Murad’s particularly meteoric socio-economic advancement was not unique in Tripoli. After all, the admiral was not the only western-born renegade in Yusuf’s divan. The governor’s Prime Minister was a Russian-born former marine, Muhammad D’Ghies, had similarly been taken captive, converted and eventually rose in Tripolitan political circles.274 Similarly, the German-born Swede John Wilson, a member of the Philadelphia’s crew turned renegade after being taken captive in the city. Much like the others, he sought to entrench himself in the Tripolitan administration. The commonalities among these three men: Murad Ra’is, Muhammed D’Ghies, and Wilson, whose convert name was not preserved in the historical record, besides their obvious willingness to convert was a language proficiency, be it either Arabic or the lingua franca, as most importantly, their willingness to serve the Tripolitan pasha. Effectively, religious conversion impacted which government you could serve in North Africa, but not one’s overall chances for social mobility. However, it certainly facilitated one’s prospects.275

In addition to his captain duties, Murad had also become the de facto warden to the captured crew of the Philadelphia. The sailors officially became the prisoners of the pasha, and the new, young United States was forces to cope with the ramifications, both at home and abroad of having an American naval crew suffer the “indignities”276 of becoming North African hostages.

274 Folayan, Tripoli during the Reign of Yusuf Pasha Qaramanli.
275 Interestingly, most of the western consuls who worked in North Africa wore their previous captivity as a rhetorical ‘badge of honor’ to represent their fidelity in regards to the particular country they served. At the end of the day, they used it to justify whatever objectives or policies they were looking to push through—more often than not, ones that were to their own economic interests. There are sources that discuss the at times conflicting interests of consuls and the governments they were hired to represent.
276 This is a common trope in captivity narratives albeit one that is not routinely based in historic fact. See Chapter 4 of this dissertation for more information on the actual treatment of Americans in Tripoli.
The Chaos in Egypt

Conditions in Egypt did not improve after the withdrawal of Ottoman and English troops in 1803. The officially appointed Ottoman governor, Hüsrev Pasha was facing endless troubles in subduing the ongoing revolts, curtailing the power of the Mamluk households and attempting to mitigate the growing threat from a young Macedonian quartermaster and his Albanian contingency.

Before a particularly humiliating “fiasco” named the ‘expedition of donkeys’ Mehmed Ali appeared only once before in al-Jabarti’s chronicle. The quartermaster’s first recorded mention in Ajai’b was from a few months prior, in April of 1803. From the entry we learn that the Macedonian officer was allied with Tahir Pasha, commander of the Albanian troops.

While Al-Jabarti wrote of Mehmed Ali only in passing, the entry was as telling as it was fleeting. In a few spare lines, we learn two important characteristics are noted about the young Macedonian. First, he was an ally of the Albanian commander. Secondly, he was a quartermaster in charge of distributing wages. These two characteristics: his position, and his alliance with the Albanian forces, would prove pivotal in his later attempts to control Egypt. As quartermaster, Mehmed Ali had access to soldiers’ wages. Therefore, he was in a position to leverage the ever-

278 ibid.  
279 “This fiasco caused an estrangement between the pasha and the army… the pasha [Hürev] ordered the soldiers to leave Cairo. They demanded their pay; he asked them by what right they deserved pay, since they had accomplished nothing. They, in turn refused to leave (Cairo) Muhammed Ali Sarcheshme was the most prominent man among them. The pasha tried to trap him, but with no success… The pasha left Cairo and fled to Damietta. This was the first appearance of the name of Muhammad Ali and from this time forward his importance increased…” Al-Jabarti, ‘Abd Al-Rahmān Al-Jabarti’s History of Egypt, vol. 4, 46.  
280 ibid.  
shifting alliances of 1803 Cairo to his advantage. \textsuperscript{282} Troops, Ottoman or otherwise, routinely mutinied if unpaid; and his position as 

*sarçeşme* enabled him to navigate and manipulate the loyalties and actions of various brigades behind a veil of relative neutrality. After all, he was responsible for distributing wages, but not for administering them.

We see that Mehmed Ali was also cultivating an amicable relationship with Tahir Pasha, the Albanian commander. Long known in the Ottoman world for their unruly albeit courageous conduct, the Albanian irregulars were much stronger and better equipped than the three-hundred men that accompanied the young officer from Kavala. Mehmed Ali’s alliance with Tahir and his men provided him with ready manpower in tumultuous Cairo, as well as with access to the soldiers needed in his eventual rise to power. As we shall below, within a few short years their loyalty became a cornerstone to facilitating his ambitions during his early, precarious period in power.

Mehmed Ali’s ties with this particular division are also telling about his capacity for political opportunism. Historically, the narrative of his rise to power has become so engrained with his alliance with the Albanian battalions that he has often mistakenly been remembered as Albanian himself. Perhaps this was his ultimate objective, since the loyalty and support of four thousand men provided him with much more clout than would have otherwise been available to an officer in his position. However, I argue that Mehmed Ali was likely following a strategy similar to other aspiring governors of the time.

**Turning Albanian**

\textsuperscript{282} (*Sarçeşme,*) Sarcheshme in Perlmann’s edition of *Aja’ib.*
In fact, Mehmed Ali’s efforts to ‘turn Albanian’\textsuperscript{283} mirrored the actions of two of important contemporaries in the Ottoman world: Acre’s Cezzar Ahmad Pasha and Osman Pasvanoğlu of Vidin. These three individuals, none of whom were Albanian themselves, all employed similar strategies to garner the support and loyalty of the notorious Albanian units.

The appeal to Albanian ethnic ties constituted a well-established practice since the seventeenth century, when the harsh conditions of the Albanian hinterland and the prospect of career advancement throughout the military ranks and officialdom provided incentives for mercenaries to join the Ottoman military system. These men were often followed by the support of the fellow countrymen from the region. Constituting the part of the larger ‘westerner’ grouping within the imperial establishment, the officials of the Albanian origin and their patronage networks became one of the most important factors in the politics of the early modern Ottoman world.\textsuperscript{284} While their fortunes diminished throughout the course of the eighteenth century, the military tradition, militarization of Albanian countryside and their ethnic and regional solidarities made them a ready group to be addressed by the likes of Mehmed Ali, Osman Pazvanoğlu or Cezzar Pasha.

The first, Cezzar Ahmad, was born in southern Bosnia and left for Cairo as a young man. After spending several years in the households of the Egyptian grandees, eventually rising to the position of bey. In Egypt, Ahmad forged a reputation for his contentious and difficult character, as well as for his fierce loyalty. After slaughtering over seventy Bedouins in retribution for the murder of his Mamluk patron, ‘Abdualla

\textsuperscript{283} Aksan, \textit{Ottoman Wars}, 220.

Bey he was nicknamed him Cezzar—the butcher.\textsuperscript{285} The death of ‘Abduallah nevertheless left him in a vulnerable position, as he had lost his protector among the Mamluks. He faced seriously peril when he became “dangerously compromised in Mamluk political intrigues”\textsuperscript{286} with the influential Ali Bey al-Kabir, himself a Georgian from Abkhazia. Cezzar Ahmad was forced to flee to Syria. There, the narrative of Cezzar Ahmad’s life becomes murky. Making his way first to Beirut in 1770, “turned Albanian to recruit warriors”\textsuperscript{287} and established a new army of Albanian, Syrian and North African mercenaries—and By 1775, he was firmly in control of Acre. Having previously asked Selim III to be named serasker of Egypt during the French invasion, Cezzar Pasha commanded a significant army and maintained a brutal reputation. From Philipp we know that Cezzar governed Ottoman Acre with a firm hand and was interesting in expanding his powerbase.\textsuperscript{288} The Albanian forces continued to serve his interests while he remained in control of Acre.

The second figure, Osman Pasvandoğlu, was the Bosnian\textit{vali} of Vidin in modern-day Bulgaria during the 1790s. Like Cezzar Pasha, Osman ‘turned Albanian’\textsuperscript{289} in an effort to recruit soldiers to fight against Ottoman rule. Born in 1758, Osman was the son of Ömer Pasvandoğlu, a wealthy landowner originally from Tuzla in Bosnia. In part because of their local influence, Ömer was eventually forced out from Vidin after being accused by the Porte of inciting the local population against the authority of the Ottoman state. After eventually obtaining clemency and returning to Vidin, Ömer met a tragic end and was executed for treason in 1788. His

\textsuperscript{285} Philipp, \textit{Acre}, 136, ibooks edition.
\textsuperscript{286} Gibb, Al-Djazzar Pasha, Ahmad, \textit{The Encyclopaedia of Islam}, 268.
\textsuperscript{287} Aksan, \textit{Ottoman Wars}, 230, regarding Cezzar.
\textsuperscript{288} Philipp, \textit{Acre}, 136-145, ibooks edition.
\textsuperscript{289} Aksan, \textit{Ottoman Wars}, 220, regarding Pasvandoğlu.
son Osman fled first to Serbia and later to Albania. During this time, Osman began amassing a brigade of mercenaries. Fighting for the sultan in the Austro-Ottoman war of 1787-91 allowed Pasvandoğlu was allowed to return to Vidin in 1791, and, with the support of his soldiers, the Pasvängii, he began raids in Wallachia and Serbia to the north and west.

After several years of amassing landed estates and recruiting support for his cause, Pasvandoğlu’s territories stretched from the Danube river to the Balkan mountain range, and from the Black Sea coast to Belgrade. Zens argued that Pasvandoğlu was able recruit so much support because of his ability to cater to the concerns of specific groups of people—among whom were the Albanian infantrymen who played a central role in the governor’s ability to maintain his administration.

The last of these three individuals, Mehmed Ali was born in Kavala. During his rise to power in early nineteenth century Egypt, Mehmed Ali depended on the Albanians as the foundation of his powerbase. Likely born in 1770, little is known about his life before he arrived in Egypt in 1801. Fahmy noted that his father, Ibrahim Ağa was not originally from Kavala, but from Konya in central Anatolia, and that the family might possibly have had Kurdish familiar roots. Mehmed Ali’s family was of means, and it was his parent’s effort to “bring me up [as] a gentleman.” His maternal uncle played a role in the administration of Ottoman territories as the governor of Kavala. Through these connections, Mehmed married a woman named Emine from the village of Nusretli in 1787, when Mehmed was seventeen years

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291 ibid, 103.
293 ibid, 4.
Likely through these same connections, Mehmed Ali was appointed second-in-command of the three-hundred auxiliary troops from Kavala that were sent to Egypt. We know from al-Jabarti, that by the spring of 1803, Mehmed Ali had already formed an alliance with Tahir Pasha, the Albanian commander with four-thousand mercenaries under his control. In fact, it enabled his rise to power in 1805. These three officials, all of whom shared notable backgrounds, were able to successfully cultivate the support of the Albanian irregulars in their efforts to seize power.

This point is worth analyzing because while numerous officials, Ottoman or otherwise, attempted to curry favor with the notoriously rowdy Albanian battalions and failed. Historical records point to a somewhat deliberate effort on the part of these men to ‘turn’ Albanian, and in doing so entrench themselves in the irregulars’ good graces. I argue that because of the several commonalities among them and the irregular forces with which they were attempting to sway to their favor.

First, while these three figures: Cezzar Pasha, Pasvandoğlu and Mehmed Ali all had influential connections by ways of their respective families, none of them had access to established patronage systems, such as the Mamluk households or the Caucasian networks that influenced the official distribution of political appointments from within the Porte. Thus, much like the Albanian irregulars, they were all political outsiders in the hierarchical systems during the time they were attempting to rise to power. While they held more influence and political capital within the Ottoman military system, than a typical Albania recruit, they were nevertheless removed from

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294 ibid. 7.
the standard mechanisms that allowed for political advancement.

The distance from the traditional military hierarchies allowed these three figures to ingratiate themselves with the Albanian irregulars who were similarly outsiders to the system. Aksan wrote, “the irregulars were blamed for almost all disturbances”\textsuperscript{296} during times of inter-service rivalries. This research argues have been easier for another outsider such as Mehmed Ali, Pasvanoğlu, or Cezzvar Pasha to rally the support of the Albanian mercenaries rather say, Hüsrâv Pasha, as the Macedonian quartermaster could more easily sway their allegiance.

These three strongmen also came to power in a time of widespread Ottoman reforms, be it Abdul Hamid’s efforts to curtail the power of the provinces and restructure the Ottoman navy, or his successor, Selim III attempts at creating an entirely new military system within his nizam-ı cedid. Rereading al-Jabarti indicates that Albanian irregulars in turn-of-the-nineteenth-century Egypt had fallen even further within the Ottoman military hierarchy. After all, the chronicler mentions how the Albanians were just as detested by the janissaries and Mamluks in the new nizam-ı cedid under the Grand Vizier, Kör Yusuf Pasha.

This resentment that the irregulars faced within the system would have made it easier for ambitious figures such as Cezzvar Pasha, Osman Pasvandoğlu and Mehmed Ali to make use of the irregulars’ frustrations and manipulate a powerful, but disregarded, corps for their own political ambitions. The common Balkan origins of these three officials who were after all, two Bosnians and a Macedonian, would have contributed in their efforts to cement the loyalty of the Albanian mercenaries. In the

age before nationalism, regionalism was an important factor in group solidarity—and better to work for a fellow Balkan outsider than say, a Mamluk or Porte official, who needed your skills on the battlefield, but nevertheless treated you with contempt.

The Rise of Mehmed Ali

We what we know for certain from al-Jabarti is that any politically ambitious leader in post-occupation Egypt was thrown into a complicated game of strategic one-upmanship that required strategic alliances and a cunning wit in order to survive. By 1803, after Hüsrev Pasha fled to Damietta and was taken hostage by the Mamluk grandees, the quartermaster only had to stand idly while Janissary foes assassinated his former ally, Tahir Pasha in his home in the following months.297

“[T]he departure of [Hüsrev] Pasha, the governorship of Tahir Pasha, his [subsequent] murder, the entry of the [Mamluks] into Cairo…these and other events took place in conformity with Divine Providence and by the immediate agency of Muhammad Ali’s devious stratagems. First, he sought to undermine the authority of his superior [Hüsrev Pasha] in collusion with Tahir Pasha…then he lured Tahir Pasha to his death and cooperated with the Egyptian [Mamluks] in their entry (into Cairo) and assumption of power. He made a show of utter friendship, aid assistance and cooperation with them, waiting to take advantage of their unsuspecting natures.”

It is interesting and telling that al-Jabarti blamed Mehmed Ali for the downfall of these two men—Hüsrev Pasha and then Tahir Pasha after him. Al-Jabarti’s chronicle Aj’aib, which is considered among the most compelling accounts of turn-of-the-nineteenth-century Egyptian life, his narrative was regularly peppered with his editorialized views of people’s characters and histories. For example, Tahir Pasha’s “dominion had lasted 26 days; had his life lasted any longer, he would have destroyed all culture and civilization.”298

What we see throughout al-Jabarti’s text is a tendency for the chronicler to

298 Ibid.
highlight the faults and embarrassments of his foes, but to fall silent on those of his friends. For our purposes here, and as Gran argued in his work on Egyptian notables and intellectuals, *The Islamic Roots of Capitalism*, the chronicler’s imaginative style serves us in two ways. First, it is clear that al-Jabarti was prone to judgments when describing the characters - *bey*s or pashas with whom he did not agree or approve. Secondly, his silences offer particular insights into which governors or elites he supported and considered colleagues. This was particularly true in the case of Hassan al-‘Attar, the prolific scholar of Maghrebi descent, and later the Grand Sheikh of al-Azhar.\(^{299}\) One could argue that al-Jabarti’s use of the phrase “devious stratagem.”\(^{300}\) was soon reflected in the popularized view of Mehmed Ali as a manipulative schemer— or as Fahmy paraphrased from nineteenth century traveler’s chroniclers “the old spider in his den.”\(^{301}\) Regardless of whether Mehmed Ali was obligated to behave in a politically ruthless manner to secure his survival during the early years of his rule, it was clear that the reputation stuck with the governor throughout the rest of his career.

Within the historiography, there is a fascinating entanglement between the life of Mehmed Ali and the writings of al-Jabarti. In his dissertation, Verdery argued that al-Jabarti’s descriptions of Mehmed Ali was considered so controversial that his chronicles were only published in 1880, and after much hesitation, by the *vali*’s descendent, Tawfik Pasha. In fact, Verdery wrote “ that *Aja‘ib*” was printed many years earlier, during the actual reign of Mehmed Ali and that all copies were

\(^{299}\) Regarding the scandal that ‘Attar’s appointment caused him because of his known love affairs with men. Peter Gran writes about this in Gran, *Islamic Roots of Capitalism*. ‘Attar was also the teacher of Rifā‘a al-Tahtawi.


\(^{301}\) Fahmy, *All the Pasha’s Men*, 3, 5, 9, 308.
withdrawn from circulation and destroyed after Mehmed Ali learned of the unfavorable light in which he was portrayed.  


This was perhaps true. However, we know that the chronicle must have been relatively well-known before its publication, as Ayalon mentions several contemporaries who had copies of it, and even more borrowed from it in their own works.

Nevertheless, it is correct that the vali had attempted to limit his circulation by the time he was firmly in power but we do not really know the extent to which Aja’ib was read by Egyptian, and western, elite. It seemed that the chronicler’s opinion of the vali, as well as his opinion of Mehmed Ali’s mistreatment of Umar Makram, and other Egyptian uluma had permeated into his text.

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fter his humiliating defeat at the hands of the Mamluk cavalrymen, Hüsrev Pasha was taken hostage by the grandee al-Bardisi in the port of Damietta. After the death of Tahir Pasha, the Ottoman Porte appointed another governor for Egypt. However, this time, Ottoman officials chose none other than Ali Burghol, the Georgian corsair who seized Tripoli in 1793 and fought with Murad Bey to be Hüsrev’s successor. Al-Jabarti wrote extensively about Ali Pasha al-Tarabulusi and his, in the chronicler’s interpretation, ravenous desire for power. The circumstances of his return to favor among Constantinople elites remain unknown. However, by 1803 it seemed that Ali Burghol was once again firmly in the good graces of the Porte. On July 10, 1803, the former corsair arrived in Alexandria with a firman from the sultan.
declaring him the new governor of Egypt.\textsuperscript{305}

From Ottoman correspondence with Hurşid Pasha, the governor of Alexandria, we see how Ali Burghol attempted to consolidate power in Alexandria. After arriving in the port city, he quickly turned his attention to the Albanian soldiers who he claimed were the enemy of the Egyptian people, and had several of them killed.\textsuperscript{306} Hurşid Pasha wrote a concerned letter to the Vizier, but it seems that Burghol’s strong man tactics, and his efforts to create a rift between the Mamluks and the Albanians, whom had forged a short-lived alliance.\textsuperscript{307} Burghol looked to build up his forces in Alexandria before traveling on to Cairo. Al-Jabarti wrote of the corsairs return to Egypt:

Then he left [the Mamluks] and went on the other side of the mountains to Syria. The [Grand] Vizier Yusuf Pasha sent him, after the defeat, with letters to the Ottoman government, and he remained [in Istanbul] until the army revolted against [Hüsrev] Pasha and ejected him. When the news reached Istanbul, he asked for the governorship of Egypt, under the presumption that the connection of the Ottoman government with Egyptian and its domination would continue, though only Tahir Pasha and the Albanians were there. He took along an immense quantity of money, and arrived in Alexandria, where he heard of the upheaval which had taken place – the death of Tahir Pasha, the expulsion of the Janissaries, the alliance of the Albanian party with the Egyptian [Mamluks,] and their seizure of [Cairo.] He now wanted to devise a plan and to hunt the eagle with the raven thereby gaining a renewed, secured, and permanent sovereignty; but his schemes availed him nothing, and the fates have him no aid. He was like one digging his grave with his own hands, or cutting off his own nose, not knowing that the city of Cairo was the Conquering One. Many the tyrants that she has conquered, even though they were almost pharaohs. If God’s aid be not with the champion, the first cause of harm to him is his own striving.\textsuperscript{308}

Constantinople’s choice in appointing Ali Burghol as Hüsrev’s successor was likely multifaceted in its reasoning. Given his familiarity with the Mamluk households

\textsuperscript{306} HAT Dosya No: 80 Gömlek No: 3323.
\textsuperscript{307} HAT Dosya No: 88 Gömlek No: 3623.
and specifically with Murad’s Mamluks, among whom al-Alfi and al-Bardisi were counted, Burghol was in a unique position to leverage his previous experience in Egypt, and broader North Africa, to his advantage.

After Murad Bey had since succumbed to the plague, Burghol could have persuaded several of the lesser grandees to support his claim to the governorship, as his ties to the household were secure and because he too had fought with them against French occupation. By 1803 the grandees were strongly divided amongst themselves, and Ali Burghol would have likely looked to benefit from infighting among them. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, Hüsrev Pasha his predecessor, was the protégée of the current Kapudan Pasha, Küçük Hüseyin. Given that his mentee had just been humiliated and taken prisoner in the province, the Kapudan Pasha would have wanted to insulate himself from further political embarrassment. Moreover, Ali Burghol’s known taste for risky political takeovers—be it in Tripoli or Egypt—and his former alliance with the since deceased Gazi Hasan, who had haunted Küçük Hüseyin’s early years as admiral, the corsair would have been an inconsequential loss to the Porte in the case of his failure.

Simply put, Burghol was a small gamble that had a potential for significant rewards. After all, he had overthrown the Karamanlıs in Tripoli and had made it as far as Djerba in Tunis. Perhaps his strongman tactics could be put to good use in settling a chaotic Egypt. Upon arriving in Alexandria in July 1803 with three ships, five-hundred men and the vali of Thessaloniki, 309 Burghol wrote to the Mamluks “the sword of the sultanate is long; it may be that the sultan will seek against you the aid of some of your opponents over whom you have no control.” 310 We do not learn from

309 C.DH Dosya No: 77 Gömlek No: 3846.
Ottoman sources which opponents he referred to here. However, the Porte looked to Ali Burghol, faute de mieux, as an emissary with a capacity to wield a strong hand and rustle the province under his control.

From the Ottoman Porte’s records, we know that the Alexandrian governor, Hurşid Pasha wrote to the Grand Vizier on July 13, 1803 informing him of Burghol’s arrival in Alexandria. In this same naval report, which was copied to the sultan in a hatt-ı hümâyûn, we learn that Selim III had been informed that Al-Bardisi had followed Hüsrev Pasha to Damietta and of the looting and raiding in the port town and in Rashid.311 The sultan was keeping a very close eye on the ever-shifting dynamics of political authority in the province. Regardless of the Porte’s reasoning, much like his predecessor before him, Burghol’s governorship of Egypt would not last for long. In fact, on his way to Cairo, after securing the support of several thousand soldiers, the Mamluks he attempted to subdue ultimately struck down Burghol, a compelling example of the transregional connections in the Ottoman world. Al-Jabarti wrote of his death:

Before him were the Maghrebi soldiers, behind him the Egyptian [Mamluks.] When they came to the country around al-Qurayn, they dismounted, and the Maghrebi contrived to have an altercation with [Ali] (Pasha’s) servants, which they blew up out of all proportion until recourse was had to weapons. The Egyptian soldiers rioted in the rear, and the pasha and his men were now in the middle. The tide of battle swept over them, and 14 of his men fled to the valley, while 13 threw themselves into a nearby irrigation ditch in their consternation. One of the Mamluks fired on the pasha with his carbine and hit him. Together with him were killed his nephew Hasan Bey, his kathuda, and the remaining eighteen. As the pasha fell, on the verge of death, he saw one of the two amirs and called out to him, “You there! I beg you: I have a shroud inside my saddlebag. Wrap me in it and bury me: don’t leave me unburied.” When the pasha died, the [Mamluk] gave some money to one of the Bedouins, along with the shroud. He told the Bedouin: “Go to where they are fighting, take the pasha, shroud him, and bury him in a grave.” The Bedouin answered: “I don’t know him (by sight).” [The Mamluk] said he is the one with the largest beard of them all.” So [the Bedouin] did as he was commanded, and

311 HAT: Dosya No: 86 Gömlek No: 3548.
they dug trenches for the rest of them and buried them, and that was the end of the matter.312

Ali Burghol, the Georgian corsair who trained in Algiers, governed Tripoli, was allied with Murad Bey, and briefly served as the Ottoman governor to Egypt, was dead. Rather symbolically, in the hour of his death, Ali Burghol was flanked by North African and Egyptian combatants and shot in the middle by the Mamluks he sought to overpower. Al-Jabarti makes little mention of Sulayman Bey and Muhammed Bey’s rationale in killing Burghol. Instead, the chronicler, much like Ibrahim Bey after him, assigned the blame squarely on the quartermaster, Mehmed Ali. Despite blaming Mehmed Ali, al-Jabarti argued that the death of Ali Burghol was of no particular loss for the fortunes of Egypt, or for the city of Cairo. In his animated style of prose, the author wrote that the blame in the corsair’s downfall was as much Burghol’s doing as anyone else’s objectives in Cairo, and actions in Alexandria:

All of it was the evil result of his deeds, the wickedness of his soul and the foulness of his disposition. I have heard that he said to his soldiers: “If I get what I desire regarding the Egyptian [Mamluks] and with a victory over them and the Albanians, I will give over the city and the populace to you for three days to with as you wish.” The proof of this was what he did in Alexandria during his stay there in the way of tyranny, cruelty, and confiscation of the property and goods of the people, and his soldiers’ lording it over them with tyranny, rapine, and immorality; to say nothing of his insulting scholars and showing his contempt for them.313

We know from the correspondence between Hurşid and the Porte that Burghol was attempting to curtail the power of the Albanian contingency in Alexandria, and in doing so had caused a great deal of havoc in the coastal town.314 Cairo was without a governor. Hüsrev Pasha was still a Mamluk hostage. In an effort to dislodge the

314 Hurşid alluded to this in his correspondence with the Porte, see previous BOA citations, also see al-Jabarti’s quote from above.
grandees from power, Mehmed Ali ordered the Albanian faction to take to the streets demanding their back pay from the provisional rulers. Al-Bardisi, who assumed power then attempted to levy a tax on the Cairene merchants to pay off the Albanian irregulars. Much like Pasvandoğlu before him, Mehmed Ali won the support of the masses, including the merchants in the city, who in turn marched against al-Bardisi’s new tax levies.\(^{315}\) Fahmy wrote “News of this tax spread like wildfire from one neighborhood to the next and on 7 March 1804 the masses took to the streets in a huge demonstration carrying banners, dying their hands with indigo, hitting on drums and showing, ‘Of how much will you fleece me, Bardisi?’”\(^{316}\) Shortly thereafter, in the chaos that followed the demonstrations, Mehmed Ali had his men attack the houses of the grandees in the city, and al-Bardisi and the other Mamluks to flee Cairo. Mehmed Ali quickly released and dismissed the former governor Hüsrev Pasha, sending him back to Constantinople, and took control of the city and the Citadel of Cairo.\(^{317}\)

One rival remained: the third Ottoman appointee, the former governor of Alexandria, Hurşid Pasha. Hurşid had been the governor of Alexandria since 1801 and was familiar with politics in Egypt.\(^{318}\) However, much like al-Bardisi before him, Hurşid Pasha needed soldiers and found himself forced to levy a tax on the merchants and artisans of the city in order raise money for Syrian troops to come to his support. This won him the scorn of the Cairene merchants and ulama of al-Azhar, a development whose flames Mehmed Ali was quick to fuel.\(^{319}\) Tensions came to a

\(^{316}\) ibid.
\(^{317}\) ibid, 22-23.
\(^{318}\) ibid.
\(^{319}\) Al-Jabarti, *‘Abd Al-Rahmān Al-Jabarti’s History of Egypt*, vol. 3, 506; see also ibid, 25.
head in May when the people of Cairo demanded that Mehmed Ali replace Hurşid Pasha as governor. Bitter fighting broke out between the two rivals’ supporters in the city, until on July 9, 1805 a firman arrived from Istanbul appointing Mehmed Ali as the vali of Egypt. Hurşid left for Constantinople and the young quartermaster was now the governor of one of the richest provinces in the Ottoman Empire. After a protracted battle with three different governors, first Hüsrev Pasha, then Ali Tarabulsi, and then Hurşid Pasha, Mehmed Ali finally received the long awaited, albeit reticent support of the Porte. While still in his thirties, Mehmed Ali was appointed the official governor of Egypt. After his investiture, the young vali looked to secure his new position and curtail the previous anarchy.

**Egypt and the First Barbary War**

Mehmed Ali was not the only regional actor vying for control of a North African province. By the winter of 1804, Ahmed Karamanlı, the deposed older brother of the Tripolitan pasha was in Upper Egypt with the Mamluk grandee al-Alfi. From American sources we learn that the deposed pasha “after a series of vicissitudes and disasters” Ahmed was besieged with the Mamluks in the villages of Miniet in Upper Egypt. With Ahmed were a few Tripolitans and Bedouin auxiliaries under his command. In an effort to speak with Ahmad Pasha, the American council to Tunis, William Eaton had taken it upon himself to find and recruit the deposed bey to the American war effort.

To obtain access to the exiled Tripolitan governor in Egypt, Eaton first had to arrange a meeting with the Ottoman Grand Vizier, Kör Yusuf Pasha. In yet another

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321 ibid.
322 ibid.
demonstration of the interconnectedness in operation in the nineteenth-century Mediterranean as well as the interconnectedness among the provinces and the Porte, the nineteenth century American officer knew that to access the former governor of Tripoli, who was fighting with the Mamluks in Upper Egypt, official protocol first required him to speak with the Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Porte. Upon meeting with the Grand Vizier, who spoke French, Eaton explained his position and his ambitions for regime change in Tripoli.\textsuperscript{323}

After the meeting, and effectively receiving Porte's blessing, the American was free to ally himself with Yusuf's younger brother, and attempt to overthrow the governor in Tripoli. In turn, Grand Vizier agreed to provide a letter of amnesty and a passport for Ahmed Pasha, Eaton was able to arrange a meeting the former governor in Cairo. Eaton wrote of Ahmed Pasha’s response to the diplomatic chain of command, “This fortunate occurrence assured the Bashaw of our highest respect for the Grand Seignior; and cautioned him against any steps which might go to compromit our good intelligence with that Sovereign.”\textsuperscript{324} A demonstration of judicious political engagement with Porte officials allowed the consul to convince the Ahmed Karamanlı Pasha to speak with him, but also to reassure him that the American government was sensitive to the entangled political hierarchy systems in the broader region.

After speaking to the Grand Vizier, Eaton sent messengers to Ahmed and waited for him to arrive from Upper Egypt. In the interim however, the American happened to come across some Tripolitans who had recently fled the province. Unaware that he was speaking with an American, with whose government province

\textsuperscript{323} ibid., 280-281.
\textsuperscript{324} ibid, 295.
was at war, the Tripolitan merchant spoke openly to Eaton about the conditions in the city. He wrote:

A Tripolitan who had left Tripoli 90 days’ prior, was an Arnaut Turk [Albanian, who supposed Eaton to be English and said,] "Tripoli had lost many men in the different attacks of the American's last summer: the town as much damaged: and the inhabitants under such a state of consternation that no body slept in the city and that no business was done there." ... the man continued "He observed that the war had been unfortunate to the cruisers. They had been led to believe that the Americans were all merchant men and that they should have nothing to do but to go out of and bring them in, but they found them devils, from whom nothing was to be gained in war and therefore he was quitting the service of Joseph Bashaw. The bashaw was nevertheless determined not to make peace with these infidels until he shall have humbled them and made them pay for the damages they had done to his navy and city. He acknowledged that Hamet Bashaw had many friends in Tripoli (still) but that Joseph Bashaw had taken care of him! It is ascertained that the later has employed assassins to poison the former. These undoubtedly have been reported that they have executed their commission; and hence we account for the report of Hamet Bashaw's death.\footnote{ibid, 290.}

It is impossible to corroborate this chance meeting between the Tripolitan merchant and William Eaton. Nevertheless, Eaton’s account of the encounter was likely accurate. The American war with Tripoli had wreaked havoc on the Tripolitan economy and the twenty-one-day bombardment of the city had ensured in massive losses for city. Moreover, further details in Eaton’s account that overlap with the information found in Ottoman archives. During his time in Egypt, Eaton met with the chief of the Awlad Ali tribe. The same tribe from Derna who had sent cavalrymen in support of the Porte's efforts against the French occupation of Egypt, which historically had strong connections with both the provinces of Tripolitania and Egypt. Eaton claimed that the chief knew of his plan. The leader told Eaton:

… [T]hat twenty thousand men, Barbary Arabs, were ready to march with him from this border to recover their native country and inheritance: repeated that he knew our plan and how that he had seen me, he would pledge his head to the Turkish General to bring me Hamet Bashaw in ten days. The Turk accordingly dispatched him the next morning on this message.\footnote{ibid.}
The claim was particularly insightful, since it referred to the forced relocation of over twenty-thousand Tripolitans that left province, either because of the ongoing aggressions with the Americans, their support for Ahmed Karamanlı when he was the governor of Derna the previous year, or a combination of both. Moreover, the conversation that took place between the leader of the Awlad Ali tribe and the American counsel underscored the connection of the information systems between Ottoman and North African officials. As this meeting happened shortly after the latter’s meeting with the Grand Vizier and had the Ottoman’s permission. It indicated that the ties between Ottoman officials and regional elites were extremely strong and worked on systems of alliances and mutual cooperation.

**Tripoli during the War**

Eaton’s letters are an insightful lens into the affairs of nineteenth century Tripolitans in Egypt, we can also glean critical information from the records of Americans who were present in the city of Tripoli itself. In addition to the relatively short length of their imprisonment, the American captives were given a great deal of personal freedom in Yusuf’s Tripoli. So much so that the records of the American servicemen held in Tripoli in 1805 offer critical insights into the governance and operations of Tripoli and the interworking of Yusuf’s divan. Tripolitan economic and commercial interests can also be found in the writings of the ship’s crew. While technically prisoners of the pasha, the American marines were given remarkable access to the governor, his family, the operations of his divan as well as the broader city and the markets of Tripoli.

William Ray, an American serviceman in Tripoli recorded invaluable insights into the operations of turn-of-the-nineteenth-century province. Ray’s impressions of
the market and commercial interests of the province are particularly worth analyzing.

In his journal, he wrote:

The markets of Tripoli are well supplied with excellent fish. Their commerce and manufactures, compared with those of our own country are very insignificant. An inland traffic is carried on with Arabia and [Central and Sub-Saharan Africa.] To Arabia they sell woolen manufactures, Morocco leather indigo, cochineal and ostrich feathers, for which they reserve silks muslin, sal-ammonia, saffron, sugar coffee, senna, cassia and other drugs. To [Central and Sub-Saharan Africa,] they send salt, silk, and woolen manufacture which they barter for gold dust, ivory and [slaves]. This trade is carried on by caravans. They exchange commodities with Tunis and sometimes with Egypt. Their exports are Morocco leather, hides, wool, oil, ostrich feathers, barilla soap, way honey cattle, horses, guns, figs olives, dates, almonds and various other fruit. They carry on a considerable traffic with Malta, chiefly in Maltese bottoms and sell them a large number of cattle, sheep, goats, mules and camels for which they receive European goods, and plank for ship and boat building, their principle manufactures are blankets and woolen cloths, leather, carpets, mats, saddles, tinsel cords, muskets, pistols, sabers, power, soap embroidered handkerchiefs, sword knots, jewels, rings, etc. 327

Ray’s assessment of the manufactured products of Tripoli as ‘very insignificant’ compared to those of the United States at first seems to have been more an arrogant flair intended for his American audience than historical observance. Allison noted,

Ray entitled his narrative the Horrors of Slavery but apparently passed his days composing poetry and lamenting his conditions. 328 His attempts at literary prose aside, Ray’s account was regularly peppered with the recorded observations of the Tripolitan markets, the customs, practices of marriage, death and birth in the province, and the accounts of the governor’s relations with his family and members of his divan. These records, aside from further subverting Ray’s taste in descriptive titles, allow us a lens into the day-to-day life of Tripolitan subjects of Yusuf Pasha. 329

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327 William Ray and Hester Blum, Horrors of slavery, or, the American tars in Tripoli, Subterranean lives (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2008), 117.
328 Allison noted that Ray “seems to have spent most of his time in captivity writing poetry” Allison, The Crescent Obscured, 112. Allison also wrote that among the greatest discomfort faced by the men were the long days of boredom.
329 ibid., Chapter XIII “Manners, Customs, etc. of the Tripolitans” and Chapter XII “Description of the Place.”
When compared with commercial records of the age, Ray was largely correct in his assessment of the relative decline of Tripolitan trade. The province had long been reliant on maritime trade for its economic viability and had become dependent on foreign commercial vessels to export the various commodities: the leather, wool and ostrich feathers that Ray listed above, as well as raw materials from the west of the province, such as madder.\footnote{Mark Frederick Dyer, \textit{The Foreign Trade of Western Libya, 1750-1830}, unpublished PhD dissertation (Boston University, 1972): 335.} The trade of all of these commodities had been hit hard by the previous years of instability within the province. Moreover, the outbreak of the Napoleonic wars, the subsequent destruction of the French shipping industry, the American blockade of Tripolitan ports, as well as a simultaneous war that Tripoli was waging against the Swedish crown, all had a massive impact on province’s revenues.

Effectively, these “wars which continued uninterrupted throughout the first decade of Yusuf’s rule, not only deprived Tripoli of the commercial shipping of combatant nations but also prevented the ships of other nations from arriving in port.”\footnote{ibid, 329.} The pasha attempted to compensate for the lost revenues by looking inland, and tightening his grip over rural populations and on the caravans. The young governor’s attempts to increase revenues by making “unusual demands for money [for the tribes] and [stripping] their wives of their jewels”\footnote{March 22, 1804 Doctor Jonathan Cowderly Notes. See, Jonathan Cowdery, \textit{American captives in Tripoli; or Dr. Cowdery's journal in miniature kept during his late captivity in Tripoli.} (Boston: Belcher & Armstrong, 1806).} eventually backfired in the pasha’s later efforts to recruit troops. His attempts at extracting funds for the war with the United States proved economically disastrous for the governor and the province, as by the end of the war in 1805, the governor’s funds were so low that “his steward [had] run a debt for the supply of the kitchen.”\footnote{ibid, May 24, 1804.}
Ray’s account also allows us to glean information into how destructive the bombardment of the Tripolitan city and its walls had been to the infrastructure as well as the administration’s later ability to rebuild the city. The author informed readers that construction in Tripoli was dependent on two central components: white stone extracted from Tripolitan quarries and hauled a great distance to the harbor, and cement imported from Egypt. While Ray does not offer any further information on the sale or transport of building materials between the two provinces, we can speculate that the export of all Egyptian manufactured goods had slowed after the French invasion of 1798, as Egypt was in its own state of disorder. Other than highlighting the economic ramification of the French invasion of Egypt for Tripoli, we can presume the province experienced difficulties in securing the materials needed to reconstruct the city and its walls.

Moreover, a key element of the Tripolitan economy that Yusuf looked to exploit after coming to power in 1795 and that Ray only skimmed over, was the province’s commercial activities in a different kind of commerce: slavery. While it is important to distinguish among various forms of captivity in Tripoli, this chapter cannot delve into the numerous manifestations of slavery that existed in the province. After all, several of the Mamluk agents of the pasha, many of his officials, the American captives from the Philadelphia who, as we shall see below, served as doctors and companions to the pasha’s family, and the numerous other westerners that Yusuf’s mariners had taken hostage were all categorized as slaves. Moreover, the Neapolitan slaves who Ray described as living “in abject slavery,” the black men and women who were similarly taken captive—by caravan traders rather than corsairs—and sold

334 Ray and Blum, Horrors of Slavery, Or, the American Tars in Tripoli, 113.
335 ibid, 114.
in markets throughout the province or the broader Mediterranean, as well as countless others individuals, all faced various forms of enslavement. In short, the concept of slavery in turn-of-the-nineteenth-century Tripoli, much like the rest of the Ottoman world, was a multi-layered system of subordination where different individuals were accorded different levels of agency and privilege and correspondingly denied different levels of agency and privilege.

In an attempt to fit the American hostages into this larger framework of North African slavery, Americanist historians have argued that, “[i]t was not bad to be a slave because one was harshly treated” but rather, for the men of the Philadelphia “slavery was wrong because it denied them their liberty.” However, one could argue that this was a rather insincere understanding of ‘liberty’ for several reasons. First, many Americans were actively involved in the capture, subjection, and bondage of countless individuals who were to be bought and sold in the newly independent United States. Secondly, similar to their Tripolitan counterparts, American vessels also took Tripolitan captives along the province’s shores throughout the war. Lastly, the men of the Philadelphia, and especially the officers, were given some of the greatest degrees of freedom allowed for subjects in the province of Tripoli. In fact, it is through the breadth of access accorded to these men that what we learn more about Yusuf Pasha and his family.

Jonathan Cowderly was the crew physician aboard the Philadelphia and became Yusuf Pasha’s personal family physician. As the governor’s doctor he was given unprecedented access to the members of the household and to Yusuf’s council. From Cowderly’s records, we learn that the governor had epilepsy, that he routinely

336 Allison, The Crescent Obscured, 112.
337 ibid.
suffered seizures and was under the care of Tripolitan marabouts who attempted to exorcise various demons from the governor.\(^{338}\) We also learn that Yusuf had three wives, one Bedouin and two of whom were black. Yusuf made a habit of marrying his children off to officials in his divan, as Ray substantiated in “January of the next year, the Bashaw’s eldest daughter was married off Sayyid Selim, the chief casileda [treasurer.]”\(^{339}\) According to the same source, Yusuf’s first wife, who Tripolitans referred to as the queen, was around the age of twenty-three and had given birth to her ninth child on June 18, 1804.\(^{340}\) In addition, Yusuf Pasha married his eldest son, who Cowderly claimed the British consul flippantly referred to as ‘the Tripolitan Prince of Wales,’\(^{341}\) off to the eldest daughter of his rival, his brother Ahmed, the ex-Pasha who was contemporaneously on his way to Derna.\(^{342}\)

Cowderly’s account of his time in Tripoli, and the genuine kindness offered to him by the Pasha and the members of the Tripolitan divan was quite remarkable. For example, after treating the pasha’s eighteen-month old child for a fever, Cowderly was given a horse and with the protection of his appointed dragoman, allowed to visit the personal gardens of Yusuf Pasha. En route, before arriving at the governor’s gardens, the doctor detoured and visited Murad Rais in his estate. “[C]oming to Admiral Lysle's garden we found him there, and he invited me in. It was very beautiful. He loaded us with its fruits and offered me access to it whenever I chose, and said I was welcome to anything growing in it. I concluded to postpone going to the Bashaw’s garden until another day.”\(^{343}\) It is through this intimate and

\(^{339}\) Ray and Blum, *Horrors of Slavery, Or, the American Tars in Tripoli*, 75.
\(^{340}\) ibid.
\(^{342}\) Ray and Blum, *Horrors of Slavery, Or, the American Tars in Tripoli*, 80.
unprecedented access to Yusuf Karamanli and his inner circle that we glean insights into the Tripolitan experiences of the war. Through Cowderly, we also learn of Yusuf’s growing political worries. “The Bashaw shewed the greatest anxiety for peace. He was sensible of the danger he was in from the lowness of his funds and the disaffection of his people.”

The doctor was correct in his assessment. Tripolitans were growing increasingly frustrated throughout the turn of the nineteenth century with their new, young governor. The fallout from years of turmoil had taken a toll on the province and the new bombardment campaign on the part of the American navy was further exasperating Tripolitan frustrations. While Yusuf had a bomb shelter in his rooms and could pass the days protected from the explosions, most residents did not have much access to protection and were growing wearier of the constant struggles of the last years. The economic struggles of Tripoli had hit the food markets and by 1804, there was little bread to be found in the province, even for the members of the Pasha’s extended family.

The bashaw ordered the market people to not sell grain to anybody but his household. There was no bread t be had for money. A dispute took place between the bashaw and the renegado Lysle about the purchasing of some barley. Lysle was considerably intoxicated and insisted on his right to purchase grain in the market. The bashaw was highly affronted and flew at him with all his might, struck him and ordered his mamelukes to disarm him and put him in prison, which they strove to obey and carried him off. The bashaw however soon ordered him released and then ordered [Lysle’s] servant who was supposed to be the cause of the quarrel bastinadoed with five hundred blows, which was immediately put into execution.

The leniency accorded to Murad, and the severity of punishment inflicted on the admiral’s servant was rather symbolic of the conditions that most Tripolitans

344 ibid, May 28, 1804.
345 ibid, November 8, 1804.
faced in their turn of the nineteenth century lives, as well as those that the captives of
the *Philadelphia* experienced. While Doctor Cowderly was allowed great deal of
freedom, and indeed, hospitality on the part of his Tripolitan captors, enlisted men and
the ship’s crew were not accorded such graciousness. Indeed, the accounts of William
Ray rebuked the officers of the *Philadelphia* nearly as much as the Tripolitan captors
for, at times, the pitiful conditions that the lowest ranking servicemen experienced.
After years of war, plague and siege, Yusuf Pasha’s decision to wage war on the
young United States, regardless of his political reasoning, had disastrous
consequences for the residents of the province. Everyone, including the governor
himself, was facing the severity of wartime conditions.

