Cultivating Empire: Indians, Quakers, and the Negotiation of American Imperialism, 1754-1846

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Abstract
This dissertation examines the ways in which indigenous peoples and missionaries, specifically Quakers (Society of Friends), contributed to the development of the American empire in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The U.S. civilization plan, in which Friends were central participants, offered agricultural education to American Indian men and, for women, instruction in the “domestic arts” as part of a broader mission complex. Far from being simply a means to “assimilate the Indians,” the mission complex was central to U.S. imperial and economic development, and its methods, endurance, and character grew out of a particular historical moment and as the result of a negotiation of Indians’ and Euroamericans’ goals and motivations. In order to investigate that negotiation, “Cultivating Empire” follows the evolution of diplomacy and agricultural mission work in the Ohio Country as a case study, and it draws upon individuals’ journals, family papers, account books and receipts, as well as missionary correspondences, meeting minutes from the Society of Friends, and various papers of federal, state, and territorial governments. Reading Euroamerican-produced sources against the grain in conjunction with sources such as Hendrick Aupaumut's (Mohican) invaluable journals, moreover, offers means to bring indigenous politics to bear on this history, and it offers a top-down and bottom-up glimpse of the making of American empire. Such work reveals that the Society of Friends and its members, and their cooperation with the U.S. federal government, in many ways established the paradigm for the United States’ model of “philanthropic” empire beginning in the late eighteenth century. It also demonstrates that the society’s work was foundational for the development of the federal government’s relationship with non-governmental organizations and imperial policies abroad. Quaker diplomacy and agricultural missions also, however, offered Native peoples a powerful discourse and innovative means to continue to negotiate for power into the twenty-first century. U.S. state officials, Quaker missionaries, Euroamerican immigrants, and indigenous peoples together, then, produced the paradigms of U.S. empire in North America and the world in ways that had lasting consequences.

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CULTIVATING EMPIRE: INDIANS, QUAKERS, AND THE NEGOTIATION OF AMERICAN IMPERIALISM, 1754-1846

Lori J. Daggar

A DISSERTATION in History

Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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CULTIVATING EMPIRE: QUAKERS, INDIANS, AND THE NEGOTIATION OF AMERICAN IMPERIALISM, 1754-1846

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Lori J. Daggar
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This dissertation examines the ways in which indigenous peoples and missionaries, specifically Quakers (Society of Friends), contributed to the development of the American empire in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The U.S. civilization plan, in which Friends were central participants, offered agricultural education to American Indian men and, for women, instruction in the “domestic arts” as part of a broader mission complex. Far from being simply a means to “assimilate the Indians,” the mission complex was central to U.S. imperial and economic development, and its methods, endurance, and character grew out of a particular historical moment and as the result of a negotiation of Indians’ and Euroamericans’ goals and motivations. In order to investigate that negotiation, “Cultivating Empire” follows the evolution of diplomacy and agricultural mission work in the Ohio Country as a case study, and it draws upon individuals’ journals, family papers, account books and receipts, as well as missionary correspondences, meeting minutes from the Society of Friends, and various papers of federal, state, and territorial governments. Reading Euroamerican-produced sources against the grain in conjunction with sources such as Hendrick Aupaumut’s (Mohican) invaluable journals, moreover, offers means to bring indigenous politics to bear on this
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1.1. Peace Medal distributed by the Friendly Association................................. 45.
In 1831, a young French aristocrat, Alexis de Tocqueville, traversed the Atlantic to visit the United States. He traveled widely, taking in all that he could, and in 1835, he published the first volume of a revealing portrait of the republic in its adolescence. In his famous *Democracy in America*, Tocqueville devoted hundreds of pages to descriptions of American political structures, economics, and reform efforts, as well as to the plights of African Americans and American Indians. With regards to the latter, the Frenchman explained that “[t]he Spaniards, despite acts of unparalleled monstrousness that left them indelibly covered with shame, were unable to exterminate the Indian race or even prevent the Indians from sharing their rights. The Americans of the United States achieved both results with marvelous ease, quietly, legally, philanthropically, without bloodshed, without violating a single one of the great principles of morality in the eyes of the world. To destroy human beings with greater respect for the laws of humanity would be impossible.”

Tocqueville’s assessment of U.S. Indian affairs implicitly acknowledged a fundamental truth: Americans, like imperial Spaniards, exacted violence over North American indigenous peoples. According to the Frenchman, however, Americans did so “philanthropically.” Beginning in the late eighteenth century, Americans set out to “civilize,” through agricultural education, American Indians who, due to their supposed “savage” and “barbaric” state, “misused” North America’s bountiful lands. Tocqueville insisted that the civilizing process made way for the rapid proliferation of American

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democracy, and that it was a humane alternative to the depravity that characterized Spanish imperial policies. For him, the United States’ method for dealing with its “Indian problem,” though harsh, nonetheless offered a means to avoid the “indelible shame” attributed to the Spaniards’ brutality.

Many Americans, particularly missionaries, did not consider efforts to “civilize” Native peoples to be quite so vicious. They instead viewed such policies to be the most enlightened way to tackle a problem of immense proportions. Peaceful diplomacy and then axes, ploughs, and fences, they argued, were the best defenses against indigenous peoples’ “extinction.” U.S. officials and settlers too gave voice to these ideas, though they added their own motivations and reasoning to their arguments. Civilizing policies could save an entire race, but they could also facilitate nation-building and territorial acquisition, as well as create new consumers and debtors. Though Americans’ goals and motivations differed, most saw philanthropy—if not philanthropic violence—as central to their national project. Ultimately, however, as Tocqueville’s statement suggests, acts and rhetoric of philanthropy offered means by which to obscure the cultural, economic, and political carnage of American settler colonialism and imperialism, and they were fundamental to the making and endurance of American empire.

* * *

“Cultivating Empire” seeks to understand the roots, contingencies, and consequences of U.S. empire-building in North America. Before the United States became a global imperial power, it was a continental empire. Americans used Native lands to develop their own economy, exported social and cultural ideals, and framed their
political ascendency in North America in dialogue with Indians’ political and economic
dependence and decline—decline that was often fictional. And they did so with
missionary assistance and in ways that obscured the mechanisms and processes of their
imperialism. Agricultural mission work, part of the federal government’s civilization
plan, was one such mechanism. Ideas of “savagery” and Native peoples’ supposed misuse
of abundant lands—as well as Americans’ land hunger—prompted George Washington’s
Secretary of War Henry Knox to conceive of a plan to civilize the Indians in 1789. His
plan, and the federal government’s eventual partnership with missionary societies,
became the cornerstone of U.S. Indian policies in the nineteenth and into the twentieth
century. The plan’s longevity was not, however, preordained. The primary goal of the
plan was to educate American Indians in the ways of agriculture for males and “domestic
arts” such as spinning and weaving for females in order to make way for American
territorial acquisition. The plan’s methods, endurance, and character, however, grew out
of a particular historical moment and as a result of a negotiation of goals and motivations.

Despite the civilization plan’s goal to assimilate Native peoples and thus eradicate
their culture, indigenous peoples of North America did not succumb to the fates assigned
them by Tocqueville and Euroamericans more generally; they did not fall to extinction,
and they did not disappear. Rather, they influenced the character of U.S. Indian policies
and of American imperialism. Indeed, the emergence of the civilization plan itself was, in
part, due to Native peoples’ persistence. After years of violence during both the periods
of European and American colonization, the struggling American republic, equipped with
a still-small state apparatus, needed an Indian policy that cut the financial and human
costs of war. Knox developed his understanding of Indian affairs in the context of
conflict, and he, like others, understood the practicalities involved in attempting to colonize a vast array of still-powerful peoples. Endemic violence in the eighteenth century and armies of united Indians in the 1790s thwarted American dreams of conquering North America quickly and efficiently. Those Native peoples who avoided war—but nonetheless maintained their own politics and ways of living—offered the United States equal amounts of frustration. Knox thus conceived of his plan to civilize Native peoples in 1789 in the midst of Native-produced obstruction. Recognition of that fact forces us to consider the limits of U.S. state power and the ways in which that power grew together with the breadth of indigenous authority in eastern North America during the era of the early republic.

Agricultural education was, on paper, at the heart of the civilization plan, with other goals including the spread of Christianity and, sometimes, literacy. Central to the plan were missionaries—members of the Moravian church, Presbyterians, Methodists, and, most often in the early years of the nineteenth century, Quakers. Indeed, thanks to their own expertise and interest in Indian affairs, Knox found an able partner in the Society of Friends (Quakers), and Friends’ relationship with the federal government proved long-lasting. The clerks of Friends’ Indian concerns committees were the War Department’s frequent correspondents beginning in the late eighteenth century, and Friends offered diplomatic support and performed the work of establishing and maintaining agricultural missions in both New York State among the Haudenosaunee peoples and in the Ohio Country, among the Shawnees, Miamis, Delawares, Wyandots, and their neighbors. Friends divided their labors into two distinct jurisdictions: Philadelphia Friends missionized in Haudenosaunee Country, while Baltimore Friends
worked among the various Ohio Indians. The Society of Friends’ political structure facilitated its partnership with the U.S. War Department, and it likewise lent organization to the society’s philanthropic efforts in Indian Country. The society was organized in a series of hierarchical “meetings,” with yearly meetings serving as the umbrella organization for smaller, more local monthly meetings. The Philadelphia Yearly Meeting corresponded with the Baltimore Yearly Meeting regularly after the latter’s establishment in 1795, and both corresponded with the London Yearly Meeting on the topic of civilizing Native peoples.

The Society of Friends and its members, and their cooperation with the U.S. Federal government, in many ways established the paradigm for the United States’ model of “philanthropic” “destruction” beginning in the late eighteenth century. Friends performed diplomatic work alongside U.S. officials, and they received public lands and funds for their missions. Friends corresponded with federal and state officials, shared information about local Indian politics, and offered their labor in mission spaces. In return, they received financial support as well as explicit endorsements, often from the secretary of war or the president, that facilitated both traveling to mission sites and striking partnerships with regional Indian agents. After years of working with Friends, the U.S. government institutionalized its partnership with missionary societies in 1819 with the passage of the Civilization Act, which guaranteed $10,000 annually for missionary endeavors in Indian Country. Another prominent missionary society, the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM), established in 1810, followed the Quaker model of agricultural education, and they continued, like the Friends, to work at home and abroad into the twentieth century.
Analyzing the formation of the partnership between the U.S. government and the Society of Friends is foundational for understanding the United States’ humanitarian work in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Framing the partnership in this way encourages scholars to abandon the tendency to treat Friends’ mission efforts in isolation. Indeed, the case of the Society of Friends offers a means to explore the early foundations of federal relationships with what would later be termed non-governmental organizations (NGOs), as well as the roles of NGOs in imperial development. While the term may appear, at first blush, an anachronism, members of the Society of Friends were non-government individuals who were, nonetheless, quasi-state actors, and they performed work similar to that of later and present-day NGOs—many of which, like the Friends, received government funds. The Society of Friends brought to its agricultural mission work ideas regarding civility, religion, race, gender, class, and education. Friends also, however, compromised their own religious tenets—namely, distancing oneself from the affairs of worldly governments—to take advantage of the benefits that federal support offered—money, intelligence, and personnel support. The personnel, financial, and political ties that grew between Friends and the U.S. government in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century established a paradigm for Indian policies, and they proved

2 The movement toward cultural and social histories in the 1970s and 1980s enabled historians to view missions—correctly—as sites of cultural negotiation. That rich scholarship offers a jumping off point for a renewed look at Friends—and missionaries more broadly—and Native Americans’ connections with broader political and economic developments. For studies of Friends’ missions, see Jill Kinney, "'Letters, Pen, and Tilling the Field': Quaker Schools Among the Seneca Indians on the Allegany River, 1798-1852" (Ph.D. diss., University of Rochester, 2009); Diane Rothenberg, "Friends Like These: An Ethnohistorical Analysis of the Interaction Between Allegany Senecas and Quakers, 1798-1823" (Ph.D. diss., City College of New York, 1976). Matthew Dennis’s Seneca Possessed begins the work of connecting Quaker missions to broader political phenomena. Matthew Dennis, Seneca Possessed: Indians, Witchcraft, and Power in the Early American Republic (Philadelphia, 2010).
crucial both to the political and economic growth of the American imperial state and to the cultivation of a U.S. reputation of moral authority.³

That reputation was often grounded in ideas of humanitarianism, mercy, and charity, and, as work by Ian Tyrrell demonstrates, it remained a central concern of the United States in the world into the twentieth century and, indeed, to present day.⁴ Moral authority was a means by which to claim political authority on the international stage, and that linkage between morality and political power reached back, as Tocqueville makes clear, to the days when the “Black Legend” soured the Spanish Empire’s reputation. Nonetheless, the emergence of Friends’ partnership with the federal government reveals that a seemingly simple question remains: why did the particular way in which Americans endeavored to spread “civilization”—agricultural education carried out by a combination of missionary, Native, and U.S. state agents—gain such purchase in the United States in the first place?

As the following pages make clear, notions of “civilizing” Native peoples were grounded in differing opinions and motivations, practicalities, and contingencies, and the

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³ Friends’ work in Indian Country differed little from other ventures, described as NGO efforts, in other locales. In a 2002 study funded by the United States Agency for International Development, Bureau for Africa, for example, the authors write that “[t]he involvement of NGOs in education can be traced from the end of the 19th Century when missionaries introduced formal education in the country. The main aim of schooling was to spread Christianity but apart form [sic] teaching the bible the schools which were opened also offered lessons such as reading, writing, counting, carpentry, brick laying and needlecraft.” The authors note that government funding for such efforts grew as the twentieth century progressed. See Esme Chipo Kadzamira and Demis Kunje, “The Changing Roles of Non-Governmental Organisations in Education in Malawi,” (Zomba, Malawi: Centre for Educational Research and Training, University of Malawi, 2002), IV-V. Julie Hearn offers a starting point for understanding twentieth and twenty-first century missionary organizations as “invisible” NGOs. See Julie Hearn, “The ‘Invisible’ NGO: US Evangelical Missions in Kenya,” Journal of Religion in Africa, Vol. 32, Fasc. 1 Christian and Islamic Non-Governmental Organizations in Contemporary Africa (Feb., 2002), 32-60.
actual policies of civilization, Indian affairs, and empire-building more generally were marked by negotiation. Scholars Francis Paul Prucha, Bernard Sheehan, and Reginald Horsman point to ideas of Christian humanitarianism and race as the primary factors in determining U.S. Indian policies, but such interpretations omit other defining developments that marked the early republican period. Both ideas of Christian humanitarianism and race played key roles in creating Indian policies, but both were also tools employed by the U.S. state and its citizens to meet a certain end, namely, to build a powerful empire that stretched to—and beyond—the Pacific. Some Americans firmly believed that civilization and even Indian removal were humanitarian policies, others cared less about ideas of humanity and more about the growth of U.S. power in North America and the world. All, however, grappled with ideas regarding moral authority—indeed, even the self-interested employed a discourse of humanity—and all were complicit in processes of settler colonialism and empire-building. The question of how such a discourse developed to become a viable defense of some of the harshest of U.S. Indian policies—including removal—is an important one.

So too are questions regarding the consequences of that discourse’s development. At the heart of the civilization plan was Americans’ need to build their republic, both politically and economically. Indeed, U.S. Indian policies were inseparable from larger efforts of state-building, and they were, as a result, influenced by those efforts. Costly

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war with Britain in the American Revolution combined with the struggle to build a system of taxation that most Americans could accept. Episodes such as Shays’s Rebellion made clear that the taxation issue was not an easy one to reconcile for many Americans, and subsequently economic issues were on the forefront of citizens’ minds. Unsurprisingly, Indian policies such as the civilization plan and removal were bound up in the context of state formation and economic development.

Indeed, one of the central claims of “Cultivating Empire” is that agricultural mission work ultimately contributed to the development of the U.S. market economy and the entrenchment of ideas that both accompanied and facilitated the growth of market capitalism. Missionaries’ labors were part of a mission complex, a web of networks that linked urban manufacturers and their wares—the axes, hoes, and ploughs required for farming—with Indian consumers, interior lands, and growing markets. Missions required goods that, in turn, bolstered American manufacturing and consumerism, often at the expense of Native peoples’ once more global economic ties with a variety of polities. Ideas of poverty, morality, and charity, meanwhile, also played a large role in defining Indian policies, and they were bolstered by the complex’s development. As historian Michael Katz argues, the connection between virtue and success accompanied the “transition to capitalism” in the early republic. Drawing connections between these ideas, cultivated, in part, in the republic’s urban spaces enables us to link Indian policies and Native peoples’ histories more fully with the social, economic, and political history of the early republic.

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Early Americans themselves understood the situations of Native Americans, African Americans, and laboring peoples as connected and in dialogue with one another. Missionaries compared the civilization plan as akin to the colonization plan that endeavored to send free African Americans to Liberia, while Baltimore Friends perceived Ohio Indians, and explicitly wrote about them, in ways that drew upon their experiences living among the enslaved and wage laborers of the city. Agricultural mission work among Native peoples, then, was bound up in the ideas and developments of the republic at large.

Approaching the problem of the development of U.S. Indian policy in such a wide-reaching way enables us to wed the histories of U.S.-Indian relations with the broader narratives of early American history. Too often, analyses of U.S. Indian policy—and, indeed, Native Americans’ histories in general—remain divorced from the larger story. But framing Indian policy against the backdrop of state formation and market development offers a means by which we can better understand the contingencies of policy development as well as the way in which Native peoples, their politics, and U.S. Indian affairs influenced the development of early American economics, politics, and social hierarchies, analysis that is rarely undertaken by scholars of the early republic.  

Market development, in many ways, gave Indian policies their character, as did the goals and motivations of Native peoples, missionaries, settlers, and U.S. officials. But efforts in Indian Country also profoundly influenced the development of the United States. Missionaries’ agricultural work, diplomacy, and influence offered a blueprint for the development of U.S. foreign relations in places like Hawaii, Alaska, and Liberia. The emphasis on agricultural production and the consumption of American manufactures in Indian Country, meanwhile, expanded the U.S. market economy and further encouraged the intertwined development of both the agricultural and manufacturing sectors of the American economy—an intertwining that men like Tench Coxe and Thomas Jefferson debated in the years of the early republic. Such economic growth contributed to the growth of the federal state and the American empire.

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Understanding Friends’ partnership with the federal government as fundamental to the growth of American empire also adds to a growing historiographical corrective. Ian Tyrrell’s work, like many works by scholars of empire and American foreign relations, suggests that the United States built its moral empire at the end of the nineteenth century. A burgeoning literature, including works on North American settler colonialism, demonstrates, however, that such a timeline obscures the United States’ imperial beginnings. Bethel Saler’s study on settler colonialism in Wisconsin Territory, for example, suggests that families, missionaries, and even ground-level U.S. officials were complicit in the haphazard development of the republic’s territories. By examining the important role of the state in such processes, “Cultivating Empire” ultimately suggests instead that it was often on the edges of empire where the federal state strove to exercise the most power. Thus not only does Friends’ relationship with the federal government reveal that Americans’ territorial and “moral empire” emerged in the late eighteenth century, but it also demonstrates that the federal state employed various agents—both state and non-state—in an effort to carry out its policies. This endeavor had mixed results, thanks to actors’ own motivations and goals, but nonetheless, Quakers’


partnership with the U.S. government offers a compelling means to analyze how and why missionaries and cultural imperialism more broadly became vital components of the American empire, and it forces us to understand Americans’ empire as one built upon foundations of both settler colonialism and federal state power and initiative. Indeed, the American empire that occupies a central place in these pages was not an all-powerful behemoth but rather one built upon reciprocal relations of power. It was also one built upon popular narrative fictions of humanitarianism and indigenous “dependence.” This perspective on power and discourse facilitates a simultaneously “top-down” and “bottom-up” exploration of the ways in which U.S. officials, missionaries, Euroamerican settlers, and Native Americans each played a role in the making of American empire.


13 Much of my understanding of empire is based upon a number of scholars’ works. See, for example, Amy Kaplan, *The Anarchy of Empire in the Making of U.S. Culture* (Cambridge, 2002); Ann Laura Stoler, *Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power* (Berkeley, 2002); Ann Laura Stoler, ed., *Haunted by Empire: Geographies of Intimacy in North American History* (Durham, 2006); Catherine Hall, *Civilising Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the English Imagination, 1830-1867* (Chicago, 2002).


14 Theorist Lorenzo Veracini notes the importance of narratives in settler colonial societies. Key among those narratives is a disavowal of violence. In the United States, Americans obscured the violence of their project with ideas of humanitarianism. Veracini also points to Tocqueville’s *Democracy in America* as being a settler colonial text. See Lorenzo Veracini, *Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview* (New York and London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 76-86, 95-104.
Bernard Sheehan wrote in 1973 that “[b]ooks about Indian-white relations are usually confined to the description of the white man’s policy and Indian’s reaction.”

And, indeed, beginning in the 1970s, historian Francis Paul Prucha penned an extensive corpus of literature devoted to the development of Indian policies in the United States, and his work stood then, as it does now, as the quintessential interpretation of U.S.-Indian policy relations. His studies emphasized Americans’ paternalism and Christian humanitarianism, and volumes such as The Great Father offer much in the way of detailed accounts of various policies’ strengths and weaknesses. Largely absent from Prucha’s analyses were Native peoples’ own politics. Much, however, has changed in the literatures of American Indian history and of early America since Prucha completed his volumes. While notions of paternalism, emphasized by Prucha, are important for understanding some early Americans’ motivations, they are insufficient for understanding Indian policy’s connection with the larger history of the early United States, and a simple acceptance of those ideas obscures both their creation and the many inherent contradictions that accompanied Americans’ discourse of humanitarianism. While Prucha

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15 Sheehan, Seeds of Extinction, IX.

Other scholars have offered much-needed updated takes on Indian policy, but still they adopt top-down perspectives. See, for example, Stephen J. Rockwell, Indian Affairs and the Administrative State in the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); William H. Bergmann, The American National State and the Early West (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).
focused his interpretations on Americans’ ideas of humanitarianism in an effort to approach the past on its own terms, in doing so, he overlooked some of the more insidious consequences and designs at work, namely state formation, market expansion, and imperial rivalries. Analyzing the rhetoric of paternalism “on its own terms” serves to mask important underlying agendas, and it encourages scholars to render U.S.-Indian relations a somewhat separate, unique thread of American history.

With the “New Indian History” that grew during the 1980s, scholars such as Ned Blackhawk, Brian DeLay, James Merrell, and Daniel K. Richter reveal in clear terms, however, that Native peoples’ histories are fundamental to any history of early North America. What is more, scholars such as Stephen Warren and Joshua Piker have offered histories of individual indigenous peoples and towns that have not only forced scholars to rethink the geopolitics of North America but have encouraged many to find ways to tell stories on both the macro- and micro-levels. These works should encourage historians

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to approach policy history in a similar manner, to combine the “top-down” approach adopted by Prucha with the “bottom-up” approaches showcased in works by Piker and others. The resulting approach, a simultaneously “top-down” and “bottom-up” history, guides what follows, and rather than offer a wholesale rejection of Prucha, it combines his analysis with the lessons gleaned from the New Indian History. It aims to interrogate the ways in which Native peoples’ politics also affected U.S. policy, market and imperial development, and it contributes to our understanding of the history of Native peoples’ “survivance” in North America.  

Indeed, a set of interrelated queries drive this history. How was the American empire made? How did Native Americans’ various motivations influence its growth? Why did U.S. Indian policies take on the forms they did? How did Americans—and, indeed, Tocqueville and many of the world’s citizens—come to understand the “civilization plan” as “humane”? And finally, and perhaps most importantly, given the devastating removal of thousands of American Indians from eastern North America, why do such questions and histories matter? The answers are not, of course, simple. Nonetheless, an exploration of the emergence of the U.S. civilization plan and its endurance, offers a means by which to investigate these questions.

The Ohio Country, in particular—and thus Ohio Indians and Baltimore Friends’ work among them—offers a compelling case study. Though scholars define the geographic bounds of the region differently, “Cultivating Empire” focuses on the lands

[19] Gerald Vizenor understands “survivance” as an “active sense of presence,” and his work aims to dispel the notion that Native peoples merely survived or reacted to Euroamerican colonialism. See Gerald Vizenor, Manifest Manners: Narratives on Postindian Survivance (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1994), vii.
and peoples that make up present-day Ohio and Indiana. Baltimore Friends established their agricultural missions within the bounds of these modern-day states, at Wapakoneta and Captain Lewis Town (Lewistown) in Ohio and at Dennis’s Station (near present-day Huntington) in Indiana. It was in the Ohio Country that the federal government established its blueprint for colonization with the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. That document established the procedure for U.S. territorial acquisition and for the translation of “territories” into “states” and “settlers” into citizens who possessed the equal rights of their counterparts in other states. The region allows us to see how American imperialism facilitated the economic rise of one of the early United States’ most rapidly developing regions.

What becomes quickly apparent in an examination of civilizing efforts in the Ohio Country, however, is that any history of mission work in this relatively small region requires an examination of more far-flung locales. Colonial Pennsylvania, early republic Baltimore, and even western New York, Detroit, Missouri, and the Mexican Republic factor into the story of American empire in the Ohio Country. Indeed, traveling Quakers, U.S. officials, settlers, and Indians created linkages between discrete locales, and they force scholars to understand regional histories in a wider context. Moreover, recent scholarship pays excellent attention to the Ohio Valley and Great Lakes, but too often those treatments are confined to the continent, overlooking broader context and connections and encouraging a division between Atlantic and continental histories. This is particularly true, with important exceptions, for the historiography of Ohio and Indiana during the era of the early republic. Part of the aim of “Cultivating Empire” is to
encourage further connections between continental and Atlantic historiographical paradigms.20

“Cultivating Empire,” then, frames Friends’ agricultural mission work in the contested Ohio Country as a case study, and it demonstrates that missions and "civilizing" policies were not simply tools for “assimilating the Indians,” but rather were hinges for economic and political development. It shows that the United States’ civilizing efforts offered Native peoples a discourse and means to negotiate for power even as those same efforts bolstered Americans’ claims to moral authority on the international stage.

The first chapter sketches the eighteenth-century history of Quaker-Native relations. Its central focus rests on Friends' and Delaware Indians' diplomatic partnership during the years of the Seven Years War (1754-1763)—a war fought in large part over Ohio Country lands—and the ways in which this partnership proved formative for U.S.-Indian relations. It reveals that though Friends were once deemed "meddling nuisances" by the colonial Pennsylvania government, they ultimately became invaluable partners of the U.S. government after the American Revolution.

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Chapter two continues to examine how missionaries' and Native Americans' diplomatic efforts laid the foundation for U.S. imperial politics and policies. Here, in an examination of 1790s diplomacy, I draw upon the scholarship of U.S. foreign relations to argue that Native nations conducted themselves as—and were in reality—sovereign nations with their own diplomatic and political ambitions during the earliest years of the republic. Indians' politics forced U.S. state officials to bring missionary men to the dinners, official treaties, and pipe-smoking affairs that characterized the spaces within which the United States conducted some of its earliest diplomacy with foreign nations in North America. As a result of Native political authority and the international politics of intercultural diplomacy, then, missionaries labored as extensions and representatives of the U.S. government in Indian Country.

I connect Baltimore Friends' educational reform work among the free and enslaved laboring poor in Baltimore with their agricultural instruction among Ohio Indians in chapter three. Such analysis reveals that Friends' visions of and efforts in the "west" were informed by their experiences in the east. It argues that Quakers took advantage of the young republic's small state apparatus to garner official support for their work among Native peoples, but that emerging U.S. social ideals nonetheless shaped Friends' efforts in both Baltimore and Indian Country. This chapter also reveals the ways in which Quakers offered the Ohio Country's Indian nations direct intellectual links to the emerging discourses of race and class of the early American republic. Rather than offer "civilization" according to Euroamerican standards, then, these missionary linkages served to educate Native communities in the ways of American imperialism such that
Native peoples continued to take advantage of Euroamerican politics and policies into the nineteenth century.

Chapter four tells the story of how the "mission complex" expanded the influence and power of the United States in the Ohio Country and beyond. The mission complex linked missionaries, humanitarians, manufacturers, federal employees, and indigenous peoples through networks of markets and capital: the material goods used in the agricultural missions offered a means both to stimulate business for eastern (and developing western) manufacturers and develop a new consumer base in the Ohio Country. Attention to the functioning of this system, based upon hierarchical relations of power, reveals how the early U.S. Empire thrived off of economic growth. It also demonstrates that imperial state policy, as well as a myriad of Native and non-Native actors, facilitated the development and expansion of capitalist markets and forms of labor in the early republic, and that such developments linked Native peoples ever closer to the U.S. market economy through the War of 1812 and beyond.

The fifth chapter demonstrates that Native peoples in the Ohio Country manipulated Americans' own economic and social ideals for their own purposes in efforts to assert the authority of their nations beyond the War of 1812. They drew upon the paradigm of missionaries' labor and contracted Euroamerican wage laborers to perform the same physical work formerly undertaken by missionary men on their lands by the 1820s and 1830s. They blended many of their own economic ideals with the understandings of both poverty and "poor Indians" brought to them through missionary rhetoric, and they used their increasingly uncertain political and economic status to make claims upon the U.S. state for material aid. By doing so, however, they aided in the
development of the U.S. economy and its social relations in Indian Country, the United States, and beyond, and they contributed to the growth of the early American state.

The final chapter, "Of Mercy and of sound policy too: Indian Removal and the Cultivation of American Empire" contends that, as a result of Indians’ persistence, ideas of poverty, dependence, civilization, and humanitarianism intertwined to facilitate the ongoing development of a discourse of exclusion that increasingly characterized American imperialism during the nineteenth century. These exclusionary politics combined, however, with U.S. government officials' desire to present the United States as a humanitarian state on the world stage, and some U.S. officials and their missionary partners wove ideas of poverty, the "deserving poor," and mercy into their statements regarding Indian removal. With Great Britain's abolition of slavery and the United States' ongoing dependence upon slave labor, Indian affairs, and missionaries' connection with policies, thus became a means by which some cast the United States as a benevolent power. Race, then, was not always the central factor in shaping Euroamerican-indigenous relations; rather, ideas of race, class, and nation together created a discourse of inclusion and exclusion that, in turn, shaped the politics of Indian removal, benevolence, reform and empire in the early republic and on the world stage.

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In 1817, Superintendent of Indian Trade Thomas L. McKenney, a Quaker, prophesied that the indigenous peoples of North American would, “at no very distant day,” “constitute a portion of ‘our great American family of freemen’” thanks to the
ongoing efforts of missionaries.\textsuperscript{21} His sentiments are reminiscent of episodes labeled by literary scholar David Kazanjian as being part of the United States’ “colonizing trick.”\textsuperscript{22}

By relegating American Indians to a future citizenship premised on their eventual civilization, Americans cultivated a homogenous and inherently equal citizenry by masking the inequalities that accompanied their developing political economy. Through policies of “philanthropic” violence—civilizing efforts as well as schemes such as African colonization and Indian removal—Americans worked to realize—and display for others—the nation’s adherence to its founding tenets of freedom and equality. By pointing to their missionary partners and framing their efforts as philanthropic, however, Americans obscured their empire-building efforts. Missionaries’ agricultural mission work in Indian Country masked the process of transforming Indians lands into a marketable commodity, and it concealed the fact that agricultural education implicitly relegated Native peoples to the lowest ranks of the republic’s developing social hierarchy. Missionaries’ partnership with the federal government likewise facilitated the erosion of Americans’ recognition of Native peoples’ sovereign authority by providing “evidence” of Natives’ “dependence” on American aid, and it attempted to mask the violence of removal by offering a means to frame it in humanitarian terms.

By continuing to assert political, economic, and cultural autonomy, however, Native peoples exposed the contradictions inherent to Americans’ project and forced the United States to adapt its policies to Indians’ persistence. Miamis, Shawnees, and their neighbors in the Ohio Country ultimately seized the benefits of civilizing schemes—

\textsuperscript{21} Thomas L. McKenney to Samuel Worcester, October 30, 1817, Newberry Library, Chicago, Il.  
\textsuperscript{22} David Kazanjian, \textit{The Colonizing Trick: National Culture and Imperial Citizenship in Early America} (Minneapolis, MN and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2003).
missionary labor, infrastructure, and a political discourse that enabled them to make
claims upon the U.S. state—and ensured that U.S. policies would continue to be
negotiated throughout the nineteenth and into the twenty-first century. Missionaries’
work, and Indian policies more broadly, offered Americans a means to cultivate new
lands, as well as a nation and an empire, but North American indigenous peoples
ultimately played an immense role in developing that empire’s character by forcing
Americans to adapt their policies and ideas to Native peoples’ own politics of
endurance.23

23 A note on the text: abbreviations, including those that are superscript, the long s, and other
eighteenth and nineteenth century notations included in primary source materials cited in the
main body of the text have been corrected to modern usage and, in the case of abbreviations, fully
written out.
In 1757, Pennsylvania's governor William Denny confronted Philadelphia's Quakers. The Earl of Halifax, Denny wrote, offered "very strong Expressions of Dissatisfaction" regarding "a Treaty held with the Indians at Philadelphia by the People called Quakers, which his Lordship was pleas’d to think the most extraordinary procedure he had ever seen in Persons who are on the same footing only with all others of the King’s private Subjects, to presume to treat with Foreign Princes." Such frustrations were understandable. It was the height of the Seven Years War in Pennsylvania, and members of the Quakers' Friendly Association for the Preservation of Peace with the Indians by Pacific Measures had, one-year earlier, forced the issue of the controversial 1737 Walking Purchase to the forefront of official conversation at the Treaty of Easton. Discussion of the suspect land deal was a political nuisance that Denny had hoped to avoid. After a series of private meetings with the Friends at Easton, however, the Delaware leader Teedyuscung approached the governor and his secretary to officially request that “Friends might have liberty to examine into their complaints” regarding the late purchase. Denny ultimately conceded and, in doing so, strengthened Friends' relations with Native peoples and, in turn, their ability to influence Indian affairs in eastern North America.

25 Ibid., 39.
When the Earl of Halifax framed Friends' treaty work as "the most extraordinary procedure" adopted by "the King's private Subjects," he condemned private citizens' participation in official diplomatic affairs. Friends, however, paid no heed. They participated in the 1758 Treaty of Easton, they continued to offer gifts at meetings, councils, and treaties with the region's Indian peoples (gifts that the colony's officials gladly accepted), and they maintained their connections with leaders like Teedyuscung. Friends' efforts during the Seven Years War, though they stirred controversy during the 1750s and 1760s, also contributed to a narrative of Quaker-Indian friendship that was foundational for their ongoing diplomatic and reform work among the continent's Native peoples throughout the subsequent centuries. That narrative proved central to the cultivation of Friends' partnership with the United States War Department in North America.

The Friendly Association's efforts in Pennsylvania built upon the revered history of William Penn's first meeting with Native peoples in 1682. They were also the consequence, however, of Friends' and Delawares' political agendas. During the 1750s, Pennsylvania Quakers faced political competition in the colonial assembly as well as internal strife within the Society of Friends. At the same time, Delawares confronted the consequences of migrations and land competition. They witnessed European peoples invade their home of Lenapehoking, and they watched as some of their countrymen left their lands for new homes in the Ohio Country. Friends and Delawares, then, each confronted political crises. Those Delawares still in "Penn's Woods" saw peace with Pennsylvania as crucial to their futures on their lands, and Friends hoped to scavenge for
as much political capital as possible while also upholding their faith's commitment to peace.

Though some scholars interpret the eighteenth century as a period when the Society of Friends turned inward, individual Quakers' work in Indian affairs suggests that some Friends found ways to resist that turn.\(^{26}\) That Israel Pemberton, Anthony Benezet, and others willingly pursued a political connection with Pennsylvania and the Indians by forming the Friendly Association, suggests that various Friends envisioned different futures for their society and for themselves. Already during the 1750s, some Friends saw that philanthropic benevolence offered a means to engage with the world, to cultivate a positive image of their society, and to garner political capital within their community. Friends' relationship with the Delawares during the years of the Seven Years War—as well as their continued philanthropy after that conflict—reveals, then, that the Quakers were a varied lot, and that they held myriad political opinions and motivations. Those opinions and motivations, however, also proved to be pivotal for Friends' ability to gain a political foothold during and after the American Revolution and throughout the following centuries.

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When the Delaware Teedyuscung sought alliance with Quaker Israel Pemberton and other members of the Friendly Association in 1756, he did so in large part because his people shared a history of friendship with Philadelphia's Quakers—a friendship

rooted in both action and memory. Friends and Delawares laid the groundwork for their enduring friendship in the late seventeenth century when William Penn, newly arrived in North America, met with leaders of the Delaware Nation beneath an elm tree on the banks of the Delaware River. Or, rather, they laid the groundwork by remembering (and romanticizing) that fabled gathering later.\textsuperscript{27} Indeed, during the height of war, the Friendly Association's clerk recorded a meeting between the Friends and various Native leaders wherein William Penn, then dead, figured prominently. The men gathered reportedly enjoyed a meal and discussed their conjoined pasts. They together spoke of the “happy state of the first settlers” of Pennsylvania and bemoaned “the unhappy Rupture” which had, of late, disrupted their lives and threatened Euroamericans and Native peoples' already tenuous coexistence.\textsuperscript{28} They lamented that some Delawares and their allies, mostly hailing from lands in the western Ohio County, attacked Pennsylvania settlements, and they likewise lamented that Euroamerican settlers and governments slighted the region's Native peoples during several land negotiations. The men gathered at the table, however, determined to restore peace. As they continued to speak of William Penn’s first treaty of peace with the Indians, Conrad Weiser, provincial interpreter, reportedly noticed a calm overtake the agitated Native discussants. Weiser informed the men that he had not “heard [the Indians] express themselves with so much openness” and urged the Quakers there assembled to call “together as many of our ancient Men of the

\textsuperscript{27} The meeting was immortalized in Benjamin West's 1771-72 \textit{Penn's Treaty with the Indians}, and Friends and Delawares referenced the meeting throughout their exchanges during the Seven Years War and on into the nineteenth century.

\textsuperscript{28} Minute book of the Friendly Association for Regaining and Preserving Peace with the Indians by Pacific Measures, Indian Papers (Am .525/Collection 310), The Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.
Survivors of the first settlers as we could collect and to give the Indians another Meeting.”

Penn and other first generation Pennsylvanians would play a pivotal role, along with the "ancient Men" of the Delawares, in restoring peace to “Penn’s Woods.”

Those "ancient Men" who crossed the Atlantic in the late seventeenth century were among the earliest of the Quakers. The Society of Friends organized in the midst of England's violent mid-seventeenth-century turmoil. Many Friends identified with Parliamentarians during the English Civil War as a result of both their aversion to the Anglican Church and their place among the ranks of England's middling and non-elite populations. By the time of the Restoration of Charles II to the throne in 1660, however, many officials and English Protestants considered the Friends with contempt. Quakers failed to recognize social distinctions and, more broadly, England's socio-economic hierarchy, they believed in the spiritual equality of the sexes and a de-emphasis of the Bible, and they opposed oath-taking and military service and action. Such beliefs meant that the Friends were, increasingly, aberrations in English society. Though the Society of Friends eventually became a quietist, inward-looking faith, during the mid-seventeenth century Quakers openly protested the war, the Anglican Church, and England's prevailing social order. Many English subjects consequently deemed them radical.

Under Charles II, Friends encountered particularly vehement opposition. The Quaker Act passed Parliament in 1662 and required all English subjects to swear an oath of loyalty to the king—an act that violated Quaker doctrine. The Conventicle Act of

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29 Ibid.
1664, meanwhile, forbade meetings for unauthorized worship—anything that was not Anglican worship—if there were more than five persons present. These harsh realities offered Friends' ample reason to journey across the Atlantic, though, even in North America, Friends encountered others' scorn. The Puritans, in particular, discriminated against the Quakers in Massachusetts. Perhaps most infamously, Puritan colonists hanged Puritan-turned-Quaker Mary Dyer in 1660 after she repeatedly refused to leave the colony. Quakers' belief in social and gender equality directly contradicted the firm hierarchy of the Puritan's city upon a hill. Quaker William Penn's 1681 acquisition of land, then, offered many Friends a means to live unmolested in North America.

Quakers' peace testimony, conceived of by George Fox during the years of English civil war, required peaceful relations with the continent's indigenous peoples. Even at Pennsylvania's founding, then, the Quakers' political motivations—the peaceful acquisition of land for their own colony—required the recognition of Indians' rights to their lands. As a result, William Penn, unlike many of his fellow English proprietors, initiated a policy of paying the region's Native peoples for their lands. It was in this context that William Penn famously treated with Delawares beneath a tree on the banks of the Delaware River.

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While Friends' pacifism and Penn's desire for land required that they establish close working relations with the Delawares, the Quakers' faith and recognition of others' spiritual potential pushed them to respect Native peoples as well as recognize the many shared cultural similarities with their Delaware neighbors. Indeed, both George Fox, the founder of Quakerism, and William Penn penned positive accounts of their time among the Delawares, and their writings figured prominently in the development of Friends' attitudes regarding Native peoples in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Fox noted in his journal, for example, that the Indians "received mee very loveingly," and he emphasized their willingness to embrace his religious teachings. Penn likewise explained that "[i]f an European comes to see them, or calls for Lodging at their House or Wigwam they have him the best place and first cut. If they come to visit us, they salute us with an Itah which is as much as to say, Good be to you." Both Fox and Penn penned such accounts consciously, but their willingness to frame Delawares as polite people who possessed the equivalent of their own greeting, "good be to you," reflects the influence of their belief in the Inner Light and their recognition of their shared qualities. Indeed, the Inward Light, an internal spiritual presence that rendered everyone—without exception—capable of receiving God's grace, encouraged Friends like Fox and Penn to view Native peoples in their own image. Fox noted in his journal, for example, that he was asked, upon a visit to an Indian village, to prove that Indians possessed the spirit of Christ. In order to make his case, he simply asked one individual whether he knew when he

committed wrong. When the man replied in the affirmative, Fox used the response as evidence of the Inward Light.\textsuperscript{35}

Fox’s beliefs and observations influenced eighteenth-century Friends. Anthony Benezet quoted Jonathan Carter in his \textit{Some Observations on the Situation, Disposition, and Character of the Indian Natives of this Continent}, in order to make the point that Indians were "not without some sense of Religion, such as proves that they worship the great Creator."\textsuperscript{36} Friends did, of course, note differences, but compared to many of their other English religious counterparts, they were particularly receptive to Native peoples' cultures and mannerisms. The wide availability of Fox and Penn's writings likewise encouraged eighteenth-century Quakers to contemplate and adopt their forbears' views. Those views rendered Friends willing to embrace Native peoples’ potential for reform—a trait that would prove foundational for their later reform work.

Quakerism itself encouraged individuals like Penn, Fox, and Benezet to consider working with and among Delawares, but Friends and Delawares also shared a number of practices that rendered each intelligible to the other. Like Friends, Delaware women were central participants in the rituals of their people. Early twentieth-century anthropologist M.R. Harrington noted that not only were girls "taught the manifold duties and arts of the household, how to tan hides, and to plant and cultivate the garden," but they also "received instruction in the tradition and rituals of religion."\textsuperscript{37} On the twelfth night of the

Gamwing, an annual celebration that took place just after harvest, one early twentieth-century Delaware informed another observer that that night "is the time that our women and any other person who feels competent among our young people take part and help. If his mind is made up, anyone truly is permitted to 'Sing-the-Fires-out.'" Delaware women, moreover—like many Algonquian women—enjoyed political power. Not only could they speak during the Gamwing, but Delawares traced their lineages through the maternal line, and they afforded women prominent roles in matters of peacemaking. Although Delaware women enjoyed, arguably, greater political power and mobility, the Society of Friends too considered women to be the spiritual equals of men, and they permitted them to share their thoughts in meeting when moved to do so.

Similarly, George Fox, believing that God moved individuals to speak, embraced one Delaware man's contention that he received a vision from the Great Spirit. The Delaware in question reportedly explained that if his people "did hurt or wrong the white people, they would be destroyed. And this hath been seen and fulfilled, that when they did wrong the English they never prospered and have been destroyed." After listening

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to the man, Fox came to the conclusion that "that Indian was a prophet and prophesized truly."\(^{41}\) William Penn likewise offered appreciation for Delawares' religion when he explained that they believe "in God and Immortality without the help of Metaphysics."\(^{42}\) All of this suggests that Friends viewed Delaware spirituality in the context of their own. Not only did this provide Fox and Penn with the satisfaction of knowing that their religious tenets were grounded in "truth"—if evidence demonstrated that Native peoples possessed the capacity for religion, then surely the Inner Light was, in fact, real—but it also suggests that Friends and Delawares recognized their similarities and that this recognition, in turn, facilitated their partnership during the eighteenth century.

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The Seven Years War in North America put Friends and Delawares' relationship to the test. The British and French empires long antagonized one another, and by mid-century, the fertile Ohio Country lands were particularly divisive in North America. Both France and Britain claimed the lands as theirs, and neither power paused to consider Native peoples' own claims, save for when such claims bolstered their own. The valley was valuable. The Ohio River flowed out of western Pennsylvania and offered a pathway to the heart of the continent and the Mississippi River, though Euroamericans found parts of the river to be initially impassable. To hold claim to the region was to gain a foothold to the rich continental interior and to the thriving port of New Orleans. By mid-century, British officials contested French efforts to build new forts in the region, and Native

\(^{41}\) Ibid.
peoples grew increasingly frustrated. Lieutenant Colonel George Washington attempted to push the French out of the region, but he failed. As episodes such as the 1754 Battle of Jumonville Glen and the well-known history of Washington’s Fort Necessity suggests, Ohio River politics stood at the center of the conflict between French and British at mid-century.\(^{43}\)

The string of early eighteenth-century wars for empire in North America presented Pennsylvania's Quaker leadership with the problems inherent in being pacifist leaders in an empire at war. The Friends avoided crippling political controversy by appropriating funds rather than men in arms, though as historian Hermann Wellenreuther makes clear, Friends’ peace testimony in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries did not necessarily preclude them from ensuring against any dangers to government. Nonetheless, Governor Benjamin Fletcher of New York, who took charge of Pennsylvania after the Crown suspected William Penn of treason in 1692, informed the Quaker-dominated Pennsylvania colonial assembly that their funds would “not be dipt in blood.” Friends agreed to the proposition and allocated funds that were, according to Fletcher, used for budget items such as salaries. Though Wellenreuther interprets Fletcher’s statement as a political one meant to assuage the fears of Friends, the episode offers a glimpse of the ways in which the Society of Friends avoided destructive political

conflict. By working to ensure that their own Indian affairs remained peaceful, moreover, Pennsylvania’s Quakers worked to keep wars distant.44

This changed when the governor of Pennsylvania, Robert Morris, declared war on the Delawares in 1756. Many of the colony's inhabitants cheered the declaration: they blamed the Delawares for recent attacks on their lands and families. Indeed, the Seven Years War in North America pitted French against English, but Native peoples were largely responsible for its start. Delawares fought alongside French and British but they also did so as individual groups, each with its own political agenda. The "French and Indian War" was, more accurately, a contest for power among many polities. Even more confusing for colonial Pennsylvanians were political and geographic divisions among Delawares. “Eastern” Delawares still lived in Pennsylvania and remained neutral or sued for peace. "Western" Delawares—those who migrated to the Ohio Country to escape European colonization and find peace—fought to protect their adopted lands against the incursions of Anglo-American families that pushed toward and beyond the Appalachian Mountains. In many Pennsylvania colonists’ minds, however, Delawares were Delawares, Indians were Indians, and all of them were violent.45

The escalation of violence in western colonial Pennsylvania exacerbated the problem of Friends' pacifism. Members of the Proprietary party pressured their Quaker colleagues in the colonial assembly to vote for defense of the colony. Proprietary party

members saw the violence as a political opportunity to discredit and disempower their Quaker party rivals—many of whom, but not all, were members of the Society of Friends. William Smith, a Proprietary party member and vocal supporter of the current colonial proprietor Thomas Penn, circulated pamphlets questioning Quakers' ability to lead in a time of war, and he urged that a loyalty oath be required of all assemblymen. As a result of party antagonisms and the threat of losing political power, Friends in the assembly split into two factions. Defense Quakers remained in the assembly and voted to allocate funds for the defense of the colony, while stricter pacifist Friends abdicated their seats.

