Imperial Enterprise: The United States International Volunteer Program, Neoliberal Empire, and Northern Youth

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Imperial Enterprise: The United States International Volunteer Program, Neoliberal Empire, and Northern Youth

Abstract
In recent years, the phenomenon of Northern international volunteering has been conceived as an instance of post-collegiate "continuing education" and, as such, has been attributed to a neoliberal logic of self-enterprise. However, such accounts have neglected to interrogate how an entrenched logic of empire also animates the practice of recruiting and deploying Northern citizens to volunteer in the "developing" world. Also overlooked have been the particular intersections of these logics in the discourses of international volunteer programs, the related subject formations of Northern volunteers who come under their tutelage, and the ways in which these intersections engage broader geopolitical objectives of Northern states.

Focusing on the Ecuador operations of a major US-American international volunteer program that I call Global Community, this dissertation examines the interplay between imperialist injunctions of improving and touring a mythologized "Third World" Other and neoliberalist directives of self-enterprise and consumerism, among others. Drawing on one year of ethnographic fieldwork conducted with a cohort of Global Community Ecuador volunteers, this dissertation also examines the role of the international volunteer program in the application of a governmental technology that is both imperial and neoliberal in its rationale.

Recruitment materials, compendium texts, and training activities are examined as both discursive formations and governmental acts that index broader discourses of imperialism and neoliberalism, simultaneously constructing and instructing volunteers in relation to a discursively produced Ecuadorian otherness that the program frames as the cornerstone of the volunteer stint. Focusing specifically on three distinct "contact zones" (Pratt 2007/1992) through which the program attempts to guide the volunteer – the Ecuadorian public space, the Ecuadorian homestay, and the Ecuadorian classroom (where volunteers teach English to Ecuadorian students) – each ethnographic chapter explores the relational components of volunteer subjectivity vis-a-vis an imagined Ecuadorian alterity, considering how volunteer subjectivities index program discourses and behavioral injunctions, as well as a continual interplay between the imperial and the neoliberal. Additionally, I examine how volunteer subjectivity is constituted through their continual subjection to Ecuadorian discourses around gringo-ness, which, in unsettling the production of white US-American racial normativity, pose indirect challenge to some of the foundational assertions of international volunteering discourse.

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IMPERIAL ENTERPRISE: THE UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL VOLUNTEER
PROGRAM, NEOLIBERAL EMPIRE, AND NORTHERN YOUTH

Caitlin Anderson

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IMPERIAL ENTERPRISE: THE UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL VOLUNTEER PROGRAM,
NEOLIBERAL EMPIRE, AND NORTHERN YOUTH

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Caitlin Anderson
For my beloved parents, Nancy and Eli
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ABSTRACT

IMPERIAL ENTERPRISE: THE UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL VOLUNTEER PROGRAM, NEOLIBERAL EMPIRE, AND NORTHERN YOUTH

Caitlin Anderson
Kathleen D. Hall

In recent years, the phenomenon of Northern international volunteering has been conceived as an instance of post-collegiate “continuing education” and, as such, has been attributed to a neoliberal logic of self-enterprise. However, such accounts have neglected to interrogate how an entrenched logic of empire also animates the practice of recruiting and deploying Northern citizens to volunteer in the “developing” world. Also overlooked have been the particular intersections of these logics in the discourses of international volunteer programs, the related subject formations of Northern volunteers who come under their tutelage, and the ways in which these intersections engage broader geopolitical objectives of Northern states.

Focusing on the Ecuador operations of a major US-American international volunteer program that I call Global Community, this dissertation examines the interplay between imperialist injunctions of improving and touring a mythologized “Third World” Other and neoliberal directives of self-enterprise and consumerism, among others. Drawing on one year of ethnographic fieldwork conducted with a cohort of Global Community Ecuador volunteers, this dissertation also examines the role of the international volunteer program in the application of a governmental technology that is both imperial and neoliberal in its rationale.

Recruitment materials, compendium texts, and training activities are examined as both discursive formations and governmental acts that index broader discourses of imperialism and neoliberalism, simultaneously constructing and instructing volunteers in relation to a discursively produced Ecuadorian otherness that the program frames as the cornerstone of the volunteer stint. Focusing specifically on three distinct “contact zones” (Pratt 2007/1992) through which the program attempts to guide the volunteer – the Ecuadorian public space, the Ecuadorian homestay, and the Ecuadorian classroom (where volunteers teach English to Ecuadorian
students) – each ethnographic chapter explores the relational components of volunteer subjectivity vis-à-vis an imagined Ecuadorian alterity, considering how volunteer subjectivities index program discourses and behavioral injunctions, as well as a continual interplay between the imperial and the neoliberal. Additionally, I examine how volunteer subjectivity is constituted through their continual subjection to Ecuadorian discourses around gringo-ness, which, in unsettling the production of white US-American racial normativity, pose indirect challenge to some of the foundational assertions of international volunteering discourse.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Distant Fantasies

“Here, take some of these before I eat them all.”

On an early Saturday morning I sat in the sunlit kitchen of a Spanish colonial style house in the wealthy suburbs of Cuenca, a large city in the southern highlands of Ecuador. Cool mountain air mingled with the warmth of the morning sun, its brightness creeping slowly across the shaded room. Across the table from me was Matt, a 25-year-old from a suburb of Indianapolis, and between us a small white bowl filled with bright mango slices that he had set out when I had arrived. “They’re super good,” he now added groggily, flashing a sleepy smile as he spoke. A cell phone chirped from a distant upper corner and the yap of a small dog quickly sounded from somewhere above us. Slow footsteps padded back and forth overhead. The house, it seemed, was stirring. Dressed in a faded grey hoodie sweatshirt and jeans, his sand brown hair slightly rumpled, Matt looked like he could use a few more hours of sleep.

The night before, Matt’s students had thrown him a birthday party at Bar Verde Pintón y Maduro, one of the city’s most popular nightclubs. I had left the party at around 2 o’clock in the morning, when the festivities were being relocated to a local bar. I had called Matt in the morning to confirm whether he was still up for our interview, and he had proudly informed me that he had not gotten in until 7:45 in the morning. My ears still ringing with reggaeton and merengue, I had listened as he had proudly filled me in on what they had done afterwards. “Yeah, we left Verde Pintón but, like, all the bars were closed, all the discotecas were closed, so we just went back to my buddies’ hostel and finished all those beers we took from the bar. I just got home.” The friends he spoke of were from the United States. They had come to visit him now that his classes were over for the semester, and the 4 of them would be embarking on a 2-week trip through Peru later that morning. When I had arrived at the house, a bi-level structure with walls of snow white adobe

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1 For purposes of anonymity and confidentiality, all names and places of origin are pseudonymous. Additionally, and for the same purposes, several potentially identifying details about “Global Community” have also been changed.
and a roof of terra cotta half-cylinder tiles, Matt had greeted me at the door and we had joked in hushed tones that his lack of sleep might make the next hour or so a bit difficult for him.

As we began the conversation, Matt responded to my questions as elaborately and as thoughtfully as always, taking time to ponder and clarify. Approximately 30 minutes in, I had a few more areas I wanted to cover. “When you were applying and planning to come here,” I asked, “were you expecting anything in particular? Did you form any specific expectations?” Matt shook his head slightly as I finished the question. “Well, I didn’t do as much research on purpose,” he began, “because I didn’t want to have expectations. I feel like sometimes when I would put expectations on things and then I don’t reach them, I feel really upset about it. So, if I had come in saying, ‘Oh yeah, I want to become fluent in Spanish’ or, ‘I’m going to love my host family and we’re going to talk forever’ or, ‘I’m going to make the best friends ever’ and that didn’t happen, I would be upset about it, and so far I’ve been super content with what I’ve achieved down here.”

I listened as he went on to explain that he loved the city where he was living and that he had gotten “lucky” with an “amazing” host family. We continued talking for a bit, and I soon asked him if he had any sense of the Global Community mission. “I’m not sure really,” he confessed, his voice trailing off and his gaze drifting to his right. He seemed distracted by his thoughts. “I don’t know if this is answering the question,” he said after a few seconds had gone by, “but I guess a different expectation—sorry, this is like the question 10 minutes ago but...” Like many of his peers often ended up sharing with me, it turned out that Matt had in fact formed some expectations and I was grateful he was choosing to share.

“At first,” he continued in a somewhat confidential tone, “I thought I’d be in a little town. Like, an indigenous community, teaching.” His voice a bit wistful, he continued, telling me that he sometimes returned to this expectation in his mind, especially when he traveled to more rural areas outside the big city where Global Community had actually placed him. He described a recent trip Quilotoa, a national Ecuadorian tourist attraction flanked by small predominantly Amerindian towns. He told me how he and a friend, another Global Community volunteer named Andrew, had traveled there on the bus and stayed with an “indigenous family” who owned a
hostel. Smiling, he recalled the moment of their arrival as the “only gringos” in the town. “We walked in and everyone was there greeting us and whatever and it was like, a little indigenous school. It was like, ‘How sick would that be to teach here for a couple months even?’”

My interest peaked, I asked him, “Why would it be so…” Before I could finish, Matt was ready with a response. “Just because it’s a different experience,” he said, his eyes brightening. “If I was in an indigenous town for a year, I’m sure I would really, really struggle, but 6 months is long enough to where you get a good experience but short enough to where you don’t go crazy. It would just be something totally different. Seeing something totally different and doing something totally different that not a lot of people could say they’ve done.” He continued talking about the town he and Andrew had visited, remembering that he had “been uncomfortable for two days,” as there had been no running water in the hostel where they had stayed.

Recalling that he had prefaced his account of this trip by sharing that, before coming to Ecuador, he had actually imagined living in a “little town, an indigenous community,” I asked him if what he had just described corresponded to what he had envisioned so many months ago when he had made plans to spend a year teaching English in Ecuador through Global Community, a United States international volunteer organization. “Yeah,” he replied, his eyes brightening. He nodded with certainty. “At first, that’s what I thought and I was like, ‘I’m okay with this. I’m sure I’m going to struggle. I’m sure it’s going to be really hard. But how much am I going to get out of this? Spanish, like, experience teaching, experiencing the culture, just a whole different experience that I would have that sets me apart, y’know. It’ll definitely boost my resume and whatever and make me a better candidate for lots of things, I hope.”

As Matt’s words hung in the air, I quickly nodded, offering a casual “mm hmm” intended to indicate that I understood just what he meant. He had presented his vision to me as one that I would naturally relate to, and, in the moment, it was easy enough to do so. Two years ago, I too had been a Global Community volunteer, and, more recently, I had spent extended time with Matt and his cohort of 35 other volunteers who were participants in my dissertation research. At the same time, however, I found myself quietly distracted by the fantasy Matt had just laid out, a
fantasy distinctly void of any remote consideration of how the people of Quilotoa may feel about him (or any other US-American) coming to live in their town, let alone as a teacher and as a teacher of English at that, a fantasy lacking in any contemplation of whether English instruction was even desired or regarded as necessary by the people of the town, a fantasy that took these issues for granted as it easily moved onto the matter of making himself "better" and boosting his resumé through living, specifically as a US-American English teacher, within a space of imagined Third World "other-ness."

Back at the table, Matt continued, apparently determined to eke something out of his big city placement in a "developing" country. “But even here in Cuenca,” he pointed out, “I don’t have the same amenities or the things I had back in the United States and it’s made me a lot better as a person.” I asked him how so, and he replied, “I don't know, I've lived on my own a lot, but I've always had things like a dishwasher or laundry machine or something like that, and so when I have to take my clothes to the laundry and it costs money and time or I have to wash my dishes by hand, it’s like – it’s going to make me appreciate – for example, with the laundry, I’m going to save my money. I’m not going to waste money on stupid stuff.”

Matt was part of a cohort of Northern international volunteers that I ethnographically followed for almost a year, a group of 36 mostly young, mostly white, mostly middle and upper class, all college educated US-Americans who had come to Ecuador as would-be English teachers through an international volunteer organization I refer to as Global Community. In 2009, the year I began fieldwork, Matt and his peers were part of the nearly 1 million US-Americans who volunteer internationally every year (see Lough, 2013). After passing through a straightforward application process (a few essays, letters of recommendation, and an interview with a program alum) and in exchange for an up-front payment of roughly $5,000 per person, Global Community had trained, placed, and kept supervisory and supportive tabs on Matt and his fellow volunteers as English teachers in partnering Ecuadorian institutions of education – a mix of colleges, high schools, and vocational institutions. No prior teaching experience, Spanish language ability, or relevant training was required of the volunteers – though a native English
speaking ability and a college education were. Over the course of the year, volunteers received a monthly stipend paid by their hosting Ecuadorian educational institutions and subsidized by the Ecuadorian government; half of this they were required to give to their “host families,” also recruited and coordinated by Global Community.²

Returning now to that sunny morning in the home of Matt’s host family, as arresting as it may have been in the moment, Matt’s fantasy – his recounted vision of himself accumulating certain skills and attributes through an immersion into an imagined “Third World” otherness – would turn out to be one of many that were quite similar. Over many hours of in-depth conversations with his peers, I asked them about their expectations, listening both when they responded directly to my questions as well as when they inadvertently gave glimpses into what they had envisioned. As the year proceeded, I became privy to an array of fantasy encounters – with “host families,” students, the proverbial “community,” and “the culture” – all of which centered on the fulfillment of self-oriented desires to experience, to grow, to “test out” teaching, to broaden perspectives, to be titillated and entertained, to learn Spanish, to be pushed out of one’s “bubble,” and all with an eye towards a vague sense of self-improvement and a more explicitly expressed calculation of how it would enhance their career and/or graduate school prospects. By the end of the year, I had become almost unfazed by these accounts. However, every time I heard one I could not help being struck by the sense of entitlement that they belied, a casual sense of entitlement to not only drop into the communities, schools, and homes of Ecuador and somehow improve them, but also to make use of their imagined encounters with the people, conditions, and cultures that populated these spaces in ways that allowed them to accumulate a certain human capital expected to yield a return on the job market.

How does a middle or upper-middle class US-American youth even presume to aspire towards pursuing a volunteer stint in the “Global South,” a “developing country,” or the “Third

² Based on anecdotal evidence, this stipend was significantly higher than the typical salary of full-time Ecuadorian English teachers in comparable positions, and, as per Global Community policy, volunteers were required/permitted to teach in a half-time capacity only.
World”

How does he or she come to relate to the imagined local communities and cultures of these particular regions of the world as spaces which he or she can easily drop into, “help,” tour, and, at the same time, make use of in terms of her or his own imagined personal and professional development? What are some other relational aspects of this subjectivity that volunteers develop vis-à-vis the imagined “Third World” cultures, communities, and individuals they attempt to explore, “improve,” consume, know, and “experience”? What is the institutional context in which such a subjectivity is able to emerge? What sorts of controlling constructs and rationalities of rule are implicated in the formation of this subjectivity?

Taking an approach that has gone relatively unpursued in the literature on Northern international volunteers and development workers, this dissertation foregrounds an examination of how the actual international volunteer program plays a key role in the subject formations of volunteers, interpreting it as an institution of governmentality (see Vrasti, 2013; see also Miller & Rose, 2013, p. 21) through which an ideational relation between the US-American/Northern volunteer subject and an imagined Third World is made through the deployment of program discourses that are circulated and mobilized on its promotional website, in its printed literature, and, in the case of Global Community, over the course of its intensive orientations and periodic conferences administered to volunteers over the course of their yearlong volunteer stint. At the same time, a central contention of this dissertation is that neither the institutional context that is the phenomenon of Northern international volunteering nor the particular subject positions it offers to volunteers are simply isolated phenomena. Rather, they are situated in historic and ongoing state projects of capitalist empire and neoliberal governmentality, and moreover,

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3 For lack of a better alternative, I use these admittedly problematic terms interchangeably throughout this dissertation. By offsetting them with quotation marks, I hope to underscore their discursive nature. By using them, my intention is not to uncritically reify anachronistic binaries or hierarchical world orderings in which the international volunteer industry is, itself, clearly invested. I use them as instantly recognizable, if problematic, terms that reference a particular region of the world that has been discursively produced through histories of colonialism, imperialism, Cold War science, development, and, more recently, imperfect geographical/economic distinctions that have emerged as the more politically correct, (if ultimately similar for all intents and purposes), way of codifying and ordering the world.
constitute the translation of the political rationales that animate these projects to the realm of the programmatic (Ibid, p. 60), and ultimately the institutional, where matters of individual conduct and related self-imaginings most actively intersect with concerns of national policy (Gordon, 1991).

1.2 Origins of the Study: Encountering the International Volunteer Program and Arriving at Volunteer Subjectivity as the Research Focus

The subjectivity formation processes among the participants in my study were not always foremost in the conceptualization of my dissertation research. In fact, I had originally come to the project with the intention of examining the ways in which the Global Community program generated a particular truth about Ecuador, a concern that had been cultivated during my own time as a Global Community volunteer in Ecuador. Here, my own story of arriving at the topic of international volunteering becomes salient.

In the fall of 2007, I had come to the Global Community program fresh from graduate school coursework and not remotely versed in the discourses and cultures of international volunteer programs. Upon signing on with Global Community Ecuador, I had quickly received an introductory packet that included a guide entitled “A Manual for Living and Working as a Teacher in Ecuador”, (the Manual, hereafter), an 82-page bound document that was essentially an overview of Ecuadorian culture, customs, and idioms, the Ecuadorian education system, and job expectations and obligations that awaited me as a Global Community English teacher. I had also received a brief description of the Ecuadorian “host family” with whom I had been placed for the year. As I had begun reading, I had been surprised by the program’s approach insofar as it read as a sustained exercise in the “othering” of Ecuador, Ecuadorians, and Ecuadorian “culture.” Moreover, and strangely enough, while the guide encouraged the volunteer to “keep an open mind,” it paradoxically coursed with powerful strands of ethnocentrism and cultural chauvinism. In particular, Ecuadorian English teachers were cast as misguided and ineffective, mired by their “traditional” techniques, which were identified as the “the creation of structured and rigid

4 Title reworded for purposes of anonymity and confidentiality.
classrooms and the use of rote memorization.” My fellow volunteers and I were strongly discouraged from using these methods and were instructed to utilize a purportedly superior and more up-to-date Communicative Language Approach that was based on interactive activities, games, and English-only classroom policies.

But perhaps the most striking example of this sort of cultural chauvinism was found in a letter penned by the program’s executive director. In it, he alerted the reader to the difficulties of “teaching at the university level in a developing country.” Part of the challenge, he began, would be to avoid disillusionment and discouragement when institutions and people acted differently from the ways I, the volunteer, expected them to. He went on to explain what he meant. “It’s difficult to be sympathetic,” he cautioned in a been-there-done-that toned interlude, “when department chairmen are irresponsible, when teaching roles or classes are changed or cancelled with little notice, and departments seem disorganized, or faculty unqualified and poorly prepared, or students don’t seem to care.”

While the ethnocentrism of this description of what we, as US-American volunteers, might expect to find in Ecuador had been troubling enough, what came next had been even more unsettling. “But there are reasons that developing countries are struggling economically,” the letter continued. “And if you face some of these situations, you will see first-hand some of the reasons why. These are also characteristics of other segments of the society as well.” These reasons had remained unspecified, with the next two sentences then simply informing the volunteer that, “Knowing this is extraordinarily important for persons interested in helping or doing work in developing countries. In trying to make anything happen in any culture, it is imperative to understand how the culture actually functions, what the values really are, how the community will really react.”

While the idea that as volunteers we were to attempt to understand the culture in which we were going to work lent a tone of sensitivity that is often applauded and undoubtedly preferable to the alternative, this appeal to an ethic of understanding could not distract from the more casually asserted claiming of US-American authority to in fact change a culture (or, at least,
“make [something] happen” in a given culture). Moreover, it was paired with an injunction to not only develop one’s understanding of a local culture as a matter of course, but to then attribute unsettling phenomena (i.e. the aforementioned “irresponsible” chairmen, last-minute changes to teaching schedules, etc.), as well as the broader “economic struggling” endured by developing countries, to cultural values and behaviors. Indeed, aside from a quick mention of “historical factors, even ones that are no longer valid,” there was no mention of the historic and ongoing relations of political and economic domination between the United States and Ecuador, and Latin America, more broadly.

In these ways, the executive director (who earlier in the letter had in fact recommended that my fellow incoming volunteers and I read Harrison and Huntington’s (2000) Culture Matters: How Human Values Shape Human Progress) seemed to be not only biasing us against our future teaching institutions, but also instructing us to understand these institutions as symptoms of a broader dysfunctional Ecuadorian culture that was itself to blame not only for “economic struggling” the country endured, but also for everything that we would presumably find problematic about it. In fact, as if to underscore the executive director’s points, a quote from a former volunteer had been pasted alongside the text of his letter. It read:

My relationship with my director has given me a first-hand look at the roots of many problems Ecuador seems to have. From afar, it seems to have huge, general problems with unidentifiable causes. However, when you start to understand a little better, it seems like many of the problems stem from people who care highly about appearances, but do not want to or are unable to see that they are highly lacking in organization.

Struck by this culturalist explanation of global inequality, this endlessly ahistorical, apolitical and condescending attribution of a developing country’s economic struggles to bad behavior on the part of its citizens, and the lack of attention to histories of colonization and present-day actualities of neocolonialism and imperialism, I had read on. As I did, I had quickly learned that the purported cultural pathos of Ecuador was precisely where we, as college educated US-Americans, were to come in. We were to “do a tremendous thing for Ecuador” not only through teaching English, but also through leading by behavioral example. Specifically, we
were to "give them [our future students] the skills and even more importantly the attitudes they need to make their country successful in meeting the needs of all of its citizens."

As it turned out the Manual was an introduction of things to come. The next phase of my instruction on "living and working as a teacher in Ecuador" came with the month-long in-country Orientation, where the culturalist, ethnocentric discourse of the Manual only intensified. Here, the Global Community field staff picked up where the guidebook had left off, schooling my volunteer cohort on Ecuador and Ecuadorians through the most banal and predictable stereotypes about the “Third World;” dangerous, dirty, “traditional,” backward, irresponsible, corrupt, inferior, undeveloped – these constructions dominated our education on the country, the culture, and the people. “These people really know how to steal!” one field director told us during a lecture on safety. "In Ecuador, there is no word for germ," said the woman who gave us the 'health talk,' “It doesn’t exist.” This sort of othering was also at play in how the field directors represented our future bosses ("Ecuadorian directors are procrastinators," read one line of an e-mail from a field director) and our students ("Ecuadorian students find any way they can to cheat," said the other field director during an orientation session on classroom management).

Over the course of the year, I was continually struck by how my fellow volunteers seemed to pick up these deficiency-based ways of thinking and talking about Ecuador and Ecuadorians, processing the unfamiliar by rewording the program’s problematic teachings and bandying them about in their conversations with each other. For that reason, I tended to keep my distance from the group and did not delve as deeply as I might have into the ways in which they imagined and constructed Ecuador in their thoughts and daily conversations. However, it was deeply troubling that this way of thinking and speaking about Ecuador and Ecuadorians – this condescension, this othering, this generalizing – was so apparent and common among these people who were entering Ecuadorian classrooms as teachers.

By the end of the year, I had gotten over my initial shock, but the things I had heard stuck in my mind as I returned to the United States. After a brief detour brought on by contemplating a different research interest that ultimately fell through for logistical reasons (See Appendix A), I
eventually began contemplating how these informal findings had the makings of a dissertation project. Having never studied international development, I started reading. At the recommendation of a friend, I started with Arturo Escobar’s *Encountering Development* (1995). I was instantly captivated by Escobar’s critical history of the international development project and was intrigued by his conceptualization of development as a set of discourses and practices through which the “Third World” is produced in particular ways that rationalize and normalize the intervention of the West. Specifically, Escobar’s assertion that this discourse centered on constructions of the Third World as backward, inferior, and childlike resonated powerfully with what I had heard from the lips of my field directors and peers during the year I spent in Ecuador. As plans for research took shape in my mind, I began to conceptualize volunteers as something akin to Escobar’s “experts,” whom emerge in his text as the producers and deployers of the discourses of development. I began to think about how, after being schooled by our field directors in the sort of discourses Escobar describes, many of my peers had in turn reproduced these discourses in their conversations, e-mails, and practices both in and outside of the classroom, “expertly” describing an Ecuador that was defined by deficiency, problematic behaviors, and immorality.

However, in addition to the program’s constructions of Ecuador and Ecuadorians, there was another strand to my research interest. This was the particular volunteer project in which my peers and I had engaged: teaching English in Ecuador, a South American Spanish-speaking “developing” country. This project had always sat with me uncomfortably as a misguided form of “help,” a contribution that was clearly steered by ulterior motives. Why was it so important to teach English in Ecuador? Why was this being presented to us as a need? Did this not simply constitute a neo-imperialist move to impose the English language in non-English speaking contexts, to bolster markets for US-American products by indirectly building familiarity with the language of the United States, to reify US dominance by constructing the English language as a necessity for populations who live in a country where the national language is Spanish?
The program, it seemed, had anticipated these very sorts of concerns. On its website and in its printed literature, the program pointedly informed prospective volunteers that it “been invited” to teach English in Ecuador. Further, the website explained, English proficiency in Ecuador meant increased economic opportunity. These coded reassurances that we were not “imposing” English on Ecuadorians offered a palatable explanation of what were doing: providing a useful service that had not only been requested, but was also unequivocally beneficial to the people of Ecuador. There was no imposition to see here. However, I could never turn off my somewhat knee-jerk critique – what of the global context of US hegemony through which any Ecuadorian demand for English had taken shape? How did it serve US interests? Who exactly had invited us to teach English in Ecuador and how were they positioned with respect to the global elite?

Upon arrival in Ecuador as a volunteer, my questions had been quickly complicated by what I found. English instruction was everywhere, particularly in the cities, where English academies and institutions were easily found. However, in addition to these private businesses patronized by the country’s upper classes, English instruction was provided to Ecuadorian children in both public and private primary and secondary schools, as per national policy. Moreover, with regard to the experience of my peers and I, our educational institution directors clearly seemed to want us there and it soon became apparent to me that “native English speakers” were highly coveted as English teachers. As one Ecuadorian English professor, Doctora Barragán told me once with a somewhat irreverent, somewhat defeated smile, “They [the students] don’t want us.” When it came to attitudes toward learning English, among my students there was a mixture of perspectives. Some hated learning English, others loved it, many enjoyed it, and some did not seem too passionate either way, but were there because their parents had enrolled them or because their educational institution required English or because their educational institution had a foreign language requirement and they believed English was the most useful language to study. Regardless of their level of interest, all students were quite cognizant and convinced of the national truism that learning English “opened doors;” this was not
only a commonsense belief but also an empirically based conclusion. In Ecuador, it is common knowledge that many employers commonly require a certain level of English language education (and a certificate that verifies this).

While everything I witnessed pointed to real desires for English instruction – on the part of both the state and individual citizens – it also underscored a certain colonizing force that English seemed to exercise. English, as Escobar (1995) had written about development, “had achieved the status of a certainty in the social imaginary” (p. 5) and when it came to the idea that “English opens doors” it did, at many moments and within certain settings, seem “impossible to conceptualize reality in other terms” (Ibid). While my peers and I had not initiated the colonizing grip of English, we were inescapably agents of it, and for many of us, willingly so. Within the group, many were certain that we were in fact doing a good thing, providing English instruction in a country where learning English was, based on what we saw and heard, actually quite consequential in the employment chances of our students. In this light, I began to think of the volunteers that the program sends to developing countries not only as subjects of a broadly circulating development discourse that mobilizes notions of imparting a one right way of teaching onto members of a woefully misguided society, but also as subjects of an equally broadly circulating English discourse that constructs English language skills as an essential and vital concern for economic survival (more on this later).

As my interest in ethnographically studying the volunteer program grew, I also began researching the specific activity of U.S. international volunteering, quickly discovering that, over the last 10 or so years, rates of volunteering overseas had risen dramatically among U.S. citizens, particularly among those who were white, in their early twenties, college educated, and of the middle and upper classes (see Lough, 20065; also see Lough, 2010, 2012, 2013a, 2013b).

5 Drawing on US Census data from 2005, Benjamin Lough (2006) found that 92% of US international volunteers that year were white, that people between the ages of 15 and 24 were most frequently volunteering overseas, that over 50 percent of all international volunteers held a bachelor’s degree or higher, and that 3 out of 4 had attended some college. Additionally, Lough (Ibid) found that 6 out of 10 international volunteers hailed from households with an annual income of more than $50,000 and that 1 in 4 came from households with an annual income of
It was at this time that I came across the website of the International Volunteer Initiative (later the Building Bridges Coalition), which was housed by the Brookings Institution (see Brookings Institution n.d.). Here, I discovered that international volunteering was being supported and advocated as a strategy of United States “soft power,” a sort of unabashed cultural imperialism by another name (see Caprara, 2007; Caprara & Rosenthal, 2008, Quigley & Rieffel, 2008; Rieffel & Zalud, 2006). The stated mission of the Initiative was to develop and enhance private international volunteer programs (going beyond the federal Peace Corps was a prominent theme on the website), and to double the number of US volunteers overseas the program was counting to 100,000 by the year 2010\(^6\) (see Rosenthal, 2008). To this end, the initiative had partnered with the major U.S.-based private international volunteer organizations, a list that included Global Community.

Discovering the Brookings Initiative served me with a dose of irony, as I had steered clear of Peace Corps in large part because of its unappealing image as an official tool of US propaganda overseas. After talking to other people in my cohort of volunteers, I learned that many had done the same. However, the Brookings Initiative recast us as simply a new generation of “diplomats” who may not be operating under the direct auspices of the US federal government, but who were nonetheless expected to do its bidding – spreading purported US-American values and ideals among populaces of poor nations while fostering good will, admiration, and gratitude through our benevolent assistance.

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\(^6\) This target number suggests a very specific kind of international volunteer being counted by the Initiative, as the annual number of US international volunteers has reportedly remained above 830,000 since 2004 (see Lough, 2013a).
Finally, while I was reading through the documents and memos that the Initiative posted to its website, I was also scouring for any academic literature I could find on the present trend of US international volunteering. Anthropological and sociological sources were few and far between. Nevertheless, I found an analytical piece written by sociologists Stacey Ilcan and Suzanne Lacey (2006) who deftly linked the increased reliance on voluntary labor among international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) in the developing world to the rationality of neoliberalism that governs the Northern nations where most of these INGOs are based. This article cogently argued that as a neoliberalist mandate of citizen responsibilization has swept Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia, the INGOs based in these nations have followed suit in their approaches to development work in economically poor countries, recruiting private citizens to work as volunteers in social service capacities. In this light, then, Northern international volunteers also emerged as unwitting agents of a global process of neoliberalization that is spearheaded by the powerful Northern countries that have a vested interest in moving poor nations toward exceedingly market-friendly economies.

In formulating my research questions, I was then confronted with a dizzying mix of development discourse, the apparent discourse of English language learning, cultural imperialism or “soft power” agendas of the US state, and neoliberal responsibilization of the global South through the Northern deployment of volunteer service as a way of structuring development work. In designing this study and entering the field7, my mind frequently spun with all of the forms of power that seemed to dramatically converge in the phenomenon of US international volunteering and the particular instance of it to which I had been privy and part. The task of capturing and substantiating the exercise of all, or even any, of these mammoth and abstract-seeming brands of power through ethnographic fieldwork – my preferred and almost intuitive approach to “doing research” – was overwhelming. Even trickier was the fact that I was committed to focusing primarily on the volunteers, and they were not, as far as I could see at that time, the intended

7 See Appendix A for extended discussion of methodology, fieldwork, and my own positionality vis-à-vis the research focus and study participants.
objects of these exercises of power. What then would their stories really tell us about how these brands of power are exercised? Without the resistance or reactions of their students or the perspectives of Ecuadorian people they interacted with, where was the evidence that any power was being exercised?

At this point it seemed that I had misplaced my focus, but inspired by notions of “studying up” and troubled by the ways in which my peers had come to “know” Ecuador and Ecuadorians during my own year as a volunteer, it was on the volunteers and their perspectives that I stubbornly chose to focus. So, the question remained: how to engage in an ethnography of their lives and stories that would not just be an uncritical account of their perspectives but would also shed light on the exercise of power in the world of international volunteering?

In retrospect, my confusion signaled a deeper problem, one which centered on the fact that at that time I was admittedly accustomed to thinking about power largely as something “done to” the economically and socially vulnerable “by the” economically and socially powerful. In other words, despite several years of graduate school coursework, where readings of Michel Foucault’s work on power had troubled this very idea, I still had trouble breaking with, or at least complicating, the more conventional notion of power as something exercised by the “powerful” over the “less powerful” or the “powerless.” Missing was a consideration of how the “powerful” (or, more accurately, the members of the dominant classes) are reproduced as such, how they are perhaps deployed by the state for particular purposes, and what kinds of exercises of power are operating in this process. While I did not fully realize it at the time, somewhere in the back of my mind was the familiar conceptualization of volunteers as the powerful, upper class Westerners who were in Ecuador somehow “doing” imperialism, or neoliberal responsibilization, global English hegemony, or the development discourse to Ecuador and Ecuadorians. This conceptualization was not only a bit clumsy with respect to thinking about the complexities of how power works, but also overshadowing with respect to the ways in which the volunteers themselves were being subjected to a certain exercise of power by way of their enrollment as pupils and trainees of Global Community.
Ultimately, the actualities of fieldwork were what troubled my original thinking since, due to my decision to focus on the volunteers, I was in fact interviewing mostly them and not their students, whose accounts would have spoken more to the familiar question of how there were any sorts of power being exercised over them in classrooms presided over by US-American volunteer English teachers. Further, while my conversations and participant-observation with the volunteers always yielded something about their views of Ecuador, the process of linking their views to the constructions of the Ecuador discourse did not produce much in the way of ethnographic substance that I had been expecting. In other words, it was clear enough that they were looking through an othering lens that had been imparted to them during (and undoubtedly before) Orientation, but only looking at their perceptions of Ecuador seemed to leave something out of the picture – namely, a whole mode of being, thinking, and speaking (of which these perceptions were a part) that was always constituted in relation to this imagined Ecuador and these imagined Ecuadorians they spoke about, a mode of being that was implicit (but undeniably present) in the Global Community teachings that had paraded those perceptions of Ecuador and Ecuadorians which had been so troubling, and which all volunteers had seemed to uncritically take up.

Essentially, the project had begun to take on a different dimension, one that was shaped in large part by the nature of the ethnographic methods themselves and the particular object at which I was directing them, that is the everyday lives, perspectives, statements, peer worlds, and behaviors of the volunteers. Upon commencing fieldwork, I was not only involved in attending Orientation sessions and documenting the ways in which the field directors depicted Ecuador, Ecuadorians, and Ecuadorian “culture,” as I had been as a volunteer. Rather, I was now talking to the volunteers, learning how they spoke about why they had decided to participate in the program, gaining a sense of how they saw themselves, what their motives, desires, and intentions were, their expectations and fantasies, their concerns, their priorities, and the ways in which they coped with the everyday exigencies of life, which was for them in an unfamiliar place which is popularly imagined and constructed by the program as a “developing country.” I began to
identify connections between the different strands of the volunteers’ self-understandings/ways of being that I was hearing and witnessing and certain distinct modes of being that were being presented, modeled, and encouraged, in ways both implicit and explicit, to the volunteers throughout the Orientation, as well as on the Global Community website and in its literature. I now saw that the program discourses not only constructed Ecuador and Ecuadorians in particular ways that gave rise to a certain system of knowledge, but also constructed and instructed the Global Community volunteer in particular ways, targeting her as a pupil to be molded, directed, and guided in ways that synchronized with how she was being depicted. This shaping of the volunteer was in fact deeply informed by the sorts of culturally chauvinist, othering discourses around Ecuador, Ecuadorians, and Ecuadorian culture that I had identified during my first year with the program as a volunteer.

To be certain, this theorizing remained somewhat subterranean and undeveloped during fieldwork, as I had yet to delve deeply into Foucault's ideas around subject formation. It was through gradually familiarizing myself with these ideas and continually reckoning with and analyzing my data in the months following fieldwork, that I arrived at a more theoretical insight — that is, that the program produced not only a discourse about Ecuador (something which was significant in and of itself), but also certain volunteer subject positions that were always constructed in relation to the constructs and ‘truths’ of the program’s discourses around Ecuador and Ecuadorians. Moreover, it was the collection of assumptions, beliefs, agendas, and tendencies vested in these volunteer subject positions, as well as the related volunteer subjectivities that took shape in relation to the circulation of these subject positions by way of Global Community programming, that formed the substance of my data; in other words, this was the actual stuff that I had picked up on during the extended amounts of time I spent talking to, hanging out with, observing, and interacting with the volunteers, not to mention the many hours I had spent sitting alongside them in Orientation and other program conferences held throughout the year. It was this power of subject formation among the volunteers that my fieldwork was
indexing. In a sense, then, it was my methods and the data they generated that helped point me toward the questions that my research would begin to answer.

Thus, while I had come into the research with a vague idea of exploring international volunteering as an apparatus that “does something” through the actions of the volunteers, the questions ultimately changed. While I had set out with questions of how members of the dominant classes of the most dominant nation exercise power, the questions ultimately became how members of these dominant classes are formed as particular subjects through the apparatus of international volunteering. Following Foucault, I also came to see international volunteering, as a “strategy of moralising” (in this case, of the inhabitants of economically poor nations) that not only acts on those being “moralized” but also “allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and exercise its domination” (Foucault, 1980, p. 203). Indeed, as Foucault observed in an interview,

A dominant class isn’t a mere abstraction, but neither is it a pre-given entity. For a class to become a dominant class, for it to ensure its domination and for that domination to reproduce itself is certainly the effect of a number of actual pre-mediated tactics operating with the grand strategies that ensure this domination. But between the strategy which fixes, reproduces, multiplies and accentuates existing relations of forces, and the class which thereby finds itself in a ruling position, there is a reciprocal relation of production. Thus one can say that the strategy of moralizing the working class is that of the bourgeois. One can even say that it’s the strategy which allows the bourgeois class to be the bourgeois class and to exercise its domination.” (1980, p. 203)

At this point, however, identifying and understanding the microphysics of the discourses at work in the subject formation of the volunteers was substantial but simply not enough, as I had yet to situate these subject formations and these discourses within broader geopolitical, historical, and political economic contexts. It was at this point that I came across several studies that had actually begun to explore subject formation among Western development workers and international volunteers. The first of these was an interview study of Northern development workers in which author Barbara Heron (2007) identifies a “helping imperative” vis-à-vis racial and socially subjugated populations that, she argues, has always been central to bourgeois subjectivity, and has co-existed alongside a broader “planetary consciousness” that has been foundational to bourgeois subjectivity since the emergence of modern European empire.
Planetary consciousness, Heron writes, is “a world view that infers relations of comparison with the Other on a global scale, comparison in which the Other always comes off as somehow lacking or not quite up to an unmarked standard. Operating alongside this sense of comparison and simultaneously authorized by it are a sense of entitlement and an obligation to intervene for the “betterment” of the Other wherever he or she resides” (p. 7) – (this sense of entitlement and obligation constituting the helping imperative Heron speaks of).

For Heron, this planetary consciousness and sense of entitlement and obligation to intervene are dominant constructs that linger on from Western colonialism – what she calls, “colonial continuities” – and continue to shape the production of Western bourgeois subjectivity. Contemporary development work, Heron argues, is a key medium through which these colonial continuities find expression and are enacted, as it constitutes a space in which members of the Northern middle and upper classes are able to engage in acts that are defined as magnanimous helpers of vulnerable, inferior others, and thereby make themselves/are made into appropriate bourgeois subjects.

While Heron’s specific research focus was distinct from mine – her participants were apparently situated in the world of international development organizations that has remained somewhat distinct from the brand of private voluntary organizations embodied by Global Community – reading her theoretical framework was edifying as it was the first time I had come across a real translation of postcolonial theory (most often confined to the realm of literary and historical texts) to empirically observed human processes taking place in the here and now. More importantly, the “colonial continuities” that Heron had posited as key constructs of contemporary Northern bourgeois subjectivity resonated powerfully with the things I had heard and seen among the participants of my own study. At the same time, however, there were other aspects of volunteers’ narratives that were not accounted for by Heron’s argument.

For example, in her explanation of how she had decided to come to Ecuador, one volunteer, Amanda, a 23-year-old from Guilford, Connecticut, had positioned herself not only as a natural improver of the lives of what she referred to as the “little poor children” of Ecuador, but
also a strategic self-developer. For instance, she told me that she had decided to apply to the organization’s Ecuador program, in part because, with plans to pursue a career in business, she believed that acquiring Spanish language skills would be an asset. Alternatively, when I asked her if she ever thought about the potential impact she was possibly having as an English teacher in Ecuador, she appeared disinterested. “I don’t personally think about it,” she told me. Without a doubt, Amanda was much more interested in how a year of living and teaching in Ecuador would have an impact on her life as far as job prospects and personal development. In fact, with a few months still left in her teaching contract, she had already tasked herself with planning how she would spin her year in Ecuador to future employers when she returned home to the states. “I’m going to have to think about this stuff,” she told me, “because I’m going to be in interviews when I’m back getting a job; like how has Ecuador changed you?” Momentarily distracted by the thought, she had mulled it over for a few seconds and then posited a tentative summation: “I’ve been working for a year in a foreign country. That’s an accomplishment for anybody. Not many people do it. I’ve definitely learned patience from teaching those kids, umm, acceptance of other cultures, independence – oh, and Spanish language proficiency.”

Amanda’s intention to use her year in Ecuador as a piece of capital in future prospects was not an afterthought nor was it trivial but a concern that had framed her decision to come to Ecuador and weighed on her mind throughout her time in the country. Moreover, it was what kept her in Ecuador when she grew frustrated with her students. “I had awful, disrespectful students,” she told me. Continuing she said:

I was like, “This is not what I’m here for. I don’t need this.” And the only thing that kept me here was that I wasn’t going to get a recommendation if I leave early. So, that’s why I’m here. I’m not staying here for 8 months and putting up with this and then not getting a recommendation.

As in my conversation with Matt, who was introduced at the beginning of this dissertation, this theme of investing in the self through entering the spaces of, “experiencing,” and acting upon people and culture (often imagined as singular and homogenous) of Ecuador in particular ways that are tacitly imagined as automatically beneficial for these people and this culture was central
for Amanda, as it was for most of their fellow volunteers. Yet this finding was largely absent from the account posited by Heron, who had briefly addressed the role of professionally oriented self-development among her participants but had found its influence in their subjectivities to be marginal in comparison to that of the helping imperative and the planetary consciousness upon which this imperative rests. Where the theme of strategic self-investment did make an appearance was in another study that I had come across during data analysis.

In early 2013, political scientist Wanda Vrasti had published an ethnographic study of Northern volunteer tourists, focusing on one group who had gone to rural Guatemala and one group who had gone to rural Ghana. From the outset, Vrasti had been quick to echo the prevalent critique that volunteer tourism fails to bring change to the material and social conditions in developing countries that it claims to target. From there, she had proceeded to investigate what volunteer tourism actually does accomplish. Situating the phenomenon of volunteer tourism at the “intersection between subjectivity, biopolitics and capital in neoliberal governmentality” (p. 3), Vrasti argued that the activity of traveling to developing countries and engaging in volunteer stints works to produce political subjectivities that help volunteers meet the exigencies of the current regime of neoliberal capitalism. Volunteer tourism, Vrasti argued, “helps young adults embody the responsible, resourceful and self-enterprising subject needed to navigate the contingencies of neoliberal capital” (Ibid, p. 87). Of particular relevance to my findings was Vrasti’s claim that volunteer tourism “is about getting as much done as possible, expanding your human capital, gathering professional assets, acquiring new knowledge, even while on vacation. It is a reflection of the neoliberal injunction to organize all temporalities of life according to calculations of future gain” (Ibid, p. 86).

Indeed, Vrasti’s ethnographic findings mirrored several of my own, and she made sense of them in a way that resonated with the broader context of neoliberalism in which I had already come to see international volunteering as being situated. Notably, however, while Vrasti made intermittent nods to a colonial/imperial past as a sort of broader historical frame, she avoided exploring the existence of an imperial present or drawing significantly on postcolonial theory in a
context where, as Heron and my data had shown, the continuity of the colonial is exceedingly salient. The result was a failure to critically interrogate what could be considered the imperialistic dimensions – i.e. the entitlement to access, intervene, and improve vis-à-vis the imagined Third World other – of the political subjectivity that international volunteer stint seemed to cultivate among participants in both Vrasti’s study and mine, and the ways in which the production of this self-enterprising subjectivity might actually be secured through the mobilization of and engagement with certain constructs that are rooted in colonialist discourses (for example, Heron’s helping imperative that is rooted in a “planetary consciousness” and a “sense of entitlement and obligation to intervene for the betterment of the Other wherever he may reside”), or the ways in which the production of a neoliberal subjectivity that is based on self-improvement through touring and helping the Third World Other also might entails the production of what might be considered an imperialist subjectivity.

In sum, each of these studies spoke to a dominant thread of my own findings, however, read either separately or together, they left key issues unaddressed. In this study, I examine how an interdependent fusion of imperialist constructs and neoliberal constructs takes shape, such that the imperialistically rooted impulses of othering, touring, and improving Third World spaces and populations (which Heron takes up) are inextricably meshed with the neoliberal ambition of self-improvement and development of human capital (addressed by Vrastri). In seeking to understand how this fusion happens, this study examines how the volunteer organization under study blends neoliberal and imperial constructs on its promotional website, through volunteer trainings, and in compendium guides provided to volunteers and other miscellaneous textual materials distributed to them throughout the volunteer stint. Essentially, I argue that “helping” activities rooted in a colonialist or imperialist ethic come into conflict with neoliberalist self-improvement schemes and vice versa, each constituting a sort of vehicle for the expression and mobilization of the other.

My study also attends to what I view as several other important considerations and subjects of inquiry left largely unaddressed by the aforementioned studies. First, as previously
mentioned, I interrogate the role of the volunteer organization in the subjectivity formation of volunteers. In the studies of both Heron and Vrasti, the role of the volunteer organization in the volunteers’ subjectivity formations had remained strangely unaddressed. Second, I also consider the context of an imperial present, drawing on the work of Marxist geographer David Harvey (2003, 2005) for a working definition of capitalist imperialism in which international volunteer service is situated today (discussed below).

Finally, in light of Heron’s compelling arguments, I also explore the historical evidence of a “planetary consciousness” as a mental construct among the US-American bourgeoisie. As part of this exploration I examine how and when this mental construct of the economic elite ascended to dominance in the United States. How did the planetary consciousness that Heron identifies as being so central to bourgeois subjectivity unfold within the United States context? In exploring this particular area, it is important to point out that I depart somewhat from Heron with respect to terminology. Heron (2007) explicitly interprets the category of “bourgeois” as that which “references the discursive construction of a simultaneously mythical and normative identity pertaining to and shaping Northern white middle-class subjects, and, as such, always connotes whiteness” (p. 6). As “middle class” is an often frustratingly vague term (making it somewhat difficult to know exactly which segment of society Heron is referencing), I utilize a more specific definition of bourgeois, borrowing from historian Sven Beckert (2001), who defines the US bourgeois as the “capital rich” (p. 6) segment of the United States population that took shape in the mid-19th century, forming a “distinct elite based on the ownership of capital rather than heritage and birth” (Ibid) and “whose power, in its most fundamental sense, derived from the ownership of capital rather than birthright, status or kinship” (Ibid). (Here, it should be remembered that within the white supremacist patriarchal legal slavery context of the 19th century United States, whiteness (generally) and non-slave status/maleness (always) were baseline prerequisites for ownership of capital, thus raising the need for significant qualification of Beckert’s definition).
As an additional frame of reference, Beckert’s “distinct elite” categorization probably corresponds to what US-American sociologist C. Wright Mills (1951/2002) typologized as “captains of industry” (p. 6) white men of the country’s urban centers who emerged amid “the industrialization of America, especially after the Civil War” as the most economically successful builders, moneylenders, and merchants, operating as “big enterprisers,” their exploits giving rise to the image of “a master builder and astute financier, but above all a success” (p. 5) and consequently a sort of “urban hero the old middle class” (p. 5) of small entrepreneurs seeking to emulate their accomplishments.

That said, while Beckert does not touch on the racial or gender composition of his definition of bourgeoisie, Heron clearly does and this is a critical point. At the same time, while Heron is certainly correct in her claim that there is a commonplace conflation of bourgeois with white, it is important to note that since the late 19th century formation of the bourgeoisie as a cohesive class in the United States (see Beckert, 2001), bourgeois subjectivity has not existed monolithically or been divided only according to gender. Rather it has been further subdivided by race (see for example Frazier, 1957; Graham, 2000), even as the white (male) bourgeois subject has been positioned at the top of an intra-bourgeois hierarchy, has been granted an exclusive legitimacy within the popular imagination, and has certainly constituted the particular bourgeois sub-group that has maintained near exclusive control of the state apparatus. For this reason, it is to this most dominant subsection of the US bourgeois – the white bourgeois, both male and female – that I am generally referring to with my own usage of the terms bourgeois, elite, wealthy, and economic elite.

The reason for employing Beckert’s definition of bourgeois as a very clearly defined capital owning and economically wealthy segment of society has to do not only with the fact that I draw on David Harvey’s Marxist theory of capitalist imperialism (presented below) but also with the results of my exploration into the particular history of what Heron refers to as “planetary consciousness” in the United States. While my exploration is nowhere near exhaustive, it does, I argue, begin to reveal the ways in which notions of intervening to help an inferiorized other,
whether domestically or abroad, has strong roots in elite US-American society. As Beckert shows, the US bourgeoisie was a segment of the population that, since its 19th century formations, had always regarded the “moral uplift” of the working classes as nothing short of critical to the maintenance of “social peace,” a condition which, in turn, the bourgeoisie regarded as imperative for maintaining the flow of commercial trade upon which its accumulation of wealth and property was of course based (see Chapter 5).

Drawing on historical accounts, what I want to suggest is that as US capitalist imperialism began to take off in the late 19th century (see Chapter 2) – by which point, the “captains of industry” had, according to Beckert, fully consolidated as a distinct and cohesive class – the US state mobilized this “helping” construct (along with the equally bourgeois construct of touring the overseas lands and cultures of inferiorized others for leisure purposes) and circulated it as part of protracted efforts to recruit willing agents into projects intended to serve the preservation of its burgeoning empire (see Chapter 5). These projects included serving as teachers in US imperial territories and visiting certain of these areas as leisure tourists. The primary targets of this recruitment were not, I suggest, members of the nation’s bourgeoisie as defined by Beckert or Mills, but rather the young adult children of the non-elite segments of the small-holding entrepreneurs and farmers, also known as the petty bourgeoisie or the small capitalists (Mills, 1951/2002). As historian Cindy Sondik Aron (1987) has argued, these children would go on to comprise “the new middle class” of white collar workers employed by those institutions that underwent dramatic growth and intense bureaucratization in the decades following the Civil War (i.e the period that gave rise to the tax-funded school system, the private corporation, and the federal government offices or “civil service”). In short, there was, I suggest, a sort of mainstreaming of moral uplift work and international tourism activities, both of which had originated as key domains of US-American bourgeois culture in the mid to late 19th century. (This discussion forms the focus of Chapter 5).

Thus, as alluded to above, in examining how a construct of planetary consciousness ascended to dominance, I consider the role of the US-American state. Indeed, while Heron refers
to the development industry as a vehicle for the expression of bourgeois planetary consciousness and a helping imperative which she construes as being sort of leftover from an imperial past, she is less exploratory of how these mental constructs are situated in a context of ongoing imperial practice on the part of the state and moreover, what role the state has in the strategic circulation of these constructs among the population. In other words, Heron neglects to link the "colonial continuities" she does highlight to a Canadian/Northern political rationality, thus keeping a consideration of state role largely out of her account. This omission, particularly in light of Vrastri's governmentality framework which links the ethic of self-enterprise to the regulatory power of the neoliberal state, encourages a questioning of how the state has played and continues to play a role in the circulation of colonial continuities. This is a central question for my own study. How has the historic alliance between the US state and the US bourgeoisie (consolidated and politically dominant by the late 19th century) been implicated in the ascent of these constructs as dominant constructs in how non-elite white middle class subjects imagine themselves vis-à-vis foreign "others"?

1.3 Theoretical Framework: Governmentality, Neoliberalism, Subject Formation, Imperialism

In this dissertation, I examine the processes of subject formation as negotiated by one cohort of US-American volunteers enrolled in the year-long Ecuador program of an international volunteer organization that I refer to as Global Community (discussed more extensively below). I look specifically at the role of the international volunteer organization in these processes, as well as the ways in which they are situated within a broader context of US imperialism and neoliberalism. As Mark Kelly (2013) has pointed out, Foucault never explicitly posited a theory of the subject or subjectivity per se, but rather endeavored to theorize power and, more specifically, to account for how the exercise of power worked to produce subjects and related subjectivities. Going against the (at the time) conventional accounts that began with the subject, Foucault instead pursued what has been referred to as a decentered approach (see, for example, Ferguson, 1990, pp. 18-22) that rejected the notion of a transcendental, essential subject that
was to be studied as a fundamental sort of entity that produced bodies of knowledge, and rather looked at how the exercise of power took on different modalities and forms over the course of history and how this variability of power (which, he argued, was in fact exercised through the production and application of knowledge) gave rise to the production of different kinds of subjects and subjectivities in different epochs.

For Foucault, this foregrounding of power did not detract from a focus on the subject but rather changed the conversation by asserting that subjects were in fact formed or constituted in relation to exercises of power and then examining at length the intricacies of how subject formation was undertaken. In an essay written near the end of his life, Foucault (1983) himself observed that while such an approach had earned him a reputation of theorist of power, but maintained that his objective had always in fact been “to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects” (p. 208).

Another important point made by Kelly (2013), is that while Foucault’s earlier work could and often did conjure a process of subject formation that was done by external apparatuses and imposed upon passive selves, his later work emphasized the idea of “how the subject constituted itself, in one specific form or another, as a mad or a healthy subject, as a delinquent or nondelinquent subject, through certain practices that were also games of truth, practices of power, and so on” (Foucault, 1997, p. 290, as cited in Kelly, 2013). Lest it was inferred that Foucault was now suddenly reversing course and centering the subject as the locus of its own formation, he, himself, emphasized that while “the subject constitutes itself in an active fashion through practices of the self, these practices are nevertheless not something invented by the individual himself. They are models that he finds in his culture and are proposed, suggested, imposed upon him by his culture, his society, and his social group” (Foucault, 1997, p. 291).

In the interest of clarifying key terms that I use repeatedly in this dissertation, I utilize Foucault’s theoretical insights to think of the subject as a malleable “form” (Ibid, cited in Kelly, 2013, p. 514) – as opposed to an unchanging, underlying “substance” (Ibid) – that is continually constituted in historically variable in ways that are directly related to the application of different
technologies of power to the human body and consciousness. Drawing on Kelly’s interpretation of Foucault, I refer to subjectivity not as “the transcendental quality of consciousness that has traditionally been identified as subjectivity” (Kelly, 2013, p. 515) or even human consciousness per se (Ibid) but rather as the “way we relate to our consciousness” (Ibid) that is coterminously constituted in relation to the historically variable, power-laden practices through which we are made and through which we make ourselves into subjects.

For Foucault, there are “three modes of objectification” through which, he argued, this process of subject formation (or, transformation, as he termed it) has occurred over the course of Western history. These three modes included the mode in which the human being is made the object of scientific inquiry (the speaking subject of linguistics, the producing subject of economics, the living subject of biology); the mode in which the subject is produced through “dividing practices” that draw distinctions between various types of subjects (the mad versus the sane, the sick versus the healthy, the criminal versus the good) and are deployed most heavily by institutions (the mental asylum, the hospital, the prison, as well as the school); and finally, the mode in which “a human being turns him- or herself into a subject” (1983, p. 208).

Mapping onto Foucault’s three modes of objectification are what he elsewhere identifies as the various technologies through which the process of objectification and ultimately subject formation happens. These break down into two categories: technologies of power -- “which determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to certain ends or domination, an objectivizing of the subject” (Foucault, 1988, pp. 16-17) -- and technologies of the self – which “permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality” (Ibid). Technologies of power might be thought of as corresponding to those modes of objectification that center on inquiry and dividing practices (to be discussed below). Technologies of the self can be understood as those corresponding to that mode of objectification in which human beings turn themselves into subjects.
While it is admittedly somewhat tangential to the more specific insights of Foucault that this study draws upon, his account as to how the constructs of soul and self were produced during Antiquity is critical to his larger framework of subject formation that he would develop by the end of his life and in which the theoretical perspective of this study is situated. To this end, in the paragraphs that follow, I review Foucault’s ideas regarding technologies of the self that emerged in Antiquity, and follow this with an overview of Foucault’s theoretical history of the technologies of power and the rationality of rule he termed governmentality as they emerged during the modern era.

Foucault (1983) traces the emergence of technologies of the self in Western civilization to ancient Greco-Roman culture, and argues that, with the emergence of Christianity and the eventual rise of the modern era, there occurred key shifts in the content of the three components that comprise the self-relationship: the ethical substance (or, that which is being worked on or attended to in the self-relationship), the mode of subjectification (or, the specific terms and objectives of the self-relationship), and the nature of askesis (or, the application of particular techniques through which individuals engaged to constitute themselves as subjects of a particular ethics). Essentially, in Antiquity the self-relationship was one in which the ethical substance was comprised of acts, desire, and pleasure, the mode of subjectification was a concern with creating a “beautiful life,” and an askesis defined by an imperative to care for the self, which Foucault understands as having been something distinct from simply self-interest or self-fascination, something that involved “a sort of work, an activity” that required “attention, knowledge, technique” (Ibid, p. 243). He emphasizes that the Greco-Roman term for self-care – epimeleia heautou – was also used to refer to what a doctor did for his patients, a monarch for his subjects, and the activities involved in agricultural management. It was an ethical work which constituted a technology of the self insofar as the individual was not compelled to do this work by civil law or religious obligation, rather the decision to engage in it constituted a “choice about existence made by the individual” that mapped onto a desire to imbue one’s life with a certain beauty that was to remain after death (Ibid, p. 244).
Intertwined with Antiquity’s care for the self was the additional imperative to *know* oneself, and to do so specifically in a way that was understood as being useful to the more primary activity of caring for oneself. All of this together defined the ethics of Antiquity. With the emergence of Christianity and the onset of the medieval era, Foucault (1983) argues, the nature of *askesis*, or ascetism, changed so that the imperative of self-care for the accomplishment of a beautiful life dropped out and was effectively replaced by an imperative to abnegate the self in order to save the soul. Here too, the act of knowing the self was important but now in a way that was qualitatively distinct: the point became discovering, knowing, and disclosing an imagined inner self, the better to abnegate it and secure the salvation of one’s soul.

It is important to emphasize that, in the morality of Antiquity the concept of “truth” was critical, as it was believed that the ascetic component of the self-relation – that is the working oneself - was a necessary condition for achieving access to truth. In other words, performing certain practices and operations on oneself that qualified as self-care, it was believed, would make one susceptible to knowing the truth” (Ibid, p. 251), and in turn, accessing and knowing truth was believed to then have its own positive effects on the individual. This conditioning of access to the truth on the performance of ascescis would continue during the Christian era but in the form of self-abnegation practices that replaced self-care practices of Antiquity. According to Foucault, the central technology of the self that arose under this new knowledge ethics of the Christian era was the confession. It was over the course of the Middle Ages, Foucault (1990) argues, that “the confession became one of the West’s most highly valued techniques for producing truth” (p. 59).

Beginning in the 16th century, however, Foucault (1983) argues, the link between ascescis and accessing truth was severed with the advent of what he refers to as the *Cartesian moment*—that is the period following Descartes’ proposition that truth is accessed through the observation of evidence and the acquisition of *knowledge* based upon this evidence. At this point, Foucault argues, “evidence is substituted for ascescis” and the “relationship to the self no longer needs be ascetic to get into relation to the truth. It suffices that the relationship to the self reveals to me the
obvious truth of what I see for me to apprehend that truth definitively” (Ibid, p. 252). This marks the emergence of what Foucault refers to as the nonascetic subject, a subject who can gain access to truth through the acquisition of evidence-based knowledge. Here, it is important to highlight Foucault’s distinction between what he describes as questions of philosophy and practices of spirituality; in the ancient era, he argues, the two had been distinct but inseparable. However, with the onset of the modern era, when acquiring knowledge became the condition for accessing the truth, conventional practices of spirituality would be abandoned for the act of acquiring knowledge without any ascetic transformation of one’s being—knowledge acquisition would both take the place of and alter the meaning of spiritual practice. The objective is no longer the achievement of a beautiful life or the salvation of one’s soul but the “indefinite development of knowledge” (Foucault, 2005, p. 18). In other words, knowledge becomes both the means and the end.

The Cartesian moment presaged the emergence of those modes of objectification that Foucault identifies as dividing practices and modes of inquiry, both of which correspond to what he refers to as technologies of power. Importantly, for Foucault, something called power that is universal and able to be traded or taken or given as though it were a thing does not exist. Rather, power, he argues, exists only when it is exercised and for this reason he prefers to refer to an exercise of power and relations of power, with the former being understood as the performance of set of actions that modify other actions and the latter.

Additionally, and equally important, for Foucault the condition of a power relation is freedom, defined in a broad sense as circumstance in which there exists for the individual or collective subject over whom power is being exercised “a field of possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse comportments may be realized” (1983, p. 221). In this way, a power relation is distinct from a relation of violence, in that the latter “acts upon a body or upon things; it forces, it bends, it breaks on the wheel, it destroys, or it closes the door on all possibilities” (Ibid, p. 220). This is not to say that power relations do not make use of violence as a tactic – or that matter, of consent – but what makes a relation one of power (and not of
violence or consensus) is not only the possibility of different reactions but also the condition that
the objective is always an action of some sort on the part of subjects, rather than their repression
or elimination. The exercise of power, as Foucault (1983) writes:

> is a total structure of actions brought to bear on possible actions; it incites, it induces, it
> seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; in the extreme it constrains or forbids
> absolutely; it is nevertheless always a way of acting upon an acting subject or acting
> subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action. A set of actions upon other
> actions.” (p. 220)

In other words, even as it may constrain or repress in some aspect, the exercise of power is
ultimately productive; it generates human action rather than eliminating it altogether.

In his body of work, Foucault drew a distinction between sovereign power of the Middle
Ages and what he referred to as the biopower of the modern era. While the former was
categorized primarily by subtractive acts such as seizure, appropriation, and the taking of life,
the latter emerged in the 17th century as a form of power that was aimed at administering life – “a
power bent on generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them, rather than one
dedicated to impeding them, making them submit, or destroying them” (Foucault, 1990, p. 136).

Tracing the history of biopower, Foucault argues that it can be broken down into two forms, or
“poles.” One of these is what he calls anatomo-politics, which “centered on the body as a
machine: its disciplining, the optimization of its capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the parallel
increase of its usefulness and its docility, its integration into systems of efficient and economic
controls” (Ibid, p. 139). The other is biopolitics, which “focused on the species body, the body
imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological processes:
propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity, with all the
conditions that can cause these to vary” (Ibid, p. 139). Each form of power carried its own set of
distinctive dividing practices through which human beings were made into subjects.

In his account, Foucault argues that anatomo-politics – or at least its constituting
practices and rationale -- had long been in use among military barracks, religious orders – at least
since the 17th century. However, it was over the course of the 18th century that it would begin to
infiltrate Western European society and ultimately become institutionalized as the predominant
form of social control. The specific example of this Foucault highlights and examines in great detail is of course, the shift within the Western European penal system from a model of public execution and torture that aimed to expiate and repress the human body in the name of example making and retribution toward one of corrective incarceration that aimed to compel the human body to action in the name of reform.

In Foucault’s argument, the three interlocking instruments through which anatomo-politics, or disciplinary power, is exercised take the form of several acts: hierarchical observation (through which information is collected about the observed and utilized to create knowledge about him); normalizing judgment (through which a normativity is created and conformity incentivized through punishing and rewarding individuals for infractions and obedience of the rules, respectively); and, finally, the examination, which represents a combination of both hierarchical observation and normalizing judgment in that “it is a normalizing gaze, a surveillance that makes it possible to qualify, to classify and to punish. It establishes over individuals a visibility through which one differentiates them and judges them” (Foucault 1975/1995, p. 184). It is in the examination that the individual is made both an object of knowledge (through the information extracted from and about him by the examiner through the instrument of the exam) and subject of power (through compelling the subject to prepare for the examination and ultimately demonstrate his capabilities). As Foucault writes, “at the heart of the procedures of discipline, [the exam] manifests the subjection of those who are perceived as objects and the objectification of those who are subjected” (Ibid, p. 184).

At the same time that disciplinary technologies of power were spreading and intensifying throughout Western society, Foucault contends, so were another set of important technologies of power. These technologies centered on eliciting from individuals, candid accounts regarding their actions. These were, what Foucault refers to as, procedures of confession. Having originated in the Christian churches of the Middle Ages where it was situated in the broader practice of penance, with “the rise of Protestantism, the Counter-Reformation, eighteenth century pedagogy, and nineteenth century medicine,” Foucault argues, “it gradually lost its ritualistic and exclusive
localization; it spread; it has been employed in a whole series of relationships: children and parents, students and educators, patients and psychiatrists, delinquents and experts” (Foucault, 1990, p. 63). Like discipline, the confessional technology is one in which information is collected about the subject, but primarily through first-hand disclosure rather than continual observation. Also like discipline, it is a procedure in which the subject (i.e. the confessant) is subjected to the judgment of the authority in question (i.e. the “knowing other” to whom he confesses). And, like the subject of disciplinary techniques, the confessant is also met with an obligatory course of treatment intended to reform his behavior, and in this way, he is simultaneously made an object of knowledge and a subject of power. Importantly, Foucault, in fact, categorizes the confession as a kind of discipline. However, he argues, there is something of a distinction with respect to how it was deployed over the course of its ascent.

While the sort of disciplinary techniques he describes in Discipline and Punish (1975/1995) – those of the prison, the military barracks, the school, the hospital – were integral to the exercise of anatomo-politics, procedures of confession (while undoubtedly utilized within those same institutions) were the central techniques in the exercise of what he refers to as biopolitics, the other pole of biopower. Specifically, it was through the confessional practices around sex during the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries that biopolitics – the concern with reproducing the species body – came to be so significant in modern Western society. As Foucault (1990) elsewhere argues, this had everything to do with the formation and rise of the bourgeoisie in the 17th century (see Foucault, 1990, pp. 105-114). As this class ascended in economic and political dominance, it rejected the aristocratic system of alliance – “a system of marriage, of fixation and development of kinship ties, of transmission of names and possessions” (Ibid, p. 106) – and the notion of “blood” as the basis of one’s ranking. This was a system that had for so long kept out the very individuals who now formed part of the ascendant bourgeoisie. In need of a different ideological principle around which to justify its own entry into economic and political dominance and seeking to distinguish itself from the aristocracy (as well as the proletariat), the bourgeoisie in turn deployed a system of sexuality, which centered on determining and abiding by the most
proper and most effective use of sexual relations for ensuring the production of progeny capable of carrying on family lines. It was to do what the system of alliance had done for so long, but without being based on the principles of alliance but something else – sex. As Foucault (1990) puts it, "the bourgeoisie’s ‘blood’ was its sex" (p. 124). The focus was explicitly on the health and robustness of the physical body and, for this reason, the bourgeois can thus be understood, in Foucault’s words:

...as being occupied, from the mid-eighteenth century on, with creating its own sexuality and forming a specific body based on it, a ‘class’ body with its health, hygiene, descent, and race: the autosexualization of its body, the incarnation of sex in its body, the endogamy of sex and the body” (Ibid, p. 124).

This was, according to Foucault, a transposition of the aristocratic system of alliance, and in it "the [aristocratic] concern with genealogy became a [bourgeois] preoccupation with heredity” (Ibid) and this preoccupation involved the development of great bourgeois anxiety over the sexual proclivities and activities of members of the bourgeois family unit, now identified as the central vehicle for carrying on economic and political rank and not for factual bloodlines but its evinced ability to reproduce robustly healthy offspring.

The designation of sex as a central problem was fueled in large part by doctors, educators, and eventually psychologists who the bourgeois willingly invited to examine, diagnose, and treat family members whose behaviors violated sexual norms and thus threatened to thwart the establishment of alliance that sex – as opposed to blood – was now expected to do. The central technique utilized by these professionals on the bourgeois family was, Foucault (1990) emphasizes, the confession. As he writes:

a pressing demand emanated from the family: a plea for help in reconciling those unfortunate conflicts between sexuality and alliance; and, caught in the grip of this deployment of sexuality which had invested it from without, contributing to its solidification into its modern form the family broadcast the long complaint of its sexual suffering to doctors, educators, psychiatrists, priests, and pastors, to all the ‘experts' who would listen…from the mid-nineteenth century onward, the family engaged in searching out the slightest traces of sexuality in its midst, wrenching from itself the most difficult confessions, soliciting an audience with everyone who might know something about the matter, and opening itself unreservedly to endless examination. (1990, p. 111, my emphasis)
All of this, argues Foucault, constituted the 19th century consolidation of biopolitics, the other pole of biopower that complements anatomo-politics; but also important to point out in this discussion of Foucault’s technologies through which human beings are made into subjects is that, the modern bourgeois focus on sex and the species body, the technique of the confession, which was the central way in which sexual pathos was discovered and treated, was a key way in which the confession increasingly spread beyond the confines of the Church and “became one of the West’s most highly valued techniques for producing truth” (1990, pp. 59, 57-70).

At this point in the discussion, what is important to emphasize with respect to both of these dividing practices – techniques of discipline and confession -- is that they can be seen as being integral to the emergence of Foucault’s third mode of objectification: that which he identifies as the “modes of inquiry,” or the human sciences (psychology, sociology, the study of language and myth), which took off in the 19th century as a new realm of scholarship that took man, as its object of study and assumed a positivistic approach. Throughout his discussions of discipline and confession, Foucault underscores that the emergence and development of these sciences was grounded largely in the actual practices of discipline that were being increasingly implemented and carried out at institutions and the actual practices of confession that were being undertaken within bourgeois homes under the advisement of psychiatric authorities.

Here, a review of Foucault’s concepts of discourse and discursive formation is helpful, as they not only form one of the modes of objectification, but are also critical to his theories around the actual workings of technologies of power. In Archeology of Knowledge (1969/2002), Foucault contends that discursive formations are groups of statements that together reflect a certain regularity – “an order, correlations, positions, functionings, transformations” (p. 41) – with respect to “objects, types of statement, concepts, or thematic choices” (Ibid). In this way, discursive formations can be thought of as systems of statements that abide by certain rules, and discourse, itself, the actual statements that make up a discursive formation. According to Foucault, the statement – which he identifies as the building block or “atom” (Ibid, p. 134) of a discourse and a discursive formation – is similar to a sentence, a proposition, or a speech act but is distinct in that
it is an event of speech, writing, or even practice that, by Foucault’s definition, is defined by
different sets of criteria, existent at a level that is different from language; a statement is,
Foucault’s words, “a function of existence that properly belongs to signs and on the basis of
which one may decide, through analysis or intuition, whether or not they ‘make sense,’ according
to what rule they follow one another or are juxtaposed, of what they are the sign, and what sort of
act is carried out by their formulation (oral or written)...it is not in itself a unit, but a function that
cuts across a domain of structures and possible unities, and which reveals them, with concrete
contents, in time and space” (Ibid, p. 145).

Critical to Foucault’s concept of discourse is his contention that, contrary to how the
concept of discourse had been treated conventionally, discourses are in fact distinct from
languages in that they are not arrangements of signs that reference something else. Discourse is
not, in his words, “a slender surface of contact, or confrontation, between a reality and a language
(langue), the intrication of a lexicon and an experience” (1969/2002, p. 54); rather, discourse is its
own thing and a thing that, as it is exercised, produces a particular reality rather than concealing
or encoding a hidden, underlying reality; this is how Foucault’s concept of discourse is
purposefully distinct from that of Marx’s concept of ideology. In other words, discourses, Foucault
argues, are not “groups of signs (signifying elements referring to contents or representations)” (p.
54) but are “practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak” (Ibid). Further,
while statements are the constituting atoms of discourses, discourses can be understood as the
building blocks of what Foucault referred to as the distinct regimes of truth that characterize
different civilizations: “Every society has its regime of truth,” he observed in an interview (1980),
“its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes to function
as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false
statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded
value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as
true” (p. 131).
Foucault's concept of discourse and particularly its relation to the production and maintenance of the "truth" is critical to understanding his theory of subject formation, which breaks from the conventional notion of the autonomous and universally transcendent subject as the independent source of discourse and instead argues for a subject that is in fact deeply situated in and effectively produced by multiple discourses, and most often by those acceptable and dominant discourses that comprise the truth regime of a given society. As Foucault states in *Archeology of Knowledge*, "discourse is not the majestically unfolding manifestation of a thinking, knowing, speaking subject, but, on the contrary, a totality, in which the dispersion of the subject and his discontinuity with himself may be determined" (1969/2002, p. 60). In particular, discourses generate the possible positions – or *enunciative modalities* (pp. 55-60) – that subjects may occupy. In this sense, subjects might be thought of as the conduits, manifestations, and ultimately the *effects* – rather than autonomous creators – of discourse.

In *Archeology of Knowledge*, Foucault's insistence on the mutability and definitive impermanence the subject can be found in his discussion of the subject of medical discourse, or in other words, the medical doctor:

The various situations that the subject of medical discourse may occupy were redefined at the beginning of the nineteenth century with the organization of a quite different perceptual field (arranged in depth, manifested by successive recourse to instruments, deployed by surgical techniques or methods of autopsy, centred upon lesional sites), and with the establishment of new systems of registration, notation, description, classification, integration in numerical series and in statistics, with the introduction of new forms of teaching, the circulation of information, relations with other theoretical domains (science or philosophy) and with other institutions (whether administrative, political, or economic) (p. 58).

In other words, according to Foucault's argument for the decentered subject, there are no sovereign subjects, but rather subjects of discourse.

Returning now to the emergence of human sciences as the third mode of objectification, the point is that all of these human sciences were comprised of numerous discourses and their attendant subject positions – for example, the criminal, the delinquent, the mad man, the sexual subject – and the sort of real life articulation of these positions and the placing of human individuals into them was carried out through the practices of discipline and confession. In this
way, in the modern era, the encounter between the individual and the school, the prison, the hospital, the mental asylum, and the psychiatrist has been one of subjectification. Importantly, Foucault argues that human sciences as a mode of objectification was always intertwined with the mode of dividing practices that is most visibly at play in social institutions, emphasizing that discursive formations are always interwoven with techniques of discipline as they are with techniques of confession. With respect to the latter, which Foucault refers to as a kind of discipline in and of itself, he points out that:

   The confession is a ritual of discourse in which the speaking subject is also the subject of the statement; it is also a ritual that unfolds within a power relationship, for one does not confess without the presence (or virtual presence) of a partner who is not simply the interlocutor but the authority who requires the confession, prescribes and appreciates it, and intervenes in order to judge, punish, forgive, console, and reconcile; a ritual is corroborated by the obstacles and resistances it has had to surmount in order to be formulated; and finally, a ritual in which the expression alone, independently of its external consequences, produces intrinsic modifications in the person who articulates it: it exonerates, redeems, and purifies him; it unburdens him of his wrongs, liberates him, and promises him salvation. (1990, p. 62)

*Governmentality*

The political context for the emergence of biopower and its attendant dividing practices and modes of inquiry was, argues Foucault, one that was characterized by a new rationality of rule that accompanied the formation of the modern Western state, the development of markets and market towns, and the formulation of a new social category: populations. In this new world, the medieval concern with the survival of the monarch was slowly overtaken by a fixation with ensuring the wellbeing of the population through the distant regulation of its behavior. Essentially, as states increasingly took on the responsibility of large masses of people, there was a new reliance on institutions – schools, workshops, hospitals – to guide the individual toward the particular conduct deemed appropriate for ensuring his or her wellbeing. Here it is important to emphasize Foucault’s point that government (or the “conduct of conduct” as he famously described it), whether performed by the state or any other body, always has “a whole series of specific finalities,” (1991, p. 95) and that its central premise is that the achievement of these finalities (or what can also be considered objectives) rests upon the successful disposing or
arranging of things in a particular way that is directed “to an end which is ‘convenient’ for each of the things which is to be governed” (Ibid).

Insofar as the state took on population wellbeing as its central objective and conduct regulation as its central strategy for achieving this, there was what Foucault describes as a “governmentalization of the state” in which the act of governing, and developing the capacity to do so from afar, became the primary task of the state and thus emerged as the dominant political rationality of the modern era. As the rationality of rule that has predominated the modern era, governmentality – which, Foucault argued, constitutes the “contact between the technologies of domination of others and those of the self” (1988, p. 19) – would pass through several distinct phases in which there arose particular “arts of government,” each articulating different objectives, strategies, and philosophical reasonings while remaining loyal to the broader principle of population wellbeing. These phases included mercantilism, which emphasized strict controls to ensure the reproduction and productivity of the population; liberalism, which argued for the existence of “natural” processes of population and markets and demanded that each be allowed to take its course without controls from the state; and ultimately, neoliberalism, which rejected what it found to be the “naïve naturalism” of liberalism and called upon the state to ensure that market competition take place by actively cultivating certain ideal conditions within markets and specific optimal behaviors among populations.

Here, it is important to emphasize Foucault’s point that undergirding and in fact wholly informing liberalism as an art of government was the then newly developing science of economics. It was from this claim of science and scientific authority regarding populations and markets that liberalism staked its argument that there were in fact natural, fundamental processes that the state needed to let flourish so as to achieve an envisioned sort of homeostasis. As with any other human science – psychology, sociology, criminology – economics produced its own particular subject, that which came to be known as homo œconomicus. Foucault argues that roots of the homo œconomicus subject can be traced directly to 17th century English empiricism, which built upon the Cartesian subject by conceiving of a subject “who is not so much defined by
his freedom, or by the opposition of soul and body, or by the presence of a source or core of concupiscence marked to a greater or lesser degree by the Fall or sin, but who appears in the form of a subject of individual choices which are both irreducible and non-transferable” (Foucault, 2008, pp. 271-272). By irreducible Foucault means that English empiricist philosophy maintained that the process of choice-making is always grounded in a sequence-like series of decisions that ultimately boil down to one underlying decision that can be reduced no further (i.e. Foucault’s example of a choice to exercise being grounded in a preference for no pain as opposed to pain and the chooser’s linking of exercise to the outcome of no pain) and by non-transferable, Foucault is underscoring a distinction between the subject of interests and the subject of rights, a competing construct conceived by the 18th century discourse of legal theory. Legal theory’s subject of rights was, according to Foucault, continuously enmeshed in a dialectic between his own rights and the rights of others in which the regular renunciation or transfer of his rights to others was required for the preservation of the right or, justice, whereas the act of choice that defined the subject of interest was conceived as something that was not transferred to or away, it remained fully intact regardless of the choosing of others (even if the choices of others limited the choices of the subject of interest, they did not somehow spell the renunciation or transfer of choice, itself).

This rule of choice, as Foucault went on to state, “this principle of an irreducible, non-transferable, atomistic individual choice which is unconditionally referred to the subject himself is what is called interest” (Ibid, p. 272), and the correlative subject, which English empiricism defined specifically by his theorized propensity to make choices based on his interests, is thus referred to as the subject of interests. This concept of subject of interests is important to understand, as it was the subject of interest that the science of economics took up in the 18th century in its own conception of homo œconomicus as a subject of interest who achieves personal benefit through acting in a way that maximizes his interests. As Foucault states, “At the point of intersection, as it were, of the empirical conception of the subject of interest and the analyses of the economists, a subject can be defined who is a subject of interest and whose
action has a multiplying and beneficial value through the intensification of interest, and it is this that characterizes homo œconomicus (Ibid, p. 276). According to the classical economics that undergirded economic liberalism of the 18th century, homo œconomicus was a partner of exchange.

With the development of neoliberalism in the first third of the 20th century, the argument changed but it remained grounded in the science of economics. With neoliberalism, Foucault argues, there was a significant shift with respect to how the market was actually conceived. Under liberalism, a key thesis of the économistes had been that of free exchange – “free exchange between two partners who through this exchange establish the equivalence of two values” (2008, p. 118). However, in neoliberal thought, the most important principle that must be upheld is that of competition. This emphasis on competition, Foucault argues, had of course become a well-established tenet of liberal thought by the end of the 19th century. However, where neo-liberals of the 20th century would break with liberals of the 18th and 19th centuries was in the method for ensuring competition. While liberals argued for laissez-faire policies in which the state refrained from any and all involvement with the market (save for the arbiting of disputes), neoliberals argue that laissez-faire constitutes a sort of “naïve naturalism” which incorrectly assumes that competition is a natural phenomenon that will inevitably take place. As Foucault summarized this shift:

There will not be the market game, which must be left free, and then the domain in which the state begins to intervene, since the market, or rather pure competition, which is the essence of the market, can only appear if it is produced, and if it is produced by an active governmentality. There will thus be a sort of complete superimposition of market mechanisms, indexed to competition, and governmental policy. Government must accompany the market economy from start to finish. The market economy does not take something away from government. Rather, it indicates, it constitutes the general index in which one must place the rule for defining all governmental action. One must govern for the market, rather than because of the market. To that extent you can see that the relationship defined by eighteenth century liberalism is completely reversed” (Ibid, p. 121).

Within this framework of competition, Foucault shows, there is a reconceptualization not only of the market and the government’s role, but also of homo œconomicus. Neoliberalism, Foucault explains, rejects conventional theories of the market that emphasize labor that man sells
for a wage and posits instead the idea of human capital which man uses to secure an income. Neoliberalism roots this theory in claims of how the worker actually regards the wage -- not as the price at which he sells his labor, but as an income (Ibid, p. 223). An income, neoliberals conceive, is thus "the product or return on a capital," and capital is thus anything that makes possible a future income. With this emphasis on human capital, Foucault argues, a distinct neoliberal model of homo œconomicus then emerges, one that breaks with the idea of homo œconomicus as the "man of exchange" and posits instead the idea of homo œconomicus as "entrepreneur of himself, being for himself his own capital, being for himself his own producer, being for himself the source of [his] earnings" (Ibid, p. 226). As Foucault summarizes:

You can see that we are at the opposite extreme of a conception of labor power sold at the market price to a capital invested in an enterprise. This is not a conception of labor power; it is a conception of capital-ability which, according to diverse variables, receives a certain income that is a wage, an income-wage, so that the worker himself appears as a sort of enterprise for himself" (Ibid, p. 225).

Foucault's concepts of subject formation, power, discourse, governmentality, liberalism, and neoliberalism are central to the ways in which this study approaches and situates the topic of subject formation among a group of U.S.-American international volunteer teachers in Ecuador. I argue that Global Community operates as an instrument or institution of government (Miller & Rose, 2013), oriented toward regulating the hearts and minds of young middle and upper-middle class Americans according to the neoliberal ethics of self-enterprise and responsible citizenship which, in the context of a neoliberal state, incite subjects to attend to their own well-being while simultaneously taking responsibility for that of others. The organization's enticement of the volunteer to develop key professional skills through the act of "helping" others sets this process of subjectification in motion. To the extent that it recruits volunteers and trains them intensively for a one-month period of "orientation" before sending them to remote locales where the daily teachings of the orientation period operate as discursive social norms (reinforced through occasional staff check-ins and periodic conferences), I suggest that, in the lifespan of one cohort of yearlong volunteers, Global Community acts as an instrument of government that initially draws quite heavily on and exploits a kind of disciplinary power before taking on its classic
characteristic of "ruling from a distance" that it then employs for the vast remainder of the year. However, as I will show, there is more to the story than just neoliberal self-enterprise at play in the institutional practices and discourses of Global Community and the subject formation of the participants of this study. Equally central is the context of U.S.-American imperialism in which international volunteering is situated.

First, however, it is important to provide some basis for my decision to utilize a conceptual framework of governmentality. Following Vrasti’s lead (2013), I also situate the general phenomenon of Northern international volunteering as a technology of government. Vrasti borrows her definition from Foucauldian governmentality scholars Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller, who have, since Foucault’s original contribution of governmentality as a concept, have built upon his work, lending the concept a greater degree of specificity and texture that are useful for inquiries into its various iterations and expressions. Following Miller and Rose’s (2013) definition, the conceptualization of Northern international volunteering as a technology of government distinguishes it as that set of mechanisms through which a particular program of government is actually deployed.

As Miller and Rose (2013) define it, the programmatic dimension of government corresponds to that “realm of designs put forward by philosophers, political economists, physiocrats and philanthropists, government reports, committees of inquiry, White Papers, proposals and counterproposals by organizations of business, labour, finance, charities and professionals that seek to configure specific locales and relations in ways thought desirable” (p. 60). Importantly, they argue, a program of government is not a derivation or determination by certain political rationalities; rather, they insist, the relationship between a political rationale and a program of government is one of translation, one which they describe as “both a movement from one space to another, and an expression of a particular concern in another modality” (Ibid).

With respect to international volunteering, the case for such a conceptualization is made most immediately by the promotional websites of Western international volunteer program websites, where Western subjects are called to bolster their career potential through acquiring
new skills and strengthening resumes (an ode to the neoliberal "entrepreneur of the self"). As the Foucauldian concept of government is not restricted to official state projects and instead extends to cover any sort of substantial effort to shape the conduct of subjects in ways that align with dominant political objectives (see Rose, 1998, pp. 11-12), these websites alone and the clear ways in which they translate neoliberal imperatives into the specific modality of recruiting Northern subjects into international volunteering, could suffice as the marker of a program of government at work. However, there are also real and significant ties between the private industry of international volunteering and various bodies that are officially vested with acting in the interest of the state. In the specific case of the United States, the aforementioned Brookings Institution launched an Initiative on International Volunteering and Service in 2006.

Exemplifying the connection between the regulation of population and the achievement of political ends that defines Foucault's concept of governmentality, the Brookings Initiative ties the molding of the behavior and aspirations of US volunteer-subjects directly to the achievement of certain political objectives. The discourse of the Initiative is suffused with references to how the recruitment and deployment of US citizens as international volunteers promises the execution of a highly valuable project of *shaping the conduct* of US citizens in particular ways that invoke neoliberal ideals. For example, in one memo there are mentions of how international volunteering imbues volunteers with enduring "habits of civic engagement" and ultimately "strengthens America's civil society" (Caprara, Bridgeland, & Wofford, 2007, p. 2), both references indexing a neoliberal discourse of citizen responsibilization. In the same memo, international volunteering is likened to domestic volunteering, which is lauded for its fostering of "increased volunteer connection and participation in their community, knowledge of local community challenges such as the environment, health, and crime, and personal growth through strengthened habits of citizenship and service," (Ibid) all of which can be read as subtext for accustoming (white middle class) citizens to the neoliberal withdrawal of the state from the mediation of social welfare by orienting them toward taking up precisely the kinds of "service" work that was, in the post-World War II era, more largely under its official jurisdiction.
However, whereas Vrasti (2013) argues that international volunteering is tied solely to a program of neoliberal government, I want to examine how it is also animated by a program of what might be termed imperialistic government, in which volunteers are also encouraged to order their thoughts and shape their behavior in ways that invoke conventional Western subject of imperialist discourses and in which the central political ideal is the achievement of US foreign policy objectives that contribute to the preservation of the US’s leading hegemonic position in the international order.

A Definition of Imperialism

In this dissertation, I employ a definition of capitalist imperialism as outlined by Marxist geographer David Harvey. In The New Imperialism (2003), Harvey argues that capitalist imperialism in fact constitutes a “contradictory fusion” of the “politics of state and empire” and the “molecular processes of capital accumulation in space and time” (p. 26). Driving each side of this binary, he argues, is a distinct logic – a territorial logic of the state, which centers on ruling territories and populations for the purposes of resource and labor extraction (to be put to political, economic and military ends), and a capitalist logic which centers on an endless quest for accumulation and new markets. Capitalist imperialism is thus defined by the convergence of two logics that, Harvey emphasizes, are quite distinct and often in tension. While territorial logic occasionally acts as the more dominant force, it is the capitalist logic, he contends, that usually dominates, and this what renders it a capitalist imperialism, as opposed to other forms imperialism can take. For capitalist logic, imperialist practice centers on exploiting both the uneven geographical conditions under which capital accumulation occurs and what Harvey calls the “asymmetries” that inevitably emerge through the spatial diffusion of exchange--these asymmetries include unequal exchange, extortionate practices tied to restrained flows of capital, the emergence of monopolies, and the extraction of monopoly rents. According to Harvey, what ultimately takes place is:

The equality condition usually presumed in perfectly functioning markets is violated, and the inequalities that result take on a specific spatial and geographical expression. The
wealth and well-being of particular territories are augmented at the expense of others. (Ibid, pp. 31-32)

The resulting territorial inequalities, Harvey argues, are not simply a product of uneven concentrations in natural resources or locational advantage, but also of the asymmetrical exchange relations that emerge through diffusion of exchange, and the ways in which these asymmetrical relations work to create uneven concentrations of wealth and power. Preserving particularly advantageous patterns of asymmetry is where territorial state logic comes into play in all of this: “One of the state’s key tasks,” he writes, “is to try to preserve that pattern of asymmetries in exchange over space that works to its own advantage...The state, in short, is the political entity, the body politic, that is best able to orchestrate these processes. Failure to do so will likely result in a diminution of the wealth and the power of the state” (Ibid, p. 32). Harvey’s subsequent reference to bourgeois imperialism underscores the classical Marxist conception of the state as the instrument of the bourgeois (owners of means of production) class, or as Marx and Engels put it, “but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie.” Moreover, Harvey’s usage of bourgeois imperialism further emphasizes the inextricable relation between state logic and capitalist logic that is at play in imperialism; as bourgeois elites are both owners of production and manipulators of the state, capitalist imperialism is by default bourgeois imperialism.

In Harvey’s account, state power – both coercive and hegemonic – is critical to imperialist practice. Following the thought of Hannah Arendt, Harvey maintains that the endless process of capital accumulation must be accompanied by an equally endless accumulation of power. To this end, modern imperial states rely simultaneously on tactics of domination and hegemony, the latter being the Gramscian concept that Harvey chooses to interpret as “political power exercised through leadership and consent of the governed” (Ibid, p. 36). Here, Harvey uses the concept of leadership as put forth by historical sociologist Giovanni Arrighi (1994/2002) in his own adaptation and application of the concept of hegemony to the realm of inter-state relations. According to Arrighi, Harvey explains, a dominant state can lead other states in one of two ways: on the basis
of its own achievements through which it becomes the example to follow, entraining other states in its own particular trajectory of development; or through "leadership," which entails a conscious effort to lead other states in a particular direction, and in the process coming to be perceived as pursuing the collective interest of all states. The former enhances the prestige and power of the dominant state but ultimately can lead to the deflation of its power, as other states seek to emulate it and compete for its powerful position. In contrast, leadership inflates the power of the dominant state to the extent that it is perceived to be acting in the common interest of all states. Harvey disagrees with Arrighi’s view that emulation and competition always have the effect of deflating the dominant state.

An important distinction between leading by example and leadership lies in the distinct models of power upon which they are based. Leading by example is based upon a model of distributive power, or a zero-sum game in which states are in perpetual competition for what is perceived to be a finite amount of power that is monopolized by the dominant state. This competition precludes the establishment of true hegemony, Harvey argues, as true hegemony "entails the use of leadership to create a non-zero sum game in which all parties benefit, either out of mutual gains from their own interactions (such as trade) or through their enhanced collective power vis-à-vis nature by, for example, the creation and transfer of new technologies, organizational forms, and infrastructural arrangements (such as communication nets and structures of international law)" (Ibid, p. 37). According to Arrighi, the accumulation of this collective power is the core foundation of a state’s hegemony over the world, however, it is through a mixture of both consensus and coercion that the power of the hegemon is fully produced and expressed.

Returning now to Harvey (2003), he traces the rise of what he calls capitalist, or bourgeois, imperialisms to the late 19th century economic crises that afflicted Western Europe. Previous economic collapse of the 1840s - “the first capitalist crisis of overaccumulation” (p. 42) - had resulted in the partial incorporation of the bourgeois into the state and had been resolved by prolonged investment into infrastructure and geographical expansions into Atlantic trade, primarily
with the United States. By 1860 however, these fixes were expiring, as the US Civil War had disrupted the Atlantic trade and European political movements were beginning to destabilize the region. In this context, As Harvey puts it, “surplus capitals in Europe, increasingly blocked by assertive capitalist class power from finding internal uses, were forced to swamp the world in a massive wave of speculative investment and trade” (Ibid, p. 43). This turn of events created a need for state protection and regulation of such ventures. However, in the context of late-19th century nation-state formation, such a turning outward actually contradicted the tenets of bourgeoisie nationalism, which preached national solidarity (as opposed to incorporation of “others”) and emphasized internal consolidation (as opposed to outward annexation). “How, then,” Harvey writes, “could the problem of over-accumulation and the necessity of global spatial-temporal fix find an adequate political response on the basis of the nation-state?” (44, my italics).

As he observes, in response to this quandary,

A variety of nation-based and therefore racist bourgeois imperialisms evolved (British, French, Dutch, German, Italian). Industrially driven but non-bourgeois imperialisms also arose in Japan and Russia. They all espoused their own particular doctrines of racial superiority, given pseudo-scientific credibility by social Darwinism, and more often than not came to view themselves as organic entities locked in a struggle for survival with other nation-states. Racism, which had long lurked in the wings, now moved to the forefront of political thinking. This conveniently legitimized the turn to… ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (of barbarians, savages, and inferior peoples who had failed to mix their labour properly with the land) and the extraction of tribute from the colonies in some of the most oppressive and violently exploitative forms of imperialism ever invented (the Belgian and Japanese forms being perhaps the most vicious of all). (2003, p. 45)

Harvey’s observation here engages one of the points of departure in postcolonial studies, a field that also greatly informs this study. As foremost postcolonial scholar Edward Said observed in *Culture and Imperialism* (1993):

Neither imperialism nor colonialism is a simple act of accumulation and acquisition. Both are supported and perhaps even impelled by impressive ideological formations that include notions that certain territories and people require and beseech domination, as well as forms of knowledge affiliated with domination: the vocabulary of classic nineteenth-century imperial culture is plentiful with words and concepts like “inferior” or “subject races,” “subordinate peoples,” “dependency,” “expansion,” and “authority” (p. 9).

In this dissertation I thus draw on Said’s body of work as a guiding account and framework of the particular mental constructs, attitudes, and “structures of feeling” vis-à-vis the
colonized “other” that emerged and found expression in Western imperialist societies of the 19th century and beyond. A key theme of Said’s work is that at the center of imperial culture, discourse, and thought there has been a binary construction of “us” and “them” which has served as the ideological justification for European/Western domination of “other” peoples and the “proof” of European superiority. In his textual analyses Said provides countless examples of the way in which this binary was a central aspect of Western literature of the Western European imperial era.

Returning to Harvey’s (2003) periodization, he argues that during the late 19th century emergence of European bourgeois imperialisms the United States was developing its own bourgeois imperialism, which was both similar and distinct to that of Europe. This had to do with the particular history of the United States and the particular historical moment, that is the specific set of social and economic conditions amid which US bourgeois imperialism was evolving between 1870 and 1945. This history, along with a consideration of how Foucault’s account of liberal governmentality can account for a concurrent unfolding of capitalist imperialism, forms the focus of Chapter 2. In the following section of this chapter, however, I review the particular period of US-dominated capitalist imperialism that formed the context into which Global Community, and contemporary Northern international volunteering as a phenomenon, was born.

1.4 A Context of Neoliberal Imperialism

The emergence of private/NGO Northern international volunteering as we know it today can be traced to the early 1990’s. As Vrasti (2013) underscores, it was at this point that “overseas charity work was packaged as an all-inclusive commodity and sold off to conscious consumers (mostly young adults aged 18-25) through travel agencies, for-profit organizations and educational institutions” (p. 1). However, while Vrasti contributes a masterful account of the Northern governmental push to produce “flexible citizens that combine economic rationality with moral responsibility” (Ibid, p. 50) and the use of international volunteering as a technology for doing so, what she overlooks is how Northern international volunteering is situated not just as a remnant from a colonial past but as a technology of an imperial present, that is, a geopolitical
context in which, according to Harvey, capital continues to exploit entrenched patterns of uneven geographical development for maximal profit and the advanced capitalist state continues to "try to preserve that pattern of asymmetries in exchange over space that works to its own advantage." In the paragraphs that follow I discuss this present, drawing on Harvey’s framework as well as additional historical accounts.

In the specific period of the 1990s, the history of capitalist imperialism had transitioned into a period of what Harvey describes as neoliberal hegemony, triggered in the 1970s by a series of events that started with the oil crisis of ’73, the deluge of “petrodollars” into the banks of Wall Street (both orchestrated by Nixon in an act of statecraft against new industrial competitors Japan and West Germany), the ensuing lending binge on the part of US commercial banks to governments of Latin American countries, Paul Volcker’s interest rate hike of the late seventies and early eighties (dubbed the “Volcker shock”). The culminating result of these events (which are described in more detail in Chapter 4) spurred the Latin American debt crisis of the eighties, and it was this event that provided the United States-controlled International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank with the leverage to force open the economies of Latin America to foreign trade and investment. In exchange for providing emergency loan assistance and acting as a mediator for debt rescheduling agreements between the governments and the banks, these institutions famously demanded that the former undergo drastic programs of structural adjustment that were oriented toward the continual servicing of foreign debts. Key stipulations of these programs were draconian cuts in social spending programs, the abandoning of import substitution industrialization (an institution of post-World War Latin America) and its replacement with a model of export-oriented development, the sale of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the embrace of privatization, and the reduction and eradication of barriers to foreign trade and foreign investment.

At the time, the economic doctrine of neoliberalism, provided the ideological cover for what amounted to a compulsory opening of less developed economies to global capital, whose overaccumulation in the 1970s (see Chapter 4) had triggered a continual domestic economic crisis in the United States and throughout the advanced capitalist world. As the leading hegemon
at the time, the United States under Reagan, along with the United Kingdom under Thatcher, had led the way in the imposition of the new neoliberal order.

While much attention is rightfully devoted to these devastating impacts that structural adjustment unleashed on the societies of developing countries during the eighties and nineties, it seems that less consideration is sometimes given to the ways in which this drastic restructuring delivered tremendous gains for the dominant classes of the industrialized countries and the United States, in particular. However, such a consideration is, I think, a critical ingredient for understanding how in fact neoliberalization of the developing world in the eighties and nineties actually can be read as a phase of US imperialism. Several authors have made this connection evident.

Citing the centrality of privatization in the IMF agreements and the steady transfer of state-owned enterprises into the private sector that it precipitated, Greg Grandin (2006) argues that what transpired in Latin America in the eighties and nineties amounted to “one of the largest transfers of wealth in world history” (p. 187). In just a 7-year period (1985-1992), he reports, more than 2,000 government owned enterprises of Latin America were sold into the private sector, where they were purchased, often for bargain prices, by multinational corporations and members of a burgeoning class of well-connected Latin American billionaires. As he describes it:

Railroads, postal service, roads, factories, telephone services, schools, hospitals, prisons, garbage collection services, water, broadcast frequencies, pension systems, electric, television, and telephone companies were sold of – often not to the highest but to the best-connected bidder. (Ibid, p. 187)

In its magnitude and its coercive undertones, the wave of privatization, Grandin argues, can be understood as the “third conquest” of Latin America, with the first having been the “plundering of American gold and silver by the Spanish and the Portuguese” (Ibid, p. 187) and the second having taken place in the latter half of the 19th century and first few decades of the 20th, when US corporations expanded into the predominantly independent republics of the region, extracting raw resources and farmed goods and controlling the majority of its railroads, mines,
ports, oil fields and electric companies (Ibid). Backing up Grandin’s claims is a World Bank report that confirms the intensity with which Latin American governments privatized during the late 1980s and early 1990s, citing it as the region that accounted for 66% of the total privatization that happened around the world between the years of 1988 and 1992 (Sader, 1993). Moreover, the report maintains that, in Latin America, foreign buyers accounted for 1/4 of the total privatization revenues generated during these years.

Here, it must be pointed out that even as billions of dollars flowed into Latin America for the purchase of enterprises formerly owned by the state, much of this money was already earmarked for debt servicing, thus leaving Latin American governments with neither the enterprises nor much of the revenues from payments received for them. Indeed, the simultaneous sale of enterprises and the continual debt servicing added up to an even broader transfer of wealth from Latin America to the lender countries during the last two decades of the 20th century. By 1989, a UNICEF report was contending that between loans, aid, and the repayment of interest and capital, the transfer of wealth from developing countries to developed countries had reached an annual total of $20 billion – and that this figure was closer to $60 billion if one considered the “effective transfer of resources implied in the reduced prices paid by the industrialized nations for the developing world’s raw materials” (In Moralez-Gómez and Alberto Torres 1995, p. 2). “In practice,” extrapolated Daniel A. Moralez-Gómez and Carlos Alberto Torres (1995), “this means that Latin America is meeting the capital needs created by the recession in industrialized societies by sending to their banks the equivalent of two Marshall Plans used for the reconstruction of Europe in the late 1940s” (1995, p. 2).

Indeed, as Dumenil and Levy (2004) report, in the specific case of the United States (the leading creditor to the developing world throughout the 1970s), the total capital income “pumped in” from abroad jumped from being 40% of the nation’s domestic profits at the very end of the 1970s to representing 80% of the nation’s domestic profits at the onset of the 1980s. This sudden

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8 Here, Grandin credits Topik and Wells (1998) with having first described this period in Latin America as the “second conquest.”
jump was due in large part to the Volcker shock of that same period, but from that point onward the percentage of domestic profits that lay in income from abroad would remain at around 80% for the duration of the 1980s and into the 1990s, taking a dive to 60% in the mid-1990s only to climb back to 80% within a few years and increasing even further until falling sharply at the end of the 20th century (Dumenil and Levy, 2004). Citing these figures, Harvey (2005) contends that, while the US economic boom of the 1990s is often attributed overwhelmingly to the country’s technological revolution and the Clinton administration’s neoliberal welfare reforms that defined that decade, it was actually this “flow of tribute from the rest of the world that founded much of the affluence achieved in the US in the 1990s” (p. 93).

Important here is the point that, because overwhelming portions of new structural adjustment loans were generally used by governments of developing countries to service old loans, the 1980s and 1990s led not only to draconian austerity measures, massive privatization, spiraling income inequality and unemployment, and plummeting economic growth, but also, and ultimately, much greater levels of foreign debt. As George Ann Potter (2000) reports, in 1980 the total foreign debt owed by Latin American and Caribbean countries was at $191 billion and by 1990 (after 10 years of structural adjustment prescribed to bring foreign debts to more manageable levels) this figure had reached $480 billion. This was the case even though these countries had paid a total of $350 billion between 1980 and 1990 in foreign debt service. At the end of the next 10 years, this effect was replicated, with total foreign debt owed by these countries reaching $750 billion in 2000 despite a total of $815 billion in debt service paid between 1990 and 2000 (Ibid, p. 67).

Like Grandin and Moralez-Gómez and Torres, David Harvey (2003) also underscores the massive transfer of wealth from poor to rich nations that ensued over the course of neoliberal structural adjustment. In particular, Harvey argues that this flow of assets and capital from south to north constituted the foregrounding of a distinct form of accumulation, one that was based not on the process of expanded reproduction (i.e. continual reinvestment of surplus capital into profitable enterprises) that classical Marxism holds as the hallmark of capitalist societies, but
rather, on acts of dispossession akin to the foundational “enclosure of the commons” and other forms of theft that, according to Marx, enabled the “original accumulation of capital” in Western Europe and all of the accumulation that subsequently followed. Informed by Marx’s description of original accumulation, Harvey (2003) lists a number of processes that qualify as such (and sound strikingly familiar, in light of events of the 1980s and 1990s):

…commodification and privatization of land and the forceful expulsion of peasant populations; the conversion of various forms of property rights (common, collective, state, etc.) into exclusive private property rights; the suppression of rights to the commons; the commodification of labour power and the suppression of alternative (indigenous) forms of production and consumption; colonial, neo-colonial, and imperial processes of appropriation of assets (including natural resources); the monetization of exchange and taxation, particularly of land; the slave trade; and usury, the national debt, and ultimately the credit system as radical means of primitive accumulation” (p. 145, emphasis added).

As Harvey points out, Marx confined these kinds of processes to a particular stage of pre-capitalist relations, maintaining that they generate the massive capital accumulation that fuels a society’s complete transition to a system of accumulation by expanded reproduction, the implication being that once this transition is complete, processes of original accumulation are no longer at play. Echoing other contemporary Marxist accounts, Harvey departs from this assumption, arguing that what Marx referred to as original or “primitive” accumulation is actually something that persists alongside expanded reproduction in capitalist societies, (thus Harvey’s own rephrasing of it in more general terms: accumulation by dispossession), albeit in a generally minor role – that is, until crises of accumulation strike. At this point, when existing profitable sites of investment are exhausted (and political actors fail to remedy the situation through internal reforms), accumulation by dispossession emerges from the margins to become the dominant form. As Harvey (2003) writes,

What accumulation by dispossession does is to release a set of assets (including labour power) at very low (and in some instance zero) cost. Overaccumulated capital can seize hold of such assets and immediately turn them to profitable use. In the case of primitive accumulation as Marx described it, this entailed taking land, say, enclosing it, and expelling a resident population to create a landless proletariat, and then releasing the land into the privatized mainstream of capital accumulation (p. 149).

This sort of thing, Harvey argues, is precisely what the US embarked upon with a vengeance over the course of the 1980s, after a decade-long crisis of accumulation around the advanced
capitalist world. To be certain, Harvey points out, recession in the North led to a sustained wave of accumulation by dispossession within the North, itself, (the United States, along with the United Kingdom, and other metropole countries as well); however, it is also true, in Harvey’s estimation, that accumulation by dispossession became the central tactic of contemporary Northern imperialist practice in the global South.