Tripoli, much like Egypt and Tunis, had an active history of Mamluk
households in the governor’s service. However, little records survive outside of
modern-day Tripoli. Despite this unfortunate omission in the historical materials
available, we are better able to piece together Tripoli’s involvement in another
manifestation of slavery, the one of the trans-Saharan caravans.

By the end of the eighteenth century, most of the major desert caravan routes
cut through Tripolitan territory at one or more points along their journey. From the
west to east, these routes were: the Ghademes-Air-Kano Road that ran along the
Tripolitan boarder into the city of Ghademes and ended in Tunis, the Tripoli-Fezzan-
Bornu route; the Fezzan-Kawan Road from Lake Chad to Murzuq which split off
either north to Benghazi or east through the Augila Oasis arriving in Alexandria or
Cairo, and the Cyrenaica-Kufra-Waidi route that was later renamed the *Sanussi* route
because of their the movement’s lodges along the caravan road.346

346 A. Adu Boahen, “The Caravan Trade in the Nineteenth Century,” *The Journal of African History* 3,
However, while the slave trade from the caravan routes was an important component of the late eighteenth century economy and for the inland cities of the provinces, Wright calculated that former British Consul in Tripoli, Honorable Archibald Fraser, was correct in his estimation that “[t]he General Ballance [sic] in Trade against Tripoli is paid off[f] by the sale of slaves taken in their piracies and the Money spent amongst them by the Agents and Consuls of the several European powers with whom they are at peace.” This antidote would account for Yusuf’s attempts throughout the previous decade to build up his maritime strength. With access to the harbor cut off by the Americans, trade with the interior of the province and indeed with its neighbors to the east and south became an important means to attempt to secure the economic prospects of the province.

As Yusuf Pasha looked to extend his authority beyond the walls of Tripoli, his attention turned south to the regions of Fezzan and southern Cyrenaica. Immediately, Yusuf first faced rebellion from the Amazigh populations of the Gharyan Mountains of western Tripoli. After refusing to pay their annual tax, they assassinated Yusuf’s emissary, Haj Ahmad Agha al-Khaznadar and then seized the goods of a trans-Saharan caravan, which consisted of of five hundred camels weighed down with grain and monies. In response, Yusuf sent his forces, dispersed the population, killed the leader, Shaikh Abd al-‘Onafi, and put down the rebellion. In retribution, the people of Gharyan were forced to pay an indemnity of 100,000 Spanish dollars.

By 1805, Yusuf was attempting to regain sovereignty over Derna. His brother Ahmed had fled by sending over one-thousand men to quell any remaining dissent in

347 Wright, The Trans-Saharan Slave Trade, 55.
348 Folayan, Tripoli during the Reign of Yusuf Pasha Qaramani, 47-48.
349 Ibid.
the eastern coastal town by offering amnesty to those who helped his deposed brother capture the city. The following year, Yusuf attempted to secure his control over the southern province of Fezzan, and to thwart the revolts of the nomadic Awlad Sulaiman tribe which had “cut off a commercial artery”\textsuperscript{350} of the trans-Saharan trade route from Fezzan to Tripoli.

As this central route connected Tripolitania with the markets of Bornu and Hausaland, it was particularly problematic for the leader for various reasons. First, the Awlad Sulaiman were being supported by the Saif al-Nasr clan who had long since resisted Karamanlı rule. His early successes in thwarting domestic rivals that looked to undermine Tripoli’s trade networks would continue throughout the decade. Yusuf turned his eye towards the areas bordering the Sudan region, namely Ghadames and Fezzan. Folayan argued that this focus was largely motivated by commercial rather than political reasons. Both Ghadames and Fezzan were important centers for commerce, and that Ghadames linked Tripoli to Timbuktu by way of Tuat, as well as linking the center with Hausaland via Ghat, and then Bornu via Murzuq. In addition to these important point for trans-Saharan trade, Ghadames also was a meeting point for caravans from Tunis and Algiers.\textsuperscript{351} Access to the Ghadames caravan route would become a point of contestation between Tripoli and neighboring Tunis.

Wright’s research demonstrated that Tripolitan activity in the Saharan slave trade played a central role in the economy of the province. He cited records from the former British Consul in Tripoli Fraser, when analyzing the role of the slave trade in the economies of the region and calculated the consul’s numbers to argue that slave trade constituted about 86% of the import economy in Fezzan “32,000 sequins for

\textsuperscript{350} ibid, 50.
\textsuperscript{351} ibid., 49-51.
only 800 slaves, out of 37,380 sequins total\textsuperscript{352} and a corresponding 82\% of the import economy of Ghadames.\textsuperscript{353} “(8,000 sequins for 200 slaves out of a total of 9,725 sequins, including 1,000 sequins’-worth of gold dust).”\textsuperscript{354} While records do not indicate on the Tripolitan center’s reliance on the caravan trade throughout the turn of the century and specifically throughout the years of irregular American maritime blockade, it is likely that Tripolitan participation in the caravan trade compensate for the loss in revenues from the ports.

The inland routes that connected the provinces, not the sea, that proved to be the most economically, as well as politically effective means of exercising one’s attempts at political autonomy. While Yusuf was attempting to regain control over the larger province and expand his reach southwards, his older brother was in the company of five-hundred mercenaries, several hundred Bedouins, and Tripolitan nomads, as well as a handful of Americans, marching from Alexandria to the port town of Derna.

The chronicle of Ahmed Karamanlı and William Eaton’s march to Derna are well chronicled in American historiography. Suffice is to say that in the eleventh hour, the American government and Yusuf Karamanlı agreed to peace. The Americans were released. Jonathan Cowderly “bid the Bashaw a final adieu, at which he seemed much affected.”\textsuperscript{355} Yusuf remained in control of the province, while Ahmed Karamanlı who marched to Derna with the Americans, was forced into exile in Syracuse, Sicily, abandoned by the American men he trusted.\textsuperscript{356}

\textsuperscript{352} FO 76/2, Fraser, \textit{Some Account of the Trade}.
\textsuperscript{353} ibid.
\textsuperscript{354} ibid.
\textsuperscript{355} Doctor Jonathan Cowderly Notes. June 6, 1805.
\textsuperscript{356} William Eaton correspondence to Ahmed Karamanlı, from September 1805-1806. Eaton actually wrote on behalf of the deposed pasha, … “[b]ut I cannot from any shape in which the subject can be viewed be persuaded that the manner of serving ourselves of Hamet Bashaw and abandoning him, can be reconciled to those principles of honor and justice, which I know actuate the national breast. It seems enough o cancel every pledge that we have bought him back to the post from which had been
Despite the American evacuation and the political ineffectualness of his brother, the governor of Tripoli had to reclaim authority over his political adversaries in Tripolitania. To do so, Yusuf began a systemic attack on his brother’s allies, as well as his own rivals in the province. In a September 17, 1805 letter to London, the British consul to Tripoli wrote:

‘Leon Farfare,’ a Jew, was assassinated. A trader in gold dust was hung as being the murderer, but as it is known that a principal (sic) officer of the Bashaw administered poison to the deceased a few days previous to his death there can be no doubt but that his fate was condemned. A letter by the deceased to the bashaw's brother is said to have been intercepted and this circumstance together with the probability of his having been privy to some of the secrets of the castle may have awakened the bashaw’s suspicions. He was the principle merchant here [with] the bashaw's confidence and the secretary in all his transactions with the Christian powers, broker to several consuls and had served me in that capacity in the month of March.  

It was interesting and telling that the Pasha blamed the death of the merchant on a trader in gold dust from the caravans. Farfara’s role as a negotiator for Yusuf Karamanli with the Americans, a notable figure among diplomatic circles, and his duties as a banker, were similarly noted in Jonathan Cowdery’s notes. After the war, Yusuf Pasha needed to eliminate all threats of rebellion within the province, the next chapter in Tripolitan history was marked by its relations with the interior of the province and with the trans-Saharan merchants. Indeed, both Tunis and Tripoli turned their attentions on the political as well as the economic consolidation of their provinces after the turn of the century.

**Meanwhile in Tunis**

While the end of the eighteenth century brought chaos for both Egypt and

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357 FO 76/6 17-18
358 Doctor Jonathan Cowderly, May 29, 1805.
Tripoli, Tunis was comparatively peaceable. In fact, the province experienced economic growth under Hammuda Pasha. After the 1795 delegation to the Porte regarding the forced removal of Ali Burghol, political relations between the administration of the Tunisian bey and the Porte remained quite positive. Tunis, like Tripoli, supported the empire’s efforts against the French throughout the invasion of Egypt and participated in the broader Ottoman war effort by placing French diplomats under house arrest, and keeping them imprisoned longer than either Tripoli or Algiers.

Unlike his neighbors to the east however, when Hammuda Pasha assumed power in 1782, the province was already in a relative state of prosperity. The ongoing wars with France and the succession troubles that consumed the middle of the eighteenth century had finally ended. Moreover, Hammuda’s predecessor, Ali II, instituted a set of reforms that set the foundation for the centralization of power within the Bardo. So, his heir-apparent Hammuda was able to step in to the framework that his father established, backed with the support of a stable divan, and continue the system of reforms before his official investiture in 1782.

Despite the different contexts in which Yusuf Karamanlı and Hammuda Bey came to power, by the turn of the nineteenth century the governors were pursuing similar strategies to expand commercial revenues and secure their respective hold on power. The uniformity of approach is a particularly compelling demonstration of the regionalism and cohesion present in the socio-economic and political systems of the provinces. This is to say that despite distinctive political and economic conditions, Tripoli and Tunis simultaneously turned their attentions inland and expanded the cross-provincial trade that effectively tied the provinces of Egypt, Tripoli and Tunis.

geographically together: the trans-Saharan caravan trade. In effect, the reign of Hammuda Pasha was marked by his attempts to consolidate power within province and to invigorate the trans-Saharan caravan networks.

Positive relations with the Porte, and the governor’s attempts at economic expansion did not imply that Tunis was not coping with its own set of internal difficulties. Plague and famine throughout the eighteenth century had, much like in Tripoli and Egypt, repeatedly devastated the province. In fact, an outbreak of plague was the major instigator in the 1784-92 war between Tunis and Venice. Troubles arose when Tunisian merchants from Sfax chartered a vessel, flying Venetians colors, to transport cargo from Alexandria to Tunis. However, contagion spread among the crew en route between the North African cities. The merchants ordered the captain, Angelo Emo, to return, and dock in Tunis, which was equipped with quarantine measures. Emo however, decided to sail to Malta, where officials ultimately destroyed the merchants’ cargo and set fire to the ship.

In response, the merchants from Sfax demanded indemnities. The Venetians offered a meager compensation of 140,000 sequins, which the Tunisians quickly refused as unacceptable. Tensions between the two parties grew, and eventually, escalated to war. By January of 1784 the Venetian envoy had been expelled from Tunis. Tunisian corsairs began active campaigns against Venetian vessels. Aggressions continued until Emo— who by 1792 became an admiral in the Venetian navy— lead a bombardment targeting the ports of La Goulette, and Sfax. A cease-

361 Abadi, Tunisia Since the Arab Conquest, 259-260.
363 ibid.
364 ibid.
fire between the two parties was reached shortly thereafter and secured favorable terms for the Tunisian merchants.\textsuperscript{365} However, even this war, which were largely if not exclusively, spurred on by the commercial interests of the province underlined Hammuda Pasha’s unwavering focus on Tunisian economic expansions.

The Tunisian governor’s efforts to consolidate power and expand the Tunisian economy were not based on western or even domestic challenges to his position. Rather, historians of Tunis argued that Hammuda was attempting to unravel the remaining vestiges of influence that neighboring Algiers held within the province.\textsuperscript{366} The succession crisis of the mid-eighteenth century allowed the neighboring deys to exploit the infighting among the various Tunisian contenders. In effect, the general disorder “encouraged the rulers of Algiers’ ambitions to control Tunisian resources.”\textsuperscript{367} In effect, Algerian influence remained quite prevalent in the province until the last decades of the eighteenth century when Ali Bey’s reforms began limiting the westernmost regency’s exploitation of Tunisian reserves by enforcing the Bardo’s authority within its provincial domains and over its commercial interests. Trade between Tunis and Europe began to grow substantially under the governorship of Ali Bey, particularly as the then governor allowed broad concessions to European agents interested in trading with the province.\textsuperscript{368}

Therefore, by the time Hammuda came to power in 1782, the framework was already in place to limit their western neighbor’s influence within the province. Early on, things were looking quite optimistic for Tunis. Hammuda’s commercial reforms

\textsuperscript{365} ibid.
\textsuperscript{366} Ismael Montana, \textit{The Trans-Saharan Slave Trade, the Abolition of Slavery, and Transformations in the North African Regency of Tunis, 1759-1864}, unpublished PhD dissertation (York University, 2007).
\textsuperscript{367} ibid, 21.
\textsuperscript{368} ibid, 24.
took advantage of the “bumper harvests of the mid-1780s” and revived trade with Europe. Nevertheless, the established practice of trade concessions worked exclusively to the European merchants’ favor undermined local interest in the province’s agricultural trade. To reverse this, Hammuda Pasha opted for a policy that required western merchants to obtain an export license (taskara). In the new system, western agents were then required that they use the beylik as the middleman in the transactions, rather than deal directly with the Tunisian merchants themselves. Forcing Europeans to obtain licenses in order to trade with the province proved profitable for Hammuda’s administration in two ways. First, it allowed for a new stream of revenues. Secondly, it spurred on domestic trade that the beylik could then tax. However, not everyone was happy with these new reforms. MacGill, in his Account of Tunis wrote:

A more substantial reason for the decline of the commerce of Tunis…[is] the ill-advised conduct of the Bey. From an ill directed desire of grain, he has not only become a merchant himself but also permits the whole of his ministers, and the people of his court to follow his example. The produce or manufacture which the subject brought to market, he could formerly dispose to the highest bidder; now it is laid hold of by the rapacity of these princely and diplomatic merchants, and if paid for, which is not always the case, it is paid at the price they choose to give, and at which the cultivator or manufacturer cannot afford to sell.

This quote was written in 1807 by Thomas MacGill, an English merchant who traveled to the province and found the new polices frustrating to his commercial interests. MacGill’s claims of Tunisian excess at the highest level of governance were rather overstated. Contemporary travel narratives of the age referred to Hammuda’s

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369 ibid, 27.
370 ibid, 25.
early years in power represented a ‘Golden Age’ or the ‘Augustan age’ of Tunisian history. Vilification and hyperbole aside, pragmatism stood out as the key motivator in Tunisian directives. In his analysis of the young governor, Abun-Nasr wrote:

Taking over from his father at a time when Tunisia was prosperous, he increased its prosperity by the careful management of state revenues. We are told that he was so careful not to burden the public treasury with his personal expenditure that he was often described by the vainglorious Tunisians as having a miserly disposition. He set an example to his ministers and government officials by wearing only locally produced garments, and in order to encourage them to take an interest in agriculture he rode every week to his estate to supervise the work in person. He discouraged the widely practiced custom of giving charity to the poor, and urged its seekers to go and work. While delegating to the ‘ulama the tasks of administering justice, he looked personally into complaints about the conduct of government agents.

The general description of Hammuda Pasha as an economically judicious governor also echoed throughout the vast collection of materials written on turn-of-the-nineteenth-century Tunisia. His efforts to revitalize agricultural production of the province were not his only attempts at increasing revenues. Nor was he solely focused on trading with his primary grain market to the north—nor could he have been—as it was soon about to be difficult to feed his own population much less maintain his grain trade with Spain or France.

The turn of the century had disastrous consequences for the agricultural commerce of the province. The destruction of the French commercial fleet had, as with Tripoli, greatly reduced the maritime traffic between Tunis and its major trading partners, which was particularly ill-fated as Tunisian merchants relied on European vessels for the transport of passengers and goods from the province. Reliance on

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374 Montana, *The Trans-Saharan Slave Trade*, 32
French and Venetian ships was not the only factors working against Tunisian commercial interests. Rather, the endemic famine and grain shortages effectively cut off the grain trade between Tunis and Europe.

Valensi wrote, “during the whole of the first third of the nineteenth century, only two years of good crops may be noted.” While this is true, the famine of 1805 was particularly devastating for the province. So much so, that Hammuda Pasha prohibited the exportation of grain. These restrictions stayed place through the end of the decade and had massive consequences for Tunisian trade. MacGill described the conditions of maritime trade:

The trade of the coast of Barbary has certainly declined considerably of late years. But though this commerce as at a former period much more extensive and lucrative, and might once perhaps have been more worth of the attentions of a nation; yet notwithstanding the low state to which it is reduced...[He continued,] [t]he famine, which did so much mischief in the regency of Tunis (1805,) induced the bey to prohibit the exportation of grain from his state; and as plenty was not for some seasons restored, he has not as yet deemed it prudent to remove his prohibition. Grain being the chief article, which drew ships to his ports, that branch of traffic, has been entirely destroyed. Now that the crops are abundant, were he again to permit exportation, it is much to be doubted whether, under the present circumstances it would resume its former activity.

Maritime interests also shifted away from the corso after 1805. In his work, Panzac argued that the relative abandonment of the corsairing practice had less to do with the investment of the beylik, since the authorities continued to equip ships at more or less the same rate as before, but rather in private individuals’ decreased willingness to fully kit out the ships. He argued, “[b]efore 1806, fitting out of ships by private individuals represented 80 to 95% of the total, and after that date, only 20 to

30%. From then on, privateering lost much of its appeal.\textsuperscript{378}

This information, coupled with the ongoing risk of plague that accompanied Mediterranean travel and which had previously devastated the province, such as during the eighteen-month long epidemic of 1784, spurred the governors’ efforts to expand inland.\textsuperscript{379} Afterwards, Hammuda Pasha looked south, and specifically towards integrating the Ghadames caravan trade into the broader provincial commercial resources.\textsuperscript{380} During the worst months of the epidemic, the pasha suspended trade of the caravans as well as the maritime ports, the pasha was looking to expand the overland trade networks with Central and Sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, it is from Miss Tully’s account that we learn that an official of the Bornu government was visiting Tunis and Tripoli in an effort to discuss trade relations between him and the two North African provinces. Miss Tully wrote:

A black prince of Bornou [sic] is here at present; his come from Tunis and is returning to Bornou... The prince has one of the best houses in the town allotted to him by the Bashaw... The [officials] do not wish to let out their troops for hire, and seldom lend them; when they do, it is only to Mahometans. They seek after no conquests, are content with their own situation, and for many years, have not stood in need of auxiliary soldiers. They could raise if required, great armies expeditiously, from the number of their subjects and the goodness of their horses, as they possess the best qualities of those animals being as serviceable as those of Arabia and as beautiful as those of Barbary.\textsuperscript{381}

From Miss Tully’s records coupled with the reports of Robin Hallett, we learn that the emissary’s caravan consisted of twenty camels and “slaves [that had been]

\textsuperscript{378} ibid, 58.
\textsuperscript{379} The consequences of the 1784 outbreak were far reaching. Illness first spread onboard a French boat carrying pilgrims back to Tunis from Alexandria. The captain nevertheless ignored the rigorous quarantine procedures, which had protected Tunis throughout the eighteenth century, allowing travelers to disembark in the port of La Goullete. The negligence on the part of the captain led to the century’s worst plague outbreak in Tunis, which was later referred to as al-waba’ al kabir [The Great Epidemic.] For additional information, see Gallagher, \textit{Medicine and Power in Tunisia, 1780-1900}, 26.
\textsuperscript{380} Montana, \textit{The Trans-Saharan Slave Trade}, 37-39.
\textsuperscript{381} Tully, \textit{Narrative of a Ten Years’ Residence at Tripoli in Africa}, 201.
seized in wars and raids and as tributes, as was the customary practice for visiting officials of the time. Contemporary sources indicate that the emissary was in the North African provinces for “political, intelligence and diplomatic reasons as well as trade interests.” While unfortunately we do not have further details of the regarding the mission, we do know from other traveler reports the frequency of the slave markets in Tunis. From Edward Stanley wrote of the 1786 Tunisia slave markets and caravan bazaars in great detail:

The market for black slaves is held on Friday in the Bazar, on a place like a stage, raised about three feet with benches round, and a platform in the middle, to walk them up and down and shew [sic] their limbs to the purchasers; no Christian is allowed to buy a black slave. I have seen many among them, of both sexes, with fine regular features, very different from the Guinea blacks. These people are brought to Tunis from the interior parts of Africa, by caravans which come regularly once a year, but from what part I could never learn. I was informed by a merchant, that they were five months on their journey, bringing ostrich feathers, gold dust, slaves, gums and a variety of other articles, which they sell and exchange for goods proper to carry back.

While Stanley rich notes on the Tunisian slave markets of the late-eighteenth century are remarkable in their own right, we can also compare them with later accounts, such as Marcel and Frank’s *Histoire de Tunis: précédée d'une description de cette régence* that was first published in Algeria in 1851, and offered accounts of the sales of slaves in nineteenth century Tunis. From Frank’s notes we learn that much like in the eighteenth century, Christians and Jews were not allowed to purchase

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382 ibid.
383 Montana, *The Trans-Saharan Slave Trade*, 43-44.
slaves as “this prerogative is only granted to Muslims.” However, the most notable difference between Stanley and Frank’s account was the scale of the markets and numbers of human beings bought and sold in Tunis. We see how from the weekly affair Stanley wrote about that the Tunisian slave markets become systemized over the turn of the century. “Once the sale is completed and ratified by the seller and the buyer, in the same market, there are writers (kâtebs) that a purchase contract (heddjéh,) to avoid any kind of dispute between the two parties.” The bureaucratization of the slave markets not only underscored Hammuda Pasha’s interest in expanding the commercial revenues of the province, but also his propensity for having the regency act as a middleman in Tunisian commerce. Moreover, Frank’s account also offers readers a lens into the prices and demand for different slaves within the Tunisian markets:

Prices of black men and women widely vary, depending on their age and the intrinsic value that gives them their particular qualities; the most beautiful black women, in all the splendor of the youth, normally cost 600 dollars; girls [typically] sell for a lower price, and their value will likely be higher or lower depending on how close they are to the age of puberty. [Meanwhile,] young boys and men are much cheaper because they are less popular.

From Frank’s account were we further learn about the interconnectivity of the provinces in regards to the slave trade. For example, his point of reference was not the slave markets of Algiers or Morocco, but rather those of Cairo. Repeatedly throughout his text, he compared the number of slaves in Tunis, the commerce of the caravans,

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385 “…cette prérogative n’étant accordée qu’aux Musulmans.”
386 Marcel and Frank, Histoire de Tunis, 117. “La vente une fois consommée et ratifiée par le vendeur et l’acheteur, il y a sur le Marché même, des écrivains (kâtebs) qui délivrent un contrat d’achat (heddjéh,) pour éviter toute espèce de litige entre les deux parties.”
387 ibid. « Les prix des Nègres et des Négresses varient beaucoup, suivant leur âge et la valeur intrinsèque que leur donnent leurs qualités particulières; une des plus belles Négresses, dans tout l’éclat de la jeu[n]esse, peut ordinairement coûter 600 piastres; les jeunes filles sont d’un prix plus bas, et leur valeur est susceptible d’être plus ou moins élevée suivant qu’elles approchent plus ou moins de l’âge de puberté. Les jeunes garçons, ainsi que les hommes faits, sont beaucoup moins chers, parce qu’ils sont moins recherchés. »
the visual inspection of slaves, as well as even the rate of plague outbreaks to those of Egypt, and specifically the Cairene markets.\textsuperscript{388} This reference point alludes not only to the socio-economic connections among the provinces but also highlights the viability of the intra-Ottoman slave trade between the North African provinces and the Ottoman Porte in the early nineteenth century.

Bin Diyaf wrote that among Hammuda Pasha’s customary gifts to Selim III was a number of black slaves [\textit{raqiq al-Sudan}] sent to the Ottoman sultan as a consular present [\textit{hadiyya}] from the Tunisian bey.\textsuperscript{389} When Montana compared these findings with Ehud Toledano’s research the eunuchs of the Porte, who were historically sent via Tripoli, Tunis and Algiers to Constantinople, we have this underlying system of inter-Ottoman economic cooperation.\textsuperscript{390} To further substantiate this argument, we can look to Tunisian historian Lucette Valensi work on the records of the Venetian consul in Tunis. Where from her work on the inventory of ships registered with the emissary’s office, we see twenty-nine of the two hundred and eighty-four vessels that left Tunis were destined for either Egypt or Istanbul and carried slaves.\textsuperscript{391}

Montana’s work on the history of the slave trade in Tunis was thought provoking and reincorporated the trans-Saharan caravans into the broader structure of the Tunisian economy. Similarly, Dyer and Write’s work underscored the importance of the trans-Saharan caravans in Tripolitan economy. This dissertation builds on this body of work by arguing that rather than read these two patterns independently of one another, comparing the slave trade of the provinces allows us to speculate that

\textsuperscript{388} ibid.
\textsuperscript{389} Montana, \textit{The Trans-Saharan Slave Trade}, 50.
\textsuperscript{390} ibid.
\textsuperscript{391} ibid, 50-51.
Tunisian and Tripolitan participation in the trans-Saharan slave trade mimicked one another in a pattern that followed the broader socio-economic and political regionalism. Moreover, commercial expansion and political centralization of the provinces’ inlands were not the only motives that drove the actions of Hammuda Pasha and Yusuf Karamanlı. While the Tripoli governor was dealing with the ramifications of his war with the Americans, the Tunisian bey was preparing to undercut an external rival of his own, namely the Algerian dey.

**Tunis: A Different Type of Rival**

Since the mid-eighteenth century, the political reach of the Algerian province entrenched itself into the workings of their Tunisian counterparts. Historically, the province of Algiers maintained a socio-political status that elevated it above its neighbors. Moalla argued that the Porte’s appointment of an Algerian commander for the sultan’s campaigns and the use Algerian janissaries to subdue the revolts in the Tunisian province at the turn of the eighteenth century indicated a particular affinity on the part of the Porte for its westernmost province. While Moalla did not cite any Ottoman language sources, we know from Ottoman documents in the Porte that Constantinople routinely tied Tunis and Tripoli in with Algiers when discussing the *corso*. However, turn of the nineteenth century brought with it new economic models that pushed beyond the maritime or even privateering interests of the provinces.

Nevertheless, Moalla wrote “the Algerian threat of a complete annexation of

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392 In the era before the rise of Mehmed Ali, the Ottoman *bahiyye* and Porte regularly categorized the three *ocak* provinces of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli together, because of their shared histories in the *corso*. However, as we will see in the very end of this chapter, and at the especially in the next one with the outbreak of the Greek War of Independence, Mehmed Ali slowly begins to encroach on the broader North African provinces, and pull them into Egypt’s sphere of influence.
the Tunisian Regency, hanging like the sword of Damocles that only the Porte could prevent from falling on the beys’ heads still represented an efficient dissuasive tool against [Tunis’s] possible dissidence. This dissertation argues however that by the turn of nineteenth century, the politics of North Africa were no longer so clear cut. Algiers was historically much stronger than its eastern neighbor. Tunis was also routinely subjected to Algerian sway, and several instances of diplomatic bravado. Algerian emissaries would not infrequently thumb their nose at the Tunisian bey and his councils. Nevertheless, the Tunisian victory over Algiers in the 1807 war demonstrably showed that while influential the power of the dey was not authoritative within the Tunisian province.

While Moalla’s historiographical paradigm called for the inclusion of the Tunisian province into the broader Ottoman world was invaluable in its analysis of the Tunisian beylicate and its relations with Constantinople, Tripoli, and with Europe, the scholar’s arguments concerning Ottoman-Tunisian relations in regards to Algiers are more debatable. Moalla specifically pointed to Cezayirli Gazi Hasan and his early maritime training within the westernmost province as a “renewed acknowledgement of the particular status enjoyed by the Algerian corsairs” at the turn of the nineteenth century. Indeed, the author drew a continuous line connection Algerian captains, from the sixteenth century corsair Barbarossa Hayreddin Pasha to the Georgian admiral who died nearly two hundred and fifty years later. However, Gazi Hasan’s relationship with the North African regencies was complicated at best. Gazi Hasan himself fled Algiers for Spain. Moreover, as we saw in Chapter One, the

393 Moalla, The Regency of Tunis and the Ottoman Porte, 1777-1814, 55
394 Moalla, also see Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period, 180-183.
395 Moalla, The Regency of Tunis and the Ottoman Porte, 1777-1814, 55.
corsair captains of North Africa were not included in the Admiral’s broad sweeping maritime reforms within the Asitane. In fact, the captain struggled to find the most constructive approach to limit the growing autonomy of the Ottoman provinces—North Africa included. Lastly, during the failing years of Ali Bey’s governorship in Tripoli, Gazi Hasan supported a fellow Georgian corsair, Ali Burghol, in his 1793 attempts to overthrow the Karamanlis—not the governor of Algiers, who had at his ready disposal an army far superior to the 300 mercenaries who accompanied Burghol. I argue that rather to Algiers, Gazi Hasan’s ultimate loyalty was that to the sultanate of Abdul Hamid I. Moalla’s problematic use of sources is also reflected in her analysis of the 1807 war. The author wrote:

Hammuda, who had been for years engaged in reforming and improving his army, finally declared war on Algiers in 1807. The first battle between the two armies near Constantine, in the east of Algeria, ended in a shameful rout for the Tunisians. A new expedition was sent to the western frontier two months later, under the command of Yusuf Sahib al-Tabi solemnly invested with full powers by the bey. Yusuf managed to inflict a severe defeat on the Algerians and came back crowned with glory in August 1807.396

While Moalla’s assessment of the two major battles in the 1807 was largely correct, her nationalist reading of events colored her text and were based exclusively on the chronicles of Bin Diyaf, who she previously referred to as “our national chronicler,” thus, invoking the question of Moalla’s intended audience. Nevertheless, her overall assessment was accurate: tensions remained high between Algeria and Tunis during the turn of the century.

Hostilities erupted after Hammuda Pasha offered sanctuary and support to Mustafa Ingliz, the exiled dey of Constantine (in eastern Algiers.)398 After a few

396 ibid, 56.
397 ibid, 57.
antagonistic diplomatic exchanges on the part of both governors, in January 1807 Hammuda Pasha sent his army on a mission to invade Constantine. Hammuda’s troops, which were largely comprised of Ottoman trained janissaries, were forced out by their Algerian counterparts in May. The Algerian victory proved to be short lived, when the Algerian dey’s men were subsequently defeated outside of Salata in Tunis, and then again repulsed the following year when their forces attempted to invade in June 1808. After the Tunisian victory outside of Salata, Hammuda Pasha ended Tunisian bey’s annual tribute to Algiers, and cast off the remaining vestiges of his neighbor’s influence. Abun Nasr wrote of a third attempt by the Algerian dey to invade Tunis, this time by sea, in 1811, but Tunisian corsairs were able to block their Algerian counterparts from attacking their harbors.

Hammuda Pasha’s soldiers repeated ability to ward off Algerian attacks clearly demonstrated that the likelihood of successful Algerian invasion was simply not possible by the turn of the nineteenth century. Moalla’s depiction of the Algerian threat “hanging like the sword of Damocles” over Tunis simply did not apply to the governorship of Hammuda Pasha. Regardless, it was in Moalla’s assessment of the Porte’s response to the hostilities between Tunis and Algiers that her sources proved to be weakest. Moalla wrote of the conditions between Hammuda Pasha and the Sublime Porte:

The precarious nature of Selim [III]’s power probably prevented him from standing firmly in support of Tunis against Algerian domination in the Maghrib region. The Tunisians were therefore left, or secretly encouraged, to fight their own war against the Algerians, in order to create a new status quo, which the Porte would readily sanction.

399 Moalla, The Regency of Tunis and the Ottoman Porte, 1777-1814, 58. Also ibid.
401 Ibid.
402 Moalla, The Regency of Tunis and the Ottoman Porte, 1777-1814, 55.
403 Ibid, 56.
Moalla, in her notes, cited a reference to an article by Charter discussing the Porte’s official neutrality in the hostilities between Tunis and Algiers, with reference to a November 1807 *firman* from Selim III that instructed the provinces to direct their frustrations towards Christian Europe rather than one another. This was likely correct, as the Sublime Porte did not benefit from having its provinces at war with one another. However, the author did not cite any further Ottoman primary, or secondary, sources to substantiate her claims beyond this statement of official neutrality. Moreover, Ottoman records from late 1807 only have one preserved document regarding the provinces of Tunis and Algiers: the annual official re-investiture of the *bey* Hammuda Pasha and the Algerian *dey* Ahmad Pasha for the following year. In 1808, a memorandum was sent to Mustafa IV informing the sultan of the death of Ahmad Bey and the succession of Ali III to the governorship of Algiers. Moreover, Ottoman records do not indicate that there was any correspondence Hammuda Pasha and the Sublime Porte regarding Algiers in the year before Selim III’s deposition.

If one were to speculate on the behavior of the High Divan, then the Ottoman Porte would have likely deferred to the provinces to resolve their own disputes and only stepped in. This is to say, it would only intervene officially or otherwise, in excessive instances of administrative dereliction or antagonism towards Constantinople’s policies—much like we saw with the sultan’s delayed sanctioning in the removal of Ali Karamanlı of Tripoli and Gazi Hasan’s repeated attempts to curtail

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405 C.DH Dosya No: 99 Gömlek No: 4933.
406 HAT Dosya No: 1356 Gömlek No: 53112.
407 BOA, Katalog searches for Tunus, Cezayir-i Garb, Cezayir, in the Hicri years 1221-1222.
the Mamluk grandees of Egypt before the French invasion.\footnote{408 See Chapter One of this dissertation for more detail.}

Despite Moalla’s problematic reading of Ottoman-Tunisian history in regards to neighboring Algiers, her contribution to the field remains quite valuable. Her research was the first historical attempt to dismantle the Tunisian nationalist paradigm in regard to the province’s relationship with the High Porte. Her visionary attempt to cast off historiographical notions of Tunisian provincial autonomy continue to be essential contributions that will serve as the foundation for new models in North African history.

‘Systematic Pacification’

Folayan argued that from 1806 through the mid-1810s, Yusuf Karamanlı was effectively attempting to systematically pacify the province.\footnote{409 Folayan, *Tripoli during the Reign of Yusuf Pasha Qaramanlı*, 48.} Simultaneously, Mehmed Ali and Hammuda Pasha were also attempting similar measures in their respective territories. The years 1806-7 brought war for the Tunisian governor and Yusuf Pasha’s attempts to quell the Awlad Suleiman revolts while Mehmed Ali attempted to consolidate power and curtail the lawlessness of the recent Cairene experience. In effect, three governors of the North African provinces were undergoing similar efforts to consolidate power under their authority and in turn either mimicking one another in the process, or concurrently learning and adapting to their circumstances in paralleling ways.

In effect, each power holder needed to eliminate their local rivals for power, reinforce their control over the domestic economies, and reaffirm his connection and loyalty with the Ottoman Porte. Matters were further complicated in Constantinople in May 1807 when spurred by wide scale \textit{yamak} revolt, the Shiekh ul-Islam issued a
fatva that forced the abdication and imprisonment of Selim III. His cousin Mustafa IV replaced him. Ottoman notables had been increasingly disgruntled with the reformist’s nizam-i cedid, and choose Mustafa IV as a successor who would be more sympathetic to the traditionalist calls for consistency and stability.\(^{410}\) Mustafa IV’s sultanate lasted just over a year and by July 1808, he too was deposed—this time in favor for Selim III’s brother—Mahmud II. Mahmud II continued with his brother’s reforms, and would later lay the foundation for the tanzimat, or reorganization, period of the 1830s.\(^{411}\)

In Cairo, Mehmed Ali Pasha was similarly attempting to thwart his rivals. Fahmy listed a triumvirate of his adversaries: the ulama, the Mamluks and the Cairene merchants.\(^{412}\) In an effort to curtail their efforts against his new governorship, Mehmed Ali first placed the Sheikh al-Sarqawi under house arrest in 1806, curtailing the religious scholars’ economic influence in the province by eliminating their tax exemptions, seized their multazims or tax-farming territories if any duties remained unpaid, pared down their ability to hold tax-free or rizqa land which were mostly used for awqaf, religious endowments, or madaris, religious schools.\(^{413}\) However, the most significant threat to Mehmed Ali’s tenuous rule was the Porte. After all, Constantinople had only supported his claims for the governorship after much hesitation and foot-dragging on the part of the Asitane. In 1806, the Kapudan Pasha arrived in the Alexandrine harbor, this time with Musa Pasha, the former vali of Thessaloniki who had been appointed as Mehmed Ali’s replacement.\(^{414}\)

\(^{410}\) Aksan, Ottoman Wars, 1700-1870. Internal and External Challenges to Selim III, Also see, Shaw, Between Old and New, Final chapter.
\(^{411}\) Fahmy, Mehmed Ali, 29.
\(^{412}\) ibid, 30.
\(^{413}\) ibid, 30.
\(^{414}\) ibid, 31.
However, Mehmed Ali still maintained the support of his Albanian soldiers who had become exceptionally wealthy and powerful in the shadow of the governor, as “not a man among them [had not] acquired a number of houses, wives, estates for tax-farming and unbelievable power.” After negotiating with the ulama, who had just revolted against the governor because of his attempts to curtail their commercial interests, the young Pasha leveraged enough support to give the Ottoman officials no choice but to leave Egypt, and reappoint Musa Pasha as the governor of Thessaloniki.

A more salient threat came the following year, in the spring of 1807. Five thousand British troops landed in Alexandria in an effort to restore their Mamluk allies under the leadership of al-Alfi, a grandee who spent time in England currying favor with British officials during the French invasion. However, British objectives were similarly thwarted in Rosetta when they fell captive to the scheme elaborated on the part of the city’s governor, Ali Bey al-Salaniki. Mehmed Ali, had their heads sent on spikes to Cairo, where they were hung from Bab Zuweila. The governor eventually ordered the ears be chopped off and salted as a gift for the sultan, and their heads buried. By November of that year, Mehmed Ali received a firman from Mustafa IV thanking him for protecting Egypt from the “heathen English.” The Mamluks continued to be the most powerful adversary to Mehmed Ali’s control of Egypt. In May 1810, shortly before Mehmed Ali had the Mamluks massacred in the citadel, the grandee Ibrahim Bey commented on the new governor:

We have already experienced his ways and his treachery. We have witnessed his dealings with those who served him and helped him to gain control of this

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415 ibid.
416 ibid.
417 ibid.
418 ibid., 32-33.
country...Foremost was his master Muhammad Pasha Khusraw [Hüsrev Pasha] and then his kathuda and khazindar Uthman Agha Kinj, his drinking companions. With his friend the late Tahir Pasha he took over the Citadel and burned the palace. Then he set the Turks against Tahir Pasha, and they killed him in his house. Then he appeared friendly towards us [the Mamluks] ready to help us as if he were one of our soldiers. He joined with Uthman Bey al-Bardisi and seemed to show him sincere friendship and brotherhood and swore fidelity to him. Then he incited him against ‘Ali Pasha al-Tarabulusi. He was killed, and we were implicated. Then he worked to betray al-Alfi and his followers through his brother (al Bardisi). He set the soldiers against us with demands for pay. He counseled ‘Uthman Bey to put a tax on the people… Ahmad Pasha Khurshid [Hürşid Pasha] arrived and named him vizier, and he set out to fight us. Then his desire to overthrow Ahmad Pasha came to light and he quickly returned to Cairo, sowing discord between him and his soldiers until they turned against him. He told Sayyid ‘Umar the qadi of the shaykhs that Ahmad Pasha wanted to assassinate them, so they stirred up the people. Then followed warfare, and the houses were burned. Sayyid ‘Umar spent great effort in helping him, and he seemed to show him friendship and goodwill. When he reached his objective and secured his power he turned him out of Cairo and exiled him from his homeland, violating all the promises and agreements between them... You and others have witnessed it. Who can trust this man or conclude a truce with him? 419

Ibrahim Bey’s anger with the young governor is palpable in his text. By the summer of 1810, tensions came to a head between the Mamluks and Mehmed Ali. In a letter from the governor to the Grand Vizier from July 14, 1810, the governor wrote the amirs of the Egyptian households continued their revolt against “direct Ottoman rule.” 420 Because of their disloyalty to the sultan, Mehmed Ali argued he went to battle against them, captured several, and held them hostage. The remainder fled, sought refuge in Upper Egypt or attempted to flee to Sudan. 421

After the infamous assassination of the Mamluks, Mehmed Ali assumed the responsibilities—and wealth—of valî on March 5, 1811. However, the High Porte was displeased with Mehmed Ali’s assassination of the Mamluks and his seizure of

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421 ibid.
power. In response, Constantinople called him the “smallest of viziers”\textsuperscript{422} and that it was only out of his pure longing for control that he got to be where he was.\textsuperscript{423} Fahmy noted in both \textit{All the Pasha’s Men} and in \textit{Mehmed Ali} that the pasha maintained a difficult relationship with the Porte throughout his entire tenure as \textit{vali}.\textsuperscript{424} However, the ambitious governor’s influence would eventually reach the Hijaz, Crete, Sudan, and Syria. Mehmed Ali began looking to expand his influence westward.

The \textit{vali’s} correspondence from 1810-13 suggests that he was also establishing his influence in broader North Africa. First indicators of Mehmed Ali’s interest in the Maghrebi provinces, and specifically their vessels and maritime expertise, can be traced back to January 26, 1811. In a letter the English Admiral of the Fleet, Mehmed Ali referred to the agreement between the British government and the Porte. The Kapudan Pasha, Kucuk Husseyin agreed to allow English trade ships to dock in the port of Alexandria. In the letter, the \textit{vali} referred to maritime trade between Egypt and Sweden, and the logistical troubles that Egyptian ships faced in their attempts to sail across the Mediterranean, during the ongoing Napoleonic Wars, in their trade with Europe.\textsuperscript{425}

Mehmed Ali was comparing the ports of Alexandria with French and North African ports regarding their capacity for different kinds of vessels. This early suggestion, from before the assassination of the Mamluks, points to the \textit{vali’s} early interest in using the maritime expertise of his neighbors’ provinces to his own advantage, as it was only under the protection of British gunships that vessels could securely dock and depart from the Alexandrine harbor. Moreover, the letter
effectively pointed to a dual relationship between the English and Egypt at the time. The English were assisting the Egyptian vali, and in turn, the Porte, in their maritime trade but at the same time, still posed a serious threat to the province. It had only been five years since the British invasion of 1807, and the empire's power was growing at sea in the light of the French commercial maritime decline. Mehmed Ali, in a strategic power play, was serving as middleman in the ongoing between the Ottoman Empire and Great Britain.

**Tripoli**

As the governor of Egypt was attempting consolidate power, the vali of Tripoli was effectively adopting similar strategies to secure his own position. One of the most significant changes with the turn of the century was the shift in the provinces of Tunis and Tripoli away from the corso. After the war with the United States, the Tripolitan governor also turned his attention inland. First, he turned his attentions first to Derna, in an attempt to reconsolidate power in the eastern part of the province, and then to suppressing the Awlad Suleiman revolts within the territory. The Awlad Suleiman, the Bedouins that lived in western Tripolitan between Fezzan and Tripoli had allied with the Saif al-Nasr clan, to the north, which had long resisted Karamanlı rule in the province. Effectively, the Awlad Suleiman were using their influence in Fezzan to block the trans-Saharan routes from effectively reaching Tripoli. This measure was in retaliation to Yusuf Pasha’s attempts to clamp down on the payment of annual tribute rates by the clans in order to refill the coffers after the end of the war with the Americans.  

In response, the governor sent a battalion under his eldest son Muhammad Bey

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to subdue the Saif-al-Nasr forces outside Sirte. In the battle that followed, the sheikh of the Saif-al-Nasr clan was killed, and their resistance quickly crumbled thereafter.\textsuperscript{427} The Awlad Suleiman continued to resist the governor’s attempts at centralization. Yusuf looked to centralize his power over two main territories for the trans-Saharan routes: Ghadames to the far west of the province and Fezzan. The Tripoli-Fezzan route had been under the control of Tripolitan merchants. The Ghadames route cut through western Tripoli on the way north to Tunis were the two most frequented paths in the first third of the nineteenth century. To consolidate the Tripolitan center’s hold, Yusuf Bey sent forces under his son Ali to Ghadames in 1810. The town quickly surrendered to the forces. Residents paid twenty thousand gold \textit{mithqals} and \textit{mahbubs} to Yusuf. Furthermore, the pasha imposed a governor of his choice on the town to collect ten percent of all the trade that passed through the city.\textsuperscript{428}

Having curtailed the power of the traders in Ghadames, and centralized and imposed his man as the governor of the city, Yusuf Pasha turned his attention to Fezzan in 1811-1812. Fezzan, was not incorporated into the broader Tripolitan province until the middle of the eighteenth century. By the early nineteenth century, the space had since fallen out of Tripoli’s control. In a fascinating power-share arrangement, Yusuf Karamanlı allowed the Awlad Muhammad governors of Fezzan to continue to use the title of ‘sultan’ seal on all internal correspondence within the territory. However, any correspondence between the de facto governor of Fezzan and Tripoli was endorsed with a smaller seal of the title of ‘Sheikh.’ In return for internal autonomy, Yusuf insisted that Fezzan’s annual tribute be regularly collected from Murzuq, and that the sum equivalent to five thousand Spanish dollars be paid in gold.