The peace testimony conflict was not new but amplified. William Penn himself had had to find ways to balance his pacifist principles with his duties as the governor of Pennsylvania to protect the king's subjects. After the turmoil of the mid-to-late seventeenth century in England, many of the Friends advocated for removal from the world, and they adopted a more quietist *modus operandi*. To hold political power in colonial Pennsylvania as a Quaker, then, was already to engage with the world; to agree to support war, as the Defense Quakers did, was to threaten the very meaning of what it meant to be a member of the Society of Friends by the mid-eighteenth century. Unsurprisingly, the public division between Friends in the assembly coincided with the Philadelphia Monthly Meeting's call for simplicity and avoidance of "pernicious Books

and the Corrupt Conversation of the World." Pennsylvania's crisis was also a crisis within the Philadelphia Meeting.

It was in this context that Israel Pemberton, Jr., a Quaker merchant and councilman who abdicated his seat in the assembly, and several others called on Governor Morris "to reconsider the proposed declaration of war, and to institute a rigid inquiry, as to 'whether some apprehensions these Indians have conceived, of a deviation from the integrity of conduct towards them, so conspicuous in the first establishment,' may not have assisted, to alienate their affections." Pemberton, Anthony Benezet, and interpreter Conrad Weiser then met with Delaware leaders and urged them "to lay down the hatchet." The Friends demonstrated "willingness to meet them, at some place mutually agreed upon, in friendly conference." They believed that "some further attempts may be made by pacific Measures to reduce them to a Sense of their Duty, and that a farther opportunity may be offered to such as may be willing to separate from those who have been the wicked Instruments of perverting them." As Friends' language suggests, they, in essence, waged war against Pennsylvania's violent measures; they pitted peace against war in a battle to determine which would guarantee political stability.

The Friends' language also reveals both their political motivations and their internalization of earlier Friends' accounts of the region's Indians. On the one hand, they

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48 Tolles, Meeting House and Counting House, 236. See also, Marietta, The Reformation of American Quakerism, 1748-1783.
49 Samuel Parrish, Some chapters in the history of the Friendly Association for Regaining and Preserving the Peace with the Indians by Pacific Measures (Philadelphia, Friends’ Historical Association, 1877), 10.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid., 11-13.
endeavored "to reduce [the Indians] to a Sense of their Duty"—rhetoric that appealed to their former colonial constituents, and on the other, they blamed Delawares' violence on "those who have been the wicked Instruments of perverting them"—language that recalled both Fox and Penn's claims that Native peoples were once polite and religious. The careful balance of language suggests that Friends hoped their political exile from the assembly was temporary. Peace, they hoped, would not only afford the colony security, but its triumph would restore the Quakers' political mandate. That Friends' words were recorded in the minutes of the Provincial Council is further suggestive of their hope to win back the hearts and minds of their fellow colonists.

It was at this same meeting that Conrad Weiser, the colony's interpreter, suggested that Pennsylvania round up its "ancient Men" and "give the Indians another Meeting." Weiser, the proprietors' employee, likely envisioned such a meeting to take place between the colonial government and the Delawares. He likely knew that Friends would be present, but also probably hoped that they would accept their place as subjects of the government. For Friends, however, the prospect of another meeting was far more meaningful. Theorist Yael Zerubavel argues that groups perform "memory rituals" in order to revive, reaffirm, and modify collective memories in an effort to reemphasize the "master narrative" of their identity.53 While Friends acted for political, self-interested purposes, the prospect of reviving their own political power—and that of the Quakers writ large—likely made the re-performance of the earlier, romanticized meeting between Penn and the Indians attractive. By remembering and recreating a past in which they

possessed ample political power, they hoped to remind others' of their history of leadership.

The Philadelphia Yearly Meeting dampened the effect, however, by declaring "any interference with 'public affairs' to be beyond its jurisdiction." Instead of abandoning the peace effort, however, Pemberton and his companions established the Friendly Association. It was the first of Friends' voluntary associations, and it offered a means to engage with the political world in a way that complemented the Society of Friends' commitment to peace. It also, however, offered Friends a means to pursue their own agendas as individuals separate from the larger body of the yearly meeting. It meant that Friends could engage with political life, accumulate "moral capital," and, in turn, maintain their position of leadership within their community. For men like Israel Pemberton, a prosperous merchant from a prominent Quaker family, it was ideal. The Friendly Association wove together ideals of benevolence, pacifism, and political action in a way that spoke to mid-eighteenth-century Friends' political needs and aspirations. The association's example proved enduring.

The Friendly Association boasted a large membership drawn from the most-respected (and prosperous) families of Philadelphia Friends. The association declared that it was "determined to improve every future opportunity of manifesting some Regard" with the Indians after "seriously considering the fatal Consequences of losing that Interest and Friendship our Predecessors had obtain'd by their upright dealing and Hospitable

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54 Parrish, 24.
55 On the term "moral capital" as it connects to British abolition, see Christopher Leslie Brown, Moral Capital: Foundations of British Abolitionism (Published for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture) (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006).
56 Marieta, The Reformation of American Quakerism, 188.
Treatment of the Indians in the first Settlement."\textsuperscript{57} The mission statement was thus twofold: the association endeavored to exact peace in the colony, but it also sought to revert back to what was, to the Friends’ minds, a glorious past. The intervening decades between Penn and the Seven Years War saw a slow decline in both Quakers' proportional population in the colony and their political power. Those changes, they implicitly argued, produced the "fatal Consequences" of war.

The association raised funds for the purchase of presents distributed during conferences with Native leaders and their peoples. Members also attended numerous councils and treaties in 1756 with the most significant being the Treaty of Easton. Friends attended the meeting in an unofficial capacity that frustrated the colonial government's efforts to unilaterally deal with the Delawares. Given that many of the Friendly Association's members included those who abdicated their legislative seats, their presence was controversial. They endeavored to steer politics by circumventing the colony's official political process. Some Delawares, undoubtedly aware of the Quaker-proprietary political divide (indeed, they were using it to their advantage), were left "inquisitive about the Governor's coming" to Easton at all.\textsuperscript{58} According to one Quaker chronicler, however, Delawares were "told he was on the road and would be here soon." Still doubtful, the Delawares ultimately concluded that if "Israel Pemberton said so, they would believe it."\textsuperscript{59}

Delawares' uncertainty and alliance with the Friendly Association was chronicled later by Samuel Parrish, a descendent of the prosperous Parrish family—a family whose

\textsuperscript{57} Minutes of the Friendly Association, HSP.
\textsuperscript{58} Parrish, 29.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.
own John Parrish played a pivotal role, as will be seen in chapter two, in Indian affairs during the 1790s. Parrish's account is, of course, biased. Writing in 1877, however, Parrish's narrative describes the pivotal role played by the Friendly Association in crafting Friends' internal narrative of their own work in Indian affairs. That narrative both endured and transformed as it was passed down through subsequent generations of Friends, and it was foundational to their involvement in Indian affairs throughout the subsequent centuries.60 Despite the bias of time and association, Samuel Parrish's account of Friends' efforts at the Treaty of Easton is supported by contemporary documentation, though much of that documentation varies.61 What is certain, however, is that Friends played a pivotal role both at the treaty and behind the scenes.

The Delaware Teedyuscung, in particular, embraced the Friends' willingness to pursue peace. He professed that he was glad that they were "willing to renew the old, good understanding, and that you call to mind the first treaties of friendship made by Onas, our great friend....We take hold of these treaties with both our hands, and desire you will do the same, that a true friendship may be re-established."62 Like Friends, the Delaware leader employed the past for political purposes. He reminded Pennsylvanians that their forbears declared friendship—not merely through words but through treaty.

Instead of invoking the power of wampum or oral agreement, as would have been custom

60 Parrish's narrative largely borrows from the official meeting minutes printed by Benjamin Franklin in *Minutes of Conferences held with the indians at Easton, in the months of July and November, 1756; together with two messages sent by the government to the indians residing on the Susquehannah; and report of the committee appointed by the assembly to attend the governor at the last of the said conferences* (Philadelphia: B. Franklin, 1757).
61 James H. Merrell, ed., *Easton Treaty Texts, July and November 1756*. Indeed, historian James Merrell performed an extensive text analysis of the various transcripts that circulated after Easton and found many to contain differences both large and small.
62 *Minutes of Conferences held with the indians at Easton*, 4.
among his people, Teedyuscung consciously appealed to the Europeans' strategy of using paper when crafting peace and alliances, and he likely did so in order to place his argument for peace in their own political context. He established Pennsylvanians as the hypocritical violators of their own political tools. The Delaware concluded his speech by informing Friends that "what you said to us we took to heart, and we speak to you from our heart, and we will deal honestly with you in every respect."63

Teedyuscung was simultaneously perfect and horribly suited for the role of negotiator. Born around 1700 in Delaware lands near present-day Trenton, New Jersey, he was accustomed to dealing with Euroamericans. He wore European-style clothing, and his people were well-acquainted with European trade goods and modes of conduct. He was a "go-between"—a man who was at the same time in both and neither the worlds of the Delawares and the Europeans. His ability to render himself intelligible to both Delawares and Euroamericans in Pennsylvania proved valuable, and he proved a pivotal ally of the Philadelphia Friends' Indian affairs work.64

Teedysucung met with the Friendly Association during a series of private meetings at Easton, and he asked the Friends to "examine into [Delawares'] complaints" regarding the controversial 1737 Walking Purchase.65 The purchase concerned a large tract of land north of Philadelphia near the Forks of the Delaware in the Lehigh River Valley, and it ultimately became emblematic of colonials' desire for cheap land. Pennsylvania officials claimed that William Penn purchased lands that were bounded by

63 Ibid; this text is also contained in Parrish, 14.
64 Anthony F. C. Wallace, King of the Delawares: Teedyuscung, 1700-1763 (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1949). Teedyuscung also and less usefully, however, had extensive familiarity with European alcohol as well.
65 Parrish, Some chapters, 39.
the distance of a day and a half walk. Penn’s sons, Thomas and John then produced a deed in order to claim that Pennsylvania had already paid for the lands but that the walk was never performed. Some Delaware leaders reluctantly allowed Pennsylvania to measure the lands in 1737. John and Thomas Penn and land speculator James Logan, however, hired a team of skilled runners to complete the "walk" on a prepared trail. By doing so, the colonial government measured out a tract much larger than Delawares had originally intended to sell—roughly 1,200 square miles. The purchase remained a foul memory for Delawares during the Seven Years War, and Teedyuscung endeavored to bring it up during the treaty in order to gain political leverage. After the conclusion of the 1756 treaty, Pemberton followed through on Teedyuscung’s request. He formally asked proprietary secretary Richard Peters for permission to examine the Minutes of the Governor and Council in order to evaluate the Delawares' claim of fraud. Peters denied his request.

Proprietary government officials considered the Friendly Association's work during the 1756 treaty to be a nuisance, but the aftermath of the Walking Purchase incident reveals that their annoyance became open disdain. Indeed, in 1757, Pennsylvania Governor William Denny informed the Earl of Halifax of Friends' interventions. According to Denny, the Earl considered the Friends' actions to be "the most extraordinary procedure he had ever seen," but Friends were undeterred. Indeed, Israel Pemberton informed Mennonites just one year later that "[t]he Encouragement we daily

67 Colonial Records, VII, 394, 397-398.
receive...is alone worth all our Labour & Expense, but we likewise have the Satisfaction of finding our Proceedings are well approv'd of by the King & Great Men in England...which will not be agreeable to those who have oppos'd us.⁶⁸ In this letter, Pemberton crafted a narrative that both ignored official disdain for their work and framed their efforts as politically viable. His invocation of the "King & Great Men in England" suggests that he hoped to frame the Friends' work as beneficial to the colony and empire. Such a narrative either would prove useful to build coalitions if the Friends regained political power after the war, or it would facilitate the maintenance of their unofficial diplomatic work. Either way, it was a narrative with political purpose.

Members of the Friendly Association also captured their political message in coin. In 1757, they distributed the first peace medal coined in the British colonies. It was a tradition that the United States, most famously President Thomas Jefferson, continued throughout the nineteenth century. The Friendly Association's medal depicted a Quaker seated across from an Indian, likely Delaware, male (see figure 1.1 below). A council fire burned between the two, and the Quaker held out a peace pipe—both symbols of peaceful negotiation. While the medal was not meant to depict William Penn's first treaty with the Delawares literally, certain elements were borrowed from the tale of the "first establishment." The elm beneath which Penn reportedly treated with the Indians in 1682 was diplomatic sacred space, and the men on the coin invoked that romantic past. The tree was symbolic, but the placement of the Quaker beneath its branches was also significant. The Quaker ventured into the woods to treat with the Indian; he was a guest

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⁶⁸ Israel Pemberton, Draft of a letter to Benjamin Hersey and Mennonites, 29 5th Mo. 1758, “Pemberton Family Papers, 1741-1789,” Haverford College Special Collections, Haverford, PA.
on Native ground. When William Penn arrived on the shores of the Delaware, the members of the Friendly Association recalled that he too was a guest: "when [the Indians'] Numbers were great and their strength vastly superior, they received our Ancestors with gladness, relieved their wants with open Hears, granted them peaceable possession of the Land, and for along Course of Time, gave constant and frequent Proofs of a cordial Friendship." The peace medal thus harkened back to a rosier past, but it also suggested a way forward. It asserted that alliance between Euroamericans and Native peoples was crucial, and the placement of the Indian in the sun and the Quaker in the woods, suggested that Native peoples could prove to be an aid to European success on the continent. This was, then, but one vision of North America's political future.

Figure 1.1

This medal depicts a Quaker holding a peace pipe at a council fire. These medals were distributed to Native peoples by members of the Friendly Association as a token of their goodwill, as a reminder of the peaceful past, and as a statement of their political agenda.


The peace medal was also indicative of the Friendly Association's support for Teedyuscung. In 1757, Teedyuscung continued to craft his political power, even as the

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69 Minutes of the Friendly Association, HSP.
proprietary government endeavored to take advantage of his political weaknesses. When the Earl of Halifax, through Governor Denny's pen, argued that the Friends endeavored to treat with "Foreign Princes," he conceptualized—for primarily political reasons—Native polities as sovereign political entities whose leaders were similar to those in Europe. The earl’s assertion that Native leaders were “foreign princes” was likely not a widely-held viewpoint in Britain, but it reveals both that notions of Native sovereignty had political currency in the British Empire and that Friends’ aid was so unwanted that the earl was willing to present Native peoples as sovereign polities in order to discourage Quakers’ efforts. Teedyuscung's authority in Pennsylvania was also derived, in part, from colonial government officials' desire to seek out individual Native "chiefs"—whether truly leaders or not—as partners during treaty negotiations. In doing so, they sought to undermine localized tribal authority. Treating with a leader representing a hierarchical indigenous polity was far simpler than negotiating with what were, in actuality, many clan and village leaders.

As a consequence of partnership with Friends and the colony's attempt to simplify negotiations with the Delawares, Teedyuscung spoke on behalf of eastern and western Delawares at a council held in 1757 between members of the Pennsylvania government and leaders of the western Indian nations (including western Delawares). Positioning himself as leader of a coalition of all gathered nations, Teedyuscung implored the gathered Indians, "I take you, my Grand Children, by the Hand; I take your young Men by the Hand; I take the Hatchet out of all your Hands, and lay it upon the Ground, and observe you to do so." 70 Teedyuscung invoked the authority of the Delaware Nation by

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70 Colonial Records, VII, 726.
referring to those gathered as his "Grand Children" in the tradition of fictive kinship. He used his peoples' authority as "grandfathers" to seek the respect of those gathered, but he also sought power among the English. In a monologue addressed to the gathered Ohio leaders and councilmen, Teedyuscung explained, "[y]ou see here this Belt; It tells you that Peace is concluded. With one hand I take hold of the governor; the Five Nations take hold of the Governor likewise. With my other hand, I will take hold of you, and bring you together." Teedyuscung, then, was the link between Pennsylvania and the Six Nations (Haudenosaunee) on the one hand, and the Ohio Indians on the other. Not only did he seek to bolster his power by fashioning himself as a grand mediator, he also sought to dramatically alter North America's political landscape. He sought to bring the old "Covenant Chain" to the Ohio Country. It was an idea that would bolster his own power, and give the British an advantage over their French foes.

Teedyuscung's proposal was grounded in fantasy. Few, particularly those among the Ohio Indians, recognized the Delaware as a viable leader with the authority to create and lead a coalition of "ten nations." Just as importantly, the idea was rejected by the leaders of the Six Nations who were also present in 1757. The Haudenosaunee had long claimed superior status among the Crown's Indian allies. During the Seven Years War, Sir William Johnson, a man closely connected with Six Nations' leadership, tried desperately to convince them to join the British in the fight against the French. The British promised to recognize the Six Nations’ fictional authority over southern and western lands and peoples so long as they then turned over those lands to the British as

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71 Colonial Records, VII, 726.
part of their alliance. From the Six Nations' perspective, it was a means to ensure that Iroquoia remained protected against British encroachments; from the Crown's perspective, the agreement granted them political authority over lands and peoples that it had never conquered. The Six Nations had already declared Delawares to be "women" and subordinated them to the council at Onondaga, and so, in 1757, Pennsylvania supported its Haudenosaunee allies and dismissed Teedyuscung's proposal.

The Six Nations, however, went further. They referred to them as "nephews" rather than "grandfathers" and reduced the Delawares under Teedyuscung's leadership to the status of tributary nation, while also allowing them to occupy lands in the Wyoming Valley. What was more, they co-opted Teedyuscung's role as mediator. They informed all gathered,

that we have not only brought about this Union with our Nephews on the Waters of the River Susquehannah, but also have sent Messages to our Nephews, the Delawares and Minisinks, and to those likewise of our own Nations, who are on the Ohio under the influence of the French; We have told all these that they must lay down the French Hatchet, and be reconciled to their Brethren, the English, and never more employ it against them, and we hope they will take our advice; We, the Mohocks, Senecas and Onondagas, deliver this String of Wampum to remove the Hatchet out of your Heads that has been struck into them by the Ohio Indians, in order to lay a Foundation for Peace.


74 *Colonial Records*, VIII, 182.
If the Friendly Association's goal was peace alone, then the council and the subsequent 1758 Treaty of Easton was immensely satisfying. If, as was more likely, they hoped to secure some semblance of political authority in the colony and heal divisions within their society, then the aftermath of the council was disastrous. Teedyuscung, the association's principal ally, was politically impotent. What was more, Friends received no credit for the peace despite their earlier attempts to convince others of their political support in London. Indeed, several months after the 1758 treaty, Philadelphia Quakers "received undoubted Intelligence from our Friends in London" that a circulating report "designed to lay on us the whole Blame of the late Indian Ravages."75 London Friends were in turn "desirous of receiving from the Governor and Council the whole of these Charges in such manner that we may acquit ourselves" and protest their "Interest and reputation as a Religious Society."76 Not only had Philadelphia Friends failed to secure political capital, but they had also failed to heal the growing internal tensions within the Society of Friends. Indeed, they had made matters worse. The London Yearly Meeting redoubled its efforts to encourage its members to minimize their involvement in governmental affairs.77

Despite cautions from the London and Philadelphia meetings, in 1759 Pemberton opened a store near Fort Pitt in order to provide wares to nearby Indians at a reasonable

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75 Colonial Records, VIII, 243-244.
76 Ibid.
77 Tolles, Meeting House and Counting House, 235.
His efforts were, in many ways, a continuation of his earlier work among the Indians during the war. They stemmed from a perceived sense of benevolence, but, unlike the earlier peace efforts, they also incorporated his economic ambitions. Members of the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting chastised Pemberton in an effort to enforce recent calls to embrace simplicity and minimal engagement with the world. They explained that "we did desire thee not to prosecute thy Intentions of Fixing a Licenc'd Trade with the Indians in the manner thou propos'd." Instead of embracing his fellow Quakers' perspectives, however, Pemberton continued to frame his work as misunderstood benevolence. Indeed, in a letter to the Moravian missionary Christian Frederick Post, Pemberton reflected that "[p]arts of the Service which fall to our Lotts may subject us to divers Difficulties & Inconveniences some of the greatest is that of being often blamed & censured by those we love & Esteem, yet if he who knows the Secrets of all Hearts approves of our Intentions, he can & will in due time manifest our Integrity & reward us openly."

While Pemberton struggled to square his own efforts with the demands of his yearly meeting, Teedyuscung succumbed to bribery and alcohol. In an effort to bury the Walking Purchase issue for good, Pennsylvania's Provincial Council offered Teedyuscung £400 in 1762 to claim that "[h]e himself knew nothing of the Proprietors cheating them, and was sorry it had reached their Hearts." The council then "asked

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78 The most complete compilation of Pemberton's life before, during, and after the Seven Years War is Thayer's biography of the man. Theodore Thayer, *Israel Pemberton: King of the Quakers* (Philadelphia: Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 1943).
79 William Calendar, Jos. Morris, John Reynell, Jacob Lewis, Owen Jones, Rich Wistar, Jacob Shoemaker, Jr., Thomas Say to Israel Pemberton, 1st Month, 26, 1759, Pemberton Family Papers, Haverford College Special Collections, Haverford College, Haverford, Pennsylvania.
80 Israel Pemberton to Christian Frederick Post, 6.5 Month, 1760, "Pemberton Family Papers, 1741-1789," Haverford College Special Collections, Haverford College, Haverford, PA.
81 *Colonial Records*, VIII, 708.
whether the Indians had ever conferr'd together about the Lands they said were never sold by them to the Proprietors, He answered that they had, & that they would be contented with £400.\textsuperscript{82} Teedyuscung was murdered by arsonists—likely representatives of the Susquehanna Company of Connecticut—the following year during an attack on the Delawares' settlement in the Wyoming Valley.\textsuperscript{83}

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The attack on the Delawares' settlement was part of renewed violence in Pennsylvania. Once again, Pennsylvanians pushed onto Indian lands to the fury of western Indians. A group of Euroamerican men expressed their frustrations with the government's ineptitude, dubbed themselves the Paxton Boys, and determined to take measures into their own hands. Indeed, they argued that the "Quakers may talk what they will of the Happiness & Justice of their Administration, but...their want of the Principles of Justice & the common Feelings of human Nature for the distressed" meant "that we cannot but blame them as the Cause of many of our Sufferings."\textsuperscript{84} When the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting chastised Pemberton for opening a store, then, it did it because it knew that prevailing political attitudes did not look upon it favorably, and it wished to remain, at least for a time, distant from Indian affairs. For a religious group whose own historical beginnings were clouded in violence and ostracization, others' scorn was a potent concern.

\textsuperscript{82} Colonial Records, VIII, 708.
\textsuperscript{84} “Apology of the Paxton Volunteers,” Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.
The Paxton Boys called into question Quakers' past political leadership by pushing the Society of Friends’ pacifism to the forefront of discourse once more. Rather than lament Quakers’ inability to raise funds or pursue war, however, the men questioned Friends' very humanity by questioning their ability to care about "the distressed." For Friends in the colony and in London, the problem was serious. One Friend informed another that the Paxton men "were still roving about in companys, and that in all their Revels, they Breath vengeance against Is Pemberton...as well as against many others."85

After the Paxton Boys' brutal murder of Conestoga Indians near and at Lancaster, they set their sights on killing both Moravian Indians in Philadelphia and Israel Pemberton. More generally, a flurry of pamphlets almost universally blamed the Quakers for the recent violence.86 Friends' political past and the Friendly Association's efforts combined to render the Quakers widely hated among their fellow Pennsylvania colonists.

Friends' troubles did not cease once peace returned to Pennsylvania in the mid-1760s. Instead, the American Revolution exacerbated Friends' political woes. News of rebellion gripped Philadelphia in 1774, and it forced both the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting and individual Friends to confront the practicalities, once again, of wartime politics. The yearly meeting condemned opposition to Great Britain, and admonished its members against participating in protests. The stance proved problematic for both those Quakers who harbored sympathies for colonial independence as well as for those who advocated pacifist neutrality. As a result, "Free Quakers" organized in Philadelphia and moved to contribute money to the cause and take up arms. Those who chose the

85 Susanna Wright to Isaac Whitelock, Jan. 16th, 1764, Parrish Family Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.
increasingly strict policies of the meeting endeavored to remain above the fray. As scholars such as Sydney James suggest, however, many non-Quaker Pennsylvanians often confused these latter Friends' neutrality with loyalty. Officials jailed numerous of Philadelphia's Friends for suspected loyalties to the British, and they exiled others. They sent Israel Pemberton, for example, to western Virginia for failing to take a loyalty oath—an oath that violated his religious principles.

Over time, however, the yearly meeting softened its anti-Revolution position, and increasing concern over the slave trade pushed some Friends to take on variations of the philanthropic work that Israel Pemberton continued after the Seven Years War. Sydney James points out that Friends in Philadelphia—as well as in other meetings in eastern North America—offered relief for the victims of war in 1775, including those Friends who lived in rebellious and besieged Boston as well as their Quaker and non-Quaker neighbors in Philadelphia in 1776. The war years—and the accompanying internal squabbling—pushed Friends to repair their reputation as a society among their peers. Crucially, Friends' wartime philanthropy gained sanction from the yearly meetings in Philadelphia and London, and it meant that the meetings officially recognized such efforts as a means to heal internal divisions and garner political capital.

89 James, *A People Among Peoples*, 258-261. Friends also offered extensive support to Quakers and non-Quakers in the south and Nova Scotia.
Native peoples' politics proved to be just as complicated during the Revolution as they had been during the Seven Years War, and, like the Quakers, many communities faced internal divisions. Some were pro-American, some favored the British, and others desired neutrality. Colin Calloway demonstrates that, for Shawnees in particular, the American Revolution offered an opportunity to form an alliance with the British and recommence their quest to secure the lower Ohio Valley lands against Euroamerican encroachments. For many Shawnees and Six Nations peoples alike, the political ramifications of the war centered on the destruction of their lands, communities, and crops. The Revolution, then, brought about devastating economic and political consequences, but it also offered an opportunity to protect, maintain, or reaffirm the boundaries of Indians' lands. It was, in many ways, part of the ongoing battle for the Ohio Country—waged since Delawares fought to keep westward roaming Pennsylvanians off of their lands during the 1750s and 1760s—and it offered the hope that Native peoples could serve their own political agendas during a contest between their two Euroamerican neighbors.

Despite the complicated geopolitics of war and alliance, the 1783 Treaty of Paris declared that, as British allies, Native peoples lost the war. If the treaty signers did not lump a particular Indian nation along with the losing British allies, they ignored their

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90 Colin G. Calloway, *The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and Diversity in Native American Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). The fighting at Oriskany Creek in western New York was perhaps the most emblematic of those divisions. That battle between Oneidas and Mohawks—as well as the war more generally—altered the power dynamics in New York. Internal disagreement and the devastation wrought by the Americans' Sullivan Campaign rendered the Six Nations politically weakened

presence on the map of North America altogether. Indeed, the British abandoned their Indian allies during peace negotiations. Consequently, more of the Delawares chose to migrate westward and, in doing so, they endeavored to keep much of their culture and political organization intact. Others, however, remained and continued the fight—whether through violence or simple occupation—for their lands.\(^\text{92}\)

Indeed, while the American victors claimed authority over Ohio Valley lands once claimed by the British, Delawares, Shawnees, and other Ohio Country Indians did not recognize those rights to their lands. Disputes over the controversial Kentucky region, proved especially difficult to resolve. Ohio Indians raided settlers through the 1780s and early 1790s, and they put financial, political, and military strain on the young U.S. state at a time when its inhabitants were testing its authority in episodes such as Shays's Rebellion.\(^\text{93}\) The region's Indians also partnered with the British, still lingering in Ohio Country forts after the Revolution, in efforts to thwart U.S. expansion. One official noted in 1784 that “the British keep within those garrisons, several Americans who were taken prisoners by the Indians under their direction” and that Congress should “take such measures as becomes the honor of the United States so flagrantly wounded by the Officers of the King of Great Britain.”\(^\text{94}\) Indians' alliances thus ensured that the United States' dreams of unfettered expansion remained elusive.


\(^{94}\) M247, reel 69, NARA, Oct. 1784, p. 140.
The U.S. state, meanwhile, attempted to wed dream with reality with a series of ordinances in the 1780s. The 1787 Northwest Ordinance, in particular, proved crucial to both the processes of empire building and state building during the nineteenth century. At its most basic level, the 1787 ordinance provided a procedure for territories' incorporation into the U.S. as states, and it sketched a plan for their government. The United States Congress appointed territorial governors and secretaries, and territorial officials were to "adopt and publish in the district such laws of the original States, criminal and civil, as may be necessary and best suited to the circumstances of the district, and report them to Congress from time to time."\textsuperscript{95} It was a practical system, and it was also a clear assertion of federal power over states and territories that enabled the republic to avoid formerly articulating its status as an imperial power. Congressional power over the territories meant that subsequent states and territories must adopt laws, procedures, and rights of "the original States" that were "not repugnant to the principles and articles" of the Ordinance created by the federal government.\textsuperscript{96} It was, in essence, a plan for self-replication across the continent. What was more, the legislation required "an oath or affirmation of fidelity and of office; the governor before the president of congress, and all other officers before the Governor."\textsuperscript{97} The territories thus had their own governments, laws, courts, even a representative in Congress, but all were subject to congressional approval or to the approval of a congressional appointee. Lastly, the Ordinance explicitly

\textsuperscript{95} Northwest Ordinance, July 13, 1787; (National Archives Microfilm Publication M332, roll 9); Miscellaneous Papers of the Continental Congress, 1774-1789; Records of the Continental and Confederation Congresses and the Constitutional Convention, 1774-1789, Record Group 360; National Archives.
\textsuperscript{96} Ibid., section eleven.
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid., section twelve.
banned slavery in the Northwest territories, revealing that the federal government claimed the power to limit the extension of slavery and to define the property rights of individuals living beyond the bounds of the original state. Power flowed from the center outward and the Northwest Ordinance should be interpreted as a watershed moment in defining the federal state's powers.\footnote{It is unsurprising that the Northwest Ordinance was adopted near the end of the federal government's organization under the Articles of Confederation. Gordon Wood's \textit{Creation of the American Republic} suggests that the 1780s were years in which government officials and intellectuals struggled to define the powers of the federal government and its role in individuals' lives. Wood presents the crisis of the 1780s as part of a break down of republican political theory and, indeed, the 1787 legislation reveals that government policy-makers were attempting to redefine the authority of the federal government. The government’s use of federally-backed troops to put down Shays’s Rebellion illuminates the varied components of the debate concerning federal power. Gordon S. Wood, \textit{The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787} (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1969).}

The Northwest Ordinance codified the United States' imperial ambitions, but the mechanics of empire nonetheless remained uncertain and obscured—many Americans did not wish to consider themselves constituents of a new empire. The U.S. federal state was small, and its Articles of Confederation did it no favors. The loose confederation of states meant that the federal government lacked the resources to colonize a continent and its peoples by force. Such a political organization was, in some ways, the result of Americans' victory in a revolutionary contest that concerned, largely, competing visions of empire. With victory, Americans' initial vision for empire prevailed. The functioning of the British Empire in eastern North America had been predicated on the mutual consent of its constituent parts. A delicate and contested balance of power existed between the center and the periphery with the colonies subordinate to metropolitan authority and colonial inhabitants vested with the rights of Englishmen and substantial
power over the conduct of local affairs. Britain's North American colonists had found this arrangement increasingly frustrating. When the Crown attempted to pay its war debts with new taxes after the Seven Years War, for example, the colonists affirmed their perceived right to be governed by consent and insisted, by the 1770s, that "taxation without representation" was unjust. Many colonists wished to govern their own internal affairs, and, through protest, they articulated their own imperial vision in which multiple centers were connected by mutual affinity.

That arrangement, however, proved practically problematic for a migratory population, and the Northwest Ordinance thus not only bolstered federal power and vested it with the ability to expand its territorial reach, but it also suggested a new mode of empire. Jack Greene argues that revolutionary Americans separated from Britain in part because they envisioned the relationship between "peripheries and center" to be one of mutually constitutive parts, but the Ordinance legislation suggests that, at least for 1787 policy-makers, this was no longer the case. Episodes such as Shays's Rebellion seemed to suggest for some policy-makers that limited, decentralized power was inadequate. The problem posed by the continent's Indian peoples did so likewise.

The Northwest Ordinance declared that "[t]he utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians; their lands and property shall never be taken from them without their consent; and, in their property, rights, and liberty, they shall never be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorized by Congress."

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100 Jack P. Greene, *Peripheries and Center*.
101 Northwest Ordinance, article 3.
document thus presumed Euroamerican immigration to the region, and it also implicitly presumed future land sales. It presumed, in other words, settler colonialism. This posed a conundrum, however, with regard to U.S. Indian relations. If Native peoples' property could "never be taken from them without their consent," then the United States needed to translate and transform Native peoples' ideas regarding land into ones of private property, so that they would be intelligible to Euroamerican land buyers. Such a transformation would promise peaceful dealings with the Indians, and it would facilitate the new U.S. policy of buying Indian lands through formal treaties. In the meantime, however, the United States government erased Indians' alternative conceptions of the land, and instead, as the ordinance's text reveals, assumed that ideas of property were already mutually intelligible.

With the pressures of U.S. immigration to the region, however, tensions continued to mount. Skirmishes abounded in the Ohio Country during the 1780s. Just two years after the ordinance's presumptions regarding private property, the U.S. federal government endeavored to begin the hard work of altering Native peoples' conceptions of their lands. To do so, Secretary of War Henry Knox devised a plan to transform the continent's Native peoples into yeoman farmers. He enlisted the aid of missionaries, and his plan is the product of a small, indebted state bent on territorial acquisition premised on the ideas of commoditized private property and recognition of indigenous peoples’ persistence. It articulated Americans’ desires for the “west,” but also offered an implicit acknowledgment that the state required assistance. Indeed, Knox declared in 1789, "[m]issionaries of excellent moral character should be appointed to reside in their nation, who should be well supplied with all the implements of husbandry and the necessary
stock for a farm. These men should be made the instruments to work on the indians."¹⁰²

In the Ohio Country, however, Knox’s plan remained an idea into the 1790s. Ohio Indians’ politics intervened, prevented that idea from being translated into action, and prompted Friends to continue their diplomatic work, this time alongside U.S. officials.

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Given their history, Philadelphia's Quakers were accustomed to cultivating political partnerships that proved mutually beneficial. Like their relationship with the Delawares in colonial Pennsylvania, the Quakers struck up a partnership with the U.S. federal state in an effort to achieve their own political and philanthropic ends. Indeed, Friends' willingness to engage with public philanthropic projects continued after the American Revolution, and they resumed, once again, their diplomatic work in Indian Country.¹⁰³ Friends and Delawares' relationship during the Seven Years War was one that bred continuity between the eras of the British and American empires in North America. The situation in the Ohio Country was tense, and with the outbreak of war in 1790s, individual Friends once again perceived an opportunity to benefit Indian peoples, serve the public, and remain true to their religious principles.

¹⁰³ Friends lobbied Congress in 1790, for example, to end the slave trade and, more broadly, slavery in the United States, but nothing came of their efforts. March 12, 1790, The Pennsylvania Packet, and Daily Advertiser, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, page 2.
Chapter 2
Resurrecting the "Chain of Friendship": The International Politics of Intercultural Diplomacy

In the heat of June 1791, Quaker John Parrish dined with Colonel Timothy Pickering, then a U.S. commissioner to the Six Nations, "12 or 15 Sachems and head wariors of the Six Nations," and an interpreter in western New York. Conversation was friendly, and the food, in Parrish's opinion, somewhat too lavish given both his Quaker taste for simplicity and the fact that a war was on. After several servers cleared the table, Parrish solicited the group's interpreter to aid him in offering the diners a speech on behalf of the Philadelphia Society of Friends. Parrish informed the Haudenosaunee men that he was of the "peaceable people called Quakers," and that he and his brethren had come "with a design to see our Bretheren the Indians and take them by the hand and brighten the Chane of friendship agreeably to the Custom of their friends our Ancestors." He explained that "the People called Quakers came into this country with Wm Penn abour 108 Years ago and in consequence of which lived together abour 70 Years in uninterrupted Peace & fellowship." In his opinion, "if the Indians desire[d] to perpetuate the same friendly disposition...a peace of still longer continuance may be the happy consequence of the Presant Treaty." Towards the end of this speechmaking, however, another commissioner interrupted him and insisted, "there was none but men of Peace presant." Parrish later reflected that the statement "occasioned me to stop shorter than otherwise I should have done."104

104 John Parrish journals, William L. Clements Library, The University of Michigan, Journal, "Concerning Treaty at Newtown Point Indian Treaty 1791," 5th day 30 [June 30], 1791 (hereafter
Despite this latter commissioner’s brusqueness, Parrish’s inclusion at the diplomatic dinner was purposeful, though his role was ill-defined. Friends’ history of cooperation with Native peoples rendered Quakers useful both to the U.S. government and to Native polities and their leaders, but Friends’ inclusion in official proceedings was a relatively new phenomenon. Some, like the second commissioner, were not yet accustomed to the prominence top U.S. officials like Pickering afforded non-governmental diplomats. Even Parrish—whose diplomatic speech irritated at least one Oneida diner that evening—lacked familiarity with his new position. Indeed, shortly after Parrish spoke the Oneida Good Peter informed him that "we ware now in a free freindly conversation between Brothers it w as not the business of the Treaty we ware not at the Council Fire." Parrish erred by speaking of official business at an informal gathering—a rare mistake given that Friends were, by the 1790s, savvy diplomats. But his mistake was born from his position in flux. During the 1790s the Society of Friends operated as a private organization that, unlike during the 1750s, cooperated openly with the U.S. federal government. The federal state was still small and, similar to the ways of the French empire in North America, the legitimization of U.S. overtures of peace by a few well-connected missionaries was essential to the early United State’s ability to assert and exert authority in far-flung locales—particularly in the Ohio Country where a host of Native nations vied for power. Friends’ usefulness and their emerging partnership with

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105 Parrish journal, 5th day 30 [June 30], 1791.
106 With men like John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and William Eaton acting as peace commissioners in Europe and North Africa during these years of war, missionary men became useful stand-ins in Indian Country, and they established a paradigm of U.S. missionary diplomacy
the U.S. government thus was born from necessity, and it encouraged a paradigm of federal cooperation with non-governmental organizations.

As Good Peter’s criticism of Parrish’s speech reveals, however, the Quaker’s status was confused not simply because of the society’s increasing connection with the federal state, but because of Native polities’ uncertain political status in U.S. politics. On paper, they were neither foreign or domestic, while in practice, Native peoples were, for all intents and purposes, necessarily treated as sovereign nations. At the 1791 table, Pickering was aware of Haudenosaunee diplomatic politics, and he acceded to their desires, expectations, and standing alliances. The Six Nations had a long history of working with—though sometimes against—the Society of Friends, and Friends were useful allies to have. As a result of Native nations’ power on the ground, the U.S. government allied itself with the Society of Friends, Parrish its representative, and, ultimately, the Society’s agenda. Native nations, their authority intact as evidenced by Pickering's inviting a Quaker diplomat to dinner, ensured that they both checked and shaped the United States' imperial ambitions in the Ohio Country. They forced the United States to recognize Native sovereignty in the dinners and pipe-smoking affairs that

that enabled the United States to extend its diplomatic presence in North America and abroad by expanding its diplomatic contingent.

characterized U.S.-Indian diplomacy—even if U.S. officials had other ideas on paper—and they ultimately compelled a partnership between the U.S. federal government and non-governmental organizations like the Society of Friends.\footnote{Parrish was one among several other missionary brokers during this period: the Moravian John Heckewelder and other members of the Society of Friends were also occasionally among the government’s dinner guests.}

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In 1789, Secretary of War Henry Knox wrote to President George Washington, "Indians ought to be considered as foreign nations, not as the subjects of any particular state." He penned the words within a broader dialogical context of the struggle between federal authority and the power of the states, with an argument for the "foreign" status of Native nations uttered, in part, to bolster the Federalist viewpoint. Knox’s statement was also, however, a consequence of wartime exigency. The Treaty of Paris ending the American Revolution attempted to obliterate Indians’ claims to Ohio Valley and southeastern lands, but it ultimately failed in its aim. In the southeast, the Creeks effectively played Spanish interests off of American, and for a time, they maintained their lands in the region. Alexander McGillivray, a Creek with Scottish heritage, was crucial to that effort, and he, like the Shawnee Blue Jacket and Miami Little Turtle in the Ohio Country, maintained connections with competing Euroamerican officials to do so.\footnote{The ongoing Spanish presence in Florida after the American Revolution enabled the Creeks to continue to play imperial powers off of one another. See Thomas D. Watson, “Strivings for Sovereignty: Alexander McGillivray, Creek Warfare, and Diplomacy, 1783-1790,” \textit{The Florida Historical Quarterly}, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Apr., 1980), 400-414.} For a republic that struggled to raise revenue or field militias adequate to the task of quieting citizen rebellions such as Shays’s Rebellion in Massachusetts, the ongoing persistence of
Native peoples—complete with skirmishing in the Ohio Valley during the 1780s—pushed Knox to articulate a relationship between Indian nations and the federal government, just as it had pushed him to conceive of the civilization plan in 1789.

That relationship, however, was a contested and confused one. Knox’s claim that Native nations were “foreign” was a novel one, particularly in comparison to the Constitution’s suggestion that Native polities were neither foreign or domestic. John Parrish’s inclusion as part of the U.S. diplomatic apparatus, however, suggests that during the 1790s the United States recognized Native nations' sovereign power (and its subsequent need to court that power) in practice—the United States’ own diplomatic apparatus was insufficient—while treaty relationships similarly showcased the international nature of U.S. dealings with various Native American polities.

The early national understanding of a hierarchy of nations, however, influenced the articulation of Native nations' place in the Constitution's all-important commerce clause. The clause lists "the Indian tribes" as distinct from "foreign nations" but also from "the several States." They were a uniquely ambiguous political entity, at least in the rhetoric of U.S. statecraft, and here it is evident that the founders' understanding of foreign relations collided with their North American imperialist desires. Native nations were foreign nations, but something more uncertain on paper and in practice. Indeed, one of the central elements of U.S. Indian policy, for example, the 1790 Trade and Intercourse Act, was built upon the ambiguous status of Native polities as articulated in the commerce clause. The act endeavored to control U.S. citizens' ability to buy and sell goods in Indian Country, and it prohibited Americans or individual U.S. states from buying Indian lands. It ultimately attempted to bolster the power of the U.S. state in its
dealings in Indian Country and also over its citizenry. Because the act asserted the power of the federal government to buy lands and issue trading licenses, however, it simultaneously recognized Native nations' sovereignty. The federal state dealt with Indian nations, and that, in turn, rendered individual Native nations the federal government’s diplomatic equivalent. With the Trade and Intercourse acts the federal state attempted to articulate its own powers and, by necessity, those of Native polities.\(^{109}\)

The United States issued the Trade and Intercourse Act in an attempt both to ward off British traders and to regulate settler colonization of Indian lands. The acts also exposed the republic’s commitment to building its fledgling economy. Indian affairs became crucial to that task—a trend that proved enduring. The federal government seized upon its ambiguous relationship with Native nations in order to ensure that trade revenues became federal revenues.

Native polities’ political status remained contested for decades after Knox’s statement. Indeed, Chief Justice John Marshall's infamous 1831 ruling in which he declared the Cherokee Nation and all other Indian nations "domestic dependent nations," contributed to an on-going argument concerning North America's Indian polities. He ultimately declared that they were considered and treated by the U.S. government as "foreign nations" prior to *Cherokee Nation v. The State of Georgia*:

> They have been uniformly treated as a state from the settlement of our country. The numerous treaties made with them by the United States

recognize them as a people capable of maintaining the relations of peace and war, of being responsible in their political character for any violation of their engagements, or for any aggression committed on the citizens of the United States by any individual of their community. Laws have been enacted in the spirit of these treaties. The acts of our government plainly recognize the Cherokee nation as a state, and the courts are bound by those acts.

Marshall went on to declare Native nations "domestic dependent nations" as a consequence of his reading of the U.S. Constitution, and as the result of his wondering "whether the Cherokee constitute a foreign state in the sense of the constitution." That document, at best, couched relations with Indian nations in vague terms and, at worst, endeavored to utilize Indian policy in the creation of a powerful state. Knox's declaration that Native nations were "foreign nations," coupled with U.S.-Native diplomatic protocols, however, reveals the extent to which the U.S. Constitution's framers not only sought to create the U.S. state, but sought to create the U.S. imperial state predicated upon fictions that transformed Indian sovereignty into an uncertainty.¹¹⁰

Indeed, there was a tension between policy and law on the one hand and the actual workings of U.S.-Native relations on the other: encounters revealed that the U.S. state's imperial policy—and the government’s inclusion of missionaries into its diplomatic apparatus—was produced as a result of Native nations' sovereignty. For men like Knox and Parrish—the people conducting the actual work of diplomacy in Indian Country—Native polities had to be treated as foreign nations. Indeed, despite the historiographical trend to interpret the rise of the U.S. nation-state in conversation with the decline of

¹¹⁰ Cherokee Nation v. The State of Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, italics mine.
Native sovereign authority, U.S.-Native relations show that Natives' sovereignty remained intact after the American Revolution and into the nineteenth century.

While officials debated, disagreed, and harbored inconsistent ideas regarding Indians’ status vis a vis the United States, they constructed Indian policies in the context of their dealings with other polities. The Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, supported a foreign policy that simultaneously promoted a global United States reputation of strength and increased government revenues. He advocated for congressional regulation of foreign commerce—like he did the Indian trade with the trade and intercourse acts—in an attempt to ensure that the federal government reaped the financial benefits of global trade. Revenues and centralized power were the primary goals of both Indian policy and foreign policy more broadly.111

Beyond financial policy, federal officials treated Indian nations in ways reminiscent of their relations with the North African states. With the Treaty of Paris in 1783 and the subsequent loss of British imperial protection in the Mediterranean, the United States negotiated treaties with the various Barbary States in order to avoid the seizure of American ships' cargoes and crewmen. Such treaties were similar to captive exchange negotiations in Indian Country. What was more, the United States continued to engage in practices of federally-funded gift-giving and ransom payments to the North African nations into the nineteenth century. Given its still-small state apparatus and limited budget, it is not surprising that the U.S. balanced its engagements among both Indian nations and the Barbary States with isolation from European conflicts as a matter

of imperial necessity. Native polities—like their North African counterparts—forced the United States to construct a very particular foreign relations agenda, one of balanced—and selective—military and diplomatic engagement. In the discourses and policies of statecraft, Tunis, Algiers, Morocco, and the Indian nations were sovereign, but, in keeping with a commitment to ambiguity and the advantages that accompanied that status, U.S. officials also deemed these polities as among the more "barbaric" nations of the world.\textsuperscript{112}

Knox’s need to frame Indian affairs in the context of federal power was a consequence of his understanding of both Native and global diplomatic politics, and it was also the result of U.S. officials’ familiarity with the potency of Native authority in

\textsuperscript{112} In an excellent contextualization of Washington's "Farewell Address," Marie-Jeanne Rossignol argues that ideas of "isolation" were related to U.S. desires to expand in North America and protect economic interests in the Mediterranean. See Marie-Jeanne Rossignol, "Early Isolationism Revisited: Neutrality and Beyond in the 1790s," \textit{Journal of American Studies}, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Aug., 1995), 215-227. There were also parallels, namely treaty agreements concerning captives, between U.S. responses to captive-taking practices in the Barbary States and Indian Country. One Moroccan emperor, moreover, captured American sailors after failing to receive a present from the United States; gift-giving, then, was just as important in the Mediterranean world as it was in Indian Country. For Barbary captives, see Gary E. Wilson, "American Hostages in Moslem Nations, 1784-1796: The Public Response," \textit{Journal of the Early Republic}, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Summer, 1982), 123-141; Martha Elena Rojas, "Insults Unpunished: Barbary Captives, American Slaves, and the Negotiation of Liberty," \textit{Early American Studies}, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Fall 2003), 159-186, see in particular pp. 165, 170.

practice. Parrish observed diplomatic pageantry that suggested both federal and Indian sovereignty—as well as his own conception of both. Prior to the treaty proceedings in 1791, for example, Parrish witnessed three to four hundred Senecas marching into Colonel Pickering's encampment. The "wariers...came in Indian file with their Rifles on their sholders and drew themselves up in a line by the [colonel's] Tent and gave him 2 Sallutes by the discharge of their guns, which the Colonel received as a mark of respect." Not only was this a show of Seneca military power, but Pickering's reception of their army, along with the Seneca salutes, suggests that the Senecas, in the eyes of both Pickering and Parrish who interpreted the events, were incorporated into the Euroamericans' own framework of state-backed military power.