The ways in which Northern international volunteering and Global Community, specifically, are situated in this context of late 20th century capitalist imperialism are multiple. For one, as neoliberal economics became hegemonic within the international development community, international donors that had traditionally given to governments of developing countries were encouraged to redirect their giving toward the private sector. At the same time, the international monetary organizations had begun to co-opt the rhetoric of grassroots political movements that had increasingly begun to critique the top-down model of the post-WWII development project. The seductive slogan of “people to people” development emerged as the official codification of a model now heralded by the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, all of which billed this new model as being more effective, transparent, and democratic than the conventional model. It was in this context that there was a proliferation of the private and voluntary organization (PVO), a category/term understood in the US world of foreign aid as a “nonprofit organization that provides charitable social services, such as humanitarian assistance” (McCleary and Barro, 2008, p. 534, n.1). Most frequently, the term is understood to refer to an organization that provides this assistance in an overseas capacity and with the intended purpose of contributing to international relief and development (Ibid).

As McCleary and Barro (2008) report, between 1986 and 1993 the number of PVOs registered with the United States Agency of International Development (USAID) skyrocketed from 176 to a total of 417, and it was precisely during this time frame (particularly the early 1990s) that many of today’s leading US-based private international volunteer organizations were founded. (Although just how many became registered with USAID as PVOs is not clear.) Founded in 1986,
Global Community, the private international volunteer organization that is the focus of this research, was among these organizations.

The foregoing description of the geopolitical context within which the contemporary iteration of international volunteering was conceived and has been increasingly promoted corresponds more or less with Heron’s (2007) brief depiction of a system of “neo-colonialism” in which trade terms, staggering national debts, and World Bank/IMF structural adjustment programs are “instrumental in compromising the autonomy of post-colonial states and keeping them in a dependent relationship with the former colonizing powers” (Ibid, p. 17). However, in addition to electing to draw on Harvey’s account of this system as one of capitalist imperialism in which the United States continues to be the leading hegemon, I have also begun to consider the more direct link between the neoliberalist character of this particular imperial moment and the rise in private voluntary organizations that include Global Community. What remains to be explored is the possibility of an attempted use of international volunteer organizations, development workers, humanitarians on the part of governing bodies in the preservation of the particular conditions of this context. For example, with respect to the United States, is there still a role intended or projected by governing forces for US-based international volunteer organizations and their coteries of US-American volunteers in the preservation of the system that Heron and many others refer to as neo-colonialism and what I prefer to conceptualize as capitalist imperialism? If there is such an intended role, what is it and how can we draw not necessarily direct causality but apparent connections between this intended role and the discourses that suffuse attempts on the part of the international volunteer organizations to recruit, train, and, effectively, govern their volunteers?

Indeed, on Global Community’s promotional website, where prospective volunteers are directed toward a project of self-enterprise, they are also urged to both tour and “make a difference” in the lives of anonymous black and brown populations that inhabit the Southern countries which continue to be the most heavily exploited within the international hierarchy of world capitalism, a clear invocation of not only Said’s observations on culture and imperialism but
also of the “colonial continuities” (i.e. planetary consciousness and helping imperative) identified by Heron (2007) as being integral to Western bourgeois subjectivity.

The specter of these colonial continuities is also apparent in the discourse of the aforementioned Brookings Initiative, where, for example, in one policy brief that emphasizes cultivating habits of civic engagement and strengthening civil society, there are corresponding mentions of how “how service abroad brings the additional benefit of forging personal relationships between generous Americans and poor citizens of foreign lands” (see Caprara, Bridgeland, & Wofford, 2007, p. 2), a statement that demarcates a clear subject position for populations of developing countries, and a clear subject position for US-Americans vis-à-vis these populations. Indeed, this textual representation of would-be international volunteers constitutes a move to entice American citizens to not only enact the role of the generous, hopeful, resourceful up-lifter to “poor citizens of foreign lands,” but also to see themselves as this up-lifter and aspire to behave in such ways vis-à-vis the “poor citizens of foreign lands.” This can be interpreted as an invocation of an imperialist discourse that constructs the Western subject as the natural figure of benevolence, guidance, and salvation for the world’s poor, a subject that is simultaneously vested with carrying the flag into foreign spaces and thus the natural servant of empire overseas. (Here, there is also the necessary insertion of the familiar construction of certain unspecified countries as being incapable of managing material conditions of their populations without the expert assistance of the United States).

Illustrating what Foucault described as the distinctive characteristic of liberal/neoliberal governmentality, these representations of US-American volunteers are bound with the intention and expectation that volunteers’ overseas help acts will benefit the wellbeing of the volunteer as well as that of that of the broader US population who is theoretically being made safer through international volunteer service. For example, the potential effect of international volunteer travails is imagined by the authors of the aforementioned policy brief through the lens of a recent “Terror Free Tomorrow poll” (Ibid, p. 2) which, according to the brief’s authors, showed a “markedly
positive change in major Muslim nations’ perceptions of the United States in response to humanitarian relief and service initiatives” (Ibid, 2).

At the same time these helping acts are imagined by the Initiative as fulfilling broader US nation-state interests which are in turn pinned to ensuring the wellbeing of the broader US population. Exemplifying the connection between population regulation and the achievement of political ends that defines Foucault’s concept of governmentality, the Initiative ties the molding of the behavior and aspirations of US volunteer-subjects directly to the achievement of certain geopolitical objectives. For example, the recruitment and deployment of US citizens as international volunteers is touted in another policy brief as a something that not only “strengthens America’s civil society” (a domestic political objective), but also “advances public diplomacy objectives abroad” (Rieffel & Zalud, 2006, p. 1). More specifically, it is promised that US international volunteers “promote cross-cultural understanding” (Ibid, p. 1) and “contribute to institutional capacity building, social capital, democratic governance, and a respect for human rights” (Ibid, p. 1).

These buzzwords – institutional capacity building, social capital, democratic governance, and human rights – of course invoke the argument of several international legal scholars who regard such language as part and parcel of “the new modalities of informal imperialism” (Ayers, 2009, p.3), a post-colonial system of control in which the extension of neoliberal capitalist accumulation is legitimated through “the putatively non-imperial languages and practices of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘democratisation’” (Ibid). In another memo, the author likens international volunteering to domestic volunteering, which he lauds for “increased volunteer connection and participation in their community, knowledge of local community challenges such as the environment, health, and crime, and personal growth through strengthened habits of citizenship and service,” all of which can be read as subtle justifications for the neoliberal withdrawal of the state from social welfare.

While these objectives could be taken to be solely reflective of the interest of the US state as an actor seeking dominance on the international stage, it could also be argued that from the
point of view of a neoliberal state such as the United States, the extension of neoliberal capitalist accumulation is itself equivalent to the enhancement of the welfare of the domestic population, thus likening its current imperialist project to a form of liberal/neoliberal government in which conduct of the domestic population is shaped so as to achieve political ideals which are concerned primarily with the welfare of the population. At the same time, to the extent that volunteers will assist in “reversing the negative attitudes toward the United States that prevail in many parts of the world,” (Quigley & Rieffel, 2008, p. 2) their efforts are also linked more explicitly to the wellbeing of the population enhancing “the security and well-being of Americans” (Rieffel & Zalud, p. 1).

The Brookings Initiative, which appears to have ended in 2009, ultimately led to the formation of the existent Building Bridges Coalition, a self-described “consortium of leading organizations working collaboratively to advance the quality, impacts and scale of international volunteering” (Building Bridges Coalition, n.d.). With respect to its specific members, the Coalition lists “international volunteer organizations, corporations, universities and colleges, government agencies, policy makers, and other stakeholders” (Ibid). Global Community, the organization that forms the focus of this research, was, at the time of fieldwork, among these members.

1.5 The Specific Case of Global Community

While it is not often emphasized in the literature, in addition to the connection between neoliberalism and the explosion of private voluntary organizations, as it turns out, there has been a clear relation between language education policy and the Western-led neoliberalization of the developing world. Specifically, a new and explicit emphasis on English instruction emerged as one of many tactics of choice among countries seeking to attract foreign investment as part of the “opening” that was being pushed by the World Bank and IMF in the eighties and nineties. The most well known examples of countries that pursued such tactics are China and Singapore (see Dixon, 2005; Kim et al., 2013; Suárez 2005). This emphasis on English language instruction as a sort of signaling of receptivity to global capital also forms part of the context, into which Global
Community – a US organization dedicated to placing US-American volunteers as teachers, typically of English, in developing countries – was conceived and subsequently expanded.

As the vaguely told institutional lore goes, Global Community was originally founded by a recent college graduate from a prestigious US university who traveled to a remote Southeast Asian village in the mid-1980s. After a few weeks in the village, the college graduate was reportedly asked by municipal officials to help start a local school. The college graduate obliged and, after a year, began recruiting other college students to the project, resulting in a handful of additional volunteers. By the end of the 1980s, the small project had developed into an organization, complete with an application process and institutional protocol: prospective volunteers filled out applications, were interviewed and, if accepted, were expected to spend one year volunteering in the country where placed in an educational capacity; in order to do so, they were obliged to pay a fee that covered their airfare, health insurance, training, and orientation. For the duration of the year volunteers received a small monthly stipend (it is unclear where these funds came from) to cover food and local transportation. Communities and towns where they volunteered provided housing. By 1993, the fledgling organization had been forced to leave the original Southeast Asian country where it had gotten its start, as the country’s government had decided to begin suspending visas for foreign teachers, but it had expanded its programming to 6 new countries that spanned East Asia, Latin America, Africa, Central Europe, and Eurasia. Ecuador was one of these countries.

Finally, as Global Community is a development organization that was conceived in the mid-1980s and with a specific focus on education, its entry into Ecuador should also be situated in the specific ways in which neoliberal reforms were impacting education in the developing world during the early 1990s. As scholars have noted, neoliberal structural adjustment of the 1980s wielded great consequences for public education in the global South (Carnoy, 1995). During this time, as the IMF and the World Bank directed Southern governments to dramatically reduce government spending on education, numerous cost-cutting-oriented reforms were put into place. As Martin Carnoy (1995) explains, in the 1980s, there emerged a typology of reforms that
included finance-driven reforms, competitiveness-driven reforms, and equity-driven reforms – and “whereas all countries have proposed – and sometimes implemented – all three types of reforms in the context of structural adjustment...the heavily indebted countries of Latin America and Africa have been obliged to focus almost exclusively on finance-induced reforms” (Carnoy, 1995, p. 664).

Finance-driven reforms, Carnoy (1995) argues, broke down into three key areas: the shifting of public resources away from the traditionally more expensive domain of higher education toward the typically less costly area of primary education (justified by efficiency arguments which maintained that basic education for a greater number of people was a better use of public resources than state-subsidized higher education for student populations that tended to be of elite backgrounds); the privatization of secondary and higher education (for example, the introduction of user fees in existing public schools (charged to individuals and whole communities) and the creation of new private schools, particularly at the secondary and tertiary levels); and, lastly, attempts to reduce the cost per student at the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels (an effort that included slashes to teacher salaries enabled by “removing the link between teachers’ salary levels and civil-service scales and reducing the requirements on formal qualifications” (Carnoy, 1995, p. 663), as well as teacher hiring freezes, increases in class size (argued by the World Bank to be a money-saving change that would have no effect on student performance as long as class sizes ranged from 20-45 pupils per teacher), the imposition of double and triple shifts for teachers, and, with public resources freed by the creation of a smaller, cheaper teaching force, “much more public spending on high yield, low cost’ resources (such as books and other supplies, or in-service training)” (Ibid, p. 663).

By the end of the eighties, however, significant pushback against these sort of finance-driven reforms and the effects that they were reportedly having in education sectors in developing countries had arisen in the international community. As a result, in 1990 the World Bank, along with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNICEF, and UNESCO, sponsored the World Conference on Education For All (EFA) in Jontien, Thailand, a massive meeting
attended by delegates from 155 governments and representatives from 20 inter-governmental agencies and 150 non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The conference was billed as a response to what was being framed as a worldwide crisis in education that was disproportionately affecting the developing world. Moralez-Gómez and Torres (1995) contend that the immediate result of the conference was the generation of a new Education For All (EFA) discourse that predictably enough avoided altogether “the political economy aspects of inequality between the developed and developing world” (p. 9) – aspects which had only been exacerbated by structural adjustment of the 1980s – and instead drew from human capital theory to define the education crisis and education itself as a matter of better preparing the citizens of developing countries for participation in a global labor market.

Part of this discourse was a call for higher levels of government spending on basic education (particularly for children) in the developing world. In this way, it appeared in some sense to break with the reforms of the eighties that had systematically dismantled government spending on education. However, as Moralez-Gómez and Torres (1995) pointed out several years later in their review of the Conference’s resulting Declaration of Education For All, the justification behind this call was one that equated education with human capital formation (a hallmark of neoliberal theory) and human capital formation was positioned as desirable insofar as its purported ability to attract foreign capital investment to developing countries and thereby increase the latter’s levels of economic growth. In other words, education was now posited as a means of preparing citizens to compete more effectively in a global labor market while the unequal imperialistic relations of this global market were left unaddressed. Moreover, some have argued that, in its explicit focus on basic and vocational education and its aversion to university level education, the EFA discourse’s implication was that citizens of the developing world were to be educated not to fill the ranks of intellectual, scientific, or technological leadership classes but specifically in order to form a cheap, skilled workforce that could be used to attract, and subsequently labor cheaply for, multinational corporations from around the globe (see Corragio, 1994; Moralez-Gómez & Torres, 1995). For several critics, the international organizations’
preference for creating a Third World semi-skilled labor class at the expense of an intellectual, technological, and scientific leadership class was thrown into sharp relief by the Declaration’s explicit insistence that public funds be directed away from higher education toward primary and basic education.

In this way, the EFA initiative gave rise to a new World Bank-derived education policy for highly indebted countries that quickly became hegemonic: government funds were now to be directed toward education initiatives on the basis that education was now equated with human capital formation, which in turn was defined as a way of increasing participation in the global market and as a way of attracting those foreign capital investors who dominated this global market. Such a policy can perhaps be understood as a technology of late 20th century imperialism in that it appeared to institutionally support a continued international division of labor (Spivak, 1988). This adds another important contextual element to Global Community’s origins and its entry into Ecuador in 1992 (just two years after the Education For All Conference), particularly in light of several facts: Global Community Ecuador was initially sponsored by the state (by way of the state-owned PetroEcuador, see below); Global Community volunteer stipends are to this day subsidized by the Ecuadorian government (Field Note); and, vocational schools have, since the organization’s first days in Ecuador, numbered heavily among the educational institutions that take on and receive Global Community Ecuador volunteers. The specific details of the circumstances surrounding Global Community’s entry into Ecuador in 1992 are discussed below.

1.6 The Specific Context of Ecuador and Global Community’s Arrival

To more fully understand the significance of Global Community’s entry into Ecuador, the country that forms part of the specific focus of this dissertation, it is important to review the particular national political-economic context that framed Global Community’s entry into the country in 1992, as well as the specific history out of which this context emerged.

Ecuador is a small Andean/Pacific/Amazonian country located in northwestern South America, where it is bordered by Colombia to the north, Brazil to the east, and Peru to the south. Part of the Spanish empire until 1827 and an independent republic since 1830, the political
history of the Ecuadorian nation-state began with a prolonged period of aristocratic-clerical Conservative rule based in and around Quito, the highland city that had been at the center of Spanish colonial administration for the area. This was followed by a Liberal bourgeois revolution precipitated by the country's lowland-based cacao boom (1880-1920) and led by a burgeoning coastal elite of merchants and cacao producers. With the collapse of the cacao industry in the twenties, the country entered into a period of populist-oriented rule characterized by recurrent instability caused by the ongoing politico-regional rivalry between highland Conservatives and Liberals of the coast. It was during this time that United Fruit Company (later Chiquita Banana) having exhausted its viability in Central America and Colombia, moved to Ecuador, thus marking the country’s first phase of US capital penetration, as the country’s cacao industry had remained under the control of coastal domestic elites. (Trade with the United States, however, had expanded during the era of cacao, such that the United States became the country’s primary trade partner by 1915).

Initially, US economic expansion into Ecuador adhered to the conventional model of enclave capitalist imperialism that was prevalent at the time. In 1934, United Fruit purchased an enormous former cacao plantation surrounding the coastal town of Tenguel and transformed it into a banana zone, building manager and worker quarters in the town and a number of nearby hamlets it constructed from scratch, recruiting a labor force from the nearby city of Guayaquil (to which many cacao workers had migrated after the cacao bust), and constructing a system of internal railroads for the transport of the fruit (Striffler, 2001). Following World War II, global demand for bananas increased dramatically, and in 1947, Galo Plaza Lasso, a US-educated, pro-US sierra [highland] landowner was elected president of Ecuador after running on a campaign that emphasized a program of agro-export led development. In the months leading up to Plaza’s inauguration, United Fruit technicians traveled to Ecuador to meet with the president-elect, and upon taking office in 1948, Plaza embarked upon a number of pro-banana development projects, including the creation of a Comisión de Orientación y Credito para el Banano, which was a credit agency for banana producers, and the initiation of a road building project that was financed in part
by the United States government as well as international lenders. Over the next few years, Ecuador’s banana production exploded (Pineo, 2007), with the value of banana exports shooting from just $5 million in 1947 to $44 million in 1953. By 1951, bananas had become the country’s top export and by 1953, Ecuador was the world’s top supplier of bananas, with 2/3 of banana shipments going to the United States (Pineo, 2007).

During this period, the export of Ecuadorian bananas was controlled by just a handful foreign multinationals, which, by the 1940s and early 1950s, were seeking to minimize their risk by shifting away from the enclave model of vast land ownership and direct production, opting instead to channel the bulk of their investment into shipping. As a result, the majority of Ecuador’s bananas were grown not on vast foreign-owned plantations but on domestically owned medium landholdings that contracted with large multinationals that controlled the export business. For example, by 1954, 80% of shipping was controlled by just 5 companies, which included United Fruit, Standard Fruit, and one Ecuadorian owned company, Bonita Banana (Pineo, 2007).

By the late 1960s, the country’s banana boom was slowing down, and the country shifted from its position as a principal supplier to one of reserve supplier. The slowdown of the banana boom was accompanied by the Ecuadorian government’s search for another export boom to sustain its economy. In 1964, it granted oil exploration concessions to the US-based companies Texaco (later Chevron) and Gulf, which, upon receiving the concession, established a jointly owned consortium for exploration (see Dhooge, 2009). By 1967 these companies had discovered commercial amounts of oil in the country’s Amazon region. Concession requests from multinational corporations subsequently poured into the Ecuadorian government, and by 1970 the latter had granted roughly 30 concessions that covered a total of 10 million hectares (Valdivia, 2008). However, what began as a familiar story of foreign multinational domination over capitalist natural resource extraction was quickly reversed in 1971 when a military government came to power through a coup and promptly nationalized the oil industry through a series of reforms that included the creation of a state-owned oil company, Corporación Estatal de Petróleo Ecuatoriana (CEPE) and the ratification of a Hydrocarbon Law (1971) that did several key things: rendered all
subsoil elements property of the state; granted CEPE the rights to explore, exploit, transport, and refine these elements; reduced the size of concession areas that could be granted to foreign oil companies; raised the royalty percentage of profits that companies had to pay to the government; and, required the renegotiation of contracts with foreign oil companies so that they accorded with the stipulations of this Hydrocarbon law (see Dhooge, 2009). Specifically, the government mandated that CEPE be granted a 25% interest in the Texaco-Gulf consortium, a move that led to Gulf pulling out of the country in 1976 and ceding its remaining 37.5% interest over to CEPE, thus giving CEPE a majority share of 62.5% (Ibid).

For the duration of the 1970s, Ecuadorian state revenues from oil sales translated into vast public investments in education and healthcare, rapid urbanization, and the creation of consumer subsidies (see Pino, 2007; Valdivia, 2008). At the same time, these developments were financed not only by a windfall of oil profits but also by foreign loans that these profits effectively enabled by strengthening the country’s credit rating. Over the course of the 1970s, the Ecuadorian state accumulated massive levels of foreign indebtedness. By 1980, the country’s foreign debt totaled $3.5 billion, a figure that was 52.5 percent of GDP. When the Volcker shock came, the country was thus hit especially hard, and this effect was quickly compounded by fluctuations in world oil prices that came in the early 1980s.

By 1981, Ecuador’s foreign debt stood at more than $5 billion, and interest payments equaled 84 percent of its export revenues (see Pino, 2007). Upon taking office in August of 1981 – the same month that Mexico declared its inability to continue servicing its debt and began negotiations with the IMF – Ecuadorian President Osvaldo Hurtado went to the IMF for assistance. His predecessor had been denied a loan from the World Bank, but by October of that year, Hurtado had agreed to an IMF package of reforms similar to what the Mexican government would ultimately have to follow: a devaluation of the Ecuadorian sucre (by 32 percent in May of 1982 and then 21 percent in March of 1983) and an austerity program that included cuts in government subsidies (on wheat and gasoline, specifically), new taxes on consumer products, and increases in transportation fares (see Conaghan, 1988, p. 133). By 1983, the Ecuadorian
economy was contracting by 2.8%, sparking protests and labor strikes. Hurtado was succeeded by León Febres Cordero, a pro-Reagan millionaire (Pineo, 2007) who, undeterred by the economic crisis that was engulfing the country following the first round of structural adjustment, enthusiastically entered into new negotiations with the IMF that resulted in the reduction of import tariffs and the elimination of export subsidies. In return, the Ecuadorian government received the IMF’s blessing and a round of new loans from commercial lenders, bringing the country’s foreign debt to $8.1 billion by 1985 (see Weiss, 1997).

As Kay Treakle (1998) has recounted, during that same year the country was hit with the international collapse in oil prices. Then, in 1987, a mega earthquake struck, destroying the country’s oil pipeline and halting oil exports for 5 months. By 1988, the country was in a deep recession, with the economy contracting by 6 percent and per capita income having fallen from USD $1,444 to USD $977, a decrease of 32 percent (Ibid). In this context, and with President Cordero’s first term coming to an end, the country elected a new president, Rodrigo Borja Cevallos, a social democrat of the Izquierda Demócrata (Democratic Left) party who had run on a platform that advocated gradual, as opposed to drastic, reforms and championed a more thorough integration of social policy into the country’s economic development plans. Once Borja assumed the presidency, however, the country was beset with new economic woes: as Cordero had kept inflation artificially low, once he was out of office inflation rose dramatically. As a solution President Borja raised the interest rates, a move that lowered the money supply and prolonged the ongoing recession. As president, Borja did manage to retain some autonomy from the IMF, the World Bank, and the country’s foreign creditors as he actually increased social spending, carried out an 18-month moratorium on debt servicing, and subsequently made payments of only 30 percent of the interest owed, asserting that any larger amount would jeopardize the country’s development and the social welfare of the population (Ibid). Moreover, Borja refused multiple debt rescheduling packages designed by the IMF, thus putting further stress on the relations with the IMF, the World Bank, and foreign lenders (including CitiBank, which, froze the state’s assets in
1992 and threatened to keep them that way until the Ecuadorian government paid the interest owed on its debt held by bank).

Despite all of this, however, President Borja continued to secure new loans for the country by implementing numerous IMF recommendations (with the chief exception being the privatization of state-owned enterprises): he continued the liberalization of foreign trade by establishing free trade zones; he passed a *maquila* law that exempted those who hired temporary workers for export processing from paying the standard package of wages and benefits; he declared by executive action that foreign investors would henceforth be treated roughly the same as national investors; he loosened price controls; and, he pursued austerity measures that included the continued elimination of government subsidies (see Hey, 1995). By 1990, the country’s foreign debt had climbed to $11.2 billion.

In the neoliberal restructuring of Ecuador, however, the central target for the IMF and the World Bank was the country’s state-controlled oil industry. Writing about the economic conditions of Ecuador in 1980s, Gabriela Valdivia (2008) informs us that, “One of the most important aid conditions set by lending organizations was to encourage a favorable environment for foreign investment in petroleum” (p. 463). Over the course of the decade, the IMF and the World Bank kept the pressure on, and by 1989 a key step toward satisfying this condition was taken with President Borja’s dissolution of state-owned CEPE into Petroecuador, a company that inherited CEPE’s holdings and, like CEPE, was still state-owned but was now decentralized, “divided into affiliated but independent enterprises that would tackle distinct aspects of petroleum production (e.g., exploration, production of derivatives, domestic distribution)” (Valdivia 2008, p. 463). By 1990, at which point Texaco’s concession was two years away from expiring, Petroecuador bought out the US oil company’s remaining oil consortium interests, prompting its departure from the country.

Ironically, the creation of Petroecuador by itself constituted a nationalization of the Ecuadorian oil industry as it entailed the Ecuadorian government’s taking over of all remaining foreign concessions held at the time. However, it was a nationalization that was situated within a
larger attempt on the part of the Ecuadorian government (now beholden to neoliberal structural adjustment) to attract a new round of private foreign investment in the country’s petroleum industry. (Indeed, the decentralization of CEPE can probably be understood as a neoliberal reform adopted in order to do just that). To this point, at the time of the creation of Petroecuador, President Borja declared that it was not in fact a nationalization and insisted that “foreign investment remained necessary in terms of capital and technical know-how” (Roos and van Renterghem, 2000, p. 49).

Borja’s successor, President Sixto Durán Ballén (1992-1996) subsequently made good on Borja’s vow. In the year that he ran for president, Durán had formed the radical right wing Partido Unidad Republicana (PUR) after breaking with the more center-right Partido Social Cristiano (PSC) when it chose not to nominate him as presidential candidate for the 1992 presidential election. As part of his campaign platform, Durán promised deeper market reforms as a solution to the ongoing economic recession that continued to grip the country in the wake of its initial rounds of neoliberal restructuring. After winning the election, Durán won the approval of the IMF and the World Bank when in his inauguration speech in August of 1992 he pledged to establish strong incentives to attract multinational investment in the country’s petroleum industry.

Returning to the specific issue of the liberalization and internationalization of the country’s oil industry, Suzana Sawyer (2004) cites several key steps that Durán would take to signal to foreign oil companies that they were welcome in Ecuador. First, shortly after taking office in August of 1992, Durán pulled Ecuador out of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) specifically so that Ecuador would be free to exceed the oil production quotas of 275,000 barrels per day that OPEC had previously set for the country; by 1993, Ecuador’s oil production levels had soared to 373,000 barrels per day. Second, one year later, in November of 1993, the Durán administration managed to pass through the country’s national congress a series of liberalizing amendments to the country’s aforementioned Hydrocarbon Law. According to Sawyer (Ibid), these amendments, which were drafted in close collaboration with World Bank advisors, aimed to accomplish several things:
“...[to] deregulate the price of gasoline (thus cutting state subsidies and imposing taxes and duties); to grant marginal fields (i.e., reserves previously discovered by Petroecuador but not yet produced) to private companies; to allow private corporations to exploit gas in the Guayaquil Gulf (a right previously reserved solely for Petroecuador); to allow private corporations to participate in the expansion and operation of the TransEcuadorian Pipeline; and, importantly, to introduce a new type of exploration and exploitation contract: "production-sharing contracts. (p. 96)

As Sawyer underlines, the introduction of production-sharing contracts was extremely significant in terms of providing incentive to foreign oil companies as it signaled a dramatic relinquishment of state oversight with regard to the activities of multinational oil companies that chose to conduct exploration and exploitation in Ecuador. Essentially, risk-service contracts, which had been the contract form stipulated by the original Hydrocarbon Law of the 1970s, had meant that contracted multinationals could explore for oil in Ecuador at their own expense (or, "risk") and would be reimbursed (and compensated for services according to an agreed upon rate or "profit share") by the Ecuadorian government for costs incurred only if they struck oil, and even then, in order to receive reimbursement, companies were required to account for and justify all expenses. Under production-sharing contracts ushered in by Durán’s amendments, however, reimbursement was abolished and while companies were now responsible for their own costs, they were also entitled to a higher profit share, if and when they discovered oil. Moreover, as Sawyer points out, with the end of reimbursement also came the end of the government’s ability to hold national companies accountable for their expenses and this carried significant implications: “With new production-sharing contracts," she observes, “the surveillance of multinational activity would virtually disappear. Contracts were awarded to those companies that committed to investing the most capital, proposed the most elaborate exploration plans, and offered the state the best production-sharing deal. As no reimbursement of investment was involved, neither Petroecuador nor the Minister of Energy and Mines needed to monitor investments and, consequently, multinational activity” (Sawyer, 2004, p. 97)

Referring to the departure from OPEC and the Hydrocarbon Law amendments, Sawyer (2004) writes, “both moves sent a clear message to global capital: Ecuador was embracing a “free” market economy, unfettered by prior protections and restrictions” (p. 96). It bears
mentioning that in September of 1992, at the very beginning of his presidency, Durán had also
taken the step of liberalizing the country’s capital accounts with the passage of the Ley de
Liberalización de Flujos de Capital e Inversión (Vos, 2000), which, as the name suggests,
legalized and thus liberalized the inflow and outflow of capital (a staple IMF-recommended
neoliberal reform that was seen as key to attracting foreign investors).

However, in addition to Ecuador’s departure from OPEC and the liberalization of capital
flows, and even before the amendment of the Hydrocarbon Law, the Ecuadorian government had
been telegraphing what could be interpreted as yet another signal to multinationals that Ecuador
was ready to welcome foreign investment into the oil industry: Petroecuador, the state-owned oil
company, had begun sponsoring a newly formed US-American English instruction volunteer
program called Global Community, which had just recently come to Ecuador in 1992.

Because, Petroecuador’s sponsorship of Global Community ended by the end of 1993
(right around the time of the amendment of the Hydrocarbon Law), the relationship between
Petroecuador and Global Community should perhaps not be overstated. Yet, the fact that Global
Community Ecuador was sponsored by Ecuador’s most central, most economically viable public
corporation at the exact moment when the Ecuadorian government, still beset with economic
crisis, was in the midst of an intense campaign to open up its oil industry to Northern and Western
multinationals as per the conditional lending policies of a US-dominated World Bank/IMF/IADB
complex is key to understanding the ways in which the Global Community Ecuador program was
situated in the imperial processes of the late 20th century.

Moreover, the end of PetroEcuador’s sponsorship of Global Community Ecuador did not
mean the departure of Global Community from Ecuador. Rather, Global Community Ecuador
transitioned into a new partnership with the country’s national vocational education institute that
has branches around the country, thus suggesting an even deeper integration into the country’s
education structure. Importantly, Global Community’s first years in Ecuador coincided with the
inception of another English language teaching partnership between the country’s Ministry of
Education and Culture and the British Council (an in-country agency of the British government).
This was an initiative called the Curriculum Reform Aimed at the Development of the Learning of English (CRADLE) (see Chuisaca and Paucar, 2010; Haboud, 2009; King and Haboud, 2010).

Established in 1992, under the authorization of President Durán’s Minister of Education, Eduardo Rodrigo Peña (see Chuisaca and Paucar, 2010, pp. 18-19), the CRADLE’s central claim was that the current system of English instruction in the Ecuadorian public high schools was flawed and, upon identifying a number of specific problems, CRADLE endeavored to improve this system through a series of targeted interventions that included the creation of new English courses and study plans to be used in the public high schools, the production of instructional materials (which ultimately resulted in the production of a series of textbooks, Our World Through English, that were then used in public high schools), the creation of English teacher training modules, the systemization of English language testing (including a National Exam given at the end of a student’s final year in high school), and the forging of relations between CRADLE and Ecuadorian universities in order to promote English teacher training (see Chuisaca and Paucar, 2010, pp. 15-16). As Chuisaca and Paucar (2010) underscore, a number of legal changes around the instruction of English also came out of the initiative, the most significant one being a mandatory increase of English periods such that Ecuadorian public high schools were now required to administer English instruction to students 5 times per week. By 2007 (the same year that fieldwork for this dissertation was commenced), this new English curriculum and its attendant regulations had reportedly been implemented in 95% of the country’s public high schools and in 60% of its private high schools (Ibid).

**Neoliberal Fallout: Ecuador Post-Durán**

Returning now to the economic context of Ecuador during the radical neoliberalization of the 1990s, it is important to point out that President Durán’s liberalization and internationalization of the country’s petroleum industry would result in a deluge of foreign capital into the country’s petroleum industry and a full-fledged oil boom. Between 1991 and 2001, foreign investment in the exploration and exploitation of oil rose astronomically, jumping from $90 million to $1,120 million in this 10-year period (Stanley, 2008, p. 7). As a result of this investment, production rates soared
from 7,500 barrels a day in 1993 to 62,000 barrels per day in 2002 (Ibid). This was part of a larger surge of foreign direct investment (FDI) into the country that took place during Durán’s first years in office. Indeed, between 1992 and 1993 (the year of Durán’s election and his first year in office), the net inflow of FDI into Ecuador more than doubled, jumping dramatically from $206 million to $530 million. FDI would remain above $500 million (except in 1996 when it fell to $465 million) until 1998, when it would climb to $830 million (World Bank 2000, as cited in Rivera-Batiz, 2000, p. 39).

As it had been for most of the 20th century, the United States was responsible for the majority of the FDI that came into Ecuador during this period, accounting for an average of 58.7% of Ecuador’s total FDI between the years of 1992 and 2001 (Stanley, 2008, p. 1). During this period, US investment in Ecuador, (which climbed to 66.9% of the country’s total FDI in 1995 (ECLAC, 1996, as cited in Rivera-Batiz, 2000, p. 43)), was channeled mostly into mining and agriculture (75.3% in 1995), with the remainder being divided between manufacturing (15.1% in 1995) and services (9.6% in 1995) (ECLAC 1996, as cited in Rivera-Batiz, 2000, p. 44).

Predictably, Durán’s changes to Ecuadorian law and the immediate boom in foreign investment that followed shortly thereafter would generate several large ripple effects. One of these was a fiercely determined mobilization of the country’s largely Amerindian population that resided in the petroleum-rich Amazonian region that was now being targeted by multinational oil companies (Sawyer, 2004). After nearly thirty years of Texaco-led petroleum excavation that had left the area mired in “disease and displacement, contamination and corruption,” (Sawyer, 2004, p. 13), local community organizers immediately pushed back against the prospect of a new invasion of oil companies, taking on the multinational companies directly, staging several massive protests in Quito throughout the 1990s, and helping to galvanize what would ultimately emerge as one of Latin America’s most dynamic Amerindian political movements of the neoliberal era (Sawyer, 2004).

Another key consequence of Durán’s liberalization of the oil industry was the Ecuador’s worst economic crisis in over a century (Lucero, 2001), one that was sparked by the related boom
and subsequent bust of the country’s private banking sector. As Martinez\(^9\) (2006) discusses, Ecuador’s deluge of foreign oil investment between 1992 and 1994 had shortly led to an enormous expansion in domestic credit, and in 1994, Durán, at the encouragement of the IMF and the World Bank, had passed the General Act of Institutions of the Financial System, (LGISF) a financial liberalization law that: lessened the oversight capacity and regulatory powers of the country’s Banking Superintendent, allowed for easier entry into the banking industry, expanded the range of operations that a bank could perform (both directly and through subsidiaries), and opened the country’s banking industry to foreign capital. Following the passage of the act, the number of banks and financial institutions in Ecuador exploded, increasing by 57% and 180% respectively (Martinez, 2006). Moreover, with minimal regulation, an ongoing inflow of oil-related private capital, and greater bank competition than ever before, there ensued a wave of high risk lending and unscrupulous practices, all under the assumption that the Ecuadorian government would ultimately be able and willing to bail out the country’s banks in the event of adverse outcomes. However, as several scholars have noted, while the LGISF gave unprecedented freedom to the financial industry, the existing Ecuadorian banking framework into which it was inserted had little in the way of resolution protocols for failure of the large financial conglomerates that had proliferated in Ecuador over the course of 1980s and come to dominate the country’s banking industry by the early 1990s (de la Torre et al., 2002). Instead, Ecuadorian bank closure policy was limited to protocols for resolving and containing isolated failures of small banks, and LGISF did nothing to change this.

All of this was working to set the stage for economic disaster, an outcome that was soon hinted at in 1994 and 1995, when the US raised short-term interest rates from 3 to 6 percent. In much of the developing world, where structural adjustment programs had dictated the liberalization of countries’ capital accounts, there was a resultant outflow of capital towards the United States, largely from Mexico (the “peso crisis” of 1995), but also from other countries that

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\(^9\) For the proceeding details of the Ecuadorian economic crisis of the late 1990s, I have drawn from the accounts of de la Torre et al. (2002) and Martinez (2006), except where otherwise noted.
included Ecuador, thus dealing a blow to the reserves of their banks. In response, the Ecuadorian government raised interest rates to roughly 50 percent in order stem the hemorrhaging and to keep the national currency (the sucre) from crashing. Economic growth subsequently fell to 1.5 percent for the year of 1995. As a result, the country’s banks were hit with a slowdown in loan repayments and experienced increased difficulty in attracting funds. This, however, was only the start. The year of 1998 brought a collision of three external shocks: flooding caused by the El Niño weather pattern damaged Ecuadorian crops and infrastructure to the tune of 13% of GDP; a collapse in world oil prices dealt a further blow to the country’s GDP and its public sector tax revenue, which had come to be based heavily on oil profits; and, finally, a contraction in foreign lending (caused by the Asian financial crisis of 1997) dramatically reduced the inflow of external credit. Over the course of 1998, economic growth slowed down and by April of that year Solbanco, one of the country’s midsize banks, closed, sparking panic and prompting the start of a bank run which, in a domino effect, quickly led other Ecuadorian banks to the brink of closure. Deposit flight was soon followed by capital flight, which, by the end of the first quarter of 1998, was equal to 4.4% of 1998 GDP.

As the banking crisis began to take shape, the Ecuadorian government took steps to intervene. However, the existing legal framework did not allow for the government to conduct bank mergers as a way of protecting against bank failure contagion. Instead, the government’s options were limited to funding failing banks through its Central Bank of Ecuador (CBE), closing them down, or nationalizing them. By October of 1998, 17 of the country’s 35 banks were illiquid and 11 were receiving emergency liquidity from the CBE (de la Torre et al., 2002). However, to prop up the banks that it chose to save and to keep the sucre within its exchange rate band, the government was frantically selling dollars on the foreign exchange market, a move that sparked a speculative attack on the sucre as investors sensed an imminent currency appreciation.

In the meantime, to quell deposit flight the government had begun raising interest rates dramatically but with public confidence badly shaken, the bank runs continued such that by December 1998, Congress tried to intervene legislatively with the establishment of a 1% financial
transaction fee. While the fee had been intended to discourage withdrawals, it had the opposite effect as people opted to conduct transactions in cash and avoid the banks altogether, and while the ADG had been intended to instill confidence its impact was negligible.

In the meantime, the sucre continued to depreciate and so much so that by February, the government abandoned the country’s longtime fixed exchange system and let the currency float. By early March, the sucre had plunged from 7000 per US dollar to 1800 per US dollar in the space of just two weeks. At this point, the government took the extreme measure of declaring a weeklong banking holiday, which was followed by its freezing of certain deposits for a period of four months. While this had the effect of temporarily halting currency depreciation, when deposits were then unfrozen in July of 1999, bank runs resumed with a vengeance. In the meantime, an international audit of the country’s banking system had been conducted, and its results, announced in July, declared several of the country’s largest banks to be insolvent and several others to be capital deficient. With GDP falling by 6.3% (see Weisbrot et al., 2006, p. 6; Wong, 2007, p.6), with a public debt greatly elevated by an expansionary monetary policy being used to prop up the banks, and with civil servant compensation already in arrears, the Ecuadorian government subsequently defaulted on its Brady bonds the following month, becoming the first country to do so since the inception of the program in 1989. Over the next several months the currency went into a free fall until finally, in January of 2000, with inflation at 96% and an imminent coup in the works, Ecuadorian president, Jamil Mahaud took the drastic step of adopting the US dollar as the national currency, thus sacrificing the country’s sovereignty over its monetary policy in exchange for the badly needed stability that US currency was anticipated to bring.

While an understanding of this history is critical to understanding the context of Global Community’s arrival and subsequent tenure in Ecuador, it is equally important to understand that by the time of this research (2007-2010), Global Community Ecuador was operating in a national political context that was significantly different from that into which it had been invited in the early 1990s. By 2007, the oft-discussed “left turn” in Latin American politics was well under way, led by
a cohort of national politicians promoting what they termed 21st century socialism, a movement summarized by Amy Kennemore and Gregory Weeks (2011) as one that “claims to build on the mistakes of both neoliberalism and twentieth-century socialism, seeking to increase state regulation and power, but in a democratic manner that allocates resources more efficiently and does not stifle innovation or personal choice” (p. 267). The prescriptions of this movement materialized in Ecuador most intensely by way of leftist economist and self-described Christian socialist, Rafael Correa, who was elected as president in 2006 and took office in January 2007. A graduate of universities in Ecuador, Belgium, and the United States, Correa had run on a platform that included promises to reverse the socially and economically devastating effects of neoliberal policy by taking on the foreign multinationals and increasing social spending (see Conaghan, 2008). He also pledged to reduce US military presence in Ecuador by expelling the US military base located in the country’s coastal city of Manta by way of not renewing its 10-year lease that was set to expire in 2009. The base had been built in 1999 as part of “Plan Colombia,” the US government’s newly reloaded “war on drugs,” which, among other things, sought to target Colombian drug trafficking activity by militarily intercepting flights and sea voyages. By the time of Correa’s presidential campaign, the military base was indeed looked upon with contempt by many Ecuadorians, who resented it as both a symbol and a functioning instrument of US imperial practice in Ecuador, and Latin America, more broadly (Field Note, 2009). It was during fieldwork that the lease did expire and a highly publicized formal ceremony, attended by Ecuadorian officials but unattended by invited US officials, was held to mark the end of the base’s existence and the exit of its US personnel (Solano, 2009). In addition to taking this concrete step of tempering US presence in the country, Correa has continued to be openly critical of the United States government and its policies in Latin America. Further, in addition to publicly aligning himself with Chavez, Morales, and Castro, Correa has openly courted the foreign investment of US rivals and declared enemies such as China, Iran, and Venezuela (Conaghan, 2008).

These acts have taken place alongside Correa’s direct challenges to the dominance of multinational oil companies in Ecuador. During his first year in office, Correa raised the royalty tax
on “windfall profits” (profits exceeding a certain maximal level) made by foreign oil companies to 99% (it had already been raised to 50% in a 2004 bill submitted by then President Palacio and passed into law by the Ecuadorian congress that same year (see Stanley, 2008)). He followed this act with intentionally defaulting on the country’s $4 billion in international loans in 2008, declaring the country’s foreign debt “immoral” and citing evidence from an Ecuadorian presidential commission that pointed to criminal violations committed by foreign governments that sold the country’s debt to investors, hedge funds, and pension funds (see Faiola, 2008).

Following this act, Iran extended Ecuador a $30 million line of credit (Ibid), and the China Development Bank extended a $1 billion two-year loan to the Ecuadorian government in 2009 (Escribano, 2013; Ross, 2014).

Since then, it has been precisely through its increased lending activity in Ecuador (and Latin America, more generally) that China has become increasingly dominant as a trade partner and foreign investor in Ecuador, particularly in the petroleum industry. Indeed, the loan extended to Ecuador by the China Development Bank in 2009 was the first of several “loans-for-oil” that China has extended to Ecuador whereby, in return for loaned funds, Ecuador pledges to sell a certain amount of its oil to Chinese oil companies over the course of the repayment period (see Escribano, 2013; Gallagher et al., 2012, as cited in Escribano 2013). When the Chinese companies purchase the oil (at market rates), payments are then deposited into PetroEcuador’s account with the China Development Bank, which then extracts the funds and pays itself, putting the money toward repayment of its loan to Ecuador. Since the first loan of 2009, the China Development Bank extended another loan in the amount of $1.6 billion in 2010 and yet another for $2 billion in 2011 (Escribano, 2013; Gallagher et al., 2012). By 2014, China was being reported as Ecuador’s top creditor for the year 2013, reportedly providing 61% of the Ecuadorian government’s total financing necessities (Ross, 2014). In exchange, China has become Ecuador’s top purchaser of oil in a very short period of time: in late 2013, Reuters reported that for the year of 2010 almost 1/3 of Ecuador’s oil exports had gone to China, and that, for the year of 2013, 83% of Ecuador’s oil exports had been allocated to Chinese state oil companies. While
the United States has, according to the World Trade Organization (WTO), remained Ecuador’s chief market for exports and its top source of imports, the WTO also currently lists China as Ecuador’s second greatest source of agricultural products, manufactured goods, and fuels and mining products (World Trade Organization, September 2014).

Importantly, in addition to locking Ecuador into selling the bulk of its oil to China, these loans-for-oil deals also come with certain strings attached that have implications for Chinese investment in the country. Unlike World Bank loans and IMF lines of credit, Chinese loans to Ecuador and other Latin American countries are distinct in that they do not carry policy or economic conditions (something which Latin American leaders have often lauded as a superior alternative that respects rather than constrains the loan recipient’s national sovereignty). However, they do carry commercial conditions that, for example, award massive building contracts to Chinese companies (see Escribano, 2013; Gallagher et. al., 2012). In Ecuador, this fact was embodied in the 2010 Chinese Development Bank loan for $1.6 billion, which was designated to cover the cost of constructing a hydroelectric dam; the dam, in turn, was required as per loan conditions to be assigned to a Chinese firm (see Escribano, 2013, p. 157; Gallagher et al., 2012, p. 6).

Other such projects have reportedly included the construction of a large oil refinery, paid for by the China National Petroleum Company. The site of the refinery is close to the coastal city of Manta (the former location of the now departed US military base), whose port has been placed under Chinese management (Ross, 2014). Finally, Andes Petroleum, a consortium of China’s two largest petroleum companies (Sinopec and CNPC) that entered Ecuador in 2005 (when it took over the Ecuadorian assets that had belonged to the Canadian oil company, Encana) has become a relatively significant foreign producer of Ecuadorian oil. An article based on research conducted in 2012 claimed that Andes Petroleum was responsible for the production of 7% of Ecuador’s oil and listed it as coming in second only to the Spanish company, Repsol, which is the leading foreign producer of the country’s oil (see Escribano, 2013). (According to this same article, Ecuadorian state oil companies produce 50% of the country’s oil). Given events that have
since transpired, China’s position may have advanced significantly. In 2013 and 2014, several reputable news media outlets claimed to have proof that, despite launching a highly publicized Yasuni-ITT Initiative\textsuperscript{10} to keep “the oil in the soil” of the country’s Yasuni National Park (known to be rich in petroleum but also among the world’s most biologically diverse rainforests and home to several indigenous Amazonian groups), the Correa administration privately agreed to help Andes Petroleum and China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) explore for oil in the park (an allegation that has been categorically denied by the Ecuadorian ambassador to the United Kingdom) (see Hill, 2014; Schneyer & Pérez, 2013). In 2013, Correa officially abandoned the conservationist initiative, thus raising the possibility that any alleged plans to grant Yasuni concessions to Chinese oil companies may have been put in motion, a move that would obviously stand to increase the percentage of the country’s oil extracted and sold by China (see Ross, 2014).

Suffice it to say, in the last decade, the longtime exercise of imperial US power in Ecuador (and Latin America, more broadly) has been substantively challenged not only by Correa’s policies, but also by the growing economic and political influence of China in Ecuador (and Latin America, more broadly). This turn of events is something which has undoubtedly helped make the execution of Correa’s social policies financially possible. Indeed, in light of China’s recent activities in Latin America, many have speculated and surmised over whether we are in the midst of a moment of transition, a sort of 21\textsuperscript{st} century “changing of the guard” or shift in hegemon with respect to US-Latin American economic and political relations (see Dumbaugh and Sullivan, 2005; Paz, 2012; Roett & Paz, 2008).

During fieldwork, these more macro-level developments with respect to the Ecuadorian national government and the China phenomenon were not particularly discernible to me in any

\textsuperscript{10} The conservationist Initiative was effectively a drive to raise funds from the international community. It was based on Correa’s pledge to abstain from drilling in the Yasuni National Park on the condition that the international community contributed a total of $3.6 billion to compensate the Ecuadorian state for 50 percent of the estimated profits it stood to gain by extracting and selling the amount of petroleum estimated to lay below the grounds of the park.
empirical fashion. They were definitely not touched upon by Global Community staff, volunteers, or by any of the Ecuadorian students, teachers, school officials, or “host family” members with whom I spoke. However, this particular moment in the historic imperial relation between the United States and Ecuador is yet another contextualizing condition to consider with respect to the ethnographic findings of this dissertation, if only to bear testament to the ways in which institutions and discourses of empire (i.e. the international volunteer organization) can remain firmly embedded even as longstanding imperial relations are in the process of possibly being substantively troubled and altered in important ways. Indeed, the enduring presence of Global Community in Ecuador appears somewhat disconnected (at least for the moment) from important shifts that might later be looked upon as veritable seismic changes to the geopolitical-economic context in which it is currently situated.

At the same time, the particular timeframe of my fieldwork (2007-2010) was clearly at the very beginning of Correa’s tenure and the acceleration of Chinese lending, investment, and trade, thus it is not entirely surprising that Global Community Ecuador was still in operation. Still, it is interesting to note that among the different actions taken and statements made by Correa, he did not suddenly send Global Community (or Peace Corps for that matter) packing; nor has he mentioned any future plans to do so (as he has done with respect to de-dollarizing Ecuador and returning the country to the sucre as the national currency). In light of Correa’s challenges to the US imperial relation and the newfound (and still arguably nascent) influence of China as an international power in Ecuador (and Latin America more broadly), the continued operation of Global Community Ecuador is perhaps something of a testament not only to the reality of neoliberalism as a global condition, but also to the enduring hegemony of English as the language of international business and to an unwavering desire among Ecuadorian political and economic elites to signal to global capital that Ecuador is in fact “open for business.” In any case, the particular juxtaposition of a United States English instruction volunteer program that is subsidized by the Ecuadorian state and Ecuadorian state policies that attempt to loosen the grip of US influence over Ecuadorian sovereignty and its economy, along with the arrival of China as
the US’ willing rival and potential imperial successor, is yet another element of contextualization in this study.

The potential effects of the continued tenure of Global Community (and other organizations like it) in Ecuador are, of course, multiple. Based on the findings of this research, I would suggest that one of these effects is the continued deployment and circulation of state-sponsored discourses that seek to produce US (middle/upper class, predominantly white) subjects animated by strong senses of entitlement and obligation both to “help” and tour the populations and cultures of developing countries and to approach, regard, and engage in these activities of touring and helping as invaluable vehicles of a self-investment that is deemed necessary for and perhaps most relevant to the prospect of career success. (Embedded here are of course the familiar binary themes of Southern otherness/inferiority and Western/Northern normality/superiority that have suffused imperialist/ and colonialist discourses for centuries, along with the calculated prioritization of rational self-interest that has been identified as foundational to neoliberal discourses.) That these discourses, which are suffused with familiar notions of Northern/Western superiority/US supremacy and Southern inferiority are being applied to US-American subjects in Ecuador by a US-American international volunteer organization at the particular moment when another “developing” country (i.e. China) is substantively challenging the United States in its traditional imperial role in Ecuador, and Latin America more generally, is striking.

Also arresting is the fact that this moment is also shaped by strong waves of anti-US rhetoric on the part of Correa and other national leaders of Latin America. On that note, there is also an interesting juxtaposition in that Global Community and other organizations like it are attempting to entice and recruit their volunteers through a neoliberal discourse that incites them to treat their volunteer stint as a form self-enterprise precisely at a time when the Ecuadorian president, in concert with other Latin American leaders, is explicitly condemning neoliberal doctrine, backing this condemnation up with actual policies, and aligning with self-proclaimed leftist and socialist leaders of other countries. Thus, in addition to examining the role of the US-
American volunteer organization in the subjectivity formations of its volunteers and the interplay between neoliberal and imperial discourses in that subjectivity formation, another contribution perhaps made by this study is that of a historical snapshot of several key strands of US imperialist governmentality-discourse at work during the particular moment when the economic and political dimensions of US empire in one particular part of the world are facing contestation, potential alteration, and possible decline.

1.7 Chapter Outline

As a way of establishing one of the key theoretical assumptions of this dissertation, I have thus far discussed the ways in which Northern international volunteering is situated and implicated in US imperial practice. The more main concern of this dissertation centers on examining and considering the ways in which contemporary Northern international volunteering, and Global Community, in particular, act as a technology of government (see Vrasti, 2013) in such a way that instills volunteers not only with ethics of neoliberalism but also with imperatives that are rooted in the sorts of colonial continuities described by Heron (2007) as being central to bourgeois subjectivity (and therefore perhaps theoretically conceivable as imperialist). Before moving onto this material however, the following three chapters speak to the particular histories that at once begin to answer some of the questions posed by this dissertation, to deeply contextualize its ethnographic findings, and to inform its arguments. In this discussion, I highlight Foucault’s relative silence around Western imperialism (something which scholars such as Gayatri Spivak (1988) have also critiqued), observing that this a peculiar and unfortunate oversight as systems of imperialism have indeed been an integral component of the emergence and progression of liberalism and neoliberalism.

Thus, in Chapters 2-4, I lay out a history of how the capitalist-imperialist relation between the United States and Latin America has unfolded since the late 19th century. I use this history to argue that imperialism has operated as a profoundly illiberal system insofar as its practices have continually violated what Foucault defined as liberalism’s foundational characteristics: “freedom,” non-coercion, and non-repression. The historical fact of Western and Northern imperialisms
renders Foucault’s silence around imperialism all the more problematic; in thinking about how we might transcend it and actually use Foucault’s theories of liberal and neoliberal governmentality to account for it, I suggest that we might think of imperialism as an example of what Foucault referred to as "strategies of security" or, schemes through which liberalism’s production of "freedom" is secured through acts that are in fact categorically illiberal. As Foucault (2008) stated in one of the lectures that comprises Birth of Biopolitics, "Liberalism must produce freedom, but this very act entails the establishment of limitations, controls, forms of coercion, and obligations relying on threats, etcetera" (2008, p. 64). Taking it a step farther, I also want to posit that imperialism as a “strategy of security” for liberalism and neoliberalism actually has its own governmental effects. In the same way that neoliberal governmentality theoretically produces the self-enterprising subject, imperialism might be thought of as an art of government that theoretically produces a Northern/Western subject who relates towards the Third World “other” in a particular way that has been encouraged by the imperial state for purposes of empire building. Here, I am trying to push Heron’s aforementioned (2007) “colonial continuities” concept further by exploring the role that the US state has actually played in the wider circulation of these constructs (Heron does not emphasize the role of the state and leaves the how of circulation a bit vague), as well as how it has deployed these constructs for the purposes of involving certain segments of the domestic population in overseas imperial projects.

The actual specifics of how the US state has carried out this project form the focus of Chapter 5. In this chapter, I look for and historically trace Heron’s (2007) “colonial continuities” within the specific context of the United States, using a history of bourgeois class formation to show how “a sense of entitlement and an obligation to intervene for the betterment of the Other wherever he or she resides” (p. 7) has indeed formed a key component of US bourgeois class performance and cultural formations. After illustrating the historic relevance of this construct to US-American bourgeois subjectivity, I then highlight how, throughout the 20th century, the US state has continually recruited members of the country’s white middle and upper classes into various projects intended to serve the building, preservation, and advancement of its overseas
empire (for example, international "humanitarian" work and international tourism), and in the
process, has drawn on and popularized the traditionally bourgeois constructs of providing moral
"uplift" for the racial/social "other" and of touring imperial "others" through overseas travel.

In this chapter, I thus build further upon Heron's less developed argument that bourgeois
subjectivity has also involved an assumption that contexts of overseas inferiorized "otherness"
are always "available" for bourgeois leisure consumption and are to be imagined and pursued in
this manner by the proper bourgeois subject. To do this I examine how the activities of touring
and gazing upon the cultures and peoples of countries such as Egypt (part of the British empire)
and later Cuba and Mexico (part of the US empire) formed a key domain of class performance for
the US bourgeoisie. I argue that a sense of entitlement to tour the Other thus might be considered
as an additional colonial continuity/mental construct of bourgeois subjectivity. I follow this with a
discussion of the ways in which the US state has in fact viewed mass tourism to Latin America
through a lens of imperialist logic, treating it as an important objective and recruiting members of
the countries non-elite white middle classes into it, thus popularizing the bourgeois mental
construct of touring the "other" as a form of leisure.

With respect to today's world of international volunteering (which is largely privatized but
endorsed and facilitated by the state), an overarching argument of this dissertation is that the US
international volunteer organization binds those imperialist notions of uplifting and touring the
"other" with neoliberal notions of self-enterprise, and that this is borne out in how Global
Community both promotes and defines the volunteer stint to prospective and current volunteers
and how it prepares and guides the volunteers through the volunteer stint. Specifically, Global
Community encourages the volunteer to set out not only to "uplift" and tour the Third World
"other," but to do so as part of a self-enterprise/self-development endeavor, and this construction,
I will subsequently argue, is indexed in how Global Community volunteers think about the
volunteer stint, the cultural formations that emerge among them, and the relational subjectivities
they develop vis-a-vis what they have been encouraged to understand as Ecuadorian
"otherness." In part, this dissertation is thus responding to the sort of dichotomy generated by two
different aforementioned studies: one that has emphasized bourgeois constructs of “helping” (Heron, 2007) in Northern/Western international volunteer work and another that has looked at the neoliberal ethic of self-enterprise in the world of international volunteering (Vrasti, 2013) – neither, however, examined the interplay between the two and neither really looked at the subject making role played by the international volunteer organization, which I think is so important to do in all of this.

In Chapter 6, I turn to the specifics of my ethnographic fieldwork: the particular international volunteer organization on which I focused and the volunteers I ethnographically followed and interviewed over the course of 11 months. I introduce the volunteers and examine their stories of arriving at the decision to apply to Global Community, considering the specific life contexts of their decisions and how they explained what drove them to do it. I argue that a common twin desire to “experience another culture” and acquire certain things (resume fodder, language proficiency, teaching experience) constitutes an imperial-neoliberal fantasy to the extent that it pairs touring the Other with making strategic use of the Other for self-enterprising purposes of building up one’s human capital. In this chapter, I also highlight how, in some sense, this self-oriented way of conceiving of an international volunteer stint (a way that is again constructed and instructed by Global Community and most international volunteering organizations) can conceivably work to convince and draw in those prospective volunteers who are initially critical and reluctant to participate in such a program. Additionally, as I show in this chapter, such focus on self-oriented agendas can be the source of a kind of inner conflict among volunteers, one which stems from concerns that one is being “selfish;” I argue that such a conflict in fact underscores how the neoliberal self-enterprise aspect of the contemporary construction of international volunteering breaks with more conventional colonial era “helping” discourses that construct international volunteering as a purely altruistic endeavor.

In Chapters 7 through 10 I spend more time examining other relational aspects of the volunteers’ subjectivities with respect to “Ecuadorian people” and an imagined “Ecuadorian culture” (two constructs which Global Community implicitly bills as distinct features of the overall
“experience”). I consider how Global Community acted as a productive force with respect to these subjectivities, inviting the volunteers to position themselves in particular ways vis-à-vis the distinct human and cultural elements which it bills as part of the “experience.” I focus on several key “contact zones”¹¹ (Pratt 1992/2007) for which the organization attempts to prepare and guide the volunteer, offering him particular relational subject positions that are in fact colored by imperialist constructs of touring and intervening and the neoliberal ethic of enterprising self-development. Each ethnographic chapter is devoted to a different zone, as it were, and these include: “Ecuador” writ large (i.e. a broadly imagined encounter of the volunteer with Ecuadorian people culture, and public space), the homestay, and, the classroom. Drawing on data collected through interviews and participant-observation, I examine the relational components of the subjectivities that appeared to emerge among the volunteers, examining how they positioned themselves in their narratives and their practices vis-à-vis their Ecuadorian counterparts and what was often perceived as Ecuadorian “culture;” in the process, I hold these findings up against the particular ways in which Global Community discourses constructed the volunteer vis-à-vis each zone and moreover, how Global Community trainings instructed volunteers to conduct themselves in each zone in relation to the particular iteration of imagined Ecuadorian otherness they were being prepared to encounter and engage with there.

In Chapter 7, I examine how volunteers were not only encouraged to tour Ecuador and Ecuadorian people through an objectifying, othering/ethnocentric lens, but also directed to actually make use of this touring of Ecuadorian otherness as a way of developing their own human capital to be used on the job market. While volunteers quickly assumed this subject position, as I explore in Chapter 8, it was this very subjectivity (and the white middle/upper class US-American normativity upon which it was largely based) that was deeply challenged as volunteers found themselves in the marginal position of the “gringo.” In Chapter 8, I in fact

¹¹ Leading post-colonial literary theorist Mary Louise Pratt (1992/2007) coined the concept of “contact zones” to refer to “social spaces where disparate cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in highly asymmetrical relations of domination and subordination – such as colonialism and slavery, or their aftermaths as they are lived out across the globe today” (p. 7).
examine their experiences under this sort of counter-subjectification and the dimensions of what I conceived as a sort of situational double consciousness (Du Bois, 1903/2007) that began to take shape among them as they navigated Ecuadorian public spaces as white US-Americans.

With regard to the homestay zone, which is the focus of Chapter 9, I argue that in its in-country Orientation for the volunteers Global Community depicts the Ecuadorian “host family” as a cornerstone of the “experience” and constructs it as an object of consumption that constitutes a key impetus in the overall imagined self-investment being undertaken by the volunteer. In attempting to prepare the volunteer for life with an Ecuadorian host family (a project that is already premised on an othering of Ecuadorian families, people(s), and culture(s), more generally), I argue that Global Community mythologizes it with tropes of Third World exoticity, authenticity and tradition and commodifies it as an object of a sort of strategic cultural consumption that is billed as both titillating or “interesting” and beneficial in specific ways to one’s professional enrichment. In all of this preparation, the volunteers were interpellated as consumers of a sort of at-your-service, exoticized Ecuadorian family. What then generally unfolded among the volunteers over the course of the year was an institutionally sanctioned process of judging the Ecuadorian host family according to certain criteria that reflected what volunteers had been encouraged to look for in and desire from the Ecuadorian host family. This often resulted in the production of a US-American consumerist gaze that produced the Ecuadorian host family as both a commodity for Northern consumption and an object of Northern evaluation.

Finally, in Chapter 10, I turn to the classroom. It is here that Heron’s colonial continuity that centers around a “sense of entitlement and obligation to intervene for the ‘betterment’ of the Other wherever he or she resides” (Heron, 2007, p. 7) became most salient. Building on Heron’s argument, in this chapter I argue that a significant portion of what is going on in Global Community Ecuador’s recruitment, training, and deployment of US-American volunteers as English teachers into Ecuadorian classrooms involves the production of US international authority through the governing of the volunteers to act as authorities vis-à-vis Southern populations. This sense of authority might be thought of as another dimension to the sense of entitlement and
obligation to intervene that, Heron (2007) has argued, structures Western bourgeois subjectivity vis-à-vis an imagined “Third World” Other – and one that also serves the US state’s imperialist objectives.

Alongside the invocations of entitlement and obligation to “help” that were clearly at play in Global Community discourse, I argue, there was also a construction of the volunteers as authorities vis-à-vis their students (and Ecuadorian English teachers) as well as a multifaceted incitement on the part of the program for volunteers to claim and exercise a certain authority as they stepped into teacher roles. Beginning with an ethnographic vignette in which this became explicitly clear, I explore more deeply a negotiation of authority as a central component of what is taking place in the Global Community teaching stint. I move beyond the narrow construct of “teacher authority” (though this is certainly part of the picture, here) to examine: how the program in fact authorized the volunteers to assert themselves as English teachers in Ecuadorian classrooms; what exactly the program authorized them to do in their classrooms; how this authorization process drew on imperial and neoliberal ‘truths’ that seemed to work in symbiotic fashion; and how volunteers often drew upon imperial ‘truths’ in recovering from symbolic disruptions to their authority in the classroom and internal challenges to their authority stemming from insecurities as novice teachers. I also consider the ways in which this authorizing of young US-Americans as volunteer English teachers in the global South makes use of (certain members of) the US population in ways that cohere with geopolitical objectives of the United States as an imperial power.
CHAPTER 2: BEGINNINGS OF US IMPERIALISM IN LATIN AMERICA

2.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter I discussed the ways in which this dissertation situates the phenomenon of Northern international volunteering in contexts of neoliberal governmentality and capitalist imperialism. Generally speaking, there has been only a limited effort to approach Northern international volunteering with such theoretical perspectives. However, as noted in the previous chapter, a key exception and valuable reference for my own analysis has been the work of Wanda Vrasti (2013), who situates the specific trend of Northern voluntourism at “the intersection between subjectivity, biopolitics, and capital in neoliberal governmentality” (p. 3).

Using these Foucauldian concepts to make sense of ethnographic data on two groups of Northern voluntourists, Vrasti compellingly argues that voluntourism acts as a strategy of neoliberal government insofar as it urges and ushers subjects into fending for their own personal and professional development and provides them with a way to develop the kind of credentials and experience that satisfy the demands of a contemporary brand of global capitalism that emphasizes international experience, cosmopolitanism, and multiculturalist orientations.

However, as incisive and compelling as Vrasti’s argument is, it is also incomplete as it simply does not attend to the condition of Western/Northern imperialisms in which voluntourism (as well as Western/Northern humanitarian work and tourism, more generally) is also situated. While she provides an overview of Foucault’s historical account of the emergence and trajectory of liberal and neoliberal governmentality and convincingly defines Northern voluntourism as a technology of neoliberal government, she neglects to do anything similar with respect to imperialism. Such an oversight is something that Vrasti shares with Foucault, whose work has been critiqued by several leading scholars for its marked silence on the historical realities of European and US-American imperialisms that not only developed during the ascendance of biopower and liberalism, but were in fact deeply intertwined with the rise and consolidation of world capitalism that formed the broader economic and geopolitical context of their ascent (see Spivak, 1988; Stoler, 1995; Young, 1995).
Marxian literary theorist Gayatri Spivak was perhaps the first to critique Foucault’s work for its reticence around modern Western imperialism. In her classic essay, *Can the Subaltern Speak?* (1988), Spivak critiques Foucault’s assertion that modern power as exercised in 17th and 18th century Europe became less about sovereign power tactics of acquiring territory and coercing human bodies, and more about the deployment of procedural techniques used to discipline and sustain human bodies and what they were capable of doing according to the needs of capitalist production. Specifically, Spivak highlights Foucault’s failure to acknowledge that, “the new mechanism of power in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (the extraction of surplus value without extraeconomic coercion is its Marxist description) is secured by means of territorial imperialism – the Earth and its products – ‘elsewhere’” (1988, p. 85). Further, she continues, “[…] to buy a self-contained version of the West is to ignore its production by the imperialist project” (Ibid, p. 86). In short, as Spivak and others emphasize and as this chapter illustrates, the rise of European and US-American imperialisms over the course of the 18th and 19th centuries was in fact deeply intertwined with the rise and consolidation of liberalism and neoliberalism as Western arts of government.

In light of Spivak’s critique – and informed by theoretical and historical accounts of Western imperialisms – a key point of departure for this dissertation is the understanding that in Western society there has not only been a liberal state or a neoliberal state, but also an imperial state, whose practices of overseas rule have continually contradicted what Foucault describes as the foundational principles of liberal/neoliberal governmentality insofar as they have relied heavily on the exercise of repressive power over populations of imperial territories as well as a great degree of intervention in the economic processes of these territories. For example, historian Norbert Finzsch (2008), who has conceptualized the territorial expansion that marked the first century of US history as *settler imperialism*, has argued that such a varietal of imperialism is “inherently genocidal” (p. 253) it that it is premised on the literal usurping of land from one population and its replacement with another. Specifically, Finzsch defines settler imperialisms as “the rhizomatic expansion of settler colonies and settler states directed against “exterior”
indigenous populations, achieved in the context of a democratic and egalitarian society of white, predominantly Protestant Anglo-Saxon settlers organized in farms and family households” (p. 253). According to Finzsch, who is clearing marking settler imperialism as a distinctly Western phenomenon, settler imperialism has often followed a typical trajectory that includes: continual settler transgressions against established boundaries between colonial and indigenous territories, the materialization of different forms of indigenous resistance, a period of low-intensity warfare between the two sides, the state’s military involvement on the side of the settlers, and, ultimately, the violent dispersal and mass extirpation of indigenous populations.

In the history of the United States (which, along with Australia, Finzsch details as an exemplary case of settler imperialism), such a trajectory is of course borne out by the widely known record of murder, "removal," spiritual devastation, and land theft that US settlers and US state forces visited upon indigenous populations in the name of white Anglo-Saxon settlement (see Go, 2011; Greenberg, 2005; Johnson, 2013; Stannard, 1992). Notably, Finzsch argues that, in its historical constitution, settler imperialism is distinct in part because it is not underwritten by a remote engine of capitalist industrialism (as is the case in the more classic definitions of imperialism); there is no periphery and no core, he argues, but rather a “complex interactive community” (Ibid, p. 254) of agrarian homesteaders and urban rentier capitalists, each jointly involved in and simultaneously enriched by territorial dispossessions of indigenous populations.

In the case of the United States, a protracted period of continental settler imperialism would give way in the late 19th century to a rapidly consolidating overseas capitalist imperialism, which is a theoretical condition posited by David Harvey (2003) and reviewed in Chapter One. The aim of the present chapter is to ground my emphasis on the historical fact of US capitalist imperialism (henceforth, US imperialism or imperialism) in actual events by drawing on the accounts of scholars who have studied US empire at length. In addition to tracing the beginnings of US imperialism in Latin America, a secondary aim of this chapter is to consider this history of US empire in light of Foucault’s account of governmentality, which forms the other key theoretical point of departure of this study. To this end, I conclude this chapter with a discussion of how,
despite their noted reticence on the condition of imperialism, Foucault’s theories of liberal
governmentality might still be used to account for it.

Focusing specifically on US capitalist imperialism in Latin America, which is the regional
context of this study, this chapter begins by tracing the late 19th century emergence of US
imperialism and then follows its trajectory up until the beginning of World War II. This period of
roughly 70 years began with a dramatic increase in US trade and capital investment in Latin
America as well as the establishment of a formal empire with the imposition of US sovereignty
over Hawaii, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Cuba, Guam, the eastern half of Samoa, and a 10-mile
Canal Zone area in Panama (the secession of which from Colombia was strategically aided and
abetted by the US state under president Theodore Roosevelt for purposes of gaining a
concession to build the canal). Unlike US expansion of the mid to late 19th century, the acquisition
of these new territories, while also tremendously violent in nature (particularly in the Philippines),
was not (with the exception of Hawaii) done with the intention of taking and “settling” already
occupied lands, but was instead intended to at once open and preserve sites for US capital
investment while also creating a strategic chain of naval outposts that would provide an
unobstructed sea route to East Asian markets.

The establishment of formal US empire was followed by earnest attempts on the part of
the US state to eradicate debt-related military interventions on the part of Western European
powers in Central America, where all republics were deeply indebted to European creditors. This
began in 1904, with President Theodore Roosevelt’s declaration that, when Latin American
governments fell behind on international debt payments, the United States would step in and act
as an “international police power,” ensuring that they paid their debts and thus negating the need
for European military intervention in the western hemisphere that the US had always tried to claim
as its own sphere of hegemony. As I will discuss, Roosevelt’s statement (dubbed the Roosevelt
Corollary, as it modified the early 19th century Monroe Doctrine, which had put European powers
on notice that any new attempts at colonizing any part of the western hemisphere would be met
with US intervention) ushered in a sustained period of turning numerous Central American and
Caribbean republics into "dependencies" (Rosenberg, 2004), starting with the Dominican Republic in 1904. Through this practice (which generally included the extension of loans by private US banks to national governments, the imposition of US control over national customs houses, US military occupation of the nation’s territory, and related suppression of internal opposition), the United States government set about transitioning Latin American republics off of a silver standard currency and onto the gold standard currency utilized by the United States. This undertaking was, in turn, related to a broader objective of creating a gold-backed dollar bloc based in New York that would rival Britain’s gold-backed pound sterling bloc based in London.

The establishment of formal empire and the creation of dependencies in Central America and the Caribbean Basin would be accompanied by an acceleration of US capital investment in Latin America, overall, and a tightening of asymmetrical trade relations between the two regions. This was the age of Guggenheim and Rockefeller mining empires in Mexico and South America, United Fruit and Standard Fruit “banana republics” in Central America, Hershey Chocolate’s domination of sugar cultivation in Cuba, and Standard Oil’s control of oil fields in South America and Mexico. With their great economic leverage, these US firms often exercised tremendous influence and control over the governments of the ostensibly sovereign republics in which they based their operations. Moreover, as with the establishment of formal empire and dependencies, the arrival and penetration of US capital and trade always commanded the protection of the US state in the form of the deployment of an endless stream of military invasions and shows of naval force as a tactic for quelling the labor protests and cases of political instability deemed to pose threat to US economic interests.

The first third of the 20th century thus marked a sort of imperial surge that arguably leaned more heavily toward coercion than consent. By the early 1930s, however, with a World War looming and the need to secure Latin American alliance, the United States changed its tone and tactics, instituting its “Good Neighbor Policy” that emphasized intra-hemispheric solidarity between North and South and ushered in a marked reduction of US military interventions. At the same time, and as the second to last section of this chapter will show, the era of Good Neighbor
drew the two regions into an even tighter asymmetric economic integration. In the pen-ultimate section of this chapter, I highlight the United States’ World War II emergence as an industrially, financially, and militarily dominant world power and I review the ways in which the FDR administration parlayed these “three legs” of capitalist hegemony (Harvey, 2003, p.42) into a role of singular leadership over the formation and subsequent overseeing of the post-WWII international financial institutions.

2.2 1870-1899: Economic Expansion, The Spanish-American War, Formal Overseas Empire

Among historians of US empire there is general consensus that the second half of the 19th century ushered in a shift from continental expansion to commercial expansion (see Greenberg, 2005; LaFeber, 1998; O’Brien, 2007; Williams, 1980/2007). This is not to say that at this time the phenomenon of US continental empire and all of its defining practices (the dispossession, genocide, and confinement of Amerindians) suddenly stopped. Rather, the country’s transition toward commercial empire in the late 19th century meant that after roughly 50 years of rapid and aggressive territorial expansion pursued through a combination of war and diplomacy with Spain, France, Britain, and Mexico, and First Nations, the dominant model of expansion promoted and pursued by the US state (by then under control of the Northern industrialist class) transitioned from a pattern of conquering and claiming new lands for agrarian settlement to a paradigm of opening and accessing new markets for US exports.

In his account of this period, LaFeber (1998) first and foremost departs from the more conventional argument that the initiation of US commercial empire in the latter decades of the 19th century was propelled by unsustainable surplus created by Civil War-driven industrial production. Instead, he argues that the war actually interrupted a surging economic growth rate that had accompanied an industrial revolution already well underway by the 1840s. LaFeber (1998) argues that while the Civil War did not act as a catalyst for surplus production, what it did do was shift the balance of political power such that industrialists of the victorious North became instantly dominant with respect to the defeated Southern planter class (see LaFeber, 1998, p. 7). While industrialists and planters alike had always depended upon foreign markets for their goods,
slaveowners had always tied the search for foreign markets together with a search for new lands to which slavery could be extended. In the 1840s and 1850s, the era of Manifest Destiny, territorial expansion had been a contentious issue between pro-slavery Democrats of the South and North and industrialist Republicans of the North. Once slavery was abolished and Northern industrialists became politically empowered, however, the campaign for annexing new lands for agrarian settlement became significantly muted, particularly as “many policy makers and publicists believed the United States either had an adequate undeveloped frontier or already had too great an expanse to govern well” (LaFeber, 1998, p. 33).

Moreover, in place of continental expansion, a new vision of US empire was taking shape among the country’s political and economic elites. The conception of this “new empire” is generally attributed to Lincoln’s Secretary of State, William Seward, who championed a vision of US empire that LaFeber (1998) describes as integrated; US domination of world commerce, particularly the Asian markets, was the goal and, rather than the establishment of colonies, Seward envisioned a process of annexation and incorporation of Latin America and Canada into the United States as states – a process that promised to be no less violent and illiberal than colonization, but which Seward characterized as the natural and auspicious order of things, predicting in one speech that Mexico would “be opening herself as cheerfully to American immigration as Montana and Idaho are now” (the implication being that it would then subsequently become a US state, much like had occurred with Texas) (see LaFeber, 1998, p. 28; see also LaFeber 2013, pp. 7-10). These incorporated territories would be added to the US continental base from which the US would rule international trade. Islands in the Caribbean would be held as satellite bases from which to protect an envisioned US-controlled canal that would cut through Central American isthmus and connect the Caribbean Sea to the Pacific Ocean (LaFeber, 1998). Seward also called for high tariffs to protect and bolster the development of domestic industries (Ibid).

While the fuller realization of Seward’s vision would not actually take place until the turn of the century, the commercial expansion it championed was already beginning to play out as he
was articulating it. Indeed, by the war’s end the Northern industrialists and financiers who supported Seward’s view had not only gained the political upper hand but also accumulated vast amounts of surplus capital, an outcome that heightened their sense of urgency in accessing new sites of investment. In the decades that followed the war’s end this new Northern elite bloc turned to Latin America, seeking to trade finished products made in US factories and to establish raw resource enterprises (agricultural cultivation, extraction of minerals) and infrastructural construction enterprises (thus allowing an investment of capital surplus). As LaFeber (1998) reports, by the 1870s US exports were regularly exceeding imports for the first time in the nation’s history, thus reversing its historically unfavorable trade balance and, according to LaFeber’s numbers, doing so in dramatic fashion. This favorable trade balance would persist for the final three decades of the century (with only several isolated exceptions) and remain intact throughout the first half of the 20th century. As LaFeber (1998) mentions and others have documented more specifically, this overall increase in exports came in part from expanded trade activity with Latin America, with US exports to the region shooting from $64 million in 1880 to $132 million by 1900 (O’Brien, 2007, p. 57).

This dramatic growth in trade was accompanied by a surge of US direct investment in Latin American republics (Grandin, 2006; O’Brien, 2007). During the final three decades of the 19th century, members of the US economic elite established sugar cultivation enterprises in Cuba and Peru, mining operations in Nicaragua, Honduras, Chile, and Mexico, banana plantations throughout Central America and Colombia, and petroleum extraction operations in Mexico (Grandin, 2006; O’Brien 2007). In addition to agricultural and mineral extraction, construction of communication and transportation systems (promoted as an innovation necessary for the movement of goods to market) also emerged as a vehicle for capital investment schemes in Latin America. For example, between the mid-1870s and 1890, Mexican Cable Company and Central and South American Cable Company, both owned by US-American James A. Scrymser, laid land and undersea cable lines through Mexico, Central America, Peru, and Chile and purchased landlines to connect the transcontinental communication web to Argentina and Uruguay (O’Brien,
Concurrently, and into the 1890s, US capitalists also carried out massive railroad building projects in Chile, Peru, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and northern Mexico (Grandin, 2006; O’Brien 2007).

An important point to make here is that, accompanying this growing commercial expansion were significant protections that the US state enacted for its domestic industries. These protections came largely in the form of import tariffs, a central policy of a pro-industry Republican party that would dominate politically from the beginning of the Civil War through the first several decades of the 20th century. The first dramatic increase of import tariffs came in 1862, when members of congress began building a “tariff wall” that would remain largely intact for the duration of the extended Republican tenure. As the foregoing discussion illustrates however, the objective of protecting domestic industries co-existed with the aim of accessing foreign markets for the sale of surplus produced by those domestic industries. A key response to this contradiction came in the form of the McKinley Tariff Bill of 1890, which raised tariffs on certain imports to an extraordinarily high level, while eliminating tariffs on others (LaFeber, 1998, pp. 112-121). In leaving certain items un-tariffed, the bill then created a form of leverage for the US state, which it stated it no uncertain terms; a provision of the bill stipulated that the president could decide to impose tariffs on any non-tariffed import if it judged that the producing country was discriminating against US goods (Ibid). In other words, the bill marshaled the tariff – or the threat of tariff imposition – as a weapon to keep foreign markets open to US exports. Then, to get around the competition that non-tariffed items would inevitably pose to domestic industries, the McKinley Tariff Bill also committed the US government to providing a 99 percent refund for imported raw materials that were to be used in producing manufactured items; the rationale was that the manufactured items would ultimately make their way to foreign markets (Ibid). As president, McKinley (1897-1901) would raise tariffs again. They would be kept high by his successor, Theodore Roosevelt (1901-1909) and by Roosevelt’s successor William Taft (1909-1913). After being lowered significantly by Democratic president Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921), they would be raised to particularly high levels again in 1922 under the Fordney-McCumber Tariff
Act passed by a Republican-dominated Congress (see LaFeber 1998; LaFeber, Polenberg, & Woloch, 2015, pp. 95, 103)

As the above discussion begins to suggest, the late 19th century increase in US exporting and international investing was being accompanied by a veritable political movement among US actors who championed these practices and called upon the state to do everything in its power to facilitate them. This had to do with the actual events unfolding as the country entered into a period of industrial maturation and all of the economic booms and busts and social ills that this brought with it. As LaFeber (1998) recounts, for a brief moment in the post-Civil War years, the vast lands of the western US had been looked to by the nation’s leaders as a bottomless source of surplus absorption and land for individual farmers. However, this moment came swiftly to an end amid a quick secession of economic depressions that gripped the country in the post-Civil War years. The first of these downturns had begun with the panic of 1873 and lasted until 1878. The second came in less than five years, beginning with 1882 to 1885. At this point, according to LaFeber (1998), growing numbers of US businessmen and political leaders began gravitating more strongly to the idea that the seemingly endless western frontier actually could not absorb the nation’s surplus and that the opening of foreign markets was the only way of avoiding market crashes and the related social turmoil that ensued as weak demand sent prices plummeting and unemployment soaring (see LaFeber, 1998, p. 16). The popularity of tapping foreign markets to absorb US surplus intensified further in the 1890s when the country sank into yet another economic depression that lasted from 1893 to 1897. By this time, of course, the penetration of overseas markets was more than just an idea; as discussed above, it was already very much an actual and continual practice, but one that was continually spurred on by the idea that such a practice constituted a quick and effective fix to the internal vicissitudes of industrial capitalism; and this idea apparently to gathered even more steam every time it had an opportunity to be mobilized as a solution. As LaFeber (1998) points out, "with each panic and depression the American business community displayed a reintensified interest in foreign markets" (p. 19).
Here, it is worth noting historian William A. Williams’ (1980/2007) point that, in addition to the wealthy industrialists of the North, there was an emergent non-industrialist capitalist class that was also pushing particularly hard for the continued opening and securing of overseas markets in the late 19th century. These were the small to medium size dirt farmers of the Midwest, a segment of the population who, upon moving beyond subsistence levels of farming had, according to Williams, “found themselves in a highly competitive surplus-producing marketplace economy that increasingly operated as part of a world system” (p. 92). As Williams writes, by the final three decades of the 19th century, “the American farmer was a capitalist businessman whose welfare depended upon free access to a global marketplace, and who increasingly demanded that the government use its powers to ensure such freedom of opportunity” (Ibid). Williams argues that ultimately what came to pass, however, was that while these farmers had long championed overseas commercial expansion as a vehicle for accessing and opening overseas markets for their surplus, it would ultimately be the wealthier, organized, and well-connected industrialist factions of the Northeastern and Midwestern cities that would end up leading the charge for the US government to facilitate the opening of overseas markets, shaping the “new idiom of empire as a way of life” as they did. Citing and echoing the arguments of other historical accounts of late 19th century US imperialism, Williams argues that the urban industrialists “recognized the necessity of expansion for the capitalist political economy – industrial and financial as well as agricultural;” (95) and, as they began to act on this realization, the pro-empire farmers “lost control of their own idea and program” (Ibid). Still, while they would not be the ones to define and control an imperialist movement that would be led by Rockefellers, Carnegies and Morgans, Midwestern farmers would form a consistent base of political support for the expansionist initiatives that this movement steadily pursued and achieved.

While the focus of this discussion is on the late 19th century rise of US capitalist imperialism, in the interest of avoiding a completely US-centric portrait of the late 19th century expansion of US trade and investment in Latin America, it is important to consider the context of Latin America during this period. Over the first three decades of the 19th century, the vast majority
of Latin America had been embroiled in wars of independence against the Spanish and Portuguese colonial regimes. By 1830, liberation had been won by the Mexico along with most of Central America and the overwhelming majority of South America. However, for many of the newly independent states the post-revolution period was one of economic crisis. Much commercial capital had left by way of capital flight or repayments of European loans that had been put towards military efforts against the Spanish and the Portuguese\(^\text{12}\) (Pike, 1977, p. 64). Moreover, as Peloso and Tenenbaum (1996) observe, “very soon after they began their independent life, the new independent states in Latin America were deeply in debt “(p. 18). This, they argue, was due to the fact that many new Latin American governments were hit by the collapse of several large merchant houses in Britain. Upon declaring independence many Latin American states had enlisted these merchant houses to sell bonds on their behalf in the international market and in return the houses had extended large loans; the collapse of the houses combined with a downturn in trade in 1825-1826, and the borrowing Latin American governments defaulted on their loans, thus preventing them from borrowing more credit from alternative lenders.

\(^{12}\) During the revolutions in Latin America, the United States, had largely abstained from attempting such a role, as it had been engaged in talks with Spain for the acquisition of its Florida territory and had received clear warning from the Spanish Crown that any extension of aid to the rebels would be met with its withdrawal from the negotiation process (O’Brien, 2007). Here, a little background information is useful, as it underscores the way in which antebellum agrarian imperialism also involved the taking of land, not only from indigenous peoples, but also from other imperial powers (who had, in turn, taken it from indigenous peoples by conquest and colonization). While the United States refrained from openly supporting the Spanish colonies in their war for independence, it cast its designs on the North American Spanish territory of Spanish Florida. As historian Walter Johnson (2013) informs us, the “U.S. Congress passed a secret law providing for the annexation of any territory in North America, and began the covert funding of an American-aligned uprising against Spanish rule in Florida (covert because an overt American military action against the Spanish presence in North America would likely have drawn the British into the conflict)” (p. 26). Over the next decade, Spanish Florida was infiltrated by US settlers and soldiers (recruited by General Andrew Jackson to lay claim to the land and lead a rebellion against the Spanish Crown). The United States government (which had held imperial designs upon the Spanish territory for some time) sent military support, and quickly established occupation of several areas of the territory. This in turn led to a short war against the Spanish and the Spain’s ceding of the territory over to the United States with the Adams-Onís Treaty of 1819.
However, in the latter half of the 19th century, international trade would explode in volume and this carried significant impacts for the republics of Latin America. This trade was controlled largely by Western European powers, which in the continuing wake of the industrial revolution engaged in an unprecedented economic expansion, seeking out raw resources for domestic manufacturing enterprises and recently created mass consumer markets that were encouraged to crave products deemed exotic. Moreover, European industrialists were increasingly in command of surpluses and thus sought out external sites for profitable investment. The independent Latin American republics became a focus for this trade and investment, thus bolstering the political power of Latin American Liberal factions, a pro-trade group comprised largely of merchants. For the first few decades following independence, Liberals had been in sustained conflict with Latin American Conservative factions comprised of an alliance between Catholic clergy and the hacendado elites who owned plantations that were largely responsible for domestic production and did not look fondly on the competition from imports. Among other things, Liberals embraced export-led economic development as the key to successful state-building and, given the lack of domestic capital and the ongoing indebtedness from independence, saw foreign investment as the necessary catalyst for making this happen.

Thus, as trade with Europe began to grow, so did European investment that went toward financing the building of extraction facilities, as well as the infrastructure and transportation that were necessary for getting exports to port for shipment. This was the beginning of the era of European financed and operated railroads, trains and steamships in Latin America. In this way, the late 19th century foreign markets agendas of US industrialists and farmers coincided with an ongoing search for foreign capital investment among Latin American governments and elites.

Thus when the US Civil War ended and the US political and economic elites were advocated commercial expansion, Latin American republics were governed and led by Liberals that were wholly committed to implementing a model of export-driven economic growth. Indeed, as argued by Topik and Wells (1998), the latter third of the 19th century was when Latin American republics were in the midst of to a foreign dominated primary export boom. This had everything to
do with events of the recent past that had left the region facing substantial internal challenges. By the end of the US Civil War, most of the formerly Spanish colonies of Latin America had been independent for approximately four decades, and in the years that immediately followed liberation, many of the new republics faced economic crisis and political instability. Not only had they been economically drained by Spain during the revolutionary wars (a situation not helped by the sudden postwar decline of wartime demand levels) and infrastructurally devastated by almost two decades of armed conflict, but moreover, the region was heavily indebted to European powers. During the wars, Britain had moved in as the primary source of financial support for the rebels, lending vast amounts of capital, thus integrating Latin American economies into its own (See O’Brien, 2007; Pike 1977). British loans had been accompanied by British investments, which only tightened economic integration between Latin American republics and the distant European power that was beginning to emerge as a metropole to the region.

Moreover, as British investment intensified, Latin American governments and elites increasingly regarded the United States as a new source of foreign capital investment, one that was particularly appealing for the forms of advanced technology implemented by a small trickle of US investors that had begun to move into the region upon its independence from Spain (O’Brien, 2007). At the same time, it should be noted that with many Latin American societies, there remained an ambivalence with respect to the ramifications of closer relations with the United States, thanks to a series of US imperialistic moves between the 1820 and 1860 – the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 (in which President James Monroe, had effectively laid claim to the newly independent republics by declaring that any colonizing activity undertaken by European powers in the Americas would be answered with US military intervention); the 1846-1848 US war against Mexico (in which Mexico had lost over half of its territory to the United States). By the last quarter of the 19th century, there had also been numerous violent filibustering attempts led by private US-American citizens who had corralled makeshift armies of private citizens (often veterans of the Mexican-American War) into land grabs in Nicaragua, Cuba, and parts of Mexico. While these attacks on Latin American sovereignty had not been officially endorsed or supported by the US
federal government, they were nonetheless condoned by it and, moreover, were explicitly supported and financed by Southern political and economic elites that had sought to annex more slave territory during the antebellum period.

Ultimately, however, despite whatever misgivings harbored by Latin American governments and elites around the implications of entering into closer economic relations with the United States, as discussed above, trade between the two regions rose dramatically in the latter decades of the 19th century, as did US investment in Latin American republics. It was during this period of intensification of commercial relations with Latin America (which overlapped with the recent political consolidation of the US industrialists and financiers) that US foreign policy toward Latin America began to center increasingly on the securitization of US commercial interests in the region. The use of military force quickly became the commonplace strategy, authorized by President Grover Cleveland and endorsed by multiple US factions that included the American Manufacturing Association and leading intellectual leaders (O’Brien, 2007). In this context, the US state relied repeatedly on the threat and the exercise of military force to quell perceived internal instability in Latin American republics, sending warships to Latin American ports a total of 5,980 times between 1869 and 1897 to protect US commercial interests (Grandin, 2006).

In addition to the continual use of military aggression to control the politics of independent Latin American republics (a policy that would become known as “gunboat diplomacy”) another development that occurred during the late 19th century era of US commercial expansion was the establishment of a formal empire in the Pacific and Caribbean regions, a project that was put in motion by Cleveland’s decision to intervene in the late 19th century Cuban struggle for independence from Spain. As historian William A. Williams (1980/2007) highlights, for most of its existence, the United States economic and political elites had maintained ambitions to acquire Cuba; Southern planters had wished to annex it as a slave state, while others argued that it was necessary to acquire the island as a buffer against foreign invaders that might seek to enter and attack the US from the south and by way of the Mississippi Valley Basin. During the Civil War, there was renewed interest in acquiring Cuba; Williams attributes to Northern concerns over the
Union’s inability to fully execute an embargo against the Confederacy (“blockade runners” loaded up at neutral ports located in both Cuba and the Bahamas), swirling anxieties at French attempts at colonizing Mexico between 1863 and 1867, and a growing interest in constructing (and protecting) a canal through the Central American isthmus. Then, in the late 1860s and early 1870s, the United States leadership used the eruption of a protracted Cuban rebellion against the Spanish as an opportunity to condemn European colonialism as an illiberal system in need of eradication.

In the period between the Cuban rebellion of 1868, which was ultimately crushed by Spain, and the second Cuban rebellion of 1895, Williams (1980/2007) argues, US imperial ambitions vis-à-vis Cuba were further “intensified by five dynamic and mutually reinforcing developments of the intervening years” (p. 113). First, Williams argues, there was the fact that by the 1890s, extra-continental commercial activity had been embraced as a way of life by a significant portion of the US population that included industrialists, agriculturalists, alike, and it was generally regarded as integral to the future of the nation’s economy. Second, in the decades following the Civil War, he contends, a certain zeal emerged among the economic, political, intellectual, military, and religious leadership of the country to “save and reform, if not transform” the world; Williams suggests that, in response to the Cuban rebellion, this late 19th century burst of US reformism (which is well documented) also worked to heighten historic ambitions among the country’s leadership to acquire the island.

Such fears were then greatly exacerbated by Williams’ third posited development: the Panic of 1893, in which an overaccumulation of capital, a resulting market crash, and a subsequent economic depression had the multiple effects of one, spurring fears among the US population of total collapse of the capitalist economic system; two, increasing the appeal of foreign markets as the solution to the country’s economic problems; and three, heightening existing concerns that Japan and the European powers would take and divide up the China marketplace among themselves, leaving no segment for the United States. This context of economic depression also contributed to heightened anxieties when in 1895, Cuban rebels,
largely proletarian and of African descent, began fighting for independence from Spain, and in the process, destroying commercial property held by US sugar barons, thus stirring concerns about the future viability of US capital interests if the rebels were to succeed in liberating the colony from the Spanish Crown (which, until then, had provided local protection for US interests).

The fourth development that William identifies is the magnification by the market crisis of a *cultural* crisis that was unfolding as the country shifted “from an agrarian-commercial political economy to an industrial-financing system” (Ibid, p.114). In other words, while agriculturalists of the country’s rural areas had ascended during the latter decades of the 19th century, when economic crisis hit in the 1890s, this faction then steadily lost “their formerly superior *structural* power” to the manufacturers and bankers of the cities. This event carried its own ripple effects – the downgrading of the agriculturalist “social and intellectual value system, economic priorities, and political agenda” – that were only dramatized by the economic depression of the 1890s.

Fifth, and finally, Williams argues that the combination of the first four developments (all of which might be understood as a sort of multifaceted economic, cultural, and psychic response to the consolidation of capitalism as the country’s dominant system and paradigm) – drove many among the United States citizenry to clamor for some sort of centralized order to be imposed upon the international marketplace. As he writes, “Even those who clung to the pure Smithian doctrine of the marketplace began to agitate for more vigorous action by the government to expand the marketplace to preserve America’s uniqueness. They wanted more expansion abroad, more empire, to preserve individualist freedom at home” (Ibid, p. 115).

For Williams the most crucial development among all of these was the economic depression, which he argues, effectively heightened the sense of urgency around all of the other developments, and ultimately rendered it, “impossible to deal calmly or abstractly with the revolutionary turmoil in Cuba and the situation in Asia” (Ibid, p. 113). Moreover, in this context of economic depression, the prospect of unfettered expansion into Cuba, Williams argues, surfaced repeatedly as a sort of unifying focus, a common solution to multiple problems that was endorsed by otherwise fragmented interests. In this vein, the idea of US intervention in Cuba’s liberation
struggle – conceived as a way of fully “freeing” up the island to unfettered US trade and
investment – emerged as a common focus around which divergent interests began to converge.
Moreover, amid the combined pressures of economic crisis at home, related desires for
expansion into China, and anxieties around the securitization of investments in Cuba, the US
political leadership came to “think of Cuba in terms of China—meaning that freeing Cuba could
lead to a beachhead in the Philippines (also owned by Spain) for access to Asia” (Ibid, p. 116).

Once intervention in Cuba won overwhelming popular support by the mid-1890s, Williams
argues, it remained to be determined how exactly the United States would step in. What began in
1895 as a call to provide economic assistance to the Cuban revolutionaries soon evolved into
urgings to provide military assistance to help the revolutionaries complete the liberation of the
island from Spanish colonial rule. Then, as economic depression and cultural strife continued to
escalate in the United States, Williams argues, the US political leadership began to lean
increasingly toward the idea of full-on war against Spain for control of Cuba, a development that
had everything to do with the increasingly heightened imperative of accessing Asian markets and
the related calculation that battling Spain for Cuba would allow for a grab at the Philippine Islands
(also a colony of Spain), which, if successful, would provide the United States with a beachhead
from which to access Asia. Responding to the fraught situation, Williams argues, President
Cleveland requested a war plan from the US navy (by now well versed in maritime warfare) who
came back with an “imperial strategy” to extinguish Spanish authority in the Philippines as a
means of “liberating” Cuba from the Spanish Crown, thereby securing a US point of entry into
Asia.

Between April and August of 1898, the United States waged a naval and expeditionary
war on several fronts of the remaining Spanish empire – the Philippines, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and
Guam – ultimately suppressing Spanish forces, and curtailing altogether the ongoing
independence struggles in both Cuba and the Philippines (see Peréz, 1998, esp. p. xv; Williams,
1980/2007, pp. 116-119). In the Paris Treaty of December 1898 that formalized the end of the
war, Spain declared Cuba independent and ceded to the US the other three Spanish-ruled island

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territories that the US had occupied during the war: Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines (for which it paid $20 million to Spain) (see Go, 2011, pp. 55-57; Wesling, 2011, p. 4). Notably, in the case of the Philippines, the end of war between Spanish and US forces precipitated a brutal three-year war between US forces and Philippine rebels who had been fighting for independence from Spain and now resisted the imposition of US rule (Go, 2011, pp. 57-59). The conflict, which came to be known as the Filipino Independence war, quickly took shape as a genocidal campaign of torture, destruction, and murder (see Go, 2011, pp. 58-59; Wesling, 2011, pp. 105, 114) with US military troops burning villages to the ground, slaughtering farm animals, torturing and murdering civilians alike (with the age limit purportedly 10 years old). In total, 400,000 Filipinos, both civilian and rebel, reportedly lost their lives (see Go, 2011, pp. 57-58).

In the meantime, the US congress authorized the continued military occupation of Cuba with the Army Appropriations Act of 1901. The occupation would continue until 1903, at which point the Congress made US military withdrawal contingent upon eight conditions which worked to significantly reduce Cuban sovereignty, thus turning it into a de facto US territory. These conditions were delineated in the Platt Amendment (1903), which the Cuban government was compelled to make to the country’s national constitution (see Pérez, 1988/2015, pp. 183-188). As per the amendment (named for US Senator Orville Platt, who headed up its drafting), they included the leasing of Guantanamo Bay to the United States in perpetuity (the rationale being that the bay would be used as a naval base to protect US interests in the Caribbean); the establishment of a tariff that allowed for the entry of US agricultural and industrial goods into the Cuban market; and, the granting to the US of the right to intervene militarily in Cuba whenever the US government deemed that political order in Cuba was under threat (see also LaFeber, 1998, p. 416).

In the middle of these events, the US government also officially annexed the islands of Hawaii in 1898 (LaFeber, 1998). As historians have illustrated, the US taking of Hawaii was a process that had actually originated in the first half of the 19th century (Kaplan, 2002; LaFeber, 1998; Skwiot, 2012). Starting in the 1820s, US traders had begun traveling to the islands in
search of sandalwood and were soon followed by missionaries. By the year 1842, a US-American was serving as the republic’s prime minister (alongside the Hawaiian monarch) and in 1848 new land reform measures, advocated by missionaries and traders, turned land that had was owned by the Hawaiian royalty and worked by Hawaiian commoners into private property that could now be owned by foreigners. The Hawaiian economy was reoriented from whaling to sugar-cultivation dominated by US-American settlers, and the Hawaiian population steadily diminished thanks to disease brought by the settlers. By 1875, the United States staked its claim over the country’s sugar exports in the Treaty of Reciprocity and in 1893, the US settler class, now an oligarchy, deposed the Hawaiian monarchy with the help of US marines, inserted itself as the provisional government, and began a campaign for US annexation which would eventually happen in 1898. Thus, even though the US conquest of Hawaii can be understood as an instance of settler imperialism that had in fact taken root at the height of US agrarian-settler imperialism, it was an event that received the official sanction of the US state at a point when a paradigm of non-settler capitalist imperialism had become dominant and when capitalist industrialism had taken full root in the continental United States. To this point, the “Big Five” sugar oligarchy (comprised of 5 US-American sugar corporations that had long dominated the Hawaiian sugar industry) would only increase its collective profit levels in the years following territorial annexation (an event that brought the advantageous removal of pre-existing import tariffs), all while deepening its shared control over the islands’ political and economic affairs.

2.3 The Panama Canal

In the years that followed the annexation of Hawaii, the acquisition of Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Guam, and the de facto acquisition of Cuba, the United States continued to expand its new formal empire, declaring sovereignty in 1900 over the eastern half of the Samoan islands, a Pacific archipelago that had been the object of territorial rivalry between Germany, Britain, and the United States for almost half a century (LaFeber, 1998, pp. 35-36). Another imperial annexation came in the form of the Panama Canal Zone (LaFeber, 1994). This was the 10-mile territory, which President Theodore Roosevelt placed under US sovereignty in 1902 after
dubiously negotiating the rights to build the Panama Canal (a key component of Seward’s imperial vision). Throughout the 19th century, US politicians and capitalists had been attracted to the idea of connecting the Caribbean Sea to the Pacific Ocean by building a canal through Central America. Such a feat, it was believed, would give the United States an invaluable advantage in international trade.

While it is beyond the scope of this discussion, a few details of the story behind how the US acquired the rights to build a canal and the territory surrounding the canal warrant mention as they provide a powerful illustration of how late 19th century US imperial power was exercised not only through outright war and occupation but also through disingenuous political dealings that amounted to a sort of conquest through trickery. In what follows, I will briefly summarize.

In the late 1890s, there was resurgence of support among the US political establishment with respect to building a trans-Isthmian canal (a key component of Seward’s imperial vision). The context was the recent Spanish-American war, the successes of the US Navy that had delivered US victory in that war, the purported need for a push toward Asia that had been deployed in justifying that war, and a general spirit of extra-continental expansionism that was woven throughout all of these elements. In the late 1890s, Congress ordered a commission, headed by Admiral John Grimes Walker, to determine the best options for building a US-owned and operated canal through Central America and President McKinley directed Secretary of State John Hay to reopen negotiations with Britain to abrogate the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, which had been ratified in 1849 and prohibited both the United States and Britain from taking sole control of any Central American waterway and from fortifying any such waterway militarily. Hay’s effort to renegotiate the treaty continued under the direction of President Roosevelt and ultimately resulted in an almost full repeal of the original treaty. Britain, ensnared in the Boer War in South Africa and feeling threatened by German naval advances and Soviet expansion toward India, ultimately agreed to a treaty, the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, which granted the US the authority to

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13 For this summary of events, I rely on the accounts of Ameringer, 1966; Donoghue, 2014; LaFeber, 1989; and Parker, 2009.
build and control a Central American canal on the condition that all nations be granted access to the canal on terms that were fair and reasonable. The treaty did not address the question of US military fortifications to the canal, thus implicitly permitting them.

The Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, ratified in November 1901, was a watershed moment for US imperialism in the western hemisphere, as Britain had officially forfeited incredibly significant ground in the region and the US had been the beneficiary. Following the treaty’s ratification, plans moved forward to build an isthmian canal but Panama was not yet the official targeted site. For much of the 1890s, Nicaragua had been the favored site of the canal among US politicians. This changed for a number of reasons during Roosevelt’s presidency and Panama became the targeted site. At the time, the land that would come to be known as the Republic of Panama was a territory of Colombia. At the time, the Colombian territory of Panama was home to the Panama Railroad, a US-owned corporation that was not only the most powerful and lucrative business in the territory but also the one that stood to profit most handsomely from a canal construction project that was set to take place alongside the existing railroad tracks and would thus rely heavily on the assistance of rail transportation every step of the way.

In the first few years of the 20th century, the US attempted to negotiate a canal concession with the Colombian government, but was ultimately rebuffed (the latter citing concerns over national sovereignty compromises that it perceived to inhere in the US’ proposal). The failure of the negotiations reportedly outraged the Roosevelt administration, which quickly began weighing alternative schemes. The option of continued negotiation with Colombia was rejected, as was pursuing a canal through Nicaragua. Seizure of the isthmus from Colombia, however, was entertained, as was bypassing the Colombian government altogether and negotiating directly with local Panamanian government officials. At this time, a group of US-American elites connected with the Panama Railroad Company began colluding with a group of elite Panamanian separatists to orchestrate the secession of the territory. A French man by the name of Phillip Bunau-Villa served as the go-between between the separatists and the Roosevelt administration. Bunau-Villa was a shareholder in Nouvelle Compagnie, the French company that
had received a concession from the Colombian government to build a canal through Panama but had ultimately abandoned the project; he thus stood to make a handsome profit from the sale of canal construction materials to whomever might ultimately build it. He ultimately secured President Roosevelt’s vow and Secretary of State John Hay’s more explicit promise to provide naval support for the separatists (under the pretext that a revolution in Panama would jeopardize US interests in the region thus justifying intervention) once secession got underway. Another key go-between the separatists and the Roosevelt administration was William Cromwell, the US-American lawyer for Nouvelle Compagnie.

Importantly, collusion between the US-American actors and the Panamanian secessionists was done with the understanding that once secession occurred, the new Panamanian government would grant the US a concession to build a canal through Panama. However, once secession occurred (accomplished with US Navy ships floating nearby in a show of force against the Colombian government) and it came time to write the canal treaty, the Roosevelt administration effectively strong-armed the new Panamanian government (comprised of the same Panamanian secessionists it had just supported), threatening to retreat from protecting the republic from Colombian forces if it did not comply with its terms, which essentially turned Panama into a US territory a 10-year occupation. Like the original treaty that had been rejected by Colombia, the Hay-Bunau-Varilla treaty allowed Nouvelle Compagnie to sell its property and concession to the United States government for an amount of $40 million and stipulated that the US would pay Panama an annuity of $250,000 and a one-time payment of $10 million in gold.

Unlike the treaty rejected by Colombia, there was no mention of Panamanian sovereignty. To the contrary, the treaty granted near US sovereignty over the designated 10-mile Canal Zone. “The republic of Panama,” stated Article III, “grants to the United States all the rights, power, and authority within the zone mentioned…which the United States would possess and exercise if it were the sovereign of the territory…to the entire exclusion of the exercise by the Republic of Panama of any such sovereign rights, power or authority” (as cited in Parker 2009, p.
Further, the treaty empowered the US to lease the zone in perpetuity (as opposed to the period of 100 years stipulated in the original treaty rejected by Colombia), and finally, while Panama City and Colon (the two terminal cities of the future canal) were not included in the canal zone, the US was granted control over the sanitation, sewage, water supply and policing of public order in these cities. Moreover, as numerous historians have detailed, the Canal Zone was quickly infiltrated with US workers and the area became the equivalent of a US settler colony, characterized by dangerous and often deadly work conditions and an apartheid system between the white US workers, Panamanian citizens, and West Indian workers, who were also recruited to work on the canal and who would comprise the majority of the labor force (see Donoghue, 2014; Parker, 2009).