\textsuperscript{427} Ibid, 53-55.  
\textsuperscript{428} Ibid.
dust, henna or slaves. The individual appointed by the governor, Muhammed al-Mukkani, to serve as bey al-nawba, or ‘collector of the Bashaw’s tribute.’

Yusuf’s influence in Fezzan was about to grow exponentially. In 1810, al-Mukkani reported to Yusuf that the annual tribute rate could be easily tripped if the Pasha were willing to invest al-Mukkani with the powers of governor of Fezzan rather than tribute collector. Moreover, infighting among Awlad Muhammad successors worked to Tripoli’s favor when the nephew of sultan offered to collaborate with al-Mukkani in return for the latter’s support in his claims to the sultanate of Fezzan. One week after assuming his uncle’s position, the young governor was confronted by al-Mukkani demanding increased tribute rates. The young successor could not afford to pay, and as a result was promptly executed. In the chaos that followed, the Fezzan Mamluks along with the Awlad Suleiman tribe attempted to resist the new governor’s forces, but reinforcements from Tripoli quickly secured al-Mukkani’s power.

In return for Yusuf’s official investiture Mukkani tripled the annual tribute rate was tripled from five to fifteen thousand Spanish dollars. Having secured Fezzan, Yusuf shifted his attentions eastward, and mounted campaigns to quell rebellions in Benghazi and Derna the following year. As was the case in Yusuf’s support for al-Mukkani in Fezzan, the governor was driven by economic interests and his push eastward was spurred by the backlog of tribute payments. Under the command of his son Muhammad Bey, who thwarted the Awlad Ali rebellion of 1810, the governor’s son returned to Tripoli in February 1812 with “several head of cattle, twenty-two boxes filled with money and jewelry all valued at about $80,000.”

In Tunis meanwhile, a janissary revolt broke out in September 1811. Like in

429 ibid, 52.
430 ibid, 54.
Constantinople and the reforms of Selim III, the Tunisian janissary *jund* forces rebelled against the centralization efforts that Hammuda Pasha was implementing. In response, Hammuda became increasing severe towards the Tunisian *jund* and the notables that supported the *jund*. In 1805, the governor sanctioned the dismissal of the notable *dey*, Ibrahim Busnaq and in 1808, another janissary Muhammad Qara Bunnali was executed, under the pretense of conspiring with the Algerian *dey* against Hammuda Pasha. Revolt broke out in September when janissaries seized the citadel in Qasbah. However, the uprising was quickly put down by Hammuda’s forces, and the fleeing janissaries were assassinated by the governor’s men under the command of Yusuf Sahib al-Tabi, the same commander who lead a successful defeat of Algerian forces in 1807.\(^{431}\) In September of 1814, Hammuda Pasha died and was succeeded by his brother ‘Uthman, followed before the end of the year by his cousin, Mahmoud. The age of Hammuda Pasha, and the bey’s resolute and austere model of governance, had come to an end.

**Conclusion**

The turn of the nineteenth century brought new patterns in the regional behaviors of the North African provinces. We saw how shifts in political authority, and declining interest in the *corso* spurred a renewed interest in the inland networks of the trans-Saharan caravans and examined how the governors of Tunis and Tripoli attempted to legitimize their rule during a period of political transformation. The two governors, much like their counterpart in Egypt, were forced to navigate internal, as well as regional, threats to their authority. The turn of the century brought a new era that was marked with the internal consolidation of power and, in the last years of the

\(^{431}\) Moalla named this figure twice in her chapter.
Napoleonic wars, North African rulers attempted to shift their commercial pursuits from the *corso* of the sea to the caravans of the sand. This chapter gave a Tripolitan face to a Tripolitan war using sources that are often overlooked in Arabic historiography and have better contextualized the regional ramifications and contexts of the war.

Moving forward, it touched on the North African provinces’ engagement in the practice of slavery and on how the commercial and economic interests drove policy in the region. It used contemporary accounts to elucidate both the experiences of western and of black slaves in Tripoli and Tunis, and are able to better contextualize the various manifestations of subjection experienced in the region. The cross-provincial ties that bound governors such as Ali Burghol, and Ahmed Karamanlı to the broader region and how tribes, notables, and officials regularly traversed the provincial divides of North Africa, and how alliances did not either begin or end with borders.

Lastly, this chapter also interrogated how political changes in the region were historically embedded in the broader diplomatic world of the Porte, and how political change needed to be addressed through the Porte’s hierarchical systems, and in turn, how political transformations in Constantinople trickled down to regional revolts in the North African provinces.
CHAPTER FOUR
LOCAL RESPONSES TO THE NEW ORDER, 1814-1824

The turn of the nineteenth century brought significant changes to the wider political structures of the North African provinces from 1801-1814. This chapter continues in the vein of political transformation, and examines North African procedural adaptability in the years between the 1814 Congress of Vienna and the 1824 Egyptian campaign in Morea. By focusing on 1814-24, we are able to connect the North African revival of the corso and the corresponding upsurge in European antagonism against the North African maritime practice to the subsequent maritime conscription of the regencies’ fleets by Mehmed Ali’s campaign in Morea.

The interim period was an era of change within the economic and political policies of Tunis and Tripoli. A ‘period of adjustment’ that accompanied economic and commercial transformations of the age that were spurred by the Congress of Vienna and the subsequent 1816 Anglo-Dutch attack on Algiers. The frantic restructuring, and the effective end of the corso highlighted the resourcefulness of the provinces as well as their attempt to survive the changes of the day.

This chapter ends right before the active conscription of Tripoli and Tunis up into the 1824 efforts of the Egyptian vali and his son Ibrahim Pasha, in the Greek War for Independence. Their active participation in the key moment highlighted how North African power dynamics began to swing sharply towards Cairo’s favor by the mid 1820s. Moreover, isolating the timeframe between 1814-1824 allows us to delve into the dynastic troubles that had a massive impact on the government of Tunis, the 1818-20 plague that struck the province and crippled its economy after the death of Hammuda Pasha.

Lastly, it also examines how Egypt and Tripoli paralleled one another in their
underlying imperialist expansionist endeavors inland. Post the decline of the *corso*, Yusuf Pasha began on several levels to mimic his neighbor to the east.

**Conditions in the Provinces**

By the summer of 1815, European actors increasingly exerted pressure on the provinces, and to a lesser extent the Porte, for the North African governors to abandon the long held tradition of the *corso*. Hammuda Pasha, the governor of Tunis, whose rule ushered in a period of reform and governmental centralization, as well as a tightening of the bonds between Tunis and the Porte, died in 1814. After the previous years of instability, the growing interference of Algiers into Tunisian administration and intra-familiar rivalries of the eighteenth century, the Husainid dynasty of Tunis began to flourish under Hammuda Pasha.

The governor, despite his administrative successes was nevertheless not the legitimate heir to the *beylik*. Upon coming to power, Hammuda had taken the place of his older cousin Mahmoud, who was ahead of Hammuda in the line of Husainid succession. However, the supplanting of one cousin over another was considered acceptable, or at least represented such, by Bin Diyaf and by the various officials in the Bardo Palace of the time. Mahmoud suffered from painful gout that would leave him incapacitated, and by the time Hammuda came to power in the eighteenth century, the province was just beginning to emerge from the succession troubles of the previous decades.

It was not surprising that after Hammuda’s 1814 death, various contenders for power began to emerge from the woodwork of the Bardo Palace. Robert Greenhow

\[433\] ibid, also see Ismael Musah Montana and Ehud R. Toledano, *The Abolition of Slavery in Ottoman Tunisia*, passim.
wrote:

Many changes had in the mean time [sic] taken place in Tunis. On the 15th of September 1814, Hamouda Bey, while taking a cup of coffee after a long day’s fast in the Ramadan, fell down and expired… he was not the rightful heir to the throne, according to the European laws of succession for Mahmoud and Ismael, the sons of Mahmed the elder brother of [Hammuda] father, were still alive, retaining in as state prisoners in the palace. On the death of Hamouda, his brother Othman assumed the crown but it did not rest long on his head; he had a powerful enemy in the Sapatapa Sidi Yusuf, who was anxious to govern himself, and considered that the aged Mahmoud would be a more convenient representative of royalty. The troops were accordingly corrupted, and on the 20th of December, Othman was murdered by the hand of Mahmoud himself, who having also dispatched the two sons of his victim, assumed the title and power of Bey, without opposition. 434

Shortly afterwards, the new Tunisian governor, Mahmoud Bey, had Sapatapa Sidi Yusuf assassinated and threw his body to the mob outside the palace walls.435 With this bloody assassination, Mahmoud Pasha’s position as bey was secured and he governed Tunis for a decade, from 1814 until 1824. As Tunis was facing an internal crisis, all three of the corsairing provinces—Tunis, Tripoli and Algiers—were simultaneously about to experience a drastic reduction of their economic revenues.

However, in a turn of events for Tripoli, Yusuf Pasha was attempting to consolidate power over the broader province of Tripolitania by extending his reach beyond the walls of the city into the eastern and southern spaces of Cyrenaica, Ghadames, and Fezzan. To do so, the Tripolitan governor turned to his sons and trusted agents. Specifically, he looked to individuals that he could use as political proxies that would be willing to exercise the will of the pasha in beyond the provincial center.

In the south, Yusuf backed Mohammad al-Mukkni’s political takeover of

435 ibid.
Fezzan in 1810. By seizing power and overthrowing the Awlad Mohammad sultans from the region and entrusting a governor in the region who was entirely dependent on Tripoli’s militaristic strength for its survival, Yusuf’s will was thus practically guaranteed in al-Mukkni’s Fezzan. After all, the latter was entirely dependent on the Tripolitan pasha to maintain his hold on power, and the governor knew it. Al-Mukkni had held true to his promise to triple the governor’s revenues from the trans-Saharan caravans.

Around the same time the governor was making a move for Fezzan, Yusuf equipped his eldest son, Mohammed, with an army to curtail the Bedouin rebellions to the east of the province. Cyrenaica was a region that had long operated with a significant degree of autonomy from the Tripolitan center. By sending his son to subdue the revolts of the Awlad Ali—a clan that historically lived in the region that crossed over the Tripolitan-Egyptian frontier, Yusuf was effectively reversing Cyrenaican administrative self-rule. Mohammad, as per his father’s orders, went east in 1810, and was given the significant size of the army to defeat the Awlad Ali. He returned victorious to Tripoli with their slaves, livestock and funds.

These efforts on the part of the Tripolitian governor to extend his authority beyond the provincial center allowed him expand his influence into the broader sphere of his domains. More importantly however, they allowed him to prevent the potential for ambitious political rivals, such as the Awlad Ali, from gaining power in the far reaches of the province. Effectively, the governor was establishing a basis for political behavior where any dissenting, or even potentially autonomous voices would not be

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437 See Chapter 3 of this dissertation
tolerated—as in the case of the Awlad Mohammad sultans of Fezzan and their removal by al-Mukkni. The pasha was willing to overthrow, or at least undermine, the pre-existing power structures with new systems that were inherently more sympathetic to his interests. Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that these 1810s inland expansion became part of a larger aggressive political pattern pursed by Yusuf Pasha throughout his reign.

**A Return to the Old Warring Ways**

By 1815 all three of the provinces had proactively revived the *corso*. So much so, that the number of campaigns waged on the sea had grown exponentially over the course of a year. In a radical volte-face from the previous years, which brought a near-abandonment of the maritime practice, by mid-decade the three provinces fully revived their efforts to actively target and attack western vessels. The shift across the corsair provinces was matched by their effort to expand their maritime commerce and – in the Tunisian and Tripolitan case – to further their inland trade networks. To give an example of how significant this return to the *corso* was, the number of Tunisian campaigns from the years of 1813 and 1814 combined numbered at only thirteen. The number of campaigns engaged in during 1815 was a far more significant forty-one.

There were two interlinked factors behind the radical turn away from the *corso* in the early years of the century. First came the commercial shift, as North Africans begun to expand into the world of merchant shipping. After the outbreak of the Napoleonic wars, and the subsequent English blockade, French commercial shipping effectively came an effective halt in the Mediterranean. This limited the region’s

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440 ibid.
441 ibid., 260-270.
access to the French commercial vessels that North African merchants relied on to transport their goods to Europe and across the Ottoman Empire. To offset these losses, North African merchants increased their participation in the commercial world of maritime commerce as several of them maintained long-standing commercial ties with various port-cities such as Marseilles and Livorno.

Panzac wrote, “the arrival in Marseilles on 5 November 1809 of a convoy of six Maghrebi commercial ships was an exceptional event, not only because of the number of ships, but also because of their flag—North African ships were now replacing French vessels that were victims of an implacable British blockade. Even their limited cargoes provided a valuable contribution to a maritime market that was particularly depressed.” Panzac was overall correct in his assessment. However, I contend that we can push this argument further still. After all, the shift away from the corso towards commerce was likely spurred on by several other North African-specific factors that were effectively centered on the British blockade of French ports.

After all, it was under the auspices of European captains that the two most significant incidents of plague hit eighteenth-century Tunis. Port authorities in Malta successfully contained the first outbreak when they burned a Tunisian vessel from Sfax, preventing the infection from physically reaching the province. However, the Venetian captain’s refusal to return the vessel to Tunis, a port equipped with the necessary quarantine measures, the subsequent destruction of the goods onboard lead to the outbreak of the 1784 war between Tunis and Venice. Not only did the war lead to the eventual blockade of various Tunisian ports, but the measures taken by the

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444 ibid.
Maltese officials did not even spare the province from further outbreak.

Later that year, a French captain’s similar disregard for quarantine procedures and his negligence in allowing a handful of infected pilgrims on to the porte of La Goullete lead to worst outbreak of the plague in the century, which later became known as the as al-waba’ al-kabir [The Great Epidemic].

These instances had massive consequences for Tunisian trade. The second effectively brought a temporary halt to both the caravan and the maritime commerce of the province as Hammuda Pasha attempted to contain the epidemic. These outbreaks demonstrated to North African officials the wide-reaching consequences of a general disregard for their maritime procedures on the part of European captains. Therefore, a general turn towards ‘in-house’ commercial endeavors is not particularly surprising—particularly given the scope of these two events and their disastrous effects on the province’s economy. Additionally, the turn of the century and the subsequent revival of the trans-Saharan trade caravans made the need for accesses to commercial vessels even more pressing across the provinces of Tripoli and Tunis. The decreased availability of French commercial vessels, the ones traditionally used to transport commodities from the provinces was only exacerbated when the inland networks of the caravans began bringing more slaves, gold dust, and numerous commodities to the provincial coastlines for export.

The burgeoning interest of North African merchants in commercial shipping and their attempt into engage in ‘legitimate’ maritime trade was ultimately unsuccessful. Numerous European customs and port officials deliberately undermined North African traders’ attempts to engage in maritime commerce.

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446 See Chapter 3 of this dissertation.
Targeted and blocked by difficulties, routine ill will, and the general widespread duplicity on the part of European port authorities—North African traders encountered countless obstacles in commercial shipping.\textsuperscript{447} This description was succinctly summed up in a 1813 letter from the French consul’s bureau of Algiers regarding the troubles that North African merchants had in southern European ports of entry, and in turn the growing sense of frustration within the Maghrebi provinces:

No one is persuaded more than I of the damage done to our enemy by the severity of our customs offices, and it is primarily in foreign places—where one hears the cries of the merchants of London and sees the degradation of the English merchandise—that it is easiest to be convinced; but may I be permitted to say that the customs houses of Marseilles and Leghorn have perhaps shown to the citizens of the Barbary states a gratuitous harshness which in no way belongs to the Emperor’s policy. When in Marseilles in January 1811, various Algerian ships were sequestrated there: the crews had been forcefully removed from their vessels and thrown onto the street without any assistance whatsoever. They came to me despair shouting in an outbreak of: “Give us bread or kill us.” I arranged for them to be given sustenance, but this was stopped as soon as I left Marseilles. What happened when the Algerians returned here? They came en masse to the palace of the dey crying out “Char-Allah!” (God’s Justice) against the French consul. This event exposed me to the greatest danger. And in addition, the sequestrations may have been extended unnecessarily: they have exposed the merchandise to ruinous deterioration and in some cases even total loss for the owners.\textsuperscript{448}

While the above quote is from the French consul to Algiers, it is clear in the historical record that the difficulty in accessing European markets was endemic for all North African traders—Algerian, Tunisian and Tripolitan, alike.\textsuperscript{449} The Tunisian bey would recall these commercial rebuffs after the 1815 revival of the corso. Historians have attributed a return to the campaigns because of the systematic closing off of the various ports and efforts at expanding North African maritime commerce. The corsair campaigns off North African shores were far more aggressive after the 1815 upsurge

\textsuperscript{447} Panzac, \textit{Barbary Corsairs}, passim.
\textsuperscript{448} Panzac, \textit{The Barbary Corsairs}, 1800-1820, 262.
\textsuperscript{449} Ibid also see Panzac, \textit{The Barbary Corsairs}, 259-60.
than they had been in previous centuries.

After the mid-decade return to corsair campaigns, various historians, such as Panzac have gone so far as to argue that the provinces no longer respected the peace accords that they had struck with various European countries.\textsuperscript{450} The accepted argument has become one where, rather than abide by the centuries-old practice that protected the commercial fleets of their tribute-paying allies, North African campaigns began to target any and all mercantile ships that they could capture, friend or foe alike. “North African corsairs’ greed and their contempt for earlier treaties had no bounds…”\textsuperscript{451} To support this argument, he quoted two sources, and several uncited statistics about the multifold increase in capture of vessels and slaves off the coast of the Italian cities. First, Panzac used the translated \textit{firman} discussed below in this section, and this quote from the French consul to Tripoli concerning a ruse that Murad Ra’is, the Scottish-born Admiral, had concocted to capture Latin American vessels headed for Iberia:

\begin{quote}
The plan was obviously to deceive somevaluably-loaded Portuguese or Spanish ship from Mexico or Brazil, or flying the flag of some other nation that was neither at peace nor at war with the regency, and surprise it outside the Straits [of Gibraltar], because they boarded twenty new uniforms in European style, each made up of a blue jacket with little silver buttons, a white linen waistcoat and trousers and a raphia hat. The captain decked himself out in a blue morning coat trimmed with gold braid, double on the collar and sleeves. \textsuperscript{452}
\end{quote}

The above source demonstrated that Murad’s scheme was remarkably clever and, arguably, rather amusing. However, the French consul nevertheless specifically mentioned that the Tripolitans, despite their disguises, were attacking ships that they

\textsuperscript{450} Panzac, loc. cit.
\textsuperscript{451} Panzac, 268.
\textsuperscript{452} ibid.
were “neither at peace nor at war with[.]”\textsuperscript{453} In effect, the statement did support Panzac’s claim of utter avarice or a general contempt at the hands of the North African fleets towards any and all vessels they encountered. Rather, if anything, it demonstrates that the fleets were quite deliberate and strategic in their attacks.

It is in the second source that Panzac uses that his argument became much stronger. Citing a translated firman in Devoulx’s \textit{Le Rais Hamidou}, Panzac argued that the corsairs’ greed was most apparent in their attacks on Ottoman as well as European vessels. The firman, and in particular Mahmud II’s exasperated tone with the Algerian dey from Ramadan, 1230 [early August, 1815] were quite clear in Devoulx’s translation:

\begin{quote}
The corsairs of the regency of Algiers [among others] are capturing commercial ships belonging either to the subjects of the Sublime Porte, or to nations that are at peace with it; they reduce to slavery their captains and sailors and seize their cargoes. The Sublime Porte is responsible for these ships; they are in possession of safe-conduct passes, and the Sublime Porte is at peace with them. The European governments never cease to lodge complaints against you and to make it known that you are capturing their ships. I am giving you this warning in order to cause you to cease these aggressive acts and abandon this sanctionable course of action. Recall how I defended you in allowing you to recruit soldiers in Smyrna, and in listening to the speeches of your agents throughout the Empire. I sent you firmans on this subject; furthermore, I recently sent you a kapidji bashi named Mohammed with the mission of representing me. This kapidji bashi is in Algiers bearing written orders and is responsible for supervising their execution. You, first of all, prince of princes, and all of you, captains and heads of the regency, submit yourselves to God and to His Prophet, and obey the orders of the Prince of Believers, the Vicar of God on earth. May my firman be carried out, may my orders no longer be ignored. This is my will…\textsuperscript{454} 
\end{quote}

Reading both the translation and Devoulx’s opinionated commentary on the events in Algiers, one could understand how Panzac, when reading this firman alone, got the impression of a relentless voraciousness on the part of the North African

\textsuperscript{453} ibid. \textsuperscript{454} ibid.
corsairs towards any and all vessels, Ottoman or not, that came across their path. It was likely Devoulx’s materials that led Panzac to see the modus operandi of the corsair campaigns after 1814 as ceaseless and indiscriminate.

Before analyzing Devoulx’s material, however, it is important to step back and access the surviving Ottoman records to establish a context for the events that Devoulx wrote about in his original manuscript, and specifically for the details surrounding the above-stated firman. Looking to the Sublime Porte to establish a basis for Constantinople’s perspective, I mined through the entire collection surviving Ottoman documents that concerning the corsair provinces. Through these sources, we can see that by 1815, Panzac’s argument was partially correct—North African corsairs had in fact fully revived the campaigns and had reengaged in the corso. The body of Ottoman archival materials however does not support the second part of Panzac’s argument or demonstrate avid rapaciousness and the scope of the corsair attacks.\(^4\) In fact, only one surviving Ottoman document referenced a corsair attack on a vessel that was under the protection of an Ottoman subject.

The incident took place on May 22, 1815. In an internal Ottoman procedural memorandum from the Cevdet Dahiliyye, we learn that news reached Constantinople about a coordinated attack on the part of Algerian, Tunisian and Tripolitan corsairs against one of the Porte’s own vessels—a cargo ship under the protection of Tanas Ra’is of Missolonghi, carrying grain and supplies to artillery battalions to Preveza, near Ioannina, was attacked.\(^5\) In response, the Porte notified the North African

provinces that they were not to commandeer any ships or supplies under the protection of the sultan.\textsuperscript{457}

This attack is historically fascinating. Not only did it break with long-held alliances and ties of loyalty, not to mention the frequent overlapping-consensus between the Porte and the provinces; it also demonstrated an outright display of antagonism on the part of the provinces towards fellow subjects of the Porte. For as intriguing as this one particular incident was, there is no other mention of it, or of any other corsair attacks on other Ottoman vessels in any of the surviving documents in Constantinople.

If we return to Devoulx’s manuscript for further insights into the \textit{firman}, we acquire another piece of information regarding the document that constituted the basis of Panzac’s argument. Immediately before introducing the \textit{firman}, Devoulx wrote:

At that time, Greece was merely a [Ottoman] province. It may therefore seem strange that the Algerians, who themselves were vassals of the Porte, would have dared to make a run at the expense of the [other] subjects of their sovereign. The fact is certain, however. And it turned out that the Algerians were by no means hindered from laying their hands on vessels that belonged to either subjects or tributaries of [the Porte] in regards to the nations that were at peace with the Grand Sultan, it would be useless to note that treaties do not always protect from the affronts of Algerians. I have at my disposal dispatches in which the Sublime Porte addressed in this regard, [with] severe admonitions to the Dey of Algiers and captains of his navy, threatening to treat them as enemies if they persisted in this direction.

These acts of blatant insubordination multiplied under the administration of Hajj Ali Pasha and took the character of a real aggression. The Ottoman Porte, justly indignant at such methods, confiscated a fondouk that the Regency of Algiers had built to serve Smyrna deposit barracks recruits, withdrew all its officers from this Regency, ordered a fleet of fall upon the Algerian vessels and prepared an expedition against Algiers. But before the complete execution of these orders, on 11 [Rabi’a el-Thani] 1230, [March 23, 1815] El Hadj Ali Pasha was murdered in the bathroom of his apartment, replaced by El Hadj Mohammed, the treasurer, who was himself murdered seventeen days later, and Omar Pasha was succeeded. On coming to power, he hastened to send an envoy to Constantinople to ameliorate the sovereign wrath. And Sublime Porte, perhaps happy to

\textsuperscript{457} ibid.

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welcome his claims of fidelity and devotion, forgive the past with the hope that the future would be irreproachable. 458

Reading Devoulx, we are left with several impressions. First, the North African corsair attack on the Ottoman vessel took place off the coast of modern-day Greece. Secondly, the sultan had grown increasing frustrated in his efforts to curtail corsair attacks in general. Most importantly, we are informed that the Porte began outfitting an expedition for the province of Algiers. However, none of these claims are directly substantiated from by text of the firman that Devoulx translated as proof of his argument. Further undermining Devoulx’s claims, Ottoman records do not indicate that the Porte was preparing an attack on Algiers in either 1815 or 1816. Moreover, there was an extremely important red flag in Devoulx’s chronology. The author clearly demonstrated that the tension between the province and the Porte had abated after the assassination of Haji Ali Pasha in late March of 1815.

The firman that Devoulx considered to be “severe admonitions to the Dey and his navy” 459 arrived in Algiers in Ramadan, 1230 [early August, 1815], over four months after the death of the dey, Ali Pasha—the same watershed moment in which

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458 Devoulx, Le rais Hamidou, 75. Original French text: « A cette époque, la Grèce n'était qu'une province turque. Il peut donc sembler étrange que les Algériens, vassaux eux-mêmes de la Porte, aient osé faire la course aux dépens des sujets de leur souverain. Le fait est certain cependant, et il est avéré que les Algériens ne se gênaient nullement pour porter la main sur des navires appartenant à des sujets ou à des tributaires de la Turquie ; quant aux nations qui étaient simplement en paix avec le Grand Sultan, il serait oiseux de faire remarquer que les traités ne les mettaient pas toujours à l'abri des avanies des Algériens. J'ai à ma disposition des dépêches dans lesquelles la Sublime-Porte adressait, à ce sujet, de sévères remontrances au dey d'Alger et aux capitaines de sa marine, les menaçant de les traiter en ennemis s'ils persistaient dans cette voie. Ces actes de flagrante insoumission se multiplièrent sous l'administration de Hadj Ali Pacha, et prirent le caractère d'une véritable agression. La Porte Ottomane, justement indignée de ces procédés, confisqua un fondouk que la Régence d'Alger avait fait bâtir à Smyrne pour servir de caserne de dépôt à ses recrues, retira toute créance aux agents de cette Régence, donna l'ordre à sa flotte de courir sus aux bâtiments algériens et prépara une expédition contre Alger. Mais, avant la complète exécution de ces ordres et le 11 rebi 28 1230, El Hadj Ali Pacha fut égorgé dans les bains de ses appartements, remplacé par El Hadj Mohammed, trésorier, qui fut lui-même assassiné dix-sept jours après, et eut pour successeur Omar Pacha En arrivant au pouvoir, celui-ci s'empressa d'expédier un envoyé à Constantinople pour fléchir le courroux souverain, et la Sublime-Porte, heureuse peut-être d'accueillir ces protestations de fidélité et de dévouement, pardonna le passé à la condition que l'avenir serait irréprochable. »

459 Ibid.
he argued Algiers’ previous disloyalties had been forgiven, and positive relations between the province and the Porte had once again been restored. Given this rather striking inconsistency in Devoulx’s timeline, even if his translation of the order was correct, the author’s analysis of the events surrounding the firman, as well as his general assessment of the relationship between the North African provinces and the Porte were ultimately, flawed.

Rather, we have an instance where the general information presented to the chronicler was largely accurate, but nevertheless a historical figure, in this instance Devoulx himself, skewed the details of a narrative in order to shape the argument that he wanted remembered. In Devoulx’s case, the narrative he presented was effectively an argument for insatiable Algerian maritime avarice. His intentions in depicting the province as such remain unclear. However, one could speculate that the authors unfamiliarity with the region and its maritime practices, a distaste he may have had for Algiers or the corso itself underlined his description. Finally, he could simply attempt to put a popular spin on his narrative, boosting the sales of his book. Nevertheless, it is clear that his jumbled timeline had particularly lasting effects on our contemporary understanding of nineteenth century North Africa.

Moreover, one cannot use Devoulx as a basis to access North African maritime behavior in general. First, it is important to remember that Devoulx himself was only familiar with one province, and was in fact, writing the historical narrative of one corsair in particular, Raïs Hamidou. However, over the years, historians of the region have used Devoulx’s materials to flesh out broader patterns about nineteenth-century North African practices in general. For example, Panzac used Devoulx as a source to access the behaviors of all three of the North African regencies. In fact, he
went so far as to state, “corsair activities were [in 1815] very close to becoming pure and simple piracy...”\textsuperscript{460} This statement is particularly enlightening because not only did it demonstrate that Devoulx’s sources have since been used by scholars to mistakenly perpetuate an idea of a North African general malice towards Europe and indeed the Porte, but it also shows that Panzac himself was drawing implicit conclusions about the regional cooperation, or at times collusion, that the provinces had with one another. After all, Devoulx’s \textit{Raïs Hamidou} had no direct relation to either the broader history of Tunis or Tripoli.

Therefore, it is critical that we return to the records of the Porte, to see what Constantinople had to say about the behaviors of its westernmost provinces, particularly in regards to their attacks on the Sultan’s ships. By returning to the sources – specifically to the internal report of the Porte and the presumably accurate translation of the order by Devloux (since no corresponding copy of the decree has been preserved in Constantinople) – and reading them against the broader collection of surviving document of the Porte, we arrive at a narrative of 1815 North African maritime practice very different from the one of Devloux or Panzac.

By taking a critical eye to Devloux’s chronicle in general, a much more corresponding record of interaction, and indeed of specific engagements between the 1815 \textit{corso} with both Europe and the Ottoman center emerges. First, Ottoman documents point to one clear attack on the empire’s vessel by North African cruisers--off the coast of Prezeva. However, Devoulx himself commented within his chronicle on a particular attack off the coast of Greece. In fact, this was his only specific reference to a corsair campaign against Ottoman vessels. When looking at these two

\textsuperscript{460} Panzac, \textit{The Barbary Corsairs}, 280.
points—the Ottoman record of a sole attack, and Devloux’s off-handed comment about an attack’s location, and reading them alongside the chronology of the events, which placed the incident in May and the firman’s arrival to Algiers in early August, it is quite likely that Devloux was referring to the same attack off Prezeva that Porte officials wrote about: the one that involved a vessel under the command of Tanaś Ra’is.

Further, in examining the exasperated firman outlined above, it remains clear that the message from Mahmud II to the dey was referring to corsair attacks on ships the Porte was responsible for keeping safe—meaning western ships with whom the Porte had amicable trade and political relations. In fact, the reference that the sultan made to attacks on proper Ottoman ships was only in passing. When the document is read in this context, as well as in part of the larger body of Ottoman documents on the 1815 corso, the historical evidence for a North African ‘take no prisoners’ approach to the campaigns that Panzac argued for simply does not hold up.

Moreover, working exclusively from all the available Ottoman documents for the period of 1814-1817 concerning behaviors of the North African navies, one can see two major trends in the patterns of the corsair campaigns. First, we can easily substantiate Panzac’s argument that there was a noted return to the corso in the middle of the decade, as Ottoman records indicate that the number of attacks in general had very much risen. However, reasons behind this shift, and indeed the scope of the attacks conducted, were very different from the one presented in the literature. In fact, rather than attack random targets their ships happened across, North African corsairs targeted the ships of one country in particular—Austria.

Moreover, all three provinces’ fleets had the same specific target in mind. This
is a particularly important, and an entirely logical, reaction to the political context of the time. After all, by the summer of 1815, the attentions of the European powers and their officials, many of whom were in Austria because of the ongoing Congress of Vienna, had turned towards North African shores. By the summer of 1815, it was clear from European sources that western powers were looking to end the practice of North African privateering, a proposition that would have disastrous effect on the provinces’ economies.

**Targeting Corsairs: Fallout from the Congress of Vienna**

Reviewing Ottoman documents from May 1815 through May 1817 offered a very different scenario. In the Ottoman Archives, there are twelve internal reports from either the records of the War Office and copies of memorandums sent to Sultan Mahmud II that involved attacks by North African cruisers during this period. Of these twelve, ten targeted Austrian vessels, captains or commercial interests. In fact, the only two incidences did not involve Austrian merchants or officials were the previously mentioned internal report concerning the attack off the coast of Preveza.\(^{461}\) The other report, fromb Ottoman War Office regarding the seizure of a Russian ship under the command of the Captain Panayot and its cargo by Tripolitan corsairs in July 1816.\(^{462}\) The report informed Porte officials that the Russian embassy had filed a corresponding complaint.\(^{463}\) The remaining ten documents all involved Austrian property or persons. While this nevertheless can still be considered an aggressive return to the maritime practice, the timing and scope of the attacks is far too politically aligned for it to have been spurred on by anything other the changing

\(^{461}\) C.DH Dosya No :55 Gömlek No :2738.
\(^{462}\) HAT Dosya No :1283 Gömlek No :49740
\(^{463}\) ibid.
political currents in Europe and the Porte.

To offer some context regarding the Congress of Vienna, and why the North African corsairs were so targeted in their mid-century attack: in September of 1814, various European officials had met in Austrian capital to negotiate a viable peace plan for the continent after drawn out Napoleonic wars. European attention towards the Maghreb began in the summer of 1814, when the English Admiral Sidney Smith wrote a “Memorandum on the Necessity and Means of Ending the Piracy of the Barbary States”\(^{464}\) and circulated it among diplomats. Early on, the document—and specifically author’s disgust towards the continued practice of white, Christian, slavery, in light of the growing trans-Atlantic abolitionism movement was nevertheless met with resistance.\(^ {465}\) Over the course of the next year however, and after the easy American defeat of Algerian forces in June of 1815, which despite a couple of short-lived days of hostility was termed the Second Barbary War, European governments began to pay heed to the negotiated peace—and the particularly favorable terms for American shipping interests in the Mediterranean.\(^ {466}\)

By October, Sardinia brought forward a petition calling for European intervention into the ongoing \textit{corso} campaigns. In response, the various powers present in the Congress of Vienna unanimously condemned the practice, and in turn tasked England, the strongest naval presence in the Mediterranean, with putting an end to the centuries-old practice.\(^ {467}\) Given the maritime information networks of the time, and the centrality of the corsairs in relaying this information from one Mediterranean port to another, it was thus not particularly surprising that Austrian

\(^{464}\) Panzac \textit{Barbary Corsairs}, 271.
\(^{465}\) ibid.
\(^{466}\) ibid.
\(^{467}\) ibid, Panzac \textit{Barbary Corsairs}, 271-272.
vessels were the most sought after targets of the North African cruisers.

Returning to the Porte’s documented attacks on Austrians offered a great deal of insight into the historical context because the documents also demonstrate the voracity with which both Austrian, and North African, mariners targeted one another.

The first reported incident of a North African corsair attack after the one off Prezeva came from November 1815, a few short weeks after the Congress’s condemnation of the *corso*, when Algerian, Tunisian and Tripolitan fleets were out hunting for Austrian commercial ships.\(^{468}\) Similar reports of attacks on Austrian targets were filed in December 1815, as well as February, and every month from June to November 1816,\(^{469}\) with attacks oftentimes repeatedly occurring in the same month.\(^{470}\) The tenacity with which North African corsairs targeted Austrians is particularly exceptional in its doggedness, and did not correspond at all with the image of a general greed and avarice that was presented by both Devoulx and Panzac.

For example, by the summer of 1816, the assaults had taken on a personal element in their scope. A September report regarding the attack and brutal murder of Ali Ra’is, one of the Tripolitian governor’s captains, alongside that of his artilleryman at the hands of some Austrian merchants outside a coffeehouse in Trieste was particularly violent and highlighted the tensions between the regencies and Austrian mariners.\(^{471}\) Rather than argue of a haphazard, indiscriminate methods in the cruiser campaigns, the records indicate that there was a real and demonstrated antagonism between the two parties, which presumably was largely spurred on by the political changes of the time.

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\(^{468}\) C. DH Dosya No: 55 Gömlek No: 2738.

\(^{469}\) See citation 24 of this dissertation.

\(^{470}\) Ibid.

\(^{471}\) C. HR Dosya No: 182 Gömlek No: 9069.
Tensions came to a head between the North African provinces and the various European powers after the bombardment of Algiers. Under the command of the British Lord Exmouth, Britain ultimately violated the peace agreement between it and the province. In August of that year, under the guise of diplomatic exchange, the Anglo-Dutch fleet sailed past the provinces’ fortifications and immediately bombarded the city.\textsuperscript{472} While the attack was extensive, most of the city was nevertheless spared because of the strength of its inner fortifications. However, the Algerian maritime fleet was almost entirely destroyed.\textsuperscript{473}

In an effort to offset Algiers’s maritime losses, both the Sultan of Morocco and Mehmed Ali of Egypt sent vessels to the \textit{dey} to replace the ones destroyed by the Anglo-Dutch attack. In what Panzac referred to as an act of “Muslim solidarity,”\textsuperscript{474} the North African provinces were the ones that offered support to Algiers in this moment of crisis. This was an evident display of solidarity on the part of Egypt and Morocco, and the ties that bound the provinces together were far more regional in nature rather than religious or political. After all, records do not indicate that the Porte, or Mahmud II offered to provide assistance to the \textit{dey} or any other predominantly Muslim province across the Ottoman domain. So, while this research agrees with Panzac’s assessment of the Moroccan and Egyptian support as being a sign of solidarity, it was more \textit{regional} rather than \textit{religiously} based.

Immediately after the attack on Algiers, Exmouth wrote to both \textit{beys} of Tunis and Tripoli demanding that they abandon the centuries-long practice of the \textit{corso}. Panzac argued that “the Anglo-Dutch fleet’s actions had brought a definitive end to

\textsuperscript{472} Panzac \textit{Barbary Corsairs}, 276-285.
\textsuperscript{473} ibid.
\textsuperscript{474} ibid, 289.
the activities of the Barbary corsairs." Through Ottoman records, we can corroborate that North African corsairs had greatly scaled back their campaigns after the 1816 attack under Lord Exmouth. However, while North African privateering was being condemned by European officials, these same individuals had turned an eye towards colonizing North African space. In a letter to the Porte from May 1817, Iskerlet, the Voivode of Boğdan (Moldavia) informed the Porte that the Knights of Malta, who remained displaced after the French occupation of 1798 wanted to seize Tripoli from the Ottoman Empire and had already secured the support of the French Republic. While these plans never reached fruition, they nevertheless foreshadow the upcoming French invasion of Algiers within just over a decade— an event that would radically transform the political configuration of Ottoman North Africa.

Shortly after the attack on Algiers, during the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in the autumn of 1818, the European Alliance of Power which consisted of Great Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia, met to discuss the withdrawal of military forces from France, and negotiate the implementation of reforms post-Congress of Vienna. The Concert of Powers, effectively all five of European powers, agreed on the 39th protocol “to make a formal effort by means of negotiations to induce the states of Barbary finally to abandon their practical depredations…” The Congress was seen as a threat by the Barbary powers—a threat that was crystalized when the states subsequently sent warning to the provinces of a joint attack was met with indignant frustration on the part of the regencies, particularly in light of their previously thwarted efforts at commercial maritime trade. The bey of Tunis, Mahmoud Pasha, in

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475 ibid, 228.  
476 HAT Dosya No: 1285 Gömlek No: 49842.  
477 Folayan, Tripoli during the Reign of Yusuf Pasha Qaramanli, 97.
a letter to the French Admiral who arrived at the province with the news was:

Let him be called robber and pirate who captures ships and takes belongings without reason, without justice, and outside all laws, disregarding customs and treaties. As for us—thanks be to God!—we have never had evidence, or heard it said, that in our ports we have failed to respect customs or treaties; to deserve such intimidation from you [. . .] it is not appropriate, since in the past the goods of our own merchants have been taken, and treaties of friendship have been broken by people of whom we would never have believed it possible. [. . .] How can we agree to your demand that we never again arm our ships? And if it happened that war broke out between one of the Powers and the Ottoman Porte, what would we answer, when asked to arm our ships to go to its aid, following the custom that we have always practised? [sic] 478

This quote offers us several key insights into how the North African governors themselves were attempting to negotiate the changes they were facing. First, Hammuda Pasha pointed to the previous difficulties encountered in their efforts at commercial trade as a reason for a return to the corso. The frustration that we previously experienced with the blocked commercial attempts of the Maghreb left a lasting impression on the governors. Moreover, it would not be long before the Tunisian governor’s words and the question of Ottoman military support would become one of the chief concerns of the North African corsairs. After the 1820s outbreak of the Greek uprising, Mehmed Ali’s efforts the rebels would soon be greatly dependent on the North African maritime expertise of the corso.

We learn of Constantinople’s perspective in a hatt-i hümayun dated from August 16, 1819. 479 The various European powers had applied as much pressure on the Porte as possible to eliminate the corso threat posed on European shipping. We also see that the Porte was aware European powers reached a decision regarding the corso, largely spurred on by Britain’s insistence in the elimination of the privateering.

478 Panzac, The Barbary Corsairs, 290.
479 HAT Dosya No: 00300 Gömlek No: 17829.
And that France, Russia and Austria have remained largely silent and indifferent.\textsuperscript{480}

His Majesty’s government made the most noise to put an end to the \textit{corso}. The memorandum to the sultan also informed us that letters were sent by the Kapudan Pasa to the \textit{ocaks}, warning them about the radical change in conditions, as well as admonishing them not to harm any British ships. The admiral was also careful to inform the provinces that they should expect such behavior and policy requests from the ambassadors of Europe.\textsuperscript{481}

\textbf{Trending Inland: Expansionist Efforts of Tripoli and Egypt}

Before delving into the Tripolitan Pasha’s efforts to expand his territorial reach, it is important to step back for a moment and access the conditions in Tunis from 1815-1824. After the 1816 consolidation of power under Mahmoud Pasha, Hammuda Pasha’s effective, if not immediate successor, grew ill. The death of Hammuda Pasha, the succession troubles, the poor health of Mahmoud Pasha, and the effective end of the \textit{corso} in 1816-7 were further compounded by the 1818-1820 outbreak of a plague.\textsuperscript{482} As the situation in Tunis became increasingly tenuous, the regency faced an era of decreased agricultural production and famine, as plague spread throughout the regency. Mahmoud attempted to increase levies on the trans-Saharan caravans to recoup some of his losses, but conditions pushed Tunis to the brink throughout the decade.\textsuperscript{483}

\textbf{Turning Inland}

Maritime changes in the mid-1810s had a massive impact on North African socio-economic conditions in the provinces. However, the provinces were by no
means exclusively focused on the sea or on maintaining their regional position exclusively through the sea. While a great deal of work has been done on the political ‘entrenchment’ and ‘expansionist’ efforts of Mehmed Ali during his early years in Egypt, he was by no means the only North African governor interested in expanding his territorial dominion into the Sahel.

Yusuf Karamanli, the governor of Tripoli, much like his Tunisian counterpart Hammuda Pasha, was attempting to extend his control into the southern spaces of the province and to expand his revenues from the trans-Saharan caravans. However, efforts to expand his reach were pursued along lines very similar to those of his Egyptian counterpart and were directed in subduing Bedouin populations of Tripolitania. By 1810, Yusuf’s support, the territory of southern Fezzan was firmly under al-Mukkni’s control and the administration by the middle of the 1810s. After a successful expansion into the south, Yusuf turned his attentions east, and attempted to strengthen his control over Cyrenaica and the Bedouin peoples that lived along the Egyptian frontier.

The eastern portion of the province was historically accustomed to operating with a certain degree of autonomy from the Tripolitan capital. Indeed, as al-Ahmida discussed, pastoral Bedouins, such as the Sa’adi, maintained strong social systems in the eastern spaces of Tripolitania and worked in conjunction with other clans, such as the Awlad Ali and the Jwazi, to establish an intricate and sophisticated pastoral economy in the region. Effectively, the Cyrenaican economy worked so that during the rainy years excess livestock, grains and provisions were produced and sold off to either Egyptian or Maltese markets. The net profits were then used to offset the years

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484 Fahmy, Mehmed Ali, the titles of Chapters 2 and 3.  
485 Ahmida, Making of Modern Libya, Chapter 4.
of unforeseen droughts and to ameliorate the accompanying food shortages of the arid seasons. This is particularly important and points to a sense of regional histories as the Bedouins traditionally regarded Egyptian towns, such as Sallum, Sidi Barrani, Marsa Matruh and even extending to the coastal city of Alexandria, as their “natural” market in the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{486} In fact, Egypt and Malta were Tripoli’s two most significant trading partners of the time.\textsuperscript{487} Moreover, as Aharoni studied, the nineteenth-century composition of the Bedouin population in Egypt maintained historically very close ties with the broader Maghreb, as a great deal of the people were themselves of Maghrebi descent. In the published translation of his doctoral dissertation, he wrote, “[t]he biggest waves of migration [to Egypt] came from the Maghrib (North Africa), and they reached their peak towards the middle of the eighteenth century. This migration set its hallmark on the Bedouin populations of Lower and Middle Egypt. It was the second wave of Bedouins of Maghrebi origin which entered Egypt in the seventeenth century and returned to Cyrenaica.”\textsuperscript{488}

This was particularly true in the case of the Hanadi and the Awlad Ali, which would often form confederations with smaller Bedouin communities in western Egypt.\textsuperscript{489} Ahmida discussed Yusuf’s efforts to enlist the support of the various Bedouin chiefs into his network of agents, and tasking them with the responsibility of collecting taxes from his people, at a reduced rate reserved for themselves, or his frequent use of “the army and local tribes”\textsuperscript{490} to put down rebellion. While the system worked effectively at curtailing widespread Bedouin uprising from gaining traction,

\textsuperscript{486} ibid.
\textsuperscript{487} ibid, also see below.
\textsuperscript{489} Ahmida, \textit{Making of Modern Libya}, loc. cit.
\textsuperscript{490} Aharoni, \textit{The Pasha’s Bedouin}, 210.
Tripoli was unable to eliminate the Bedouin confederations, or undermine the relatively high degree of localized power, such as we saw with the sultans of Fezzan. This arrangement thus allowed the provinces of Fezzan and Cyrenaica to maintain a *de facto* autonomy from the Tripolitan governor.