On yet another occasion of Seneca military parade, "about 50 Indians" formed "a line near the Coln." and "sent and fired 3 sallutes & informed that their was as many more on their way." The marching indicated that the Seneca Nation possessed an army, even if it was not, at the moment, hostile; the assurances that more warriors were available conveyed a claim to power but also a subtle threat. The Senecas' military showing demonstrated that they possessed the power of arms, men, and respect, and it served as a means to translate Native sovereignty into a performative diplomatic space that was easily understood by U.S. officials. Such a show facilitated Senecas' ability to minimize their cultural differences while also asserting their place—and thus both

113 Historian Leonard Sadosky's work on early American diplomacy situates both Indian affairs and U.S. relations with European empires in a single conversation, but it does so by privileging a top-down view of history, and it thus tells a tale of high-level statecraft, leaving Knox's statement fixed in the realm of Federalist-Democratic Republican politics. See Sadosky, Revolutionary Negotiations: Indians, Empires, and Diplomats in the Founding of America (Jeffersonian America) (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2010), in particular, chapter 5.

114 Parrish, 4th day, the 29th [June 29], 1791, vol. 2.
eroding and maintaining political difference—among the many nations that the United States government recognized as sovereign. The meeting of two sovereign polities—each foreign to the other—created such spaces, and they were representative of each power’s attempt to find a common performative language that would render one intelligible to the other.\textsuperscript{115}

These elaborate spaces of diplomacy further complicated—and enshrined—U.S. officials' already ambiguous perceptions of Native leaders and Native nations' political standing. For John Parrish, Native leaders were the equivalents of the most prominent European statesmen. Parrish described the Shawnee Blue Jacket's "person and appearance" as "much like the great men such as an Admiral or General." When, in 1791, moreover, the Seneca Red Jacket spoke to Pickering and others of the U.S. diplomatic entourage, Parrish reflected that the chief's "appearance and manner his eliquence and person I concluded would out no inconsiderable figure on the floor of a British Parliament or an American Congress I do not remember have seen any states man make a more magisterial appearance." The Quaker understood Red Jacket as belonging to the realms of diplomacy and international politics, while Pickering, who received the Seneca statesmen in the company of Parrish and an interpreter, legitimated the Seneca's claim to authority by engaging in Six Nations diplomatic traditions of speech-making. Parrish's presence, a consequence of Pickering's appeal to Six Nations' alliances and protocols, likewise underscored the power of the Six Nations in western New York; Colonel Pickering

\textsuperscript{115} Parrish, 6th of the 7th month [July 6], 1791, ibid. Like dress, these military parades were central to performing diplomacy. See Timothy J. Shannon, "Dressing for Success on the Mohawk Frontier: Hendrick, William Johnson, and the Indian Fashion," \textit{The William and Mary Quarterly}, Third Series, Vol. 53, No. 1, Material Culture in Early America (Jan., 1996), 13-42.
encouraged the Quaker's participation in the meeting and thereby recognized the legitimacy of the Senecas and their diplomatic networks.116

Some private U.S. citizens likewise recognized the potency of Native sovereignty. One worried citizen, for example, perhaps a student, penned an essay in 1794 in an effort to answer the query "Is the prosecution of the present Indian War an advantage to the United States?" The answer reveals this citizen's understanding not only of the politics of states and war but of Native nations' relationship with the United States. The author, in prose that suggests a reading of Vattel's Law of Nations, contended that when "bodies of people have united themselves together in civil society" they may, "in order to answer the purpose of self-preservation more effectually," engage in war "against other bodies of people, who have encroached upon their liberty and rights....The prosecution of the present Indian war is in defence of personal safety. For, if we did not send an armed force to impede their incursions and savage cruelties, our frontiers would daily be diminished in number." Though the widely-read Law of Nations left the question of Indians' political status ambiguous and suggested that Europeans had a right to Native lands because of a failure on the part of the latter to "cultivate the earth," this essayist nonetheless reveals that war was necessary for Americans' "self-preservation," and that Native nations and the United States were both "bodies of people." They were equals engaged in war because Native nations' threatened the United States' preservation; Indians threatened to "diminish" the "frontiers." Even if the essayist cultivated his or her opinion because of a desire to eradicate Native peoples or claim Indian lands, it remains that the politics of war

116 Parrish, 3rd day, the 9th, 1793, vol. 4, 43; Parrish, 6th day, the 1st, 7th month [July 1], 1791, vol. 2.
necessitated an understanding of Native nations as "bodies of people"—an understanding that combined with their presumed inferior status based upon ideas of supposed "savagery" or "heathenism"—to render Native peoples' status confusing in the eyes of common Americans as well. This provides a glimpse of early U.S. citizens' understanding of the international politics of war with Native nations.¹¹⁷

William Eaton, future U.S. consul to Tunis, similarly understood Native nations and their leaders as sovereign equivalents of the United States. Writing in 1793, he informed Stephen Jacobs that "the Indians are determined not to talk of a peace so long as one Federal American lives on the N West side of the Ohio." Here, Eaton revealed, somewhat unwittingly, that the U.S. desired peace with the Indians; this is especially significant given that treaty rhetoric usually involved presumptions of Native nations' desires for friendship. U.S.-Native diplomacy and the writings of U.S. citizens, however, reveal that such presumptions were the products of imperial fiction. Moreover, Eaton went on to tell his correspondent that he "heard the Cornplanter (a Commissioner & Chief from the Six Nations)" refuse to speak of peace "in the presence of, and in a talk with our Commander in Chief." Native "commissioners" and leaders, then, had a direct line of communication with the President of the United States. Many presidents did, in fact, receive visits from Native leaders in meetings and gatherings not unlike later U.S.

state dinners, and Eaton's report reveals that he too envisioned Cornplanter as a statesman who dealt with the U.S. head of state.\footnote{1793 April 15. William Eaton ALS to Stephen Jacobs, Native American History Collection, William L. Clements Library, The University of Michigan.}

Eaton also understood Native nations, however, as possessing close ties with Britain; Friends were not, then, the only links in the Six Nations' chain of alliances. Like many Native North American nations, the Haudenosaunee, Shawnees, Wyandots, and others cultivated close ties with the British Empire and its representatives. The Seneca diplomat Red Jacket, for example, reminded Pickering in 1791 that diplomacy with his people—or any Indian nation—was not as simple as professing friendship. After Pickering asked the Seneca why his people sought the alliance of the British—a question that, alone, reveals Pickering's awareness of Native sovereignty—Red Jacket informed the colonel that "the British are our Anchant friends, they live near us when we treat with them they make use of Wampum which we understand they give us good advice...they make use of waighting when they speake to us." Since, according to Red Jacket, "not one man among us can read," when the United States violated Natives' customs of wampum-giving and speechmaking during U.S. treaty-making, "then we are oblige to go to our Kneighbours the British to get them explaind us." Not only were the Six Nations' ties with the British the product of proximity, then, but it was because British officials made use of their knowledge of Native diplomatic protocols such as the exchange of wampum belts. When, on another occasion, the Seneca insisted, "we have our anchant customs I have one in my hand, (meaning the belt)," he emphasized that the meeting between the United States and his nation was one between two nations with diverse—and equally
significant—traditions. The Seneca’s insistence upon “anchant” customs likewise suggested his own conception of Senecas’ sovereignty, one grounded in a long past. As Pickering well knew by the 1790s, courting Native authority—and thus Native protocols—could produce a myriad of advantages in both the political and military realms. The United States' continuance of speechmaking, gift-giving, and other traditions in Indian affairs, then, was derived from an understanding that such appeals to Native traditions, along with the recognition that Native nations commanded power that required such appeals, fostered strong diplomatic relations. Appeals to Native authority were, simply, the product of smart foreign relations; enlisting Friends as unofficial diplomats who possessed vast knowledge of Native protocols was the same.119

Red Jacket's speech to Pickering also reveals much, moreover, about his own perceived power and that of his nation. The Seneca continued to explain "we desire you to appoint an agent for Indian Affairs to whom we may go to [tell] every thing that happens to us and from whom we may hear what concerns us as this used to be in old times." In responding to Pickering's query regarding the Six Nations' relationship with the British, Red Jacket made an appeal: he recognized the extent to which Pickering and the United States required the friendship of the Six Nations, and he used that knowledge in an attempt to acquire an Indian agent who would engage in reconnaissance for his nation. Such an individual would also serve as an ambassador between his nation and the United States. Though Red Jacket was no doubt aware that the United States commanded

119 Parrish, 4th day, the 13th [July 13], 1791, vol. 2. Native nations wielded their alliances with Britain to assert political power in ways similar to those undertaken by African Americans by 1830. See Van Gosse, "As a Nation, the English Are Our Friends': The Emergence of African American Politics in the British Atlantic World, 1772-1861," The American Historical Review, Vol. 113, No. 4 (Oct., 2008), 1003-1028.
formidable power and that his people needed to work with that power (just as he knew that the United States needed to work with him), he nonetheless understood, rightfully, that the Six Nations were not a colonized people; they were a sovereign power.120

Native nations showcased their power when making appeals, but also in making clear—or purposefully obscuring—their own political agendas. Like the Society of Friends, the Mohican Hendrick Aupaumut was a useful ally of the United States, but he was also acted on behalf of his people. In 1791 Aupaumut visited the Ohio Indian nations "having agreed with the great men of the United States to take a Tour with their Message of peace." Six Nations leaders opposed his trip, yet still he went. To his mind, "if the western nations could be rightly informed of the desires of the United States—they would comply for peace." Such information, he argued, would be delivered best by "an Indian to whom they look upon as a true friend." Like Parrish and other diplomatic members of the Society of Friends, Aupaumut relied upon a peaceful past to make claims to power in a violent present. Indeed, his nation, the Mohicans, possessed a reputation for peace-making, and in describing the kinship relationships between the Mohicans, Miamis, Shawnees, Delawares, and others, he explained that "it was the business of our fathers to go around the Towns of these nations to renew the agreements between them—And tell them many things which they discover in among the White people in the east."121

120 Parrish, 4th day, the 13th [July 13], 1791, vol. 2.
Aupaumut's travels through the contested Ohio Country as a diplomatic messenger reveal his close ties with the United States, but also his own political motivations. Indeed, the Mohican informed Delawares:

> since the British & Amercians lay down their hatchets—then my Nation was forgotten. We never had had invitation to set in Council with the white people.—not as the 5 Nations & you are greatly regarded by the white people but last winter was the first time I had invitation from the great man of the United States...according to that invitation I went and after we arrived at Philadelphia—I find that the business was for the wellbeing of all nations—and then I was asked whether I would carry a Message of peace to you, here.

Aupaumut's statement appealed to Delawares' egos—they were, after all, "greatly regarded by the white people" unlike his own nation—but it also belied his desire to give the United States reason to remember the Mohicans. Lamenting that his "Nation was forgotten" after the American Revolution, Aupaumut undertook the work of peace that was central to his nation's historical identity, and he allied himself with the U.S. government. His motives were thus born of a desire for peace but also for political authority. Aupaumut hoped that alliance with the United States would offer the Mohican nation advantage.122

Aupaumut's work and motivations reveal the international nature of 1790s diplomacy. Like Friends, Aupaumut's diplomacy aligned with the desires of U.S. officials, and they recruited him for their purposes, but he undertook his mission for the Mohicans. Indian Country, like the United States, was not a united place; rather, it was fractured by alliances and viewpoints. The "western nations" so often mentioned en masse in U.S. government correspondence were conflicted. Some wished to broker peace

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122 Aupaumut, narratives, 30.
with the United States but remained firm that no further land sessions should be made; a
pan-Indian union of nations, meanwhile, fought for their lands under the leadership of the
Miami Little Turtle and the Shawnee Blue Jacket; "back nations" as Aupaumut called
them, meanwhile hated the Shawnees and "wished to see the Shawannese [on] one side
by themselves...and have washed their kittle [sic] to boil the Shawannese so as to have
Good broth." There were other views too. The Six Nations, like all the Indian nations,
engaged the United States, Britain, Shawnees, Delawares, and others of the allied Ohio
Nations in talks, sometimes to broker peace, other times to push for war, but always with
the political future of the Six Nations in mind. These were the international politics that
combined with U.S. imperial ambitions to produce the political landscape of 1790s North
America.

Those same politics, however, were the very politics that produced the U.S.
government’s relationship with the Society of Friends. With Native leaders affirming
their sovereign status in speech, appearance, and pageantry throughout the 1780s and
1790s, missionary partners such as John Parrish grew in importance. Such figures offered
a means to treat with Native peoples peacefully while satisfying and recognizing Native
claims to authority—as Pickering did when he invited Parrish to dinner—yet Friends’
status was ambiguous enough that the United States could maintain its fickle official
stance regarding U.S.-Indian relations. The U.S. government’s relationship with the
Society of Friends, then, was one born of compulsion and imperial expediency.\textsuperscript{123}

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\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., 59.
During the 1790s years of war in particular, men of friendly reputation like John Parrish and his fellow Quakers—William Hartshorne, Joseph Moore, William Savery, and others—were indispensable to U.S. hopes for peace with Native nations. Like the go-betweens who brokered relations between Euroamericans and Native peoples in decades past, Quakers’ indeterminate relationship with the United States and their history of diplomacy in colonial Pennsylvania combined to render them malleable actors whose ambiguity enabled them to find usefulness among both Native and American leaders. Also like many of those go-betweens, Friends found ways to carry out their own agendas—the pursuit of peace and political capital. Theirs were efforts to create a godly society on Earth through peaceful relations and labor, and when proselytizing in Indian Country they focused on work, virtue, and civility while de-emphasizing Bible instruction. This appealed to many Native communities both on a spiritual level and because Friends' message was practically applicable to their daily lives. Friends continued to invoke historical memory in diplomacy as they had during the Seven Years War, and, as a consequence, their reputation among and partnership with Indian peoples endured into the nineteenth century.

124 Indeed, another Friend, William Hartshorne, attended the treaty councils near Detroit in 1793, and his journal, though less detailed, corroborates those of John Parrish. See W.M. Hartshorne’s Journal of Journey to Detroit, 1793, 1 vol., MSS 003/152, Friends Historical Library, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania. While Friends' documents were often written with the presumption that they would be read by fellow Quakers (and, indeed, Parrish himself wrote that his journal was intended for public consumption), we should not assume that such sources are entirely exaggerated. The fact that Friends such as Parrish acquired access to both the inner diplomatic workings of U.S.-Native relations and Native communities offers evidence that Friends were esteemed among many Native peoples and deemed useful by U.S. officials.

125 Minute book of the Friendly Association for Regaining and Preserving Peace with the Indians by Pacific Measures, Indian Papers (Am .525/Collection 310), The Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia; Samuel Parrish, Some chapters in the history of the Friendly Association for Regaining and Preserving the Peace with the Indians by Pacific Measures (Philadelphia, Friends’ Historical Association, 1877), 10; Minutes of the Friendly Association,
When violence escalated in the 1790s Ohio Country, Friends wrote a memorial to President Washington, the Senate, and the House of Representatives indicating that they were "deeply affected with the distressed situation of the frontier inhabitants," and that they "desire[d] a solid and careful enquiry may be made into the cause." They claimed it had been their "uniform care to admonish and caution our members against settling on lands which have not been fairly purchas'd of the original owner," insinuated that the government should do the same with its citizens, and promised that "as far as our influence extends, we mean to maintain this our ancient testimony inviolate, which from experience has been found effectual to the preservation of peace with the natives, who with great hospitality, cherished and assisted our forefathers in their early settlement of this country." Friends thus reminded the federal government of their previous history with Native peoples on the continent, encouraged officials to work toward peace, and, in turn, asserted their unique ability to promote peace. They also, however, carefully trod the line between support for Indian peoples and the United States, which bolstered both their appeal and ability to function as a neutral non-governmental organization.\(^\text{126}\)

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\(^{126}\) HSP. James Merrell and Jane Merritt’s scholarship, in *Into the American Woods* and *At the Crossroads*, respectively, illuminates the incredible significance of the Seven Years War in Pennsylvania both in terms of the pivotal role that cross-cultural negotiation played in diplomacy and in the consequences that diplomatic successes and failures had on the political order that emerged post-1763. In sketching a declension narrative, however, both miss an opportunity to evaluate the continued importance of "go-betweens" and negotiation in late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century North America's ever-evolving, still uncertain, political landscape. See James H. Merrell, *Into the American Woods: Negotiations on the American Frontier* (New York, W.W. Norton & Company, 1999); Jane Merritt, *At the Crossroads: Indians and Empires on a Mid-Atlantic Frontier, 1700-1763* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007).
Though the Society of Friends in Philadelphia engaged in the national politics of Indian affairs and war with their petitions, from the perspective of the debt-ridden federal government, Friends' most valuable work took place on an individual basis in Indian Country. Peace was, after all, far less expensive than war, and it encouraged regular trade. As a consequence of the Quakers’ already-extensive dealings in Indian Country and the constant migrations of Native communities and individuals during the latter half of the eighteenth century, knowledge of Friends and their friendships with Native peoples circulated throughout eastern North America by the 1790s. In 1793 Detroit, for example, John Parrish encountered several local traders who informed him that "our coming will be usefull as a number of the tribes have a Knowledge of friends of whom they have a favorable oppinion from their haveing nothing to do with the shedding of Blood and their honest deeling with them in the first settling [of] the Country." A Shawnee in western New York likewise knew of Friends' past work in Indian Country, as did "18 Onados [Oneidas]" who visited the Quaker and several other Friends in 1793. Friends conversed with these latter Oneidas "to mutual Sattisfaction" akin to "a time of brighting the Chain of friend-ship which they exprest their gladness to find that the fire which was kindled by our fore fathers was not quite gone out."127

Such encounters reveal that Friends had a special reputation among Native peoples, and that repute proved useful in furthering friendly interpersonal and diplomatic networks. Most other religious-minded men, conversely, often were lumped with

negative connotations of "white people." Indeed, in 1751, the renowned Presbyterian missionary David Brainerd wrote, "[the Indians] understood that the white people were contriving a method to deprive them of their country in those parts" and "that I was sent on purpose to accomplish that design." Of course, Parrish and other Friends glorified their friendly reputations in their writings to some extent, but their consistent ability to interact with Native leaders and their countrymen, coupled with many other missionaries' comparatively few successes during the 1790s, demonstrates that they did, in fact, possess a special reputation for diplomacy among Native nations.¹²⁸

Though Friends were the most adept in their diplomatic encounters with Native nations, other missionaries, particularly the Moravians, were also successful. John Heckewelder and David Zeisberger, like Friends, attended treaty councils and often discussed Indian affairs with colonial and then U.S. officials, and both their treaty attendance and mission work offered them ample opportunity to gain intimate knowledge of their pupils. Heckewelder and Zeisberger's journals offer detailed ethnographic information, and they reveal their ability to cultivate close ties with Native peoples. These men were, however, nearly unique among late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Ohio Country Moravians. Other Moravian missionaries, such as Abraham Luckenbach and John Kluge, failed to cultivate workable relations among the Delawares in 1806 Indiana Territory.¹²⁹ Moravians' mission work—with its emphasis on theology—

¹²⁸ Thomas Brainerd, The Life of John Brainerd, the Brother of David Brainerd, and his Successor as Missionary to the Indians of New Jersey, (Philadelphia: Presbyterian Publication Committee, 1865), 234-235.
¹²⁹ Instead of a robust diplomatic and religious partnership, these latter two missionaries became central witnesses to and verbal targets for Delaware and Shawnee witch-hunters. See The Moravian Indian mission on White River; diaries and letters, May 5, 1799, to November 12,
appealed to some Native communities. Those communities who did not wish to adopt the
tenets of Christianity could however, find use for Quakers' friendship.\(^{130}\)

Also appealing, from both Indians’ and U.S. officials’ perspectives was the
Society of Friends’ hierarchical organization. Yearly meetings at Philadelphia, Baltimore,
and London oversaw Quarterly and Monthly meetings which, in turn, supervised
individual meetings that consisted of local Friends. Moreover, Friends' various
committees appointed clerks with whom federal officials and Native peoples alike could
communicate, in consultation with the committee. That clerk could also call upon
volunteer committee members for various tasks among Indian nations—including travel,
diplomacy, and, eventually, mission work and its requisite reconnaissance. Like the
Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts (SPG), the Society of Friends
thus offered a relatively efficient means to coordinate communication and labor in Indian
Country. Friends’ organization also underscored their ambiguous status \textit{vis a vis} the
United States. The Society of Friends operated as a non-governmental organization that
nonetheless possessed the efficiency, funds, and labor necessary to effectively offer the
United States diplomatic—and later mission—support in Indian Country.

It was a model that later caught on in the United States. The American Board of
Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM), established in 1810, adopted a similarly
hierarchical structure. Importantly, however, Friends became the United States’ most oft-

recruited missionary partners, particularly in the first quarter of the nineteenth century—but also during President Ulysses S. Grant’s “peace policy” in the postbellum years—due to their history of working alongside Native leaders and their people. Friends enjoyed and capitalized upon their appeal to those Indians who saw value in the economic and diplomatic benefits that came with alliance with the Society of Friends.

Indeed, Friends’ reputation for usefulness and diplomacy preceded them in the 1790s Ohio Country. It was not unusual for Quakers traveling through western New York or the Ohio Country to encounter Haudenosaunee, Delaware, or Shawnee individuals with whom they or a member of their society had already formed friendships. Near Detroit in 1793, for example, John Parrish crossed paths with a Nanticoke, John White, who lived among the Christian Indians under the tutelage of the Moravian missionary John Heckewelder. White, who visited Philadelphia on several occasions prior to encountering Parrish in Detroit, exchanged pleasantries with the Friends and asked after several other members of the society, including John Pemberton, Robert Parrish, and Isaac Zane—all men who had been involved with Indian affairs prior to the crisis of the 1790s. Thomas King, one of the "neighbouring Indians" Parrish encountered during his travels to western New York, likewise "inquired particularly after his freinds [sic] Isaac Zane & Israel Pemberton." Such memories of Israel Pemberton and others were the consequence of Friends' efforts among the western nations and, in particular, members of the Delaware nation during the Seven Years War in Pennsylvania. When Parrish encountered a Shawnee in Detroit, he later noted in his journal that the Shawnee knew "as most of the Shawneys do a good deel a bout friends, as well as the Delawares." The
Delawares were among Friends' closest—if not the closest—of their Native allies, and they were central to the creation of Quakers' reputation in Indian Country.\textsuperscript{131}

Like the Shawnee who possessed knowledge of both Friends and Delawares, Wyandots, who similarly had close relations with Delawares in Ohio and Indiana, too possessed knowledge of the Society of Friends. By the 1790s, however, one Wyandot linked the society with the U.S. federal government. Just prior to treaty proceedings in 1793, Parrish "received a visit from a Wyondot Chief" who had an interest in reaching an eventual "accomodation between their people and those of the U. States." The man "said he remembered the old friendship that subsisted in time past that they had still a large Belt in possession as I understood him from Pennsylvania." For this leader, the Pennsylvanian colonial past—Friends' past—lived on in the present and had the power to shape the relations between his nation and the United States; he understood Friends as diplomatic extensions of the U.S. federal government—people with whom he desired a friendly, working relationship.\textsuperscript{132}

Memories of Pennsylvania's past and Friends' work with the Delawares became not only a useful means to build and spread Friends' reputation for peaceful negotiation with Native peoples, but they also served as powerful diplomatic tools. Indeed, just as Parrish did at the 1791 dinner table, Native and Quaker diplomats often invoked rhetoric of a "chain of friendship" in their messages between one another. Six Nations' rhetoric may have referenced memories of the "covenant chain" in eastern North America, and

\textsuperscript{131} Parrish, May 1793, Journal, untitled, April 30, 1793-June 1, 1793 (hereafter referred to as vol. 3); Parrish, Memoir, undated [c. 1790]; Parrish, Vol. 4, the 29th [June 29], 1793, 19-20. The Nanticokes were closely linked with the Delawares.
\textsuperscript{132} Parrish, 29 and 7 of the week [June 29], 1793, Vol. 4, 15.
Parrish and other Quaker journalists may have conflated their own understanding of Pennsylvania's founding with this rhetoric. Nonetheless, the chain metaphor became a mutually intelligible language for both Friends and Native peoples, and it appears in sources originating from military officials and both the Baltimore and Philadelphia yearly meetings of the Society of Friends. The Oneida Good Peter, for example, asserted the power of the Six Nations by using the chain metaphor to assert a Haudenosaunee diplomatic agenda. At a 1791 meeting between the Six Nations and the United States he remarked, "it is the voice of the 6 nations that the chain of friendship be made Bright, we dont intend to sell any more of our lands." Here, Good Peter invoked the historical to resurrect both past alliances but also former Haudenosaunee power—power that, while by no means extinguished, was nonetheless threatened by the growth of United States authority. Such rhetoric was, like material goods and military pageantry, crucial to the ongoing development of cultural and political spaces within which Native polities and Americans could converse in metaphor.133

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Colonels William Preston and William Fleming wrote to the Shawnees in 1778 that "The Governor and Council will appoint Commissioners to talk with you, and endeavour to Cover the Blood that has been Spilt upon the Path of Peace, and brighten the Chain of Friendship." Col. William Preston and Col. William Fleming, "Address to the Shawnee," April 3, 1778 in Reuben Gold Thwaites and Louise Phelps Kellogg, eds. Frontier Defense on the Upper Ohio, 1777-1778 (Madison, WI: Wisconsin Historical Society, 1912), 260.
Indeed, diplomats such as Parrish and Good Peter and political leaders such as the Wyandot Tarhe used the chain metaphor to articulate and achieve their own political objectives, and it also invoked a binding political relationship. Tarhe, for example, informed Philadelphia Friends in a 1799 letter that they "told us at that time when we met together...That you then formed a Chain of Frienship: You said it was not a Chain of Iron, but that it was a chain of precious metal, a chain of silver, which would never get rusty....We have no records or place of security for our Speeches as you have—nor can we write as you do....But if you examine your old Books and papers you will there find written all that passed between your Forefathers and ours." By 1799, after the birth of the Baltimore Yearly Meeting, Baltimore and Philadelphia Friends divided philanthropic work among Native peoples into separate jurisdictions presumably for the sake of ease and efficiency of resource-use: relations with Wyandots and Shawnees, Delawares, and others in the Ohio Country were in the hands of the Baltimore Yearly Meeting of the Society of Friends, while Philadelphia Friends handled relations in New York. When Tarhe offered his speech to the Philadelphia Friends he was either unaware that his lands fell under the philanthropic jurisdiction of the Baltimore Yearly Meeting or he failed to care. The Wyandot's business concerned the Society of Friends writ large and he, for the time being, associated Friends with Pennsylvania; in his mind, it was to that group that his memory-infused language was intelligible.134

What was more, in a calculated diplomatic stroke, Tarhe emphasized his relations with Philadelphia Friends' former allies, the Delawares. He informed Friends that his

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134 Minutes of the Baltimore Yearly Meeting Standing Committee on Indian Concern, Vol. I, 3 mo. 23 1799, 34-35 (Friends Historical Library, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore), hereafter BYMIC minutes.
people were "much pleased to hear that you still hold in remembrance our nephew the Delaware nation, The promisses and obligations made between your grandfathers and ours included our two Nations (Wy andots [sic] and Delawares) in the Chain of friendship and brotherly love, considering us as one and the same people, which ...pray, that the great Spirit will never permit to be divided." While the Delaware Teedyuscung presented himself as a leader of the Delawares and of a political confederation that he referred to as the "Ten Nations" during the Seven Years War—a coalition that may have included some Wyandots among those supposedly confederated nations—the Wyandots were not present at Penn's treaty in 1682. Indeed, for most other purposes and despite the conglomerated nature of Ohio Country Indian villages by the late eighteenth century, Delawares and Wyandots would still have insisted on their separate identities. Tarhe thus proved himself a master politician: Quakers had allied themselves with Delawares in the past and, by resurrecting the chain of friendship metaphor and asserting his people's political alliance and fictive kinship with the Delawares, the Wyandot hoped to capitalize on that partnership and ensure that his people would not confront United States officials alone.

Native nations' memories of diplomatic friendship with Friends thus shaped the character of American imperialism by ensuring that the nation's leading philanthropists aided state officials in their empire-building project in North America. They compelled the United States to develop a brand of empire that relied, in many ways, upon the
reputation-cultivating and labor-intensive diplomacy, mission, and educational work of non-governmental societies.\textsuperscript{135}

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The reputation and malleability of the Society of Friends and its members contributed to its value as a government partner, but so too did Friends' years of diplomatic experience in Indian Country. Indeed, that experience rendered Parrish’s misstep at the 1791 dinner table a rare occurrence that was the product of his society’s changing role in official U.S. diplomacy. Quakers understood the importance of Native nations' protocols, and they willingly undertook the sometimes-tedious work of cultivating partnerships with the various Native nations that they encountered. Friends' copious meeting minutes, epistles, and publications ensured that knowledge of diplomatic protocols and Native alliance networks survived within the meeting. Since men of varying ages served on Friends' committees, the committee system likewise ensured that knowledge passed from one generation to the next to become an essential foundation for Friends' diplomatic work in Indian Country.\textsuperscript{136}

\textsuperscript{135} BYMIC minutes, 3 mo. 24 1799, 34-35; For Teedyuscung, see Jennings, \textit{Empire of Fortune}, 274; Anthony F.C. Wallace, \textit{King of the Delawares: Teedyuscung, 1700-1763} (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1949).

\textsuperscript{136} The Friendly Association for Regaining and Preserving Peace with the Indians, active during the Seven Years War in Pennsylvania, for example, published and circulated numerous pamphlets detailing their efforts among Delawares during the 1750s and 1760s. Such documentation survived into the nineteenth century. Samuel Parrish, for example, published \textit{Some Chapters in the history of the Friendly Association for Regaining and Preserving Peace with the Indians by Pacific Measures} in 1877. See, for example, Samuel Parrish, \textit{Some Chapters in the history of the Friendly Association for Regaining and Preserving Peace with the Indians by Pacific Measures} (Philadelphia, 1877); Charles Thomson, Thomas Jefferys, Christian Frederick Post, Friendly Association for Regaining and Preserving Peace with the Indians by Pacific Measures, \textit{An Enquiry in the causes of the alienation of the Delaware and Shawanese Indians from the British interest...who thereupon abandoned the fort and country} (London, 1759).
Relationships sometimes formed when delegations of Native leaders visited Philadelphia or met Friends during the treaty councils of the 1750s and 1760s. It is likely that these meetings further lumped all Friends together in Native peoples’ imaginations since they occurred before Maryland Friends—some of whom migrated southward from Philadelphia—founded the Baltimore Yearly Meeting. When Parrish visited the Tuscaroras in 1793, for example, he was pleased to find that "divers of the inhabitants came in and seemed pleased to see us, and what made our Visit more agreeable one of the Chiefs I know who had been several times at my house." Friends' connections with various Indians also, however, blossomed as a result of Friends' open curiosity. During his 1793 voyage from western New York to Detroit "a bord the Schooner Dunmore," Parrish observed that there were "representitives of 5 different Indian Nations on Bord, some Mohocks Mossesogers, Mohickins, Kighugers, & Stockbridge." The Quaker likely gleaned such particular information through word of mouth, but also from the onboard exchange of pleasantries. Captain John, one of the Mohawks aboard the Dunmore, made the effort to visit Parrish in his Detroit lodgings after their journey together and "exprest his sattisfaction in his acquaintance with us and wished we could make it in our way to return by the Bay of Canty that we might see him at his [own] house that he might make us welcome." Never one to miss an opportunity to develop closer ties with a new contact, Parrish "red to him Friends missage to the Indians which he much approv'd of" whereupon Captain John "said he would communicate the substance to the Indians at their council where he expected to set out for next day." What began as a casual, chance

137 Parrish, [May 1793], Vol. 3.
acquaintance aboard a schooner, quickly developed into the interpersonal foundations for diplomacy.¹³⁸

Sometimes, however, Friends' attempts to cultivate their international networks failed due to unforeseen circumstances. When Zebulon Heston, a Friend traveling with Parrish to the eastern Ohio Country fell ill along the way, Parrish settled for sending a letter to the Shawnees and Wyandots rather than paying them a personal visit. He wrote, "we should have been glad to have come and seen you...but one of us Zebulon Heston...being far advanced in age & in a poor State of helth & our horses forspent, we are not [at] liberty to go any further then...Newcommers Town." He then conveyed his affection for the nations and reminded them that Friends "had no other motive meaning then your good and the Peace of our own minds we seek nothing that is yours, but you unto God." Episodes such as this reveal not only Friends' persistence, but that they were aware both of the importance of their connections and of the diplomatic protocols common to many Native nations. Failing to pay a promised visit to an ally could have devastating consequences in Indian Country, and thus a letter was required to ensure that relations remained strong. Through years of alliance and observation, Friends knew how to maintain relationships with Native nations.¹³⁹

Friends cultivated knowledge through experience, and the time required for the acquisition of such knowledge and experience increased Friends' value to the U.S. federal government by the 1790s. The Society of Friends’ relationships with various Native nations facilitated, for example, traveling Friends’ intelligence-gathering work. Before

¹³⁸ Ibid.
¹³⁹ Parrish, Memoir, undated [c. 1790].
setting out for Detroit, Parrish reflected that "we should be likely to have an opportunity to see a number of Indians and such others that might give us some necessary intelligence to facilitate the Business we are engaged in." Once in Detroit, the Quaker did, indeed, gather intelligence "which was not the most favourable," and he then wrote to various commissioners working with Colonel Thomas McKee near Grand Rapids "informing them the Intelligence we had received since we came here." By the 1790s, Friends were crucial links between Native nations and the United States; by using their own interpersonal networks to promote peace, they facilitated U.S. diplomatic reconnaissance and constructed a valuable international information network that linked Philadelphia, western New York, the Ohio Country, and the Great Lakes.  

By the 1790s, Quakers such as John Parrish made this work appear simple; in reality, however, Friends’ efforts were only feasible after acquiring both years of experience and knowledge of Native diplomatic protocols. Failure to abide by Natives' rules of alliance making could make things awkward, if not dangerous during treaties with various nations. In 1761 Pennsylvania, one Quaker woman described a particularly uncomfortable interaction that was the product of Friends’ ignorance. A Delaware leader, Papoonan, informed the Quakers that "God had been so kind to them" so as to ensure "that his young men had success in hunting & killed a great many Deer," and the resulting skins he wished Friends "to accept as a token of his love." Unaccustomed to Native politics of gift-giving and consequently caught off guard, one Friend explained that "as Providence had favoured us with abundance, he thought we ought rather to be helpful to them, & excused friends from receiving their presents." Papoonan, appearing

140 Parrish, May 1793, Vol. 3.
noticeably "uneasy" then, again encouraged Friends to accept the skins, "that this was their practice, of their forefathers, therefore they had brought those skins, & again requested friends would accept of them." Sensing their mistake, the Quakers quickly replied that they "desired him not to take it amiss, that we did not at once receive them."

Two days later Papoonan, still "uneasy," visited Friends' lodgings to revive the issue, whereupon the Quakers explained "that we were sorry that any thing that was said respecting their presents should give him uneasiness." Friends were savvy enough to learn from their mistake, and immediately set about repairing their relationship with the Delaware leader.¹⁴¹

Native nations' politics thus shaped missionaries' abilities to work with their peoples, and diplomatic blunders could render relationships between missionaries and Native nations untenable. In 1802, Joseph Patterson, a Presbyterian missionary near Chillicothe in the Ohio Country, experienced great frustration when a group of Shawnees refused his primers, books, and preaching. A man unknown to the chiefs there, Patterson "went to the chiefs who were assembled, and...informed them of the design of my mission, and that tomorrow was our day of worship, and signified my intention of [preaching] to any who would attend." Rather than offering Patterson statements of friendship and invitation as Friends often received, the Shawnees "answered roughly that they would hear nothing from me till the great council determined, nor should any of their people." These Shawnees ultimately decided that Patterson should go home.¹⁴²

¹⁴¹ Entries dated August 8th, August 10th, [Unknown Quaker woman], 1761 August 4-12, Journal [Easton, PA], Quaker Collection, William L. Clements Library, The University of Michigan.
Patterson blamed his failure upon his interpreter's lack of commitment, the Shawnees' being too "alarmed and confused" to engage him in formal speech at the chiefs' council, the ill effects of alcohol among the Indians, and, somewhat closer to the truth, his own inability to speak their language. Missing from this laundry list of excuses, however, is the fact that Patterson arrived at the Shawnees' town lacking the foundations for meaningful relations with its inhabitants. Though he frequently commented in his journals that the Shawnees offered him food and lodging—gifts that suggest their willingness to bring Patterson into their network of alliances—Patterson was ultimately too hard-headed to realize that mission work required patience as well as a willingness to engage Native nations and their leaders on their political terms. Waltzing into the chiefs' council without first laying the groundwork for meaningful conversation did not produce faithful converts, and such episodes reveal the great tenuousness of diplomacy in early America. British and then U.S. relationships with Native peoples were fragile, and they required constant—and experienced—cultivation; Friends, with their history of experience in Indian Country, thus became useful in nurturing U.S. relations with Native nations.  

As Patterson's experience among the Shawnees suggests, because of Native nations' political authority, gifts were essential to diplomatic relations and in the smaller exchanges between Native and non-Native individuals, as well as between missionaries and their targeted flocks. U.S. officials and their partners drew upon earlier empires' modes of gift-giving practices in their own efforts to engage with Native peoples. Gifts ranged from small to lavish and included food, clothing, and an assortment of smaller

143 Ibid., the 2nd, 57.
items such as needles or tobacco. John Parrish in 1791, for example, offered his friend and fellow diplomat the Mohican Hendrick Aupaumut and two of his companions "a flag hankerchef which was received with gratitude." The gift of a flag symbolized Parrish's association with the United States, and it cemented his status as a partner and representative of that polity. Such items were political symbols, and they were also the material markers of reciprocity, the tangible symbols of interpersonal relationships. It was significant that the failed Presbyterian missionary Joseph Patterson arrived at the Shawnee chiefs' council with nothing but primers when they had already offered him generous (though to him rather less than ideal) lodging and several meals. Gifts were the means by which friendships developed, but, as in the case of Patterson or the Quakers at Easton, they could also stifle budding relationships.\footnote{Parrish, 4th day 13 [July 13], 1791, vol. 2. Scholarship on gift-giving in early America reveals that gift-giving was intricately connected with assertions of Native power. See, for example, Joseph M. Hall, Jr., Zamumo's Gifts: Indian-European Exchange in the Colonial Southeast (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009); Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); David Murray, Indian Giving: Economies of Power in Indian-white Exchanges (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2000).}

Food was also central to Native politics of gift giving, and successful diplomats engaged in the rituals of food diplomacy. Knowing these rules, in 1793 Detroit Parrish offered "the Moravian Indians that came to us" several items to "releive their present necessities," including "a bout 27 Bushels of corn & a bout 400 of flower." He followed this offering with a letter—"in encouraging them to persevere in a life of Sivilization and Christian fortitude"—to carry with them back to their Moravian community. Though these Moravian Delawares were already "converted," Parrish wasted no time in maintaining his networks with them since his society had already had extensive dealings.
with the Moravian Delawares during and after the Seven Years War in Pennsylvania. In the turbulent years of the later eighteenth century, all friendly alliances were crucial, and Friends' overtures paid off. The Delawares later sent Parrish a letter extending "hearty thanks" for the "Provisions to the Amount of one hundred dollars, which we acknowledge as a testimony of your former Love and friendship toward us."

In 1790, moreover, the Delaware Captain White Eyes "sent a message to request" that Parrish and other Friends "would make him a visit." Upon arrival, they found that not only had the Delaware "had the logs cut that was fell a cross the road...out of the way" for their coming, but that he "had a Calf killed" whereupon they enjoyed several items "roast and boiled & were entertained with much kindness & hospitality." Immediately after dinner, Friends and White Eyes "smoked our pipes together," and Parrish reflected that "it was like a time of brightening the chain and renewing of friendship agreeable to the Easton of our forefathers."

White Eyes, an old friend and political ally of the Quakers in Pennsylvania, made a point to solicit Parrish's company and offer him gifts of sustenance, but this encounter extended beyond the bounds of mere friendship. When in his journal he connected the dinner and subsequent sharing of tobacco with the "the Easton of our forefathers," Parrish revealed that the meeting was simultaneously personal and diplomatic. That was not an unusual experience in the eighteenth century. The lines between friendship and official diplomacy often blurred because effective diplomacy was impossible without friendship.

146 Parrish, Memoir, undated, [c. 1790]
Indeed, as Parrish's 1791 blunder at Pickering's dinner table reveals, even experienced diplomats stumbled from time to time precisely because friendship and diplomacy were so intermingled.

Such instances of gift-exchange long characterized both Native-non-Native interpersonal relationships as well as, more broadly, diplomacy in colonial America, and they remained at the center of U.S.-Native relations throughout the nineteenth century. When he was not at the dinner table of Colonel Pickering or attending the treaty deliberations at Newtown in western New York in 1791, John Parrish spoke with locals and distributed gifts among the Senecas who camped nearby. He offered Senecas "600 seames of thread with 300 nedles to the women & girls" and "about 100 fish hooks & some lines to the men & boys which highly delighted them for which they gave many thanks." Several days later, Colonel Pickering and the interpreters likewise attempted to distribute "the publick Present." The Senecas were the recipients of private and public gifts, but because Parrish was allied with Pickering and the U.S. government, all of the gifts supported the United States' goal of maintaining friendly diplomatic relations with the Six Nations. With help from the Society of Friends and its members, then, the United States government continued the British imperial tradition of appealing to the various nations on Natives' terms.

The power of Friends' diplomatic past, together with their relationships with the many Indian nations they encountered during their experiences in Indian Country, meant that, by 1791, events such as John Parrish's dinner with Colonel Pickering and others were relatively commonplace. The Quaker dined with Pickering on several occasions,

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147 Parrish, 7th month, the 6th [July 6], 1791, vol. 2; Parrish, 7th day, 16 [July 16], ibid.
often with Native men in attendance as well. He shared a meal, for example, with the colonel, an interpreter, and the Seneca Red Jacket "& several other Indians" in 1791. Members of Native nations, however, were not always in attendance. In 1793 Detroit, Parrish dined with Colonel England and "a company of wellbehaved genteelmen mostly officers" and "with the Officers at their Mess" on another occasion. Men like Parrish, then, were important diplomats among Native and non-Native men, but they also worked to maintain their relationships with their American connections.148

Such dinners among Quakers and U.S. army men involved, however, more than mere pleasantries: Parrish was often privy to official government information. At one meal, he learned that the U.S. interrupted a council between Britain's ally, the Mohawk Joseph Brant, and the western Indians, while another evening's talk was "on the Subject of war & the Slave trade." Dinners and informal conversations rendered Parrish not only useful to Pickering among Native leaders, but they also sowed the seeds of trust between the Quakers and the U.S. government. Not long after dining with Colonel England in Detroit, for example, Parrish found himself in "the Garden of Coln. England a beautifull airy Place where we spent some time in Looking over Some papers relative to Indian Affairs." Friends' relationships with top U.S. officials gave them intimate knowledge of official policy, and they served to blur the lines between their roles as private citizens concerned with peace and official United States diplomats.149

Indeed, those lines were so blurred that Parrish himself often struggled to define whether he was a private citizen or an official U.S. diplomat. He informed the Seneca

148 Parrish, 7th month the 6th [July 6], vol. 2; Parrish, May 1793, vol. 3.
149 Parrish, 19th of the 8th month [August 19], vol. 4, 76.
Red Jacket that he, along with his fellow Quaker companion, was "here in a privit [sic] capacity." He continued to explain that "we had nothing to do with Government affairs, but we ware heartly united with the Commissioners for promoting the work of Peace." He then again felt it necessary to state that "although we ware in a private capacity yet it was a matter of much concern that we had obtained the concurrence of our Bretheren at home...& like wise our proceeding was approved of by the Presedent of the U.. States." In a single message to Red Jacket, then, Parrish twice informed the Seneca that he was there on private business, and twice informed him that his work was done in conjunction with the official leadership of the United States. Parrish's status relative to the U.S. government was confusing.  

Indeed, Parrish often contemplated the nature of his relationship with the federal government. Parrish, a private U.S. citizen, attended treaties in a self-described "privit capacity," yet he kept his journal of events with the awareness that they were "disigned for publick Views." This understanding of public and private underscored the Society of Friends’ work as a non-governmental organization: the society’s papers were not officially policed by the government—the Society of Friends was “private”—but Parrish’s papers were intended for public consumption by other Friends. Parrish and the Society of Friends understood their role as a spiritual one of promoting peace and uplift among Native peoples, but also as one wherein Parrish and the society acted as liaisons between the federal government and the broader U.S. citizenry. Parrish, by calling explicit attention to his presence in a “privit capacity,” revealed the ambiguous—if increasingly defined—relationship between the Society of Friends and the U.S.

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150 Parrish, May 1793, vol. 3.
government. Friends’ non-military status also underscored the emerging qualifications for diplomats.

It was in the function as liaisons between government and citizens that Parrish took the most liberties in his writing. The issue of alcohol, in particular, occasioned Parrish to question whether he had the authority to confront Colonel Pickering and the U.S. commissioners with his concerns for Native leaders' sobriety. The Quaker, deciding it most appropriate to address the issue in a letter to Pickering, insisted that he "came heare from a apprehention of duty and with the Concurrence of our friends of Philada. to attend the Treaty without any intention to Interfeer or meddle with the publick business."

Continuing on in his letter, however, he reflected that, "as Subjects of the United States equally concernd in it[s] wellfare with our fellow Sitizens," he had a duty to ensure that the treaty was conducted "to the general benifit of the white Inhabitants and the good of the Indians."

The Quaker, also, however, included his opinions of the government's official policy towards Native nations. Though he was usually pleased with Colonel Pickering's efforts, he did not shy from offering scathing criticism of federal Indian policy. He wrote, for example, that "many People it may be said Lement the steps that was taken by Goverment after the war Ceased with Great Brittan that insted of singly attending to the Establishing a Peace (with the Natives) measure ware persued to procure Large & extensive tracts into their Country, and making them believe they ware a conquered People and that all their Lands in reallity was the Property of the United States, which

151 Parrish, 3 & 4 of the week, July 1793, vol. 4, 29-31; Parrish, 6th day of 7th month [July 6], 1791, vol. 2.
only tended to raise their resentment and become a [?] Enemy." As the word "believe"
reveals, Parrish undertook his work for reasons of perceived benevolence, but also
because of a fundamental political disagreement: he did not buy into the imperial fiction
that Native peoples "ware a conquered People." As the words of both William Eaton and
the anonymous essayist revealed above, in that assessment, Parrish was not alone.152

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Understanding the partnership between the United States and the Society of
Friends during the 1790s forces us to consider together the breadth of Native sovereignty
during the era of the early republic and both the limits of U.S. state power and the ways
in which that power grew during the same period. Parrish's presence at the 1791 dinner
table reveals that the federal government cultivated an entire diplomatic apparatus in
order to effectively treat with Native nations, and the Society of Friends played a defining
role in the development of that diplomatic schema. As U.S. officials well knew, among
the Shawnees, Delawares, and others, there existed a division between the power of
"civil" leaders and "war" leaders. Indeed, prior to the meeting of a treaty council the
Shawnee Blue Jacket informed Pickering and Parrish as much when he stated that if "he
was present he had no voice in the Council he was of the war department...he said he had
heard of the Quakers and had come on purpose to see us and he believed a peace would
take place but he had no voice in the Civil department." Such a statement reminded the
U.S. commissioners of the violent realities of previous Euroamerican disagreements with
Native powers in North America. For Pickering and Parrish both, memories and stories of

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152 Parrish, 2nd and 3rd of the 7th month [July 2-3], 1793, vol. 4, 24, italics mine.
1760s warfare—as well as the ongoing violence that characterized the Ohio Valley during the 1780s—informed their understandings of diplomacy and war with Native nations: U.S.-Native diplomacy required both war and civil chiefs.¹⁵³

U.S. diplomatic relations with Native nations required knowledge regarding Native protocols of gift-giving and alliance networks but also savvy human symbols of peace—missionaries. These essentials were premised upon both Native polities’ sovereign and ambiguous diplomatic status with the United States. Partnering with a non-governmental organization like the Society of Friends offered the United States the ability to cultivate peace and authority through Friends’ interpersonal networks, but it also offered opportunities to exert imperial influence in Indian Country via unofficial means. Friends’ diplomatic work continued into the nineteenth century, but in the Ohio Country—and in western New York as well—it was coupled with agricultural mission work that further connected Indians’ economies with that of the United States. Such mission work also served to chip away at the United States’s practical need to court indigenous sovereignty. With agricultural missions and the growth of a mission complex, the Society of Friends offered “evidence” of Native peoples’ “dependence” on U.S. goods and services. As will be seen, such economic “dependence” translated into political dependence for many Americans as the nineteenth century wore on.