2.4 1904-1933: Informal Empire Through Monetary Rule, Gunboat Diplomacy, and Capital Penetration

As illustrated in the foregoing section, the turn of the century marked the accelerated rise of US overseas capitalist empire. In a period of less than ten years, the country had demonstrated the strength of its Navy by defeating Spain, it had consequently taken on an overseas empire that provided it with several naval bases from which to access China, and, through stunning imperial conquest, it had taken command of the building and operation of the most highly coveted transoceanic waterway that would connect the Atlantic to Pacific. This ascent would continue over the course of the first three decades of the 20th century, when the United States would emerge as a major economic power in the world (Rosenberg, 2004). Part and parcel of this phenomenon were sustained efforts among the country’s political leadership to integrate new areas – both those the country had officially taken as dependencies and protectorates and the independent republics of Latin America – into the US economic system. As historian Emily Rosenberg (2004) has shown, a critical part of this process, was placing these areas on the US’ own monometallic system of the gold standard. Here, it is helpful to review some of the events that led to the adoption of this system McKinley’s Gold Standard Act of 1900 which established gold as the only legal monetary metal (Ibid).
As Rosenberg (2004) discusses in *Financial Missionaries to the World*, the late 19th century US economic crises that had been part of the impetus behind the war against Spain had also given rise to a “free silver” movement, comprised of populists and ultimately favored by Democrat politicians. This movement called for a remonetization of silver—which had been legislatively taken out of commission in 1873—and the adoption of a bimetallic system as a way of increasing the money supply. In response, a powerful “sound money” counter-movement (backed by Republicans) had emerged, arguing for the preservation of the country’s gold standard as a way of maintaining economic stability and creating strong credit markets. As Rosenberg points out, the sound money movement was also driven by agendas to both emulate and foster close economic ties with Europe, which generally utilized a monometallic gold-based currency system. Furthermore, sound money activists argued that a bimetallic currency system would be impossible to maintain and would ultimately result in the exclusive usage of silver currency (a practice these activists pointedly attributed to the purportedly “backward” countries of Asia and Latin America).

With the election of McKinley, the sound money movement triumphed and as Rosenberg (2004) illustrates, a movement to take the gold standard global – specifically to the US imperial territories – quickly materialized. As Rosenberg (2004) argues, moving the economies of these territories onto the gold standard was viewed by pro-gold activists as critical to US interests:

> In their view, the turn-of-the-century global currency situation was highly disadvantageous to US overseas interests. All economic transactions – private commerce and investment or even strategic expenditures such as payment for troops stationed overseas and remittances for construction of a proposed trans-isthmian canal in Central America – involved international payments. These payments could be more costly or complicated for Americans if exchange rates fluctuated violently, if monetary values were not predictable, and if international accounts were denominated in pound-sterling and kept in London, a situation that gave British businesses a competitive advantage. (p. 8)

Within the first few years of the 20th century, then, the United States moved Puerto Rico and the Philippines off of the silver standard that had been in effect under Spanish colonial rule, and onto a gold standard. During this period, the US also moved Panama, independent for decades but
now considered a protectorate thanks to the Panama Canal, off of its silver standard and onto a gold standard.

Importantly, the geopolitical context of the United States’ new mission to more fully integrate Latin America into its economic system through currency reform was one in which European powers still exercised a great deal of control and authority – and this point was, of course, was not lost on US political leadership (Rosenberg, 2004). In the early 20th century, many Latin American countries were indebted to Germany as well as Britain and France, thus rendering them subject to European military intervention in the event of failure to continue loan repayments. Indeed, between 1902 and 1904, Germany, France and Britain all intervened militarily in Venezuela to enforce debt repayment, sparking outrage among US political and economic elites who regarded Latin America as US territory. As Rosenberg recounts, in the name of banishing European competition from the Western hemisphere, the Roosevelt administration concerned itself with setting a new foreign policy with regard to all of Latin America. In December of 1904, Roosevelt announced to the US congress that the United States was now authorized to intervene in any Latin American country that appeared to be inviting European military intervention through debt repayment problems or political instability. This would come to be known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine of 1823.

Having proclaimed a new foreign policy that was oriented toward banishing European influence once and for all from what the US had always viewed as its rightful dominion, the question immediately became one of how to follow and apply it. As Rosenberg points out, at issue for the United States was how to follow such a doctrine without establishing a system of outright colonies or protectorates, particularly as the recent US imperial exploits in the Caribbean and the Pacific had sparked significant controversy within the US congress (which had remained divided over the establishment of a formal US empire) and had drawn widespread condemnation among the governments and citizenries of Latin American republics. As Rosenberg (2004) underscores, it was a seemingly irreconcilable contradiction – how could the US be a “police power” without being a colonial power? Or, perhaps more accurately, how could the Roosevelt
administration pursue a course of action that was unequivocally colonialist in its style, purpose, and effect (i.e. intervening in and controlling the internal political and economic processes of a group of sovereign republics for the purposes of realizing territorial concerns of the state and economic concerns of US capital) but avoid anti-colonialist resistance from Congress and Latin American republics and successfully deflect the label of “colonizer”?

The answer to this would be a strategy of exporting US financial supervision and control to Latin American governments, and the first test case would be the Dominican Republic, where an already ongoing condition of US financial supervision over a state that was neither a colony (like the Philippines) or a protectorate (like Cuba) provided the perfect opportunity to use the country as “a laboratory for working out the question of how other forms of dependency might be devised” (Rosenberg 2004, p. 38). Long reliant on sugar cultivation and export as the cornerstone of its economy, by the early 20th century the Dominican Republic had endured significant economic decline as the US, in the wake of the Spanish-American War, had made a full shift toward Cuba as its chief supplier of sugar. By the first few years of the 20th century, the Dominican government was heavily indebted to Belgium, Italy, France, Spain, and the United States. During this time the Dominican government had sought closer ties with the United States, permitting the US-American owners of the San Domingo Improvement Company to take over its customs houses and thus control the country’s loan servicing and expense payments. However, in 1901, the Dominican government repudiated the measure (Atkins & Wilson, 1998) and the Company sought the assistance of the US government, which then negotiated a deal in which the Dominican government was required to pay the Company and failure to pay would automatically authorize the seizure of certain customs houses by a US financial agent tasked with ensuring that payment was made to the Company. When the Dominican government did not make the payments, this is indeed what ensued. In October of 1904, a US financial agent took over Dominican customs houses in the city of Puerto Plata. This act in turn sparked threats from France that it would do the same with the customs house of Santo Domingo and requests from Italian creditors to the Italian government that it provide assistance in debt collection.
With European intervention looming, the US State Department advised the US Minister to the Dominican Republic to arrange a deal with Dominican president Carlos Morales – the United States would take over all of the country’s customs houses, thereby controlling the receipt and distribution of its customs and theoretically enforcing the continual servicing of its debts to European creditors and thus preventing European intervention. For the Roosevelt administration, the agreement was critical to its effort to banish European influence from the region and to this end it employed threat of coercion to ensure compliance, sending naval forces to ensure that the president’s signing of the agreement was carried off successfully.

As Rosenberg (2004) demonstrates, the details of Roosevelt’s initial plan were that the US government would take over collection of Dominican customs and apply a maximum of 55% of the customs receipts to servicing the republic’s foreign debt. The US government would also take on the authority of reviewing internal and external debt claims and would negotiate refinancing options with the private banks to whom the republic’s foreign debt was owed. While Dominican president, Carlos Morales reportedly supported the plan, this was not the case for the vast majority of the country’s political leadership. In proposing this plan to the Dominican Republic, Roosevelt sent a naval commander to ensure compliance and quell resistance from the large segment of the country’s political leadership that opposed the agreement. Upon agreeing to the plan, Dominican president Carlos Morales placed the republic on the gold standard in preparation for the anticipated implementation of the Roosevelt plan.

Initially, however, the US Congress rejected the plan on grounds that the US government should not take on the responsibility of obtaining refinancing for another country’s loans. Undeterred, the Roosevelt administration went through with it anyway, advising Morales to declare a modus vivendi under which it would officially invite the US to take over Dominican customs houses and work out refinancing with the European creditors. Against popular will, Morales signed an agreement with Roosevelt and US government officials, and bankers from J.P. Morgan and Kuhn, Loeb and Company were subsequently sent to take control of the republic’s finances. Naval power was again utilized to ensure the transfer of control. Particularly resistant
was the governor of the coastal province of Montecristi, Desiderio Arias. To this province, Roosevelt sent a naval squadron to the coastal province to ensure that Arias turned over the province’s customs house to US control.

For the next two years, the US controlled the customs houses of the Dominican Republic until 1907, when Congress passed a bill that officially authorized the intervention but included one change: instead of the US government being responsible for securing refinancing with the foreign creditors, a US investment bank (Kuhn, Loeb and Company) would extend the republic new loans which the Dominican Republic’s US-controlled government customs houses would then use to pay off the European creditors and establish solvency. In the years that followed, this arrangement, which was expected to not only circumvent European aggression but also prevent local opposition to the US-backed government from using the strategic move of taking a port and using the revenues of its customs house to fund a rebellion. The strategy not only accomplished these objectives but also resulted in the dramatic increase of US direct investment in the Dominican Republic. As Rosenberg (2004) informs us:

Before 1905 such investments had been small; under the umbrella of the receivership, US-owned sugar and transportation interests assumed an even greater share of productive activity in the Dominican Republic. Advantages to US importers and sugar exporters became embedded in Dominican tax and tariff structures. Legislation such as the Agricultural Concessions Law of 1911 awarded incentives to US sugar producers. Dollar diplomacy here, as in some subsequent cases, spearheaded a broader economic presence that included rising levels of direct US investment and trade. (p. 56)

As suggested by the preceding excerpt, the Dominican arrangement would become the precursor to a new, so-called “dollar diplomacy,” a policy that would be vigorously advocated and pursued by Roosevelt’s successor, William Howard Taft (1909-1913) and Taft’s successor, Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921). For the Taft administration, the objective was not only to diminish European influence in the region but also to, one, place the Latin American republics on the gold standard by introducing gold-based currencies that the republics were to regulate through internal central banks (whose reserves were to be kept in New York), and to two, push these countries into regimens of regular debt servicing by reforming their customs collections by placing them under the supervision of a US agent appointed by the State Department. These objectives, in
turn, were to be achieved through enlisting private US investment banks to extend loans to these republics. In order to get the US investment banks to agree to extend these loans, the loans were to be conditioned on the borrowing country’s acceptance of financial advisers (i.e. customs collectors) appointed by the US State Department. In this way, the US banks’ willingness to extend the loans was secured through their ability to condition them on the acceptance of US financial oversight. In turn, the US government’s degree of leverage to intervene and control the republics’ financial affairs to its liking was secured by the promise of a US investment bank loan extended to pay off European creditors that would be part and parcel of the borrowing country’s willingness to accept this intervention.

As Rosenberg (2004) points out, all of this was couched in a discourse of uplift for the borrowing countries, one that was at once drawn right from conventional European imperial discourse and steeped with a moralistic rejection of the violence and unilateralism associated with both European colonialism and recent US activity in the region. Dollar diplomacy was presented as a way in which dollars – “not bullets” – would be used in “civilizing” and “stabilizing” the Latin American region while simultaneously liberating it from European economic control and ridding the Western hemisphere of European intervention/aggression once and for all.

According to Rosenberg (2004), over the course of Taft’s presidency, his administration attempted to spread dollar diplomacy throughout Central America. Honduras, an independent republic that had defaulted on loan payments to Britain since 1873, was quickly targeted and a loan package was put together by a State Department appointee, Charles Conant, J.P. Morgan and the republic’s military government, which was controlled by the US fruit company and US mining company that dominated the country’s economy. In Nicaragua, things were less straightforward. By the early 1900s, the Liberal president, Jose Santos Zelaya had begun alarming the Taft administration with several acts that included formally incorporating the British-controlled east coast of the country, pledging to impose an export tax on bananas cultivated and sold by US multinationals that had previously been granted generous concessions by Nicaraguan government in the 1890s and now dominated the Nicaraguan economy, canceling a US
concession for mahogany, and courting other imperial powers to build a canal through the country that would undoubtedly rival that which the US had built through Panama.

In response, the Taft administration supported a coup against his administration, sending gunboats and demanding control of its customs houses and the rights to build a second canal. While a full recounting of the events that then unfolded between the United States and Nicaragua are beyond the scope of this discussion, it is important to note that Taft’s military aggression marked the start of what would ultimately be a decades long US occupation of the country. As argued by historian Michel Gobat (2005), it was this “illiberal political intervention” (p. 75) through which “the United States turned Nicaragua into its protectorate,” (Ibid) marking the intensification of an imperial relation that would maintain throughout the rest of the 20th century. Importantly, in addition to militarily occupying the country, the US successfully managed to keep the Nicaraguan presidency in Conservative hands, an outcome which secured the ratification of a series of plans that successively tightened US control over the country.14

Here, it is important to point that while dollar diplomacy (itself a clear form of financial imperialism) was promoted as an alternative to US military intervention in Latin America, throughout the early 1900s, in actuality, it was to be used as a pretext for exactly that (Rosenberg 2004). As Rosenberg (2004) informs us, Nicaragua was not the only example. Haiti was also to

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14 These plans included the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty (1916), under which the US paid Nicaragua $3 million (earmarked to pay Nicaragua’s total foreign debt to US private banks) in exchange for the exclusive rights to build and own a canal that would theoretically run through the country, to establish a base in Nicaragua’s Gulf of Fonseca, and to own a lease of ninety-nine years to Nicaragua’s Great and Little Corn Islands; the Financial Plan (1917), which allowed the State Department to release funds from the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty to Nicaragua on the condition that the Nicaraguan government place itself under financial supervision of a High Commission comprised of one Nicaraguan, one US-American, and one US-American “umpire” (both of the latter to be appointed by the US Secretary of State); and finally, another Financial Plan (1920), under which the Nicaraguan government agreed to buy back the country’s Pacific Railway purchased by Brown Brothers and Seligman and accept a new loan from Brown Brothers to be used in making additions to it (this last Financial Plan would draw a great deal of Nicaraguan criticism as the Railway was widely held to be in poor condition and not worth the high price at which the bankers sold their majority shares to the Nicaraguan government. Moreover, Brown Brothers significantly delayed the disbursement of loan funds (see O’Brien, 2007, Rosenberg, 2004).
be the target of repeated attempts to establish a loan-receivership agreement modeled on the Dominican arrangements and these attempts soon culminated in the use of military force and ultimately an occupation during which Haiti’s customs house, its banks, and its national treasury were placed under the control of US representatives who swiftly allocated 40% of the country’s national income toward debt repayment to both French and American banks. That same year, the US senate ratified the Haitian Treaty, which prohibited Haiti from increasing its foreign debt without authorization from the US president, allowed US economic and social oversight for the next ten years, and specifically, granted US representatives veto authority over any Haitian law.

In 1918, a new constitution, written by Franklin D. Roosevelt (at the time Assistant Secretary of the Navy), was ratified through referendum (after failing to pass in the Haitian congress). In it, foreign ownership of land, previously outlawed, was now legalized. This military-government occupation would continue for the next sixteen years (nineteen years in total), during which time brutal physical violence and killings were carried out by the US military against the Haitian population. Additionally, the country’s provinces were placed under the administration of US marines, a forced labor system was put into place for the building of roads, and the education system, formerly based on a French model implemented during colonial times, was redesigned to emulate the American education model.

In 1916, the Dominican Republic would face a similar fate. Since the imposition of the loan-receivership, the country’s economy had remained in a vice grip (with a majority of revenues forced to go toward paying foreign debt) and internal conflict had mounted. In 1911, the US-backed Dominican president, Ramón Cáceres had been assassinated, spurring the onset of civil war in which the government took out extensive loans. By 1913, the government was taking out additional loans from National City Bank to repay the original loans and by 1914, amid renewed escalation of the fighting, the government’s funding for its military efforts against the opposition was depleted. At this point, according to Rosenberg (2004), the US “demanded the right not only to collect customs but to appoint a new financial expert, paid by receivership funds, with broad powers to control income and expenditures and inspect all governmental departments”
(Rosenberg, 2004, p. 81). When the Dominican government refused to officially authorize him, the Wilson administration soon removed the expert but transferred his powers to the Receiver General’s office (still under US control) and authorized a military occupation to drive out opposition leader General Desiderio Arias and suppress his remaining forces. The official US military government would remain until 1924.

These US interventions and occupations were situated in a broader era of US aggression in Latin America that would come to be known as the Banana Wars. These wars were motivated not only by the twin US objectives to rationalize Latin American currency systems and eliminate European influence to secure US hegemony, but also by the aim of protecting US commercial interests (see Grandin, 2006; O’Brien, 2007). In the meantime, where dollar diplomacy was not extended, US military occupation was deployed in Latin American republics under other pretexts. As Rosenberg (2004, pp. 16-17) points out, in the case of Cuba, the US government chose not to impose a gold standard, as this would have disadvantaged the largely US-American class of sugar growers that dominated the Cuban economy. However, Cuba did become the object of US military and political intervention in 1906 when Cuban Liberals revolted against US-backed Cuban president Tomas Estrada Palma. In response the US sent its Secretary of War (at the time William H. Taft) to broker a solution, a move which quickly resulted in Tomas’ resignation, the self appointment of Taft as Provisional Governor of Cuba, and a US military occupation that was tasked with protecting US-owned sugarcane plantations, securing the transport of sugarcane, gathering intelligence (ostensibly to prevent future rebellions), constructing roads, and ultimately, supervising a presidential election (once it had been approved by the then Provisional Governor Edward Magoon) in 1908.

Less than ten years later, this occupation was followed by the so-called Sugar Intervention (1917-1922) which was ordered by President Woodrow Wilson when it was determined by US officials that a recent Liberal rebellion on the island, (one that had failed to oust the Conservative government but had successfully taken several rural provinces in the east), while definitively extinguished, had left in its wake a depleted force of sugar workers and a class
of sugar growers that was largely unwilling to resume sugar production due to a lack of confidence in the Cuban government’s ability to secure their crops against rebel forces (see Perez, 1978, pp. 86-101). Initially opposed by the Cuban government, the deployment of 938 US Marines in the summer of 1917 ultimately took place with the consent of Cuban president Mario Menocal. It was however met with widespread resentment and hostility among the eastern Cuban populations who often sympathized with the rebels. US forces, whose numbers would be increased by 1000 in December of 1917 – would occupy the island for five years, concentrating initially in the countryside where sugar plantations were located, but later spreading, in 1918, to the cities where labor strikes had grown increasingly frequent and formidable.

**Early 20th Century Capital Penetration**

Throughout the first three decades of the 20th century, the customs receiverships, “dollar diplomacy,” and military occupations described above went hand in hand with continued US capitalist expansion into the independent republics of Latin America, particularly the republics of Central America and the Caribbean. During the late 19th century the United States had already begun overtaking Britain as the dominant trade partner for many Latin American countries: Mexico, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, and all of Central America, including British Honduras (see Badia-Miró & Carreras-Marin, 2012). This would continue to be the case in the first two decades of the 20th century, and by the end of WWI in 1918 the United States had surpassed Britain throughout the region, becoming the top trade partner for all Latin American countries (Ibid). Increases in U.S. trade with Latin America had been accompanied greater levels of US investment. As Pike (1977) observes, the years between 1897 and 1914 marked the “first massive outpouring of U.S. capital into fields far,” (p. 159).

According to LaFeber (1994), during this period, total U.S. overseas investments rose from a total of $.7 billion in 1897 to $2.5 billion in 1908 to $3.5 billion in 1914 (p. 278). Fifty percent of this total was in Latin America. Much of it was in Mexico, where U.S. investment (much of it in oil) climbed as high as $2 billion and 43% of all property values were held by U.S. Americans (Ibid). As LaFeber (1994) also points out, the latter statistic represents a number that was actually 10%
higher than the proportion of property values held by Mexican nationals (p. 278). In Central America, U.S. companies had a monopoly on the banana trade and railroads. In Cuba, U.S. companies accounted for over fifty percent of the country’s sugar output, (O’Brien, 2007). In South America, U.S. companies dominated through their monopoly of the Chilean mining industry.

During this period, Britain did continue to be the principal source of investment for Latin America overall (particularly in South America), but the U.S. was steadily gaining on its European rival. This was particularly the case in Mexico as well as in Central America and the Caribbean, and especially after World War I, from which the U.S. emerged for the first time as the world’s leading industrial power, the world’s leading creditor nation, and thus no longer the debtor nation that it was before World War I (LaFeber, 1994). Its newfound industrial and economic hegemony had been secured in large part through the economic and infrastructural devastation endured by its European imperial rivals across the Atlantic. In the years after the war, U.S. surplus capital flowed more precipitously than ever into Latin America, the vast majority of it continuing to be channeled into agricultural, mining, and oil enterprises (O’Brien, 2007). Between 1919 and 1929, U.S. investment in Latin America soared from roughly $2 billion to $5.24 billion (Pike, 1977). By the end of the decade it was surpassing Britain as principal investor in the region overall, including longtime British mainstays in South America such as Peru, though Britain did maintain dominance in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile (see Bethell, 1989; LaFeber, 1994).

As US business came to dominate key sectors of many Latin American economies, the consequences were multiple and far-reaching, effecting both lower and upper tiers of the Latin American socioeconomic hierarchy (O’Brien, 2007). As Thomas O’Brien (2007) illustrates, across the region, there was a displacement of domestic capitalists, the overpowering of small business entrepreneurs, the land dispossession of peasants, and the disciplining of workers according to modern industrial practices championed by the US industrial elite (p. 127). With such pervasive and increasingly entrenched US economic dominance came waves of Latin American resistance, rebellion, and revolution. For example, in 1910, Mexico erupted in a revolution that did not
officially conclude until 1917. President Woodrow Wilson sent troops to support the Constitutionalist faction, which ultimately triumphed over the more radical segments. However, the Constitutionalists proved to be less pliable than Wilson had anticipated, establishing government control of lands formally ceded to US companies, putting economic nationalization on the table as an option, and engaging the demands of peasants and workers. The United States did not recognize the new government until 1922, when Mexican president pledged not to pursue nationalization of US holdings. In the years that followed, as the Mexican government leaned more toward foreign capital and banking interests increasingly away from workers and peasants, political instability mounted in the form of repeated strikes, white collar worker job actions, and consumer protests against utility rates, all of which frequently condemned the ever strengthening alliance between US interests and the revolutionary regime.

Unrest was not limited to Mexico. In the 1920s, populations of Haiti and the Dominican Republic engaged in revolts against the US occupations (see McPherson, 2014), but probably the most well known example of these rebellions was the armed insurrection led by Augusto Sandino in Nicaragua between the years of 1927 and 1933. Advancing a platform of anti-imperialism, anti-Americanism, nationalism, social justice and equality and leading an army of guerrilla fighters, Sandino orchestrated a six-year (1927-1933) revolt against a total of six thousand US Marines, sent in to suppress it, and a US-trained and equipped Nicaraguan National Guard, who later assassinated Sandino upon the withdrawal of the US forces (McPherson, 2014). The protracted conflict ultimately came to a draw, but not before stoking a wave anti-US backlash across Latin America that had been building for some time as US economic hegemony had continued unabated. Across the region, journalists, activists, and politicians denounced the United States military actions in Nicaragua and called for an end to US military interventions (O’Brien, 2007).

It was precisely during this period that US president Harold Hoover was attempting to rehabilitate the image of an aggressive, imperialistic United States. Indeed, it was in 1928, that President Harold Hoover had begun his tenure with a goodwill trip to Latin America, announcing during a speech given in Honduras that, “We have a desire to maintain not only the cordial
relations of governments with each other, but also the relations of good neighbors” (Grandin, 2006). As Grandin (2006) has argued, Hoover’s seemingly sudden declaration and the change of course it presaged, was informed by a number of factors: the fallout from the Mexican revolution, the ongoing rebellion in Nicaragua, and the region wide firestorm of anti-United States/anti-imperialist criticism that framed and followed these events, as well as the economic cost that had come with the perpetual US military interventions launched to quell them. Further, it foreshadowed changes that he, along with other members of the US political leadership would soon be aiming to make with respect to the US foreign policy toward Latin America. Drawing on a collection of essays published in 1931 in the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (under the title, Our Future Relations with Latin America), Grandin (2006) contends that the decision to launch a “good neighbor” policy reflected a new calculation with respect to the costs of ongoing military aggression in Latin America, “a new thinking among both Republican and Democratic politicians and foreign policy intellectuals that Washington could no longer afford to play catch-up diplomacy and waste its time responding to continual emergencies either caused or inflamed by direct armed interventions” (pp. 32-33).

2.5 1933-1946: FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy

While Hoover’s goodwill trip to Latin America can be read as the first inkling of a demilitarization that was to come, O’Brien (2007) argues that the first instance of a real shift away from US military intervention in Latin America would not come until 1933, approximately six years after the start of Sandino’s rebellion and five years into Hoover’s presidency. At this time, organized protest in the republic of Peru had led that country’s US-backed president to resign and had precipitated a massive labor strike against US-owned mining enterprise Cerro de Pasco, producing a revolt that was equally formidable to that led by Sandino in Nicaragua. However, instead of sending gunboats and soldiers, Hoover, now greatly constrained by the conditions of the Great Depression of 1929, experimented with a different approach to suppression, one that utilized financial pressure (i.e. withholding of loans) to gain compliance. Hoover communicated to the new Peruvian government that unless it deployed its military to suppress the workers it would
receive no US assistance in paying off debt owed to US financial house J.W. Seligman (O’Brien, 2007, p. 136). Significantly, this tactic worked to mobilize the government to quell the miner resistance. Perhaps as testament to the convictions of the opposition and the severity of the transgressions waged by wealthy US companies, now made particularly harsh amid economic downturn, Hoover’s move could not pre-empt or disrupt a subsequent oil worker protest against the International Petroleum Company (owned by Standard Oil, a US company) or subsequent labor strike carried out against telephone operators against US-owned International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT). Still, while the results had not been fully satisfactory to the US political leadership, in the midst of severe economic downturn and what appeared to be the makings of another world war on the horizon, this approach of utilizing financial pressure instead of military confrontation would not be abandoned. To the contrary it was soon taken up by Hoover’s successor, Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

In 1933, Grandin (2006) argues, FDR came to office with plans of following Hoover’s lead of fazing out the use of military intervention to control political and economic events in Latin America and replacing it with financial pressure. Many look to his inaugural address as the textual embodiment of what would become known as the new president’s “Good Neighbor Policy,” (a phrase that had originated with Hoover but would become doctrine under FDR):

> In the field of world policy, I would dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbor, the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others, the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors. (Woolley, J. & Peters, G., n.d.)

As O’Brien (2007) recounts, it was toward the end of his first year in office that Roosevelt would test this new “neighborly” approach of non-intervention in Cuba, where a general condition of US corporate control over the island’s trade, finances, and chief economic sectors had contributed to mounting unrest that escalated amid the steady plunge of world prices for sugar. In late 1933, the island was embroiled in massive uprisings that included the seizure of US-owned plantations by workers and the expulsion of US managers, work stoppages at General Electric-owned AFP power plants, and consumer protests against egregiously high prices for electricity and telephone
service charged by General Electric and ITT, respectively. The protest ultimately led to the imposition of a civil military junta led by university professor Ramón Grau San Martín, who quickly implemented a number of reforms, which included instituting an eight-hour workday, legalizing unions, mandating GE price reductions, and ordering that fifty percent of every company’s labor force be comprised of Cuban workers. Further, when GE did not resolve disputes with its workers, San Martín expropriated their plants and placed the workers in charge.

As O’Brien (2007) recounts, in response to San Martín’s sweeping changes, US ambassador to Cuba (and close friend to FDR), Sumner Welles charged San Martín with plotting a communist overhaul and, following what had then become the typical protocol with respect to Latin American uprisings, requested that US military forces be deployed to the island. FDR’s response was to send thirty battleships that surrounded the island. However, in contrast to past scenarios, troops were not sent ashore. Instead, FDR withheld official recognition of San Martín’s government while Welles courted Cuban military leader Fulgencio Batista, informing him that the US would never recognize San Martín’s government (tantamount to a full-fledged international financial blockade given the near monopoly of US investors on the island) and that US military intervention remained an imminent possibility. Shortly thereafter, in December of 1933, Batista used his position within the military to force San Martín’s resignation and appoint a new US-approved president, Carlos Mendieta, who immediately signed a reciprocal trade agreement with the United States.

As argued by historians of US-Latin American relations, this was only the beginning of a comprehensive implementation of a new doctrine predicated on less military intervention and more economic pressure. Around the same time that Welles was pursuing Batista in Cuba, FDR’s Secretary of State Cordell Hull was announcing to the Pan-American Conference, assembled in Montevideo, Uruguay, that no nation “has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another” (quoted in LaFeber, 1994, p. 376). Shortly thereafter, the United States Senate ratified the Secretary’s statement as a pledge of US non-intervention (Ibid). In the meantime, FDR had been steadily putting the policy into real effect. Within his first year in office, he withdrew troops
from Nicaragua and Haiti, thereby ending the US decades long occupations of these two countries, and he repealed the Platt amendment that had constrained Cuba’s national sovereignty so tightly since 1901 (see O’Brien, 2007; Grandin, 2006). Moreover, at around the same time as these concrete acts, FDR was declaring that, “The definite policy of the United States from now on is one opposed to armed intervention.” By 1936, he was touring South America, making stops in “Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil, where he was greeted by hundreds of thousands of cheering admirers, with even the usually skeptical Argentine press heralding him as “shepherd of democracy” (Grandin, 2006, p. 34). Key tests for the new policy would come later in the decade, when Mexico and then Bolivia nationalized their oil industries. Setting a new precedent, there was no US military intervention as there might have been only eight or nine years earlier (O’Brien, 2007).

As historians have often underscored, FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy constituted a clear change in US-American policy toward Latin America, a movement away from intervention and overt affronts to national sovereignty. That said, both the broader context of this new approach and the new strategies of control it ushered in to replace military coercion are important to consider, particularly as the beginning of the 1940s would find the two regions more tightly integrated than ever before (Grandin, 2006; O’Brien, 2007). With respect to the context, it is critical to underscore that when FDR became president in March of 1933, he inherited not only the Great Depression but also mounting tensions across the Atlantic that pointed towards another impending inter-imperial conflict. Moreover, during the early years of the Depression, the United States had lost considerable economic ground in South America, as Britain, France, and Germany had pursued bilateral trade agreements with a number of the continent’s countries, “whereby the markets of the one were open to the other on the condition that the second granted special preferences in its own market for what the first wished to sell.” Faced with enormous raw export surplus that had been generated by the global downturn, numerous countries (including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Ecuador) had signed such agreements as a matter of economic recovery (see Varg, 1976), and in this way, European countries had captured large
portions of the South American import markets, thus chipping away considerably at the economic hegemony the United States had built up during the first third of the 20th century.

In this context of hegemonic threat, recovering and further securing economic hegemony Latin America was deemed crucial for US economic recovery, and then, as the thirties progressed and tensions in Europe and Asia intensified, access to Latin American raw resources and the use of Latin American territories for US military bases emerged as critical objectives in the event that the country indeed entered a war that seemed increasingly inevitable (Grandin, 2006; O’Brien, 2007). Lending greater urgency to both of these objectives was Nazi Germany’s continued advance into Latin American markets and militaries. In fact, by the 1930s, German military training missions existed in more than half of the Latin American republics (Pineo, 2007), and by the late 1930s, Germany was fast becoming a top supplier of imports to Latin America, second only to the United States (Ibid). Thus, it was amid a severe economic downturn and a real challenge to US economic and political hegemony in Latin America by a rival imperial power that FDR adopted a stance of non-confrontation and spoke about being a “good neighbor” to the region.

Moreover, FDR’s disposal of some particularly punishing imperialist policies of the past did not spell the end of US imperial dominance in Latin America. To the contrary, demilitarization, pledges of non-intervention, and greater sovereignty granted to some nations were accompanied by new strategies of imperial control that sought to secure the economic integration of Latin America with the United States through the tool of contractual trade arrangements (Grandin, 2006). One of these was the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934, a piece of legislation that authorized the president to negotiate three-year trade agreements with individual countries in which he could lower US tariffs on imports from another country by as much as 50% in return for that country doing the same for US goods in its own markets. Between 1934 and 1939, the US government signed reciprocal trade agreements (RTAs) with nineteen countries. Ten of them were in Latin America and these included all of the Central American countries plus Cuba and Haiti, as well as Brazil, Colombia, and Ecuador (Irwin, 1998).
With respect to RTAs, it should be pointed out that, to avoid domestic pushback, the US government purposefully targeted those countries whose export products were not grown in the United States and thus posed no competition to US domestic producers. These were countries that were already top providers to the US of certain agricultural products that had never been subject to any tariff because they were not grown in the United States (i.e. coffee, bananas, etc). In this way, the RTA posed no significant gain for Central American and Caribbean countries but for the United States it was an economic intervention that locked in markets for its own products by securing a tariff reduction of up to 50 percent, thereby pre-empting any future competition from Germany or any other European country. Moreover, in 1936, when some targeted nations of Latin America questioned the necessity of signing such a binding agreement (one that seriously hindered the development of potential trade with other nations, not to mention their own manufacturing sectors), they were essentially threatened by US officials with the imposition of new, high tariffs against their products if they did not acquiesce (Varg, 1976). With the loss of access to US markets being a risk that these countries could not afford to take, particularly amid the devastation of global economic downturn, a good number of their governments (Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua) signed RTAs that same year and they were followed by two more (Costa Rica and El Salvador) the following year (Irwin, 1998).

Another key apparatus of US economic control over Latin America that came out of the Good Neighbor era was the Export-Import Bank, a federal lending institution, founded by FDR and tasked with extending earmarked loans and lines of credit to help other countries purchase US goods (see Grandin, 2006; LaFeber 1994; O’Brien, 2007). Additional loan conditions included lowering barriers to trade and US investment (LaFeber, 1994, p. 374). Initially the Bank had been directed to focus on lending to the Soviet Union, and it was soon joined by the Second EXIM Bank, whose specific assignment was to provide loans to Cuba. When the two Banks were ultimately conglomerated to form one EXIM Bank in 1936, the first targets of assistance were the Latin American republics, to which, under FDR’s command, the Bank began extending loans earmarked for the hiring of American companies to continue and complete the construction of the
Pan-American Highway, a project which had been conceived and started back in 1923 as a single intercontinental route running from Canada through the western United States, Mexico, Central America, and South America, stretching all the way down to the southern tip of Argentina (see O’Brien, 2007). With the reality of war drawing closer, the Highway took on greater urgency as a way of ensuring the speedier transport of key raw resource exports that the US would be depending on for defense production.

Thus, it should be emphasized, that when FDR removed the US warships from the Caribbean he replaced them with binding agreements that knit the region’s countries ever tighter into an asymmetrical integration with the larger, more highly developed economy of the United States, effectively creating a US-American version of the “Imperial Preference System” that had been instituted by Britain with its colonies at the Imperial Economic Conference held in Ottawa in 1932 (LaFeber, 1994). Moreover, as Grandin (2006) in particular has emphasized, these new economic controls were accompanied by new forms of political control. For example, in the specific case of Cuba, when FDR abrogated the Platt Amendment he had already brought to power a US-approved Cuban president who had immediately signed a trade agreement that would be the precursor to a series of reciprocal trade agreements and shortly thereafter became the sole recipient of loans from the Second EXIM Bank, formed to guarantee Cuban purchase of US goods. Illustrating the effect of these policies, US exports to Cuba increased by roughly 300 percent between 1934 and 1937. The case of Cuba become the blueprint for Good Neighbor economic policy with Latin America such that when FDR was subsequently abstaining from military action in response to the nationalizations implemented by the Mexican and Bolivian governments in the late thirties, he was simultaneously pursuing RTAs with surrounding and nearby countries of Colombia, Ecuador, and Brazil, thereby solidifying exclusive US access to raw resources and exclusive market access for US goods.

Significantly, Mexico, as well as Argentina, Peru, and Uruguay abstained from signing agreements; these were all countries whose governments were actively pursuing the development of domestic manufacturing industries and therefore did not opt to have a deluge of
untaxed US goods competing with domestically produced ones. (Between 1940 and 1943, however, these countries would also sign RTAs, but with tariff reductions that were not dramatically different from preexisting rates.) In other words, by 1936, when FDR was pledging to completely abstain from military intervention in Latin America – a move that would win him and the United States an unprecedented level of good will across the Latin American region – new subtler forms of economic and political control aimed at securing US economic interests were already being put into place. As Grandin (2006) writes, “Rather than weaken US influence in the Western Hemisphere, this newfound moderation in fact institutionalized Washington’s authority, drawing Latin American republics tighter into its political, economic, and cultural orbit through a series of multilateral treaties and regional organizations” (p. 4).

In exchange for its abandonment of military force and its new strategies of economic integration, the United States had gotten much in return. By 1939, all of the Latin American republics had, at the encouragement of the US government, made a full removal of the German military missions from the region and had permitted the establishment of numerous US military attaches in their place. When Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the US officially entered the war and almost immediately began establishing air and naval bases in what would ultimately amount to sixteen different Latin American republics. In early 1942, all of the Latin American republics (with the exception of Chile and Argentina) officially cut ties with Japan, Germany, and Italy. Further, many republics (all of the Central American and Caribbean nations along with Mexico, Brazil, Bolivia, and Colombia) issued a formal declaration of war against the Axis powers, with Brazil and Mexico eventually deploying air force squadrons to Italy and the South Pacific, respectively.

As for Latin America, the imperialistic intentions around the Good Neighbor policy did not preclude outcomes perceived as highly beneficial by the region’s governments and populations. To the contrary, the acclaim of Good Neighbor among Latin American governments and elites was based upon the economic gains that the policy seemed to hold in store and did help generate for Latin American countries. Indeed, after almost a decade of respite from US military
bombardment, high US wartime demand for raw exports, and EXIM Bank economic assistance that did not discriminate against industrial development projects, most Latin American countries had made a full recovery from the devastating economic effects of Great Depression. Those that depended on raw resource exports had accumulated much in the way of trade revenue. Moreover, several of the larger Latin American republics had achieved a great deal of industrial development. The EXIM Bank certainly played a large part in Latin American industrial advances, thus exhibiting a seemingly more “neighborly” orientation that could not be counted on from US private banks, which had traditionally funded only those Latin American initiatives that enhanced the extraction and transport of raw resources and had refused to fund projects that aided the development of industry (on the basis that such projects would lead to Latin American competition with US industry). During the 1930s, the US private sector continued to follow this policy but the new federal EXIM Bank now helped countries not only in the infrastructural projects that would assist in the transport of raw resources (i.e. the Pan-American Highway) – but also with the development of industrialized forms of production. The EXIM Bank’s funding of Brazil’s steel plant is one well-known example (O’Brien, 2007).

Finally, with a respite from US military bombardment, many countries had exercised new forms of political independence, with many moving toward democratization (something which the United States explicitly encouraged, to be further discussed below). Again, however, all of this went hand in hand with integrating their economies more tightly than ever with that of the United States. Indeed, in 1932 the United States had been partner to only one-third of all Latin American trade, but by 1938 it accounted for close to half of it (LaFeber 1994, p. 375).

2.6 Bretton Woods: Laying the Groundwork for Postwar US Hegemony

As previously discussed, at the end of World War I, the US, its territory untouched by the fighting and its manufacturing sector spurred by military demand, had for the first time in its history transitioned from being a debtor nation to a creditor nation, and the world’s leading one at that. During World War II, the US maintained this position through a similar combination of events. Its territory was left unscathed by the social, infrastructural, and economic devastation
that the conflict brought to Europe and Japan. In the meantime, its manufacturing had undergone a wartime boom. Here, the numbers tell the story quite powerfully. Between 1940 and 1944, for example, U.S. industrial production increased by 90%, while its agricultural output went up by 20% and its total gross national production of all goods and services climbed by 60% (LaFeber, 1994, p. 431). Additionally, between December and April 1945, the country’s total plant capacity rose by 50%, (Woods, 1990, p. 22). Then, in the final year of the war, the value of U.S. exports was $15 billion, 5 times that of 1938 (Ibid).

Another key event in the World War II consolidation of US international prowess was that the country’s temporary transformation into a war economy had resulted in a national military that was unrivaled in size, strength, and technology. For example, by the end of the war, the US’s naval fleet of 70,000 vessels equaled all the rest of the world’s navies combined (LaFeber 1994, p. 459). Also at the US state’s disposal at this time were 100,000 planes and its exclusive possession of the atomic bomb (Ibid), a feat it had clearly demonstrated to the world in 1945 when it obliterated Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Ibid, p. 449).

Finally, in 1945, the U.S. held 2/3 of the world’s gold, (LaFeber, 1994, p. 432), a dominant share that equaled close to $25 billion, (Ibid, p. 561). The mass accumulation of gold had much to do with FDR’s Gold Reserve Act of 1934, an economic-recovery-oriented piece of legislation, which: prohibited the possession of gold among the population, (except for artisanal gold, collectors’ gold, or amounts of gold up to US $100); ordered the immediate conversion of privately held gold into dollars; and, gave the president the authority to raise the price of gold to between 50 and 60% of its most recent statutory price of $20.67 (see Rauchway, 2008; Rosen, 2007). It also made the gold of the nation’s private banks the property of the U.S. government. The rationale for this Act was multi-faceted. For one, it aimed to reverse gold flight and gold hoarding among the elite, a practice that had grown during the economic downturn of the Depression and was believed to be thwarting economic recovery by suppressing economic growth. Additionally, FDR believed that by raising the price of gold and thereby devaluing the dollar there would be several effects that would aid the economic recovery: a devalued dollar
would make U.S. exports much cheaper on the world market, (thus attracting foreign buyers and giving a boost to the country’s foreign trade, which in turn would improve employment rates in agricultural and manufacturing sectors; domestically, a devalued dollar would make imports more expensive, this driving U.S. consumers to purchase U.S.-made goods. With a greater aggregate demand for domestic goods and a greater money supply from boosted exports there was a price inflation – or re-flation – of domestically produced goods. This re-flation was understood by FDR’s economic team as being critical to the country’s economic recovery. It was seen as the key solvency to domestic producers, and this restarting the flow of credit extension from lenders (see Rosen, 2007).

Empowered by the Gold Reserve Act, FDR set the price of gold at $35/ounce, an increase of roughly 41% (Rauchway, 2008). The immediate result was a deluge of gold into the country’s banks from where it was then transferred to U.S. treasury coffers. The gold came not only from U.S. citizens but also from European investors troubled by economic protectionism in their own countries, the rise of fascist regimes in Germany and Italy, the increasing threat of war economic protectionism in their own countries (see Romer, 1992). These investors were encouraged both by the promise of high returns for their gold and perceptions of the US as a bastion of economic and political stability. Over the next several years, gold poured into the United States (Rauchway, 2008; Rosen, 2007).

In the years following the war, the United States exploited its supreme material leverage to preside over the organization of the international order. Even before the end of the war, however, the United States had begun to exercise its growing leverage in order to pursue its post-war economic and political agenda. At the center of this agenda was a commitment to multilateralism, a doctrine that denounced the pre-war trend of bilateral trade agreements, the inter-imperial rivalries they fostered, and the militaristic fallout (Woods, 1990). All of this, they argued, had led to the start of World War II. Military conflict would continue as long as bilateralism persisted, whereas open international markets would usher in greater distribution of economic prosperity, and consequently a lasting peace. US multilateralists in the early 1940s thus called for
the reduction of trade barriers and the eradication of discriminatory trade policies (see Woods, 1990; Gardner, 1980). At the same time, however, as historian Richard Bennett Woods (1990) points out, what the US State department really advocated was a “modified multilateralism” that would protect domestic producers from the effects of an import increase deemed necessary to restore balance to the international economy. Essentially, because the United States was in possession of the vast majority of the world’s gold and the dollar would therefore be the strongest currency, officials concluded that the country would have to import more than it exported in order to circulate US dollars and achieve a sufficiently balanced international economy. However, at the same time, a deluge of imports, it was theorized, would have the effect of dislocating domestic producers, something which, if left unmitigated, could not only send the domestic economy plunging but also spell severe political backlash. For this reason, US State Department’s multilateralism was not tantamount to free trade, but rather a consisted of a system in which protective tariffs would continue to be permitted for the country’s domestic producers.

The more pressing matter for US multilateralists was access to Britain’s colonial markets and their chief target for reform was thus Britain’s system of “imperial preference,” a series of exclusionary trade agreements that Britain had formally established with its numerous colonies and dominions in 1932. The objective had been the creation of a trading bloc based on the principle of “home producers first, empire producers second, and foreign producers last.” During the war, Britain had tightened its control over the bloc, making access to its domestic and colonial markets even more difficult.

One of the earliest US attempts to deploy its leverage to push Britain into abandoning imperial preference was FDR’s Lend-Lease Bill of 1941, which found a way around the Neutrality Acts of the 1930s (see Fellmeth, 1996; Kennedy, 1999, Chap.13). As the second world war had begun to brew in Europe and Asia during the thirties, FDR and the US congress had endeavored to carve out a position of US non-involvement through a series of Neutrality Acts, intended to prevent the US from being drawn into any potential conflict by placing limits on the legal ability of its government and its citizens to provide munitions, supplies, and funds to the warring, or
“belligerent” nations. A key feature of the latter Acts had been the “cash-and-carry” provision, which permitted the sale of raw products and finished goods that were not explicit for purposes of war to belligerent nations as long as these items were paid for in cash and carried away in their own vessels (see Kennedy, 1999, p. 437). The last Neutrality Act had been passed in 1939 and had prohibited US private companies from making loans to belligerent nations. Underscoring FDR’s growing inclination to support the Allies, however, this Act now extended cash-and-carry to war munitions and supplies. However, by December of 1940, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill was informing FDR that it would soon be out of the requisite cash, thus rendering defeat against the Nazis an inevitable certainty (Kennedy, 1999).

FDR’s response to Churchill’s statement would be the proposal of a new piece of legislation to the US congress, one that was carefully crafted to avoid violating the latest Neutrality Act (held dear by both a congressional majority and a wider public, each animated by a vehement desire to avoid entering another world war) but effectively getting around its limitations; in FDR’s plan the “cash and carry” provision and the loan prohibition of the Neutrality Act of 1939 were to be left intact while an additional legislative route for extending assistance to belligerent nations was to be created. Passed by congress in March of 1941, FDR’s Lend-Lease bill stipulated that US supplies and munitions could be extended to belligerent nations, but not in return for payment (i.e. cash that Britain no longer had) or a future repayment (i.e. a loan that was still prohibited by the Neutrality Act of 1939). Rather, the receiving nation would have to sign a master agreement – ultimately termed a “Mutual Aid Agreement” – with the United States in which compensation for the aid took the form of a series of pledges to be honored thereafter. The central pledge of this agreement was found in the clause of Article VII:

The terms and conditions upon which the United Kingdom receives defense aid…and the benefits to be received by the United States of America in return therefore…shall be such as to not burden commerce between them and the betterment of world-wide economic relations: they shall provide against discrimination in either the United States of America or the United Kingdom against the importation of any product originating in the other country; and they shall provide for the formulation of measures for the achievement of these ends” (as cited in Woods, 1990, p. 30).
As Woods (1990) has argued, for the FDR administration the content of this “consideration” was intended to be nothing less than full acquiescence on the part of the British government to open its colonial markets in Africa and Asia to US exports. Predictably, British officials were resistant to the idea, and, after the Lend-Lease bill was passed by the US congress in March of 1941, nearly a year of contentious debate ensued between US and British officials over what the precise language of Article VII was to be (Woods, 1990). Importantly, during this time, Germany made significant advances against British forces in the Balkans. By June of 1941 Hitler had invaded Russia and was pledging to invade Egypt and take over Britain’s Suez Canal, thus greatly inhibiting transit between Britain and British colonial India. By August of 1941, Churchill was arranging a visit to FDR, hoping to convince the president to officially enter the war or, at the very least, to expand US military assistance to Britain. As for FDR, his intention for the summit, which took place secretly at sea off the coast of Newfoundland, was to hammer out the terms of Article VII. The clandestine conference produced the Atlantic Charter, an agreement between the two countries that laid out eight principles upon which they based a common vision for the postwar international order. Without using the words “empire” or “imperialism” the charter implicitly broached the subject of breaking up Britain’s vast control over much of the world and the many markets to which it lay claim. Principles included the right of all people to choose their own government and the restoration of this right in those cases where it had been forcibly removed; the refrain from any territorial changes not congruent with the “freely expressed wishes of the people concerned;” and most importantly, a pledge that signatory nations would “endeavor to further the enjoyment by all peoples of access without discrimination and on equal terms, to the markets and raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity” (cited in Woods, 1990, p. 52).

After the Atlantic Charter meeting, however, the British continued to contest the language of Article VII, claiming that it amounted to interference in Britain’s internal affairs and spelled the dissolution of the British empire. Discussions around this portion of Article VII continued for months. When Pearl Harbor happened the two nations were still at an impasse. When the US
subsequently entered the war, Churchill considered Article VII a moot point as the US was already committing itself to defeating the Axis powers. Continuing to press the issue, however, the FDR administration simply changed their bargaining chip from provision of munitions (now irrelevant with the country’s official entry into the war as an Allied nation) to the possibility that, if Britain failed to accept Article VII, the matter of determining the compensation for US aid would simply be left to the US congress, who might possibly designate the aid as a loan and thus ensnare Britain and the other Allies into a repeat of the war debts-reparations imbroglio (see Woods, 1990, p. 60) that had followed World War I and precipitated economic and political instability that, in the eyes of most, had contributed largely to the rise of Nazi Germany and thus the commencement of the current World War (see Cohrs, 2006, Chap. 4). Still FDR was willing to negotiate and ultimately made two concessions: a commitment that preference reductions on the part of Britain would be met with tariff reductions on the part of the United States, and a recognition of the right of the British dominions to approve or reject any new modifications to their existing trade agreements with Britain. Churchill agreed and both nations signed a Mutual Aid Agreement in February 1942 (see Woods, 1990, p. 61).

As Woods (1990) has contended, these initial wartime negotiations between FDR and Churchill can be understood as initial steps toward a gradual “changing of the guard,” and were only the first of many official agreements and accords through which the exercise of United States power in the international community would take on new proportions and its ascent as leading global hegemon would be steadily institutionalized. Indeed, while still negotiating the terms of Article VII, the FDR administration took the reins in other matters of the post-war international order. In December of 1941, FDR hosted Churchill at the White House to draft the Declaration of United Nations, which was based upon the Atlantic Charter and would ultimately be signed by twenty-six of the Allied nations in early 1942. Planned as a peacekeeping/collective security organization to be led by the most economically dominant Allied nations – the United States, the Great Britain, Russia, China, and France – and to be headquartered in New York City, the United Nations would officially be formed in 1945, at the United Nations Conference in San Francisco,
where delegates from an additional twenty-five governments signed the Declaration. During the years in between, several United Nations meetings were convened. Among them was one that amounted to another critical component of the United States assertion and exercise of post-war leadership. This was the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, a 22-day meeting held in 1944 in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire and attended by the 44 Allied nations.

The Bretton Woods conference grew directly out of the Lend-Lease bill situation. As Woods explains, after Churchill agreed to Article VII, British officials began working on a set of agreements to reduce imperial preference. At the same time, Britain’s leading economist John Maynard Keynes (who had led the British side in the Article VII negotiations) began working on a plan for the post-war international economy. For Keynes, if the US was to prevail with its vision of multilateralism (and because of its leverage it was certain that it would), there were at least two conditions that were critical to establish in order for it to survive: currency equilibrium and liquidity for nations beset with large war debts. The formulation of currency equilibrium as a mandatory condition for a post-war era of multilateralism was based on the recent experience of the interwar years, which, particularly during the Depression, had been characterized by currency wars, in which nations devalued their currencies to render their exports cheaper and thereby attract more buyers and increase their national revenues. This “beggar-thy-neighbor” strategy was termed as such because it was a form of economic survival that was premised upon attacking the economies of fellow countries by undercutting their currencies. By the early 1940s, the general consensus was that these currency wars and their various domestic economic fallouts had been a key factor in the escalating tensions that ultimately erupted into World War II.

At the same time, most economists contended that while too much autonomy with respect to currency valuation had proven detrimental, some degree of sovereignty in this area was in fact necessary in order for national governments to shield their economies from the vicissitudes of international capitalism. This argument was also based on the recent events that had unfolded during the worldwide economic downturn. During this time, the balance of payment deficits of experienced by most countries had been accompanied by high unemployment levels.
In response, the British government (along with several others) had abandoned the gold standard that prevailed at the time, floating its currencies and allowing it to depreciate. This maneuver had delivered the intended effect of lowering the prices of their exports on the world market (as well as their import substitutes in their internal markets), thus rendering their exports more competitive and ultimately bringing about an increase in trade revenues for the country. Additionally, by leaving the gold standard, the British government had been able to pursue expansionary monetary policies, lowering interest rates (which had previously been kept high to maintain parity with the gold exchange rate) and consequently resolving the domestic problem of high unemployment.

Drawing on recent examples of the ways in which leaving the gold standard had helped countries recover from the downturn, Keynes thus reasoned that some sort of flexibility with respect to exchange rates were imperative for domestic wellbeing. This was evident not only from Britain’s positive results, but also by the more harmful outcomes that had accompanied the decisions of many governments to stay on the gold standard. These governments had instead sought flexibility elsewhere, taking alternative measures to minimize the impact of the downturn on their domestic economies. As Eichengreen and Irwin (2009) explain, many of these countries had, as a protectionist measure against outflows of gold and reduction of imports, instead placed limitations and restrictions around the exchange of their national currencies into foreign currencies (i.e. exchange controls). By the early 1940s, the dominant opinion in the mainstream economic community was that these exchange controls had excessively constrained the flow of trade and were thus responsible for exacerbating and prolonging the global Depression. To keep international trade going, it was believed, there could be no control or limitation on exchange activity with regard to current accounts; free and full convertibility was a must.

At the same time, however, it was also evident to Keynes that the gold standard provided a price stability that could not be sacrificed. Thus, he concluded, a whole new system was in order, one that allowed for both the long-term price stability that the gold standard was believed to afford but also provided a government with the ability to exercise monetary policy, as Britain had,
in a way that was not dependent upon the amount of gold held in its country’s reserves. In other words, there had to be a way to reconcile external stability with internal stability, or in Keynes words, “to obtain the advantages, without the disadvantages, of an international gold currency” (quoted in Gardner, 1980, 79).

The second of Keynes’ conditions, liquidity, was based on the economic reality that by the early 1940s, many nations simply would not be able to participate in a multilateral system unless they had the cushion of some form of aid that could be used to ameliorate the inevitable economic dislocations that would occur as they opened their economies to the abundance of US imports waiting to rush in. Balance of payment problems (i.e. more money going out than coming in) were greatly anticipated, and the reduction of a country’s money supply that accompanies such problems was understood as potentially disastrous to the internal equilibrium of afflicted countries. As is widely known, Keynes was an advocate of stimulating aggregate demand through full employment policies that centered primarily on the creation of public works. In addition to domestic economy concerns, there was also the fact that Europe and Russia were in dire need of aid for post-war rebuilding and recovery.

Keynes’ proposed plan to address the need for controlled currency flexibility and sufficient liquidity was the creation of an “international clearing union.” On the one hand, the union would act as a fund, providing member countries with the necessary to participate in a new multilateral international economy and with the requisite aid to rebuild. On the other hand, it would hold its member nations to certain rules regarding currency valuation. In Keynes’ plan, the clearing union would not deal directly with national governments but with the central banks of member nations. Further, international trade would be conducted through the union rather than through nations. The union would hold all foreign exchange, and central banks would establish union accounts, in which they would be extended a line of credit (using the banking principle of overdraft facility) in a new, neutral, gold-based supranational currency that Keynes called “bancor.” The total overdraft capacity of Keynes clearing union was to be $26 billion (see Gardner, 1990, p. 112). In the beginning, only the United States and Great Britain would peg their
respective currencies to the bancor. As other countries established central banking systems they could apply to become fund members and, upon being granted entry, would be obliged to do the same. A country could deposit gold into the fund and it would be converted into bancor credit to its account, however bancors could never be exchanged for gold. As far as the respective credit line amounts, each country would be designated a quota that was to be determined according to a number of variables, including respective pre-war trade revenues.

Essentially, Keynes’ envisioned system would work in the following way. When a country’s central bank “bought” the currency of another country (i.e. to pay for products imported from that country), its union bancor account would incur a debit. When a country’s central bank “sold” its domestic currency to the central bank of another country (i.e. a buyer of its exports), this would generate a credit to its bancor account. In other words, importing would generate debits, while exporting would generate credits. In this way, while central banks would retain control over how much foreign exchange could be purchased by domestic citizens, currency convertibility between central banks, themselves, would be unrestricted, as central banks would be obligated to sell domestic currency to other central banks on demand. However, to manage the generation of account debts and surpluses, exchange rate manipulations would be permitted and, in some cases, required, but only to a point and they could only be performed with the approval of the fund’s board of governors. For example, if a country’s debits reached a certain point and stayed there for a certain period of time, it could borrow from the fund or alternatively, it would be permitted to depreciate its currency (in order to attract purchasers of its exports) up to 5 percent in one year. If its debits went higher than half of its quota, the fund could require the country to depreciate its currency, order it to hand over its gold reserves, direct it to outlaw capital exports, or terminate its fund membership. By the same token, if a country’s account credit grew too large (i.e. exceeding its account balance quota), it would also be required to adjust by either appreciating its currency in order to render its exports more expensive and thus theoretically deter buyers until its account credits came down. Alternatively, excess creditors could extend loans to central banks that were in the red, thus addressing the matter of helping countries
stimulate aggregate demand and providing aid to those that needed funds for post-war reconstruction. Either way, at the end of the year, surplus credit in fund accounts would be transferred over to a reserve fund, from which countries could also borrow.

Under Keynes’ plan, there was thus an intentionally built-in incentive for countries to avoid large debts but also to prevent excess credits. As the name of Keynes’ envisioned fund suggests, the objective was to continually "clear" or balance trade deficits and surpluses between countries so that a broader sort of equilibrium was being perpetually cultivated. As is widely acknowledged, this was in fact the distinctive feature of Keynes’ plan – the fact that it placed pressure on both debtor and creditor nations to balance their economies; accumulation of surplus was to be actively corrected in the same way that accumulation of deficit was. At the same time, as many have pointed out, this British concern for equal sharing of responsibility between debtors and creditors, alike, materialized not only in the wake of the Great Depression (an event that had rocked the conventional knowledge around the viability of free markets) but also at the very moment when Britain suddenly found itself in the position of debtor nation.

While Keynes had been developing this plan, US economist and senior US Treasury official Harry Dexter White had, as directed by US Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, been drafting his own post-war financial agreement to be enacted between the Allied nations. As Woods emphasizes, White did this with the explicit objective of positioning the United States to effectively preside over the post-war international economic order, which would be based upon principles of the modified multilateralism advocated by the US State Department. Like Keynes, White envisioned an international apparatus that would effectively oversee and regulate the post-war international economy. A key responsibility of this apparatus would be to oversee member adherence to a number of agreed upon terms and to provide the liquidity to assist member nations in participating in a multilateral system. Unlike Keynes, who envisioned one institution that would pursue currency equilibrium and liquidity provision, White proposed the establishment of two institutions – an Inter-Allied Stabilization Fund, that would deal primarily with the former and a bit with the latter, and an Inter-Allied Bank for Reconstruction, that would attend fully to the latter.
With respect to the Inter-Allied Stabilization Fund, it would be run by a governing board elected by members, it would be capitalized by member subscription, and it would utilize the dollar as the main currency. Dollars would be sold to members so that they could rectify balance of payment problems (and would not be sold to those whose dollar/gold reserves were at a certain maximum), and there would be a number of conditions to which member nations would have to agree: no foreign exchange controls, no bilateral clearing agreements (i.e. the much condemned “Schactian practices” employed by Nazi Germany during the interwar period), no exchange rate manipulation (unless permitted by the board), no deflation/inflation of currency (unless permitted by the board) and acquiescence to a tariff reduction program (Woods, 1990, p. 74)

By 1943, Keynes and White had exchanged plans and were negotiating the provisions of each. This initial negotiation process would culminate with the Bretton Woods conference to which all 45 Allied nations plus Argentina (which had maintained an official position of neutrality) were invited. In the end, the White plan was the one that prevailed, with several minor concessions made to the British. The following paragraphs will provide a brief summary of how the United States successfully got its own self-interested agenda through and some discussion of what the contents of what this agenda was.

First, with its coffers filled with the majority of the world’s gold and its dollar supremely strong, the United States had flatly rejected Keynes proposed idea of a gold-backed neutral “bancor” as the world reserve currency, and pursued the more self-interested course of making the dollar the world’s gold-backed reserve currency. In the end, the resulting system was what would be known as the adjustable peg currency, in which gold would continue to serve as the foundational commodity basis of money but with the US dollar as the universal representative, thus advantaging the United States considerably. Nations would peg their currency to the US dollar, which in turn would be pegged to gold at $35/oz. Further, to maintain currency stability, nations that joined the fund – or, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as it would be called – would be required to intervene in currency markets (i.e. buying and selling their currency to
maintain the parity of their currency) and would be responsible for keeping exchange rate fluctuations to a minimum (within a maximum “band” of one percent above or below parity).

Second, the overdraft facility proposed by Keynes was also overruled by White’s stipulation that the fund be based on capital subscription, in which member nations contributed pre-designated amounts. Third, the total amount of the fund’s capital would be $8.8 billion, an increase of the $5 billion total originally proposed by White but far less than the $26 billion originally proposed by Keynes. To collectively generate the Fund’s stipulated total of $8.8 billion, each member country was required to contribute an individualized “quota” that was determined by the Fund according to a range of country factors that included the size of each country’s national economy. Twenty-five percent of each country’s quota was to be paid in gold or gold convertible currency (i.e. the dollar), while the remaining seventy-five percent was to be paid in the country’s national currency. Each country’s quota amount was used to determine its share of votes in the Fund’s governing board, with most decisions requiring a majority of eighty-five percent to pass. Early on, White had decided that it was imperative for the United States to have a majority share of votes and one that was large enough to enable it to, in White’s own words, “block any decision” (see Woods, 1990, p. 74).

At the Bretton Woods conference, this issue of quotas and votes was predictably contentious, as Keynes had envisioned a majority share of votes for Great Britain and the less wealthy countries advocated for a more egalitarian system in which every country, no matter its quota size, was granted one hundred votes. Predictably enough, the US triumphed, securing the largest quota amount and thus the voting majority originally insisted upon by White. Closely following the US in descending order of quota and votes allotment were Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China; the most economically dominant Allies at the time, these were the remaining countries that FDR had famously tapped to act, in concert with – and under the ultimate supervision of – the US, as the “four policeman of the world” in the post-war era (Ibid).

A country’s quota amount was also used to determine how much money that country would be able to borrow or “draw” from the Fund if and when it encountered a balance of
payment problem. As Woods informs us, a country would be permitted to draw a maximum of the gold/gold-convertible portion of its Fund contribution. Anything beyond that maximum would require the permission of the governing board and, at White’s insistence, the board was empowered to deny request if it determined that the member country was not attempting to correct is imbalance or was doing so in ways that contradicted the tenets of the IMF’s guiding doctrine of multilateralism.

Finally, there was the key issue of how much freedom governments were to have in manipulating their currencies (i.e. controlling the exchange rate of their currencies) for purposes of avoiding or recovering from short-term balance of payment problems and their related internal fallout. In the White plan, currency depreciation had been prohibited. The Keynes plan had also been relatively strict, proposing that member nations only be allowed to depreciate their currencies by up to 5% per year, unless directed to do so by the clearing union’s governing board. However, this restriction had been based on Keynes vision of a $26 billion fund as opposed to the $8.8 billion fund that was ultimately to prevail. For this reason, as Gardner (1980) explains, when it became clear that there would be far less liquidity available than originally envisioned, Keynes shifted from arguing for a strict limit on currency manipulation to insisting on one that was more liberal. In the end, the United States acquiesced.

Importantly however, as Benjamin Cohen (2001) informs us in his historical account of the Bretton Woods agreements, joining countries were not required to liberalize their capital accounts and were even encouraged to maintain capital controls. This aspect spoke directly to another event of the global economic downturn of the 1930s – that is, the increase in currency speculation and related short-term volatile inflows and outflows of capital that taken place in the 1920s. By the 1940s, the prevalent belief among the leading economists of the United States and Europe was that the preponderance of short-term flows of capital that had characterized the unregulated twenties and continued into the thirties had in fact been the prime culprit of the Great Depression.
With respect to White’s International Bank for Reconstruction (which triumphed over Keynes’ vision of housing the question of liquidity for recovery in the stabilization fund), this is where the vast amount of liquidity was to come from. In the end, the IBRD was to be capitalized at $9.1 billion paid in by forty-four nations (ten percent contributed immediately and another ten percent on call). While this capital was to be at the IBRD’s disposal for purposes of direct loans, as Woods (1990) explains, the IBRD was stipulated to deal less in direct lending and more primarily in underwriting and guaranteeing loans made by private banking institutions to borrowing governments (which would also guarantee their received loans). As with the IMF, capital subscription amounts were linked with voting shares, thus ensuring that, as with the IMF, the United States would hold veto authority. As Woods (1990) explains, for the United States, the rationale behind the bank was multifaceted. First, it was expected be the catalyst for the distribution of badly needed capital to war-torn Europe and the industrializing nations of Latin America and Asia and, in so doing, provide a degree of economic stability that would stave off the spread of communism and totalitarianism, both of which were attributed to fertile conditions of poverty and economic downturn. Second, as a guaranteeing and underwriting institution, the IBRD was also counted on to encourage an international lending model that was privately financed, as opposed to publicly funded by US taxpayers. Third, it would institutionally provide the United States with the ultimate authority over foreign lending, and yet, while most of this lending would in fact be in US private sector dollars and the United States would have veto power, the collective structure of the Bank would shield the United States from claims of imperialism when a debtor country came under Bank pressure (see Woods, 1990, p. 143).

An important footnote to all of is the fact that when the Bretton Woods agreement was subsequently ratified by the US congress in June of 1945 it was with several concessions made to the New York banking community, which, together with numerous congressional Republicans, was collectively and adamantly opposed to the creation of the IMF and the IBRD on the official grounds that the institutions would precipitate the massive lending of US dollars to non-credit worthy countries and related fallout. More fundamentally at play here was the bankers’ realization
that the creation of these two institutions would usurp some of their control of international lending and investment and place it more substantially in the hands of the US government, thus cutting into profits in a number of ways that included the eradication of their authority to advantageously manipulate exchange rates and the public financing of overseas industries that would compete with the overseas ventures of their biggest clients (i.e. United Fruit, Ford, etc.) (see Woods, 1990, p. 229). The concessions, which were made to Wall Street in exchange for its agreement to end its campaign against the institutions worked to officially consolidate US control over them even further. They included the appointment of as US banker to a National Advisory Council that would supervise US foreign loan policy, the enabling of US congress to play an advisory role in relation to the IMF and the IBRD, and the headquartering of both organizations in New York as opposed to Washington D.C. (Woods, 1990, p. 213). (The last of these concessions was ultimately reversed as the headquarters of both institutions, which began operations in 1947, ended up being located in Washington D.C., as preferred by the Treasury Department).

While somewhat tedious to review and consider, these key aspects of the Bretton Woods agreement – the awarding of a majority of votes to the United States in both the IMF and the IBRD; the abolition of exchange controls that would ensure the flow of payments; the provision of Fund loans which would help countries facing balance of payment problems in such a way that prevented them from having to rely on making domestic monetary policy that could end up blocking of the flow of international commerce; the adoption of a dollar standard that was backed by gold (the majority of which was now in the possession of the United States) – are important to understand because they illustrate how, directly after World War II the United States was able to impose its particular economic interests onto a new international monetary policy (that it was almost unilaterally setting), and thus effectively define its particular economic interests as the universal economic interests of all countries and the world economy as a whole.

In addition to the actual content of the Bretton Woods agreement, it is also important to consider that joining countries were essentially agreeing to sacrifice a great deal of economic sovereignty in order to become members of a fund whose terms were skewed towards the
interests of the most economically, militarily, and technologically dominant nation at the time, the United States. It was in effect a sort of institutionalized ceding of authority by many sovereign nations to the government of the one country that was the most militarily, economically, technologically, and financially dominant; an institutionalization of US global dominance. In particular, the US priority of perpetual and unhindered capital accumulation (now that its own economy and industrialization was peaking) was clearly prioritized. In the immediate present, the reach of this effect was vast, with a total of thirty governments signing onto agreements by December 31, 1945, the deadline by which, it had been decided, at least 65 percent of the stipulated capital quotas had to be met in order for the institution to begin operations (International Monetary Fund, 2012). This number would double within the next ten years and continuing growing as decolonization in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean basin got underway and newly independent republics joined the institutions (Ibid).

Equally important to underscore is that the acquiescence of joining countries was obviously not accomplished through outright coercion (though for a country to withhold consent would have left it excluded from the sort of massive insurance policy that the IMF was to provide in a new, uncharted era of multilateral trade) but rather through a process of consent-building, even though none of the forty-three consenting nations (Russia ultimately exited the negotiations and refrained from joining the IMF, condemning it an instrument of Wall Street domination) was nearly as well positioned as the United States to benefit from a new, more open, multilateral system. Compliance of the governments of these countries was obtained through a process of conferring at a meeting, not a military invasion. In this way, it provides an illustration of Harvey’s conception of hegemony and its centrality in capitalist imperialism.

An important footnote to highlight here concerns the issue of Reciprocal Trade Agreements that FDR had introduced during the 1930s. For the British, these agreements were tantamount to, if not more bilateral than, the imperial preference system that the United States was now pressuring it to abolish. This remained a sticking point for much of the negotiation process, with Britain demanding that, in exchange for its dismantling of imperial preference, the
United States make a large horizontal tariff reduction that would effectively do away with the selective tariff reduction defined the bilateral reciprocal trade agreements with Latin American republics. The United States had initially agreed, but would ultimately retreat from this agreement in 1945 when congress opted to renew the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act (RTAA), which had been scheduled to expire that year. RTAA proponents (a group that included congressional Democrats, special interests looking for post-war external markets for surplus, and eventually a majority of congressional Republicans) claimed that insofar as promised to liberalize trade between the United States and signatory nations through the two-way reduction of tariffs, the Act was a win for multilateralism.

However, the fact was that, in their basic structure and stipulations, Reciprocal Trade Agreements were essentially cases of the same bilateralism that the United States identified and condemned as being at the heart of Britain’s system of imperial preference. Moreover, the leading US argument for the renewal of the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act (circulated by Charles Taft, director of the Office of Transport and Communications Policy and FDR-appointed marshal of the RTAA renewal campaign) cited not only a universalist objective of keeping international trade flowing, but also the more narrowly interested and blatantly interventionist goal of steering Latin American economies toward export commodities that would not create competition for US industry (see Woods, 1990, p. 221). Essentially, while the United States had undergone an explosive industrialization during the post-Civil War under the protection of extremely high tariffs, it was now strategizing to keep Latin American republics from doing the same, even as it kept protective tariffs in place for those industries it determined to shield. By the mid-1940s, the effects of this contradictory policy were already being felt by Latin American governments, who had realized that “the trade agreements did not encourage diversified investment or provide protection for new industries but kept developing nations locked into single-crop production for export, thus making them practically economic slaves to the world markets of whatever crop happened to be their specialty” (Woods, 1990, p. 226). With respect to the European Allied nations – particularly Britain – the US-American case for RTAA renewal was guided by the objective of keeping Europe
from drifting toward higher levels of protectionism that would keep US wartime surplus out, even as the United States practiced its own protectionism by retaining national control over RTAA tariff setting.

None of this profound contradiction was lost on the British, who concluded that what the United States was pursuing was a kind of “one-sided multilateralism” (Woods, 1990, p. 242) in that it “wanted to protect its special interests while forcing its trading partners to expose the vulnerable spots in their economies” (Ibid). In the end, despite British protestations, the United States would proceed with this multilateralism even while demanding that Britain abandon imperial preference. Importantly, it would ultimately retreat from most of its demands and instead identify full convertibility as the most critical concession needed from Britain in order to ensure that its preferred vision of multilateralism would be realized. In 1945, the State Department and the Treasury Department would make full convertibility (implemented within a year’s time), along with ratification of the Bretton Woods agreement, a central condition of an enormous emergency loan that was to be made by the US to Britain in 1946 (i.e. the Anglo-American Financial Agreement (see Woods, 1990, pp. 332-362)), thus using the promise of badly needed aid as a carrot and the very real prospect of post-war bankruptcy as the stick.

In the case of Latin America, however, the United States would use additional, more coercive and interventionist tactics in its attempt to ensure that the region’s markets remained fully open to US exports and capital investment and that its economies stayed the course of producing primarily raw exports. This endeavor, which was the shared work of private capitalists and state actors and was to some extent disrupted by import substitution industrialization implemented by certain governments and Marx-inspired political movements inspired, relied heavily on the use of illiberal tactics such as covert and not so covert forms of political interference in democratic processes (including election meddling and coups), terrorist persecution and murder of political dissenters, and the installation and propping up of pro-US dictatorships. This phase of US imperialism in Latin America forms the focus of sections below. However, in order to properly frame this history, it is necessary to first provide some brief
discussion of the US-Soviet conflict in which it was situated and which was typically used as justification for economic and political interventions into the political and economic affairs of sovereign Latin American republics.

2.7 Conclusion

In this chapter I have presented theoretical conceptualizations of both settler imperialism and capitalist imperialism and, with a focus on Latin America, I have provided a detailed history of how these particular relations of control and domination took shape over the course of the last two centuries. In light of this extended discussion, it can be argued that the historic fact of US imperialism indeed lends support to a key theoretical assumption of this study -- that is, that the United States has, since its inception, continued to exist and operate as an imperial power. The question remains as to whether and how the illiberal rule of imperialism is compatible with Foucault’s theory of liberal/neoliberal governmentality, which represents the other key framework that this study utilizes in conceptualizing the US political-economic historical context in which US international volunteering takes place. In other words, is there any way in which Foucault’s theory of liberal governmentality provides for the illiberal forms of imperial rule practiced by liberal democratic nations and theorized by critical scholars of European history such as Norbert Finzsch and Marxist thinkers such as David Harvey?

In the third lecture of those that would be published in The Birth of Biopolitics (2008), Foucault made several critical points about liberalism that, I think, could be useful for thinking about or conceptualizing modern Western imperialism in terms of his general framework. Specifically, Foucault argued that in liberal governmentality, “freedom” is the central condition but it is not an inherent or naturally occurring condition. Rather, it has to be produced, organized, and, in effect, secured. As Foucault stated, “Liberalism formulates simply the following: I am going to produce what you need to be free. I am going to see to it that you are free to be free. And so, if this liberalism is not so much the imperative of freedom as the management and organization of the conditions in which one can be free, it is clear that at the heart of this liberal practice is an always different and mobile problematic relationship between the production of
freedom and that which in the production of freedom risks limiting and destroying it” (p. 64). This need to produce, organize, and secure freedoms gives rise to “strategies of security, which are, in a way, both liberalism’s other face and its very condition, must correspond to all these imperatives concerning the need to ensure that the mechanism of interests does not give rise to individual or collective dangers” (Ibid, p. 65). While it is clear that Foucault is referring to domestic or internal productions of freedom that also risk “limiting and destroying it,” I think that his insight can be used to think about the rampant limiting and destroying of “freedoms” that has been carried out elsewhere — in “other” nations — in the name of securing American economic “freedom.”

In this light, imperialism might be conceived as its own “art of government” in which the central principle is that of “security” (in the same way that “freedom” is the central principle to liberalism) and the wellbeing of the population is pursued through controlling (and thus enlisting the population in a project of control), both by coercion and consent, the populations, markets, and governments—the “dangerous classes” on a global scale—that inhabit the territories of empire. In this schema, what we know as liberalism might be understood as a strategy of enabling that allows forms of overseas securitization to take place, and enabling mechanisms can be understood as those which grant freedom for national elites to invest in previously untapped overseas markets, and in so doing, enable the securitization of the viability of the national economy in the face of overaccumulation. Enabling mechanisms might be understood as the imperialist government’s declaration and exercise of its right to intervene militarily and politically in the affairs of countries where elite constituencies have trade and investment interests and to impose changes intended to shape the outcome of events to its liking all in order to allow for the securitization of interests of these elites and in turn of the broader national economy against pitfalls of overaccumulation through this overseas expansion. Finally, enabling mechanisms might be seen as the freedom granted (and often promoted to the point of it becoming an informal obligation) to and exercised by religious, social, and educational missionaries to easily enter into the territories of empire and attempt to replace or significantly modify existing practices with ones
that predominate in the imperial nation and ideologically support the activities of investing elites and the securitizing actions of the state (i.e., protecting the private property of its citizens). This freedom to proselytize might be understood as producing greater security for economic interests and political influence of the imperial nation (and again, the survival of the national economy against the pitfalls of overaccumulation) by generating consent through indoctrination.

In other words, just as the “freedom” of the labor market is produced through “a large enough number of sufficiently competent, qualified, and politically disarmed workers to prevent them exerting pressure on the labor market” (Foucault, 2008, p. 64) (i.e., an act of un-freedom vis-à-vis the workers) or the “freedom to work, freedom of consumption, political freedom and so on” (Ibid, p. 68) of FDR’s New Deal was produced through “a series of artificial, voluntarist interventions, of direct economic interventions in the market” (Ibid) (i.e., an act of un-freedom vis-à-vis “natural” economic processes), or “freedom” of competition is produced/secured by anti-monopoly laws (Ibid, 64) (i.e., an act of un-freedom vis-à-vis owners of capital), so the security that could be seen as being at the heart of an imperial governmentality might be understood as being produced/enabled by the “freedoms” of liberalism – specifically the freedom to invest and trade overseas, the freedom to protect economic interests through military force and political intervention, and the freedom to cross borders and indoctrinate (even the freedom to consume goods extracted and/or traded by territories of empire could be understood as an enabling mechanism of security). In other words, Foucault’s theory or framework of liberal governmentality could conceivably be turned on its head. In any case, whether imperialism is to be understood as legitimately constituting its own art of government based on a principle of security or as a mechanism of security that undergirds liberal governmentality, the important thing, I think, is to understand the two—imperialism and liberalism—as having historically existed as a symbiotic pair, neither having been in operation without the other.

However, what does all of this mean with regard to situating the subjectivity formation processes of US-American volunteer English teachers in Ecuador, or any other “developing” country for that matter? Because imperialism is realized through actual human practices it can be
understood to depend upon the deployment of the domestic population, or more accurately, specific segments of the population deemed appropriate for the various imperialist tasks that range from violent repression and coercion to activities construed as enabling, such as education and other kinds of “humanitarian” work. In this light, imperialism might be understood as both a strategy of security and a technology of government through which the “freedom of liberalism” is actually secured not only through the illiberal interventions imposed upon populations, markets, and governments that inhabit in territories of empire but also through the shaping of the conduct and self-understandings of US subjects vis-à-vis “other” populations, cultures, societies, and governments that fall within the realm of US empire. In other words, imperialism can be considered to bear governmental effects not only for the indigenous populations subjected to the imposition of external control of the imperial state but also for the populations who are recruited and deployed by the imperial state to exercise this control.

This is where the concepts of imperial and colonial discourses, developed by Edward Said (1978/2003, 1993), Homi Bhabha (1983, 1984, 1994), and Gayatri Spivak (1985, 1988) become central, as does Heron’s (2007) qualitative empirical study of contemporary development workers and her argument that the subjectivity formation among Western development workers is shaped by “colonial continuities” (Heron, 2007) that include a sense of planetary consciousness and a sense of entitlement to help. These themes form the focus of Chapter 5, in which I turn to investigating and tracing the historical existence of these constructs in the United States and the legible ways in which they have been actively circulated by the US state. However, first I attend to the trajectory of US imperialism in Latin America that transpired in the years following the end of World War II. The following chapter reviews the era of Cold War US imperialism and in Chapter 4 I trace the events of the period that Harvey has categorized as neoliberal hegemony. Chapter 5 will then examine what this long history of US imperialism (in Latin America) has entailed the application of particular governmental technologies – humanitarianism/volunteering and tourism – to certain segments of the United States citizenry.
CHAPTER 3: COLD WAR EVOLUTION OF US EMPIRE IN LATIN AMERICA

3.1 Introduction

This chapter examines how the end of World War II ushered in the globalization of US empire beyond its original domain of Latin America (Grandin, 2006) and explores the evolution of the longstanding imperial relation between the United States and Latin America in the post-WWII era. As historians have argued, with respect to Western international power relations, the late 1940s marked a decisive “changing of the guard” from Britain to the United States, which had emerged from WWII unrivaled with respect to its military, financial, and industrial domains that, Harvey argues, comprise the “legs” of hegemony. The political expression of this multifaceted dominance was US’s leadership in the formation of the Bretton Woods institutions and the United Nations. These institutions could be regarded as several apparatuses that were central to the consensual dimension of US imperial power in the post-World War II era. On the coercive front, there was the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and here, the intermingling of US state and US capital is striking, thus lending support to Harvey’s conception of capitalist empire as a fusion, albeit contradictory at times, of state politics and capital.

Looking at what the post-WWII re-ordering of US politics meant for US imperial practice in Latin America, I devote this chapter to tracing the steady stream of economic, political, and military interventions that characterized the fifties, sixties, and seventies and through which the US state, in collusion with and often at the behest of, US capital worked tirelessly at keeping the Latin American region open to US capital and closed to Soviet influence. Key tactics of this era included the CIA-coordinated coup (starting with the overthrow of Guatemalan president Jacobo Arbenz in 1954 and continuing with a flood of CIA-backed coups against left-leaning Latin American presidents and their replacement with individuals deemed more amenable to US economic and political interests), the CIA-coordinated overseeing of police forces of pro-US Latin American states and the training of these police forces in methods of torture to be used on leftist activists and their associates, and, finally, the State Department’s funding of “dirty wars” intended to suppress political dissent in pro-US Latin American states.
3.2 The Cold War Context and the Creation of the CIA

As is well known, the United States post-war ascent as leading hegemonic power was conditioned by opposition it faced from the Soviet Union, the only super power that had attended Bretton Woods but refused to join the IMF when the negotiations were complete. The refusal was driven by Soviet objection to US dominance over the governing of the IMF as well as the culmination of an increasingly troubled alliance between the two countries, one that had been tenuous since the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, when the United States (along with Britain, France, and Japan) had sent troops in support of the anti-Bolshevik forces who were then ultimately defeated. With the subsequent Soviet transition to communism, relations between the two republics had only deteriorated, particularly in 1933 when the United States refused to.

During World War II, the alliance between the two nations had been precarious at best and when the Soviet Union opted out of the Bretton Woods agreement, this was interpreted by the United States as a rupture in the alliance. Shortly after the Bretton Woods conference, and in the name of national security, the Soviet Union began installing client regimes in the Eastern European republics it had occupied during the war and the United States government reacted with condemnation (even as it clearly maintained its own system of Latin American client regimes for the very same purposes). By the years immediately following the war, President Truman was not only condemning Soviet expansion but also declaring the existence of a Soviet communist threat to the new international order that had been so carefully worked out at the Bretton Woods Conference and the many other United Nations meetings that had surrounded it. Engaging the Soviet Union in direct confrontation was not an option; what would emerge instead would be a protracted, indirect conflict that would quickly become known as the Cold War, essentially a competition between the two powers to both maintain and expand their respective “spheres of influence.”

With regard to the preservation of post-war US hegemony, Harvey argues that the Cold War played an integral role. As Harvey (2003) points out, it was precisely by declaring itself the defender of freedom against communism and following through with material forms of assistance,
such as the Marshall Plan of 1948 (which would not only provide $12.4 billion in funding for the rebuilding of European infrastructure and revamping of European industry, but also dictate the removal of intra-European trade barriers on the premise of bringing free trade to the region) that the United States exercised and strengthened its hegemonic power among the elites and propertied classes of capitalist nations. In this way, the US became a leader for European elites, winning their allegiance not only through declarations of preserving freedom but also through material assistance to be used in facilitating and expanding processes of capitalist accumulation.

At the same time, as Harvey (2003) also points out, while the United States relied heavily on winning and sustaining the consent of the world’s capitalist classes, it also expended a great deal of effort in exercising coercion and moreover, building up its coercion capabilities. At the center of this effort was the formation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), a government agency that in the span of less than a decade would become one of the state’s key tools for actively shaping and controlling the political and economic processes in sovereign nations, particularly those that lay within the boundaries of its empire to the south or, in the new Cold War lexicon, its long claimed “sphere of influence.” Before moving into a discussion of the CIA’s specific activities in Latin America, and the implications, effects, and repercussions that postwar US global hegemony held for the region, more generally I devote the next few paragraphs to tracing the early history of the Central Intelligence Agency in order to provide some general sense of how the Agency was conceived, the official purpose and tasks with which it was initially vested, how it grew significantly in size, autonomy, and scope of its authorized activity, and how by the early fifties it formed a sort of key nexus of state and capital interests and was being deployed by these two forces to actually orchestrate and actively assist in the overthrowing of sovereign nation governments that were held to pose threat to US economic and political interests.

As historian Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones (2003) has argued, the CIA was by no means the US’s first foray into international intelligence gathering. Its immediate predecessor had been the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), a foreign intelligence service created by President Roosevelt in June of 1942 and headed by Colonel William J. (“Wild Bill”) Donovan, a Conservative
Republican millionaire who had commanded New York’s 69th regiment in World War I and had been a classmate of Roosevelt’s at Columbia Law School. The impetus for establishing the OSS had been the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, an event that had subsequently been read as nothing less than a profound failure of US intelligence to learn and warn of Japan’s plans. According to Donovan and Navy higher-ups, the attack was also clear justification for the establishment of a peacetime centralized intelligence service that would keep the United States safer in years to come. In the context of a war on Nazi fascism, however, the idea was a controversial one and many, including those at the top, remained ambivalent.

President Roosevelt and subsequently President Truman exercised caution: the former never openly supporting the creation of a such an agency and only beginning to gauge the political will to do so at the time of his death in 1945, the latter first expressing resistance to the idea (first disbanding the OSS upon coming to office following Roosevelt’s death before then reinstating it) and then articulating his apprehension around the possibility that the creation of such an agency would lead to the development of a US-American police state akin to the Gestapo state of Nazi Germany. Beyond fears of an imminent totalitarianism, Truman was also preoccupied with the potential outcry from the US public that might accompany the creation of such an agency, the damage that the creation of such an agency could to the country’s international image, particularly in Latin America, with whom the continuation of alliances and asymmetrical market relations were deemed critical (especially in the event of a new war breaking out).

Nevertheless, in September of 1945 and amid congressional urging, Truman tasked Secretary of State James Byrnes with developing a "comprehensive and coordinated foreign intelligence program for all federal agencies" (in Jeffreys-Jones, 2003, 32). By then the contradiction of a purportedly free and open society engaging in covert intelligence gathering had been papered over with the caveat that such activity would carry no domestic police power (that would be left to the Federal Bureau of Investigation) and would be restricted to the collection of foreign intelligence only (thus making the implicit but important contention that while liberal democratic principles had to be preserved within the nation’s borders and with respect to the
nation’s own citizenry, the potential imposition of an illiberal virtual US “police state” on “other” citizenries of the world – in the name of US security – was less egregious).

Ultimately, the plan that won the support of both the State department and Truman came from one Admiral Sidney Souers, who proposed the creation of one central intelligence agency (separate from the State Department) to be controlled by the president through a military dominated National Intelligence Authority and empowered with the capacity to “perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence as NIA may from time to time direct” (quoted in Jeffrey-Jones 2003: 34). As the planning of the CIA got underway, Truman created an interim Central Intelligence Group (CIG) in 1946, with Souers as its inaugural director overseeing a staff of eighty. Souers was quickly succeeded by Lieutenant General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, who increased the staff from eighty to a little over eighteen hundred, one third of which worked overseas.

The Central Intelligence Agency was officially created by provision of the National Security Act, passed into law by Congress on July 26, 1947. In the CIA provision, the NIA proposed by Souers became the National Security Council (NSC), which was, true to Souer’s plan, predominated by members of the military. Also in keeping with Souer’s plan, the CIA director was to be a presidential appointee but was subject to Senate approval. Further, the provision stipulated that the director or deputy could be of the military, as long as one of the positions was held by a civilian (a point that had fostered much debate between the military and the State department in the months leading up).

In the first six months of its existence, the CIA concentrated its activities on espionage and generating predictions. Amid new levels of apprehension regarding reported forays into propaganda production among Soviet allies in October of 1947, however, provisions were quickly made for the CIA and the State Department to enter into the production and dissemination of pro-United States propaganda in targeted countries. Additionally, by December of 1947, the NSC issued a directive authorizing the CIA to engage in “psychological warfare,” an area of combat that had emerged as a category during World War II, and according to Jeffreys-Jones, involved,
“for example, the issuance of unattributed publications, false attribution, forgery, and the secret subsidization of publications” (Jeffreys-Jones 2003, 50).

Another important expansion of CIA capabilities, came in 1948, when the eruption of massive riots in Bogota, Colombia following the assassination of Liberal presidential candidate, Jorge Eliécer Gaitan fueled domestic criticisms that the CIA had failed to predict an event that had posed threat to the US-American delegation in Bogota at the time of the riots for the Ninth Inter-American Conference. When it came out that there had been no intelligence failure (inaugural CIA director Roscoe Hillenkoetter would testify that the Agency had in fact issued a warning to the State Department that had gone unheeded) and thus no weakness in the overall intelligence structure of the agency, a campaign was soon launched to instead fortify the CIA’s covert operations capabilities to prevent such riots. By June of 1948, the National Security Council issued NSC 10/2, a directive which created a new covert operations unit – the Office of Policy Coordination – which was prohibited to underwrite “armed conflict by recognized military forces” but was authorized to organize and implement “propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerillas and refugee liberation groups, and support of indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world” (Jeffreys-Jones 2003, 55-56)

The creation of the Office of Policy Coordination was a watershed moment for the CIA. Another key development in the formative years of the CIA came in 1949 with the passage of the Central Intelligence Act. Even before the events in Bogota, powerful elements had been issuing serious criticisms of the CIA’s capabilities and Truman had appointed an investigation committee, which returned with a slew of recommendations that were then debated by Congress in closed hearings. The resulting Central Intelligence Act essentially granted a new level of congressional authorization and extrajudicial capacity to the Agency, permitting it to disregard immigration laws in order to recruit a maximum of one hundred defectors per year and allowing its director to draw upon secret funds and engage in financial transactions without reporting them to Congress (as
other federal agencies were required to do). As Jeffreys-Jones (2003) describes it, whereas the original provision for the creation of the CIA had obligated the CIA director to protect secrets pertaining to methods and sources, the law of 1949, “gave him the power to create secrets to protect” (Jeffreys-Jones 2003, 60). With the passage of the law, CIA covert operations expanded greatly in a short period of time. Between 1949 and 1952, the Office of Policy Coordination increased the number of personnel at its disposal from 302 to 2,812 (with an additional 3,142 contracted overseas) and its available funds shot from $4.7 million to $82 million. Much of this went to propaganda efforts but also facilitated the CIA ventures into new sorts of activities and operations; these included the acquisition of air transport facilities and its provision of financial assistance to the British for what was to be a failed attempt at overthrowing the communist regime of Albania in 1949.

As Jeffreys-Jones demonstrates, the real expansion of the CIA’s covert operations would come during the administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower. In 1952, Eisenhower ran for president on a campaign that criticized Truman’s foreign policy as dangerously complacent, overly focused on the defensive containment of Soviet communism and sorely lacking in offensive initiatives that would “wrest control from the Kremlin.” During his first year in office, Eisenhower developed a foreign policy agenda – dubbed the “New Look defense policy” – that purposefully sought to avoid the cost and large-scale casualties of massive military interventions by replacing them with increased nuclear airstrike capability and the more frequent and comprehensive use of unconventional warfare, to be achieved in part through the covert operational arm of the CIA. Indeed, having worked extensively with OSS during WWII as Allied Supreme Commander, Eisenhower had come to office an ardent proponent of the CIA, and as part of his “New Look” policy the Agency would expand its scope of operations and activities in critical ways that would have implications for the future. Specifically, Eisenhower strongly advocated and supported the development of psychological warfare (or psywar), which soon rose to the status of a science and sanctioned the introduction of assassination into US foreign policy when he advocated the CIA’s elimination of Fidel Castro and Dominican dictator, Raphael Trujillo (both to be discussed below).
Further, under Eisenhower, the CIA moved more definitively into the territory of instigating, aiding, and participating in coups of governments deemed as posing a threat to US Cold War objectives. The first of the CIA-backed coups would be the well-known case of the overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq in August 1953 (see Blum 2003 for a detailed account). Covert intervention in Iran would be quickly followed by what would take shape as a steady stream of replications in Latin America over the next several decades. In the following section, where I turn to the implications of US post-war hegemony for Latin America, a review of these events will form part of the focus.

3.3 From Anti-Fascism to Anti-Democracy: A Change in Policy Toward Latin America

Turning now to post-WWII relations between the United States and the non-industrialized independent republics of Latin America the questions that section seeks to address is: how did this post-war globalization of US hegemony play out in this particular region? Given that the ethnographic context of this dissertation is Ecuador and in light of the preceding sections on US empire in Latin America what did the exercise of US imperial power look like in Latin America in the post-WWII/Cold War era?

As historians have illustrated, in the years following the war’s end, the United States moved quickly to institutionalize the Latin American alliance that had emerged during the war, quickly re-designating it as an alliance against communism (Grandin, 2006; O’Brien, 2007). In 1947, President Truman touted the “Inter-American System,” which he claimed, had become “steadily stronger for half a century” (in Grandin 2006, 39). That same year, the delegates from United States and the Latin American republics attended the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security, held near Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. As Jeffreys-Jones (2003) argues, for the US, the aim was to establish a hemispheric anti-communist collective defense agreement. For Latin American republics, securing economic aid on the order of the Marshall Plan concurrently being administered in Europe and Japan was the objective. In the end, the Conference yielded a commitment from the Latin American republics to a hemispheric security pact and an agreement from Latin American delegates to postpone the
presentation of their arguments for economic aid until a future economic conference. The resulting Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, dubbed the Río Pact and signed by the United States and nineteen Latin American governments, indeed stipulated that any attack or threat of attack against any of the signatory nations (whether perpetrated by a signatory or non-signatory nation) would be considered an act of aggression against all, and armed/military action could be taken by any signatory nation as a defense against the aggression if approved by a two-thirds majority. In the following year of 1948, at the Ninth Inter-American Inter-American Conference (held in Bogota, Colombia), the Organization of American States (OAS) was formed as the organizational channel through which the Río Pact was to be enforced (Ibid).

As Jeffreys-Jones (2003) emphasizes the founding charter of the OAS, which was signed by the US government and 20 Latin American governments, was significant in many ways. One of these was its striking tendency to simultaneously forbid and permit intervention among the signatory states. On the one hand, several charter articles emphasized the right of each state to determine its political, social, and economic system without external interference and stressed the obligation of each state to refrain from intervention in the affairs of other member states, including the use of armed force. Article 15, for example, stated quite clearly, "No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements" (as cited in United States Department of State, 1952, p. 2419-20). Article 17 essentially reiterated the content of Article 15:

The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever. No territorial acquisitions or special advantages obtained either by force or by other means of coercion shall be recognized (Ibid, p. 2420).

On the other hand, these articles were followed by several important qualifications that essentially served to dramatically weaken their provisions. For example, Article 19 went on to state that, "Measures adopted for the maintenance of peace and security in accordance with
existing treaties do not constitute a violation of the principles set forth in Articles 15 and 17” (Ibid).

Even more pointed was Article 24, which specified that,

Every act of aggression by a State against the territorial integrity or the inviolability of the territory or against the sovereignty or political independence of an American State shall be considered an act of aggression against the other American States (Ibid, p. 2421).

Such text clearly provided for intervention in the affairs of a nation that was conceivably facing some sort of threat, with the nature of that threat left open to a case-by-case interpretation but the clear and present threat de rigeur being communism. This was even more apparent in Article 25, which Jeffreys-Jones (2003) has interpreted as containing a veritable loophole that effectively enabled the United States to intervene in the domestic affairs of any Latin American country in order to prevent it from becoming communist:

If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected by an armed attack or by an act of aggression that is not an armed attack, or by an extra-continental conflict, or by a conflict between two or more American States, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the American States, in furtherance of the principles of continental solidarity or collective self-defense, shall apply the measures and procedures established in the special treaties on the subject (as cited in United States Department of State, 1952, p. 2421).

These collective defense and security agreements between one supremely dominant nation (the United States) and a large group of independent republics that possessed nowhere near the economic, technological, and military might of the former (Latin America) point to a clear instance of state-driven attempt to further consolidate US hegemony over extra-continental territories which, in the lexicon of the Cold War context, lay within the United States’ claimed “sphere of influence.” However, what accompanied this state driven effort and ensued in the wake of the OAS’ establishment was deeply indicative of that fusion of state politics and capitalist processes productive of uneven geographic development that David Harvey defines as the essence of capitalist imperialism. Before entering discussion of these kinds of events that defined the Cold War era US-Latin America relationship, however, it is important to highlight the Latin American context of the late 1940s.
As historians such as Greg Grandin (2006) have illustrated, during World War II, Latin America had undergone several significant economic and political changes. As US wartime production had soared, there had been increased US demand for Latin American raw exports, and as trade with the US flourished, economic growth in the region had skyrocketed. Accompanying this phenomenon had been an increasing level of economic nationalism among many Latin American states. As historians point out, in response to the Great Depression, many governments had begun to intervene in their national economies in new ways geared at containing its social and economic impacts (see Bulmer-Thomas, 2014; Grandin, 2006; O’Brien, 2007). For example, as global demand for raw resources had plummeted in the thirties, export-driven Latin American countries were left unable to import consumer goods and in response, many Latin American governments had founded development banks to subsidize domestic production of consumer goods. As for domestic demand levels, Latin American governments had actively intervened in matters of public interest and resource distribution to enable consumers’ purchasing capacity and this had meant clamping down on US corporations in various ways (O’Brien, 2007). In 1937, for example, the Bolivian government had nationalized Standard Oil (founded by John D. Rockefeller and at the time the largest oil company in the world), which had for years reaped astronomical profits while evading taxes, illegally funneling crude oil out of the country through a secret pipeline to Argentina, and failing to meet local demand for fuel (Gordon and Luoma, 2008). As O’Brien (2007) illustrates, in the mid-thirties, Mexican president Lázaro Cárdenas had implemented a land reform effort aimed at, expropriating land held by US companies and redistributing it to the peasantry; in 1938, when US oil companies refused to allow their workers to unionize, he nationalized them. In Chile, the national government raised taxes on the US-owned copper companies that operated within its borders (Ibid). Additionally, most of the governments of the larger Latin American countries, including those of Chile and Peru, instituted regulations requiring that the workforces of US companies be comprised of a minimum percentage of national citizens (Ibid).
In the meantime, waves of industrialization had given rise to processes of proletarianization and worker mobilization (Grandin, 2006; O’Brien, 2007). For instance, between 1941 and 1945, Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico (the region’s economic giants) had seen increases of between fifty and sixty percent in the number of manufacturing workers and these shifts had immediate impacts on the social and political reality (O’Brien, 2007). According to O’Brien (2007), “Growing urban workforces translated into larger and more militant labor movements that would press for greater economic benefits from their nation’s rulers and the American corporations that controlled key sectors of the region’s economies” (p. 182). Importantly, as Grandin (2006) points out, these local instances of class formation and mobilization were unfolding amid official high-level promotions of democracy that were taking place as many Latin American governments allied themselves with the United States in a worldwide conflict being construed as a struggle between democracy and fascism. The result, according to Grandin (2006) had been something of a regional transition toward democratic rule that proceeded with the encouragement of the United States. As Grandin (2006) emphasizes, beginning in 1944, there had been a revitalization of democratic governments in Chile and Colombia and an emergence of new democracies in Peru, Argentina, Venezuela, and Guatemala, all of which had previously been ruled by dictatorship. Importantly, many of these democracies were more social than liberal in nature. As Grandin (2006) describes these transitions, “Broad coalitions ranging from political liberals to Communists toppled dictators throughout the continent, while new reform governments extended the franchise, legalized unions, expanded public education, provided health care, and implemented social security programs” (p. 40).

While the United States government had refrained from attacking Latin America’s shift toward economic nationalism during the thirties and early forties, this would change abruptly beginning in 1945 (Grandin, 2006; O’Brien, 2007). In February of that year, Assistant Secretary of State William Clayton (a key player in the modified multilateralism movement pursued by the FDR and Truman administrations) effectively denounced Latin America’s recent leanings toward economic nationalism in a speech delivered to the region’s leaders at an Inter-American
Conference on War and Peace (held in Mexico City), calling explicitly for the lowering of tariffs, the increase of US industrial exports to the region, and a greater role for US corporations in the region’s extractive and agricultural industries (O’Brien, 2007). This abrupt shift was of course situated in the recent conclusion of World War II, an event that instantly diminished any leverage that Latin American governments had held over the United States when Nazi infiltration of the region was perceived as a real threat and a less confrontational stance with Latin American governments was understood as critical to winning and maintaining their alliance. With the pressure of active war now removed, it appears that the US political establishment no longer felt beholden to affecting such a diplomatic or “neighborly” stance.

At the same time, however, the immediate danger of Nazi infiltration had been quickly replaced, from the US government’s perspective, with the threat of a post-war economic slump triggered by an overaccumulation of capital that would come with the sudden decrease in demand for war supplies and the inability of war devastated Europe to serve as market for US consumer goods. Compounding this was the known fact that Western European nations had already begun talks with Latin American about postwar economic relations and the related fears among US political class that the United States could conceivably be economically bumped out of Latin America by its old imperial competitor. There was also growing US preoccupation with maintaining access to Latin America’s raw resources (oil, cotton, rubber, etc.) in the event of a feared third world war with the Soviet Union. All of these realities and concerns add further context to Clayton’s remarks and the accompanying draft resolution to end economic nationalism in Latin America.

In addition to reversing its World War II position of support for Latin America economic nationalism, in the years following the war, the US government also changed its stance on democratization in Latin America (Grandin, 2006). As the newly declared threat of Soviet communism now replaced the danger of Nazi fascism, the US political leadership now cast the particular brand of social democracy spreading across Latin America as both a gateway to Soviet/communist infiltration and an indirect threat to US corporate property (a point now being
strongly lobbied by US corporate interests, which now amped up their calls for the US
government to protect their holdings in the region). According to Grandin (2006), by 1947, just
two years after the end of World War II, the United States was sending “signals that its preference
for democrats over autocrats was now contingent on political stability” (p. 41). Not insignificantly,
these US-American concerns meshed with growing anxieties among Latin American elites who
had grown increasingly intolerant of political mobilization of the proletariat class and of the social
democratic reforms that were being passed by political leaders, viewing such developments not
only as a significant threat to traditional social-racial hierarchies but also as a deterrent to foreign
(ie United States) capital investment and the accelerated industrialization and capital
accumulation that such foreign investment was expected to stimulate (Ibid).

In the late forties, a highly publicized response to the demands made by Assistant
Secretary Clayton came from the Argentine economist Raúl Prebisch, a figure who lent
intellectual legitimacy to the region’s policy shift toward economic nationalism (O’Brien, 2007). As
head of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), a division of the newly formed
United Nations, Prebisch posited the thesis that the economic vicissitudes and intractable poverty
of Latin America were directly related to the region’s continued allegiance to an economic model
that was based on raw resource exports and finished good imports. This, Prebisch argued, was
because on the global market, raw resources, or “primary products,” tended to be priced lower
than finished goods, or “secondary products,” thus creating a perpetually unfavorable terms of
trade for Latin American countries. Prebisch’s solution was for Latin American countries to wean
themselves off of finished good imports by pursuing state-led industrialization that was to be
facilitated in part by imposing high tariffs on imported goods, thus ensuring that domestically
produced goods would substitute imported goods and provide the demand that would trigger and
propel industrialization.

As O’Brien (1999) observes, Prebisch’s prescription, which came to be known as import
substitution industrialization (ISI), thus legitimized what many Latin American countries had been
doing as a matter of pragmatism during the Depression – developing national industry through
state intervention that ranged from subsidizing domestic manufacturing enterprises to redistributing wealth in various ways so that populations could purchase domestically produced goods. In the years that followed, Prebisch’s prescription was thoroughly adopted by those larger Latin American nations – Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Uruguay – that had already made significant advances in state-led industrialization and had the market size and resources to sustain import substitution policies. Governments of smaller, poorer countries (Ecuador, Paraguay, all of the Central American countries) also pursued ISI but, in light of smaller domestic consumer markets and relatively limited resources with which to underwrite domestic industrialization, did so on a relatively minimal scale.

O’Brien (2007) points out that during this time, and despite the consternation of the US government at Latin American economic nationalism, US multinationals actually proved to be adept at adapting to ISI policies in Latin America. This was facilitated in part by the fact that those Latin American governments that adopted ISI simultaneously maintained the intention of accepting foreign investment directly into their domestic manufacturing industries, viewing it as “a further spur to industrialization, although they remained committed to protecting those manufacturing sectors dominated by local capitalists” (O’Brien, 2007, p. 194). In fact, building up domestic industrialization specifically through the use of foreign investment was actually part of Prebisch’s prescription for Latin America (Ibid). Thus, by the late forties and early fifties, after a decade of increased expropriations of US agricultural enterprises and amid a wave of Latin American policymaking that institutionalized both the use of heavy tariffs on foreign imports and the strategic reliance on foreign investment for industrialization, the nature of US investment in Latin America shifted to accommodate these realities and became more heavily based in manufacturing and less tied to agricultural production (Ibid).