The system was such that the eastern province that Benghazi and Derna routinely had their own administrators, as well European consular representatives who were largely autonomous from the governor in Tripoli in the day-to-day affairs of the region. In fact, as we saw in the previous chapters, the region of Cyrenaica served the Tripoli administrators as a region for quasi-exile, one where potential troublemakers, such as Ahmad Karamanlı, Yusuf’s older brother, and Saverio Naudi, the French emissary of Malte extraction, were sent if they posed a threat for the powers that be in Tripoli.

Given the strength of the Bedouin confederations the day-to-day administration of Cyrenaica worked very much along the same lines of the Awlad Mohammad sultans of Fezzan. Within this system, the sub-provinces were accorded a relatively high degree of internal autonomy within the broader Tripolitan domain as long as their regional administrators maintained a system of alliances to the governor in Tripoli. Under the governance of Yusuf Karamanlı, however, the power of Bedouin leaders was increasing seen as a threat by the pasha. In turn, Tripolitan governor spent a great deal of effort to reestablish his authority over the eastern provinces in the period from 1805-10.

By 1811, the growing power of the Awlad Ali from the Jebel Akhdar area outside of Derna and their refusal to pay the impost levied on them, became increasing troublesome for the governor. Rather than attempt to negotiate with the
elders, the governor sent his eldest son, Mohammed Bey, to curtail the rebellion and reestablish Tripolitan control over the eastern realm. Mohammed Bey successfully suppressed the uprising. However, he circumstances surrounding his return were rife with concerns regarding his increasingly aggressive behavior. From travelers’ reports, we can the diplomatic gossip circulating in the Tripolitan center about Mohammad Bey.

Reports claimed that in the process of curtailing the power of the Awlad Ali, the governor’s son became increasingly jealous of his father’s political authority. He wanted to overthrow Yusuf and claim the province for himself. From these surviving sources, we can trace tales of the heavy hand that Muhammad Bey purportedly used with the Bedouins of the east, the brutality that he inflicted on his own slaves and, finally, his desire to eliminate his father. A Sardinian physician, Paolo Della Cella, traveled to the province in 1817 as a guest of consul. In a letter to his medical colleague in Genoa, the doctor wrote of the rumors circulating around Mohammad Bey, and his growing desire for power:

…Mahmet Karamanli, eldest son of the present Pacha of Tripoli; …of disposition the most brutal…there is no cruelty with which he is not stained, no violence which he has not committed; one of his choicest pleasures was to watch the convulsive motions, comparative sufferings, and dying agonies of some of his slaves, to whom he occasionally caused graduated doses of arsenic to be administered…having been employed by his father at the head of a small army, to reduce to obedience a tribe of Bedouins who had infested the shores of the gulph, [sic] ravaged the adjoining districts, and (proh nefas!) refused to pay the customary tribute, he so fully executed the commission that not a single one of the whole tribe remained alive.

Upon his return to Tripoli, elated with the success of his sanguinary expedition, and accustomed to the most implicit and blind obedience to his orders; he no longer treated his father with respect, but in one of his many sallies of passion struck at him with a poniard, which was fortunately warded off by a female slave. 491

491 Paolo Della Cella, Narrative of an Expedition from Tripoli in Barbary to the Western Frontier of Egypt in 1817 by the Bay of Tripoli in Letters to Dr. Viviani of Genoa: With an Appendix, Containing Instructions for Navigating the Great Syrtis (London: Arch, 1822), 5.
While Della Cella’s description of Mohammad Bey was unwavering in its depiction of Mohammad’s ruthlessness, it nevertheless remains unclear how accurate his claims of the bey were. After all, Della Cella visited Tripoli in 1817, well after Mohammad Bey attempted patricide in 1813 and his subsequent forced departure from the city. Moreover, the Awlad Ali, continued to be viable political opponents—for both the governor of Tripoli as well as his Egyptian counterpart Mehmed Ali Pasha long after their supposed elimination at the hands of Mohammad Bey in 1810.

Reports of the latter’s aggression towards his father and the attempt on Yusuf’s life were recounted in multiple sources. Because of the attempt on his life, Yusuf decided to give Mohammad the governorship of Derna and Benghazi, as he had previously done with his brother Ahmed. Further exasperating this instance of historical déjà vu, by attempting to assassinate and overthrow his father, Mohammed Bey put himself and the governor in the exact same position that Yusuf had put his own father in nearly twenty years before. After all, as a young man Yusuf too had rebelled against the elderly Ali Karamanlı, laid siege to the city of Tripoli, and assassinated his older brother, Hassan.

Perhaps it was partially because of the similarity of experiences that Yusuf decided to simply expel Mohammad Bey from the city walls out to the east, rather than adopt a more radical position and exile him entirely or even assassinate him, eliminating the possibility of any threat posed by his son. Regardless of Yusuf’s motivations, the pasha removed all imminent dangers on his life while maintaining a close eye on his eldest son.

From Della Cella, we learn that upon his arrival to Derna, Mohammad Bey allied himself with the Jwazi of the region in his efforts to proactively mount a
rebellion against his father. Over the next few years, Mohammad’s efforts proved effective. By 1817 his position in Benghazi and Derna began to pose a serious threat to his father’s rule in the Tripolitan center. Folayan went so far as to claim that Mohammad’s efforts in the east were successful to the point that the bey had nearly carve out “a state within a state”\textsuperscript{492} in the eastern sphere of the province. Yusuf was about to respond.

During the governor’s efforts to amass and send force east, Della Cella arrived in Tripoli. It was at this point that the account of the traveler adopted first-person voice: during the summer of 1817. This is an important because up until his arrival in the summer, the information we are offered about Mohammed’s exile from Tripoli was historical hearsay, and was therefore difficult to corroborate. Nevertheless, after his arrival in the province, Della Cella became a more reliable source, particularly as the physician accompanied Ahmed during the march east. The doctor wrote of his entanglement in the affair:

…Instead of punishing [Mohammad after his attempt on Yusuf Pasha’s life]…his father sent him out as governor of the provinces of Bengasi and Derna, upon the eastern frontier of his territories, inhabited by a powerful tribe of Bedouins called Zoasi, long affected towards the Pacha and frequently breaking out into open rebellion. But no sooner was the new governor arrived at Bengasi, then the Pacha found that in his son he had given a chieftain to the malcontents; and the rebellion spreading rapidly throughout those provinces, the Pacha judged it expedient to dispatch a considerable body of troops under the command of his second son, Bey Ahmet, in order to check the progress of the insurrection and punish the treacherous conduct of the rebellious son. Bey Ahmet having a degree of caution…desired that a physician might attend him upon the expedition, the Pacha, to whom my profession was known, earnestly requested the Sardinian Consul to offer me the appointment... and found me eager to accede to the proposal.\textsuperscript{493}

The Sardinian did in fact accompany Ahmed Bey out east. However, it is

\textsuperscript{492} Folayan, \textit{Tripoli during the Reign of Yusuf Pasha Qaramanli}, 54.
\textsuperscript{493} Cella, \textit{Narrative of an Expedition from Tripoli in Barbary}, 5-10.
unclear how much the physician knew about Yusuf Pasha’s upcoming move against his son. After all, the language that Della Cellla used, “[to] check the progress of the insurrection and punish the treacherous conduct of the rebellious son”494 hardly befit the massacre that was to follow.

Nevertheless, as news spread along the coastline of the “considerable body of troops”495 under Ahmed Bey’s command, their intended destination and targets, the Bedouin leaders quickly backed away from Mohammad Bey’s rebellious position. Concerned for their safety, Mohammed’s allies ultimately abandoned him and his cause. So extensive was the change among the Bedouin elders that by the time of Ahmed’s arrival in Derna, the overwhelming majority of his brother’s allies had fled the area altogether.496 Mohammed Bey was left with no choice but to flee Derna and seek refuge in Bomba, a small town to the southeast close to the frontier with Egypt.497

When Ahmed finally arrived, the remaining inhabitants quickly surrendered themselves, threw themselves at his mercy, renounced their rebellion, and pledged their loyalty to Yusuf Pasha. At first Ahmed appeared to have conceded to the Bedouins’ claims, and pacified the city without so much as having to fire a shot.

Rereading Al-Jabarti

From al-Jabarti we learn of Mohammed and his sons’ arrival in Cairo and their subsequent visit to the vali Mehmed Ali

During [mid-April 1817] [the grandson of] Yusuf Pasha, governor of Tripoli and his younger brother arrived, requesting that their father, [Mohammed] who was fleeing from his own father [Yusuf], be permitted to come to Cairo. Having been put in charge of the district of Darnah and Benghazi,

494 ibid.
495 ibid.
496 ibid.
497 ibid.
Mehmed Ali Pasha was easily inclined to provide Mohammed and his family with political refuge in Cairo. For all his efforts at securing his position in Egypt and expanding his empire, the Hijaz was not the only military campaign that the Egyptian vali was conducting in 1817. The Awlad Ali cavalry, which Mohammed Bey had been dispatched from Tripoli to fight in 1810, was rebelling against Egyptian

499 Footnote 31, on page 386-7 in the translated edition stated: “Unclear, meant is probably the father of Ibn Yusuf [Yusuf Karamanlı] But there is no other indication of a brother of al-Jabarti in Libya. [sic] Also a brother in the sense of ‘close friend’ is not indicated elsewhere.” Perlmann and Philip translated the original Arabic text, “wa hūwa ibn akhī al-lethī bi-masr awalan” as two separate ideas: “He is the son of my brother. After living in Cairo…” From the footnote, we can see that translators were under the impression that it potentially referred to a brother of the chronicler, al-Jabarti who could have lived in Tripolitania. While Perlmann and Philipp made clear in the caveat regarding the translation that there was no other reference to al-Jabarti having siblings in Tripoli during the time, the scholars remained uncertain as to the original meaning of the text. I posit an entirely different reading of the original Arabic language chronicle.

In the Arabic edition of Aja’ib, that was published by the Egyptian National Library in 1998, the clause, wa hūwa ibn akhī [he is my brother’s son] was not at all separated from the remaining al-lethī bi-masr awalan [who (was) in Egypt first.] Rather, the two clauses were unmistakably meant to be read as a single statement—and were bracketed together by commas before wa and after awalan. An alternative translation of this sentence would be: he is my brother’s son who (was) in Egypt first, rather than translation of “[h]e is the son of my brother. After living in Cairo…” While this may seem to be a small semantic distinction, it nevertheless greatly alters the meaning of the text. In that the phrase, he is my brother’s son who (was) in Egypt first it is implied that the son of Yusuf Pasha had historical ties to Egypt and would naturally be able to find refuge in the province. Perlmann and Philip interpreted the text in such a way that the possessive, my brother referred back to the chronicler, al-Jabarti. However, it could have back to the pasha, Mehmed Ali. This theory would clear up a great deal of confusion, as in this instance, my brother’s son would have referred to the similar status that both Yusuf Pasha and Mehmed Ali shared as Ottoman provincial governors whose territories neighbored one another—that is implying a kinship between the two governors and the two spaces. Moreover, in this instance the second part of the statement, who (was) in Egypt first, would have pointed to Mehmed Ali’s relatively new presence in Egypt. Mohammad’s travels with Mehmed Ali to the Hijaz—is also worth analyzing. Mohammed Bey accompanied the Egyptian vali during his ongoing battles against the Wahhabis. It was very likely that the Egyptian governor asked the Tripolitan bey to accompany him on his visit because he was looking to recruit Maghrebi soldiers from among Mohammed Bey’s Bedouin allies, particularly since the Bedouin of Cyrenaica were renowned for their cavalry skills and had served the previous Ottoman sultan during the French invasion of Egypt.
forces along the border in 1817. One can easily see the hand of Yusuf Pasha, and by extension Ahmad Bey and his actions against the Bedouins of the east, as the source of the trouble. Not only does this reinforce Ahmida’s claims of an Awlad Ali alliance with Mohammed Bey but it also strengthens the assertion that Della Cella’s claims that Mohammed Bey behaviors were likely exaggerated. It is from the Cairene scholar that we learn the fate of the Awald Ali. Al-Jabarti wrote of their engagement with Hasan Bey al-Samashirji:

Hasan Bey al-Samashirji returned from Darnah and another village called Sabwa accompanied by some of the Awlad Ali. This tribe had split into two groups, one of which, remained obedient, the other rebelled and withdrew into the district. Sent by the pasha against the rebels, Hasan defeated them in the first engagement, but they defeated him in the second. He then returned to Cairo where the pasha augmented his troops. Reinforced by the loyal group of the tribe, these troops launched a surprise attack, killing their brothers and raising their camels and sheep which they sent to Fayyum. The Bedouin thought this plunder would satisfy their adversaries. On the other hands, the loyal tribal chiefs of the Awlad Ali who return to Cairo with Hasan Bey thought that pasha would realize that the victory was due to them and would therefore relinquish his claim to the booty. This booty, supplemented by other livestock, he was expected to give to them. They encamped in Giza and Hasan Bey went to the pasha, who summoned the tribal notables in order to confer robes of honor on them. When they arrived, he had them imprisoned! A few days later, all the booty was brought from the Fayyum, and the tribesmen were released. It is said that the sheep numbered 16,000 or more, and the camels 8,000 or more, including females.500

As per Egyptian sources, it is clear that Mohammed Bey’s forces had not eliminated the Awlad Ali in 1810, despite the information given to Della Cella in Tripoli to the contrary. Rather, there remained a powerful kinship network whose territory straddled the Tripolitan-Egyptian frontier that challenged both Tripolitan and Egyptian governors’ efforts at centralization. As in their territory straddled the border, their frequent crossing between the provinces made it difficult for either governor to


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In his discussion of nineteenth-century pastoralism and trade, Ahmida wrote, “When Muhammad rebelled against his father in 1817, the Awlad Ali and the Jwazi supported him. The Awlad Ali and the Jwazi took advantage of their alliance and usurped the land of their cousins, the 'Abaydat, killing their chiefs.” 

While this could very well be the case, it would be highly improbable for the Awlad Ali to formed an alliance with Mohammed Bey, or the Jwazi, if the former had ruthlessly massacred them in 1810. Rather, we have another instance of the radical disjuncture in how chronicles are more susceptible to the desired histories that their contemporaries wanted to be remembered rather than the actual histories they were reporting. It is without doubt that Della Cella was given inaccurate information.

Moreover, the vilification of Muhammad Bey’s character by either Yusuf Pasha or his brother Ahmed Bey in Tripoli was entirely strategic in its purpose. After all, it would be more difficult to find historical compassion for Ahmad, his Jwazi allies, and their subsequent annihilation at the hands of the Ahmed and Yusuf Pasha if they had been tarred with the brush of political brutality themselves.

**The Elimination of Political Rivals**

Having removed his older brother from the broader Tripolitan province entirely, Ahmed Bey proceeded to Bomba and then to Benghazi. On September 5, 1817 Ahmed invited the leaders of the Jwazi to the town on the pretext of discussing peace. Despite his promises of a general amnesty, however, Ahmed Bey had his men massacre everyone in the city. Here, Della Cella became a reliable source, as he witnessed the following events firsthand. Della Cella description:

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[The Pasha’s] instructions to his son were to dissimulate, and seem to forget the past, but to take ample vengeance at a favourable moment. The Bey and his courtiers entered so fully into their sovereign's intentions, that the Zoasi were treated as the most favourite subjects…Under these exterior tokens of kindness, lurked and ripened the design of assassinating first the chiefs, and then the whole of the tribe… meanwhile, it was industriously rumoured, that the Bey had sought and obtained his father's permission solemnly to bestow the red mantle upon the chiefs of the Zoasi tribe, as a reward for the signal attachment they had shewn him…[some Jwazi] ventured to express to the whole tribe their suspicions of treachery; but the dice were now thrown…Accordingly, the whole tribe of Zoasi appeared… and covered the adjacent plain with its flocks and herds… the hapless chiefs, amounting to forty-five, made their grand entry into Bengasi…[while the bey] was partaking of it with them… the Bey's guards, with drawn sabres, suddenly rushed into the apartment, and executed the sanguinary orders… I hastened to the fort as the only place of security, [as the chiefs were] struggling and expiring in the blood which was flowing from their wounds, while the Bey on horseback, armed with a musket, in the midst of his Mamelukes and of the dead, was swearing and raving like a madman, because the troops were not yet upon the march against the Bedouins…[then] Bey himself heading his cavalry, and advancing at full speed, invested the Bedouin encampment, when all the children and men who had remained there were massacred, [several of the women where stampeded underfoot the horses]… a few days after…twenty-two hostages… were massacred by the Bey's soldiers… their bodies were then thrown into the sea. Amongst them were two boys, one of whom was seven years of age, the other only five… the bodies of the children, being cast upon the shore near the town… and devoured by dogs, no person daring to remove or inter them. A few of the Zoasi… now fled for safety to the sepulchre of a Marabout, called, from the place of his interment, Oecia. The Bey not daring to violate so holy an asylum, ordered that no succour should be afforded them… The whole town was sincerely but silently interested in the fate of these persecuted people; upon the third day a copious spring of water issued from the tomb of the Marabout; the ground close to it was found sprinkled with dates and other articles of food, the hungry were fed, the whole population of Bengasi and the adjacent villages flocked to admire and reverence such a portentous event, and the Marabout's reputation rose, in proportion as that of the Bey sunk into hatred and horror. In a few days we are to march for Tripoli; I full of real affliction at the bloody scenes which I have just witnessed; the Bey and his followers, though vexed at not having completely exterminated their enemies, consoling themselves with the plunder they have collected during the expedition.503

Della Cella’s graphic description of the relentless violence Ahmed used and the brutality with which his men tracked down the very last person standing—be it young

503 Cella, Narrative of an Expedition from Tripoli in Barbary, 221.
boys or unarmed people hiding in a Marabout’s shrine—highlighted the desire of the Tripolitan governor’s to eliminate any and all potential threats to his rule. Moreover, argue that there were strong corollaries between the ways in which Yusuf Pasha responded to the rebellion of Cyrenaica, and Mehmed Ali’s equally brutal massacre of the Mamluks in the Cairo Citadel a few years before.

The assassination of the Mamluks at the hands of Mehmed Ali’s men has been well studied in the historiography of Egypt. Nevertheless, it is worth offering a short description of the massacre for the sake of comparison. Fahmy wrote of the March 1811 bloodshed:

Heralds were sent to the markets announcing, “Yarin alay,” or “Tomorrow there will be a procession”. On the eve of the procession Mehmed Ali sent notification to all Mamluk leaders – with whom he had reached a temporary truce allowing them to stay in Cairo – inviting them to the Citadel with their retainers to witness the official bestowal of the command of the Hijaz campaign on his son Tousson and cloaking him with the ceremonial robe. He pleaded that his son would be honored to have the Mamluk leaders march with him through the streets of Cairo after receiving the full regalia from his father; the Mamluks were therefore told to arrive attired in their ceremonial robes in the Citadel...Not realizing that this “auspicious hour” would be the hour of their death, the Mamluks ascended in great pomp and ceremony to the Pasha in his divan, or council chamber, in the Citadel. After spending an hour drinking coffee with him, the leaders left in a procession that descended again in the prescribed manner and passed through a narrow path that led down to the city. After all the troops had passed through a certain gate, an order was given to close that gate trapping the Mamluk beys with all their retainers in the narrow pathway. The Pasha’s soldiers were then ordered to open fire and to spare no one. The shooting went on for an hour, killing over four hundred and fifty Mamluk beys; the heads were severed from the corpses and displayed to Mehmed Ali who by then had retired to his harem. The bloodbath continued in the city below as the Pasha’s soldiers were unleashed into the Mamluks’ households where they pillaged their property, raped their women and killed any remaining Mamluk who dared to hide.

It is demonstrably clear from reading the narrative of the two events that both governors’ plans for the elimination of their political adversaries were remarkably

504 Fahmy, All the Pasha’s Men, 36-37.
similar. Both governors lured their political rivals under the false pretense of peace and amnesty to an honored event that involved the cloaking of a ceremonial robe—be it for Tusson Pasha or the Jwazi elders. Their corresponding political rivals, with all the corresponding pomp and regalia attended both events. After their agents welcomed the officials, feigning friendship and hospitality towards them and conversing with them, the governors had their men ruthlessly massacre their opponents on sight. This critical point underscored the lengths to which North African political actors paid attention to, and oftentimes mimicked, the tactics of their regional counterparts. In doing so, it highlighted the sensitivity of the regional political ties, as well as the networks between the provinces, and their rules.

In the ensuing chaos, the Jwazi, like the Mamluks before them, were hunted down by the governors’ men, their property seized, and all the women and children found were either brutalized, murdered or both.\(^{505}\) The details of the events, the systemic attack on all Jwazi/Mamluk bystanders afterwards, and the short timespan between the two events—less than six years in fact—strongly indicates that Yusuf Pasha was mimicking Mehmed Ali Pasha’s efficient elimination of his rivals, the Mamluk grandees.

The historical similarity was later mirrored in the historiographical interpretation of events. Folayan argued that Yusuf Pasha’s chief incentive in the complete subjection of the Jwazi and his behaviors in Cyrenaica, was not political retaliation, but rather economic profit.\(^{506}\) Admittedly, the Jwazi leaders’ property was quite significant and generously subsidized to the coffers of Ahmad’s father in Tripoli. Upon his return to the capital, Ahmed Bey arrived with over 10,000 heads of

\(^{505}\) ibid.

sheep, 6,000 oxen, 4,000 camels, chests of money and a large number of slaves.\footnote{ibid.} However, while the Mamluks of Cairo similarly possessed notable wealth, it was not the main incentive behind Mehmed Ali’s assassination of the grandees. Rather, their continued political threat to his authority posed the most significant liability to the governor.

As Della Cella himself mentioned, Ahmed Bey’s troops already plundered the Jwazi livestock, cattle and camps, and reaped whatever spoils they could find before tracking the survivors to the Marabout’s tomb.\footnote{Cella, \textit{Narrative of an Expedition from Tripoli in Barbary}, loc. cit.} Effectively, reaping the spoils of war did not stop the Pasha’s son from an attempt to eliminate his enemy. Granted, sanctuary in a religious shrine made it easier for the compassionate allies of the Jwazi to unearth a well, scatter the area with food and supplies, and claim divine intervention, thus allowing the supporters to cleanly escape any retribution from governor’s son. Nevertheless, Yusuf’s intention in this attack, much like Mehmed Ali’s before him, was the utter obliteration of his political adversary, not the economic gain from the accompanying violence—if anything, we see from Della Cella’s account that Ahmed Bey’s men only took solace in their vast spoils after being unable to entirely eradicate the Jwazi.

Several similarities exist between Folayan’s analysis of Yusuf Pasha’s desire to expand his territorial reach, his reliance on a handful of trusted agents, be it al-Mukkni in Fezzan or his sons, and the nationalist historiographical work of by scholars of Egypt, such as Marsot. This is to say, not only were the historical means that both the governors’ used similar in their efforts to expand the geography of their respective domains, but subsequently historians of North African have since
interpreted the behaviors of both governors through the discourse of commercial incentive. However, the central difference here is that while more contemporary works, such as Fahmy’s *All the Pasha’s Men*, have dismantled the Marsot and Lawson’s arguments of territorial expansion as spurred by financial incentive, very little work has questioned Folayan’s analysis of Yusuf Pasha’s incentive for his expedition to Bornu.

**North African Imperialism, Expanded**

In Tripoli, plans for the pasha’s southern expansion into Bornu first materialized in 1817, after al-Makkani’s firm seizure of Fezzan from the Awlad Mohammed sultans. Yusuf Pasha decided to take advantage of the political instability in Bornu after the Fulani Jihad and the chaos of the invasions which were followed by growing rebellion in Kanem and Baghirmi which, with the support of the Wadai Sultanate, was attempting to break free from the Bornu Empire.

The Tripolitan governor made no secret of his desire to expand his reach southwards into the western Sudan.  

In his work on the history of Tripoli, Folayan wrote off Yusuf Pasha’s rationale behind targeting his attentions specifically on Bornu, south of the Kaouar [Kawar] salt oases in what is now northeastern Niger:

However, the whole of the Saharan stretch south of Fezzan to the Kawar oasis did not offer much attraction to any would-be imperialist. It was extremely difficult to hold together or control effectively, not only because of the predominantly nomadic nature of its economy, but also largely because of the extreme individualistic character of the various small units which at best formed an extensive but very loose confederation. For areas of reasonable political organization one had to move down to the region of Lake Chad.

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Folayan’s 1970s assessment of Yusuf Pasha, the governor of Tripoli’s, interest in Bornu as “would-be imperialist”\(^5\) was nothing short of monumental and groundbreaking for its time, despite his later hesitance with the idea. And as we shall see, would later be followed by a similarly inspired work on the behavior and actions of Mehmed Ali in the Sudan.

**Bornu, the Historical Context**

The Bornu Empire, which by the late eighteenth-century was centered in the Lake Chad basin out west towards Hausaland and had enfolded the historically proceeding Empire of Kanem of the north, in what is now modern-day Niger, into its broader territory. By the turn of the century, the Kingdom of Wada’i, adjacent to Bornu to the east, had annexed territory in Darfur to its east, and embarked on a new political push into the northern spaces of Bornu, the ones that constituted the spaces of Kanem. Wada’i forces were largely successful in these attempts.

By 1806-8, Sabun, the Sultan of Wada’i claimed both the territories of Kanem in the north and Baghirmi in the southeast from Bornu. These losses were in part due to the growing pressure Bornu was facing to the west. Trouble was compounded by the Fulani jihad of Uthman dan Fodio that declared against Bornu and absorbed most of Hausaland in 1808. Accusing the Babur of polytheism and of aiding in the Hausa efforts against them, the Fulani attacked and defeated Bornu forces under Mai Ahmad ibn Ali. They claimed and destroyed the capital of Bornu, N’Gazargamu, in 1808.\(^6\)

Greatly weakened by these losses, the remaining Babur rallied around a new figure, Sheikh Muhammad al-Amin al-Kanemi. A notable figure of both Fezzani and

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\(^5\) ibid.

\(^6\) ibid, also see Dixon Denham and Hugh Clapperton, *Narrative of Travels and Discoveries in Northern and Central Africa, in ... 1822, 1823 and 1824, by Major Denham, Capt. Clapperton and Dr. Oudney, With an Appendix*, (London: John Murray, 1828).
Kanembu heritage with extensive property in Marzuq, the center city of Fezzan, al-Kanemi first trained as a religious scholar in Egypt, most likely at al-Ahzar, before returning to Bornu to “settle as a learned man of Faqih, [Islamic jurisprudence,] in Kanem.” 

Dixon Denham, the Englishman later appointed as the lieutenant governor of the British colony in Sierra Leone, wrote of al-Kameni during his early 1820s travels in Bornu:

Born in Fezzan, of Kanem parents, though on the father's side descended from a Moor, [al-Kameni] had, after visiting Egypt, proceeded to Kanem, as sheikh of the Koran, where he was greatly beloved and respected, on account of the extreme correctness of his life, and the benevolence of his disposition; while the miracles and cures which he performed, by writing charms, were the theme of all the country round. Soon after the conquest of Bornou, El Kanemy formed a plan for delivering that country from the bondage into which it had fallen; and, stirring up the Kanemboos to assist him by a well-planned tale of having been called by a vision to this undertaking, he made his first campaign with scarcely 400 followers, and defeated an army of the Felatahs nearly 8,000 strong. He followed up this victory with great promptitude and resolution, and in less than ten months had been the conqueror in forty different battles. Nature had bestowed on him all the qualifications for a great commander; an enterprising genius, sound judgment, features engaging, with a demeanour gentle and conciliating: and so little of vanity was there mixed with his ambition, that he refused the offer of being made sultan; and placing Mohammed, the brother of sultan Achmet, on the throne, he, first doing homage himself, insisted on the whole army following his example. The sheikh built for sultan Mohammed his present residence, New Birnie, establishing himself at Angornou, three miles distant, and retaining the dictatorship of the kingdom pro tempore. Such a commencement was also extremely politic, on the part of the sheikh; but his aspiring mind was not calculated to rest satisfied with such an arrangement. The whole population now flocked to his standard, and appeared willing to invest him with superior power, and a force to support it. One of the first offers they made was to furnish him with twenty horses per day, until a more regular force was organized, which continued for four years. He now raised the green flag, the standard of the Prophet, refused all titles but that of the ‘servant of God;’ and after clearing the country of the Felatahs, he proceeded to punish all those nations who had given them assistance, and with the slaves, the produce of these wars, rewarded his faithful Kanemboo and other followers for their fidelity and attachment. 

513 ibid.  
514 ibid, 179.
Under the leadership of al-Kanemi, the Bornu began to re-stabilize. Eventually, by 1812, al-Kanemi succeeded in defeating the forces of the Fulani jihad in Bornu. However, for as successful as he was in his efforts against Uthman dan Fodio’s forces the troubles sharpened Yusuf Pasha’s interest in Bornu for himself. Yusuf sent his agent in Fezzan, al-Mukkni on a diplomatic mission to Bornu in 1807-8. While the latter was initially met with hospitality, diplomatic engagements with Babur officials quickly soured. Historians have since directed the blame for this fallout on none other than Awlad Mohammed officials in Fezzan who were happy to continue as the middlemen between Bornu and Tripoli.515

Tripoli remained keenly aware of Bornu’s strategic location in the trans-Saharan slave trade after al-Mukkni’s takeover of Fezzan in 1810. And the governor kept a particularly sharp eye on the political instability in Bornu and looked to profit from it. Under al-Mukkni the number of raids (gharzzie) into Babur territory rose exponentially. By 1816 Kanem, in north Bornu, alone was raided twice. In the years following the 1816 Anglo-Dutch attack on Algiers, Tripoli’s interest grew further still, and was likely spurred on by the governor’s increasing close relationship with the British consul to Tripoli, Consul Hamner Warrington. He arrived in Tripoli as Consul General in 1814, and Warrington like other consuls before him, was especially interested in the British exploration of Africa. He later became involved with the Fezzan expeditions of Richie and Lyon, Gordon Laing’s efforts to reach Timbuktu, those of Dixon Denham, as well Clapperton and Oudney who traveled to Bornu.516

It is unclear if the Tripolitan Pasha’s interest in expanding the slave trade through Bornu was the catalyst that first ignited Warrington’s interest in the efforts of

515 See Chapter 3 of this dissertation.
British explorers in Africa and his ready willingness to facilitate the endeavors of several of his countrymen. However, we can trace the consul’s early taste for the looting of antiquities. Shortly after his arrival in Tripoli, he convinced the pasha to gift several Roman columns from Leptis Magna. These columns still stand in the gardens of Virginia Water in modern-day Surry. However, this was only the beginning. Warrington continued to raid the antiquities of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica as much as he pleased, and even wrote in 1821, “I flatter myself [that] His Lordship will shortly have the best private collection in England.”\textsuperscript{517} A great deal of this collection now stands preserved in the British Museum.\textsuperscript{518}

In order to facilitate his ransacking and to ease British expeditions into Africa, Warrington realized that he needed to cultivate a friendship with the pasha, which he readily did. Maltese circles often referred to him as the “Bashaw of Tripoli”\textsuperscript{519} and the French wrote of his influence, “more a master of the country than then Pasha himself, a [mere] gesture on his part made others tremble.”\textsuperscript{520} In 1965, Bovill wrote of the Consul and his intentions, “The idea of the British flag and British trade being carried into the heart of Africa stirred him deeply, and he longed for the day when the Union Jack would be hoisted on the Niger.”\textsuperscript{521}

Despite his rather tedious inclination towards colonialism, it is through Warrington’s records that we can trace Yusuf Pasha’s intentions to expand his reach into Bornu. In August of 1820, Warrington wrote to the Foreign Office with the governor’s explicit proposal of territorial expansion. The consul wrote, “His Highness

\textsuperscript{518} ibid. 
\textsuperscript{519} ibid. 
\textsuperscript{520} Ibid, Original text, « Plus maitre du pays que le Pacha lui-meme, qu'un geste de sa part faisait trembler. » 
\textsuperscript{521} ibid.
says that if England would advance him twenty-five thousand pounds, he would repay it in a few years, and which could enable him to take Bornu and Sudan and fix a Bey at each place and that the produce of the country would enable him to relinquish the Slave Trade particularly as there is much Gold Dust at Sudan.”

The same year that Warrington wrote to England relaying the Pasha’s interest in expanding his reach southwards was the same year that the Tripolitan governor’s neighbor to the east, Mehmed Ali began his own southern expedition in the Sudan. Under the command of his son Ismael, the vali dispatched nearly four-thousand troops. Fahmy noted that the vali wanted exploit the allegedly abundant gold mines of the region, capture the remaining Mamluk amirs in Kurdufan that were actively engaging in the slave trade, and establish better control over the Red Sea trade. Most importantly however, Mehmed Ali wanted to capture as many able-bodied Sudanese men as possible, and forcibly conscript them into his Egyptian soldiery.

It is critical to also distinguish between Mehmed Ali’s desire to control the Sudan, and Yusuf Pasha’s corresponding drive to do the same in Bornu. First, Mehmed Ali did in fact send Ismael and his men south in 1820; Egyptian forces conquered the territory in 1821; and Sudan remained under Egyptian control until the 1885 capture of Khartoum by Mohammed Ahmed al-Mahdi. However, while Yusuf Pasha was explicit and adamant in his desire to expand into Bornu, his imperial ambitions never materialized into military campaigns. This point however, it was not for lack of effort on the governor’s part. Rather, it was the governor’s decision to turn to the British for support in his imperialist endeavor that ultimately blocked his attempts altogether.

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523 Fahmy, *All the Pasha’s Men*, 87-88.
Despite Yusuf Pasha’s claims however, there was little gold dust to be found in Bornu.\textsuperscript{524} Historians have since argued that his claims were likely a ploy to cover his real interest in expanding the trans-Saharan slave trade and that the popularization of abolitionist sentiments in Europe was the main reason behind British officials’ unwillingness support the governor’s imperialist project. This second point is correct, in that abolitionism was gaining traction in Great Britain and across Europe.

On the other hand, British imperial interest in the African continent was also expanding rapidly in the 1820s. The Foreign and Home Offices were increasingly paying a great deal of attention to appointment of diplomatic officials, such as Warrington, who themselves expressed a keen interest in British colonial expansion, and were actively supporting British explorers, such as Denham on their missions into the different parts of the Central-Saharan and Sahel regions.

Admittedly, the 1807 prohibition on British subjects’ engagement in the slave trade did likely spur some suspicion regarding the Tripolitan governor’s actual ambitions. After all, the Pasha’s middleman with the British government was himself a seasoned British imperialist with a keen interest in African exploration. Therefore, Warrington would have known that gold dust did not arrive in Tripoli from Bornu via the Air-Kano caravan passage but rather via western route from Timbuktu-Gao.\textsuperscript{525}

Nevertheless, it is important to return to Bovill’s assessment of the British Consul General to Tripoli, man who “longed for the day when the Union Jack would be hoisted on the Niger.”\textsuperscript{526} Moreover, it is also important to remember that the British themselves had established a colony in neighboring Sierra Leon twenty-years

\textsuperscript{524} Folayan, \textit{Tripoli during the Reign of Yusuf Pasha Qaramanli}, 86-88.  
\textsuperscript{525} ibid.  
\textsuperscript{526} Bovill, “Colonel Warrington.” loc. cit.
before, in 1800. British officials were deeply interested in expanding their foothold on the African continent. In fact, they would annex Lagos in 1861 and would incorporate the territory of modern-day Nigeria, the same space that comprised significant part of the Bornu Empire in 1820, into the British Crown’s colonial possessions before the end of the century.

The procedural causality for British reticence in supporting Yusuf Pasha on his Bornu mission, and specifically for refusing him the loan that he first requested in 1820, and then requested again in 1824, likely had more to do with the Colonial Office’s own interest in the region. After all, His Majesty’s government was openly interested in expanding its colonial positions. Moreover, given the growing weakness of Yusuf’s hold after the 1815 Congress of Vienna, the prominence of Warrington’s position in Tripoli, this research speculates that the British government was likely bidding it’s time for regime change in Tripoli. British Foreign and Home Office records unfortunately do not indicate why the plans of Tripolitan pasha were not given more attention in London, and British records at Kew did not explicitly indicate that London was waiting for conditions to grow more favorable towards its own colonial interests. However, the implicit tone of the records exchanged between the British consul and London indicate that Warrington saw the Pasha as more of a hindrance to the prospects of British colonialism in Africa rather than a help.527

The willingness of the pasha to discuss his expansion into Bornu with British officials was particularly striking considering that there was no record of the pasha’s intended Bornu expedition in the Ottoman records. It seemed that the North African

governor—much like Mehmed Ali in Sudan—turned to Europeans in his efforts to colonize Bornu and and Kanem, and their efforts to construct and build their respective armies and not to the Porte. Given this, and the tenacity with which Yusuf Karamanli attempted to outmaneuver both al-Kanemi in Bornu, going so far as to hold the latter’s children hostage in Tripoli, one is left with a sense that much like his neighbor to the east had done “[b]y absorbing the Sudan into Egypt’s borders, Muhammad ‘Ali distinguished Egypt from the Sudan and brought Egypt a little closer to Europe,” 528 One could argue that Yusuf Pasha had hoped to do the same with Tripoli central and his southern Saharan neighbors.

**Tripoli’s Relations with Bornu**

Despite the hostility that Yusuf Pasha’s agent, al-Mukkni, demonstrated during his regular invasions into Kanembu territory, Sheikh al-Kanemi reached out to Yusuf Pasha in his efforts to suppress the rebellions of 1817 Baghirmi. It remains uncertain as to why al-Kanemi chose to ally himself with Tripoli, when the pasha’s own agent had been so hostile towards Barbur territory. However, Folyan speculated that al-Kanemi believed that the spoils of war and the plunder of the Baghirmi forces, which could only be put down with Tripoli’s assistance, would have been enough to secure amicable relations between him and his neighbors to the north. 529

Yusuf agreed to help al-Kanemi in the latter’s endeavor against Bahirmi, and even went so far to entrench himself as al-Kanemi’s ally. The governor even replaced al-Mukkni with a corsair of Georgian descent named Mustafa al-Ahmar in 1820. However, Tripoli’s attempts to feign friendship with Bornu did little to deter the interests of the governor. Between 1817-1820, Yusuf Pasha’s imperialist ambitions

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528 Powell, *A Different Shade of Colonialism*, 47.
became one of the central concerns of his administration. So much so, that after the removal of al-Mukkni, Yusuf sent al-Ahmar from Marzuq in 1821 with a force of nearly five hundred cavalry carrying thirteen-hundred infantrymen and over two thousand pack animals to organize a joint attack with al-Kanemi’s forces outside the new Babur capital of Kuka. These cooperative military attacks were largely successful, and al-Kanemi believed so certainly in his alliance with the Tripolitan governor that after the joint mission of 1821, the governor of Bornu sent his three young children to Marzuq with al-Ahmar, as he believed Fezzan to be safer.530

In late 1821, al-Kanemi’s suspicions began to slowly grow. The initial cause for concern corresponded with the arrival of three British explorers in Tripoli, a Dr. Oudley, Captain Clarington and the Major Dixon Denham. However, rather than outfit them with a traveling party and supplies, Yusuf delayed them in the city for over a year.531 After much negotiation with the British Consul Warrington, the three British men were allowed to proceed from Tripolitania to Bornu under the protection of two hundred armed men. By the time the party arrived in Bornu however, they were met outside of Kuka with between somewhere between three to five thousand Babur troops heavily, armed and ready to meet any external threat. Folyan wrote of the event, “This must have been humiliating for the Arabs who had on the road spoken contemptuously of Bornu’s military strength and boasted to the British explorers that they alone could ‘eat up Bornu’.”532 In fact, by 1822 al-Kanemi had become outspoken in his fear of a Tripolitan threat and forbid the explorer Oudley from traveling outside his immediate protection, stating, “should accident befall you,
the bashaw [of Tripoli] will make it a plea to invade my country.” Tensions grew over the next several years and by late 1822-1825 Bornu “lived under the constant fear of military invasion.”

Yusuf was so persistent in his desire to expand his reach into Bornu, that by 1823 he openly stated to the British Consul Warrington that he was holding al-Kanemi’s children not explicitly as hostages, but rather were being held in Marzuq to ensure “the future submission and fidelity” of al-Kanemi. It was not until after the 1824 denial of Yusuf’s second loan request by the British for 50,000 pounds—a request that Consul Warrington supported—that Yusuf Pasha finally abandoned his plans to invade and control Bornu. Only then did he allow for the release of al-Kanemi’s children.

The historian Folayan first classified the behaviors of Yusuf Pasha as “imperialist” in the 1970s. Folayan’s work, based on extensive research in the Foreign Office Archives in England, was explicit in the imperialist objectives of Yusuf’s behaviors. Nevertheless, the historian remained ambivalent in the underlying motives behind the Pasha’s interest in Bornu. Folayan argued that Yusuf’s interest in Bornu was largely, if not exclusively, economic in nature. While it is true that by the 1820s Tripoli’s finances were in a growing state of distress, the governor’s relentlessness in his pursuit of territorial expansion, as well as in his efforts to gain the support of the British government, finds a clear parallel in the behaviors of his Egyptian neighbor, Mehmed Ali, and the latter’s expansion into the Sudan. Yusuf was

533 FO 76/17 Warrington to Wilmot, 17 July 1823. Also see CO 2/13 Oudney to Wilmont, 28 March 1823.
534 ibid.
535 ibid., 95-6.
536 ibid., 96.
537 ibid., See “The Abortive Scheme.”
looking to mimic the behaviors of his eastern neighbor, both in the elimination of his political rivals within Tripolitania as well as his rivals to the south of the desert.

Despite his expressed desire to expand his territory, by 1824 Yusuf Karamanlı was facing a much more pressing concern regarding his governorship in Tripoli. As the decade immediately following the end of the corso wore on, the condition of the governor’s finances grew increasingly dire. Having been refused loans from the British government, Yusuf turned to two sets of creditors: European merchants and to Mehmed Ali in Egypt.

By 1823, Mehmed Ali in Egypt was looking to recoup his funds. That year, he sent an emissary from Cairo, Mohammed Dorbi to Tripoli to offer the governor an option. Yusuf would repay the 250,000 monies to the vali; otherwise, the Egyptian governor would be willing to forgo the debit, if his Tripolitan counterpart were to place the western cities of Derna, Benghazi, and the southern territory of Fezzan under the direct sovereignty of Egypt for a period of twelve years. Yusuf refused, claiming that the offer was “little better than a permanent conquest of the best part of his territory.” This move on the part of Mehmed Ali would open a new age of Egyptian domination in North African affairs.

Conclusion

In this chapter we saw how, as Mehmed Ali was organizing an expedition into the Sudan, Yusuf Karamanlı was simultaneously looking to expand his reach southwards and extend his power into Bornu. We examined how the seeds of North African imperialism were planted, not just in the divan or the political ambitions of the vali of Egypt, but rather regionally. Moreover, we investigated the overwhelming

538 Folaran, “Tripoli—Bornu Political Relations, 1817-1825,” passim. Also see below.
539 FO 76/17 Warrington to Wilmont, 16 November 1823.
similarity of the methods used by the Egyptian and Tripolitan governor, their broader ambitions in the region, as well as the empires that they turned to for support in their respective quests and argued that these waves of imperialist expansion were sparked at similar moments, approached from similar tactics, and underscored an effort by the two governors to bring their provinces “closer to Europe” by turning almost exclusively to the British in the expression and attempted implementation of their imperialist agendas.

By highlighting these radical changes in the lead up to 1824, which represented another key watershed moment for the provinces, this chapter highlights how early-nineteenth century North African provinces and their rulers not only cooperated in times of crisis, such as the bombardment under Lord Exmouth, but also mimicked one another in their efforts to eliminate their political rivals, as well as the tactics they applied to further their imperialist agendas.