Indeed, after the defeat of the allied Indian nations at the Battle of Fallen Timbers in 1794, the United States Senate ratified the Treaty of Greenville in an effort to assert, once again, authority over the Ohio Country's Indian populations. While the treaty established a boundary line between the United States and Indian Country in the region, it also ushered in a renewed effort to "civilize" the Indians. Friends were, by 1795, reliable partners of the U.S. War Department, and they took the lead in civilizing efforts with the support of none other than John Parrish's dinner mate, Timothy Pickering. Warfare gave way to redoubled efforts to obscure the entrenchment of ideas of difference—as well as Indians’ sovereignty—altogether. 1795 marked a change in Ohio Country Indian relations, but it did not usher in the decline of the region's Native peoples. Instead, Indians' ongoing political power and persistence forced the United States to embark upon the hard work of empire in the Ohio Country—“civilizing” work that was intimately connected with efforts to define what precisely it meant to be a citizen and a young republic.
Chapter 3
"Useful Knowledge" for "Good Citizens": The Society of Friends' Educational Philanthropy in Baltimore and the Ohio Country

Some of Philadelphia's Quakers migrated southward to northern Virginia and Maryland during the latter half of the eighteenth century, and they brought their memories of William Penn, the Friendly Association, and their fellow Quakers' recent diplomatic efforts with them. Baltimore Friends continued Philadelphia's tradition of working among the continent's Native peoples, and one of the first tasks of the Baltimore Yearly Meeting was to establish an Indian Concerns committee. That the meeting wasted no time doing so reveals the importance they placed upon participation in Indian affairs. Baltimore corresponded regularly with Philadelphia Friends on matters of reform.  

Indeed, in 1796, the year of the establishment of Baltimore Friends’ Indian Concern Committee, the Philadelphia Committee on Indian affairs sent a letter to Baltimore Friends asking them to relay any important information regarding Indian affairs to the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting. Philadelphia Friends assured Baltimore that they would do likewise writing, “[a]s in our attention to this concern any thing shall arrise that may be deemed useful & proper to communicate we mean to impart the same desiring like care may rest with you, that what may occur as useful herein may be intimated to your loving friends." Friends' history of contributing to Indian affairs in Pennsylvania, western New York, and the Ohio Country, and their cooperation with Philadelphia Friends informed

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154 The meetings honored their promise: the BYMIC meeting minutes include excerpts from memorials and letters of correspondence that traveled between the Philadelphia and Baltimore yearly meetings. For 1796 letter, see BYMIC, vol. 1 22nd 5 mo 1796, pp. 3-7.
the Baltimore committee's decision to cooperate with the U.S. federal government and its new strategy for dealing with the “Indian problem.”

Henry Knox first proposed a general "civilization plan" that would transform Indian peoples in 1789, but the 1790s War for the Ohio Country necessarily put those plans on hold in the region. With peace, however, the United States confronted the problem of how to transform a diverse region still populated by indigenous polities into territories aligned with the federal state. The civilization plan offered a means to deal with the government’s Indian problem in the aftermath of war, and it offered a means to commodify Indians’ lands. It also ensured that ideas regarding citizenship and morality traveled between the urban coast and the interior of the continent. Those ideas, carried by the government’s missionary partners, ultimately reinforced notions of Native peoples’ “otherness.”

Baltimore Friends corresponded with now Secretary of State Timothy Pickering, and they eventually agreed to work as civilizing agents, accepting federal funds for establishing agricultural missions. With peace in 1795, Baltimore and Philadelphia Friends essentially divided the northeastern portion of the continent into two philanthropic jurisdictions in order to begin civilizing reform. The Philadelphia Yearly Meeting began work among the Haudenosaunee and other peoples in the northeast while the Baltimore Friends endeavored to reform the Ohio Country's Native populations.155

155 Most scholarship on Quaker missions centers on Philadelphia Friends' efforts among the Haudenosaunee in western New York. Such work occurred at the same time as Baltimore Friends' mission work in the Ohio Country, but there were notable differences between the two projects. Philadelphia Friends were much more willing, for example, to offer instruction in reading and writing in addition to farming. See Matthew Dennis, *Seneca Possessed: Indians, Witchcraft, and Power in the Early Republic* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010); Jill Kinney, "Letters, Pen, and Tilling the Field": Quaker Schools Among the Seneca Indians on the Allegany
From the federal perspective, Friends remained useful allies into the nineteenth century. They maintained their knowledge of indigenous networks and cultures, and they possessed a hierarchical organizational structure that facilitated the coordination of long-term projects in remote regions. Friends were not, however, mere pawns of the federal government. They carried with them their own goals, motivations, and ideas when traveling among Delawares, Miamis, and their neighbors. They used their partnership with the War Department and the still small federal state in order to instruct Native peoples how to labor toward morality and supposedly to save Indians from extinction. Friends drew upon emerging ideas of poverty and alcohol use to claim that liquors, in particular, left Ohio's Indian peoples "destitute and miserable, their morals corrupted...their minds embittered against the white people." Such observations were exaggerated—Ohio Indians boasted corn fields that prevented them from being completely "destitute and miserable"—but those observations were compelling, and they encouraged the maintenance of the civilization plan during the first half of the nineteenth century. Friends’ ideas and experiences thus relegated Native peoples to the bottom of the republic’s social hierarchy and ensured that class-based assumptions became an inherent piece of the federal civilization plan, a consequence of the federal government’s need for missionary assistance. The ideas of race, class, and gender developing in urban Baltimore

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traveled to the Ohio along with Quaker missionaries, and, in turn, Friends—along with other Euroamerican immigrants who moved westward—offered Native peoples direct access to those ideas. To understand Friends’ agricultural mission work and federal Indian policy more broadly in the nineteenth century, we must examine the emerging ideas that ultimately gave the U.S. civilization plan its gilded aura of benevolence.

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In 1796, several of the Baltimore Friends went to the Ohio Country "for the purpose of learning [Natives'] situation and disposition and thence to judge of the practicability of introducing among them the simplest and most useful arts of civil Life."\(^{157}\) They carried with them—as they would on subsequent trips and in their correspondences—their religious tenets, assumptions regarding Native peoples’ potential, and ideas regarding both race and class that were cultivated as a result of their experiences living in the booming and diverse city of Baltimore. Those ideas had shifted since the days when Fox and Penn noted Delawares’ polite mannerisms, a consequence of ongoing changes in U.S. political economy. The Friends' old partner in Indian Country, Timothy Pickering, relayed President Washington's approval and applauded Friends' actions because, in his view, "[m]ost attempts at civilising the Indians...have been preposterous—We have aimed at teaching Religion & the Sciences before we have taught them the simple and essential labours of civil life."\(^{158}\) Federal support for Friends’

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\(^{157}\) Timothy Pickering to St. Clair, May 31, 1796 (Quaker Collection, Magill Library, Haverford College, Haverford, PA). The letter is also included in an entry dated 10th month, 1796 BYMIC, 13-14.

\(^{158}\) Ibid. Karim Tiro's suggestion that Pickering endorsed Quaker missionaries because they focused on agricultural rather than theological instruction is likely correct. Friends' early
efforts only grew as time wore on. In 1801, the Secretary of War Henry Dearborn thanked Friends for their previous work among Native peoples and expressed his hope "that by a Steady and persevereing application of the means provided by the Government of the United States, powerfully aided by the constant exertions of your Society, the Savage tribes will ultimately form a useful part of the great family of the United States." The Secretary, impressed by Philadelphia Friends' burgeoning agricultural work among the Haudenosaunee in western New York, was also "induced to ask whether it is probable that suitable characters for the above mentioned purpose could be found in your society who would ingage to go into the Choctaw Nation...on condition of receiving a reasonable compensation from the public." Both the Secretary's promise of funds and Pickering's support for Friends' efforts among Ohio Indians reveal that the federal government was eager to continue its relationship with the Society of Friends generally. Indeed, Dearborn failed to distinguish between Philadelphia and Baltimore Friends, and both meetings considered his letter. Ultimately, Baltimore Friends did not missionize in Choctaw Country, but they did set their sights on the Ohio Country.

U.S. claims to authority in the Ohio remained tenuous even during the earliest years of the nineteenth century, and the federal government—as elucidated by both Pickering and Dearborn’s request for Friends’ aid—still required missionary

references to providing "religious instruction" (which, by 1796, disappear from the minutes) suggest, however, that they were, at first, open to the possibility of providing more than agricultural education. This may then suggest that Friends altered their reform agenda to suit, for political and practical purposes, the needs and wishes of the U.S. federal government. See Tiro, "We Wish to Do You Good."

159 May 22, 1801, Secretary of War Henry Dearborn to Henry Drinker, National Archives I, M15 Letters Sent by the Secretary of War, reel one, Washington, D.C. (hereafter NARA).
160 Henry Dearborn to Henry Drinker, May 18, 1802, NARA, M15, roll 1, 214.
assistance. The United States managed a military victory with the Battle of Fallen Timbers in 1794 and subsequently gained a large tract of land in southeastern Ohio with the Treaty of Greenville the following year, but still the region remained contested. The endurance of the Miamis, Shawnees, and their neighbors, particularly in the northwest of what became the state of Ohio and also Indiana, meant that U.S. domination remained elusive, and that the hard work of empire remained.

The federal government, still reeling from the expenses of war with Ohio Indians and keen to establish peace, hoped that Friends would offer a means by which to pacify Native peoples, and agricultural education seemed the key. For members of the Society of Friends, however, the purpose of mission work was more profound. Their agricultural initiatives were deeply connected with their religious principles. Friends saw in the materiality of the world an opportunity to labor towards godly perfection, and they looked in horror upon those who "suffered the plantation of God to be as a field uncultivated, and a desert." Baltimore Friends’ celebration of work as well as of

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161 While most histories of the early republic, and the Ohio Country in the early republic more specifically, tend to view either the 1795 Treaty of Greenville or the War of 1812 as the end of Native authority in eastern North America, historians of Native American history pay increasing attention to the presence of Native peoples in the Ohio Country beyond those dates and, indeed, beyond removal. See, for example, Stewart Rafert, The Miami Indians of Indiana: A Persistent People, 1654-1994 (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 1996); Stephen Warren, The Shawnees and Their Neighbors, 1795-1870 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2005); Charles Beatty-Medina and Melissa Rinehart, eds., Contested Territories: Native Americans and Non-Natives in the Lower Great Lakes, 1700-1850 (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press: 2012), see especially chapters six and seven.

cultivation ultimately provided a powerful impetus behind their mission to Ohio Country Indians.

So too, however, did their experiences in urban Baltimore. Baltimore was one of the early republic's most diverse cities, and it boasted a robust and evolving economy. Walking through Fells Point or down Market Street, Friends encountered stevedores, seamstresses, slaves, and street sweeps—all of whom labored for the wages that provided basic sustenance and shelter or, in the case of the enslaved, lined the pockets of those who claimed ownership of their labor. Friends witnessed both demographic and economic growth on an unprecedented scale: between 1790 and 1830, Baltimore's population grew by 497%. Much of that growing populace provided labor that transformed eighteenth-century Baltimore Town into the thriving metropolitan Baltimore whose harbor was one of the most important ports in the United States. That harbor attracted the United States' rural population, refugees from Saint Domingue, and other travelers, all of whom made the city diverse and its harbor the second-most popular destination for immigrants arriving from Europe, after New York City. What was more, Baltimore boasted the largest African American population in the United States by 1820, and with "two of every five people of color in the city...enslaved," this made for complicated race, class, and labor relations.

Markets and Morality: Intersections of Economy, Ethics, and Religion in Early North America (Fall 2010), 515-548.


Baltimore's diversity meant that it nurtured a robust economic hierarchy. Historian Seth Rockman's analysis of class in the early nineteenth-century city reveals in stark terms the material conditions of poverty that accompanied economic development. The city, straddling the worlds of both North and South, was integrated—and becoming more so on a daily basis—with an economy that was reliant upon both enslaved and waged labor. Baltimore's labor hierarchy was uncertain—particularly at the bottom. Wageworkers sought out and answered ads seeking labor for hire, and some managed to string together enough opportunities that enabled them to survive on their own or to survive with the assistance of public services.\textsuperscript{165} Employers' needs, however, added to the challenge of finding and maintaining work. They often hired and fired workers depending upon both seasonal and daily business needs.\textsuperscript{166} It was an employers' market, and it meant that there was a growing sense of difference between laborers and their employers. Friends, in many ways, occupied central positions in this developing economy that left wageworkers "scraping by" in the otherwise thriving city. Members of the Society of Friends employed free African Americans in their homes and many became prominent merchants and businessmen. Like their Philadelphia counterparts, they manumitted their slaves relatively late. The Maryland Yearly Meeting (which later became the Baltimore Yearly Meeting) did not threaten to disown Friends for slave-ownership until 1777, three years after Philadelphia took such action.\textsuperscript{167}

\textsuperscript{165} For one of the best treatments of early republican Baltimore, see Rockman, \textit{Scraping By}.  
\textsuperscript{166} Rockman, \textit{Scraping By}, 7.  
\textsuperscript{167} David Brion Davis insists that “Quakers’ decision to disengage themselves from slavery was not an inevitable outgrowth of George Fox’s advice in 1657 to treat slaves with Christian mercy and if possible limit their terms of bondage to thirty years.” Instead, he points to Friends’—even Philadelphia Friends—relatively slow route toward abolition. See David Brion Davis, \textit{The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770-1825} (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell
This stratified socio-economic world was the foundation upon which the republic’s developing economy was built, and that hierarchy infiltrated most aspects of daily life in both subtle and obvious ways. Historian Jack Marietta suggests that Friends sought to distance themselves from worldly politics and the emerging market economy, and he explains Friends’ eventual emergence as a revitalized group set to reform American society by pointing to Friends’ “turning inward” during the late-eighteenth and early nineteenth century.\footnote{168} Importantly, however, Friends had actively sought to reform Indian affairs since the seventeenth century. Friends’ eagerness to engage in reform in the early nineteenth century had a number of origins. Most importantly, Friends’ reform work was, in part, a product of their experiences with the labor market in Baltimore, and that engagement had profound consequences for their efforts in the city as well as in the Ohio Country. As will be seen, social hierarchy—a notion that seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Friends openly disavowed—infused the core of Baltimore Friends’ reform philosophy by the early nineteenth century. The “benevolence” with which Friends approached their work among Ohio Indians was built on an assumption of difference: Indians, like wage workers, were in need of assistance not merely because they were supposedly “savage,” but because Friends deemed them impoverished, and thus they were in some way corrupted and susceptible to immorality.

Quakers’ place within a robust social and economic hierarchy reveals the extent to which ideas of difference formed a part of their daily lives. Though Friends made up a

tiny fraction of Baltimore's inhabitants, many occupied powerful positions in the city's social and political circles and were active entrepreneurs. Prosperous Friends on Baltimore Yearly Meeting's Indian Concerns Committee, like other wealthy members of Baltimore's religious denominations, occupied the leadership positions in their meetings.\textsuperscript{169} Philip E. Thomas (the eventual president of the B&O Railroad), and Elisha Tyson and Elias Ellicott (prominent businessmen in Baltimore's flour industry), for example, were highly visible members of the Indian Concerns committee during the first decades of both the committee's existence and its work among indigenous peoples.\textsuperscript{170} These men benefitted mightily from others' labor, and, though their faith demanded that they embrace simplicity, they showcased their success in a number of ways.

Many elite Quakers exhibited their status by engaging in philanthropic efforts. Indeed, one's visibility within the meeting corresponded with the extent to which one engaged in its public outreach. Participation on committees translated into a form of "moral capital" that not only elevated one's status within the meeting but in the city as well.\textsuperscript{171} Philanthropy served as a means to engage with the public and leave one's mark upon urban life. Because philanthropy required time, however, it was often the wealthiest Friends who participated most extensively in meeting causes by serving as committee clerks and conducting correspondence with the federal government. It was also these

\textsuperscript{170} Rockman, \textit{Scraping By}, 17, 19; see BYMIC minutes for membership lists. Thomas, for example, served as clerk of the Indian Concerns committee for a time.
\textsuperscript{171} Christopher Leslie Brown, \textit{Moral Capital: Foundations of British Abolitionism} (Published for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture) (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006). Brown's analysis reminds scholars to consider the myriad personalities, beliefs, and motivations that fueled not only abolitionism but reform efforts more generally. See also James Walvin, \textit{The Quakers: Money and Morals} (London: John Murray, 1997).
individuals who garnered the most political "capital" fit for Quakers who openly avoided the more obvious political posts. The wealthy Baltimore Friend Elisha Tyson, for example, served on the Baltimore committee for Indian Concern as early as 1803 and contributed to the attempt to found the Baltimore School (and later, House) of Industry for the urban poor in 1804. He also found time to travel to the Ohio Country in 1808 to visit Friends' agricultural missions then underway as well as actively pursue abolitionist politics until his death in 1824. Tyson's philanthropic exploits garnered him a position of prestige within the meeting, and it also provided ample material for a memorial penned by John Tyson after his death. That his efforts became enshrined in print meant that a wide audience of Friends—and others—knew of his charitable work. His philanthropy was a means by which Tyson cultivated both his public image and his political capital.

While Friends like Tyson and Philip E. Thomas occupied the leadership roles in their meetings and committees, more middling men, like farmer Baltimore Phillip Dennis, performed the actual labor of civilization in the Ohio Country. Friends were not

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172 Jack Marietta suggests that, after the political fallout of the Seven Years War in Pennsylvania, the Society of Friends turned “inward.” See Marietta, *The Reformation of American Quakerism.*
174 Ibid. Indeed, even John Tyson's subtitle for Elisha Tyson biography, "the Philanthropist," indicates the importance of such work in cultivating a legacy.
175 Elisha Tyson's example also reveals, however, that Friends' many reform activities took place in tandem. Just as Friends' embrasure of the early republic's class hierarchies colored their reform efforts, the overlapping membership both in the Philadelphia and Baltimore Yearly Meetings' benevolent works committees throughout the nineteenth century likewise demonstrates that Friends' efforts among Native peoples cannot be understood in a vacuum. Those who influenced what happened in the Ohio Country had direct ideological ties with a series of other urban efforts. See, for example, Sydney James, *A People Among Peoples;* Jack Marietta, *The Reformation of American Quakerism.* It is important to note, however, that some Quakers undertook such causes privately, without the official sanction of their meeting. When considering Quaker benevolence in the early republic, then, it is important to consider Friends both as private individuals and as members of the Society of Friends.
immune to Baltimore's class hierarchy, instead they internalized it. Ideas of class and material difference influenced the character of Friends’ benevolence.

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Thanks to Friends’ experiences in urban spaces, Baltimore Quakers’ agricultural reform work grew out of an assumption that Native peoples and laboring poor shared much in common. Indeed, those Friends who traveled to Shawnee or Miami Country soon saw that the problems that bedeviled wage workers in Baltimore also plagued Native Americans. The Baltimore committee and its traveling representatives often took pains, for example, to contrast Native peoples' supposed poverty with the richness of the lands. Friends wrote that Ohio's Indians "suffered all the miseries of extreme poverty, in a country, which, from its great fertility, would, with but little cultivation, abundantly supply them with all the necessaries of life."176 Gerard T. Hopkins, Elisha Tyson, William Kirk, and other Baltimore Friends who travelled to the Ohio attributed this dissonance to Indians’ “laziness.” Elisha Tyson wrote in 1808, "[h]ere is a proof of Indian industry, William Kirk last built a house and cleared a corn field for this old Indian. The field is entirely neglected though the land is excellent. A part is grown up with spear or bluegrass so that it would mow."177 In a similar vein, another Baltimore Friend explained to Miamis living near Fort Wayne: "Brethren There are some amongst us who are not industrious and will not work; these cannot earn the comforts for

176 Friends, A Brief Account of the Proceedings of the Committee...for Promoting the Improvement and Civilization of the Indian, 8.
177 "Notes of a Journey taken by Elisha Tyson and James Gillingham on a visit to some Indians in the neighbourhood of Fort Wayne.” Friends Historical Library, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, PA,1808, 27th of 4th month.
themselves which industrious people do: but are often in great distress and poverty so that we clearly see it is by industry that a comfortable living must be obtained.\textsuperscript{178} That this Friend compared Ohio Indians to “some amongst us” further reveals the extent to which Friends’ experiences in Baltimore informed their observations of Native peoples.

Ohio Indians were impoverished, Quakers claimed, not only because of their supposed lack of industry, but because of their predilection towards drinking. Alcohol consumption, these Quaker men believed, distracted the region's Native peoples from properly employing their lands. Baltimore Friends contended that if the region's "traders could not be restrained from furnishing them with this destructive article, in exchange for their skins and furrs, they would not be easily persuaded, to turn their minds toward agriculture and the useful arts."\textsuperscript{179} The distracting qualities of alcohol paralleled what Friends saw as one of the primary reasons why urban laborers struggled to care for their families. Friends informed the Shawnee Captain Lewis that "[s]pirituous Liquors not only corrupts the minds of those who drink it, but it also occasions great poverty & distress in the families of those men who get drunk because it destroys their reason and disqualifies them for work, it has this effect upon the white people who drink it and it will have the same effect upon you."\textsuperscript{180} Indeed, Friends’ concerns over alcohol were so pronounced that they lobbied the Ohio legislature in 1808 to prohibit the sale and trade of alcohol to Indians.\textsuperscript{181}

\textsuperscript{178} 3 mo. 19, 1808, BYMIC minutes, 177.
\textsuperscript{179} Friends, \textit{A Brief Account of the Proceedings of the Committee...for Promoting the Improvement and Civilization of the Indian}, 14.
\textsuperscript{180} 11 mo. 15, 1811, BYMIC minutes.
\textsuperscript{181} 3 mo. 12 1809, BYMIC minutes, 198-199.
Notions of family and masculinity were at the heart of Friends’ critiques of Native men’s supposed laziness and alcohol abuse. In Baltimore, at the precise moment when ideas of work and home grew increasingly distinct, men were expected to be the primary providers for their families—at least in the visible labor market—while women, ideally, remained at home to raise, educate, and care for children as well as perform the essential duties of running a household. Scholars such as Jeanne Boydston demonstrate that women’s work contributed to the early republic’s economy by enabling men to leave the home, but as historian Karin Wulf demonstrates, the prevailing assumption by the nineteenth century was that women relied upon men for their well-being.182 Those women who were unfortunate enough to have to work outside of the home were among the distressed poor in the urban republic. As Baltimore Friends’ wrote, alcohol use “occasions great poverty & distress” among the families of “white people,” and it had the same affect upon Native women and children.183 Indeed, when Friends, U.S. officials, and other Euroamericans encouraged Native men to pick up the ax and plough, they often appealed to the conditions of the men’s families.

Friends’ efforts to alter Indians’ conceptions of labor were in line with government officials' efforts to transform Native peoples' gendered relationships. Native societies often delegated agricultural work to females, and thus the "civilizing" work of both the government and Quakers hoped to force Native men to accept what was, for

183 11 mo. 15, 1811, BYMIC minutes.
many Ohio Indians, "women's work." Baltimore Quakers, however, did not see their efforts as doing so much. Instead, they were combating the image of the "squaw drudge" who toiled in the fields. Agriculture, reformers contended, was a manly pursuit. Quakers, famously "non-conformist" in the social and theological sense, nonetheless emphasized, like many of their fellow nineteenth-century Americans, that the proper place for Indian women was in the home. As Gerard Hopkins explained to Miamis and Potawatomis in 1804,

brothers the white people in order to get their land cultivated find it necessary that their young men should be employed in it and not their women. Women are less than men. They are not as strong as men. They are not as able to endure fatigue and toil as men. It is the business of our women to be employed in our houses. to keep them clean to sew knit--spin--and weave...for themselves and families to make clothes for the men and the rest of their families to keep the clothing of their families clean and to take care of their children.

The seamstresses and poor women of Baltimore were largely responsible for the making of clothes, spinning, and weaving with which Quakers were familiar and to which they referred in this passage. Most of their wives, while often occupied in the home, took part in Baltimore Friends' public reform culture and even served on the Indian Concern

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185 This was in direct tension with many indigenous peoples’ own conceptions regarding gendered divisions of labor. In Iroquois villages, Daniel K. Richter notes that “an Iroquois town was largely a female world” as women “tended the fields” and men, as hunters and warriors, “dispersed to locales near and far.” Daniel K. Richter, The Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization (Chapel Hill: Published for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, Virginia, by the University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 22-23. See also Theda Perdue, Cherokee Women: Gender and Culture Change, 1700-1835 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998).
committee by 1815. Moreover, Friends' belief in the Inner Light ensured that Quaker women enjoyed spiritual equality and constituted a significant portion of the Society of Friends' ministry. Baltimore Friends claimed to be exceptional (and, in many aspects, were) when it came to their views of women in society yet these Friends wrote and uttered the line "women are less than men" in their message to Miamis and Potawatomies. Such a statement may be attributable to a number of factors. Notions of labor and gender changed in rural and urban areas during this period and in different ways. What was more, Friends were likely attempting to convince men that agriculture required strength that women did not have. Nonetheless, the sentiment was yet another indication of the extent to which Friends incorporated ideas of difference into their "benevolent" work. Many Friends encouraged white elite or "middling" women to take on public leadership roles and, by the forties, some pushed to expand female claims to citizenship by fighting for the right to vote; they encouraged Native women, however, to remain in the home.

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187 See BYMIC membership list, 1815, vol II.
188 Indeed, Amy Greenberg argues that antebellum expansionism, between the U.S.-Mexico War and the U.S. Civil War, was grounded in developing gendered ideals. See Amy S. Greenberg, *Manifest Manhood and the Antebellum American Empire* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
189 Unabashedly non-conformist Quaker women of the 1840s (Quaker abolitionist and proponent of women's rights Lucretia Mott among them) viewed Native women's labor in the fields as evidence of their servility; they believed that female Natives' liberation would come about through spinning and other such work in the home. Nonetheless the Quaker Joint Indian Committee declared in 1842, "history confirms the deeply interesting fact, that no people ever yet were elevated to the rank of civilization while their females were held in a servile condition." Lucretia Mott served with the women of this Joint Indian Committee. See Carol Faulkner, *Lucretia Mott's Heresy: Abolition and Women's Rights in Nineteenth-Century America* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 135. On women and reform more broadly, see Lori D. Ginzberg, *Women and the Work of Benevolence: Morality, Politics, and Class in the Nineteenth-Century United States* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990).
This reorganization of gender roles also corresponded to efforts to organize the United States' non-native population according to patriarchic norms. Among the non-Indians in the United States, men were most often the individuals with whom the government formed an explicit relationship. Census records, for example, usually placed the eldest male as the “head of household," and beneath his name were listed the others living in his home and under his care. With explicitly labeled patriarchs, the government's bureaucratic apparatus could more efficiently deal with its growing population. The federal government's partnership with Quakers in the Ohio Country—particularly once Quaker women began accompanying their husbands to the region to teach spinning and weaving in 1815—facilitated the exportation of this system of governing and, moreover, conformed with the social dynamics of the developing market economy in the east and of Americans’ settler colonialism. Like the white, "middling" women whose domestic labor supported men’s wage labor outside of the home, Baltimore Friends encouraged Native women to support their husbands' work by laboring within the home.  

The language of treaties between the United States and Native Americans, moreover, involved rhetoric of protection, promises of peace, and broad notions of friendship—all of which implicitly challenged Native masculine diplomatic roles. An 1805 treaty with the Wyandots, for example, states “[t]he said Indian nations do again acknowledge themselves and all their tribes, to be in friendship with, and under the protection of the United States.” The United States thus presupposed both that Native

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190 For female domestic labor and the developing market economy see Jeanne Boydston, *Home and Work.*
Americans required “the protection of the United States” and that they desired friendship with the U.S. government. With the United States demanding peace from Native people and presuming friendship, Native peoples’ own diplomatic powers of making war and crafting military alliances were, according to treaty rhetoric, subjugated beneath United States authority. Indeed, such a loss of diplomatic and military authority had once rendered Delawares “women” in the eyes of the Six Nations.

Native leaders like the Miami Little Turtle, the Wyandot White Loon, and others, however, far from being passive recipients of Quakers’ messages, capitalized upon Euroamericans’ assumptions regarding poverty and gender. When it suited them, they employed language of pity and charity to gain access to wares or assistance. Indeed, like laborers in Baltimore, Native Americans possessed bargaining power that enabled them to negotiate for authority. The Wyandot Tarhe, for example, informed Friends that his people were "poor & needy" when he contemplated the advantages of accepting aid from Quakers in 1805. The Miami Little Turtle, moreover, employed a discourse of

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192 While issues of masculinity are present in these treaties, it is worth remarking that women in many Native societies were also esteemed peacemakers and political figures. As the United States presumed to be the guarantor of peace and friendship, this also attacked Native females’ roles in political society. See, for example, Theda Perdue, *Cherokee Women*; Susan Sleeper-Smith, *Indian Women and French Men: Rethinking Cultural Encounter in the Western Great Lakes* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2001).


195 Seth Rockman demonstrates that even those who “scrapped by” in Baltimore did possess some power when it came to taking advantage of public almshouses on a seasonal basis. See Rockman, *Scraping By*, 194-231.

196 2 mo. 3 1806, BYMIC, 118-122.
poverty in his dealings with both the Society of Friends and U.S. government officials. In
doing so, he made claims upon the U.S. state. Speaking in regards to traders in 1802, for
example, the Miami chief told Baltimore Friends, "Our repeated entreaties to those who
brings this evil [liquor] amongst us, we find, has not the desired effect. We tell them;
brothers, fetch us useful things—bring goods that will clothe us, our women, our
children."197 Here, the Miami claimed impoverishment in order to secure economic
advantage—he did not want just anything that traders or the U.S. government might feel
like offering, but rather he wanted "useful things" like textiles. Little Turtle went on to
tell traders in 1802, for example, that the Miami chief told Baltimore Friends, "Our repeated entreaties to those who brings this evil [liquor] amongst us, we find, has not the desired effect. We tell them; brothers, fetch us useful things—bring goods that will clothe us, our women, our children."197 Here, the Miami claimed impoverishment in order to secure economic advantage—he did not want just anything that traders or the U.S. government might feel like offering, but rather he wanted "useful things" like textiles. Little Turtle went on to say that the liquors that were often obtained in exchange for furs, "made us poor" and that it caused "our young men to go without clothes, our women & children to go without anything to eat."198 Like Friends, Little Turtle emphasized the Miamis’ desire to care for their women and children. He appealed to Friends’ own assumptions in an effort to secure what he wanted.

When Friends received Little Turtle's pronouncements in 1802, they moved to send Gerard T. Hopkins and Matthew Dennis to Miami lands in order to begin an agricultural mission. Dennis began his mission work among the Miamis two years later.199 While some historians rightly connect such rhetoric of pity and poverty with an

197 Memorial of Evan Thomas, and others, a Committee Appointed for Indian Affairs, by the Yearly Meeting of the people called Friends, held in Baltimore. 7th January, 1802. Referred to Mr. Samuel Smith, Mr. Griswold, Mr. Davis, Mr. Hoge, and Mr. Randolph, American Antiquarian Society, Worcester, MA.
198 ibid.
199 On Hopkins and Dennis, see also Daniel K. Richter, "Believing That Many of the Red People Suffer Much for the Want of Food": Hunting, Agriculture, and a Quaker Construction of Indianness in the Early Republic," Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 19, no. 4, 601-628. See also Rockman, Scraping By, 194-231. In his chapter on "the consequences of failure," Rockman likewise makes a strong case for wage earners' power despite their status as laborers in Baltimore's emerging capitalist economy.
older mode of Native diplomatic condolence speechmaking, we should not assume that such rhetoric was static. Native leaders' expressions of poverty took on new meanings in the early republic and blended with older modes of Native-European diplomacy and gift-giving. They enabled Little Turtle and others to secure philanthropic assistance and, as chapter five makes clear, initiated a relationship within which Native Americans asserted the power to make claims upon the state and its recruited laborers. Little Turtle adapted missionaries' notions of impoverished Indians for his own devices by connecting his own rhetorical overtures of poverty with the gendered model of poverty with which so many Euroamericans—particularly urbanites like the Baltimore Friends—were increasingly familiar. This gendered model of poverty, featuring male breadwinners and female and child dependents, cultivated in places like Baltimore, traveled to the Ohio along with Quaker missionaries where Native peoples appropriated them, remade them, and facilitated their entrenchment.

Thanks in part to both Friends and some Native men, then, gendered ideas regarding labor and authority, again grounded in a sense of difference, became central to the U.S. civilization plan. Quaker reformers, often deservedly, possessed a reputation for progressive thinking; their efforts among Native American women, however, revealed the extent to which they were, nonetheless, influenced by and contributed to the development

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200 Matthew Dennis, for example, argues that, while often political in nature, overtures of impoverishment should be understood as more stylistic than substantive. See Dennis, Seneca Possessed, 154-156.

201 The phrase “poor Indians” was, as historian Laura Stevens demonstrates, a way to invoke an ideal colonial sensibility during the eighteenth century. By the nineteenth century, however, I argue that the idea of the “poor Indian” not only evoked images of savage innocence but also destitution—a shift that owed much to early republic Americans’ increasing experiences with and anxieties regarding poverty. See Laura Stevens, The Poor Indians: British Missionaries, Native Americans, and Colonial Sensibility (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).
of U.S. social hierarchies. These views colored Friends’ work in the Ohio Country, and traveling Friends ensured that ideas regarding eastern cities’ developing social hierarchy migrated westward. Friends’ reform work in Baltimore and Ohio, among wage workers and Indians, thus was built on myriad assumptions of difference, and it sought to offer correctives. Rather than eliminate difference through uplift, however, Friends’ prescription—“useful knowledge”—served to reinforce emerging ideas regarding labor, morality, and poverty in both Baltimore and the Ohio Country.

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Friends’ agricultural mission work, with its goal of offering Indians “useful knowledge” for their betterment, was, at its core, an educational initiative. It was one that relegated Native peoples, however, to the bottom of the republic’s emerging social hierarchy. Baltimore Friends, like their counterparts throughout the Atlantic world, engaged in efforts to aid the city's poor, and they regarded both labor and education as central, intertwined elements of their work. Friends in Wilmington, Delaware were in many ways the most ardent in their philanthropic work, and they managed to raise impressive sums of money that ensured that poor children—African American and Euroamerican alike—could attend Quaker-run schools.202 Philadelphia Quakers, with whom the Baltimore committee on Indian Concern corresponded regularly, likewise participated in numerous efforts to provide poor relief and charity schooling. In doing so, they not only contributed to the development of Indian policies in North America, but they rendered educational reform among American Indians and working men and women

202 James, A People Among Peoples, 274.
central to the development of ideas regarding morality, citizenship and the young republic's national character.

Ideas regarding education, still contested in the United States, traveled to Indian Country with Quaker agricultural instructors, and they provided some of the most fundamental intellectual underpinnings of the U.S. civilization project more broadly. Indeed, Friends’ agricultural missions were an effort to rescue “poor Indians” from the vagrancies of a destitute life, and they offered Native peoples a tool—“useful knowledge”—for combating poverty. For many early Americans, ignorance of the ways in which one might lead an industrious and sober life bedeviled the whole of the nation's "poor"—white, black, and "red" alike. For some Friends, a belief that ignorance lay at the root of the nation's inequality and moral degeneracy constituted the philosophical core of their benevolence. Combining with that belief, however, was a movement towards ideas of humanitarianism, born out of the age of Enlightenment and emerging conceptions of sensibility in the early republic.203 Novels such as the British work Clarissa instilled within many middling and elite early Americans a sense of duty towards those who struggled to make ends meet.204 Far from prescribing simple financial assistance, however, education became a means by which budding philanthropists could do their part to help their fellow citizens—as well as Indians and enslaved Africans—while garnering

204 Lynn Hunt, among others, also sees the rise of the novel as a central to the cultivation of sensibility in the later eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa and Pamela are exemplars of such works.
their own “moral capital.” What was more, many thought that acts of humanitarianism would contribute to the betterment of the young republic as a whole.205

Reformers’ insistence upon offering certain peoples specific forms of “useful knowledge” was ultimately bound up in ideas of race, class, and gender. Baltimore Friends traveled to the Ohio Country with the promise of "[r]eligious Instruction, Knowledge of Agriculture and useful Mechanic Arts," but they did so without offering complimentary instruction in the skills of reading, writing, or numeracy—skills many deemed "useful" for others and taught as part of a transition towards "practical" education by the late eighteenth century.206 “Useful knowledge” was based upon one’s station, and educational reform efforts among “poor Indians” and those facing poverty was both born from and in fundamental tension with the early republic’s emphasis upon universal

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205 Much of this discussion is informed by Lynn Hunt’s work but see also Sarah Knott, Sensibility and the American Revolution (Chapel Hill: Published for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture by the University of North Carolina Press, 2009).

Many U.S. officials viewed the civilization plan as a benevolent, humanitarian project. It is impossible to disregard the notion that for many white inhabitants of the U.S.—particularly those invested in western land sales and speculation—"civilization" policies and agricultural education were a means to limit Natives’ occupation of western lands and to eliminate, through assimilation, the existence of Native Americans altogether. Yet, at a time when "removal" policies were not yet official, pinpointing Native peoples’ "usefulness" through education in particular "mechanic arts" was also a means of ensuring that history would smile upon the expanding nation. This was certainly true for Quaker philanthropists in the Ohio Country. Even Secretary of War Henry Knox contended, however, "[h]ow different would be the sensation of a philosophic mind to reflect that instead of exterminating a part of the human race by our modes of population that we had persevered through all difficulties and at last had imparted our Knowledge of cultivation, and the arts, to the Aboriginals of the Country." ("Henry Knox to George Washington, July 7, 1789" in Lowrie, Walter and St. Clair Clarke, Matthew, eds. American State Papers: Documents, Legislative and Executive, of the Congress of the United States, Vol. IV, Indian Affairs. 38 Vols. (Washington, DC: Gales and Seaton, 1832)).

education. Plans for universal education—schemes thought up by the likes of Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Rush, and Noah Webster—ultimately emphasized the utility of education in creating a moral citizenry. These men believed that an educated citizenry was necessary to ensure that the best representatives served the federal government. At stake, then, was not just the nation's political future but also its moral future. Indeed, for most thinkers, morals were inseparable from politics. Education, from the earliest days of the republic then, was at the center of a U.S. national project. Along with ideas of the nation’s moral future, however, came fears about the nation’s corruption: “failures,” those who experienced the conditions of poverty, appeared to be a threat to the moral health of the republic—a corruptible force that could render the body politic diseased.

Indeed, reformers attached an array of assumptions to their educational efforts such that stereotypical ideas of laziness or corruption plagued urban workers and their children. In 1805, for example, the trustees of the newly established Free School in New York wrote, "Children thus brought up in ignorance, and amidst the contagion of bad example, are in imminent danger of ruin; and too many of them, it is to be feared, instead of being useful members of the community, will become the burden and pests of..."

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208 See especially Knott, Sensibility and the American Revolution, chapter two.
The Free School’s young pupils were thus supposedly in danger of becoming useless either because of the parents' "extreme indigence...their intemperance and vice, or to a blind indifference to the best interests of their offspring." What was more, these children—and the nation more broadly—were susceptible to the “contagion of bad example.” Immorality, then, was a disease that required rooting out. The parents' supposed incompetence, however, meant that others needed to educate their children in order to provide for the common good and to stamp out the scourge of vice. Indeed, "it becomes the duty of the public," the Free School trustees wrote, "and of individuals, who have the power, to assist them in the discharge of this important obligation."

For Free School reformers and many others—including Friends—education was a matter of practical and immediate importance. In no other way was this made clearer than in the very discourse surrounding "useful knowledge" and its acquisition. Free School reformers feared that laborers’ children would fail to become “useful members of the community,” while Baltimore Friends consistently declared their intentions to offer Native peoples “useful knowledge.” Indeed, the language of "usefulness" was...

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210 Ibid., xviii.

211 Ibid., xix. Friends in North America had similar concerns for their own children and, in consequence, expended great energy in considering the schooling of Quaker children more generally. Owen Biddle penned a narrative in 1790, for example, that discussed the possibility of modeling John Fothergill's London Quaker school in Philadelphia. See Owen Biddle, *A Plan for a School on an Establishment similar to that at Ackworth, in Yorkshire, Great-Britain, varied to suit the Circumstances of the Youth within the Limits of the Yearly-Meeting For Pennsylvania and New-Jersey: Introduced with the Sense of Friends in New-England, on the Subject of Education; and an Account of some Schools in Great-Britain: To which is Added, Observations and Remarks, Intended for the Consideration of Friends* (Philadelphia, Joseph Crukshank, 1790).
omnipresent in the discourse on proper education. Politicians debated whether a military education was "useful" for a successful and morally upright life, and prominent men of Baltimore formed an association in an effort to define and attain "useful knowledge."\(^{212}\)

When Baltimore Friends used the term "useful" to describe the particular arts and employments that Native people could learn, then, they connected their work among Ohio Indians to the early republic’s broader discourse surrounding notions of "usefulness," morality, and education.\(^{213}\)

\(^{212}\) With regards to the military, by 1826 Secretary of War, James Barbour, proclaimed citizens' labor to be more important than military service. He wrote, "at least a million and a half of our most useful citizens would be relieved from the unprofitable pageantry of military parade...constituting so injurious a draft on their industry." “Annual Report of the Secretary of War, Showing the Operations of the Military Establishment of the United States in 1826; and Report of the Board of Officers on the Organization of the Militia,” 4 December 1826, *American State Papers* Class V (Military Affairs) (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1832-61), III: 388-9 in John Dwiggins, "The Military Establishment and Democratic Politics in the United States, 1783-1848" Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 2012.

Far from performing intensive manual labor themselves, several prominent members of the Baltimore meeting's Indian Concerns committee instead spent their evenings debating just what constituted "useful knowledge." For the "Society for the Attainment of Useful Knowledge," a social group to which several members of the Baltimore Friends' Indian Concerns committee belonged, "useful knowledge" could mean a number of things, and their schooling in literature, history, and the like meant that their own "usefulness" was quite different than that of others. Their meeting minutes offer a glimpse into the questions that were, at the time, both deemed worthy of debate and crucial to prominent Baltimorean men's "attainment of useful knowledge." On January 6, 1798, for example, the men asked "Is a Man of Good morals & Sound Constitution—Justifiable in passing the prime of life in a State of Celibacy?"\(^{212}\) After lively discussion they decided in the negative; procreation was, instead, advisable. Similar deliberation ensued when, on October 28 1797, the men debated whether, "In Case of a general emancipation of the Slaves in the United States by Law—Ought Government to indemnify the present Holders."\(^{212}\) Debate ended with an answer in the affirmative. Over the course of the group’s three-year existence the men debated the issues of a land tax, the armament of merchant vessels, debt prison, and "the mental faculties of the Ladies" (they found, according to Enlightenment principles, that "the Ladies" were the mental equals of men). See Society for the Attainment of Useful Knowledge Minute Book, 1797-1800, The Constitution By-laws and Minutes of The Society for the Attainment of Useful Knowledge Baltimore, 1797-1800. Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore, Maryland, 32-33; 19-20; 57.

\(^{213}\) On broader discourse, see, for example, Boudreau, "‘Highly Valuable &Extensively Useful’: Community and Readership Among the Eighteenth Century Philadelphia Middling Sort,” *Pennsylvania History*, vol. 63, no. 3 (July 1996): 302-329.
That discourse was also grounded in developing notions of class. Historian Seth Rockman rightly understands the emergence of class concepts as fundamentally connected to the material conditions of poverty. Such conditions—observed by reformers partially as the result of stereotypes and racial assumptions—also rendered educational reform efforts hierarchical. By limiting "useful" pursuits to agriculture and the "mechanical arts," Friends defined the limits, from their perspective, of Native peoples' utility. Baltimore Friends thus included Native peoples in the discourse regarding usefulness and, ultimately, the public good, even as they excluded Indians from the republic proper. In 1807, for example, civilizing agent and Quaker William Kirk proclaimed that his civilizing efforts possessed the power to transform Ohio Country Native peoples into "peasible good citizens on our fronteers" who would "become a strength to our Government." While his words revealed that he envisioned a nation that would one day include Native peoples, they also revealed that that day was not yet at hand. By emphasizing Indians' potential for transformation, Kirk excluded them from the nation, and, in doing so, contributed to the process of defining the young republic's citizenry, as well as of the American empire’s subjects. Friends’ agricultural mission work ultimately employed a discourse of humanitarianism and perpetually ongoing education in order to ensure that indigenous peoples would act as “useful” non-citizens.

Ideas of education and “usefulness” aided in the creation of ideas of class as well as gender. “Republican mothers”—also non-citizens—required education so as to cultivate good male citizens, but again, these women required only a certain form of

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214 Kirk to Dearborn, 20 July 1807, Letters received by the Secretary of War, Main Series, Records of the Office of the Secretary of War (Record Group 107), National Archives, Washington, D.C.
Eighteenth-century Quaker schools offered their pupils a well-rounded education that aimed to cultivate both practical skills and knowledge of the sciences, languages, and history. The Ackworth School in Britain, for example, served Quaker children who were "not in affluent circumstances," and Dr. John Fothergill insisted "[t]hat the English language, writing and arithmetic, be carefully taught to the sexes." Still, one nineteenth-century historian of the Ackworth schools explains "[t]hat the girls [would] also be instructed in housewifery and useful needlework." The school thus taught girls the practical arts of eighteenth-century domestic life, and it also contributed to the entrenchment of gendered and classed ideals of labor. Again, as with agricultural education among Native men and women, “poor,” non-citizens received a labor-based form of education.

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217 Thomas Pumphrey, *History of Ackworth School* (Ackworth, 1853), 34-35. One historian points out that while the school originally encouraged its pupils to engage in manual labor, the school's overseers abandoned the plan after worrying that the students might suffer "moral evil...by associating with the labourers employed" to carry out the chores full-time. These children were Quaker; their religion set them apart from other children in similar circumstances, and it certainly set them apart from non-Quaker laborers. Walvin, *The Quakers*, 96.

Memorialists in 1807 New York similarly saw religion as a means to set certain children apart from others. They wrote, “Your Memorialists have viewed with painful anxiety, the multiplied evils which have accrued, and are daily accruing to this city, from the neglected education of the children of the poor. They allude more particularly to that description of children who do not belong to, or are not provided for, by any religious society; and who therefore do not partake of the advantages arising from the different charity schools, established by the various religious societies in this city. The condition of this class is deplorable indeed...” While the practical problem of not being able to attend religious charity schools was real, these memorialists deemed non-religious children to be of a separate "class" altogether. Lancaster, *Improvements in Education*. 
Similarly, early nineteenth-century Philadelphia charity school reformers—many of them Quakers—provided more than vocational training but nonetheless provided an education tailored for pupils who were not among the affluent Euroamerican inhabitants of the United States. Friends' Philadelphia Adelphi School—a school intended primarily for African American children—used the Lancasterian method of instruction wherein older students taught younger students in order to cut costs. In contrast to other Quaker schools, the school's overseers did not endeavor to teach Quaker doctrine, but rather basic spiritual concepts.218 Indeed, Adelphi School reformers believed these children required no more than the "laws of morality, the obligations of virtue and the more obvious truths according to the Bible."219 Anything beyond that, they contended, would "not be doing justice to the motives and views of the association."220 These reformers believed that all youths of Philadelphia should receive education, but also insisted that laboring class students required "the more obvious" version. Education thus became a means by which reformers "other-ed" wage laborers, African Americans, and their children. Universal education, in other words, had its limits.

The proposed Baltimore School of Industry likewise endeavored to provide Baltimore's poor technical training that would enable them to earn a wage in the

218 See Joseph Lancaster, *Improvements in Education*. A particularly thoughtful piece on the Lancasterian schools in the United States is Dell Upton's on the schools and "spatial imagination." His argument, however, renders Friends' focus upon agricultural education work among Ohio Indians all the more perplexing compared to other republican educational initiatives. See Dell Upton, "Lancasterian Schools, Republican Citizenship, and the Spatial Imagination in Early Nineteenth-Century America," *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians*, 55, no. 3, (Sept. 1996), 238-253.


220 Ibid.
developing city. The school's proponents hoped to provide struggling individuals with a place to live while teaching them skills to bolster their ability to earn a living. The school never opened its doors but it was, nonetheless, symbolic of Baltimore leaders' efforts to find a place for wage laborers at the bottom of the emerging economy. The implicit philosophy undergirding the School of Industry and other similar efforts was that certain individuals were impoverished because of a lack of industry, knowledge, and, often, morality. Such institutions, however, provided education for work only and did not equip workers with the knowledge to advance above earning a "living wage." Likewise, Quakers' agricultural missions did not provide Ohio Indians with basic literacy or numeracy skills, and they thus relegated Native people to the bottom of the U.S. socio-economic hierarchy. The forms of education offered by the missions and by urban institutions alike, then, reinforced assessments regarding both laborers’ and indigenous peoples’ potential. By emphasizing the acquisition of certain skills—often physically labor-intensive ones—reformers further entrenched a social hierarchy grounded in ideas of labor, virtue, and, increasingly, race.