Additionally, as O’Brien (2007) underscores, to appease Latin American governments’ demands that US companies contribute more significantly to the countries where they did business, in the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s, some US manufacturing companies made a decided effort to integrate more thoroughly into the social and economic fabric of the Latin
American countries where they had operations, abandoning the enclave model (so favored by agricultural giants such as United Fruit). In this model companies created their own virtual towns and supplied their own goods and services to sustain the operations and the workers (who were required to live in these towns). In contrast, the post-war model of US capitalism in Latin America was one in which the US firm actually purchased goods and equipment from domestic suppliers and, in some cases, worked with these suppliers to improve the quality of the products they were selling. With Latin American governments showing no indication of rejecting US direct investment and with US capital proving adept at adapting to particular kind of investment preferred by these Latin American governments, the penetration of US capital into Latin American countries actually increased dramatically between 1940 and 1960, going from $3 billion to $8 billion and with 90 percent of this increase occurring after 1945 (O’Brien, 2007).

3.4 A Strategic Alliance Between State and Capital in the Ascent of the CIA Coup

As historians have shown, the post-WWI accommodation of Latin American economic nationalism on the part of US corporations did not mean that they refrained from utilizing their influence with US state actors to try and redirect Latin American governments away from. Despite being surmountable in the moment, the rise of economic nationalism was still regarded by US capital as a fundamental threat to the future of doing business in the region. Indeed, throughout the late forties and early fifties, US firms that traded with and held investments in Latin America grew increasingly intolerant of the region’s emergent business climate and the direction it was taking. As author Naomi Klein (2007) reports, from the US corporate point of view, “their products were being blocked at borders, their workers were demanding higher wages, and, most alarmingly, there was growing talk that everything from foreign-owned mines to banks could be nationalized to finance Latin America’s dream of economic independence” (pp. 90-91). According to Klein (2007), corporate discontent translated into corporate pressure on the US state. This pressure in turn took shape as a foreign policy movement in both the United States and Britain (still a significant trade partner and investor vis-à-vis Latin America) that “attempted to pull developmentalist governments into the binary logic of the Cold War” (p. 91). In other words, US
companies turned to exploiting the growing Cold War concerns of the US state to paint the shifts of Latin American states towards social democracy as a decisive move towards totalitarian communism. In this context, the signaled preferences of the US State Department for anti-communist dictatorship over social democracy would take on new, more violent, more interventionist proportions in the early fifties and beyond, beginning with the CIA-coordinated overthrow of democratically elected Guatemalan president Jacobo Arbenz in 1954. As this event marked the CIA’s first official covert operation in Latin America and because it powerfully illustrates the shape that US capitalist imperialism would take on the post-WWII era, I devote the following paragraphs to reviewing how it all unfolded.

As Jeffrey-Jones (2003) illustrates, by the early 1950s, US capitalists had already found a willing ally in the CIA. As underscored by Klein (2007), this fact has to be understood within the context of the close relations between US capitalists and CIA director, Allen Dulles (nominated by Eisenhower in 1953 and confirmed by the Senate the same year). Before coming to the CIA, Dulles had been employed by the prestigious corporate law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell, where, along with his brother, John Foster Dulles (Eisenhower’s Secretary of State), he had represented top US companies that stood to lose substantial profits if Latin America was to continue in its region-wide move toward nationalization of private companies (Klein, 2007). His clients had included J.P. Morgan & Company, the International Nickel Company, the Cuban Sugar Cane Corporation, and United Fruit Company (Ibid).

It would be under Dulles’ leadership, and at the direct request of United Fruit Company (UFC) that the CIA would orchestrate the successful overthrow of Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman in 1954 (Jeffreys-Jones, 2003). Democratically elected in 1950, Arbenz had become president of Guatemala in 1951, seven years after the commencement of the country’s “October Revolution,” a movement led by university students, professionals, and members of the military against the notoriously repressive regime of Jorge Ubico y Castañeda, who had ruled for thirteen years as a puppet dictator for the US state and UFC, allowing the former to establish military bases in Guatemalan territory and granting hundreds of thousands of hectares of the
country’s most fertile land to the latter, all while keeping the majority of the rural peasantry landless and in bondage through a pernicious system of debt-slavery. By the early 1940s, UFC controlled 40% of the country’s most fertile land, owned the country’s railroad (through its subsidiary International Railway Company of Central America), and unofficially controlled the country’s port.

Aiming to initiate a new era of democratic rule, free speech, social reforms, and national land reform, the October Revolution had begun with a general strike in response to the killing of a schoolteacher by military forces. In response, President Ubico had quickly resigned, appointing a military triumvirate that would soon be deposed by a joint team of Arbenz (then a military captain) and Major Francisco Javier Arana when it failed to honor its original pledge to hold free elections. When Arbenz and Arana enabled elections in 1944, Juan Jose Arévalo had been chosen as the first post-dictatorship president. A formerly exiled professor of philosophy, Arévalo had instituted reforms that included an increased minimum wage, literacy programs, and some land reform that expropriated foreign estates and redistributed their lands to the rural peasantry. Comprehensive land reform (envisioned as the expropriation of foreign owned lands with compensation to the deposed companies and subsequent redistribution of land to the rural peasantry), however, remained an unrealized objective during Arévalo six years in office. Upon coming to office in 1951, Arbenz, an Arévalo supporter, had acted to change this, issuing Decree 900, which expropriated large amounts of unused land (with full compensation) owned by UFC. In addition to expropriating UFC’s land, Arbenz supported militant actions of UFC workers, and initiated construction of a highway, a project that would create direct competition to the country’s railroad industry over which UFC held a monopoly. UFC had historically been successful in blocking the highway project.

Predictably, the political ascents and the subsequent actions of both Arévalo and Arbenz were followed by tremendous pushback from UFC. By 1950, the company was retaining skilled lobbyists and publicists to convince the US government and the CIA that Guatemala was on the brink of a full communist overhaul (Jeffreys-Jones, 2003). Its efforts would ultimately contribute to
the creation of Plan PBSUCCESS, a CIA operation designed to oust Arbenz on the grounds that he was a member of the Communist party whose intentions were to turn Guatemala into a puppet regime of the Soviet Union. Between 1950 and 1954, the CIA utilized methods of economic destabilization, diplomatic isolation, and psychological warfare on the Guatemalan population (including the spread of disinformation about Arbenz through newspaper articles and a fraudulent radio station that broadcast from Miami but claimed to be located in the heart of the Guatemalan jungle; death threats; and bombings), all intended to generate anxiety, fear, and Arbenz-fatigue among the Guatemalan population. The pinnacle of this activity was the CIA’s recruitment and training of mercenary soldiers. This group, a majority of whom were Guatemalan exiles, would grow to number nearly five hundred men and would ultimately lead the coup against Arbenz. Their leader, Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, a Guatemalan right wing exile, would appoint himself as president of the country. Upon taking office, Castillo made immediate and dramatic changes, making voting rights conditional upon a literacy requirement (thus disenfranchising over half the population), nullifying Arbenz’s Decree 900 (the official legislation that expropriated the UFC lands) and evicting peasants from the land they had received through it, banning political parties, bringing back the secret police created by Ubico, and, under the direction of the CIA, establishing the National Committee of Defense Against Communism, intended to suppress any known or suspected communist elements. Castillo was assassinated in 1957 but the country would remain under military rule for the next three decades, during which time the Arbenz-expropriated lands would be returned to UFC, a bloody civil war would embroil the country as the military regime fought to suppress leftist activists and guerrillas who mobilized against it, and extensive steps would be taken by the US government (primarily the intense training, funding, arming and all-around fortification of the Guatemalan military and police forces) to guarantee the preservation of the military government it had worked to implement.

The Guatemalan coup of 1954 would be the first of many post-WWII actions on the part of the US government that would blatantly violate the non-intervention “Good Neighbor” pledge that had been issued and upheld since the 1930s. According to Grandin (2006), this fact was
openly acknowledged in a 1951 memo written by the Assistant Secretary of State, who advised that because of this violation the various steps of the coup had to be “justified on technical grounds” so as to enable the United States to continue claiming a commitment to Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor policy that had been so critical in winning Latin American alliance in the years leading up to World War II.

3.5 Another Instance of State-Capital Fusion: The “Chile Project”

As the CIA was fast becoming an invaluable asset to the US capitalist elite, this class also gained an ally in Albion Patterson, a Princeton graduate who had worked at the Institute of Inter-American Affairs, a government agency formed by Roosevelt in 1942, headed by Nelson Rockefeller, and tasked with providing economic and social aid to Latin America (see Valdes, 2008). In the early fifties, Patterson had been elevated to the status of agricultural expert and was appointed as head of a number of US government agricultural missions to several Latin American countries. It was over the course of his work in Paraguay that Patterson came to the conclusion that US assistance programs in Latin America were not working as well as they could be due to a profound lack in well-trained Latin American economists to help implement and sustain them (Ibid). He also concluded that the programs were further hindered by extreme political instability in the region, and for this reason, well trained Latin American economists – understood as definitively apolitical, rational beings who dispassionately followed economic plans – could also play a much needed role because they would not participate in the sorts of political battles that swirled around them; they would simply stick to the (US-derived) economic plan and work to implement it. In this vein, Patterson leaned increasingly toward the idea of a massive education initiative to produce Latin American economists as the key to making US development initiatives work.

It was while heading a mission to Chile, that Patterson met Theodore Schultz, currently on leave from his post as chair of the economics department at the University of Chicago and two years into a massive prolonged team study of Latin America being done for the National Planning Association. Patterson, in his interest in the role of economics education in Latin American
development, had read up on the leading economists and had become a fan of Schultz’s work because in his estimation it was “more modern.” The two reportedly met every day for two weeks, discussing the economics, society, and culture of Chile. Schultz was seeking information for his component of the project, which was based on education, and as the two conversed about Chile, the economist shared with Patterson his theory of human capital. Schultz’s particular theory, of course, was situated in a broader framework of market fundamentalism currently en vogue at the University of Chicago economics department, which at the time was home to both Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, founders of the Mount Pelerin Society, a club that railed against the New Deal social programs of the 1930s and called for the total liberalization of markets and their elevation as the sole governing force in society. Schultz’s work undoubtedly appeared uniquely “modern” to Patterson because it was part of a school of economic thought that, while housed at one of the most prestigious economic departments in the United States, remained decidedly marginalized from mainstream economics of the 1950s.

By the end of the two weeks, Patterson had shared with Schultz his vision of a massive education initiative to produce trained economists. Schultz had been receptive. Out of the meetings was born the idea of a higher education exchange in which Chilean college students would study graduate level economics through the University of Chicago, earning advanced degrees in the process. Patterson placed himself in charge of finding a partner Chilean university from which to recruit students. His first choice, the nation’s top-ranking University of Chile, rejected the offer on the basis that contrary to the dean’s request, the university faculty would be granted no control in determining which US economists would be training the university’s students. However, Patterson subsequently found a home at the less highly ranked and notoriously conservative Catholic University.

The “Chile Project,” as it was quickly dubbed, was officially inaugurated in 1956 and was funded through a combination of US taxes and US foundations. Between 1957 and 1970, one hundred Chilean students pursued advanced degrees through the program (Valdes, 2008). The premise of the program, which was led by the self-described “seriously dedicated missionary”
Arnold Harberger, was a thorough indoctrination of students with Chicago school economics. A key way of doing this was focusing specifically on Chile through a "Chile workshop," an invention of Harberger’s in which University of Chicago economics professors presented to students on Chile, meticulously tearing apart its statist economic and social policies as prescribing neoclassical alternatives as the only answer. Their country held up by professors for ongoing scrutiny, students were taught that its social welfare programs (which were among the most effective and well regarded on the South American continent) and its protectionist measures were fundamentally wrong. Not surprisingly, many would then focus their doctoral dissertations on Chile’s economic and social policies, arguing against them from the neoclassical perspective they had been taught by US-American professors. Moreover, as the first students began to graduate, many returned to teach at Catholic University; by 1963 the university’s economics department was comprised almost exclusively of Chicago graduates and this included its chair, Sergio de Castro, who had been one of the first graduates. Economics graduates from University of Chicago and Catholic University, who came to be known as “los Chicago Boys,” also extended the mission to Argentina and Colombia, setting up mini-Chicago schools in those countries and apparently doing so with a real sense of urgency, determined to rescue Latin American countries from the clutches of economic nationalism that prevailed at the time and which Chicago Boys had been taught were responsible for the region’s widespread poverty rates and so-called economic backwardness.

The fact that the economics taught by the Chile project were so radically market-oriented and the fact the US government supported the project so wholeheartedly speaks volumes to the ways in which the state was actively involved in an attempt to create a path towards greater capital penetration of the country and the region – a path that had become somewhat cut off thanks to the rise of economic nationalism and ISI as the economic policy of choice among virtually Latin American countries and in Chile, particularly so. As we will see, this tactic would prove to be incredibly valuable to US capital in the early 1970s, when the US government coordinated and funded a coup d’état to oust the country’s president Salvador Allende, a Marxist
social democrat who after being democratically elected had pursued a program that included
sweeping social reforms, the nationalization of US companies, and the opening of diplomatic
relations with socialist and communist countries. However, up until that moment the Chile project,
while successful in proselytizing its students would remain ineffective in delivering political and
economic transformation of Chile or any other country in the region which remained largely
committed to state-led development and social policies that were decidedly to the left of center.
During this period, the US state served the interests of US capitalists more immediately through
the activities of the CIA.

3.6 The Sixties: Empire in Revolt and Kennedy’s Counterinsurgency Campaign

Five years after the Guatemalan coup, the Cuban Revolution erupted in 1959 with Fidel
Castro ousting US-supported dictator Fulgencio Batista, the military general that had been so
instrumental in continuing to secure the preservation of US economic and political domination in
Cuba during the early 1930s. While the Eisenhower administration initially recognized Castro’s
government in 1959, things changed rapidly when Castro began nationalizing US corporate
assets in 1960 (O’Brien, 2007). As O’Brien (2007) reports, in addition to objecting to the financial
losses this brought to the expropriated companies, US political and economic elites also were
alarmed by the wave of support Castro appeared to have in many Latin American republics,
fearing that a ripple effect of similar takeovers was only a matter of time if some sort of decisive
action was not taken. In his final year in office, Eisenhower declared a partial embargo against
Cuba. Upon coming to office in 1961, President Kennedy officially severed diplomatic relations
with Cuba and wasted no time in courting the continued loyalty of other Latin American nations. In
a speech given to Latin American diplomats at the White House in March of 1961, Kennedy
announced his proposed Alliance for Progress: a ten-year plan of foreign assistance to Latin
America in which the United States would contribute $20 billion in public and private capital over
the next ten years and Latin American nations would collectively provide a total of $80 billion of
capital (see Grandin, 2006; LaFeber, 1993, pp. 150-152; Tyvela, 2011, 2015). The objective
would be to achieve an annual per capita growth rate of at least 2.5% and in so doing
dramatically improve the material circumstances of Latin American populations. The theory was that such changes would eliminate widespread conditions of poverty that were purportedly sowing the seeds of and garnering sympathy for leftist revolutionary movements (Ibid). Significantly, and as argued by Grandin (2006), in his pitch of the Alliance Kennedy actually attempted to appropriate the (counter)discourse of revolution that was so powerful in Latin America at the time, presenting it as an American answer to Castro’s recent revolution. Indeed, if one examines the text of the speech to the diplomats, one sees that Kennedy invoked the word “revolution” nine times and concluding by inviting Latin American leaders to “complete the revolution of the Americas, to build a hemisphere where all men can hope for a suitable standard of living and all can live out their lives in dignity and in freedom that the American nations join together” (“JFK Presidential Library,” n.d.).

As numerous scholars have documented, the flip side to Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress (and, according to some, the ultimate recipient of most of its aid dollars) would be less inspiring and much less public: nothing less than a massive and highly calculated counterinsurgency campaign based on the strategic orienting of Latin American militaries, police forces, and “irregular civilians” toward US Cold War objectives (see Chomsky, 1985; Grandin 2006; Huggins 1998; LaFeber 1993). This campaign in many ways centered on training/assisting these actors in the use of repressive tactics – torture, execution, assassination, detention – against those citizens suspected and known as “subversives.” This was both an evolution of and a departure from Eisenhower’s approach, which Kennedy criticized as having been ineffective, citing the Cuban revolution as the prime evidence. As historian Michael McClintock (1992) observes, “The Eisenhower emphasis on offensive, unconventional, covert war against undesirable governments was matched by Kennedy’s overt and covert war against the internal enemies of friendly governments” (p. 161).

Kennedy’s counterinsurgency campaign had numerous components. First, upon assuming the presidency, Kennedy almost immediately called for the doubling of Special Forces, (at the time only one thousand men strong), a division of the Army created in 1952 with the
opening of the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. While Special Forces was originally intended to train and assist (and sometimes establish) foreign guerrilla forces in the use of unconventional warfare – hostage taking, murder, propaganda usage, sabotage, demolition – that was to be waged against governments considered to be adversarial or ambiguous with regard to US interests, under Kennedy this purpose would shift to include the training of foreign militaries, police, and civilian irregulars of pro-US countries in unconventional warfare tactics that were to be waged against those members of the national population deemed to be insurgents or insurgent sympathizers. As part of Kennedy’s expansion of Special Forces for counterinsurgency purposes, Special Forces developed a new medium of instruction to be deployed to targeted countries: the Mobile Training Team (MTT), “generally comprised of ten enlisted men and two officers, also called the combat/training ‘A’ Team.” By 1962, there were seventy-nine of these teams operating in nineteen countries that the Kennedy administration considered to be under threat of insurgency. While the majority of these MTTs were sent to Southeast Asia, twenty of these teams were deployed to Latin America, and according to one report by Marchetti and Marks (1974, cited by McClintock 1994), between 1962 and 1967 over six hundred MTTs were sent to Latin America.

As Dennis Rempe (1995) has shown, in 1962 Colombia became something of a pilot case for Kennedy’s new aggressive counterinsurgency initiative. Prior to that point, US military assistance to Colombia had remained relatively modest, despite repeated requests from Colombia’s Conservative-led government for assistance in the country’s civil war that had erupted in the wake of the massive riots that had followed the assassination of Liberal populist presidential candidate Jorge Elícer Gaitan in 1948 and was being fought in the countryside between Conservative paramilitaries and Liberal guerillas. During this period, Colombian president, Laureano Gómez would be the only Latin American leader to commit troops to the U.N. forces in the Korean War and would subsequently attempt to use this as leverage in convincing the US to send military assistance, adding extra incentive by claiming that the Liberal factions against which his government was fighting had been infiltrated by communists. Under
Eisenhower, the US had responded with a minimal aid package and one that was comprised of provisions that were more suited to hemispheric defense (training planes, naval equipment) than counterinsurgency; for example, it had refused to include 1100-pound napalm bounds requested by the Colombian government, the rationale being that Gómez would undoubtedly use them on the Liberal opposition. During these years, any existent Colombian communism was not perceived as posing a dire threat and, instead of massive military assistance, the US government directed its activities in Colombia toward working with labor leaders to purge labor groups of communist elements (as well as right wing Peronist elements), that, in any case, were known to have remained largely unorganized and ineffective in gaining a strong foothold.

The US position on Colombia would change dramatically in the immediate aftermath of the Cuban revolution, an event that happened to coincide with the intensifying mobilization of leftist peasants, many of whom had fought for the Liberals during the decade of civil war but had been subsequently excluded from the National Front, a bipartisan government that elite Liberals and Conservatives had formed in 1958 as a resolution to the protracted political conflict that had fueled the civil war. Like oligarchic governments of the past, the National Front had foreclosed non-elite participation in the political process, but it had also criminalized any alternative forms of political expression through a state of emergency decree, and, in its new consensus to foster rapid capitalist development (an issue that had been the key sticking point of the Liberal-Conservative conflict but had dissipated in the context of the recent transformation of traditional landowning elite into commercial farmers and capitalist entrepreneurs – an event that was undoubtedly influenced by a World Bank economic commission sent to Colombia in 1949 to "modernize" its agricultural system), the National Front government had begun to systematically dispossess peasants of lands they had cleared and claimed as independent republics upon being displaced by Conservative attacks during the civil war and transferred it into the hands of capitalist landowners.

In this context of dispossession and political exclusion, peasant resistance to the state’s actions took the form of increasingly organized, armed guerrilla movements with communist and
Marxist leanings. Watching this unfold and having witnessed the recent success of Castro in Cuba, in 1959, Eisenhower sent a team of counter-guerrilla experts tasked with assessing Colombia’s internal security, thus marking the beginning of what would ultimately be a dramatic shifting away from the US’s pre-1959 program of modest, hemispheric defense-oriented military assistance to an offensive program that was based on training and leading national militaries and police forces into battle against members of national citizenries. Upon completing its assessment, the team recommended the creation of a mobile counter-guerrilla unit, the development of domestic military intelligence, and the use of psychological warfare, along with civic action projects. Significantly, it was advised that any US aid given to Colombia for internal security be kept secret to avoid charges of US intervention and the compromise of Colombian sovereignty.

This secret intervention, put in motion by Eisenhower, would then expand dramatically under Kennedy. With the authorization of Kennedy, a $1.5 million package of military hardware was disbursed to the Colombian armed forces between 1961 and 1962. Included were helicopters, vehicles, communication equipment, and small arms, all of which were intended to outfit the mobile counter-guerrilla units recommended in 1959, specifically so that they could carry out “Orden Público” (Public Order) missions. The first of these missions would be undertaken in October 1962 by a Colombian pilot accompanied by US Air Force instructors.

Additionally, the first intelligence MTT was sent to Colombia in 1961 and in that same year, the new Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad (DAS) replaced the Servicio de Inteligencia de Colombia and began coordinating nearly all counter-subversive activity. Then, in 1962, Kennedy ordered the deployment of a US Army Special Warfare Team, led by General William Yarborough. Predictably enough, the team would make the general recommendation that the United States oversee all components of Colombia’s counter-insurgency efforts. Among the Yarborough team’s more specific suggestions (which included the employment of five Special Forces A-teams to work with key Colombian battalions; collaboration between DAS, National Police, and armed forces in the area of intelligence; increased propaganda; the covert introduction of armored buses of plainclothes soldiers or police into the transportation system and
operations zones that were to be isolated through curfews and civilian registration programs) was a secret recommendation made for the development of a covert civil and military structure that would carry out “clandestine execution of plans developed by the United States government toward defined objectives in the political, economic, and military fields”; perform “counter-agent and counter-propaganda” functions; and undertake “paramilitary sabotage, and/or terrorist activities against known communist proponents” (quoted in Rempe, 1995, p. 311).

The work of the Yarborough team would lead to the formulation of Plan LAZO, a counterinsurgency plan devised and executed by the Colombian army under the guidance of an MTT. Plan LAZO drew heavily on the use of MTTs, with Colombia going on to receive the highest number of these teams in Latin America during the early 1960s. Part of a broader, Colombian Internal Defense Plan aimed at integrating military operations with economic, social, and political undertakings, the core objectives of Plan LAZO were to execute military interventions to suppress and extirpate bandits and guerrilla forces, carry out civic action programs in areas affected by the violence between the bandits/guerrillas and the state, and to strengthen the overall security apparatus of the state. Interestingly, while civic action projects, which included medical and dental care provision, literacy training, and construction of rural schools and potable water systems (all intended to dissipate local support for the leftist/communist guerrilla forces) can be interpreted as an exercise of biopower in that they had to do with the administration of life and also as a governmental strategy in that they targeted the conduct of the local population with its welfare being the ostensible objective, they were coexistent with or perhaps more accurately, situated in a context where the consequences for non-compliance with the anti-communist mandate was death. Indeed, concurrent MTT initiatives included the training of Colombian army to successfully eliminate the political opposition through assassination. For example, MTTs provided “short-term (three week) ‘crash training programs for interrogators, mobile intelligence groups (grupos moviles de inteligencia – GMI), and Localizadores teams (grupos inteligencia de localizadores – GILs or Intelligence Hunter/Killer teams…composed of 25 veteran officers, NCOs, and civilians, heavily armed, and trained to operate in the field for long periods” (Rempe, 1995, p. 318). Upon
being trained by US MTTs, these “Intelligence Hunter/Killer teams” and various iterations of them were then added to Colombian army tactical units and the mobile intelligence groups, which essentially performed the same work as the Intelligence Hunter/Killer teams, were added to all major operating units.

Another key aspect of Kennedy’s counterinsurgency push was the annual Conference of the American Armies, which had been initiated in 1960 by the US commander-in-chief of SOUTHCOM, Major T.F. Bogart (McSherry, 2005). While started during the Eisenhower administration, this conference – described by political scientist J. Patrice McSherry (2005) as a “hemispheric security organization dominated by the United States and its organizational and ideological doctrines (pp. 47-48) – would continue throughout the Kennedy administration and beyond, bringing commanders of Latin American armies together with US military officers (who reportedly played an influential role in the organization and facilitation of these conferences) to co-ordinate and strategize around suppressing the perceived threat of “communist aggression.” In the conference meetings of the early 1960s, US military personnel were instrumental in establishing networks of military and intelligence communications that were aimed at integrating the hemispheric counterinsurgency effort. Later in 1969, the convening armies shared information on communist subversion in the hemisphere. Other key areas of focus for the annual conference included the importance of training armies in “strategies of countersubversion, counterrevolution, and internal security” (McSherry, 2005, p. 48).

An additional component of Kennedy’s counterinsurgency program was the now notorious School of the Americas (SOA). Originally established as the Latin American Ground School (LAGS) in the Panama Canal Zone in 1946, and then reorganized and renamed the U.S. Caribbean School in 1949, this inter-American military school was ultimately restructured (and again renamed) under Kennedy in 1963, its new focus being the training of Latin American militaries to fight against the spread of communism in their own countries by using counterinsurgency tactics against their own national populations (Gill, 2004). As Lesley Gill (2004) informs us, in comparison to the first thirteen years of SOA’s existence, enrollment at the
school increased by 42 percent in the ten years following the Cuban revolution, with a total of 13,500 students attending the school during that time, the countries with the highest representation being Venezuela, Bolivia, Panama, Nicaragua, and Peru. As McSherry (2005) points out, during the early 1960s, the training at SOA also changed dramatically. For the first time, courses on “combating internal enemies” appeared in course catalogs, where they joined the pre-existing subjects of communism, intelligence, countersubversion, and psychological warfare. Then, as is now known, by the late 1960s (if not before) SOA instructors were teaching their international students techniques of torture, assassination, and execution, drawing on materials from the US Army’s Project X (a scheme developed between 1965 and 1966 at the US Army Intelligence School), which in turn drew on intelligence and strategies devised from the notoriously brutal Phoenix Program being used concurrently in the Vietnam War and responsible for the torture and killing of tens of thousands of Vietnamese civilians. Significantly, as McSherry (2005) observes, “US military officials who authored the School of Americas training manuals believed that oversight regulations and prohibitions applied only to US personnel, not to foreign officers.” Thus, in the words of an internal army report on the SOA manuals, that McSherry quotes, “US instructors could teach abusive techniques to foreign militaries that they could not legally perform themselves” (McSherry, 2005, p. 50).

Finally, there was Kennedy’s expansion of overseas police training, something which the United States had been involved in for decades but which had dwindled in recent years. Five months after the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion, in September 1961, Kennedy signed the Foreign Assistance Act, which merged multiple US foreign agencies into one: the United States Agency of International Development (USAID), a State Department agency that was tasked with the administering of international economic and technical assistance programs. While the stated mission of the Agency sounded benign enough, the Agency’s activities would be modified greatly when Kennedy created the Office of Public Safety (OPS) as a division of USAID.

Kennedy’s placing of OPS within USAID was strategic. The Defense Department, which had historically overseen foreign police training, did not want to take it on for fear that it would
lead to an undue militarization of US foreign police training and would give the undesired impression of a United States that was overly militaristic in its foreign relations. With the consensus that foreign police assistance should operate under civilian auspices, the CIA had been discussed as an option, but was ultimately rejected by CIA officials who argued that it would compromise the clandestine nature of CIA work. At this point, the newly created USAID emerged as a choice and while it was initially protested by USAID officials, who did not want the association with police activity, Kennedy would ultimately override them, arguing that police programs were vital to ensuring internal security which was presumed as necessary for fostering the economic growth that was the broader focus of USAID.

As the historical literature on this subject underscores, what is striking about the US-led transformation of Latin American police forces into dissent suppressing machines is that it was done in the name of saving Latin America from the alleged tyranny of communism and making the region safe for liberal democracy to take root. The glaring contradiction of course was that the mission relied heavily on tyrannical tactics and the proclaimed agenda to liberalize Latin American economies was actually suffused with calculated plans to control Latin American economies in very particular ways that reflected the narrow self-interests of the US state and US capitalists that did business in Latin America -- for example, keeping the Soviet Union out of Latin American markets was a central objective. In other words, the fiercest proponents of a free market world were not at all content to simply leave economic and political processes to their own devices and wait for liberal democracies to naturally spring up across Latin America or to let Latin American markets run truly free. That this contradiction between principle and practice was not lost on Kennedy’s advisors is perhaps evident in the following excerpt from a paper written by USAID director David Bell in 1964. “A general theory of economic development,” Bell wrote, “assumes a minimum degree of personal security…, but recent years have taught us that we must often make special adaptations to achieve this. Where we cannot count on “naturally developing peaceful political situations, we have to work explicitly and deliberately against guerrilla warfare and terrorism, obstacles to the peaceful concentration on the problem of
economic growth” (cited in Huggins, 1998, p. 100). As Huggins points out, Bell’s argument was situated in a broader context where “a group of like-minded ‘defense intellectuals’ attached to the White House had been working on a theory of economic development that elaborated and made academically respectable the connection between internal security and economic development in ‘less-developed’ countries” (Huggins, 1998, p. 100). The most influential result was Walt W. Rostow’s well-known theory of modernization, which posited, among other things, that “order” had to be imposed so as to foster the conditions necessary for full (capitalist) economic development.

While the official creation of OPS was not finalized until late 1962, by that point the Kennedy administration had already expanded foreign police assistance in dramatic fashion. Over the course of 1961, the number of Latin American police trained in the United States rose by 100, and between 1961 and 1962, the number of US police advisers sent to Latin American countries nearly doubled. Then, in July of 1962, the CIA opened its Inter-American Police Academy (IAPA) in Panama and trained over seven hundred Latin American police by 1963, at which point the IAPA was closed and essentially transferred to the new International Policy Academy (IPA) which had opened as a CIA-controlled USAID institution in Washington D.C that same year.

Critical to underscore here is not only the opportunity for infiltration of foreign police departments that the OPS provided to the CIA, but also the actual content of the training that it provided to foreign police and how this content unequivocally implicates the United States in the exercise of illiberal rule and deductive power over “other” populations. As Huggins (1987) illuminates, foreign police trainees were instructed not only in “surveillance techniques, interrogation procedures, methods of conducting raids, riot and crowd control, and intelligence” (pp. 163-164), but also in the summary executions and assassinations of those members of the population determined to be subversives. Huggins (1987) cites the specific example, of Venezuela, where, in 1962, US officials feared that leftist activity would jeopardize the upcoming election of their preferred candidate, Raul Leoni. Here, a team of OPS trainers in Caracas determined that leftist guerrillas were systematically killing police officers and that this was
continuing because Venezuelan police officers were not killing enough guerrillas. They succeeded in getting Venezuelan law changed so that instead of being arrested for killing suspects as Venezuelan law had conventionally dictated, police officers were to be examined by a board of lawyers and returned to duty within one day. With the law changed, OPS trainers reportedly persuaded Venezuelan police to kill more liberally, leading to the outcome in which, according to one Los Angeles Times reporter, the Venezuelan police were soon “outkilling the Communists” (Ibid, p. 176).

Another powerful example of the OPS at work in Latin America is found in Guatemala (see Grandin, 2006, 2011). In 1965, Venezuela-OPS National Security Advisor, John Longan was sent to Guatemala to assist the country’s police and military in suppressing the leftist political opposition that had intensified under the US-backed military junta that had replaced Arbenz in 1954, and, inspired by the Cuban Revolution, had begun to take up arms in 1962. As Grandin (2011) has described in great detail, once there, Longan initiated something he dubbed Operación Limpieza (Operation Clean-Up), an undertaking intended to professionalize Guatemalan police activity (pp. 96-99). While there, Longan trained the heads of the Guatemalan Judicial and National police and several military officers in making sweeps by cordoning off sections of neighborhoods. He also assisted with the establishment of a 24-hour intelligence center – dubbed “the Box” – outfitted with communications and electronic surveillance equipment. Additionally, he recommended the formation of an “action unit to mastermind [the] campaign against terrorists which would have access to all information from law enforcement agencies…” (quoted in Grandin, 2011, pp. 96-97). After several months of sweeps and intelligence gathering that resulted in multiple executions, the Operation culminated in early March 1966 with the abduction, interrogation, torture, and execution of at least thirty leftist political activists whose bodies were then dumped into the Pacific Ocean. For Grandin, these acts committed by the Guatemalan state under the instruction of US officials not only perfected tactics long used by various Latin American dictators, but moreover, constituted the rationalization and systematization of “disappearance” – that is, the extrajudicial kidnapping and execution of
political activists by government security forces – in Latin America as an official tactic of state repression (see Grandin 2006, p. 96; 2011, p. 74). It also, as Grandin’s account makes clear, sowed the seeds of rampant repression to come, as the Longan-appointed leader of Operacion Limpieza, Colonel Rafael Arriaga Bosque (who the US Embassy would describe as one of Guatemala’s most “effective and enlightened leaders” (quoted in Grandin, 2011, p. 98), would then proceed to lead a brutal campaign to capture political activists that would ultimately result in the killing of eight thousand Guatemalan civilians.

In the meantime, in Uruguay, the targets of suppression were the Tupamaros, a largely non-violent leftist guerilla group that had grown increasingly active amid the country’s 1960s economic decline, the OPS had begun operating in 1965. By the early 1970s, the OPS was providing cover for the CIA’s formation and subsequent financing of Uruguay’s Departamento de Informacion e Inteligencia (DII). The DII, in turn, provided cover for the paramilitary Escuadron de la Muerte, or Death Squad (a team of police officers who carried out bombing and strafing attacks, kidnappings, and assassinations of Tupamaros and suspected sympathizers), which was made up of Uruguayan police officers, at least some of whom, it is surmised, had been among the sixteen Uruguayan officers trained at between 1969 and 1973 at the IPA in an eight-week course that included classes on the making and employment of bombs and on assassination weaponry. During this time, the CIA also conducted extensive surveillance on Russians, East Germans, North Koreans, Czechs, and Cubans living in Uruguay and delivered the information to Uruguayan government officials. Additionally, the CIA spied on exiles from the surrounding countries of Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Bolivia and sent information obtained to CIA stations in their countries of origin.

3.7 CIA-Coordinated Latin American Coups of the Sixties and Seventies

Kennedy’s effort to exercise political control of Latin American countries through the indoctrination and utilization of Latin American officials (as opposed to the previous methods of exercising control through direct US military occupations) did not, however, replace the Eisenhower tactic of regime change. This would still be pursued and accomplished multiple times
in Latin America throughout the 1960s and 1970s. In the same month that Kennedy announced Alliance for Progress, he had secretly authorized the now infamous Bay of Pigs Invasion, a CIA-coordinated attack attempted by 1500 CIA-trained anti-Castro Cuban exiles. As in Guatemala in 1954, the objective of the Invasion, which took place just one month later in April 1961, was regime change but unlike the overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz, the Invasion failed spectacularly. Undeterred by the failure of the Invasion, the CIA would proceed with a covert war against Cuba, conducting firebomb air raids of Cuban sugar cane fields, sugar mills, and oil refineries, engaging in interdiction, surveillance, and sabotage (including chemical warfare) with respect to Cuba-bound shipments from other countries, and continuing to plot Castro’s assassination (Blum, 2003). In the meantime, Kennedy converted the partial embargo of 1960 into a total ban on US trade with and travel to Cuba.

With the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion, the CIA had not been able to achieve its mission objective of regime change in Cuba. However, it was able to do exactly this in the Dominican Republic, utilizing tactics of repression against the republic’s dictator and subsequently its population in order to ultimately install a president suitable to US interests. In the 1950s, notoriously brutal Dominican dictator Raphael Trujillo, long the recipient of US economic and military aid in exchange for his strict anti-Communist stance, his pro-US investment stance, and his provision of military bases and air space to the US, had become a liability for the United States (see Atkins, 1998; Blum, 2003; Gleijeses, 1978). Having risen through the ranks of Dominican military in the era of the US occupation, General Trujillo had ruled the country since 1930, steadily amassing enormous personal wealth, all while placating to US investors (such as United Fruit, Intercontinental Hotels, and Texaco) and political elites and keeping the vast majority of the Dominican population in abject poverty and subject to violent repression (Chomsky, 1985; Herman and Brodhead, 1984). By the 1950s, however, Trujillo’s massive economic holdings were edging out Dominican elites and US investors alike while his repressive tactics of rule had grown incredibly unpopular among Latin American leaders, thus making him a liability for Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress initiative and all that it purported to champion (Atkins,
By the late fifties, a US Democratic senator was alleging that Trujillo had been directly involved in the 1956 disappearance of Jesús de Galindez and Gerald Murphy (Atkins, 1998). De Galindez was a Spanish exile that had lived in the Dominican Republic before moving to the United States and producing a dissertation highly critical of Trujillo’s regime. Murphy was a US-American pilot that had worked for the Dominican national airline; it was alleged that he had been killed at Trujillo’s command after having aided him in de Galindez’ murder by flying the latter to the Dominican Republic (Ibid). The allegations sparked a prolonged political debate around US policy toward the Trujillo (Ibid). In the meantime, it came to light that Trujillo had ordered the assassination of Venezuelan president Romulo Betancourt, an outspoken critic of the Trujillo regime. (The attempt, a car bomb, had spared Betancourt’s life but had killed his head of security). In response, the OAS had imposed strict sanctions that called for member nations to cease shipments of oil and trucks to the Dominican Republic. Additionally, the Kennedy administration significantly reduced its Dominican sugar quota (Slater, 1978).

During this period, the CIA colluded with Dominican dissidents to bring about Trujillo’s assassination. According to the findings of a Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities (convened in 1975), the CIA would provide 3 pistols and 3 carbine firearms to Dominican dissidents who were known by the CIA to be plotting to kill Trujillo (see Johnson, 1992). It has also been alleged that US-Americans living the Dominican Republic were also recruited to the cause, all while efforts were being made to find a suitable successor (Blum, 2003). Ultimately, with the failure of Bay of Pigs Invasion, the strategizing of Trujillo’s assassination was put on pause. However, amid the clear assurance that the US government would not seek recourse against a successful elimination of the dictator, Trujillo was shot and killed in 1961 (see Atkins, 1998; Johnson, 1992; Slater, 1978).

US involvement in Dominican political affairs did not end with Trujillo’s removal from office. As Slater (1978) reports, the assassination was followed by a strategic show of force that included: In the meantime, the slain dictator’s figurehead of the moment, Joaquin Balaguer, remained in office, while Trujillo’s sons took the reins from behind the scenes, with one, Ramfis
Trujillo assuming explicit command of the armed forces (Atkins, 1998). For his part, Balaguer lobbied for US support of his presidency and a lifting of OAS sanctions. To these ends, Balaguer declared that all political prisoners would receive amnesty and that all political exiles would be welcomed back (Atkins, 1998). He also banished several of Trujillo’s associates into exile (including two of the dictator’s brothers) and promised “free” elections in 1962 (Ibid). Despite these promises, domestic opposition rallied against the Balaguer presidency, condemning it as a continuation of Trujillo regime.

In June of 1961 and again in September, the Dominican Republic was paid visits by an OAS fact-finding commission tasked with investigating the Balaguer administration’s commitment to democratization and providing recommendation as to whether sanctions should be lifted (Atkins 1998). After both visits, the Commission concluded that the necessary progress was lacking. In the midst of all of this, Balaguer went even further in distancing himself from the Trujillo regime, publicly listing and condemning the atrocities that it had committed (albeit with him serving as nominal president for much of them). Soon an Inter-American Commission on Human Rights was visiting the country to make its assessment, ultimately finding that significant improvement had taken place under Balaguer. At this time, the Kennedy administration began articulating support for the Balaguer administration, and by November 1961 the US State Department was recommending to the OAS that sanctions be lifted (Slater, 1978; Atkins, 1998). However, this was retracted when the two exiled brothers of Trujillo returned to the country. It was at this point that the US began its official military intervention.

Upon the Trujillo brothers’ return, US Secretary of State David Rusk made it clear in a press conference that the US was prepared to take military action to prevent the Trujillo family from returning to power (Slater, 1978). Several days later the US sent eight ships of 1800 Marines to Dominican coastal waters where they could be seen from the capital city (Ibid). Further underscoring this threat of military action, US jets flew back and forth along the sky above the coastline and US military transmitted warnings via radio that Marines were prepared to land on shore (Ibid). As the Dominican military was warned not to support the Trujillos, the remaining
members of the Trujillo family quickly fled the country, leaving Balaguer as the widely despised last vestige of the Trujillo stronghold. Within a month (December 1961), and amid mounting local protest against a continued Balaguer presidency and under pressing direction from United States officials and other members of the OAS, the United States formed a seven-member “Council of State” dominated by members of the right wing party *Union Civica Nacional* (UCN) and presided over by Balaguer, who agreed to resign and cede his position to fellow Council member Dr. Rafael Francisco Bonnelly once the OAS sanctions were lifted (Ibid). In response, Kennedy commended the council and promised to support the lifting of the OAS sanctions (Ibid). The OAS lifted its sanctions roughly one month later, at which point Balaguer associate General Rodríguez Echavarría staged a coup against the provisional council (Atkins, 1998). The resulting military junta would ultimately be short-lived, however, as anti-coup members of the Dominican armed forces intervened within 48 hours. Rodríguez was arrested and sent into exile, along with Balaguer (Ibid). The council was restored, Bonnelly became acting president, and a $25 million credit was extended by the US to the Dominican Republic.

With a foothold thus established, US officials now doubled down on co-opting and coercing the provisional government into suppressing any activity that hinted at or overtly advocated leftist politics. By his own admission, newly appointed US Ambassador to the Dominican Republic John Bartlow Martin directed the Council of State to quell left wing activity through tactics that included harassment, arrests, beatings, and midnight raids (Martin, 1966, p. 100, as cited in Blum, 2003). In the meantime, US Attorney General Robert Kennedy had riot control equipment shipped to the Dominican Republic, reportedly along with two Spanish-speaking Los Angeles detectives who were encouraged to draw on their years of experience in suppressing unrest in East L.A. (Blum, 2003). As Blum (2003) reports, the riot control initiative would lead to the formation of a permanent riot-control unit of the Santo Domingo police.

The council would continue to preside over the Dominican Republic while plans for the country’s first free elections since 1924 were made. In what amounted to a continued exercise of its historic control over republic’s political and economic processes, the United States intervened
significantly in the election preparation, working through the seemingly more innocuous guise of a broad, multi-country OAS mission as well as through the behind the scenes involvement of Ambassador Martin and other US Embassy staff (see Lowenthal, 1970; Slater, 1978). According to Lowenthal (1979), “American advisers prepared an intensive press, radio, and television campaign to teach Dominicans the new procedures and to encourage them to vote” (p. 19) and “Embassy officials drafted and secured formal agreement in advance by the two leading candidates to a declaration that each would respect the outcome of the election and that the loser would recognize and congratulate the winner” (Ibid). US interference in the political process was also embodied in the Emergency Law (Martin, 1966, as cited in Blum, 2003), which had been agreed to by the provisional council and ordered the deportation to the United States of approximately 125 “Castro communists” and Trujillo loyalists for the duration of the election period (Blum, 2003). The objective of the Emergency Law was to, in the words of Ambassador Martin, “help maintain stability so elections could be held” (in Blum, 2003, p. 179).

Ultimately the 1962 election, which was supervised by the OAS mission and drew a 70 percent turnout, led to the presidential victory of Juan Bosch, a writer who had lived in exile during the Trujillo era and who was a member of the center-left Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD). As Atkins (1998) observes, the new president “encountered internal and international problems almost from the day he took office.” According to Atkins (1998), right wing groups vehemently opposed his presidency, while the support of pro-Bosch interest groups waned when Bosch did not keep all of his commitments made to them. Meanwhile, the lingering Trujillo era military establishment condemned him specifically for allowing leftist exiles back into the country. As for the international problems, the Kennedy administration, along with numerous members of the US congress, looked suspiciously upon Bosch’s many social democratic reforms as well as his leniency toward leftist exiles. As Noam Chomsky (1985) points out, particularly troublesome to the US embassy were Bosch’s populist reforms, his opening of a Swiss line of credit, and his cancellation of a refinery contract with the US-owned Esso oil company (pp. 150-151). In dealing with Bosch, US officials worked to block his removal of hostile military actors, as
well as his efforts at agrarian reform and labor movement building. In the meantime, US military officers cultivated close ties with the Dominican military, openly criticizing Bosch (Ibid).

Additionally, numerous US and Dominican press outlets came out against Bosch, apparently drawing on the same “communist infiltration” rhetoric, which, Blum (2003) argues, was commonly deployed by the CIA in psychological warfare campaigns. While there is no explicit evidence or admission of the United States’ direct involvement in plotting a coup against Bosch, during the first year of Bosch’s presidency, the US Embassy had decided to, in Ambassador Martin’s own words, “let him go” (as cited in Chomsky, 1985, p. 151). For Blum (2003) the US government’s tacit expression of support for a military coup was communicated when it did now renew an economic aid package to the Dominican Republic during Bosch’s first year in office.

Amid clear signals of the US government’s disapproval of Bosch, a group of right-wing Dominican military officers ultimately staged a coup a mere seven months into his presidency, citing his purported leniency toward communism and his failure to keep order as justification (Atkins, 1998). In response to the coup, the Kennedy administration cut diplomatic ties, suspended economic aid, and withdrew personnel (Ibid). However, when the new regime – a civilian council controlled by the military – declared that it would hold “free” elections in 1965 and expand its political base, Kennedy soon leaned toward recognizing it (Atkins, 1998). In the wake of Kennedy’s assassination that same year, formal recognition of the provisional junta was ultimately extended by his successor Lyndon B. Johnson (Ibid).

A little less than two years later, in April of 1965, however, a movement comprised of thousands of pro-Bosch civilians and several pro-Bosch military units took to the streets, calling for the resignation of the junta president and for Bosch’s immediate return to office (see Atkins, 1998; Blum, 2003; Chomsky, 1985). Calling themselves constitutionalists, the Bosch supporters all but took the capital city of Santo Domingo in a bloody battle against the Dominican military and their success appeared imminent. Tellingly enough, while it had chosen not to intervene during Bosch’s ouster, the US government now took action to prevent his reinstatement. In the first few days of the coup, the Johnson administration denied the constitutionalists’ request that the US
mediate between it and the military, and instead opted to set up a three-man provisional council comprised of pro-military individuals (Atkins, 1998). Then, citing a need to preserve American lives, President Johnson authorized a US military intervention to assist the Dominican military in suppressing the opposition (see Atkins, 1998; Chomsky, 1985). An initial force of four hundred Marines came ashore from ships stationed nearby, but in a matter of days the number was increased significantly, ultimately reaching twenty-three thousand (Atkins, 1998). Johnson justified the troop surge with the claim that the Dominican Republic was not undergoing a mere popular uprising but, thanks to the alleged involvement of outside conspirators that had been trained in Cuba, was apparently on the brink of becoming a communist state (Atkins, 1998; see also Fazal, 2007).

Over the next few days, US forces reportedly provided multiple forms of assistance to the Dominican military and engaged in their own attacks on the rebels, responding to rebel snipers by blowing up a downtown building, protecting the Dominican military from rebel fire but standing down as it brutally attacked the opposition, and, on another occasion, killing approximately 67 rebels and bystanders (Blum, 2003). Importantly, as Blum observes, all of this overtly violated the spirit and the letter of the non-intervention mandate in the OAS charter. To deal with this blunder, the US House of Representatives simply voted that the threat of international communism to a sovereign nation allowed for an exception to the intervention mandate, while Johnson, himself, suggested that such a mandate was outdated given the circumstances of the current times (see Barnet 1980, as cited in Blum, 2003).

For the next year, US forces continued to occupy the country while the CIA waged a steady campaign of psychological warfare against the country’s population in an attempt to win support for the US position and to impugn the rebel movement (Blum, 2003). In the meantime, the Johnson administration handed the US press lists of names of known Communists that it alleged were part of the Dominican opposition, lists that were eventually rejected after being found to be riddled with inaccuracies and were more immediately ridiculed for being extremely short in proportion to the immense size of the movement (Ibid). Simultaneously, the US embassy
reported stories of atrocities allegedly committed by the rebels—stories that would also be referenced by Johnson but that would never be proven as true and would ultimately become a source of embarrassment for his administration (Ibid).

Finally, in June of 1966, the provisional council held what Edward Herman and Frank Brodhead (1984) have conceptualized as a “demonstration election” – “organized and staged by a foreign power primarily to pacify a restive home population, reassuring it that ongoing interventionary processes are legitimate and appreciated by their foreign objects” (p. 5). (According to Herman and Brodhead (1984), who focus on the Dominican Republic election of 1966 as one of three exemplary cases, these elections are effectively manipulated to ensure that given country remains under the control of a figure or regime that will keep its economy open to US foreign investment; further they would become an increasingly common tactic during the 1960s. Supervised by US officials, the Dominican elections were held between Bosch and Joaquín Balaguer, the Trujillo figurehead who had been exiled only three years prior (Atkins 1998). Balaguer beat Bosch with a significant lead and US troops departed in September of 1966. Balaguer would remain president of the Dominican Republic for twelve more years, during which time the Dominican military and police force kept order through repressive tactics that included kidnapping, torture, and murder inflicted on union organizers and any who opposed the regime (Blum, 2003; Chomsky, 1985).

Reflecting on the events that had taken place, foreign policy adviser to President Kennedy (and known critic of the Bay of Pigs Invasion) Chester Bowles would later call the actions of the United States in the Dominican Republic between 1961 and 1966 “the most massive, sustained intervention in the internal affairs of a Latin American state since the heyday of US imperialism in the early twentieth century” (as cited in Dauer, 2005, p. 125).

While all of this was unfolding very publicly in the Dominican Republic, the US was conducting similarly extensive yet more covert operations in other countries of Latin America (and beyond) where left-leaning leaders had been elected president. For example, when the democratically elected Ecuadorian president, Velasco Ibarra (1960-1961) refused to break ties
with Cuba, the CIA reportedly conducted an exhaustive infiltration of nearly all the country’s political organizations (of both the left and the right), of the unions, and of the media (Blum, 2003). When the Ecuadoran military forced Velasco Ibarra out in 1961, his vice president Arosemara was allowed to succeed him but the position of Arosemara’s vice president would go to a man who was a CIA agent (the opposing vice presidential candidate having reportedly been smeared by CIA-manufactured evidence of a fictional association with a militant leftist organization and the Communist Party). However, Arosemara also quickly incurred the disapproval of the United States when, like Velasco, he refused to terminate diplomatic relations with Castro. In a coup alleged to have been supported by the CIA, the country’s military acted again in 1963, ousting Arosemara, canceling the impending elections of 1964, jailing known and suspected Communists and leftists, and suspending civil liberties. With the exception of a period between 1966 and 1972 – during which time the military retreated from ruling and left Ecuadorian leadership to an elected president – a businessman who was then succeeded in 1969 by Velasco, who in turn would again be ousted by the military – Ecuador would be under military government until 1979.

As Ecuador is the specific context of the fieldwork upon which this dissertation is based, it is worth noting that in comparison to other South American military governments of this era, the Ecuadorian military regimes’ exercise of repression remained relatively limited. A possible explanation could have something to do with the fact that of all the Latin American countries, Ecuador had never been the site of great US capital investment. In fact, over the course of history it remained one of the least penetrated countries in the region. With no US big business interests and with no leftist guerrilla activity to speak of, and perhaps given the country’s small size and its proximity to heavily militarized, US-friendly Colombia to the north, Ecuador was not targeted as heavily by US counterinsurgency efforts of the sixties.

An important moment in the history of US-Ecuador relations came in 1971, when oil was struck by Texaco-Gulf in an area of the country’s Amazonian region near the Colombian border. Oil operations were up and running by 1972, and it was precisely at this point, that constitutional
rule was again suspended by a military coup, this time led by General Rodriguez Lara (1972-1976), who was a graduate of the School of the Americas. However, despite his training at the SOA, Rodriguez would actually go against Texaco. An anti-Rodriguez military coup led by Alvear Gonzalez, another graduate of the SOA, would then fail in 1975. In 1976, Texaco-Gulf pulled out of Ecuador, resulting in a severe economic crisis as the windfall of oil revenues came to a total stop. At this point, with the country in economic crisis and with extreme pressure from the Ecuadorian elite, a bloodless military coup carried out several months later would result in a new president, Rear Admiral Alfredo Poveda Burbano (1976-1979), who began to appease Texaco-Gulf immediately upon taking office. Over the next three years, as part of his campaign to court and retain US foreign investment, Poveda would crack down particularly hard on labor, taking an approach of repression that was thrown into sharp relief during a sugar worker strike of 1977; Poveda’s regime crushed the protest, taking the lives of one hundred workers in the process (see Blum, 2003).

Bolivia provides another example of CIA involvement in the instigation of a coup and the installation of a US-friendly leader (Blum, 2003). As in Ecuador, the country’s president, Victor Paz Estenssoro had incurred the disapproval of Washington when he had refused to follow the US command to break ties with Cuba following its revolution. Instead, he had voted against the Cuba expulsion from the OAS in 1962, opted out of the sanctions imposed by the OAS against Cuba in 1964, and had continued diplomatic relations with Havana until, faced with a dramatic cut in US aid, had ceded to US demands that he break them. Additionally, Paz had engaged in a series of social democratic and protectionist reforms that the US looked upon with suspicion. These included universal adult suffrage, rural education reforms, land reforms, and the nationalization of the country’s major tin mines that had been owned by US companies. While the US Ambassador to Bolivia reportedly favored Paz, the Pentagon and the CIA did not, and over the course of the early sixties, the United States played an active role in building up the Bolivian military, which had been greatly weakened by a popular uprising in 1952 that had overthrown the
military government then in power and left a legacy of widespread anti-military sentiment. By 1964, the SOA graduated 1,200 Bolivian trainees. Twenty to thirty of them were senior officers.

In the meantime, the CIA worked with General René Barrientos Ortúñio, a commander of the Bolivian air force who had received his military training in the United States. In 1964, when Paz was running for re-election, Barrientos ran for vice president, and while Paz chose to keep Barrientos off of his ticket, things changed when Barrientos suddenly claimed to have been injured in a shooting attempt on his life that he implicitly tied to Paz’s police force. As the story went, the general’s life had been saved only because the bullet had struck the metal US Air Force wings that he had been wearing at the time of the shooting. In the wake of the alleged shooting (for which no record of medical treatment would ever be provided or found), the Bolivian national right wing anti-Paz newspaper, El Diario lauded Barrientos as a hero. Significantly, the board of the newspaper included a US embassy staff member working on Alliance for Progress programs and the staff of the paper included individuals that were later reported (in a sworn testimony given by Barriento’s cabinet) to have been working with the CIA. At this time Barrientos’ popularity among the military soared. Now, under pressure from both the Bolivian military and the United States, Paz placed him on the ticket as his vice presidential candidate. Once elected and in office, however, Barrientos undermined Paz at every turn, criticizing his ability to keep order, siding with dissidents, and, importantly, championing the military as the key to stability. By October of 1964, Barrientos had left office and declared himself a rebel. In November, the military deposed Paz and Barrientos assumed the presidency.

While the CIA thus appears to have been directly involved in unseating Paz and bringing US-friendly Barrientos to power, US capital interests would pay to keep him there. During his first two years in office, Gulf Oil obtained generous concessions from the new president, and when Barrientos decided to hold official presidential elections in 1966, the company contributed vast sums of money to his campaign, later admitting that between 1966 and 1969, and at the urging of the CIA, it had made a total of $460,000 in “political contributions” to right-wing Bolivian candidates, with the majority having gone to Barrientos. One Barrientos official would later testify
that the company had also donated a helicopter for a campaigning effort that carried Barrientos to remote regions of the country.

Things shifted dramatically when, after three more years in office, Barrientos was killed in the crash of a Gulf helicopter and his succeeding vice president was ousted within five months by military general General Alfredo Ovando Candia. Ovando immediately broke with Barrientos’ Gulf-friendly policies and ultimately nationalized the Gulf Oil Corporation, reportedly offering compensation of $140 million, which was 50% more than the country’s annual budget. Reports swirled of an impending CIA-backed and heavily financed Ovando ouster. It was at this point that Ovando began to change course, moving steadily and increasingly to the far right in his policies.

This change, however, drew the wrath of his domestic leftist supporters, and, after twelve months in office he would ultimately be ousted by leftist military general Juan Jose Torres, who would last only ten months before being overthrown in 1971 by Hugo Banzer, a military general who had attended SOA, received additional US military training in Fort Hood, and was reported to have been a beneficiary of Gulf during his time as a member of Paz’s cabinet. Banzer would rule Bolivia as dictator until 1978. Under the Banzer regime, the Bolivian state carried out brutal attacks against dissidents. His regime would be followed by a series of shorter dictatorships held by military officers and two elected presidents, with changes in command almost always being precipitated by violent ousters.

Even better known than the events in Bolivia is the case of Brazil, where, upon becoming president of Brazil in 1961, Joao Goulart also became the target of a Kennedy administration plot to support the Brazilian military in ousting him from office (see Blum, 2003; Hershberg and Kornbluh, 2014, Parker 1979/2014). Goulart had come to office by way of the resignation of Janio Quadros, who had refused a bribe on the part of the US to assist in the Bay of Pigs Invasion and had attempted to reestablish suspended diplomatic and commercial ties with the Soviet Union; Quadros would later claim his resignation had been done in the face of pressure that came from the US Treasury Secretary, from Kennedy adviser Adolf Berle, Jr., and from US Ambassador to Brazil, John Moors Cabot (Blum, 2003). Upon his taking of office, Goulart’s claim to the
The presidency was immediately disputed by Brazilian Conservative congress members and certain members of the Brazilian military who opposed his leftist leanings and came close to immediately ousting him through a coup. Anti-Goulart sentiment among these factions would only intensify as Goulart proceeded to pursue a course of populist reforms, resume relations with socialist countries, oppose sanctions against Cuba, declare Brazil’s independence from any “politico-military bloc,” appoint Cabinet members that were rumored to have Communist leanings, place limitations on profits that multinationals could carry out of the country, and nationalize a subsidiary of the US-owned International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) (see Blum, 2003).

According to recently declassified documents, the anti-Goulart sentiment on the part of military and Conservative factions coincided with concerns of the Kennedy administration over Goulart’s policies (see Hershberg and Kornbluh, 2014). According to these documents, Kennedy began brainstorming with aides around ways to get Goulart out of office as early as 1962, identifying the cultivation of a closer relationship with the Brazilian military as one possible strategy (Ibid). As these documents also reveal, in the months that followed, a US military attaché, Lieutenant Colonel Vernon Walters was deployed to foster contact with the Brazilian military. He would become the key liaison between the latter and the Kennedy administration. In the meantime, these efforts were supplemented by other tactics being carried out by the CIA: according to an interview with US Ambassador to Brazil Lincoln Gordon, the CIA ultimately spend $5 million to fund anti-Goulart political candidates and began this practice as early as 1962 (DeWitt 2009; Parker, 1979/2014). According to former CIA agent turned author, Phillip Agee, the CIA also put large sums of money toward funding mass anti-Goulart urban demonstrations and disseminating anti-communist propaganda by way of right-wing newspapers and books distributed to high school and college students (in Blum, 2003). Additionally, US officials strategically capitalized on relations with the Brazilian military that dated back to WWII when Brazil had permitted the US to build aircraft staging bases on its territory, and continued to court its allegiance through the ongoing US Military Assistance Program (Blum, 2003).
As the CIA kept track of coup plots that were taking shape within the ranks of the military and the numerous anti-Goulart organizations it was funding, Kennedy leaned increasingly toward deposing Goulart. He would be assassinated before having decided to proceed with these plans, but by 1964, Johnson had authorized “Operation Brother Sam” (declassified in the seventies by the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library), a plan that directed the US military to provide coup plotters with ammunition, arms, fuel, and possibly troops, if deemed necessary. At this point things accelerated. According to an interview conducted with Lieutenant Colonel Walters (the aforementioned US military attaché deployed to Brazil in 1962) by historian Phyllis Parker (1979/2014), the leader of the anti-Goulart military faction, General Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco wrote and submitted to Walters an anti-Goulart paper, accusing the latter of conspiring to implement a dictatorship. In response, the Johnson administration set about drawing up specific contingency plans in the event of civil war. These included the provision of a large shipment of petroleum (to be used in the event that the state oil union destroyed the country’s refineries); a deployment to Brazilian coastal waters of a US Navy task force that was to be outfitted with aircraft carriers, guided missiles, and destroyers; and, the provision of weapons and ammunition to the insurgents (Parker, 1979/2014). There was also discussion of providing substantial material assistance to help the new government in getting started. In the meantime, Ambassador Gordon impressed upon anti-Goulart state governors of Brazil the importance of recognizing the post-Goulart government as legitimate.

The Brazilian military’s successful ousting of Goulart took place on March 31, 1964. As Goulart fled to Uruguay, the military declared a state of emergency and Castelo Branco was appointed president. In the first few weeks of the takeover, the country’s constitution was modified so that the powers of the Executive were significantly expanded while job stability guarantees for holders of public office were suspended, thus providing the pretext for the subsequent investigation and removal of thousands of Goulart era civil servants and military personnel and the purging of leftist Congress members (Blum 2003). Nearly 50,000 people were reportedly detained (Ibid). Additionally, the country’s main trade union federation and a league of
land reform organizations were closed, along with the country’s two national student unions. In the months that followed, the country’s three existing political parties were abolished and two new parties were created: the dominant military party, Aliança Renovadora Nacional (ARENA) and the opposing Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (MDB), a weak umbrella party comprised of members of the former parties. Presidential elections were also made indirect. While denying any involvement, the Johnson administration lauded the coup as the salvation of Brazil from totalitarianism and communism. However, what would ensue would be twenty years of a military dictatorship which, in the beginning, cultivated increased commercial ties with the Soviet Union (Blum 2003). The Brazilian military would rule the country for the next two decades, keeping order and ensuring its continued re-election through systemic repression of political dissidents, all while making claims of a constitutionalist democratic two-party system (purportedly for purposes of international image and its relation with the United States).

Finally, in the well-known case of Chile, where democratically elected President Salvador Allende was ousted in 1973, the CIA began its covert operation in that country as early as 1961 (Blum, 2003; Kornbluh, 2003). The context was one in which Jorge Alessandri, a member of the sort of conservative right wing party that Washington traditionally supported in Latin America, had won the Chilean presidential election of 1958. However, Allende, a self-declared Marxist and leader of the socialist coalition Frente de Accion Popular, had come extremely close to victory. Thus, despite Alessandri’s victory, by 1960 the Cuban revolution and the significant signs of support for Castro across Latin America had shaken the Kennedy administration into concluding that the persistence of right wing oligarchy in Chile (and Latin America, more broadly) would actually increase the appeal of leftist governments to Latin American populations. For the next election of 1964, it was decided, Alessandri was out, centrist Christian Democrat Party candidate, Eduardo Frei was in, and Allende was to be undermined at every turn (Kornbluh, 2003). As Kornbluh (2003) shows, for the next three years, the CIA waged a $3 million anti-Allende campaign that consisted of propaganda circulation, economic support for non-leftist parties, anti-communist trainings administered to the poor, organized labor, students and members of the
media. At the same time, it provided $20 million in funding for Frei. During the actual election, when both Allende and Frei ran against the incumbent Alessandri, the CIA intensified its efforts, producing propaganda that involved scare tactics and disinformation and enlisting members of the Catholic church to conduct surveillance, to preach against communism, and serve as religious cover for CIA operations. Frei would win the election, but during his six-year term the CIA would continue in its campaign against Allende and the rise of social democratic politics, more generally. In the meantime, Chile continued to receive an exorbitant amount of US aid during the sixties, the US political establishment having tapped it as a showcase for Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress initiative. Moreover, as Kornbluh points out, despite the lack of any external or internal threat to Chile, the amount of US military aid to the country rose dramatically during this period, an event which Kornbluh (2003) interprets as “a clear effort to establish closer ties to the Chilean generals” (p. 5).

Despite these efforts on the part of the US, Allende would, however, come even closer to victory in the country’s 1970 presidential election, winning a plurality of votes, thereby leaving it to the Chilean Congress to vote between him and the runner-up, Alessandri, who was also running again. As Alessandri was the runner-up, Chilean convention pointed towards the near-certainty of an Allende victory. It was at this point that the US government, now under the control of the Nixon administration, ratcheted up its efforts to keep Allende from assuming the presidency. As per usual, this had not only to do with the US state’s fears that a successful Allende would spark a wave of social democracy that could coordinate with Western European movements (Grandin, 2006, p. 60; Kornbluh, 2003) but also with the threat that Allende was perceived to pose to US corporations, which were responsible for two thirds of Chile’s foreign investment total of $1.6 billion (Kornbluh, 2003, p. 83). Indeed, by 1970, Chile was a hub of US foreign investment that was centered particularly on a massive copper industry that was responsible for roughly four-fifths of the country’s yearly export earnings (Ibid). Two US corporations – Kennecott Company and Anaconda – controlled 80 percent of the wealth generated by this industry (Ibid).
During his campaign, Allende had promised to nationalize both of these companies and undertake a massive wealth redistribution program that would center on Chile's poor. Allende's imminent victory was thus met with panic on the part of the US copper companies, as well as many others that did business in Chile (such as Bank of America, International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT), and General Motors) and Latin America, overall (O'Brien, 2007, p. 247). Since the fifties this corporate faction had feared that Allende's election, the potential success of his political program, and a related embrace on the part of the Chilean people would bring about a far-reaching Latin American swing towards nationalization that would inevitably slash at the lucrative profits they had been able to extract for so long in this part of the world. Moreover, the apparent failure of the protracted "Chile project" (now entering its fourteenth year), which had been devised to precipitate adoption in Chile and other Latin American countries of radical free market economics that would secure US multinational dominance in the region, was evident. The Chicago Boys, numerous and impassioned as they were about privatization, deregulation, had failed to sway political opinion and, much to the contrary, the Chilean population had voted in a social democratic Marxist president who had run on a platform of nationalizing large sectors of the economy that were presently in the hands of both foreign and domestic corporations (Klein, 2007).

With the election of Allende looming, President Richard Nixon ordered the CIA to put plans in motion to either keep Allende from assuming office or to remove him once there (see Kornbluh, 2003, pp. 1-2). To achieve Nixon's stated objective, the CIA created a Special Task Force and initiated a covert operation ("Project FUBELT"), which Nixon authorized. Part of Nixon's vision included a calculated and coordinated effort to, in his now famous words, "make the economy scream" (Ibid), the objective being to bring about Allende's fall from grace by unleashing an economic downturn on the Chilean people. To this end, the CIA began producing and circulating in Chile a new round of propaganda that threatened a total termination of US/foreign aid and predicted the nationalization of all business if Allende were to be elected (Ibid). Here, the CIA especially targeted the military, warning that all military aid would be cut and
promising full US military support (minus direct combat operations) in the task of preventing Allende from taking office (Ibid). As a financial panic ensued, the CIA sent arms to a handful of Chilean military figures who emerged as potential coup leaders. Within a short time, the Chilean Commander-in-Chief of the Army (presumed by coup leaders to be a potential obstacle) was assassinated. (As Kornbluh's account reveals, the weapon that killed the Commander would later be revealed as a match for the same kind of arms sent by the CIA).

Despite economic sabotage and the elimination of the Chilean Commander-in-Chief, however, Allende was officially elected president by the Chilean Congress and took office on November 3, 1970. Undeterred, the US government undertook a project to bring total economic and political destabilization to Chile, using its veto power at the US EX-IM Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank to reduce loans made to Chile and exploiting its influence at the World Bank (formerly the IBRD) to lower Chile’s credit rating from a “B” to a “D” thus providing the pretext for loan denial (Kornbluh, 2003). Underscoring the fusion between capital processes and state politics that Harvey defines as the essence of capitalist imperialism, this new credit rating also had a deeply negative effect on levels of private US investment and trade with Chile. US businesses refused to invest in or sell products to Chile, an event that has been dubbed by some observers as an “invisible blockade” (see Kornbluh, 2003) – an embargo that could be formally attributed to market forces but was tacitly coordinated between the US state and US capital seeking to strangle Chile economically. As a result of the blockade, the nation was indeed beset with frequent shortages in everyday consumer products as well as equipment that was vital for both transportation operations and the operation of the country’s extractive industries that had formerly been owned by US businessmen but were now nationalized by Allende.

While the US state was perhaps leading this charge, US capitalists were thus falling into line in ways that both helped the state and attended to their own ambitions to keep in place the asymmetrical economic relations that had allowed them to profit for so long. This fusion was not only evident in the “invisible blockade,” but also in the documented covert collusion between International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT), the CIA, the White House, and the US Embassy
(exposed in 1972 by columnist Jack Anderson) to block Allende both before and after he officially assumed the presidency. Kornbluh (2003) provides a summary the activities of this collusion:

The corporation had approached the CIA in July 1970 and offered a secret “election fund” to support the conservative candidate Jorge Alessandri; it had conducted its own covert political operations inside Chile, among them passing funds to Alessandri through a secret channel provided by the CIA; ITT had urged the embassy to be more aggressive in blocking Allende, and conspired with CIA officials to destabilize the economy and “stop Allende.” After the elections, ITT officials had secretly funneled tens of thousands of dollars into a secret Swiss bank account for *El Mercurio* [right-wing Chilean newspaper heavily funded by the CIA] as part of a covert CIA propaganda operation. (Kornbluh, 2003, p. 100)

As this excerpt suggests, during Allende’s very first year in office the CIA Station in Chile was working diligently to create a climate conducive to his overthrow. “We conceive our mission as one in which we work consciously and deliberately in the direction of coup,” read one cable sent by the Station in 1971 (in Kornbluh, 2003, p. 95). Indeed, as Kornbluh’s account reveals, at the time of this cable, the CIA was in fact continuing its ongoing support of an extreme rightist anti-government organization called Patria y Libertad, training its members in guerilla warfare and bombings. During the Allende presidency, members of Patria y Libertad, clad in riot gear, led rallies and marches, committed acts of violence, and openly called for the overthrow of Allende. Additionally, as Kornbluh (2003) shows, the CIA also infiltrated Allende’s *Unidad Popular* coalition, using undercover agents to steal the government’s coup contingency plans.

Throughout all of this, propaganda operations were also put into high gear as the Chile Station of the CIA capitalized on its pre-existing infiltration of the media that had taken place in the years leading up to Allende’s election, subsidizing the production of alarmist, anti-government articles in newspapers (like *El Mercurio*) and magazines that it funded. Importantly, much of this propaganda effort was directed at the Chilean military, which the CIA looked to as the body that would ultimately execute the coup. For example, according to Kornbluh (2003), in 1971 the CIA was “conducting a ‘deception operation,’ designed to convince the Chilean generals that Allende was secretly plotting with Castro to undermine the army high command” (p. 95). According to declassified CIA documents cited by Kornbluh (2003), this operation was explicitly intended to “arouse the military” to “move against [Allende] if necessary” (Ibid). Additionally, the CIA infiltrated
the Chilean military by recruiting new assets from within its ranks, as its pre-Allende assets had been largely purged from the military in the wake of the Schneider assassination.

As Naomi Klein (2007) emphasizes, a key player in the actual plotting of the coup that would end in Allende’s death was also Chile’s National Association of Manufacturers, an organization generously funded by the CIA and foreign multinationals. Headed by Orlando Sáenz, the Association denounced Allende and formed a double faceted “war structure” that split its efforts between coordinating with the Chilean military and creating economic plans that were to be given to the Armed Forces that would be responsible for removing Allende and taking over the government. As Klein (2007) highlights, the economic plans were drawn up by none other than a number of leading Chicago Boys, recruited by Sáenz and put up in an office close to the Presidential Palace. As Klein also points out, a US Senate investigation later claimed that “over 75 percent” of the funding for these economists came from the CIA (see Klein, 2007, p. 86).

On September 11, 1973, the Chilean military carried out the coup, taking the port city of Valparaiso, announcing the overthrow of the Allende’s Popular Unity government, and executing a full-on aerial and land assault of firing tanks and rocket attacks on La Moneda [Chile’s presidential home]. From inside La Moneda, Allende broadcast radio messages calling on students and workers to “defend your government against the armed forces” (quoted in Kornbluh, 2003, p. 113). Allende would be found dead inside La Moneda by two o’clock that afternoon. By 2:30 the Chilean armed forces declared via radio broadcast that the president had surrendered and the country was under military rule. General Augusto Pinochet was named chief of the military junta, which was comprised of heads of the army, air force, navy and Carabineros.

The Chilean coup has gone down in history as one of the most violent and vicious of the 20th century. According to CIA documents cited by Kornbluh (2003), military forces immediately rounded up 13,500 Chilean citizens in raids and mass arrests that targeted “officials of the deposed Popular Unity government, political activists, labor unions, factory workers, and shantytown dwellers” (pp. 161-162) and held them at over twenty detention centers that had been established across the country. What ensued was a massacre. The military executed
approximately 1,500 civilians. Between 320 and 360 of these civilians were shot to death on sight in the street or killed by firing squads inside detention centers, where detainees were held incommunicado and interrogated under torture. Bodies were burned in secret graves or dumped into the ocean, into the Mapocho River, and along the city streets at night. Fully aware of the carnage, which immediately drew international outcry and condemnations from many members of the US Senate, the Nixon administration reserved public comment but privately embraced the new Pinochet regime on September 13, just two days after its success. Eight days later, on September 21, the CIA Station in Chile was reporting that, “Severe repression is planned” (see Kornbluh, 2003, p. 162). By September 24 more than a dozen other countries recognized the Pinochet government, even as the atrocities had become common knowledge in the international community. At this point, the Nixon administration quietly extended its public recognition.

In addition to being the bloodiest of the 20th century, the Chilean coup was also unique because it was the first that was directly shaped, not only by the specific interests of US capitalist factions that wanted to reverse a previous leader’s moves toward nationalization, but also, as Klein (2007) points out, by the economic “shock doctrine” of privatization, deregulation, and deep cuts to social spending that had been developed by Milton Friedman. As planned, Pinochet implemented the five hundred-page economic plan that had been drawn up by the Chicago Boys. He privatized most state-owned companies and banks, he cut government spending by ten percent, he permitted speculative finance, he did away with protectionist measures that had sustained domestic manufacturers, and he removed price controls, which was, as Klein points out, “a radical move in a country that had been regulating the cost of necessities such as bread and cooking oil for decades” (Klein, 2007, p. 79).

As Klein (2007) reminds us, the basic argument of Friedman’s doctrine was that this sort of shock treatment would indeed jolt the economy into shape; changes would be painful in the beginning but would ultimately bring stability as the market settled into its “natural” state. Thus when the country experienced an inflation level of 375 percent in 1974, massive layoffs and business closings due to the deluge of cheap imports that came with the removal of protectionist
measures, and widespread hunger, the Chicago Boys’ response to the National Manufacturers’ Association, now gravely concerned, was that the shock therapy had simply not been implemented thoroughly enough. Friedman himself paid a visit to the country and advised Pinochet that more shock therapy was needed and, if administered immediately and extensively, would bring an “economic miracle” within months. Taking Friedman’s advice to heart, Pinochet fired his economic minister and gave the job to Sergio de Castro, a leading Chicago Boy. De Castro proceeded to take the shock therapy to radical heights: slashing public spending by 27 percent (he would continue making cuts until 1980 when public spending would end up at half the level it was under Allende); privatizing five hundred state-owned companies; and, eliminating more trade barriers (Klein, 2007, p. 98). These drastic changes delighted the international community of free market enthusiasts, who looked upon Chile as a shining example even as widespread social costs were plainly evident. Indeed, the shock therapy experiment was bringing astronomical gains to foreign companies and the Chilean finance community, “a small clique of financiers known as the ‘piranhas’ who were making a killing on speculation” (Klein, 2007, p. 80).

This dramatic transferring and concentrating of wealth among the super elites carried out on the backs of a Chilean majority now beset with unprecedented levels of unemployment and poverty (along with brutal government repression the Pinochet regime practiced to suppress any opposition) became the basis upon which free market radicals around the world declared that the medicine was indeed working. In the years to come (and as I discuss further below), the Chilean case would become instrumental in shaping the direction of US imperialism in Latin America (and beyond).

3.8 “Dirty Wars”

As the preceding discussion has begun to reveal, by the mid-1970s, right-wing military regimes ruled nearly every Latin American country. The only exceptions were Venezuela, Peru, Colombia, and Costa Rica. As illustrated above, many had been put into place by the covert activity of a CIA that was animated by a United States government-capitalist coalition bent on installing leaders who would both comply with the dual foreign policy objective of suppressing any
and all activity it considered to be pro-communist and following US friendly economic policies. With respect to the latter, Milton Friedman’s program of radical free market economics ultimately became the favored course. Other military governments, such as the Paraguayan regime of dictator Alfredo Stroessner (1955-1989), the Uruguayan military regime (headed by Juan María Bordaberry), and the Argentinian military regime (headed by Jorge Rafael Videla (1975-1981); Roberto Viola (1981); and, ultimately, Leopoldo Galtieri (1981-1982)) had taken power without the sort of calculated coup-inciting intervention of the United States, but this did not delink them from the US imperial cocktail of anti-communist/anti-left-wing politics, fascism, brutal repression, and, in the cases of Argentina and Uruguay, experimentation with free market shock therapy. Like those Latin American military governments directly installed by the United States, these military governments were also sustained and rewarded for ruling in ways that complied with the US agenda in Latin America.

As has been well documented, the era of US-supported Latin American dictatorships combination of fervent anti-communism, counterinsurgency initiatives, military rule, and generous funding and training from the United States translated into one of the most violent and repressive periods in Latin America, as many of the era’s right-wing regimes engaged in all-out systematic, genocidal elimination of thousands of members of their populations that were known or simply suspected to be involved in or associated with leftist political movements. These so-called "dirty wars" of the sixties and seventies constituted a staggering taking of life by the state through execution, “disappearance,” and death by torture. In the case of Argentina, the country most notorious for extirpating members of its population during its military regime (1976-1983), the country’s National Commission on the Disappeared (conducted between 1983 and 1984) placed the official number of people killed by the state at 8,960 (as cited in United States Institute of Peace, n.d.-a). Investigative journalists and human rights organizations, however, have since estimated that the total was closer to 30,000, with tens of thousands imprisoned and tortured. According to Chile’s Truth Commission, 3,197 Chilean citizens were killed by the state under the Pinochet regime (Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, 1993). In Brazil, two
decades of military government reportedly resulted in the state-sponsored killing of 475 of its citizens (Schneider, 2011) and the imprisonment and torture of tens of thousands (Arns, 1985, as cited in Mezarobba, 2010). According to Paraguay’s Truth and Justice Commission, conducted from 2004 to 2008, the 34-year regime of dictator Alfredo Stroessner brought at least 59 summary executions; 336 forced disappearances; 18,772 cases of torture; and 19,862 arbitrary detentions (as cited in United States Institute of Peace, n.d.-b). And according to Uruguay’s Commission for Peace, during the period of military government (1973-1985), the state was responsible for the deaths of 26 Uruguayans; 23 of these were determined to have been by torture, and 3 by direct intent to kill (as cited in Allier, 2006, p. 90). Importantly, these numbers were only a fraction of the 222 reported disappearances filed with the Commission by the Uruguayan organization, Mothers and Families of the Disappeared (Ibid), and some human rights organizations have placed the number of disappearances at 300. Additionally, there are claims that under the military junta there were between 3,000 and 4,000 Uruguayans imprisoned and detained and between 28,000 and 68,000 that were forced into political exile (Ibid).

As journalists and historians have uncovered through examining newly declassified documents, the United States did not only bring some of these regimes to power and actively support them economically with full knowledge of the atrocities they were committing against their populations. Rather, under the control of the Johnson and Nixon administrations, the United States government actively encouraged and assisted these installed regimes in setting up and maintaining their systems of repression – the executions, the torturing, the “disappearances” – in the name of suppressing leftist activity or “subversion.” As Huggins (1998) discusses, OPS activity increased dramatically in Brazil in the months and years following the military coup. To start, OPS-Brazil advisors reportedly pushed for and were directly involved in the establishment of several bureaucratic police agencies (the Department of Public Safety, the National Institute of Identification, and the National Information Service). During their tenure, these US state actors engaged in a number of activities geared toward fostering and scaffolding a repressive Brazil state. They trained Brazilian police officers in counterinsurgency tactics that were concurrently
being utilized by the US military in rural Vietnam. They also schooled Brazilian police officers in crowd and riot control tactics that included the use of snipers and “shock troops.” They assisted in the writing and implementation of Brazil’s 1967 “Police Organic Law,” which centralized police activity by subsuming regional and municipal police activity under the jurisdiction of individual state secretaries of public security, who were appointed by the military. They also maintained contact with Brazil’s infamous “death squad” police units which had emerged in the late 1950s with the creation of the Escuadrão Motorizado by Brazilian OPS associate, Amaury Kruel and the Civil Police motorized patrol units of the early 1960s. Finally, they were instrumental in the creation of Brazil’s OBAN, a secret, extra-official pilot program formed in Sao Paulo. OBAN was aimed at further integration and better coordination of the different police and military organization and would be subsequently compared to the notorious violent and murderous Phoenix Program formed by the CIA during the Vietnamese War. By 1973, Amnesty International charged OBAN with the some of the most brutal torture committed under Brazil’s military government. OBAN would be expanded nationwide with the creation of DOI/CODI, which would also be charged with the most some of the most extreme torture.

In the case of Chile, US support for and involvement in the repression carried out by Pinochet’s military government was also multifaceted. As Peter Kornbluh (2003) reveals, the CIA Station in Chile immediately promised assistance in the form of planning, training, and organizational support for Colonel Juan Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda, who was head of the newly created Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA), which was the secret police agency created by Pinochet covertly in 1973 and officially in June of 1974. Later, the CIA would admit that it had offered Chile’s services “assistance in internal organization and training to combat subversion and terrorism from abroad” (in Kornbluh 2003, 220). The fact, however, that such assistance could easily be used in the suppression of internal political opposition was readily acknowledged by agency officials. While much of the nature and extent of this assistance remains classified, what has been disclosed and uncovered shows a series of meetings between Contreras and CIA officials between 1974 and 1977 and according to Contreras, in August 1974 a team of CIA
specialists did arrive in Chile to train DINA officers. During these years DINA continued to live up to what had been its near instant reputation as one of the most brutally violent agencies of the Chilean armed forces. “Agents not only coordinated and conducted interrogations,” Kornbluh (2003, p. 167) writes, but also carried out systemic clandestine raids and arrests, while building a network of secret detention and torture centers to extract information from supporters of the former Allende government, terminate, and disappear them.” According to Kornbluh (2003), in addition to providing training, planning, and organizational support, CIA officials and Contreras were reported by US embassy political officer, John Tipton, to be “in a close relationship” whose conviviality was felt throughout the organizational culture of the CIA Chile Station. Moreover, in 1975, and at the recommendation of Santiago Station Chief Stuart Burton, the agency briefly placed Contreras on its payroll, establishing secret bank accounts for him and depositing funds as compensation for projects Contreras performed directly for or with the agency (Ibid).

Direct support for Pinochet regime repression also came from the executive branch of the US government, where Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was instrumental in restarting and continuing the flow of aid to Chile in the wake of the coup, even as the US congress passed economic and military aid restrictions in response to reports of the regime’s human atrocities. Kornbluh (2003) has demonstrated that, for Kissinger, maintaining the abundant supply of arms to Chile (the country would be among the top five purchasers of US military hardware in 1976) was key to maintaining the military government that the US had effectively installed there. “If we cut off arms, the military government will fail,” Kissinger was reported saying during one meeting with President Gerald Ford in December 1974 (quoted in Kornbluh, 2003, p. 233). In another meeting, the State Secretary’s agenda was even clearer: “I want to do everything possible to get arms for Chile,” he reportedly said later that same month (Ibid). At the time, a Senate hearing being led by Edward Kennedy was in the process of setting a limit on US economic aid to Chile, capping it at $25 million for the following year of 1976 (Kornbluh, 2003). The Ford administration, however, would simply ignore this and send a total of $112 million in food, material, and credits. In that same year, the US congress would pass a bill that banned all military aid, credit, and cash sales.
of weapons to Chile (Ibid). Once again, however, the Ford administration intervened, responding to the bill by relying on USAID lawyers to work out a technically legal way of skirting this restriction as well (Ibid).

In Argentina we find another example of the US state essentially ordering repression to be carried out against the population in the name of preserving the military government that professed its loyalty to the US foreign policy agenda of fighting communism by any means necessary. According to declassified documents published by the National Security Archive, Kissinger was not only informed two months in advance of the coup that would usher in a military junta in 1976, he was also briefed on the bloodshed that was expected to follow by Assistant Secretary for Latin America Will Rogers, who explained in a meeting two days after the coup, “I think also we’ve got to expect a fair amount of repression, probably a good deal of blood in Argentina before too long. I think they’re going to have to come down very hard not only on the terrorists but on the dissidents of trade unions and their parties” (The White House, 1976, pp. 20-21). In this very meeting, Kissinger expressed his desire to “encourage them” (Ibid, p. 22). The following day, the IMF released a credit in the amount of $127 million to the Argentine junta (see Osorio and Novaro, 2006). Within several weeks, the US congress approved a request, written and endorsed by Kissinger and made on behalf of the Ford administration, to grant the junta $50 million in military support (Ibid).

Then, approximately two months into the Argentine military government, when the international community along with the US media, US universities, and the US congress exposed and condemned the widespread Argentine human rights violations, Kissinger simply wished “the new government well” in a meeting with Argentine Foreign Minister, Admiral Cesar Augusto Guzzetti (see Osorio and Costar, 2004). Just one month later, in July 1976, Kissinger was briefed explicitly on the repression being committed in Argentina (Ibid).

3.9 The 1973 Oil Crisis and the Rise of US Bank Lending to Latin American Governments

By the early 1970s, US global dominance was beginning to weaken for a combination of reasons, both external and internal. For one, the country was being surpassed in the realm of
industrial production by Germany and Japan. Compounding this turn of events was the country’s fiscal crisis spurred largely by the high cost of the Vietnam War, which, by 1970, was entering its tenth year. As David Harvey (2003) explains, the US government responded to the latter by printing new money, which led to a deluge of surplus US dollars into the world market. However, demand for the dollar was already falling as Japan and West Germany had come to surpass the United States in the realm of production. Thus, by the early seventies the dollar had grown overvalued and several European countries began redeeming their dollars for gold, thus draining the US gold reserves significantly.

It was in this context, with US hegemony increasingly under attack, that Nixon acted, first suspending the convertibility of the dollar to gold in 1971 (Gowan, 1999) and then quickly abolishing it altogether several months later, thus abandoning the Bretton Woods system that had pegged the dollar to gold at $35 per ounce. This is an incredibly important event as it amounted to the US’s jettisoning of the rules established by the US/UK-crafted Bretton Woods system once these rules had become more of a liability to US global dominance. According to Peter Gowan (1999), Nixon’s move to leave the Bretton Woods system was indeed part of a broader attempt to reassert US hegemony, to “break out of a set of institutionalized arrangements which limited US dominance in international monetary politics in order to establish a new regime which would give it monocratic power over international monetary affairs” (p. 19). As Gowan explains, “the August 1971 decision to ‘close the gold window’ meant that the US was no longer subject to the discipline of having to try to maintain a fixed par value of the dollar against gold or anything else: it could let the dollar move as the US Treasury wished and pointed towards the removal of gold from international monetary affairs. It thus moved the world economy on to a pure dollar standard” (pp. 19-20).

Nixon’s changes to global monetary policy would be quickly followed by the oil crisis of 1973, an event which ended up bringing a deluge of cash directly to US banks, thus shoring up the financial component of US hegemony even as its primacy in the area of industrial production continued to descend. As Gowan (1999) has shown, this turn of events was not coincidental or
random but related to a calculated strategy on the part of Nixon. Specifically, Gowan asserts that while the dominant narrative around the oil crisis of 1973 has maintained that OPEC raised oil prices as an intended oil embargo against Israeli allies in the concurrent Arab-Israeli War, subsequent reports (that include an interview with Nixon’s Ambassador to Saudi Arabia) have in fact shown that the Nixon administration had been pressuring the Gulf states to increase oil prices from as early as 1971, and that from as early as 1972, the Nixon administration had been planning to designate US private banks as the financial institutions that would recycle the profits.

In essence, Gowan claims that at the beginning of the 1970s Nixon’s primary focus had been to deliver a formidable hit to the economies of Japan and Western Europe, both US allies that were dependent on oil from the Middle East (and much more so, as Harvey points out, than the United States) and United States staunchest competition on the industrial front. With this as his driving objective, Nixon had proceeded to collude with Gulf states to send oil prices soaring, the expectation being that the economies of Japan and Western Europe, which depended heavily on oil from Gulf states, would be seriously weakened as they began running serious trade deficits that would come as a result of the price hike. However, as the Nixon administration set in motion this plan to economically cripple the competition, it soon augmented it with another scheme of statecraft. Indeed, when it became clear to the Nixon administration that the Gulf states would be flooded with surplus cash that their economies would not be able to fully absorb the plan reportedly evolved to include securing the investment of the Gulf states’ petrodollars in New York investment banks, a move that would bring tremendous financial gain and leverage to the US just as its competition was floundering. Gowan claims that Nixon in fact used the threat of military invasion to gain the Gulf states’ compliance. The result was the oil crisis of 1973, which harmed Japan and Western European countries more so than the United States (which did not depend as much upon OPEC for its oil) and led directly to a windfall of petrodollars for the New York banking community, rendering Wall Street the undisputed financial capital of the world. Importantly, while other governments advocated for the IMF as the recycling vehicle for the petrodollars, the United
States pushed forcefully for its own private banks, and as the politically dominant state in the Middle East, it was the United States that ultimately won out.

The oil crisis and the subsequent infusion of petrodollars into US banks turned out to be enormously significant for the developing world. As the banks were suddenly flooded with capital there was a sudden push to find profitable sites of investment (i.e. borrowers that would turn a profit through the collection of interest rates). In the words of former World Bank official, Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski (1988) there was “a drive to lend.” Discouraged by the performance of domestic companies, which were now giving low rates of return, the US banks targeted developing countries, viewing them as attractive lending risks not only because of their vast wealth in natural resources that their governments were actively seeking to exploit as part of ambitious export-development schemes, but also in part because of the decade’s axiomatic rationale (attributed to Citibank CEO Walter Wriston) that “countries don’t go bankrupt” and that “governments can’t move away or disappear” (see Harvey, 2005). There ensued an aggressive and fiercely competitive movement among the US banks to lend vast amounts of money to developing countries at extremely low interest rates, an event that several writers have conceptualized as “loan pushing,” (see Basu, 1991; Darity, 1986; Darity and Horn, 1988; Eaton and Taylor, 1986) which can be broadly understood as an attempt upon the part of creditors to “supply more credit to borrowing countries than the latter would take at the prevailing interest rate” (Basu, 1991, p. 24). As these writers have underscored, the impetus for loan pushing came not only from the promise of fees and interest paid by the borrowing country to the bank, but also from relations between banks and their corporate clients that sold products to developing countries and therefore wanted to ensure that the latter were provided with funds to be used in buying their goods; in other words, US bank credit became an “instrument” of export promotion.

During the lending frenzy of the seventies, Latin American governments eagerly welcomed the loans, looking to it as the eternally elusive foreign capital infusion that would be the key to economic and social development that had proven exceedingly difficult amid minimal US private bank lending in the years that had followed World War II. According to Jeffrey Sachs et al.
(1988), most of the lending was made to central governments, public sector development banks, and government-owned companies, and it was put towards large scale public sector projects, including industrialization efforts in countries such as Brazil and Mexico. Non-oil producing countries, like Brazil, welcomed loans as a way to cover high expenses incurred under the oil crisis without compromising ongoing industrialization efforts, and oil-producing countries such as Mexico, Ecuador, and Venezuela, which had been unharmed by the oil crisis, channeled the money toward further developing their petroleum industries. In all of the Latin American countries, foreign debt surged during astronomically during the 1970s.

In fact, between 1974 and 1982, the total amount of global foreign debt grew from US $44 billion to more than US $360 billion. And here, it is appropriate to point out a historical event that is often dropped from the dominant narrative on the accumulation of debt in developing countries during the 1970s. As Greg Grandin (2006) highlights, throughout the decade, Third World leaders had not only eagerly accepted loans from the US private banks, they had also actively pursued a radical reordering of the terms of global trade, utilizing the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development as a platform for promoting their proposals and codifying them in an agenda referred to as the New International Economic Order (NIEO). Drawing on the ideas of Raul Prebisch and citing the growing indebtedness of Third World nations, the proposed reordering went beyond the securing of more loans to include fundamental changes in the economic relations between First and Third World nations. As Grandin (2006) describes it, the NIEO “included increasing financial assistance to developing countries, negotiating the transfer of first-world technology and industry to poor nations, lowering tariff barriers to third-world manufacturing, recognizing each state’s full sovereignty over its natural resources and economic activities (which would legitimate industrial expropriations and nationalizations), and setting just prices for ten core commodities – cocoa, coffee, tea, sugar, hard fibers, jute, cotton, rubber, copper, and tin” (p. 185). In addition, Grandin notes, in the 1970s most Third World countries were championing the creation of new international financial institutions tailored to the specific
concerns of non-OPEC developing countries and many had started to assemble into a single, organized bloc within the U.N. General Assembly (Ibid).

3.10 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have reviewed the Cold War era evolution of US imperialism in Latin America, noting such key events as the creation of the CIA, the ascent of the CIA-coordinated coup as an imperial tactic, the Chile project and Kennedy’s counterinsurgency campaign and its focus on training Latin American state security forces in the waging of “dirty wars” against members of Latin American populations. In the latter two sections of this chapter, I considered the 1973 oil crisis as a product of US statecraft undertaken by the Nixon administration, and I reviewed the directly related subsequent rise of predatory commercial lending among US commercial banks to Latin American governments. These latter events fall within the early years of what David Harvey has periodized as neoliberal hegemony (see Harvey, 2003, pp. 62-86) and set the stage for monumental, but not altogether unprecedented, shifts in US imperial practice.

Notably, unlike the time period discussed in the previous chapter (Chapter 2), the post-WWII decades covered in this chapter is commonly known as the era of “embedded liberalism” in order to:

…signal how market processes and entrepreneurial and corporate activities were surrounded by a web of social and political constraints and a regulatory environment that sometimes restrained but in other instances led the way in economic and industrial strategy. (Harvey, 2005, p. 11).

That US imperial practice became arguably more systematized and “embedded” in US state institutions such as the CIA and US state-led supranational institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF during this period is perhaps theoretically fitting. Further, perhaps unlike the US imperialism of the late 19th and early 20th century, which had been more dramatically at odds with a comparatively unregulated economy and pre-FDR dearth of interventionist social welfare programs, US liberalism of the post-WWII era can be thought of as emerging less contradictory in practice to the continued, but now more organized, practice of US imperialism. In the following
chapter, I continue to trace the events that defined the evolution of US imperialism that transpired between 1970 and into the new millennium.
CHAPTER 4: NEOLIBERAL EMPIRE

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I turn the focus to the years between 1970 and the early 2000s. As discussed in the previous chapter, this period has been conceived by Harvey (2003) as the age of neoliberal hegemony. The United States entered this period having been overtaken by Japan and West Germany in industrial production, one of its “three legs of hegemony” (Harvey, 2003). According to Peter Gowan (1999), Nixon’s response was to direct a strategic blow at the economies of these two powers by orchestrating a dramatic oil price increase instituted by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The result was the oil crisis of 1972, an event that, in turn, produced an enormous payday for OPEC countries, which then, under the direction of Nixon, deposited their profits into US banks. This glut in “petrodollars” at the US banks, in turn, led to a lending binge on the part of US banks, their key targets being developing countries, mostly in Latin America. By the early 1980s, most Latin American countries had acquired unprecedented levels of indebtedness (particularly in the wake of the oil crisis, which had not only raised oil prices but weakened global demand for raw resources produced by these countries), and it was precisely at this moment that spiraling inflation in the United States led Carter’s (and subsequently Reagan’s) Treasury Secretary Paul Volcker to dramatically raise the interest rate. This act, in turn, produced debt service payments that were impossibly high for Latin American governments to make. Default was imminent, prompting a full-scale debt crisis.

As many have observed and as this chapter illustrates, the crisis provided the perfect leverage for a US-led restructuring of Latin American economies according to neoliberal doctrine, which by this point had become hegemonic at the US-dominated international financial institutions. In exchange for IMF credit approval that would prompt the private banks to reschedule loans, Latin American countries had to follow a prescription of privatization, draconian social spending cuts, and pro-market legislation. Importantly, the debt crisis and the US exploitation of it came at a time when Latin American governments had become increasingly closed to foreign trade and investment and when US capitalists and politicians viewed the re-
opening of Latin American markets as the answer to US economic troubles. Debt rescheduling in exchange for structural adjustment would go through several iterations over the course of the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations. This era would also be characterized by a continuation of US-funded “dirty wars” in Central America. The early millennium saw more of the same, with continued US interference in the political processes of independent Latin American republics and several attempted coups (some successfully executed) that have been purported by many to have been funded and orchestrated by US state actors.

4.2: 1979-1990, Transition to Neoliberalism: The Volcker Shock and the Latin American Debt Crisis

In his periodization of US imperialism, Harvey (2003) classifies the years between 1970 and 2000 (and presumably beyond) as the era of neoliberal hegemony. Before reviewing what implications this held for US imperialist practice, it is important to lay out the context in which this shift came about in the United States and some of the key events that characterized it. As discussed earlier, the end of World War II brought the emergence of the United States as the economically, militarily, financially dominant power and, from this position of dominance, the country’s political elites immediately took a leadership role in constructing a post-war framework for international relations and domestic policy. Over the next two decades, the United States managed to maintain this position, experiencing high levels of economic growth.

At the end of the 1960s the high levels of growth and employment that had risen under the Keynesian framework were plummeting and the United States had entered into a fiscal crisis spurred largely by the high cost of the Vietnam War, which, by 1970, was entering its tenth year. As David Harvey (2003) explains, the government responded to the latter by printing new money, but this quickly triggered massive inflation (i.e. prices for goods and services increased at a higher rate than wages). In this context, labor movements called for more equitable distribution of wealth and were becoming increasingly formidable with respect to political influence, both in the United States and in most European countries. As Harvey (2005) writes, “Discontent was widespread and the conjoining of labour and urban social movements throughout much of the
advanced capitalist world appeared to point towards the emergence of a socialist alternative to the social compromise between capital and labour that had grounded capital accumulation so successfully in the post-war period” (pp. 14-15).

Faced with the combined threat of diminishing returns and an increasingly powerful labor movement’s demands to give up more of what was by then a shrinking pie, Harvey argues, economic elites were threatened both economic and politically – and had to “move decisively if they were to protect themselves from political and economic annihilation” (Ibid, 15). Indeed, as this “double crisis of capital accumulation and class power” (Ibid) came to a head in the early seventies and was manifest most potently in the nation’s cities, the US state began to respond in precisely this manner. In the case of New York City, President Nixon pulled the plug on federal aid that had been extended to the city in response to social unrest of the sixties that had accompanied an eroding economic base (thanks to deindustrialization) and a declining tax base (in the wake of rapid suburbanization and the mass departures of the city’s middle and upper classes). Abandoned by both industry and government and thus left with little in the way of revenue, the city of New York increased its borrowing from private banks and was then dealt the final blow when, in 1975, these banks, led by Walter Wriston of Citibank, refused to reschedule the city’s accumulated private debt. The city declared bankruptcy in 1975. At the time, President Gerald Ford’s Secretary of Treasury William Simon, reportedly impressed by the aforementioned case of Chile (where US-enforced massive privatization was now fully underway and bringing great profits to Chilean elites and US multinationals), advised Ford to continue denying federal aid to the city. Over the next few years, the process of neoliberalization that had been imposed on Chile was repeated in New York City (see Harvey, 2007; see also Greenberg, 2010; Smith, 1996).

In Harvey’s estimation, the investment banking sector’s management of the New York fiscal crisis constituted a galvanizing and unifying triumph for the financial and corporate business classes, and they now sought to take the gains made by capital against labor in New York city to the national level. Accordingly, the neoliberal practices and principles that had been applied in
New York (and initially in Chile) were increasingly taken up by economic elites as a radical unifying creed. In the following years, finance and corporate business lobbied extensively for neoliberal policies in Washington and sought to create intellectual legitimacy for such policies by forming and generously funding a number of well-known neoliberal think tanks that still exist today: The Heritage Foundation, the American Enterprise Institute, the Hoover Institute, as well as the National Bureau of Economic Research (Harvey, 2005). Importantly, as Harvey underscores, a key part of finance and corporate business’ effort to implement the neoliberal economic platform at the national level was its active appropriation of the Republican party (already more decisively pro-business than the Democrats) as “a political class instrument and a popular base” (Ibid, p. 48), and this was done in large part through the vigorous formation of corporate-sponsored political action committees (PACs) once the Supreme Court ruled in 1976 that corporations could make unlimited donations to political parties and PACs. On the other end, the patronage of finance and corporate business was welcomed by influential Republican politicians, such as California Governor Ronald Reagan and William Simon who, according to Harvey, “went out of their way to urge the PACs to direct their efforts towards funding Republican candidates with right-wing sympathies” (Harvey, 2005, p. 49).

While the consolidation of neoliberalism as the economic platform of the Republican party was unfolding, Harvey argues, a monetarist orthodoxy had infiltrated the government by way of Paul Volcker, an economist appointed to the presidency of the US Federal Reserve by democratic President Jimmy Carter in 1979. Carter had made the appointment with the expectation that Volcker would take drastic action to quell spiraling inflation by raising interest rates and thereby putting a freeze on the circulation of money. Volcker had acted immediately, nearly doubling interest rates from eleven to twenty percent between 1979 and 1980 in what came to be known as the “Volcker shock.” When Reagan came to office in January of 1981, he immediately reappointed Volcker with the expectation that he would stay the course, which Volcker did, keeping interest interests at twenty percent until 1982, at which point he then lowered them to twelve percent. By that time, however, the “Volcker shock” had thrown the country into
the deepest recession since the Great Depression. The rate increase had put an instant freeze on lending and pushed unemployment above 10 percent. High unemployment had, in turn, brought about the emptying of unions, and it was at this point, with the power of labor greatly weakened, that Reagan had struck, launching a campaign of pro-business reforms that included further decimation of the labor unions, drastic tax cuts for corporations and the wealthy, deregulation of industry, and the privatization of public assets. In this way, then, the economic and social effects of the Volcker shock were immediately manipulated into a beachhead for a drastic pro-business/pro-elite restructuring of the US economy that Reagan would pursue for the duration of his two-term presidency, thus realizing a full restoration of elite dominance that had been kept in some degree of check during the post-war era of Keynesian economics and heightened growth and had been met with increasingly formidable challenge from labor movements in the 1970s. What, however, did the Volcker shock and Reagan’s neoliberal policies mean for the developing world and US empire in Latin America?

In fact, the Volcker shock was a key turning point for economic relations between the United States and developing nations, particularly Latin America. As has been well documented, Volcker’s decision to send interest rates soaring carried disastrous consequences for the Latin American countries that had been the primary lending targets/recipients for the US commercial banks during the 1970s. Because the banks had done their lending in US dollars, the Volcker shock instantly sent interest fees soaring to levels far beyond the budgetary capacity of developing nations and thus pushing these nations to the brink of default. Latin America was hit particularly hard as its debt was disproportionately held by US commercial banks, whereas countries in Africa and Asia had borrowed primarily from multilateral institutions. Compounding this problem further was the fact that the US recession caused by the Volcker shock had resulted in a massive decline in US demand for Latin American exports, thus precipitating a collapse in trade revenue for Latin American countries. By mid-1982, US commercial banks had begun to notice this combined ripple effect of the dramatic increase in US interest rates – a sharp increase
in the debt-export ratio among Latin American countries – and had suspended all new lending to Latin American countries (Kuczynski, 1988).

With a sudden and dramatic increase in interest rates, a precipitous fall in export earnings, and the denial of new lending from commercial banks, Latin American countries were faced with imminent default on their foreign debt. In 1982, Mexico became the first to officially declare it would no longer be able to service its debt, thus exposing US commercial banks to catastrophic losses. Indeed, as Nora Lustig (1997) points out, in 1982, Mexican debt held by the top nine US commercial banks amounted to fifty percent of their capital, and “a Mexican default would have been a significant threat to their survival” (p. 30). What ensued was a powerful illustration of the capitalist imperialism that Harvey describes, in which the “one of the state’s key tasks is to try to preserve that pattern of asymmetries in exchange over space that works to its own advantage,” including the advantage of its financial institutions (Harvey, 2003, p. 32). Despite the official position taken by neoliberal doctrine against state intervention in market processes, when confronted with the possibility of catastrophic losses to the country’s private financial institutions, the US Treasury and Federal Reserve, on behalf of Reagan’s neoliberal administration, intervened and called on the IMF to help protect the US commercial banks from the consequences of their own reckless lending, negotiating a deal that would supply more short-term lending to deal with the immediate problem of debt servicing while effectively taxing the Mexican state and people via neoliberal reforms. Because the Mexican case would become the blueprint for how the United States responded to what would turn out to be an epidemic debt crisis affecting most of Latin America, as well numerous countries in Africa, and the Philippines, I provide details as to how this first arrangement was negotiated, its terms, and its conditions in the paragraphs below.

As Arturo Santa Cruz (2012) reports, by February of 1982, Mexican Secretary of Finance, Jesus Silva Herzog and Banco de Mexico President Miguel Mancera Aguayo had begun making monthly visits to Washington, keeping multiple key parties – namely, US Secretary Donald Regan, US Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, International Monetary Fund Director
Jacques de Larosiere, and World Bank President Alden W. Clausen – informed of Mexico’s escalating fiscal troubles (see Santa Cruz, 2012). With regard to the IMF, these visits entailed reviving relations that had lapsed during the country’s oil boom of the late 1970s. Before the boom, the country had entered into an Extended Fund Facility\textsuperscript{15} (EFF) arrangement with the IMF in 1976, but under President Jose Lopez Portillo (1976-1982) it had subsequently withdrawn from relations with the IMF, as Lopez Portillo denounced IMF oversight as a threat to Mexico’s sovereignty. During consultations with Silva Herzog in 1982, the IMF communicated that its assistance was conditional upon Mexico entering into a new EFF arrangement, an option which Lopez Portillo continued to reject, but by July, Silva Herzog was promising that Mexico would pursue once the newly elected president Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado took office in December of that year. In the meantime, Volcker and Regan stipulated to Silva Herzog that US lending would only be extended if Mexico entered into an EFF arrangement with the IMF.