The larger objective of this chapter was to juxtapose North Africa’s relationship with the sea and Europe to the north as well as that with its relationship with the desert and the Sahel to the south. Its purpose is to stretch out our conceptualization of North Africa not as an exclusively Ottoman or Mediterranean space, but also an African one. Doing so highlights the historical narrative of the region as a vital part of the larger African continent. This dissertation, which in its primary objective attempts to reformulate our understanding of how different spaces work together in a region like North Africa also attempts to draw our attention to how the governors of this region worked and coordinated efforts, both with their European and Ottoman neighbors, as well as with their African ones. The larger objective of this

540 Powell, A Different Shade of Colonialism, 47
new lens is an attempt to tease out the historical connection between the seas and the sands of the Saharan desert.
CHAPTER FIVE
MEHMED ALI’S EGYPT AND THE NEW FACE OF OLD EMPIRES
1824-1829

I know very well that I do not have a navy, and that I cannot build one in the sands of the Pyramids. Therefore, great losses will incur, but eventually, I will have one, and then I will overtake and defeat the Greeks. 541

Historians of Egypt have long recognized Mehmed Ali’s massive appetite for territorial expansion. By 1820, the pasha’s reach extended into the Hijaz and was beginning to expanding into the Sudan. But the governor of Egypt remained undeterred by either the militaristic or the economic costs of his empire building efforts. Rather than limit himself to the eastern Mediterranean, the vali of Egypt had already expressed a desire to grow his empire westward and administer the Tripolitan territories of Fezzan and Cyrenaica. With the emergence of this new, compelling and powerful political center in Cairo, Mehmed Ali demanded the attentions of both his provincial neighbors as well as those of imperial authorities in the Porte and beyond. The Egypt of Mehmed Ali was about to became a regional center in the broader Maghreb as well as in the Eastern Mediterranean.

As European imperial rivals began to recognize the growing influence of the Egyptian governor’s ever-expanding political capital, the vali proved to still be in early stages of his empire building. Over the course of the next decade, his reach span first into Crete and Morea, and then again into Syria and parts of Anatolia. It is the thesis of this chapter that we can trace two overarching themes in the behaviors of the North African provinces during the 1820s. First, there was an overwhelming shift in

541 Mehmed Ali, as quoted in Boyer to Belliard, Alexandrie 26 November 1824, Douin and Boyer, Une mission militaire française auprès de Mohamed Aly. Original text: «Je sais bien, dit-il, que je ferai des pertes, mais enfin, puisque je n’avais pas de marine, pour en avoir , je ne pouvais pas en former dans les sables des Pyramides; à force de pertes, je finirai par en avoir une, et alors je braverai les Grecs et les vaincrai.»

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how both Ottoman and European imperial powers came to view the region after the
days of the corso finally ended, and namely who the power players in the region were.
Since the days of Barbarossa Hayreddin Pasha, Algiers had historically commanded
the largest naval and militaristic reserve in the region, and in turn wielded the
strongest influence among both its neighbors and beyond. This was about to change.
Over the course of the decade and the events in Morea, Egypt overtook Algiers in its
prestige and influence as a regional center. Secondly, we see the continuation of a
theme we witnessed in the previous chapter. While Mehmed Ali was attempting to
eliminate his political rivals, consolidate his power over the entirety of Egypt, and
reshape his army, he was setting an example to follow by his western neighbors.
Tripoli, and later Tunis, were about to adopt exceedingly similar standards for their
own standing militaries by means of extensive drilling, training and highly disciplined
regimentation programs.

In this chapter, we analyze three major points regarding the Egyptian role in
the Ottoman struggles with the Greek Orthodox rebels of the 1820s. First, we will
examine the lengths to which the Egyptian vali attempted to build a navy, the tactics
he used to achieve these aims, and lastly its subsequent destruction in the Battle of
Navarino. Secondly, we will explore the last year of Ibrahim Pasha’s campaign in
Morea, which, this dissertation argues is critical in the vali’s invasion of Syria in the
1830s, and signified nothing else than an explicit rupture in Cairo’s relations with the
Porte. In the twelve months following the 1827 naval losses in the Bay of Navarino,
Ibrahim Pasha refused to abandon his post or his men and return to Cairo. However,
because of the naval blockade, the supplies and rations of the Egyptian regiments had
been reduced to almost nothing. Matters were complicated by Mahmud II’s refusal to
allow the Egyptian army to leave the mainland and ultimately resulted in the souring of relations between the vali and the sultan. Lastly, we look to European sources, both Russian and British to contrast the historical depictions of Ibrahim Pasha, to introduce important Russophone sources into the historical literature of North Africa, and to analyze how extremely contradictory the historical representations of the future governor of Egypt were. The objective of this chapter in tying these three distinct points of analysis together is to be able to reincorporate the extent to which turn of the nineteenth century Egyptian history is in fact both Maghrebi and Mediterranean history.

**Egypt and the Porte, in a North African Context**

In the 1810s, Egypt’s regional influence was expanding rapidly as both Tunis and Tripoli struggled economically. The succession of the ailing Mahmud Bey to the Tunisian governorship and the subsequent outbreak of plague in 1818 effectively undercut the province economically and politically well into the mid-1820s. Tunis was suffering through internal crises and thus remained relatively silent on the imperial stage of the broader Ottoman world. Mahmud Bey’s administration struggled to reestablish a measure of socio-economic stability similar to the one that had marked the years of Hammuda Pasha’s government, albeit under direr and much more severe economic constraints. Meanwhile, the Karamanlı pasha of Tripoli’s attempts to curtail the financial losses following the decline of the corso were largely unsuccessful. His imperialist ambitions toward Bornu were thwarted by expanding British colonial interests beyond their control of Sierra Leone, and his position as Tripolitan vali increasingly threatened by both the increased influence of European

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542 See Chapter 4 of this dissertation, also see Dixon Denham and Hugh Clapperton, *Narrative of Travels and Discoveries in Northern and Central Africa.*
diplomats and the political ambitions of his three sons.

However, while the Congress of Vienna had enormous consequences for the socio-economic prospects of both Tunis and Tripoli, they were by no means the provinces hardest hit by the effective end of the *corso*. Algiers was the most debilitated. As the province with the strongest maritime tradition, the end of the *corso* had particularly devastating consequences not only for the economic and political conditions of the westernmost province, but also on its position within the broader Mediterranean and Ottoman worlds. The leverage Algiers was able to wield over its neighbors to the east began diminishing after the turn of the century. This decline was further exacerbated after the bombardment of the city walls by the Anglo-Dutch fleet.\(^{543}\) Gone were the days when both Ottoman and European powers considered Algiers to be the apex power among the triumvirate of *corso* regencies. Long considered the socio-political and economic center of the three provinces maritime activities, the *corso* tied not only the narrative of the provinces together, but also framed the historical conceptualization of the region. This spatial imagination was about to change.

Moreover, Algiers was simultaneously the most villainized in western popular imaginations.\(^{544}\) This paved the way for the province’s eventual fall to the expansionist interests of imperial France, while its reduced socio-political state accelerated a power shift east, towards Egypt. A weakened Algiers allowed for a new Cairene political center of gravity to emerge within the broader North African region.

The emergence of the Egyptian center in the Maghreb was not simply a


byproduct of the vali’s desire for territorial expansion or his growing influence in the broader Ottoman world. Rather, was also a manifestation of a weakened Algerian hold over the Western Mediterranean during a time when Tunis and Tripoli were floundering in their efforts to restructure their economies. Never one to miss an opportunity, Mehmed Ali was beginning to reconsider his broader position in the Maghreb—a state of affairs that would only be heightened by the outbreak of revolt in the Morea over the course of the decade.

From the center of the empire, the 1820s brought a new set of political crises that threatened the territorial integrity of the sultan’s well-protected domains. In the Morea, Tepelena Ali Pasha had effectively carved out a small empire for himself and his sons, Veli and Mukhtar Pasha. Tepelena Ali Pasha was officially the governor of Ioannina. However, his de facto territory extended from Mukhtar’s pașalık of Avlonya [Vlorë] in modern-day Albania, through Macedonia, Northern Greece and south into Veli’seyalet of peninsular Morea.545 A formidable regional player, Ali Pasha grew frustrated with the demands of the Porte. His subsequent calls for independence greatly disturbed Mahmud II and his officials in Constantinople. Regardless, the behavior of the Ioannina governor was not the sole cause of concern for the empire’s territorial integrity in Southeastern Europe. Tepelena Ali Pasha’s behaviors simultaneously spurred the militarization of the Greek Orthodox rebels in Morea.546

Greek language chronicler from the era were explicit in drawing a connection between the rebellion of Ali Pasha and the growing unrest in Morea. One wrote, “it cannot be doubted that the declaration of the Porte against Aly was the immediate cause

545 Aksan, Ottoman Wars, 1700-1870, 287-8.
of the Greek insurrection.\textsuperscript{547} Instigator though he was, the Albanian governor of Ioannina was not the root cause of the tension. Subversion of Morean public order can be traced back to the 1770s, and the uprising that took place under the Russian Orlov brothers—two officers from the Russian Imperial Army.\textsuperscript{548} Their efforts were effective; and their political agitation received support among the Greek Orthodox communities of the region. Constantinople sent in battalions of troops, which comprised mostly of Albanian irregulars in an effort to quell the uprising.\textsuperscript{549} In doing so however, the Porte unintentionally helped to prime the region as a political tinderbox.

While the Albanians troops successfully subdued the Orlov rebels, their behavior and the subsequent plundering of the territory effectively replaced one form of disorder with another, only further undermining Ottoman authority and the social order in Morea.\textsuperscript{550} By the time Tepelena Ali Pasha began his efforts against the Porte nearly half a century later, the seeds political protest had long since been planted, had matured, and were effectively ripe for the harvest.

Questions of causality aside, the rebels of Morea gradually gained both the attention and support they needed for their cause. The fight for Morea would eventually ignite the Greek Revolution, spur European involvement in the region, cost both Mehmed Ali and Mehmed II their naval fleets, spark yet another war between the Porte and Russia, antagonize the Egyptian vali into invading Ottoman Syria and Anatolia, and most of all, transform the topography of the sultan’s domains in the Balkans.\textsuperscript{551}

\textsuperscript{547} ibid, 6.
\textsuperscript{549} ibid.
\textsuperscript{550} ibid.
\textsuperscript{551} Regarding the term: ‘Greeks:’ within western sources they are overwhelmingly calls ‘Greeks,’ even Mehmed Ali in the above translated quote from Boyer’s letter, (granted the vali probably said Rum and
Tensions escalated and the stage was set. Even Ali Pasha’s death two short years later did little to quell the rising tide of dissent among the Rum [Orthodox] in the Morea.\footnote{Christine Philliou, “Breaking the Tetrarchia and Saving the Kaymakam: To Be an Ambitious Ottoman Christian in 1821” in \textit{Ottoman Rule and the Balkans, 1760-1850: Conflict, Transformation, Adaptation}, edited by Antonis Anastasopoulos and Elias Kolovos (Rethymno: University of Crete Press, 2007).} As the rebellion gained traction among the Orthodox communities of the peninsula, the problem of the insurrection grew increasingly troublesome for the Porte. Initially, Constantinople was slow to react. It first sent in Albanian troops do what they had previously done before during the Orlovi Rebellion while the Porte attempted to implement a containment policy to the limit the breadth of the revolts.\footnote{Aksan, \textit{Ottoman Wars, 1700-1870}, 190.}

To quell the significant rise in the Orthodox piracy off the peninsula and neighboring islands—a great deal of which was directly targeted against Ottoman vessels—Sultan Mahmud II focused his early attentions on the naval realm. He appointed none other than Mehmed Ali’s old rival, Hüsrev Pasha, as Grand Admiral of the Ottoman fleet in 1822. Chosen mostly for his successes in rebuilding the Ottoman fleet in the Black Sea, Hüsrev’s appointment as the Kapudan Pasha would eventually lead to more fractionalization within the Ottoman world, and most importantly to a bitter rupture between Constantinople and one of its most powerful governors, Mehmed Ali of Egypt.

Despite the sultan’s initial gesture towards a proactive naval response, the Porte ultimately delayed any decisive action against the insurrection. So much so, that by the
middle of the decade, the effort against the Morean rebels were at their nadir, and the Ottoman forces that had been sent to the region grew increasingly desperate for tactical support. The poor management of the early years of the Morean conflict however was not out of pure administrative negligence on the part of the Sultan or his officials. The reason behind the Porte’s half-measures in quelling the rebellion was that Mahmud II’s attentions were focused on a much more immediate threat. In that, while the rebellion in the Morea threatened the empire’s territorial integrity in the Aegean, Ionian Seas and in the broader Balkans, the reformist sultan turned his attention to adversaries that were quite literally, much closer to home.

Mahmud II’s westernization attempts eventually produced the 1839 Edict of Gülhane that officially introduced the tanzimat overhauls. By 1820, the sultan had grown increasingly focused on limiting the power of his adversaries within the Asitane itself. Mahmud II paid considerable attention to reining in the substantial power of the frequently disloyal janissaries. The elite forces of the kapıkulu had long proved extremely resistant to the military reforms of the age—regardless of whichever sultan was attempting to implement them. After all, the janissary revolts had put an end to the sultanate of Mahmud II’s reformist predecessor, Selim III. Mahmud II was determined not to make the same mistake.

In an effort to pare down the power of the elite infantrymen before the ‘Auspicious Incident’ of 1826 and the disbandment of the yeniçeri class, contemporary sources argued that the sultan had little choice but to center his attentions on the “military and civil preparations [needed] to secure his position… as he apparently realized that any failure in these areas would mean disaster.” For Morea, this meant

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554 ibid.
555 Christine M. Philliou, Biography of an Empire, 97.
that the sultan’s priorities did not align with the ongoing troubles in the Morea. In her work on the Phanariot communities, Philliou argued that in order to cope with the simultaneous crises, Mahmud II had little choice but to outsource the general war effort against the Greek Orthodox rebels.556

This effectively meant that the Porte once again became heavily reliant on the irregular Albanian forces. The difference between the strategy and the similar efforts 50 years earlier against the Orlov brothers however, was that the Porte used the latter as a stopgap measure, while the Grand Vizier increasingly applied pressure on the Egyptian vali to spur his involvement in the conflict.557 The extent of Mehmed Ali’s reach, as well as the military aptitude of his son Ibrahim, had been recently displayed in both the Sudan and against the Wahhabis of the Hijaz. Constantinople needed Cairo, again. But the former still had to draw the latter’s interest to make the vali commit to the ongoing conflict. Eventually, the Porte was successful, and Mehmed Ali’s influence would soon extend to the islands of the eastern Mediterranean.

**Before Crete: The Early Response**

Before delving into Mehmed Ali’s role—as well as his use of the naval fleet of his North African neighbors—first in Crete and then in Morea, let us reassess the historical position of the Egyptian governor in the ongoing struggle before his troops landed in Crete. Historiographically, Mehmed Ali’s early interest in the Greek Orthodox uprising has uniformly been presented as ambivalent. The narrative given within the literature is such that the pasha could only be prompted, finally and hesitantly, into action after a significant amount of diplomatic negotiations with and prodding by the Porte, after the sultan enticed him with pașaliks of Crete and later

556 ibid.
557 ibid.
Morea. The literature tells us that it was only after said prompting that the vali first sent his son-in-law, Hussein Bey, to put down the Cretan revolt. Notable examples of this approach can be seen in Dodwell’s assessment of Mehmed Ali’s “benevolent detachment,”558 before the sultan offered the governor the island. The same argument was later implicitly echoed in what Fahmy argued was the governor’s ‘ultimate’ objective of Syria, which – as he argued – was to serve as a ‘cornerstone of the Pasha’s ‘empire.’”559

What we see in both these monographs, as well as in the broader historiography, was that scholars of North Africa, as well as their Ottomanist counterparts, have long considered the invasion of Crete to be a mere precursor to Ibrahim Bey’s efforts in Morea. And in turn, Morea was framed largely as a catalyst for Mehmed Ali’s more audacious and enterprising invasion of Syria and Anatolia. At the same time, scholars presumed that Mehmed Ali’s involvement in the uprising was largely limited to his charged correspondence with the Porte, Ibrahim’s later struggles in Morea, the father and son’s tumultuous relationship with Hüsrev Pasha, the pasha’s growing desire for Syria, and the resulting power struggle that ensued between the two camps—Egyptian and Ottoman.560

In as much, the governor’s behaviors before Ibrahim’s 1825 peninsular campaign—but after Hussein Bey’s 1823 conquest of Crete—have been largely portrayed as overwhelmingly indifferent. So much so, that one could be forgiven for thinking that the vali’s interest in the Peloponnesian revolts was inextricably tied to Ibrahim landing in Methoni and his subsequent troubles on the peninsula. To support

558 ibid.
559 Fahmy, All the Pasha’s Men, 47.
560 ibid, also see Khaled Fahmy, Mehmed Ali: From Ottoman Governor to Ruler of Egypt (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2008), and Dodwell, The Founder of Modern Egypt.
his argument of ‘benevolent detachment’Dodwell relied heavily on Douin and other Francophone sources. He claimed that prior to his involvement in Crete in 1822, Mehmed Pasha viewed the rebellion with explicit indifference, as well as a detectable bit of disdain towards the interests of the Porte. Dodwell wrote:

In true opportunist vein, he had got rid of the Albanian troops whom he did not want by encouraging them to leave his service for that of the rebel of Janina. He was informed of the activities of the Greek revolutionary societies which had been established in Cairo and Alexandria, but took no measure against them. He did nothing to hinder the embarkation of Greek volunteers at Alexandria. He even set free a party of Greek slaves sent to him by the Dey of Algiers.

As we shall see below however, this was simply not the case. Given the location for the outbreak of violence as well as the maritime expertise of the rebels in the Aegean and Ionian Seas, it was not long before the Porte revived its interest in the Mediterranean corso. In fact, the outbreak of the rebellion marked an important shift in the Porte’s engagement with the corso after the Congress of Vienna. The change was so significant within official Porte’s documentation that by the early 1820s, one could argue that the Greek uprising, and the rebels’ reliance their maritime prowess had, albeit briefly and entirely unintentionally, reversed the fortunes of the North African corso well before the Egyptian vali’s involvement in the region.

First, one can observe a significant increase in the Ottoman Porte’s internal documents regarding the broader workings of the North African provinces, as well as a newly revived interest in the corsairs’ maritime activity of the eastern Mediterranean and Aegean Sea. This marked a dramatic shift from the Porte’s behaviors in the previous years. Immediately after the Congress of Vienna, official Ottoman documentation regarding any and all North African corsair attacks or campaigns in

561 Dodwell, The Founder of Modern Egypt, 69.
562 Ibid.
Mediterranean waters had dwindled almost to null. In fact, between the winter of 1816 and the summer of 1820, only a handful of notices made their way to the sultan regarding the practice. And even these overwhelmingly focused on the ongoing European and British effort to eradicate the practice, and made passing mention of the Maghrebi *corso* in the Mediterranean Sea. The dearth of sources was not for a lack of actual campaigns. North African corsair attacks continued well after the Congress of Vienna, and even spurred the Anglo-Dutch bombardment of Algiers in 1816, and the European sieges of Algerian and Tripolitan ports in 1820. Nevertheless, the records of the Ottoman Porte remained overwhelming silent on the maritime activity of the North African corsair fleets between late 1816 and 1820.\(^{563}\)

From 1820 onwards however, just as the Greek Orthodox insurgency was gearing up, there was a significant increase in the number of Ottoman reports regarding *corso* campaigns in the Mediterranean. Interestingly, the first few reports from the Porte’s records point to the efforts of the rebels, who had already begun an ardent maritime campaign of their own, as well as to a strong suspicion on the part of the Porte that their Russian imperial rivals had involved themselves in the ongoing struggle. What is most fascinating however, was that it is through *Egyptian* records that we are able trace the subsequent efforts at intelligence gathering.\(^{564}\)

A careful analysis of Ottoman sources, as well as Mehmed Ali’s correspondence with Ottoman officials and his North African neighbors point to a far more nuanced response on the part of the Egyptian governor in the early years of the

\(^{563}\) BOA searches for korsan, korsanlar, akdeniz, akdenizli korsanlar, tunus, tarabulsgrab, tarabulsgarp, 1221-1235 Hicri, see HAT Tarih :19/Z /1232 (Hicri) Dosya No :1280 Gömlek No :49623, and HAT Tarih :24/L /1234 (Hicri) Dosya No :300 Gömlek No :17829 for examples of internal memorandums to Mahmud II.

\(^{564}\) HAT Dosya No: 1418 Gömlek No: 57981
uprising, well before Egyptian forces’ 1822 involvement in Crete. For example, while internal Ottoman documents indicated the Porte’s suspicions of an ongoing Russian imperial involvement in the Greek uprising, it was only by way of Egyptian sources that we could trace the Porte’s reaction to the above-mentioned misgivings.⁵⁶⁵

In Cairene archives, one can find a letter Mehmed Ali wrote to Constantinople discussing his ongoing efforts to trace Russian involvement in the uprising. By way of the report, we learn that the Grand Vizier had tasked the provincial governor of Egypt, and likely several other provincial leaders, with the responsibility of speaking with and gaining information from the various Russian consuls across the Empire. In response, Mehmed Ali wrote to the Grand Vizier, Izmirli Hacı Salih Pasha in early June 1821 to update him about his ongoing efforts regarding the Porte’s potential Russian problem.⁵⁶⁶

From this source we learn that the tenacity of the ongoing revolts in Morea and Messinia heightened the suspicions of both the Egyptian vali and the Porte. In response, the Egyptian governor began to investigate which if any, and to what extent, the Porte’s imperial rivals were providing tactical support to the Greek rebels. First on his list to interview was the Russian General Consul to Egypt, Giorgio Čivini.⁵⁶⁷ In his meeting with Mehmed Ali, Čivini, denied any Russian involvement in the Greek uprising, and firmly rejected allegations of Russian association, or support for the rebels. So much so that the consul decidedly announced to the Egyptian governor that the “Russians do not support subversive missions against other imperial powers.”⁵⁶⁸

⁵⁶⁵ ibid.
⁵⁶⁶ Letter from Mehmed Ali to the Sadr-ı Azam, Ramadan 1236. DWQ, Khedival Folios.
⁵⁶⁸ Letter from Mehmed Ali to the Sadr-ı Azam, Ramadan 1236. DWQ, Khedival Folios.
Clearly, the Egyptian governor was not indifferent to the troubles in the Morea. Moreover, the timing of this document between Cairo and Constantinople is particularly telling. First, it was clear that Mehmed Ali was involved in the early political strategies of the Asitane and that he was in close contact the High Porte during the first outbreak of revolts. This confidential correspondence of the vali and the information he provided regarding the Russian consul in Egypt suggests that vali’s interest in the conflict was more salient than the ‘benevolent detachment’ Dodwell so strongly attempted to convey. This is especially true if we account for the fact that the hostilities between the Morean rebels and the Porte broke out in February, merely four months earlier.

Secondly, the willingness of the pasha to interrogate the Russian consul on behalf of the Porte, in early summer of 1821 indicated not only that the Egyptian vali was indeed involved in the early years of the Greek uprising. It also highlighted a central concern of the Porte—that the Russian Empire, under Alexander I, was looking to expand its foothold in southeastern Europe and to do that it was leveraging its ties to the Orthodox coreligionists. Ever since the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, and the protector status claimed by Catherine II over Eastern Orthodox subjects in the Ottoman Empire, officials in the Sublime Porte became increasingly wary of Russian influence within the sultan’s domains.

The documents under discussion clearly reflect the Porte’s pre-established worries that their Russian imperial adversaries were providing aid to the Greek rebels. To offer further context, it was not only Russia’s efforts at cultivating ties with Orthodox communities in the Ottoman Balkans, or the trouble that the Orlov revolt had

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569 Dodwell, The Founder of Modern Egypt, 69.
caused previously for the Porte. Rather, concern both within the provincial and the central spheres of the Ottoman world went far beyond the questions of historical meddling on the part of Saint Petersburg. In the years immediately before the uprising, influential pro-independence movements, such as the Filiki Eteria, [The Society of Friends] had gained significant traction among the Greek subjects of the Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{571}

The Society of Friends was one of the most prominent groups of the time. A pro-independence movement that originated in 1814 Russian-controlled Odessa, the Friendly Society had become increasingly popular among the numerous Ottoman Greek subjects across the empire. Under the administration of a Russian official (of French extraction) the Duc de Richelieu, Greek migration had increased substantially at the turn of the century in Odessa. The development of the new port on the Black Sea coast went in line with the larger colonization project, as the city and the region became increasingly important under Russian control post the 1792 Treaty of Jassy.\textsuperscript{572} Correspondingly, ties between the Ottoman Greek Orthodox of Odessa and the Russian administrators increasingly solidified throughout the Napoleonic Wars. The closer the Orthodox community became with Russians officials in Odessa, the easier it became for Ottoman officials to suspect a Russian hand behind Greek Orthodox rebellions. While authorities in Saint Petersburg remained highly suspicious of any sort of secret societies, the active involvement of high-ranking individuals, most importantly, Alexander Ypsilanti, had to raise doubts regarding the attitude of the Russian court towards the Society’s plans. Due to its sizeable Greek population, its commercial

\textsuperscript{571} ibid. For further insights into the Friendly Society, see Lucien J. Frary, \textit{Russia and the Making of Modern Greek Identity, 1821-1844} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); Philliou, \textit{Biography of an Empire}. Also see Fleming, \textit{The Muslim Bonaparte}.

\textsuperscript{572} Herlihy, “Greek Merchants in Odessa in the Nineteenth Century,” 401-402.
importance, especially after its conversion to a *porto franco*, Odessa became the hub of Greek political activity.\(^{573}\)

Moreover, Ottoman official records show that the sultan and his officials were aware of, and sensitive to, Russian-Greek cooperation even before the outbreak of the war. A diplomatic memorandum sent to Mahmud II in 1817 indicated that Ottoman officials in the Morea kept a close eye that the presence of Russian soldiers on Orthodox corsair vessels in the Aegean.\(^{574}\) After the outbreak of hostilities in 1820, the news of a potential Russian hand backing the rebels came as no surprise to the Porte and only further added to the considerable concern about European imperial involvement in revolts.

Given this general state of wariness, I argue that the letter from Mehmed Ali to the Grand Vizier pointed to a far more proactive involvement of the Egyptian governor in the early years of the conflict than had been previously imagined. After all, the rebellion broke out in April of 1816, and within a few short weeks, the governor of Egypt had already questioned the Russian consul in Cairo and reported back to the Sublime Porte on his findings. This begs the question of whether Mehmed Ali was actually indifferent to the developments, or was his response perhaps more strategic and pragmatic than has previously been imagined.

New Russianist historical scholarship on Saint Petersburg’s involvement – even if involuntary – underscored the importance of the Russian connection in the early years of the revolt. Frary, who based his work on Russian and Greek sources, wrote in his 2015 monograph:

> The Greek War of Independence dragged the Russian Foreign Ministry into a complex international entanglement affecting the broad region from the

\(^{573}\) ibid.  
\(^{574}\) HAT Dosya No: 1418 Gömlek No: 57981.
Balkans to the Nile to the Caucasus. The internationalization of the crisis involved more than great power diplomacy: it resulted in a Russian–Ottoman war, the devastation of Crete and the Morea by an Egyptian army, the arrival of a French expeditionary force in the Peloponnese, a Russian blockade of the Dardanelles, and the disruption of Black Sea commerce and communications.

However, while this new study underlines the complexity and the extensive geographical implications that Russian involvement in the rebellion had on both North Africa and the broader Ottoman world, very little North African scholarship has focused on Mehmed Ali’s equally relevant and complex ties with Russian officials, or Greek independence movements in Egypt. For example, Dodwell in the quote discussed above pointed to the known presence of Greek independence movements in Egypt. However, he did not elaborate on which ones were active or how prevalent they had become in Cairo or Alexandria. This is a general theme throughout the literature, as more contemporary works by scholars such as Marsot and Fahmy have also overlooked the early role of the vali in the revolts.

Unfortunately, we lack detailed information regarding the activity of Greek independence movement in nineteenth-century Egypt, at least as can be found within the registers of the Egyptian National Archives in Bulaq. However, it would not be a stretch to speculate that such organizations, including The Society of Friends, had grown increasingly popular in 1820s Alexandria—particularly given the cosmopolitan nature of the city, the relative prominence of the local Greek community, and the role of the city’s port as an eastern Mediterranean shipping hub.

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575 Frary, Russia and the Making of Modern Greek Identity, 19.
576 Dodwell, The Founder of Modern Egypt, 69. Dodwell simply referred to the groups as “Greek Revolutionary Societies.”
Supporting this thesis, we see that in his correspondence with the Porte, Mehmed Ali expressed a looming concern of Russian interference in the ongoing revolts. For instance, we learn from Ottoman records that in March 1820 the governor of Egypt traveled to Alexandria to meet the Russian Consul and discuss Saint Petersburg’s involvement with the rebels in Morea.\textsuperscript{578} This was a different interview (and indeed a different Russian Consul) than the audience Mehmed Ali had with Čivini in the summer of 1821. Similarly, in a letter sent to his agent, Nacib Efendi, from June 1822, the \textit{vali} passed along information he had received from his \textit{kathüda}, Mehmed Lazoğlu, regarding the possibility of Russia using the Greek Orthodox rebels in their efforts to gain more leverage over the Ottoman Porte. Effectively, the pasha of Egypt was requesting that his agent in Constantinople find out more information about the contemporaneous state of affairs on the peninsula.\textsuperscript{579} Given the extent of correspondence transmitted between Cairo and the Porte during the years prior to Ibrahim Pasha’s 1825 landing in Morea, it would seem that the Egyptian Pasha’s role in the early years of the conflict merits historiographical reconsideration.

**Meanwhile in Tunis and Tripoli**

Before delving into the Tripolitan and Tunisian role in the Ottoman Empire’s efforts against the Greek war, it is important to step back and consider the situation within the province during the 1820s. As we saw previously, Yusuf Karamanlı, much like Mehmed Ali, was keenly interested in expanding both his economic as well as his territorial footprint within the region, specifically into Bornu. However, unlike his Egyptian neighbor, Yusuf’s primary objective in expansion to the south were driven by the economic rationale of the province.

\textsuperscript{578} HAT Dosya No: 1162 Gömlek No: 45986
\textsuperscript{579} Mehmed Ali to Nagib Effendi 1 Rajab 1237, DWQ, Khedival Folios.
In the case of Egypt, Fahmy challenged Marsot and Lawson’s reasoning that economic incentive was the cornerstone of Mehmed Ali’s expansions. The historian argued that the Egyptian vali’s expeditions in the Hijaz and in Morea were only taken on after extensive prodding and incentivizing by the sultan and that these efforts ultimately ended up costing the pasha more than he got out of them. However, Fahmy was himself less convinced by this argument when it came to Mehmed Ali’s expedition to Sudan. He stated, “[t]he Pasha might also have been lured by the alleged abundance of rich gold mines in Sinnar. More important [still] was the need to conscript the black Sudanese in the army he was contemplating and which he had already undertaken the first steps to create.” In the case of Tripoli, it is even harder to overlook the impact of the Congress of Vienna on the Tripolitan economy, and in turn the extent to which the loss in provincial revenues impacted the expansion into Bornu.

While Yusuf’s effort to make political use of the weakened state of Bornu post the Sokoto invasion proved to be unsuccessful, his efforts in Cyrenaica and Fezzan at suppressing the Bedouin communities revolting against his centralization efforts had yielded better results. The governor of Tripoli managed, by way of a bloody massacre very much akin to the massacre of the Mamluks in the Cairene citadel, to subdue the Jwazi rebellion as well as to send a message to any would-be political rival in the western part of the province about the extent of the governor’s reach. In doing so, the Tripolitan pasha forced his strongest adversary, his eldest son Mohammed into exile in Egypt. Despite these early efforts at political containment, the pushback

580 Fahmy, All the Pasha’s Men, 44.
581 ibid. 40.
582 See Chapter 4, also Paolo Della Cella, Narrative of an Expedition from Tripoli in Barbary.
583 ibid.
against the Bey’s consolidation of power began to crystalize before the end of the 1820s. A compendium of internal pressures, spurred on by the bey’s increase in taxation levies, the growing influx of European influence and traders in the province, coupled with tensions within the Pasha’s family and the rapacious political appetite of his older sons, all combined to gradually chip away Yusuf Bey’s hold on power.\textsuperscript{584} In as much, while Yusuf Pasha attempted to rebuild his navy in the early 1820s, and by extension his position in both the region and the broader Ottoman world, his continued administration was under the greatest threat from within the city walls of Tripoli itself.

By the mid-1820s, Tunis was under new leadership. The previous bey, Mahmud ibn Muhammad was a cousin who had seized power from the reigning dynastical branch of the family, and in turn his governorship was as complicated as it was controversial.\textsuperscript{585} The death of Hammuda Pasha, the succession crisis of Uthman ibn Ali, his subsequent assassination, and replacement by his cousin Mahmud ibn Muhammad compound with the trouble of the economic downturn after the effective end of the corso and the Congress of Vienna, while plague of 1818 further crippled the economy.\textsuperscript{586} Collectively, these forces decimated Tunis.

The historical trajectory of Tunis was about to change. Mahmud ibn Muhammad died in 1824 and was succeeded by, Hussien II, an accepted member of the previously reigning Husainid to the Tunisian beyliciate, that same year. The new governor’s succession not only saw a change in leadership but also a positive shift in

\textsuperscript{584} Folayan, \textit{Tripoli during the Reign of Yusuf Pasha Qaramanli}, 106-110.
\textsuperscript{585} See Chapter 4, also see Jacob Abadi, \textit{Tunisia Since the Arab Conquest: The Saga of a Westernized Muslim State} (New York: Apollo Books, 2013). Also see Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, \textit{A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period}.
Tunisian socioeconomic stability. The popular support behind Hussien II’s appointment to the beylicate was well known among both North African Ottoman officials at the Porte. A memorandum to Sultan Mahmud II made note of the popular resentment of the Mahmud Bey’s seizure of power.587

Upon his assumption in 1824, Hussien II was intent on rebuilding the province and his fleet as quickly as possible. By August of that year, two short months after assuming the beylicate, the governor of Tunis was in active discussions with his North African counterparts and the Ottoman Porte regarding the expansion of his naval fleet, and was already engaged in conversations regarding the assignment of North African oarsmen to the Ottoman tersane.588 By the autumn of that year, Tunis sent a fleet of ships to the Alexandrian dock where they were to be equipped and kitted for battle.589 Tunisian involvement in Egyptian preparations for the Morea campaign continued throughout the next year and was not limited to either vessels or mariners. In an effort to expand the province’s economy and to recoup some of the financial losses from the downturn in trade with Europe, Tunis began to export grain to both Egypt and Anatolia in preparation for the Morea campaign.590 This assistance was not unidirectional in nature, either. Ottoman reports from 1824 indicate that an English fleet was sailing off Tunisian waters in an effort to deter the new bey from expanding its fleet. In response, he governor turned to both his North African neighbors and the Porte for assistance. Soldiers where sent from Izmir to rendezvous whether Algerian counterparts and from there were sent to Tunis to offer assistance to their Tunisian

587 HAT Dosya No: 458 Gömlek No: 22558 and HAT Dosya No: 551 Gömlek No: 27144.
588 HAT Dosya No: 889 Gömlek No: 39280.
589 HAT Dosya No: 921 Gömlek No: 40066.
590 HAT Dosya No: 581 Gömlek No: 28551.
counterparts.\textsuperscript{591}

This collegiality between the two provinces, and specifically between the \textit{dey} of Algiers and the \textit{bey} of Tunis, was short lived. In September of the following year (1825) the Asitane reprimanded the governors of both Tunis and Algiers for their behaviors towards one another.\textsuperscript{592} An order was written to the Tunus Beylerbeyi and to Mahmud Paşazade Hüseyin Paşa concerning the enmity between the peoples of Algiers and Tunis. The Porte reprimanded the Tunisian governor for offering sanctuary to escapees from the Algerian army. The Sultan had to deem this sort of activity as inappropriate and damaging to the greater efforts of the Ottoman Empire and demanded that the escapees should be rounded up and returned to Algiers.\textsuperscript{593}

Overall however, relations between Tunis and the Ottoman court remained overwhelmingly positive. In the summer of 1827, the Sultan wrote to his Grand Admiral, the Serasker Mehmed Hüsrev Paşa, ordering the Admiral to award medals to the Tunisian soldiers that were sent to accompany the new recruits in training. Given their exemplary performance, the Porte felt extra recognition was due beyond the standard salary and supplies given, as the Tunisians had set an example for other officers from the provinces.\textsuperscript{594}

The mid-1820s proved to be more complicated for the Tripolitan pasha. By 1825 the pasha was nearly sixty. He found himself confronting growing opposition from a plethora of forces within Tripoli. First, and most dangerous to his continued political rule, was the overzealous aspirations of his youngest son Ali who explicitly

\textsuperscript{591} HAT Dosya No: 870 Gömlek No: 38699.
\textsuperscript{592} C. HR Dosya No: 21 Gömlek No: 1043.
\textsuperscript{593} ibid.
\textsuperscript{594} HAT Dosya No: 298 Gömlek No: 17695.
looked to overthrow him. The behaviors of the rebellious young man were further complicated by the administrative overreach of the equally ambitious British consul, Hanmer Warrington, as well as the growing dissatisfaction of the Tripolitan elite about the ever-increasing influence of western and European residents within the province. The three forces together proved to be an explosive cocktail.

One source of trouble for the pasha was the increasing prominence and influence of Europeans, mostly from Malta, within the province. Over the course of the early 1820s, the growing prominence of Maltese traders began to threaten that of the province’s elite. Historically, Malta and Gozo were the islands most heavily raided by the corsair campaigns, and its captives constituted the greatest percentage of slaves held in the Tripolitan bagnios. Over the first two decades of the century however, the sheer number of Maltese, as well as the growing prominence and wealth of the community, was increasingly felt and resented by the local Tripolitan elite. Local disgruntlement grew after the turn of the century when control over the import of specific foodstuffs and items, such as wine, enabled the Maltese in Tripoli to establish a stronger foothold in the province’s economy. However, a controlled monopoly over key imported goods was not the only reason for the growing resentment of the new Maltese residents, who by the early 1820s counted in the several hundred, in Tripoli.

Rather, it was equal parts the protection accorded to them by the influential British consul, Warrington. After the 1814 Treaty of Paris, the Maltese archipelago became an official colony of the British crown. Officially British colonial subjects,

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595 Folayan, Tripoli during the Reign of Yusuf Pasha Qaramanli, 115-117.
596 ibid. 110-112.
the Maltese of Tripoli were provided with the full protection and support of Warrington and the British consular office.\textsuperscript{598} Local resentment, both in Yusuf’s extended household as well as among the Tripolitan notables was further exasperated by what was seen as Consul Warrington meddling in local affairs. In what Folayan called the British diplomat’s efforts to “promote British influence”\textsuperscript{599} Warrington extended the protection of British consular office even beyond British subjects and colonial subjects. His new protégés came to include Bedouin sheikhs disputing with the vali, rebelling factions from Fezzan such as the Gharian rebels in the late 1820s, as well as the family of the exiled son of the governor, Mohammed whose family had been granted asylum in the British funduk.\textsuperscript{600}

Yusuf grew impatient; it seemed that Warrington’s hubris had finally caught up him with him. The days where the consul was the pasha’s preferred confidant were long over and in fact, by the late 1820s Warrington had fallen out of favor within the Tripolitan palace. Yusuf, frustrated by the wave support that his exiled son Mohammed was receiving as well as the ever-expanding reach of the British official, went so far as to confront Warrington about his infamous nickname. Because of the consul’s influence within the province, Warrington had earned the nickname ‘the Bashaw of Tripoli’\textsuperscript{601} among the various European diplomats of the Mediterranean, and was regularly referred to as such by his colleagues and peers.

The actually pasha however, was not amused. In an audience with Warrington, Yusuf declared, “I am even told by other consuls that you are the Bashaw and not

\textsuperscript{599} ibid. 162.
\textsuperscript{600} Folayan, \textit{Tripoli during the Reign of Yusuf Pasha Qaramanli}, 111-114.
\textsuperscript{601} Bovill, “Colonel Warrington,” 162-163.
me.™602 Taken aback, Warrington denied an intentional overreach, and humbled himself in front of the provincial governor.™603 However, Yusuf was not the only Tripolitan official irritated by the sway of European influence within the province. In fact, the growing power of the British consul had become an explicit threat for the Tripolitan government. In response, Yusuf appointed Hassuna D’Ghies as his new chief and foreign minister. From a notable family, whose economic interests extended throughout Tripolitania and from Timbuktu in the south and to Paris and Marseilles in the north, D’Ghies was frustrated with the political status quo and the languishing power of the province. First, he traveled to London on an official mission in 1821-3, during which D’Ghies attempted to curtail the influence of the British consul, as well as that of his French counterpart, Rousseau, within the province.™604

Yusuf Pasha eventually appointed Hassuna D’Ghies as his Chief and Foreign Minister in the early months of 1826. Throughout his tenure as Chief Minister, from 1826-1829, D’Ghies’ central objective was to extend Yusuf Pasha's political authority within the province. In fact, the minister considered it his responsibility to help lift the Tripoli pasha “from the state of degradation into which his authority and his revenue have fallen.”™605 First on his list was the British Consul Warrington and his French counterpart, Rousseau. By April of 1826, D’Ghies implemented a new set of policies in an effort to curtail the influence of the European diplomats. Most upsetting to Warrington however, was the order he received to stop serving as the official representative of not only Great Britain, but also to Austria, Portugal, Rome, Naples,

™602 FO 76/20 Warrington to Bathurst, 13 July 1826; J. Richardson, Travels in the Great Desert of Sahara, (London 1848) Vol. 1 325-326.
™603 ibid. 110-114.
™604 ibid.
™605 ibid. 110-114.
Tuscany as well as the Kingdom of the Netherlands.\textsuperscript{606} Justifying the measure to Yusuf Pasha through the framework of personal profit, and specifically through the governor’s reduced income in consular presents from the several states that Warrington represented, D’Ghies was successfully able to curtail the power of the diplomat for hire.\textsuperscript{607}

Further undermining the consul’s influence within the province was the minister’s new regulations regarding disputes within the city. Throughout the first half of the decade his influence became increasingly blatant—both in regards to the protection the consular office gave to the growing Maltese community as well as the refuge and protection that was similarly accorded to Tripolitan subjects, and namely the influential opponents of the Bey, which pose the greatest threat to the continued viability of Yusuf’s administration. To further limit the consul’s influence in the city walls of Tripoli, D’Ghies instructed his agents in the government to begin a covert propaganda campaign against the British consul and the British government.\textsuperscript{608} The Tripolitan minister wanted the people of the regency to blame the British government as the source of their own hardship, both socially as well as economically. According to D’Ghies’ orders, both Yusuf’s imposition of tax increases, as well as the resented prominence of the Maltese community were both squarely the fault of the British consul. But the propaganda campaign had an unintended side effect. By the next year, the Maltese of the province as well as the British diplomatic corps, and the consul’s own family became the subjects of routine street harassment, assault and sometimes murder.\textsuperscript{609} Folayan note that within the month of July 1826 alone, Warrington had

\textsuperscript{606} ibid.
\textsuperscript{607} ibid, also see Bovill, “Colonel Warrington.”
\textsuperscript{608} ibid.
\textsuperscript{609} ibid., 114.
chronicled three such attacks within the city of Tripoli itself.\textsuperscript{610}

Despite the ongoing troubles with the province the governor remained committed to provide as much support as possible to both the Porte and to his Egyptian counterpart. It remains unclear as to whether Yusuf Karamanlı believed that these measures would somehow deter the encroachment of both Ottoman as well as Egyptian imperial interests into his province. However, what is clear from Ottoman records is that the province of Tripoli remained extremely engaged in the ongoing efforts in the lead up to Navarino as well as in the Russo-Ottoman war of 1828-1829.

**Building an Egyptian Navy**

From Ottoman and Egyptian sources alike, we can trace the extent of the Egyptian pasha reliance on the fleets and the manpower of the North African provinces during the Morea conflicts. The *vali* had used North African infantrymen before—namely Bedouins from Cyrenaica, irregulars and mercenaries from the broader Maghreb had fought in his campaigns in both the Hijaz and Sudan.\textsuperscript{611} Through his correspondence with his agent in Constantinople, Nacib Efendi, we can see that the Egyptian governor regularly supplemented his ground forces with North African recruits from both Tripoli and Tunis in the years before his maritime involvement in Crete and Morea.\textsuperscript{612} However, it was only after the outbreak of the uprisings in the Morea that the extent of Mehmed Ali’s full involvement in the North African political sphere began to crystalize and take shape.