Quakers' agricultural missions, like urban educational reform efforts, thus emphasized the acquisition of particular kinds of knowledge and "habits of industry," and they similarly framed the “Indian problem” as a moral problem. According to Baltimore Friends, however, Indians’ failures were not solely their fault. In 1796, the Baltimore

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222 Historian Seth Rockman rightly argues that the school "suggests a second, seemingly contradictory pattern in the emergence of a wage-economy—the persistence of coercive labor relations. The School of Industry sought to add the city's 'free' wage-earners to the ranks of enslaved, indentured, and imprisoned laborers from whom work had long been compelled." Seth Rockman, "Work, Wages, and Welfare at Baltimore's School of Industry," 575.
Indian concerns committee wrote, "[t]he distresses and difficulties which these poor people labour under we believe may in a great degree be attributed to their propensity to the use of Spiritous Liquors introduced among them by Traders and Evil-minded men...and through this their attachment to this debasing and destructive Enjine of Satan, they are left destitute and miserable, their morals corruped...their mind embittered against the white people." 223 Here, Friends made clear that it was also corrupt Euroamericans who were responsible for Indians' "poverty." Instead of setting a moral example, traders "corrupted" Indians in much the same way that the New York Free School’s "indigent" parents corrupted their children. This, again, contributed to the notion that there were those within the American nation—some white men—who actively spread the disease of vice. Indeed, those Euroamericans whom reformers labeled immoral or corrupt were in danger of being banished from the nation all together. One Friend wrote that some Americans’ manner of living contributes to produce ferosety being continually engaged in hunting savage beasts...these people live between the law & the Indians, & as settlement cultivation & law extends further, The wild game & the Indians retreat, these people keep their position & follow the game & the Indians, & in their commerce with the latter have borrowed all their Vices, & neglected their Virtues. 224

According to this Friend, these settlers were not "poor Indians" but they were not truly American "citizens" either. Instead, they lived "between the law & the Indians," a consequence of their "whiteness," "ferosety," and lack of proper virtue and occupation. They needed to cease "hunting savage beasts," learn the proper ways of settlement and

223 5th month 22, 1796, BYMIC minutes, 3-7.
224 Anonymous Friend, "A Journey to the Northwestern territory the 2d of the 10th mo 1797," MSS 003/005, Swarthmore College, Friends Historical Library, Swarthmore, PA.
cultivation, and, instead of keeping "thier possition," they needed to pick a side. Like Native Americans, these "white savages" (also described as witchcraft-practicing “Arabs” in at least one early republic textbook) needed to learn to live within the law and become civilized for the good of the republic.  

That traders and settlers spread the contagion of vice in lands on the fringes of the empire was equally disturbing as the problems plaguing the republic’s cities. From Friends’ point of view, both had the power to affect the nation’s future; Native peoples did possess, after all, the potential for becoming “good citizens.” Framing Indians' problems in this way thus was, in part, a neat way of pinpointing the problems plaguing the republic. It meant that Friends could combat Ohio Indians' problems—and those facing the republic—by sharing with them their “useful knowledge” of farming, and, through farming, virtue. With knowledge and virtue the Ohio Country and its inhabitants would become a healthy portion of the growing republic.

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225 Elijah Parish, A Compendious System of Universal Geography, Designed for Schools. Compiled from the Latest and Most Distinguished European and American Travellers, Voyagers and Geographers (Newburyport, MA: Thomas & Whipple, 1807), 86. The image of the "white savage" becomes all the more powerful when considering that Peter Silver's "anti-Indian sublime" groups most militant, white Europeans together as a sector of society united by their hatred of Native people. See Peter Silver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009).

226 Daniel Richter's work on Quaker ideas of Indians in Ohio adds to our understanding of the development of ideas of race in the early republic. Framing Friends' work in the context of educational reform—and connecting that reform to urban reform efforts—however, enables us to consider issues of class and citizenship as well. Richter, "Believing That Many of the Red People Suffer Much for the Want of Food.”
Quaker reformers’ readiness to provide Native peoples only with agricultural instruction reveals that by the early nineteenth century Friends embraced an economic and social hierarchy built upon assumptions of Natives’ ignorance and material difference. At an earlier point in their history, Friends once refused to show deference when addressing their supposed social superiors, and men like George Fox and William Penn took pains to comment upon Native peoples’ similarities with non-Natives. By the early nineteenth century, however, Friends’ educational and reform movements embraced the recognition of a clear difference between Native Americans and African Americans, and the poor more generally, on the one hand and everyone else on the other. Ohio Country Native Americans needed to heed the instructions of Friends in order to learn to raise food that could ensure their survival; Baltimore's African Americans and urban poor were to go to the School of Industry in order to learn to earn a living wage; all were to learn to take their place in the developing economy. The most prominent members of the Baltimore Society of Friends, therefore, were fully entrenched in the new political economy of the early republic and their benevolence reveals the ways in which these former social and theological outcasts became, at least in part, simultaneously part of and contributors to a mainstream culture built around the assumption of inequality. While some state officials disagreed with their inclusive—albeit stratified—vision of the nation, it nonetheless shaped U.S. imperial Indian policy. Agricultural education and technical training remained a centerpiece of Native American boarding schools into the twentieth century.

Hope for the future was also at the heart of Friends’ mission. Even as traveling Quakers closed their eyes to Ohio Indians' corn fields, they saw with clarity the region's
potential to become like the more familiar urban coast. They made frequent references, for example, to the small villages they encountered during their travels, and they projected upon them their own prospective visions. One traveler, for example, described a place on the eastern shore of the river in Virginia, as containing only three houses but quickly added that "thier was a time when the cittys of London & philadelphia did not contain more, & I see no reason which it may not grow as large as them or any place, if it do not it is neither for want of room or Materials." Another Friend proclaimed that "Many difficulties attend new settlers—though the soil in most places is luxuriant beyond the conception of those who live in our eastern Counties, yet the labour of clearing is great and the pinching times they experience before they can get much returns ought to be weightily attended to." Life in the "west," Friends contended, was difficult at first, but they could develop that wide expanse through which they traveled in a way that would resemble life near home.

Traveling Friends carried visions of their home in Baltimore with them on their journeys. Friends’ experiences in that booming metropolis influenced their observations of Native peoples, their dreams for the western lands, and, ultimately, U.S. Indian policy.

Baltimore was a thriving city, however, because of its position as an urban center through which goods moved: it connected the agrarian lands of rural Maryland with a thriving harbor. Baltimore Friends understood the importance of economic infrastructure in the development of lands; their own flour and textile successes were built upon economic

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227 Anonymous Friend, A Journey to the Northwestern territory the 2d of the 10th mo 1797, MSS 003/005, Swarthmore College, Friends Historical Library, Swarthmore, PA.
228 Anonymous, Diary, 1807 9 mo 10-10 mo 12, Journals (MSS) MSS 003/8, Swarthmore College, Friends Historical Library, Swarthmore, PA.
projects akin to that underway in the Ohio Country. They also understood, however, the importance of workers and consumers—black, white, and, in the Ohio Country, "red"—in building cities. Their reform work, then, could build a moral, industrious nation and a powerful empire, and it could transform a vast west into a place resembling home, one farm at a time.
Friends’ agricultural mission work offered them a means to better the supposedly wretched situations of Native peoples. It also, however, offered a way to remake the earth in God’s image, to cultivate the “outer plantation” by encouraging habits of industrious virtue among Native peoples and Friends alike, and to spread “moral beauty over the face of the desart.” Ultimately, however, Quakers’ missions had far-reaching economic and political consequences that extended beyond even their own explicit goals. Agricultural education offered a means by which to include Native peoples in the republic’s emerging social hierarchy, and agricultural mission work facilitated the growth of the U.S. economy. Indeed, agricultural missions transformed landscapes, mobilized capital, and supported a national effort to build a "great and united empire" through commerce by both requiring goods and labor and promoting socioeconomic "conversion." With federal direction and investment, missionaries like the Friends, Indian agents, blacksmiths, merchants, and manufacturers contributed their work and wares toward efforts to civilize indigenous peoples in the Ohio Country. In turn, they linked urban and rural economies and produced agricultural goods, laborers, markets, and, so officials hoped, increasingly marketable—and taxable—land. When the U.S. federal government recruited and paid Quaker missionaries for their efforts to "civilize" Native peoples, then, it employed them

229 Thomas L. McKenney to Dr. Samuel Worcester, Extract of a letter from Thos. L. M’Kenney ... to Dr. Samuel Worcester ... of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missionaries, Newberry Library, Chicago.
as imperial agents in a mission complex that linked the economies of Indian Country with those of New Orleans, the urban U.S. coast, and the world.²³⁰

The mission complex expanded the influence and power of the United States in the Ohio Country, the North American southeast, and beyond through mission work and economic development by linking missionaries, humanitarians, manufacturers, federal employees, and indigenous peoples through networks of markets and capital. It was imperial, and by supporting Indians' agricultural education, it endeavored to render—if temporarily—the region's Native Americans an agrarian working class. As chapter five will show, it also offered opportunities for Native peoples to manipulate U.S. economic development for their own purposes, even as it transformed landscapes and bolstered the United States' ability to reap the rewards of expanding agricultural markets in lands that remained in Indians' hands. In the Ohio Country—a territory of fertile land that banned U.S. slavery with the Northwest Ordinance of 1787—this state-directed project provided a cost-efficient means of imperial economic development, and it reveals the federal state's importance as a pivotal actor in the developing U.S. market economy and its social

relations. Attention to the mission complex thus adds to our already rich understanding of market expansion and economic change in the early republic.  

Like Philip Curtin's "plantation complex," the mission complex was, at its core, a "political and economic order" that fostered economic development, and viewing Friends and Natives through this lens enables us to situate two central facets of U.S. colonialism—civilizing plans and mission work—within the social, political, and economic strategies that advanced U.S. colonialism. What is more, the concept forces us to recognize missions' power to facilitate broad economic change as well as produce the more familiar episodes of cultural negotiation in the early republic. The mission complex was central to the layered economic, social, and political development of the Ohio Country, and it reveals that there were alternative—though not necessarily competing—forms of economic development at work in North America. Evidence of the simultaneous existence of the state-driven mission complex, Native economies, and slavery in the North American southeast makes this clear. Attention to the complex's functioning in the Ohio Country, however, allows us to chart the sinews of market development in lands further removed from the South's developing slave markets. Such analysis then elucidates the fact that peoples, politics, and policies in Indian Country played critical roles in producing dynamic ideas of wage labor, private property, and class in the early republic and its continental empire—and beyond. Attention to the functioning of this system based

upon free yet hierarchical relations of power ultimately illuminates how the early U.S. empire thrived off of economic growth, and it reveals that imperial state policy, as well as a myriad of Native and non-Native actors like the Friends, facilitated the development and expansion of capitalist markets and forms of labor in the early republic.

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Indian Country was thus crucial to U.S. imperial and economic development, and as U.S. missionaries representing a variety of societies traveled abroad more frequently as the nineteenth century wore on, lands and peoples in the Pacific and Atlantic worlds likewise grew and shaped the U.S. economy and empire. For the utility of the "plantation complex," see in particular, Philip D. Curtin, *The Rise and Fall of the Plantation Complex: Essays in Atlantic History* (Cambridge, 1990); Jack P. Greene, "Early Modern Southeastern North America and the Broader Atlantic and American Worlds," *The Journal of Southern History*, Vol. 73, No. 3 (Aug., 2007), 525-538.


Recent scholarship linking slave markets, labor, and investment with the development of U.S. capitalism offers a useful model for linking Indian Country—and the mission complex—with the development of the U.S. economy. Like slavery, missions, boarding schools, and the civilization plan more generally were connected with nineteenth-century paternalistic notions of "benevolence," and they were, similarly, hinges for economic growth. See Walter Johnson, *River of Dark Dreams: Slavery and Empire in the Cotton Kingdom* (Cambridge, 2013); Edward E. Baptist, *The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the Making of American Capitalism* (New York, 2014).

When Friends traveled to the Ohio Country at the turn of the nineteenth century, they ventured into a world created by the region's Native communities, British and French inhabitants, and migrating Americans. The regional economy was built upon the rules of neighborly reciprocity and the politics of collective economic advantage: it drew upon the communal labor practices embraced by regional Native peoples for their utility in efficiently clearing lands and harvesting crops. Euroamerican immigrant families adopted these practices and similarly sent members to community events such as logrollings in order to assist new arrivals in the difficult work of clearing and building on land. The civilization plan in the Ohio Country likewise borrowed and built upon the region's cultural labor relations: it brought together Quakers and members of Native communities to transform the landscape, and it thus modeled, at first, existing economic practices.233

Friends used their government connections to gather information regarding travel and communication before embarking on their journeys to the Ohio Country. Secretary of War Dearborn responded to Friend Isaac Tyson's 1808 query regarding his Ohio destination and informed him that the government had “no messenger going to Fort Wayne, but the trail for that Quarter leaves the City every Sunday & Thursday. No Post Office being established at Fort Wayne, you will have to direct to that place by the way of Staunton, Ohio.” The secretary's response revealed that Tyson would experience a

deprivation of government facilities in the west, but that there was enough administrative support to make an organized departure possible. Friends were more fortunate than most early Americans by virtue of their well-connected government partners, and they used them to gather information that facilitated their journeys.  

En route to their Ohio missions, Baltimore Friends passed through a region marked by layers of economic development. Mounds—remnants of the Mississippian cultures of the Mississippi and Ohio valleys—dotted their path and caused befuddlement as some struggled to ascertain whether they were the residue of an old European colony or rather built by northward roaming Indians from "Mixico" fleeing civil war. Surely "northern Indians," as one Friend wrote, did not build them. Nor did the region's Native peoples, so Friends thought, produce the abundant fields of corn that appeared so impressive. By the time Baltimore Quaker Gerard T. Hopkins passed through the eastern portion of the upper Ohio Valley in 1804, however, westward travel was in the process of adding another layer of change to the lands already altered by millennia of economic development, centuries of fur trading, and imperial conflicts. Friends' journeys, like those of others, bolstered the economic development of a number of Quaker and non-Quaker towns between Baltimore and Ohio or Indiana by feeding local economies that profited from an increasing stream of provision-seeking, migrating travelers.  

Indeed, the Ohio River was the primary artery westward, and towns such as Wheeling and Marietta reaped the profits by offering wares, boatmen, and guides. One

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234 Henry Dearborn to Isaac Tyson, Apr. 16 1808, Miscellaneous Letters Sent by the Secretary of War, 1800-1809, Records of the Office of the Secretary of War (M370, reel 3), NARA, Washington, DC.

235 Anonymous Friend, Journal of trip to Northwest Territory, 1797, MSS 003/005, Friends Historical Library, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, PA.
Friend traveling near the Scioto River, for example, remarked that “the people in the town endeavour to supply them & make them pay well for it.” Though traveling Friends made up a small percentage of westward-bound immigrants, their federally sanctioned travel contributed to the small-town profits that, in turn, encouraged both migration to and settlement in the region. Legal settlement had the potential to generate federal revenues and expand emerging markets, and federal officials endeavored to divide the Ohio lands into townships and expedite their sale for such purposes. At the turn of the century, however, land sales were slow; legitimate migration to the region proved insufficient to produce relief for the debt-ridden federal government. With squatters filling the region, the government failed to reap its desired revenues even after the 1787 Ordinance opened the lands to large speculation. Congress initiated a system of credit with the Frontier Land Bill in 1800 in an effort to attract smaller purchasers, but such a scheme likewise failed to open the lands to small buyers who too frequently failed to pay off their debts.236


Government officials, hopeful that migrating settlers would buy and fill the lands, conceptualized plans for the lands even if revenues, because of loan defaults, were less than expected. Governor Harrison's 1802 scheme for Jeffersonville near the Ohio River in Indiana Territory, for example, resembled a checkerboard with open lots adjacent to those that were to be occupied. President Jefferson found Harrison’s idea "handsome, & pleasant," believing "it to be the best means of preserving the cities of America from the scourge of the yellow fever which being peculiar to our country must be derived from...our cloudless skies, [for]...Ventilation is indispensably necessary." Jefferson envisioned "the cities of America" flourishing in the region, and, with keen interest, he sent a sketch of the proposed town for Harrison's perusal since he could not "decide from the drawing you sent me, whether you have laid off streets round the squares thus or only the diagonal streets therein marked. The former was my idea, and is, I imagine, more convenient." Not surprisingly, Jeffersonville's original design was abandoned by 1810 due to the impracticalities of so many open lots in a state that saw massive population growth—a staggering 413%—during the first decade of the nineteenth century.²³⁷

While the federal government struggled to determine the best means of reaping revenues from settlement in the region, land speculators such as John Armstrong and William Wells (the latter was a speculator in the 1790s and an Indian Agent for the U.S. in the 1800s) endeavored to turn a profit by buying extensive tracts and offering loans to individuals with signed contracts. Like federal policies, Wells' correspondence reveals

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not a lack of settlers but rather a frustrating lack of legitimate settlers in the region. Wells informed Armstrong that he encountered "numbers of people" wanting "to purchase lands but they are mostly poor, destitute of money, and wish to purchase on long credits." As a result, "the sales of lands at Cincinnati were very small, when we consider the number of settlers, and the immense quantity of superior lands there offered for sale." With legitimate settlement and land purchases, speculators and the government alike hoped to reap revenues and manage squatters.238

Federally directed economic development promised to boost the evolution of the regional economy already underway and generate revenues for the government and speculators alike. Friends' missions thus complemented the federal and speculator quest for legal settlement in both the long and short term. And not simply because farming would free Native nations to sell much of their increasingly commodified lands to the United States—though that was, of course, part of the story. The Northwest Indian War was a still-fresh memory to many Americans—particularly in Ohio and Indiana Territory—and Friends' work offered a means by which the federal government could deal peacefully with Native peoples. Friends' work targeted, in particular, Native nations' young men, and those men were often in fact and certainly in Euroamericans' imaginations the warriors who wrought bloody havoc among settlers and their property. Many government officials, Friends, and settlers hoped Natives’ “transition” to farm life would secure peace. With peace—or with the illusion of peace—secured by educators who enjoyed a positive reputation among the region’s Indian nations (as opposed to the

generally suspect reputation of government officials) would come, in the minds of many, regional stability; with that would come increased land sales, settlement, and state and federal tax revenues. Because peace was a protracted process, however, Baltimore Friends' agricultural mission efforts were also crucial to the United States' short-term economic policies: they aimed to convert to the ways of civilized economy those who many Americans deemed agriculturally-deficient "heathens." In turn, they created and expanded U.S. markets and consumerism.\(^{239}\)

Indeed, in many ways the aim to convert was, for economic and political purposes, most important. Both the nation's finances and its humanitarian reputation were at the forefront of officials' thinking. Governor William Henry Harrison pondered in 1801, for example, "Whether some thing ought not to be done to prevent the reproach


Friends also, however, continued their work as diplomats and negotiators in Indian Country. In 1808, for example, Baltimore Friends Elisha Tyson and James Gillingham traveled to the Ohio Country in order to see the progress of their society's philanthropy firsthand. Before they embarked on their tour, Secretary Dearborn inquired "If Mr Tyson & Mr Gillingham should find it convenient, while on their visit to the Western Indians, to spend a day or two at Greenville, with a party of Indians at that place, under the direction of an Indian called the Prophet." Dearborn wanted "to have such enquiries made...as to the real views and Intentions of those people & especially of their leader." He also informed the Quakers that it would "be very desirable to have similar enquiries made among the Wiandots at Sandusky as to the actual Conduct & apparent views of that People, in relation to the Interests of the U.S." Friends' positive reputation among the region's Native populations contributed to the government's desire to send them to gather information from groups who were often hostile to the federal government's plans. Such work was important in a region so near British traders, because those traders often endeavored to turn Native nations against American interests. The federal power that mobilized Tyson and Gillingham's diplomatic and reconnaissance work, however, was masked by their affiliation with the philanthropic Society of Friends. See Henry Dearborn to Elisha Tyson and James Gillingham, Mar. 24, 1808 (M15, reel 2, RG 75, NARA); for British traders see, for example, Harrison to Henry Dearborn, Feb 19, 1802 in Esarey, *Messages and Letters*, 38-39.
which will attach to the American Character by the extirpation of so many human beings." Though he ultimately concluded that such matters were better left to the president to decide, his concerns echoed those of the first Secretary of War, Henry Knox, who in 1789 contended, “How different would be the sensation of a philosophic mind to reflect that instead of exterminating a part of the human race...[we] had imparted our Knowledge of cultivation, and the arts, to the Aboriginais of the Country.” Paternalistic rhetoric bolstered U.S. claims to benevolent power fit for a republic even as it facilitated the development of an imperial market system; it was "knowledge of cultivation," after all, that mattered most to men like Knox. Such an emphasis on agriculture not only required an expanded market economy, but it also contributed to the development of class hierarchy in the United States: Native peoples were fit for farming, these men determined, and so agricultural education alone would prove their savior. The veneer of benevolence was central to U.S. imperial economic transformation.240

As chapter three demonstrates, Baltimore Quakers' brand of mission work was a product of their experiences in their urban environment and its economy of wage laborers and slaves. They determined European-style farming to be the best means of eradicating Natives' "savagery," and, from their perspective, cooperation with the War Department and the small federal state facilitated the expansion of their efforts to save impoverished

Indians from extinction. Their work also, however, supported U.S. policies that, in turn, developed capitalist markets and forms of labor. Baltimore Friends’ mission work, focused on "useful" agricultural education, encouraged a commodification of Native labor that erased the individual and his need for numeracy as part of an agricultural education, even as it mobilized Friends’ own work on behalf of their religious society and the state.241 Indeed, for their work they received pay from the federal government in ways similar to the tax benefits, grant money, and funds granted to other voluntary organizations in the nineteenth century and beyond. Though Friends’ compensation was piecemeal at first, the Civilization Fund of 1819 institutionalized their pay and guaranteed that missionaries received $10,000 annually. State power mobilized Friends and, later, other missionaries in the effort to solve an ongoing "Indian problem." 242

Indeed, similar to ideas of "disciplined labor" in other imperial contexts, the U.S. state worked with missionaries to define and class its labor force using categories of civilization and savagery. Quakers’ efforts helped shape nineteenth-century rhetoric that

241 Most works on Quaker benevolence slight the significance of Friends’ efforts among Indian nations; far more prominent in analyses is Quakers’ antislavery work. See, for example, Bruce Dorsey, Reforming Men and Women: Gender in the Antebellum City (Ithaca, NY, 2006); Sydney V. James, A People Among Peoples: Quaker Benevolence in eighteenth-century America (Cambridge, 1963). Seth Rockman’s work on early Baltimore requires us to consider Baltimore Friends as participants in and products and producers of a dynamic urban economy. See Seth Rockman, Scraping By: Wage Labor, Slavery, and Survival in Early Baltimore (Baltimore, 2009). Even with the later dominance of evangelical missions in North America, China, and elsewhere, agricultural work and economic transformation remained central to U.S. mission efforts.

proclaimed indigenous populations to be working toward civilization—they were never all quite "civilized" despite the rhetorical exceptions of the "five civilized tribes." The civilization project was, then, a constant work in progress, a never-to-be-completed work, and it set precedents for the federal management of labor on the continent and abroad, even as it contributed to economic transformation. The complex was a "benevolent," free labor answer to the problems presented by federal desires for land, revenue, economic development, and remaining indigenous communities: agricultural uplift produced agricultural production, markets for American manufacturers, and, in turn, increasingly valuable land. 243

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Armed with both a mission and federal support, Baltimore Quaker Phillip Dennis arrived in Indiana Territory in 1804. He there embarked upon the first of Friends’ agricultural efforts by forming "Dennis's Station" for the benefit of Miami, Eel River, and Delaware Indians on the Wabash River thirty to forty miles southwest of Fort Wayne. Friends later formed at least two other missions at Captain Lewis Town (Lewistown) and Wapakoneta both among the Shawnees in western Ohio. The Miami chief Little Turtle positioned Dennis's Station or "Little Turtle's Farm School" at a location several miles away from the village in which the theoretical pupils lived, likely in an effort both to

243 The notion of "civilization," like Elyssa Faison's work on "womanhood" in imperial Japan, was one category that served to define and mold the dynamic U.S. workforce throughout the nineteenth century. This was intimately connected with ideas of race and labor. See Elyssa Faison, Managing Women: Disciplining Labor in Modern Japan (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2007). On race and the development of the working class see David R. Roediger, The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class (London, 1991).
assert control over the Quakers' work and keep the Euroamerican men at a distance. The mission was nonetheless just south of the Forks of the Wabash—a valuable location where the Little River joined the Wabash in Indiana. Though it took over twenty years for the United States to claim ownership of the spot, Dennis's work of clearing and fencing fields, producing crops, and constructing a cabin for his residence not only showcased for the local Miamis and some Delawares the intricacies of becoming a “proper” agriculturalist, but offered an opportunity to expand an agricultural market at a lucrative location.\(^{244}\)

By the end of 1804, only one Delaware family relocated to the farm school lands, but Dennis offered his colleagues in Baltimore hope for the future by noting "that 55 Eal river Indians had been at his station." Such rhetoric of success encouraged the maintenance of the mission complex and ensured that the state continued its efforts to manage the labor of missionaries and their pupils. In 1807 Wapakoneta, Quaker William Kirk agreed to bring civilization to the Shawnees there for "one thousand dollars, as pay" along with a federal budget of $6,000 "on condition" that he would "undertake the Superintenency and...procure the necessary Assistants and labourers, together with such implements of husbandry and horses as [his] proposed system embraces." The Quaker kept Secretary of War Henry Dearborn informed of his progress and in doing so revealed the vast amount of physical work that he, his Quaker employees, and the Shawnees performed. After several months in Ohio, he had "placed all the young men among the

\(^{244}\) For the founding of Dennis’ Station see Gerard T. Hopkins journal, 1804, HSP; see also “Minutes, 1795-1815, Baltimore Yearly Meeting Standing Committee on Indian Concerns,” vols. 1 and 2, SW MR-B79, Friends Historical Library, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, PA, 87. These minutes are hereafter cited as BYMIC.
Shawnees (except while three of them were imployed in making a small improvement for a few Dellawares...)" and had high hopes that he was "likely to succeed as fast as the most Sanguine could have expected as they work constantly with my young men."

Together, Shawnees and Friends "built several Cabins," "made Rails & fenced in about one Hundred Acres of Ground," "cleared about thirty" more "& planted in Corn better then two Hundred Acres." By 1816, moreover, Baltimore Friends' mission among the Shawnees at Wapakoneta yielded "between 7000 & 8000 Bushels" of corn, and they "found many of [the inhabitants] at work, in their fields" with "a considerable portion of them...becoming industrious" and raising poultry.\(^{245}\)

Through missionary and indigenous labor, the federal government produced and managed workers but also transformed the landscape and expanded present and future markets. The missions were thus labor-intensive ventures that fostered U.S. economic development, and the federal state viewed them as worthwhile investments. Kirk's mission at Wapakoneta, located just north of the Greenville line that separated Indian Country from the United States in Ohio, offered an opportunity for the U.S. to reap economic benefits from lands that remained unceded by Native peoples. Though Kirk departed the region in 1808, Friends agreed to sustain the mission site in 1810 after Secretary of War William Eustis wrote that "the Government has consented to

\(^{245}\) BYMIC, vol. 1, 87; Henry Dearborn to Henry Drinker, October 24 1806, Miscellaneous Letters Sent by the Secretary of War, 1800-1809, Records of the Office of the Secretary of War (National Archives Microfilm Publication M370, roll 3, 229), Record Group 107, National Archives Building, Washington, D.C. (hereafter M370); Henry Dearborn to William Kirk, November 24 1806, M370, roll 2; William Kirk to Henry Dearborn, July 20th 1807, Letters Received (Main Series), 1801-1889, Records of the Office of the Secretary of War (National Archives Microfilm M221, roll 8), Record Group 107, National Archives, Washington, D.C; BYMIC, vol. 2, 14-15.
relinquish...the public property at that place to [Friends'] discretion and management" and that "the Government is to be at no expense hereafter in conducting this establishment."
The deal saved Friends the cost of buying land for their missions, minimized federal costs, and allowed the government to pay for services with a currency that was, at the moment, much more readily available than government cash—land. It also pleased regional Indian agent John Johnston who, prior to the agreement, argued that abandonment of the settlement at Wapakoneta would "give a stroke to the buisness in this country from which it will not soon recover." He explained that, "all the Tools necessary for the purpose of Farming on a large scale is on the spot," that "a waggon road from the Settlements in ohio to the Town is cut out," and that he knew "of no place in the Indian country where money could be so usefully expended as with the Shawanoes at Kirks Settlement."246

Johnston's words, coupled with the actions of Friends and government officials, reveals that the civilization plan in the Ohio Country promoted not just subsistence farming among "poor Indians" but "Farming on a large scale." Friends noted in 1813, for example, that 3,000 bushels of corn were sold that season but also explained that "when Peace is restored in that Country, these People will be more than Ever disposed to pursue the farming business." "Indian country," both Friends and officials thought, could contribute to the development of U.S. territory, indigenous communities, and agricultural markets, but it was no easy task. Missions required roads to connect the farms with

nearby towns, and the work of civilization required textiles, agricultural implements, and stores for Native peoples' future consumerism. Friends' agricultural education work bolstered trade in Indian wares, and by doing so, it incorporated Ohio Indian nations and their resourceful lands into the U.S. market economy.\textsuperscript{247}

None of this would have been possible, however, without U.S. government officials' efforts on the ground. These men sold and distributed farm implements such as rails for fences and supplies for the construction of mills. Moreover, they constructed political alliances with settlers, Native chiefs, Quakers, and government officials. Indian agents William Wells and John Johnston, for example, worked with Baltimore Friends and kept them abreast of developments in the region. Wells informed Quakers in 1805, that "there would be 100 acres of Land under good fence at the Little Turtles Town (15 miles north of Dennis' Station) by the 1st of the 6 mo" and "that they had obtained a large number of Hogs and some Cows." When Philip Dennis returned to his family in Maryland, Friends asked Wells to place one of his men at Dennis's Station, at Friends' expense, until they could find another Quaker to carry out the work. Friends likewise informed Johnston that "we request thee to do us the favour to hire two suitable men...and draw on our Treasurer Elias Ellicott at sight for the amount of expence incurred; we also request thee to write to us about the middle of the 7th mo (July) and let us know what aid

\textsuperscript{247} BYMIC minutes, Vol. I, 10 mo 12 1813, 258-259. The minutes are silent on the distribution of profits and the precise location of sale. Friends report that the Shawnees had planted about 250 acres of corn at Wapakoneta, putting the average yield per acre between 28 and 32 bushels. These yields approximate the average reported through the first half of the nineteenth century. An 1820s family farm, for example, yielded 30 bushels of corn per acre. See David M. Strothers and Patrick M. Tucker, "The Dunlap Farmstead: A Market-Dependent Farm in the early History of the Maumee Valley of Ohio," \textit{Archaeology of Eastern North America}, Vol. 30 (2002), pp 155-188; see page 178 for chart on 1820 farm production.
is rendered." Wells, Johnston, and other Indian agents thus oversaw U.S.-Indian relations at Fort Wayne, Piqua and elsewhere in the region, but they also maintained connections with the society that provided diplomatic and educational support to the federal government's plans. They served as the crucial links between Friends, the federal government, and Native peoples on the ground.  

These relationships, particularly those with high ranking officials, offered Friends' efforts the federal seal of legitimacy. Friends often arrived at western posts carrying letters signed by the secretary of war mandating that post officials welcome them and treat them with hospitality. Secretary Dearborn wrote to territorial Governor William Hull and John Johnston in 1808, for example, in order to ensure that they offered Elisha Tyson and James Gillingham a warm reception. The secretary informed his men that “any civilities you may afford them in the execution of their benevolent intentions will be grateful to them and their Society & pleasing to the Pres'. of the U.S.” When Friends and other missionaries carried such letters they not only showcased federal officials' approval of their work, but they supported implicit federal claims to control citizens' movement. Such letters would not have been necessary if movement was entirely free in Indian Country. The federal government enhanced its authority over both citizens and non-citizens by managing its laboring and administrative bureaucracy; Friends’ agricultural

mission work thus contributed to a western state-building project that took place in many forms.  

Baltimore Friends relied upon men like Johnston for assistance, but they also influenced agents' hiring. After Johnston replaced Wells as Indian Agent in Ohio, the War Department recruited Quaker John Shaw to serve as Johnston's paid assistant. Shaw continued the work at Dennis's Station after Philip Dennis and then William Kirk returned to Maryland. Baltimore Friends' influence, however, extended further. They encouraged federal officials to hire Hendrick Aupaumut as another of Johnston’s assistants in 1809. Friends deemed the experienced Mohican go-between "to be a judicious intelligent, worthy man, and well qualified for extensive usefulness" among the Miamis at Dennis's Station. Friends explained that "we so far interested ourselves in his behalf with the Government as to solicit some assistance for him, which has been granted and placed under thy superintendence, and we take the liberty to request thy friendly aid and attention to him, which will very much oblige us, and promote the benevolent view of Government." In part because of Friends' influence, Aupaumut found employment

249 See Henry Dearborn to Governor William Hull, John Johnston, Samuel Tripper, Mar. 24, 1808 (M15, reel 2, RG 75, NARA). For additional letters restricting missionaries' movements see, for example, Henry Dearborn to William Ewing, Mar. 18, 1805, ibid.

The control of movement extended to the region's Native people as well. The government required "passports" for traveling Native Americans who wished to venture to Washington, D.C. In 1802, Secretary Dearborn informed his Indian agents that they were “directed not to furnish any Indians with the means of travelling to the Seat of Government unless they have passports.” The reason for the passports, Dearborn claimed, was to minimize the “many inconveniences arising from Indians travelling through the country to the Seat of Government without passports.” By 1806, the president of the United States would only see traveling Native leaders during four months of the year—May, June, October, and November—since he deemed it “expedient to decline receiving visits from his red children, while Congress are in session. See Henry Dearborn to Brownson Apr. 19, 1802 (M15, reel 1, RG 75, NARA); Henry Dearborn to Charles Jouett, Sept. 6, 1802, ibid.; Henry Dearborn to William Wells, Nov. 3 1806 (M15, reel 2, RG 75, NARA).
with the War Department and maintained a vital presence in the Ohio Country during the War of 1812.250

Relationships with Indian agents, perhaps most importantly John Johnston, with the secretary of war, even with the president of the United States, were vital to Friends’ work, but so too was their connection with developing economic posts. Indeed, the early republic's Indian factory system connected eastern manufacturers and developing regional centers such as Cincinnati with the rural interior, and, the factory stores, along with the civilization plan, were key components of the mission complex in the Ohio Country. The factories offered for sale the manufactured agricultural implements, textiles, and other goods requisite for Natives civilized lifestyle—the Fort Wayne factory store, for example, had nearly 500 hoes on-hand in 1806. More broadly, however, the factories aimed to wrest control of the fur trade from private traders and establish stores and an administrative hierarchy of Indian factors and agents in Indian Country. By attempting to monopolize the sale of agricultural manufactures, linens, and other goods, moreover, it contributed to federal overtures of Native dependence on U.S. manufactures during the early nineteenth century. The stores, along with the Trade and Intercourse Acts that established the federal government as the overseer of the Indian trade, meant that the federal government controlled both trade and market expansion in Indian Country.

Because "Indian Country" was so near the official boundaries of the United States in the

upper Ohio Country, federal expansion of markets there expanded both Euroamericans' access to markets and, in turn, the regional and national market economy.  

The work performed by the purveyor of public supplies and later the superintendents of Indian trade offered federal backing to the creation of an economy built upon the shared interests of agriculture and manufacturing. Tench Coxe, in particular, as one of the first to procure goods for the federal Indian trade and factory system, set the model for the later superintendents. Coxe was a strong supporter of manufacturing and industry, and he supported government regulation of "revenue and commerce." He argued that manufactures should aim at "accommodating the interests of agriculture, manufactures and commerce in such a manner, as to render them reciprocally a support to each other, and mutually beneficial to the interest of the nation." For Coxe, agriculture and manufacturing went hand in hand and, together, they contributed to national political independence and power.

251 For Fort Wayne accounts see Bert J. Griswold, ed. *Fort Wayne, Gateway to the West, 1802-1813* (Indianapolis, 1927), 405-663; see page 458 for 1806 figure. Linking Indian policy with the broader context of early federal economic policy is crucial to understanding federal power and economic development in the early republic. See, for example, Douglas A. Irwin and Richard Sylla, eds., *Founding Choices: American Economic Policy in the 1790s* (Chicago and London, 2009). Factory stores existed until 1822. The mission complex, however, was not always reliant, specifically, upon "factory" stores. Though the factory system was abolished, federal stores—some, as in the case of Alaska, operated by Quakers—remained central to U.S. imperial power throughout the continent and, indeed, abroad. On the factory system see Ora Brooks Peake, *A History of the United States Indian Factory System, 1795-1822* (Denver, 1954); William H. Bergmann, *The American National State and the Early West*; Stephen J. Rockwell, *Indian Affairs and the Administrative State in the Nineteenth Century*. For Quaker-run stores in Alaska see Nicholas E. Flanders, "Missionaries and Professional Infidels: Religion and Government in Western Alaska," *Arctic Anthropology*, Vol. 28, No. 2 (1991), 44-62.

252 Secretary of War Dearborn to Coxe, Feb. 10, 1804, (M15, reel 1, RG 75, NARA); Tench Coxe, “An Address to an Assembly of the Friends of American Manufactures convened for the purpose of establishing a Society for the Encouragement of Manufactures and the Useful Arts, read in the University of Pennsylvania, on Thursday the 9th of August 1787,” (Philadelphia, 1787), 29-30, accessed online at http://find.galegroup.com/ecco/infomark.do?type=search&tabID=T001&queryId=Locale%28en
The purveyors and later the Superintendents of Indian Trade procured goods from merchants and manufacturers in cities such as Philadelphia and Baltimore, or in western towns like Cincinnati, and they utilized the republic's rivers and fields to ship the wares to factory stores for both purchase and distribution as Indian annuities. In 1810, for example, Coxe paid one man $837.42 for "ironmongery," another $111.90 for "50 axes & 40 grubbing hoes," and still another $1,426.35 for "axes, ploughs, etc." "Blacksmiths tools" from Philadelphian Nicodemus Lloyd and 120 medals from the silversmith Liberty Brown were also paid for with federal funds. In 1814, moreover, the Superintendent of Indian Trade John Mason informed then Secretary of War John Armstrong that "a considerable portion of Woolens can be bought at Cincinnatti on pretty good terms." As Mason's statement suggests, federal officials sought the best prices for their business. Once officials were satisfied with the specifics of procurement and shipment, the items traveled to the factory stores at Fort Wayne and Piqua in the Ohio Country and elsewhere throughout the heart of the continent, and the trade thereby supported U.S. manufacturers but also those engaged in occupations such as shipbuilding, road-building, and transport. The expansion of markets in Indian Country had far-reaching and often profitable economic consequences.  

Once procured, Native nations and individuals purchased and received trade goods with their annuity funds. In 1802, Wyandots, Delawares, Shawnees, Ottawas, Chippewas, and Potawatomies obtained $1,000 per nation in the form of "Thirty Rifles, Thirty pounds of Powder, sixty pounds of Lead, one hundred small corn Hoes, and sixty small axes." Eel River Indians, Wyandots, Weas, Kickapoos, Piankashaws, and Kaskaskias received similar items but in proportion to their number such that each nation received $500 worth of goods. Offering such goods as Indian annuities translated rhetorical support of urban manufacturing into real federal financial backing: the purchase of goods aided manufacturers in the short term, while the potential to expand markets in Indian Country offered hopes for a new consumer base that included both Indians and, with regional peace, migrating Euroamerican settlers. The United States thus compensated Native peoples for their lands with annuities, but then used those annuities to invest in its own economy.

Because the wares possessed the power to transform U.S. officials' economic aspirations into reality, their quality mattered. When John Johnston complained that some wares were defective, Superintendent Mason therefore informed him that "The Rifles you complain of were made in Philad....I request you will continue to make your observations on the goods sent, to forward samples, to describe the articles best suiting Indian Trade out of this much good will grow & every attention shall be paid in the soliciting." The stores' accounts thus reveal the simultaneously diffuse and centralized power necessary

Whelen, June 5, 1802 M15, roll 1, 222-223. Tench Coxe, the first to procure goods for the U.S. Indian trade, set the model for later superintendents. His ideological support of the intertwining of U.S. agricultural and manufacturing sectors thus translated into policy. See Jacob E. Cooke, *Tench Coxe and the Early Republic* (Chapel Hill, 1978).
for the maintenance of the mission complex as well as the extent to which Native nations' consumerism influenced the development of the U.S. economy.\textsuperscript{254}

Between 1807 and 1811, the factory store at Fort Wayne made a profit of $10,502.77—a pittance in terms of the national GDP but a large sum in Indian Country nonetheless. The decreased military activity in Indian Country, in part the result of Friends', Indian agents', and Natives' diplomacy in the region, combined with these profits and the expanding reach of U.S. markets to render the factory system and missionaries' efforts worthwhile, co-constitutive investments. In 1806, moreover, the factory's accounts reveal that more than one-third of the debts owed the store—$1,203.00—belonged to Native American individuals. The stores therefore not only encouraged Native people to participate in the U.S. economy, but they also welcomed them—along with the Euroamericans who owned the remaining two-thirds of the debt—into a cycle of credit and debt. Though the factory system stores' success was inconsistent, and "factory" stores ceased to exist after 1822, government-run stores and Indian agencies remained central to Indian policy throughout the nineteenth century, and their connection with officials' desire both to expand the U.S. economy and undermine private and foreign traders aligned with broader U.S. policy.\textsuperscript{255}

Just as popular notions of the national defense supported both the development of the U.S. standing army and tariffs on domestic military manufactures, similar concerns

\textsuperscript{254} Henry Dearborn to Israel Whelen, 4 March 1802, M15, roll 1, 177; John Mason to John Johnston, Jan. 3, 1808, M16, roll 1, 196.

\textsuperscript{255} Griswold, ed. \textit{Fort Wayne, Gateway to the West}, 405-663. Andrew Fagal similarly asserts that the early national arms trade was, in part, a push for government revenue that simultaneously undercut foreign traders. See Andrew J. B. Fagal, "American Arms Manufacturing and the Onset of the War of 1812," \textit{The New England Quarterly} 87 (Sept., 2014): 526-537.
about the virtue and industry of the nation's republican citizenry rendered any state-directed commerce required to "civilize" Native Americans commensurate with notions of the nation's benevolence. In many Americans' political imaginations, Indian factories and annuities likely were connected with the "Indian problem" and notions of U.S. benevolence—not to federal economic policy. Because of this, neither Federalists nor Democratic-Republicans bemoaned—or explicitly recognized—the expansion of the mission complex in the Ohio Country, and Indian policy changed little as a result of the "Revolution of 1800."  

So subtle—from the perspective of the average U.S. citizen—was the cost-efficient development of the U.S. imperialist mission complex in the Ohio Country, that it facilitated the transformation of the region's political and economic order with little fanfare. Most contemporaries—and many historians—saw the 1795 Treaty of Greenville as the death knell for Native sovereign power in the region, but only because "peaceful," economic imperialism was less obvious—if no less violent for its social, economic, and political consequences—than war. Together civilizing policies, market expansion, and federal investment in Indian Country transformed Ohio Country inhabitants' ways of life. They also, however, enabled indigenous peoples to continue to shape the diffuse state's policies, the U.S. economy, and American imperialism.

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The mission complex accelerated the incorporation of indigenous peoples into the U.S. market economy and offered them additional power as consumers in the early republic—even as it encouraged Native peoples’ disengagement with other Atlantic markets. Shawnees, Miamis, and their neighbors, however, continued to make daily decisions based upon their needs and desires as well as upon the opportunities at their disposal. U.S. policies constrained these opportunities, but they did not eliminate them. Indeed, the labor relations that accompanied the mission complex rendered Shawnees and their neighbors key creators, links in, and manipulators of the U.S. economy, and this continued even during the volatile years of the War of 1812. Because the War Department partially funded the civilization project by allocating annuity funds toward agricultural tools and missionary labor, in essence Native nations paid Friends and government officials to clear their fields, build mills, plant corn, fence lands, and build the roads that connected their crops with Euroamerican markets. Shawnees, Wyandots, and their neighbors therefore found ways to take advantage of the United States’ commodification of their lands: they adopted the practices undertaken by missionaries and the federal state, blended those with their own ideas of economy, and used Euroamerican labor and resources, purchased with their annuities, to invest in their lands. They ultimately, then, helped shape the expansion of the U.S. market economy in the nineteenth-century Ohio Country before, during, and after the United States' war with Great Britain. Even more broadly, they continued to act as active participants, affected by the same squabbles, opportunities, and obstacles as their Euroamerican counterparts, in the politics and economy of North America.
The economies of the Miamis, Shawnees, and their neighbors prior to U.S. mission work were subsistence based and built upon a foundation of agricultural production, hunting, and international trading networks. In addition to trading with indigenous polities, the Miamis, for example, cultivated especially close relationships with French traders, while the Shawnees historically traded with both the British and French. From the seventeenth through nineteenth centuries, fur-trading partnerships, in particular, often blossomed as a result of intermarriage and the subsequent establishment of kinship ties by Euroamerican men and indigenous women. For some Ohio Country Indians, relationships with Quaker missionaries became an additional means by which their networks produced economic advantage. The mission complex in Indian Country thus enabled Native peoples to continue to employ Euroamericans and their policies for their own purposes, albeit in new ways, even as it fostered economic change.\textsuperscript{257}

Indeed, for some Shawnees and Miamis, Friends' primary value was not in their instruction but in their ability to produce crops. In 1808, for example, when the Miami chief White Loon complained to Friend Elisha Tyson that some Quakers and government officials were being dishonest, he contended that they worked their own fields for profit and that the corn "was all gone" when his "people went down to receive it." Upon Tyson's inspection of the mission, White Loon proclaimed, "You expected to find your young

\textsuperscript{257} For more on Ohio Indians' economies, see Stephen Warren, \textit{The Shawnees and Their Neighbors, 1795-1870} (Campaign, IL, 2008); Hinderaker, \textit{Elusive Empires}. For kinship, marriage, and trade see Susan Sleeper-Smith, \textit{Indian Women and French Men: Rethinking Cultural Encounter in the Western Great Lakes} (Amherst, MA, 2001). The Miami leader Jean Baptiste Richardville, for example, was the son of a Frenchman and a prominent Miami woman, and he used his connections with both the French and Miamis (and government agents) to cultivate wealth and political power during the early nineteenth century. See Bradley J. Birzer, "Entangling Empires, Fracturing Frontiers: Jean Baptiste Richardville and the Quest for Miami Autonomy, 1760-1841" (Ph.D. Diss., Indiana University, 1998).
men working in our fields; instead of which you found them working in a field by
themselves, we would like it much better if they would work in our fields." If Friends’
efforts “taught” Native Americans anything, it was how to hire, deploy, and manage
Euroamerican workers with both cash and their federal annuities.258

With missionaries and Euroamericans providing them with the agricultural
infrastructure, labor, and goods that produced crops and further connected their lands
with diverse markets, some individuals and communities sought to reap the benefits of a
diversified, increasingly global economy while remaining on their lands. As a result, a
myriad of competing political opinions regarding the extent to which individuals should
engage with the Euroamerican economy developed. Indeed, just as one scholar deems the
War of 1812, a "civil war" among Americans and British, so too were there divisions
among the inhabitants of Indian Country.259 In a report concerning Tecumseh's visit to
the Shawnees at Wapakoneta in 1810, for example, Indian agent John Johnston informed
Governor Harrison that the Shawnee leader "made no impression on the [Wapakoneta]
Shawanese, and went away much dissatisfied at their not coming into his views."
Johnston went on to say that he “indirectly encouraged their emigration westward, and
told them that their annuity should follow them. They appear determined to remain, and
are much attached to the town and the improvements, which are considerable." One
should analyze such statements with care, but given that the Shawnees' appreciation of
the town's "improvements" opposed Johnston's stated desire to push them west, and that

258 BYMIC minutes, "The address of the Committee of the Yearly meeting of Baltimore dated
19th of the third month 1808..." included in the minutes, Vol. I, 3 mo 19 1808, 180-189.
259 For the "civil war of 1812" see Alan Taylor, The Civil War of 1812: American Citizens, British
Subjects, Irish Rebels, & Indian Allies (New York: Knopf Doubleday, 2010).
they also refused to join Tecumseh's war against the United States in 1812, it appears that the Shawnees at Wapakoneta not only wished to remain on their lands, but valued the results of Friends' labor. In part then, political divides between so-called "accommodationists" and "nativists" during this period were, just as among U.S. citizens, political debates produced by a changing economic world.260

Tensions among regional Indian leaders were on full display at an 1809 treaty between Indiana Territory Governor William Henry Harrison and the region's Miamis, Delawares, and Potawatomies. The United States endeavored to buy a tract of land inhabited by the Weas on the Wabash, and Harrison promised the Potawatomies a share of the proceeds if the Miamis agreed to sell. The Potawatomies consequently pressured the Miamis to give up the lands in exchange for annuity payments, and, though Little Turtle expressed interest in selling, the Mississinewa Miamis refused. By this time, the Miami Little Turtle's influence was on the wane while that of Jean Baptiste Richardville, chief at the Mississinewa villages, was ascendant. Richardville did not attend the treaty, but rather sent words of support for a treaty agreement, a move that suggests that he

anticipated complications would arise that would potentially harm his own trading business relations with the British, Americans, or both. Both Richardville and Little Turtle supported a Miami political future based upon private property and wealth acquisition and also one situated in Indiana along the Wabash. Little Turtle, however, supported selling the Weas' lands in return for increased annuity payments, but the Mississinewa chiefs told Harrison that "you know when things are scarce they are dear, you know the price of lands. We are willing to sell you some for the price that it sells for amongst yourselves." The Mississinewas ultimately suggested that they would "sell their lands by the acre & that they should receive two Dollars for it." Though Harrison refused the latter offer and Miamis ultimately agreed to accept annuities, the Mississinewas' proposal nonetheless reflects the reality that some Native peoples wished to negotiate as inhabitants of Euroamericans' economic world while others, like Little Turtle, were content to accept annuity payments.