Important to highlight here is that, during the year of 1982, there were clear indications that the Reagan administration regarded the Mexican fiscal problem as an opportunity to have the Mexican government steered towards its preferred policies. As Santa Cruz reveals, in the summer of 1982 (following the election of de la Madrid), a US State Department briefing paper, obtained by the press, suggested that, in the face of Mexico’s current economic crisis, US financial assistance “could be helpful in pointing Mexico toward the right internal policies.” Further, 1982 was the year of what Joseph Stiglitz (as cited in Harvey, 2005) has referred to as “the purge” of all Keynesian-oriented figures from the IMF and their replacement with neoliberal

\textsuperscript{15} As James Raymond Vreeland (2003) explains, the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) is one of the IMF’s four lending facility programs. The original facility program, the Stand-By Arrangement (SBA), involved the extension of a line of credit to countries that had run into balance of payment problems and were generally intended to be limited to one year. As years went by, however, participation in such programs was lasting beyond this time frame, leading the IMF to initiate the Extended Fund Facility program, under which arrangements were anticipated to have durations of three to four years. In the words of the IMF, the EFF program was “established to provide assistance to countries: (i) experiencing serious payments imbalances because of structural impediments; or (ii) characterized by slow growth and an inherently weak balance of payments position” (IMF, 2015).
economists, thus producing an IMF that embodied what the Reagan administration held as the “right internal policies” (Santa Cruz, 2012, p. 46).

By early August – when Mexico had just US $100 million in international reserves and a debt payment of US$700 million scheduled for the following week – Silva Herzog placed Regan on notice that, without a new loan, Mexico would be defaulting on its foreign debt, the majority of which was held by US commercial banks. Donald Regan – known for his “Trade not aid” slogan with respect to the developing countries – responded by inviting Silva Herzog to Washington, where it was determined that US $3.5 billion was needed to avert immediate crisis. An emergency loan package of US $2 billion was put together with funds from the US Treasury and the US Federal Reserve. Notably, United States negotiators placed harsh conditions on the loans it provided, first stipulating that US$1 billion of the US Treasury loan be extended as an advance payment for future US oil purchase from Mexico with the oil heavily discounted at $5 per barrel below market prices (a condition that reflected the demands of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve of the Department of Energy that had been recruited by the US Treasury to make the actual purchase of the oil). When this condition was immediately refused by the Mexican president Jose Lopez Portillo and talks threatened to break down, US officials then abandoned barrel price and instead came back with the prospect of a “front-end fee” which yielded into an implicit interest rate of 38 percent – an amount that was more than twice the prevailing market interest rate. Such a move was condemned by Mexican officials as a pecuniary action on the part of the United States, and Volcker, himself, (as cited in Lustig, 1997) later called the interest “egregiously high” and reflective of “the need to satisfy the Yankee trading instincts of Budget Bureau and Energy Department officials far removed from any sense of the larger issues at stake and more than slightly sensitive to the possibility of subsequent political criticism” (Volcker & Gyohten, 1992, p. 201).

To produce the rest of the US $3.5 billion, Volcker called upon the central banks of a group of developed countries (members of the G-10 plus Spain), which, under the aegis of Switzerland’s Bank of International Settlements (BIS) collectively extended a loan in the amount
of US $1.85 billion, half of which was contributed by the US Treasury and the US Federal Reserve. The key condition of the BIS emergency package was an assurance from Silva Herzog that Mexico would immediately begin negotiating an EFF arrangement with the IMF.

Upon entering talks around Mexico’s prospective EFF arrangement, Silva Herzog and IMF officials brought commercial banks into the picture with the IMF acting as an arbitrator, procuring the banks’ cooperation through promises that Mexico would be compelled to change certain structural conditions which were believed to have caused the debt crisis and ensuring Mexico’s compliance with structural reforms by making that a condition of the EFF line of credit from the IMF and the IMF’s assistance in obtaining new lending from the commercial banks. Ultimately, a deal was worked out in which the IMF would extend Mexico a line of credit for US $3.7 billion and the commercial banks would put up a total of US $5 billion in new lending to Mexico, in the meantime granting Mexico a debt moratorium of ninety days. During this time Mexico was expected to put its financial house in order. As for Mexico, in exchange for granting it a line of credit, the IMF imposed a program of adjustment that included reducing its public sector deficit from its current level of 16.5 percent of its GDP to 8.5% of GDP in 1983, cutting it further to 5.5% of GDP in 1984, and finally, to 3.5% of GDP in 1985. Clearly, reductions of this magnitude portended deep and immediate cuts in public expenditures (Looney, 1985). Another key stipulation was that Mexico’s public sector debt – at approximately US $60 billion in 1982 – would not rise by any more than US $5 billion during 1983 (Ibid). As outlined in the Letter of Intent, signed by Mexican officials and printed in the Mexican press, these broader objectives would be pursued through price increases for public services, imposition of new taxes, and cuts in government subsidies of basic consumer goods. As Richard Peet (2003) points out, these extreme reductions in public expenditures would coincide directly with the continual free fall of real wages that was hitting the country in the early 1980s.

Understanding the key details of the resolution of the Mexican debt crisis is useful for several reasons. First, it provides some substantive insight into how US imperial practice began utilizing neoliberalization of debtor countries as a tool for preserving the asymmetries that Harvey
references as the foundation of imperial relations. It was precisely through the specific events outlined above that the Reagan administration first, in Harvey’s words, “found a way to put together the powers of the US Treasury and the IMF” (2005, p. 29) and that what he refers to as the IMF-US Treasury-Wall Street complex really began to take shape. Second, the arrangement between the banks, the IMF, and Mexico would become the blueprint for what would quickly emerge as a debt crisis affecting not only Mexico or even Latin America but countries in Africa and Asia as well (Kuczynski, 1988; Sachs and Williamson, 1986). Indeed, following the Mexican debt crisis, commercial banks slowed their lending to developing countries even further, demanding payment in full on loans that would have otherwise been refinanced. Over the next year, (August 1982 through the spring of 1983), fifteen countries followed in Mexico’s footsteps, renegotiating the terms of more than $90 billion in external debt held by commercial banks (Delamaide, 1984). According to a World Bank report (cited in Sachs and Williamson, 1986), between 1982 and 1985, a total of thirty-eight countries (including eight of the thirteen South American countries and four of the seven Central American countries) engaged in these renegotiations.16 Throughout all of these renegotiations the Mexican arrangement of 1982 served as the model (see Bogdanowicz-Bindert, 1985; Sachs and Williamson, 1986). New loans from the commercial banks were generally conditioned by IMF-debtor country agreements in which the IMF extended a line of credit in exchange for the debtor country government’s pledge to pursue austerity measures such as the ones set for Mexico in 1982.

It is worth noting the official narrative that surrounded the debt crisis between 1982 and 1985, as it would change significantly over the next several years. As former World Bank official Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski (1988) points out, for the first few years of its trajectory the debt crisis

16 Jeffrey Sachs (see Sachs and Williamson, 1986) cites a World Bank study (“Development and Debt Service: Dilemma of the 1980s” -- see reference list for complete citation) which lists the thirty-eight countries as: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Central African Republic, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Guyana, Honduras, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, and Zambia.
was intentionally spun by the US government, the IMF, the World Bank and the commercial banks as a question of liquidity as opposed to solvency. As Kuczynski (1988) explains, this was done in order avert a full-scale financial panic and with the expectation that once the global recession abated the developing countries would return to pre-recession trade revenues and be fully capable of servicing their external debt. The official line was that debtor nations had run into a temporary cash flow problem that required a quick fix of more cash and certain adjustments to restore liquidity and continue servicing their debts. Richard Peet (2003) draws a link between this dominant narrative and the sorts of adjustments imposed by the IMF which, he argues, were relatively modest in comparison to the sorts of reforms that would be imposed just a few years later when the narrative on the debt crisis changed. Specifically, the measures called for in the early eighties centered on raising taxes and tariffs, devaluing the currency (theoretically making exports more competitive on the global market, reducing domestic spending on imports, and thereby adjusting trade imbalances), and reducing government expenditures. (Peet's point is helpful for understanding the evolution of neoliberal reforms over the course of the eighties but it cannot be forgotten that, while less drastic than what was to come, such reforms greatly effected the lives of the populations upon whom they were visited, particularly the poor, who were most vulnerable to such reforms, in particular, currency devaluation, which rendered wages less valuable and thus translated into an instant pay cut, and government expenditure cuts that often targeted social spending.)

As the years went by, however, rates of growth did not recover and the developing countries remained deeply indebted, unable to service their debts without new loans. It was at this time that the official narrative began to change. The crisis was no longer depicted as a liquidity snag that could be fixed with one-time loan disbursements and a regimen of adjustments but the result of entrenched structural problems that required dramatic reordering of debtor nation economies. In a context of increasingly hegemonic neoliberalism, World Bank and IMF economists asserted that the debt crisis was due not so much to the reckless loan pushing that had been carried out by surplus rich US commercial banks in the 1970s and early 1980s (even as
evidence of growing risk had mounted) or the drastic interest rate increase on the part of Volcker or even the global recession that had driven down export demand around the world, but to a legacy of economic nationalism in Latin America and around the developing world, (specifically protectionist trade policies such as ISI). According to neoliberalism, for those countries that had pursued it, economic nationalism had resulted in low export growth, which in turn prevented the generation of revenues necessary to service foreign debt. The solution, according to the neoliberalist model (which, by 1985, was the prevailing doctrine at the World Bank and the IMF) was radical liberalization of these countries’ economies. Theoretically this would not only increase export revenues but also attract foreign capital investment, reduce state expenditures, and, in turn, generate the revenues necessary to sustain foreign borrowing.

In 1985, Reagan appointed a new Secretary of Treasury, James Baker, who unveiled a new debt crisis management scheme that was reflective of the neoliberal orthodoxy that had by then taken hold. Faced with the fact that continued debt trouble posed serious financial losses to US banks that held the debt and aware of the fact that widespread default on foreign debt was in the near and certain future for many countries, Baker identified fifteen high debtor nations and called upon First World commercial banks to extend $20 billion in loans and multilateral lending agencies (i.e. the World Bank and the IMF) to extend $9 billion, all to be disbursed to the high debtor nations over the next three years. As with the debt plans of the preceding years, the new loans were to be conditioned by requirements that the debtor nations implement market-oriented reforms, but Baker Plan reforms were distinct as they were comparably more comprehensive in nature than those that had been stipulated in the recent past. Namely, they included privatization of state-owned enterprises, abolition of subsidies, reduction of trade barriers, and investment liberalization. In other words, they amounted to a more radical neoliberal overhaul of the economies of debtor nations. In particular, privatization of state industries was a central feature of the Baker Plan, more so than it had been in early iterations of neoliberal adjustment championed by Regan. As argued by Walden Bello (1993), it was with the creation of the Baker Plan, then, that market-oriented structural adjustment (which the World Bank and the IMF had begun to
utilize as a condition of assistance during the late 1970s and in the early years of the Reagan administration) was institutionalized and radicalized even further.

With the creation of the Baker Plan, Mexico and eleven other nations (twelve out of the fifteen identified by Baker) signed on and began receiving new loans in exchange for complying with the requisite neoliberal reforms, thus abandoning the premise of the fledgling New International Economic Order of the 1970s, (which had sought to address structural inequalities between First and Third World nations), and the specific reforms it had prescribed (Grandin, 2006). As many have observed the changes that were implemented by Latin American (as well as Caribbean, African, and Asian) governments in the 1980s were extreme, far-reaching, and, with respect to economically impoverished majority segments of their populations, draconian in both conception and effect. Greg Grandin (2006) provides illuminating detail with respect to specific kinds of reforms that comprised neoliberal regimen, stating that over the course of the decade, Latin American countries “slashed taxes, devalued their currencies, lowered the minimum wage, exempted foreign companies from labor and environmental laws, cut spending on health care, education, and other social services, did away with regulations, smashed unions, passed legislation that allowed up to 100 percent repatriations of profits, cut subsidies designed to protect national manufacturing, freed interest rates, and privatized state industries” (p. 187). Thus, the phrase, “shock therapy:” a term embraced by neoliberal economists, themselves, with respect to what it was that the international financial institutions, under the command of the US Treasury, were administering to developing countries that had become financially insolvent.

The year of 1989 might be thought of as the third stage in the US state’s effort to globalize neoliberal economic policy. By this time, the high levels of commercial bank lending, called for by Baker, had failed to materialize and the identified debtor nations were in no better position to continue servicing their foreign debts. In this context, President George H.W. Bush’s Secretary of the Treasury Nicolas Brady unveiled a new plan which was the first to call for debt relief in exchange for the same sorts of neoliberal structural adjustment requirements that had conditioned the assistance provided by the Baker Plan and the emergency packages
brokered by Reagan’s first Treasury of the Secretary, Donald Regan. According to Harvey (2005), under the Brady Plan, “financial institutions agreed to write down 35 per cent of their outstanding debt as a loss in exchange for discounted bonds (backed by the IMF and the US Treasury), guaranteeing repayment of the rest (in other words creditors were guaranteed repayment of debts at the rate of 65 cents on the dollar)” (p. 75).

The United States government thus not only saved its banking system but also manipulated a crisis that posed catastrophic consequences not only for the debtor nations but also for the US banking system into a form of leverage for imposing economic structural changes that promised to resume US capital accumulation and the reconsolidation of the US elite economic and political dominance (whose position had grown increasingly precarious amid the decreased economic growth and the related ascendance of labor movements throughout the 1970s). In considering the US/UK-led neoliberalization of the 1980s, the significance of privatization cannot be overstated. Indeed, what ensued over the course of the 1980s and 1990s with respect to the sale of Latin American state enterprises has been considered by many to be, in the words of Grandin (2006), “one of the largest transfers of wealth in world history” (p. 187). Providing helpful figures, Grandin (who regards the period as the “third conquest” of Latin America) points out that, “between 1985 and 1992 over two thousand government industries were sold off throughout Latin America” (Ibid, p. 188), much of it going directly to multinational corporations and a burgeoning class of well-connected Latin American billionaires who exploited the wave of endless privatization as an opportunity to amass great wealth. Virtually nothing was immune from being sold off – “railroads, postal service, roads, factories, telephone services, schools, hospitals, prisons, garbage collection services, water, broadcast frequencies, pension systems, electric, television, and telephone companies were sold off – often not to the highest but to the best-connected bidder” (Ibid).

As David Harvey (2003) argues, the Wall Street-Treasury-IMF mandate of privatization indexed a broader transition from accumulation by expanded reproduction (conventional capital accumulation through reinvestment of surplus capital) to accumulation by dispossession.
Essentially, decades of accumulation by expanded reproduction had ultimately led to an overaccumulation crisis in the 1970s, and, following Marxist theorist Hannah Arendt, Harvey points out that, “capitalism always requires a fund of assets outside of itself if it is to confront and circumvent pressures of overaccumulation. If those assets, such as empty land or new raw material sources, do not lie to hand, then capitalism must somehow produce them” (Ibid, p. 143). With this phrase, accumulation by dispossession, Harvey employs Marx’s concept of “original” or “primitive” accumulation: the foundational process of appropriation, co-optation, and outright thievery (utilizing tactics of predation, fraud, and violence) through which the assets that formed the original basis of capital accumulation were acquired and privatized with help of the state. However, Harvey argues that this process did not disappear with the emergence or subsequent progression of capitalism but rather has continued to be ongoing. In other words, it does not represent a previous stage of capitalism but a perennial, if relatively ancillary, condition of it. What Harvey does argue is that at times of crisis in expanded reproduction (the more predominant form of capital accumulation) and/or when developmental states endeavor to “join the system’ and seek the benefits of capital accumulation directly,” (Ibid, p. 153) accumulation by dispossession rises to be the dominant form of accumulation.

It was in part through the privatization of the 1980s, both domestically and in developing nations (where it was imposed by the Wall Street-IMF-Treasury complex) that a new “fund of assets” was indeed “produced” through a comprehensive releasing of assets held by other entities (the state, communal landholding indigenous communities, etc.) to the market. The freeing up of these assets meant dramatic cuts in publicly provided services (as water, education, healthcare were released to the market), the abolishing of minimum wage laws (as labor power was released to the dictates of the market), and the dismantling of collective land rights (as land was released to the market). In addition to privatization, there are, in Harvey’s estimation, three additional components that were integral to the broader ascent of accumulation by dispossession that unfolded in the 1980s and 1990s.
First, there was not only the mandated selling off of state enterprises and commonly held assets, but also a process of financialization. Financialization is a concept developed in the area of heterodox economics, where it forms a key part of the intellectual conversation. However, as several have underscored, it is a concept that has been defined, employed, and interpreted in various ways, resulting in a term that is somewhat ambiguous. While Harvey does not provide a straightforward definition, one writer who offers a definition that might correspond with what Harvey has in mind is Greta Krippner (2005), who, like Harvey, both follows Giovanni Arrighi and places emphasis on the question of accumulation. In her article, The Financialization of the American Economy, Krippner (2005) defines financialization as “a pattern of accumulation in which profits accrue primarily through financial channels rather than through trade and commodity production” (p. 176) and Krippner defines “financial” as “activities relating to the provision (or transfer) of liquid capital in expectation of future interest, dividends, or capital gains” (p. 176). Most who write about financialization attribute its emergence to the structural conditions of the 1970s: amid a crisis of accumulation (that is, a general scarcity of profitable sites of investment) surplus capital “sought out” the relatively underutilized financial industry as an alternative site of investment where the turning of profits could resume. With this in mind, I think it is useful to consider the contention of Dumenil and Levy (2005) that the origins of financialization were not only structural but political as well – that is, it was sparked by the particular condition of overaccumulation (which demanded a new alternative to expanded reproduction) but also initiated and advanced by members of a particular segment of the capitalist class – the finance industry – that had been held largely in check during the post-war “Golden Age” of capitalism but had become more politically influential over the course of the 1970s. In particular, Dumenil and Levy (2005) point to the Volcker shock of 1979 – or what they term the “coup of 1979” – which, they argue, was not simply a politically neutral attack on inflation but rather a move orchestrated by members of the newly powerful finance industry that stood to benefit greatly from a high interest rate that promised to bring in vast sums of capital from debtors.
As Krippner (2005) shows, in the years following the Volcker shock, finance’s share of US corporate profits began to rise in dramatic fashion. In 1979, finance accounted for roughly 20% of corporate profits, while manufacturing dominated corporate profits at a little over 35% (with the service sector accounting for approximately 4%) (see Krippner, 2005, p 179). Over the next three decades, finance’s share began to rise (albeit in volatile fashion), catching up occasionally with manufacturing’s share which also fell and rose and fell several times (Ibid). By around 1997, however, finance was accounting for roughly 30% of corporate profits and manufacturing was responsible for 28% (Ibid). From there, the shares of the two sectors would go in starkly opposite directions, with finance’s share of corporate profits continuing to climb (reaching 45% in 2001) and that of manufacturing plummeting steeply, bottoming out at just 10 percent by 2001 (Ibid).17

Returning now to Harvey (2005), it was these specific practices that characterized the deluge of mergers and acquisitions of the eighties, nineties, and new millennium – specifically, what he refers to as “asset-stripping through mergers and acquisitions” and “the dispossession of assets (the raiding of pension funds and their decimation by stock and corporate collapses) – that form a key component of how financialization led to and entailed a form of accumulation by dispossession. However, there are many others that he lists such as stock promotions (an often fraudulent practice that entails purchasing a large amount of shares in “penny stocks,”

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17 For an incisive discussion of the onset of financialization see Crotty (2005). Specifically, Crotty argues that financialization was spurred on by a shifting corporate investment culture in which shareholder earnings became increasingly critical to a corporation’s survival. This had to do with new industrial competition from Japan and West Germany, which, thanks to the Volcker interest rate increase, were able to take advantage the fact that the post-WWII corporation that had operated as an “integrated coherent combination of relatively illiquid real assets assembled to pursue long-term growth and innovation” was increasingly altered according to “a ‘financial’ conception in which the NFC is seen as a ‘portfolio’ of liquid subunits that home-office management must continually restructure to maximize the stock price at every point in time”). This shifting culture was in turn tied to a combination of fierce competition from Japan and Western Europe (now exacerbated by the interest rate increase which raised the exchange value of the dollar and thus rendered the United States an even more attractive export target) and a context of low global demand rates triggered by the oil crisis of the early seventies and the neoliberal policies implemented in the eighties and nineties which, among other things, had the effect of raising unemployment, stifling wages and cutting social welfare expenditures.
promoting them to other potential buyers and thus orchestrating a buying frenzy that drives up the market value of the stock; then selling the original large amount of shares at the inflated price thus raking in large profits while sending the market value plummeting and leaving the new buyers with shares that are now worthless), Ponzi schemes, and corporate fraud of the sort committed by Enron, where falsified corporate profits and the subsequent collapse that ensued ended up dispossessing many of their jobs and pensions. In addition, financialization also entailed the usurious practices of credit card companies which, in the 1980s, began aggressively targeting members of the working and middle classes who were now being mercilessly squeezed by the high levels of unemployment, wage stagnation, and public expenditure cuts that had come with the neoliberal reforms of the Reagan administration.

Turning to the question of how financialization shaped imperial relations between the United States and developing countries, focus can be placed on the decade of the nineties. The stock market had taken a dive in 1987 and interest rates were lowered in the United States, two events that rendered the US less attractive to the financial industry than it had been in the preceding years. In this context financial agents began increasingly targeting developing countries as sites of portfolio investment.

The third key component of accumulation by dispossession has been what Harvey refers to as the “management and manipulation of crises.” This is a practice based on what Harvey (2005) describes as the “springing of the debt trap” with the Mexican debt crisis serving as the establishing blueprint for what would become “the fine art of deliberative redistribution of wealth from poor countries to the rich” (p. 162). According to Harvey, the US Treasury-Wall Street-IMF complex became expert at pulling off exactly what it had done with Mexico in the early eighties. Fed Reserve chairman, Alan Greenspan followed Volcker’s precedent several times in the nineties. Thus, while debt crises in individual countries had been the exception in the 1960s, they suddenly became relatively common with almost no developing country left immune. Referred to as “confiscatory deflation” by neoliberals, the structural adjustment that follows debt crises is, according to Harvey, nothing less than accumulation by dispossession. In emphasizing how debt
crisis can be triggered and manipulated to facilitate accumulation, Harvey draws the useful analogy with the capitalist tactic of facilitating accumulation through generating unemployment to create a labor surplus, which in turn drives down wages that owners will have to pay.

Finally, Harvey points to the state’s increasing role as an agent of redistributive activity – specifically, “reversing the flow from upper to lower classes” that had occurred during the years of the Keynesian crisis – as the fourth component of financialization. This is accomplished through privatization of social goods, cuts in social expenditures, as well as revisions of the tax code that render it more regressive than progressive.

4.3 Imperial Interventions of the 1980s: US-Backed Repression in Central American Civil Wars

In addition to the imposition of neoliberal restructuring, the Reagan presidency was also defined by a new campaign of repression in Latin America (Grandin, 2006), something which had begun to re-emerge under Eisenhower (after something of a reprieve under Roosevelt and Truman) before flourishing under Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and Ford and most recently diminishing under President Jimmy Carter (1977-1981), who had run on a platform that had included a call for US leadership on human rights and had taken certain steps to delink the United States from South America’s dirty wars.

While the US had been aiding the military suppression of leftist movements in Latin Americas throughout the sixties and seventies, it was, according to Grandin (2006), in the eighties, coming off the failure of the Vietnam War and faced with the recent success of the Sandinistas, that the Reagan administration committed itself to eradicating “third world revolutionary nationalism” (Grandin, 2006, p. 91) through the use of “low intensity warfare.” As Greg Grandin (2006) has argued, this had everything to do with the radicalization of right wing conservatives that had come with defeat in Vietnam, their increasing influence “first within the White House during the Ford interregnum and then from outside the Carter administration, manning the ramparts of the growing number of think tanks and lobbying groups – the Committee on the Present Danger, the Committee for a Free Congress, the Committee for the Free World,
the Committee to Maintain a Prudent Defense Policy – dedicated to defense and foreign policy issues” (Grandin, 2006, p. 64). As Grandin (2006) posits, “They were more bellicose than the professional soldiers, not only to prove their mettle but to overcome what they thought was a crippling caution instilled in the ranks of the military by Vietnam” (p. 64). Throughout the Carter administration, these elements had banded together in opposition to what they perceived as erroneous leniency toward Communism, brought on by public outcry over the atrocities of the Vietnam War and the humiliation of defeat. They accused Carter of weakness and blamed diplomatic strategy for the success of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, where, after nearly forty years of rule, the right-wing, repressive US-backed Somoza regime had been overthrown in 1979 by the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN, or the Sandinistas), a guerrilla organization named for Augusto Sandino, led by a group of former university students, and comprised of a wide cross section that included members of the peasantry, workers, adult children of the country’s petit bourgeoisie, Catholic church leaders, and anti-Somoza elites (see Morley, 1994).

In its campaign for the White House, the Reagan camp had taken pride in distinguishing itself from Carter, and in the area of Cold War policy this meant condemning the so-called “containment” approach of which it accused the Carter administration. Upon taking office in 1981, Reagan instituted a policy of active rollback with respect to communist governments and having campaigned on a platform of restoring US authority in the world, Reagan filled his administration with the aforementioned “civilian militarists” and with politicized Vietnam veterans (such as Oliver North and Richard Armitage). The result would be, according to Grandin (2006), a veritable neoconservative overhaul of the State Department and the CIA. The more specific credo of Reagan’s general stance – the Reagan doctrine – was the provision of aid to anti-communist guerrilla movements (who Reagan sometimes referred to as “freedom fighters”) around the world as part of a broader, aggressive approach to weakening international Soviet influence. While this doctrine would be applied to numerous countries in various regions of the world, in Latin America the central target was Nicaragua.
Even before Reagan took office, however, the Republican offensive against the Sandinista regime had actually gotten underway during the days of Carter’s presidency. As historian Morris H. Morley (1994) has documented, around the same time that Carter was submitting a controversial Nicaragua aid package bill to Congress, Department of Defense officials were reaching out to former Nicaragua National Guard colonel Enrique Bermúdez in an effort to explore the possibilities for overthrowing the FSLN government. At this time, Morley recounts, Bermúdez was introduced to the CIA by the head of the Western Hemisphere Division the Air Force, and by the middle of 1980 he was being paid by the CIA and was being groomed to become the leader of a CIA project akin to the Bay of Pigs Invasion of 1961. In the meantime, working outside of Carter’s command and within the “hard hegemony” frame of candidate Reagan, Republican Senator Jesse Helms and his top aide John Carbaugh also began to lay the foundation for a counterrevolutionary operation (see Grandin, 2006). In mid-1980, and working with one Nat Hamrick, a US-American gun dealer and hardwood supplier working out of Nicaragua, Helms and Carbaugh brought together ex-National Guardsmen, Honduran military officers, representatives of the Argentine military junta to brainstorm an operation aimed at destabilizing the FSLN government (Ibid).

Once Reagan was in office, these initial efforts on the part of the CIA and Senator Helms officially came together and progressed rapidly (see Morley 1994). In early 1981, just after Reagan’s inauguration, Major General Robert Laurence Schweitzer, assistant to the deputy army chief of staff under Carter and now an NSC member under Reagan arranged a meeting between Reagan’s newly nominated CIA director William Casey and Honduran officials, who proposed to Casey a plan to destabilize Nicaragua through the use of a paramilitary exiled National Guardsmen force of contrarevolucionarios (counter-revolutionaries) or “Contras.” Casey approved the plan, kept it secret from the State Department, as well as Congress and the general public. Along with Casey, Vietnam veteran turned NSC member Oliver North would become its chief sponsors.
Launched in 1981, the Contra operation quickly took on massive proportions that were transnational in scope. Casey and North enlisted numerous states that included Israel, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, and Panama, as well as private security firms, arms dealers, businessmen, international drug traffickers, conservative religious organizations, retired US military, and grassroots organizations (which were tapped to fundraise to provide humanitarian aid to the Contras). The component of the network activity that would foment the most scandal when it finally emerged was of course the one that piggybacked on another secret operation in which US officials had enlisted Israeli arms dealers to sell US missiles to revolutionary Iran (now under a US arms embargo) in exchange for the release of seven US hostages. By 1985, in what would become known as the Iran-Contra affair, Colonel North successfully directed portions of the payments collected by the Israeli arms dealers to the funding of the Contras.

In the meantime, and working under the direction of the CIA, the Contras carried out a full-fledged genocidal war against the Nicaraguan population, one that was indiscriminate and unyielding (Grandin, 2006). In later years, Contra officials and contracted mercenaries would tell of village massacres, massive abductions in which victims were raped, tortured, and murdered, razings of schools, clinics, and power stations, and the executions of civilians, Sandinista officials, doctors, nurses, judges, and heads of cooperatives (Ibid). The effort to destabilize through terror also involved the CIA’s organization of what it called “unilaterally controlled Latino assets” – essentially mercenary units recruited to launch a coastal offensive from a converted oil rig located in the international waters of the Pacific Ocean. Comprised of Guatemalan, Salvadoran, and Ecuadorian soldiers of fortune, these units carried out bombings of Nicaragua’s Pacific coast and implanted mines in the waters of its major commercial port (Ibid).

The Contra operation continued for the duration of the eighties, resulting in the deaths of nearly four thousand civilians by the year 1985, as well as the wounding of another 4,000 and the kidnapping of 5,000 (Grandin, 2006). Additionally, in the early eighties, the Reagan administration reduced the country’s sugar quota by 90%, terminated the economic aid programs that had been started by Carter, persuaded US allies to decrease their aid to the country as well, and put
pressure on multilateral lending agencies to decline Nicaraguan loan applications (these policies had subsequently been dialed back for the 1984 US presidential election but had been resumed once Reagan was re-elected). Under continued siege the FSLN government was compelled to allot over half its national budget to defense, thus taking valuable funds away from its social reform programs that had won them popular support (O'Brien, 2007). However, such efforts had still failed to accomplish the Reagan administration’s overarching goal: the electoral defeat of the FSLN party. In 1984, elections (validated by multiple independent observers, mostly from countries allied with the United States), had resulted in the presidential victory of FSLN leader, Daniel Ortega, an outcome that prompted Reagan to denounce the election as fraudulent and implement a US trade embargo that took effect in May of 1985.

Over the next five years, the US continued to pump money and support into Contra warfare and the total number of civilian killings reached thirty thousand (Grandin, 2006, p. 116). As the 1990 election approached, the United States poured money into the opposition party, the Unión Nacional Opositora (UNO) or the National Opposition Union. According to sociologist Christian Smith (1996), the CIA donated a total of $28 million to the party’s campaigns and US Congress authorized the donation of $9 million in “election assistance,” $7.7 million of which went to the UNO and its affiliates (pp. 356-357). Additionally, the CIA secretly channeled a total of over $600,000 directly to 100 Contras exiles through its covert Nicaraguan Exile Relocation Program; the money was designated to finance Contra political activity in Nicaragua in the eight months leading up the scheduled February election (Ibid). Finally, in November of 1989, President Bush announced that if the UNO presidential candidate, Violeta Chamorro were to be elected he would immediately lift the US trade embargo (see Chomsky, 2002, p.110-11, Ch. 4, n.13), which by that point, had been in effect for almost five years. Still, going into the election, polls showed a clear FSLN advantage (Smith, 1996, pp. 356-357). The outcome, however, would ultimately contradict the predictions. Chamorro was elected president with 55 percent of the vote versus 41% for the FSLN candidate Daniel Ortega, and, after ten years of what amounted to covert sabotage,
economic strangulation, and a terror campaign waged against the country’s revolutionary government by the Contras and the United States, FSLN rule officially came to end (Ibid).

As the Reagan administration funded and coordinated the Contra war against the revolutionary FSLN government in Nicaragua, it was also taking extensive steps in other Central America countries to suppress mounting opposition to the oppressive right wing regimes that it had long supported, and in some cases, brought to power. Indeed, the Reagan administration’s proclaimed charges against rebel movements that were intensifying in El Salvador and Guatemala echoed the same charges it leveled against the Sandinista government of Nicaragua: specifically, that the rebels maintained ties to Castro and the Soviets, and if successful, would allow for a Soviet beachhead to be established in the Caribbean Basin. As historians have documented, the state repression carried out in these countries, which was equally brutal to the counterrevolution being waged concurrently in Nicaragua, was at the behest of and made possible by generous funding from the US government.

For example, Grandin (2006) informs us that, in the case of El Salvador, where the Frente Faribundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) began mobilizing in 1980, the US authorized ten million dollars of military aid to the country’s notoriously repressive government in 1981. Notably, by this point US congressional expressions of concern for human rights abuses that had characterized the late seventies had all but evaporated within the context of the Reagan administration. In the years that followed, the US intensified its training of Salvadoran military at the SOA (expanding its forces from a little over 5,000 soldiers to 53,000), equipped it with plans, weapons, and helicopters, and established an intelligence and reconnaissance system in neighboring Honduras and in Peru (Grandin, 2006, pp. 101-103). With a total of $6 billion of support from the United States over the course of the next ten years, the Salvadoran government terrorized its population in a genocidal offensive that ultimately killed fifty thousand civilians (Ibid, p. 104). Ultimately, the Salvadoran government was unsuccessful in defeating the FMLN, which reportedly maintained the loyalty of the majority of the population in both rural and urban settings (Ibid, p. 108). When the protracted conflict finally came to an end in 1991, it was at the urging of
the US government (which, in the wake of the Soviet collapse, no longer feared a threat of “communist aggression” taking hold in Central America). Importantly, the FMLN, undefeated, was able to negotiate for land reform, judicial reform, the dismantling of the government’s death squad system, and the discharge of some of the most extreme human rights offenders from the country’s military (Ibid).

4.4 The Nineties: Neoliberal Economics, NAFTA, and the “Pumping of Income”

With respect to the 1990s, Harvey (2005) understands this decade as the period of consolidation with respect to neoliberalism as global economic doctrine. Key here was the 1995 creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), an international institution that had been in the making since the end of World War II. Dedicated to ensuring that international trade between WTO members abides by key principles of unfettered commerce, open markets, anti-protectionism, the WTO is understood by Harvey as being a crucial component in the global consolidation of neoliberalism (Harvey, 2005, p. 66). With respect to the late 20th century US dominance of this neoliberal project, of particular note is that when the US senate passed the WTO agreement, it did so with the proviso that the US could disregard any WTO ruling that it deemed unjust to US interest (Harvey, 2005, pp. 73-74). Additionally, others such as Ha-Joon Chang (2003) and Robert Hunter Wade (2003) have argued that the membership rules and agreements of the WTO inflict significant constraints on the development policies of recently industrializing countries that have heretofore relied on degrees of protectionism to build up their economies, embodying a sort of “kicking away the ladder” effect. (Attributed to German economist Friederich List, “kicking away the ladder” was a concept used heavily by the US state in defense of its own protectionist policies in the 19th century against British demands for “free trade” and open markets). In the meantime, the more economically and militarily powerful WTO members, like the United States and the European Union, have been able to engage in a much more selective enforcement of WTO rules and keep large parts of their economy protected from external competition (see Chang, 2003; Wade, 2003).
Another key event in the neoliberalist turn was, of course, the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. While it was ratified and signed into law under President Bill Clinton, the roots of the infamous trade agreement between the United States, Mexico, and Canada originated with President Reagan, who had called for a "North American accord" in his 1979 presidential campaign (Orme, 1996). In the year leading up to the election, Reagan had proposed the idea of a trilateral free trade agreement to US business leaders, Canadian Conservatives, and Mexican president, Jose Lopez Portillo. The idea of a "North American accord" went against Mexico's tradition of economic nationalism. However, amid swollen foreign debt, high public deficit, and a trade deficit with the United States, Lopez Portillo had been interested in moving toward a bilateral trade agreement with the United States as a solution to Mexico’s economic situation. Ultimately, however he had concluded that the radical nature of what Reagan was proposing was simply impossible given Mexico’s political climate, characterized by a powerful industrialist class that remained solidly committed to a protectionist framework that was premised on the contention that a free trade pact with any industrial giant such as the United States would decimate Mexican industry. In 1979, Lopez Portillo had thus declined Reagan’s proposal to negotiate any such accord, informing him that the likes of what he was proposing was generations away from being possible in Mexico. Indeed, in the same year that Reagan was inaugurated, Lopez Portillo had reversed a previous decision to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in the face of intense public debate that it had provoked. In Canada, on the other hand, it had only been matter of waiting for President Pierre Trudeau, a social democrat, to be succeeded by a Conservative candidate, and this had come to pass in 1984 when Brian Mulrooney had assumed the Canadian presidency. That same year, the two countries ratified a bilateral free trade agreement.

In the meantime, Lopez Portillo had been succeeded by Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado in 1982, the president who had quickly begun adopting neoliberal reforms in exchange for debt rescheduling. In addition, as George W. Grayson (1995) reports, de la Madrid Hurtado took key steps toward liberalizing trade with the United States, signing a Bilateral Subsidies Understanding
(1985) in which he agreed to end export financing over the next two years in exchange for being granted an injury test in countervailing duty litigation; entering the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1986; and, entering into a Bilateral Trade and Investment Framework (1987) that built further upon the provisions of the Bilateral Subsidies Understanding. Still, Reagan's free trade agreement had remained largely on the backburner as the Mexican debt crisis had taken precedent. Ultimately, it was Reagan's successor, George H.W. Bush (1989-1993) who would revive the cause of negotiating a free trade agreement with both Mexico and Canada, and in 1990 it was de la Madrid's successor, an economist named Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) who, after an unsuccessful attempt at cultivating new trade ties with Japan and Western European nations in the wake of the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1989, would inform the Bush administration that Mexico was ready to sit down at the table. Importantly, by this time, Salinas had already proven to be the most radical neoliberal president that Mexico had yet seen. Among other things, he had drastically reduced tariffs in 1990 and NAFTA would accelerate this process.

NAFTA was historic because it was the first free trade agreement between two industrialized countries and a developing country, thus constituting a stunning instance of asymmetrical economic integration; the size of the Mexican economy, for example, was just five percent of that of the US economy. Central provisions of the agreement included a ten-year phasing out of all key tariffs (with a period of fifteen years being granted to sensitive items such as corn and sugar); the elimination (within six years) of Mexican tariffs on over eighty percent of US textile and apparel exports; the granting of "national treatment" to any North American company investing in the US, Mexico, or Canada; the opening up of all of Mexico's petrochemicals to foreign investment (with the exception of eight); the full opening up (by the year 2000) of Mexico's financial services market to US and Canadian banks, financial service providers, and insurance companies; and finally, the opening up of Mexican roads and railways to US and Canadian companies (before NAFTA, Mexico had required that, upon reaching the border, foreign companies to transfer cargo and passengers to Mexican transporters).
Importantly, approximately one year after NAFTA was passed, President Clinton called the first annual Summit of the Americas (a meeting of the thirty-four members of the Organization of the Americas (OAS)), where he proposed the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), another trade agreement whose essential aim was to expand the provisions contained in NAFTA to all nations in the hemisphere (excluding Cuba), thereby creating a hemispheric zone of “free trade.” Representatives from all of the attending nations approved Clinton’s proposal, yet negotiations would not be launched until the Second Summit of the Americas, held in Santiago, Chile in 1998. At this time, the thirty-four nations established a Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC), and, in the following year, working groups comprised of representatives from each country began meeting every few months for negotiations, the projected end date being slated for the year 2005.

Thus far, I have provided some key details with respect to the complex process of neoliberal restructuring that took place in Latin America at the overwhelming command of the United States (and the United Kingdom) over the course of the 1980s and 1990s. Recalling Harvey’s definition of capitalist imperialism as a fusion of the politics of state and empire with the molecular processes of capital accumulation in space and time, the events that unfolded over the course these decades constitute a continuation of US imperialism that characterized the 19th and 20th centuries. Amid a domestic crisis of overaccumulation and on the verge of a debt crisis (brought on by the Fed’s interest rate increase) that would have spelled financial disaster for the domestic economy, the state (through the channel of the US Treasury) had intervened in such a way that not only averted this threat (thus demonstrating an exercise of state logic) but also opened up vast economic opportunities for capital accumulation by multinational corporations (such as IBM and Citibank) that could now take over, invest it, and profit from industries that had previously been held by Latin American governments. The 1990s had brought the consolidation of neoliberal hegemony through the founding of the WTO and NAFTA.

In addition to being imperialistic in practice, this neoliberalist restructuring was also imperialistic in outcome. Here, we can recall that a key part of Harvey’s argument is that capitalist
imperialism is not only a fusion of state politics and capitalist processes but also a resultant preservation by the state of uneven geographical conditions that emerge from the process of capital accumulation. As Harvey (2003) states, “The wealth and wellbeing of particular territories are augmented at the expense of others” and “one of the state’s key tasks is to try to preserve that pattern of asymmetries in exchange over space that works to its own advantage” (p. 32). Indeed, during the nineties, the United States experienced a boom, driven in part by the dramatic technological innovation that prevailed during that decade, but also, and to a large degree, by neoliberal restructuring (accumulation by dispossession) of its own economy and those of other countries, a move which, according to Harvey (2005), allowed the US to “pump high rates of return into the country from its financial and corporate operations (both direct and portfolio investments) in the rest of the world” (p. 93). Supporting his argument, Harvey cites work by French economists, Gerard Dumenil and Dominique Levy (2004) who show that the ratio of total financial income flows from the rest of the world to the United States (including all profits from US foreign direct investment and all income from portfolio investment accumulated by corporations, households, funds, etc.) to domestic profits nearly doubled from 45% in 1978 to an average of nearly 80% during the neoliberal restructuring of the 1980s and 1990s. Further substantiating Harvey’s claims are figures provided by James Wilkie, Eduardo Aleman, and Jose Guadalupe Ortega (2001, as cited in O’Brien, 2007), who report that US direct investment in Latin America more than tripled between 1990 and 1999, shooting from US $70.7 billion to US $223 billion.

Of this increase, investment in manufacturing comprised a significant part, rising to US $51 billion (a near doubling of what had been at the outset). However, the bulk of this investment was in finance, where it more than quadrupled to US $124 billion. How this explosion in US investment and resultant “pumping” of “income from the rest of the world” (Dumenil and Levy, 2004, p. 661) contributed to a broader restoration of class power in the United States is illustrated in the way in which the profits of the eighties and nineties were distributed. As Harvey (2005) summarizes:
After the implementation of neoliberal policies in the late 1970s, the share of national income of the top 1 per cent of income earners in the US soared, to reach 15 per cent (very close to its pre-Second World War share) by the end of the century. The top 0.1 percent of income earners in the US increased their share of the national income from 2 per cent to in 1978 to over 6 per cent by 1999, while the ratio of the median compensation of workers to CEOs increased from just over 30 to 1 in 1970 to nearly 500 to 1 by 2000. (p. 16)

These figures are particularly striking when one considers that, in the eighties and nineties, aggregate rates of global growth actually declined, thus throwing into sharp relief the centrality of dispossession (rather than expanded reproduction) and redistribution to the new levels of US capital accumulation during this period. Thus, what transpired was not only a massive redistribution of wealth from developing countries (as well as the domestic population) to the United States, but to a specific contingent of capitalist who had always been at the helm of capitalist imperialist relations.

In the meantime, as neoliberal restructuring of the developing world (and the domestic economy) enabled an economic boom and a restoration of class power in the United States, conditions in Latin America (as well as most of Africa) declined sharply. In most countries, neoliberalization led directly to deep and seemingly intractable economic stagnation, an epidemic that led economists to label the 1980s as Latin America’s “lost decade.” Among several of the larger economies, neoliberal “shock therapy” did produce initial spurts of growth, but these were quickly followed by economic collapse – Mexico in 1995, Brazil in 1998, Argentina in 2001 (Harvey, 2005). Overall, the “shock therapy” of the eighties and nineties dramatically widened income inequalities, particularly in Mexico, as a small percentage of well-connected elites (in addition to the many multinationals) participated in buying up newly privatized state assets, becoming instant billionaires while the majority of the populations suffered a drastic decline in their standard of living, enduring cuts in wages and food subsidies, layoffs, currency devaluations, and the conversion of public services – such as water, electricity, etc. – into private commodities that now had to be purchased (Grandin, 2006; Harvey, 2003, 2005; O’Brien, 2007). As Grandin (2006) notes, by 1996, the proportion of the Latin American population that was living on two dollars a day had risen to one third (compared with only eleven percent in the late 1960s), and
between 1995 and 2005, the number of Latin Americans living below the poverty level increased by over 20 million to reach a total of 221 million.

In concert with its imposition of neoliberal economics in Latin America, the US state continued to devote vast amounts of money, manpower, and armaments to projects of repression in Latin America (Grandin 2006). As discussed in the foregoing section, in the Cold War context of eighties, the key targets of these efforts had been the leftist rebel groups of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. In the nineties, with the Cold War officially over, US-sponsored violence and repression in the region was rebranded under the moniker of the “war on drugs.” Several have argued, this new projection of US force had less or as much to do with an objective of eradicating drug trafficking as it did with creating a rationale for ensuring “order” in a region that, with the creation of NAFTA and the wave of structural adjustment programs, was now reopened to US capital after the “turning inward” that had characterized the region over the sixties and seventies and had so alarmed US business leaders (See Youngers, 2000, McSherry, 2000). In the eighties, the hub of US-sponsored repression expanded from Central America into to the Andean region of South America that spans Colombia, Peru, Venezuela and Ecuador. And, as McSherry (2000) argues, just as in the years following World War II, the central objective of this effort was to maintain access to Latin American markets on US terms, however the official Cold War narrative of fighting the spread of Soviet communism was now replaced with one of battling the inflow of narcotics into the country. Such a rationale was convenient enough as the neoliberal shock therapy of the eighties had in fact delivered skyrocketing rates of coca production and trafficking as Latin America’s poor and working classes struggled to find sources of livelihood in the face of massive unemployment, wage cuts, union-busting, privatization of social services, the invasion of US agribusiness, and economic collapse.

4.5 Into the New Millennium: Anti-Neoliberal Latin American Political Movements, CAFTA, and Continued Election Meddling on the Part of the US State

Throughout the nineties and into the early millennium, the ravages of neoliberal policy in Latin America sparked movements of organized resistance and grassroots political mobilization
among the region’s poor and middle classes (O’Brien, 2007; Grandin, 2006). In 1994, the militant Zapatista Liberation Army occupied four towns of Chiapas, Mexico in protest of neoliberal reforms that had provided for the release of communal lands to the market, cut domestic corn subsidies for domestic small-scale farmers, and allowed cheaply priced corn grown and sold by US government subsidized agribusiness to enter the country, a move which caused corn prices to plummet by forty-eight percent and sent small corn farmers into economic ruin (O’Brien, 2007). In the late nineties and the first few years of the millennium, a coalition of indigenous protesters in Bolivia took to the streets in protest of the privatization of water and gas that had been demanded by the IMF in exchange for debt rescheduling and new loans and had been subsequently implemented by the country’s government (Ibid). During the same time, significant movements also took shape in Argentina and Ecuador (Ibid).

Suffice it to say, then, that by the time George W. Bush became president of the United States in 2001, there was deep and widespread discontent across Latin America (and the developing world, more broadly) with the United States campaign of neoliberalism, its failure to deliver the sorts of social and economic improvements its proponents had promised, and the extreme human suffering it appeared to have instead precipitated. Moreover, this discontent had begun to manifest at the region’s polls where several countries had begun electing leftist presidents (see O’Brien, 2007). In 1996 Ecuadorians had elected Abdala Bucaram, who had run on a populist anti-structural adjustment platform (but would only serve one year before being ousted for corruption and erratic behavior). In 1997 Venezuelans had elected Hugo Chavez, who in addition to openly criticizing the United States with charges of imperialism and billing himself as a champion of the poor and working classes, had quickly begun declaring the need for a region-wide Latin American socialist revolution inspired by 19th century independence leader, Simon Bolivar. In 1999 Chileans had elected the Socialist party candidate, Ricardo Lagos.

Thus, as the legitimacy of market fundamentalism was clearly on the decline across the region, the foreign policy challenge at hand for Bush administration was, according to political scientist William M. Leogrande (2007), to “define a new relationship with Latin America beyond
the old slogan of ‘trade not aid’ and open markets – a relationship responsive to the region's emerging demand for social and economic change” (p. 356). In the estimation of Leogrande and most others, the failure of the Bush administration to do this began almost immediately.

Despite coming to office with promises of prioritizing relations between the United States and Latin America and pledges not to “bully” as other administrations had done in the past, Bush maintained a staunch commitment to the neoliberal reforms that had fallen increasingly out of favor across the regions, insisting that the recent social and economic ills demanded not an alternative economic program but an increased level of liberalization (Ibid). Moreover, in addition to ignoring the sea change away from support for market fundamentalism in Latin America, Bush also assigned Latin American foreign policy to “cold warriors” who comprised the most conservative segment of the Republican party. These were officials who had built careers through planning and executing operations aimed at thwarting and repressing the emergence and functionality of “unfriendly” governments in Latin America and beyond during the protracted post-World War II conflict with the Soviet Union.

In this context, Hugo Chavez, largely ignored by Bush’s predecessor Bill Clinton, was instantly marked as a target, with Washington lending moral and material support to his domestic opposition by way of US officials and various institutions that together provided not only a sympathetic ear but also close to one million dollars in support during Bush’s first year in office (Ibid). By April 2001, the Chavez opposition was organizing a national strike and massive street demonstrations with the intention of parlaying the unrest into the ousting of Chavez, something which would come to pass that same month when one protest erupted into gunfire and the Venezuelan military arrested Chavez and promptly installed Pedro Carmona, a business leader who, upon assuming the presidency, immediately suspended the country’s constitution and dismantled the legislature and the Supreme Court. Expressing its tacit support for these events, the Bush administration refused to call the operation a coup (despite the fact that nineteen of the Latin American heads of state immediately condemned the transfer of power as unconstitutional), and instead blamed the Chavez administration for what had transpired, defended the military as
the advocate of the Venezuelan people, and openly supported Carmona. Amid immediate and massive street protests and the pro-Chavez loyalty of certain military factions, however, senior officers soon returned the ousted president to office. In the following year, the domestic opposition tried again, this time organizing a strike against the petroleum industry and demanding Chavez’s resignation. When the military did not step in as it had done a year earlier, the opposition abandoned the plan and instead collected enough signatures for a new election, which was held in August of 2004, but resulted in the re-election of Chavez as president. It was at this point that Chavez then launched a vigorous campaign of international diplomacy, throwing his support to other leftist political candidates in Latin American countries, reaching out to Argentina by purchasing some of its debt, exporting oil at subsidized prices to Cuba and several English-speaking Caribbean countries, and cheaply selling heating oil in a number of poor communities in the northeastern United States.

As Leogrande (2007) details, in the United States the Bush administration responded with condemnation, charging Chavez with subversion and announcing the existence of a Cuba-Venezuela “axis of evil” that had to be defeated. This sort of rhetoric only worked to lower the already negative opinion that most Latin American leaders had formed with regard to the United States’ recent involvement in the failed coup in Venezuela and cultivated widespread negative opinion of the Bush administration among the Latin American public. Importantly, while the region’s leaders did not universally or unconditionally embrace Chavez or his policies and style of rule, many regarded him as an ally. Perhaps more importantly, almost all Latin American governments deeply disapproved of the interference of the United States in the political affairs of Venezuela. Such an act clearly perpetuated the United States’ history of imperialism in Latin America and deeply contradicted Bush’s 2001 claims that a new day of multilateralism was dawning for relations between the two regions.

In the midst of seeking to oust Chavez through repeated coup operations, the Bush administration also directed its energies to stemming the wave of leftist political mobilization that Chavez was actively supporting. Specifically, as Leogrande (2007) shows, between 2002 and
2004, the Bush administration endeavored to forestall the election of leftist presidents in several Latin American countries where the United States held significant leverage – Nicaragua and El Salvador. Specifically, in the weeks following 9/11, the US State Department had declared that Nicaragua’s Sandinista party had ties to terrorists, and, shortly thereafter, the Deputy to the Acting Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs had dropped hints that if Sandinista candidate Daniel Ortega were to be elected in the presidential election of 2002, the United States would view the country as a new target in its war on terror. His comments had been quickly picked up by the Nicaraguan right wing, which had used them to threaten voters with the prospect of the US war on terror being brought to Nicaragua if Ortega were to be elected. As the election drew closer, the Acting Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs openly denounced Ortega to the Nicaraguan Chamber of Commerce, pressured Nicaraguan business leaders to support the Liberal candidate, Enrique Bolaños, and, according to media reports, successfully convinced the Conservative candidate to drop out of the race (in order to direct more votes to the Liberal candidate). The candidate exited the race soon after meeting with the Acting Assistant Secretary. In the weeks to come, the US Ambassador to Nicaragua campaigned with Bolaños, handing out food to the poor at rallies. Finally, when Ortega was still leading in the polls in the weeks leading up to the election, Bush’s brother and then Florida governor Jeb Bush penned an article for the Miami Herald, in which he declared Ortega “an enemy of the United States” and forcefully endorsed Bolaños. His article reached Nicaraguan voters by way of the country’s right wing press outlets, which reprinted the piece with the heading “Brother of President of the United States Backs Enrique Bolaños.” Just a few weeks later, Ortega lost to Bolaños.

Similar strategies were deployed in El Salvador in 2004, when the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front ran a candidate in the presidential election. One month before the election, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Roger Noriega (who had openly commended the coup in Venezuela just two years prior) flew to El Salvador and delivered a speech to voters in which he pointedly directed them to “consider what kind of relationship they want the new administration to have with us” (Sheridan 2004, as cited in Leogrande, 2007, p.
Otto Reich (former top official with the Reagan administration who had more recently held Noriega’s position, but had since moved on to become a special envoy for Latin American Affairs at the National Security Council) then gave a telephone press conference from the headquarters of the Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA), which was the party preferred by Washington; in it he expressed his worry over the impact that an FMLN victory would have on the country’s “economic, commercial, and migratory relations with the United States” (Sheridan 2004, as cited in Leogrande, 2007, p. 379). Republicans in the US congress quickly followed up with a declaration that they would begin a campaign to deport Salvadorans from the United States if the FMLN was victorious; if successful, such a campaign would have cut off an annual remittance total of $2 billion. In the end, the FMLN candidate, Shafik Handal, lost to the ARENA candidate, an outcome that Leogrande attributes in part to the fact that Handal, as a veteran Communist and FMLN commander during the civil wars of the 1980s, could not garner broad based appeal among the Salvadoran population of 2004 in the way that the more youthful ARENA candidate was able to do. Still, the outcome of the election cannot be fully divorced from the clear steps the United States took to control the political process in this small and economically poor country that was and continues to be highly dependent on remittances from the United States.

Importantly, the specific context for the Bush administration’s interventions in the democratic processes of these Central American countries was one in which plans were in the works to begin negotiations of a major trade treaty between the Central American and United States governments were underway. Negotiations officially began in January of 2003 and ended in May 2004 with the creation of the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) (see Kose and Rebucci, 2005). Thus the period of pre-negotiations and the actual negotiation period, itself, overlapped precisely with the time period when US state actors were attempting to thwart the election of leftist presidential candidates in two signatory nations – Nicaragua and El Salvador. In Nicaragua, the 2002 election of a right wing candidate came just before CAFTA negotiations began. In El Salvador a right wing president was elected in March 2004, at which time CAFTA negotiations were just coming to an end but ratification by individual signatory governments still
remained as the final step. With right wing presidents secured in Nicaragua and El Salvador – along with Costa Rica, Honduras, and Guatemala – CAFTA would ultimately be ratified by nearly all of the signatory Central American governments by early 2005, while Costa Rica would ratify it in early 2007 (OAS, n.d.). During this time the government of the Dominican Republic also joined the agreement, at which point it became known as CAFTA-DR (Ibid).

In the meantime, early millennial US intervention in Latin American presidential elections was not limited to the region of Central America. Again, the context of trade agreement negotiations was at play. As the Bush administration was negotiating CAFTA it was also attempting to create a much more comprehensive Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, which would include all of the Latin American republics. It was during this period that, in 2002 (the same year as the Nicaraguan election), leftist candidate and leader of the coca grower’s union Evo Morales ran for president in the South American nation of Bolivia. According to Leogrande (2007), US Ambassador Manuel Rocha responded to Morales’ candidacy by threatening the country’s electorate with the cessation of US aid if they were to elect Morales. In the weeks that followed that threat, Morales’s support reportedly doubled, sending him from fourth place in the polls to second place in the actual election. Because none of the eleven candidates had won a majority, the Bolivian congress was required to select the winner from the two frontrunners. Again the US ambassador intervened, lobbying the competing party leaders to support Morales’ opponent, Gonzalez Sanchez de Lozada, who was ultimately selected and assumed the Bolivian presidency in 2002.

In light of the trade deals negotiation context, the actions taken by the United States in Bolivia along with those taken in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Venezuela must be understood as an example of how, despite Bush’s pledge to chart a new relation with Latin America, the US state clearly continued to intervene to “preserve that pattern of asymmetries in exchange over space that works to its own advantage” (Harvey, 2003, p. 32). Indeed, Handal, Morales, and Ortega were all part of a new Latin American political movement that openly challenged this historic pattern and its most recent incarnation in the accelerated asymmetrical economic
integration of Latin America and the United States structural adjustment policies and NAFTA had brought about and that CAFTA and FTAA promised to further facilitate. In his discourse, Chavez even went so far as to call for an alternative economic integration of Latin America that excluded the United States.

Despite these early millennial successes of US imperialism in Bolivia, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, however, the next five years brought the election of six Latin American presidents who had run on left and center-left platforms: Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva in Brazil in 2003, Nestor Kirchener in Argentina in 2003, Tabare Vazquez in Uruguay in 2005, Evo Morales who ran again in Bolivia in 2006, and Rafael Correa in Ecuador in 2007. This period marked what many, the politicians included, began to describe as the rise of the wave of 21st century socialism. As discussed in the preceding chapter, it was precisely amid these events that the fieldwork for this dissertation was conducted.

4.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have reviewed the events that comprised the greater part of the 1970-2000 period that Harvey periodized as neoliberal hegemony, focusing specifically on the Latin American/"Third World" debt crisis precipitated by the loaning and borrowing frenzy that followed the oil crisis of 1973 and the era of structural adjustment through which the United States was able to exploit a condition of indebtedness to exact draconian changes in the economies and social welfare systems of Latin America and beyond. As discussed in the introduction to this dissertation, this was done not simply to “help” Latin American governments repay impossible debts that left US and other Northern banks extremely exposed (and thus vulnerable to collapse if repayment was not enabled) but also to re-open Latin American economies which, out of an agenda followed by Latin American governments to develop national industries, had become increasingly closed to foreign capital in the years that followed World War II.

By the late 1970s, the re-opening of these economies was being regarded by US corporations and US state actors as the lifesaving remedy to domestic stagflations and waves economic crisis. Neoliberal structural adjustment was accompanied by unrelenting US
involvement in and sponsorship of breathtaking repression and staggering violence meted out over the course of Central American civil wars. In the case of Nicaragua (“lost” to the Sandinistas during the Carter administration), the Reagan administration armed and trained the Contas. In the case of neighboring Guatemala and El Salvador the United States helped these country’s US-friendly governments to suppress domestic political movements through tactics of brutal repression visited upon self-declared rebels and civilians alike. The unifying objective was to shape and steer the political and economic structures of these countries so that Soviet communism (or anything interpreted to be sympathetic to or aligned with it) was kept out and allegiance to US political and neoliberal economic objectives was either restored (as in the case of Nicaragua) or maintained (as in the cases of Guatemala and El Salvador). The culmination of neoliberal restructuring can perhaps be found with the late 20th century successful passage of NAFTA, whose negotiation and execution this chapter also reviewed, while the early 21st century neoliberalist meddling of the United States in the political and economic affairs of Latin American countries is exemplified by the cases of Venezuela, Bolivia, Honduras and Nicaragua.

These more recent developments are important to highlight not only for purposes of grasping the latest trajectory of US capitalist imperialism and the particular context into which the latest iteration of US international volunteering came into being, but also because it was during the latter years of this period that, as Harvey points out, the notion of “freedom” was being strategically deployed with particular intensity by the Bush administration (see Harvey, 2005, pp. 5-7, 36-38). As Harvey observes, the idea of freedom is one so central to US-American understandings that simply referencing it as a guiding concern is almost bound to win uncritical support for all manner of projects waged in its name (such as the US invasion of Iraq); this is so, he suggests, even when the freedom in question “turns out to be nothing more than the convenient means to spread corporate monopoly power and Coca Cola everywhere without constraint” (Ibid, 38).

From a Foucauldian standpoint, such a narrowly defined (entrepreneurial) freedom is in fact what neoliberals have earnestly called upon the state to produce and secure. What Harvey is
valuably pointing out is that such figures have not hesitated to bury such definitions in more vaguely defined, broadly appealing notions of freedom that all “freedom-loving” US-Americans can rhetorically get on board with. This slight of hand and the fact that the Bush administration’s resurgent celebration of (entrepreneurial) freedom was used to justify and defend some of the most vigorous interventionism in the economic processes and political affairs of US imperial territories (both conventional and more recently claimed) is striking, throwing into relief the sort of symbiotic relation between the (neo)liberal condition of “freedom” and the unfree “strategies of security” marshaled to effectively produce it, particularly in regions “elsewhere” (Spivak, 1988, 85).
CHAPTER 5: TOURING AND HELPING OF “OTHERS” AS TECHNOLOGIES OF IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT

5.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I reviewed the history of US imperialism in Latin America. I concluded that review with a discussion of whether and how Foucault’s theory of liberal governmentality, which is largely silent on the matter, might begin to account for this history. Drawing on Foucault’s lectures on liberalism that were printed in Birth of Biopolitics (2008), I suggested that we might think of imperialism as a strategy of security that has its own governmental effect, or even as an art of government in and of itself; I also suggested that in either conceptualization, we might think of “security” as the central product of imperialism in the same way that “freedom,” according to Foucault, is the central product of liberalism. If we are to perhaps think of imperialism as something that has to do with governing populations in particular ways, then work by post-colonial studies scholars is invaluable for beginning to identify the specific ethics that imperialism seeks to inculcate and the specific technologies that are deployed in doing so. Particularly useful here is Barbara Heron’s (2007) aforementioned concept of planetary consciousness:

…a world view that infers relations of comparison with the Other on a global scale, comparison in which the Other always comes off as somehow lacking or not quite up to an unmarked standard” Operating alongside this sense of comparison and simultaneously authorized by it are a sense of entitlement and an obligation to intervene for the ‘betterment’ of the Other wherever he or she resides. (p. 7)

Again, Heron (2007) frames this planetary consciousness as a foundational component of bourgeois subjectivity, stating that “…entitlement and obligation to intervene so as to ameliorate the Earth and the lives of its human inhabitants (continue to) need to be acted out worldwide, in the process of (re-)constituting bourgeois subjectivities” (p. 37). In this vein, she conceives of the international development industry as a sort of essential vehicle through which Western bourgeois subjects cultivate and perform this consciousness; the activity of development work thus becomes a site of class/race/(and often) gender-specific subject formation.
In this chapter, I suggest that, in addition to thinking about how this specifically delineated concept of planetary consciousness is foundational to bourgeois subjectivity, we can also explore how the existence of a bourgeois planetary consciousness has also been highly useful for state-coordinated projects of empire. In particular, I submit that the US state has in fact borrowed or taken up this planetary consciousness and impressed it upon broader, non-bourgeois portions of the population in service of recruiting them to serve in overseas imperial projects. (This exploration is particularly warranted because, as this chapter will begin to show, those who have comprised the US population of overseas humanitarian workers have never been exclusively, or even necessarily mostly, of the economic elite). In this way, what Heron describes as “planetary consciousness” might be recast as an ethic of a certain kind of governmentality that is oriented toward imperialist objectives. In this light, the development industry, in addition to being seen as a sort of catalyst for bourgeois subject formation, can also be conceived as a technology of government. In this chapter, I suggest that the age-old apparatus of US international humanitarian work and the Third World tourism industry, might be thought of as key technologies of this governmentality – and that the state has historically played a key role in each.

In proposing such a framework, it is necessary to support it with some historical substantiation. That is the central aim of this chapter. Specifically, I show how the US state has invoked a sense of planetary consciousness in its execution of projects that have sought to enlist the domestic population in service of the economic and military initiatives that fall under Harvey’s definition of capitalist imperialism and which I outlined in the introductory chapter of this dissertation. However, before presenting this history, I think it is important to provide some background as to where, when, and how this planetary consciousness may have originally taken shape. According to Heron, who draws on the work of Ann Stoler (1995) and Laura Ann McClintock (1995), this planetary consciousness was something that emerged among the Western European bourgeoisie during the imperial era and over time has become a central mental construct of western bourgeoisie subjectivity, in general. Taking this as a point of departure, the first section of this chapter seeks to investigate how that claim might apply
specifically to the case of the United States bourgeoisie. I provide some orienting historic detail with respect to the formation and consolidation of the US bourgeoisie in the late 19th century. The second section then investigates whether and how a sense of entitlement and obligation to “help” an inferiorized other might be located as a central construct in the cultural history of the US bourgeoisie. Drawing on historical literature, I suggest that there is indeed a case to be made for the emergence of this consciousness as central components of US bourgeois culture vis-à-vis members of the US working classes. Specifically, I cite bourgeois “uplift” projects coordinated by elite charitable organizations; as I will discuss, such elite projects always had a political objective, whether it was instilling the working classes with values and behaviors deemed necessary for the continued advancement and preservation of a capitalist society, diffusing opposition from organized labor, or, by the late 19th century, protecting property from the so-called “dangerous classes.”

This material is followed by a section that investigates the activity of leisure tourism among the US bourgeoisie in the 19th century, focusing specifically on the advent of leisure tourism to places that were commonly framed as being inferior to the United States. Here, I attend to the discourses that shaped and suffused this activity and consider how they produced particular subject positions for the bourgeois tourist vis-à-vis the people and places he encountered. This consideration is a key addition to Heron’s framework; while she references a sense of entitlement to enter the spaces of the Other in order to help him/her as being part of and parcel of helping work, I suggest that the simple act of being in and gazing upon peoples, places, and cultures of understood as culturally, racially, and socially inferior can be disaggregated as its own bourgeois mental construct and that this construct is not only attached to projects of performing goodness but to leisure travel as well.

The latter focus of this chapter is a discussion of how the US state appeared to have effectively harnessed these bourgeois activities in service of overseas imperial rule, promoting them and stoking the development of planetary consciousness among members of the non-elite, white middle classes it recruited for overseas humanitarian work and tourist travel to Latin
America. Before getting to this discussion however, I include a consideration of how the US state actually appears to have done this domestically with interventions that were framed as projects of uplift for certain internal “others.” I focus specifically on the post-Civil War Freedmen’s schools movement, which began as a private bourgeois project but was quickly taken over and underwritten by the state. As with future such projects, the recruitment of teachers for the Freedmen’s schools offered up a subject position imbued with a sense of entitlement and obligation to help an “other,” who was imagined as inferior, uncivilized, primitive and in need of improvement. An important point here is that as with future such projects, a large plurality, if not a majority, of recruited individuals were not of the economic elite, but rather were of the white middle and lower classes. This is important to recognize as it speaks to the ways in which the bourgeois planetary consciousness was effectively being mainstreamed by the state in its effort to recruit teachers to the cause of educating freedmen. This is a pattern that would then be repeated with the federal government’s takeover of the Indian boarding schools in 1891, a project that was also initiated in the private sphere by US elites and appears to have been carried out as a form of civil service employment not only by elites but also by those of the country’s non-elite middle classes.

As mentioned, I devote the final sections of this chapter to illustrating how the US state effectively drew upon or borrowed the elements of this planetary consciousness construct – a sense of entitlement and obligation to intervene for the improvement of others purported as inferior to white Anglo-Saxons, a sense of entitlement to insert oneself into the territories inhabited by these others for purposes touristic consumption – and deployed them in recruiting non-elite members of the society into helping projects and tourism projects that were designed with the intention of serving US empire overseas.

Specifically, I trace the history of state’s efforts to incite middle class whites to “help” the populations living in the territories claimed by the country’s overseas imperial reach and also to tour the territories of empire for purposes of leisure, all through a language of inferiority of mythical cultures, societies, and peoples they would encounter in these territories. I suggest that
both US overseas volunteer programs and US-dominated Latin American tourism schemes have constituted technologies of government whose projected ends have to do with imperialist objectives. The first of these sections traces how, beginning with its late 19th century conquest of the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Cuba and other territories of the former Spanish empire, the US state has sought to manage inferiorized Others of imperial territories through a model of “uplift” that echoes bourgeois initiatives aimed reforming domestic Others. Like the domestic iteration of this model, the execution of this model has involved an effort not only to manage and shape the conduct of designated Others (who, like the freedmen and American Indians have been simultaneously and disproportionately subject to applications of deductive power), but also to shape the conduct of a largely white, largely middle class segment of the population so that it endeavors to perform this uplift work. Here, I suggest that, in service of this extra-continental project, the state has drawn on and deployed the bourgeois construct of “planetary consciousness” described by Heron. Evidence of this can be found in the early 20th century state-led recruitment of US-American teachers to teach in US-American colonial schools as well as the mid-20th century recruitment of US-American volunteers to serve overseas as part of the federal Peace Corps program, and the early millennial explosion of international volunteering that was largely privatized in nature but adamantly supported by bodies and actors involved in the work of shaping state policy.

Following this discussion, I turn to the ways in which the state has also worked to enlist US citizens as tourists of imperial territories for purposes of enhancing economic and political projects that fall under Harvey’s definition of capitalist imperialism. Specifically, I highlight FDR’s initiative to promote tourism to Latin America as strategy aimed at lining Latin American pockets with dollars that would then theoretically be used to purchase the US goods. This was part of FDR’s effort to avert a post-WWII economic crash and it can be seen as being tied with the US state’s simultaneous post-WWII efforts (discussed in Chapter 3) to thwart a Latin American industrialization that would create competition for US producers. In other words, it was part of a broader US interference in Latin American economies that was designed to maintain US
dominance. Moreover, as I illustrate, FDR’s effort to spur US tourism to Latin America (which involved extensive propaganda as well as generous state subsidies to US airlines and hotel chains) hinged on imparting US middle class citizens with a sense of entitlement to insert themselves into Latin American spaces and engage in touristic consumption from a stance of positional superiority (Said, 1978/2003).

Jumping forward to the latter decades of the 20th century, I then examine the precipitous development of “Third World tourism” that began in the late 1960s, reviewing how this phenomenon was initiated at the direction and under the supervision of the World Bank, which advocated tourism as a state-led development strategy and provided massive funding to developing countries for purposes of expanding their international tourism industries. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, the World Bank has historically been dominated by the United States, but the US government would become even more explicitly involved in the development of Third World tourism when USAID became a major subsidizer in the early 1980s. I argue that since then the incredible growth and expansion of Third World tourism has resulted in a textbook example of Harvey’s concept of capitalist imperialism insofar as the US state has worked to promote and bolster an industry that is in turn dominated by and highly lucrative for US corporations; meanwhile, one can theorize that the penetration of Latin America by US-owned tourism companies only reinforces the US state’s historic claim on Latin America as part of its informal empire/sphere of influence. Moreover, the undertaking of this tourism project has involved an effort to shape the desires and conduct of the US middle class citizen so she aspires to and goes through with becoming a tourist of Third World spaces; this effort has entailed the discursive production – through tourism advertisements and other promotional media – of the US citizen as a subject entitled and even obligated to enter the spaces of Latin America, to gaze upon the lands, cultures, and peoples she or he encounters there, and to do so through a lens of US/First World superiority.

5.2 A History of the Western Bourgeoisie
In *Desire for Development* (2007), Barbara Heron draws on the work of historians Ann Laura Stoler (1995, 2002) and Laura McClintock (1995) to establish a broad-based, general understanding of bourgeois culture as something that took root in 19th century Western Europe. As both Stoler (Ibid) and McClintock (Ibid) have shown and as Heron (2007) echoes, in an effort to distinguish itself from both the aristocracy and the working class, the bourgeoisie relied upon a continual demonstration of a number of “cultural competencies” that were not only equated with notions of authentic whiteness and European-ness, but also signified a more specific distinction of bourgeois class membership. These included “in addition to owning property, rootedness, an orderly family life, rationality and self-mastery; and from the domestic sphere, monogamy, thrift, order, accumulation, classification, quantification, and regulation” (Heron, 2007, p. 29) as well as notions of “goodness” performed through expressions and acts of sympathy towards those deemed less fortunate and/or less evolved. Drawing further on Stoler and McClintock, Heron emphasizes how boundary drawing through the performance of these competencies unfolded at the site of mistress-maid relations within the metropole bourgeois home. Beyond the home and in the territories of empire, attempts to preserve the integrity of bourgeois distinction took shape through social constructions of space that demarcated boundaries between the bourgeois and the foreign “other.” This theoretical perspective contends that, as these spatial demarcations were never solid or stable (and presumably even less so than in the metropole), a great deal of boundary anxiety swirled around perceived threats to what had been constructed as the hallmarks of bourgeois distinction – that is, racial purity, specific cultural competencies, innate superiority, etc. Here, Heron (2007) suggests, is where a helping imperative vis-à-vis the imperial subject came into play in bourgeois subjectivity:

Since bourgeois identity formation was constructed through notions of how to live and the education of appropriation desire, in short, moral regulation, it followed that the various groups of Others were seen to lack these very attributes and understandings, and could not be considered fit to govern themselves. They required moral regulation specific to their deficiencies; that is, Others needed to be civilized, through governance, education, and learning how to live and what to desire in bourgeois terms since this represented the highest achievement of civilization…Played out in respect to empire (and the working classes at home), the civilizing mission of colonialism was foundational to the bourgeois
self, a “natural” outgrowth of a relationally configured subjectivity of global dimensions. (p. 30)

In her account, Heron (2007) conceptualizes bourgeois subjectivity as “a kind of mythical construct, which, although not absolutely homogenous across geographical spaces, is constituted through, and also reproduces, historically derived commonalities that are productive of the identities of white middle-class subjects in the world today” (p. 33). She is careful to avoid any claim of a sort of direct transfer of bourgeois culture from 19th century Europe to 21st century Canada, and instead suggests a broad, continuous heritage of bourgeois subjectivity that is conditioned by contextual specificity but retains a certain foundational consistency. This is an important caveat to make, but what goes unexplained is exactly how bourgeois class and culture formation came about across the Atlantic. In the paragraphs that follow I review some of the particular history of the US-American bourgeoisie, highlighting how Heron’s helping imperative as well as the activity of touring the “other” (somewhat downplayed in Heron’s account) emerged as key aspects for this group. In this way, I am attempting to provide some historical and context specific grounding to the planetary consciousness and helping imperative that Heron has sovaluably identified as central constructs of bourgeois subjectivity.

A History of the US Bourgeoisie

Historian Sven Beckert (2001) has examined the consolidation of the US bourgeoisie, an event which, he argues, took place between the years of 1850 and 1896. According to Beckert, the original members of the US capitalist economic elite were merchants who made their fortunes through selling raw materials – mostly cotton – purchased from the slave-owning planters of the South to manufacturers of Europe. Soon this trade expanded to include the purchase of the finished goods from Europe and the selling of them to retailers across the United States – not only the South, but also the Northeast and the new territories in the West. By the 1850s, the center of this mercantile activity was New York City, where traders had taken advantage of certain geographical aspects that were conducive to international trade – “a large protected port that remained free of ice throughout the year, its closeness to the open sea, and a river that
provided it with easy access to a vast hinterland” (p. 18) – and building up key infrastructural components such as canals and railroads. Through this process, US-American merchants quickly established the city as the premier transatlantic link between the slave-based agricultural economy of the US-American south and the industrial economy of Western Europe, particularly Britain.

Within this context of a trade-based economy, the extension of credit became an integral component that was crucial to the flow of commerce. While this activity had historically been performed by general merchants, by the 1850s, commercial banks stepped in and took it up, giving rise to a new, supremely wealthy, banker contingent of the New York economic elite (a good number of whom were former merchants) and precipitating a decade-long proliferation of new banks (many opened by merchant elites). Finally, while merchants and bankers economically and numerically dominated the nation’s supremely powerful New York economic elite in the 1850s, it was at this time that they were increasingly joined by a third contingent of artisans turned manufacturers who had developed their shops into lucrative enterprises and accumulated vast sums of real and personal wealth. By 1856, this manufacturing/industrialist segment comprised twenty percent of the city’s economic elite.

Notably, according to Beckert, divergent backgrounds and distinct methods of accumulation translated into significant differences between the respective merchants/bankers and manufactureres turned/turning industrialists. In the 1850s, they did not, he argues, form a cohesive social class (in the way that they would in the decades to come). For one, merchants and bankers, at the time the dominant and entrenched faction, were quite unsettled by the emergence of manufacturers as their new capital-rich counterparts and tended to look down upon them as upstarts from lesser origins, as many of the manufacturers hailed from economically modest beginnings. The stigma of “new money,” however, was not necessarily the decisive mode of boundary maintenance (many of the merchant/banker elite had accumulated, as opposed to inherited, their wealth in their own lifetimes). Rather, as Beckert writes, “merchants shunned industrialists because manufacturing involved the dirty, smelly, and decidedly unrefined world of
the factory and a day-to-day struggle with its workers” (p. 63). Industrialists, on the other hand, tended to have their own resentment toward the mercantile/banker elites, regarding them as parasitic hangers-on who amassed their wealth through the productive labor of others (i.e. industrialists and workers) and more often than not, made their lives harder by pressing for free trade, importing inexpensive products from Europe, and extending credit on punitive terms. In this vein, manufacturers engaged in their own boundary maintenance, defining themselves as producers, and by virtue of this role and their sincere creed of ingenuity and science as the harbinger of progress, the true engine of the nation’s future.

At the same time, however, despite their significant differences, the economic elite of New York shared certain basic ideological assumptions in the 1850s. According to Beckert, “a commitment to progress, markets, and democracy was common to all” (Ibid, p. 66). Merchants, bankers and industrialists embraced the rapid changes that accompanied capitalist economic development, understanding them as evidence of an unfolding linear march toward overall improvement. Informed by Protestant ethics and liberal economic principles, they understood markets as the natural regulators of production, distribution, and consumption. They also believed that “creative engagement with the material world brought success on earth and acknowledgement in heaven” (Ibid, p. 67). Integral to their ideological worldview were the interrelated constructs of opportunity and freedom; opportunity (the unfettered chance to accumulate), they insisted, was the product of freedom, and freedom was thus a condition for this opportunity.

5.3 History of “Uplift” Work and Leisure Travel to Territories of Empire Among the US Bourgeoisie

In Beckert’s account, there is considerable light shed upon how the bourgeois “helping imperative” discussed by Heron took root among the US bourgeoisie during the mid-19th century as a method of managing the social inequalities between themselves and the working classes. Indeed, according to Beckert, amid the rapid proletarianization and increasingly turbulent economic conditions of the 1850s, reformer movements and philanthropic activity formed a key
area where merchants/bankers and manufacturers often came together, thus transcending otherwise adversarial relations between them. With each faction viewing itself as the most important class for the future of US society, he argues, each faction also saw itself as the natural steward for the wider community and, to this end, during the mid-19th century, both merchants/bankers and industrialists believed in, spent time organizing, and participated in projects intended to "improve" the conditions of the working class. At the same time, as Beckert demonstrates, each faction had its own distinct philosophy as to the rationale and objectives of stewardship. Merchants tended to view poverty as an inevitable and permanent societal condition and regard charity work as the moral duty of the rich as well a strategy for ensuring the conditions of social peace that they believed were imperative to the flow of trade. Industrialists on the other hand generally rejected the idea of "permanent proletariat," viewing wage labor and poverty as a station in life that workers passed through on their way to economic autonomy (particularly given the opportunities for young white men that were being created by ongoing Western expansion/Amerindian dispossession). Moreover, they saw their own charitable work as part of a broader project of building republic of independent producers. As part of this project, “workers, in the eyes of industrialists, had to be molded to assume their position among the respectable working class, many employers going to some lengths to teach them frugality and good work habits” (Ibid, p. 74). Manufacturers were not without their own class-interested strategies, however; as Beckert points out education and relief initiatives were also deployed as a way of quelling the unionization efforts that began to pick up momentum in the mid-19th century.

In any case, despite their different philosophies and rationales regarding charity, however, merchants/bankers and industrialists did often come together in a common effort to organize and engage in charitable works. As Beckert (2001) observes, in the mid-19th century, the New York bourgeoisie

…asserted their authority over the public sphere and over the city’s poorer inhabitants by creating, financing, and running vigorous reform movements – movements that were part of a wave of religiously inspired reform efforts that swept the United States for more than three decades. Combining their belief that salvation was to come from industry, sobriety, and piety with a new evangelical fervor, they found multiple ways to involve in the
material and spiritual life of New York’s laboring classes. They worked with the Sabbatarian reform and temperance movements. They formed and financed numerous benevolent associations. Some, such as the American Home Missionary Society, dispatched preachers, spread the gospel, or advocated temperance; others, such as the Association for Improving the Conditions of the Poor (AICP), distributed charity. Still others helped justify radical, far-reaching efforts to remold the lives of their less well-off brethren. In New York, specifically, their most important goal was the reform of the city’s working class and poor, and many of these organizations concentrated on building institutions to rescue the “worthy poor” – by building asylums for widowed women or orphans, for instance. (p. 75)

As historians such as Paul Boyer (1978) have underscored, organizations like the AICP vehemently argued that members of the working class should be provided not with “outdoor relief” (i.e. public works jobs) and cash/food assistance but with moral interventions in which a “friendly visitor” dropped by and theoretically compelled the poor to change the habits and behaviors deemed as the cause of their economic condition. Embedded here was what Boyer (1978) has identified as one of the most fundamental assumptions of the bourgeois moral reform efforts of the mid to late 19th century (and beyond)—that is, that poverty was caused not by the vicissitudes of capitalism and forms of economic domination but primarily by character flaws of those who were poor. The design of this moral rehabilitation effort was suffused with strategies of using Protestant ideals to lead Catholic immigrants away from their purportedly errant faith, but was also premised on conducting forms of surveillance in order to draw distinctions between the “deserving” and “undeserving” poor and dole out whatever necessary assistance accordingly.

It is important to note that during the mid-19th century period the moral reform efforts of a fledgling bourgeois class were unfolding in direct competition with another form of charity work practiced by the numerous organizations involved in municipal politics and electioneering. As Theda Skocpol (1995) has demonstrated, the middle of the 19th century marked the ascent of patronage democracy in the United States. By the 1840s, property ownership requirements for voting rights had been largely fazed out, extending the franchise to nearly all adult white males. In the country’s large cities, where working class European immigrants were forming critical masses, this democratization of suffrage went hand in hand with the formation and ascendancy of political “party machines,” which employed a strategy of securing votes for their respective
municipal election candidates by doling out favors – namely public sector jobs, cash gifts, and help with run-ins with the law – at local levels in working class neighborhoods. As Terry Golway (2014) shows, as the populations of the country’s cities became increasingly Irish – particularly with a new wave of Irish immigration prompted by the Potato Famine of the 1850s – so did the memberships of respective party machines. Along the way, the urban party machine became a political tool that was wielded not by white Anglo-Saxon male elites, but by Irish Catholic working class men. Threatened by the political influence of an enfranchised working class majority, urban elites of the old white Anglo-Saxon Protestant establishment generally denounced the party machine as corrupt, despotic, and wasteful, couching their statements in anti-Irish, anti-Catholic, anti-immigrant/nativist rhetoric (see Beckert, 2001, pp. 79-81; Golway, 2014, p. 45). At the same time, however, there were those elites who quickly adapted to the political reality of large and enfranchised working classes, and moved to use the urban party machine as a valuable, if culturally unpalatable, tool of class control. This was particularly true in New York, where bourgeois members of the anti-abolition Democrat party found common cause with working class immigrants, who also tended to oppose abolition on the grounds of seeking to avoid competition from free black laborers.

While New York elites of the mid-19th century collectively looked upon the Tammany Hall party machine with contempt, it is important to note that there were those who saw the writing on the wall (specifically, the immigration-driven change in urban demographics and the broadening of the franchise) and ultimately began to treat the party machine as a tool, however unpalatable, for exercising control over a municipality dominated by working class immigrants (see Beckert, 2001, pp. 82-85). During the Civil War, bourgeois Democrat involvement with and support for New York’s Tammany Hall party machine became even more pronounced, particularly in the wake of the Draft Riots of 1863, when “white working-class New Yorkers took to the streets in response to the implementation of the Conscription Act of March 1863, which enabled the federal government to draft any male between the age of twenty and thirty-five and all unmarried men between age thirty-five and forty-five who did not procure an acceptable substitute or pay $300
for an exemption” (Beckert, 2001, pp. 137-138). The riots, which lasted for five days, left 105 people dead, and were punctuated by chants of “Down with the rich!” stoked elite fears, among Republicans and Democrats alike, of the working class majority. As Beckert observes, bourgeois Democrats aligned themselves all the more closely with Tammany Hall, which was in turn strengthened from their involvement. Over the next ten years, Tammany Hall was the dominant force in municipal politics, putting up as mayoral candidate party boss William Tweed, who, upon winning the election, led the city into a period of prosperity and social peace with a strategy of deficit-spending/public works that resulted in numerous infrastructural improvements and a great deal of urban expansion into northern Manhattan (Beckert, 2001).

The Late 19th Century Rise of Bourgeois Moral Reform Efforts in the North

The late 19th century would usher in the ascent of bourgeois charity efforts in cities such as New York, Philadelphia, Boston and Chicago, where elite fatigue with party machine politics was setting in. In New York, this fatigue was embodied in the crumbling of an already delicate relationship between the city’s outnumbered elite and the Tammany Hall-backed mayor, William Tweed, who held the favor of the working class majority. The key to this relationship, it seems, had been not only the period of Civil War-driven Northern elite prosperity that had characterized the 1860s and Tweed’s ability to maintain social peace, but also the favorable economic opportunities and outcomes that Tweed’s policies appeared to deliver for New York elites. In his account, Beckert (2001) suggests while the city’s economic elites had remained contented by the economic and social conditions that had accompanied Tweed’s tenure (many of them profiting from the sale of municipal bonds overseas and local real estate development deals that came with his deficit spending model), most were generally willing to accept his strategy of working class patronage (public works jobs and cash assistance in exchange for votes that kept him in office). However, this would all change in 1871 when a Tweed corruption scandal drove international bondholders to halt the city’s credit. In what Beckert (Ibid) has described as a “municipal coup d’etat,” a coalition of outraged bankers, merchants, industrialists, and professionals responded to this turn of events by uniting to oust the city’s Tammany-Hall-backed
mayor. The coalition, which would call itself the Group of Seventy, successfully drove Tweed from office, took control of the city's finances, usurped city official jobs for themselves, installed their own pick for Tweed's replacement as city mayor, and declared a restructuring of the city's political system (Ibid).

This event would, among other things, help pave the way toward a sea change among the city's bourgeois that would have critical implications for the model of social welfare management that would ultimately prevail. Indeed, according to Beckert (2001), the municipal coup d'état staged by the city's elites entailed nothing short of an ideological reorientation within their ranks, and this, he argues, had much to do with the newfound influence of a small group of radical intellectuals who produced theoretical arguments for the retreat of the state, the liberalization of the market, the disenfranchisement of the working classes, and the naturalness of social inequality. As the drying up of international credit and the ousting of Tweed were quickly followed by new waves of working class mobilization and unrest in 1872, New York elites, according to Beckert, flocked more and more to the ideas of these intellectuals. This became even more the case with the Depression of 1873 (which would grip the country for the next six years) and the new rounds of worker demonstrations that accompanied the economic downturn.

While elite calls for a weaker state, freer markets, lower taxes and less public spending amount more perhaps to a radicalization of late 19th century bourgeois ideology than to its total inversion, it was in Beckert's estimation, a significant change. For example, he points out that while the 1860s had seen the majority of the city's wealthy "come to embrace or at least accept an expansive public policy that lavished city funds on urban improvements and public schools, as well as on public health and a municipal government deeply involved in urban planning," (Beckert, 2001, pp. 191), by the post-Tweed/Depression years of the 1870s the city's bourgeoisie had generally united around a model of fiscal retrenchment that was being put into full effect. According to Beckert, as part of this retrenchment there was, among the bourgeois, a withdrawal of support for public relief and a championing of private charity as the superior system for extending assistance to the city's poor. The rationale for cutting publicly funded assistance lay in
the material reality of economic downturn and the ideological claims that many of the poor were in
fact “undeserving” of relief and that generous public aid would breed “pauperism” (the purportedly
conscious choosing of a life of poverty). Private charity, the bourgeoisie argued, was better
because charity organizations were notoriously stricter and more selective with their assistance,
choosing to assess and evaluate the purported legitimacy of requests for aid and the character
and related worthiness of those making them.

Important to note here is Beckert’s contention that the late 19th century interest of the
New York bourgeoisie in providing any relief for the city’s poor was not only more committed than
ever to a model of private charity, but was now articulated more primarily than ever before in
terms of securing its property and possessions from the working class. This, he claims, was a
departure from the mid-19th century bourgeois conversation around helping the poor, in which
concern was expressed moreso in terms of saving society from the contagion of immorality that
was purported to be thriving in working class neighborhoods. While this is a subtle distinction, it is
important, Beckert (2001) argues, because it was within this context of fear of expropriation
(heightened in fact by the brief success of the Paris Commune in 1871), that the bourgeois
combined their new penchant for private charity with calls for increased security measures –
“stronger police forces, national guards, and strict legislation” (p. 217).

Moreover, within this context of working class unrest that tirelessly questioned the
lopsided distribution of wealth and the bourgeois’ employment practices that promised to maintain
it, the New York bourgeois, with the help of English philosopher Herbert Spencer, began to
develop a new ideological position that justified their economic dominance with claims of genetic
superiority. In the 1870s, Spencer, who became a great friend and continual guest of honor to
New York elites, adapted Darwin’s theories of natural selection to the workings of society and the
condition of social inequality, lending intellectual legitimacy to the idea that the rich were rich
because they had been born with innate physical and mental advantages and the poor were poor
because they were plagued by inferior genetic composition.
However, Spencer’s thought not only provided the elites with a justification for conditions of social inequality. It also lent them the rationale for moral uplift (to be overseen and coordinated at the private discretion of none other than the most superior members of the society) as the best possible solution for ameliorating its effects. Essentially, if the problem was one of genetic make-up individuals and not one of politics or economic systems, it followed that the answer lay not in structural change but in changing the behavior of the poor so that they would not only improve upon their own material, spiritual, and moral condition but also improve upon their lineage, passing on to their offspring the superior traits acquired through the interventions of elites and the application of their directives.

While the aforementioned events are specific to the context of New York during the late 19th century, I think that they provide critical evidence with respect to the emergence of a helping imperative as being an important mental construct of US-American bourgeois subjectivity and culture. This is for two reasons. First, according to Beckert (2001), it was at this very time that New York economic elites began acting more cohesively than ever before, taking pains to articulate, develop, and perform a separate class identity replete with numerous criteria of which charity work was just one. Second, according to Beckert (2001), it was the bourgeoisie of New York that not only “dominated the nation’s trade, production, and finance and served as the gatekeeper of America’s most important outpost in the Atlantic economy” but also “staged the most elaborate social events anywhere, setting the bourgeois standard for the nation” (p. 4, my emphasis). While perhaps an additional historical account would be necessary in order to fully substantiate Beckert’s claim, it seems plausible enough that, because of tremendous wealth and leverage of New York’s bourgeoisie, those particular behaviors, practices, styles, and tastes that it adopted as key identity markers and membership criteria would have carried great influence with bourgeoisies across the country. In other words, the New York bourgeoisie of the late 19th century might be regarded as a sort of ground zero for the development and circulation of bourgeois culture nationwide.
Here it is important to note that the events that confronted the New York bourgeoisie in the 1870s and onward also represent just one specific case of a broader phenomenon that was transpiring across the country at the very same time. As Boyer (1978) has shown, the sort of working class mobilization and unrest that was transpiring in New York City during the last three decades of the 19th century was also common in cities across the country, where it was producing a more or less equal effect upon the mindsets of local bourgeoisies. As he writes,

Urban disorder was familiar enough from the antebellum period, but in the Gilded Age it took on a more menacing aura as a direct expression of labor unrest. The first ominous portent came in the summer of 1877, during a period of severe business depression, when a wildcat railroad strike led to tense confrontations, violent outbreaks, and scores of deaths in Pittsburgh, Chicago, and many other rail centers. The tempo working-class discontent picked up in the 1880s and culminated in 1886 when a massive wave of strikes, armed encounters, and (in some instances) strike-related deaths hit Saint Louis, Milwaukee, New York, Cincinnati, Chicago, and other cities. On the evening of May 4, 1886, in Chicago’s Haymarket Square, an unknown person threw a bomb at police attempting to break up a peaceful, anarchist-sponsored strike rally. One policeman was killed by the bomb and seventy injured; four demonstrators were shot dead, and many wounded when the enraged police retaliated with gun and club. (p. 125)

According to Boyer, this continuous wave of unrest, protest, and demonstration that often turned violent elicited a “profound uneasiness” across wealthier classes of the United States, one that often bubbled into hysteria expressed by numerous media outlets. In this context, the elite embrace of private charity that focused on moral reform of the working class remained not at all unique to New York, but rather began to materialize across the country in the form of a charity organization movement led by elites who sought not only to change the behaviors of working class but more specifically to take control of social regulation from the urban party machine, which many believed was at fault for stoking working class political dissent. As Theda Skocpol (1995) observes, “Charity Organization reformers, along with many other American elites in the late 19th century, were especially appalled by the ways in which public relief for able-bodied unemployed men could become enmeshed with grassroots party politics. In their eyes, this situation undermined the integrity of the "public interest’ and simultaneously harmed the moral character of the individuals who received the governmental handouts” (p. 96). In this light, the bourgeois embrace of private charity can be understood not only as a form of fiscal retrenchment
in which the goal was to cut city spending but also as sort of power struggle for the hearts and minds of a working class that tended to identify less with bourgeois reformers, who dropped in periodically to scrutinize and sermonize, and more so with the party machines, whose leaders and representatives not only reflected the ethnic, linguistic, and cultural composition of their constituencies and but also provided more substantive forms of assistance such as jobs and cash assistance, all while remaining a “sympathetic friend, talking and living in the same style as his neighbors, even as he used his political connections to arrange help for them” (Ibid, p. 98).

Underscoring the popularization of the charity movement, Boyer (1978) observes:

“...[the] ‘charity organization’ spread like wildfire in the later 1870s and the 1880s, quickly becoming, as one historian has noted, almost a fad. By the 1890s over 100 cities had charity organization societies; the movement had attracted an impressive array of able leaders; journals like Lend-a-Hand (Boston), Charities Review (New York), and Charities Record (Baltimore) were providing publicity and a forum for ideas; and the annual National Conference of Charities and Corrections (NCCC) had emerged to give the leadership an opportunity to formulate policy and discuss issues of common concern (p. 146).

International Travel as Bourgeois Class Performance

In addition to tracing the early history of US bourgeois reform movements intended first to perform one’s perceived spiritual duty towards the less fortunate and then to pacify members of the “dangerous classes” and protect one’s property, Beckert (2001) also discusses the importance of travel in US-American bourgeois culture. As he writes, “In a world in which most people moved only because of wars, persecution, or poverty, many well-to-do New Yorkers left their homes for places close and far in predictable rhythm: summers dictated a move to the country, young adulthood a trip to the American West and to Europe, and sickness a trip to the spas of Europe. Summer travel was by far the most common, and by the 1850s their, railroad lines brought New York’s mercantile elite to fashionable places, such as Saratoga, the Catskills, Cape May, Niagara Falls, and Newport. Postadolescent sons of well-to-do New Yorkers saw travel as an important rite of passage” (p. 43). As Beckert observes, among the US-American bourgeois of the middle to late 19th and early 20th centuries first-hand exposure to Europe gained
through time spent there was equated with notions of being “cultured,” as Europe represented for this group the “original source of refinement and tradition” (Ibid, p. 43).

As it turns out, bourgeois travel in the 19th century was not limited to the countries of Europe or certain en vogue locales of the United States. In fact, by 1839, US-American elites were journeying in droves to what was then the Ottoman province of Egypt, their numbers coming in second only to their more numerous British counterparts whose government would ultimately invade, occupy, and colonize it in 1882 (Schueller, 2001). By the start of the Civil War, there were five hundred US-American travelers in Egypt. In June of 1867, by which point bourgeois wealth had reached unprecedented levels thanks to skyrocketed wartime demand, the chartered Quaker City (formally the USS Quaker City) departed from New York, carrying “members of the triumphant Northern commercial and industrial elite” (Obenzinger, 1999, p. ix) across the Atlantic on what amounted to the first US-American steamship package tour, a multi-destination “pleasure excursion” (as Mark Twain would dub it in his first-hand chronicles of the voyage, later published in 1867 as Innocents Abroad) that would carry the travelers to and from a string of countries that included Egypt as well as France, Italy, Greece, Russia, Turkey, the Morroccan city of Tangier, and the “Holy Land” of Palestine (then under Ottoman rule).

Importantly, as Malini Johar Schueller (2001) demonstrates in her historical account of 19th century US discourses around the “Orient,” US travel to Egypt in the 19th century took place amid a broader US fascination with the “Near East” that was fueled by the recent emergence of “Egyptology” as a Western science devoted to unearthing the remains and decoding the mysteries of ancient Egypt (and, in the United States, often utilized to support polygenesis theories of human origin that were, for the larger part of the 19th century, commonly used as scientific justification for the enslavement of blacks) and permeated with Orientalist discourses (circulated largely by the groups of US missionaries to Egypt that had preceded the tourists) that emphasized notions of Eastern depravity and discourses of conquest that echoed reigning domestic discourses around westward expansion and the ongoing brutal “removal” of the Amerindians around which it was predicated.
Jumping forward into the 20th century, it was in the 1920s that large numbers of the US bourgeoisie began traveling to the Latin American countries that fell within the US imperial reach. As historian Dennis Merrill (2009) has shown, by the 1920s and 1930s, it was Cuba and Mexico that were becoming major tourist destinations for US elites, quickly rivaling Europe in their popularity. According to Merrill, it was in the 1920s that Cuba began to emerge as the touristic playground of the US-American elite. In 1919, the same year that Prohibition went into effect, Cuban developers had successfully lobbied for the passage of the Tourist Bill which legalized gambling (a version of the bill had perished as recently as 1910 under pressure from US President Taft, who had in turn been pressured by US-American religious leaders and social reformers who denounced the bill for its potential to lure US-Americans to Cuba to gamble). In the years that followed the bill’s passage, developers and hoteliers (both Cuban and US-American) led a building frenzy geared toward attracting US-American elites, buying up oceanfront properties, building opulent hotels and extravagant casinos and sprawling golf courses, and lobbying the Cuban government to complete public works projects aimed at attracting and accommodating US tourist desires for comfort. The number of annual visitors (predominantly US-American) to the island went from 56,000 in 1920 to 90,000 in 1928 (Merrill, 2009). By 1937, the number was at 178,000 (Ibid).

Following the popularization of Cuba as an elite destination, it was in the early 1930s that more and more US-American elites began traveling touristically to Mexico, a development, which Merrill (2009) shows, had everything to do with the country’s proximity to the US, as well as the relative affordability of travel fare (particularly in the post-Depression years), the reduced feasibility of transatlantic vacations (thanks to mounting conflict in Europe), the Mexican government’s own concerted development of a tourism industry (though unlike Cuba it was state-led versus being coordinated by private corporations and entrepreneurs), and, perhaps, the charting of a new era of diplomatic relations between Mexico and the United States. Indeed, the first half of the 1920s had been characterized by unyielding tension between the two republics, a product of the fallout from the Mexican Revolution (1910-1920), which had succeeded in the
actualization of several outcomes: the ousting of US-backed Mexican President Porfirio Diaz; the ousting in of the seizure and redistribution of US-owned private property; the nationalization of the formerly US-dominated mineral and oil industries; the legalization of labor unions; and, a fledgling alliance between Mexico and the Bolshevik regime of Russia. The United States, which had proceeded to back the overthrow of new reformist president Francisco Madero in 1913 and had intervened in 1914 and again in 1916, had never approved of the new political leadership (which continued to seize US-owned private property into the 1920s), much less to the growing phenomenon of US-Americans taking leisure trips to the republic.

During this period, Merrill (2009) purports, US Ambassador to Mexico James R. Sheffield, known for an intolerant and confrontational orientation, was anything but supportive for the development of the Mexican tourism industry, penning numerous missives (published in major US newspapers), lambasting the country’s political leadership for its post-revolution move to the left and condemning Mexican President Plutarco Elías Calles (1924-1928), who had begun his presidency expressing vocal support for the rebellion being waged against occupying US troops by Nicaraguan revolutionary Augusto Sandino (see Chapter 2) and ordering another seizure of US-American property.

This stance began to change in the late 1920s. At this time, President Elías began to take steps to attract US investment: “slowing agrarian reform, co-opting labor through state sanctioned unions, and establishing Mexico’s Central Bank for national commercial and industrial development” (Merrill, 2009, p. 34). It was in this context, specifically in 1927, that the pro-business US administration of President Calvin Coolidge began to call for renewed efforts to rebuild relations with Mexico, and it was at this time, as Merrill points out, that the newly appointed US Ambassador to Mexico, Dwight W. Morrow (a close friend of Coolidge and former associate at J.P. Morgan) attempted to smooth diplomatic relations through a number of tactics, that included a subtle enough but unmistakable promotion of travel to Mexico to US elites. According to Merrill (2009), “Morrow sprinkled his public speeches—before business groups, college commencements, and private philanthropic organizations—with allusions to Mexico’s
ambience’ (p. 60). A direct endorsement came in December of 1927, when Calles invited Morrow to accompany him on a railway tour through the north of Mexico (an area where tourism was particularly intense) and Morrow, in turn, invited comedian Will Rogers, who obliged and proceeded to recount the trip in a series of articles published in the Saturday Evening Post (Ibid).

Between 1933 and 1934, US tourist spending in Mexico increased to forty-one million dollars and it became the third largest site of US tourist expenditure (the top spot still being claimed by France, to which Canada was second). In 1935, the number of visitors to Mexico (mostly from the United States) reached 75,000 and by 1937 the official figure was 127,000 (Merrill, 2009, p. 66). Over the next few years, it became the top Western hemisphere destination for US travelers (Ibid).

What is important to understand about the growth of this new US bourgeois touristic focus on Mexico and Cuba in the 1930s is that it, according to Merrill, it entailed the amplification of a particular US-American ideational orientation toward Latin American peoples and places that was distinct from that produced through previous US-American travel to and around Europe. As Merrill (2009) in fact points out, the US-American discourses around traveling to Mexico and Cuba were quite distinct from those that surrounded trips to Europe. While US-American travelers to Europe were often critical and even derisive of what they encountered, especially in France, “Europe in general and France in particular registered as the epicenter of civilization and sophisticated pleasure” (p. 10). With its artistic and architectural achievements, Merrill (2009) argues, Europe provoked “awe, admiration, and perhaps a touch of status anxiety” (Ibid). Latin America, on the other hand, particularly Mexico and Cuba, which together had been the object of over a century of US conquest and imperial domination (outlined in Chapter 2), were, according to Merrill (2009), constructed through a “more ambiguous civilizational language,” (p. 10) which, Merrill argues, mirrored the discourse of European Orientalism identified and analyzed by Edward Said. Specifically, Merrill (2009) points out that, in similar fashion to 18th and 19th century European discourse on the Middle East, US-American travel discourse produced Latin America as “backward, exotic, and awaiting the civilizing influence of the United States” (p. 10).
Lending credence to Merrill’s argument, if one explores the US tourist guides of this era, it becomes clear that they were in fact suffused with such a narrative. A key example is found in an excerpt from the extremely popular Terry’s Guide to Cuba, published in 1926 and cited by Merrill. “The polite, tolerant visitor to Cuba,” the author, Thomas P. Terry advises the US-American reader, “will get real enjoyment out of his sojourn if he radiates consideration and views the island and its people en color rosa. It is unjust to measure their institutions by American standards for Cuba is a young country and the people have not yet had time to polish their civilization as they propose to” (Terry, 1926, p. 40).

With respect to Cuba, Merrill (2009) argues, the island republic was also constructed as a sort of hedonistic paradise, an image that was always infused, in particular, with notions of exotic Cuban women awaiting sexual conquest at the hands of US-American men. In addition to sexual conquest, the civilizational language of the US-American discourse on travel to Cuba was also characterized by dominant paternalistic narratives of the 1898 Spanish-American War in which the US was purported to not only have saved Cuba from the tyrannical rule of the Spain but also to have taken Cuba under its wing as a fledgling nation, not fully formed and in need of long-term guidance on the path to civilization. With this kind of rhetoric in heavy circulation, historians argue, US-American tourists to Cuba engaged in hedonistic pursuits – gambling, drinking, patronizing of prostitutes, and taking in of the country’s infamously “sensual” and “exotic” musical reviews – through the particular lens of paternalistic self-congratulation and with an eye toward whether or not the Cubans they encountered were appropriately grateful for what the United States had purportedly done for their country thirty years prior.