The involvement materialized in the form of the Egyptian pasha’s direct requests for North African troops and supplies. Mehmed Ali sent letters to the governor

\textsuperscript{610} ibid.
\textsuperscript{611} Fahmy, *Mehmed Ali*, 53.
\textsuperscript{612} Letter from Mehmed Ali to the Katkhoda Negib of the Asitana, 7 Safar 1237 DWQ, Khedival Folios.
of Tripoli, Tunis and Algiers from as early as late June, 1821.\(^\text{613}\) The vali wrote to his North African counterparts asking them to provide him with troops and provisions in his efforts against the rebels. Along with his letters and requests, he included two *fatvas* from the Ottoman Şeyh ül-İslam and the Emirü’l-mû’minîn in support of the request for ships of war to be sent from the three provinces to Alexandria, where they were later to rendezvous with the vessels of the Ottoman imperial fleet.\(^\text{614}\)

The framing of the letter highlighted the North African provinces’ shared Islamic obligation towards the Sultan and the empire, and would effectively foreshadow the upcoming role of Mehmed Ali as the interlocutor between the North African provinces and the Porte.\(^\text{615}\) This critical shift was extremely noteworthy, as until the 1820s, it was Algiers rather than Egypt that had overwhelmingly dictated the broader imperial maritime policies of the region. A paradigm shift was taking place - rather than contact the *dey* of Algiers primarily, and by extension the governors of Tripoli and Tunis, the Ottoman Porte reached out to Mehmed Ali and an effort to secure ships and mariners from the North African provinces.

Returning to Istanbul and the Porte’s records, we learn the fate of these requests as well as of an active intervention of Mehmed Ali before his men landed in Crete. In the Prime Ministerial Archives, we find a memorandum sent to Sultan Mahmud II from December 1821, which indicates that Tunis, Tripoli and Algiers had in fact sent the ships for Mehmed Ali’s efforts and in response to Mehmed Ali’s previous request. The Maghrebi vessels had already arrived in Alexandria, and were then reinforced on the orders of Mehmed Ali Pasha. After sailing from Egypt alongside the vessels of the

\[^{613}\text{Mehmed Ali to the Dey of Algiers 22 Ramadan 1236, DWQ, Khedival Folios.}\]
\[^{614}\text{ibid.}\]
\[^{615}\text{ibid.}\]
Ottoman merchant navy, they dropped anchor in Rhodes for the winter and were to be sent in various directions. The Tripolitan navy was rearmed and sent to the shores of Cyprus. There, the authorities commissioned it help suppress rebel-led piracy and the maritime insurrection that had broken out on the island. Meanwhile, the navies of Tunis and Egypt would be sent with the merchant fleet, after weather allowed, to Dersaadet in Istanbul. These engagements, both with the North African fleets as well as with the Ottoman Porte had taken place before the Egyptian governor was offered the paşalık of Crete and well before his son Ibrahim’s involvement in Morea.616

Despite the overwhelming body of historical evidence that indicates a proactive response on the part of each of the North African provinces in the early years of the revolt, one must maintain an accurate perspective of the Egyptian vali’s early interest in the uprising. This is to say that if the Egyptian governor was driven mostly by his own imperial ambitions—as has been argued in the literature—then it is clear that these interests were not limited to either the eastern Mediterranean or Syria and Anatolia. Rather, we see a demonstrable effort by the Egyptian governor to pull western neighbors, and their resources, into his broader sphere of influence. Citing Douin, Fahmy underscored the importance of territorial expansion in the strategies of Egyptian vali during the lead up to the Morea campaign. As a French military adviser recorded, the vali, in a moment of candor during their conversation in 1825, said:

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\begin{align*}
\text{I am now the most important man [}\text{I'homme du jour}\text{] in the entire Ottoman Empire. I have returned the Holy Cities [of Mecca and Medina] to the true believers; I have carried my victorious armies to places where the power of the Grand Signor [i.e. the Ottoman Sultan] was not known, and to places whose people had still not heard of gunpowder. My right arm, my son Ibrahim, will conquer Morea and the moment his mission is crowned with success, I shall call him back and return these lands to their legitimate master. I will call back my forces, raise [new] conscripts, complete my regiments and then grab the paşalıks of Damascus and Acre ... I will organize une grande armée and I}
\end{align*}
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616 ibid.
shall not stop except at the Tigris and Euphrates. 617

Fahmy mostly used the record of this conversation as the foreshadowing of the vali’s eventual expansion into Syria and Anatolia, two expansions that took place over the course of the next decade. While he was correct to argue that the governor’s desire to carve out his own empire was a salient— if not the most salient- factor in the governor’s decision making, I argue that it is also important to look at this quote in regards to the events of the mid-1820s.

Tactically speaking, if a provincial governor such as Mehmed Ali wanted to control the swath of territory from the Aegean islands south to the Greater Syria coastline and beyond, then he would need maritime expertise of the Maghrebis to secure the commercial and naval routes of the eastern Mediterranean Sea—a stretch of water that constituted some of the most important trade routes for the Ottoman Empire. In order to do so, said governor would need quick and ready access to commercial and naval vessels, as well as to men who could operate the vessels and were familiar with the trade routes and ports. Therefore, if we are to take the above quote at face value and believe the vali when he spoke of his great Syrian ambitions, then we cannot limit our attentions to the territories east of Alexandria in the framework of the governor’s strategies for administering his potentially massive Syrian empire. After all, the Porte had already begun to see the vali as an interlocutor in their dealings with his western neighbors, while the provinces themselves began to fall under the Egyptian Pasha’s influence and engage his requests for assistance. Besides, it would have been out of character for an ambitious governor like Mehmed Ali to not want to make full use of the recently under-employed corsairs of the North African coast, particularly when he

617 Fahmy, All the Pasha’s Men, 38.
was after so much coastline for his empire.

From the Ottoman sources, we see that Mehmed Ali was beginning to shape himself into a new powerbroker in the Maghreb. From 1822, there was a significant increase in Egypt’s maritime interest—both in regards to the expansion of the small preexisting Egyptian fleet as well as to the construction and purchasing of new vessels. At the same time, from Egyptian sources we also see a significant increase in the attention that was paid to the Cypriot coastlines. As Mehmed Ali’s interest in the maritime world of the Mediterranean became increasingly obvious, so too did the records of his correspondence with North African governors about their fleets and mariners. The more Mehmed Ali focused on the sea, the more his attentions turned westward, and in turn, manifested into requests for support from the governors of Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli.

By the following winter, Egyptian governor’s growing involvement in the Maghrebi and the Mediterranean worlds had grown in complexity. In two separate letters, the vali reached out to Algiers and to Tripoli. On February 27, 1823, Mehmed Ali wrote to the dey of Algiers expressing his gratitude for the dey’s support and for generously providing the governor of Egypt with a laundry list of previously requested supplies. The Egyptian governor wrote that the Porte’s best interests could only be served if the two men continued to work together and that they had common goals and desires for the broader region.

Similarly, in a letter written to Yusuf Karamanlı of Tripoli, Mehmed Ali wrote that he was equally appreciative of the positive exchanges and the ‘sense of trust and

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618 Letter from Mehmed Ali to Grand Vizier 10 Shawwal 1236 DWQ, Khedival Folios.
619 Letter from Mehmed Ali to Kapkhoda Nagib of the Asitana. 7 Safar 1237 DWQ, Khedival Folios.
620 Mehmed Ali to Amr the Jizair el Garb Algiers 15 Jamad Akhar 1238 DWQ, Khedival Folios.
loyalty between the two parties’. In acknowledgment to the Tripolitan governor’s graciousness, Mehmed Ali sent a gift of ten horses with saddles, ten swords of gold, 250 kilos of sugar, 250 kilos of coffee, 800 kilos of gunpowder, 200 ardeb measures of rice, and ten shilen length of cashmere to demonstrate Egypt’s continued goodwill and friendship towards its Tripolitan neighbor.\footnote{Mehmed Ali to the Governor of Tripoli 15 Jamad Akhar 1238 DWQ, Khedival Folios.} Over the course of the next year, the Egyptian governor’s maritime expansion became increasingly successful and his forces effectively put down the last of the Cretan rebels, clearing Sfakia in 1824.

However, the Peloponnesian expansion was not enough to abate the territorial avarice of the Egyptian vali. Fahmy was correct to argue that Mehmed Ali had more ambitious plans for the region of the eastern Mediterranean, namely on the four paşalıks of Syria. By the mid-1820s however, Mehmed Ali was nevertheless ready to assist the Porte in its efforts in the Aegean Sea. Entrusting his son Ibrahim with the task of subduing Morea, the vali soon began preparing an army of his new Egyptian conscripts to sail from the shores of Alexandria. Ibrahim Pasha was placed in command of the forces and named the vali of Morea. However, his appointment as the governor of the region did little to secure Ibrahim’s direct command over his forces and his fleet.

Perhaps the most troublesome point of contention between Mehmed Ali and the Porte was the assignment of Hüsrev Pasha to the post of the Kapudan Pasha of the fleet. Despite his humbling failures as the deposed vali of Egypt, Hüsrev’s bureaucratic career had advanced within the sultan’s domains. By the time of his appointment as Grand Admiral in 1822, Hüsrev had served as the governor of several provinces including Salonica, Bosnia, Silistre, a brief stint in Tunis as the military commander under Hammuda Pasha, as well as the Admiral of the Black Sea fleet.\footnote{Philliou, Biography of an Empire, 98.} In the years
following his Alexandrine departure, Hüsrev had grown increasingly influential at the Porte, and in doing so he became indispensable to Mahmud II’s reform attempts. Both Philliou and Aksan note that the admiral was a lifelong supporter of the traditional patronage systems within the Ottoman bureaucratic structures; “the hallmark of Hüsrev’s long career was his adherence to the system of slavery and patronage in which he had been brought up.”

Walsh, an Irish physician and the clergyman to the British embassy in Constantinople in the early nineteenth century wrote of Hüsrev’s practices:

Hussereff Mehmed Pasha who for thirty years was constantly engaged in buying up children in Georgia and Circassia, to educate them for different offices of the Turkish empire...The Greek insurrection had now commenced...The efficacy of European discipline had at this time just begun to conquer the prejudices of the Turks, and Hussereff also endeavored to introduce it into his fleet, particularly among the marines.

From this quote, we can glean two important observations about the new admiral of the fleet. First, throughout his successful career as an Ottoman bureaucrat, Hüsrev remained explicitly committed to the devşirme practice of collecting young, Christian male slaves funneled young men from the Caucasus into the heart of the Ottoman Empire and from there, enabling the rise of a select few to some of the highest offices within the empire—through the very same patronage networks that Gazi Hasan Pasha, Küçuk Hussien Pasha, and Hüsrev had used, and the same that Mehmed Ali had so brazenly circumvented in his rise to power in Egypt. Secondly, we learn that Hüsrev was keenly interested in implementing a new set of naval reforms. Much like Gazi Hasan before him, Hüsrev believed a new navy, based largely on western European models, would enable the Ottoman flotilla to overcome the challenges that it faced in

623 Ibid.
624 Robert Walsh, *A Residence at Constantinople During a Period Including the Commencement, Progress and Termination of the Greek and Turkish Revolutions* (London: Westley & Davis, 1836), 523.
regards to the growing presence of Russian commerce in the Black Sea as well as with the maritime excursions of the rebels off the shores of Morea. It is in these two points that we find the foreshadowing for the admiral’s troubles with Ibrahim Pasha, their constant conflicts, and tactical head-butting in Navarino and beyond, their incessant quarreling over naval formations off the coast of Morea, as well as the lingering resentment that Hüsrev Pasha towards the vali of Egypt, Mehmed Ali.

After all, Hüsrev Pasha was not originally granted the paşalık of either Salonica, Bosnia or Silistre, but rather of Egypt. As the governor of one of the empire’s wealthiest and most important provinces, the position of Misir valisi carried with it a great deal of prestige and wealth, both of which Hüsrev was denied after his embarrassing capture during the ‘Fiasco of the Donkeys.’ It was not surprising, therefore, that Hüsrev maintained a longstanding resentment towards the Egyptian governor. This antipathy would soon be projected on to the admiral’s ceaseless quarrels with none other than Ibrahim Pasha during their efforts in the Morea campaign.

North Africans in the Eastern Mediterranean

The question remains, what was the specific role of the North African fleets in Mehmed Ali’s efforts against the rebels? Ottoman sources provide particularly useful insights into the issue. From the Porte’s records, we can see that by November of 1823, while Hussein Bey was fighting the insurrection in Crete, he received news from Tunis that some Greek Orthodox rebels fell into captivity during a battle with Tunisian ocaks. They commandeered an English ship, and took the rebels to Malta to be interrogated. Similarly, in a report to the sultan from the spring of 1824, we learn that

625 See Chapter 3 of this dissertation.
626 For additional information see Fahmy, Mehmed Ali, and Fahmy, All the Pasha’s Men.
627 HAT Dosya No: 856 Gömlek No: 38241
eight Tripolitan ships were equipped and attached to the sultan’s fleet, and that the Tripolitan governor had promised the addition of more ships to be expected as soon as they were completed the following months. While the North African fleets were actively involved in the ongoing troubles, the Alexandrine shipyards were brimming with activity.

By that summer, in July 1824, Ibrahim Pasha’s campaign in the Morea was underway. The vali’s eldest son departed from Alexandria with an extensive force. The commander was accompanied by 17,000 infantrymen, four artillery battalions and 700 cavalrymen. However, the rebels enjoyed the strategic advantage of a rugged coastline and a familiarity with the local coastline and waterways; Ibrahim and his forces were therefore unable to dock safely until February of 1825. The pasha’s slow start was quickly offset by a rapid succession of victories in the field during the summer of 1825. By early autumn of that year, news reached Mehmed Ali in Cairo, by way of a letter from Ibrahim in Morea, that his men were regularly stopping shipments of British aid intended for the Greek rebels. However, this early support from European allies did little to shift the tide towards the rebel’s favor. By April of the following year, the military reforms of the Egyptian vali’s new army were proving to be largely successful. Having put down the insurrections within the Morean peninsula, Ibrahim Pasha united with Reşid Mehmed Pasha, the Rumeli Governor and Serasker of the Ottoman army in northern Greece in Third Siege of Missolonghi and Ottoman forces captured the mainland city.

As the combined Ottoman-Egyptian forces were focusing their efforts on

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628 HAT Dosya No: 920 Gömlek No: 40001
629 Fahmy, All the Pasha’s Men, 55.
630 Fahmy, Mehmed Ali, 70.
631 Aksan, Ottoman Wars, 1700-1870, 294.
capturing Missolonghi that we start to see the vali’s most ardent attacks on the Ottoman
Grand Admiral, Hüsrev Pasha in the Egyptian records. In his letter sent to the Porte on
April 13, 1826—three short days after the city had fallen—the Egyptian governor
wrote to the Grand Vizier complaining about Hüsrev Pasha’s tactical incompetence.
According to him, the latter lacked experience in both naval and ground formations and
even the official’s mandubs [deputies] were unable to mediate between the admiral and
the Egyptian vali or his son. Nevertheless, the ongoing struggle for power between the
two was just beginning to unfold.632

Tensions worsened—by winter of the following year, the Egyptian governor
forced the hand of the sultan. In February 1827, Hüsrev Pasha was removed from the
command of the admiralty and the Ottoman fleet was put under the de facto control of
Ibrahim Pasha. However, the Ottoman conquest of Missolonghi had consequences that
went far beyond the personal career prospects of Hüsrev Pasha. The Ottoman conquest
of the mainland city attracted a great deal of European attention and sympathy for the
rebels’ cause. Paintings by the French romantic artist Eugène Delacroix and operas
composed by Gioachino Rossini helped to solidify both popular opinion and official
European supports for the Greek Orthodox insurgency. Philhellenism was à la mode.633

As the combined Ottoman-Egyptian efforts were making headway against the
Greek revolts, the engagement of North African ships with both the official Ottoman
fleet as well as Mehmed Ali’s forces, both of which were being equipped in the
Alexandrian shipyards, became increasingly prevalent during 1824 and into 1825. The
vali, had done everything in his power throughout the early 1820s to develop the

632 Mehmed Ali to the Grand Vizier 5 Ramadan 1241 DWQ, Khedival Folios.
633 For more information see: Nina M. Athanassoglou-Kallmyer, French Images from the Greek War
of Independence (1821-1830): Art and Politics Under the Restoration (New Haven: Yale University
Alexandrine shipyards, and had commissioned North African, as well as French sailors and engineers into the construction of his new fleet. In a particularly vivid report sent to Mehmed II on August 14, 1825, we learn that the Kaptan-ı Derya Hüsrev Pasha had sent a report to Dersaadet recommending a Tripolitan corsair, the Kaptan Küçük Mehmed for an award of bravery.\(^{634}\) Using his own brig, the Tripolitan ocaķ organized an attack on Greek rebels in the strait off the island of Sisam [Samos]. After heavy fighting, the Greek fire ship, the Kontra Mizata, lit fire to his mast, leaving only 13 of the 105-man crew alive. Subsequently, Küçük Mehmed Kaptan left a trail of gunpowder from the head of the ship to the ammunition depot and then lit it. He and his remaining crew members jumped in the water as the ship exploded, destroying several enemy ships in the vicinity.\(^{635}\)

From Ottoman and Egyptian sources alike, we further learn of the involvement and requisitioning of North African vessels by Mehmed Ali for the Morea. An October 17, 1825 notice informed Mahmud II that the ships in the imperial fleet, as well as vessels from Tunis, Tripoli and Egypt were repaired, equipped, and sailing for Missolonghi to support Ottoman efforts after the capture the mainland city.\(^{636}\) From Egyptian records we find corresponding reports of these maritime preparations. In a letter to the Grand Vizier, Mehmed Ali outlined his response the sultanic edict he received and informed the Vizier that he had readied a supporting fleeting to provide reinforcement for Ibrahim Pasha. The vali equipped a significant flotilla comprising of thirty-one ships belonging to the sultan’s imperial fleet, four ships that had been sent to him by the dey of Algiers, twenty-three other ships of war that were purchased

\(^{634}\) HAT Dosya No :661 Gömlek No :32256.  
\(^{635}\) ibid.  
on the vali’s order, another two ships specifically kitted for the Emirü’l-mü’mînîn, along with ten other bukhairas, and an additional twelve corsair ships which the letter identified as Egyptian, but which were most likely were either manned and operated or purchased from the corso provinces. Further adding to the already substantial force, Mehmed Ali rented the vessels of thirteen Egyptian traders as well as those of twenty-three foreign traders in Alexandria. In sum, the total number of vessels that were to leave Alexandria’s harbor was one hundred and eighteen.

This was a massive fleet. The vali had effectively transformed the maritime status of Egypt. By recruiting most of North African sailors that had effectively been unemployed in the post-corso years of the 1820s, as well as the same French and Maltese firms that previously had contracts with the ports of Benghazi and Tripoli, the governor of Egypt had successfully channeled the market for maritime labor from the regencies to Egypt. From the governor’s records, we learn that Mehmed Ali was looking to build his fleet along European lines and used several smaller corvettes to match the sailing schooners used by the rebels.637 This compelling fact, not only underscores Egypt’s broader ties to both the Ottoman Maghreb but also to the world of the Mediterranean. Not only was governor looking to make the most of his naval ambitions, the languishing dockyard labor of his western neighbors, as well as the growing attention of the Porte on the behaviors of his Greek Orthodox adversaries.

Mehmed Ali informed the Grand Vizier that to amass this significant force he had spent 1,336,000 and had provided the sum of 705,000 monies to be given to Hüşrev, the Kapudan Pasha.638 The following day, the governor wrote a similar letter to the sultan in Constantinople. From it we learn that in addition to the significant

637 ibid.
638 MA to the Grand Vizier 3 Rabia Evval 1241 DWQ, Khedival Folios.
flotilla waiting in the docks of Alexandria, Mehmed Ali had also readied ground troop reinforcements, whose mission was to first dock in Crete, deliver supplies to Egyptian forces on island then continue north to meet Ibrahim Pasha in Morea. North African vessels continued to aid the Ottoman war efforts throughout the length of the campaign in Morea.\(^639\) In the autumn of 1826, Tripolitan vessels under the charge of Tayyer Bey set sail to provide maritime and ground reinforcement directly to Hüsrev Pasha. In fact, the only lull in North African vessels participation corresponded with the October 20, 1827 destruction of the Ottoman fleet in the Battle of Navarino.

**Tripoli Undone, Tunis Redone**

Yusuf’s problems extended beyond the realm of growing European influence. As the provincial economy gradually declined post-1818, the Tripolitan governor found himself facing a resurgence of the internal threats that had threatened his hold on power a few years back. While the sociopolitical conditions within the province continued to deteriorate, support for Mohammed, the governor’s exiled son in Egypt, continued to grow among the Tripolitan people and the Bedouin clans to the east.\(^640\) However, his eldest son was not the only threat that the Pasha faced from within his immediate family.

The Pasha’s youngest, and most ambitious son, Ali Bey was also proving to be an increasingly viable danger. Tensions escalated further when Mehmed Ali of Egypt had tried to mediate between the estranged Mohammed and the Tripolitan governor. Because of the Egyptian *vali’s* influence, Mohammed was eventually able to return to the province as the *bey* of Derna for a short time. However, this was by no means the end of the conflict between the father and son. During a subsequent outbreak of

\(^{639}\) HAT Dosya No: 281 Gömlek No: 16683.

plague in the city of Derna, the Tripolitan governor explicitly forbade his son, or his family, from entering the city of Tripoli. Their relations soon deteriorated and Mohamed soon found himself exiled in Egypt once again, while Ali Bey took his family hostage, locking them in the Tripolitan castle. With little choice, Mohammed once again took flight to Egypt where he eventually died in 1828. The records of the Egyptian National Archives do not hold documents specifically relating to the Egyptian governor’s mediation between the two Tripolitan officials. What we find instead is a very curiously worded letter sent from Tripoli to Cairo right before the death of Mohammed in Egypt.

The circumstances surrounding the death of the Tripolitan governor’s son remain unclear. However, in the months before his death Mehmed Ali received a letter from the British Consul to Tripoli, Warrington. In his letter, the British official informed the pasha that he would be traveling to Egypt on unofficial business and requested that he have an audience with the vali and be accorded the proper permissions for his travels. What was particularly striking about this seemingly innocuous letter was that foreign officials and diplomats typically received the according letters of introduction and permissions from the Foreign Office in London or from the respective governor that their consulate served in, not the one of the territory they look to visit. It remains unknown whether the Tripolitan governor, or his youngest son, Ali, were in anyway involved in the death of the exiled bey apparent. Speculation aside, what we do know was that six months later the eldest of the three brothers, Mohammed was found dead. Tensions between the two surviving sons of Yusuf Pasha, Ahmed and Ali came to a head, to the point where Warrington

641 ibid.
642 Request to Mehmed Ali 7 Rabia Akher 1243 DWQ, Khedival Folios
expressed his concern about the outbreak of war between the brothers upon Yusuf Pasha’s death. In a grim twist of fate, Warrington reported that while still a young boy Ali had apparently expressed his desire to do as Yusuf had done before him: eliminate both his older brothers and his aging father, and assume the governorship of Tripolitania for himself. The pasha confided in Consul Warrington of his dismay with the infighting between his two surviving heirs. Nevertheless, Yusuf attempted to remove himself directly from the quarrel. The infighting between the two surviving brothers foreshadowed the dynastic rivalry in Tripoli a decade later, the same one that eventually brought down the House of Karamanlı and reintroduced direct Ottoman administration of the province.

Political one-upmanship was by no means limited to the direct line of Karamanlı men. In the late 1820s, we learn of the final act between the Pasha and his former chief of the Marine, Murad Ra’is, the Scottish renegade born Peter Lysle. Murad, who was also Yusuf’s son-in-law, had fallen out with the Tripolitan governor. With little choice but to seek haven first in the British consulate and then arrange his escape to Egypt, it seemed that the aging governor was eliminating all viable opposition to his rule. Despite eliminating Murad however, the feud between Ahmed and his younger brother Ali raged on, and would eventually cost Yusuf the paşalık in 1832.

From British diplomatic records we see that in the mid-to-late 1820s, the governor of Tripoli had introduced a “new mode of drilling” among his men his

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644 ibid. 110-115.
645 ibid.
646 ibid.
647 ibid.
648 ibid. 107
men that was very much along the same lines as the military reforms of Mehmed Ali in Egypt. In fact, in what the French Consul of Tripoli explicitly referred to as Yusuf’s ‘nizam djedide,’ the similarities between the Egyptian governor’s new military organizations and the overhaul introduced in Tripoli were explicit. Folayan argued that European consuls saw the actions of the Tripolitan pasha as conducted “probably in imitation of Muhammed Ali of Egypt.” Moreover, European consular records indicating a connection between the military reforms of Egypt and Tripoli suggested that the military administration systems of the North African provinces were far more interwoven than previously imagined.

From British records we are able to glean further insights into the efforts of the Tripolitan pasha and his military reforms of the age. Yusuf had reached out, through the French consul, to recruit French assistance in the training of his new officers. While his attempt was ultimately unsuccessful, we are able to contextualize it in the Pasha’s efforts at reforms, which simultaneously included the regular purchase of British made firearms and ammunition through the British firm of H. Fatham, which were coordinated through the offices of the British Consul to Tripoli, Warrington.

The outbreak of the Morean revolt led Tripoli, much like Tunis and Egypt, to revive its maritime forces. Immediately after the Congress of Vienna, The Tripolitan governor had all but abandoned his pre-existing naval fleet, to the point where the governor was officially rebuked for the insignificant size of his fleets buy an official Ottoman convoy from Constantinople in 1823. Over the next year however,

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649 ibid.
650 ibid. 107-108.
651 ibid.
652 ibid.
653 ibid. 108.
Tripolitan maritime capacity was about to grow, exponentially. From 1823-4, Yusuf Karamanli began reinforcing his navy and the fortifications of the city. He refortified the city walls and increased its munitions to 170 guns. Much like his neighbor to the east, Yusuf shifted his attentions to the ship builders of Malta to reinforce his fleet. Specifically, the Tripolitan governor turned to the firms of Hunter and Ross in Malta, which alongside the vessels that Giuseppe Muscat, produced for the naval fleet in Benghazi under contract.654

These commissions, which mirrored the contracts the Mehmed Ali had with the French engineer, M. de Cerisy, significantly increased the size of the Tripolitan fleet in record time. By 1828, the Tripolitan navy had twenty-eight vessels, and was regularly engaging in the ongoing efforts against the Greek rebellion.655

These findings are also consistent with the records of the Porte. In the summer of 1825, Tripolitan vessels became increasingly active in the Ottoman efforts for Morea. In July of that year, the tersane-i amire [imperial arsenal] contacted the three corso provinces requesting that each territory provide oarsmen for the naval engagements off Morea.656 Tayyar Bey was appointed commander of the Tripolitan faction and worked with Hüsrev and Ibrahim Pasha in coordinating the tactical preparation of the North African seamen.657 This pattern continued before and after the Battle of Navarino.

It was only after the extensive losses off Navarino Bay, which decimated the fleets of all the North African provinces, as well as those of the Sultan, that the Tripolitan governor diverged from his Egyptian counterpart in the Porte’s efforts

654 ibid.
655 ibid. for more information on M. de Cerisy, see Fahmy, All the Pasha’s Men, 61 citation 103.
656 HAT Dosya No: 889 Gömlek No: 39280.
657 HAT Dosya No: 281 Gömlek No: 16683.
against Russia. In that, while Mehmed Ali refused to support further the Sublime Porte in the war of 1828, Yusuf Karamanlı outfitted and sent five ships to meet with sultan’s imperial fleet in April of 1829. Moreover, by July of that year, the Tripolitan shipyard had prepared additional vessels, manned by corsairs, to offer further logistical support in the war effort.

**In Tunis**

As Tripoli was facing an era of mounting internal pressures, the situation within Tunis was brought a renewed period of relative stabilization under the new administration of Hussein Bey and his government. However, there was no denying that the troubles of the previous decade, combined with the end of the *corso*, had hindered the Tunisian economy. In the 1820s, the Tunisian currency underwent devaluation and the growing competition from European merchants had taken its toll. Nevertheless, despite mounting socio-economic pressure, the new pasha was eager to demonstrate his continued alliance and fealty to the Porte.

From Ottoman records we can trace that the coronation of Hussein corresponded with a rapid expansion of the Tunisian naval fleet. The governor provided regular reports and updates to the Ottoman center about the activities of new Tunisian ships or additional mariners in their effort against the Greek Orthodox rebels. And, as in the case of Tripoli, Tunisian support for the Porte’s efforts in Morea continued after the losses at Navarino, and the subsequent outbreak of war with Russia in 1828.

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658 Fahmy, *All the Pasha’s Men*, 54.
659 HAT Dosya No: 1069 Gömlek No: 43759
660 HAT Dosya No: 573 Gömlek No: 28116
Interestingly, the expenses for these maritime improvements, which were extensive in their own right, were far costlier for the financially insolvent Tripoli and Tunis. Both Tripoli and Tunis’s pashas poured massive amounts of their already limited reserves into expensive maritime expansions. Surviving North African and Ottoman sources do not point to the logic behind the governors’ strategy in their unwavering support for the Porte at a time of financial instability. We are left to wonder if Hussein Bey and Yusuf Karamanlı believed that by supporting the Porte and Egypt in the Morean efforts they would be able to secure their respective hold on power, or if they believed that somehow, their participation against their European powers that had effectively cut off their corso revenues a few years before would eventually allow them to resume the practice. Records only indicate the consequences and sadly not the causes of the policy.

Regardless, it was clear that both governors were eager to pour massive amounts of money into the expansion of their fleets and, by extension, the naval capacities of both the Egyptian governor and the Ottoman sultan. This, naturally, had massive consequences on the economic health of the provinces. We know from Tunisian sources that by 1829, Hussein Bey had accrued a deficit surmounting two million piasters and that the province was experiencing a devastating drought.\textsuperscript{662}

Ottoman sources also provide rich insights into the tumultuous political relationship between Tunis and Algiers in the late 1820s. While Hussein Bey was eager to cooperate with Mahmud II, he was far more reticent to offer any support to Algiers in its ongoing crisis with the French. In fact, after his extensive naval losses in the Battle of Navarino, Hussein Bey reportedly have said that he would not offer

\textsuperscript{662} Abadi, \textit{Tunisia Since the Arab Conquest}, 277.
support or assistance to his western neighbors even if Mahmud II were to order him with a “hundred firmans”\textsuperscript{663} to do that. Rather the Tunisian government sent the congratulatory delegation to the French Marshal de Bournmont upon his conquest of Algiers.\textsuperscript{664}

**The Warning Signs**

Reading Egyptian sources we learn that the Battle of Navarino was not an unexpected event. Ibrahim’s assessment of British interests in Morea and the detailed correspondence he maintained with his father throughout the campaign point to the growing concern about European involvement and their role in the Morea. In what Fahmy referred to as the Morean “last straw,”\textsuperscript{665} the growing frustration between the Porte and Cairo is increasing present in the text. Ibrahim informed the vali of the growing European support that the rebels were accruing in Morea. In turn, the vali notified the Ottoman Porte about the grave need of the Porte to open negotiations with the insurgents. However, the Porte did not act.

In a wonderful letter from Mehmed Ali to Nacib Effendi, his agent in Constantinople, the Egyptian vali wrote heavy-heartedly of his failure to convince the Porte of an impending disaster and his inability to confront European forces head on. He wrote:

Regarding the present situation there are two issues worth thinking of. The first is that the moves of the Europeans are merely a bluff; the second is that the fleets will, in fact, try to intercept our navies. If they are only bluffing then this is exactly what we want…If, therefore, the Europeans are not bluffing…then we have to realize that we cannot stand up against them, and the only possible outcome [if we do so] will be sinking the entire fleet and causing the death of up to 30 or 40 thousand men…Then it will be said that Mehmed Ali Pasha was the cause of this disaster and my name will always be stained with such a disgrace…Taking the responsibility of wasting thirty or

\textsuperscript{663} Abadi, *Tunisia Since the Arab Conquest*, 272.
\textsuperscript{664} ibid.
\textsuperscript{665} Fahmy, *All the Pasha’s Men*, 55.
forty thousand lives is no easy task. I have, therefore, stopped sending letters to my son encouraging him to fight on…Unfortunately, my dear friend, although we are men of war (ehlli harbdan), yet we are still in [the rudimentary level] of that art[.] Whereas the Europeans are way ahead of us and have put their theories (about war) into practice…(Contemplating all of this) one thinks of accepting the lesser of two evils, namely, the principle of independence (for the Greeks) and (conducting it through) Austrian mediation. This will mean unfortunately that… all the effort and money that I have put into this affair will have been wasted together with my soldiers and officers…Here I am at a loss: shall I be grieved at the calamity of the Sublime State (devlet-i aliyye) or at my lost effort? I am, therefore, most sorrowful and anguished.  

Growing European support for the rebels took a toll on the pasha; the events of the autumn further justified the pasha’s sense of dread. On 20 October, 1827 both the Ottoman and the Egyptian fleet were destroyed within the span of an afternoon. The collective efforts that Mehmed Ali, and the North African provinces had allocated to fighting on behalf of the sultan, had gone to waste. Mehmed Ali was furious. And he knew where to assign blame. Fahmy succinctly wrote, “[Mehmed Ali] was convinced that this heavy loss was not caused by any oversight on his part, nor was it the result of any negligence by his son, Ibrahim. Rather, he was adamant that the disaster at Navarino was a direct result of the Porte’s intransigence and, specifically, of Hürev’s incompetent interference – an opinion shared by many in the Ottoman capital.”

Fahmy was right—Ibrahim Pasha was likely a more skilled military commander than the recently retired Grand Admiral of the Ottoman fleet. But there is also a significant distinction in the nature of sources available.

While the Egyptian National Archives contain the intimate as well as official exchanges between Ibrahim Pasha and his father in Cairo and the letters between the vali and his representatives across the empire, the records available from of the

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666 Ibid. 59.
667 Fahmy, Mehmed Ali, 74.
Ottoman Porte lack the corresponding subjectivity. Sultan Mahmud II and Hüsev’s private mulling about the secret ambitions of the Egyptian governor and his son were simply not preserved within the official paperwork of the Ottoman Empire or the reports about the military campaigns in the Morea.

Source imbalance aside, the losses of Navarino were disastrous for both the vali of Egypt and for the Porte. Ottoman mismanagement of the day-to-day administration of the battalions and supplies had, much like the Egyptian governor predicted, led to the loss over 40,000 of the pasha’s troops.668 The ones that did survive were now facing a new set of challenges. Ibrahim’s four-month grain supply stored off the bay of Navarino was set on fire. His collective forces had less than a thirty day supply of rations remaining and little likelihood of replenishing their provisions and supplies, as European ships had quickly prevented the vali’s supply from reaching the ports.669

The Dust Settles After Navarino

From Egyptian and British records alike, we know that Ibrahim Pasha’s return to Alexandria on October 14, 1828, seven days shy of the one-year anniversary of the destruction of the sultan and his father’s treasured fleet off the Bay of Navarino.670 It is from the extensive correspondence that Ibrahim had with his father, as well as the exchanges that the governor had with Constantinople that we learn of the extreme difficulties Egyptian forces based in the peninsula as well as the continued activity of Tunisian and Tripolitan mariners against the rebels.

Fahmy made clear that Mehmed Ali foresaw and warned the Porte about the

668 Mehmed Ali to Nagib Effendi 13 Rabia Akhar, 1243. DWQ, Khedival Folios.
669 ibid.
670 Mehmed Ali to Katkhoda of Egypt 4 Rabia Akhar 1244. DWQ, Khedival Folios.
dangers of directly confronting European powers. However, after the disastrous losses of Navarino, the historian wrote, “Mehmed Ali refused to listen to these stubborn and unrealistic demands of the Porte [for Ibrahim Pasha to continue on in Morea] and proceeded to sign a treaty with the European powers guaranteeing the safety of his son's withdrawal from the Greek mainland.” What Fahmy did not discuss however, was that Ibrahim Pasha evacuation from Morea did not take place for another full year after the defeat of Navarino. It is only in the context of that year and the extreme hardship faced by both his son and his troops that we can fully understand Mehmed Ali’s later confrontation with the Porte in Syria. Moreover, it is from the records of that year that we can examine the extent to which the Egyptian vali’s and his North African counterparts remained committed to their efforts in the Morea even after the losses of Navarino.

This leads to the question of why Fahmy, who so carefully analyzed and narrated the details of the Morea expedition up until the naval losses, would entirely omit the narrative of last year of the campaign—which arguably included some of the more dramatic correspondence between Ibrahim Pasha and his father. Returning to Fahmy’s source, Rene Cattauí’s Le Regne de Mohamed Aly d'apres les archives russes en Egypte did not further elucidate the historical silence, as the source that Fahmy cited was a letter dated from the following summer: on 11 August 1828. Further examination of this historiographical discrepancy leads to an interesting, and similarly mistaken finding within a published primary sources from the time.

In the British Annual Register of 1828, published in London for Baldwin and

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671 Fahmy, All the Pasha’s Men, 60.
672 Fahmy cited the Conclusion of negotiations between the Pasha and Edward Codrington, from 11 August, 1828 sec.: Le Regne de Mohamed Aly d'apres les archives russes en Egypte, edited by Rene Cattauí (Cairo: Royal Egyptian Geographical Society, 1931), vol. 1, 284.
Cradock by C. and J. Rivington in 1829, we can uncover more context for the historiographical question mark regarding this last year of Egyptian presence in Morea. Within the *Register*, the events of Ibrahim Pasha’s time on the peninsula as well as his evacuation under the auspices of his father’s accord with Admiral Codrington were described as follows:

Ibrahim found himself condemned to inactivity, and condemned moreover to starvation if he remained in the Morea. The exhausted country itself could not supply his army; the sultan, combating for existence in the north, had no aid to spare for his friends in the south; and all communication with Egypt was prevented by the presence of the allied fleets... His scruples regarding the honesty of giving up his post without the authority of the [G]rand [S]ignor were overcome by the authority of his father, the Pacha of Egypt, with whom [A]dmiral Codrington arranged the evacuation of the Morea dated the 6th of August, 1827…

It is correct that the treaty between Mehmed Ali Pasha and Admiral Codrington was signed on a 6th of August. However, it was signed on the 6th of August the following year, in 1828 rather than 1827 as described above. Simply put, it would have been unnecessary for the governor of Egypt to have signed any treaty with a British admiral in the summer of 1827. Ibrahim was still relishing in the recent victory of at Missolonghi and philhellenism had just begun to gain popular support in Europe. The Treaty of London which secured the support and assistance of the Greek rebels by Britain, France and Russia was not signed and ratified until July 1827 and the naval catastrophe that Mehmed Ali so dreaded in the Battle of Navarino would not take place until that autumn, in October 20th, 1827. It is likely that this typographical error on the part of the Baldwin and Cradock is what has led to some of the historiographical confusion. Reading the chronology as presented in 1829 provides the reader with a sense of the relatively immediate evacuation of Egyptian forces after

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the Battle of Navarino. Adding to the confusion still was that the dates of the naval battle were not explicitly mentioned in the description within the *Annual Register*.

Rather, it is only by reading the conditions of the treaty, that one can discern the post-Navarino scenario that the Register was discussing. For example, “Article 1.—‘His highness Mehemet Ali Pacha engages to give up all persons under his control made slaves after the battle of Navarin, who will be sent to Egypt, and will immediately place them at the disposal of admiral Codrington.” However, one needs to be explicitly mindful of the date of the Battle of Navario, and moreover, familiar with Ibrahim Pasha’s surviving correspondence in the Cairene *Dar al Wathai’q* to be able to pinpoint this historiographical error and to know for certain that the timeline, as presented above, was simply wrong.

This historiographical oversight was not limited to the influential monograph or printed primary sources mentioned above. Rather, it is representative of and our broader understanding and scholarship of Ibrahim’s Morea campaign. Dodwell, who focused heavily on the role of the Greek insurrection in shaping the Egyptian policy, similarly glossed over the final year of Ibrahim’s Morea campaign. He wrote “Ibrahim’s army returned starved, crippled and miserable. Many where so worn by privations that they could not march.” Similarly, in her study of Mehmed Ali, Afaf Marsot’s discussion of the affair was similarly brief, and limited to the hunger and lack of resources. She wrote:

Ibrahim's reports from the Morea revealed that the troops were sick and starving; consequently, some regiments had revolted, some had deserted and tried to make their way to Rumelia by land, killing and stealing on their way. The rest were reduced to eating animals which had died, and even to eating pigs. … supplies never reached Ibrahim and daily reports of starvation reached the *wait*, as well as news of mutiny, for if the men were ready to die in battle

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674 ibid.
they were not willing to die of starvation.\textsuperscript{676}

These examples are the closest we have to a full analysis of Ibrahim’s time in Morea post-Navarino. A few sparing lines in full-length monographs, neither of which mention the Pasha’s military efforts after losses on the peninsula nor the extent of time Egyptian troops remained in the Morea after the naval losses. Working from Ottoman and Egyptian records sources however, we are able to piece together a very different picture than the one presented in the current historiography.

**The Hunger and Resentment Grow**

By the winter of 1827, the *vali* of Egypt would receive near-daily reports regarding the hunger and frustrations of his men.\textsuperscript{677} After their victory, European powers worked quickly to prevent any supplies from reaching Ottoman garrisons. Much as Ibrahim Pasha had predicted, the conditions and morale were so bleak in the winter that the remaining Egyptian force had effectively fallen to shambles. However, the growing desperation of his son and his men were by no means the only communication that the Egyptian governor sent, or was sent, regarding the condition of Ibrahim’s troops in the Morea.

One month after the Battle of Navarino, in November 1827, before their supplies ran out and the hunger set in, we learn that Mehmed Ali had written to the Porte urging for his son’s *continued* stay in Morea. News had reached Cairo that Constantinople was considering the possible withdrawal of Ibrahim Pasha and the remaining vessels to Anatolia, where the fleet was to be repaired and sent back, while


\textsuperscript{677} See letters from the winter of 1827-1828. For example, Mehmed Ali to Nagib Effendi on 12 Jamad Akhar 1243, Mehmed Ali to Nagib Effendi 25 Ragab 1243, Mehmed Ali to Nagib Effendi in the Acentine 25 Jamad Akhar 1243, Mehmed Ali to the Grand Vizier 6 Ramadan 1243, Mehmed Ali to the Grand Vizier 13 Shawal 1243, again 16 Shawwal 1243 DWQ, Khedival Folios.
Ibrahim was to update the Porte’s officials on the events post Navarino. As per his letter, Mehmed Ali argued firmly against such a measure. The Pasha believed that the evacuation of the commander would send an explicit message to the Greek rebels that the Ottoman sultan was ready to acquiesce to their demands for independence, and in doing so further instigate the Greek uprising. Instead, the governor suggested sending the ships back to Alexandria where they would be repaired and returned to his son’s command, and that Ibrahim remain in his post in Morea.

That same day, the Pasha sent another letter to his agent in Constantinople complaining that news had reached him regarding the scandal-mongering in the center. The newest gossip circulating amongst various Ottoman officials was that the Egyptian governor was secretly planning his imminent resignation as the Sultan’s official representative in Egypt. Rumor had it that Mehmed Ali was in clandestine negotiations with the British and was about his loyalty to the Sublime Porte. In response, the vali denied the allegations, and went so far as to complain to Necib Pasha that Hüsrev Pasha was personally responsible for spreading the hearsay in an effort to stir trouble. True or not, it is worth mentioning that the governor did not write a corresponding letter to the Porte or to the Grand Vizier claiming his innocence and denouncing the reports as misinformation—a measure that he had taken in an effort to clear his name on many occasions in the past.

From the tone and the information presented in the documents and letters dated from immediately after the naval defeat, I speculate that Mehmed Ali was still attempting to make the most strategic and least costly tactical decisions he could after

678 Mehmed Ali to the High Porte 8 Jamad Evval 1243. DWQ, Khedival Folios.
679 ibid
680 Mehmed Ali to Nagib Effendi 8 Jamad Evval 1243. DWQ, Khedival Folios.
Navarino. In the immediate weeks following the sinking of his cherished fleet, the
governor was still willing to risk the life of his son and best commander, as well as his
army, in an effort to minimize the overall losses incurred in the Morea.

These two points frame the Egyptian vali’s position as one that was much more pragmatic and less reactionary than previously imagined. Rather, Mehmed Ali’s position regarding his continued efforts in the Morea was far more nuanced and complicated after Navarino than is currently represented in the historiography.

The issue of supply shortages first appeared in the historical record during December of that 1827. In a letter Mehmed Ali Pasha wrote to his agent in Constantinople the vali mentioned sea routes had been cut off and Ibrahim and his men were growing increasingly concerned about the dwindling supplies. Further, the situation deteriorated further because of the ongoing drought in Crete.\textsuperscript{681} However, that was not the only concern of Ibrahim or the remaining troops in the region.

In one particularly graphic letter Mehmed Ali wrote to his agent, Nacib Effendi about Suleiman Pasha’s disregard for the island’s administration we learn that Crete, which was officially under Egyptian control, was attacked by rebel forces. The insurgents, emboldened by the allies’ victory, killed the men on Crete, raped and cut off the breasts of the younger women, eviscerated the pregnant ones, and destroyed or stole whatever provisions they could find. We are told in the letter that Suleiman Pasha did little to intervene and that only Egyptian forces remaining tried to defend

\textsuperscript{681} Mehmed Ali to Nagib Effendi 27 Jamad Akhar 1243 DWQ Khedival Folios. It is difficult to know if these were exaggerated claims on the part of the Egyptian governor. However, it was routine for military victors of the age to engage in the mutilation of their adversaries’ bodies as part of their victor’s booty. For example, Mehmed Ali once sent a shipment of 5,000 human ears to the sultan as a present. Further, given the brutality with which the Albanian irregulars had conducted themselves, in several years before the Greek Orthodox uprising, it would therefore not be an exaggeration to assume that these claims, were at least, partially based in fact.
the surviving villagers. However, the troubles were only just beginning.