Just as Miamis, Shawnees, Delawares, and Stockbridges debated their economic and political futures, Euroamericans debated their own. In Philadelphia, the issues of profit and economic disparity intersected with the politics of embargo in 1813 during the height of the war with Great Britain. One citizen, William Groves, informed a friend that five hundred of the city's residents met in the city's Northern Liberties section to declare their abstinence from sugar, tea, and coffee. Brown sugar cost residents thirty-two cents, coffee, forty he complained—a good ten to fifteen cents above the standard price. All, he explained, was the result of "Acompany of speculators to sett the People Agane the war."

261 JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS at the Indian Treaty at Fort Wayne and Vincennes September 1 to October 27, 1809, in Esarey, Messages and Letters, 362-378, see especially 370-371.
Speculators' profits, gathered to push people against war with Britain, would not prove sufficient for men like Groves since he claimed that "the war party has Gott stronge by it for they See that the Big fish will eat them." Profit, speculation, consumerism, and war intertwined in Philadelphia and both reinforced and created political divisions: political debate often was cast in terms of economy and vice versa. And the same was true in Indian Country.\(^{262}\)

Natives’ political debate also centered around the question of how closely to ally with the Americans. Indeed, some Ohio Indian Nations attacked the United States before war with Britain broke out in 1812. The Shawnee brothers Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa endeavored to rally together a pan-Indian coalition of forces in an effort to halt Americans’ territorial encroachments in the region. The Shawnees at Wapakoneta chose not to participate in the attacks as did many others, particularly Delawares in the region, but some Ohio Indians did join the effort. The Shawnee Prophet Tenskwatawa established Prophetstown as a base from which allied Indians launched attacks between 1809 and 1812. William Henry Harrison, former territorial governor of Indiana and new leader of the U.S. army, attacked the town during the Battle of Tippecanoe in 1811, dealing Tenskwatawa and his allies a severe blow. Shortly after the United States’ victory there, regional Indian leaders who tended to ally themselves with Americans, gained the political upper hand among their people.\(^{263}\)

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\(^{262}\) 1813 December 21. William Groves ALS to William Carner; Philadelphia, [Pennsylvania], War of 1812 collection, William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI.

\(^{263}\) On Shawnees’ political efforts during the years surrounding the War of 1812 see R. David Edmunds, *The Shawnee Prophet* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1983); Patrick Bottiger, "Prophetstown for Their Own Purposes: The French, Miamis, and Cultural Identities in the Wabash-Maumee Valley," *Journal of the Early Republic*, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Spring, 2013);
Politics remained largely divided, however, among Ohio Indians. The situation continued to deteriorate with the United States’ formal declaration of war against Great Britain in June 1812. That summer proved a tumultuous one: the Miami leader Little Turtle died, and the United States suffered a number of blows early on. The United States evacuated Fort Dearborn at present-day Chicago, and William Wells, former Indian agent among Ohio Indians, was killed during the evacuation. Fort Wayne endured a siege, though its factory buildings burned, and some forces, including some Miamis, attacked Fort Harrison that first year as well. For the most part, however, Miamis endeavored to remain neutral in the conflict. Nonetheless, the U.S. army attacked numerous Miami villages near the Wabash. Harrison’s army attacked Little Turtle’s Village as well as three others near the Forks of the Wabash. In December, Lieutenant Colonel John B. Campbell attacked the Mississinewa villages, though he received orders to avoid harming prominent leaders such as Richardville, White Loon, and Pacanne who were open to working with the Americans.264

The war continued into 1814. Tecumseh died at the 1813 Battle of the Thames, and, finally, in July 1814, most regional Native nations treated for peace with the Americans. The peace gave Americans the upper hand, and diminished Britain’s ability to pose a significant threat in the region. Though Native peoples’ politics shifted after the war, they were left by no means powerless.

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Indeed, even during the years of conflict, individuals as well as groups found ways to benefit from the situation as best they could. Native peoples' connections with War Department officials and missionaries expanded their ability to take advantage of a variety of money-making opportunities in the region during the war. Like civilizing mission work itself, war with Britain provided an impetus for federally mobilized labor, and it stimulated the U.S. economy by requiring the increased production of wares, the shipment of manufactures, and the building of infrastructure. In short, it made available new economic possibilities for war-torn regions' inhabitants, even as it produced death and destruction in its wake. Thanks to the economic ties wound tighter by civilizing mission work, Miamis, Shawnees, and others too participated in the regional wartime economy.

During the war, the U.S. Army Quartermaster paid Ohio Wyandots forty-eight dollars for 1,200 pounds of beaver, it offered the Seneca Tommy Smith forty-eight dollars for "one grindstone, one drawing knife and one Chissel for helving & repairing axes," and it paid the Shawnee Chief Captain Lewis sixty dollars for "One Horse pressed into the public service." Some individuals thus combined their existing economies with the emerging trend toward work-for-hire labor, while others provided a good or service for individual profit. Emerging American economic practices traveled to Indian Country, and there combined with Native nations' understanding of economic relations to create an economic system that was marked, increasingly, by developing ideas of investment and production.\(^\text{265}\) Individuals like Tommy Smith, Captain Lewis and others who provided

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\(^{265}\) United States DS to The Wyandots of Solomons Town, [Ohio]; Quarter Master’s Department, North-Western Army, ca. 1812, War of 1812 Collection, Box 2, William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan; B.F. Stickney ALS, ADS to Jacob Fowler; McPherson’s Block House,
The War of 1812 thus created economic opportunities, but it also disrupted life in the region in profound ways. Baltimore Friends' mission work stalled during the years of the war, but John Johnston remained in the region. He retired from his post at Fort Wayne at the start of the war, but after removing to Piqua, Ohio, he nonetheless continued to serve the United States. The War Department, hoping to keep a man who maintained good relations with the region's Indian nations in its employ, opened an agency at his home. Delawares who desired to remain neutral in the conflict sought the assistance of agent John Johnston to do so, and the Indian agent hosted many of them—to the chagrin of his Euroamerican Piqua neighbors—at his farmstead at Piqua during the height of the war. Acting on instructions from General William Henry Harrison, Johnston sold clothing, among other goods, and he reported in 1813 that such offerings would "take all that remains on hand." When wartime rendered Delawares wanting, their relationship


266 Goods or services needed by the U.S. War Department and the war effort could translate into profit for many throughout eastern North America—particularly because of the ongoing trade embargo with Great Britain. Josiah Paine of Maine, for example, earned $250 in 1812 "to send an express to Passamaquoddy" despite the fact that the Secretary of War declared the charge to be high. Manufacturer Nathaniel Cushing of Charleston likewise profited from the war effort by securing a contract to produce anchors for the U.S. Navy in 1813, while James Rees of Geneva [NY?] earned $135 for "the use of my farm and lot on which the public stables are built in Geneva and for the hire of my black man." As Rees's case shows, the economics of war were inclusive: slave labor supported the war as did waged labor. The similarities in Indians' and Euroamericans' economic engagement during war with Britain, reveals that the wartime economy further developed the connections between Indian Country and the United States. 1812 September 28. Henry Dearborn LS to Jacob Eustis; Head quarters, Greenbush. (1 page) War of 1812 collection, William L. Clements Library, box 2. 1813 July 27. Amos Binney DS to Nathaniel Cushing, War of 1812 collection, William L. Clements Library, box 3; 1815, 4 Documents. (4 pages), War of 1812 collection, William L. Clements Library, box 4.
with Johnston enabled them to maintain their politics either in support of the war or of neutrality. Delawares' stay at Johnston's Piqua farm reveals not that they were "accommodationists" who sought either to support the United States or remain neutral but, rather, that they supported a policy of alliance with the United States and its representatives—whether missionary or Indian agent. Such an alliance, they determined, offered the best prospects for the future but also for their endurance during the war.

In a myriad of ways, then, members of the Ohio Country Indian nations continued to create, adapt to, and manipulate a dynamic economic world. The later history of the Friends' mission at Dennis's Station, however, illuminates the contentious trajectory of Natives' and federal power as well as U.S. economic development. Neighboring settlers destroyed most of the original mission infrastructure at the start of the War of 1812, and such actions suggest that they viewed the site as an economic and political threat. Native nations possessed the power to take advantage of the mission complex, but that power could also make them visible targets of an ambitious empire—an empire that profited from economic growth in Indian Country.

Though Native peoples' manipulation of the mission complex threatened Americans' dreams of an empire whose economic heart lay in Ohio Country fields, it also bolstered U.S. claims to Indians' economic dependence. Though this dependence was mainly rhetorical, U.S. officials nonetheless used the notion to promote, in turn, fictional ideas of Native nations' political dependence. Much of Indiana Territory Governor William Henry Harrison's correspondence dealt with the problems of Indian affairs, and it reveals the extent to which Native nations continued to wield power in the Ohio Country.

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267 Johnston to Genl. John Mason (Supt. of Indian Trade), Jany. 4, 1813, National Archives, T58.
Despite this reality, the governor informed his territorial legislature in 1805 that the region's benevolent Indian policies had secured Native nations' "entire dependence." Recognizing his territory's incredible potential and emphasizing peace, he continued to remark that, "the mighty river which separates us from the Louisianians will never be stained with the blood of contending nations; but will prove the bond of our nation, and will convey upon its bosom, in a course of many thousand miles, the produce of our great and united empire." Indian affairs, statehood, and economic production were linked in Harrison's mind, and the mission complex offered evidence of "dependence;" it offered a veneer of legitimacy to U.S. political claims in Indian Country.²⁶⁸

For Harrison, Natives' "entire dependence" led to increased land sales, "settlement and improvement," "produce," tax revenues, and economic stability. The mission complex was thus crucial because it aided in the distribution of farm implements, gave the federal government hope that those tools would, in fact, find use among Native populations, and offered officials like Governor Harrison evidence of Native economic and, in turn, political "dependence." Such "evidence" would, officials hoped, encourage the settlement of the "right sort" of people and, in turn, boost land sales and increase revenues. These points were crucial in the maintenance of the civilization project in the Ohio Country, and they explain why, despite the limited success of the explicit goal of complete assimilation, it endured and shaped U.S.-Indian—and, ultimately, foreign—policy throughout the nineteenth century and beyond.

²⁶⁸ William Henry Harrison to the General Assembly, Jul. 29, 1805, Esarey, Messages and Letters, 152-158.
When one travels through Wapakoneta, Upper Sandusky, and Lewistown, Ohio as well as Fort Wayne and Huntington, Indiana—all central locations of missions and Indian trading posts—the remnants of old railroads and canals still remain, many of which were built not long after Quakers and Native peoples helped build the mission complex and the U.S. imperial market economy. These remains reveal, however, that the layered development of the U.S. economy—but also American imperialism—was both a "top down" and "bottom up" affair. As such, tracing the federal state's power in building a mission complex reveals that Friends’ missions and the "civilization plan" not simply as tools for “assimilating the Indians,” but rather were crucial means by which the U.S. state consolidated its power and spread its economic influence in the early nineteenth century. At the same time, Friends’ mission work and the relationships that grew between Indians and officials as a result of federal Indian policies likewise offered ways by which Native peoples could make a living during the War of 1812, and they enabled Indians to use missionary labor to their advantage. Such trends continued even after the war. Indeed, Indian peoples employed and manipulated Euroamericans' ideas of "civilization" and economy for their own purposes beyond the War of 1812 in ways that had lasting consequences.269

269 Amy Kaplan's "anarchy of empire" combined with Ann Stoler and Catherine Hall's work on reciprocal power relations between colonizers and colonized facilitate this consideration of the ways in which indigenous peoples helped create the American empire. Amy Kaplan, The Anarchy of Empire in the Making of U.S. Culture (Cambridge, 2002); Ann Laura Stoler, Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power (Berkeley, 2002); Ann Laura Stoler, ed., Haunted by Empire: Geographies of Intimacy in North American History (Durham, 2006); Catherine Hall, Civilising Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the English Imagination, 1830-1867 (Chicago, 2002). Notable models for incorporating indigenous peoples into the broader narrative of U.S. history in the nineteenth century include Jeffrey Ostler, The Plains Sioux and U.S. Colonialism from Lewis and
Chapter 5
“A Damnd Rebelious Race”: Native Authority in the Aftermath of War

*These Miamies Genl are a damnd rebelious race and I believe it true what Lauountain tells me that Richardville caries the Key and nothing can be done without his assent*

—Hugh B. McKeen, 1826

When peace returned to the towns and fields of Ohio and Indiana in 1816, the economic and political changes underway in the region continued apace. For some, the year ushered in cause for celebration: the Euroamerican inhabitants of Indiana Territory found themselves citizens of the United States endowed with all of the political rights and privileges (if they were male) that accompanied statehood. Indiana's Indian peoples, meanwhile, continued to cultivate and dwell upon their lands much as they had prior to the state's incorporation into the official limits of the metropole. Statehood meant, however, that Indiana—and Ohio as well—boasted a robust population. And both states were growing. Surges in population continued after statehood, and it encouraged the ongoing development of interstate infrastructure that facilitated immigrants' movement and employment. In the ongoing struggle to give order to the chaos of U.S. immigration to the region, additional non-government agencies materialized to address the problems of labor and economy that accompanied U.S. colonialism.

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In 1817, for example, Nathan Guilford, Ethan Stone, and Daniel Roe organized the Western Emigration Society in order to facilitate American movement into this "Western Country," newly free from British occupation. They declared Cincinnati "the most proper place for such a Society" because of its size, "local situation," and the fact that it operated as "a thorough-fare through which much of the migrating population passes." By the time of the society's founding, Cincinnati contained a much larger population than either the more northern expanses of the state or its neighbor to the west, Indiana. One inhabitant estimated that the city boasted "about 9,000 inhabitants, 15 lawyers, not the most eminent, 20 physicians" and that "the number of emigrants that are daily arriving are immense." The emigration society eased the "great uncertainty and embarrassment" in "not knowing where to seek employment, where to apply for information," or knowing "where they can find a situation best suited to their circumstances." The society thus functioned as a matchmaker in the business of employment, receiving applications from "persons wanting to employ Mechanics, Tradesmen, Labourers, &cs.," as well as from "persons wishing for employment of any kind," and it connected them with employers seeking to bolster their fortunes through hired labor. These connections proved essential to the practical functioning of everyday life in the nineteenth-century Ohio Country, and by the 1820s, the practical

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271 May 20, 1817, Western Emigration Society Papers, VFM 519, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, Ohio.
272 Samuel Todd, Post-Script in Nathan Guilford to William Avril, Western Emigration Society Papers, VFM, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, Ohio.
273 Ibid.
274 May 20, 1817, Western Emigration Society Papers.
problems of making ends meet shaped the lives of Euroamericans and Native peoples alike.

Native nations and individuals used their market and government connections to earn a wage and assert authority during the War of 1812, and they continued to do so through the 1820s and 1830s. The mission complex established a space within which indigenous peoples could still, even after statehood, navigate and confront U.S. imperial power. The discourse of civilization offered them a language—mutually intelligible to Native peoples and U.S. citizens and officials—to demand goods and labor and to complain when such things failed to materialize. Miamis, Shawnees, and their neighbors, accustomed to dealing with U.S. officials and their missionary partners, thus manipulated the tools and language of "civilization," and they employed a variety of strategies that ensured that they continued to possess and wield authority in the region despite the increasing pressures of U.S. settler colonialism.

Many who remained in Ohio and Indiana after the war became neighbors, employees, and employers in a region that boasted a growing Euroamerican population. Some used their connections with Euroamericans to make claims upon the U.S. state and individuals, others employed the discourse of civilization to secure both material goods and bolster their political agendas, while others contemplated the advantages of participating in nation-building projects in places as far flung as Missouri. Such strategies illuminate the ways in which Shawnees, Miamis, and others found ways to remain connected to their lands and, when that appeared impossible, their people. While many scholars view the War of 1812 as the death knell of indigenous authority in the "old Northwest," attention both to the strategies that emerged as a result of the mission
complex and to indigenous peoples' roles in developing and participating in the dynamic Ohio Country economy after statehood reveals that their authority endured.

Such efforts did not come, however, without a price. Indians' claims making bolstered the U.S. federal state apparatus, and it linked them ever closer with the legal and bureaucratic policies of the United States. What was more, when Native peoples dared deviate from U.S. officials' ideas of "proper" Indian behavior—when they actually succeeded in adapting and adopting the ways of the American Empire—they fueled calls for their removal. As chapter six demonstrates, by appropriating U.S. Indian policies for their own purposes, some indigenous peoples forced Americans to grapple with the contradictions that lay at the heart of their civilization schemes. Ideas of race, class, and difference increasingly rose to the fore of discourse as, ironically, the differences between Euroamericans and many Native peoples eroded.

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After the War of 1812 concluded, the Shawnees and their neighbors in the region endeavored to take advantage of missionary and federal labors. Leaders like Captain Lewis at Lewis Town and Black Hoof at Wapakoneta maintained relationships with Friends in order to secure material advantages, organize their own labor force, and cultivate closer political relationships with U.S. officials. Despite their expertise in the arts of agriculture, they requested and accepted Friends' assistance and instruction in cultivating crops. Though sources indicate that Wapakoneta's inhabitants remained on relatively stable footing following the War of 1812, the Shawnees claimed strategically that "the war swept away every thing from us, and plunged us in the same situation, or
near the same, notwithstanding the United States have been very charitable to us, as well as our good friend John Johnson." The Shawnees at Wapakoneta suffered losses during the late war, but nothing like what Miamis suffered, for example, along the Wabash. Indeed, when Friends visited Wapakoneta in 1816, they noted that several hundred acres of corn and other infrastructure remained intact. Black Hoof and his people nonetheless endeavored to take advantage of the benefits Friends offered, rejoicing at the "prospect of the same help that we received from our friends the Quakers before the war." As political allies who had historically advocated for Shawnees, Friends offered the means to facilitate Shawnees' own economic development projects. In maintaining and cultivating their connections with missionaries, Shawnees, Miamis, and their neighbors engaged a strategy that drew upon older paradigms of Native-Euroamerican interaction and offered opportunities for indigenous peoples' success in a region undergoing increasingly rapid economic development.

For their part, the Baltimore Friends wasted no time in traveling to Ohio and Indiana to assess the condition of the region's Indian peoples. Their report to the Secretary of War William H. Crawford stressed that the Shawnees required further instruction from Friends to complete their transformation into civilized peoples. Writing to the secretary from Baltimore in August 1816, James Ellicott and Philip E. Thomas informed him that they had recently traveled among the Shawnees at Lewis Town and

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276 Ibid.
277 James Ellicott and Philip E. Thomas, August 1, 1816, Report on feasibility of introducing farming and other civilising activities among the Indians at Waupagkonnetta and Lewis Town by the Society of Friends at Baltimore (from NARA RG 107, Secretary of War, Letters Received), Shawnee File, Box # 8027, Folder 1 of 1 (1816), Ethnohistory Collection, IU.
Wapakoneta and found both Shawnees and Wyandots in Ohio "anxiously disposed to obtain instructions relative to the cultivation of their lands." In a population of 800 at Wapakoneta, for example, the Shawnees had "400 acres of ground enclosed by tolerable good fences, 250 acres being planted in Indian corn." They cultivated that land "principally with hoes," however, because they had only two ploughs. That lack encouraged Ellicott and Thomas to reiterate that the Shawnees and Wyandots yet required instruction—the use of hoes seemingly indicated their continued ignorance of agricultural techniques. The Friends had successfully overcome the Shawnees' "general indisposition" to work, "which prevailed...when the Society of Friends first embarked in this concern," and they were pleased that "the principal obstacles which retarded our successes are in a great measure removed" thanks to the mission foundation laid by Friends before the war. If they obtained their projected budget for work among the Indians ($4,720), Ellicott and Thomas concluded, the Friends could alleviate "[t]he situation of these Indians," which was "peculiarly calculated to awaken the commiseration and excite the benevolence of all who feel for the sufferings of their fellow men." The Friends' report to the War Department reflected a strategic blindness to Shawnees' economic ingenuity and success as agriculturalists: they either could not see the Shawnees as proficient or they weighted their record to reflect their own agenda.

278 Ibid. Friends reported a similar situation at Sears' Town. Wyandots near Upper Sandusky, meanwhile, received annuities from the government and were reportedly anxious "to receive instruction in their farming business."

279 Ibid.

280 Ibid.

281 Ibid.

Whatever the case, Friends' partnership with the War Department established a foundation for missionary-government cooperation on the continent and abroad. As earlier chapters demonstrated, the War Department relied on Friends as correspondents prior to the War of 1812 in part because their funds and organizational strengths made them efficient and useful partners. After the United States settled the dispute with Great Britain, the War Department gradually incorporated other societies into its cadre of philanthropic partnerships, particularly the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM), established in 1810. Increased religious fervor and immigration to the region after the conclusion of the war fueled multi-denominational, federally funded mission work that modeled Friends' labor-intensive civilizing mission work.

When the Civilization Act of 1819 passed—guaranteeing $10,000 annual support for missionary projects—it codified twenty years of partnership between Friends and the federal government. Drawing on the example offered by Friends' cooperation with the state, it opened opportunities for a larger variety of voluntary and religious societies to participate in the civilizing project. With the passage of the act, the federal government

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wrote into law its determination to transform non-citizens into potentially assimilable, culturally homogenous co-inhabitants of North America. Individuals and societies received the funds for building construction and the running of schools and institutions of learning for Native peoples, and the monies were contingent upon schools’ success. Unlike Baltimore Friends’ efforts, many of those schools included literacy education, though manual and agricultural labor remained a centerpiece as well. The government also expected those employed by funded institutions to “impress on the minds of the Indians, the friendly and benevolent views of the government towards them.” In addition to bureaucratizing the missionaries' relations to the state, the act institutionalized the United States’ economic and imperial ambitions.

The U.S. imperial market economy encouraged missionaries to conceive of and brand their mission endeavors in a manner tailored to ideas of development, "improvement," and profit. In the early 1820s, Baptist missionary Isaac McCoy centered his mission work at a school that offered reading and writing instruction, and ensured that males were "instructed in agriculture, and Mechanic Arts," and "the Females in Spinning, Weaving, Knitting, Sewing &c." Missionaries in the field, most notably Friends, Moravians, and Jesuits during the preceding centuries, usually wrote to their home

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285 Students at a school in Cornwall, CT, for example, spent two and a half days laboring the “school’s agricultural property.” See John Demos, *The Heathen School: A Story of Hope and Betrayal in the Age of the Early Republic* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 72.
286 February 29, 1820, regulations for the civilization of the Indians, Department of War. NARA M15, 379.
288 McCoy, Isaac to J.C. Calhoun, Fort Wayne, October 1, 1821, Secretary of War, Letters Received, M-145 (15), RG 107, NARA in Shawnee File, Box #8029, folder 1 of 1 (1821), Ethnohistory Collection, Glenn A. Black Laboratory of Archaeology, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana.
congregations with news of their feats of conversion among the "heathens" in efforts to solicit funds for future work. McCoy and Friends, on the other hand, wrote not of religious triumph over savagery, but of economic development, and they solicited funds from the United States government. In an effort to obtain federal support for his mission, McCoy informed Secretary of War John C. Calhoun in 1821 that "[o]ur prospects in relation to those several tribes (the Scattering Mohigans Accepted) are truly inviting. And we trust that the patronage of the Government, And the liberality of the public, will render our funds adequate to the undertaking: I therefore humbly solicit a share of the 10,000 Dollars appropriated by Government for Indian reform." To bolster his argument for funding, he detailed both the immense labor required for his mission work as well as ample evidence of his mission's economic contributions. He explained that "[b]eside the Superintendent & the Directress, there are belonging to the Establishment. A School Teacher, An Agent to procure Supplies of provision &c- And four labouring men. two assistent females. and a labouring woman." McCoy then wrote that "[w]e have cultivated this season 35 Acres of Land, 100 have 8 spinning wheels and a Loom-- The property belonging to the Mission consists of Land improvements, Horses, Cattle, Hogs, farming utensils, Houshold furniture. &c—and estimated at 1,800 Dollars." Thus, while his evangelical work still mattered, McCoy recognized that a successful appeal for federal monies depended upon the extent to which he could make a case for his essential role in economic progression. The prospect of receiving U.S. federal funds encouraged him and other missionaries to offer a certain type of missionary work and reporting.

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289 Ibid.
290 Ibid.
Meanwhile, Native peoples continued to engage the imperial market as consumers, employers, and manipulators. Just as they had with Baltimore Friends before the war, the Ohio Country's Indian peoples capitalized on the economic opportunities that the new missions engendered. McCoy's report to the federal government, for example, confirmed that Shawnees and their neighbors remained the beneficiaries of missionaries’ labor. Moreover, as Euroamerican population numbers increased, Indian leaders increasingly took advantage of that growth when they could by hiring immigrant men on their lands. They incrementally embraced the Euroamerican economic model, and they exploited their role in the U.S. economy to assert their own political authority and independence.

In 1820, for example, a group of Shawnees and Delawares who migrated from Ohio informed President James Monroe that since "our Tools will need frequent repair, and our Horses Shod, we ask if you are willing to give us a Black-Smith for five years only, to mend our ploughs &c. during that time, some of our Young Men, will learn with him to do it for us." The stipulation that the blacksmith should stay for "five years only" suggested that the Shawnees and Delawares desired to extract knowledge and labor from the hired man but did not wish to tolerate an open-ended engagement with the American. Instead, they maintained a preference for reciprocal, gift-based relationships that strengthened political ties between nations, even as they asserted themselves as employers with the power to re-hire or dismiss contracted labor at the end of a specified period.

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291 September 16, 1820, Shawnee and Delaware Indians, Talk to the President of the United States, Principal Town on Apple Creek, State of Missouri, RG 107, M-92 (14), NARA in Delaware File, Box # 1524 (1820-1827), folder 1 of 2 (July 1820-1821), Ethnohistory Collection, Glenn A. Black Laboratory of Archaeology, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN.
period of work.292 The Shawnees and Delawares integrated Euroamerican ideas of
apprenticeship, hired labor, and contract, but, as they built their own economic
infrastructure, they asserted their relative autonomy, created and reinforced their political
connections to the United States as contracting nations.

The Shawnees embraced and manipulated commercial market relations, but they
also combined the concepts of debt and market exchange with those of older, trade-based
forms of exchange with which they were familiar. According to George Johnston's 1829
promissory notebook (a collection of receipts that record Wapakoneta Shawnee's names,
debts, and the items they purchased), approximately 200 Wapakoneta Shawnee debtors
failed to pay off their loans, and a roughly equal number of receipts were torn out of the
notebook, signifying debts canceled (figure 5.1). Johnston's notebook thus provides
evidence of the Shawnees' participation in a cycle of credit and debit and in the larger
U.S. economy, just like the large number of Euroamerican debtors of the republic.293
Indeed, every needle and yard of cloth marked as sold signified the profits of merchants
and entrepreneurs elsewhere. Given that the Shawnees possessed a robust gift-exchange
tradition, they may have viewed the goods as gifts. What is certain, however, is that they
borrowed Johnston's money to secure items such as cloth, knives, bridles, and teakettles,
and they did so to the detriment of Johnston's finances. The ambiguities of the evidence

292 Though Joseph Hall's work on gift exchange centers on the sixteenth through eighteenth
centuries, it offers excellent analysis, applicable elsewhere in Indian Country (as demonstrated in
chapter two, for example), of the importance of gifts in cementing political relationships. See
Joseph M. Hall, Jr., Zamumo's Gifts: Indian-European Exchange in the Colonial Southeast (Early
293 John Johnston's Fort Wayne factory account books similarly reveal that Indians were
responsible for more than one-third of the debts owed the factory store in 1806. See Bert J.
Griswold, ed. Fort Wayne, Gateway to the West, 1802-1813 (Indianapolis, 1927), 405-663; see
page 458 for 1806 figure.
reveal the consequences of the intertwining of a variety of economic understandings. While President Jefferson and William Henry Harrison conspired to drive up Indians’ debts in an effort to facilitate land sales in the early nineteenth century, some Native peoples nonetheless found ways to take advantage of those schemes.²⁹⁴

Figure 5.1. George C. Johnston’s promissory book, Ohio History Center, Columbus, OH.

While most Shawnees obtained these goods in cash or future cash payments, some secured the wares or canceled their debts through barter. Such transactions included

Native women in the republic’s emerging economy, and they offer a means to expand historians’ understanding of women’s roles in the development of early American markets. “Turkey Feathers wife” (Figure 5.1) obtained goods at Johnson’s store, as did the Shawnee Mary DeShane who paid off part of her debt with "winter Deer Skins" in the "amount of fifty cents." The latter transaction offers a glimpse of the ways in which multiple economies collided with and became intelligible to one another in Wapakoneta. In this instance, DeShane exchanged skins, once the basis for trade in the region along with furs, for both a good and for a cancellation of standing debts. This system of market exchange shaped Ohio Country Indians' ideas of gift-giving and reciprocity, and it also produced a regional economy built through economic syncretism.295

Wapakoneta Shawnees welcomed Quakers to their town and accepted the agricultural infrastructure they offered, but their willingness to use Friends and other Americans like George Johnston for economic investment purposes suggested a kind of economic translation rather than assimilation. When Friend Isaac Harvey, then missionary at Wapakoneta, attended the funerary services of the aged Shawnee chief Black Hoof in 1831, he observed that the Shawnees intensely grieved the man's death, and that they marked their loss with food and ritual. He noted that "[t]wenty deer were killed, beside a large number of turkeys and what smaller wild animals they considered fit to eat—no tame animal or fowl was suffered to be eaten on that occasion, though there was a large quantity of bread prepared."296 Here is revealed Shawnees' selective appropriation of Euroamerican goods and practices and the complicated nature of their

295 Ibid.
296 Henry Harvey, History of the Shawnee Indians from the Year 1681 to 1854, Inclusive (Cincinnati: Ephraim Morgan & Sons, 1855), 187.
politics: "tame" or domesticated animals had no place in this ritual of death. In 1810 Wapakoneta Shawnees had turned Tecumseh away from their midst and refused to buy into Tenskwatawa's spiritual message of difference. In 1831, they maintained their acceptance of Euroamerican labor and infrastructure, but also revealed that they too valued their own cultural practices. Such episodes further demonstrate that cooperation with the U.S. government and its imperial agents was selective and politically and economically purposeful rather than mere "accommodation" of U.S. "expansion."  

Labor, trade, and cultural practices thus remained arenas within which indigenous peoples could exercise power. Indeed, the Shawnees and Delawares' request for a five-year contracted blacksmith demonstrates that Native peoples invested in their lands by taking advantage of Euroamerican labor, government money, and their annuity payments. At the same time, however, the War Department bolstered the local economy and facilitated settler colonialism by hiring men in need of work. Though the number of men hired to labor on Indian lands was relatively small, they were hired to perform the same tasks that Friends once handled. John Johnston wrote to William H. Crawford in 1816 that "labouring men is much wanted to instruct them [the Indians] in farming and to enable them to live on their own industry." He went on to request a budget of $2,000

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298 Johnston, John to William H. Crawford Piqua, October 22, 1816, Shawnee File, 1813-1816, Box #8027, Folder 1 of 1 (1816), Ethnohistory Collection, Glenn A. Black Laboratory of Archaeology, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN.
that included payment for the labor, sustenance, and tools of six men, two each for Shawnees, Wyandots, Delawares, and Senecas living near Johnston's Piqua agency.\textsuperscript{299} By 1829, the Miamis were due to receive the services of "10 Labourers" as part of the fulfillment of their annuity payment for that year.\textsuperscript{300} Those ten hired hands each received forty-five dollars and worked at either the "Miamie Villages" or they received their compensation for "[l]abour performed for [the] Thorntown party [of Miamis]."\textsuperscript{301} These workers may have thus supplemented their household subsistence economy with wages earned for work performed on behalf of the Miamis.\textsuperscript{302}

The relationship between market development and "civilization" established by the mission complex, then, endured after the War of 1812, and it broadened to draw upon the labors of missionaries and non-missionaries alike. U.S. immigration to the Ohio Country thus offered Native peoples and the War Department a growing labor force, even as it increased tensions between Euroamericans and their Native neighbors. That some migrants labored for Native peoples, moreover, reflects the contingencies of U.S. political and economic development: the mission complex, replete with its message of assimilation, offered both the possibility and the tools, labor, and infrastructure required

\textsuperscript{299} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{300} Miami and Eel River Indians, Receipt, Annuity Payment, August 24-December 23, 1829 (from N. Robertson and D. Ricker, ed., The John Tipton Papers, vol. 2, pp. 186-189), Miami file, 1829-1847, Box #5023, folder 1 of 1 (1829), Ethnohistory Collection, IU.
\textsuperscript{301} Tipton, John, Abstract of Payments for Labor at Miami Villages, 1829 (from N. Robertson and D. Ricker, ed., The John Tipton Papers, vol. 2, p. 238), Miami file, Box #5023, Folder 1 of 1 (1829), Ethnohistory Collection, IU. The "Thorntown" Miamis were Eel River Miamis who once lived on the Thorntown Reserve lands that were ceded to the United States in 1828.
\textsuperscript{302} While census data is inconclusive, the men who labored on Miami lands were likely from nearby lands and had recently moved there. 1820 U.S. Census; Census Place: Wayne, Indiana; Page 236; NARA Roll: M33_15; Image 135, accessed on Ancestry.com, June 28, 1815.
for indigenous peoples to remain in the region and become either masters of Ohio Valley farms or yeoman farmers themselves.

Indeed, while the federal War Department arranged for Euroamericans to labor on Ohio Indians' lands, Miami and Shawnee leaders such as the prominent Richardville family among the Mississinewa Miamis contracted Euroamerican laborers on their nations' lands to perform the same tasks as Quaker missionaries like William Kirk once had. While scholars such as Stephen Warren view Shawnees and their neighbors' cooperation with both Quaker missionaries and the civilization plan more broadly as evidence of their desire to appear as a peaceful people capable of living among the white Euroamerican population of Ohio, such an interpretation overlooks Native peoples' desire to manipulate U.S. policies for their own *proactive*—as opposed to *reactive*—economic and political purposes.\(^\text{303}\)

The Richardvilles, like Little Turtle among the Miamis during the first decade of the nineteenth century, cultivated connections with Euroamericans that facilitated Miamis' ability to hire and manage labor on their lands. These relationships similarly served to bolster Jean Baptiste Richardville's political position in Miami Country, even as it offered opportunities for the region's immigrants to find work. Though Miamis' relations with Friends were more distant and infrequent after both the War of 1812 and the destruction of Dennis's Station, the mission complex facilitated and diversified the ways in which Miamis took advantage of expanding Euroamerican markets and the presence of U.S. officials. Friend Philip Dennis's labor at Dennis's Station, moreover,

remained a not too distant memory, and because the mission complex contributed to the region's economic development, Miamis took advantage of the shared language of economy and improvement that was, in part, a consequence of the U.S. civilizing project and its rhetoric.

Jean Baptiste Richardville, in particular, used his presence in both the regional fur trade and as an employer in Indiana to cultivate connections with the U.S. federal government. Richardville's father was a Frenchman and his mother was a prominent Miami. He received a Euroamerican education and was well-schooled in the ways of European politics, economy, and diplomacy. Richardville profited from both the fur trade and Euroamerican immigration to the region, and his accumulation of wealth—he was the wealthiest man in Indiana by 1840—suggests that his economic aims were personal. He nonetheless worked to secure a prosperous future for the Miamis in Indiana by ensuring that his economic interests intertwined with Miami political interests.  

To that end, Richardville and his son John secured laborers for work on Miami lands. They hired out tasks that reflected what U.S. officials understood to be "civilized" ideals, and their efforts suggest that Miamis and their neighbors endeavored to use Euroamerican conceptions of economy: they invested in their lands in order to become formidable economic players. In 1824, for example, the Richardvilles arranged for William Ewing to make "a Contract with the Miami's to Make rails and fence their ground" and, the following year, William Caswell earned $3.00 in return for making a

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In the case of Ewing, the elder Richardville, in particular, used the resources available to his people to hire out work that promised future returns. Ideas of investment, gaining prominence in the United States and the Ohio Country, lurked behind such labor contracts. Hiring Ewing to fence ground with a contract, moreover, suggests the adoption of evolving ideas of free labor and private property. U.S. market practices combined with the existing exchange economy in the Ohio Country to create a market system characterized, increasingly, by dynamic ideas of investment and production and that included Native and non-Native workers and employers. The emerging Ohio Country economy was one wherein all inhabitants struggled to assert themselves at the top of an economic hierarchy. The fact that Euroamericans were willing to perform such tasks reveals both their desire and need to work and their willingness to labor for Miami or Shawnee masters.

Richardville was largely responsible for cultivating a connection with the Ewing brothers, and while he used them to invest in his peoples' lands by contracting them to fence, clear, and plough lands, he also used the relationship in other productive ways. The Ewing brothers and their father were experienced traders who sought profit, and they demonstrate the extent of economic change underway in the nineteenth-century Ohio Country. Whereas regional traders once offered goods in exchange for valuable furs, these men made their profits by offering goods on credit, and they often succeeded in racking up Indians' debts that could then translate into profit during treaties with the U.S. government since debts were often deducted and paid out of treaty annuities and

payments. Richardville was himself a shrewd businessman, however, and he knew the power of consumerism. As historian Stewart Rafert makes clear, "[t]he Ewing firm could not survive without Miami annuities, and the Miami could not have resisted demands for removal as long as they did without the influence of the Ewings."\textsuperscript{306} Thus, as Miamis secured annuities from various land deals, they offered business to the profit-minded Ewings who supplied them various goods; this, in turn, ensured Richardville and his countrymen Euroamerican allies who shared an interest in Miami persistence in Indiana. Emerging capitalist ideas thus offered Miamis opportunities to thwart both U.S. imperialist ambitions and U.S. colonists' efforts to remove them until 1846. Even then, many Miamis remained in the state after Richardville and another chief, Francis Godfroy, purchased lands and allowed their countrymen to remain on those lands after removal.

In addition to forming connections with regional economic players such as the Ewing brothers, Richardville maintained a public role as a chief among the Miamis, and he attended many treaties and councils prior to and after the War of 1812. As a consequence, he cultivated and maintained connections with both Miamis and federal officials, and such a strategy served him well as a political and economic leader in Indiana. When in 1824 Indian agent John Tipton declared that traders in the region were "not to employ directly or indirectly any other than natural born american citizens of the united States" whether "as clerk or otherwise," Richardville made sure to apply for a trading license regardless.\textsuperscript{307} Upon hearing of the application, and the subsequent political problems that Richardville's application created due to his position of power,

\textsuperscript{307} John Tipton to Comparet and Coquillard, September 1, 1824, \textit{Tipton Papers}, Vol. 1, 391.
then territorial governor of Michigan Lewis Cass urged Tipton to approve the application since "it is impossible to mark the difference between whites and Indians, so as to determine where the political rights of the one cease and of the others begin. It is a mixed question, depending for its solution, not so much on the relative quantity of Indian or white blood in the veins of the person, as upon his education, habits or pursuits."  

Richardville thus frustrated U.S. desires to render indigenous peoples culturally dead or vanished as a result of civilization policies. As Cass's statement to Tipton suggests, the civilization plan and the economic and social relations that resulted from the mission complex meant that race alone would not serve to "other" all Native peoples.

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308 Lewis Cass to Tipton, October 14, 1824, Tipton Papers, 398. Richardville's case reveals the power that economic savvy yielded both among U.S. officials and Miamis. In 1826, Richardville's political ally, Le Gros supported Richardville's economic pursuits, and he worked closely with Richardville to confront U.S. power in the region. Le Gros advocated on behalf of Jean Baptiste's request for the license, and he further informed Secretary of War James Barbour that "We wish you would let Richardville have goods and the exclusive right to trade with our Nation, in order to prevent as much as possible the impositions practised on the Indians in that country by the traders." 308 This was not, however, simply a move to benefit a friend. Le Gros's support of Richardville's trading business was political. Richardville's relations with Euroamerican traders and federal officials translated into political power for the nation, and granting him the exclusive right to trade with the nation meant that the Miamis could more easily control their own economy and their peoples' access to alcohol. Importantly, however, this was not a quest to isolate the Miamis' economy from global trade. It was, rather, a quest to regulate trade in ways similar to the embargoes and trading restrictions adopted by the United States at various times before. 308 It was a move that combined older notions of leadership grounded in ideas of reciprocity with emerging ideas of private property, profit, and political economy more generally.

Whereas Native women played crucial roles in cultivating networks of economic and political interests in pre-nineteenth-century Algonquian societies, increasingly this power rested with male leaders. Richardville stood to profit handsomely by controlling trade with the Miami nation, but he also stood poised to ensure that his people would receive both fair treatment and pricing. His was, in many ways, a progressive vision, tinged with self-interest as it was, of political authority in Indian Country. Economic and political power thus intertwined among the Miamis in ways both old and new. Though Le Gros's appeal to grant Richardville exclusive trading rights with the Miamis in Indiana ultimately failed, it nonetheless reflected Miami leaders' awareness of their bargaining power—Richardville did, after all, acquire a trading license. As both Richardville's power and the relationship between Richardville and Le Gros demonstrates, economic power combined with Miami politics to bolster that nation's claim to authority by the 1820s.
Cass seemed to suggest that Richardville was Metis, but “education, habits, or pursuits” mattered as well. Expanding markets in the Ohio Country meant not only that the United States economy grew, but that Miami and Shawnee businessmen could grow their profits and connections in the region as well. This in turn meant that men like Richardville were important politically but also economically: it was in U.S. officials' interests to keep such individuals satisfied. Richardville possessed the power to contribute to both U.S. economic growth and the maintenance of U.S. imperial dreams of uncontested rule in the region while also claiming power for himself and the Miamis in Indiana. Richardville's application for a trading license ultimately reveals, then, that in the early nineteenth-century Ohio Country, practical concerns of politics and economy could trump blood quantum, and economic success and Euroamerican ideals regarding education proved a gateway to political power.

Richardville's economic and political power in Indian Country, moreover, intersected with U.S. state and national politics in crucial ways. His efforts make clear that racial politics in Ohio and Indiana were complicated.\textsuperscript{309} When John Tipton became Indian agent for the Miamis in Indiana, he made the mistake of complaining about the ways in which Richardville conducted himself as leader of the Miamis. Interpreter John Boure informed Tipton in 1829 that he should be acquainted "with the feelings of Cheef

\textsuperscript{309} Much of the literature on the early republic Ohio Country focuses on African Americans’ interactions with Euroamericans, overlooking the ongoing presence of Native peoples. See, for example, Ellen Eslinger, "The Evolution of Racial Politics in Early Ohio" in Andrew R. L. Cayton and Stuart D. Hobbs, eds., \textit{The Center of a Great Empire: The Ohio Country in the Early Republic} (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2005), 81-104.
Richardville towards you."\textsuperscript{310} Boure continued to explain that the powerful Miami "was very much dissatisfied with you sow far as to say should thay Bee a treaty hee wood treet with Govr Cass But not you."\textsuperscript{311} By 1830, the Miamis wrote a memorial to Lewis Cass, the superintendent of Indian Affairs, complaining of Tipton. They informed Cass that "it seems as if our Agent wished & has usurped a power which we do not believe properly belongs to his office."\textsuperscript{312} They went on to say that Tipton "selected a place for the payment of our annuities contrary to our wishes. Our Principal Chief T B Richardville remonstrated & positively objected going to the place selected by our Agent & requested him to pay the annuities at or near the same place they were paid last year./ on a reserve made at the Wabash Treaty expressly for that purpose/. to which he objected."\textsuperscript{313}

What began as a dispute between Richardville and Tipton thus escalated to involve key federal officials like Lewis Cass and the Secretary of War. After the Miamis' memorial, Tipton wrote to Secretary of War John Eaton and informed him that "in 1828 I paid these people at a place selected by their chiefs where there was no good water, in a river bottom covered with nettles. I told the chiefs I would not pay at that place again. in 1829 I proposed to pay on their reservation near the Treaty ground 20 miles nigher to the residence of the principle chief. but this was ten miles from a point where two chiefs have stores. I then appointed a place 8 miles below on the wabash to which the chiefs would

\textsuperscript{310} John B. Boure to John Tipton, December 24, 1829 (from N. Robertson and D. Ricker, ed., The John Tipton Papers, vol. 2, pp 230), Miami File, Box #5023, Folder 1 (1829), Ethnohistory Collection, IU.
\textsuperscript{311} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{312} Miami Indians, Letter to Lewis Cass, 1830 (from National Archives, RG 75, Letters Received), Miami File, Box #5023, Folder 1 of 2 (1830-1833), Ethnohistory Collection, IU.
\textsuperscript{313} Ibid.
not come."\textsuperscript{314} The Miamis' grumblings thus forced Tipton to explain himself to his superior. Such politicking demonstrates the authority that Ohio Indian leaders yet possessed. In that same letter to Eaton, Tipton warned that "the chiefs of this Tribe will control the operations of the Government unless the Department sustain the ground I have taken."\textsuperscript{315}

The dispute would have been problematic for any U.S. Indian agent interested in removing Indian peoples, but it was particularly troublesome for Tipton, a Democrat, in 1830. That year William Ewing, a pro-internal improvement Whig, wrote to Tipton supporting the state legislature's recent passage of a Canal Bill. Ewing's connections with Richardville, the Miamis, and U.S. officials like Tipton positioned him as a nineteenth-century go-between who, in an effort to best satisfy his own financial interests, encouraged Tipton to facilitate a policy that was amenable to the Miamis. Though Indiana citizens sent a memorial to the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives demanding Miamis' removal westward in order to make room for the proposed Wabash and Erie Canal, Ewing told Tipton that "their Removal from the State now I believe to be impracticable--would it not be well to suffer them to occupy back & unimportant situations for a while, as their increased annuity will be of material benefit in the first settling of our county and there is yet room for all."\textsuperscript{316} Ewing, then, in an effort to ensure

\textsuperscript{314} John Tipton to John H. Eaton, February 15, 1830 (from N. Robertson and D. Ricker, ed., The John Tipton Papers, vol. 2, p. 250-251), Miami file, Box #5023, Folder 1 of 2 (1830-1833), Ethnohistory Collection, IU.

\textsuperscript{315} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{316} Ewing, William G. to John Tipton, February 3, 1830 (from N. Robertson and D. Ricker, ed., The John Tipton Papers, vol. 2, pp 244-247), Miami File, Box #5023, Folder 1 of 2 (1830-1833), Ethnohistory Collection, IU; For Indiana memorials, see "Memorial of the Legislature of Indiana" (from Cong. Doc. Series #181, document 74), and "Memorial of the General Assembly of
continued profit from Miamis' annuity, encouraged Tipton to "restore…influence over old Richardvill" in order to "[gratify] the Malicious Minority, and false faced, formerly your hypocritical friends, who hope to throw obstacles in your road, when serving your country & its best interest." Gratifying Richardville and allowing the Miamis to remain in the state benefitted not only the Miamis, but it enabled Tipton, a Democrat, to indulge his Whig political opponents. What was more, Ewing openly stated that Miamis' annuities stimulated Indiana's economy. Indian affairs were bound up in individual profit schemes as well as state and federal economic policy.