In the case of Mexico, another country that had long been the object of US imperial conquest (see Chapter 2), the beginning of the 1930s found the Mexican national government seeking to play a more active role in the country’s international tourism industry. Aiming to siphon off some of the US tourist dollars that had flowed into Cuba over the course of the 1920s, the Mexican state was however limited by the global economic downturn of the early 1930s. Tourism development in Mexico remained largely in the hands of US-American and Mexican elites, with
the United States government beginning to more actively encourage US citizens to travel south of the border on holiday. With all of this came particular constructions of Mexico as “America’s Egypt,” (see Merrill, 2009, p. 75), a dubious distinction that clearly underscored a sort of proprietary claiming of Mexico through the prism of empire. Interestingly, as Mexico’s tourism development was taking place shortly after the country had been embroiled in a decade-long revolution, much of the touristic marketing of Mexico clearly sought to dispel images of Mexico as barbarous, disorderly, and backward, explicitly calling out such stereotypes and rejecting them as unmerited. Seeking to reassure a US-American public, tourism promoters and affiliated US travel journalists raved about Mexico as just the right blend of exotically traditional and authentic indigenous folk cultures and 20th century comforts and amenities. However, as with Cuba, images of Mexico as a country fundamentally behind and inferior to the United States with in its oft-purported march toward progress abounded nonetheless, if more so in promoters’ breathless allusions to Mexico’s “traditional” Amerindian folk cultures and majestic ancient ruins (as well as with standard warnings from guidebooks and travel writers that routinely flagged Mexican food preparation practices as unclean (see Terry, 1935, p. xxix) and disparaged the country’s strong labor unions as loathsome inconveniences (see Merrill 2009, p. 80) than in explicit references to a purported lack of civilization.

What is also critical to highlight about this US travel/tourism discourse vis-à-vis Latin America, is that it not only constructed Mexico and Cuba as uncivilized spaces to be tamed and ordered through US influence, but also positioned the US-American bourgeois subject (i.e. the tourist in question) as possessing an innate right to physically be in Latin American spaces, and not only to be there but to tour there – and lest it remain unclear, touring Latin America was an activity premised on acts of gazing, sexual conquest, as well as various relations of domination with Latin American service workers (Merrill, 2009). As it turns out, this injunction to tour also included an encouragement to exploit untapped business opportunities. For example, the 1935 edition of Terry’s Guide to Mexico urged US-American tourists not only to explore the country’s Maya culture (which, using “Aryan rates of progress,” the writer ranked as being, “perhaps not
more than a few thousand years behind the foremost nations of the world in the great procession of races from savagery toward enlightenment” (Terry, 1935, p. 579), but also to take advantage of Northern Mexico’s purportedly vast reserves of “undeveloped wealth” (Ibid, p. 62a) and “cheap labor” (Ibid), declaring in no uncertain terms that, “The writer hopes that Americans will not be negligent in securing their share of the great wealth of this land of opportunity” (Ibid, p. 62b) and noting that, in Northern Mexico, in particular, “Practically everything awaits development, but it will not continue to wait” (Ibid). Calling the US-American to tour, it can thus be argued, constituted a particular subjectification of the US-American subject into a position of microlevel dominance that was situated in and palimpsestic of the US state/capital position of imperial dominance in Latin America.

In light of Merrill’s illuminating historical analysis, then, I suggest that it was during the 1930s and 1940s – amid the popularization of international travel as a desirable way of spending leisure time and the construction of this travel as an engagement with a culture that was constructed not only as exotic, exciting, and different but also fundamentally and reassuringly inferior – that an already longstanding US-American tradition of “othering” Latin American peoples, spaces, cultures through pop culture and media imagery began to morph into a legitimized sense of desire and entitlement to tour Latin American peoples, spaces, and cultures – to insert oneself into the spaces of these Latin American peoples and cultures for purposes of gazing, sexual conquest, titillation – as a form of leisure among the US-American elite classes. At this time, perhaps, touring imperial territories through a lens of superiority began to emerge as a significant mental construct of mainstream US subjectivity.

5.4 The Freedmen’s Bureau and the Indian School Service: The State’s Borrowing of the Bourgeois “Helping Imperative” in the Management of Internal “Others”

Returning now to the subject of uplift work as a bourgeois activity, this section will explore how, beginning in the late 19th century, the US state would begin to borrow this pastime and draw upon its underlying assumptions to direct middle class citizens into humanitarian projects designed to manage internal “others.” To start, it should be mentioned that the while the
aforementioned Northern elite moral reform efforts in Northern cities had been losing their battle against patronage tactics of the urban party machines during the 1860s and early 1870s, it was at this very time that such efforts were actually gaining significant ground in the southern states of the country. As historians have shown, during the Civil War charitable organizations, helmed by a mixture of religious leaders and Republican economic elites, had begun to establish schools for slaves who had been left behind by planter families fleeing Union forces. While it would take several years for the educational movement to come under the official sponsorship and coordination of the state (i.e. with the creation of the Freedmen’s Bureau in 1865), it is important to note that its impetus came from within the federal government. During the very first year of the war, the Lincoln administration was already debating what its official course of action was to be with respect to the thousands of refugee slaves encountered by occupying Union forces in the South. The discussion was situated in the broader question of what would become of black slaves if and when emancipation were to come, particularly as there was massive Northern opposition to black emigration to the North. This was true among the proslavery Democrat leaders who flatly opposed abolition and many Republican leaders, particularly those of the Free Soil camp, who vehemently opposed the extension of slavery into the new territories but also opposed post-slavery black migration into these territories on grounds that it spelled labor competition and racial degradation (see Du Bois, 1935/2013; Foner, 1965; Lind, 2007; Voegeli, 1967). (In this way, the Free Soil camp’s slogan – “Free soil, free speech, free labor, and free men” – was clearly intended to apply only to those free men who were also white.) While Northern Democratic leaders stoked fears among the white populace that Republican leaders were in fact orchestrating a Northern influx of free blacks, Republican leaders sought to devise a plan that would avert this very outcome. As historians have shown, during the first few years of the Civil War, Lincoln was already seriously exploring the possibility of colonizing parts of Central America and the Caribbean and using them as receiving sites for compulsory immigration of emancipated slaves (see Frederickson, 1987; Scheips, 1952; Voegeli, 1967; Zoellner, 1960).
It was in this context of a search for ways to keep freed blacks firmly in the South that elite Northern anti-slavery advocates began sending teachers and relief workers to work with refugee slaves in Union occupied territories of the South. The first site of this effort was in the Union held area surrounding Fortress Monroe, Virginia. In the early months of the war, Union forces at the Fortress had begun receiving escaped slaves and, upon calculating that if re-enslaved they would be put to work in aiding the Confederate side, refused to turn them over to Southern planters (who often came looking for them). In May of 1861, Union general Benjamin Butler had famously supplied the legal justification of this act by declaring the refugee slaves “contraband of war.” Within months of this declaration, after thousands of escaped slaves had begun arriving at the Fortress, a free black woman by the name of Mary Peake was giving classes to the “contraband” slaves out of her own home and under the sponsorship of a Protestant abolitionist organization by the name of the American Missionary Association (Morris, 2010).

Just a few months later, in November 1861, a similar sequence of events played out in amplified form on the Sea Islands of South Carolina, where after taking the islands, Union forces were sharing the terrain with roughly ten thousand slaves whose masters had promptly fled by boat (Rose, 1999). At the time, the collection of abandoned Southern property was the responsibility of Lincoln’s Treasury Secretary, Salmon P. Chase, a Free Soiler Republican and former governor of Ohio. As historian Willie Lee Rose (1999) recounts, Northern public opinion heavily supported the Union’s appropriation and strategic employment of all abandoned Southern property and this included slaves. His thinking conditioned by these factors, Chase sent two agents to the Islands to intervene and further assess the situation. One was a Lieutenant Colonel William H. Reynolds, who came recommended by the wealthy cotton manufacturer and Rhode Island governor (and friend to Chase) William Sprague and was to put the contraband slaves to work picking the cotton and organize its export to the North. The other was a lawyer (and close friend to Chase) by the name of Edward L. Pierce, who was to attend to the social and human circumstance of the contraband slaves, a group that was now enduring the onset of winter under
starvation circumstances (the Union soldiers having appropriated most plantation foodstuffs for themselves) that were compounded by little clothing, no medical care, and the new violence of Union soldier abuses (which included not only the hording of food but also the alleged attempt of one officer to assemble a group of slaves for export to Cuba, where slavery was still firmly in effect) that were causing the Lincoln administration great embarrassment.

It was upon Pierce’s arrival to the Islands that the American Missionary Association sent their own agent to the scene: a Methodist reverend from Ohio by the name of Mansfield French. Together, Pierce and French (who knew Secretary Chase personally from his days as the governor of Ohio) devised a course of action that was premised on coordinating a Northern-led project of education, ministry, and waged employment of the “contraband” slaves, all with the purported aim of preparing them for freedom, paid labor, and full citizenship. Importantly, Pierce’s report from the Sea Island indicates that the work that was to be carried out there was not understood as an isolated intervention to deal with the immediacy of unharvested cotton and materially destitute contraband slaves, but rather was envisioned as a sort of experiment that sought to inject a system of free labor into one corner of the feudalistic south – a form of domestic capitalist imperialism that necessarily included the capitalistic socialization of those who were counted on as the labor supply (and would be the precursor to efforts in Latin America and the South Pacific). If successful, Pierce recommended that the plan, which we can understand as an early thread of – or “rehearsal” (Rose, 1999) for – Reconstruction, could and should be implemented across the entire south (see Rose, 1998, p. 29). While Pierce was to gather financial backers and willing relief/education workers in Boston, French was to do the same in the city of New York.

In New York, French’s efforts were predictably carried out under the auspices of the American Missionary Association (AMA), the organization that had originally sent him to South Carolina. The AMA had been founded in 1846 by a group of men who had broken from several different missionary societies in protest at the societies’ respective refusals to take an oppositional stance against slavery. The most influential of these men was Lewis Tappan, a
wealthy businessman and staunch abolitionist who came from the aforementioned Calvinist-Federalist tradition that had fueled the creation of numerous missionary organizations in the first third of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century (see Feller, 2001; Wyatt-Brown, 1997). By the time he helped found the AMA, Tappan had been involved in the New England missionary and benevolent association circuit for quite some time, but like his fellow AMA founders peers had grown frustrated with its common stance of taking a soft approach to slavery. If like any other missionary organization, the AMA’s objective was the accumulation of as many “saved” souls as possible (ideally those of the entire republic and beyond), its rationale around condemning slavery and achieving abolition held that slavery was in fact a sin – because, according to the explanation of historian Lewis Perry, “the slaveholder interfered between God and another moral agent, the slave, and thereby placed himself in the sinful position of contending against divine sovereignty” (as cited in Jones, 1980, pp. 20-21) – and the remedy was a project of moral suasion, in which the Southern slaveholder, through the power of religious conversion, would be compelled to forsake his crime against God and free his human chattel from the bonds of slavery. At the same time, as Jones informs us, the AMA held that slaves and recently liberated slaves, themselves, were also in desperate need of religious salvation because, as the AMA and other evangelical abolition societies claimed, the condition of slavery had left them plagued by vice, prone to “intemperance” with regard to personal habits, degraded, and “lacking a conception of their own worth as moral human beings” (see Jones, 1980, p. 21). Clearly, for the AMA and other missionary organizations that were willing to take the radical stance of condemning slavery as a pernicious sin, abolition provided fertile ground for their business of saving souls.

As Griffin (1957) informs us, none of the founders and officers of these evangelical organizations had actually been official clergymen, but rather laymen of “rising and social and economic station” (p. 426). In addition to economic standing, these men were however unified in their adherence to Calvinist Protestantism and its increasing emphasis on charity, or “the idea that certain persons, having received God's sanctifying grace, were obliged to extend to all men the means of obtaining that grace.” As Griffin observes, in early 19\textsuperscript{th} century New England, this
principle of Protestantism "had passed into the philosophy of Federalism which supplemented the
eritage by adding to the elect of God the elect of men" (p. 426). In other words, followers of
Calvinist Protestantism easily found a home in the political perspective of Federalism, as both
were premised on the idea of a small, select group of special men leading the majority, whether it
was in the area of spiritual salvation or the execution of democracy. As federalism met its demise
shortly thereafter, its remaining proponents carried on their traditions and ideas through the
formation and operation of benevolent Protestant societies. The idea of the rich leading the rest
remained clearly in use, as these societies appointed presidents who ranked among the North’s
wealthiest men, as did the idea of “keeping society godly and orderly, stable and quiet” (Ibid, p.
428).

In Boston, Pierce was not officially tied to any established organization. In distinction to
French’s work in New York, he pulled together a faction of interested parties that was decidedly
non-denominational, but like French’s coalition, was also populated by the city’s wealthy. As
Willie Lee Rose (1999) informs us, at the first meeting Pierce held in Boston, “the professions
most largely represented were the ministry and teaching, ably backed up by a contingent of
public-spirited business leaders, among whom were some of the wealthiest men in Boston” (p.
36). In distinction to the evangelicalism of the AMA faction, the members of this group were
driven in part by a notion of “liberal Christianity” but the majority, according to Rose, were inspired
even more significantly by the Free Soil movement, which, again, opposed the extension of
slavery into the newly added US territories of the West on the grounds of unfair competition
posed by slave-owners against non-slave-owning, less wealthy white settlers, but also opposed
the migration of free blacks into these territories on the grounds that they would pose competition
to free whites and threaten the sanctity of the Midwest as a purely white region.

These men would form the Boston Educational Commission, and if the AMA’s objective
might be understood as the accumulation of souls in order to increase church membership and
strengthen and expand the hegemony of the Protestant church, the Boston Education
Commission’s objective could perhaps be interpreted as bringing the preparedness for and
experience of education, wage labor, and citizenry directly to Southern blacks precisely in order to keep them from seeking all of this out in the North. At the same time, it must be highlighted that key members of the Boston Education Commission had vested interests in preserving the South’s role as a supplier of raw, cheap cotton, and for this to happen there of course needed to be an uninterrupted supply of cheap cotton labor; Edward Atkinson, for example, the Treasurer of the Commission, had recently been the treasurer and agent for six Boston cotton manufacturing firms (and was a apparently a fervent proponent of free labor as opposed to slave labor being the most efficient way to harvest cotton).

In any case, a key common denominator with respect to the strategy of both of these early factions was a notion of “uplifting” and “improving” the contraband slaves through the specific vehicle of education (see Jones, 1980; Morris, 2010). This was to be paired, no doubt, with putting the contraband slaves to work in the collection of cotton; this was framed as serving the dual purpose of bringing in a profit for the Union while also initiating the contraband into the rhythms and practices of capitalistic waged labor. Other central objectives (particularly in the case of the AMA) were suffrage and land ownership for freed slaves; historians have shown, however, the achievement of these objectives proved less successful in the face of minimal political will and much Southern opposition. The Boston Educational Commission described its mission as “the industrial, social, intellectual, moral and religious improvement of persons released from slavery in the course of the war for the Union” (see Morris, 2010, p. 3), while the National Freedmen’s Relief Association, an additional group formed by AMA leaders, produced a constitution in which stated goals were to teach emancipated blacks “civilization and Christianity” along with “order, industry, economy, and self-reliance; and to elevate them in the scale of humanity, by inspiring them with self-respect” (quoted in Rose, 1999, p.41).

The immediate result of these organizing activities was a voyage taken by a variety of Northern elite backers and constituents to the Sea Islands, where they provided relief, instruction, and ministry to the “contraband” slaves. This expedition of the Gideonites, as they would be dubbed, clearly followed up on the Fortress Monroe initiative in a big way, propelling the
continued formation of a freedmen’s aid movement that would continue to grow during the final years of the Civil War and continue for just a few years following its conclusion in 1865. The 1862 formation of the movement’s two distinct factions – one driven by the AMA and the other by the Boston Educational Commission (which later became the New England Freedmen’s Aid Society) – marked the birth of two broadly distinct approaches to freedmen’s aid that would characterize the movement for the duration of its existence. The dozens of freedmen’s aid societies that would proliferate thereafter would inevitably take one of the two approaches and align themselves accordingly, with the non-denominational organizations eventually gathering under a new umbrella organization of the American Freedmen’s Union Commission (AFUC) and the evangelical organizations allying with the AMA, which would become the largest, richest, and most influential of all the evangelical freedmen’s aid societies. While the distinction between the two approaches is important to highlight, what is also important to note is that regardless of orientation, evangelical or nondenominational, these societies all took approaches that continued to center on providing education for the freedmen and suffused this model of education on notions of their uplift, improvement, and reformation.

Not surprisingly, their common constructs of uplift, improvement, and reformation figured heavily into these organizations’ teacher recruitment efforts, which were by 1865 being subsidized and overseen by the state in the form of the Freedmen’s Bureau. As historian Jacqueline Jones (1980) has shown, the recruitment ads for teachers placed by the AMA and the New England branch of the non-denominational AFUC were strikingly similar in their picture of the ideal teacher. In its magazine, American Missionary, the former posted a notice that Jones summarizes (with some direct quotes) as calling for “experienced teachers with missionary spirit, a lack of ‘romantic or mercenary motives,’ physical health, ‘culture and common sense’ and ‘benevolence, gravity, and earnestness’” (see Jones, 1980, p. 35). The latter painted a similar picture in its own magazine where it published an advertisement that listed prospective freedmen’s teacher qualifications as “health, courage, energy, high moral character, experience, good judgment, temper, good education, power of discipline, deep interest in the cause of the
Negro, and earnest religious faith” (Ibid). While this sort of language is not entirely surprising, it is important to highlight because it underscores how, in their teacher recruitment efforts, bourgeois-led freedmen’s aid organizations engaged in a certain discourse that constructed a particular subject position to which readers were encouraged to aspire – and one which applicants were implicitly instructed to embody if they in fact wanted to obtain a position as a teacher. This subject position is clearly infused with the sort of helping imperative that Heron (2007) identifies as being central to bourgeois subjectivity.

However, contrary to conventional narratives around the freedmen’s schools, many of the freedmen’s teachers were not exclusively of the bourgeoisie. For years, the dominant image of the freedmen’s schoolteacher was that of a young white woman from an economic elite of New England – the iconic “New England schoolmarm” famously depicted by W.E.B. Du Bois (1935/2013, p. 170) and other historians since. However, recent work by historian Ronald E. Butchart (2010) actually disrupts this portrait by suggesting, among other things, that many of the freedmen’s teachers were, in fact, not of wealthy backgrounds. (Here, it also must be pointed out that Butchart’s research shows that while the majority of the freedmen’s teachers were in fact white, over one third were actually black – another disruption to the traditional schoolmarm image). Moreover, he finds, over half of the teaching force between 1861 and 1876 were Southerners and one third of this half were white Southerners. Not more than 1/5 of the freedmen’s schoolteachers, he finds, were from New England. However, what I am most concerned with here are Butchart’s findings about the social class composition of the teachers. While conceding that “relative social class status is always a difficult issue historically” (p. xv), Butchart (2010) uses census data from the pertinent period to convincingly argue that, “as many of the teachers came from the lower tiers of a genteel but declining middling class as came from lives of prosperous leisure,” (Ibid) thus further troubling the conventional portrait of freedmen’s teachers as being only of the economic elite. Specifically, he finds that while most of those teachers who were from the Northern states were in fact well educated, with nearly three quarters of them having completed some amount of advanced secondary or higher education and with
most of this portion having graduated college, one third of the Northern teachers were not at all wealthy, coming “from homes with no landholdings at all and total wealth of $200 or less” (p. 85). Moreover, while a small number of Northern white teachers did come from families that, according to the census data used by Butchart, were in possession of “wealth,” Butchart also stresses that the mode level of wealth for many Northern white teachers was $1000 during a period when the median family wealth in the North was between $1000 to $3000 (p. 85). In other words, many of those who did qualify as “wealthy” were among the least wealthy of the wealthy.

This point about the non-elite nature of a great number of freemen’s teachers is important to emphasize because it points to ways in which the attempt at a certain socialization or subjectification on the part of bourgeois-led freedmen’s aid organizations (which later came under the control and direction of the state) was not applied simply to other bourgeois individuals but also, and perhaps more extensively, to those of non-elite socioeconomic standing. In other words, the effort to impart upon individuals a desire to intervene for the purported betterment of an inferiorized other wherever he may reside (Heron, 2007) and, moreover, to identify as a person who is entitled and obligated to engage in this specific activity (all while this activity has been calculated to serve certain economic and political interests of a bourgeois class concerned with keeping blacks in the South after Emancipation) was, whether intentionally or not, a project in which the non-elite were invited by the bourgeoisie, and later the state, to adopt a mental construct that, Heron has argued, was a foundational and perhaps even exclusive part of bourgeois subjectivity.

The other important point to mention here is that while the freedmen school movement originated as a private bourgeois-led initiative, by 1865 it was being officially underwritten and funded by the state, which, under the control of a Radical Republican congressional majority, extended Lincoln’s Freedmen’s Bill (originally limited to expire one year after the war’s end). As Beckert (2001) emphasizes, the Freedmen’s Bill – and Reconstruction, more generally – were a point of great contention amongst Northern elites, with merchant Democrats calling for the accommodation of Southern planters and minimal post-war federal intervention in the social
relations of the South, and industrialist Republicans, who struck a stricter stance, insisting that the national government intervene to manage, oversee, and guide the post-war reformation of these relations. By 1872, and under a Democrat-dominated Congress, the Freedmen’s Bureau was in fact disbanded. However, its brief existence can be understood as a key moment when the US state became officially involved in an “uplift” project that had been initiated by members of the country’s bourgeoisie.

As it turned out, this project would be the predecessor to another uplift intervention, one that was to be directed at American Indians in the 1870s. Like the Freedmen’s Schools movement, the American Indian Schools movement would be initiated by members of the country’s elite before being taken over by the state. Also like the Freedmen’s Schools, the American Indian Schools movement would rely heavily on the participation of the country’s white middle class, which, it seems, were recruited through a similar discourse of uplift for an inferiorized other purportedly in need of civilization. The following paragraphs are devoted to a brief review of this intervention, which, together with the Freedmen’s Schools movement, can be understood as a precursor to future interventions that would be then carried out under the coordination of the US state within the territories of the formal overseas empire the US would acquire roughly thirty years later.

The Indian School Service

Close on the heels of Lincoln’s Freedmen’s Bureau Bill but pertaining to a different segment of internal “others” was the Appropriations Bill of 1871, which officially made Indians “wards” of the state (Adams, 1995), as Adams puts it, “a colonized people” (Ibid, p.7). The timing of this Bill is significant in several ways. It was passed at a moment when a system of removal, treaty violation, and brutal warfare had been going on for almost a century, when a near total defeat (but not a total extermination) of the Indian nations had been accomplished, when the spatial boundaries between Indians and whites had reached new levels of proximity, and when white settlers were precipitously and violently laying claim to more and more of the western spaces to which Indians had been forcibly removed (Ibid).
The predecessor to the Appropriations Bill had been President Ulysses S. Grant’s 1869 “Peace Policy,” which was oriented toward reforming a notoriously corrupt Office of Indian Affairs, known for its graft, embezzlement, and the doling out of field appointments according to a system of patronage (thus mimicking the aforementioned state of municipal politics against which bourgeois reformers were concurrently railing in the nation’s large cities). The Peace Policy entailed several acts: the placing of appointments of Office and reservations personnel in the hands of church boards; the pledge of increased federal support for Indian education; and the creation of a Board of Indian Commissioners comprised of leading members of the nation’s philanthropic community. Grant had in fact formed this policy in the wake of growing pressure from leading philanthropic reformers who, in the years following the Civil War, protested the genocidal Indian Wars carried out by the US military and the mistreatment of American Indians at the hands of the Office of Indian Affairs. Following the Peace Policy, however, little changed and what ensued was a battle on the part of Office figures against the church, which was now newly empowered vis-à-vis the management of the American Indian population. During the 1870s, reformers had increasingly taken up the cause, arguing that after a century of dispossession, “removal,” and murder, the US government was continuing to fail utterly in its obligation to American Indians. Following the passage of the Appropriations Bill, this reform movement consolidated further, with key events being the publication of the 1881 publication of Helen Hunt Jackson’s A Century of Dishonor: A Sketch of the United States Government’s Dealings with Some of the Indian Tribes, which worked to further galvanize this particular reform movement and bring greater attention to the cause, and the successive formation of several charity organizations dedicated to the “uplift” of “the Indian” – the Boston Indian Citizenship Association (1879), the Women’s National Indian Association (1879), the Indian Rights Association (1883), and the Lake Mohonk Conference (1883) (see Adams, 1995, pp. 9-12). These organizations, which joined the Board of Indian Commissioners (founded during the era of Grant’s Peace Policy), were all founded by various members of the country’s elite, with the Lake Mohonk Conference being the creation of one Albert K. Smiley, an esteemed Quaker philanthropist and owner of a luxury resort.
on New York’s Lake Mohonk. As Adams (1995) recounts, beginning in 1883, Smiley invited, “prominent philanthropists, government officials, missionaries, and even military figures to his plush hotel for several days of discussion and debate” (p. 11). This would continue for the next thirty years, and the Lake Mohonk Conference would become among the most influential of the reform organizations.

By the mid-1880s, these organizations had formulated a general “Indian policy” position of their own, one which emphasized the salvation, civilization, and uplift of American Indians who, it was purported, “not only need to be saved from the white man, they needed to be saved from themselves.” Education of the American Indian figured heavily into the reformers’ vision, as did notions of Indian savagery. As Merrill Gates, president of the Lake Mohonk Conference, stated to conference participants in 1891:

We are going to conquer barbarism, but we are going to do it by getting at the barbarism one by one. We are going to do it by the conquest of the individual man, woman, and child which leads to true civilization. We are going to conquer the Indians by a standing army of schoolteachers, armed with ideas, winning victories by industrial training, and by the gospel of love and the gospel of work. (Quoted in Adams, 1995, p. 27)

In this way, the Indian schools movement emerged from a specific sect of elite reformers who denounced the state’s historically brutal and dishonest treatment of the Indian nations and called for the government to make good on its age old promise to “civilize” them, thus proposing to trade a policy of racist annihilation for a policy of reformism that was perhaps well-intentioned but ultimately just as racist in its premise. As Stoler (2001) has observed, such a movement bore striking similarity to Dutch colonial attempts to produce the “perfected native” in the East Indies (p. 854). Over the course of the 1870s, 1880s and 1890s, and with the steadily increasing financial support of the state, reformers would experiment with three different models of Indian schooling – the reservation day school, the off-reservation day school, and the off-reservation boarding school, the objective always being to discern the most effective way of retraining American Indian children in the ways of the white man and preventing their lapse back into the purportedly savage ways of their cultures and communities. Ultimately, a consensus formed around the contention that removing American Indian children altogether from their homes and
reservation communities and educating them in remote boarding schools in “civilized” locales was
the most effective way to “kill the Indian in him and spare the man” (this being the dictum of
choice for Richard Henry Pratt, an Army Lieutenant from Indiana who had fought in the genocidal
Indian Wars being waged in the west during the late 1860s and early 1870s and subsequently
risen as a leading “expert” on “Indian education” in the years thereafter) (see Adams, 1995, p.
52).

As indicated, the funding of American Indian education also became increasingly
prioritized by the state. Beginning in 1877, Congress started allotting funds specifically for the
project of Indian education (Adams, 1995, p. 27) and as per the provisions of the Appropriations
Bill, the government steadily devoted more and more funding to the construction of Indian schools
with expenditures climbing from an initial annual total of $20,000 in 1877 to $1,364,568 by 1890
and $2,060,695 by 1895 (Adams, 1995, p. 27). In addition to directing more and more funding
toward the construction and running of Indian schools, in the early 1890s and at the behest of the
reform community, the US state also took greater control over the Indian schools by essentially
wresting them from the control of the Indian Office, an institution notorious for being subject to the
political patronage and thus continual object of reformers’ chagrin. By the early 1890s, positions
in the Indian schools had been reclassified as civil service employment.

In this way, it was with the movement to bolster American Indian education, the
subsequent bourgeois fixation on reforming American Indian school system, and the placing of
the Indian School Service as a form of civil service that the US state presided over the marriage
of the age old construct of white Anglo-Saxon obligation and entitlement “to overspread and to
possess” territories inhabited by “other” peoples (i.e. Manifest Destiny) was officially wed to a
construct of white Anglo-Saxon obligation and entitlement to intervene for the betterment of
“other” peoples whom this process of overspreading and possessing had encountered, abused,
and dramatically reduced but had failed to fully “remove.” This twin obligation/entitlement of
expanding and intervening had always been there to some degree, as white Anglo-Saxon
settlement in lands inhabited by native peoples had always involved the state’s implementation of
civilization schemes. However, the magnitude of the late 19th century Indian school movement and its status as a large scale government project marked an important moment in which, it can be argued, the helping imperative described by Heron – the sense of obligation and entitlement to intervene for the “betterment” of the inferior other – took on new level of formalization as it became a matter of state policy and a form of civil service to be carried out by middle-class white Anglo-Saxon Protestants.

Indeed, while the Indian education movement was clearly started by the country’s New England and Atlantic elite, the majority of its teachers came “not from the region most directly associated with Indian reform, the Northeast, but from those areas closer to the Indian frontier” (Adams, 1995, p. 83) – “the Midwest, the Plains, and the Far West” (Ibid). While class background information on Indian School Service teachers proves elusive, Adams (1995) hypothesizes that among these teachers (a modest, and eventually overwhelming, majority of whom were women) a quest for economic security was a prevalent driving motivation. In other words, Indian School Service teachers were apparently not inheritors of moneyed existences, despite the fact that elite philanthropists were the leaders and ideological shapers of the movement to which they were recruited. These apparent characteristics, combined with the civil service designation granted to Indian School Service employment, suggest that these Indian School Service teachers were in fact members of the country’s emergent white collar middle class theorized by Mills (1951/2002) and in fact identified by Aron (1987) as the resident employees of a newly burgeoning civil service of the late 19th century (discussed in Chapter One).

In this way, I suggest, bourgeois civilizing interventions carried out upon “other” peoples were not only made into a fundamental component of internal imperial policy, but were also informally legitimized and even celebrated by the US state as an appropriate construct of white Anglo-Saxon Protestant non-elite middle class subjectivity. This translation of a bourgeois sense of entitlement and obligation to intervene for the betterment of an inferiorized other (Heron, 2007) is somewhat difficult to thoroughly substantiate, as recruitment and training materials for this movement prove difficult to find. However, the bourgeois-led Indian reform movement itself was
clearly suffused with such constructs. An example of this comes from the words of reformist Indian Office Commissioner Thomas J. Morgan (see Adams, 1995, pp. 60-70), who took it upon himself to speak for American Indians with the following words:

We [American Indians] are like leaves driven by the tempest, like sheep without a shepherd, like vessels at sea with no sails or rudder...We are surrounded on every side by the resistless tide of population; a tide we cannot withstand nor escape nor compete with. Our only hope is in your civilization, which we cannot adopt unless you give us your Bible, your spelling book, your plow and your ax. Grant us these and teach us how to use them, and then we shall be like you. (quoted in Adams, 1995, p. 84)

Moreover, there are some sources that provide critical evidence of the lionization of such a helping imperative being deployed in the recruitment of Indian School Service teachers. For example, the following is an excerpt from the memoirs of Flora Gregg Iliff (1954/1985), who as a young woman worked as an Indian School Service teacher on Walapai Indian Reservation and later the Havasupai Indian Reservation, both in Arizona. In the excerpt Iliff recalls sitting in class at the Oklahoma Territory Teachers’ Institute where she was a student and recounts the words of a speech delivered by a lecturer who was apparently there to recruit teachers for the Indian School Service:

These Indians are almost completely out of touch with the civilized world...Their village on the floor of the gorge can be reached by either of two trails, both of them steep and both of them dangerous...The canyon in which they live is so inaccessible that it is difficult to find teachers to work in such isolation. The Havasupai—the People of the Blue Water—need you (p. 3).

5.5 From the Thomasites to the Peace Corps: The State’s Invocation of the Bourgeois “Helping Imperative” for Purposes of Overseas Empire

The commencement of US formal empire at the turn of the 19th century was bound with bourgeois ideological constructs of uplift, improvement, and civilization to be carried out overseas upon the state’s new imperial subjects, particularly Filipinos, but also Hawaiians, Cubans, and Puerto Ricans. A key example of this is found in a speech delivered by President McKinley’s to a Methodist church delegation in November of 1899 (see Schirmer and Shalom, 1987, pp. 22-23). Here, McKinley took the opportunity to address criticism he had received over his annexation of the Philippines, hanging his innocence on his claim that the new empire had come by accident not intention, insisting that when he had ordered his army general to “capture and destroy the
Spanish fleet” (Ibid) in the Philippines – which was necessary, he pointed out, because “if the Dons were victorious they would likely cross the Pacific and ravage our Oregon and California coasts” (Ibid) – he had only thought as far as the battle at hand. Imperial conquest had never been in the plans. It was rather a side effect of defeating the Spanish, an act that he construed as imperative to national security (all of this while conveniently evading the point the United States had been the ones to initiate war with Spain). According to McKinley, it was only when the Philippines had then “dropped into our laps” (Ibid) that he had begun to wrestle a great deal with the matter of “what to do with” the islands that “came to us, as a gift from the gods” (Ibid). He had, he claimed, “walked the floor of the White House night after night until midnight” (Ibid) and turned to God multiple times. It was during this time, he claimed, that an epiphany had come to him:

…and one night late it came to me this way—I don’t know how it was, but it came: (1) That we could not give them back to Spain—that would be cowardly and dishonorable; (2) that we could not turn them over to France and Germany—our commercial rivals in the Orient—that would be bad business and discreditable; (3) that we could not leave them to themselves—they were unfit for self-government and they would have anarchy and misrule over there worse than Spain’s was; and (4) that there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, by God’s grace do the very best we could by them, as our fellow-men for whom Christ also died. (Ibid)

As it turned out, McKinley’s reference to education, uplift, civilization, and Christian conversion for Filipinos was not mere rhetoric intended to win points with the Methodist delegation but indicative of a whole approach to colonialism that was being hastily developed as the Spanish-American War was being fought and the taking of Spain’s empire was being anticipated. According to historian Glenn Anthony May (1976), during the Filipino-American war that followed the Spanish-American War, the US military was already organizing schools in the Philippines and US soldiers were already being assigned as teachers in them. By 1900, a Department of Public Instruction had been formed by an army general and was being directed by an army captain. According to May, the principal objective was understood by the military not in terms of educating students but rather as an imperative to garner goodwill toward the United States among the Filipino population and in so doing, to pacify the islands and whittle away local support for the Filipino independence fighters.
Before discussing the particulars of this education initiative and how it relied on the recruitment of US-American teachers, it is important to situate it as part of a broader approach to colonialism that the McKinley administration was attempting to execute. Indeed, McKinley’s stated plan to develop, civilize, educate, and train colonial subjects constituted what Meg Wesling (2011) has termed a “paradigm of colonial tutelage,” and it embodied an attempt on the part of the US government to bridge the glaring contradiction between liberal democratic ideals (upon which the country had historically staked its nationalist claims of exceptionalism) and an explicit colonialist project (that mirrored systems of overseas domination implemented by the very European countries from which the United States had liberated itself and hence claimed distinction). Indeed, once US forces occupied Philippines (but before the war with Spain was even officially over), McKinley had issued what would become his infamous Proclamation of Benevolent Assimilation, a written statement that declared US sovereignty over the islands but, as evidenced by both its title and content, sought to head off any association with European colonial powers – even as it imposed US rule in no uncertain terms. “It will be the duty of the commander of the forces of occupation,” the Proclamation read,

…to announce and proclaim in the most public manner that we come, not as invaders or conquerors, but as friends, to protect the natives in their homes, in their employments, and in their personal and religious rights. All persons who, either by active aid or by honest submission, cooperate with the government of the United States to give effect to these beneficent purposes, will received the reward of its support and protection. All others will be brought within the lawful rule we have assumed, with firmness if need be, but without severity so far as may be possible. (United States Adjutant-Generals Office, 1993, p. 858).

In this way, McKinley’s stated claims underscored a plan to adopt an imperial style that was informed by yet consciously distinct from that of Europe. As Julian Go (2006) reports, in preparing for extra-continental empire, US policy makers and fledgling colonial officials were in fact reading up on British colonial policies as a guiding framework and had immediately bought into the idea of a “racially underpinned civilizing mission” (an idea that dovetailed easily with US traditions of white Anglo-Saxon supremacy as well as the doctrine of social Darwinism that was en vogue at the time). However, these figures had quickly denounced the overall style of British
colonial rule as “tyrannical and reckless” (see Go, 2006, p. 19) – qualities which they, in turn, attributed to the legacy of European monarchy from which the United States had always taken pride in distinguishing itself. Going forward, Go (2006) argues, US colonial officials, scholars, and policy makers claimed that, unlike European colonialism, civilizing missions administered by the United States to the Philippines and Puerto Rico would be uniquely committed to what they posited as the true objective of civilization: eventual self-government to be exercised by “the natives” – Filipinos and Puerto Ricans – themselves. Go (2006) summarizes the professed objectives of the US government during this period: “Rather than ruling overseas colonies for centuries as the British had been doing, and rather than ruling in a ‘reckless’ and ‘tyrannical’ manner, the United States would use colonialism as a mechanism for spreading the gospel of American liberal democracy” (p. 19). According to Go, policy makers and colonial officials would dub this model of colonial rule as “democratic tutelage” and “political education,” and it was to be implemented not only in the Philippines but in Cuba and Puerto Rico as well. As McKinley explained to the members of the First Philippine Commission in January of 1899, “The Philippines are ours not to exploit, but to develop, to civilize, to educate, and train in the science of self-government” (quoted by Harrison, 1922, p. 36, as cited in Lansang, 1952, p. 226; see also Go & Foster, 2003, p.11).

As discussed by Go (2008), in settling on this particular model of colonial administration for Puerto Rico and the Philippines (and despite their aims of distinguishing a distinctive brand of US imperialism), US officials followed the Europeans, supporting it with ideas drawn from the burgeoning field of “race science.” Rejecting the orthodox position of biological racism that emphasized blood, genes and stock and an immutable fixity of racial inferiority, these men instead drew upon French biologist Jean-Baptiste Lamarck’s theory of “soft inheritance” (or the heredity of acquired traits) which had been taken up by a neo-Lamarckian camp of race scientists in the late 19th century, and used it to argue that Filipinos and Puerto Ricans were among the lesser races (thus justifying the colonial enterprise of the moment) but could be improved and made ready for self-government (thus signaling a commitment to liberal democratic principles
even if they were to be achieved through illiberal – but purportedly necessary – means).

Specifically, infamous US colonialists such as Elihu Root laid the blame at the feet of the Spanish Crown, arguing that it had ruled in such a way that had left its subjects woefully “ignorant, credulous, and childlike” (quoted in Go, 2008, p. 29) and thus incapable of self-government and desperately in need of an education in liberal democracy if they were ever to be independent.

Here, it is worth noting that the use of Lamarckian theory thus allowed US colonialists to, in a sense, have their cake and it too; their employment of it at once justified colonial rule with prevailing conceptions of Filipinos and Puerto Ricans as being inferior and in such a way that might as well have been biological for all its purported intractability and enabled the noble claim that US colonialism would be only temporary, its duration dependent on the progress of the Filipinos and Puerto Ricans, themselves. In this way, it seems, US colonialists sought to save face on several fronts: maintaining an official, if clearly perverted, commitment to the principles of liberal democracy upon which notions of United States exceptionalism was based; sanitizing US colonialism for consumption by the US-American public; and representing colonial rule to Filipino and Puerto Rican subjects (the human targets of “pacification”) as a beneficial and temporary arrangement.

In this way, not only was the US distinguishing itself from the British and French colonial regimes with noble promises of certain (yet always vaguely defined) independence for its subjects as part of its colonial model but, in at once making independence the end goal of colonial rule and declaring Filipinos and Puerto Ricans not yet ready for freedom and hinging their readiness on a full blown United States democratic education, it was creating a convenient ideological pretext for imposing its sovereignty over the islands. Moreover, as Meg Wesling (2011) has argued, the tutelage paradigm served “as a temporary measure through which the US government could set the terms under which independence would finally be granted” (p. 13).

As Go (2008) reports, the model of US colonial tutelage was comprehensive and multifaceted. He identifies its three chief mechanisms as: economic and infrastructural development; political education for local elites; and public schooling. It is on the third facet that I will focus here.
As May (1976) reports, by mid-1900, the Second Philippine Commission had appointed one Frederick Atkinson, a high school principal from Springfield, Massachusetts, to oversee the McKinley-mandated honing of the public school system that the US military had already established in the Philippines. By early 1901, the Commission had approved Atkinson’s Act 74, a piece of legislation that “provided for a centralized system of public primary schools, consisting of ten (later eighteen, then thirty-six) school divisions, each under the supervision of a division superintendent; empowered the General Superintendent (Atkinson) to hire one thousand trained American teachers; authorized the division superintendents to appoint Filipino teachers for the schools within their districts; and provided for the establishment of normal, agricultural, and trade schools” (May, 1976, p. 139). As stipulated by the Act, the Philippine Commission would pay the travel expenses of US-American teachers, as well as their monthly salaries, which were set at a rate significantly higher than the average monthly teacher salary in the United States (Ibid). In the coming months, over 8,000 US-Americans submitted applications. In June 1901, roughly one hundred US-American teachers would arrive in the Philippines by way of the Sheridan and the Buford, and in late August 1901 a total of 523 more would join them (Ibid, p. 144); this latter group would famously be dubbed the Thomasites for the old army transport ship Thomas that carried them there. In the meantime, the United States was pursuing similar schooling takeovers and teacher deployments in its imperial territories of Hawai’i, Cuba, and Puerto Rico (see Wesling, 2011, pp. 15-16).

With this state-led recruitment and deployment of US-Americans to serve as teachers in US imperial territories, I suggest, there was an empire-oriented effort underway to shape and guide the conduct not only of colonial subjects, but of (certain) US citizen subjects, as well. Here, the governmental objective can be surmised as the guiding of members of the country’s non-elite white middle classes so that they would aspire to do the work required to administer this schooling in the United States newly acquired colonial territories. To do this, I submit, the US state was in fact drawing upon those mental constructs of moral uplift for purportedly inferior and
dangerous others that, at the turn of the century, were already in heavy circulation among members of the country’s bourgeoisie.

As discussed above, the end of the 19th century was in fact the height of an urban moral reform movement being led and undertaken by private citizens who were members of the economic elite, individuals deeply disturbed, panicked even, by the overall state of the country’s poor urban sectors and more specifically, by the various forms of conduct they witnessed taking place in these areas among these sectors’ inhabitants. As Boyer (1978) reminds us, the economic crises of the 1870s and the riots that had ensued in urban working class neighborhoods had shaken the country’s economic elites, causing on the one hand a closing of ranks among the bourgeoisie and on the other a call to action issued by certain members of the bourgeois for other bourgeois to join them led rehabilitating the urban poor. With these calls to action came the emergence of a large charity organization movement in the 1870s, led by the elite and suffused with notions of entitlement and obligation of the elite to intervene in the lives of the poor. The charity organization movement was quickly joined by the formation of the settlement house movement which gained momentum in the 1880s and 1890s and was also led by members of the economic elite such as Jane Addams (Boyer, 1978). The stated justification was often not just a matter of professed morality (i.e. that intervening for the presumed betterment of the poor was the “right” thing to do), but also one of securing the property and physical safety of the upper classes and society overall in the face of working class rebellion, riots, and related political change that could bring about forms of economic redistribution (Boyer, 1978).

Thus, by the time President McKinley was emphasizing the civilization, education, and training of Filipinos in his aforementioned speeches delivered to the Philippine Commission and the Methodist church and at the time when thousands of US-Americans were being recruited as teachers of colonial subjects, bourgeois notions of uplifting inferior Others and bourgeois-led interventions purporting to do so had become a frequent and highly publicized phenomenon in the US context. In other words, at the very moment when the US state became involved in
strategically applying such notions to the ruling of the inhabitants of its new empire, US society
was already immersed in the popularization of elite discourses of moral uplift for racialized
Others.

As historical accounts of the ensuing teacher recruitment effort prove elusive, it is difficult
to know for certain how bourgeois constructs of entitlement and obligation to intervene for the
betterment of inferiorized Others actually figured into them. In other words, the exact ways in
which this recruitment effort may have attempted to attend to and shape the conduct of those it
targeted, the ideals it actually deployed, the forms of behavior it actually encouraged, the sorts of
appeals it made and rationales it mobilized are hard to know. However, connections between the
ways in which the state was publicly framing the enterprise and the ways in which actual teachers
seemed to understand it and imagine their role in it are quite telling. For example, in his
examination of US international humanitarianism, historian Jonathan Zimmerman (2006) provides
a quote from Anna Donaldson, one of the first US-American teachers in the Philippines. The
statement was reportedly uttered over the course of Donaldson’s voyage to the Philippines during
a layover in Hawai’i. After meeting with US-American officials from the schools in Hawai’i
regarding the educational work that they would soon be doing in the Philippines, Donaldson
reportedly said: “The fact that so much has been done for civilization and uplift of the Hawaiians,”
Anna Donaldson reportedly said, “gave us courage to believe that similar mission would be
crowned with success” (as quoted in Zimmerman, 2006, p. 2).

Moreover, while the founding operators of the U.S colonial schools in the Philippines
were soldiers charged with the strategic objective of pacifying the islands by convincing the
Filipino public of US goodwill, the rhetoric used to talk about and promote the schools to the US
public was suffused with constructs of charitable moral uplift and civilization for the “inferior
races.” It was in this way, I suggest that the state strategically borrowed or drew upon the
bourgeois “helping imperative” (Heron, 2007) in its efforts to guide the conduct of the masses in
such a way intended to serve empire; indeed, without diluting the salience of humanitarian charity
work as a core construct of bourgeois subjectivity, it is worth pointing out that, as with the work of
other federal programs aimed at pacifying internal “others” (i.e. the Freedmen schools and the Indian school service), the actual application of this paradigm in the US colonies was to delegated to and carried out not largely by members of the bourgeois but by the non-elite young adult members of the white middle classes (Zimmerman, 2006). As Zimmerman has underscored, those recruited and enlisted into serving as teachers in these schools hailed predominantly from white middle class backgrounds (Ibid, pp. 13-15).

Clearly, the recruitment and deployment of white middle class teachers constituted a state project that was calculated to serve multiple ends. For one, their arrival and subsequent tenure in the new US territories lent a physical substantiation of the state’s professed commitment to “benevolent assimilation,” a dynamic which, in turn, stood to secure nationalist claims of US exceptionalism, both in the global community and at home. Secondly, there was the actual “civilizing” work that teachers were ordered to perform in the classroom – the imposition of English in the Philippines and Hawai’i, the cultivation of awe and appreciation for the achievements of Anglo-American civilization, and the inculcation of a moral compass attuned to values and codes held to be distinctly US-American (see Wesling, 2011) – which the state held as being integral to the uplift of the imperial subject and thus the ultimate success of the imperial project. Finally, with respect to the Philippines, where ongoing US suppression of independence fighters threw the violent contradictions of the US imperial project into sharpest relief, the mass deployment of US-American teachers in 1900 was held up by political leaders and popular media outlets as evidence that civilian rule had been put into effect, that the United States’ imperial takeover was a benevolent one that was oriented toward the interests of Filipinos, and that peaceful tutelage was prevailing over violent warfare. At the same time, the state’s deployment of so many teachers was not only a performative gesture but also part of a real strategy aimed at bringing about the pacification of the island – a strategy that clearly echoed the mid to late 19th century bourgeois tactic of minimizing the perceived threat of the “dangerous classes” with moral uplift projects.
In light of these historical events, I suggest that it was with the state’s recruitment and deployment of middle class US-Americans to serve as overseas uplifters in newly acquired imperial possessions that circulating bourgeois constructs of “planetary consciousness” and a sense of obligation and entitlement to intervene for the betterment of the inferior “other” – those “colonial continuities” identified by Heron (2007) – began to be formally adopted by the state as a matter of extra-continental imperial policy and made into governmental objectives with regard to the regulation of the white middle class population. Moreover, through the state’s adoption and circulation of these constructs, I suggest, such constructs were consolidated as legitimate and desirable modes of being white and middle class in the United States.

Importantly, the state’s pronounced use of the bourgeois construct of uplift for others in its endeavor to regulate the population according to the needs of empire was not a singular instance that occurred only during the imperial surge of the late 19th and early 20th century. This would happen again 60 years later when President Kennedy created the Peace Corps by Executive Order in 1961. Notably, just as the recruitment and deployment of US-American middle class college graduates as teachers in the Philippines, Hawai’i, and Puerto Rico had accompanied McKinley’s violent war against those Filipino militants that actively resisted the newly imposed US imperial rule, Kennedy’s call for US-American volunteers in 1961 was issued alongside this president’s escalation of another imperialist war being waged (albeit in less conventional and more covert form) against leftist opposition, “subversives,” communists, and suspected communist sympathizers in Latin America that resisted US dominance in the region.

The Peace Corps

It was an impromptu set of remarks made on the campaign trail to a group of 10,000 young adults who had gathered at the University of Michigan to await Kennedy’s arrival there on October 14, 1960 that many Peace Corps historians look to as Kennedy’s first unofficial announcement of what would ultimately become the Peace Corps during his first year in office (see Rice, 1985; Cobbs Hoffman, 1998; Meisler, 2011). “How many of you,” candidate Kennedy reportedly asked the crowd, “are willing to spend ten years in Africa or Latin America or Asia
working for the United States and working for freedom? How many of you who are going to be doctors in Ghana; technicians or engineers, how many of you are going to work in the Foreign Service and spend your lives traveling around the world? On your willingness to contribute part of your life to this country will depend the answer whether we as a free country can compete” (as quoted in Cobbs Hoffman, 1998, p. 11). As the lore goes, in the moment, the crowd responded to Kennedy’s challenge with great enthusiasm that would be channeled into the creation of a petition by student organizers in support of Kennedy’s still vaguely defined international youth service program. Over the next few weeks, the organizers gathered approximately eight hundred signatures in support of candidate Kennedy’s proposal, reportedly delivering them to him in person two days before the election (Meisler, 2011, p. 9). In the meantime, candidate Kennedy had spoken to a crowd of roughly 35,000 gathered at the Cow Palace Auditorium in San Francisco on November 2, revisiting the proposal he had informally pitched just a few weeks prior, but this time referring to it as a “peace corps” and reiterating its intended objective of deploying US-American youth to “help” peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America through imparting an ascribed expertise. He told the crowd:

There is not enough money in all America to relieve the misery of the underdeveloped world in a giant and endless soup kitchen. But there is enough know-how and enough knowledgeable people to help those nations help themselves. I therefore propose that our inadequate efforts in this area be supplemented by a peace corps of talented young men willing and able to serve their country in this fashion for three years as an alternative to peacetime selective service – well-qualified through rigorous standards, well-trained in the language, skills, and customs they will need to know (quoted in Rice, 1985, p. 15).

After beating Republican candidate Richard Nixon roughly a week later, John F. Kennedy was inaugurated as president of the United States on January 20, 1961. On day two of his presidency he reportedly asked Robert Sargent Shriver, a Yale law school graduate, businessman, and his brother-in-law to head a presidential task force for the formation and running a program based on a model proposed by an MIT professor who had envisioned an “International Youth Service” that would begin small (Meisler, 2011). Rejecting this vision, Shriver reportedly advocated for something much bolder, larger, and far-reaching. Working with Harris Wofford, Shriver subsequently recruited two men who had submitted their own ideas for
international youth service program and who shared Shriver’s point of view: Warren W. Wiggins, deputy director of Far Eastern operations of the ICA (then the precursor to Kennedy’s USAID) and William Josephson, Far Eastern regional counsel for the ICA. According to Meisler (2011), Shriver was drawn to these men for their “insistence that the Peace Corps must be large enough to make an impact on the developing world, to satisfy the aspirations of tens of thousands of young Americans, and to swell the American public’s pride in the accomplishments of its government” (p. 18).

Within a short period of time, Shriver produced a report – “The Report to the President on the Peace Corps” – and submitted it to Kennedy a little over a month later on February 24, 1961 (Ibid). The report called for the “immediate establishment” of the Peace Corps and recommended that it be done by Executive Order to ensure timeliness and that it be housed in the State Department but that it exist as its own government agency, independent of ICA, so as to prevent it from becoming tainted by the purported tendencies of that agency toward the excessive bureaucracy, elitism, and out of touch relations with local Third World populations that partly driven the creation of the Peace Corps in the first place (Rice, 1985). By March 1, 1961, the Peace Corps had been officially, if temporarily, created by Executive Order 10924 (Meisler, 2011, p. 20); Congress would vote to authorize its permanence roughly six months later (Ibid).

In the meantime, Shriver’s report defined the Peace Corps’ fundamental function as “the placement of Americans in actual operational work in newly developing areas of the world” (as quoted in Rice, 1985, p. 45). Volunteers were to be selected from a pool of applicants that was open to any US-American woman or man, aged eighteen and older. As with the country’s existing Foreign Service, the process of application would include a written test and an oral interview. Training, suggested to last from six weeks to six months would focus on language instruction and the teaching of particular skills required by the specific lines of work to which volunteers would be assigned. The duration of service was recommended to be between two and three years, during which time volunteers would receive a minimal stipend intended to allow for a “decent standard of living.” Moreover, unlike the notoriously removed foreign diplomats and development experts and
their overseas lifestyles of privilege that were not congruent with the standard of living
experienced by the ordinary population, volunteers were to live in material conditions that
mirrored those of the hosting communities they served and were to refrain from “all conspicuous
consumption” (in Rice, 1985, p. 46).

Echoing the ways in which the Thomasites had been constructed roughly 60 years prior,
Peace Corps volunteer recruitment efforts were suffused with notions of the white middle class
US-American as a noble hero to peoples of the developing world, who were conversely
constructed as not being able to do for themselves. These efforts were laden with injunctions for
these members of the US population to order their thoughts and behavior in such a way that
embodied this construction, to, in essence, be the hero for communities in developing countries.
Knit throughout these constructions and injunctions were those constructs that Heron has argued
as being fundamental to bourgeois subjectivity: a sense of obligation and a quieter sense of
entitlement to intervene in the lives of foreign others, implicitly and not so implicitly constructed as
being sorely incapable of ordering their lives in a way that was good for their own welfare. (Such
a characteristic suggests that the Peace Corps constituted an attempt to govern not only a
targeted segment of the domestic population in such a way that would accomplish goals
conducive to US global hegemony, but also the populations of the Third World. Indeed, an
emphatic and pointed hope and expectation that the Peace Corps articulated was that volunteers
would not simply “help” populations of Third World but, more importantly, help these populations
to help themselves, to create better lives for themselves, thus underscoring an administering and
optimizing of life (i.e. biopower) that accompanied the contemporaneous exercise of imperial
repressive power outlined in Chapter 3)).

A powerful example of this governmentality at work in the Peace Corps recruitment effort
can be found in a promotional poster created during the 1960s. The mustard yellow poster18
contains two black and white photographs: a “before” shot depicting three triangular tent-like

18 Peace Corps Digital Library. Retrieved from

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structures and a wooden trough, shared by two crows who sit perched at one end and a rooster who buries his head into the other end, apparently feeding; and, an “after” shot that captures a row of several triangular shaped, eave-roofed structures, set back from a road and adorned with tidy flower gardens in their front yards. The first photograph is captioned “1962: INDIA The Jalpaiguri poultry farm” and the second is captioned, “The Jalpaiguri poultry farm two years after the Peace Corps.” Clearly the intent is to emphasize in a literal way the dramatic and tangible difference that Peace Corps volunteers make in developing countries. However, the text that sits below the photographs tells the fuller story of the Peace Corps entering the Jalpaiguri poultry farm and fleshes out the implied construction of the volunteer as a sort of hero while calling upon the reader to become that hero (all while implicitly reaffirming the capitalist model of development as the strategy, goal, and outcome of Peace Corps interventions):

When the Peace Corps arrived at the Jalpaiguri government poultry farm in 1962, the chickens were fighting crows for a chance at the feeder.

Now the crows are gone. Peace Corps Volunteers made Jalpaiguri a model of good poultry production by introducing improved rations, modern chicken houses and proper sanitation – and by keeping crows out of the corn.

Farmers from the surrounding countryside came to look and decided to try the same thing themselves. With Peace Corps help, they formed poultry cooperatives. Now these farmers are marketing more than 40,000 eggs a week – and the idea has caught on in other parts of India.

In just two years, the number of chickens on India poultry farms established or helped by Volunteer grew from 65,000 to 650,000, and egg production increased from 90,000 a week to more than a million.

Other things have been happening around Jalpaiguri. For instance, a Volunteer helped 20 small farmers form a vegetable cooperative. Now it’s India’s biggest.

But much more needs to be done in this famine-threatened land. India’s farmers want to know how to fertilize their crops, how to increase corn and wheat yields, how to get low-cost feed for their hogs. Indian mothers are concerned about the health and nutrition of their children.

The government of India has asked the Peace Corps for an additional 1,000 Volunteers by the end of 1966 to work on these problems.

You can help. If you’d like to find out how, write:

Peace Corps
Washington, D.C. 20525
Another example of this twin dynamic of constructing US-Americans as heroes entitled and obligated to “intervene for the ‘betterment’ of the Other wherever he or she resides” (Heron, 2007, p. 7) and actively attempting to mold the thoughts and behaviors of the population accordingly can be found in plenty of Peace Corps advertisements from the 1960s and beyond. Another example from the Peace Corps’ early years is found in a visually striking ad that pictures the Statue of Liberty. However, instead of holding aloft the iconic torch, the statue is pointing decisively to the right, her right arm and index finger outstretched horizontally. The bold print located above the statue’s pointed crown reads, “Make America A Better Place. Leave the Country.” The smaller text located below the image fleshes out the particular call being made:

*Of all the ways America can grow, one way is by learning from others.*

*There are things you can learn in the Peace Corps you can’t learn anywhere else.*

*You could start an irrigation program. And find that crabgrass and front lawns look a little ridiculous. When there isn’t enough wheat to go around in Nepal.*

*You could be the outsider who helps bring a Jamaican fishing village to life, for the first time in three hundred years. And you could wonder if your country has outsiders enough. In Watts. In Detroit. In Appalachia. On its Indian reservations.*

While this ad places emphasis on Peace Corps volunteers learning valuable lessons from the communities they help – thus suggesting a sort of two-way street as opposed to unilateral “help” – this learning is imagined as something that happens while the volunteer is stepping in and singlehandedly improving the life and wellbeing of a given community, bringing “it to life,” even. Perhaps in a strategic move, it embraces and works to depoliticize the very idea of an “outsider” doing this, turning it into a positive, and thus deflecting any association with the imperial legacy of Western outsiders stepping in to direct, oversee, and improve in African, Asian, and Latin American territories. As with the words of the Jalpaiguri poultry farm poster, the text of this poster works to discursively entitle and obligate the targeted consumer of the ad to boldly and heroically

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19 This advertisement was created in 1968 by Bernie Zlotnick of Young & Rubicam, one of several Madison Avenue advertising agencies that, at the request of the National Advertising Council, did pro bono work for Peace Corps (Cobbs Hoffman, 1998). It was accessed in Cobbs Hoffman, 1998.
intervene in the lives of Third World populations, clearly construed as hapless and otherwise hopeless without the intervention of said Peace Corps volunteer.

What is also important to understand about the Peace Corps is that, in Latin America in particular, it was intended to co-opt the calls for revolution being issued by local rebels, and it was presented as a way to prevent violent, Marxist, anti-yanqui revolution by inciting a peaceful capitalist, nominally democratic, pro-US revolution. (That the hundreds of thousands of Latin Americans who did not fall in line (i.e. those who either disagreed with and/or actively resisted the US capitalist model through organized political activity; those who sympathized with and/or supported those who engaged in this political activity; and, those who were merely suspected of falling into either of these categories) were being subjected to the most brutal violence – massacres, torture, executions – at the hands of US-trained, equipped, and funded national militaries and police forces was a fact left out of the presentation and dissemination of such a vision and from the specific promotion of the Peace Corps program.) Peace Corps volunteers sent to Latin America were given the general overarching assignment of “community development.” More specifically, volunteers deployed to Latin American countries were to capture widespread discontent with social and economic conditions and direct it in ways that dovetailed with US interests, helping local peasants organize, speak out, and rise up against the entrenched Latin American oligarchies and semi-feudalistic systems that the US often blamed for not sufficiently spreading the wealth or extending the franchise and thus creating the conditions in which Marxist movements inspired by Castro’s success in Cuba could gain wide appeal. Here it should not go unnoticed that weakening the semi-feudalistic model so engrained in the rural areas of Latin American countries could be seen as dovetailing with the interests of US multinationals which, during the 1960s, in particular, were looking to penetrate the rural areas of the region more thoroughly and, in so doing, replace the purportedly inefficient, non-wage-based haciendas owned and operated by national oligarchies with their own capitalistic operations.

Like the recruitment of volunteer teachers who were sent to the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Hawai‘i at the turn of the 19th century, the establishment of the Peace Corps in the mid-20th
century can be understood as an effort to guide the conduct of the US white middle class citizenry in such a way that cohered with political objectives of empire. And, as was the case at the turn of the 19th century, this volunteer movement was being launched at a moment when US control faced serious local resistance and when forms of extreme military force were being applied to quell this resistance (see Chapter 3). Indeed, the existence of a projected role for Peace Corps volunteers in the US state’s attempt to reconsolidate dominance in Latin America is supported not only by first-hand accounts of collusion between the CIA and Peace Corps volunteers in Latin America (see Windmiller, 1970), but also by ways in which the Peace Corps was deployed in tandem with more explicit forms of US dominations. For example, in 1962, one of the first things that Kennedy did during the US-led post-Trujillo restructuring of the Dominican Republic (see Chapter 3) was to establish a Peace Corps mission there (Atkins, 1998, p. 127).

Indeed, it would appear that, in just the same way as volunteer teachers were sent in to “pacify” the Filipino population at the precise moment when Filipino rebels waged a war against the violent imposition of US rule and US troops were responding with brutal repression, so were a new round of volunteers called upon to wage “peace” in regions of the world where resistance against US imperialism was again mounting and covert “dirty wars” of suppression were being carried out at the behest of the US government. In this context, it seems, Kennedy followed President McKinley’s strategy to the letter. The Peace Corps, however, would be much more comprehensive and far reaching than the US-American teaching force deployed at the turn of the 19th century.

If we are to see the volunteer projects of the early and mid-20th century as two distinct efforts on the part of the US state to secure an empire in revolt through the deployment of humanitarian volunteers, can we situate the late 20th/early 21st century volunteer projects in a similar way? Indeed, as has already been discussed at length, the most recent crop of US volunteers has been similarly situated in a period when the US launched a new round of imperial domination and repression in the form of neoliberal restructuring that has benefitted US capital and an intensification of the drug war in parts of Latin America.
5.6 International Tourism as a Technology of Government: The State’s Promotion of Touring “the Other” for Purposes of Overseas Empire

As Barbara Heron (2007) argues, a key construct of bourgeois subjectivity has been not only a sense of entitlement not only to intervene for the betterment of the Other but also a sense of entitlement to “be in the Other’s space” (p. 66), whether it is for purposes of betterment or of gazing upon and effectively touring the Other. Heron argues that both ostensible purposes—bettering and gazing—constitute a way in which bourgeois subjects perform boundary maintenance, arguing that both activities have historically rested upon and helped reproduce assumptions of inferiority of the Other and thus are a key way in which an identity of superiority is secured by bourgeois subjects. Without disputing Heron’s argument, I have thus far tried to build upon it by exploring the historic role of the US state in actually extending and spreading this bourgeois helping imperative to the non-elite white middle classes—and for purposes that have had to do with securing US empire. In this section, I move to the theme of tourism and examine how beginning in the late 1930s the US state similarly borrowed the bourgeois construct of leisure travel to imperial territories and began promoting tourism of the territories of US empire among the white non-elite middle classes. I also examine how this governmental agenda has related to imperialist objectives vis-à-vis those particular territories.

At the commencement of the 1940s, when FDR was increasingly planning for the now certain entry of the United State into World War II, another key part of his Good Neighbor policy in Latin America would take formal shape: that is, his active promotion of US touristic travel to Latin America as a means of one, bolstering the ongoing asymmetrical economic integration of the two regions and two, stimulating pro-US sentiment through people-to-people interactions. According to Rosalie Schwartz (1997), FDR saw US tourism to Latin America as an opportunity for tightening the tie between the United States and Latin America, and this opportunity had begun to appear all the more viable thanks to shifts in patterns of US tourist consumption. Specifically, by the mid to late 1930s, US travel to Europe (the continent that had always received the bulk of US tourist dollars) had dwindled amid wartime risks that increasingly characterized trans-Atlantic
travel and acts of war being carried out on the European continent. Aware of this reality, Schwartz argues, FDR and his advisers calculated that US tourist flow could be redirected to Latin America, and this event, it was wagered, would help to generate a sense of hemispheric solidarity between the two regions. As Schwartz (1997) contends, "Most Latin American governments had pledged their nations to a united front against fascism, but subversion and erosion of commitment remained a constant threat. Since the hemisphere had long served as a source of raw materials for Europe’s industries, and access to minerals, fibers, and food would be critical in an attenuated conflict, the US prepared to foil enemy penetration in all forms, whether clandestine operations involving acts of sabotage, infiltration into government ranks, or propaganda" (p. 105).

By the middle of the 1930s, FDR had already begun encouraging Cuban officials to pursue tourism as a form of economic development. In 1935, the president took a much-publicized vacation to Mexico, and in 1937, he pointedly championed travel during a speech made in Fargo, North Dakota, where the senator was a well-known isolationist. "Yes, it pays to travel," he told the audience. "We get a bigger perspective and a lot of knowledge" (quoted in Merrill, 2009, p. 128). The following year, the president declared 1940 as “Travel America Year” (a phrase which, in and of itself, emphasized inter-American cohesion and unity between the distinct North, Central, and South Americas).

FDR’s desire to boost inter-American travel informed, to some extent, Schwartz (1997) argues, his support for the completion of the Pan-American Highway. While FDR understood the Highway fundamentally as a certain boon to the transport of raw resources, he also, Schwartz argues, regarded it as an impetus to inter-American tourism. Taking FDR’s vision to heart, major hotel operators quickly formed the Inter-American Hotel Federation, an organization that focused on the singular goal of increasing touristic travel up and down the Pan-American highway.

To appreciate the significance of this turn toward promoting US tourism to Latin America as a matter of foreign policy, it is helpful to consider just how sharply it departed from previous US policy on the issue. As mentioned above, throughout the 1920s, the United States government had specifically avoided lending its support or approval to the development of US tourism in
Mexico or Cuba. In the case of Cuba, there was a reluctance to publicly endorse the gambling industry that formed such a central part of the island’s tourist attractions. In the case of relations between Mexico and the United States, things had been even more fraught in the context of the Mexican revolution. However, with war upon the United States in the late 1930s and early 1940s, fostering US tourism to Latin America became part of a broader strategy to secure the military alliance of the region. This, Schwartz (1997) argues, is what lay behind FDR’s new promotion of inter-American travel.

By 1940, FDR’s encouragement of US travel to Latin America was folded into a broader state-led initiative to foster, shore up, and solidify feelings of good will between US and Latin American populations. This was entrusted to the newly formed Office of Inter-American Affairs (OIAA) headed by Nelson A. Rockefeller. According to Gisela Cramer and Ursula Prutsch (2006), the OIAA was established generally to “respond to perceptions of a massive threat to the security of the United States” (p. 786); more specifically, its duties were to “assist in the preparation and coordination of policies to stabilize the Latin American economies, to secure and deepen US influence in the region, and to combat Axis inroads into the hemisphere, particularly in the commercial and cultural spheres” (Ibid). To this end, during the early forties, the OIAA sponsored the production of films on Latin America and had them distributed en masse to schools, community centers, colleges, churches and clubhouses. According to Cramer and Prutsch (2006), through these films the OIAA sought to foster what they describe as a “positive interest in the region as an object of study, travel or investment” (p. 795); in this way the entitling of US citizens to gaze upon and go to spaces of Latin America can be understood as having formed a key part of the US state’s effort to preserve historic relations of economic and political domination vis-à-vis sovereign republics of Latin America, an effort that went hand in hand with the sorts of asymmetrical economic treaties and political controls imposed upon the region’s governments by FDR and discussed in Chapter 2 (i.e. Reciprocal Trade Agreements, EX-IM Bank activities, meddling in Cuban presidential politics, etc.).
The reach of this new state-led travel campaign was no small thing. According to Cramer and Prutsch (2006), by 1944 promotional films were being viewed by five million US-Americans per month. Underscoring the seriousness with which the US state took the endeavor, the propaganda effort centered on partnerships between the OIAA and the expertise of Hollywood movie producers. As Schwartz writes, “Hollywood sent moviegoers on dozens of imaginary trips to Latin America. Through such musical comedies as *Down Argentine Way, Fiesta, That Night in Rio, They Met in Argentina, Carnival in Costa Rica, Holiday in Mexico, and Luxury Liner*, movie fans learned to rumba, samba, and conga…In Walt Disney’s *Saludos Amigos* popular cartoon characters cavorted to Latin rhythms through Peru, Argentina, and Brazil. Entertainment films, cleverly crafted to carry the government’s wartime message, undoubtedly roused some viewers to head south of the border as soon as the war ended” (Schwartz, 1997, pp. 106-107).

Thus, it can be submitted that through these propaganda efforts of the OIAA the US state hinged its efforts to inspire good will between citizens and Latin Americans upon a certain interpellation or discursive production of the United States middle/upper class subject (the targeted prospective traveler) as a sort of voyeur of Latin American peoples, geographical spaces, and cultures, a subject free to insert himself or herself into Latin American territories, either physically or simply optically, and gaze upon, take in, investigate, marvel, and attempt to know the peoples, places, and cultures he or she found there.

It is also important to understand that in the same way that the state adopted and actively promoted the bourgeois construct of moral uplift for inferior Others and the sense of entitlement and obligation to engage in such a project for imperial purposes at the turn of the century, by suddenly promoting travel to Latin America to the non-elite middle classes of the United States, it was essentially doing the same with what had previously been a behavior exclusively engaged in by the nation’s elites (Skwiot, 2010). As previously discussed in this chapter, touring the spaces of empire had taken hold among the upper classes in the mid-19th century and “in a world in which most people moved only because of wars, persecution, or poverty” (Beckert, 2001, p. 43). It was thus, as Beckert shows, only the country’s elite that had traditionally “left their homes for
places close and far in a predictable rhythm” (Ibid) for purposes of leisure, health, education that centered on seeing and knowing a foreign place.

As discussed above, elite travel to the territories of US empire accelerated soon after the turn of the century when US imperial gains provided the upper classes with imperial playgrounds of their own. As Skwiot (2010) has shown, the US acquisition of Hawai’i and the imposition of US control over Cuba (afforded by the Platt Amendment) initially brought attempts at settler colonialism led by annexationists and Prized destinations were Hawai’i and Cuba, where enterprising individuals erected exclusive resort communities in Waikiki Beach and Marianao, respectively. Initially, these were part of broader annexationist schemes to bring wealthy whites (and in the case of Hawai’i, laboring whites) to the islands as tourist-settlers who would ideally purchase land, invest capital, and push for full annexation. As Skwiot (2010) shows, this plan had focused on generating an influx of “upstanding,” moneyed white Anglo-Saxon US-Americans to the islands in order to bolster their candidacy for full annexation to the United States and had strictly avoided any hedonistically oriented tourism promotion schemes. By the early twenties, however, annexation had been scrapped, and a tourism industry premised more definitively on offering tastes of decadence and debauchery to the tourist had taken root, its targets being the same US elites who had been tapped as settlers but who were now no longer to imagined as new upstanding citizens of these imperial territories awaiting annexation and instead construed as pleasure seeking tourists.

Cuba had become the notoriously raucous playground for US elites, famed for its gambling and prostitution (not to mention its lack of Prohibition laws). Hawai’i was also promoted through a lens of eroticism and exoticism, the island’s traditional hula dance performed by scantily clad Hawaiian women was held up as a key attraction along with images of an aristocratic existence on the island where the only palace in all of US territory existed. During this decade, specific groups of non-elites – artists, bohemians, young white men seeking to escape the constraints of Prohibition – had begun to travel across the border into Mexico, but their numbers remained small and their travel practices were part of broader marginalized lifestyles
deemed eccentric and/or immoral by dominant norms and were not in any way championed or encouraged by the US state.

Following the commencement of FDR’s efforts to democratize travel to Latin America, the US state’s promotion of US tourism to Latin America continued in earnest after the war. During the war, producing US tourists of Latin America had been looked to primarily as a propagandistic way of securing alliances against an extrahemispheric enemy. Before the war ended (and thus before the commencement of yet another war against an extrahemispheric enemy), FDR soon identified another purpose of tourism to Latin America for another purpose: it was to be a way of maintaining the nation’s levels of industrial productivity (upon which the United States new position as leading world power was largely based) while avoiding a post-war recession within its borders. As Schwartz (1997) has shown, by 1943, FDR, concerned with the post-war US economic outlook, had concluded that a war-ravaged Europe would no longer be viable as a market for US goods, and with no sizeable alternative, cutbacks would have to be made in production, a scenario that would translate into mass unemployment and economic decline when it inevitably coincided with the impending return of hundreds of thousands of US military men who would be in need of work. To avoid a production slowdown, FDR tapped Latin America as the market that would soften the blow of losing Europe and ensure continued US production levels. The problem was how to supply Latin America with the funds to purchase US goods. Part of the answer it was decided would be tourism. As Schwartz (1997) writes, “In the circularity of hemispheric commerce, traveling Americans would put dollars in the hands of Latin Americans whose purchases would, in turn, sustain US factory operations” (p. 107).

5.7 The “Third World Tourism” Boom: Late 20th Century Growth of US Tourism to Territories of Empire

Today, any governmental strategy to produce US-Americans as consumers of the spaces, cultures, and peoples of developing countries (and particularly perhaps the Latin American republics that have historically comprised the territories of US empire) must be understood as being situated within the late 20th century explosion of tourism worldwide; between
1992 and 1997, the total number of international tourists went from 463 million to 594 million, an increase of 30 percent in just 5 years; by 2004 the total was at 763 million and was predicted, by the UN World Tourism Organization, to rise to 1.56 billion by the year 2020. It must be further understood as being part of an especially dramatic increase in tourism from developed countries to developing countries; in the mid-1970s only 8% of all tourists were traveling from developed countries to developing countries; in the mid-1980s this number had more than doubled, rising to 17%. In the mid-1990s, it had nearly tripled, reaching 20%. At that point, the vast majority—80 percent—of tourists to developing countries were from a total of 20 developed countries (Honey, 1999).

The growth in First World – Third World tourism can be traced to at least two contributing factors that compounded any impact wielded by the development of faster, larger commercial airplanes and more generous vacation leave standards passed by the International Labor Organization in 1970 (Honey, 1999). First, in the late 1960s, the World Bank began pushing governments in developing countries to pursue tourism as a major development strategy. At the time, the driving concern of the Bank’s tourism campaign was a perceived lack of foreign debt-servicing capacity among developing countries (many newly independent) and high levels of unemployment within these countries. Regarded as a significant generator of both foreign exchange and jobs, tourism was pegged as the solution to both problems. In 1966, the Bank made its first tourism-oriented loans through its private sector arm, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), which extended assistance to the hotel and accommodations industries of Kenya, Tunisia, and Morocco.

In 1969, the Bank established a Tourism Projects Department (TPD), which was to assist developing countries in the actual setting up of tourism sectors by providing technical and financial assistance in areas of policy and planning, land and infrastructure development, lines of credit for developing and building hotels, training for tourism workers, and investment in hotels, museums, and wildlife conservation. By 1972, in a Tourism Sector Working Paper, the TPD was justifying this turn to tourism with claims that, between 1960 and 1968, exports (other than oil)
from developing countries had risen at a rate of 7.6% per year while tourism receipts in
developing countries had risen at an annual rate of 11%. Moreover, the paper argued, the outlook
for primary products, in particular, was doubtful and developed countries could not be counted on
to allow for increases in imports of manufactured goods from developing countries. Tourism was
thus presented as a promising option for developing countries, one which would enable them to
diversify their sources of foreign exchange (Hawkins and Mann, 2007).

Between 1969 and 1980, the Tourism Projects Department operated by sending staff
teams on macro-economic missions to developing countries, where they conducted in-country
assessments that included determinations of investment requirements, identifications of obstacles
to tourism sector growth and policy recommendations to overcome them, and predictions of tax
revenue growth, foreign exchange earnings, and employment figures. During this period, the TPD
financed and assisted with tourism projects by loaning directly to governments in twenty-seven
different countries (Hawkins and Mann, 2007) which included Morocco, Tunisia, the Gambia,
Tanzania, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt and Senegal in Africa, Nepal, Indonesia, and South Korea in Asia,
Jordan and Turkey in the Middle East, Yugoslavia in Southeastern Europe, Barbados in the
Caribbean, and Honduras, the Dominican Republic, and Mexico in Latin America (Rangan, 2007).

The seventies were the era of mass tourism and the Tourism Projects Department’s work
in developing countries both reflected and contributed to this condition. As Vidya Rangan (2007)
writes:

A typical project financed by the Bank in this period involved the setting up of an
integrated tourist resort complex in selected areas/sites of the country with an average of
3000 rooms, necessary support infrastructure like water, sewerage, and transport;
support for promotion and marketing of the destination; training for locals to work in the
resort and/or additional recreational facilities like golf courses, gaming reserves and so
on. Master planning of destinations for tourism and initiating training and skill-
development projects to employ local people in tourism were also characteristics of
projects funded by the Bank in this period. (pp. 21-22)

Between 1970 and 1980, the TPD’s cumulative loans increased from $50 million to seven
countries to a total of $1 billion extended to 27 countries. Partnering with the TPD was the Bank’s
IFC which, during the seventies, expanded its tourism lending to private sectors of developing
countries, focusing its assistance on private hotel investors and ancillary services such as touring companies and tourism promotion and financing companies (Rangan, 2007).

If the World Bank’s aggressive promotion and underwriting of tourism as a development strategy was the first contributing factor to the late 20th century growth in tourism from developed countries to developing countries, the second was the neoliberal turn of the eighties and new levels of support from both international agencies (such as the World Bank, but also the United Nations) and USAID, in particular, towards a new privatized model of Third World tourism. By the late seventies, the World Bank was opting to close down its Tourism Projects Department, citing high costs and coordination difficulties that came with such massive projects it had been undertaking, the existence of other more pressing areas where Bank resources could be directed, the fact that the tourism facilities it had helped build were being used and enjoyed by the world’s elites and not the world’s poor that they were intended to benefit, and the fact that financing for tourism could be obtained through other channels (i.e., the private sector). From this point, the market was to dictate the growth of tourism sectors in developing countries, not their governments.

Shortly thereafter, in 1985 USAID began to enter the scene of Third World tourism that, after a decade of World Bank-financed growth, had emerged as full-fledged sector of the world economy. In particular, USAID directly engaged what had become an increasingly vocal environmentalist critique of the World Bank’s mass tourism projects and paired a new concern for ecologically sustainable tourism with, what was by then, the hegemonic principle of private sector development initiatives. The government agency funded twenty conservation and development projects that were carried out by the international non-governmental organization of World Wildlife Fund (WLF) in 1985. It also initiated and generously funded the Parks in Peril program, which was aimed at improving the management and recreational/educational use of twenty parks in Latin America and the Caribbean and was run by the US environmental charity Nature Conservancy (which in turn worked with local NGOs in developing countries). Then, in 1992, USAID began extending assistance to be used by a coalition of US conservation NGOs in a
number of biodiversity projects in Asia and the Pacific region. Throughout all of this, USAID also funded numerous ecotourism studies that spanned a wide range of topics and geographical areas (Honey, 1999). By the middle of the 1990s, USAID was involved in a total of 105 projects that had ecotourism components and spanned numerous regions (in Latin America, the countries included Belize, Ecuador, and Costa Rica), and, as Honey (1999) writes, “These projects were all multidimensional but showed a strong emphasis on working with the private sector and channeling funds through US-based NGOs, a shift from USAID’s usual practice prior to the 1980s of primarily funding government programs in developing countries (p. 17).

While USAID was helping to underwrite this sort of private sector-led priming of Third World ecological systems and landscapes for Northern touristic consumption, there was a concurrent systematic marketization of Third World tourism sectors, which had, under era, been the domain of Third World governments. Recalling that the goal of TPD projects had always been to help governments establish tourism sectors that would not only bring in tourist foreign exchange but also attract foreign investment in these tourist sectors (Honey, 1999), fulfillment of the latter objective had begun to take place during the seventies. However, with the neoliberal turn of the eighties, this accelerated dramatically as Third World governments, now obligated by structural adjustment programs, took new steps to attract foreign investment in all economic sectors. In tourism sectors, this meant the passage of new legislation such as Costa Rica’s “Tourism Development Incentives Law,” which “included exemptions from property taxes and from import duties for construction and remodeling materials and vehicles such as vans and cars, fishing and pleasure boats, jet skis, dune buggies, and golf carts” (Honey, 1999, p. 178) and a subsequent campaign launched by the Costa Rican government in 1987 to draw foreign investment to the development of luxury tourism resorts (Ibid).

With regard to tourism sectors this legislative shift generally meant exemptions for tourism investors from property taxes and elimination of duties on imports of products used by tourism investors to start up their ventures (i.e., materials for construction and remodeling, vehicles such as vans, cars, fishing and pleasure boats, golf carts, etc.). It also meant the
passage of “open skies” legislation (which deregulated and marketized national air space), the relaxation of immigration policies (to allow easy entry and exit to foreign investors and tourists), the commencement of international public relations campaigns, and the establishment of tourism ministries where there were none before (see Honey, 1999; Robinson 2008). In some cases the shift also translated into the selling off of government owned airlines and hotels to private investors (see Honey, 1999; Robinson, 2008).

Within this new context of privatized tourism, tourism investments in developing countries surged and tourist arrivals increased dramatically. By the late nineties, tourism to developing countries was increasing at an annual rate of 6 percent – this was almost double the 3.5 rate of increase in developed countries (Honey, 1999). As stated above, the vast majority of these tourists were from twenty developed countries. Moreover, the percentage of tourists from developed countries traveling to developing countries had tripled in the space of two decades, landing at twenty percent in the mid-nineties.

In the midst of all of this, Latin American countries have, according to critical globalization theorist William Robinson (2008), exhibited some of the highest growth rates in the world with respect to tourist arrivals. In 2004, the region saw a total of 60 million international tourist arrivals and a total tourism revenue of $45 billion, which made up 12 percent of the region’s foreign exchange earnings from exports (and a much higher percentage in certain countries) (Robinson, 2008, p. 134). In particular, Central America has had the biggest increase in international tourist arrivals, and in this sub-region tourism revenue comprises 35 percent of all foreign exchange earnings from exports. In 2004, Mexico stood as the top tourist destination with over twenty million arrivals, but the Caribbean had the highest amount in tourism revenues at $19.1 billion (43 percent of the regional total). In South America, Brazil and Argentina represented two of the region’s top four national markets with respect to tourism receipts. During the nineties the growth rate of arrivals in these two countries remained relatively steady, but Ecuador and Peru, while drawing smaller shares of the regional tourism market, saw jumps in their annual rates of growth with respect to international tourist arrivals – in the period between 1990 and 1995 their annual
growth rates were 4% and 7%, respectively, and in the period between 1995 and 2000, these had nearly doubled, going to 7.3% and 12.4%, respectively (Robinson, 2008).

As part of his more general argument that capital is no longer organized along nation-state lines but has been transnationalized such that traditional metropole-periphery relations have disintegrated, Robinson (2008) argues that the case of tourism in developing countries cannot be analyzed “along the old dependency theory lines of metropolitan capital dominating local economies with the support of comprador groups” (p. 139). Specifically, Robinson emphasizes that involvement in tourism in developing countries is dominated by transnational corporations (TNCs) such that, as with other TNC dominated industries, any wealth that is generated is not necessarily appropriated by the national economy of one metropole country (as in the multinational model of nation-state imperialism that characterized the 19th and 20th centuries), but rather is seized by transnational capital which, as he points out, “may circulate it anywhere around the world (Ibid). Further, Robinson points out, these TNC chains of the global tourism industry are often not involved as direct owners or managers, but operate by entering into contractual agreements with local investors whom act as managers and franchisers, and leasees. Also, Robinson (2008) underscores, TNC’s may dominate the industry but they are not the only investors; rather, they are joined by scores of entrepreneurial nationals, foreigners, ex-patriots, and even some local residents of tourist destinations. These groups, he points out, “buy up storefronts and mains streets, converting them into ‘tourist ghettos’ of handicraft outlets, boutiques, internet cafes, on-site tour operators, bars, and restaurants” (p. 140). In sum, Robinson contends that, “the notion popularized in the underdevelopment literature of tourism as a form of colonialism is valid insofar as it refers to the colonization – for the purpose of providing services and making profits – of some social groups in global society by others, but not some nations by others. Global tourism reflects the domination of the rich over the poor in global society. But it is increasingly inaccurate to characterize this in nation-state centric terms as the domination of an imperialist core over the periphery” (Robinson, 2008, p. 140).
Importantly, whether one takes Robinson’s transnationalist perspective or assumes Harvey’s framework of nation-state based rivalry for global hegemony (as this dissertation is perhaps more inclined to do), the Third World tourism industrial complex can be understood as a technology of empire for several reasons. First, its massive growth originated at the direction of World Bank and it was promoted within a framework of adaptation to (as opposed to transformation of) the ongoing colonialist relations in which trade between the wealthy imperial powers and the countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America is both non-negotiable and dictated by the preferences of the former. The particular imperial moment of the late 1960s and early 1970s was one in which “center” countries were reluctant to import finished goods from “periphery” countries, and this meant that periphery countries would be forced to abandon or scale back any industrialization efforts (at the time seen as the great equalizer) and find another way to accumulate badly needed foreign exchange, and one that would be acceptable to the countries that dominated the global economy. This reality presented the periphery countries with the options of either continuing to take a classic peripheral role of monocultural raw resource supplier to the center, or, given the dramatic vicissitudes of raw resource trade demonstrated over the course of the 20th century, find an alternative way to fit their economies into the world economy. At the behest of a US/Western-dominated World Bank, this alternative way was to be mass tourism.

Second, despite the Bank’s prediction that by pursuing mass tourism Third World countries (many of them newly independent at the time) would begin to transcend their colonial pasts of economic “underdevelopment” (a prediction implicit in the Bank’s framing of mass tourism as a “development” strategy), a defining feature of Third World tourism has continued to be an extraordinary degree of foreign ownership (which was largely US-American and Western European in the sixties, seventies, and eighties) and leakage of total economic profits back to these countries. As Martha Honey (2008) informs us:

For mass tourism in developing countries—prepaid tours, cruises, and all-inclusive resorts—most money generated by tourism flows out of the host country or never even enters it. Major outflows of foreign exchange come from payments for imported goods,
management fees, administrative costs, expatriate salaries, tax breaks, and import content on local purchases. (p. 122)

Honey points out that even with the advent of ecotourism, which has been championed as a brand of tourism that enables developing countries to retain more profits, studies have shown that it has not made any significant difference. Honey cites one study from 2001, which found that for the majority of small developing countries, the average leakage equaled between 40 and 50 percent of their gross tourism earnings, whereas it was between only 10 and 20 percent for most developed countries and those developing countries that had more diversified economies. A large part of this leakage, the study found, came from payments to foreign-owned tour operators, hotels and airlines and from imported food, drinks and other supplies (see Honey, 2008, p. 123).

5.8 Contemporary Third World Tourism as a Technology of Government

Today there may not be an explicit or even detectible government-led campaign to increase US tourism to Latin America as there was under FDR in the thirties and forties. However, as theorist Nikolas Rose (1998) emphasizes, if one is to make use of Foucault’s framework, as this dissertation does, government is not to be understood “in terms of ‘the state,’ an omnipotent and omniscient entity extending its control from the center throughout the social body,”(68) but rather through the lens of governmentality, which is not bound by official state bodies but entails a heterogeneous and multilateral ensemble through which political authority and its aims are operationalized and applied to the population. As Rose (1998) puts it:

Governmentalities are combinations of political rationalities and human technologies. They are ways of construing the proper ends and means of political authority: the objects to which rule should be addressed, the scope of political authority, the legitimate methods it may use. And they are ways of seeking to operationalize such ambitions, devising techniques and constructing devices to act upon the lives and conduct of subjects, to shape them in desired ways. (p. 68)

20 This particular definition of the state was one explicitly rejected by Foucault, who instead conceived of the state as “not a universal nor in itself an autonomous source of power…but the effect, the profile, the mobile shape of a perpetual stratification (étatisation) or stratifications, in the sense of incessant transactions which modify, or move, or drastically change, or insidiously shift sources of finance, modes of investment, decision-making centers, forms and types of control, relationships between local powers, the central authority, and so on…nothing else but the mobile effect of a regime of multiple governmentalities” (Foucault, 2008, p. 77).
Rose (1998), for example, argues that the psy disciplines have acted as a technology of liberal
government insofar as they have involved the development of “techniques by which the practices
of everyday life can be organized according to the ethic of autonomous selfhood” (p. 17) and, in
correlation, the defining of freedom as “the realization of the potentials of the psychological self in
and through activities in the mundane world of everyday life” (p. 17).

The Third World tourism industrial complex can be understood in the same way, as a
technology of government, comprised of multiple components that include travel agencies, travel
magazines, travel television programs, hotel corporations, airlines, non-governmental
organizations, ministries of tourism (set up and operated by governments of developing countries
but as part of a larger acquiescing to the World Bank’s state-led tourism development campaign
of the seventies and USAID’s market-led tourism development campaign of the 1990s and
onward), travel supplements in newspapers, and even Hollywood movies depicting touristic
adventures of US citizens in developing countries, tourism marketing campaigns (which are
typically, it is worth noting, coordinated and launched by Northern advertising agencies and public
relations firms contracted by Southern governments). The aim of this technology is to incite the
US subject to not only place himself in the geographical territories of empire for purposes of
leisure but also, I would suggest, understand himself as a rightful consumer of these territories
and the particular elements of these territories that are presented to him as commodities that can
be accessed in exchange for monetary payment. In other words, along with the commodification
of the Third World that critical tourism scholars have noted, there is an attempted
consumerization of the US/Northern subject that is targeted as the purchaser of this commodity.
This has been going on at least since the FDR-led effort to introduce US citizens to Latin America
as tourists in the late 1930s and it intensified in the period after the war and into the 1960s and
1970s.

In the eighties and nineties, the actual topographies and ecologies of Latin America
(those beyond the beaches and resort space) became the commodity and the US subject was
encouraged to think of herself as an “ecotourist.” During this period, cultural tourism, “whereby
the indigenous (and to a lesser extent, Spanish colonial and republican) heritage and customs form the principal tourist attractions (Baud & Ypej, 2009, 1), emerged and can, like ecotourism, be understood as an attempt to respond to and co-opt pushback from community-based organizations and international non-governmental organizations against the World Bank's resort based mass tourism model of the seventies, and, in particular, calls from these organizations for tourism development initiatives that involved greater levels of participation, control, and resultant benefits for local communities, particularly those comprised of Amerindian and Afro-descended ethnic groups that had historically borne the brunt of systemic economic, social, and cultural oppression and therefore constituted the populations that the Bank, it was argued, should be helping the most, particularly amid the fallout from neoliberal structural adjustment programs of the eighties.

Emerging from the genres of ecotourism and cultural tourism has been community-based tourism which, like ecotourism, has been defined in numerous ways (see Blackstock, 2005; Manyara and Jones, 2007; Ruiz-Ballesteros & Hernández-Ramirez, 2010), but might be thought of as a tourism model that aims to involve economically poor communities in tourism enterprises as a means of economic development and in a way that places decision making, coordination, planning, and operations largely in community hands, with a large part, if not all, of the local proceeds going directly to these communities. The advent of the “community-based tourism enterprise” (CBTE) has been endorsed by the World Bank, USAID, and the UN World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) (Blackstock, 2005) as an effective tool for poverty alleviation and economic development. In many cases, the particular communities that become involved in this form of tourism are indigenous and/or rural, and may be contending with the encroachment of extractive industries onto communal lands and/or exploitative jobs as workers for those industries (Hutchins, 2007), recent constraints posed by conservation efforts that prohibit traditional ways of life such as farming and fishing, and/or looming displacement/disenfranchisement at the hands of ecotourism and mass tourism operators and investors. In its attractions, activities, and environmental settings, community based tourism often overlaps with ecotourism, but is often
equally if not more strongly oriented toward showcasing purported aspects of community traditions, practices, and quotidian life as part of the tourist experience (see Bartholo et al., 2008; Hutchins, 2007; Mitchell and Reid, 2001; Ruiz-Ballesteros & Hernández-Ramírez, 2010; Theodossopoulos, 2013). In its name and its design community-based tourism clearly seeks to emphasize themes of respect, inclusion, control, and economic benefit for local peoples that often inhabit natural environments penetrated by ecotourism and mass tourism enterprises, alike. In this way it implies an attempt to correct previous and ongoing situations of external domination by wealthy tourism operators and investors.

Along with these new iterations of tourism-based commodification – of Third World environments, cultures, and communities – there is a continued consumerization in which perhaps more than ever before, the US/Northern tourist is incited to aspire to and actually move to place his physical body among, within, and near to certain local populations and communities of developing countries and take in the purportedly endogenous practices now commodified at perhaps an unprecedented level of intensity by the global tourism industrial complex, in general and the Third World tourism industrial complex, in particular.

However, if we are to understand the Third World tourism industrial complex as a technology of government, then what is or what are its ethics? That is, what is its “domain of specific types of practical advice as to how one should concern oneself with oneself, make oneself the subject of solicitude and attention, conduct oneself in the various aspects of one’s everyday existence” (Rose, 1998, p. 31)? Rose (1996), for example, posits that the psy disciplines generate and develop a range of “complex emotional, interpersonal, and organizational techniques by which the practices of everyday life can be organized according to the ethic of autonomous selfhood” and the centrality of this ethic is both reflective and constitutive of the ways in which the psy technologies work to govern individuals “in terms of their freedom” (p. 16). In this way psy technologies can be understood as being a programmatic embodiment of the “contemporary regime of the individual” (p. 16) that defines liberal governmentality.
It is possible to think about tourism (as well as humanitarian work) as a program of what might theorized as an imperial governmentality, in which the central principle is security pursued through illiberal practices and forms of hegemonic domination of “other” populations that reside within the territories of empire. If security through domination is the central principle of imperialism, it is necessary to consider how some of the sociologically and anthropologically purported tenets of tourism (and humanitarian work) might relate to this principle in the way that the tenet of autonomous selfhood relates to liberal freedoms? If we were review the sociological and anthropological literature on tourism, one of the most central themes of the conversation is that of *authenticity*. Indeed, with the late 20th century growth in general tourism came the emergence of a field of sociology and anthropology that focused on the social organization of tourism as well as “the tourist” as a distinct subject position. Very quickly, the theme of “authenticity” was posited as a central organizing principle of touristic activity and it became the key topic of debate among tourism scholars. In the paragraphs that follow, I will spend some time reviewing the major schools of thought around authenticity in relation to tourism so as to provide some context for the way in which authenticity was then later examined from a postcolonial perspective that focused on tourism within developing countries (a specific area that is most pertinent to the aims of this dissertation).

Within the tourism studies literature, authenticity has in fact been a central concept. In 1976, US-American sociologist Dean MacCannell argued that all forms of tourism center around a sort of fundamental “quest for authenticity” that is essentially a response to conditions of industrialized, modern society. MacCannell’s claim, however, was that, because the tourist attraction is always contrived for tourist consumption, this quest for authenticity is always fruitless, that what tourists consume and experience is a form of “staged authenticity” that can and does only ever mimic whatever authentic original they are seeking out. In response to MacCannell, constructivist tourism scholars such as Erik Cohen (1988) countered that if authenticity in touristic attractions does in fact exist to the extent that is perceived and thus constructed by tourists themselves; in other words, if tourists believe that what they are consuming is “real” this makes it
so. Challenging both MacCannell and constructivists, tourism scholars of the post-modernist school of thought have since contended that there is no such thing as real authenticity tourist attraction, as the concept of authenticity, itself, is a construction. Further, they contend, the tourist generally understands this, and moreover, is content with presentations of “genuine fakes” (Brown 1996, in Wang 1999, p. 357), understanding and appreciating the tourist attraction as carefully produced fantasy. Then, there are more recent perspectives such as that posited by Ming Wang (1999), who conceptualizes authenticity in tourism as an existential condition in which the tourist is not consuming the purported authenticity of an object outside of herself, but is experiencing a sense of authentic self as a result of participating in touristic activity.

While all of the aforementioned treatments of authenticity are relevant to this discussion of how notions of Third World authenticity consumption can be considered as a sort of ethic of Third World tourism as a governmental technology, the treatment of authenticity that is most pertinent to the interests of this dissertation is that which has underscored the particular salience it has taken on and the specific meanings and effects it carries in the Third World tourism industrial complex (see MacCannell, 1984; Bruner, 1991; Silver, 1993; Hutchins, 2007; Cohen, 1989). As has been widely reported, notions of authenticity, as they are cooked up, conveyed, marketed in the specific sub-field of Third World tourism are replete with notions of a pre-modern, pre-industrialized, pre-development past purported to still be alive and well in certain regions of the world. For example, just over twenty years ago, Ira Silver (1993) argued that the version of authenticity presented in advertisements and brochures promoting touristic destinations of Third World countries was rooted in and suffused with Orientalist discourse insofar as they depicted Third World countries as places of “pastoral primitiveness” where traditions remained static and the people “largely unchanged by the forces of Western colonialism, nationalism, economic development, and even tourism itself” (Silver, 1993, pp. 303-304). Analyzing a handful of marketing materials, Silver found that common words used to depict Third World tourist destinations included: unspoiled, untouched, stone-age, traditional, and primitive.
While Silver was perhaps the first to explicitly situate contemporary touristic marketing of the Third World within the broader imperialist discourse of orientation identified and masterfully dissected by Edward Said (1978/2003), his observation of the overwhelming use of a pastoral primitivity myth in Third World tourism materials was part of an emergent sub-body of tourism scholarship which, over the course of the late seventies and the eighties, highlighted and critiqued the ways in which these materials tended, in the words of critical literary theorist Mary Louise Pratt (1985), “to fix the Other in a timeless present” (as cited in Bruner, 1991, p. 240) (See also Britton 1979; Adams 1984; Bruner 1989, 1991; Cohen 1989, 1993). Since then, numerous analyses have continued to corroborate these findings, many of them placing a more forceful emphasis on the rootedness of Third World tourism marketing material imagery in colonial Orientalist discourse (see Hutt, 1996; Philp and Mercer, 1999; Sturma, 1999; Echtner and Prasad, 2003; Palmer, 1994; Kanemasu, 2013).

This body of work has pushed the conversation further in helpful ways, lending important complexity to initial discussion. Catherine Palmer (1994), for example, shows that in the case of the Bahamas, what marketing materials depict is not a “primitive” present untouched by Western influence but rather a distinctive place where neither the pre-colonial/pre-Western nor the colonial era subaltern Afro Bahamian ever existed. Then, in what they claim as “probably the most comprehensive attempt to date to examine Third World tourism marking,” Echtner and Prasad (2003) developed a typology of myths spun by advertisements and brochures promoting tourism to Third World countries.21 Using a methodically comprised sample of tourism brochures

21 In compiling their sample, Echtner and Prasad first chose a total of 30 countries from the list of 130 countries designated “Third World” by the World Bank in 1996. Using 1996 data from the World Tourism Organization, they made this selection based on high tourism earnings and amounts spent on promotion. These 30 countries were then divided into five regions, and a final sample of 12 was selected on geographic representation: the Caribbean was represented by Jamaica and Cuba; Latin America was represented by Costa Rica and Ecuador; the Pacific Islands by Fiji; Asia by China, Thailand, and India; North Africa/Middle East by Egypt and Turkey; and Sub-Saharan Africa by Kenya and Namibia. From there a total of 223 brochures were collected from 47 North American travel agencies (with collection being completed once it was determined saturation had been reached for each of the 12 countries), and after eliminating brochures that contained little verbal and visual data, the final sample was a total of 115 brochures.
promoting a total of 12 different Third World countries, the authors identified three different types of destinations, according to distinct kinds of “attractions, actors (hosts and tourists), actions, and atmosphere portrayed in the verbal and visual components of their brochures” (p. 663). They designated these types as “‘Oriental countries’” (which included China, Egypt, India, Turkey, and Thailand); “‘sea/sand’ countries” which included Cuba, Fiji, and Jamaica; and “‘frontier’ countries” of Costa Rica, Ecuador, Kenya, and Namibia (named as such because brochures depict attractions that are exclusively natural, thus drawing a line between an imagined developed world and undeveloped world, and inviting the tourist from the former to the venture over it into the frontier).

Utilizing a postcolonial framework, Echtner and Prasad corroborate the findings and arguments of Palmer and others, observing that what characterizes the brochures for sea/sand destinations is a “romanticized version of colonial exploitation.” Destinations are depicted as “places where nature is pristine and never harsh, where the people are friendly and never unwilling to cater to every tourist need, and where the resorts offer amenities to satisfy every sensual desire, whether active or passive…The tourists (described as sunseekers, lovers and sportspersons) expect to have unfettered access to abundant nature, well-equipped amenities, and submissive (be it serving or smiling) hosts” (2003, p. 672). They refer to this fantasy spun by tourism brochures as the "myth of the unrestrained" in that the Third World destination and the people who reside there are presented as being "fully available for the indulgent"; hedonistic desires are free to roam and the tourist can rest assured they will be met.

Turning to the set of “Oriental” countries, if those of the sea/sand variety are presented through a lens of romanticized colonial exploitation, those of this category are, according to Echtner and Prasad, depicted through images that evoke the era of colonial exploitation, trade, and conquest. Brochures for “Oriental” destinations (which are designated as such not only because of their geographic location but because they comprise the region of the world that has been known and imagined by the Western consciousness through a discourse of Orientalism that continues to suffuse the ways they are depicted in tourism brochures), they argue, spin a myth of
the unchanged that emphasizes ancient civilizations, relics and ruins of long lost empires, mysterious legends and mystical secrets, of fallen kingdoms, and a past opulence and extravagance that exists only as artifact and is contrasted with a present-day “peasant simplicity” (2003, 669). These destinations, depicted as being both frozen in time and far behind Western progress, are presented as awaiting discovery by modern tourists, “who are encouraged to relive the journeys and experiences of colonial explorers, traders, treasure hunters, archeologists, etc.” (Ibid, p. 669).

Finally, there is the myth of the uncivilized, Echtner and Prasad (2003) argue, which brochures tell about those destinations that the authors classify as “‘frontier’ countries.” This myth depicts the destinations as primordial, pristine, overgrown with lush that is unfamiliar to the Western consciousness, inhabited by dangerous animals, and populated not by simple peasants or servile colonial subjects but by “natives” depicted as “untouched, untamed, primitive...savage in appearance and somewhat surprising in their disposition (unpredictable: sometimes stoic, sometimes smiling)” (p. 677). Like the myth of the unchanged, the myth of the uncivilized also draws on themes of colonial exploration of the unknown, but instead of ancient ruins and buried treasure and mysticism, it is the untamed wilderness that is the object of discovery and conquest. This myth of the uncivilized, in which there is a purported total absence of Western influence and an emphasis on a sort of absolute primitiveness, seems to reflect the “pastoral myth” described by Silver and others, but as Echtner and Prasad convincingly demonstrate, it is just one of at least three ways in which Third World authenticity is marketed to Western tourists.

In addition to their typology of Third World tourism marketing materials, a key contribution of Echtner and Prasad’s study is their illumination of how the myths they put forward continue to draw the sorts of “hierarchical binary oppositions” that have been the hallmark of colonial discourse and are an instrumental tool of ideological domination that undergirds the broader relations of asymmetry between the “First” and “Third” worlds. In the myth of the unrestrained that is used to promote sea/sand destinations, the binaries include advancing/stagnant, industrialized/undeveloped; disciplined/unrestrained and master/servant; the myth of the
unchanged that is told about “Oriental” destinations advances a multifaceted bifurcation between changed/unchanged, modern/ancient and advancing/decaying; and in the myth of the uncivilized, one finds multiple dichotomies that include civilized/uncivilized, advanced/primitive, controlled/untamed and developed/undeveloped.

In this light, can we begin to think about a notion of consuming Third World authenticity as an ethic of tourism – something that tourists are led to believe they should be doing as proper tourists – that is situated in a broader imperialist principle of security? Indeed, as argued by Foucault, by consuming, gazing upon, and knowing something through a certain lens there is a fixing of that object in its parameters; in the case of Third World tourism, there is arguably a way of keeping this region of the world “primitive” by looking upon it as such – and, by keeping it “primitive,” myths of greater Western progress, development, and advancement are also maintained, thereby justifying the West’s position as economically and geopolitically dominant power vis-a-vis the “Third World” or “developing countries” within the international order.

In this light, “Third World” tourism becomes not only about the right and entitlement of Western subjects to be in spaces of the Third World as voyeurs, but to be there on the premise of consuming an authenticity that ideologically reaffirms First World/Third World binaries and therefore implicitly justifies imperialistic dominance of First World countries over those of the Third World? Can we think about how encouraging Western subjects to travel to Third World countries with intentions of consuming an authentic pre-modern past might reflect political objectives of the sending nations?