By January 1828, we saw just how quickly the situation deteriorated, at least for the army. Marsot was correct in her assessment that the Pasha received near daily updates about the lack of grain and supplies available for his son and his men. What she did not mention however, was the extensive correspondence from the governor of Egypt correspondingly sent near daily letters of his own to Constantinople asking for the Porte’s help in providing supplies and foodstuffs for the remainder of the Egyptian army. Support was promised early on by the Porte, however Ottoman assistance materialized for Ibrahim and his men.

Reading through the materials, one is given a detailed insight into the pasha’s growing angst about the condition of his military. As the letters from Morea were becoming increasingly distressed, the pasha in Cairo was increasingly disgruntled about the administrative mismanagement on the part of the Ottoman Porte. Matters became further complicated for Ibrahim the following spring, after the Russians declared war on the Porte on April 26, 1828. Reading Ibrahim’s letters in Dar al Wathai’q, which openly discussed food shortages and the lack of grain supplies, became increasing strained during the winter months of 1827-8. Countless attempts on part of Mehmed Ali, his agent in Constantinople, Nacib Effendi, and his Foreign Minister, Boghos Bey Yusufian, Ibrahim Pasha and others were made to secure the appropriate grain shipments from the Asitane during these difficult months.

However, the grain shipments never arrived. Rather, Ibrahim’s supply lines were cut off by the rebels. Vivid accounts of illness and famine increasingly trickled

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682 ibid.
683 ibid., 136.
684 ibid.
into his letters to Mehmed Ali. So much so, that by the summer of 1828, the latter had
grown fed up with the Porte and was ready to evacuate Ibrahim and his troops from the
Morea. By July, Mehmed Ali was in negotiations with the English to secure the return
of Ibrahim Pasha and his men to Alexandria. However, still then, Ibrahim refused to
surrender his position in the Morea. In his historical volume published half a century
after the events of Morea, the Hellenist George Finley wrote:

The army of Ibrahim Pasha suffered great privations during the winter of 1827-
28. Though no regular blockade of the ports in his possession was maintained
by either the Greeks for the Allies, his army would have starved, or he would
have evacuated the Morea, had he not succeeded in attaining large supplies
provisions rum the Ionian Islands, And particularly from Zante. About fifty
Ionian boats entirely manned by Greeks, where almost constantly employed for
several months in carrying provisions to Ibrahim’s troops in Greece. But even
with all the assistance supplied by the Ionians, the price of provisions was high,
and the suffering of the soldiers work great in the fortresses of Navarin, Modon,
and Coron. At last the sufferings became intolerable.

In June 1828 about two thousand Albanians in garrison at Coron broke out
into open mutiny [against Ibrahim,] and after plundering the place marched out
to return home…The French government undertook to send an army to expel
Ibrahim... On 19 July 1828 a protocol was signed, accepting the offer of France;
and on 30 August an army of 14,000 man, under the command of General
Maison landed at Petalidi in the Gulf of Coron. The convention concluded by
Codrington at Alexandria had been ineffectual [in persuading Ibrahim to
abandon his post]. It required the imposing force of the French General to
compel Ibrahim to sign a new convention for the immediate evacuation of the
Morea. This convention was signed on 7 September 1828, and the first division
of the Egyptian army, consisting of five thousand-five hundred men, Sailed
from Navarin on the 16th. Abraham Pasha followed with the remainder on 5
October; but he refused to deliver up the Fortress to the French alleging that he
had found them occupied buy Turkish garrisons on his arrival in Greece, and
that it was his duty to leave them in the hands of the sultans officers. 685

Finley’s assessment of the conditions overwhelmingly corresponds with the
records of Mehmed Ali in the Egyptian National Archives. The one point of debate
between the two sources is the issue of European blockade. We know from the vali’s
letters to Constantinople and from Ibrahim’s letters to his father that the three allied

685 George Finlay, A History of Greece: The Greek Revolution, Pt. 2: Establishment of the Greek
powers were actively preventing the arrival and the distribution of grain ships from both Egypt and from Anatolia—however the conditions of their cordon were not clear.⁶⁸⁶ Even Finley references the European cordons in his analysis of Ibrahim’s continued survival in Morea and his reliance on Ionian support. While Ottoman records do not discuss the matter, the issue of the European blockade and Mehmed Ali’s increasing frantic efforts to supply his son and men indicate that at a covert attempt to provide Ibrahim and his men with at least some limited rations would have taken place.⁶⁸⁷

We know from letter the Egyptian governor to his kethüda that Finley’s overall timeline was accurate. Ibrahim and the remainder of his men docked in Alexandria on October 14, 1828.⁶⁸⁸ Upon his return, the commander was too weak to walk.⁶⁸⁹ The damage done to the governor’s relationship with Constantinople was arguably irreparable by this point. However, tensions worsened when Mahmud II responded furiously to Ibrahim’s abandoned post. The vali was subsequently forced to defend the evacuation of his understandable, but nevertheless serious, insubordination. After receiving a condemning rebuke, written in the hand of Sultan himself, Mehmed Ali responded to the High Porte on October 19, 1828. While a copy of the Sultan’s original letter was not available at the Prime Ministerial Ottoman Archives, we learn, by way of Mehmed Ali’s response to Mahmud II, that the sultan had strongly censured the Egyptian vali, and admonished the governor’s impertinent disregard for the Porte’s wishes during the post-Navarino phase of the campaign.

In a contrite response, Mehmed Ali attempted to further explain his reasons for

⁶⁸⁶ See, Mehmed Ali to Nagib Effendi 25 Ragab 1243 which explicitly mentions the blocking of access to ports by the 3 European powers. DWQ, Khedival Folios.
⁶⁸⁷ ibid.
⁶⁸⁸ Mehmed Ali to Katkhoda of Egypt 4 Rabia Akhar 1244. DWQ, Khedival Folios.
⁶⁸⁹ Mehmed Ali to High Porte 9 Rabia Akhar 1244. DWQ, Khedival Folios.
the decision to negotiate with Admiral Codrington. He wrote, again, and in great detail
of the gravity of the conditions in the Morea, the starvation of his troops, the constant
illness, the subsequent poisoning of his men from consuming the last of their rancid
supplies, and the pleas of the five hundred Cretans inhabitants that begged Ibrahim to
return to Egypt. Despite the contrition the vali was obligated to demonstrate any
cooperative regard the vali felt towards the Sublime Porte had long since soured.
Mehmed Ali held the Porte responsible for his financial and military losses in Morea
and for his lost windfalls from the eastern Mediterranean maritime trade. As Dodwell
wrote, the Egyptian governor “unluckily had sufficient insight to lay these misfortunes
at the door of the ‘pig-headed Sultan’ and the ‘ass-like Vaziers’ [sic] who had rejected
his advice.”

The Importance of Russia

Again, by the winter of 1828, the Ottoman records inform us that Yusuf, the
Tripolitan governor, was rebuilding his fleet and had sent five vessels to assist in the
sultan’s fleet’s efforts against the Russians. Similarly, we have corresponding records
of both Tunisian, as well as Algerian involvement in the maritime hostilities of the
age, with the deployments of galleons, frigates, corvettes and other ships under the
Tunisian Patrona Ahmed and Piyale Osman Bey to the Mediterranean.

Interestingly however, it was at this point that Hussein II dissented. In the
summer of 1829, the governor of Tunis wrote an official, sealed report to the Porte,
informing the Asitane that it would not be possible for the regency to provide the
Ottoman navy with additional tactical support or ships for the war with Russia.
Hussein Bey wrote that he had taken defensive measures to refortify the walls, and to

690 Dodwell, The Founder of Modern Egypt, 93.
691 HAT Dosya No: 573 Gömlek No: 28108.
increase the coast’s defenses, but that he was unable to provide the sultan with more ships.\footnote{HAT Dosya No: 573 Gömlek No: 28116.}692 This was the first recorded incidence of the Tunisian governor actively refusing to engage in the broader Ottoman efforts of Morea. Moreover, this report corresponded with the strengthening relations between Tunis and France in the face of the upcoming invasion of Algiers. The focus of the governor of Tunis had shifted, and that his alliance had gone from the Porte to his continued viability in the province.

Hussein Bey was not alone. The \textit{vali} of Egypt had also refused to provide the Ottoman admiralty with additional vessels and support during the ongoing war with the Russian Empire.\footnote{Fahmy, \textit{All the Pasha\'s Men}, 54.}693 By the summer of 1829, Mehmed Ali was fully preoccupied with rebuilding both his army and establishing his upcoming plans for a Syrian invasion. Mehmed Ali was thus, fully aware that his interests no longer aligned with those of the sultan. The Treaty of Adrianople, that ended the Russo-Ottoman War of 1828-1829, was signed on September 14 in what is modern-day Edirne, and swung the pendulum towards Russia’s advantage. The Ottoman Empire allowed full access to Russian commercial vessels through the Danube and Dardanelle Straights, effectively expanding Russian commercial efforts from the Black Sea into the Mediterranean. Moreover, the treaty recognized Russian sovereignty in the Caucasus, from Georgia to the Khanates of Yerevan and Nakhichevan, which make up modern-day Armenia and western Azerbaijan, forced the Porte to guarantee the autonomy of Greece, allow for Serbian independence and gave the Russians effective control of Moldavia and Wallachia. The topography of the Sultan’s well-protected domains in Southeastern Europe had entirely transformed.
It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to include Mehmed Ali’s Syrian Campaign of 1831-1833. For our purposes here however, it is from Russophone records written during Mehmed Ali’s Syrian campaign that we learn the full extent of Ibrahim Pasha’s position in both Morea the consequences that it had for both him and his father, and for Ottoman-Egyptian relations after 1830. In his published memoirs, *Avtobiografiia A.O. Diugamelia*, Aleksandr Osipovich Diugamel, the Russian Consul to Egypt from between 1833 and 1837, traveled on behalf of his government to meet with Ibrahim Pasha while in Konya during his Syrian campaign. Translated into English for the first time, we learn the impressions of the consul as recorded in the Russian language journal, *Russian Archive*, which focused on history and literature and about his impressions of Ibrahim Pasha from January 1833, and Mehmed Ali’s imperial designs. Further, we can use this text to contrast it with the impression given to readers by the Anglophone records of previously discussed Reverend Swan in 1825. The future Russian consul to Egypt wrote:

Moreover, due to his concern with legality, the emperor Nicholas considered it his duty to support Turkey and curtail the ambitions of the Egyptian pasha. In this situation, it was necessary to encourage the sultan and intimidate Mehmed Ali. The General Lieutenant Murav'ev was entrusted with this double task. He was supposed to go to Constantinople first, and subsequently to Alexandria. I was assigned to him as a plenipotentiary of the Ministry of War[…]

For a couple of years, the Pasha of Egypt, Mehmet Ali, had made constant effort to improve his troops and fleet. On the orders of the Porte, and in order to assist her to quash the Greek rebellion, his son Ibrahim Pasha landed with the troops in Morea. Such a recourse of the sultan to his vassal increased the political standing of the latter. The growing power of Mehmed Ali was a concern of the Porte; when, as a result of alleged two-decade-long insults from Abdullah Pasha of St-Jean d’Acre, the Egyptian Pasha invaded Syria and took Acre, making the confrontation between the sultan and his vassal inevitable, and both parties started to prepare for war. The Turkish army under Husseyin Pasha was defeated by Ibrahim Pasha in the valley near the Syrian town of Homs and following this victory the Egyptian army crossed the Taurus and entered Asia Minor.
Of his time with Ibrahim:]
On January the 5th, 1833 I arrived to Konya and at the very moment I crossed the city gate I saw the courier of the French embassy, who had left Constantinople a couple of days ahead of me. It is possible that the French messenger rushed to Konya in order to warn Ibrahim Pasha about my arrival and to set his mind against the proposal I was going to make. Generally, the policy of [France’s] Talleyrand's cabinet at this time was characterized by suspiciousness and duplicity, which was in stark contrast with the straightforward and open actions of Emperor Nicholas. The behavior of French representatives in Constantinople and Alexandria bore the mark of outrageous partiality towards the Egyptian Pasha and I saw that they wanted Mehmend Pasha to be girded with the sabre of Osman and become the sultan in Mahmud [II]'s place. Later, in 1840, this favor of the French towards Egypt was even more open and was one of the reasons of this country's estrangement from the rest of Europe.

I was granted the audience with Ibrahim Pasha just after arrival to Konya [in 1833. It was my first encounter with this extraordinary man, with whom subsequently I conversed quite often. Ibrahim Pasha was of average height, with his thin beard that already became somewhat gray, even if he was only around 40 years old. His face was marked with smallpox, and he was definitely not a handsome man. At the same time, his eyes showed particular energy, and his moves were energetic. Ibrahim Pasha had nothing in him of a coarse savage, as he had been described to me; instead, he was immersed in the European ideas and views. He was well versed in the matters the newest developments of military art and knew well the international relations. He was fascinated with France more than with any other country, which is understandable considering that it was the Frenchmen who brought the achievements of enlightenment to Egypt. The most important individual in this respect is the Suleyman Bey, the renegade ‘Selve,’ [who was of French extraction] who was the head of the Egyptian general staff and who exerts great influence on Ibrahim Pasha.

When I entered Ibrahim Pasha's quarters, he was sitting cross-legged on the sofa and he was incessantly swinging his body from one side to another. In his lifestyle, he was like the majority of the Turkish dignitaries. He didn't smoke and had only one servant to attend to him. In Morea, he had been accompanied by scores of servants, which constitute a necessary entourage of any high-ranking individual in Turkey. However, after noticing the uselessness of such indulgences, Ibrahim Pasha changed his lifestyle. He had only one carpet to lie on, and only one fur robe. There is no doubt that Ibrahim Pasha tried to set the personal example in order to rid the Egyptian army of anything excessive, which could cause logistical problems during the movement of the army.

After customary introductions, I informed Ibrahim Pasha about the mission of Gen. Muravev to his father and passed what I was instructed to do. Subsequently, I made a strong demand that Ibrahim Pasha halt the march of
his army [in Anatolia] at least until he received new orders from his father. However, I have to say that my rhetorical efforts were in vain: Ibrahim Pasha continued to claim that he is removed from political affairs and as a commander he is no position to make [political] judgments, but only to follow the instructions of his father. Thus, declining my propositions, he continued: 'Where did this particular friendship on the part of the Russian emperor towards the sultan originate from, if, only four years before, [the Russian emperor] had conducted a war against [the sultan]?'

I replied: 'As long as Turkey declined to respect the law, which had been conferred to us by previous treaties, we remained in open war with them. However, as soon as the sultan requested peace, it was granted to him on sound and generous foundations.'

Ibrahim: 'It wasn't worth to make such expenses only because of the excessive sense of honor.'

Me: 'The war was not conducted because of the excessive sense of honor, but also in our commercial interests, which required safeguards. We never considered taking away any Turkish possessions. When I was in Adrianople, we were closer to Constantinople than [you are now] from Konya. Moreover, between us and the Ottoman capital there was no Bosphorus... And all this considered, didn't we restore all the possessions we had conquered to Turkey?'

Ibrahim: "But tell me, finally, why the Russian emperor is so much interested in the fate of the sultan?"

Me: 'Because, as I've already told you, His Majesty the Emperor is a faithful ally and a friend of His Majesty the Sultan, and he also considers the war you wage against the sultan, a most unjust one.'

Ibrahim: 'And what do you call an unjust war?'

Me: 'We call the war, in which an administrator of the country leads against his ruler, an unjust war.'

Ibrahim: "Do not confuse, please, the Misir valisi, with a mere Pasha of some Konya or Kutahya."

Me: 'I know that the Egyptian pasha is without comparison in terms of wealth and power to any other pasha, but nonetheless he is the subject of his ruler.'

Ibrahim: "I can see that you have no idea about the real cause of the war..."

And he started his account of all the grievances of Mehmed Ali against Abdullah Pasha. He told me that the Porte did not pay any heed to the complaints of his father, that after taking Acre, Mehmed Ali was content with punishing Abdullah Pasha, and he offered the Porte to give [Abdullah] his post back. But the sultan wanted to see in [Mehmed Ali] only a maverick vassal. Then, the subject of the conversation moved to different topics. Ibrahim Pasha talked a lot about India, about the fear of the English that the Russian would eventually take their conquest from them. [He also told me] that Admiral Malcolm told him about all those fears. Then he turned to discuss the revolutionary spirit spreading across Europe and told me that it spreads like wildfire.694

Clearly, the Russian consul’s vivid and detailed account of his time with the Egyptian commander offers Anglophone scholars a compelling perspective into the character of the future vali of Egypt. First, reading Diugamel’s text one is given a vastly different perspective on the character and the way of being of Ibrahim Pasha, particularly when compared with the physical description offered by Reverend Charles Swan from a few years before. The Reverend Charles Swan accompanied a detachment of British officers aboard the Cambrian that were sent to Morea to negotiate a prisoner exchange with Ibrahim Pasha in December 1824. After meeting with the Egyptian military commander, the reverend spoke of his impressions of Ibrahim:

The Pasha is a stout, broad, brown-faced, vulgar looking man, thirty-five or forty years of age, strongly marked with the small-pox; his countenance possesses little to engage, but when he speaks, which he does with considerable ease and fluency, it becomes animated and rather striking. He frequently accompanies his words with a long drawling cry, which to European ears, sounds ridiculously enough. His manner carries with it that sort of decision which the common appendage of despotism. Deprived of this, he would resemble an uneducated, hard-favored seaman of our own country. He was plainly clothed for a Turk; and his camp establishment altogether had none of that parade and luxury which we are accustomed to attach to eastern warfare...” [He continued] “Speaking of Morea...although he regretted the necessity of his present proceedings, yet it was his intention to pursue them to the utmost. He would burn and destroy the whole Morea; so that it should neither be profitable to the Greeks, nor to him, nor to any one. Would would these infatuated men, the dupes of their own imbecile Government, do for provisions in the winter? He knew that his own soldiers would suffer--that they two must perish. But his father, Mehemet Ali was training forty thousand men, and he was in daily expectation of a reinforcement of twelve thousand. If these were cut off, he would have more, and he would preserve till the Greeks returned to their former state... He repeated, 'I will not cease till the Morea be in ruin.' The sultan has already conferred upon him the title and insignia of Pasha of this unhappy land; and said his highness, ‘If the good people of England, who are so fond of sending money to the Greeks, would send it directly to [Ibrahim] it would save them considerable trouble; eventually, it all comes to [the pasha’s] treasury.”

The text was first published in in 1828, after both the Ottoman capture of Missolonghi and the European powers’ successes off Navarino bay, it is easy to surmise several important points. First, British diplomats were explicit in their attempts to portray Ibrahim Pasha as a repulsive, barbaric despot, who would not “cease ‘till the Morea be in ruin”696 and in doing so justify their government’s support of the Greek Orthodox rebels. Secondly, it is obvious that British, and indeed European support of the Greek rebels became increasingly common knowledge by the fall of 1825—to the point where Ibrahim Pasha had become explicitly flippant about it in his conversations with an Anglican clergyman. Lastly, Swan’s characterization of Ibrahim Pasha’s behaviors and comportment during his time on the frontlines of the Morean field is useful countermeasure to the Russophone description of the pasha.

Rather than portray Ibrahim Pasha as a despotic “stout, broad, brown-faced, vulgar looking man [with] a long drawling cry, which to European ears, sounds ridiculously enough,”697 Diugamel wrote of Ibrahim’s compellingly energetic eyes, in a manner inherently similar to the one found in the western traveler reports of Mehmed Ali, that Fahmy analyzed so carefully. Diugamel claimed to have found “nothing in him of the coarse savage, as he had been described to [Diugamel,]” but rather found a man “immersed in the European ideas and views. He was well versed in the matters the newest developments of military art and knew well the international relations.”698 The claim leads readers to wonder where Diugamel had originally heard the above-mentioned descriptions of the Pasha, and more generally how much weight to place on diplomats’ perspectives within the broader historical record.

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696 ibid.
697 Conder, Greece, Vol 15, 255.
698 Diugamel’, “Avtobiografiia A.O. Diugamelia.”
Diugamel had an explicit admiration for the young commandant's comportment and the minimalist subdued airs that Ibrahim attempted to model to his men and commanders under his charge. If anything, one could argue that Diugamel expressed a fondness for Ibrahim Pasha, who the consul explicitly described as “extraordinary,” and charismatic in his rhetorical abilities. This leads one to wonder how can two descriptions written only eight years apart could convey the same man in such radically different depictions, and more importantly, what interests did the respective authors have while depicting Ibrahim the way that they did?

**Conclusion**

From Ottoman, North African and western sources, one can easily see that the 1820s proved to be a watershed moment in the broader Maghreb. It was a time when the region experienced a pull towards the gravitational center of Cairo. With the burgeoning empire of Mehmed Ali and its increased sway over first Tunis and Tripoli, and later in the French attempt to recruit him into their capture of Algiers, we can trace how imperial powers, Ottoman and European alike, began to consider the Egyptian vali in their Maghrebi diplomatic efforts and considerations.

Throughout this chapter, we analyzed the regional, maritime, military, and tactical connections among the provinces of Ottoman in Egypt, Tunis and Tripoli. This chapter elucidated how, in his efforts to build an Egyptian navy, the vali of Egypt turned to the North African regencies for their maritime expertise. We examined the underlying ties between the province of Egypt and the broader Mediterranean space in which it operated, looked to both Western and Eastern European sources to gain insights into how Ottoman Egypt and North Africa operated during the Peloponnesian struggles.

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699 Ibid.
These events provided the context for Ibrahim Pasha’s efforts in Morea, and led to a re-evaluation of the Egyptian governor’s ‘benevolent detachment’ towards the Porte, and the conflict to the north both before his involvement in Crete as well as after his losses in the Bay of Navarino. Further, this chapters made clear that the Tripolitan governor looked to incorporate the strategies of his Egyptian counterpart first into his planned Bornu expansion and then in his efforts to reorganize his military. This chapter completed the regional framework for how the North African provinces of the Ottoman Empire operated independently as well as collaboratively in their efforts to resist European encroachment and maintain their regional connections during the time of shifting power politics.

Next, in the epilogue, we will examine how France and the Porte would invade and (re)capture the spaces of Algiers and Tripoli, respectively; in doing so we will focus on the local response to the corresponding structural upheaval.
HISTORICAL AFTERWORD
THE LEAD UP TO INVASION

By the late 1820s, Mehmed Ali’s penchant for territorial expansion had established Cairo as a new political center and the Egyptian vali as an important—if not critical—player in the Ottoman Maghreb. When we last left the vali and his son Ibrahim Pasha, we were able to compare the gradual rise of an Egyptian center in the Maghreb as seen by different western and Russian representatives, the administrative ethos of the governor’s son, as well as the diplomats’ early efforts to ingratiate themselves in the good will of the vali in order to win his support in their expansionist endeavors. In effect, we set the stage for the historical postscript, which addresses Mehmed Ali’s extended influence and authority in North Africa. By examining how Europeans saw the vali’s growing power we established a foundation for the analysis of imperial schemes of the age that pushed forward territorial land-grabs and eventually brought about a new era of North African colonialism.

This afterword serves a double scope. On the one hand, it aims to summarize the developments analyzed throughout the dissertation, by tracing the course of events that had been set in motion in the period under discussion. At the same time, and more importantly, my aim in this section is to broaden the scope of the study and identify future directions of research. Therefore, the present epilogue examines the emergent role of an Egyptian center of power in North Africa during the years immediately after Navarino, building off Chapter Five’s analysis of the contrasting European perceptions of Ibrahim Pasha and the role of Mehmed Ali in Egypt, and examines the lead up to two central invasions of the Maghreb by competing imperial powers. Throughout this section, we analyze how through the failed attempts for economic reform in the aftermath of the Congress of Vienna, and growing European influence
and competition in the region subsequently paved the way for political instability within the provinces of Tripolitania and Algiers. Conversely, I also examine how, through the strengthening of its relations with France, the Husainid dynasty of Tunis was able to remain in power after first its neighbors to the west Algiers, and then five years later, its neighbors to the east, Tripoli, both fell the victims of direct imperial military occupation. Lastly, it also touches upon the subsequent Maghrebi resistance efforts against the occupying powers, in both Algiers and Cyrenaica.

During the period under discussion, significant overlaps in the Sufi intellectual and theological networks that historically connected Algiers, Timbuktu, Ghademes, Benghazi and al-Azhar in Cairo gradually took root. These same predominantly Islamic, anti-imperialist networks bound the resistance movements of Abdul Qadir al-Jaza’iri in Algiers with those of Mohammed Sannusi in Cyrenaica. This work will juxtapose the intellectual networks and pedagogical styles of North African scholarly institutions such as al-Azhar University in Cairo, with the minimalism of the Sanunsi movement, alongside the Sufi tenants of the Algerian sheriff, who while a scholar by training, took up arms and led the fight against the French invasion of Algiers.

Doing so allows us to further examine the inland ties of the North African provinces and their connections with the Sahel, while also allowing the present study to move from the imperialist ties of the region, to the anti-imperialist ones that emerged in the first half of the nineteenth century—simultaneously and along similar theological tenets. Interestingly, mystical communities whose members incorporated both the Islamic pedagogical doctrine of *ijtihad*, adjusting it into the rich North African tradition of maraboutism, established themselves through a network of lodges along the desert caravan routes. These communities looked to transform the spaces that had been serving
for the transport of slaves, ivory and gold dust into a network of religious and intellectual exchange where *Maliki* scholars from Cairo would engage with disciples and students of Amazigh saints and holy men.

The main goal of this afterward is to transform our understanding of how knowledge flowed across the topographical reality of the broader North African region. This section will eventually look to examine the network of cities and oases across this border region, the same ones that served as the backbone for trans-Saharan caravan trade and in addition to the transportation of slaves, gold dust, and henna, also disseminated systems of knowledge. Books bought in Timbuktu were sold in Cairo and the religious *tefseer* writing of *uluma* in Cairo was sold and read in Ghadames.

These desert networks were critical in the Islamic intellectual exchange and theological ties that connected North Africa to the larger African continent, and that tied political movements like that of the *Sannussiya* movement to a community of religious scholars, and students of *fiqh* and in doing so, blurred the lines between religious doctrine and political mobilization. This afterward, as it is currently presented, offers critical background to this forthcoming research.

**Historical Background for 1830**

France is engaged in a quarrel with the Dey of Algiers, which her dignity requires that she terminate in a manner worth of her. Experience has demonstrated that the means already employed are insufficient. The sending of a military expedition to the coast of Barbary presents many difficulties and is open to many dangers. The expedition, however successful it may be, would be expensive and would perhaps arouse the jealousy of a rival nation… it would be possible to have the robber dens of these Mohammedan barbarians destroyed by coreligionists who have already known something of discipline and who are in closer touch with civilization… Mohammad Ali would not be unwilling to send an army to these parts, in conjunction with France, in order to bring these countries into the orbit of civilization, etc.”

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700Drovetti to Polignac, 1 September 1829, Douin, *Mohamed Aly et l’expédition d’Alger (1829-1830)*, 1.
Algiers, as the regency with the largest navy and the highest socioeconomic stake in the corso, was the province that most defiantly agitated against the forced implementation of western laws that demanded the elimination of the practice. Under the authority of the dey, the Algerian rais al-marsa continued the campaigns well past the Congress of Vienna. Targeting mostly French and Austrian vessels, the dey remained entirely defiant to the imposition of European norms, despite the increased risk to the city’s both physical and economic security. Traders from Europe traders grew increasingly frustrated with cost of their seized property, and, in turn, both the French and British had responded by attempting repeated blockades and bombardments of the city. Regardless, the Algerian maritime campaigns continued. Tensions worsened throughout the 1820s and gradually frayed the few remaining diplomatic ties between the governments of France and the regency.\textsuperscript{701}

\textsuperscript{701} The distinction between dey and bey was an extremely important one. In that while the Husainid and Karamanlı families overwhelming centralized and exercised control over Tunis and Tripoli while cooperating, to varying degrees, with the sultan and the Porte, the dey of Algiers was actually elected by the Algerian divan to rule the province. This distinction not only marked a more salient gubernatorial tie between the province and the Porte, in that Constantinople remained a larger stakeholder in the administration of the territory, but it also meant that as elected official the deys of Algiers were historically easier to depose, and also allowed for different internal pressures and ruptures to form. Early on, the Algerian navy’s choice in successor held the greatest sway over the selection of new deys. Over time however, this influence shifted to the military of the province, and the dey maintained in a precarious position of an absolute ruler whose tenure was under constant question. In fact, nearly half the deys elected from 1671-1818 were assassinated. Further adding to the governor’s troubles were the hereditary customs that required he abandon his family, children and home and lead “a prisoner’s life in the governmental palace.” See H. Z. Hirschberg, A History of the Jews in North Africa: From the Ottoman Conquests to the Present Time / Edited by Eliezer Bashan and Robert Attal (Leiden: Brill, 1974), 5-6 for further information. The parallels between the customary seclusion of the dey and the gilded kafis of the sultanic heir-apparent were overwhelming evident. Hirschberg cited travelers’ chronicles to Algiers to surmise, “His status has been tellingly defined: a rich man having no control of his riches; a father without children; a husband without a wife; an autocrat deprived of his freedom; a king of slaves and the slave of his subjects.” The divan of Algiers had ensured that the authority of the governor effectively served as his own cage. Given the compendium of pressures on Algiers and the increasingly diminishing authority of the dey, conditions were such that by 1829 French officials in Paris were openly discussing the viability of various options for the removal of Dey Hussein II, from power and supplanting him with a more favorable alternative.

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Ongoing troubles with France were not the only concern of Algiers. Historically, the most powerful of the regencies, the new diminished status of the province after 1815 proved to be a particularly bitter pill for the dey and his administration to swallow. If a new rival contender on the far east of the North African coastline was not troublesome enough for the dey, Tunis—Algiers’ old rival and former vassal neighbor—soon found itself in a position to air old grievances and undermine the rule of Hussein II. Abun Nasr wrote of the Tunisian reaction to the French occupation:

Husayn Bey’s interest to remain on good terms with the French as well as his vainglorious of annexing Algeria, or at least larger parts of it, to Tunisia prompted him to respond positively to the proposals of General Clauzel, the French commander in Algeria and to place the beylik of Constantine under the authority of the Tunisian prince. The Tunisian delegation which traveled on a French ship to Algiers concluded a convention with Clauzel on the 18th December 1830, under which Husayn Bey’s brother Mustafa would become the bey of Constantine under French sovereignty. Husayn Bey is reported as having told his confidants that he entered into this agreement with the French because he believed that they would not want to rule Algeria and consequently they would hand it over to him. 

Perhaps because of the historical tensions that dominated the relations between Tunis and Algiers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the potential for a Tunisian ‘David’ to extend his authority over the Algerian ‘Goliath,’ or perhaps out of sheer socio-economic interest of Hussein II to maintain himself and his dynasty on the Tunisian beylicate, it was clear from the historical record that the Husainid government attempted to benefit from their neighbor’s misfortunes. The bey was not alone.

The French government also found the symbolic nature of an Algerian conquest particularly appealing. The most geographically extensive of the regencies,
the province already equipped with a strong military, the best-fortified harbor, and booming agricultural production. Moreover, Algiers had come to symbolize the source of long-held frustrations associated with the *corso* in western popular imaginations. In short, to conquer Algiers meant not only to conquer North African topographies for the restored monarchy of Charles X, but to eliminate the *corso* once and for all, as well as the cornerstone of Ottoman power to the west.

Frustrations rose. Algiers refused to cede the regional authority it once leveraged over Tunis and the broader region, while European moralistic antagonism began to fixate on the provinces western shores and regard the *dey*, Hussein II, as a cause of all of Europe’s maritime woes. However, the catalyst that led both parties to an open conflict was, unexpectedly enough, an insect swatter. The event, which became known as the Flywhisk Incident took place during a heated argument between the *dey* and the French consul to the province, Pierre Deval.

The *dey* was furious. Officials in Paris kept ignoring his letters and refused to negotiate the repayment of eight million francs, the outstanding sum that the French government was due for several years of Algerian wheat shipments. The wheat had been purchased by the since-defunct First Republic at the turn of the century to feed Napoleonic troops stationed across the Mediterranean, with the terms of the arrangement originally set by Algerian merchants from the local Bakri and Bushnaq families and French officials. Despite the fact that nearly three decades had passed since the purchase, the funds remained unpaid. In fact, it was only after the drop in the province’s revenues in the 1820s, and the inability of the Bakis and Bushanqs to meet increased tariff demands of Hussein II that the *dey*, as the merchant’s creditor, began
to actively look for repayment.\textsuperscript{703}

The French stalled, and Charles X’s officials remained overwhelmingly 
dismissive of the governor’s demands. After repeated attempts to write directly to 
Paris, the dey—frustrated with the lack of response—demanded to speak with the 
French Consul. However, Pierre Deval was not diplomatic in his response. The 
consul, rather than trying to intercede or ameliorate the dey’s concerns, brusquely 
disregarded the demands, and proclaimed that “his government would not deign to 
reply to the [dey’s] letters dealing with the debts.”\textsuperscript{704} Infuriated over the loss of nearly 
eight million francs and the blatant disrespect demonstrated towards him, the 
governor struck the Frenchman with the swatter he had in his hand and reportedly 
called Deval a “wicked, faithless, idol-worshiping rascal.”\textsuperscript{705}

France immediately demanded reparations; the dey, just as quickly, dismissed 
them scornfully. This resulted in a swift deployment of the French naval fleet to 
blockade Algerian ports in an effort to force the dey to back down from his demands. 
However, the impediment did more disservice to French tradesmen in Marseilles than 
the Algerian fleet. French merchants against the measures and the government 
found itself forced to reconsider its position. In August of 1829, the new Prime 
Minister, Jules de Polignac, dispatched another fleet, this time under the Provence, in 
order to renegotiate the terms of peace with Hussein Dey.

Neither the belated effort of French diplomats nor the reluctant offer of an 
armistice managed to convince the Algerian governor. He tersely dismissed de

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[703]{ibid. 249.}
\footnotetext[704]{ibid. 249-250.}
http://proxy.library.upenn.edu:3101/HOL/Page?handle=hein.cow/cowcs0159&id=1&size=2&collectio
n=cow&index=cow/cowcs Last accessed March 11, 2016.}
\end{footnotes}
Polignac’s men from his audience with the statement, “I have powder and cannons. As it is not possible for us to agree, you are free to leave,” and ensured that the *Providence* was fired upon by the city’s naval batteries as it sailed out of the port. As far as Algiers was concerned, Parisian efforts at diplomacy failed as long as the sum of eight million francs remained unpaid.

The French fumed, and the dey’s breach of protocol and rejection of peace offer quickly turned into rhetorical fuel that ignited both public opinion and official tempers against Algiers. The incident provided the French authorities with a pretext to reopen a decades-long debate regarding a possible French invasion of Algiers that, as far as Paris was concerned, would oust the disdainful governor and simultaneously free the French merchants of threat of the *corso*.

Despite the increasingly garish displays of popular chauvinism within the salons of Paris, the French Foreign Ministry soon became engrossed in broader continental concerns. The treaty of Adrianople, signed and ratified by both the Porte and Nicholas I’s government in September 1829, granted considerable concessions to the Russians, whet the appetite of expansionists within the French Foreign Ministry, and brought a halt to any immediate plans regarding the invasion of Algiers among the members of Polignac’s government. Effectively, the French Prime Minister, along with his European diplomatic cohort, found himself consumed with the territorial competition and scheming that accompanied the European powers’ careful monitoring of the ‘Eastern Question’ and diplomatic scramble for influence within the

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sultan’s well-protected domains.\textsuperscript{709}

It was in these early days of expansionist machinations that the French consul to Egypt, Bernardino Drovetti would become extremely influential within his home government in Paris. The Sardinian-born, nationalized French citizen who had served in Bonaparte’s \textit{Grande Armée}, had remained in Egypt, and – after a brief period of service in the capacity of the Russian consul in the province – rose to the position of Consul General for France under Mehmed Ali. Drovetti concocted a plan to eliminate the defiant Algerian governor, while at the same time would provide the government of Charles X with a convenient diplomatic bulwark.

According to the diplomat, French interests would be best served by striking an alliance with the governor of Egypt and making use of Mehmed Ali’s freshly rebuilt army and his expansionist proclivities towards his neighbors. The consul was convinced that, with French assistance and the cooperation of the \textit{vali}, the swath of territory along the Southern Mediterranean between the Western Desert of Egypt and the coastal town of Oran in Northwestern Algiers could, if planned correctly, fall under the governorship of Mehmed Ali—but ultimately belong to France. This way, Paris would eliminate any remaining threat from the \textit{dey}, bring an end to the \textit{corso}, and avoid expenses that a direct invasion would demand. The Consul General to Egypt quickly persuaded Polignac of the merits of his master plan.

Historians remain uncertain of the exact origin of Drovetti’s plans. However, there are indications that the plan was the consul’s own idea, soon becoming his favorite topic of conversation — both with Mehmed Ali Pasha and, perhaps not so strategically, with Drovetti’s colleague and close ally, the British Consul General in

\textsuperscript{709} ibid., 95-96.
Egypt, John Barker. Barker f was a career diplomat and had served as the general consul for the Levant Company in Aleppo for nearly thirty years. The Englishman considered Drovetti’s plan laughable, and routinely expressed his disregard for the Frenchman’s plan in his letters to London. Regardless, Drovetti increasingly became infatuated with his own stratagem throughout the winter of 1829. The more he dwelled on the project, the more he believed that involving Mehmed Ali would shield the French Foreign Ministry from vehement protestations that a direct invasion would invoke across Europe while simultaneously freeing the majority of French forces. In turn, this would allow Paris to remain on the look for any potential land-grabs to be had in the ongoing Eastern Question that consumed Polignac’s time and efforts.

Perhaps because of Drovetti’s explicit subjectivity towards his plan, the consul’s enthusiasm for the project became contagious, at least in the short-term. While in the company of Mehmed Ali, Drovetti convinced Cairo of the merits of his plans for the North African coast. From French diplomatic sources we know that the governor expressed an early interest in the idea. Mehmed Ali posed three conditions to his upcoming cooperation with the French Foreign Ministry.

First, the vali requested a subsidy of 20 million francs, a demand that the French government was willing to accommodate. Secondly, the governor wanted to secure a guarantee of royal protection from Charles X, which the French deemed acceptable. Thirdly, and most importantly for Mehmed Ali, the governor requested that the French navy provide him with vessels for his own use, and specifically with

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710 ibid.
711 ibid.
712 ibid.
713 ibid.
four 80-gun line ships.

The point of contention between the two parties was the ships; the French claimed that it was unclear why would he need them for the campaign and they had none to spare; Mehmed Ali refused to move forward in the plan without a guarantee of those vessels.

Paris resisted; Cairo forced the issue, arguing that Drovetti had personally agreed to the terms. Eventually, after extensive back and forth between the two parties, Mehmed Ali walked away from the idea of a western expansion. The following summer Paris invaded Algiers lacking even tacit support of either the Porte or the governor of Egypt, and certainly without the acquiescence or backing of the actual inhabitants of the province. France spent the next seventeen years attempting to subdue Algerian resistance, and the next 132 years forcing its authority on its colonial possession. In doing so, the government of France created the environment for one of the bloodiest and most violent examples of North African colonialism. Conditions that would lead to the subsequent death of countless Algerians over the next half a decade, during the age of initial political resistance and even more during the subsequent political massacres and the eventual Algerian War for independence from 1954-1962.

**French Ships, Algerian Ships, and Constantinople**

One could argue that the most salient reason for the Egyptian governor’s

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political backpedaling was largely due to mishandling the negotiations by French diplomats rather than a disinterest in western expansion—the position largely presented in the Francophone historiography. Drovetti, as per his letters to Paris, had originally agreed to Mehmed Ali’s terms, and the vali was adamant in his demands for the gunships. In a report from the French Captain Hudier, who arrived to Toulon at the end of December 1829 from Alexandria, Mehmed Ali considered the ships a necessary condition and stated that he would not send his troops until the vessels dropped anchor in Alexandria. Studies on the diplomatic exchange between Paris and Cairo, as well as—to a lesser extent—scholarship on Mehmed Ali’s rule in Egypt, present the situation in a totally different light.

The common thread of their arguments has been that the vali had in fact considered a western expansion into the Tripoli, Tunis and Algiers, but had thought against it and pursued his subsequent invasion of Syria and Anatolia. However, that simply was not the case. Mehmed Ali had been exceedingly forthright with the French consuls and emissaries in Egypt regarding his plans to invade Ottoman Syria. The conditions for a potential invasion of Maghreb did not rule out the possibility of Egyptian expansion both westward and northward. Rather, I argue that Mehmed Ali was likely looking to gain as much maritime expertise as possible to facilitate his invasion of the Levant of Greater Syria. After all, the maritime trade routes that connected the port cities of Alexandria to Yaffa, Haifa, Sidon Beirut to Iskenderun, Mersin and Antalya were some of the most commercially profitable in the entire

715 Douin, Georges and Boyer, Une mission militaire française auprès de Mohamed Aly, passim.
However, when the vali’s unwavering stance regarding the conditions of the alliance and a sentiment of French national hubris among officials of the French Foreign Ministry proved too strong for Paris. Effectively, the officials considered the notion of providing French military vessels to the vali of Egypt as too great of a disservice to the honor of French Royal Navy. At least, that was what Paris argued. So unyielding was the Foreign Ministry that by January 20th, 1830 the French prime minister was considering another plan entirely.\textsuperscript{717}

Polignac’s new position was that it would be preferable for the government of Charles X to rely exclusively on French forces during the attack on Algiers. However, in order to keep the political buffer in place, as Polignac argued, Paris should encourage Mehmed Ali to enter Tunis and Tripoli, while the invasion of Algiers would be entrusted exclusively to French forces. The revised plan saw the reduction of the subsidies accorded to vali to 10 million francs. Moreover, while not providing Mehmed Ali with any vessels of their own, the French would allow the governor to construct his own ships in French shipyards, a move which the prime minister’s cabinet considered useful, as it would allow Mehmed Ali to exercise control over the newly conquered provinces.\textsuperscript{718} Again, however, Mehmed Ali refused.

**Caïrene Incentives for a French Alliance**

The disdain that Mehmed Ali intimated towards the Porte was reflective of the generally dismissive tone Cairo had for Mahmud II after the governor’s losses in Navarino and the sultan’s subsequent refusal to allow Ibrahim Pasha to abandon his post. In fact, after conversation with his old rival, and longtime antagonist, Hüsrev

\textsuperscript{717} Douin, *Mohamed Aly et l’expédition d’Alger (1829-1830)*.

\textsuperscript{718} Ibid.
Pasha, the governor let his true sentiments regarding the Porte be known in a conversation with Baron Emile de Langsdorff, a young French diplomat from Fumel in Aquitaine who was assisting in the discussions. Mehmed Ali said:

[Hüsrev] complains of the Sultan and the ministers, of peace as well as of war… [recently] The divan lacks the measures to collect the money it needs to pay its war indemnities. It has alienated the provinces [asking for resources] that only Egypt can supply [to the Porte.] Everywhere, however [popular rebellion] is fermenting. While in all the provinces of the empire, the cannons fire to announce the birth of the Sultan’s newborn son, the people are crying in the streets of Constantinople “When will our woes end? The father is bad, the son will [only] be worse!... The [Ottoman] Empire is great, without doubt… and Egypt would be great if I had men, and [yet] Egypt is only one of its provinces.

But this greatness is not real, all the parts of this vast body are dislocated. Bosnia, Serbia, and all the neighboring districts are independent in practice…before long Baghdad and all the provinces of Asia Minor …will give neither men nor money [to the Porte.] The reforms have destroyed the old body but have done nothing to replace it… [speaking of his desire for a navy and the concern and envy that it aroused, the pasha continued…] They want me, my commerce, my soldiers, my buildings… do they not want to be like me? I want a navy and I want it for myself. A few more alliances and I will become a great maritime power. Egypt is great, fruitful, every day sees increase its resources; my army is excellent. I will conquer Syria at will. Abdullah Pasha trembles behind its walls since we spread news that my son Ibrahim was preparing an expedition against him. I have great things in my head, but it still takes ten years to mature this! Meanwhile, I conquer each year several thousand feddans of desert, I dig canals, I sell cotton, I plant mulberry trees, olive trees; Egypt will have nothing to envy Europe [in] and I will give you everything your climate refuses you.719

Working from this source, it was clear that the Egyptian governor felt free to speak his mind.720 Not only was he not attempting to keep his plans for an upcoming Syrian invasion a secret, but the extreme frankness of the vali in his conversation with a still junior French diplomat is quite striking in the range of issues covered. Firstly, 

719 Ibid, 73.
720 While it is difficult to ascertain the historical reliability of any source, particularly diplomatic ones, Fumel at the time was a young diplomat of low standing, who frequently served as a translator in the vali’s audiences. Considering the relative freedom of the vali in his divan, and the relatively low-standing of Fumel at the time, (who did not pose much threat to the pasha) this research argues that Fumel is as credible as can be ascertained.
in the final twist of fate in the two Ottoman officials’ complicated relationship, Hüsrev, the standard-bearer for the traditional practices of the empire’s patronage systems, was looking to assuage his relationship with the governor, whose rule he had vehemently opposed for so long. One could argue that this case explicitly demonstrates the fact that even so prominent officials as Hüsrev Pasha had lost faith in the Porte’s administrative choices and the reform attempts of Mahmud II. In effect, Constantinople’s staunchest supporters were attempting to establish external safety nets, beyond the imperial divan. Secondly, the personal disdain of the Egyptian governor towards the sultan and the reforms he was attempting to introduce was entirely palpable.