When, in the early 1830s, the United States endeavored to buy the remaining Miami lands in Indiana, Tipton and others knew that Richardville was savvy, and they knew that he stood in the way of completely swindling the Miamis. George B. Porter, a U.S. commissioner, wrote to Cass in 1833 that he "cannot...believe that these Indians will dispose of the whole of their Lands:—nor are they willing now to move West of the Mississippi:—nor is fifty cents per acre a sufficient price. Chief Richardville knows, as well as anyone else their value. They are worth at least two dollars per acre." Playing the property game according to Americans' own rules of market economy and value

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317 Ibid.
318 Whigs were generally in favor of internal improvement programs, while Democrats generally opposed them. The debate was especially intense in places like Ohio that seemed prime for improvement projects thanks to growing population numbers and an expanding economy. On overcoming “the tyranny of distance” through improvement projects, see Daniel Walker Howe, *What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815-1848* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 211-242.
319 Porter, G. B. Letter to Cass, Fort Wayne, August 23, 1833 (from National Archives, Record Group 75, O.I.A., Letters Received), Miami File, Box #5023, folder 2 of 2 (1830-1833), Ethnohistory Collection, IU.
increased Miamis' ability to remain on their lands, and it explains, in part, why they were able to maintain much of their territorial holdings into the 1840s and beyond the time when most other regional nations sold their holdings to the United States. Though it is quite possible that Tipton was truthful when he informed Eaton in 1830 that many Miamis "have many times requested me to pay the heads of families, or individuals, alledgeing that the village chiefs cheate them," cheating their fellow countrymen or no, Miami leaders such as Richardville cultivated connections with Euroamericans and their economy in an effort to ensure the best possible political and economic future for his people even as he turned a profit for himself.\(^\text{320}\)

The Shawnees at Wapakoneta also utilized the connections established by the mission complex to invest in their futures, but unlike the Miamis, they maintained closer connections with Friends after the War of 1812. Black Hoof and other Wapakoneta Shawnees invited Friends to visit their town and resume mission work there in 1815, and, in response, Friends arranged for Joseph and Martha Rhodes to offer instruction in the agricultural arts, domestic production, and literacy. When Martha died in Ohio, Black Hoof and his countrymen grieved her passing alongside Joseph, and they lamented Rhodes's departure from the mission.\(^\text{321}\) The relationship between Friends and the Shawnees thus continued to be simultaneously personal and practical, with the lines between the two blurred. Friends were political allies and useful sources of economic assistance, and their personal relationships with Native peoples, built upon a century and

\(^{320}\) John Tipton to John H. Eaton, February 15, 1830 (from N. Robertson and D. Ricker, ed., The John Tipton Papers, vol. 2, p. 250-251), Miami File, Box #5023, Folder 1 of 2 (1830-1833), Ethnohistory Collection, IU.
\(^{321}\) For report on Martha Rhodes's death and Black Hoof's sympathies, see 10 mo 16, 1817, BYMIC, vol. II.
a half of cooperation, facilitated Indians' efforts to remain in their homes and ancestral lands. Securing labor and maintaining connections with government officials and missionaries proved crucial for Native leaders, but those Shawnees, Miamis, and their neighbors who did not occupy positions of leadership also found ways both to participate in the expanding market economy and manipulate U.S. policies to their advantage. Shawnees at Wapakoneta adapted to the emerging regional economic order bolstered by Friends' mission work in their town, and they invested in their future. By the 1820s, Baltimore Friends partnered with Ohio and Indiana Friends to run mission schools at Wapakoneta, Lewis Town, and Upper Sandusky. With the new influence of these latter Friends, the schools began to offer not only agricultural instruction but lessons in reading and writing as well. In 1823, however, Baltimore Friends reported that many Shawnees in Wapakoneta "expressed a wish that their children might be taught to work as well as read and write...they had also wholly abandoned all intention of removing, and appeared very desirous that Friends should continue the school." Friends may have included the statement in order to justify their own conceptions of what a "proper" education for indigenous children should look like. Sources suggest, however, that the Shawnee parents at Wapakoneta valued the "improvements" made by Friends there, and they in turn likely encouraged their children to learn to labor in order to continue to invest in Shawnees' future in Ohio. For some, the key to maintaining a foothold in their home hinged upon the next generation acquiring trade skills and learning to take advantage of and maintain agricultural infrastructure.

322 See BYMIC, vol. II.
Wapakoneta Shawnees' belief in the economic advantages afforded from Friends' labor are perhaps most obvious in their reaction to an 1831 treaty in which they sold their lands to the U.S. government. After misunderstanding treaty deliberations, the Shawnees sought out the assistance of Quakers. In looking toward removal they explained,

[w]e are sorry to find that it is to be the price of our farms that is to take us to our new homes. We expected no such thing—we understood plainly that the government was to be at all that expense, and that what our improvements here were worth, after being valued by good men, was to be paid us in money, to assist us in making farms at our new homes. We have good homes here, and had abundance of labor and pains to make them. We wanted good men to value our improvements, for we are not ashamed of our homes...We cannot let our property go in this way; if we do, we are a ruined people.\(^\text{324}\)

While Shawnees' plea to Quakers reveals them as peoples attached to their lands, the passage also clearly speaks to their hope that investment in their lands—not merely accommodating or accepting Euroamericans' prescriptions for their endurance—would enable them to keep their homes. When confronted with sale, these Shawnees understood their improvements as investments that could yield higher returns during land negotiations. Indeed, as chapter six reveals, U.S. officials also acknowledged those improvements when negotiating removal. While Ohio Country Indian leaders were crucial to efforts to carve a place for their peoples in the region, the individuals who supported Friends and their leaders' "improvement" efforts and who built fences and contributed to the efforts to invest in their lands, also envisioned and used the tools of the U.S. market economy to work for a future among the growing Euroamerican population in Ohio.

\(^{324}\) Harvey, *History of the Shawnee Indians*, 204-205.
Ohio Indian leaders and their peoples in the early nineteenth century often possessed, wielded, and supported economic and political power in ways that harkened back to the ideals of reciprocity and leadership common among many of the region's peoples. Generous gift-giving once cemented hereditary chiefs' authority among their people, and chiefs' oversight of the distribution of annuities or land operated similarly in the nineteenth century. When Richardville or Godfroy offered their people the opportunity to remain in Indiana by offering a place for them on their recently purchased lands, they not only bolstered their own power, but they served their people in much the same way as their forefathers had for centuries. These leaders took advantage of the connections established by the mission complex, used them to serve their people as best they could, and, while they were at it, continued to mold, as employers, traders, and farmers, the creation and expansion of the U.S. market economy in the Ohio Country.

* * *

Mission work and the civilization plan linked Ohio Indians ever closer to the U.S. market economy, and they opened new avenues of economic manipulation and strategic persistence for Native leaders and their peoples—avenues that simultaneously borrowed and diverged from earlier imperial precedents. As was the case prior to the War of 1812, such economic engagement continued to influence indigenous peoples' politics. As the Miamis' 1830 complaint regarding Tipton's reported abuse of power suggests, indigenous strategies for combating U.S. power increasingly involved claims making, petition writing, and a general willingness to issue complaints to state officials. Such appeals often involved matters of investment, labor, debt, or claims for economic redress.
Sometimes these requests were successful, and sometimes they were not. Regardless, they strengthened the bonds between Ohio Country Indian leaders and government officials and Native nations and the U.S. state, just as economic strategies linked Native peoples closer to the U.S. market economy that they helped to create. As Native leaders like Richardville employed a variety of strategies to secure a future for their people amidst a rapidly growing Ohio Country population, they participated in the creation of the U.S. economy, and they continued to contribute to the growth of the U.S. state.

The ability to make claims upon the U.S. federal government offered Ohio Country Indians an opportunity to engage with the state, but it also reveals that while there was power in making such appeals, indigenous peoples' opportunities were increasingly defined by that growing state. Native peoples in the Ohio Country used their connections with John Johnston, missionaries, and others to learn and navigate the evolving U.S. bureaucracy and legal system in order to claim what was rightfully theirs, and they could do so in large part because of the authority of indigenous leaders, the desires of U.S. officials, and the pressures of land hungry United States immigrants. As Richardville's successful application for a trading license suggests, Native leaders' power and relationships with traders and officials meant that regional peace and U.S. hopes for eventual removal often hinged upon these leaders' happiness; as a result, these

325 Stephanie McCurry's work on women in the Civil War South offers excellent analysis on the role of petitions in forming bonds with the state. See Stephanie McCurry, *Confederate Reckoning: Power and Politics in the Civil War South* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010).
relationships became crucial for Americans’ own economic and political gains, just as they had during the heyday of the fur trade in the pays d’en haut.\textsuperscript{326}

Political efforts to seek redress were not new, but by the 1820s, Ohio Indians' methods of seeking and exacting compensation for losses or grievances revealed the extent to which market considerations were at the forefront of their thinking, the extent to which Native peoples' practical concerns had shifted by the nineteenth century, and the ways in which they used and grew the U.S. state apparatus. Rather than seek gifts or adopt kin to remedy their losses during war with Osages, for example, Ohio and Indiana Indians in 1822 bargained for land. They "set up a claim against the Osages, of one thousand Dollars, for damages Sustained," and they rejected $500 worth of material goods in favor of a tract adjacent to their own in Missouri.\textsuperscript{327} Employing U.S. officials in these claims-making endeavors became a key strategy for some Native peoples in the early republic, and the allied Indians' claim, in particular, demonstrates that the desire to remain a united people drove Indians' politics. The aftermath of war with Osages offered an opportunity to use U.S. policy to their advantage: the commoditization of lands meant that Delawares, Shawnees, and their neighbors could bargain for Osage land in an effort to expand a territory in the west intended for the use of their people.

\textsuperscript{326} Women, in particular, played vital roles in the cultivation of political connections with Euroamerican economies. See, in particular, Susan Sleeper-Smith \textit{Indian Women and French Men: Rethinking Cultural Encounter in the Western Great Lakes} (Amherst, MA, 2001); Lucy Elderveld Murphy, \textit{A Gathering of Rivers: Indians, Metis, and Mining in the Western Great Lakes, 1737-1832} (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000).

\textsuperscript{327} Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the Osage, and Delaware, Shawnee, Wea, Piankashaw, Peoria and Kickapoo, September 21, 1822 (from RG 75, Letters Received, Secretary of War, NARA), Shawnee File, Box # 8029 (1821-1829), Folder 1 of 1 (1822-1823), Ethnohistory Collection, IU.
Though some Native peoples used their connections with U.S. officials or missionaries to make claims against their Native neighbors, they also made claims upon the U.S. state for redress whenever they perceived a failure to fulfill a political or economic obligation. In 1826, for example, Le Gros, Richardville's Miami compatriot, issued a lengthy complaint on behalf of his nation that weaved together economic concerns with an assertion of political authority. He informed the Secretary of War, James Barbour, that, while the United States had fulfilled most of the provisions of the 1818 Treaty at St. Mary's, it had promised the Miamis a blacksmith and a gunsmith, two laborers whom had yet to be provided to his countrymen. Weaving ideas of economics, reciprocity, and sovereignty into his appeal, Le Gros asked, "Now father, who is to pay the damage which has accrued to my nation in consequence of this failure?" and he followed this query with a remedy for the United States' misstep.\(^{328}\) He declared, "I wish to make a proposition to you, which is, that you will authorise our Agent, to employ a good blacksmith, who can repair our guns likewise, and a good trusty Miller in lieu of the gun smith as promised by the Treaty, to be placed at the mills, as that position will be central to the nation."\(^{329}\) Though the treaty stipulations were eight years old, less than one week after the Miami's complaint, the Superintendent of Indian Affairs, Thomas L. McKenney agreed to find, employ, and send Le Gros his miller; by the summer of that same year, the miller was in Miami Country.\(^{330}\)

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\(^{329}\) Ibid.

\(^{330}\) Thomas L. McKenney to Le Gros, February 2, 1826, in *Tipton Papers*, 519-20; Hugh B. McKeen to John Tipton, June 28, 1826, in *Tipton Papers*, 546-47.
Le Gros's success reveals the extent to which Native nations in the Ohio Country continued to wield power in their interactions with the United States into the 1820s and beyond despite the political consequences of the War of 1812. Though U.S. policies constrained their actions to some degree, Native peoples still found potent ways to negotiate for power, just as they had when they forged partnerships with Quaker diplomats in the 1750s and 1790s. Le Gros's manner of bargaining and negotiation was characteristic of Miami relations with the United States into the 1840s. In 1826, for example, Le Gros confidently informed Governor Lewis Cass that "[y]ou have made a request of us for our land, which we have already refused. I told you our situation. We have a right to trade or exchange our property."\textsuperscript{331}

These methods of combating and negotiating American empire travelled along with migrating Indians to places like Missouri. Thus, as chapter three makes clear, Americans’ ideas regarding race and class travelled, but so too did new ways of manipulating and appropriating those ideas. American settlers were not naive to such claims to power. Just as settlers destroyed Dennis's Station at the start of the War of 1812, they continued to attack Indians' agricultural infrastructure. "Six ploughs, and other Tools, were Stolen from us by the Whites," Shawnees and Delawares complained in 1820, and "our Houses have been broken open and our property robed [sic] by the Whites. Father! The Whites do not Steal these things merely for their value, but more to make us abandon our Land and Take it themselves."\textsuperscript{332} Just as Americans were savvy to

\textsuperscript{331} Chief Le Gros to Gov. Lewis Cass, 12 October 1826 in Stewart Rafert, \textit{The Miami Indians of Indiana}, 77.
\textsuperscript{332} September 16, 1820, Shawnee and Delaware Indians, Talk to the President of the United States, Principal Town on Apple Creek, State of Missouri, RG 107, M-92 (14), NARA in
Native peoples' ability to translate economic "improvements" or success into political power and entrenchment in a coveted land, so too did Ohio Indians recognize Americans' greed: the thefts did not occur simply because Indians owned items of value (though that was part of it), but rather they occurred because Americans wanted Indians' developed lands. Perhaps more important, however, was that the victims of the thefts recognized their power to seek redress.

Indeed, Shawnees and Delawares did not employ violence to remedy the situation, but rather they chose to petition the president of the United States. They actively sought compensation for their losses, and such efforts further cemented a political relationship with the United States that simultaneously undermined and solidified Native polities' independent power. From the U.S. perspective, these claimants depended upon the state for assistance; from the petitioners' perspectives, the familiar rules of political alliance and reciprocity demanded that the U.S. government make amends for the acts of its citizens. Here, then, differing notions of the political relationship between the U.S. government and Indian peoples produced an opportunity for Indian peoples to exercise power. Indeed, the politics of fictive kinship meant that the Shawnees and Delawares seeking redress possessed the right, from their perspective, to exact compensation from their "father." U.S. paternalism offered a means to erode indigenous sovereignty, but it also provided opportunities for Indians to navigate and make claims upon the state bureaucracy in ways that reflected their own understandings of political reciprocity and association.

Delaware File, Box # 1524 (1820-1827), folder 1 of 2 (July 1820-1821), Ethnohistory Collection, IU.
While the politics of petitioning involved the meeting of distinct political cultures, the claims nonetheless reveal the adaptability of Native peoples' political economy. In the same 1820 petition to the president, Shawnees and Delawares claimed that "Two White Men have Stolen Two Hundred Dollars in Species, One Rifle estimated at thirty Doll.s and one Bridle at Two Dollars."\textsuperscript{333} Not only did these men demand redress in the form of monetary compensation, they demonstrated the extent to which their culture changed during the course of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. While land still held value for reasons of lineage, nationhood, kinship, and history, such ideas were coupled with ideas of worth rooted in the dollar. Like the locks placed upon Creeks' valuables by the nineteenth century, Indians—in the Ohio Country but also in places where Indians had former or ongoing contact with missionaries—likewise took stock of their possessions and quantified them in terms of monetary value.\textsuperscript{334}

Though Native petitioners did not shy from addressing the U.S. president directly, more direct relationships also, of course, offered numerous benefits to Native peoples, even if they were formed as a direct consequence of U.S. imperial ambitions. In Ohio, Shawnees' close relationship with John Johnston offered a potential means to secure payment for crimes committed by Euroamericans in ways similar to Shawnee and Delawares' petition to the U.S. president. Johnston complained to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Thomas L. McKenney, in 1825 that he was "often compelled to grant renumeration to the Whites out of the Annuities of the Indians, and when an Indian suffers loss, which is now frequently the case...no redress can be afforded for want of

\textsuperscript{333} Ibid.

funds at the disposal of the Agent. It is believed [sic] $1000 would not satisfy the claims of this nature now pending, and which are just and equitable." Johnston went on to submit a detailed list of "depredations committed on their property by our Citizens" on behalf of the Indians near his Piqua agency in 1827. The Seneca Captain Smith claimed $35 for a horse stolen; John Sky, $65 for one horse shot and another stolen; Blue Jacket's Daughter demanded $35 for a horse stolen; others listed saddles taken by Euroamericans and horses and cows stolen, shot, or killed by the same, and money, furs, blankets, and a kettle stolen. The goods ultimately totaled just over $1,000—a debt Johnston forwarded onto the U.S. federal government on behalf of the mostly Senecas and Shawnees near Piqua. The agent performed this duty out of a concern for "the loss of their confidence in the justice of the United States," and such work served both his own interests and those of the Indians near his agency. Indeed, it appears that the act of claiming damages against Euroamericans became so common that, by 1828, Johnston needed to make clear to McKenney that a "list of Claims of Shawanoese who have emigrated from Ohio west of the Mississippi" were "unfounded and ought not to be

335 Johnston, John, to Thomas L. McKenney. Wapaghkonetta, July 18, 1825 (from National Archives, RG 75. Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Letters Received Piqua Agency 1825. (Roll #3, Ohio Historical Society)), Shawnee File, Box # 8029, Folder 1 of 1 (1825-1826), Ethnohistory File, IU.
336 Johnston, John to Thomas L. McKenney Piqua, February 20, 1827 (with enclosures), Collection Archives, RG 75. Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Letters Received Piqua Agency 1827. (Roll #3, Ohio Historical Society), Shawnee File, Box #8029, Folder 1 of 1 (1827-1828), Ethnohistory Collection, IU.
337 Ibid.
338 Ibid.
339 Ibid.
paid.\textsuperscript{340} The requests reveal Piqua-area Indians' recognition that cultivating a close relationship with Johnston offered a means to make claims upon the U.S. state.

Such claims could, however, prove to be a double-edged sword. Johnston fought for Senecas and Shawnees' property rights, but he also advocated for their removal as a direct result of the damages suffered upon the Indians near his agency. Immediately following his recommendation that Piqua-area Indians receive compensation, he wrote, "[t]hese evils and a multitude of others which readily occur to your mind are rapidly encreasing upon us, and after a considerable part of my life spent managing this description of persons I am free to declare, that in my judgment there is no adequate remedy but removal to a Country of their own, where a suitable Government could be established over them.\textsuperscript{341} Native peoples' authority—and, indeed, the political act of remaining—often encouraged their removal from eastern lands.

Though Indians' claims making produced mixed consequences, it nonetheless reveals the extent to which Native peoples engaged with the politics and strategies embraced by U.S. citizens more broadly. Petitioning formed a political bond between petitioner and the state, and oftentimes, Native peoples living in the Ohio Country or who migrated from that region not only employed the tools of petition writing and claims making, but they also employed the discourse of civilization to their own ends; they thus

\textsuperscript{340} John Johnston to Thomas L. McKenney, January 17, 1828 (from National Archives, RG 75. Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Letters Received Piqua Agency 1828. (Roll #3, Ohio Historical Society)), Shawnee File, Box #8029, Folder 1 of 1 (1827-1828), Ethnohistory Collection, IU.

\textsuperscript{341} John Johnston to Thomas L. McKenney, Piqua, February 20, 1827 (with enclosures) (from National Archives, RG 75. Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Letters Received Piqua Agency 1827. (Roll #3, Ohio Historical Society)), Shawnee File, Box #8029, Folder 1 of 1 (1827-1828), Ethnohistory Collection, IU.
turned U.S. imperial rhetoric and policies on their head. Like the poverty rhetoric employed by Little Turtle and others during the first decade of the nineteenth century, Indians continued to make claims on the U.S. state by either asserting authority, or by couching their grievances in terms of impoverishment and pity. Even when material conditions were harsh, Native peoples found ways to appeal to government officials’ ideas regarding Indians, poverty, and civilization.

After years of hearing Euroamericans' pronouncements regarding the benefits of civilization—and after receiving the material benefits that accompanied partnerships with civilizing agents such as the Baltimore Friends—Native peoples combined ideas of petition-making with ideas of either civilization or savagery, depending on their aims. Hendrick Aupaumut and his fellow Mohicans, for example, masterfully used the discourse of civilization both in an attempt to secure Indiana lands before and after the War of 1812 and, when that ultimately failed, to secure a place for the Mohicans in Wisconsin Territory during the 1820s and 1830s. Aupaumut's initial petition, penned in 1819, suggests both that he saw himself as possessing a viable claim as well as a political relationship with the state. In 1818 White River Delawares in Indiana sold their lands to the United States, but members of the Stockbridge nation lived upon those lands with the Delawares since an 1808 treaty, and they were not consulted during the 1818 negotiations.\footnote{1818 Treaty with the Delawares} When the Christian Mohican petitioned the President of the United States and Congress for redress in 1819, he wove together discourses of religion, poverty, and missionary zeal in order to make his appeal. He claimed that his people were lately "few and weak," but that they and Americans were "all descended from one father.
and...acknowledge and worship one GOD." He continued to explain that his "nation have long ago cast away their dumb idols which could not speak, and we now worship the only true GOD and Savior Jesus Christ. Our Children are taught to read and write, to Cultivate the Earth, and to worship, love obey and serve the Lord." Not only did Aupaumut claim that his people held up their end of the bargain—they cultivated the earth according to the plans set forth by U.S. civilizing policies—but he also asserted that they could be instrumental in encouraging others to live in a "civilized" manner. A portion of the Stockbridge, Aupaumut explained, traveled to the White River in the hopes of civilizing the Delawares: "We saw them lying in darkness and paganism, and believed that our GOD called upon us to send among them a [colony?] of our nation in which was built up a Church of our Lord and Savior, that we might be the means of Civilizing and Christianizing them and doeing to them great good." The Stockbridge thus internalized the discourse of civilization and appealed to U.S. missionary ambitions: they offered government officials hope that "civilized" Indians could become civilizers.

Aupaumut laced the language of Christianity together with that of civilization and duty, and he used that rhetoric to assert Mohicans' rights. Complaining of the Stockbridges' loss of the lands sold in 1818, Aupaumut contended that the Stockbridges were "directed to leave them in a short time," and that their "right to them is denied." Weaving ideas of property and investment into his claim, he continued to explain that "A

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343 A Petition from Hendrick Aupaumet, Sachem to the President and Congress of the U.S. for a location of lands. Signed by Hendrick Aupaumet, Sachem. [signed from N. Stockbridge], November 16 1819. Stockbridge Papers, Folder 5, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY.
344 Ibid.
345 Ibid.
346 Ibid.
part of our nation, as we have told you, removed to these lands and possessed them with the Delawares and Munsees and made large improvements on them, at great expense to our nation, to prepare them for us."\textsuperscript{347} Aupaumut then closed his appeal with another consideration of the Stockbridges' rights: "we pray that you will consider our just rights, and set off to our Nation such a location of these lands as we are justly entitled to---that we may not suffer under this wrong and that we may thus be aided in our designs, and our nation again be...in peace and our hearts quieted."\textsuperscript{348} It was a petition that sounded eerily similar to claims of squatters' rights in the early republic. Just as U.S. immigrants claimed a right to the lands they developed, so too did these Stockbridge. Though the Stockbridge eventually moved to Wisconsin Territory, civilizing mission work, its accompanying rhetoric and that of U.S. settler colonialism nonetheless offered indigenous peoples additional means to use U.S. economic and political ideas in order to confront growing U.S. state power.\textsuperscript{349}

Just eight years after making the 1819 appeal, couched as it was in language of Christianity and civilization, Aupaumut's signature graced a piece of paper that made yet another appeal, this time, to the ABCFM and for missionary aid. Rather than emphasize their civilized state or their belief in Christianity, however, the appeal began "We thank the Great Spirit that he has favored your Society with compassionate feelings for our Nation. We rejoice greatly that you have sent the Rev Jesse Miner to pay us a visit for the purpose of ascertaining our true state & condition to enable you to know what you could

\textsuperscript{347} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{348} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{349} The most thorough history of the Stockbridge Indians is David J. Silverman, \textit{Red Brethren: The Brothertown and Stockbridge Indians and the Problem of Race in Early America} (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010).
do for us as also for those of our Brethren around us. Here, the Stockbridge Indians appealed to their supposed "heathen" state by calling upon the power of the Great Spirit. They down played their "civilization" (which was, apparently, lost in the eight years between appeals) by thanking the ABCFM for being willing to witness their "true state." What was more, the Stockbridges, Aupaumut among them, were eager to discern what the missionary society "could do for us." The Stockbridges, armed with their long history of missionary encounters, knew that missionaries held many keys: to "civilization" and Christianity, but also to powerful political alliances, economic infrastructure, Euroamerican labor, and the U.S. government's ear.

The mission complex in the Ohio Country thus offered material benefits to the region's indigenous peoples, but it also offered a means by which Shawnees, Miamis, Stockbridges, and their neighbors could make claims upon the federal state after the War of 1812. A discourse of civilization increasingly intersected with discourses of rights and nation to create a complicated nexus of ideas that both rendered Native peoples further intertwined with emerging U.S. intellectual currents and offered them opportunities to manipulate policies to their advantage. Such strategies reveal the ways in which Native peoples adjusted to life in the increasingly populated Ohio Country: as Euroamerican immigrants struggled to make a living in a new land, Native peoples confronted similar problems of money, work, and survival in a rapidly changing economy.

The various strategies adopted by Shawnees, Delawares, Miamis and their neighbors—whether petition-writing, cultivating connections with area traders, or

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asserting economic independence—reveal that the economic and political development accelerated by the mission complex in the Ohio Country offered means by which indigenous peoples simultaneously continued to assert their cultural, political, and economic independence and consciously borrowed from and adapted to Euroamerican ideals. Some Ohio Country Indians understood that they could carve a place with the emerging political and economic order in the region, and as they made steps toward doing just that, they increasingly frustrated Euroamericans. By using the mission complex and civilizing policies to their advantage, Native peoples forced the United States and its inhabitants to recognize that indigenous power was real and enduring. For a people desirous of a unified nation, this proved problematic. Thus, as Native power and authority endured, Americans increasingly supported removal policies in a quest to acquire lands but also to render the United States a homogenous, inclusive nation—a nation built on the policies and politics of exclusion.

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When Hugh McKeen declared the Miamis to be a "damnd rebellious race," he expressed frustration at their unwillingness to disappear from the Ohio Country on Americans' terms. That he wrote the statement with Richardville in mind is not surprising. The Miami leader was, in many ways, the exemplar of what many considered to be indigenous rebellion in the early years of American empire. Richardville, along with Shawnees at Wapakoneta, Delawares and Senecas near Piqua, and others who dared remain in the region, turned U.S. imperial rhetoric and policies on their head and adopted and adapted to civilizing policies and the economic, political, and social relations
established by the mission complex. They took part in an imperial struggle on Americans' terms, but they eked out victories that frustrated U.S. attempts to take the region by force or for no financial compensation or simply entirely on the state's own terms. When Wapakoneta debtors ruined George Johnston's finances, they secured items that made their own lives just a little bit better, and they did so on their own terms by partially paying off debts through barter of furs and by becoming economically-savvy neighbors in the midst of a population that sought their physical and cultural removal. When Delawares and Shawnees petitioned for economic redress, they invested the federal state with authority, but they also forced government officials to fulfill economic and political obligations that drew upon indigenous peoples' understandings of reciprocity and political alliance. They secured, in some cases, funds and goods that frustrated, at least in the short term, Ohio Country Euroamericans' attempts to drive them off of their lands. Ohio Country Indian leaders and peoples, then, ultimately used the tools available to them, and they ensured that they continued to exercise their power to shape their own lives and also to mold the contours of American imperial policy and the U.S. market economy and state. They also forced Americans to confront an immense problem—that of how to simultaneously live up to their republican ideal while eliminating persistent Indian peoples.
Chapter 6
"Of Mercy and of Sound Policy too": Indian Removal and the Cultivation of Empire

The U.S. civilization plan and its effects offered tools with which the Ohio Country’s Native peoples could both mold and combat the American empire. The plan also, however, ensured that U.S. officials and American citizens confronted the problem of persistent eastern American Indians in a manner that cultivated U.S. claims to benevolence on a global stage. Americans’ brand of empire was cloaked in the garb of humanitarianism, and it was in large part thanks to the Society of Friends and their fellow non-governmental organizations, the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM) most particularly, that it gained purchase. That many Americans considered Indian removal in the early 1830s Ohio Country to be humanitarian is significant. With eyes toward Great Britain and a reputation at stake, Americans struggled to reconcile their own policies with those of other empires. British abolition in 1833 did not, of course, ease Americans’ consciences. It did not grant American abolitionists their victory, convince many to renounce slavery, or prevent the forced migration of thousands of enslaved people to the southwest. Instead, Americans placed their hopes upon a “benevolent” Indian policy. With the problem of slavery looming with no politically amicable solution apparent, Americans endeavored to reconcile Indian policies—particularly Indian removal by the 1820s and 1830s—with both their own and others’ ideas of sensibility, humanitarianism, and morality in order to claim moral authority on the world stage. Absent from their musings on benevolence, of course, was that southeastern Indian removal and the expansion of slavery went hand in hand.
Removal became a means by which the United States could deal with Native peoples who, by successfully appropriating and manipulating U.S. ideals and policies, refused to disappear on Americans’ terms. Importantly, Americans did not contemplate a single “Indian removal.” The removals of southeastern Native peoples such as the Seminoles or Cherokees galvanized the republic’s attention—as well as the attention of foreign observers—but in the Ohio Country, removal was a protracted process marked by land sales and both federal and missionary encouragement. For some Americans, removal in either the Ohio Country or the southeast seemed a logical solution to the republic’s “Indian problem.” They understood it in terms of sovereignty and rights to land and state versus federal jurisdiction, but they also framed it as being a fundamental determinant of the national character. U.S. officials, reformers, and everyday Americans understood Indian policy, like the problem of slavery, in moral terms, and it was part of an international discourse regarding empires and nation-states, their moral authority, and, in turn, their political authority. Those who opposed removal spoke in moralistic and humanitarian terms to point out the hypocrisies of the United States’ republican experiment. Those who supported removal schemes used the same rhetoric often to present the policy as the only viable option available to Indian peoples, as did Indian agent John Johnston when he informed Lewis Cass that offering Delawares funds to remove west of the Mississippi would be an act “of Mercy and sound policy too.”

351 John Johnston to Lewis Cass, Piqua, October 1, 1820, National Archives, RG 75, Michigan Superintendence of Indian Affairs, Letters received by the Superintendent vol. 2, 331-334, microcopy 1, roll 7 in box 1524, Delaware, 1820-1827, Delaware, July 1820-1821, folder 1 of 2, Ethnohistory Collection.
many Americans, Indians could either remove and receive government charity or face further moral corruption or extinction.

At the root of both positions, however, were ideas of philanthropy cultivated during the earliest years of the civilization plan. Whereas from the 1790s through the early 1820s, Friends’ motivations differed somewhat from those of some U.S. officials, and Quakers certainly took issue with certain aspects of Indian policy, they nonetheless perceived government efforts in Indian Country to be fundamentally beneficial. By Jackson’s presidency, however, most Quakers and other reformers openly lamented the state of U.S. Indian affairs. Nonetheless, the U.S. government’s endorsement, funding, and support of missionary projects and non-governmental organizations like the Society of Friends, enabled many officials to claim enlightenment in the realm of Indian affairs, and those claims to humanitarianism continued to facilitate the ongoing development of the federal state by both masking the violence of American imperialism and fostering the ongoing growth of the republic’s market economy.  

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U.S. officials, regardless of politics, harbored deep concerns for the United States’ reputation abroad, and Indian policy was a means by which some hoped to cultivate an image of humanitarian power on the world stage. The American Revolution invested the slavery issue with new political potential, and as such Great Britain’s elites ultimately

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352 Lorenzo Veracini suggests that a disavowal of violence marks settler colonial narratives, and in the American case, ideas of humanitarianism and charity, offered as aid to “poor Indians,” presented a similar disavowal. See Lorenzo Veracini, *Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview*, (New York and London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 76-86.
acted on their abolitionist ideas thanks to the politics of the eighteenth-century imperial crisis. A moral push against slavery was one way to defend the British Empire’s reputation—and purpose—in the face of colonial attacks. U.S. Indian policy ultimately became politicized in a similar vein during the nineteenth century.353 With fervor for abolition growing, Great Britain, in particular, presented the United States with a clear rival in the global contest over moral authority. By the nineteenth century, the new United States sought to convince the world—and itself—that it too was an enlightened empire.354

Indeed, U.S. Indian policies had global consequences and international connections. While frameworks of settler colonialism enable and encourage some to compare indigenous experiences and their relationships with imperial powers in the United States, Australia, and South Africa, fewer works explore the linkages that extended between the policies of the United States and Great Britain during the early nineteenth century.355 Reformers, often Quakers, corresponded and shared ideas and literature during the nineteenth century, and they kept each other abreast of their respective empires’ policy initiatives. Indeed, the Philadelphia and Baltimore Yearly

354 Also essential for understanding philanthropy’s role in making the United States is Kathleen McCarthy, American Creed: Philanthropy and the Rise of Civil Society, 1700-1865 (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 2003).
Meetings had, since the eighteenth century, regularly discussed the issue of Indian affairs, and London even offered some funds for North American Friends’ initiatives to civilize Native peoples. Such trends continued into the nineteenth century. In 1817, for example, Baltimore Friends recorded that "by a letter received from Elizabeth [Pickessew] a friend residing in Cork, Ireland...we have received £100 Sterling, to be appropriated to the use of the Indians to assist in procuring tools or other conveniences for their advantage."\(^{356}\)

Historian William Unrau demonstrates that prominent members of Britain’s Aborigines Protection Society (APS) developed their ideas regarding indigenous policies in light of and in tandem with those of the United States. Quaker Thomas Hodgkin, he points out, encouraged the APS to adopt an assimilationist policy in South Australia thanks to his contempt for Jacksonian plans of removal.\(^{357}\) One British reformer, Adam Hodgson, moreover, applauded Jedidiah Morse’s 1822 plan to civilize Native peoples in communities near Euroamerican settlements, and deemed the plan a humanitarian one in his 1824 *Letters from North America, Written During a Tour of the United States and Canada.*\(^{358}\)

By the 1830s, however, British officials, reformers, and thinkers considered U.S. Indian policies to be decidedly less philanthropic. In 1837, for example, Saxe Bannister, an official in New South Wales and later a member of British Parliament, applauded the United States’ civilizing efforts, but decried Jackson’s harsher policies of removal. He

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\(^{356}\) Minutes of the Baltimore Yearly Meeting Standing Committee on Indian Concern (hereafter BYMIC minutes), Vol. II, 10 mo 16 1817, 33 (Friends Historical Library, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, PA).


\(^{358}\) Ibid., 526.
also made it clear that Britain and the United States were in close competition for the right to claim moral authority. He remarked that “no more honorable rivalry can be imagined than that of the British Parliament with the American Congress in the difficult task of elevating the ignorant and protecting the weak.”359 As both the American and British empires sought to expand their territorial claims, such a competition mattered. The discourse of morality and humanitarianism offered a common language that rendered each power intelligible and comparable to the other.

Cultivating the image of a benevolent empire was not easy for a republic tainted by its notoriety as a slave-holding power. In 1827, Lewis Cass, future Secretary of War under Andrew Jackson, nonetheless made the attempt by penning an eighty-page document that compared the treatment of North America’s indigenous peoples during the eras of both the British and American empires. Cass, the architect of Jacksonian removal schemes, had served as the territorial governor of Michigan from 1813 until his appointment as Secretary of War in 1831. He was renowned as an expert on Indian affairs and penned works relating to various Indian nations, perhaps most famously, the Delawares in 1821-22, and he continued to write in defense of removal into the 1830s. He was a Democrat, and central to his pro-removal arguments were ideas of benevolence and civilization.360 His 1827 article was an attempt to position Indian policy as evidence of the United States’ enlightened state in contrast to Great Britain. His essay was in

359 Quoted ibid., 530.
response to an indictment, recently printed by the London Quarterly Review, of the U.S. government’s handling of Indian affairs. Cass’s response reveals the extent to which such criticism riled U.S. officials. He began his discussion of Indian affairs claiming that “[t]he true character of this policy has not been well understood, even in this country, and abroad it has too often furnished the motive or the pretext for grave accusation and virulent invective.”\footnote{Lewis Cass, Remarks on the policy and practice of the United States and Great Britain in their treatment of the Indians (Boston, MA: F.T. Gray, 1827), 1.} The document, written for a British but also a global audience, references the United States’ reputation numerous times, and, indeed, Cass insisted that “[t]o the judgment of the world we may safely commit the conduct of the American government, in regard to the particulars here touched upon.”\footnote{Ibid., 45.}

Those particulars included extensive analysis of wars conducted by Great Britain and the United States alike and of the virtues of U.S. efforts to offer Native peoples annuity payments and civilization. Cass deemed annuities to be a particularly enlightened policy. He argued that “[t]he plan of permanent annuities guaranties to the Indians a never failing resource against want, and its beneficial effects are apparent in the improved condition of the Wyandots, the Shawnee, and the Miamies.”\footnote{Ibid., 28.} As chapter five demonstrates, any “improvement” of Ohio Indians’ condition according to Euroamericans’ standards, was the result of Miamis, Shawnees, and Wyandots’ own adaptability and ingenuity. Nonetheless Ohio Indians were Cass’s rhetorical foil; indigenous peoples of the southeast—those peoples upon whom historians have, for the most part, centered their analyses of Indian removal—he largely ignored. The situation of
Shawnees and Miamis offered Cass his best talking points, largely thanks to mission work, land sales, and importantly, the absence of slaveholding. “Civilization” in the Ohio Country was tied to ideas of market economy, not slavery, and thus Cass offered little mention of elite Cherokees or Creeks of the southeast, many of whom owned African slaves. In this way, Cass diverted attention away from the issue of slavery in the United States, while simultaneously pointing to Indian policy as the realm in which the republic could stake its benevolent reputation.

Discussion of annuity payments and civilizing policies enabled Cass to draw explicit comparisons with the British Empire. Annuity payments, he argued, ensured Ohio Indians’ well-being, and Cass placed the policy—and others—in direct contrast with that of Great Britain in both Canada and Australia. He wrote that “[t]he inquiries, which we have instituted, have satisfied us, that no system of permanent annuities has heretofore been adopted in the Canadas, as a consideration for cessions obtained from the Indians.” Great Britain likewise offered no compensation to indigenous peoples of Australia. “We hear of no treaties of cession,” he contended, “no ‘purchases compulsory,’ or voluntary, no mutual discussions, no annuities for future relief.” Instead “The land is wanted, and it is taken.” The comparison with Britain’s colonies suggests not only the extent to which Cass endeavored to portray the United States as an enlightened power but also the degree to which U.S. officials understood the United States as an empire among

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366 Ibid., 31.
empires. Employing a direct comparison with Britain in the world, Cass took issue with the London Review’s suggestion that the United States was among the most land hungry of polities, “Has England furnished us with any example of such a system of self denial, or rather of canting weakness?” he asked. “We will not inquire in India, for there no barbarians, strictly speaking, are found. But the Australasian continent is now a British province, acquired and settled within the memory of the present generation. And where are its aboriginal inhabitants?”367 The idea of “self denial” is particularly striking. Cass’s claim that Americans were unable to deny themselves extensive lands contradicts the idea of Americans as virtuous Protestants and ultimately reveals the inconsistencies of American ideologies at work.

Britain, Cass contended, failed to ensure indigenous peoples’ well-being. He censured the British government for neglecting to pass “any prohibition against the introduction of spirituous liquors in any part of their Indian country,” and for failing to “to provide a permanent residence for the Indians.”368 Indeed, he wrote, “[t]here were no schools, and no efforts to introduce agriculture, or the mechanic arts. There were no annuities, no regulations to direct the conduct of the traders, and no law to prevent the sale of ardent spirits.”369 For Cass, then, government regulation took on the cast of benevolence. Trading laws, civilizing schemes—these were the tangible evidence of the United States’ “benevolent empire,” evidence that the British Empire did not have.

According to the London Quarterly, however, there was “‘not to be found, on the face of the globe, a race of men, so utterly abandoned to vice and crime—so devoid of all

367 Ibid., 29-30.
368 Ibid., 8
369 Ibid.
fear of God and regard towards man, as the outsetlers of Kentucky, Ohio, and the other back states.” Cass defended the reputation of Ohio Valley settlers, but also raised the issue of removal in an effort to confront the issue of vice. “Revolting scenes” of Native peoples falling victim to traders’ liquors, Cass argued, were limited to areas where Indians and settlers lived in close proximity. “In the interior,” on the other hand, he insisted that “[w]e have seen many Indians, remote from the white settlements, who had never tasted of spirituous liquors, and we can testify, from personal knowledge, that the evil itself is almost unknown there.” Such an argument suggests that Cass viewed removal from the “white settlements” as a potential remedy to Indians’ supposed miserable nature.

Cass was clear to say, however, that the issue of removal was contested. He explained that “[w]e have brought it before our readers merely as an evidence of the feelings of the American government, and of their earnest desire to discharge with fidelity a great moral debt, which is neither concealed nor denied.” By recognizing and attacking the republic’s missteps head-on, the United States could remedy past faults. Cass pointed out that in British Canada no “plan has been digested or proposed for removing the Indians from any part of the lands they now occupy, where they are peculiarly exposed to temptations and danger.” By framing the “Indian problem” as an ethical quandary with which the United States actively grappled, Cass offered evidence

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370 Ibid., 26.
371 Ibid., 43.
372 Ibid.
373 Ibid., 47.
374 Cass, Remarks, 48.
of American moral superiority, and he framed removal as evidence of Americans’ enlightened approach to empire.375

The civilization plan and missionaries’ labor also figured prominently in Cass’s evaluations of U.S. morality. Once again invoking an imperial comparison and quoting a British publication, he informed his readers that “we are told, that ‘in Canada, there is but one regular protestant Indian mission!’”376 As a result of Britain’s failure to engage in mission work Canada suffered “no want of physical wretchedness, or of moral depravity.”377 That “moral depravity” was the result of British indifference and vice. Ultimately, Cass was able to detect only minimal “interference of the British government in any plan to improve the moral condition of the Indians.”378 American missionaries, however, actively sought to spread knowledge of agriculture and the mechanic arts, and they did so at the behest of the U.S. government. Their work became an important element of American imperial rhetoric. Missionary societies’ work as non-governmental organizations was thus crucial to U.S. claims to benevolence in the early republic.

Cass’s article ultimately sought to restore and bolster the humanitarian reputation of the United States abroad, but it was also an attempt to rally his fellow citizens to his side. He insisted that Americans could not “sit still, with folded arms, while the civilized world are believing, and judging, and condemning, deceived, as they well may be, by such bold assumptions” of the United States’ Indian policies.379 He contended that

375 Interesting, by 1836, the lieutenant governor of Upper Canada, Francis Bond Head removed the Ottawas to Manitoulin Island. See Unrau, “An International Perspective on American Indian Policy,” 524-525.
376 Cass, Remarks, 48.
377 Ibid., 47.
378 Ibid., 7.
379 Ibid., 26.
“[v]ainly shall we look back with pride, or forward with hope, or around us with congratulation, if we do not cherish a sacred regard for national character.” Connecting Indian policy to the nation’s character raised the stakes at home, even as it established indigenous affairs as a pivotal battlefield upon which U.S. officials endeavored to build and protect the republic’s global reputation. The American Empire, Cass suggested, was an enlightened one; Indian policies were a means by which Americans’ could claim moral and political authority.

Cass’s frequent allusions to the virtuous nature of American intentions in Indian Country reveals the extent to which considerations of morality factored into claims to global authority. If domestic politics and divisions ensured that the United States could not compete in the race toward abolition, then a “merciful” Indian policy could, perhaps, offer a means to claim enlightened standing in the world and political durability. Indeed, in a last biting remark, Cass wrote that “[s]incerely do we hope that [Britain’s] day of glory will not be shrouded in a night of gloom,” and that “what has happened to other nations may happen to her; and the traveler may yet inquire for the site of London, as we now inquire for those of Nineveh and Babylon.”

Failed Indian policies in North America and Australia, then, showcased Britain’s backwardness and proximity to demise. The United States’ own policies offered proof of American exceptionalism: the young republic was unique for its humanitarian treatment of indigenous peoples, and it would thus endure.

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380 Ibid., 26.
381 Ibid., 80.
U.S. claims to humanitarian Indian policies rested, however, on contradictions and widely-believed fictions. The civilization plan, for example, was a supposed effort to offer Native peoples an education fit for potential “good citizens,” but it ultimately served to categorize Indians as non-citizens while also limiting their access to the educational opportunities afforded “middling” and “elite” Euroamericans. The mission complex, meanwhile, ultimately linked indigenous peoples closer to the U.S. market economy at the expense of their formerly more global connections, again in the name of “civilization” and “progression.” As earlier chapters demonstrate, Quaker missionaries carried with them ideas regarding poverty in the early republic, and Native peoples, in turn, appropriated those ideas in order to secure wares, infrastructure, and labor. Indians’ demands for material goods or labor, however, ultimately bolstered Americans’ assumptions regarding Indians’ dependence upon the U.S. federal government. Indians’ demands also facilitated Americans’ claims to offering assistance. Ideas of poverty, dependence, and charity, then, became foundations for yet another fiction embraced by many regardless of politics: by assisting “deserving” “poor Indians,” the U.S. government could cancel the “moral debt” to which Cass and McKenney referred while simultaneously revealing itself as a philanthropic empire on the world stage. Native peoples’ sovereign authority, power that forced the United States to welcome Quakers as diplomats during the 1790s, now was subsumed beneath a fiction of impoverished dependence—“domestic dependent nations” by 1831—cultivated by a growing state.

As ideas of humanitarianism and human rights gained purchase in the early United States, Americans endeavored to frame, and perhaps to understand, Indian
policies such as removal as benevolent and as a means by which the republic could
defend its character.\textsuperscript{382} The idea of a moral debt that the United States could somehow
repay to the continent’s indigenous peoples by working to alleviate their want became a
centerpiece of the young republic’s claims to benevolent power by the 1820s and 1830s.
In the 1820s Ohio Country, government assistance in the form of clothing or funds for
removal became commonplace, and just as Friends’ diplomacy during the 1790s rendered
missionaries partners in foreign affairs, so too did missionaries’ civilizing efforts
continued to offer a crucial and, importantly, visible foundation for U.S. philanthropy
both in North America and the world. Again, the Society of Friends and the ABCFM, by
performing as non-governmental organizations that nonetheless possessed close ties with
the American government, played central roles in the creation of the United States’
humanitarian reputation. In the 1820s, Superintendent of Indian Affairs Thomas L.
McKenney encouraged the American Board of Commissioners of Foreign Missions to
continue their work.

The Indians hold us in great arrears, and the Missionaries go to aid in
cancelling them—not by a re-investment of their titles to land—nor by a
counting down the cost of this vast territory, which once was theirs—no;
but they go to spread a moral beauty over the face of the desart; they go to
'reclaim another, and another portion from the wastes of dark and fallen
humanity;'—to invite the wanderers into the fold of civilization—to teach
them the arts and the comforts of domestick life; and to point them to the
vast concerns of a future state.\textsuperscript{383}

\textsuperscript{382} On the development of human rights and ideas of sensibility, see Lynn Hunt, \textit{Inventing Human
Revolution} (Chapel Hill: Published for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and
Culture by the University of North Carolina Press, 2009).