5.9 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have traced the origins of US international humanitarian work and US leisure travel to territories of empire back to the 19th century class performances and identity work of the country’s bourgeoisie. I have also endeavored to illustrate how at certain points in the history of the country, the US state promoted these traditionally bourgeois activities to a wider (white, non-elite middle class) audience with an eye toward achieving certain imperial objectives. By reviewing the later involvement of the US state in both the deployment of humanitarian
workers to Latin America and in the development of Latin American tourism sectors, I submit that both of these projects can be seen as having a sort of tactical and immediate political rationale with respect to building and preserving US economic and political domination of the populations of this region, but that they also must be understood as powerful strategies for shaping the conduct, aspirations, and senses of self among that segment of the US population that has historically been deemed most worthy of full citizenship and has been imagined as the most authentic, "all-American" embodiment of purported US values, morals, and culture – that is, members of the white, middle and upper classes. In this way, following Edward Said (1978/2003; 1993), we can think about the effects of empire not only on those subjected to it from within the imposed subject position of "other," but also on those who are counted on as the "we" that will sustain the imperial project through engaging in acts of helping and touring. The cultivation of this "we," I suggest, involves, and even requires, the production of a particular subject position or subjectivity akin to or informed by what postcolonial theorist Edward Said (1993) has described as a "structure of feeling" that insists "we are number one, we are bound to lead, we stand for freedom and order" (p. xvii), and to which, he argues, no US-American has remained impervious (see also Said, 1993, pp. 319, 336). Gayatri Spivak has also indirectly alluded to the existence of such a subjectivity among the United States population (particularly its more privileged members), commenting, in an interview, on the Columbia student who "is encouraged to think that he or she lives in the capital of the world" and "is encouraged to think that he or she is there to help the rest of the world" (Spivak, 2003, p. 622). The content of this chapter effectively begins to explore the historical production of this subject position, its original rootedness in constructs of bourgeois culture, its promotion by the state, and its relation to the geopolitical project of US imperial domination, thus shedding important light on the ethnographic material that forms the focus of the chapters to follow.
CHAPTER 6: THE VOLUNTEERS, DISCURSIVE PATHS TO GLOBAL COMMUNITY, AND SUBJECTIVITIES VIS-À-VIS ECUADOR AND THE VOLUNTEER STINT

6.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I discussed the ways in which we might consider Heron’s (2007) concept of bourgeois planetary consciousness as a mental construct that the US state has historically circulated among the country’s non-elites in service of a governmental strategy to shape the conduct of the population according to the political objectives of empire. Building on Heron’s claims, I investigated the historic place of this construct in US bourgeois culture, arguing that its salience is detectable in the historic centrality of humanitarian work and international travel to US bourgeois subjectivity, class performance, and political projects. Departing somewhat from Heron, I then argued that with the acquisition of formal empire in the late 19th century, the US state strategically promoted these bourgeois activities to the broader white middle class population, suffusing this promotion with invocations of planetary consciousness that had long accompanied and animated them.

Again, according to Heron (2007), planetary consciousness can be understood as a sense of entitlement and obligation to intervene for the betterment of an imagined other wherever he may reside; it is thus predicated on assumptions of the supremacy of the intervener (in this case, white US-American middle and upper class citizens) and notions of moral improvement as the solution to the social fallout of economic inequality. However, Heron suggests that it is also rooted in a sense of entitlement to not only improve but also to enter the spaces of the imagined other, to do so from a stance of positional superiority, and to freely gaze upon or voyeuristically consume the peoples, physical terrains, and cultures that reside within these spaces. In this way, I suggested planetary consciousness has to do not only with international humanitarian work but with international tourism to spaces understood in the public imagination (and often actively constructed by the state) as inferior. Over the course of US history, these spaces have been the territories of informal and formal empire.
Having situated Global Community in this long history of US state efforts to cajole white middle class citizens into partaking of these activities and assuming such a consciousness, in this chapter, I begin to illustrate how an imperialistic discourse of planetary consciousness fuses with a discourse of neoliberalism in the contemporary iteration of US international volunteerism, which, perhaps more than ever, is suffused with notions of leisure travel. Specifically, I explore the ways in which a construct of entitlement and obligation to both intervene and tour a space imagined as exotic, traditional, less advanced, and “developing” was at play among the statements, dispositions, and related practices of the volunteers vis-à-vis their stint in Ecuador and in concert with the neoliberal ethic of self-enterprise. In seeking to account for this interplay, I look to the Global Community website, examining the particular ways it discursively constructs the volunteer, the “Third World,” the volunteer stint and a particular relation between the three. I then consider the consumeristic quality of the subjectivities volunteers seemed to develop in relation to the particular “Third World” they imagined and anticipated. I consider how this finding speaks to the choice-oriented model that prevails in the international volunteer industry (and is most certainly employed by the Global Community program), as well as broader neoliberal injunctions of self-enterprise and consumer-as-citizen (Rose 1999) that are also at play on the program website.

Finally, I conclude this chapter with an exploration of how some volunteers grappled with reconciling their self-interest with the altruistic image of volunteer work; here, I consider the ways in which these moments of sheepish struggle indexed the fault lines produced by the recent joining of neoliberal self-enterprise with a discourse of altruism that has served as the more conventional rationale of Western humanitarian work in territories of empire. First, however, I begin with an ethnographic introduction to the volunteers and proceed from there with an account of who they were demographically, where they came from culturally and socioeconomically, where they were in their lives when they decided to apply to the Global Community Ecuador program, and what they narratively recalled in the form of driving motivations, assumptions, agendas, and expectations.

6.2 The Volunteers – Arrivals and Introductions – A Note from The First Night of Fieldwork
Field Note  
August 30, 2009 
9:15 pm

On a night in late August, I stood in a small, warm elevator, riding up to the second floor of the Mariscal Sucre International Airport in Quito, Ecuador. I checked my watch anxiously. It was 9:15. Three days earlier, I had arrived as a weary passenger at this very airport. Tonight I was returning to the airport as a somewhat nervous ethnographer, dutifully tagging along for the coordinated pick-up of thirty-six people whom I hoped would be amenable to the idea of being part of my dissertation fieldwork. My intended participants were coming to Ecuador to work as English teachers under the auspices of an education-based international volunteer program. Exactly two years prior, I had done the same thing, through the same program. Just like my cohort, the volunteers were flying in as a group from Miami, and were to arrive in Quito in the late evening and be picked up by the field directors, who were now a woman in her mid-thirties named April and a man in his mid-twenties named Tim. I had been in contact with Tim and April for the past several months, pitching my research plans and ultimately receiving, via e-mail, their okay to come and “follow” the September cohort of volunteers. Two days earlier, over plates of chicken and rice at a local Cuban restaurant, I had asked them if I could come along for the airport pick-up. “Sure,” Tim had responded, “Their flight gets in at nine-thirty. We’ll actually be there earlier to sit with this guy who’s getting in at like 7.”

Now, as the elevator doors slid apart, I stepped out and looked around. Tim and April were seated at a small black table in a lounge area, papers spread out in front of them. Sitting with them was young Asian man in retro eyeglasses and a black leather motorcycle jacket, his black hair cut into a spiky side bob. He had to be the volunteer who, April and Tim had told me, had planned to fly in separate from the group and would be arriving on an earlier flight. Plunging in, I made my way over to the table, smiling, calling out greetings as I approached. They all looked my way and smiled. I noticed that Tim had tied a yellow smiley-faced balloon to his left wrist. With introductions not forthcoming, I turned to the volunteer and told him my name. “Hi, I’m Daniel,” he responded. Pausing for a moment, he asked, “Are you a volunteer?” I shared with him that I had been a volunteer two years prior and that had decided to come back to write my dissertation on the program. “Oh, really?” he replied, his eyes widening. He paused for a moment while wheels appeared to be turning in his mind. “Cool,” he then said, nodding his head. After a few more questions about where we were each from and where I had lived in Ecuador, we fell silent and the soft buzz of the overhead fluorescent light bulb seemed to grow louder. I let my gaze drift to the papers on the table. Turning to Tim and April, I asked what they were, quickly realizing that the papers were hand-drawn street maps of the Mariscal, Quito’s notorious tourist and nightlife zone, where orientation would be held for the next four weeks. The volunteers would be staying there in a hotel on this first night, before being picked up the following day by their “host families” that would house and feed them for the rest of the four weeks.

“They’re for the scavenger hunt tomorrow,” Tim responded, referring to the maps. I nodded knowingly, recalling the summer camp atmosphere of my own orientation. After a few seconds, Tim placed the cap on his Sharpie and checked his watch. “Dude,” he said smiling, “We should go and see if anyone’s coming in off their flight!”

Feeling restless, I told him I would go with him. We walked over to a large pane of glass that looked out over the passenger walkways that led to the customs and immigration booths. As we peered through the window, a stream of people began to trickle across the second-floor hallway. Noticing a few tightly spaced clusters of young adults in the crowd, I jutted my chin in their direction and said to Tim, “I think that’s them.” Squinting his eyes, he replied, “I’m not sure,” but began waving in their direction, making
the balloon dance in the air. One young woman noticed him immediately; her face lit up and she smiled and waved back. A few others followed her lead. Others remained oblivious, concentrating on the path in front of them or engrossed in the conversation they were having with the person next to them. Then there were those who glanced up at him confusedly and slowly turned their heads away. “They’re here!” Tim announced. His grip tightening around the balloon ribbon, he informed us that he was going downstairs to wait for them to come out of customs. As he left I sat back down with Daniel and April, who, now looking a bit panicked, kept her head down. “Okay!” she responded, her hands now furiously filling in the hand-drawn street grids with colorful depictions of landmark bars, restaurants, and salsa schools that populate the Mariscal.

Daniel turned to me. “So what’s your area?” he asked. “Education,” I said. He shared that he had gotten a master’s degree in education along with his teaching certification and added that he was now thinking about going back to graduate school for a doctorate in philosophy. Our conversation was suddenly interrupted by the sound of hip hop beats – a looping snippet of Outcast’s “I’m sorry, Miss Jackson” that my ears were now trained to recognize as April’s ringtone. Snatching the small black device from the table where it sat, she glanced down at the screen, pressed a button, and answered with laser focus. “Hey Tim.” She listened. “Okay.” More listening. “Okay. Okay.” Pressing a button with her thumb, she tucked the phone away and turned to us, eyebrows arched high. “Tim says that they’re coming out!” Moving quickly, she slung her purse over her shoulder and scooped up her papers and markers, sending a few pieces of construction paper fluttering to the floor. Turning to Daniel, she gestured toward one of his suitcases, a large black duffle on wheels, and blurted out rapidly, “Do you want me to carry this?” Without waiting for an answer, she grasped its strap, and, with Daniel and myself in tow, led the way to the elevator, pulling the suitcase behind her. We arrived on the lower level and headed towards Tim who was now near the customs gate, holding the yellow balloon up and peering across the room toward the gaping archway that passengers passed through once they cleared customs.

Within seconds, a small stream of people began trickling through from the other side. As the volume of people grew, the volunteers became increasingly discernible from the rest of the passengers, mostly because of their immense luggage. Dragging oversized wheeling suitcases and some tottering under the weight of enormous backpacks, they were clearly the passengers that were planning on being in the country for more than a week or even a month. I noticed that one blond young man carried a surfboard. As had been the case with my own cohort, the group was comprised primarily of women and a small but significant handful of men. The vast majority were white. Dressed in an unofficial uniform of jeans, tee-shirts, and sweatshirts, they walked in groups of two and three, chatting with each other while keeping one eye out, presumably for their field directors, whom they had been told would be there to receive them. A few looked in our direction. Smiles began to spread across their faces and they started walking towards us, their bodies straining a bit against the weight of their luggage as they accelerated their gait. This initiated a chain reaction and soon they were all following suit. As the first of them approached, April and Tim sprang into action.

“Hi, I’m April! Welcome to Ecuador! How was your flight?”

“Hey, I’m Tim! How was your flight?”

“You want some help with your stuff?...yeah, there’s three vans parked outside that we’re gonna go to.”

Neither a program director nor a volunteer and not knowing quite how to fit into the mayhem, I attempted to pitch in, awkwardly offering to lead a few volunteers to the three white vans that had been reserved to shuttle us all to the hotel where the group would be spending its first night in Ecuador. Outside the airport, people milled around, waiting chatting, embracing, laughing, making calls on cell phones, and queuing up for one of the yellow taxis which sat idling in a long line curbside. As we picked our way
through the crowd, I lugged suitcases and tried to affect the cheeriness of the field directors, asking my sudden charges how their flight had been and where they were from. Once on the bus, I attempted light conversation with my seatmate, a soft-spoken young woman named Melissa, who told me she was from a suburb of Indianapolis. Despite my best efforts, she could only muster a few polite responses before turning to gaze quietly out the window at the first conversational lull. We settled into silence and I noticed that the entire bus was fairly quiet, with only murmurs of conversation here and there. I remembered that they had all had a long day of travel and introductions to each other.

Within thirty minutes we were pulling into the Mariscal, where the nightly farra was already at full tilt. The tiny streets were a sea of teens and twenty-somethings — milling, embracing, smoking, stumbling drunkenly, all to a frenetic soundtrack of hip hop, electronica, and reggaeton that spilled out from the bars and discotecas. As we sat stopped at a light, the party outside seeped into the van as snippets of Spanish and English drifted through the windows.

“Que fue?”
“Hey bro what’s up?!”
“Hooola lindaa. Que guapaaaa.”
“Tell her to meet us at that internet place!”

Soon we were pulling up to the hotel and double parking in a street full of nighttime revelers who looked on with bemusement as we began to climb out of white vans. April and Tim, doggedly unfazed, dove headlong into directing the volunteers. Tim made an announcement: “Okay, everyone! We’re gonna get all the luggage out and get it inside! Don’t worry about which bags are yours! We’re just gonna get it all inside and then sort it out, okay?” The drivers opened the backs of the vans and the unloading commenced, an awkward ballet of peering and reaching, slinging and hoisting, pulling and tottering, shifting and lurching, all to the urgent flashing of the vans’ red blinkers and the relentless pace of a reggaeton song that thundered over from the bar across the street. Plunked into the international post-adolescent orgy of studied cool that is the Mariscal, the volunteers moved quickly and purposefully, eager to get the woefully uncool task of unloading around seventy oversized suitcases and backdrops from three white vans over with as soon as possible. Finally, when the last duffel had been dragged out of the back of our van, a female volunteer, whom I would later know as Kelly, turned to the driver, a middle-aged Ecuadorian man with a black baseball cap, and asked him hurriedly in loud American-accented Spanish, “La cierro?” “Si, niña” he replied, nodding his head as he spoke. She slammed the door and charged toward the hotel door, her right hip banging into an unwieldy duffel slung over her right shoulder with every step. I trailed behind, passing through a glass door and into a brightly lit white tiled corridor adorned with green potted shrubbery on either side. Walking through another doorway we entered a small lobby, a fastidiously neat and sparsely furnished room where a gigantic misshapen pile of suitcases and backpacks now sat offensively, smothering the immaculate faux marble floor and towering over two diminutive maroon couches that sat against the walls. The room was engulfed in loud gringo chatter.

“Tell Rachel I have the room key!”
“Isn’t that your backpack!”
“What’s your room number?”
“I’m with Aaron and Nick.”
“We’re all in 309.”

Watching all of this unfold from behind a small reception counter were a formally attired young man and a formally attired young woman, both smiling reservedly through thinly veiled astonishment. Tim stood by the counter, acting as a liaison between the hotel staff and the volunteers who came to him in search of their room numbers. A few went directly to the counter to make their own inquiries in varying levels of broken Spanish that was often accented with American sounds of hard r’s and flat vowels.
“Buenos días. Me llama Jeremy Gilmore y necesito mi nombre—I mean, mi numero.”

“Hola! Quisiera mi cuarto por favor.”


The activity soon moved to the hallways of the hotel which became filled with the creak and shove of opening doors, the pad and thud of footsteps, the bang of suitcase wheels against steps, and a constant stream of animated bursts of talk -- individual conversations, pithy quips, random exclamations, dry banter, contagious giggles, excited non-sequiturs, pressing questions, snorting guffaws, plaintive requests for assistance and occasional announcements from the field directors. The volunteers seemed at home with each other, speaking a common dialect of upper-middle class white English, laced with the latest slang. Some girls punctuated their sentences heavily with high-pitched like’s and exaggerated literally’s, while the guys used affirmations of sick and sweet. Awesome, right on, and dude fell from everyone’s lips. People were tired but generally in high spirits and eager to be helpful and friendly to one another. Once in their rooms, doors were kept open and people came back out into the hallways to visit each other.

I circulated, trying to meet as many people as I could, poking my head through open doors and engaging any volunteer I encountered in the hallways, introducing myself and briefly explaining that I had been a volunteer and that I was now here to do a study of the program for my dissertation. “That’s legit!” one young woman declared, her eyes widening, after I had told her about my project. Others replied with an affirmative “Cool!” or “That’s awesome.” A few listened intently and asked a few questions, doing their own fieldwork, inquiring about when exactly I had been in Ecuador and where I had lived. Others listened politely, offering friendly smiles and nods, and still others seemed not in the least bit interested, their gaze drifting past me to whatever volunteer stood in the periphery. Amid their excitement with being in the hotel and their subtle sizing up of one another, it was hard to tell what anyone really thought about the prospect of having me as a researcher in their midst.

A large group of us soon ended up back in the lobby where the directors had set up a snack table of cellophane wrapped cookies, cans of potato chips and bags of platanitos. “Hey, you’ve lived here before. What’s a good bar?” The question had been put to me by Josh, a 25-year-old from Claremont, California whom I had met a few minutes ago in the hallway. He now crunched ravenously on potato chips from a green snacksize Pringles can in his left hand. As I struggled to remember the name of one bar, any bar, out of the countless bars of the Mariscal, another volunteer turned to Tim, who was standing there with us and asked hopefully, “Hey Tim, are you gonna go?” We stood around for a few more minutes, waiting for several others who had not yet come down from their hotel rooms.

After about ten minutes, we were back out on the street that we had come in from less than an hour ago. Moving slowly through the crowds, we paired up, falling into step with each other and conversing along the way. As we approached the center of an incredibly lively block, the group paused.

“What about this place?”

“Yeah, I think this is the one that Tim mentioned.”

I looked up and realized that they had selected one of the bars in the Mariscal that was known to be ‘American-themed.’ Everyone quickly agreed. We passed over the threshold and filed up a dark narrow staircase. The sounds of a Snoop Dogg and Dr. Dre song bellowed through the thin walls, exploding into full-fledged blast when we pushed open the door. It was a small dim room with walls of exposed brick that were decorated with hanging lanterns, American license plates, pieces of athletic clothing, and a poster of Jimi Hendrix. In front of us stood a green beer pong table and beyond that was a foosball table. I was instantly reminded of a local college bar at my undergraduate institution that was known for its cult-like following among many of the white students. Several
televisions hung from the ceiling, all tuned to sports programs. The room reverberated with the hip-hop soundtrack we had heard coming up the staircase. I noticed on one side was a poster of Ecuadorian president Rafael Correa and on the other a poster of U.S. president Barack Obama.

Looking around us, we moved as a unit towards the bar, a long L-shaped countertop bookended by a wall that was next to a doorway that opened out onto a balcony. We neared the bar and the discussion of what to drink ensued. What are you gonna get?” “Do you guys wanna get pitchers?” “Let’s do shots!” Finally, it was decided that we would share pitchers of beer. As two of the guys went off to get them, I followed the rest of the group to the balcony where we claimed several tables. We settled into seats and people began conversing in pairs and small groupings, their ease and confidence seeming to grow under the dim lighting, hip hop music, and promise of alcohol. I watched as people looked around, smiling approvingly. One of the guys nodded his head to the music and rapped along with Dr. Dre, nodding his head toward the floor, apparently lost in the music – or at least making himself appear that way. Two of the young women, Brianna and Casey, strode over to the beer pong table and initiated a game with some Ecuadorian young men who were dressed in baggy pants, oversized tees, and baseball caps. Within a few seconds, Casey celebrated a point. “Wuuuuuu-huuuuuuuuuuuuu!!!!!!!” She screamed, beaming and shooting her fists over her head and making a V with her arms.

I sat with Abby and Rachel, both of whom had graduated from college that May. Abby was from a large suburban town in Southern California and Rachel was from Guilford, Connecticut. We had met briefly at the hotel, and now as we sat, looking out over the balcony railing and sipping beer from pint glasses, they had a litany of questions for me about my own experience as a volunteer – where I had lived, how much Spanish I had spoken when I arrived, how much my students had been – and my research project, which Rachel enthusiastically assured me was “really cool.” Scanning the crowd from her perch, she suddenly lunged forward and screamed down into the street, “Aaaronnnnn!!!!” She had spotted another volunteer in the crowds below, and now waved her arms furiously in a criss-cross motion to get his attention. Donning a pair of black sunglasses and an oversized blue Polo t-shirt, Aaron, a 23-year-old from Newton, Massachusetts looked up at the sound of his name and a slow, dazed grin spread across his face as he shot his fists into the air in a V-for-victory sign, prompting Rachel to holler back at the top of her lungs, “Yaaaaahhhhhhh!!!!” Another volunteer later mentioned to me that the two of them had been among the volunteers who had been “doing shots together” at the bar in the Miami airport earlier that afternoon, and that they had been “drunk on the plane.” As I watched Aaron make his way toward the bar entrance below, I heard a high-pitched “Wuuuuuu-huuuu!!!” from the direction of the beer pong table. Glancing over, I saw Casey, beaming with her fists pumped into the air in another victory sign, apparently celebrating another point.

The volunteers had arrived.

Through spending this evening with the volunteers I had begun to learn some things as to who they were as a group. For one, in relation to the demographic statistics about US international volunteers, they were exceedingly typical. With the exception of three volunteers, all were white. With the exception of two volunteers, they all appeared to be in their twenties. Moreover, as per Global Community application requirements, I knew that all of them had attended and graduated from college, a clear marker of middle to upper class socioeconomic
status. However, while these things could have been easily deduced from a familiarity with Global Community policy and a quick glance at the airport, the behaviors, statements, and interactions I observed over the course of the evening identified and located the volunteers in ways that were cultural as well as socioeconomic, racial, and age-related. For example, they apparently felt at ease with staples of US-American college life: “beer pong,” “shots,” and commercialized hip-hop music. They also spoke a mostly “standard” English with white middle/upper class vernacular inflection, most punctuating their sentences heavily with the word, “like,” and many using slang such as “sick,” “dude,” “awesome,” and “sweet.”

Moreover, there was an overwhelming outward air of confidence and effortlessness that permeated the group, even as an underlying vibration of excitement and nerves remained strongly palpable. Indeed, strolling through unfamiliar streets and piling into an unknown bar, they had demonstrated a certain facility which I found striking given that, from their vantage point, they had just arrived in a foreign country where their language was not the dominant tongue and where they knew no one except for other volunteers whom they had just met 10 hours earlier. Once inside the bar, their jovial attitudes, hoots and hollers, and victory signs subtly conveyed a sense of confidence and assuredness in their right to be there. They seemed both determined and eager to irreverently explore their new surroundings, to be carefree and raucous in a country that, as it turned out, none had ever visited and many knew very little about. Despite having just arrived in the country, they interacted with this particular corner of Ecuador as though it was their playground for the night. At the time, my immediate interpretation of this demeanor was that it constituted yet another marker of class privilege, but one that was difficult to capture and conceptualize because it was not explicitly declared or decisively done, but rather telegraphed through a sort of distinctive body language and interactional style.

22 With the exception of two: Veronica, a 25-year-old who had come to Ecuador as a Global Community summer volunteer, and Gloria, a 65-year-old retired teacher who had come to Ecuador previously on a short-term educational “service trip.”
As it turned out, their behavior closely mirrored what one sociologist has found to be a foundational dispositional characteristic of privileged US-American youth. In his study of an elite US boarding school, cultural sociologist Shamus Rahman Kahn (2011) has discussed a corporal or embodied “ease” of privilege that wealthy adolescents learn and perform, asserting that this virtual habitus in fact works as a sort of cultural capital. Drawing on Kahn’s work, I later came to see this first evening out as an instance of that very ease manifest, albeit not in a school setting, but rather in the physical space of the Mariscal of Quito, Ecuador – a distinction that seemed to make the performance and exercise of ease among a group of recently arrived US-Americans that much more remarkable.

Over the course of my many conversations with the volunteers over the next 11 months, it emerged that many did in fact hail from backgrounds of relative privilege. I would learn that they were the children of doctors, lawyers, corporate managers, teachers, and college professors. This characteristic positioned them not as members of a bourgeoisie in the way that I am interpreting the term (see Introduction), but rather as part of the middle, upper-middle, and professional classes which, as I have argued, have been the conventional targets of US imperialist governmental technologies of tourism and humanitarian work (see Introduction and Chapter 5). In addition to their parents’ occupations, many also had extensive international travel experience, something which I also counted as a marker of their relative socioeconomic privilege. For some, international travel had started with one or two childhood family vacations to Europe, Mexico, or the Caribbean. However, for the majority, traveling abroad had been something they began doing as college students and by way of a combination of study abroad stints to Europe and South America, vacations to the Caribbean, and, in the case of a few, short-term “service trips” to Costa Rica, Belize and South Africa. When I asked about their international travel experience, most ticked off at least four different countries with a great majority listing many more.

Returning now to that first night in the Mariscal bar, I was also continually struck by the ways in which its gringo-oriented design seemed to enable the volunteers in affecting and
projecting such “ease” and entitlement to the space. Specifically, it seemed that a careful selection of certain adornments, musical genre, and alcoholic offerings also played a significant role in enabling them to make themselves at home almost immediately. Indeed, in its décor and its location in Gringolandia, the bar had quite literally been made for them and the volunteers had made use of it as such.

Conversely, the overall hedonistic setting of Gringolandia and this “American college bar” that the volunteers had easily found within its parameters underscored the ways in which the inferred tastes and preferences of the US-American college-aged tourist play a powerful role in the structuring of the Ecuadorian tourist industry. Set in the heart of Quito’s tourist district, the bar was indeed a picture of “staged authenticity” (MacCannell, 1976/1999). However, instead of courting US-American tourists with scenes of imagined Ecuadorian typicality, the bar was instead an informal homage to the cultural frame of the white upper-middle class US-American college student. Thus, unlike the many tourist settings that attempt to appeal to the touristic “quest for authenticity” (Ibid) of the host country, this bar catered to the volunteers in a different way, basing its entire décor around their presumed tastes, preferences, and ways of (bar) life, thus symbolically valorizing their imagined subjectivities and cultural worlds. Their behaviors once inside the bar thus illustrated the ways in which the international courting of the US-American post-adolescent tourist dollar can, when combined with well-honed senses of ease and entitlement vis-à-vis “Third World” spaces among young adult travelers, translate into a vivid display and actualization of US-American proprietorship overseas.

In this way, despite being hundreds of thousands of miles outside the United States and on an entirely different continent, the volunteers experienced and readily exploited a sort of enduring cultural privilege as the centering of white middle/upper class youth subjectivities that characterizes dominant United States culture went, for the moment, uninterrupted. Together, the US-American-oriented construction of the space and the ways in which the volunteers confidently and comfortably made use of the space combined to constitute a powerful scene of privilege-in-action.
As it turned out, this first evening out together foreshadowed several more that would take place over the course of Orientation. During the weekends, the volunteers would often descend upon a bar en masse and with an easy exuberance. After a few rounds of drinks, people’s voices would get louder, their antics sillier, and by a certain point, at least one person would often pass out. In these moments, it seemed like they were indeed on an extended Spring Break or at a college “frat party,” with all of the raucousness that is associated with these institutions of American middle and upper class college life. Having recently graduated from college, they effectively brought the college frat party into the local bars and discotecas.

I thus came to see this collective mode of being on their first night in Ecuador – their displays of exuberance, their airs of entitlement, their subtle claimings of the space for their celebration – as the expression of a shared cultural habitus. However, I also came to see it as a sort of physical embodiment of the discursively engaged expectations, assumptions, motivations, and intentions they would share with me when I eventually got to ask them about how and why they had decided to apply to and participate in Global Community Ecuador.

Before getting to that material, however, while that first evening in the Mariscal had culturally located the volunteers, over the course of the following days, weeks, and months I would also learn more about where exactly they were coming from in terms of the contexts of their decisions to apply to and participate in the Global Community Ecuador program. At what points were they in their lives when they learned about and even began to explore the option of becoming Global Community volunteers? How did they learn about the program? What were the conditions that framed and perhaps precipitated and textured their decisions to even contemplate going to live in Ecuador for one year as an English teacher with Global Community? What were their understandings of these conditions and the role they might have played in their decisions? These questions, along with further consideration of the privileged class backgrounds and related assumptions that enabled them to even arrive at such decisions, are what form the focus of the following section.

6.3 “Something else”/Privileged Escapes
“I was looking at things to do the summer before my senior year of college so I was like, ‘Oh, maybe the Peace Corps would be cool, AmeriCorps, maybe I’ll apply to some jobs.’ I was kind of all over the place because I was like, ‘Oh my God, what the hell am I going to do?’”

On a warm Monday afternoon in Loja, Andrea and I had come to Casa Sol, a local restaurant and lunchtime favorite among the city’s professionals. Andrea was in town visiting from her placement site of Quito, taking advantage of a break between school cycles to visit volunteers and see other parts of the country. It being the start of the week, the Loja volunteers were as usual consumed with copy-making for their afternoon classes and Andrea had taken me up on a lunch invitation. Arriving at Casa Sol, we had climbed the stairs to the restaurant’s second floor terrace and made our way to a table overlooking a tiny park with two vibrant orange-pink hibiscus bushes. After placing an order for chicken tamales and café con leche, we had started the interview and I had begun by asking Andrea how she had arrived at the decision to apply to Global Community. Taking a quick swig of water from a royal blue Nalgene bottle, she continued:

So, I found Global Community through a friend who actually was looking for a part-time job, and found that the office was hiring people, and she’s like, ‘Oh, there’s this weird program that, it’s like a teaching program,’ and she sent me the link, because she’s like, ‘I know you can’t really figure out what you want to do.’ That was the summer after I had come back from South Africa and I was like, ‘Hmmm, I kind of want to do this again but for a longer period of time.’ So I read up on Global Community’s website, and I wrote to whoever it was and got the names of some alumni contacts and spoke to a woman on the phone who actually lives in Portland who did a program in the Amazon like 15 years ago.

One of the subtly striking elements of Andrea’s account is the easy way in which she listed a variety of options that she counted on upon graduating from college – Peace Corps, Americorps, applying to jobs. Later in our conversation she also listed graduate school as another option she had considered but ultimately declined to pursue for the moment. Andrea’s narrative was not unlike those of many of her peers. This process of freely choosing between paying and non-paying post-college options and ultimately settling on the very low paying option of Global Community characterized the stories of other volunteers who had been college seniors at the time of applying. Moreover, in their stories of how they arrived at their decisions to apply to the Global Community Ecuador program, volunteers often casually emitted senses of possibility, of
options and choices, whose existence was, to them, unremarkable. I came to see both their reported range of choices and their easy assumptions of it as clear markers of the economic privilege they experienced as young adult children of the middle, upper, and professional classes.

Like Andrea, those volunteers who had sought out Global Community as college seniors often shared accounts of choosing between seeking employment, applying for graduate school, or “doing something else.” As they casually shared these details with me, I noticed that in addition to the presence of what might be described as a *choiced*-ness (which for some, like Andrea carried a certain degree of stress), there was also a distinct absence of anxiety around questions of post-college economic survival or economically-related pressures to look for post-college employment. Indeed, among those who had been college seniors at the time of application to Global Community, many spoke about their choice to apply to the program as a way of consciously avoiding a path of employment. As Rachel, a 23-year-old from Guilford, Connecticut, recalled:

> So Amanda and I were at NYU and we were graduating. It was May 2009, so last May, and we decided to do something that had to do with traveling because we didn’t want to stay in the states and do something conventional like get a job right away, and at that time, I’m not sure, it might still be like that in the states a little bit still, but the economy was really bad. People were losing their jobs. Everyone that we had known from high school that was working was getting laid off and everyone was back in our town so we were like, “Let’s just do something and see what happens,” and my roommate’s sister had gone to China with Global Community, and she was like, “It was really cool.”

Echoing Rachel’s narrative, an aversion to the “conventional” and an interest in seeking out something “cool” was a theme in several other volunteer accounts. For example, in explaining her motivations, Leslie, a 22-year-old from Marietta, Georgia told me (referring to her feelings at the time she decided to apply), “I don’t want to go to school or get a job just because I’m supposed to.” A few moments later, I repeated this back to her to make sure I understood, and she explained that she had not wanted “to go to school or get a job,” merely for the sake of convention or expectations – or, as she put it, “just because I felt like that was what I was supposed to be doing.” Then she elaborated further:

> And I think that the coolest people I’ve met have taken time to do something like this or some sort of thing that you’re like, “Well that’s kind of weird. And how did you get from
there to here?” The coolest people I’ve met have done something kind of out of the norm. I mean there are definitely cool people who don’t go abroad or don’t do something kind of unusual that maybe has nothing to do with their career and now—but a lot of people who I’ve found inspiring that I met, other students, people that I like, took some grad classes with at Emory had some interesting experiences that were similar to this. So I was like, “Alright. I’d like to be you maybe, or similar.”

Alternatively, others who had been college seniors at the time of application did not describe the post-college tracks of work or graduate school as undesirably conventional, but rather as an intimidating post-college world that they did not feel ready to enter. As Shannon, a 23-year-old from a northern suburb of Milwaukee, told me:

The main pull was that I wanted to do something to like, before I entered the real world. And I thought, I maybe wanna go back to grad school, but I didn’t know if it was gonna be for teaching or like, education. So this way I could test it out. And, that’s why I did Global Community.

Shannon’s story was echoed in the comments of Abby, a 22-year-old from a large suburban town in Southern California, who told me:

I definitely knew during undergraduate that I wanted to volunteer abroad because not ready to go into professional life or graduate school right away—most likely graduate school—and to pursue my professional life.

For several volunteers, Global Community was a way to postpone indefinitely their previously made plans of attending graduate school. As Casey, a 23-year-old from a small town about an hour outside of Atlanta, told me:

I graduated from undergrad last May, May of ’09, and in May, or like all of my undergrad career or whatever, I had planned to go to grad school, like directly after — ‘cause I wanna do optometry, and I can’t like, do anything without a, y’know, graduate, like, doctorate degree or whatever. So the plan was just to go straight through, but my junior year, 2008, I went abroad to Spain, and I just really, really, loved like traveling, like, being out of the country and like, um, experiencing something different in that way. And so while I was there I got really—it was like, kind of the time where I needed to start thinking about applying to grad schools for the next year, and I was just like, not interested at all in going to grad school the next year. And so, I was basically just looking for something else to do instead of like, go to grad school. Um, and I really liked being abroad, and I had a friend who had done, I knew he had done Global Community for a summer, so I was just lookin’ for programs to just like, go abroad and I, so, through him, found the website.

For other college seniors, applying to Global Community was a way to fill the time between college graduation and a more definitively planned entry into graduate school. As Erin, a 23-year-old from Bethesda, Maryland told me matter-of-factly:
I just graduated college, so when I was figuring out what to do with life after college, I wanted to go abroad and I wanted to teach English. I was a Spanish major and I wanted to work on my Spanish before I figured out my next step. Actually, I knew my next step, I’m applying to grad school this year, but I realized what program I wanted to do a little bit late in my senior year to start applying then, so I had a year to kill. So I found Global Community and I liked the fact that it was really organized and that there would be someone looking out for me wherever I was. I didn’t just want to show up with some type of certification that I paid a lot of money for somewhere and just hoped to find a job. So I liked that it was really structured. That’s where I was.

Here, it is worth highlighting the quiet assumptions of class privilege that suffuse Erin’s narrative as well as the nature of what her class position (as the child of a lawyer and a schoolteacher) apparently enabled her to do. As she mentioned, the Global Community program had appealed to her because of its “really organized,” “really structured” nature. As a young adult who was leaving the structured environment of college and making plans to shortly re-enter the structured life of graduate school, perhaps the security of “structure” was something that Erin was craving in a broader sense at that particular moment in her life. While this can remain only an inference, what is more evident is the fact that, with an affinity for a “structured” program in place, Erin, like the rest of her cohort mates, had pursued an option that charged an upfront fee of $5,000. Moreover, at no point in our conversation did anxieties about coming up with these funds factor into her account of deciding to follow through with applying and participating. (When I asked whether she had fundraised in order to pay the fee (a strategy encouraged by Global Community), she told me that she had not and that she had instead relied upon monetary gifts she had received for her college graduation and assistance from her parents.)

In this way, because Erin had been able to access the economic resources with which to pay for a "structured" program, she had been able to circumvent the unstructured burden of, for example, looking for employment and perhaps taking an unreasonably low-paying entry level job during the "year to kill" that had befallen her because she had decided upon a grad school program after application deadlines had already passed. Instead, she had been able to freely elect to embark upon an organized activity that would not only lend structure to her post-college life, but also provide her with the opportunity to work on her Spanish language skills, a pursuit
that was both a personal interest and, as she later told me, a potential asset to her professional aspirations of becoming a physical therapist and working with Latino populations.

*The Mid-Twenty-Somethings*

Not all of the volunteers had been college seniors when they applied to Global Community. A smaller group was comprised of 6 volunteers who had graduated from college one to three years prior. These volunteers had taken the “conventional” routes eschewed by some of their younger peers and entered the “real world” that some of their other younger peers were seeking to postpone. In explaining how they decided to apply to Global Community, these volunteers emphasized that they had been going through feelings of “burn out” at their jobs or senses of general stagnation in their lives, overall. Where their younger peers had recalled impulses to delay entry into the “real world” or postpone graduate school, this group of volunteers tended to articulate desires to temporarily escape, to “go away,” to leave the “daily grind” and the dullness and related emotional despair that had come with it. These sort of sentiments were illustrated in Brooke’s account of her personal circumstance and emotional state at the time she decided to apply:

B: Basically I felt like my soul kind of died (laughing) in the two years after college, ‘cause y’know I was still living at home, trying to save up money.

C: To move out? Or to do this?

B: To do something.

C: To do something, okay.

B: To do something, yeah to just earn money, ‘cause I really didn’t know what I wanted to do, and I, I don’t know how people at Planned Parenthood, at least our branch, I don’t know how at the beginning they afford enough to like pay for rent and to pay for, I just don’t know how they do it, so I just felt kind of, just kind of dead end, I guess, like very muted and so, I needed to do something else…I just needed something else, and I needed to be a little more stimulated, ‘cause I, y’know, I got to that point where I maxed out. Y’know, like, I’d learned everything that I wanted to…I just needed something and I wanted it to be challenging, I wanted it to be abroad, and I wanted it—like, I usually, I flourish when I’m being challenged, and usually when I’m being challenged on my own, so that’s why I wanted to do this and honest-to-God (laughing slightly), in large part, not in large part, but I wanted to get distance from my relationship. I wanted to get away, um, because I kind of, I ended up backing myself into a corner. So, I wanted to literally like, physically remove myself from the relationship, so, basically all of it kind of, it was y’know, like the Bermuda Triangle or something.
Thus, it was amid feelings that she described as “dead end” and “muted,” that Brooke, a 26-year-old from a large Midwestern town, recalled wanting out of her situation. Specifically, she craved more stimulation and challenge and believed that such conditions would enable her to “flourish.” Not only that, she also wanted “distance” from a romantic relationship that she felt unsure of. In short, as she puts it, she wanted to “remove herself physically,” not only from her relationship but also from her work situation, and the life that she had come to know in the two years following her graduation from college.

As with many of the aforementioned volunteers who had applied to Global Community as college seniors, certain assumptions of economic privilege were woven subtly throughout Brooke’s story of how she came to apply to Global Community. For Brooke, the child of two physicians who had graduated with a major in Anthropology and a minor Spanish, leaving an undesirable and low-wage job for a “challenge” that was even lower-paid, and moreover, required an upfront payment of $5,000 was not something that was unfeasible in the way that it most likely would be for someone depending on such a job for economic survival. Thus while she had most recently worked in a low-wage job, Brooke’s options were clearly not constrained by it, and she was able to pursue an opportunity that, she felt, spoke to her personal needs and wants. Notably, at an earlier point in our conversation she had shared with me that she had initially not “wanted to” (as opposed to being unable to) pay for Global Community, but that when she had realized that the program encouraged volunteers to fundraise their program fees she had taken this on as a way to finance her participation, commenting: “I thought that [fundraising] was a really cool thing to do. I mean it’s like a marketable skill, and it just gave me experience to like put myself out there in that way.”

Overall, this theme of picking up and leaving the daily grind was reiterated across the stories of those who had applied to Global Community several years after college. Together, their stories illustrated how upper-middle class youth select the option of international volunteering to create alternative paths to undesirable circumstances. Here, it is worth noting that such senses of alienation or anomie (as Durkheim might have had it) as those described by Brooke and
numerous other volunteers are clearly not exclusive to the upper classes of capitalist societies. However, in a dynamic that speaks to the privileged nature of Northern international volunteering, a classed access to monetary resources undoubtedly played a role in enabling Brooke and her peers to cope with such emotional strain in ways that would be much harder to orchestrate among subjects of lesser means. Moreover, it should not go unnoticed that for those white volunteers (a 90% majority of the cohort), "looking the part" of the international volunteer, as he is most frequently depicted on international volunteering websites (see Section 6.5), may have also had a hand in allowing them to even imagine themselves as volunteers in the global South. Thus, it can be inferred, relative financial wealth, claims on racial whiteness, and the phenomenon of an international volunteering industry that seems to actively target people who fit this demographic description, conceivably worked together to enable Brooke and her peers not only to escape and perhaps transcend whatever post-college senses of despair and phases of professional stagnation, but also to cloak these sentiments and downturns, as well as their attempts to overcome them, in noble claims of “making a difference” in the downtrodden or needy lives of Southern populations and in the culturally sanctioned neoliberal respectability of “broadening horizons,” taking on a “challenge,” and strengthening their resumés.

On the role of upper-class social networks

Among the volunteers who had been college seniors at the time of application, the decision to pursue an alternative to employment or graduate school had translated into an investigation of “programs.” Some considered domestic programs of Americorps and Teach for America alongside international programs such as the Peace Corps and Global Community. Others were interested only in options that would allow them to live abroad for an extended period of time, and thus went straight for the international programs. In contemplating their post-college plans, some found out about Global Community through visiting their college study abroad offices or attending recruitment sessions held by Global Community at their colleges. However, the majority knew or knew of people who had been Global Community volunteers – friends, family members, friends of friends, and even family members of friends. Indeed, as they
recounted to me their stories of deciding to do "something else," whether it was to pursue an alternate path to employment or grad school or leave behind their current post-college jobs, most volunteers specifically mentioned having known or known of friends, family members, or even family members of friends who had participated in the Global Community program itself, a dynamic which reveals the role that middle and upper class social networks play in the popularization of international volunteering among the middle and upper class youth. For example, Casey, Veronica, and Abby each recalled a friend who had participated in the organization’s programs in Asia, Africa, and South America respectively. For childhood friends and college classmates Rachel and Amanda, it was a roommate’s sister who had been a volunteer in the organization’s program in China.

For Ashley, a 23-year-old from southern California, her initial awareness of and familiarization with Global Community had been a product of her own internet research, but her decision to apply was facilitated largely through her friendship with a woman who had been a volunteer with Global Community’s Costa Rica program. As Ashley told me:

  I knew that I wanted to do some type of volunteer work and I didn't really know where to start. I'd research online and there's just so many different programs to choose from it's hard to know which ones to take seriously and I had done some teaching in Belize for about three weeks in college with a volunteer program through my college and I loved it. I loved working with kids and I had a great experience. And so then the more that I researched I found that teaching was probably going to be like, my best bet in terms of like, having a job in a foreign country, so I started looking into programs and then a lady that I babysat for 4 years in college—she was not even like a lady that I babysat for. She's probably one of my best friends. I'm really, really close with her, and she went Smith, but she did Global Community in Costa Rica and I knew that she had taught in Costa Rica but I didn’t know it was through Global Community. So as soon as I found out that she did Global Community and I heard about her experience, I knew that Global Community was a great organization, and I started researching Global Community and kind of talking to other people that had done it, and I had only heard great things so I decided to apply.

In somewhat similar fashion to Ashley’s path, for Nicholas, a 23-year-old from a wealthy town on Long Island, New York, a recommendation of Global Community had come from an esteemed older a figure: a “favorite high school teacher” whom he had contacted after graduating from college and completing one year as an assistant at a law firm. As he told me:
I reconnected with my favorite high school teacher and I went to see him in the high school in my town. We just started talking and he was like, “Oh, you know, by the way, I didn’t go straight to graduate school post college. I did Global Community. I did this program.” I had heard about Global Community before, but I had never really considered it. And I guess through last year, before that even happened, before I met with him, I’d thought about going abroad, traveling and doing something like this. This was actually pretty late. This was in May or June. So I didn’t apply until June. So I applied. And, yeah, that was pretty much how I decided to do—that’s pretty much why I immediately decided to do this program. Just a personal recommendation type of thing.

In addition to simply knowing about friends and family who had been Global Community volunteers or incidentally learning about and then drawing direction from the experiences of friends and mentor figures, some volunteers recalled purposefully seeking out friends and family and speaking with them about their experiences in order to help them decide whether or not to apply. This was illustrated in Josh’s story. At the time that Josh decided to apply to Global Community he was finishing up his final semester of a teacher certification program in southern California. He had studied abroad in Spain as a senior in college and had been impressed with how his Spanish had progressed under conditions of linguistic immersion. Reminiscing about this experience and faced with what he perceived as a dismal job market, he had contacted a friend from college who had been a Global Community volunteer. As he recalled:

So, upon finishing my credential program, I had enough opportunities to keep myself busy for the spring and summer, but I knew that the following year getting a job wasn’t really going to happen. So, I called her [my friend], got in touch with her and I was like, “Hey, Lizzie, I remember you saying that you were thinking about teaching abroad, English, are you doing that or where are you?” She said, “Hey, you know, I’m in Ecuador, this program Global Community.” She responded to me within two days and, “It’s totally great. You should totally do it.” She gave me the website; I looked over it that evening, and started applying the next day.

As with the college seniors, this process of hearing from or actively calling upon friends and family members that were known to have lived abroad or participated specifically in Global Community was described repeatedly in post-college applicants’ stories of learning about and deciding to apply to the program. Andrew, a 25-year-old from Fairfax, Virginia, had heard about Global Community through “Facebooking” with a friend who was, at the time, participating in the organization’s program in the Philippine Islands. For Brooke, her awareness of Global Community had come through her knowledge that the “daughter of my mom’s colleague” had participated in
the program in the recent past. Melanie, a 24-year-old from Los Angeles, had a family friend who
had been a Global Community volunteer in the Philippine Islands.

In sum, and as the foregoing discussion indicated, applying to Global Community
functioned for most of the volunteers as a way of pursuing an alternative to conventional and
“uncool” futures or mundane and undesirable presents. In this way, the volunteers’ stories were
ones of consciously choosing against certain options or life situations. For many, the desire to
tavel or live abroad had from the beginning been a key condition for the “something else” they
were looking for. For others, living abroad had been a considered option but not necessarily a
condition for that “something else” they desired; it would ultimately emerge through the process of
investigating and weighing their options. However, regardless of their paths to figuring out their
next steps, the vast majority looked to friends and family, often calling specifically on those
particular friends and family members whom they knew to have participated in Global Community
or a program like it.

6.4 Dreams of Difference/Agendas of Opportunity in Alterity

In the previous section, I discussed the volunteers’ stories of how they arrived at the
decision to apply to and participate in the Global Community program. A key theme was a
conscious choosing against certain options, a desire to not pursue particular paths that were
framed as the norm for their age group. Entwined with this aversion was, particularly among the
recent college grads, a sense of possibility that was suffused with silent assumptions of freedom
from financial constraints. While it is difficult to analyze the unspoken, it is important to highlight
and consider it in attempting to paint a portrait of a particular group. Recall that the ability to
become a Global Community Ecuador volunteer program was dependent on being able to pay an
up front fee of $5,000. However, with the exception of one person, no volunteer acknowledged or
mentioned any concern or consideration of financial burden as being part of his or her path to
Global Community. In attempting to paint a portrait of volunteers, this lack of expressed concern
for the financial is important to mention as it speaks to the middle class and upper class
positionings of the majority of the group. This was something that was additionally demonstrated through the professions of many of their parents.

An aversion to alternative paths, as well as a desire to escape currently lived situations, a sense of possibility, and an apparent lack of concern or sense of constraint around financial costs are each distinct themes. However, in crafting a portrait of the participants of my study, it is important to consider how such themes were often all at once interwoven through their stories. In a sense, the absence of economic anxiety and hardship might be understood as having something to do with the casual air of freedom and possibility that I noticed among many of them as they discussed their routes to Global Community.

In this section, I move from the foregoing consideration of how the volunteers’ decisions were situated in desires to not do particular things and take up an examination of what it was they professed to have wanted to do instead. What was the alternative that they desired or began to desire in the search for “something else”? How did they frame this alternative and explain why they sought it out? What was appealing to them about it? What sorts of discursive constructs inflected this search and its guiding assumptions?

As it turned out, at the center of many of the volunteers’ stories was an articulated desire to “experience another culture,” a phrase so oft-repeated that I began to see it as a kind of emic shorthand for describing what it was they had wanted to do in applying to and participating in the Global Community program. “I just wanted to experience a new place, and a different, I guess the main thing was a different culture,” Melanie told me during our conversation about how she had decided to apply and participate in the Global Community Ecuador program. In the same vein, Aaron explained to me, “I just wanted to experience like, Ecuador, I guess, and like a different culture.” Or as Brianna told me one morning over breakfast at a Quito juice bar, “I just wanted to come here and live here and experience another culture.” Echoing these explanations, but coming from a different phase of life was Peggy, a 71-year-old retired teacher (one of two volunteers over the age of 65). She told me:
I wanted to do something different for a year. When you reach—I call it the bucket list. You get your bucket list out and start checking them off. This is just one. I wanted to have a year experience in another culture...I just wanted to experience the culture.

What did they mean by “experience another culture?” On the one hand, the phrase was self-explanatory, but at the same time it seemed to be impossibly broad and to leave many specifics obscured. I would often ask volunteers to explain what they found so appealing about “experiencing another culture,” trying to get them to clarify what exactly they were referring to with this phrase, what they intended to convey, and how they understood their own desires to do it. As I pushed for further elaboration it became apparent that embedded in this idea of “experiencing another culture” was an assumption of voyeuristically immersing oneself in alternate ways of life, in alternate cultural formations, alternate languages – that is, of course, alternate to their own ways of life, cultural formations, and languages that they intended to temporarily leave behind in the United States. To do this, to “experience another culture,” was framed as inherently exciting, stimulating, and interesting largely because it involved an engagement with the different, new, the alternative. Aaron’s explanation was typical:

I don’t know, it’s just different, it’s interesting, it’s a new experience. I don’t know, it was just really different. I mean, I know a lot of people say predictable people like predictability, things to be the same. I like change, I like things to change and see different things, learn different things, meet different people.

Or as Shannon explained it to me:

I was like, eager to see like, this country or anywhere, really, in South America, and just see like, how people operate, and like, how they take their life, and like, their job, and their family, and how they like, act, with it all, I don’t know.

For Brooke, the attraction to immersing herself in another culture lay partly in an implicit desire to learn new thing as well as a visceral thrill that she associated with the act of traveling.

I just, I love seeing different places in the world and meeting new people. I think you can just learn so much from other people and I think it’s a shame when people decide to limit themselves by y’know—and I, and also, because it’s a little frightening at a certain level, it’s a little nerve-wracking to travel, and I think that’s really good. I think it’s really, really healthy to like, do things you’re afraid of. Um, there’s certain things I will never do. Like, I probably will never go skydiving ‘cause that’s not really like a useful fear, it doesn’t really build your character. I just, I think travel is just kind of, I don’t think you can really get the same experience by doing anything else. It’s just kind of unique.
For Melissa, a 26-year-old from a suburb of Indianapolis, the prospect of living in Ecuador meant somehow entering into a larger world from which she felt disconnected in the small town where she had recently graduated from college and remained, working in what she referred to as a “dead-end job.” For her, living in Ecuador connoted a certain self-led integration into a broader world that small town USA could not deliver. As she told me:

I just felt so stagnant in my life. I felt like I needed more, I needed to experience more, I needed to understand more of the world of which I’m a part. Um, because being a part of like, a global community was really appealing, as opposed to just like feeling like I was in this bubble. Um, I don’t know. Yeah, it was just something I really wanted to do.

Others alluded to an apparent craving to see and partake of something understood as definitively different from the realities they were living in the United States. As Nicholas told me:

And then after college I guess, I don’t know, I kind of wanted to experience a different culture I think, especially after going through a year of like the grind, like the day to day. I guess part of it was I wanted to get away...And, yeah, I felt I wanted to see other cultures, get to know other people, stuff like that.

Notably, embedded in their professed impulses and desires to immerse in a different world was often a stated preference for a sort of extreme or ultimate difference that, for some volunteers, proved elusive in European settings. As Aaron told me:

The idea of living in a different culture, I really liked my study abroad experience, but it was in Ireland, so it’s different, not super different – so I wanted something more different.

Aaron’s explanation was echoed in Shannon’s comment:

I think, yeah, I mean I just think it’s important to like, see other cultures, and Europe, when I went there, like, it w-, I mean, it is, in theory, another like way of life but it wasn’t that different, and here, it’s like, to me, quite different and, so.

Both Aaron and Shannon had gravitated toward the prospect of international volunteering, in part, because it would allow them to travel to a country in the developing world, which they positioned as dramatically “different” in ways that European countries were not. For both Aaron and Shannon, this interest in extreme difference also coincided with a desire to visit a mythical Third World space, which they imagined in very specific ways. For instance, Aaron told me that he was inspired in part by a previous “service trip” to El Salvador, where he had spent 10 days teaching English to elementary school children. As he recounted:
It was definitely a kind of powerful experience, particularly visiting people in their homes and really seeing how these people live. Some of them had electricity by stealing it from the power lines. Most of them, their water was like one of those big, plastic vats with rain water that was just disgusting, stagnant looking water, and that was their drinking water.

Aaron shared that he had in fact envisioned Ecuador being something like what he had seen in El Salvador. Echoing him, many volunteers shared similar visions of what they had expected and, in some sense, hoped to find in Ecuador. For example, Shannon shared that she had been driven by a desire to witness a society specifically before it became modernized. As she put it, “I think I wanted to see, I don’t know, like, Ecuador and South America before it became, like, developed and like, Americanized, or something.” She continued:

S: I looked into like, the Costa Rica but um, I think I wanted more like South America than Central.

C: Any particular reason?

S: Reason? Um, it seemed more like raw, maybe, authentic.

C: South America?

S: Yeah, and less like touristy as far as—‘cause I was looking into like, here [Ecuador], and then the Chile one was sort of okay, but then there was a Peru one that was opening up. Like, I would have rather done Ecuador or Peru, I guess. Something that was a little bit more like, um (pauses) raw, I guess is the word that I, comes—like, Argentina seems like maybe I wouldn’t get the true like, South American experience, (laughing) but I don’t know if that sounds like, retarded (laughing).

C: No, no, I think a lot of people probably say that. Like, what went through your mind when you were thinking like, the real experience, or the raw experience, or the authentic experience? Like, were you were picturing anything in particular, or expecting anything, or wanting anything?

S: I was wanting to. I was wanting like, the experience of like, the people, I guess. Of like, a less developed—I was picturing people to be a little bit more like, open and enjoying life more because they weren’t, I don’t know, like, the developing country hadn’t like, caught up with them and it wasn’t as um, I don’t know, fast-paced. And so that’s what I was picturing with like, South America in general, and then like, the raw experience, I wanted like, I didn’t want as many tourists around, I didn’t want as many like, Americans.

Like Shannon, other volunteers recalled intentions and expectations of an imagined “authenticity” – Abby, for example, told me during one conversation, “I came here kind of for typical-ness.” And many volunteers recalled visions of Ecuador that were similar to those shared by Aaron and Shannon, visions of a country imagined through a lens of poverty, rural-ness, and
conditions associated with less development. As Josh told me, "When I came into it, I thought developing country, I thought everybody would be in a worse economic situation than I am." Like Josh, Ashley had also imagined conditions often associated with material poverty, though she did not describe them in terms of an "economic situation." She told me:

A: I thought my life was going to be more difficult, like, living in the boonies or I thought it was going to be more uncomfortable…I thought it was going to be more difficult.

C: Do you know why you thought that?

A: I guess maybe just like Ecuador or Third World…I had been to Guatemala, Belize and Chile before and in South America, so I just thought that it was going to be different.

Echoing Ashley somewhat, Amanda told me, "I used to think I would live in a jungle and have cold water." Moreover, Amanda told me that, because her parents had traveled to Ecuador several times and because her father had worried about being targeted as a foreigner and being pick-pocketed (though he never actually was pick-pocketed), she had been "expecting a society where there’s no rules or regulations."

If one were to employ here the theories of MacCannell (1976/1999), then the volunteers’ stated motivations for living in a developing country might be conceived as evidence of how modern subjects utilize tourism to assuage a particular kind of malaise that stems from living under the condition of modernity. As discussed in the previous chapter, MacCannell has argued that tourism constitutes a quest for authenticity that is itself an attempted escape from the inauthenticity or the perceived falseness of modern interpersonal relations. Dreams of forging a sense of connection to an imagined (global) community amid feeling confined to a “bubble” existence, reports of desiring to see something different and meet new people after a year spent in the “grind” – these could be interpreted as examples of the very dynamic that MacCannell claims is at work in the phenomenon of tourism. Volunteers’ claims of pursuing “typical-ness” or “the raw, maybe authentic” South America “experience” only strengthen such an interpretation. Moreover, visions of living in a “jungle” setting or in a community where residents catch and store rainwater in rooftop vats reflect an expectation that the chosen destination of a “developing country” was going to deliver an immersion into a pre-modern existence. Such an expectation is
most explicitly spelled out in Shannon’s desire to live in a society before it became developed or Americanized, where people enjoyed life a bit more because development had not yet been fully realized.

From a more critical, postcolonial studies perspective, however, such as the one taken by Barbara Heron (2007), the volunteers’ stated desires to “experience another ["Third World"] culture” would be interpreted as being driven by a broader “planetary consciousness” which, Heron argues, is foundational to bourgeois subjectivity. (Again, building on Heron’s work, I have argued that such a consciousness has been mainstreamed in the United States as part of state-coordinated imperial projects, and can thus be understood to operate as a mental construct of non-elite middle class white subjectivity as well). As discussed in the previous chapters, this consciousness is characterized by a sense of entitlement to travel to, access and insert oneself into the physical space of a “Third World” that is imagined as being inhabited by an Other who “always comes off as somehow lacking or not quite up to an unmarked standard” (p. 7).

In making sense of how her research participants’ related to the physical space of Zambia as a zone of extreme alterity, Heron draws a connection to the historic role played by colonial otherness in the constitution of Northern/Western bourgeois subjectivity. Specifically, she draws on Stallybrass and White’s (1986) discussion of the colonial era European carnival, an event in which both animals and human subjects from territories of empire would be paraded about as exotic objects in fairs held in the metropole countries for the enjoyment of domestic populations. Stallybrass and White have argued that insofar as these carnivals worked to simultaneously transgress and reaffirm discursive boundaries between high and low, normal and strange, and self and other, they were central to the constitution of 19th century bourgeois cultural identity. Stallybrass and White further contend that contemporary bourgeois identity formation continues to rely upon and be carried out “under the sign of Other” (as cited in Heron, 2007, p. 57), which has become the stand-in for the colonial carnival. Heron submits that the physical space of the Third World constitutes one such site of this bourgeois identity formation.
Considering the perspectives of both McCannell and Heron is useful in beginning to make sense of the volunteers’ stated desires to experience another culture, particularly a culture understood as being found only in a mythical Third World and thus imagined as being home to pre-modern technology, invariably rural settings, generalized poverty, and less development. Indeed, volunteers expressed a sense of wanting to escape from unsatisfying existences to settings that were imagined as “authentic,” “typical” and often appealing precisely because they were understood as less modern. At the same time, in the Northern/Western imagination the act of placing the US-American middle/upper class white subject into a setting where he is purportedly surrounded by the less modern, the less developed, the poor, the rural, and the racially different can be taken to constitute an act that, in its discursive framing and subject formations, closely mirrors the carnival scenario described by Stallybrass and White. Only, instead of having the carnival brought to him, the Northern/Western subject now brings himself to the carnival, which is one now predicated on an intention of total immersion and for a lengthy period of time. For this reason, Heron’s application of Stallybrass and White’s framework as a way of conceptualizing the significance of the physical space of the Third World in the subjectivity formation of development workers is quite compelling and can serve as a model for how to think about the significance of the physical space of the Third World in the subjectivity formation of the participants in my study and the current generation of international volunteers (which runs the gamut from those who might be considered “development workers” to college grads and twenty-somethings who engage in long-term volunteer stints but bring little to no development work experience, and finally, to short stint volunteer tourists of all ages).

However, without taking away from the validity or value of the analyses of MacCannell or Heron, the desires of the volunteers to “experience another (Third World) culture” can also be approached as an instance of what I have begun to conceptualize as one governmental effect of imperialism. As discussed at length in the previous chapter, the United States state has, since the 1930s, been engaged in a long-term project of inviting, encouraging, and cajoling middle and upper class white members of the domestic population to travel to territories of empire (i.e. Latin
America) as tourists. This particular endeavor to shape the desires and behaviors of this particular segment of the population has always had a political rationale that has had to do with preserving imperial relations with Latin American countries. As discussed in the previous chapter, in the late 1930s, FDR sought to stimulate US tourism to Latin America in order to prevent a post-WWII economic slump precisely by preserving the asymmetrical US-Latin American trade relation under which Latin American imported US finished goods and confined its exports to raw resources (specifically those that did not threaten the bottom line of US farmers). Putting US tourist dollars into the pockets of Latin Americans so that they could purchase US finished goods was the key objective, and to accomplish this the FDR administration proceeded to support tourism ad campaigns that painted Mexico and Cuba as the natural playgrounds for the US white middle and upper middle class subject. In the 1970s, when Third World tourism began to take off at the behest of the World Bank, this was an instance in which, instead of transforming the status quo of capitalist imperialism, the First World-Third World economic relations were preserved and capitalist accumulation was extended into the sector of international tourism that had not yet been fully exploited in Third World economies. In the eighties, nineties and into the early millennium, the explosion of Third World tourism came about as part of a massive neoliberal turn that involved a new and frenzied round of accumulation by dispossession outlined by David Harvey and reviewed in Chapter 4.

As discussed in Chapter 5, the perpetual post-WWII construction of Latin America as a tourist destination for US-Americans has depended, in large part, upon the construction of usually white middle/upper class US-Americans (as well as citizens of other Northern/Western nations) as the rightful consumers of “Third World” cultures, which are always imagined through a lens of less than in comparison to “First World” cultures. Tourism has been construed as the right way to utilize one’s leisure time and disposable income, depicted as fun, educational, enriching, and indicative of a certain sophistication and cosmopolitanism. In this way, the desire to travel to and gaze upon other peoples, places, and cultural formations that are understood as authentic, typical, and traditional, reflect not only the sort of existential grappling with modernity as posited
by MacCannell or the bourgeois self-affirming boundary drawing exercise as submitted by Heron. It also embodies an activity encouraged by the state (and other governmental actors) for clearly geopolitical purposes.

All of that said, we can still consider the accounts of MacCannell and Heron as valid representations and interrogations of these evident desires to experience another culture and the kinds of existential ends they appear to serve for those who report having them. But we can also consider the ways in which the state and other governmental bodies have acted to cultivate these desires, how they have in fact promoted leisure travel to Latin American/Third World countries (imagined as simpler, less developed, less modern) precisely as that most palliative and rejuvenating remedy to the pressures and stresses of the Western subject’s daily life. Similarly, we can also look with fresh eyes upon the tendency of travel agencies and tourism promoters to depict trips to these areas of the world as ways for the traveler to experience senses of gratitude and renewed contentment for all the amenities and comforts of life in a “First World” country precisely through gazing upon the material poverty and ascribed primitiveness of the “Third World” “other” and her living conditions.

Moreover, with these considerations we can also begin to understand how the volunteers’ desires to “experience another culture” and the particular lens through which they imagined this other culture were situated in a context of imperialism where such motivations and such images of the Third World are actively produced and cultivated with a certain geopolitical objective in mind. We can also begin to consider the possibility that the volunteers’ quietly entitled self-imaginings and self-positionings as natural explorers, voyeurs, and studiers of “Third World” cultures – in other words their subjectivities vis-à-vis a mythically imagined “Third World” – embodied a governmental effect of imperialism.

Here it is important to point out that, as is perhaps already evident from some of the interview excerpts presented above, in addition to framing the activity of experiencing another culture as interesting, fun, and exciting, volunteers also described it as something that was universally beneficial for the traveler. For example, Shannon thought it was “important” to see
other cultures. Brooke not only found travel not only slightly frightening and nerve-wracking and therefore exhilarating, but also considered it to be “really, really healthy” precisely because it was frightening, nerve-wracking, and exhilarating. She also believed it to be the best way “to learn” and to “build your character.” All of these descriptions signal both a concern for developing, making, and taking care of the self and an animating belief that travel is an important way to do this.

Importantly, Heron also identifies this more specific motive of self-enrichment and self-development to be had through travel as a key theme among the participants of her study. She conceptualizes its appearance among them as a vestige of the European imperial era when bourgeois subjects engaged in a making of the self through an asymmetrical engagement with an inferiorized Other. She further argues that an attraction to exoticized difference that has accompanied this particular brand of self-making can also be traced to the period of European empire, but that today it “has been constructed in somewhat changed terms by the discourse of multiculturalism and the marketing of foreign travel destinations” (p. 51). Here I would like to add the context of neoliberal governmentality to the equation, particularly as the participants of my study, seemingly more so than those of Heron’s study, connected their motivations of an imagined self-enrichment and self-development that was to be achieved through “experiencing another culture” for a year directly to imagined prospects of future career success. In other words, they did not speak about the value of living in Ecuador and “experiencing another culture” solely in terms of a vaguely defined, sort of generic or holistically construed self-improvement. Rather, they identified certain specific forms of self-development that they had strategically planned to accomplish and then utilize to essentially market themselves to potential employers, to secure future jobs, to perform well on these future jobs, and more generally, to launch and excel in future careers (whether specifically envisioned and desired or not yet clearly defined).

First and foremost, almost all of the volunteers I spoke with named Spanish language acquisition/improvement as a main objective and many discussed this goal in terms of preparing themselves for particular jobs and careers they wanted to move into. Some also regarded
Spanish acquisition/improvement as improving their overall prospects for any yet-to-be-determined job in the United States. Abby explained it to me this way:

And then I knew I wanted to go to Latin America, mainly -- I mean I’ve always had an interest in the art, like literature, and the history of Latin America, but also really because I wanted to become fluent in Spanish. So, I definitely -- that’s the biggest advantage to myself by being here is that I’m learning this language that I’m hoping to use in my future profession.

At the time, Abby told me she was not entirely sure of what career she wanted to pursue. She said she was deliberating over whether to apply to master’s programs in social welfare but that, in any case, she was fairly certain that she wanted to work with immigrant populations. Here she added that, from living in Los Angeles and working with social welfare organizations in the immediate past, she had seen first-hand the need for Spanish speaking employees. Echoing Abby, Erin told me that she had plans to become a physical therapist and intended to work with Latino populations.

As mentioned, in addition to volunteers who saw Spanish language acquisition as directly beneficial to their particular career aspirations, there were many who regarded it as something that was generally beneficial in the world of work. As Jeremy, a 24-year-old from Boston, told me, “I feel like it’s just like a useful thing in the workplace, in the real world, to be fluent in another language.”

In addition to people who cited Spanish as primarily useful for specific or more general career aspirations, there was also a subset of volunteers who had either majored or minored in Spanish in college. They reported that the goal of improving their Spanish had figured heavily into their interest in applying to and participating in the Global Community Ecuador program. Interestingly, with the exception of Erin (who had been a Spanish major), these volunteers spoke about improving their Spanish skills less in terms of preparing for particular career fields and more so with an eye toward pursuing a personal interest in Spanish that they had begun to cultivate during their college years. However, for all of these volunteers a calculation of the advantage that Spanish proficiency/fluency would lend them on the job market was never far from
their minds. As Shannon, a Spanish minor who listed Spanish skills improvement as a major motivation told me one afternoon:

Well, I like Spanish a lot, and I feel like I have studied it forever, and then I went to Spain and I didn’t really like, utilize my time to like, learn the language, ’cause I was like, grasping onto Americans, and like comfort, and English. And so I really feel like I have the skills to be fluent. I just can’t practice really in the states or like, have the opportunity. So I figured this was like, a good way to do it. I mean, I think it’d be good down the road to be able-- I mean, I think I wanna work in a school, and I think I wanna do something with like ESL, or international, and I think if I didn’t do this experience, and I didn’t like, become fluent...I think I [currently] have enough Spanish to be able to like, you know, put that on a resumé, or like say I’m conversational, but I also think that if I say I’m conversational and then I can’t back it up, which I don’t think I would be able to really well, then, that’s like an issue. So, it’d be good to like, actually be able to prove that I can like, speak it. I mean I minored in it, and I can’t really speak great, so.

Notably, among the 10 volunteers who hailed from California (a contingent that equaled roughly 1/3 of the total number of volunteers), a good number of them seemed to harbor a certain affinity for the idea of being able to speak Spanish. There was a sense that they found it a “cool” thing to be able to do. However, these volunteers also partly attributed their desire for Spanish improvement to their sense that in California the ability to speak Spanish was a particularly useful skill due to the demographics of the state and the prevalence of the Spanish language. In other words, these volunteers ascribed to Spanish fluency a certain face-value desirability (as did many of the volunteers with the activity of travel), but they also regarded it as a sort of beneficial advantage to have in the particular region of the country where they lived. This was illustrated during a conversation with Melanie, who had never studied Spanish before but who told me that she now wanted to learn the language “because in California there are so many people that speak Spanish and the Spanish population is growing so much.” Continuing, she added, “I thought that [learning Spanish] would be nice. I had never been to any Latin American country before. And I was interested in the culture, like Latin culture.” A desire to communicate with Spanish speakers in the lives they had left behind and to which they planned to return was also illustrated during one conversation with Josh, who lived two hours from the US-Mexican border. He recalled college trips taken with his father to a “sleepy fishing village” in Baja California, Mexico where he had only been able to communicate with local residents in “very broken
Spanish.” He told me that, given how much he felt he had improved in his Spanish language ability, he was looking forward to going back to the village and being able “to actually have conversations” with the local people.

In addition to language acquisition and fluency development, most volunteers regarded the year long Global Community volunteer stint as being useful in other ways that had to do with career-oriented self-investment. Several people, such as Shannon, Nicholas, and Melanie saw the teaching assignment as a way to “test out” teaching as a possible future profession.

Finally, most volunteers saw the year of living in Ecuador – and “experiencing another culture” – as a sort of comprehensive, all-encompassing preparation for future envisioned careers. As Daniel told me during the lunch break on the second day of Orientation, “Yeah, these kids are all definitely here for life experience.” Daniel, a 27-year-old teacher from Miami, was the very first volunteer I had met at the airport, as he had chosen to fly into Quito separately from the group. Over the course of the two days that had followed, he had been busily talking to all of the volunteers, sifting through the group and seeking out, he told me, anyone else who might be closer to his age and who might share in his particular interests and tastes. As we walked through the busy streets of the Mariscal, looking for a place to have lunch, he told me he “felt old” in comparison to the large majority of 23 and 24-year-olds, and that he had already grown tired of the whole Orientation. It simply reminded him, he said, of numerous other orientations and trainings he had gone through over the years that he had spent with several different non-profit education organizations in Boston and Los Angeles. After he shared his equally somewhat cynically toned impression that all of the volunteers were there for “life experience,” I could not resist asking him what he meant. Looking at me incredulously, he then grunted a laugh and rolled his eyes, as though I had asked him to explain an obvious piece of insider knowledge. “I mean, come on, you know. They’re just out of college, they wanna put it on their resumes, y’know, spent a year in Ecuador teaching English, I really grew as a person, blah, blah, blah. Y’know, life experience.”
Over the next few weeks and beyond, I would listen as a number of volunteers confirmed what Daniel had told me. To be sure, most did not display the sort of instrumentalist orientation that Daniel had implicitly ascribed to them, but spoke more delicately about the topic. When I would ask them how they had decided to apply to Global Community, what their motivations had been, and why they had wanted to do it, no one immediately responded that they wanted to strengthen their resume and improve their odds on the job market (though such responses would often come later during in-depth interviews). Rather, many would share with me how they had been motivated in part by a belief that a year of living and teaching English in Ecuador would further their professional development because they would acquire the skills necessary for the kind of career they envisioned and that naturally this skill acquisition would translate into achieving and excelling in their envisioned career. This was illustrated by Andrea’s explanation of why she had decided to apply to Global Community Ecuador:

I think that it was about perspective…I wanted to live somewhere else because I’m interested in public health and I’m interested in international development and I think that even going to a big city somewhere else gives you another viewpoint, and that if you only have one point of view, you can’t really be effective. So, ideally I’d like to travel everywhere and have like all sorts of experiences and then just be this huge wealth of information and go work somewhere wonderful…So it was about perspective for me, although I also had a kind of realistic, like, I’m not going to the middle of the Sahara Desert or somewhere really, really out of my comfort zone or out of my element. And, it was about language acquisition, too, and we’ll see how I’m doing on that.

Another example came from Rachel, a 23-year-old volunteer from Guilford, Connecticut who had recently graduated with a bachelor’s degree in advertising and shared with me how her love of travel had factored into her decision to become a Global Community Ecuador volunteer. As it turned out, this love of travel was based, in part, on its perceived use-value with respect to her career aspirations:

Traveling for me has just been like such a great experience. Even for when I want to work in advertising. It’s like all about sociology, all about psychology and learning other cultures. It’s all intertwined and it [travel] just opens your mind completely.

In Heron’s analysis, this preponderance of self-oriented or self-centered motivations reflects a continued legacy of bourgeois senses of entitlement vis-à-vis the developing world and the centrality of the Other to bourgeois subjectivity formation. Specifically, she argues that an
emphasis on travel as a motivation embodies an acceptance of both a broad Western truism that travel is innately good for one’s personal growth, education, and self-development and a more specific truism that travel on the part of Western subjects to the “Third World” is particularly beneficial because of its ascribed challenges that are understood as a function of its extreme difference and exoticism. From here she argues that self-beneficial travel as a motive for international development work effectively allows Western development workers/volunteers to avoid confronting and grappling with the “moral issues in respect to the choice we are making” (i.e. one’s complicity and participation in a development industry that feeds into neocolonialistic relations). In this way, she argues, the fixation on such a motive enables the development worker to preserve a sense of a moral self.

I would submit that in addition to these effects, however, the acceptance of this truism that travel is intrinsically good for one’s self-development and the conscientious identification of self-development as a motivation for engaging in development-oriented work in the Third World also allows the volunteer subject to cultivate, experience, and demonstrate a particular self that is in accordance with the widely celebrated neoliberal ethic of self-enterprise, thus enabling him to preserve not only a sense of being a good person but also of being an ambitious, enterprising, responsible (with respect to professional advancement) person as well. Immediately relevant here is Wanda Vrasti’s (2013) argument that voluntourism constitutes a governmental technology that enables volunteers to cultivate subjectivities demanded by today’s brand of neoliberal, multiculturalist global capitalism. However, as discussed in Chapter 1, the point that is absent from Vrasti’s analysis is that becoming and behaving as a good neoliberal subject through the act of strategically investing in oneself through the activity of volunteering in a developing country means that one is also necessarily adopting, buying into, or at the very least cursorily participating in, a kind of imperialist subjectivity work that is based on continually affirming and securing Northern/Western bourgeois superiority through touring and gazing upon Third World spaces and peoples through a lens of inferiority, underdevelopment, less progress.
Both of these projects – the cultivation of a subjectivity among the population that is based on notions of superiority vis-à-vis the developing world and this population’s ongoing participation in touristic travel and helping projects in the developing world can be understood as key political objectives for the imperial state. The latter enables the continual leeching (or “leakage”) of tourism revenues from Third World countries and the former allows for the continued operation of a development industry that does not challenge the fundamental structure of the global capitalist system or its rampant inequalities, but rather looks to preserve it while helping “Third World” countries becoming more fully, if asymmetrically, integrated into it. The former also allows for the continued survival of a key myth that is critical to the preservation of US hegemony: that disparities in material wealth between the United States (as well as other “developed” countries) and the developing world is due to the United States’ superior capabilities, high level of development, and commitment to progress (thus a comprehensive sort of superiority), and not to historic relations of US economic, political, and military domination in the developing world (outlined in Chapters 2-4) that continue into the present day.

In the international volunteer industry, then, the execution of imperialist practice is quietly placed upon the shoulders of neoliberal citizens who, drawn to a project of self-betterment, are inevitably, and perhaps unwittingly, ushered into imperialistic schemes of the nation-state. Indeed, the international volunteer industry in some sense actively works to banish the specter of imperialism from the prospective volunteer’s mind with the neoliberal allure of personal experience; the ideal effect would be such that potential anxieties about the political implications of descending upon a developing country as an agent of American empire might be assuaged and drowned out with the enticing promise of a deep and meaningful personal experience for the volunteer that is to be had through experiencing the people, culture, languages, and lands of the Third World in ways that will benefit herself. This promise of experience is in fact what sells the programs. In this way, the benefits and advantages of imperial domination are implicitly offered to the individual citizen of the imperial power, even as the fact of empire remains obscured.
While this is not altogether different from colonial regimes of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century in which young European men were compelled to travel to the distant lands of the European empires, it is significant because it is taking place in a context where the idea of imperialism has fallen largely out of favor. It is an urging of the US-American upper class subject to partake of and reap personal benefits from imperialist projects, even as the word “imperialism” remains unspeakable, a dirty word to most who embark on these projects. In this way, the historically imperialist era pastimes and projects of gazing upon peoples and cultures of the Third World and “helping” them to become more modern/Western is discursively produced as a way of helping of oneself. This is an exercise in concealment but also reinvention. This helping of oneself is done through a haze of imperialist assumptions and constructs, such that making of neoliberal self-enterprising selves is inextricably bound with the making of imperialist selves.

In light of these kinds of motivations and intentions, I submit that today’s volunteer subjects are produced by, or at least positioned as, subjects of two distinct discourses – one, an age old imperialist discourse that imagines a superior Western subject who is entitled and obligated to both gaze upon and help an inferiorized Third World other (Heron, 2007), and the other, a more recently adopted neoliberal discourse that construes a subject who is constantly acting as an entrepreneur of the self, seeking out, seizing upon, and exploiting any and all situations as opportunities for a certain kind of self-investment that is loyal to an end goal of income maximization (Foucault, 2008; Rose, 1999b; Vrasti, 2013). A key question that then arises is one that centers on how the volunteers relate to the imagined Third World space in which they are determined to achieve personal and professional growth through the act of helping? What kinds of assumptions and interpretations do they make with respect to this space? How do they imagine and position themselves vis-à-vis Ecuador or the “Third World” more generally? What is the relational subjectivity they develop vis-à-vis an Ecuador that is imagined and strategically pursued as the catalyst for the fulfillment of desires for immersion in exotic authenticity and the achievement of personal and professional development that is envisioned through lenses of voyeuristic fascination with the Other and career advancement?
These are questions that will be addressed in the remainder of this chapter, as well as the additional chapters that follow. However, first (and as discussed in Chapter 1) I would like to consider the potential role of the international volunteer organization in the shaping and guiding of volunteers’ motives, intentions, and expectations with regard to becoming a Global Community volunteer and the implications this bears for conceptualizing the international volunteer organization as an institution or instrument of government. There are several reasons for this consideration. First and foremost, almost every volunteer mentioned a visit to the Global Community website as one of the steps in their contemplation of becoming a volunteer. Second, in reviewing the content of the website (something that I did before, during and after meeting the volunteers and the commencement of fieldwork) and holding it up against the motives, intentions, and expectations of the volunteers it becomes clear that on the website, there is in fact a clear institutional discourse at work such that certain conceptions are mobilized as truths and a clear volunteer subject position takes shape. This discourse and the volunteer subject position that it constructs are suffused with constructs of the imperialist and neoliberal discourses that have been discussed above, and for this reason, I submit, an analytic review of the website begins to provide some clues as to the link between these prevalent discourses and volunteer motivations, fantasies, and broader subjectivities vis-à-vis the Third World.

The prospective volunteer is invited and encouraged to take up the subject position that is depicted on the website, to aspire to it and inhabit it through the act of becoming a Global Community volunteer. And the characteristics that inhere in this subject position – what the Global Community volunteer is depicted as desiring, intending, seeking, and valuing – reflect much of the aforementioned content of the motives, intentions, and expectations articulated by the participants of this study. Ultimately, what the website appears to do is to effectively provide the prospective volunteer with powerful suggestions as to what he or she should be seeking to achieve through becoming a Global Community volunteer, what he or she should be desiring, expecting, and intending. Moreover, the website provides justifications for these ethics, intentions, and desires that are rooted in imperialist and neoliberal assumptions.
The centrality of the website in the shaping of the volunteers’ motivations and expectations was illustrated to me one afternoon approximately 6 months into fieldwork. On a cloudy day in Quito, I sat at a rooftop café with Andrea. A soundtrack of house music thumped softly in the background, accompanying the afternoon street sounds below and the laughter of nearby children, delighted by a red metal swing seat that gave a loud and creaky squeak with every push of their hands. Over plates of pasta boloñesa, a house specialty of the café, Andrea talked about her understanding of the Global Community mission. Speaking with her usual blend of rapidity and directness, she said:

I mean, I think the organization’s priority is the volunteer’s experience – of the cultural exchange, of the language acquisition, of the experience. I think that that’s Global Community’s focus.”

Pausing to stab at a piece of penne pasta with her fork, she then continued matter-of-factly:

I don’t know why I’m so into percents today but, like 70 percent of their mission, I would say, focuses on the volunteer’s experience and I think that that’s evident if you read those little stories on the website from any program – not even just from the Ecuador program – that they pick the essays that they think really portray, really sell the program to people who are applying. And it’s mostly about your own personal experience.

Seeking clarification, I asked, “Was this clear to you when you applied?” Knitting her eyebrows and reaching for a plastic bottle of water that the waiter had set down on the table, Andrea nodded definitively. “Or did it become clear?” I said, pursuing my own usual quest for specifics.

“No, it was clear to me when I applied,” she said, unscrewing the top of the bottle and taking a quick sip. Then she continued:

I think reading the essays that the office obviously, that they picked, it kind of really goes for what message they’re trying to send out to potential volunteers. So I was clear with that, and I would say that that’s pretty consistent with my own experience and sort of the experiences of other people.

6.5 The Website

Upon visiting the Global Community website, one is greeted by the faces of several little girls, apparently photographed by a camera positioned just inches away from their frames. Their warm brown visages are framed by bright sunshine and the photographer has captured their smiles and serious expressions. One little girl wears her hair plaits closed to her head. They all
wear bright pink and purple striped dresses and some wear matching headscarves that are knotted to the left side. The little girl in the center smiles warmly, her arm hooked loosely around the necks of her two friends who both stand to her right.

After a few seconds, this image is replaced with another photograph, this one a profile shot of approximately 30 black teenage boys, seated in what appears to be a large high school classroom. Sunlight streams through the space and through the small square windows that dot the wall in groups of ten. Above them are ceiling fans that hang from a tin ceiling that almost meets the edges of the wall. The boys wear white dress shirts and ties, almost all of them are smiling excitedly, some are laughing, several have their hands raised. There seems to be something going on at the front of the classroom to which the viewer is not privy.

The slide show advances to the next photograph, taken from the back of another classroom. In the foreground is a group of black students, all in their teens. They are seated on wooden benches that attach to worn wooden desks with blue metal legs. They are dressed in uniforms: the girls in white shirts and orange sleeveless dresses; the boys in white shirts and khaki pants. At the front of the room stands a young white man at a blackboard that is half-covered with chalk writing.

Finally, the last photograph to appear captures a young white woman, positioned in the center, and a younger black boy, positioned to her left, both jumping into the air. They are framed by palm trees and a single-story tin-roofed house built of sand-colored brick. Above them is the arc of a bright rainbow that cuts against a dark and stormy sky. The woman is positioned mid-air in an exuberant jump. The photographer has captured her smiling directly into the camera, her arms shot into the air, her left leg is bent below her and her right leg is straight, pointing down to the ground below her. She is the central subject of the photograph. The boy is positioned to her left and his body is turned profile to the camera. His image is out of focus and his face and expression are hidden. He has also jumped into the air; his back arched and his face turned up to the sky, his arms are stretched tautly into the air and his fingertips are fully extended as though
he just threw something up into the sky. “Looking to spend the summer abroad?” reads the caption.

The faces of black children dressed in “traditional” headscarves, the tin-roof house made of cinderblocks, the palm trees, the classroom of young black men dressed in school uniforms, and the wooden and metal desks -- these particular images mirror familiar Northern/Western depictions of “Third World” peoples and spaces that can be found anywhere from the evening news to magazine fashion shoots to television programs on CNN or the Discovery channel. Directed at a clientele that is predominantly white middle/upper class American, these images construct the “Third World” as a sort of multifaceted alterity defined by blackness, rural-ness, and “traditional” garb. These elements represent a sort of ultimate “Other” to the broad-based white upper-middle class normativity of the United States and to the more specific white upper-middle class worlds of the typical volunteer. Moreover, in these photographs, a mythical “Third World” – and more specifically, Third World difference – is conjured and presented as a key component of the “experience” that the organization is marketing to prospective volunteers.

Kate Simpson (2005) has argued that, the notion of the “Third World” is central to the marketing strategies as well as the popularity of the “gap year” industry. She illustrates how gap year international volunteer programs essentially “sell” the “Third World” to participants through evocative textual descriptions that are immediately recognizable to the Western imagination. A visit to the Global Community website makes clear that the organization engages in this sort of selling of the “Third World,” but, notably, relies less on the written word and more so on the photograph, a strategy which is perhaps at once more powerful and less problematic for the organization. Instead of describing the “Third World” with particular labels, which can be more easily identified (and attacked) as stereotypical, the organization sells the “Third World” through photographs that allow them to communicate all sorts of ideas of the “Third World” without explicitly stating anything.

The centrality of ultimate Third World otherness is illustrated not only by the photographs that are so prominently featured, but also by the conspicuous absence of photographs depicting
Third World sameness in relation to dominant visual images of the United States. For example, there are no backdrops of shopping malls, highways or close-up shots of people in jeans and t-shirts. All of these elements do exist in “Third World” countries, however, not in the popular Northern/Western imagination of “authentic third world” landscapes. To the contrary, such elements are most commonly read as instances of modernization, Americanization, and development – and these conditions do not form part of experience that the international volunteer industry is attempting to sell. On a similar note, on the main pages of the Global Community website there is also a conspicuous absence of individuals who are lighter complexioned or “white.” These racial phenotypes obviously exist in “Third World” countries, however, just as highways and shopping malls violate Northern/Western myths of Third World landscapes, they also conflict with dominant Northern/Western perceptions of Third World populations.

Instead of foregrounding images of whiter looking populations, Global Community buries such photos away in the more remote pages of its website, those that require a few clicks to access such as the informational pages of specific programs that one might explore once he or she has already viewed the photographs featured on its opening page (described above) and decided to find out more about the organization overall. For example, if one clicks to the informational page of the organization’s Chile program, one finds photographs of host country residents who are more phenotypically similar to white Anglo-Americans. Similarly, a look into the organization’s Poland program uncovers photographs of blond, white children. Thus, while the organization does use photographs of host country populations who appear less racially different from white US-Americans, it does not use these photographs to sell the program. As illustrated above, such photos are nowhere to be found in the mini-slide show that greets the viewer when he first lands on the organization’s opening homepage. Instead, the photographs selected to greet the viewer depict dark-complexioned faces and bodies, those that are marked most dramatically, in the white Northern/Western imagination, as racial “others.” The fact that photographs of whites and mestizos exist on the website but are not selected to “sell” the
program to a white middle/upper class target consumer, reveals the centrality of racial/ethnic otherness in the program’s marketing strategies. Through these images, the program tacitly markets an imagined Third World difference to prospective volunteers, identifying the consumption of this difference as a central aspect of the volunteer stint that the program is selling.

This oft-pictured racial difference between volunteer and purported beneficiary is not wholly a fabrication. Statistics in fact show that the majority of US-American international volunteers self-identify as “white” (Lough 2006, 2010, 2013) and a review of the locales into which these volunteers are typically placed by the Northern international volunteer program reveals that these are likely to be largely (though not exclusively) home to black and brown populations. However, this enduring racial difference between volunteer and purported beneficiary also reflects a reality that has to some extent been engineered by the international volunteer industry, itself, through its predominant focus on countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, as well as its targeting of white middle and upper class individuals as volunteers. Further, I would suggest, the effect of the photographs in which this racial difference is captured and presented to the prospective volunteer is one of holding it up and actively constructing it as a definitive feature of the international volunteer stint.

In addition to depicting “Third World” populations in particular ways, Global Community’s promotional photographs also present discursive images of the Northern/Western subject, as well as the mode in which he or she is imagined to relate to the peoples and spaces of the so-called Third World. First and foremost, the depiction of exclusively white volunteers works to reproduce controlling images of the US citizen subject (and perhaps more specifically, the US citizen subject who engages in international volunteering in developing countries) as a person who is, by definition, white. In this way, US-Americaness is conflated with whiteness and white US-Americanness is conflated with international volunteer work – and the planetary consciousness described by Heron (2007) is powerfully invoked. For example, the aforementioned white man conducting a class of black and brown students on the Global Community website clearly
conjures the well-worn image of a white Western male paternalistically guiding and "helping" an anonymous black and brown "Third World" populace.

Moving beyond the photographic images, the organization’s promotional website also uses textual representations to sell its programs. Here, the emphasis is placed less on describing host countries in overtly exoticizing ways and more on what the volunteer will do in these countries – what she will see, learn, and "experience," what she will accomplish, what she will enjoy, and ultimately what she will gain. Upon visiting the Global Community website, one is presented with a simple question: “Where on earth do you want to find yourself teaching?” Below that question one finds an impressive list of options embodied by an array of different host countries and an assortment of programs of varying lengths.

Clicking on “Program Details” one finds a passage which, for purposes of anonymity, I have decided not to quote directly but rather paraphrase and critically summarize. Using a blend of aspirational, commanding, and expansive language, this passage simultaneously constructs the volunteer as a sort of savior to the people of the developing world and as a sort of self-developer who will gain and develop through making a real difference, and who will ultimately be rewarded with readiness for the profession of his or her choosing. Embedded in these constructions, is not only a declaration of the volunteer’s capacity to do these things (based less, if at all, on professional experience and more on her US-American education and life experience), but also a presumption of her entitlement to do them – to travel to a “developing country” she is required to know nothing about and look around, marvel and take in, make a difference, acquire skills, and progress along a path of her own development. In this way, the anonymous “developing country,” mentioned only once, is positioned not only as the object of the volunteer’s gaze and the recipient of her benevolence, but in many ways, the backdrop for, as well as the beneficiary of, the volunteer’s own self-transformation.

With respect to the latter point of self-transformation, if one recalls the slide show described above and the ways in which the photograph of the white young man teaching a class of black and brown students constitutes a sort of photographic embodiment of the helping
imperative, this text that emphasizes the self-transformation of the volunteer might be thought of as corresponding to the photograph of the white woman leaping into the air alongside a young black boy, in front of cinderblock house and amid palm trees. This photo depicts a white Northerner joyfully encountering and communing with the racial, cultural, and geographic “difference” of the Third World and experiencing a sort of literal *uplift* of herself in the process. However, if one thinks about it, either photograph could be interpreted in terms of both helping and self-developing, as the white man leading the class can be seen as experiencing a sense of leadership and a moment of career development *while* helping his students, and the white woman can be seen as perhaps providing a form of caretaking and playtime to the young boy *while* experiencing a moment of upward momentum, of self-advancement and achievement. In this way, these photos capture the symbiotic relation between the imperialist helping imperative and the neoliberal self-development that is at play in the contemporary world of international volunteering.

Here, it should be remembered that the arrangements that Global Community coordinates actually involve multiple parties: not only volunteers, but also the directors, teachers, and staff of the education institutions where volunteers are placed as teachers; the students who attend these institutions and enroll in volunteers’ classes; the members of households where volunteers live; and, members of the communities where these institutions and households are located. However, on the program’s promotional website, the voices of the hosting country participants are nowhere to be found. Instead, the emphasis is clearly on the perspective of the volunteer, who is often spoken to directly in the pages and pages of program information, site descriptions, and what amounts to a sea of volunteer testimonials, photographs, and blog entries. In this way the volunteer arrangement is further constructed primarily as an *experience* that is to be had by the *volunteer*.

Importantly, the precedence given to a volunteer “experience” on the website was reflected back by the volunteers’ narratives not only in the multitude of self-oriented motives that they shared with me, but also in the ways in which these motives were almost never
accompanied by forthright motives that involved a desire to “help” in the developing world. In fact, of the 25 volunteers that I interviewed, only 4 mentioned a desire to “help” as a driving motive, and even among these volunteers the desire to “help” appeared to be tangential to their primary motives. For example, recall Jeremy, a 24-year-old volunteer from Boston. His primary motive had been to learn Spanish because he saw it as a useful credential and skill to have in the work world. During our conversation, he had then listed a desire to “help out” in a developing country as an additional motive a few moments later, but then quickly situated this desire to help within a larger self-oriented desire for a challenge (this perhaps being his more overall motive above and beyond Spanish language acquisition):

I just kind of wanted to go to a developing country and help out and learn Spanish in my free time and I want it to be kind of a challenge. It was like I wanted to go a country that would put me out of my safety zone, my comfort zone and I kind of like just doing that in general, different things and so yeah that’s why.

In Melanie’s case, a desire to help or, as she framed it, to respond to a perceived need, was not actually a reason she gave for having been motivated to explore international volunteer programs. It was rather a reason she gave for having been drawn to Global Community, specifically, and for having chosen it over another well-known program that recruits and places English speakers as English teachers in Japan. As she told me:

A big thing was to be teaching English in a place that probably needed it more. Like, I know Global Community places, has programs in places where they wouldn’t really be able to have teachers otherwise, and a lot of, I mean Japan is a very wealthy nation, and the government is actually paying for these English teachers, to come and I thought that I could be of more help to people in this kind of program, in a volunteer program. So, that’s why I looked into Global Community.

(Underscoring the importance of experiencing another culture imagined as new and significantly different, Melanie, who was Japanese-American, herself, also explained that she was “burnt out on Japanese stuff all the time” after having worked at a Japanese Cultural Center for a year and a half following college).

Then there was Rachel, who told me that when she was considering applying to Global Community, she was “at that point, really into volunteering and helping out and making a difference.” Here, it is important to point out that Rachel did not mention her interest in “making a
difference” as a motivation until nearly an hour into our interview, and thus long after I had asked her to explain how she had arrived at the decision to apply to and participate in the Global Community Ecuador program. (She had initially recalled seeking out an alternative to the conventional practice of getting a job after college and a desire to avoid the dismal job market.) Moreover, her account of having been interested in “helping out and making a difference” actually followed an interesting exchange in which I asked whether she was familiar with the Global Community mission and whether that figured into how she thought about her work in Ecuador. Rachel responded by first stating that Global Community was less in the forefront of her mind at that particular moment and then explaining that she was “more working with the school” where she had been placed. She then added that Global Community had trained her and that she viewed the program as a resource she could rely on if she ever had any questions. She then suddenly diverted from the question by apologizing for being congested and commenting that everyone she knew was under the weather or suffering from allergies. She then shared that Global Community had become more present in her mind during the recent Mid-Point Conference and subsequently transitioned into singing the praises of April, one of the field directors, calling her the “best mommy director” and sharing with me that April typically called her and her friend to check in on them at least once a week.

Not inferring that Rachel was perhaps trying to evade my question about how she understood the Global Community mission (at the time, I also happened to be congested and had become distracted by her diversionary comments!), I instead thought that she had simply inadvertently veered away from my question. I then tried to revisit the subject, asking whether the Global Community mission had factored into her decision to apply to become a Global Community Ecuador volunteer. The response she gave was striking:

R: Oh yeah. You were asking me about the mission statement. I forgot. Yeah. Because I was really at that point really into volunteering and helping out and making a difference.

C: Why?

R: I had gone in the summer of 2006 to Costa Rica with a program and volunteered. It was only for three weeks but I worked at this little daycare that this woman ran in her
house and I helped out and it was similar to Ecuador, like Third World kind of little towns. And I just really wanted to do something that was going to benefit other people before I did my own thing and got my job and I don’t know, lost the motivation to do that, I guess, or didn’t have time anymore. So, yeah. When I got that packet and they had all the testimonials about people, that they fell in love with their students, and they fell in love with the country, and they just felt like they helped so much in the community and everything, that definitely made an impact on me and made me want to come and do that.

Without my intending it to, my reference to “mission” seemed to have signaled to Rachel a certain discourse in which she was certainly fluent – even if it did not embody the particular set of concerns that had motivated her to become a volunteer or even those concerns that, in her mind, were normative and therefore obligatory to cite. She then took pains to at least represent herself as a helping subject, even as her motives had apparently been more directly and more powerfully shaped by a neoliberal discourse of self-enterprise. Still avoiding the question about how she understood the mission of Global Community,\(^\text{23}\) Rachel instead attempted to outwardly re-align her own motivations so that they cohered with notions of “doing good,” notions that had heretofore been wholly absent from her narrative.

Yet, even though Rachel may have been sharing this account with me in order tell me what she may have thought I wanted to hear, her explanation of the origins of her interest in helping in the developing world was nonetheless noteworthy as it centered around a certain objectification of the physical space of the developing world as a cluster of anonymous “third world kind of little towns” and was premised neither on a professed familiarity or awareness with the particular challenges or “needs” that are often ascribed to such communities and settings nor an impassioned kind of drive to intervene, respond to these issues, and change things for an imagined better, but rather on a desire to have a certain envisioned experience that would bring Rachel certain satisfaction. This satisfaction was not to be achieved through acquiring skills or having an adventure (these being the more explicitly self-advancement motives Rachel had momentarily abandoned in the face of my question about “mission”), but rather through

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\(^{23}\) Rachel later ventured an unsolicited response, which in its content, suggested that she was not certain of what the Global Community mission was and, for that reason, had been understandably wary of answering when initially asked.
experiencing certain emotions by way of being engaged in work that purports to be “making a difference.” What this difference is, or whether or not it is really taking place is secondary, if at all present in this vision.

Considering Rachel’s narrative in light of the Global Community website and its distinctive mix of imperial and neoliberal discursive constructs, it indexed to me a particular component of volunteer subjectivity that can be understood as a product of the fusion between a conventional imperial discourse that constructs an intrepid Western helper selflessly working to bring about improvement in the lives of inferior Others and a neoliberal discourse that fashions a subject who is perpetually prioritizing the self and capitalizing on any and all situations as opportunities to invest in this self. It is true that Rachel did not tie her desire to feel like she was helping to an agenda of career preparation or improved job chances, but her emphasis was definitely on a notion of fulfilling herself in particular way and, for this reason, might be seen as a self-oriented offshoot of a broader agenda in which the self, and her desire to learn Spanish and an avoid a year of predicted unemployment24. More importantly, I think, was the fact that her comments underscored the way in which the idea of helping is not altogether excised from the blatantly self-interested model of international volunteering, but rather it is repurposed in terms of how it satisfies and enriches the volunteer that is engaged in such helping. In this way, not necessarily “doing good” but the sensation and perception that one is “doing good” in the Third World takes shape as a commodity that one can pay for and receive in return.

This was illustrated even more explicitly in Amanda’s narrative. As she put it to me in one conversation, she had decided to apply to the program not only because she had wanted to travel, learn Spanish, and scuba dive in the Galapagos but also because she had wanted to “feel more like I’m making a huge difference in someone’s life.” Her wording of her desire – not to “make a difference” but to feel like she was making a difference – was subtly striking, reflecting a certain self-oriented vision in which the important thing is not to actually affect some sort of

24 Recall that Rachel had reported being largely motivated by a desire to delay job market entry after witnessing friends and peers struggle to secure employment after graduating from college.
alleged improvement or change in the lives of beneficiaries, but rather to feel like one is doing so, to have a particular feel-good moment that comes from believing that one is in fact “making a difference.” Along this line of thought, ensuring and verifying whether the imagined “difference,” “change,” or “improvement” has actually occurred is given less, if any, emphasis at all.

6.6 A Consumerist Subjectivity vis-à-vis the “Third World”?

Thus far, I have presented a portrait of the participants of my study, recounting the ethnographic characteristics of their first night in Quito and examining their narratives of how they arrived at the decision to apply to and participate in the Global Community Ecuador program. In particular, I have highlighted the ways that assumptions of class and nationality-based privilege were combined with a curiosity about an imagined Third World otherness and senses of entitlement to both voyeuristically drop into and explore this Third World otherness and make use of it in ways understood and intended to constitute a sort of self-investment. This was to be done all under the auspices of a “helping” program, even as “helping” was not foremost or even present as a driving motivation for many of the volunteers. In this way, the sorts of “colonial continuities” described by Heron (2007) and a neoliberal ethic of self-enterprise appeared to have operated in tandem in the formation of volunteer subjectivity. Playing a large hand in all of this, I have suggested, was the discursive content of the Global Community website.

In this way, I submit, a particular volunteer subjectivity is produced, one in which the Global Community volunteer relates to the imagined Third World at once as a playground, an object of curiosity and observation, an exotic realm characterized by tradition, rurality, racial otherness, and underdevelopment, and a sort of catalytic backdrop for personal and professional development to be achieved through immersion in this alterity. At this point, I want to turn to what I came to see as another relational component of volunteer subjectivity vis-à-vis Ecuador and the developing world, more broadly—that is, a consumerist component that appears to take shape at a more meta-level. While the aforementioned components have to do with how the Global Community Ecuador volunteer is guided to relate to the “Third World,” this consumerist component concerns a broader level subject formation that, I suggest, was taking place as the
volunteers engaged in the practical and logistical steps of making plans to embark upon an international volunteer stint. Such a consumerist orientation towards the “Third World” is embedded in a broader consumerist orientation vis-à-vis the international volunteer program, itself. This was illustrated in Shannon’s account of how she arrived at Global Community Ecuador program as her next step after graduating from college.

Toward the end of her senior year in college, Shannon recalled being unsure of what she wanted to do post-graduation. She had started looking for jobs, but, as she recounted, “I wanted to do something to like, before I entered the real world.” She was interested in going to graduate school to pursue a teaching certification but, with limited teaching experience, she felt the need to “test out” teaching before committing to this path. While she continued to look for jobs, she also began to look for what she called “programs,” setting her sights primarily on one major U.S. non-profit organization that recruits college graduates to be teachers in low-income schools. However, as she recalled:

The more I researched it, the more intense it seemed and not what I was looking for. And, I mean, a lot of people like drop out and sort of get like discouraged from teaching which was not what I wanted. So then, I made the decision to do something international, and then I looked at like, really any program I could find.

For Shannon, the decision to explore programs that were exclusively international was not an extreme leap. She loved to travel internationally, and by the age of 23 had been to Mexico, Morocco, Canada, and Spain, as well as several other European countries through which she claimed to have “backpacked.” As she told it, Shannon held a deep interest in “other cultures,” something which she felt had drawn her to a temporary position as a “helper” in Minnesota’s international schools, tutoring students of Hmong, Mexican, and Somali backgrounds. She had also sought out work as a tutor to recent immigrants who were studying to pass their citizenship exams.

Having settled on the prospect of international options, Shannon initially investigated post-college study abroad programs. However, she was quickly deterred by memories of a previous study abroad stint in Spain in which she regretted not “immersing” enough. As she put it,
“it was “very, very much like being at the University of Minnesota but we were just in Spain type thing.” While she liked the ways in which study abroad programs provided “a safety net of other Americans,” this time she wanted more independence, more “immersion.” As she recalled:

I was really, really looking for a program that would sort of set me up like a study abroad where I would be with other Americans, but I could also immerse myself in the culture. ‘Cause there were some programs that were like study abroad, where I could just go back and like, study Spanish or something, like, in a university after you’ve graduated from college, and I wanted, I don’t know, I wanted to do something like in between. Like, I didn’t want to be completely independent, but I didn’t want to feel like I had to be around like, other Americans the whole time.

She next looked into possibilities “where I could just do it on my own, like, universities abroad that needed teachers.” However, with little experience she felt somewhat intimidated and further, without a “program” she did not trust herself to commit to a whole year, especially if she “did not like it.” It was during a visit to the study abroad office of her university that she found Global Community. “It seemed like a good fit,” she recalled, because:

I could travel abroad, I could travel to a Spanish-speaking country which is what I wanted to do, initially. And it gave me like some, some help. They would hold my hand through the beginning part, which I liked, and they would sort of explain how to teach and there would be other Americans and I felt like it was like an easy step for me to take because they would like help me if I needed it, but I had the independence to like do what I wanted.

As she further recalled, “I thought that I wanted to be a teacher so this was like a way to test it without going back to school, and then I could also be like selfish in the fact that I could like learn the language and like, I would get something out of it as well, so, that’s why I decided.”

Shannon especially liked that Global Community promised only 20 hours of teaching per week. This, she felt, was the “perfect balance” that would allow her to see if she liked teaching, but would also keep her from being overwhelmed with adjusting to her new surroundings. As she remembered:

I only wanted to teach 20 hours a week which was good ‘cause I didn’t know if I wanted to teach, and I didn’t wanna feel like I was doing like a 40-hour week job when I was abroad and dealing with the language and the culture, and then like having to teach as well. So it seems like, it seemed like it was a good balance of like, I could have my free time but teach just like 20 hours a week, I mean that’s not that much, but I’d also see if I liked teaching.
Finally, Shannon also liked the fact that Global Community handled certain bureaucratic details such as health insurance and visas. As she put it, “They did that work for you, like, I didn’t really have to do it, I just had to give them the money, so that was, I don’t know, really like, appealing.”

As she continued in her investigation, Shannon sought out previous Global Community volunteers whose names and contact information had been provided to her as a resource by the organization’s US office:

So then I talked, I called a couple people that had done Global Community in the past and they said it was like a perfect balance between like, they’ll prepare you and they’ll like hold your hand through Orientation, and let you teach with their help, with other students, like, and it’s really a good way to like, ease into it. But then you’re on your own essentially for like 10 months. But when they say you’re on your own you have like a couple other Americans in your city; you have the directors that’ll help if you need it; you have like insurance—ooh, that was another thing, like Global Community provided you, like, they set up the insurance, they set up like, the, I don’t know, the visas, like, they did that work for you. Like, I didn’t really have to do it, I just had to give them the money. So that was, I don’t know, really like, appealing for Global Community.

Shannon’s account illustrates a process of shopping for programs. Informed by a set of desires and related criteria, she had investigated various options, carefully determining whether or not they would deliver the experience that she wanted. For example, as she mentioned, she was interested in teaching, but wanted an arrangement that would allow her to “test out” teaching and to do so while delaying entry into the “real world.” In turning to international programs, she did not want “too many Americans around,” but did want some. She also wanted a Spanish linguistic immersion, but did not want a study abroad stint. With these desires in mind, Shannon first narrowed her choices from a domestic teaching program to anything international, and then further whittled the selection down to international teaching programs, and then finally to Global Community, whose packages appealed to her the most. She liked the way it was structured, the apparent balance of assistance, guidance, and freedom that the program provided, and moreover, the focus of the program – teaching English – which would allow her to “test out teaching.” Global Community struck her as the best fit for what she was looking for and she ended up selecting it from among various other options, paying a fee of $5,000 for which she anticipated receiving a number of promised services and goods (a roundtrip airplane ticket, health
insurance, orientation/training, etc.) This process of shopping for programs was one echoed repeatedly over the course of my conversations with Shannon's peers.