Moreover, Mehmed Ali’s choice of words to express his discontentment with the reforms is particularly striking. The vali’s objection was not to the idea of reform, but rather the lack of viable administrative alternatives presented. This point demonstrated that Mehmed Ali was engaged in the political developments of both Ottoman Iraq and the Balkans, and suggested that he was looking for alternative alliances, both economic and military means to continue his rule.

There is a surprising dearth of documentation regarding Mehmed Ali and the French expedition to Algiers in the Ottoman records. We know however, by way of French and some British sources, that the Porte was entirely aware of Mehmed Ali’s ongoing negotiations. In fact, Polignac’s consul to Constantinople, General Armand Charles Guilleminot, had gone so far as to personally inform the Porte of a possible collaboration between his government and the vali of Egypt. This decision to inform the imperial divan was carried out against the explicit wishes of Mehmed Ali, and in retrospect, poor planning on the part of the French diplomat, as it further undermined
the idea of cooperating with the French for Mehmed Ali.

British intervention eventually discouraged the *vali* from the participation in the campaign. By that time however, the likelihood of a French-Egyptian coalition had dwindled, in part because of hostile stance of the Porte and the pasha’s gridlock in the negotiations with the French.\(^{721}\)

This is not to imply that the English had an easy go of convincing the Egyptian governor. For example, on March 7, 1830, the British Consul Barker arrived to Cairo with instructions from London. News regarding the protracted talks between Paris and Cairo had reached both Istanbul and London. Upon being received by Mehmed Ali, Barker argued that France’s plan was untenable—in part because the governor had not received an order from the sultan—allowing for such an expedition.

In response, Mehmed Ali burst into laughter, not even trying to conceal his contempt for Mahmud II. When the consul mentioned ‘other European powers,’ Mehmed Ali interrupted: “Stop, stop! You say that other European states, meaning at least two, [would object.] Please, in all goodness name a single [European] power whose interests would object to having the North African regencies fall under my control. Is it Sardinia, Naples or perhaps Austria?\(^{722}\) The governor had intentionally enumerated three of the European countries most affected by the continuation of the corsair campaigns. The efforts of the British diplomat had clearly been ineffective.

Ultimately, however, Barker’s efforts proved successful. Nonetheless, the root cause of the breakdown of French-Egyptian negotiations had more to do with French obduracy than British diplomatic savvy. The sticking point was, and remained, the four gunships. Mehmed Ali wanted a navy after all, and four eighty-cannon vessels

\(^{721}\) *ibid.*, xci–xcii.
\(^{722}\) *ibid.*, lxxxvii–xcii.
would be an important addition to his fleet. But Polignac refused any such concession. The pasha stood firm demanding the ships; and in an effort to appease him, at the further expense of the Algerian dey, the French offered two Algerian vessels that had docked in Alexandria under blockade. Since it was the French navy that had set up the blockade of Algiers, Polignac and Foreign Ministry argued, they were within their maritime rights to retain the ships.\footnote{ibid.} Thus, in an interesting development, the grandiose political project involving several political centers in the region and beyond, fizzled out and concluded in a claim regarding two dilapidated Algerian vessels that had just barely survived the Battle of Navarino.

**Delay Tactics**

The discussions surrounding these two Algerian ships, effectively stranded off the waters of Alexandria, offer us an important insight into Mehmed Ali’s continued interest in Algiers and the consequences it would have for his political ambitions in the region. In his work on Russian seapower during the early nineteenth century, the historian Daly wrote:

\begin{quote}
[Mehmed Ali] was aware that Sultan [Mehmed II] wanted the combined [Ottoman]-Egyptian naval forces to winter in Constantinople, but he told the British consul that his ships would accompany the Sultan's squadron only as far as the Dardanelles. [Mehmed Ali] coyly explained the previous delay had been due to the presence of two Algerian warships that had limped back from Navarino and taken refuge in Alexandria from the French blockade of Algiers; he was worried that the French might try to seize the two vessels. In reply, [Mahmud II] simply expanded his demand to include the two refugee vessels. The ships [Mahmud II] wanted returned were one 74-gun line ship, six frigates, six corvettes and four brigs; during their two-years’ idleness in Alexandria, [Mehmed Ali] had had no maintenance work done on them, as he conserved his supplies for his own vessels.\footnote{John C. K. Daly, *Russian Seapower and “the Eastern Question” 1827–41* (New York: Springer, 1991), 42-43.}
\end{quote}

However, Daly’s treatment of the events described above was based entirely
on western—namely British—accounts. In as much, it failed to depict the full context of the events or the French reluctance to provide the vali with gunships. After all, even Anglophone scholarship on Mehmed Ali and his potential alliance with the French explicitly state that Polignac’s government was trying to buy Egyptian support with Algerian means.\footnote{Dodwell, \textit{The Founder of Modern Egypt}.}

By turning to Egyptian fonds we gain a much broader perspective of these events, and of the actual context of Mehmed Ali’s efforts to curb the Porte’s influence post-Navarino. From Cairene records, we know that Mehmed Ali openly discussed the matter of the Algerian ships from as early as spring 1829.\footnote{Mehmed Ali to the Kammakam the Sadara, 25 Shawwal 1244 DWQ, Khedival Folios.} Similarly, from Ottoman records we learn that the Porte knew that Mehmed Ali was delaying the departure of the vessels, technically still under French embargo, because of his ongoing efforts to negotiate with Polignac’s government.\footnote{HAT Dosya No: 276 Gömlek No: 16237}

In a letter to his \textit{kethüda}, Nacib Efendi, the Egyptian governor wrote, much as Daly had noted, that the two ships had been used in both the Battle of Navarino and the vali’s own Morean campaigns, had sought safe haven in the Alexandrine docks because of the ongoing French blockade of their home province. However, the ships’ seaworthiness, the general state of the dockyards, and the assessment that Mehmed Ali shared with his lieutenant in the Asitane diverged significantly from Daly’s account above.

A letter, sent to the Ottoman center on 30 April 1829, was actually the first of several communications to discuss the condition of the two ships. From it, we learn that Mehmed Ali received a directive to have the fleet in the Alexandrian shipyards
rendezvous with the imperial flotilla off the coast of Morea. Within the chronology presented in the document we learn that the Porte wrote to Mehmed Ali ordering that he dispatch the ships of the western fleet docked in Alexandria. From there, the ships were to meet with the vessels under the command of the Kapudan Pasha and were likely to be deployed in the ongoing Ottoman war effort against the Russians.728

These two points, the pasha’s reference to the western fleet, rather than an Egyptian one, and the ongoing war with the Russian Empire are of critical significance. They portray the political situation between the vali, his western neighbors, and the Porte as far more complicated and nuanced than Daly’s depiction would suggest.

First, the Porte was not simply looking to winter the North African fleet in Constantinople, nor was it communicating with Mehmed Ali regarding the future deployment of just the Egyptian fleet. Rather, the sultan’s officials approached the vali ordering him to deploy all the available ships, both from the regencies and Egyptian ones. The vessels were to sail first to London, collect an agent, and then return to the Anatolian coast, where they would ultimately rendezvous with the fleet under the command of the Kapudan Pasha to engage in the ongoing Russo-Ottoman war.

Cairo and Constantinople were discussing the dispatching the entire western fleet from the Alexandrine shores to join the war effort. The distinction is an important one, since Mehmed Ali applied the term himself in order to refer to the compendium of ships belonging to the various North African provinces: Egypt, Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers. In as much, we can deduce that the Ottoman Porte was

728 ibid.
directing the Egyptian governor to deploy all ships available, including the ones not directly under his authority, to meet the imperial navy. The use of this label not only encapsulated the argument of North African naval cohesion in the lead up to the governor’s invasion of Ottoman Syria but also contextualized, and perhaps - from the point of view of Mehmed Ali - justified, the delay in the deployment of the Alexandria-based fleet, as he was not only referring to Egyptian ships.

Further clarifying his position as a regional power broker, Mehmed Ali went on to speak about the situation of a few Tunisian ships that had, under his son, reached Navarino, and remained there since. In an effort to regroup the dispersed remnants of the North African navy, post the naval losses, the vali sent Tunisian mariners to retrieve what they could of the remaining vessels. However, their efforts proved largely ineffective, as the end result of these efforts was the subsequent collection of a solitary abandoned ship, off the waters of the bay, which the Tunisians had returned to Alexandria. Further elaborating his position, Mehmed Ali informed the Asitane that he purchased and rented several other ships from Tunisian and Tripolitan merchants, and that they were being prepared and kitted for the upcoming journey.\textsuperscript{729}

On the same day that Mehmed Ali wrote his agent, the governor also addressed the kaymakam of the grand vizier in the High Porte. From this second letter we learn that the Egyptian vali received an imperial order where the Porte requested a military inventory of Mehmed Ali’s reserve troops and naval holdings; the sultan and the grand vizier insisted to have him dispatch the fleet from Alexandria, as well as to dispatch several battalions of ground forces.

\textsuperscript{729} Mehmed Ali to the Kathuda fo the Acienta 25 Shawwal 1244, DWQ, Khedival Folios and Mehmed Ali to the Kammakam of Sadara, 18 Rabia Afkhar 1245 DWQ, Khedival Folios.
Mahmud II also requested the Egyptian governor send four battalions of troops aboard the vessels from Alexandria to Anatolia. However, their intended voyage was not a direct sail to meet the Kapudan Pasha. Rather, Mehmed Ali was ordered to dispatch the fleet, send it to Izmir, collect an agent of the Porte, and from there sail to London, where it was to rendezvous with two warships that the Porte had commissioned in for the ongoing war against Russia, and from there meet with the with the sultan’s vessels.\footnote{ibid.}

The Egyptian governor still had to respond to the sultanic \textit{amr} nevertheless. The \textit{vali} claimed to have sent a few of his captains to Alexandria to prepare the vessels. The captains in turn reported that the two Algerian ships had remained in Egypt for fear of capture by French forces. According to them, the ships that had dropped anchor in the coastal city’s waters were ill-equipped for the upcoming journey that the Porte had ordered. In a similar vein, Mehmed Ali expressed his concerns about an expected high death rate among the soldiers that would be sent to Anatolia. The \textit{vali} claimed that long journey, considerable foreign presence in both Alexandria and Izmir compounded the high risk of disease and would heavy toll on the troops, leading to the death of a quarter or even a third of the soldiers and rendering the others unable to fight. In an effort to deflect the wrath of the Sultan, Mehmed Ali offered to send money rather than troops.\footnote{Mehmed Ali to the Kammakam el Sadar on 11 Shawwal 1245, DWQ, Khedival Folios.}

In this sense, Daly’s assessment of the Egyptian governor’s position is correct. The Egyptian governor was indeed stalling, and had become largely disinterested in providing support to the various military commitments of Mahmud II.

\footnote{ibid.}
\footnote{Mehmed Ali to the Kammakam el Sadar on 11 Shawwal 1245, DWQ, Khedival Folios.}
This foot-dragging continued throughout the autumn of 1829. On October 17, 1829, the governor wrote again to Nacib Efendi. At a convenient moment, after the conclusion of the Russo-Ottoman War, Mehmed Ali informed his agent that he sent a handful of vessels from Alexandria to the Asitane. However, again, the governor held back the Algerian ships, as well as the *Fayd Maragh*, the imperial ship of the Porte. Mehmed Ali argued that the delay stemmed from the necessity of more repairs, and blamed the French blockade on his inability to send the Algerian ships.

However, arguably the most convincing pieces of information in support of the hypothesis that the vali tried to extricate himself and his forces from serving Mahmud II in the war against Russia were the letters sent by Mehmed Ali to the başbuğ of the fleet and the Kapudan Pasha in first days of November 1829. The governor finally sent the ships. However, their departure date conveniently coincided with a six-week lag after the ratification of the Treaty of Adrianople. The governor, effectively, waited for peace to be brokered between the two imperial parties before he sent orders to have the vessels deployed the Porte.732

In the first letter, addressed to Ibrahim Pasha, the başbuğ of the Imperial Fleet, the governor outlined in great detail the number of ships kitted and soldiers sent to the Asitane. As per the letter, he informed the Porte that the galleon of *Burgh Zafar* had been manned with a crew of 400 sailors, the *Kaid Zafar*, and the *Fawwz Nasir* each were assigned 200 men; the *Fayd Maragh*, the imperial vessel which Mehmed Ali had delayed since the spring, was also deployed with a crew of 240 sailors. Further, the governor equipped the *Kiwan Bahri* with 230 hands, the *Asar Nasrat* with 90, the corvette the *Faid Bakhsa* was manned with another 70, as was the *Sammeret Fituh*,

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732 Mehmed Ali to Ibrahim Pasha (not his son), the Başbuğ of the Imperial Fleet on 17 Jammad Evval 1245, DWQ, Khedival Folios.
Anwar Nasrat, Masrat Bahri, Sahieer Safar, and the Hamay Bahri. Another corvette, the Anayet Haq had a party of 60 crewmembers, while the Broek Ali Kapudan el’Ihambargi, the Kora Mostafa Kapaudan, the Nama Khada, Cilen Bahri, Nozdar and Hasan Kapudan were each manned with 30 seamen apiece. After several months’ delay, Mehmed Ali had sent at least twenty vessels that were manned with 1,790 sailors in total to winter with the sultan’s flotilla.

In addition to the vessels and men, Mehmed Ali also sent nine-hundred-thousand purses with Ahmed Bey Şukri to the Asitane. From the surviving records in Cairo, we also learn that Tunisian, Tripolitan, and Egyptian vessels, as well as shipments of grain and money continued to flow from Alexandria to Anatolia throughout the winter months of 1829.

Given the extent of the vessels and seamen sent to Anatolia, it was clear the pasha was engaging in delay tactics with the Porte while expanding the scope of his navy. By the time the vali’s fleet had departed from Alexandrine waters, the two Algerian vessels that had been the point of so much contention had, as Daly noted, accompanied the governor’s fleet in their departure for Anatolia. Nevertheless, while the two ships remained in their post-Navarino state of dilapidation, however lack of repairs was neither due to the greed of the governor nor his antagonism towards the Porte.

Rather, as he was still in the heat of negotiations with the French about the four vessels he had originally requested from Paris, the vali was looking to have the French foot the bill for the ships’ overhaul. After all, if Polignac’s government was

733 ibid.
734 Mehmed Ali to the Governor of Kundia 7 Dul Qadda 1245, MA to the Kammakam the Grand Vizier, 15 Rabia Evval 1246 DWQ, Khedival Folios.
not going to provide him with the vessels from Paris, the very least they could do was to pay to repair the ones that they had already offered to Mehmed Ali.

**Political Upheaval in Tripoli**

Algiers was not the only province to experience massive political upheavals during the 1830s. The late 1820s brought a great deal of socio-political and economic trouble for the province of Tripoli and for the other two regencies of Tunis and Algiers. Troubles within the province were mounting for decades. The economic crisis started in the mid-1810s, was exacerbated political tensions, and contributed to the growing resentment towards the pasha’s increasing mismanagement in the 1820s. These difficulties effectively whittled away the already hollowed confidence in the bey’s capacity to govern, and in turn the ability of successor. Further undermining the Karamanlı leadership was the souring of relations among British, and Maltese, and the Tripolitan merchant class.

In 1828, one attack in particular aggravated relations between the communities. A handful of Maltese bankers, in the middle of a heated argument, attacked a young Tripolitan near the marina. The guards on duty rushed in to defend the boy, who was entirely outnumbered and only a teenager himself, and in the process proceeded beat the Maltese aggressors to a bloody pulp. In response, the British consul Warrington demanded reparations on behalf of the agents, who were under the protection of the British consulate. In turn, countless Tripolitans, including several Yusuf’s ministers, fumed in anger.

The mistreatment of the boy at the hands of the grown men, and Warrington’s subsequent demands, which were overwhelming perceived as European entitlement and crystallized into an open antagonism against the foreign residents of the city.
Yusuf attempted to intervene and cool tempers and granted the frustrated population the safe release of Tripolitan soldiers from the castle prison.\footnote{ibid.}

But the die was cast. Attacks on Maltese residents, as well as on members of the British diplomatic corps only increased. By 1830, two years after the incident, diplomats and their families had also fallen victim to harassment and abuse. For example, Consul Warrington along with his son Frederick, and his daughter were openly attacked while walking in the city walls. The British threatened to pull their emissaries from the province. Anger festered and the pasha’s ministers refused British demands for redress. Yusuf Pasha attempted to curtail the rampant social disorder, but his efforts were mostly futile.

**The Tipping Point**

The conditions of public disorder soon spilled beyond the walls of Tripoli and spread to the already disgruntled Bedouin communities of the western region of Cyrenaica and the southern region of Fezzan. Soon, two of the most prominent figures in Yusuf’s administration, Mohammed Beitul Mal and Hassuna D’Ghies began to discuss alternative candidates to replace Yusuf Pasha, and to restructure the Tripolitan government.\footnote{Ibid, also see, Ali Abdullatif Ahmida, *The Making of Modern Libya: State Formation, Colonization, and Resistance, Second Edition* (SUNY Press, 2011).} Facing increased pressure from the members of the *divan*, the pasha was nearing seventy and no longer possessed the wherewithal to withstand either the growing rebellions within his province or the dogged ambition of his son Ali, whom he had publicly repudiated after an earlier attempt to assassinate him. Still, the abdication of Yusuf triggered yet another round of dynastic infighting between Yusuf’s successor Ali, who was challenged by the rival claims of his nephew.
Mohammed.

Mohammed’s father and namesake was Yusuf’s eldest son and had died in Egypt after a long period of exile. However, Mohammed claimed that his father was the rightful heir and thus the stewardship of Tripoli should pass on to him rather than to his uncle Ali. The fight for control of Tripoli continued among the Karamanlı men.

**The Roots of Trouble: Egypt and Tripoli**

Compounding the governor’s troubles, Yusuf Pasha’s relationship with the Egyptian vali had also begun to sour. In 1822-3, difficulty between the two rules came to a head when Yusuf Pasha offered refuge to six Mamluks who had survived the Egyptian vali’s Citadel massacre and since fled to Kurdufan, in Central Sudan. However, with Mehmed Ali’s Sudan campaign, the Mamluks soon found themselves facing the same devastating political wrath of the governor that had let him to massacre the cavalrymen a decade prior. Fleeing first to Darfur, and then to Wadai, the remaining Mamluks ultimately were granted asylum by Yusuf, who gave them his permission to travel north from Wadai to settle in Fezzan, where they remained under Tripolitan protection.\(^{737}\) This frustrated Mehmed Ali, and he would soon adopt tactics, in many ways similar to those of Hammuda Pasha, in an effort not only to undermine, but entirely overthrow the Tripolitan regime.

The tradition of offering protection to Egyptian political dissidents began under the short-lived administration of Yusuf’s older brother, Ahmed, in the late eighteenth century. While Ahmed managed to retain power for only a couple of months following the death of his father, the practice of granting asylum to Egyptian political exiles continued throughout the turn of the century. Equally, the practice of

\(^{737}\) Ibid, 128-130. Also see, Aharoni, *The Pasha’s Bedouin*. 333
granting safe haven to Tripolitan exiles was also maintained in Cairo.  

Ahmed Karamanlı himself had little choice but to seek refuge in Egypt. Similarly, Yusuf’s eldest son, Mohammad fled Derna after his attempted uprising with the Jawazi Bedouins was brutally crushed by his brother. In Cairo, Yusuf’s exiled heir apparent sought the protection of Mehmed Ali and spent the majority of his remaining days within the city’s walls.

The political asylum seekers who fled from Egypt to Tripoli however, were typically much less powerful than those who fled to Egypt. In the 1810s, Mehmed Ali’s attempts to expand his control to the outer reaches of Egyptian territory instigated a great deal of political antagonism among the Bedouin communities of the Western Desert. Depending on circumstances and the reach of the vali’s forces, Bedouins found safe haven in Cyrenaica, where they could avoid both their forcible conscription into the pasha’s army and the various tax levies issued from Cairo.

The Awlad Suleiman, whose lands straddled the divide between western Egypt and Cyrenaica made full use of this tactic. However, from Cairo’s perspective it was one thing for the Karamanlı governor to turn a blind eye towards Bedouin horsemen evading taxes, but something entirely different to offer political sanctuary to the surviving members of the Mamluk households that had participated in the administration of Egypt since the thirteenth century.

In response, Mehmed Ali turned to his army, as well as to his alliances with the Hanadi and the Awlad Ali Bedouins. In 1826, Egyptian forces totaling 2,000 soldiers, with the likely involvement of the exiled Mohammed Bey, crossed the

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738 See previous chapters for Yusuf’s brother Ahmed, his son Mohammed, as well as eventually Murad Rai’s and Mohammed D’Ghiès.
border in Cyrenaica and took the garrison outpost of Tobruk, but did not advance further. Nevertheless, the annexation of this small outpost with a well-protected natural harbor was enough to cause concern in the divan of Tripoli. Much like his father before him, Yusuf found himself having to cope with a series of cross-border incursions, this time from Egypt rather than Tunis which, while never actively undermining his continued rule in the province, were able to generate a great deal of insecurity within the walls of the Tripolitan castle and beyond.

Egyptian border incursions continued throughout the end of the decade. Each time forces would capture exiles who had fled the government of Mehmed Ali, as well as loot and cause a great deal of trouble in the western spaces of Tripolitania, but never venture further into the regency. These maneuvers served to intimidate the Tripolitan bey rather than to expand the reach of Mehmed Ali’s imperial control. After all, despite the weakened state of the Egyptian army in the post-Navarino late 1820s, the overthrow of the aging Yusuf Pasha would not have been of tremendous military cost to Cairo. Rather, by mirroring the measures used by Hammuda Pasha against the equally enfeebled Ali Karamanli Pasha nearly half a century before, Cairo was able to maintain a relatively constant level of political uncertainty and, in doing so, tacitly undermine the Karamani governor. In effect, the Egyptian vali was looking to curtail, but not entirely compromise, the political viability of Tripoli. These measures were overwhelmingly successful. Each time the vali’s troops crossed the border, panic resonated through broader Tripolitania.

The Shocks of 1830

740 Folayan, Tripoli during the Reign of Yusuf Pasha Qaramanli,122-125.
741 ibid.
742 ibid.
In February 1830, the confidence in Yusuf Pasha’s continued rule plummeted. Months prior to the landing of 34,000 French troops in Sidi Fredj, just west of the Bay of Algiers in June that year, news reached Tripoli that Mehmed Ali was planning an invasion of Tripoli and Tunis. The news, which had arrived via different diplomatic and mercantile channels, shattered the remaining confidence in the aging governor. First to divulge the information was the Sardinian ambassador to Tripoli, who revealed that the news had reached him by way of the French ambassador in Florence. According to him, Mehmed Ali in alliance with France was planning to seize Tripoli, Tunis and Algiers. If this was not enough to ensure panic, later that month Jewish Tripolitan merchants who conducted extensive commerce in the Grand Duchy of Tuscany also returned to the harbor of the city. They quickly informed everyone that they had been forced to abandon their purchases and belongings in Livorno.743

The city was in uproar. Yusuf mobilized seventy thousand men, under the Georgian ra’is almarsa Mustafa Gurgi, and dispatched them to the Cyrenaica. Hajj Muhammed Baid al Malk and Sidi Umar marched to Bomba and Sirte in order to protect the territory from possible invasion. The governor’s divan met frequently in secret meetings in an effort to strategize a response.744 Further undermining public confidence, Yusuf immediately imposed a general tax on the population to raise the two million Spanish dollars he needed to mobilize the Tripolitan navy and army.745 While the invasion never manifested, the breaking point for the continued governorship of Yusuf Karamanlı Pasha came shortly after the June 1830 French

745 ibid.
invasion of neighboring Algiers. By then, tensions in the province were on a hair-trigger about the possibility, if not the eventuality, of invasion and even the governor’s most powerful allies had lost faith in his continued ability to lead the province.

**Removing the Pasha**

The broader population of Tripolitania had had enough and the unresolved political revolts of the 1820s flared up again. By 1831, the Gharian Amazigh united forces with the Saif an-Nasir clan under Abdul Jalil as well as the Awlad Suleiman, demanding a sharp reduction in tribute rates. Under the leadership of Abdul Jalil, the Saif an-Nasir Bedouins join forces with a compendium of Bedouins and Amazigh horsemen. Collectively, under the organization of Abdul Jalil the prepared to face Yusuf’s ground forces. Numbered between twenty-to-fifty thousand combined forces, they were not only strong enough to push back Yusuf’s men, but to advance the territory under their control from Ghademes south to Bornu and Hauasaland to the northern frontier of Fezzan. By the summer of 1831, the Karamanlı pasha had lost control of over a third of the Tripolitan province and access to the caravan routes of the trans-Saharan networks.

Compounding Yusuf’s troubles, Abdul Jalil proved himself to be a skilled negotiator. When British consul Warrington arrived in Ben Ulid to negotiate peace terms on behalf of the pasha in December, Abdul Jalil offered the entire region of Fezzan to the British in exchange for their support. The Bedouin leader’s argument was that since the French had taken Algiers, the British would be able to use Fezzan as a bulwark to limit the further spread of French expansion, and maintain their

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747 ibid.
colonial interests in the Chad basin. Negotiations not only did not favor the Tripolitan pasha but also represented a new chapter in European imperial competition.

By the following summer, the highest members of Yusuf’s divan met in secret to force the abdication of the bey. After extensive deliberations, the ministers Hajj Muhammed Baitul Mal, Yusuf’s brother in law and the former ra’is al marsa, Murad Ra’is and Muhammed D’Ghies chose to replace Yusuf with his son Ali. On 16 August 1832, a tearful Yusuf lead his final divan, summoned his son and pronounced:

My dear son and successor, I now take off the heavy burden I carry on my shoulders and throw it upon you, preferring to live tranquil and to see you on my thrown. I recommend you to act strenuously to fulfill the laws of the [Quran,] of our prophet and not to govern by caprice: the fall and sin of my government are owing to this.

In one of his first decisions after ascending to power, Ali distanced himself from Warrington, the British consul, who - many Tripolitan dignitaries believed - had for a long time exerted adverse influence on the deposed Yusuf Karamanlı Pasha. One consequence of this shift was the young governor’s newfound alliance with France, which sparked the struggle between French and British diplomacies for influence in the province. In this context, both great powers threw their support behind rival claimants for power in Tripoli, Ali and his nephew Mohammed.

The British Warrington wrote in the autumn of 1832, “If Ali succeeds this place will be no more than a colony of France as the advantages would be derived without the odium of expenses.”

A great deal of backstage maneuvering and manifestations of rivalry between France and Britain took place over the next eighteen months, to the point where, on 29 April 1834 addition of the London Times ran an article that wrote

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748 ibid.
749 ibid.
750 ibid.
“… the British have a secret design—first to overturn and confuse, and then to occupy the regency of Tripoli.”\footnote{The Times, London 29 April 1834.} When the political conditions with the province had so blatantly devolved to the point of a published discussion of a Tripolitan invasion by British forces, Mahmud II and the Porte stepped in.

**Ottoman Response**

In September 1834, the Sublime Porte sent an envoy, Mehmed Çekir, the Private Secretary of the Seraglio, as the private envoy from the Sultan dispatched to resolve the dispute between Ali and Mohammed. After a series of meetings with officials of the divan, the sultan’s representative gave a firman to Ali, in which the Porte recognized his claim and his father’s abdication.\footnote{Greenhow, The History and Present Condition of Tripoli, 80.} The firman provided Ali with the official recognition of the Ottoman sultan, and “the high honors and authority of a representative of our brilliant royalty by conferring upon [him] with the royal letter the rank of beylerbey and Prince Ruler of the said Regency of Tarabulsgarb.”\footnote{ibid.}

However, as social unrest grew in intensity, by September 1834 not even an official decree, written personally by Mahmud II, was enough to stop the infighting and public disorder. Mohammed’s supporters refused to acknowledge the firman, and while the presence of the sultan’s representative in the province sufficed to prevent an open aggression, the fighting resumed immediately after Mehmed Çekir set sail to return to the imperial capital, and continued throughout the winter.

Interestingly, while there is a pronounced absence of Ottoman documents on the French invasion of Algiers in 1830, the Porte documented the Sultan’s re-conquest of Tripoli. From the surviving records, we learn that the sultan received near weekly
updates regarding on the ongoing infighting between Ali, Mohammed, and their respective imperial backers. By winter 1834, the Porte turned to the bey of Tunis, Hussein II, in an effort to intercede. Similarly, Ottoman ambassadors in Paris and in London were both working to curtail the efforts of their European counterparts in the proxy battle between Ali and his nephew.

Moreover, it is from the Ottoman records that we know that during the political crisis of 1834-1835, Tunis supplied Tripoli with the much needed grain shipments to off-set the ongoing food-shortages. In a striking contrast to the role the Tunisian bey and his support of the French invasion of Algiers, during the Tripolitan dynastic struggle, the Husainid governance adopted a different stance.

After the French invasion of Algeria in 1830, Tunis found itself in a precarious socio-economic position. Hussein II was forced rely on loans from European merchants in order to sustain the province, and withstand the shockwaves that accompanied the political shift from the rule of the Algerian dey to the French imperial control and the restored monarchy’s subsequent attempts to curtail the political resistance of Abdul Qadir within the entirety of the province. For Tunis, this meant that the mounting European debt allowed for expanded European involvement in both the political affairs of the province as well as its economy. It was during this time that, Montana noted, a particularly salient resurgence in the, then clandestine, slave trade through the Air-Kano route. However, this shift back towards the trans-Saharan slave trade did little to compensate the province for the lack of previous maritime revenues as well as the agricultural reforms that effectively weakened both

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754 HAT Dosya No: 1173 Gömlek No: 46419
755 HAT Dosya No: 1174 Gömlek No: 46430
756 HAT Dosya No: 454 Gömlek No: 22443
the provinces' grain production.\textsuperscript{757}

Consequently, by 1835, the Tunisian administration of Hussein II was far too preoccupied with its own internal troubles to involve itself in its eastern neighbor’s dynastic succession crisis. The Porte’s response was hindered by its preoccupation with the growing Russian influence in Moldavia and Wallachia, where the Russian administration imposed new Organic Statutes, which restructured the principalities’ institutions.\textsuperscript{758} While Istanbul recognized these reforms as early as January 1834, the situation continued to be a matter of concern in the following year. Thus, the Porte wanted a swift resolution to the matter of Tripoli. Mahmud II chose a strategy very similar to the one implemented by Ali Burghol nearly fifty years before.

The sultan sent an emissary, armed with a \textit{firman} and relatively small but nevertheless substantial fleet, and reclaimed Tripoli for the Porte. In the narrative of his travels in North Africa, Robert Greenhow offered his readers a detailed description of the 1835, entirely peaceful, Ottoman recapture of Tripolitania. Greenhow wrote:

\begin{quote}
In the spring of 1835 reports were circulating in Tripoli that a Turkish armament was about to be sent to that place from Constantinople; some supposed it was for the purpose of overthrowing all opposition to Ali; others hinted that this isn't meant to take possession of the country... The letter opinion was confirmed by all the European Journals; and indeed it could scarcely have been expected that the Ottoman government, which at that moment seem to need all its forces and funds for its own defense, could have been disposed to send a large and expensive expedition for the mere purpose of settling a dispute with regard to the sovereignty of a distant country.

On 20\textsuperscript{th} of May [1835] Mohammed [Ç]ekir returned to Tripoli where he announced the Turkish squadron as near, and assuring Ali that it was sent
\end{quote}
entirely for his benefit, advising him to show his gratitude to the Sultan, by the liberal distribution of presents among its officers. The Ottoman ships appeared on the evening of the 25th and in the course of that night the whole armament consisting of one ship of the line, five frigates two sloops, two brigs, a schooner, a cutter and ten transports anchored in the roads and harbor, without any opposition either on the part of the Pasha or his rival. The next morning presence of fresh provisions were sent to the ships from the [Mohammed’s supporters] as well as from the town... On the 27th of more than four thousand Turkish soldiers with nineteen cannons and four mortars had entered the city, which was thus placed entirely at their discretion. On the morning of the 28th, Ali again went on board the Admiral’s ship, in order as it was understood to accompany the officers and the commander of the trips to the city; two hours afterwards he guns of the ships announced that the high personages were on their way to shore, and the barges supposed to contain them were discovered approaching the water gate. The Turkish Admiral and General landed and attended by their guards entered the castle; the Pasha however did not appear; it was soon ascertained that he was a prisoner onboard the flagship. At four o’clock the sultan’s firman was publicly read, by which the General Mustapha Nedgib was appointed pasha of the Province of Tripoli...

The Arabs as soon they were certain of Ali’s imprisonment, and of their own freedom from danger, abandon their tents and batteries and flocked to the town… With a few followers that two young [surviving] Princes then betook themselves to flight. Hamet succeeded in reaching the frontiers of Egypt but [Mohammed] overpowered by the sudden disappointment of all his hopes, blew his own brains out with a blunderbuss on the day after he left Tripoli; at least such with the account of his death given by his attendance. Ali and his Minister Mohammed D’Ghies were sent to Constantinople…the old Pasha Yusuf who appear to be sinking into idiocy remains in honorable durance in the castle, where [Hajj Mohammed Beitul Mal] is allowed to attend. Thus has the Caramanli family been the second time deprived of the sovereignty of Tripoli, which will not probably be regained by one of their name.

Unlike Burghol however, this time the Ottoman authority managed to retain control over Tripoli. Ottoman fears of losing even more territory to European imperial powers grew after 1830, leading the Porte to impose a new form of imperialism, this time modeled rather closely on the European model of colonialism, to the territories of broader Tripolitania. However, the ties between the North African provinces and the Porte, and as well as the Ottoman territories ties with the Sahel not only remained viable, but grew deeper as most of the Awlad Suleiman Bedouins were forced into

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759 Greenhow, The History and Present Condition of Tripoli, 80.
either the Lake Chad Basin or into western Egypt.\textsuperscript{760}

\textsuperscript{760}Minawi, \textit{The Ottoman Scramble for Africa}, 47. For more information on the Awlad Suleiman and in their historical exchanges in Egypt, please see Aharoni, \textit{The Pasha's Bedouin}. For records from the Egyptian National Archives, see Mehmed Ali to the Kathûda in Egypt, 7 Dhul ‘Quadia 1247, DWQ, Khedival Folios.
EPILOGUE

The fifty years straddling the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries constituted a period of turmoil, change, and connectivity among the Ottoman provinces of the North African coast. Across the southern seaboard of the Mediterranean, regional elites faced new challenges, were forced to accommodate new actors into their political networks, and carefully navigate across the stormy waters of local, regional and imperial politics. Some – as in the case of Algerian ta'ife, and the Karamanlıs – failed to retain their positions, others – as Mehmed Ali – succeeded in their ambitions.

However, until now, these actors have remained largely on the sidelines of most historical analysis, which presented them at the losing end and as the unadaptive victims of the unravelling of the Ottoman Empire during the emergence of new imperial idiom in the region. Spatial and temporal compartmentalization of North African history led scholars to see the North African provinces as peripheral actors, fighting a losing battle against European powers seeking to establish and expand their hold on the southern coast of the basin.

However, as I have shown in the present study, North African actors did not exist in a vacuum. Rather, they maintained and expanded the existing political networks, which in turn bound Tunis, Tripoli, and Egypt to one another, the Ottoman Empire, the broader Mediterranean, and the African Sahel. In spite of its position as an imperial periphery, the Maghreb and – more broadly speaking, the Arab provinces of the ‘well-protected domains’ – increasingly participated in the interconnected world of the turn of the nineteenth century. The governors and elites of the region demonstrated the adaptability of the North African province by refusing to remain
locked in their traditional institutional and political frameworks.

Rather, these actors demonstrated socio-political innovation, adopted one another’s tactics and actively sought the support and resources necessary for their political survival. By expanding both their vertical and horizontal ties, these actors adjusted their strategies, going far beyond the binary opposition of the center and the periphery and in doing so thoroughly restructured the political map of North Africa and the Ottoman Empire.

This dissertation has argued that this new framework evolved along two major axes of socio-political engagement, which have been generally neglected in the historiography of Maghreb at the brink of modernity: one vertical, one horizontal. While the Maghreb remained a constitutive parts of the Ottoman sultans ‘well-protected domains,’ the link between the imperial center and its westernmost possessions has remained largely neglected by scholars, who perceived the Maghreb as an imperial hinterland, beyond effective control of the Sublime Porte.

However, as I have shown in the present analysis, Ottoman authority loomed large over Maghreb and the policies and strategies of North African political actors—in their various machinations and tactics. Moreover, from the perspective of the Porte, and the empire’s ongoing commitment of resources to ward off the Russian imperial threat, Ottoman officials did not simply leave their African provinces to their own devices. Rather, as this dissertation has demonstrated, authorities in Constantinople frequently called on the support of Maghrebi fleets and intervened in the diplomatic and military affairs of the North African provinces.

While this relationship was often far from smooth and involved constant bargaining between central and peripheral actors, the Ottoman presence in the region
was far from negligent, and constituted a force that western as well as regional, diplomats penetrating the region had to account for.

In effect, this vertical axis was complemented by a horizontal one, with networks of socio-political engagement crisscrossing the region itself. The analysis of this research has shown a complex web of communication circuits, with patronage and cooperation ties straddling the region’s boundaries. However, these networks remained largely ignored by scholars, both western and North African alike. In the face of various geopolitical and internal pressures, the governors of North African provinces intensified communication with each other, trying to forge alliances, secure their rule and expand their influence in the region. Moreover, this growth of a “networking society”\(^{761}\) was by no means restricted to the powerholders, but included a variety of actors, which rarely made their way into the political histories of the region, be they Islamic scholars, corsairs or Bedouin leaders.

This complex geography of human agents challenges the established view, which regarded the affairs of Ottoman North Africa in an insular manner, as self-contained traditional communities helpless in the face of the reshuffling of global political idioms. The shift of focus from the geopolitical understanding of provincial politics towards more nuanced multiple geographies of human agents allows us not only to reconnect the region and its shared history to the region and beyond during the critical temporal juncture, but also to posit it within the wider narrative of the *Age of Revolutions*.\(^{762}\)

Sandwiched between the Mediterranean and the Sahel, the Maghrebi provinces

\(^{761}\) Barkey, *Empire of Difference*, passim.

\(^{762}\) For similar discussion on the Ottoman Balkans, see Frederick F Anscombe, “The Balkan Revolutionary Age,” *The Journal of Modern History* 84, no. 3 (2012): 572–606.
saw both the sea of water and the sea of the desert as opportunities rather than obstacles. The ebb and flow of the *corso*, attempts at tightening control over the hinterland and North African expansionist ventures into the Sahel, were all closely connected and represented the North African provinces’s response to the changing environment.

Apart from the north-south axis between the waves of Mediterranean and the dunes of the Sahel, the analysis has brought to light the importance of east-west connections that bound the Maghrebi provinces to the emergent political power of Mehmed Ali. Scholars of North Africa and the Ottoman Empire have generally approached Egyptian history in isolation from that of its western neighbors. In contrast to the peripheral status of Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli, Egypt constituted an empire-wide center, second only to Istanbul. Under the dynamic leadership of Mehmed Ali, the *vali* himself emerged as a powerful adversary to the Sublime Porte. However, the narratives of his political ascendancy have generally underplayed Egypt’s connections to the Maghreb, instead focusing on its Syrian and Hijazi policy.

As I have argued throughout the present study, the re-examination of sources provides us with a different narrative: one of a complex and multilayered nexus of political, economic and social ties between Egypt and Maghrebi provinces. With the previously hegemonic Algiers in decline and the Sublime Porte locked in a series of debilitating wars against the Russian Empire, the Egyptian *vali* became the dominant presence along the Mediterranean southern seaboard. At the same time, the relationship was far from one-sided, since Mehmed Ali was dependent on the regencies’ fleets to project his power across the Eastern Mediterranean. Obviously, the relationship between Egypt and its western neighbors was fraught with frequent
conflict, but there is no doubt that the two parties remained dependent on each other for resources and manpower.

This interdependency of North African provinces forces us to reconsider the way modern historiography has framed the region’s history, namely the implicit notion of Egyptian exceptionalism. While Mehmed Ali has emerged as a towering figure in the historiography of the Middle East, a closer analysis of the regional dynamics challenges the uniqueness of his policies throughout the period.

In fact, the interconnectedness of the North African seaboard contributed to the spread of political ideas, strategies and tactics, with provincial powerholders engaging in similar projects to crack down on internal opposition and expand their control inland towards the Sahel. Albeit extraordinarily successful, Mehmed Ali’s consolidation and expansion of his power constituted part of the wider set of North African dynamics, and the difference between him and his Maghrebi counterparts was quantitative rather than qualitative.

The existence of complex and tightly knit political networks in the region had tremendous circumstances at the point, when upheavals in Europe spilled across Mediterranean and the Middle East. Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars brought to the region a new set of diplomatic actors, who tried to expand influence of their respective governments in the region. While Eurocentric historiography has generally assumed that European diplomatic agents changed the very framework of North African policy, I argue that the dynamics played out in a different fashion.

While British, French, and even American officials had superior military forces to back up their claims; however, on the ground, it was the local patterns of connectivity and bargaining, to which these new actors had to adapt. Ottoman North
Africa constituted a hotchpotch of crisscrossing alliances, conflicts and patterns of engagement, to which European diplomats had to recourse to in order to further their agendas.

At the same time, the growing involvement of European powers in North Africa and the Mediterranean reshaped the regional political scene, as well as had a profound impact on economic fortunes of the provinces. In this respect, the famous 1798 French invasion of Egypt constituted a crucial event in regional history. In a similar manner, the crackdown on *corso* following the Congress of Vienna plunged the economies of Tunis and Tripoli into crisis, forcing their governors to restructure their respective economies.

However, the local response was not simply reactive, but constituted a blend of traditional patterns and local innovation. For instance, Egyptian and Tripolitan turn towards the Sahel and their expansion along slave trade routes was not a coincidence, but rather a conscious drive to increase revenue and political control as old sources of income dried up. Inspiration also came from the imperial center in Istanbul: the overhaul of the military by Hammuda Pasha, Yusuf Karamanli and Mehmed Ali reflected the parallel efforts of sultan Selim III *nizam-ı cedid* reforms. Taken together, these adjustments challenge the oft-repeated narrative of local, traditional institutional framework failing to adapt to the changing conditions at the dawn of the nineteenth century.

The impact of North Africa’s regional and cross-regional socio-political networks went far beyond the immediate political conjectures, shaping post-1830s period to a considerable degree. While the French invasion of Algiers in 1830 and the Ottoman reassertion of control over Tunis five years later constituted a watershed in
North African history, it did not mean that the regional networks of cooperation withered away.

On the contrary, their evolution and transformation eventually left an indelible mark on politics in the Maghreb under colonial rule. The most prominent example is the Sanussiyyah movement, whose roots we can trace to the North African turn towards the Sahel in the opening decades of the century. Obviously, the new idiom of colonialism in the southern Mediterranean had not created a blank slate and local actors used these networks in order to assert their agency vis-à-vis the authorities.

The survival and further evolution of those regional network forces us to rethink the traditional divide between early modern and modern history of the southern Mediterranean. Too often western and local have historiography alike presented the Ottoman rule in the Maghreb as the source of the region’s weakness at the break of the nineteenth century, and subsequent colonial expansion of European powers as its outcome. In rendering the history of the region as shaped solely by outside powers, this paradigm has effectively deprived local political actors of their agency.

However, as I have shown throughout the dissertation, Ottoman North Africa during the period enjoyed bustling political life of its own, and local powerholders, corsairs, Bedouin traders, and itinerant scholars pursued their own agendas, under both Ottoman and European rule. This forces us to rethink the periodization of North African political history, with the processes set in motion in the late eighteenth century continuing well into the colonial period.

At the same time, the actor-oriented approach I have adopted forces us to revisit the emergence of a new colonial idiom that gradually came to dominate the
nineteenth-century North Africa. While the discussion of the rise of colonialism has generally put focus on western actors and political trends and rendered North African political milieu as an object acted upon, the present study has shown that regional actors were very much the subjects that influenced and shaped the western approach to the region. Egyptian and Maghrebi interests played a considerable role in the ways French, British, Russian, and Ottoman imperial centers formulated policy towards the region, and, even more importantly, how diplomatic agents operating on the ground applied these policies. Moreover, the framework presented in this study extended well into the nineteenth century, when modes of imperialism transformed into colonial projects and the networks of resistance, similarly, as before, transcending the divides of the provinces and empires.
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