\textsuperscript{383} Thomas L. McKenney to Dr. Samuel Worcester, Extract of a letter from Thos. L. M’Kenney
... to Dr. Samuel Worcester ... of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign
Missionaries, Newberry Library, Chicago.
McKenney’s hope was that missionaries would follow Native peoples as they traversed the heart of the continent from the Ohio Country to Missouri and Kansas, and in doing so, they would aid Native peoples as well as pave the way for virtuous settlement—safe from the vices of “white savages” or corrupt traders—across the continent. Removal, then, would be a good. It would “improve” both lands and peoples, and it would offer evidence of the United States’ inherent virtue.

With McKenney at the helm of Indian affairs in the 1820s, ideas of removal thus became concerned with not only the emptying of lands that, supposedly, could be better employed by Euroamerican agrarians but with the expansion of morality—or, at least, American ideas of morality—in North America. According to McKenney, it was not merely North America's indigenous peoples who required civilizing. Writing in a vein reminiscent of Quaker theology, he explained that in order for Native peoples to become "a portion of 'our great American family of freemen,'" Americans needed to view Indians, as human beings, having bodies and souls like ours—possessed of sensibilities, and capacities, as keen and as large as ours—That their misery be inspected and held up to the view of our citizens, that the trophies of reform be pointed to—I say, it needs only this to enlist in their favour the whole civilized population of our country; for could the extent of their wretchedness be contemplated with indifference by our citizens, if it were known? And would not the charities of seven millions of men warm into animation their sad and dismal torpor?384

Here, discourse of civilization combined with that of poverty in an effort to appeal to Americans' own sense of and claims to civilization. Indians' "wretchedness" required Americans' charity, and such philanthropy possessed the power, in turn, to translate into moral capital that would further elevate the United States to a place of prominence.

384 Ibid.
Of all Quakers employed in the service of the War Department, McKenney attained the most prominent position, and his rhetoric and policies reflect his spiritual beliefs. As Superintendent of Indian Trade he institutionalized the paradigm of labor established by Quakers in the Ohio Country by aiding in the crafting of the Civilization Act of 1819. His belief in the Inner Light, familiarity with Quaker reform efforts, and his business savvy gleaned as a result of merchant work in Maryland all shaped his policy-making and manner of business. He ardently believed that Native peoples were the equals of Euroamericans, and he maintained a generous and philanthropic attitude toward Native peoples. Such an attitude led him to publish his multivolume *History of the Indian Tribes of North America* (1836-1844), but it also precipitated his removal from office by Andrew Jackson in 1830. Jackson disagreed with McKenney on the topic of Indians’ intellectual potential, and he deemed the superintendent too soft, in general, on Indian affairs.

McKenney’s example, while exceptional in some ways, nonetheless reveals the extent to which Friends’ early efforts established a paradigm for a program of benevolent policies that was, nonetheless, connected with ideas of market capitalism. Just as Friends’ educational reform efforts ensured that “poor Indians” received an education that was tailored for their assumed station, ideas of mercy, charity, and poverty further wed Native peoples to the republic’s socio-economic hierarchy. What is more, Cass and McKenney’s

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rhetoric of “arrears” and cancelling a debt illuminates the market context in which early U.S. Indian policies were conceived.

Indeed, ideas of success and virtue, born out of the development of the republic’s capitalist economy, ultimately gave U.S. Indian policies the “benevolent” sheen that, in turn, invested authority in the American Empire at home and abroad. Native peoples’ supposedly sad state offered the United States a chance to offer aid that, in turn, demonstrated the republic’s generous character. Central to this intellectual somersault was a tendency to frame Native peoples as “poor Indians”—not in the eighteenth-century sense of savage or misguided, but as poverty-stricken populations. If ideas regarding “civilization” and savagery encouraged Americans to consider Native peoples as “poor Indians,” Shawnees and Miamis’ own claims of impoverishment entrenched that status in the imaginations of many Americans. Though ideas of poverty and dependence relegated Native peoples en masse to the lower ranks of a developing socio-economic hierarchy, they also created space for Americans to distinguish between different kinds of impoverishment. As Michael Katz’s work shows, ideas of the “deserving” and “undeserving” poor abounded during the era of the early republic, precisely when Americans worked to define ideas of race and class. Such ideas applied to Native peoples as well. For some Americans and U.S. officials, those Miamis or Shawnees who attempted to become civilized—but who in actuality appropriated some of the ideas of the civilization plan in order to mold and combat U.S. imperial policies or to maintain

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their own lands—earned a place among the republic’s “deserving poor.” Ideas of class, then, played a large role in how Americans perceived their Native neighbors.

Katz’s work on the “undeserving poor” demonstrates that the “redefinition of poverty as a moral condition accompanied the transition to capitalism and democracy in early-nineteenth-century America.” Ascribing morality to wealth and immorality to poverty was a means by which Americans endeavored to make sense both of growing inequality and others’ sometimes dire situations. Other scholars suggest that linking poverty with laziness or vice was also a way to “discipline” laboring populations. Ultimately, it was a way of rationalizing the apparent inadequacies of the republican ideal. Katz notes that a distinction arose between impoverishment and pauperism in the early republic, with the latter term reserved for those able-bodied individuals who nonetheless failed to succeed in the U.S. economy. Those individuals whom Americans deemed the “impotent poor”—those who suffered from some condition that hindered their ability to succeed—were vilified less, though this changed as the nineteenth century wore on. Eventually, Americans subsumed “the poor,” as a more or less homogenous group, within a broad discourse of immorality and failure.

Euroamericans’ rhetoric regarding Native peoples’ impoverishment and supposed savagery or immorality similarly demonstrates the extent to which the emergence of a

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387 Ibid., 14.
389 Indeed, in some Marxist perspectives, ideology is defined as a means by which a society tries to resolve its internal contradictions. See, for example,
capitalist political economy influenced the development of U.S. Indian policy. As chapter three makes clear, Quakers and U.S. officials alike employed a discourse of poverty when considering reform among Indians and urban laborers. Those notions of poverty, however, emerged out of developing ideas regarding race and class to render those Indians who attempted to “civilize” initially among the ranks of the deserving poor, or in Katz’s terms, the “impotent poor,” in the minds of many early Americans. Those Native peoples who refused to become civilized, who failed to employ the lessons offered by missionaries, were akin to able-bodied “paupers” who inexplicably failed to try to better their station. Such categories offered Americans a means by which they could ascribe logic to the harsh consequences of American empire on the continent.  

Native peoples were akin to those “impotent poor” who were hindered by some factor, either physical or mental: they were, in the minds of American reformers, handicapped by their race and their supposed savagery—as well as, sometimes, by age or some infirmity—and they were deserving of the U.S. government’s “liberality.” At times, U.S. government officials were happy to be generous, both in the Ohio Country and elsewhere. In 1820 Missouri, for example, Delawares and Shawnees, former Ohio Country inhabitants, appealed to the U.S. federal government for redress and "pity." "Two White Men," Shawnees and Delawares claimed, "have Stolen Two Hundred Dollars in Species, One Rifle estimated at thirty Doll.s and one Bridle at Two Dollars." The owner of the stolen $200 was an elderly man, and the petitioners explained that the money took "many years to collect." They explained that the owner "is now too old to work" and that the United States should subsequently "have pity on him, and have that

390 On distinctions between poverty and pauperism, see Katz, The Undeserving Poor, 11-16.
Sum returned to him." This appeal was followed by a proclamation of Shawnees and Delawares’ civilized state. They argued that "we have made use of the plough since several years. Father! We wish to hear from you as Soon as possible so that we may know what to do." The plough "improved" lands, but it also bolstered indigenous peoples’ claims to economic assistance and prompted U.S. officials to label them as “deserving.”

Indeed, after receiving Shawnees' and Delawares' requests, Indian agent Pierre Menard informed Calhoun that they "deserve the indulgence and encouragement of Government—They have acquired habits of industry and learned to value the soil—They farm quite handsomely, and raise every kind of Stock common in the Country, and are in general orderly and well disposed." These Shawnees and Delawares were not alone among those deemed “deserving” Indians. In 1821, Indian agent John Shaw wrote to Lewis Cass that Wyandots near Upper Sandusky were "intirely destitute of many usefull Tools, and their dispositions to use them are equal at least to any other Indians that I am acquainted with, they in my opinion deserve as much of the bounty of Government as any other Tribe." Here, Shaw claimed that the Wyandots in question deserved “the bounty

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391 Shawnee and Delaware Indians, Talk to the President of the United States, Principal Town on Apple Creek, State of Missouri, September 16, 1820, RG 107 in the Great Lakes-Ohio Valley Ethnohistory Collection, Box 1524, Delaware, 1820-1827, Folder 1 of 2, Delaware, July 1820-1821, Glenn A. Black Laboratory for Archaeology, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN (hereafter Ethnohistory Collection).
392 Perhaps unsurprisingly, when Indian agents brought Indians’ claims of damages or stolen property to federal officials, they did not always receive precisely what they requested or needed. Indeed, in 1828, Johnston lamented that territorial Governor Lewis Cass’s “appropriation for this object ought at least to be double what it is.” Nonetheless, Johnston, and through him the Ohio Indians he served, did receive some compensation for their losses via negotiation. John Johnston to Thomas L. McKenney, January 29, 1828, National Archives, RG 75, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Roll 3, Letters Received from Piqua Agency 1828 in Ethnohistory Collection.
393 John Shaw to Cass, Upper Sandusky, March 27, 1821, Shawnee file, Box 8029, Shawnee 1821-1829, Shawnees, 1821, folder 1 of 1, Ethnohistory Collection.
of Government” because they showcased a particular disposition to make use of “usefull Tools.” Shaw continued to assure Cass that the Wyandots, who "may be considered poor," demonstrated appropriate "signs of thankfulness when they receive favours." Wyandots’ manners—no doubt evidence of their propensity for civilization—too convinced Shaw that those near Upper Sandusky were worthy of government aid.

Shaw also offered evidence of Wyandots’ destitution. He noted that "as a proof of the poverty, as also of the Acconomy of these Wyandots they dress very much in leather, and very seldom see them wear any costly clothing or ornaments of Silver as is customary with some other Tribes." Shaw’s argument makes clear that Americans’ ideas regarding poor Indians were, by the early republic, grounded in observable notions of destitution. For many Euroamericans and indigenous peoples alike, the materials and adornments that one wore offered information regarding economic and political status. Still Shaw’s observation is particularly interesting given his Quaker background. For Shaw, Wyandots’ leather clothing and lack of silver ornamentation connoted poverty, rather than proof of their humility or simplicity. The Wyandots’ dress also, however, demonstrated their “Acconomy” and, in turn, virtue: they refrained from wearing items that they could not afford. Federal officials' perceptions of Natives' civilization offered

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394 Ibid.
395 Ibid.
opportunities for Native peoples to receive material aid, even as it further linked Native peoples with evolving ideas of morality, poverty, and pauperism in the early republic.\(^{397}\)

Shaw’s assurances of Wyandots’ worthiness contrasted their supposed poverty with government abundance and generosity. It was a discourse that positioned the United States as Indians’ merciful benefactor. In urban spaces, Americans were more sympathetic to those—widows, children, and the “impotent poor”—who were “deserving” of public assistance, and offering charity to those in need was, like reformers’ educational efforts, a means to garner “moral capital.”\(^{398}\) A similar phenomenon applied to the United States’ treatment of Native peoples deemed to be among the “deserving poor.” Missionaries’ civilizing work, as Cass made clear, offered the United States rhetorical tools for displaying its humanitarian character. It also, however, offered means by which Indians could become “deserving” “dependents” even though rhetoric suggested “civilization” was intended to render Native men independent providers for their families. With Native Americans categorized as impoverished, U.S. officials increasingly offered assistance and “merciful” aid to those deserving individuals. In the imaginations of many U.S. officials and reformers, Indians’ vices were the result of contact with unruly Euroamericans, and as a consequence, many—like Cass—in turn

\(^{397}\) Indeed, as with American veterans, U.S. officials judged service during wartime as contributable to Native Americans’ qualifications for assistance. In 1821, the then governor of Michigan Territory Lewis Cass wrote to Secretary of War John C. Calhoun in order to inform him of Delawares’ readiness for removal westward. Cass explained that Delawares "are too poor & wretched to provide the means for their own transportation. They were faithful, zealous & useful during the late war & I am anxious they should, in abandoning their Country at your request, be satisfied, that we have not only justly, but liberally towards them." See Lewis Cass to John C Calhoun Detroit, March 2 1821, National Archives, RG 75, Michigan Superintendency Letters Sent, in box 1524, Delaware, 1820-1827, July 1820-1821, folder 1 of 2, Ethnohistory Collection.

framed Indian removal in terms of—and sometimes as a form of—morality-based public assistance.

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In 1825, President James Monroe offered a message to Congress on the topic of Indian removal. He ultimately suggested that, through removal, the United States could secure peace with Native Americans and that also “our commerce [would] be much extended.” He advocated establishing a government that would “protect their property from invasion, and, by the regular progress of improvement and civilization, prevent that degeneracy which has generally marked the transition from the one to the other state.” Through such a scheme, Monroe argued, the United States would “become in reality their benefactors.” Here it was clear that Monroe, like other U.S. officials endeavored to frame removal policies as philanthropic endeavors for reasons both foreign, as made clear in Cass’s article, and domestic. As a result, ideas of philanthropy, mercy, and charity infiltrated officials’ and reformers’ correspondences on the topic of removal.

As time wore on, U.S. officials’ rhetoric lost some—but certainly not all—of its generosity. In 1829, Secretary of War John Eaton informed Cherokees residing in Georgia that “[i]t must be obvious to you, and the President has instructed me again to bring it to your candid and serious consideration, that to continue where you are, within the territorial limits of an independent state, can promise you nothing but interruption and

399 Message of President Monroe on Indian Removal, January 27, 1825, in Francis Paul Prucha, ed., Documents of United States Indian Policy (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1975), 40.

400 Ibid., 39.

401 Ibid., 40.
Eaton nonetheless softened by the end of his message to write that removal would ensure that

Indians being thus brought together at a distance from their brothers, will be relieved from very many of those interruptions which, situated as they are at present, are without a remedy. The Government of the United States will then be able to exercise over them a paternal, and superintending care to happier advantage, to stay encroachments, and preserve them in peace and amity with each other; while with the aid of schools a hope may be indulged, that ere long industry and refinement, will take the place of those wandering habits now so peculiar to the Indian character, the tendency of which is to impede them in their march to civilization. Eaton’s statement that the afflictions facing Native peoples were “without a remedy” obscured the fact that Americans were the root of the problem. Indeed, such ideas reveal one of Indian policy’s fundamental contradictions. Namely, that the United States was a supposedly “benevolent” and virtuous power because it endeavored to tackle the problems posed by its vicious citizenry.

The contradictions inherent in Americans’ brand of humanitarianism, nonetheless, offered the foundations for removal. Indeed, such ideas prompted Alexis de Tocqueville to comment that it was “impossible to destroy men with more respect to the laws of humanity.” Removal in southeastern North America was, on the surface of things, more blatantlly contentious and violent than in the Ohio Country. As such, most historians focus their studies on removal schemes in that region, and in particular, on the experiences of the Cherokees and the “Five Civilized Tribes.” Contemporary Americans likewise focused their attentions on the plight of southeastern Indians. Georgia’s relations

402 Ibid., 46.
403 Ibid., 46–47.
with the Cherokees, in particular, galvanized citizens’ attention. In 1827, the state of Georgia declared that it possessed jurisdiction over Cherokee lands, and that Cherokees were subject to Georgia law. The state pressured the federal government to remove Cherokees from Georgia lands, and soon, Congress passed the Indian Removal Act in 1830 that authorized the president to negotiate treaties that would remove Native peoples east of the Mississippi. Soon thereafter, Georgia squatters and speculators intensified their campaign to push Cherokees out.\footnote{Theda Perdue and Michael D. Green, \textit{The Cherokee Nation and the Trail of Tears} (The Penguin Library of American Indian History Series) (New York: Penguin Books, 2008); William G. McLoughlin, \textit{Cherokee Renascence in the New Republic} (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986).}

The Cherokee Nation, however, fought back. When one Cherokee killed another on Cherokee lands, Georgia hanged the accused offender, Corn Tassel, denying the Cherokee Nation the right to prosecute its own people and attempting to signify the end of Cherokee sovereignty. The Cherokees brought the case before the Supreme Court in 1831, and, in one of the most infamous cases in the history of U.S.-Indian law, Chief Justice John Marshall ruled that the Supreme Court possessed no jurisdiction because the Cherokee Nation was a “domestic dependent nation.” The remainder of the 1830s were marked by ongoing pressure to remove and, ultimately, the forced removal of thousands during the “Trail of Tears” in 1838.\footnote{On Indian removal in the southeast, see Michael D. Green, \textit{The Politics of Indian Removal: Creek Government and Society in Crisis} (Lincoln, NE: Nebraska University Press, 1985); Theda Perdue, \textit{Cherokee Women: Gender and Culture Change, 1700-1835} (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1998); Anthony F.C. Wallace, \textit{The Long Bitter Trail: Andrew Jackson and the Indians} (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993); Perdue and Green, \textit{The Cherokee Nation and the Trail of Tears}.}
Even in the 1830s and 1840s, Ohio Country removals were, in some ways, quieter affairs.\(^{407}\) As in the southeast, it was a negotiated phenomenon, with Native peoples doing their best to secure advantage as well as they could, and in the Illinois Country, it provoked violent episodes such as the 1832 Black Hawk War.\(^{408}\) Corrupt treaties and bargains characterized the treaty-making process that ultimately rendered Ohio Indians migrants, but even there individuals such as the Miami Jean Baptiste Richardville secured some of his countrymen lands in Indiana. Nonetheless, Delawares, Shawnees, Miamis, Wyandots, and their neighbors repeatedly lost more land as the 1820s, 1830s, and 1840s wore on. Treaties with the Potawatomi and Miamis in 1826, for example, granted the United States valuable lands near the mouth of the Mississinewa on the Wabash River in Indiana. An 1828 treaty with Miamis, meanwhile, ensured that the republic gained lands near Sugartree Creek in Indiana from the Thorntown band of Miamis. The republic bought Delaware lands that lay adjacent to the Wyandot reservation on the Sandusky River in northern Ohio in 1829, while other treaties gradually ate away at Ohio Indians’ territory in the 1830s and 1840s. Finally in 1846, the United States forced remaining Miamis to leave Indiana for Kansas, though some Miamis nonetheless thwarted the United States and remained along the Wabash.\(^{409}\) Baltimore Quakers lamented the removals, but nonetheless hoped that their work would not be for naught. In 1825, when a

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\(^{409}\) This removal ultimately split the Miamis into two primary groups: Eastern Miamis (based in Indiana) and Western Miamis (based in Indian Territory).
portion of the Shawnees endeavored to leave Wapakoneta and travel westward, Baltimore Friends lamented that "We...hope that our labours have not been unavailing, and that even should [the Shawnees] finally be removed, they will carry with them the knowledge they have acquired, and as this becomes diffused amongst their people, they may long continue to reap advantage from the efforts that have been made for their benefit."\textsuperscript{410}

Removal in the north, including the infamous Buffalo Creek treaty of 1838 as well the various treaties pertaining to Ohio and Indiana lands, was embedded in developing American market culture: Native peoples and Americans took into account any “improvements” made on the lands, haggled for the best deal, and ultimately framed the removals as economic transactions. Ohio Country removal was also, like all American-sponsored removals in nineteenth-century North America, part of a national effort to exclude. The Mississippi still presented a formidable boundary in the imaginations of many early Americans, and pushing Indians west of that boundary was akin to other efforts to eliminate “undesirable” peoples—the urban poor, free African Americans, and Native Americans alike—from the new nation-state.

During the 1820s, many reform-minded Americans moved to institutionalize the poor by placing them in public almshouses, and Indian removal operated similarly: both offered a means to eliminate from the United States the specter of difference as well as those whom many Americans deemed undesirable. In both cases, rather than acknowledge the inadequacies of the republic’s political economy that was grounded in ideas of difference and inequality, some Americans employed physical space in order to exclude individuals from their view. Removing impoverished laborers by placing them in

\textsuperscript{410} November 1, 1825, BYMIC, vol. 2.
almshouses or shuffling poor Indians onto lands beyond the Mississippi meant that poverty, difference, and supposed failure disappeared behind walls and rivers in the early republic. Such removals left only a cultivated and successful—and thus virtuous—citizenry in plain sight.

In an era when Americans increasingly saw their claims to North American territories as boundless, geographic space was an obvious way to consolidate a nation both by claiming the right to an entire continent—and the right to carve up that territory as the republic saw fit—as well as by excluding certain people from the nation-state geographically. The case of free African Americans in the early republic elucidates this point. In 1806, Quaker John Parrish, the diplomat who factored so heavily into the United States’ efforts in the 1790s, argued that the United States should establish a territory beyond the Mississippi where free African Americans might settle. He wrote, “[h]ave not the General Legislature a right to instruct a committee to assign a tract within some part of the western wilderness (where there are millions of acres likely to continue many ages unoccupied) for colonization of those already free and disposed to remove thither?”411 As early as 1806, then, removal offered a possible solution for confronting the problem of African American freedom. Parrish envisioned the “west” as a land unoccupied—a surprising observation for a Quaker so involved in Indian affairs—that would offer African Americans refuge from the scourge of racism and the specter of re-enslavement.

Efforts to remove free blacks gained popularity—among reformers but also among slaveholders—after Gabriel’s Rebellion in 1800 and 1802, and as the numbers of

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411 For an overview of philanthropy in early America, see McCarthy, American Creed; see also, Seth Rockman, Scraping By: Wage Labor, Slavery, and Survival in Early Baltimore (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 194-230.
freed people grew after the American Revolution.  \footnote{412} Gradual emancipation and wartime service meant that more and more African Americans gained freedom to the consternation, and sometimes fear, of white Americans. In 1816, Presbyterian minister Robert Finley established the American Colonization Society (ACS) for the purpose of removing free African Americans to Africa. Great Britain, with the aid of the Committee for the Relief of the Black Poor, had already begun to send free Africans to Sierra Leone. Christopher Brown indicates that the committee’s work was partially the consequence of the British government’s increasing tendency “to think of black loyalists as wards of the state,” and the removal of black loyalists to Sierra Leone was similarly couched in terms of charitable aid. \footnote{413} After an exploratory mission to the continent, the ACS, similarly decided that Liberia, just north of Sierra Leone, presented an ideal location for emigrating Africans. It supposedly offered a haven away from the poverty of the republic’s urban spaces, it offered a means by which slaveholders could hide the example of free blacks from the enslaved, it offered free blacks an opportunity to gain the kinds of political freedoms longed for after the American Revolution, and it offered reformers a chance to further claim benevolence. \footnote{414}

Some missionaries explicitly considered the problems presented by both Native American and free African Americans populations to be similar. Both posed challenges to ideas of citizenship. Both were free, but they were non-citizens. Both were not quite

“American,” but they were not wholly “other” either. One missionary wrote to Superintendent of Indian Trade Thomas L. McKenney in 1818 in the hopes of convincing him to consider forming an American Civilization Society. This society, the missionary contended, would act "as a sister establishment to the Colonisation Society. The object of which should be to patronise the exertions of such Societies of different denominations as are actually engaged in civilising and educating the American Indians & otherwise to promote this verry important work." Such a society would "form a connecting chain to them, & harmonise their operations, & more effectually prevent any clashing between them than perhaps any other method." It was a proposal that revealed that some Americans considered the "Indian problem" to be akin to that posed by African Americans, slavery, and the problem of freedom.

Indeed, historian Linda Kerber demonstrates that reformers such as Lydia Maria Child, John Greenleaf Whittier, David Lee Child, and Nathaniel P. Rogers all denounced the U.S. government’s Indian policies while juxtaposing the Indian problem and slavery. These individuals, in newspapers and in novels, exposed the fictions of American benevolence in Indian Country and, as they did with the problem of slavery, denounced the United States for claiming to be a liberty-loving nation when, in fact, it was one that consistently failed African Americans and American Indians by qualifying or rejecting non-white peoples’ freedom or humanity. Most Quakers too, lamented the

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415 ? to Superintendent of Indian Trade, Nov. 6, 1818, National Archives, RG 75, T58. Letters Received by the Superintendent of Indian Trade, 1806-1824. The mission complex and ideas of civilization, too, played central roles in missionaries’ work in Liberia.
417 Ibid.
U.S. government’s plans for removing Cherokees, Choctaws, and Seminoles, and others in southeastern North America. By the 1830s and 1840s, the Whigs, the party of choice for many abolitionists, staunchly opposed Cass’s and Jackson’s removal plans as did many members of the Society of Friends. Ohio Friend Elisha Bates, for example, lamented in 1836 that he had “thought it possible that some plan might be adopted by which sections of territory (intermixed) might be obtained by Europeans, without at all unsettling the natives from those spots on which they might be disposed to locate themselves.”

Whether or not they shared Bates’s disappointment and disillusionment, some Whigs, as well as others who professed a sense of concern for the well-being of Native peoples, supported removal and participated in American settler colonialism. As Bethel Saler demonstrates, the term “settler” is flexible, and in the early republic, state agents—even those who sought to extend “mercy” to Native peoples—were settler colonists as much as Euroamerican immigrant families. In the Ohio Country, Indian agent John Johnston, for example, an eventual Whig who was removed from his post by Jackson in 1829, admitted that removal was, perhaps, Indians’ best hope for endurance. When organizing some Ohio Indians’ departures, however, he endeavored to ensure that they were provided for as well as possible, and he invoked ideas of mercy and charity, a narrative that obscured the violence of removal, when discussing plans for Native peoples’ removal from Ohio with his superiors. Various “depredations committed on [Natives’] property by our Citizens,” he contended in 1827, “are rapidly increasing…and

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418 Unrau, “An International Perspective on American Indian Policy,” 524.
419 Saler, The Settlers’ Empire, 9-10.
420 On settler colonialism and disavowal of violence see Veracini, Settler Colonialism, 76-86.
after a considerable part of my life spent in managing this description of persons I am free to declare, that in my judgment there is no adequate remedy but removal to a Country of their own, where a suitable Government could be established over them. Whatever speculative benevolence may urge to the contrary, their race must perish under the present management.”

Johnston’s argument was, like Cass’s, based upon the assumption that Americans could not—and should not—engage in “self denial.” For Johnston, federal regulation offered the moral option. Here, then, Johnston contrasted “speculative benevolence” with that of removal, a policy that, to his mind, offered the truest form of aid to Native peoples, that of survival. As with Cass’s 1827 article, federal power offered the most philanthropic course of action.

Johnston’s plan for removal was not that of Cass or Jackson, but his language reveals in stark terms his participation in American settler colonialism. In 1828 he wrote to McKenney to describe a piecemeal process by which, eventually, Native peoples would remove to the west. He argued that “the best and cheapest way to get rid of them would be to afford aid to individuals families and small parties. in this way a few years would relieve us from all within my agency, it would be much the cheapest plan by far the most agreeable to the Indians. the Agent might be authorised to purchase of each family when ready to go their right to the soil and compensate them for their improvements, and this would nearly cover all expence of emigration.”

421 John Johnston to Thomas L. McKenney, February 20, 1827, National Archives, RG 75 Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Roll 3, Letters Received Piqua Agency 1827, Ethnohistory Collection.

422 John Johnston to Thomas L. McKenney, January 29, 1828, National Archives, RG 75, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Roll 3, Letters Received from Piqua Agency 1828, Ethnohistory Collection.
advocated for removal—he wanted to “get rid of” the Indians—but insisted that both his (relative) good intentions and the economy mattered.

Though land sales and migration had long been part of U.S. government policy in the region, the push for removal in the Ohio Country began in earnest in the 1820s. Still, removal was colored by ideas of both U.S. political economy and settler colonialism: notions of poverty, charity, investment, territorial acquisition, and bargaining were at the heart of removal schemes. In 1820, Johnston remarked that Delawares near Piqua requested half of their annuity, $2,750, before attempting to remove. Johnston encouraged Cass to agree to the deal since "otherwise it will be impossible to get them off on account of their poverty." He continued to state that "some provision should be made for furnishing them with subsistence and ammunition [sic] to prosecute their journey." Ultimately, he lamented that "it is a troublesome and expensive affair to get rid of about 1800 souls many of them the most miserable and wretched of their race. The Government as an act of Mercy and justice too should present them with $3000 worth of goods, to clothe and send them away confortable [sic]...their claims for depredations could be commuted in this way." Johnston combined both harsh language—“get them off” and “get rid of”—with ideas of paternalistic benevolence in a way that he believed would appeal to federal officials and in a manner reflective of the growing tendency to couple poverty with assistance.

Johnston made a similar appeal in that same year that again wove rhetoric of poverty, mercy, and removal together, but that also reveals the extent to which British

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423 John Johnston to Lewis Cass, Piqua, December 30, 1820, National Archives, RG 75, roll 1, roll 7, in box 1524, Delaware, 1820-1827, Delaware, July 1820-1821, folder 1 of 2, Ethnohistory Collection.
agents in the region continued to offer Native peoples a means by which to counter the political authority of the United States after the War of 1812. Johnston noted that "[a]lmost all the Indians of this [Piqua] Agency has been at Malden the present seaso[n] to receive goods from the English, Necessity has been the chief motive, as it is found their annuities is totally inadequate to cloth their population." Here it is apparent that the British too—though, of course, Cass could never admit it—were willing to offer the region's indigenous inhabitants material goods to ameliorate their condition. Again, it appears that Native peoples’ ability to play one imperial power off of another did not vanish with the conclusion of the War of 1812. Indeed, Johnston sensed the political threat that British assistance posed his federal government, and he explained to the War Department that, "the character and dignity of this Government will be somewhat affected by these visits these Indians have parted with their Coun[try] and are now obliged to solicit charity from a foreign nation, whose Agents will not fail to improve the occurrence in a way the most disadvantageous to us." Foreign policy thus intersected with ideas of benevolence, charity, and Indian removal in the Ohio Country, and Johnston, savvy politician and practical Indian agent that he was, knew it. Earlier in the nineteenth century, Britain posed a military and diplomatic threat to the United States’ claim to the Ohio Country. By the 1820s and 1830s, the British state continued to act as both a diplomatic rival and as a sparring partner in a contest over moral authority on the continent and in the world. Johnston ultimately asked Cass, "[a]s the residence of the Tribes here cannot continue over a few years, would it not be an act of Mercy and of sound policy too, for the Government to send on Annually Three thousand Dollars worth
of cloathing for them?” Johnston, though he was a Whig by the 1830s, did not openly combat removal—indeed, he saw benefits to Ohio Indians’ departures. Nonetheless, the discourse of mercy and morality proved useful to him when making his appeal to Cass.

Though Johnston offered his pleas for government mercy in 1820, other middling officials continued to appeal to humanity in order to secure federal assistance in removal. In 1828, for example, William Clark lamented that “as the wild game deminishes, the pressing calls of those unfortunate people upon the humanity of the Government for assistance increases.” Here, however, Clark exposed the continuing disconnect between ideas and reality from which so many Euroamericans suffered. The “unfortunate people” to which Clark referred in this case were Delawares migrating from Ohio, Delawares who had undoubtedly sufficient knowledge of agriculture and who were by no means completely dependent on “the wild game.” Nonetheless, even this intellectual blindness offered a means to construe the U.S. government as humane.

Indiana memorialists felt similarly in 1830. A group of citizens who were primarily concerned with the ongoing construction of the Wabash and Erie Canal—a project that ran through Miami Country near the old site of Dennis’s Station—petitioned the federal government that year in an effort to eliminate Miami Indians. They framed their call for Miami removal, however, in philanthropic terms. The memorialists opened their letter stating that “the interest of the United States and of the State of Indiana,

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424 John Johnston to Lewis Cass, Piqua, October 1, 1820, National Archives, RG 75, Michigan Superintendence of Indian Affairs, Letters received by the Superintendent vol. 2, 331-334, microcopy 1, roll 7 in box 1524, Delaware, 1820-1827, Delaware, July 1820-1821, folder 1 of 2, Ethnohistory Collection.
425 William Clark to Peter B. Porter, August 1, 1828, National Archives, RG 75, St. Louis Superintendency, Letters Received, Roll 748, Ethnohistory Collection.
require, at this time, a course of appropriate measures to be pursued, calculated to extinguish the claim of the Indians, (more particularly the Miamies) to their reserved territory, lying upon the borders of the contemplated Wabash Canal, and within the boundaries of this State.” The writers were careful to say that they would “not fatigue your honorable body with detailing the evils which will necessarily follow the longer continuance of the Indians in the possession of their reserved territory.” Instead they simply explained that “humanity dictates their immediate removal from a place where they are exposed to many evils.”¹⁴²⁶ Though these memorialists were some of the very people who possessed the power to ensure Miamis’ protection from “evils,” they nonetheless chose to ignore that point by obscuring it with language of philanthropy in an effort to conceal—from others but also likely from themselves—less-than-humanitarian motives. Here it is clear that settler colonialism was a powerful force that was, nonetheless, made stronger with government assistance.

Indeed, rhetoric of philanthropy bolstered Americans’ various political claims, and it also, as with the mission complex, endeavored to conceal the violence of American imperialism. Rhetoric of mercy and charity obscured the fact that Native peoples’ territorial exclusion had political as well as economic benefits for the republic. Early Americans framed removal, in part, as an economic transaction—and it was. The mission complex was an investment in the United States’ future in a myriad of ways, and it presented easily-observable rewards when policies increasingly turned toward removal in the Ohio Country. In performing an analysis of Indian removal, federal officials and their correspondents made it clear that improved land was more valuable. In 1820, John Scott

¹⁴²⁶ Congressional Document Series #181, document 74, Ethnohistory Collection.
wrote to Calhoun regarding the sale of the Shawnees and Delawares' lands. "[T]he Bargain to the U States," he determined, was "a good one." The Indians' land had "Houses, Towns, and farms thereon," "Their Animals are domesticated to the place," and they had "all their property there." The proposed land west of the Mississippi, on the other hand, was "not of equal quality by a great difference" and would not be as valuable as the lands they were leaving for a long time, though Scott made no mention of how unfair such a transaction was for the Shawnees and Delawares or that such a move would erase all of the “gains” made by the civilization plan. Indeed, regarding the U.S. government's initial investment of $20,000 for the removal scheme Scott speculated that "[t]he Very first sales will more than remunerate this disbursement—and the Land [the Indians] will receive would not do it in many years." Improved land translated into profits. Missionaries' civilization efforts, the mission complex, and Native peoples' participation in the U.S. imperial market economy, ultimately incentivized, from the perspective of the United States, Indian removal.427

Even when confronting the possibility of relocation, however, Native peoples held negotiating power. When Benjamin Parke wrote to John C. Calhoun in 1820 regarding Weas' civilization and imminent departure from Indiana, he insisted that while the "prospect of civilizing the Weas" was "remote," even though their requests make it clear that they had learned enough of Euroamericans’ economic trends to negotiate a higher price for their lands. They contended that "the land abounded in Salt, Iron, Copper & Silver," and they insisted on $15,000 plus $4,000 annually for twelve years for their

lands. Parke "reluctantly allowed them five thousand dollars"—a price far below the asking price but nonetheless more than the War Department hoped to pay at a time of economic depression in the United States.  

Bargaining similarly took center stage in a talk delivered by Shawnees and Delawares that same year. They informed President Monroe that they would "exchange our Land which our Spanish father, has given us, for Fifty Square Miles, on the other side of White River, and Twenty Thousand Dollars....More than one half of this sum you will pay to those we owe, the half of the Balance will help us to improve our New Land, and the other half to procure Farming Utensils." Here, Shawnees and Delawares did not just "accommodate" American land greed but used it, as best they could to their advantage: they demanded certain lands for a certain price distributed in a particular way. What was more, they demanded that part of the cash balance owed them be issued in "Farming Utensils" and that the other half would help them "improve our New Land."

This was a win-win: the utensils ensured that U.S. manufacturers maintained a consumer base by expanding the mission complex further into Missouri, but it also ensured that additional lands would become "improved." Improved land was a thing desired by Indians and Americans alike.

Ideas of economy continued to have a prominent place in Americans’ appeals to Ohio Indians in 1830s Ohio and Indiana, even after the Indian Removal Act became law.

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428 Benjamin Parke to John C. Calhoun, Vincennes, August 15, 1820, National Archives RG 46 (Senate 16B-C2, Papers Relating to Indian Treaties) in box 1524, Delaware, 1820-1827, Delaware, July 1820-1821, folder 1 of 2, Ethnohistory Collection.

429 Shawnee and Delaware Indians, Talk to the President of the United States, Principal Town on Apple Creek, State of Missouri, September 16, 1820, National Archives, RG 107, M-92 (14), Box 1524, Delaware, 1820-1827, Delaware, July 1820-1821, folder 1 of 2, Ethnohistory Collection.
in 1830. In 1833, for example, U.S. officials spoke in glowing terms of the financial opportunities that awaited Miamis west of the Mississippi should they choose to remove. They contended that there Cherokees, Choctaws, and Creeks “have all got comfortable cabins to live in, good plantations and fences, cattle and horses, and every every [sic] thing comfortable about them, and last year, the Creeks raised forty thousand bushels of corn more than they wanted for their own consumption.— Instead of Indians looking to white men for bread as they used to do, now, white men look to Indians.”430 Such rhetoric no doubt appealed to some extent, but it was also likely looked upon with skepticism by Miamis, such as Richardville, who knew that their lands in Indiana were much more valuable than lands westward. Nonetheless, it is clear that U.S. officials understood that ideas of market, profit, and power held sway among Miamis, and the 1833 appeal reveals in stark terms the extent to which ideas of market economy ultimately informed U.S.-Indian relations. Indeed, officials went on to remark in that same appeal that “[o]ne of the chiefs [west of the Mississippi] had a contract to supply Fort Gibson with what corn they want.”431

Ideas of exclusion also ran through the 1833 appeal as officials insisted that Miamis would enjoy a section of land to themselves, set off from any “white people.” Such a promise would seem to undercut the officials’ insistence that Euroamericans depended upon Native peoples for wares and subsistence, but they paid such logical inconsistencies no attention. They did offer, however, that “the time may come, when

431 Ibid.
your condition shall be so improved that you may be admitted as a state in the American Union." Thus, in the west, Miamis could enjoy economic power and independence, and, perhaps, someday citizenship. But those things were in the future, and they were contingent upon removal. The 1833 appeal thus offers a glimpse of the ways in which Americans employed ideas of independence and market economy in order to cultivate—by ways of exclusion and territorial acquisition—a homogenized nation grounded in ideas of citizens’ equality.433

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After the American Revolution, the new United States struggled to pinpoint in precise terms the kind of polity it would be. Rhetoric played a central role in that defining process. The discourse of morality offered a means to compare the young republic with the empires of old, and it offered a powerful narrative by which early Americans could understand their place in the world while simultaneously grapple with their status as a postcolonial empire.

Ideas of race and class combined to create U.S. Indian policy in the nineteenth century, and missionaries and indigenous peoples alike played central roles in crafting both the character of those policies and the narrative that Americans spun when trying to contemplate and reconcile the immense violence that characterized their republican experiment. Non-governmental organizations like the Society of Friends offered a means

432 Ibid.
to provide “merciful” American charity for those “deserving” of it, and they ultimately enabled U.S. officials to make claims regarding the benevolence of the American empire on a global stage. Native peoples, meanwhile, alternatively fought, outwitted, and endured—sometimes all three—and they forced the young republic to make sense of an inherent contradiction—that of how to be an empire of liberty that denied the liberty, rights, and humanity to many of North America’s peoples.

Americans ultimately confronted that contradiction with additional contradictions. And they were powerful. The idea of a benevolent empire, one that could best Britain on the international stage, held purchase in the imaginations of many Americans. Whigs who disdained Jacksonian removal along with Democrats who saw in it the future of the nation, each saw power in the rhetoric of humanitarianism and philanthropy. As Linda Kerber points out, however, both got it wrong. Even those reformers who fought removal at the ballot box and in the press found a solution in the maintenance of paternalistic “benevolence” into the twentieth century.⁴³⁴ In the formative period of the republic’s generation, the rhetoric of civilization, built on the foundations of missionaries’ labors, became a tool by which Americans crafted fictions that ultimately became inseparable from their national narrative and sense of selves as citizens of the world. Missionaries, Native peoples, settlers, and officials together, then, created the American empire, and each played a role in defining the story of its birth—and of its supposed nonexistence.

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Conclusion

Negotiating American Empire

While missionaries endeavored to teach Native peoples in the way of "civilized" agriculture, they ultimately succeeded in teaching them the ways of American empire such that they facilitated Indians' adaptation to, appropriation and manipulation of U.S. imperial practices. Sometimes, this meant that Shawnee women obtained goods without paying off their debts. Other times, it meant that a Mohican could gain employment with the War Department in order to make connections with federal officials and Native leaders that could secure new lands for his people. Sometimes these strategies worked, and other times they did not. Nonetheless, they had consequences.

Indigenous peoples of eastern North America, as elsewhere, persisted in the face of incredible obstacles, and they made their persistence known. Their efforts—what Gerald Vizenor terms “survivance”—had ramifications that reverberate across time and space, and they point to a pattern of indigenous peoples working within and against ideological and political paradigms created as a result of U.S.-Indian negotiation.435 The experiences and strategies of one group of Shawnees who voluntarily left their Ohio lands behind during the late eighteenth century serves as a case in point. In 1824, these Shawnees, then in Missouri, combated the growing American empire with a nation-building project of their own. They employed the discourse of civilization in a political move that reveals not only their knowledge of North American geopolitics but also their

435 Vizenor defines “survivance” as being “an active sense of presence” that entails more than mere survival. See Gerald Vizenor, “Aesthetics of Survivance: Literary Theory and Practice” in Survivance: Narratives of Native Presence, Gerald Vizenor, editor (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), 1.
willingness to manipulate imperial ideas to their advantage. In 1824, they petitioned the Mexican government, in the very year of that republic's birth, in an effort to escape the clutches of the United States and join the state of Coahuila and Texas. The Shawnees indicated a desire "to place themselves under the protection of the Mexican government" and asked for a tract of land "on the west bank of the Colorado River from the Pedernales upward on this river with its western branches which go out from it, with the proportion of an English square mile for each family."\(^{436}\) They asked for this land not only for themselves but also "for all their allies and friends who may follow them, giving them one English mile square for each family."\(^{437}\) They ultimately indicated that it was "[o]n these conditions they have the hope that many thousands will unite with them in taking this asylum under the Mexican Government."\(^{438}\) These Shawnees were willing to adopt the ways of U.S. settler colonialism—moving with families to new lands—in order to remain together and ensure their future.

The Shawnees' petition reveals both that Shawnee leadership kept themselves well-informed concerning North American politics, but also that they were keenly aware of the needs of the newly republican Mexican government in particular. According to one official, the Shawnees in question apparently promised Mexican officials "of being industrious, pacific, and in another state of culture than those that have hostilized [sic] us."\(^{439}\) Here, then, it is apparent that the Shawnee leaders who made the original petition capitalized on the discourse of civilization. These were "industrious" Shawnees who

\(^{436}\) Richard C. Adams, Brief Sketch of the Sabine Land Cession in Texas, p. 50, Shawnee File, Box #8029, Folder 1 of 1 (1824), Ethnohistory Collection.
\(^{437}\) Ibid.
\(^{438}\) Ibid.
\(^{439}\) Ibid.
could also protect the Mexican state from the raids that pestered its northern border. Indeed, these Shawnees coupled their civilized state with the fact that they could offer "270 men capable of bearing arms."\textsuperscript{440} The discourse of civilization here was thus flexible: Shawnees could use it to either make claims upon the U.S. state or to appeal to other states; what was more, the Shawnees could claim to be farmers who also knew how to wage war. Civilization, these Shawnees found, offered numerous ways to mold themselves into what it was that their audience required. Indeed, they were so successful at doing just this that the official who forwarded the Shawnees' petition onward to Mexican officials wrote that, "[i]n conclusion...this province needs this kind of settlers for its advancement."\textsuperscript{441}

The Mexican Republic offered Shawnees a means by which to become "settlers" themselves. By joining the Republic of Mexico, they hoped to carve an independent life for themselves and for their nation or for a pan-Indian confederacy of Indian nations—for "all their allies and friends who may follow them." Indeed, it was a political move for independence that nearly parallels Texans' movement to be part of Mexico. What is more, the attempt to secure "one English mile square for each family" indicates an adoption of the ways of U.S. settler colonialism. These Shawnees desired land per family, and the household became the unit by which they proposed to move and settle Mexican lands. While we should not ignore the trauma of being pushed off of ancestral lands, these Shawnees demonstrate that there was ample power at play even in removal.

\textsuperscript{440} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{441} Ibid.
The Shawnees' petition did not ultimately secure them "one English mile per family," but they were nonetheless allowed to remain "on the right bank of the Red River of Natchitoches." The Mexican government granted "them as well as to their friends, those already settled, that they continue there cultivating and working the lands which they already have opened, or may have commenced to cultivate, reserving as to their estate and permanence whatever it may please the Supreme General Executive Power to resolve as a point specially of his knowledge and approbation." Thus, these Shawnees could remain in the state of Coahuila and Texas and others could join them there even though additional lands would not be available. Though this was a mixed result for the Shawnees, the petition nonetheless reveals the tenuous nature of North American geopolitics even after the War of 1812. The power of the discourse of civilization extended far beyond attempted "assimilation" or even Indians' ability to carve out a place within the Ohio Country; it offered some emigrants an opportunity to continue to play one power off of another even after the War of 1812 decreased their ability to work with the British in North America. Shawnees' adoption of ideas of U.S. empire ultimately provided opportunities to carve out new lives either in the Ohio Country or as far removed as the Mexican Republic, and such episodes illuminate the contingencies of North American political and economic development.

442 December 24, 1824, from Richard C. Adams, Brief Sketch of the Sabine Land Cession in Texas, p. 50, Shawnee File, Box #8029, Folder 1 of 1 (1824), Ethnohistory Collection.
443 Ibid.
444 On April 16, 1825, Juan Antonio Padilla reported that "the President approves the establishment of the Shawnee Indians at the points indicated by [the Governor], provided...they observe the constitution and laws of the Nation, and that they may not themselves form a body of a nation, with their own authority, but must obey those of the State." Adams, Brief Sketch, 56 in Shawnee File, Box #8029, Folder 1 of 1 (1825-1826), Ethnohistory Collection. Paying close attention to the rise and power of the Mexican Republic in the early republic reminds us that
The power of civilization and of missionaries and NGOs’ partnerships with the U.S. federal state opened space for Native peoples to develop innovative methods to combat the American empire, but it also proved remarkably effective in facilitating the growth of that empire. The civilization plan’s many effects—economic development, state growth, U.S. claims to humanitarianism—were powerful enough that variations of the plan continued to shape U.S. foreign policy into the twentieth and, indeed, twenty-first century. The mission complex soon included Asia, Africa, and South America. Wherever missionaries traveled, they brought with them particular ideas of consumerism, labor, and morality that facilitated the spread of American socioeconomic and, often, political ideals. In many ways, Indian Country was the formative ground upon which those paradigms of American imperialism emerged. As the nineteenth century progressed, the world became the United States’ newest “Indian Country.”

The Shawnees’ efforts also, however, point to the holes in Americans’ imperial project. Americans continued to adapt their Indian policies to Native peoples’ politics of persistence throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Policies shifted between—and sometimes combined—civilization, removal, allotment, boarding schools, termination, and, thanks to indigenous peoples’ work during the height of “Red Power”

and the American Indian Movement, a slow recognition of indigenous rights and sovereignty by the later twentieth century. The Society of Friends, too, remained central to such policies, and they ultimately became pivotal to President Ulysses S. Grant’s “peace policy” after the U.S. Civil War, acting as superintendents of Indian affairs during that period. Such shifts were due in no small part to indigenous peoples’ refusal to disappear.

That American policy-makers altered their tactics so often suggests their frustration in combating the United States’ “Indian problem.” Indeed, the very fact that indigenous peoples continue today to live in Indiana and Ohio exposes the chinks in the American imperial armor. Yet, to return to Tocqueville, because Americans built their empire “quietly, legally, philanthropically, without bloodshed, without violating a single one of the great principles of morality in the eyes of the world,” they ensured that Native peoples would find ways to maneuver within the legal and philanthropic paradigms of that empire and, in turn, to continuously redefine those paradigms.446 Present-day struggles in courts and before Congress on the issues of gambling, fishing and water rights, and domestic violence on Indian reservations reveal that American imperialism did not, in fact, lead to the ends that Tocqueville thought it did. He claimed that Americans, “with marvelous ease,” found a way to “exterminate the Indian race” and “prevent the Indians from sharing their rights,” but they did not, despite their best efforts, do so.447 Rather, Americans’ strategies—including mission work and “philanthropic”

447 Ibid.
violence—left room for American Indians to continue to negotiate the terms of American imperialism into the twenty-first century.
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