As Simpson (2005) and Vrasti (2013) and several others have argued, Northern international volunteering has come to represent a key form of pre- and post-secondary education for the middle and upper classes of Northern societies, one that constitutes "an educational strategy designed to enhance the employability and economic vitality of young adults in an increasingly competitive and precarious economic climate" (Vrasti, 2013, p. 87). Vrasti also contends that in a post-Fordist economic context, participation in an international volunteer program is a way in which the upper classes further distinguish themselves, their accomplishments, and their credentials from the recently ascribed ordinariness of a bachelor's degree that is now more widely accessible thanks to the so-called democratization of college that has unfolded since the 1970s. Much has been written about the general commodification of higher education and the ways that this phenomenon has begun to produce consumeristically minded students. Given this development and the fact that most international volunteer programs, whether for profit or (as in the case of Global Community) non-profit, charge a fee and deliver certain services and products in return, it perhaps should come as no surprise that many of the participants in my study (most of whom were college students at the time of application) often recounted a process of shopping for the right program – entering the process with a certain idea of what type of arrangement they desired, seeking out certain features, making comparisons, and finally settling on Global Community for reasons that reflected their particular sets of preferences and stipulations.

However, what the rest of Shannon’s story also begins to suggest is that, along the way of orienting oneself toward the international volunteer program as a consumer in search of a certain commodity or paid service provider, there is also a discernible orientation toward the global South that takes on a similar tone and shape. First, it should be pointed out that upon applying to Global Community one is required to select her desired country and program length at the outset, thus compelling the prospective volunteer to engage in a sort of shopping for “Third
World” countries. In examining Shannon’s account of choosing Ecuador, it appears that this was, in fact, what she did. As she told it, her selection process of the country where she wanted to live and teach for a year was based on several factors. For one, she wanted to live in a country where she would practice and improve her Spanish. At the time of their application, the organization had programs in four different Spanish-speaking countries: Costa Rica, Chile, Ecuador, and Peru. With these Latin American countries as the Spanish language options, Shannon had leaned towards the South American countries because, as she put it, she wanted a “raw experience” and she had believed that South America would be less touristy, less developed and thus, in her words, more “raw” than Central America. Between Chile, Ecuador, and Peru, she told me, she had ultimately chosen Ecuador because of the program dates.

Like the process of shopping for programs, this process of mulling over different countries offered by Global Community as placement sites, whittling them down based on certain preferences, and selecting a country as a placement site based on how it satisfied these preferences was also something I heard recounted by most of Shannon’s peers. Many volunteers also recalled utilizing their known desire to live in a Spanish-speaking country as the first way of narrowing this selection process. A few volunteers also told me that they had known early on that they had specifically wanted to go to South America. Their reasons were varied. Brooke, for example, had already been to Central America and now “wanted to check out” South America. In choosing Ecuador, specifically, numerous other volunteers shared that they had done so for no other reason than the program dates of September to August, which they found most convenient for their personal timetables, which often had to do with anticipated entry into graduate school the following September. For example, there was Aaron, who first told me, “I didn’t really have my heart set on Ecuador or anything, I just wanted to be in a Spanish-speaking country.” He then further explained that “the dates” had ultimately sealed his selection of Ecuador:

It was the only one that really had a similar school schedule to mine, ‘cause I wanted to come down for like a school year and be able to start law school the following school year. A lot of them were maybe like coming down in February and coming back in October, and then I wouldn’t be able to -- and like what do I do from October till the fall in September when I start school? So Ecuador just had the best dates.
Aaron’s account captures the sort of selection process followed by most of the volunteers who had graduated the previous May. Many, such as Casey, Phil, Erin, and Trevor, also planned on attending graduate school the following fall. Others reported wanting a program that would not require them to wait around in the United States past the summer. Among those who had graduated several years earlier, Spanish language acquisition was also cited as the reason that Ecuador, in particular, was a consideration. Unlike those who were also motivated by program dates, many of these volunteers were instead compelled by the recommendation of friends who had gone to Ecuador through Global Community. Josh’s account serves as an example of one such narrative:

J: When I was applying to Global Community, what I wanted, number one, was a Spanish-speaking country. Number two was I wanted to be living with a host family so I had the opportunity to be surrounded by the language as much as possible so I could improve my skills. And, I want to throw a number three in there, but I’m not sure if there is one. Oh, South American, that was it. So, it was between Ecuador, Peru, and was it I think Chile, do they have a program in Chile maybe?

C: Yeah.

J: But, anyways, yeah. My friend, she said she did Ecuador, and I said okay, great, and I just said okay I’ll do it. I didn’t really research any of the countries. I didn’t research the programs. I just sort of took the word of my friend to do it and just did it. So, that was that. Because I’m not really good at the whole research thing and making decisions. So, I just usually, I hear something good and in this case, that was good enough for me.

That this kind of selection process was so preponderant in the volunteers’ narratives is not so surprising when one considers how host countries are in fact presented on the Global Community website, as well as on the websites of most private international volunteer programs. In general, these websites literally “sell” the Third World destinations they offer (Simpson, 2005), constructing them as being ready at the volunteer’s disposal, available to be visited and explored, and waiting to facilitate a particular experience that the volunteer is being encouraged to desire.

Importantly, the point of this discussion is not to make the claim that populations and societies of developing countries are being done a disservice simply because Northern volunteers are being permitted to select where they want to work based on reasons that are often unrelated
to the ways in which their particular skills or strengths may match with certain development projects underway. While such a critique is certainly justifiable and in fact has been leveled in several news media outlets, if one begins and ends there the focus can easily be placed on answering questions of an evaluative nature rather than interrogating a broader imperialist discourse that assumes Northern/Western volunteers are innately beneficial and “needed” in the global South, in the first place; a key objective of this dissertation is the difficult task of highlighting such a discourse rather than reifying its foundational truths. Still, it has to be acknowledged that because international volunteering is so entrenched in the NGO social service contexts of developing countries, a model of allowing volunteer choice to reign supreme is most likely having some effect with respect to the efficacy of some development projects and the quality of service provision, and that these are in fact consequential effects for the many Southern populations who are compelled to rely on NGO services in various ways. That notwithstanding, what I want to highlight here, however, is that, through this model of volunteer-oriented choice there is a significant process of entitlement underway, one that permits and even requires (as Global Community does) the volunteer to simply choose where “on earth” he wants to “find himself teaching” and then make that happen after he or she completes a cash transaction.

Moreover, this particular entitlement is in some sense different from the conventional entitling of Western volunteers to drop in and “help” any developing country that they happen to end up in. This contemporary sort of entitlement is one that emerges amid an international volunteer industry which, in its very rhetoric and structure, allows, and even requires and obliges the volunteer to assume a subjectivity that, upon contemplating involvement in an international volunteer project, prioritizes the question of how such a project serves and accommodates her or him, her own particular desires and perceived needs for a certain experience, his personal and professional schedule, her idiosyncratic tastes and preferences. These are the things that the contemporary volunteer is strongly urged to place above a serious, informed, and sustained consideration of the purported “needs” of the global South, which, in turn, is portrayed as a place where “need” is so vast but also so simple in its composition that any (Northern/Western) person
can simply choose where he wants to go and be guaranteed a spot where he is “needed,” particularly since all that is required are claims of good intentions, a desire to travel, and the financial resources to do so.

What begins to happen then, I suggest, is that the developing country is more and more subject to being imagined by the volunteer largely in terms of how it can or cannot deliver certain services (Spanish language acquisition, a certain kind of setting, and a certain kind of culture envisioned as being optimal for the volunteer’s particular wishes and self-ascribed needs). Even if this only happens in the context of selecting a host country when applying to a program, I suggest that it is significant because through this act of selection the volunteer subject is potentially produced as a strategic consumer of countries of the developing world. This strategic consumer subject is not merely a tourist (who, in planning a vacation, may be drawn to how certain countries promise to fulfill leisure oriented visions), but also a self-enterprising traveler who is imagining the countries of the developing world through a lens of how they will deliver an experience of otherness that can be capitalized on for purposes of personal and professional development.

This sort of strategic consumerism vis-à-vis the developing world was also apparent in Jeremy’s story, which sheds additional light on how the structure of the international volunteer industry exerts a governmental effect with respect to the volunteer. His story also reveals the particular ways in which the choice-oriented contemporary neoliberal world of international volunteering subtly reshapes US international volunteering of a different era. Recall that in addition to wanting to “help out” in a developing country, one of Jeremy’s primary motivations was to learn Spanish; he believed such a skill would ultimately be useful in the work world and he told me that, despite having studied Spanish when he was younger, he only “could speak very little” of the language. Underscoring the way in which the world of private international volunteering is predicated on a market model of choice and illustrating how the contemporary international volunteer subject is produced through an imperial discourse of Western helping/improving and a neoliberal consumerist discourse of calculating the best opportunity for self-investment, Jeremy
had actually decided not to apply to the Peace Corps specifically because he had wanted to learn Spanish. To be sure, Peace Corps has definitely, throughout its existence, billed itself as a program that benefits the volunteer as well as the developing country. However, having been founded in 1962 and in light of its recruitment materials (see Chapter 5), the Peace Corps can be understood as being comparatively more pre-neoliberalist in its origins and contemporary structure. For example, it does not invite the volunteer to select his own destination but rather assigns the volunteer to a particular country based on its own assessment of the most appropriate match; with such a process the Peace Corps ostensibly places significant weight on a determination of where the volunteer will be most useful to the intended recipients of his service.

Knowing this and knowing that he did not have a great command of Spanish, Jeremy told me that at the time of application he had assumed the Peace Corps would probably not assign him to Latin America and would instead most likely assign him to a country in Africa, as he had spent some time in South Africa on a college study abroad program. For this reason, he had abandoned the idea of applying to Peace Corps and gone with Global Community. Given the opportunity, he had thus based his selection of volunteer program and host country on his own personal ambitions to learn a particular language in order to acquire a skill he deemed useful in the workplace.

In this way, we can see what happens as prospective volunteers are produced as consumers by the very structure of a private volunteer industry that allows them to freely select their host countries. Notably, Jeremy’s story was not unique. Abby, for example, told me that she had chosen Global Community over Peace Corps partly because the two-year commitment required by the latter did not appeal to her and partly because, due to her French fluency, she assumed the Peace Corps would send her to a French-speaking country – and, Abby wanted to learn Spanish. She told me:

I knew I didn’t want to do Peace Corps because I knew I wasn’t mentally ready to commit to two years at that point. And I also wanted control over wherever I was placed and because I speak—I spoke French and I did not speak Spanish, I knew they’d want me to go to Africa, and like I really wanted to come to Latin America, like I said, for the cultural
experience I was interested in, but also I really wanted to learn Spanish and that was a priority for me.

Through a consumerist model, then, the decision can easily be – and is perhaps most likely to be – based on whatever criteria are most important to the volunteer’s personal agenda, and not necessarily on a consideration of her discernible skill set, education, or work experience that might otherwise be deemed most relevant, applicable, and useful to a particular volunteer project being carried out in a particular region or country of the world. Pair this with the dominant neoliberal truism that international volunteering ought to be (and moreover, is in fact) invaluable beneficial to the self-development of volunteer and it is not surprising that most of the volunteers I followed did list driving motivations and intentions that were centered on self-service. Nor is it entirely shocking that very few reported notions of helping the Third World as they recalled their motivations for volunteering in Ecuador for a year.

The strategic nature of the volunteers’ selection processes was revealed perhaps most clearly in the interviews I conducted with them. However, the habit of regarding, talking about, and thus discursively producing countries as objects of their strategic travel desires and agendas had first become apparent during Orientation, when I noticed that an overwhelmingly common topic of conversation among the volunteers was where they planned to travel during the year that lay before them. It became clear that many had agendas to make the most of being in Ecuador by using it as a launch pad for travel not only within the country itself, but to other South American countries as well. Again and again, I listened as volunteers rattled off ambitious travel plans – the Galapagos Islands, Peru, Colombia, Argentina. During these moments, the volunteers resembled voracious collectors, with the object of collection being the visited countries they could add to their passports and travel experience. Further, as it turned out, I had not been alone in noticing this sort of frenzy for travel. On one afternoon, roughly three weeks into Orientation, I had lunch with Melissa, a 26-year-old from an Indianapolis suburb. As we spoke casually about the various goings-on of Orientation, she shared her impressions of her fellow volunteers with me, remarking that she had noticed that many had big plans to travel to other countries and that, in general,
people had “certain things they want to do so badly” that if they were not able to do them, she thought, they would end up devastated. By comparison, she said, she was hoping to settle in the city where she had been placed and get to know it as well as possible, thus articulating a sort of “quality over quantity” orientation. Commenting that she had realized that “group mentality is very real,” she shared that she had “gotten into that [travel frenzy] at first” but then realized that “it wasn’t really me” and that she had been “getting caught up in the group.”

Interestingly enough, this practice of relating to countries as objects of travel – whether for strategic self-development purposes or more leisure-oriented vacations – was also somewhat encouraged by the field staff during one particular session that took place toward the end of the Orientation. On the schedule, it was called “Travel in Ecuador,” and on my director’s copy of the scheduled interactive activity, I noticed that under the “Notes” section it read, “Vols convince others to visit them.”

6.7 “Selfish”

Approximately 6 months into fieldwork, Josh and I sat studying our menus in the café of a German-owned hostel located in a large city of the Ecuadorian sierra. The tin walls around us had been painted pastel blue and were offset by cheery yellow globe lanterns and woven placemats of purple, fuchsia, and midnight blue – a shrewd touch of Ecuadorian “indigenous culture” – that adorned the small brown wooden tables. Aromas of freshly brewed coffee and charred toast wafted from the direction of the kitchen, and the chatter of a local radio morning show played softly from a nearby tape deck perched on top of a white refrigerator. The doors to a few nearby guest rooms had been left ajar, bringing into view the telltale signs of a gringo backpacker clientele: a few dog-eared copies of Lonely Planet laying around, a wayward pair of jeans strewn across an unmade bed, a few pairs of rumpled socks peeking out of brown hiking boots, and several enormous backpacks propped up against beds and nightstands. The clientele demographic was further confirmed by our menus: rustic wooden slabs with printed offerings of granola, yogurt, pancakes, crepes, omelettes and various flavored versions of espresso,
cappuccino, café lattes, mochachinos, and chai teas. “This place is really popular,” Josh had told me as we had taken our seats. “A lot of people stay here when they come to visit.”

About an hour into the interview, I had just a few more questions. “Do you reflect at all,” I asked, “on what role you as a native English speaker from the United States have played in Ecuadorian education?” Even before I said it, I knew that the question felt a bit stilted and out of place in an ethnographic interview. There was a rationale, though. I had formed the question in light of the fact that, despite its disproportionate focus on a transformative volunteer “experience,” Global Community nonetheless strongly circulates a discourse of “making a difference,” or “having an impact.” In what was now the last of our 3 interviews over the course of the past 11 months, my curiosity as to how Josh might engage such a discourse had gotten the better of my fieldwork instincts. With respect to how the question now fit into our laid-back conversation, Josh’s reaction said it all. “Wow,” he said, laughing softly.

The question hung in the air. We both laughed awkwardly. I silently wished for a re-take. After a second or two, however, he began to form a response. Teaching was a profession that required training, he told me. Further, teaching English as a native English speaker carried “many expectations.” Then came the apologetics, “Here, in Ecuador, I am by no means a top quality English teacher. I’ve never been an English guy.” As he continued talking, he began to get a bit lost, pausing and exhaling intermittently. Eventually, he ran out of gas. “But, uhhhh, y’know…uhhh…” He looked to me for help, a confused and slightly sheepish expression spreading across his face. Again, we both laughed awkwardly. Feeling sheepish myself for having worded the question in a way that was perhaps a bit intimidating, I fumbled to put things more simply. Attempting a tone of reassurance, I began again, “Basically, what are you guys doing here? What do you feel, you guys as Global Community teachers are doing here?” Exhaling, he took a moment to think about the question. “What do I feel like we’re doing…” A full 10 seconds went by. As if on cue, a bird chirped loudly in the distance.

“We are teaching English,” he began, “but just as much as that, we’re also showing these people—especially here in Ecuador, where it’s impossible to acquire a visa, right? Especially to
the United States. And these people they have this perception of Americans, as y’know, portrayed through the television, as portrayed through the media, they have this preconceived, well, essentially educated conclusions they come to, given their resources. But what I’ve come to find myself doing is trying to paint a clearer picture of the U.S. Here’s what I’ve found so far, that all Americans have money, that all Americans can do whatever they want. I mean, I haven’t set that as my goal, like I need to go make sure that everyone understands. Clear things up, like, sometimes, I will try and like maybe change their perception, these misconceptions by doing things in certain situations I wouldn’t normally do, to maybe improve—” Suddenly, he stopped short. “Do I even do that?” he asked out loud. He paused. “Y’know, I don’t know if I do that…” Again his voice trailed off. Still unsatisfied with his response, he admitted, “I definitely feel like I’m not answering your question.” Then he added, “And, I don’t remember what your question was.”

Realizing ever more the disjointedness in his speech that had been elicited by my asking him what it was he was doing in Ecuador, I myself had become a bit discombobulated. But I wanted to pursue this route and Josh seemed willing, even if it took a few tries. Again, I fumbled to repeat my question as disarmingly as possible. “Like, what,” I began, “are you guys, as young United States native English speakers doing here. I think you were saying that it’s more than English?”

Sighing deeply, he began, “I okay, y’know…” He paused for a moment, before exhaling again, and then continuing, “Okay, I can’t take the whole philanthropic um, side,” he said, “cause it’s, this has been mostly a selfish endeavor for me. Right? Like, coming here so I can learn Spanish, coming here so I can experience the culture, coming here so I can like, see some parts of Ecuador.” He spoke in tones of both relief and shame, but with every word his speech became more fluid and more certain than it had been for the past 10 minutes when he had struggled to fashion a more altruistic, or at least less self-interested, answer. Josh, it seemed, was finally leveling with me. “I’m not, y’know,” he continued, “I didn’t come down here to be like, y’know, give every second of my life to change or to like, show people, “Oh yes, y’know, yes, America’s so wonderful,” y’know, all this. It’s been mostly like, um, yeah, y’know, it’s been mostly for me. When
the opportunity arises to y’know, do something not selfish, I guess, then I’m sure I’ve taken it, but like that’s the thing, it’s honestly been like, yeah, like…I guess it sounds pretty bad to say that, but, I mean, I’m really, I guess I’m here for me.” He paused for a moment and then laughed a bit self-consciously, adding, “I mean, it’s a good reason to be here. I’m not doing bad things!”

Going with his train of thought, I asked him what he had gotten out of his time in Ecuador. “An absolutely unforgettable experience,” he said, “where I’ve made new friends. I mean, this literally, this is my second home. I feel at home here for sure. My grip on the language has completely opened up my perception on life I suppose. Because if you speak one language you are limited to life in that language because communication, verbal communication is—I’ve gotten so much out of it. At least a hundred-fifty avocados, equally mango, pieces of mote…I gained a much larger appreciation on life in general. Y’know you come down here and you see people limping to the store to buy something that could last them a day.”

Ironically enough, despite Josh’s concern that what he said sounded “pretty bad,” by the time we were sitting down to talk, I had actually come to expect the self-interested nature of the reasons that he and his peers routinely gave for coming to Ecuador to teach English. Indeed, at this point in my fieldwork, it would have been more remarkable if he had articulated a more socially oriented conceptualization of what it was exactly that he and his peers were doing in the country. Indeed, in contrast to all of the elaboration around desires for personal experiences, there was generally a marked silence when it came to their notions of service. However, as international volunteering blatantly aligns itself with notions of international development and “changing the world,” I felt the need to ask the volunteers how they thought about their role in the country’s development. Like Josh, many would become stiff, some a bit tongue-tied. I would feel as though I had given them a pop quiz on material they had not been taught. Whereas their words had flowed with how they had decided to do the program, the fantasies they had nurtured, and what they had expected to get out of it, when it came to how their “service” related to the welfare or development of the country, community and/or people of Ecuador they stumbled. Sometimes, amid momentary pangs of guilt, I would acknowledge that this was perhaps too
broad of a question. Nevertheless, everyone attempted to answer the question with some frankly and unapologetically responding that they had not given the matter much thought while others referenced the “need” or the “demand” for English in Ecuador, taking their cue from both Global Community rhetoric and many of their own students, who, they reported, expressed a desire to learn English to improve their job prospects and overall life chances. Still others felt that their work in Ecuador was helping to facilitate a cultural exchange that they always held as being innately good. Not many responded to the question in the way that Josh ultimately had, with a confession of what had actually motivated his decision to become a Global Community volunteer and an acknowledgement that this did not square up with what he thought should have motivated him. Notably, I had not actually asked Josh what had or had not motivated him to become a Global Community volunteer; I had asked what he believed he and his fellow volunteers were doing in Ecuador with respect to the country’s development. His response, which had begun as the recitation of a sort of official narrative that I had heard from several others, had devolved into a candid disclosure of an internal grappling with his own motives and an apparent unwillingness or disinterest in carrying on a charade. What Josh was speaking to was not really the role he thought he and his peers were playing in Ecuador, but rather a set of self-interested motives and a lack of altruistic motivations, a characteristic which seemed to be shared by all of his peers. The difference seemed to be that most of the other volunteers seemed able to be at ease with the co-existence of a self-interested agenda and an official narrative of doing good, even if doing good or helping was not actually present in what they held as their own true motives. For Josh, however, this had become an irreconcilable contradiction.

There were several other volunteers for whom, like Josh, the sense that they should have been motivated in large part by a desire to help the people of Ecuador and affect change was palpable, as was an air of sheepishness and mild shame when they admitted that they were not. This was illustrated during one conversation with Brooke, who used the same pejorative term of “selfish” that Josh had utilized when confessing his self-oriented motives:

C: I guess, if we can get back to, well, talk about like, development. I don’t know if you
have any experience or like, um, sense of like international development work, or—

B: Oh, like post-Global Community?

C: No, I mean like in the experience in and of itself. Do you see this as, or do you have an understanding of like, international development and do you think of this as that or —

B: Y’know, I do somewhat, but I feel like I could be doing more. That’s actually been—’cause teaching’s only 20 hours a week and my lesson planning at this point does not take long, so um, I feel relatively understimulated in that regard and so part of like my frustration has been that like, I wanna do more and I’ve got so many other interests that I kind of like want to explore those, and because I’ve been lazy I haven’t, and that’s obviously my fault. But, I mean, I feel like, I feel like I’m kind of maybe like, a little bit doing something for like international development but not really.

C: Not really?

B: Not really. No, I really, I mean, I guess on an interpersonal level, yes, but like, I just—big picture I don’t really feel like I am. And, I know we’re supposed to feel like that but I really don’t. [Laughs] [Apologetically] I really don’t.

C: Where did you get the sense that you’re supposed to?

B: I mean I feel like the premise of Global Community, y’know? Like, I feel like the premise of Global Community is like we’re, and when you talk about it to other people, it’s just like “Oh my God, what a wonderful thing you’re doing,” like, y’know. And like, my whole fundraising letter is like all about, it’s just, I mean, in reality it’s pretty ironic. My whole fundraising letter is like, “I want to bring English to this developing country,” so to speak, “and “I want to provide these people with the opportunity to learn in an environment that they otherwise would not have access to,” and like all this, y’know, all this stuff. And then the ironic thing is that my purpose in coming down here has nothing to do really with other people. It’s all selfishly motivated. Um, not entirely because I really am passionate about international development in general, but like, I don’t really feel like this is necessarily serving that purpose as much as I would like it to. But I don’t think I’d wanna be down here without doing something like that, so as much as it doesn’t seem like I’m doing that much, I don’t think I’d wanna be living abroad for this extended a period of time without having some sort of purpose along those lines. Like, I mean if we’re going to Argentina for three months—and that’s just like a total like, vacation. Like, it’s like, three months of volunteering, I mean, like, we’ll do volunteering for a little while but like, there’s—I mean we’re not even pretending to like, do anything other than like, have a good time and like, live it up and travel, y’know so. But I don’t think I’d wanna do anything for this long without having like some other purpose because I feel like it, I think I’d just, I think I’d go crazy if I didn’t have something that made me feel like I’m somewhat stimulating myself and like helping others.

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25 Here, Brooke was referencing an upcoming trip to Argentina she planned to take upon completing the Global Community stint.
I came to understand these moments in which volunteers criticized their own motives as "selfish" as the indexing of a sort of friction between the two dominant discourses that shape and structure today’s world of Northern/Western international volunteering and the subjectivities of the Northern volunteers who partake of it: one, a conventional imperialist discourse that constructs the Western subject as the innate and altruistically motivated savior/helper/improver of Third World populations and communities, and the other, a more recent neoliberal discourse that presents her as a self-enterprising opportunity seeker that is concerned primarily with maximizing investments in the self for purposes of market competition. The irony of the mild to moderate feelings of guilt some volunteers appeared to have over being driven to engage in volunteer work for mostly, if not entirely, self-oriented reasons is that it in some sense worked to legitimize in their minds the conventional volunteer/humanitarian subject position that has been erected through imperialist discourse. Moreover, when they explicitly condemned their motives as "selfish," this worked to lionize this position even more, framing it as a position one should aspire to, even if one actually finds oneself not at all able to do so. This was evidenced particularly well by Brooke’s subsequent elaboration on the reasons why she did not regard what she and her peers were doing as international development work:

I mean maybe it’s a totally idealized perception that I have of people who actually do that kind of stuff [international development work], but like, y’know, like we come down here, and we like, talk about vacations and we’re like, going to freaking Venezuela for three weeks. Like, who in Ecuador can do that? Like, that’s not, that’s not, like that’s kind of ostentatious by Ecuadorian standards, and y’know, like we, I don’t know, it just, it doesn’t seem – I guess I just have this idea in my head of I guess like, the Mother Teresa or, y’know, of international development and I’m by no means that. I think, I mean, I feel like people who do the Peace Corps, I feel like really kind of take on that kind of, that idealized version of international development, that I’ve got y’know, stuck in my head. ‘Cause they [Peace Corps volunteers] are isolated, they really don’t, I mean, I think they do have a little bit of a network, but they are extremely isolated. They can’t even really talk to people at home. They have to start from scratch and like, basically dream up some sort of scheme that’s gonna help the community they’re involved in, and we’re kind of hand-fed, I feel like the process – which is exactly why I did this. It’s exactly why I did Global Community, so I’m grateful for it but it’s, yeah. I mean, like we go on these, we go to these conferences and everything’s paid for and like we just, y’know, everybody was like drunk 24/7 during Mid-Point, so it’s – and I mean the mentality of the group, like the volunteers themselves, is like, “Yeah, let’s party,” like, “Let’s have a good time.” It’s not like, “Am I doing enough for my Ecuadorian community?” Y’know?
In this way, even as a contemporary discourse of neoliberal self-enterprise has taken root in the industry of international volunteering, the imperialist subject that is entitled and obligated to intervene for the improvement of an inferior Other wherever he may reside (Heron, 2007) – a subject that is in fact entitled to travel to a developing country and, in Brooke’s words, “dream up some sort of scheme that’s gonna help the community they’re involved in” – remains part of this new volunteer subject’s conscience as the model of what she should feel, think, and desire, thus entitling her even more by not questioning the old premise of Northern/Western intervention in the developing world, but simply building on top of it.

6.8 Conclusion

In this chapter I introduced the cohort of Global Community Ecuador volunteers that I ethnographically followed over the course of one year, focusing on such aspects as the group’s race/class/age composition, as well as the volunteers’ distinct cultural performances, interactions with each other, and engagements with the physical space of the Mariscal tourist zone that they navigated on the evening of their arrival in Ecuador. Volunteers were mostly young (in their early to mid twenties), overwhelmingly white, and from middle and upper middle class backgrounds. As per Global Community requisites, all had earned an undergraduate college degree. This rendered them demographically similar to the typical US-American international volunteer painted by statistical data on this population sub-set (see Lough 2006, 2010, 2013). As discussed, from their first night in Quito many volunteers demonstrated an air of easy entitlement toward their physical surroundings that was striking given their recent arrival, but not wholly surprising given the ways in which the touristic spaces of the Mariscal appeared to court their patronage. As I discussed, this entitlement can be compared to the sort of “ease” that sociologist Shamus Kahn (2011) found to characterize the dispositions of US-American young elites; such a finding suggests that perhaps a key component of this disposition or habitus is its durability precisely in the face of relocation to new and unfamiliar environs. Moreover, the scene of the first evening – the ways in which the bar appeared to be set up for the volunteers’ consumption and the particular ways in which volunteers were immediately able to embody and perform an air of ease while in it – points
to the ways in which the explosion of the “Third World tourism” industry (see Chapter 5) works to facilitate the production of this dimension of elite subjectivity in territories of US empire.

In this chapter, I also examined how the volunteers described their paths to becoming Global Community Ecuador volunteers. Drawing on in-depth interviews conducted with the volunteers, I found that many had applied as college seniors and were consciously seeking a sort of alternative or “something else” to the post-college “real world.” Another significant group was comprised of mid-twenty-somethings who had been out of college for a few years and were experiencing senses of stagnation and boredom in the post-college work worlds that they had recently entered. Overall, most narratives were characterized not only by clear assumptions of class privilege, but also by a sense of not wanting to begin certain paths or to remain in particular circumstances. As discussed, volunteer narratives were also laden with common desires to experience an imagined Third World alterity and to develop certain career-oriented skills through doing so. Improving Spanish language skills was a frequent agenda, but notions of acquiring knowledge, accumulating teaching experience (or simply “testing out” teaching), “gaining perspective”, and accumulating “life experience” to put on one’s resume were also strong motivations. Seeming to operate far less powerfully in their subjectivities around why they opted to pursue Global Community was a notion of “helping” or “improving” the Third World communities and peoples that they imagined themselves encountering in Ecuador. At the same time, volunteers were undoubtedly aware of this image of international volunteering and knew how to speak the language of “helping,” even if it was not most salient to how they thought about themselves and what they were doing in Ecuador and why.

Indeed, while “helping” provided a noble pretext for their participation in Global Community, the “colonial continuity” (Heron, 2007) that seemed to wield greater sway was one of a more touristic nature. In this way, senses of obligation and entitlement to intervene, while still present, were perhaps muted by a sense of entitlement to drop in, gaze upon, immerse with, and “experience” Third World peoples, cultural formations, and physical landscapes, all of which were imagined through a lens of tradition, material poverty, authenticity, rurality, and less development.
This touristic gaze vis-à-vis the imperial territory (see Chapter 5) operated in tandem with a neoliberal motive of self-investment that was to be undertaken specifically through the act of immersing in, experiencing, and gazing upon “Third World” difference. Here, I argued that the allure of self-investment in fact works to mask the more awkward associations of international volunteering with US-American imperialism, thus gaining the complicity of a generation of young people who, unlike their 19th and early 20th century predecessors (see Chapter 5), would otherwise want nothing to do with such a legacy. Interestingly, however, this new neoliberal spin on an age-old technology of empire left some volunteers with feelings of guilt or at least sheepishness which they expressed by referring to their motives as “selfish.” The irony here, however, is that, by holding up the image of a benevolent philanthropic Northern improver vis-à-vis the global South and relating to it as an ideal of which one is professing to fall short, such a contestation works to preserve, legitimize, and in fact lionize this more conventional volunteer subject position that is foundational to Western imperial discourse. Finally, in the context of a Global Community application process that not only permits but requires volunteers to choose the country where they want to teach, I also suggested that volunteers developed a sort of consumeristic subjectivity vis-à-vis the “Third World” insofar as different countries are weighed and held up against each other in terms of how they can serve particular self-development objectives of the volunteer who, under the privatized model of fee-driven volunteer stints, is discursively positioned and governmentally instructed, perhaps now more than ever, as an expectant consumer of a particular experience.
CHAPTER 7: TRAINING IN OTHERING

7.1 Introduction

As key figures in the field of postcolonial studies have argued, a foundational practice of modern Western imperialism has been the discursive construction of imperial territories through an “us/them” binary that positions “them” as an “Other” marked by racial, ethnic, cultural, moral and political inferiority (see Bhabha, 1994; McClintock, 1995; Pratt, 1992; Said, 1993, 2003; Spivak, 1985; Stoler, 1995) Discussing European discourses around “the East” that were produced and circulated over the course of the 18th and 19th centuries, Edward Said (2003) famously argued that, Orientalism, as a field of study, was not only an exercise of European authority over the Orient, but that in its particular depiction of the Orient as the West’s inferior opposite was also a way in which the West was able to assert and preserve a claim of superiority over the East that rationalized the exercise of European hegemony in the region.

In Chapter 5 of this dissertation, I argued that both US humanitarian work and the promotion of US tourism in Latin America can be understood as governmental technologies of US empire, and that both of these technologies have involved the creation of distant others that are both in need of improvement at the hands of the US populations and available for touristic gazing by these same populations. These technologies have not only been applied in the US state’s pursuit of such material objectives as “pacifying” unruly imperial subjects and lining the pockets of these subjects with US dollars to be used in purchasing US finished goods (and thus helping to sustain the asymmetrical economic integration that has characterized the US-Latin American relation). They have also been deployed in service of maintaining a discursive myth of US superiority/Latin American inferiority upon which the legitimizing of US empire has largely relied (in similar fashion to the European West vis-à-vis the Orient). Here, notions of Latin American otherness have undoubtedly been critical.

In Desire for Development, Heron (2007) devotes a large degree of examination and discussion to the role of imagined Third World otherness in the contemporary production of bourgeois subjectivity, arguing that this relation constitutes a “colonial continuity” whose origins
rest in the early days of Western European imperialism. As the previous chapter of this
dissertation showed, the contemporary industry of international volunteering programs in fact
hinges on the steady production and aggressive circulation of Third World otherness, usually
presented to the prospective volunteer in the form of vivid photographs and textual
representations (see also Simpson, 2007). In the previous chapter, I argued that it is this
“otherness” that Global Community is in fact selling as the focal point of the volunteer stint; it is
the object that is to be alternately saved, helped, toured, consumed, and made use of by
Northern subjects recruited to the project. Using this finding as a point of departure, in this
chapter I will examine how this otherness was further produced by the Global Community
Ecuador staff during the in-country Orientation coordinated and held for the volunteer cohort that I
ethnographically followed. Specifically, I discuss the ways in which the Global Community
Ecuador program began conjuring Ecuadorian otherness as soon as the volunteers were in the
country, and thus, under the loose supervision, guidance, and care of program field staff.
Questions I attend to include: What were the specificities of this otherness? In the name of what
was it produced? How was it produced and what else did its production appear to do? What kinds
of subject positions did it hold up for the volunteers, and what dynamics of intersubjectivity were
fostered as all of this took place? What kinds of governmental effects were at stake in this
production of Ecuadorian otherness and how might they have indexed a symbiotic interplay of
neoliberal and imperial injunctions?

After examining key events of Orientation, this chapter then turns to the question of how
volunteers took up this practice of othering in the months following Orientation. I consider how
they often seemed to draw upon and engage in it as a way of coping with senses of
disorientedness, or what is often referred to as “culture shock;” here, I consider the ways in which
this conventional explanation of what they were experiencing and doing is perhaps descriptively
accurate, but not wholly sufficient in accounting for it). I also examine how volunteers’ othering
practices often worked to forge senses of camaraderie with one another. In addition, I discuss
one instance in which this othering was enacted through one volunteer’s use of a camera; here, I
draw on Timothy Mitchell’s (1991) concept of enframing to situate this instance in a broader Western imperialist practice, which, I argue, is in fact modeled for the volunteer by the international volunteer organization website.

In the final two sections of this chapter I examine how, throughout the year, Global Community field staff steadily continued to engage the volunteers in othering practices, and how this engagement was often inflected with a neoliberal logic such that, in one instance, the program sought to help volunteers cope with senses of “culture shock” with an activity that effectively subjectified them as critical consumers and reviewers of Ecuadorian otherness. In other instances, volunteers were ushered into a competitive photographic/verbal enframing of Ecuadorian otherness that promised both reward and recognition for those who won. Another example was that of a collective volunteer-led literary enframing of Ecuadorian otherness that, I suggest, offered potential resumé credentials for all who participated. I consider how these examples constituted a certain instrumentalization of Ecuadorian otherness, which in turn constituted a form of neoliberal opportunity maximalization that was dependent upon and enabled by the volunteers’ engagement in imperialist traditions; in this way, it entailed the production of a volunteer subject that was imperial as well as neoliberal in its commitments and assumptions.

7.2 Orientation…Day One and Beyond

“Kelsey the koala, Peggy the piranha, Matt the mosquito, umm, Cody the, umm, caterpillar?”

It was the first morning of Orientation, and the entire group of 36 volunteers sat in tightly spaced rows of black plastic chairs in a fluorescently lit classroom at CEC, a local language institution where some of them would in fact be teaching English for the year. As the Orientation schedule indicated, the volunteers were playing an introductory “name game.” I remembered this from my own year as a volunteer: the first person introduced herself, stating her name and an animal that began with the same letter as her name. The next person had to repeat this person’s name and animal, and then introduce himself in the following manner. The game went on like this until every person in the room had introduced herself. At this particular moment there were about
six names at play, but as the game progressed, those who had not yet taken their turn were to be faced with a growing list of names and animals to remember and recite. As I looked around, I saw people taking deep breaths, exhaling softly as they nervously waited their turns to recite the names and animals of all that have gone before them. No one wanted to bomb in front of the group on the first day. When the final volunteer finished her turn, program directors, April and Tim, who had been watching from the front of the room, now turned and looked at each other. April flashed a grin. “I can do it,” she said to him defiantly, as though referring to a challenge or bet that they had previously set between them.

“Go for it,” Tim responded with mock innocence, a smile already creeping across his face. April turned to the volunteer who had taken the first turn and began. “Paul the penguin…” After she had correctly named each volunteer and all of their animals, the volunteers clapped and cheered, at which point Tim announced that he would “do everyone’s first and last names and their animals.” A chuckle rippled through the crowd. Tim began, reciting the names at a fast clip, pausing only a few times to search his memory for particular animals that certain volunteers had selected. In the end he was successful, naming all 36 volunteers and their respective animals. Again the group clapped, this time more enthusiastically. As the cheering died down, Tim formally introduced himself to the group. “Hi, everyone my name is Tim Michaels and I am your field director here in lovely Ecuador. I did Global Community in 2004, and my site was Latacunga.”

“And, I am April Jamison. I was a Global Community volunteer in 2006, and my site was Machala.” April and Tim then introduced the next activity, a period of guided mingling, or “Human Billboards,” as the Orientation schedule listed it. Distributing markers and 8x11 sheets of light blue paper, April and Tim instructed the volunteers to write their names on their papers and draw several things that represented them. The room fell silent for a few minutes as volunteers bent over their desks, following directions. Once most of them had finished, the Tim and April gave them the next step, which was to circulate around the room and talk to one another about what they had drawn. People rose to their feet and drifted toward the nearest one or two people, forming small clusters. The room erupted into snippets of different conversation, punctuated with
“Dude!” and “Awesome.” After about 10 minutes, the sound of Tim’s voice broke through the chatter, “Clap three times if you can hear my voice. Clap three times if you can hear my voice. Clap three times if you can hear my voice.” As he continued this refrain, people began to quiet down, and several clapped three times.

“Okay, everyone you can go back to your seats.” People shuffled back to their rows, smiling and chatting as they went. As the room quieted down, he stood quietly, waiting until there was silence. Then, in a serious tone, he told them, that it was “going to be an intense several weeks,” and asked that they “please be on time for sessions.” The volunteers now sat quietly, listening intently, their eyes on Tim. Continuing, he pointed out that the Orientation was a “professional conference,” and told them that how they behaved during this period was going to “reflect into your entire time in the country.” Finally, he told them not to be “passive recipients” but to “demand a lot” from their presenters. Flipping open a navy blue binder, he began ticking off some of the upcoming sessions and activities from the Orientation schedule, which had been provided to the volunteers. The schedule was quite meticulous, detailing the time, location, and guest speaker of every activity of every day. When he came to the very last day on the schedule, April piped up, “And, guys please keep in mind that that everything on this schedule is subject to change and we ask that you please stay flexible, okay?” Smiling broadly, she continued, “This is Ecuador, we don’t have control over many things that we would in the United States.”

“And speaking of things we don’t have control over,” Tim continued, “Let’s talk about health. Let’s start with eating in restaurants. Tell me, how can you spot a restaurant that might be a good choice? Tell me.”

“If it looks clean?” suggested Jeremy, a 24-year-old volunteer from Boston.

Tim nodded his head. “Yeah, if people are sweeping it out and stuff. What else?”

Melanie, a 24-year-old volunteer from Los Angeles, raised her hand. “If there are a lot of people eating there?” Tim and April beamed and nodded their heads vigorously. They then launched into a series of tips. “Be careful with raw produce,” April advised. “You should really only eat fruits that you can peel, and vegetables that have been cooked.”
“Yeah, like boiled,” Tim added drily, arching his eyebrows. A few snickers rippled through the group. “So, one major thing is fecal contact,” he continued. “People are going to the bathroom and not washing their hands. Produce is going straight from the ground to the plate,” he told them, “and a lotta times it’s been treated with um, human fertilizer.” Here he drew an unmistakable line between “us” and “them”: “Ecuadorians have immune systems that are used to that,” he told them, “but we don’t.” He then explained that the volunteers’ “host families” had been forewarned around this issue before adding, “Yeah, they all know about gringos’ weak stomachs. It’s like the big joke, these gringos have weak stomachs but you Ecuadorians are the ones eating poop, so are you weird or am I weird?” Again, a few people giggled as his rhetorical question hung in the air.

In addition to fecally contaminated produce at every turn, the food on the bus also posed a dangerous hazard. “When you go on a long bus ride, people are going to come on the bus selling all kinds of good smelling treats,” Tim told them. “Go for fried carbs. Stay away from fritada.” Someone asked what fritada was. “Fritada is a bag of pieces of fried pork. Pork is expensive. These are people who don’t make a lot of money, so are they going to throw out old meat? Or just fry it up again and cover up the smell? But, whereas potatoes, those are pretty cheap, so if they haven’t sold those, they will probably just throw them away.” April then advised the volunteers to “drink plenty of water,” and to monitor their health and see a doctor if they developed severe stomach problems. As the directors delivered these tips, several volunteers got up and refilled their water bottles at a large water cooler that sat in the corner of the room. One volunteer asked if there was Swine Flu in Ecuador. Another asked about malaria and dengue fever.

The next topic was crime, which, Tim and April told the group, was “epidemic.” The streets of Quito were where numerous scams took place all the time, they said. They explained common tactics that thieves were known to employ. Tim explained what he and April, and subsequently all of the volunteers, referred to as mustardizing: “You realize, or someone comes
up to you and tells you, that you’ve got mustard on your shirt. They offer to help you clean it off. And while they’re approaching you, they or another person robs you.”

At this, Gloria, a 65-year-old volunteer from Vermont, shared that on a previous trip to Ecuador she had been warned by some Ecuadorian teachers, “Never to open a paper or allow someone to come up to you and open a paper in your face.” Taking this up immediately, Tim explained, “Yeah, yeah, yeah, here’s the scam: someone asks for directions or to help them with an address. They open a piece of paper for you to look at and it has a powdered drug that flies into your face.” At this point, Veronica, a 25-year-old from the Bay Area who had been a Global Community Ecuador volunteer the summer prior, shared that she knew “someone who that happened to.”

Concluding the session, Tim told the volunteers to be smart and use common sense, telling them, “I could walk through this park at dark, drunk, with my passport and all my money or I could cut around.” Finally, in closing he told them, “I wanted to tell you, last night at the bar, there was a red pill next to my beer.” At this the room fell silent. Tim continued, “Was that pill gonna go into my beer? One of the girls’ beers? You all need to watch out for each other.”

Then, with seemingly perfect timing, a young white US-American woman appeared at the door. It was the time for the next scheduled activity, the Scavenger Hunt. “Kara!” April greeted her. “Kara is one of our Quito volunteers and she’s gonna help out with the next activity which is the Scavenger Hunt.” Having introduced her to the group, April then began to count the volunteers off into “sixes” to form their Scavenger Hunt teams.

“One.”

“Two!”

“Three!”

“Four.”

“Five!”

“Six!”

“One.”
As I listened to the volunteers count themselves off, gradually lapsing into quiet conversations and shared smiles as they did so, I was struck by the content of the presentation that I had just observed and by the group dynamic that had unfolded as it had been delivered. First, the “Health and Safety Talk” had been suffused with notions of an Ecuadorian otherness that had been conjured even more intensely than I remembered it having been on my own first day as a volunteer two years prior. Moreover, I was struck not only by what the directors had said, but also by their cavalier delivery, their sense of ease and entitlement to not only explain Ecuadorians to fellow US-Americans, but to do so in ways that were irreverent at best and crudely disparaging at worst. Despite the international volunteering industry’s ubiquitous multiculturalist rhetoric about the moral value of “experiencing other cultures” as a way of forging greater understanding across borders, it struck me that what had just transpired could have been a role-playing scenario out of a multiculturalist workshop on how not to teach students, or in this case volunteers, about “other” cultures.

However, in addition to demonstrating an apparent lack of training in “cultural sensitivity” and an apparent latent hostility toward Ecuadorians, the presentation had also constituted an exercise of discursive power. In their “knowledge claims” about Ecuadorian immune systems, bathroom habits, crop fertilization practices, and the decision-making mental processes of (economically poor) food-sellers, the directors had turned an invasive gaze onto Ecuadorian people, turning them into objects of US-American knowledge, to be discussed and critiqued with a certain unabashed authority and irreverence by an “us” that was comprised of US-American volunteer subjects. In making their knowledge claims, they had continuously constructed Ecuador and Ecuadorians as “other,” drawing for the volunteers a clear line between “us” and “them.” The drawing of this line had crescendoed with Tim’s crass and hostile joke which instantly “othered” an entire Ecuadorian population as “weird.” In this moment, it seemed, he had used his platform as a field director to work out his own sense of frustration with being othered as a gringo, relying

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26 A theme to be discussed at length in Chapter 8.
on a captive audience of rookie volunteers as a sounding board for his retaliation. This apparent retaliation involved reasserting his own disrupted claim to normalcy by constructing and debasing an Ecuadorian other, attacking the imposition of an Ecuadorian normativity/white US-American otherness by using his knowledge of a standard crop fertilization practice to condemn Ecuadorians through a lens of hygiene transgression and using this condemnation to then level his charge of “weird”-ness.

Tim’s statements were compelling, as they seemed to take a page directly from what a bourgeois imperialism playbook might look like – the othering and inferiorizing of imperial subjects through a discourse of filth and contamination and the distinctive opposing of the imperialist subject as “clean,” and therefore superior. Moreover, his statements seemed to underscore a sort of critical anxiety around just what is at stake for the othering imperialist subject when he makes this play. “Are you weird or am I weird?” It could be argued that this very specific question, in a sense, laid it all bare for a moment, indexing a tightly held sense of racial normativity that has been described by many as being at the center of white Western subjectivity (McWhorter 2005, 2009). This subjectivity had clearly been destabilized for this particular white US-American male through the circumstance of living in Ecuador, a country where white US-Americans are in the stark and highly visible minority. That a sense of racial/social/national normativity was foundational to the subjectivity of this particular white US-American male was thrown into relief, it might be inferred, by his (disproportionate?) anger at being teased by Ecuadorians for having a “weak stomach,” not to mention the vitriolic lengths to which he would go to defend and reassert this normativity.

Bracketing this theme of destabilized racial normativity (to be revisited in Chapter 8, where I examine how an othering of whiteness colored and was indexed in volunteer subjectivities), what I want to more explicitly focus on here is what was taking place through the field directors’ delivery of the Health and Safety Talk to the volunteers. In making sense of this talk, it should be pointed out that, in talking about robbery and foodborne illness, Tim and April were not inventing phenomena. They were not fabricating things that simply do not exist in
Ecuador. However, in leading with these particular phenomena on the volunteers’ first day in Ecuador, they were implicitly constructing them as central defining aspects of the nature of the country and the Ecuadorian population. In this way, they were defining the country through a lens of problems. At the same time, they were discussing these problems in a very specific way: as dangers to be avoided by the volunteer. In this way, Ecuador was defined not simply through a lens of problems but through a lens of problems for the visiting US-American subject such that volunteers were on one level being invited to know Ecuador as a place riddled with problems and on another, perhaps subtler level they were being invited to know, judge, and relate to Ecuador primarily in terms of how it was thought to affect their own safety and welfare, how the country did or did not allow them to be safe, how the country did or did not cause them foodborne illness. This is important because it constituted a sort of active and aggressive centering of the US-American subject as an authority on a “developing” country and it did so through a blatantly ethnocentric lens that defined the country in terms of how it allowed for the security and preservation of this subject’s life and wellbeing.

Additionally, in this first session of the first day of Orientation, April and Tim had not only positioned themselves as group leaders, drawn a line between “us” and “them,” and represented “them” to “us” in particular ways. They had also, I suggest, facilitated the formation of a collective sense of belonging through an interactional production of intersubjectivity. As Randall Collins (2004) has argued, it is through interaction rituals such as the one that took place on that first morning of Orientation that “moments of intersubjectivity” are produced. While Collins’ theoretical framework is admittedly quite distinct from Foucault’s theory of subject formation and governmentality that greatly informs the arguments of this dissertation, I think that it is nonetheless applicable and helpful in making sense of the events that transpired on that first morning of Orientation and which would continue to take place in repeatedly, and thus ritualized, fashion over the course of the next 4 weeks that followed. According to Collins, interaction rituals are comprised of 4 ingredients – group assembly, a barrier to outsiders, mutual focus of attention, and shared mood – all of which had been present that morning. Gathered and sequestered in a
hotel conference room, the volunteers had been ushered by Tim and April into a collective activity in which the mutual focus of attention was the act of discussing Ecuador and Ecuadorians and doing so in a very specific way: exchanging observations, commenting upon or marveling at what others said, laughing collectively at the “weirdness” of Ecuador, Ecuadorians, and Ecuadorian systems, and thus, subtly fostering and reinforcing a nascent sense of “us” membership through identifying a clear Other.

For this reason, I came to see this session as the first of many interaction rituals in which a sense of “us” was not only discursively produced through the statements of the speakers, but also through a palpable sense of intersubjectivity that took shape as the volunteers sat collectively transfixed on what speakers were saying. These were moments when the effect of the “us/them” rhetoric was enhanced by the visceral sense of “us” generated by a mutual focus and emotional entrainment on that rhetoric (see Collins, 2004, esp. Chap. 2). Notably, there was a pedagogical element to these sessions and not just in the teaching about Ecuador but also in the modeling on the part of the field directors as to the tone, tenor, and narrative style with which to think about, conceive, relate to, and talk about Ecuador. As they provided a range of tips and supported them with matter-of-fact explanations, April and Tim had become particular kinds of experts, ones that spoke in tones of confidence and certainty that were inflected with notes of ridicule, sarcasm, measured bafflement, and always, implicit superiority, something which only bolstered the drawing of a boundary between a normal “us” and a bizarre “them,” thus continually providing a reassuring answer to Tim’s rhetorical question of who in fact was “weird.” Indeed, his question of “Are you weird or am I weird?” seemed to make crystal clear all the judgments that had been and would be implied in this session on health and safety in Ecuador, all while modeling this way of talking about Ecuadorians as “weird” as legitimate group practice.

Then, before long a few volunteers had, at the invitation of Tim and April, begun to participate in the ritual, as evidenced when the volunteer raised her hand to share her own knowledge of the additional “scam” of intoxicant-laced fliers and again, when another volunteer had offered her confirmation by sharing that she knew “someone who that happened to.” In the
meantime, Ecuador and Ecuadorians were produced as objects to be known, decoded, figured out, labeled, classified, and, to be discussed amongst each other with a sort of unfazed sarcastic humor, a sort of studied coolness that showed that one was fully versed in and casually amused (rather than flustered) by their “weirdness.” Through this ritual of sharing information about Ecuador, Ecuadorians, and Ecuadorian “culture,” an intersubjectivity began to take shape, generated specifically through the collective activity of talking about, asking about, and listening to “facts” about “them.” In this way, volunteers were also being invited and actively entitled by the statements of the field directors to authoritatively know Ecuador and Ecuadorians, and to know them not only as “other,” but also in terms of their own safety and welfare (and the safety and welfare of the visiting US-American subject, more generally), and to relate to this knowing as a foundational aspect or even condition of their membership in the group (in other words, the actual substance of their claims on a shared sense of “we”).

Over the next week, the field directors and additional invited speakers continued to initiate the volunteers into this ritual of sharing information about Ecuador and Ecuadorians, leading volunteers through a multitude of sessions, many of which were interactive and devoted some time to have volunteers fit their daily experiences and internal observations and perceptions into prescribed ways of talking about Ecuador. In this way, as Ecuador and Ecuadorians became the central topics of conversation, they were produced not only as something for the field directors to explain, but also for volunteers to comment upon and discuss amongst each other. Further, volunteers were repeatedly positioned, through the nature of the sessions, as critics, keen observers, and comedians. This was evidenced just a few days later on what was Day Four of the month long orientation.

After spending their first weekend with their Quito host families, the volunteers had, as instructed by the Orientation schedule, reconvened at 9 o’clock that morning in the fifth floor conference room of Hotel Bolivar. Seated at rows of rectangular tables adorned with starched white linens, people busied themselves in various ways, chatting with their neighbors, leafing through the dark green orientation binder they had been provided with, taking sips from the
customary Nalgene water bottles that many of them carried. Others focused on pinching and prying open the cellophane wrappers of cookies and potato chips, procured from the snack table laid out for them at the front of the room. I noticed more than a few yawns and bleary eyes. There was a long day of sessions listed on the itinerary – “Ecuaisms”, a guided review of the program’s Handbook to Surviving Ecuador\(^\text{27}\) that had been distributed to volunteers on day one of Orientation (Surviving Ecuador, hereafter). But the first order of business would be storytelling.

Standing at the front of the conference room and dressed in a fuchsia top and black pants, April greeted the group. “How is everyone doing?” she asked excitedly. “How was the weekend?” She paused expectantly for a moment. Looking up at her, people smiled and nodded. A male voice called out “Awesome!” A female voice shouted, “Great!” April continued, “Does anyone have any stories from the weekend? Any host family stories?” One volunteer answered, “My family had some political discussions.” Smiling, April responded, “Great. Any others?”

At this point, Josh raised his hand, “Well, I missed my stop on the Ecovía\(^\text{28}\) this morning,” he began, generating a few giggles among the group. As people turned to look at him, he began recounting his tale to the group, telling them that when he had realized he had missed his stop he had waited for the next stop, “y’know, hoping that it was not more than 3 turns.” Again people laughed, this time more heartily, perhaps imagining themselves in Josh’s shoes or simply picturing the situation. The intensity of their attention increased as they waited with anticipation to hear what happened next. Josh continued, “So, I finally got off the Ecovía and as I’m standing on the street I feel a wetness on my leg.” Once again the group laughed, this time quieting down quickly for the imminent conclusion. “And, so I look down and a woman has her little boy there and he’s peeing on the street.” The room erupted into a chorus of laughter, guffaws, giggles, with shaking and nodding of heads and a few exclamations of “Oh my God!” As they engaged in collective laughter, they appeared to enjoy this moment on a visceral level. Laughing himself and with his face flushing slightly, Josh continued on to the final thread of his story, and people again

\(^{27}\) Title reworded for purposes of anonymity.

\(^{28}\) The Ecovía is a contingent of bus lines that form part of Quito’s public transportation system.
quieted down momentarily to hear what he would say next. “I mean, the little boy wasn’t peeing on me, but I definitely got some of the spray.” Another ripple of laughter spread through the crowd. “Awesome!” one person called. Looking pleased with the success of his story, Josh sat back down.

During his impromptu performance, April had oscillated between laughing and performatively hiding her laughter by turning her face decidedly downward. Now, smiling and stifling a laugh, she said, “Actually, that’s very common, to see women with little boys and to just have them drop-pant in the middle of the street and pee.” The laughing died down and April asked for more stories. A young woman shared that she noticed that in public restrooms the toilet paper was located on the outside of the stall and that people tended to cut in lines.

Over the next week, the field directors and additional invited speakers continued to initiate the volunteers into this ritual of sharing information about Ecuador and Ecuadorians, leading volunteers through a panoply of sessions, many of which were interactive and devoted some time to having volunteers fit their daily experiences and internal observations and perceptions into prescribed ways of talking about Ecuador. In this way, as Ecuador and Ecuadorians became the central topics of conversation, they were produced not only as something for the field directors to explain, but also for volunteers to comment upon and discuss amongst each other. Further, by virtue of the particular format used to structure the sessions volunteers were repeatedly positioned as critics, keen observers, and comedians.

I came to see these talks as a form of discursive colonization (Mohanty, 1984), in which the field directors and invited speakers positioned themselves as authorities on Ecuadorian culture, people, and systems and proceeded to teach “us” about “them.” During such talks, the field directors’ subjectivities indeed became the implicit referent; i.e. “the yardstick by which to encode and represent cultural Others” (p. 336). As Mohanty states, “It is in this move that power is exercised in discourse” (Ibid). Over the course of these talks, a country was indeed discursively produced not only as categorically dangerous, dirty, and disorderly, but also as an object of US-American scrutiny as US-American people made themselves authoritative judges on
the social and human realities of Ecuador, and implicitly invited other US-Americans to take the same position, informally initiating them into the same evaluative “expert” role that they assumed with respect to Ecuador. Moreover, under these particular Western eyes, the evaluative criterion centered on how the particular country did or did not facilitate the survival of Western people; in the meantime, the heterogeneities of Ecuadorian society were reductively defined in terms of what degree of purported threat they posed to the welfare of the volunteers.

This dynamic was repeated even more powerfully on Day 5 of Orientation when the volunteers received yet another “Safety Talk,” this one delivered by Bob Monroe, an invited speaker who had apparently developed a reputation. On Day 3 of Orientation, Jason, a current volunteer in Quito who had been enlisted to help the volunteers buy cell phones stood at the front of the room. Before launching into an overview about the cell phone system in Ecuador, he made sure to ask the group if they had “met Bob Monroe yet.” When they responded that they had not, he simply chuckled cryptically, shaking his head.

When the hour of the “Safety Talk” finally arrived two days later, the volunteers sat in their customary rows, a sense of anticipation in the air as the famed Bob Monroe stood at the front of the room, chatting with field directors. He was a white US-American man, in his mid to late forties, and his current title (as listed on the itinerary) was Personnel Recovery Specialist. I would later learn that he was also a former U.S. Army officer. As he began his talk he smiled at the group, and shared in a raspy, southern accented voice that he was from Kentucky and now lived in Ecuador with his wife and children. Wasting no more time, he began by informing them first of the “natural disasters” that could take place in Ecuador, telling them that there were “all kinds of things that can mess up your day.” On the coast there were “tsunamis and floods” and in the sierra there were “volcanoes and earthquakes.” With those details out of the way, he shifted gears, launching decisively into a more performatively delivered set of remarks that I have reproduced below along with some descriptive notes:

“On any given day, there are between 20 and 25 thousand Americans in Quito. That’s a lot of folks.” A ripple of laughter sounded from volunteers. “Now, as a responsible citizen, as I know you all are because you’re teachers, it’s good to be self-sufficient.” As Bob Monroe spoke, a
red dot of light danced through the text on the screen, apparently controlled by a small laser pointer he held in his right hand. The word, “Responsibilities” soon appeared at the top of the screen, followed by the word, “Yours,” and a bullet pointed list:

- Documents in order
- Emergency numbers
- Food, water, basic emergency supplies on hand
- Register at your consulate
- Know what to do

He continued. “It is possible there will be an evacuation…In the event of an evacuation, people are normally flown or carried to a safe haven, and things are normally hectic. If this happens while you are here, if you are evacuated you will be probably be taken to Florida.”

The word “Target” appeared on the screen, replacing the bullet list that had come before. “Now, the United States has Ecuador listed as being in the critical crime category. In this country, crime is epidemic. I could share plenty of horror stories with you right now. Keep in mind, you will probably be victimized during your year here. But you can make yourself a harder target with your attitude. But don’t be worried – enjoy your time here. But do be a harder target. Take an active role in your safety. Most thieves are lazy. They look for the easy target. Be a harder target. Be observant. Be cautious.”

The next slide was entitled “Bus Travel.” Bob Monroe continued. “Ecuadorian bus drivers, they’re all irresponsible and they’re all overloaded. Like I said, you need to be careful, alert. Try to sit right behind the driver and be aware of overloaded buses. Understand that you will probably be victimized on the bus, and so you should only carry the essentials…Moving onto outdoor activities.”

The words “Outdoor Activities” appeared on the screen at the front of the room. “Always let someone know where you are going and when you will be back. When you go out walking or jogging, do not wear headphones. There was a woman who worked for the Embassy in Ecuador and one day she went jogging. She was wearing headphones. As she stepped off a curb into the street, she was hit by an oncoming bus and instantly killed. Instantly killed. You should also wear bright reflective clothing, always carry your I.D.’s, and always carry your cell phones. Also, dress appropriately and, if you are going hiking, bring a jacket. One American went out hiking and got lost. He hadn’t brought a jacket and by the time he was found he had hypothermia.

Okay, let’s talk about walking around and crime. Do not walk alone. I urge all of you to use the buddy system and not to walk at night. You’ve gotta remember, the cops are worthless. Here’s just an example. For a while, there was a rapist living at the top of Pichincha for an extended period of time. This person would rob groups of foreigners and rape female foreigners. This went on for a while and nothing happened until the Swiss, Germans, and the United States captured the mayor and threatened to put out a travel warning. After this, the guy was caught in two days…”

Looking around the room, I found a captivated audience. Volunteers sat rapt with attention, mutually entrained on every detail of every “horror story” being recounted for them. Except for the sound of Bob Monroe’s voice and the sounds of passing traffic from the street, the room was silent. Most maintained sober and grim expressions, while a few young women shot each other silent looks of worry, widening their eyes and lifting their eyebrows. One woman reacted quite demonstratively, fidgeting, putting her head down, and shifting in her seat quite dramatically during several of his anecdotes (particularly those that dealt with crime), almost as though trying to wriggle out of hearing or knowing this information that he presented.

[Pichincha is a mountainous hiking area in Quito that is popular among foreign tourists.]
Back at the front of the room, Bob Monroe continued. “You’ve gotta remember, a thief is a two-bit hood, a thug, a bonehead, a knucklehead. He’s scared, he’s lazy, he’s a thief. Do not try to be a hero. Don’t be stupid. I can tell you, there was one American man in Quito who fought back against a thief trying to rob him. And you know what happened? The thief shot him. The man gave him his money. You know what happened next? The thief shot him four times in the stomach. I can tell you another story. Just last week, my wife was leaving the Supermaxi in the middle of the day and a thief robbed her at gunpoint. Yes, at gunpoint. As she left the store, a gun was shoved in her face and she was told to give up her money…

Now, as far as the medical system, it is not what you are used to by any stretch. Ambulances usually do not have medical equipment and the level of care one will get in an ambulance is poor. Once you get to the hospital, what you get there probably won’t be much better…most of the doctors in hospitals are fairly incompetent.

Now, to close, just some general stuff. Don’t go through your stuff on the street. What is typical in the states is not typical here. Gringos are targets. Carry very little. Only the necessities. With respect to jewelry, only wear what you can afford to lose. Get educated. Let someone know where you are going and when you should arrive and return…We will not rest until we help you return. If you know or think someone is isolated, call me. Thank you.”

A brief silence passed and the volunteers clapped politely. The screen went blank and Bob Monroe began to pack up his things. In their seats, people quietly turned to each other and slowly began talking, their faces drawn into expressions of apprehension and concern. Through the low din of chatter, I heard several female voices exclaim with slightly exaggerated panic, “I wanna go home!”

Bob Monroe had indeed crafted a frightening tale of an Ecuador that was unequivocally dangerous and particularly so for US-Americans, whom he had identified as “targets.” He had made good on his promise of “horror stories,” sharing anecdote after anecdote about US-Americans that had been seriously injured or killed while in Ecuador. Through these stories and his no-confidence statements about Ecuadorian public officials, Ecuador emerged as a place overrun with thieves and rapists, ill equipped with useless medical facilities and non-existent public safety, and run by people that were irresponsible, inept, and, perhaps even indifferent to citizen welfare.

However, additionally, he had modeled for them a particular way of imagining and talking about Ecuador and Ecuadorians that was based not only on fear but a lens of deficit, as well. His casual references to worthless cops, incompetent doctors, and inept city officials who only got their act together when the United States intervened were statements that reproduced and mobilized dominant Northern/Western constructions of “developing” countries. Moreover, he communicated that both thinking about and conceiving certain figures (figures typically granted a certain respect, no less) in these countries in disparaging ways was an acceptable, even
common-sense, way of knowing them. His descriptions of these particular Ecuadoreans, which bordered on hate-speech, were presented as acceptable statements and even essential truths. Moreover, at no point during his talk or during Orientation, for that matter, were volunteers presented with alternative explanations or discussions of crime in Ecuador or alternative representations of Ecuadorean officials. Rather, Bob Monroe’s reductive portrait of “bonehead” thieves and his picture of a dysfunctional Ecuadorean society was positioned as the authoritative word.

In making sense of these talks, one way to begin is to recall that field directors and invited speakers were not neutral parties invited to lecture to just anyone on Ecuador. Rather, they had been charged with the task of helping the organization to keep the volunteers safe by instructing and successfully impressing upon them to take certain measures to preserve their lives and wellbeing while in Ecuador. With this as the guiding rationale, we can begin to consider how achieving volunteer compliance with the mandate of conscientiously and continually taking safety precautions becomes the objective. And what better way to ensure volunteer compliance, the field directors and Bob Monroe seemed to have reasoned, than by terrifying them into giving it with stories of what would happen to them if they did not? Here then emerges perhaps the simplest, most straightforward possible explanation with respect to the speakers’ seeming investment in grabbing the volunteers’ attention with the most horrific stories imaginable, constructing volunteers as “targets,” and inundating them with precise tips for avoiding similar fates.

In this light, such a practice begins to take shape as an attempt to govern the volunteer in a way that ideally minimizes the possibility that any ill fate will befall him while under the care of Global Community. And here we must realize that such an outcome would not only be tragic and thus undesirable but, in the international volunteering industry, also bad for business. In basic terms, if bad things happened to Global Community volunteers, word would surely spread and the reputation of the organization would be on the line and, most likely, seriously damaged. In this way, one could argue, there was a clear business logic being followed in the presentation of
these talks and their particular tone, tenor, and content. However, what else was taking place? What were the side effects of such a practice and its infinite obedience to a volunteer-as-consumer business model?

First, through these talks, volunteer welfare was centered and mobilized as the lens through which the country was defined. In the process, Ecuador was discussed, and as a result defined, almost exclusively in terms of the ways in which it threatened volunteers' physical welfare and wellbeing. Another effect was that by strategically fostering a sense of danger and carefully working to erode any confidence in the competence of Ecuadorian officials, the country became defined as decidedly unruly. In other words, the image of the country that was most expedient for the organization's particular purpose of protecting the volunteer became, among the volunteers, the controlling definition of Ecuador.

This image can be situated in a broader historic US-American discourse on Latin America that has accompanied US empire in the region since the late 19th century. Moreover, the program’s constructions of Ecuadorian otherness (and more specifically, Ecuadorian unruliness, danger, and disorder) and its mobilization of these constructions during the Orientation can be understood as indexing the circulation of a discourse akin to Orientalism, which Said conceptualized as a European system of knowledge about “the Orient” that flourished during European colonial expansion into Asia. Said famously identified such a discourse as being foundational to 18th century European systems of colonialism in Asia, arguing that the act of describing, depicting and knowing “the Orient” from the self-ordained position of expert was in and of itself one of multiple channels through which European authority over the Orient was exercised. For Said, Orientalism has been at once about knowing, illustrating, depicting, and representing the Orient from a position of hegemonic dominance and creating a very specific Oriental “Other” – an “irrational, depraved (fallen), childlike, ‘different,’” (p. 40) Oriental Other that enables the assertion of a “rational, virtuous, mature, ‘normal’” (Ibid) European. In this way, Orientalism was and has continued to be a key exercise of European authority over the Orient, but it has also been a way in which this exercise of authority along with other forms of power
(political domination, economic control, moral and cultural rule), which comprise a broader exercise of imperial hegemony, have been ideologically shored up by the particular content of its constructs.

In highlighting how Global Community Ecuador’s construction of Ecuador followed the rules of authoritative knowing that characterize Orientalist discourse, and by understanding this construction to be situated in a context of US imperialism outlined in previous chapters, we can begin to see how Global Community Ecuador, as an institution that is one among many within a larger international volunteer industry, plays a critical role in the production of the Other that Heron (2007) alludes to, as well as the planetary consciousness that, she argues, depends for its existence on the production of this Other. Heron valuably cites Western media imagery and travel literature as key producers of discursive Third World constructions like the ones described above. However, these practices of Global Community Ecuador illustrate how the international volunteer organization itself acts not only as a vital, connecting link or conduit between these broadly circulating constructions and the volunteer subject, but also as a producer of such constructions in its own right. Moreover, as the foregoing has illustrated, the discursive construction of an inferior Third World and a superior First World volunteer subject, entitled and obligated not only to intervene for the betterment of an inferiorized other wherever he may reside (to be discussed in Chapter 10) but also to authoritatively know, describe, evaluate and judge and inferiorize the cultures and peoples that form the target of the development intervention, is something that happens as the organization endeavors to train, instruct, and ultimately, govern the behavior and disposition of the volunteer.

However, in addition to constructing a volunteer subject that might be understood as the effect of a familiar and age-old imperialist discourse, I suggest that these safety sessions to which volunteers were subjected were also ones that attempted to govern the volunteer and produce her as a subject that comported with the ethic of a neoliberalist security discourse, that is the subject which, according to Nikolas Rose (1996), is “an active and responsible agent in the securing of security for themselves and those to whom they are or should be affiliated” (p. 335).
The emergence of this subject, Rose argues, has been part of the “death of the social,” or the transformation by which the traditional object or territory of government has gone from being society, conventionally imagined as a massive, broadly undifferentiated, territorially bound entity to be governed as a whole, to community, envisioned as one of many discrete, often non-territorialized assemblages, each with its own distinct and organic-seeming identity, each comprised of actors equally responsible for their own welfare and the welfare of their particular community. As part of this reconfiguration, Rose contends, states have continued to withdraw from traditional security provision (i.e. socially funded police forces and insurance programs), which has accordingly been reimagined as less the responsibility of the state and more so that of the individual (whose efforts are to be combined with the efforts of other community members to produce a condition of security for the whole community).

As it happens, security figures centrally in the schema of biopolitics. In fact, in fleshing out the distinctions between anatomo-politics (i.e. disciplinary power) and biopolitics, Foucault (2003) emphasizes that while the former may be thought of as a technology of repetition and direct manipulation of the body for purposes of making it as productive as possible, the latter is, by contrast, “a technology of security” (p. 249); this is because biopolitics is concerned primarily with optimizing the health and vitality of the species body. Moreover, this centrality of security, he argues, is what accounts for the state’s taking of life, even as it is concerned primarily with the optimization of life. The taking of life is done in the name of not only preserving the life of the population but also improving the general health of this life. And in this way, the otherwise sovereign power act of killing is not only incorporated into the biopolitical regime, but is redefined as an act of preserving and improving the life of the population.

The more important point for this discussion, however, is that in order to make the case that some person or group of people must be killed in order to protect and improve the life of the population, the state relies upon and activates racism as the mechanism through which to do this. In his discussion, Foucault defines modern racism as the biologicist sub-dividing of the human species into races and the defining of some races as good and others as inferior. In this bio-
frame, those races that are designated inferior are imagined not so much as political enemies that must be overpowered and eliminated by the state, but rather as biological threats to the race, its health, purity, welfare, and ultimately, its life. Thus as biopolitics is concerned with security and security is defined as preserving the biological race, the taking of life becomes justified as a necessary way of providing this security. In the meantime, racism – that is, the creation of an “other,” of a “those people over there” (p. 257) – becomes the mechanism through which the decisions around who is to be killed (and who is to be protected) are made and rationalized. Additionally, racism and security of the race become the rationale for the taking of life, an act which otherwise contradicts the logic of biopolitical power.

Foucault’s development of this argument is motivated or compelled by his attempt to account for killing carried out by biopolitical states. In recent years, scholars have drawn on his framework as a way of situating and analyzing contemporary events such as the “war on terror,” focusing specifically on the ways in which the killing carried out in its name is rationalized in terms of security and how those who are killed are always described and conjured in racializing ways that paint them as both inferior and threatening to the human population of the United States, and the Western world, more generally (see, for example, Kelly, 2001; Puar 2007). Here, I suggest that the Health and Safety talks of Global Community constituted an additional use of state racism, one in which the creation of a dangerous other was being deployed in an effort to actually govern a group of (non-racialized) subjects – that is, to encourage, cajole, instruct, and guide them in ordering their conduct in particular ways – and that these ways accorded in fact with the demands of advanced liberal or neoliberal societies which require the subject to become “an active and responsible agent in the securing of security for themselves and those to whom they are or should be affiliated” (Rose, 1996, p. 335). As with the production of a superior Northern/Western subject, this would-be production of a self-securing neoliberal subject was also made dependent upon the production of an inferior (and “dangerous”) “other,” the imperial and the neoliberal thus existing in a symbiotic relation.
As it turned out, the volunteers’ statements and apparent beliefs about Ecuador began to reflect back the content of the program’s Ecuador discourse relatively quickly. This was illustrated for example on that same Day 2 of Orientation mentioned at the beginning of this section. Once April had finished collecting the aforementioned stories from the volunteers about their weekends, she moved on to the focus of the session, an activity that was entitled “Ecuaisms” on the Orientation itinerary.

“Can you pass these around?” she said to two volunteers who sat nearby. She handed them each a thin stack of fluorescent green notecards. As people took one and passed, April directed their attention to the fact that each card had written on it a word or a phrase. She informed them that they were going to go outside and find a person on the street and ask them what their assigned word meant. A few people chuckled. At this point, the door to the conference room creaked open and Leslie’s face appeared on the other side. As everyone turned to look toward the sound of the door, Tim greeted her with a relaxed smile and a discreet welcome.

“Come on, Leslie,” he said, quietly. I noticed her eyes were wide and she was out of breath. It was the first day that the volunteers had been required to find their way from their host families’ homes to Orientation, which was not in the original location of the language institute or in the hotel where they had stayed the first night but rather in a different hotel several blocks away. As April continued in her introduction of the activity, Leslie entered the room, exhaled loudly, and found a seat.

Back at the front of the room, April told the volunteers that that they did not have to complete the activity alone and reassured them that if their Spanish was “not so strong” they could pair up with a fellow volunteer who spoke Spanish well. She then added that the Ecuadorian passers-by they approached and solicited for explanations of their assigned words would most likely be tickled and simply say, “Oh, what a funny gringo.” People rose from their seats, and began to walk to the door. Some walked in pairs or small groups, chatting amongst each other. Others walked alone. Leslie, however, stayed behind. When the last volunteer had exited the room, she got up and walked toward April, who had remained at the front of the room.
They exchanged greetings and Leslie quickly began. "I had the crappiest morning," she said. April’s eyes widened. "Why? What happened?" she asked. "Well, I fell off the bus," Leslie explained in an exasperated voice. "And when I was on the bus a guy tried to rob me." "Oh nooooo," April trilled, a mix of sympathy and alarm inflecting her voice. Leslie continued, explaining that the would-be thief had begun cutting through the strap of her bag, pantomiming the action as she spoke. "Oh nooooo," April repeated. "Were you wearing it [the backpack] in front of you?" she asked, referencing an anti-pick-pocketing safety technique she and Tim had impressed upon the volunteers on the first day of Orientation. Leslie gave a muffled reply and went on to add that, during the altercation, an older man next to her had called out, "No molestes a la gringa!" "Oh, okay, good, so he was on your side!" April exclaimed. "Yeah," Leslie replied, "I was like, ‘Yeah don’t molest me!’" They both laughed. "Well, I’m so sorry that happened to you." April said. "Yeah, well I still have my stuff, so..." Leslie replied, “and even in an organized place, shit happens.”

To reiterate, Leslie had arrived in Ecuador three days earlier and this was the second official day of the month-long Orientation. And yet, despite her incredibly brief time in the country she now professed to know that it was decidedly not an “organized place.” Her choice of the word “organized” was striking as it directly echoed the language of the lengthy Manual that the organization had mailed to all volunteers in the months leading up to their departure for Ecuador. In the 150-page bound document the word disorganized had appeared multiple times as a descriptor articulated by former volunteers, the guide’s author, and the organization’s executive director, and often in tandem with other similar words and phrases such as inefficient. A blurb provided by a former volunteer read, “I think the biggest problem at the University is the disorganization. The office is closed at inconvenient hours. Supervisors are late to meetings, if they decide to show up at all. It is hard to request classrooms for review sessions, etc. Paychecks are often late. However, with some persistence, these issues have always been resolved.” Echoing this description were the words of another previous volunteer, also quoted in the guide: “I
never realized that the lack of textbooks, copiers, blackboards and general disorganization would be such a problem — I thought that I would more or less be teaching from a book.”

While it was not possible to know if the liberal usage of the word disorganization in the guide directly influenced Leslie’s assessment of Ecuador as not “an organized place,” I suggest that she was making that statement within a sort of “field of truth” that recognized that claim as valid and accurate. Furthermore, this idea that Ecuador was characterized by social disorder had been mobilized several days earlier on the first day of Orientation. As it turned out, and as the following section illustrates, Leslie’s understanding of Ecuador reflected how she, and many of her fellow volunteers would come to understand the country over the course of the year.

7.3 “What Works Your Last Nerve About Ecuador?”

Every year, approximately 5 months into the volunteer stint, Global Community holds a “Mid-Point Conference,” an obligatory two-day event planned and facilitated by field directors and held at an eco-hosteria that sits on a private beach in a small coastal town. On the first morning of the conference, I fell into step with Trevor. We were each coming from the direction of the breakfast area, en route to the first session of the day. Pebbles crunching underfoot, we trudged our way along the path that connected the dining area to the open air space where the daily sessions were to be held. Leslie, Kayla, and Kelsey, three volunteers who had become fast friends in Orientation walked ahead of us, engaged in a lively debate. “They’re deciding in the Harry Potter universe which Harry Potter house they would live in,” Trevor explained. After confessing that I had never read the series, he reassured me, “That’s okay. I was big into ‘em when I was littler but I didn’t continue with the same gusto.” Pausing for a moment, he seemed to search for something to say. “I like how every room has a fireplace,” he quipped sarcastically, referring to the guest rooms of the resort. Laughing he continued, “We’re on the equator at the coast, like…” Waving to some volunteers who stood nearby, he asked if they were ready for the beach bonfire that was scheduled for that night. Turning back to me he said, “I love fire, but it’s best when you have marshmallows and graham crackers and Hershey’s chocolate.”
Trevor was a 22-year-old volunteer from a very small town in South Dakota. Before coming to Ecuador he had traveled twice outside of the United States, once to France for a study abroad program and once to Cancun for a spring break vacation, where, he said, he had “just laid on the beach.” Because he had not spoken any Spanish at the time, he told me, he did not think that the latter trip “really counted.” During his senior year of college Trevor had applied to Global Community, he told me, to “have a few more experiences” before entering law school and also to “gain perspective.”

Back on the path, the conversation hit a lull, and I looked down at my copy of the day’s schedule, reading aloud the title of the first session: “What works your last nerve about Ecuador?” Trevor took the opportunity to weigh in. “Ohh, I—When I came here I was less than patient and I still view things in that way – when stuff just takes way, way longer than I feel like it should, to get something done. I really don’t like those showers, when you have to choose between frigid shower or zero water pressure. I don’t like that.” He paused for a moment before continuing, “I don’t know, I’m generally okay here. I don’t have any—I think some people are just like, like, I don’t know, they’re like, “Oh, Ecuador.” Then he added, “I think some things that happen here would bother me much more in the United States, like, ’cause here I can just be like, okay, the cultural norms, what is the social etiquette – etiquette is completely different. So I just, when I see stuff that I think like, “Oh, that is so rude,” instead of getting upset I’m just like, “I’m in Ecuador. It’s actually not…so rude.” I asked him for an example, and he replied, “Well, there’s always the big questions: “Do you have a girlfriend? What religion are you? How much do you weigh? How much did you pay for that?” Y’know, “How much money do you earn every week?” That kind of stuff, and it’s like, “Well, I guess I’ll just tell you.” Trevor listed a few more grievances: the ways in which people deboarded buses, students that begged for him to cancel class, what he perceived as the disorganization at the institution where he taught.

This was not the first I was hearing of Trevor’s reflections on his life in Ecuador. In a previous conversation he had spoken at length about the different things that irked him in Ecuador. Indeed, like many volunteers, Trevor’s entry into life in Ecuador had been somewhat
jarring. After completing the 4-week orientation, he had traveled to Riobamba, where he had moved in with his host family, begun his teaching assignment, and attempted to navigate life in a city, language, and bureaucratic system that were completely foreign to him. Traveling to Riobamba, he had managed to miss his stop when he could not get from his seat in the back to the door in the front in time, and had ended up an hour away in a tiny town with no cell phone service. The next bus going back to Riobamba had not come for another hour. Then, upon arrival, he had gotten off to what he thought was a good start with his "host parents," but had apparently managed to offend his "host father" but did not know how he had done it, and with his limited Spanish could not figure out how rectify the matter. On his first day of teaching, he had remembered to take his house key with him but during the bus ride home that evening, he had realized that he did not know the address of the house. When he called the daughter of the couple he lived with to obtain the information, she had informed him that there was no number on the house. He had roamed the neighborhood for 30 minutes, none of the houses striking him as familiar, until his "host mother" saw him on her way home from work and picked him up. During the first week in the town, he had made a trip to open a bank account at the bank recommended by the director of his school, but could not understood the majority of what was being said to him by the bank representative, and was not successful in bringing the necessary papers until the fourth visit. In the meantime, he had been eager to rent a P.O. box at the local post office so that he could receive packages from his family back in South Dakota, however, he had not been able to make it there during the hours it was open, as it was closed during the lunch hour that he had free during the week and not open at all on the weekends. Then there was the line at the local copy store, where he made a daily pilgrimage to prepare materials for his classes. Everyday, when it came to his turn, at least two people would usurp his place in the line and make their copies while he stood watching in bewilderment.

Trevor was not unique. Indeed, as they began their lives in their field placements, many of his peers had also experienced more than a few mishaps, misunderstandings, inconveniences, and irritations. And, like Trevor had reported, throughout all of this many of them had been, or
had struggled with being, “less than patient.” Like Trevor, they were often irritated when, as he put it that morning at the Mid-Point Conference, “stuff just takes way, way longer than I feel like it should.” What was striking about their narratives of irritation is that they were also characterized by a will to diagnose the cause of the offending events and to do so in a more or less uniform way that was strikingly reminiscent of the ways in which Ecuador writ large had been constructed in the pre-departure Manual and in the Orientation sessions (described above). Indeed, in their narratives, volunteers often struggled to make sense of the way things worked in Ecuador – and, not able to glean any particular order, many concluded that there was none. Thus, as they witnessed or experienced events that disrupted their senses of order, time, or logic, their response was to issue a charge of disorganization, inefficiency, or lack of sense. Such charges were particularly intense when volunteers felt personally inconvenienced by the offending event. This was illustrated in Amanda’s comments:

> Anything that you do. You go pick up a package. You have to wait in line 4 times and sign 10 different papers and pay at 3 different windows. It’s like, “Why do you need that much paperwork for one thing? One package.” And you can’t pay your bills with a check. You have to go to 5 different places to pay 5 different bills… I’d say technologically Ecuador is about 25 years behind the States. And if I make a comparison with my dad, the computer’s kind of like Ecuador, the technology – my dad still can’t turn on a computer. So, a lot of people here are probably still in that mindset.
>
> Over the course of fieldwork, I listened as many engaged in the exact same process, expressing frustration with how things were done in Ecuador, questioning it, challenging it, complaining about it, and diagnosing it. This was illustrated in Amanda’s comments as well as something Nicholas, a 23-year-old from Long Island, said one day. “Everything is so much more laid back here,” he told me, “but to a fault where it’s inefficient at some points and some things that are done like road work, certain procedures in stores just blow my mind like, ‘Why are you doing that?’ “The time of day when they do roadwork is the busiest time and I imagine there must be a reason but for me it just makes no sense.”
>
> Backward, inefficient, slow, disorganized, dysfunctional, “no sense” -- these were the terms that dominated the ways in which volunteers often spoke about Ecuador. These terms were compelling for several reasons. First, they seemed to give voice to real senses of frustration and
exasperation volunteers were dealing with as they continually tried to function in, what was for them, a new and unfamiliar environment, where unlike their home contexts in the United States, they simply did not know how things worked. This meant that in their daily lives they were continually met by perceived obstacles that slowed them down and tripped them up as they were for example, forced to be late to a class they were teaching because they had underestimated how long it would taken them to make copies at the local copy shop, to go without clean clothes for a day or two because they had assumed the laundromats would be open on a Sunday afternoon, or to have to make several trips to the bank to open an account because they had misunderstood which documents were needed.

At the risk of armchair psychologizing, it often appeared that by applying such labels to a country that they were not able to successfully navigate at the moment, the volunteers were in a sense “projecting” their own senses of personal disorder, dysfunction, inefficiency, and slowness. It was indeed remarkable the air of confidence with which they proceeded to diagnose the country and the ways in which this diagnosing deflected attention from the simple fact that they just did not understand how things worked. Instead of considering that there was perhaps an order, a system, an organization to things and that they just did not understand it, it was easier, it seemed – or, from their point of view as US-Americans in a “Third World” country, genuinely more plausible - to write the entire country off as objectively disorganized and perpetually problematic.

Moreover, the terms that they used and the diagnosing they engaged were also words and practices that they seemed to have at the ready for dealing with internal sensations of disorientation and here, it has to be highlighted that these words and practices were also ones that Global Community had introduced them to. In the pre-departure guides, the word “disorganized” or “disorganization” in reference to aspects of Ecuador appeared 5 times, with two of these appearances occurring in the note from Global Community’s executive director (see Introduction). They were terms that gave expression to the picture of Ecuador that had been repeatedly hammered home over the course of Orientation (a place where local officials could not be depended on, where robbery was rampant, and where one could not simply live but had to
“survive”). They also reflected a perception of Ecuador that mirrored the one expressed by Leslie on the morning that she explained her lateness to Orientation by claiming to have been almost robbed on the bus (“Even in an organized place, shit happens,” she had said).

In these ways, they came to embody the subject position of the superior Westerner who is also the knowing critic. This was a subject position, I suggest, that had been held up for them during Orientation and which they were, over the course of the year, perpetually stepping into as a way of dealing with and processing senses of confusion, disorientation, and related frustration.

Notably, while volunteers often had grievances with the imagined general culture and society of Ecuador, the prime culprit for them was most often the institutions where they taught. Upon beginning their teaching assignments, many were quickly baffled and frustrated by certain logistical and administrative aspects they encountered at their schools. For example, as Julie began teaching, she was immediately thrown by certain changes that were made to her teaching schedule and student composition. The director informed her that her students were adolescents (not adults, as she had originally been told). In addition, for the first few weeks of school she had no teacher’s manual version of the textbook, and while the director of the school had informed her that the administrative office would order one for her, in the end, it would never in fact materialize. Then, there was the issue of being paid on time, something that several volunteers experienced and found incredibly frustrating. Others bemoaned in disapproving tones of the frequent cancellation of classes they encountered. This was illustrated in Trevor’s case:

The administration tells us the night before, “There’s a strike tomorrow, no class.” This has happened like five times out of an 8 or 9-week cycle. We’ve missed 5 days of class just because of strikes and we only have 4 classes a week. I mean that’s a lot of time that we missed just because—or, also I teach at night, and this was during power rationing. When the power went out, we just went home because they didn’t have candles, or I don’t know. So, we missed a lot of class because of the power, which was a little ridiculous. And then sometimes they would also tell us, like they wanted to do a Thanksgiving project. They had a Halloween project, like three different projects that never got done. But also, meetings. They say, “Come to this meeting.” And, we show up, and then they say, “There is no meeting,” or they say, “The meeting is tomorrow.” We show up. It’s just the head of the department, myself and my colleague, who is from Global Community. Oh and my favorite thing was the director told my [Global Community] colleague and I at least three times, “We’re going to go on a trip. It’s going to be fun. I’ll pay for everything. We’re going to go this weekend.” And then we wouldn’t go. So, 3
different weekends I was thinking, “Are we going? Are we not going?” And we never went. It’s just disorganized.

Peggy, a 71-year-old volunteer from Minneapolis had a similar response to what she perceived as frequent cancellation of classes. She told me:

P: The structure of the university boggles the mind. In a university in Minnesota, let’s say, the only time you’d ever cancel a class is that the professor was probably on their deathbed or there was a snow day. You had to cancel class because nobody could get there. Those were the only things I ever remember canceling class for, ever. Here, they cancel class because it’s a political day or it’s a dance in the hall day. It’s all these things, so you’re in the middle of the class and they’ll come in and say, “Oh, they’re canceling class at 5:00.” You lose the momentum and it just is so frustrating. The kids know, my students know how much I hate it because the look on my face is like, “Oh, no. Not again.” They go, “Oh, yay.” They realize it’s a bad thing. You lose continuity. You certainly lose time and teaching. It just doesn’t make any sense to me at all, at all.

C: You said reason for cancellations could be a political day?

P: Yeah, or the teachers are going to have cafecito [coffee] together because it’s someone’s birthday, truly. That’s happened three times. Or, the professors are having a meeting – and, the one meeting they cancelled class for was because they were having some group get-together where they had presents for each other and were drinking whiskey. It’s like things that you go, “What is this?” It just doesn’t even fit within my paradigm of why you cancel classes.

C: The political day. What is that?

P: That’s when the students were having elections to see who was going to represent the student body somehow. I guess there are certain parties that function. Again, I’m not always sure of what exactly is happening because I don’t have the language background to get all the nuances, but I know that class is cancelled. That I know.

Peggy’s account illustrates an apparent conflict between her own normative framework and that of the university, or at least the department of the university, where she taught. For her, the frequent cancellation of class for reasons that, to her, seemed frivolous and, as she put it, “just didn’t make any sense to me at all.” One might hypothesize that at the university where she taught, the importance of social cohesion and camaraderie and/or political activity among the students were perhaps chief priorities, perhaps equally or more important than that of holding class. To Peggy, such a notion was completely foreign, bewildering, and ultimately invalid. Yet, as a new teacher at the university she was now subject to these rules with which she fundamentally disagreed. When her colleagues decided to cancel classes for reasons she did not understand or like – even though she admitted to not having “the language background to get all the nuances” --
she had to nevertheless abide. She was essentially compelled to play by rules she did not agree with and, perhaps more than Trevor, she felt not only annoyed but also undermined with respect to her efficacy as a teacher. From this standpoint, she confidently diagnosed the cancellation of classes as a "bad thing,"

Often, volunteers took their teaching institutions to be reflective and representative of a generalized condition of Ecuadorian disorganization. One day I asked Shannon if she would share with me the kinds of things she said to friends and family back home when she was able to communicate with them:

S: I say it’s [Ecuador] like very, very slow, and like relaxed, and I think it’s like a good thing because people enjoy it, but I’m also, I also say it’s like pretty disorganized and like, inefficient, I guess. As far as like school, like the, the university setting and just like simple things that I’m like frustrated with, why it’s like, so inefficient, and like, like disorganized, like, y’know, I still don’t have like teaching manuals for all my classes.

C: Teaching manuals?

S: Like, the teacher book, like, with the answers. Like, I just have their student book. But yeah, it just seems like, disorganized, and sometimes I’m just like, “Why can’t it just like” – but then I have to like, take a step back and realize that that’s like, not, like, I’m just, that’s why I came here, was to see something else. And I’m, I mean when I get back to the states I’m sure I’m gonna be annoyed with like, how quick it is, but I tend to say that it’s yeah, like very slow, and like, it’s a very like, generous culture, and welcoming and like, open, but it’s also um, like, a little backwards, as far as like the gender roles, and um, and Catholic, and not like, stuck in the past but it’s not really like moving with the times, the modern times.

C: And, how do you understand the reasons for that? Like, why it’s that way?

S: I have no idea.

C: Okay.

S: Um, (pause) yeah. I’m not gonna pretend to understand it, like.

C: Do you have any personal theories, or you don’t-

S: Uhhh (pause) no, I don’t, like, (pause), I don’t know why it’s like, so inefficient and like, sort of disorganized, and maybe it’s just because it’s like, a poorer country and they can’t really like, gather the resources to like, like when we were supposed to get paid they were like “Ohhhh, the bank ran out of money” or something, y’know, it’s like, [in an astonished whisper] “WHAT?” Like, how is that possible? And, then it’s like, “That’s inefficient, like, the money should be there,” and, I don’t know. So I don’t understand that, and I, maybe it’s just because it’s like a poorer country? I don’t know, this is just like a different environment.
Shannon’s narrative is compelling because on the one hand she engages in a sort of self-disciplining in which she counters her own negative assessments of Ecuador with the knowing self-reprimand that she had in fact set out to “see something else,” the implication being that she therefore should not complain. In this way she begins to locate the “problem” as not lying solely with Ecuador but with her own subjective reactions to “Ecuador” as she experiences life there. At the same time, however, she abandons this apparent relativism when she assesses the country as “inefficient,” “disorganized,” “backward,” “not…moving with the times” (as well as the more positive assessments of “relaxed” and “generous”). In other words, while she explains her responses of frustration as being personal to her and therefore not universal, she remains committed to the idea that Ecuador is objectively inefficient, disorganized, backward, and not “moving with the times.” Unlike her personal feelings about this condition, the condition itself, is not something that is up for debate.

Another important aspect of Shannon’s narrative is the way in which her teaching institution functions as a sort of case in point for what she depicts as a generalized condition of Ecuadorian disorganization and inefficiency; she invokes it almost immediately after her summary statement about Ecuador being “very, very slow,” “relaxed,” “pretty disorganized,” and “inefficient.” The irony is that, while she appeared quite comfortable in describing her teaching institution as patently disorganized, she really knew very little about how her teaching institution actually operated – except for how it failed to meet her standards of organization and specifically with respect to how it dealt with her (as opposed to students, parents, administrative staff, long-term professors). Notable here was that this sort of diagnosing was done precisely in relation to an institutional practice that had not only disrupted her sense of order, but, moreover, constrained her ability to achieve her own sense of order (i.e. through teaching with the aid of a teacher’s manual). Indeed, Shannon had previously mentioned to me that, going into the classroom, she had felt some insecurity over her command of English grammar, a point that sheds some possible light as to why having a teacher’s manual – which she clarified as the “teacher book, like with the
answers (my emphasis)" – was of particular importance to her. Thus, it was from the basis of personal and abbreviated experience (she had been teaching there only three months by the time of this conversation), that Shannon confidently diagnosed the entire place as “disorganized,” and with a tone of certainty that mimicked that of an expert, well versed in the daily operations of the institution.

These latter themes were not unique to Shannon’s narrative, but rather illustrated two interrelated patterns that I found in many volunteers’ impressions of Ecuador: the tendency to apply a diagnosis of disorganization to a situation of personal inconvenience and a tendency to conflate what they perceived as a disorderly institution with a generalized condition of disorganization, and then an inclination to use that diagnosis and conflation to think about these instances as cases of more generalized Ecuadorian disorder. For example, this was also powerfully illustrated in Brooke’s retelling of an incident that occurred several months into her teaching stint at a vocational institute in the southern sierra. Describing her teaching institution, she told me, “I mean, I think it’s pretty typical Ecuadorian, but not extreme Ecuadorian, if you’re, I mean if you wanna use that term. In general, it seems like, like bureaucratic, and things like, are (lowering voice) not especially, like they’re just not well organized.” Then, she went on to tell me:

B: Like our director, he, I think it was like a week before our vacation was supposed to start, like we all, both Josh and I, had plans of like, you know we had where we were gonna be and when we were gonna be there and how long. And like, our director, like a week before we were supposed to be done with, like on vacation, he was like, “I’m gonna push it back a week.” And that, like you just can’t do that. But to him, it’s just like, “Well, what don’t you understand?” And it’s like, “Well, you know, you set up certain expectations and then you change them, like at a moment’s notice right before, so – I mean, other than that, like, he does that sometimes but it’s really not that bad. It’s really not that bad at all. Um, and he’s like, he’s kind about it, he’s nice, and he’s like, he’s flexible, which is helpful because we luckily ended up maintaining our original schedule, and like, getting—I mean, you know, it was because of those black-outs, and we had classes that we’d missed and he was trying to get us to fulfill the full one hundred hours. Um, and so that’s why he wanted to change it. But y’know, we ended up coming up with an alternative solution, and he was totally down for it, so.

C: Was that for this upcoming vacation, or?

B: It was for December, so our first time here, it was, I mean I totally panicked. Because I mean, that it was kind of, I mean, of course, like just getting here, the first ten weeks was a struggle. Um, and so I was very much looking forward to vacation and I was, y’know, I had that date in mind. Um, and I was kind of fixated on it almost, but – (laughing) – so, I
was just like, “You cannot change that. You cannot add an extra week onto that.” But luckily it worked out. Thank God (chuckling).

In calling her workplace, “not very well organized,” the substantiating situation that came to Brooke’s mind was one where her personal vacation plans became temporarily compromised by her boss’s decision to change the vacation schedule in order to recover lost hours. Such a dynamic underscores the way in which personal discomfort or inconvenience often translated into general classifications of entire systems and Ecuador, more broadly.

In sum, over the months following orientation, most of the volunteers went through a period of intense adjustment that was often characterized by frustration, confusion, and sometimes malaise. Heron (2007) writes of white women Canadian development workers in Zambia: “Our adjustments are really about the recovery of self in the strange new sites of development” (p. 59). With respect to the participants in my study, it seemed that as they worked through this apparent recovery of self, they tended to rely heavily upon the scripts and subject positions that had circulated during Orientation, reviving the language and constructions of Ecuador that had suffused their trainings and displaying a cool sense of entitlement to put down and badmouth the country, the culture, and, by implication, members of the population. Without arguing a causal relation (as there are numerous other factors that could have shaped the particular relational subjectivities that volunteers took up vis-à-vis Ecuador), it is nonetheless important to highlight the correlation between the ways in which they did relate to the imagined country and the ways that had been laid out for them – really modeled for them – by field directors, invited speakers, and previously arrived volunteers during Orientation.

Culture Shock?

Listening to the volunteers’ comments and observing their shared pastime of ridiculing and/or complaining about Ecuador, one could easily diagnose them as suffering from “culture shock,” a term coined by anthropologist Kalervo Oberg (1960) to describe what he himself had experienced over the course of his travels in Latin America and had found to be a common condition among US diplomats stationed in foreign countries. Oberg’s account was so resonant
with what I was observing among the participants of my study that it warrants quoting at length.

Culture shock, as he described it:

...is precipitated by the anxiety that results from losing all our familiar signs and symbols of social intercourse. These signs or cues include the thousand and one ways in which we orient ourselves to the situations of daily life: when to shake hands and what to say when we meet people, when and how to give tips, how to give orders to servants, how to make purchases, when to accept and when to refuse invitations, when to take statements seriously and when not. Now these cues which may be words, gestures, facial expressions, customs, or norms are acquired by all of us in the course of growing up and are as much a part of our culture as the language we speak or the beliefs we accept. All of us depend for our peace of mind and our efficiency on hundreds of these cues, most of which we do not carry on the level of conscious awareness.

Now when an individual enters a strange culture, all or most of these familiar cues are removed. He or she is like a fish out of water. No matter how broad-minded or full of good will you may be, a series of props have been knocked from under you, followed by a feeling of frustration and anxiety. People react to the frustration in much the same way. First they reject the environment which causes the discomfort: “the ways of the host country are bad because they make us feel bad.” (1960, p. 142)

Indeed, Oberg’s theoretical model, particularly the second and third stages of it, seemed to describe the volunteers to a tee. In fact, when reading his well known speech on culture shock, delivered in 1954 to the Women’s Club of Rio de Janeiro (his assembled audience being a group of US-American wives of US-American expatriate businessmen and technicians in Brazil) and then turned into an article for a 1960 issue of Practical Anthropology (see Dutton, 2012, p. 71), it often felt as though I could have been reading over those portions of my own field notes where I had recounted the things that volunteers had said and done vis-à-vis this imagined Ecuador and Ecuadorian population. As one part of Oberg’s speech went, “When Americans or other foreigners in a strange land get together to grouse about the host country—you can be sure they are suffering from culture shock” (Ibid).

However, one of the problems with Oberg’s argument is that it does not take into account the ways in which sufferers of “culture shock” have been directed and encouraged by their institutions to view and make sense of the host country, not to mention the role of broader

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30 Although he frames his claims as part of a generalizable argument, this example indicates that Oberg is basing his assertions on a very specific population of US elites who traveled internationally in the mid-20th century.
controlling stereotypes about their host countries that circulate in the dominant culture of their home countries. These constructions of Ecuador and Ecuadorean people as disorganized, dysfunctional, backward, “behind the times” did not happen in a vacuum, nor were they solely products of the volunteers’ sense of discomfort in an unfamiliar context. Rather they were articulated and circulated by subjects produced in a historical context wherein the US state has continuously governed a plurality of US subjects – particularly those it has recruited to travel as volunteers and tourists (or diplomats and expatriate businessmen and technicians) – in such a way that has encouraged them to relate to imperial territories through a lens of deficit. Even more importantly and with respect to the focus of my research, the volunteers were further situated in an institutional context – Global Community Ecuador – that did little to disrupt this. To the contrary, the program often reinforced such constructions, providing the volunteers a certain script with which to understand, conceptualize, think, and talk about the frustration and anxiety they were apparently experiencing.

To be fair, it is certainly plausible that, at the very least, sensations of disorientedness are bound to result when a subject is transplanted, either through his own volition or by force, into a foreign environment where he does not understand the dominant language spoken, the social cues and codes used, or even the geographical lay of the land. However, I suggest that the ways in which we are always already discursively positioned as particular subjects vis-à-vis the particular new and unfamiliar cultural context, the ways the cultural context in question may have been imagined for us and presented to us through various channels, and the ways in which we are guided to arrange our thought patterns, behavior, agendas, and senses of self vis-à-vis this particular cultural context play a large role in how we process this disorientedness and what we turn it into with respect to what we say and do. In the case of the Global Community Ecuador volunteers, the program was sometimes at well-intentioned pains to encourage the volunteers to refrain from judging Ecuador and to instead try to understand. (“Many practices and beliefs are rooted in hundreds of years of Ecuadorean culture,” read the first page of a pre-departure guide.
“Whatever the case, don’t condemn your host country and its people. Try to understand them. If you keep an open mind, you will learn a lot about Ecuador, about its culture, and about yourself.”

However, as the discussion in the foregoing section illustrates, overwhelmingly and more often than not, volunteers were invited, encouraged, and given tacit permission to in fact channel their disorientedness into the articulation of critical judgments, disparaging remarks, and othering conceptualizations vis-à-vis Ecuador, Ecuadorians, and Ecuadorian society and culture(s). On an implicit level, through the text of the Manual, the statements of the Orientation sessions and the behavioral modeling performed by the field directors, they were invited to adopt a position of superior critic as a way of coping with and reconciling sensations of internal disorder, and accompanying frustration, fear and anxiety. Moreover, the particular constructions of Ecuador as disorganized, inefficient – not to mention dangerous, dirty, and corrupt – were not created in a vacuum but form part of a broader discursive narrative about the “Third World” that has accompanied and served the ascent and perpetuity of capitalist imperialism.

Additionally, I would also suggest that the manifestations of “culture shock” among the volunteers were not only responses to contexts that they perceived and experienced as profoundly different, but also intense grappling with what amounted to dramatic interruptions of imperial-neoliberal fantasies that they had formed during the time leading up to their departure for Ecuador and continued to carry with them throughout their time in the country. As I argued in the previous chapter, their desires to “experience another culture” and develop themselves both professionally and personally in the process were suffused with imperialist and neoliberal constructs and assumptions. For many, there had been a sort of utopic fantasy in which they were actively and freely “experiencing” the imagined Third World Otherness of Ecuador and developing themselves professionally and personally in the process. When they were required to wait for a package longer than what they thought was normal, when they witnessed practices that to them did not make sense or, most especially, when they faced the cancellation of vacation due to unanticipated work schedules, these were literal disruptions not only to their normative frameworks but also to a certain fantasy that had hinged upon a certain freedom to move about in
the “Third World” rather than be constrained or stifled by the post-college “real world.” In this fantasy there had been little room for rules, requirements, regulations – much less rules, requirements, or regulations imposed and upheld by the very people of this “Third World” they were expecting to drop in upon and “experience” and “help.” To the contrary, my interviews with them continually suggested that they had sought to gaze upon rather than be beholden to the rules and mores of an exotic(ized) culture; to experience self-advancement through conquering challenge rather than be handicapped for much of the time by things they did not understand; to make the most of their time in Ecuador, travel as many places as they could, and squeeze out as much as possible rather than be slowed down by protocols they did not understand.

Notably, such challenges could have conceivably been looked upon, understood, and even ultimately spun by the volunteers as the very growth through adversity and discomfort they often referenced when explaining to me what had drawn them to Global Community in the first place. However, in the immediacy of everyday life such challenges seemed to be experienced as an affront to the more romantic ways in which they had envisioned their lives in Ecuador. These were perhaps not the kinds of challenges they had envisioned, or maybe the reality of challenge was so irritating to them in the moment that it foreclosed any immediate reflection or related calculation of future returns. In any case, daily inconveniences were often framed a literal snag in the “experience,” and were a sort of symbolic destabilization of the senses of ease and entitlement which had laced and animated its envisioning.

Bonding Through Othering

On a chilly Friday night, Zach and Erin led the way to a yellow taxi that sat double-parked in the street, its engine running. Ashley and I followed closely behind. Aaron was still inside, bidding farewell to Zach’s “host parents,” Lorena and Miguel, who had been host to all of us for the evening, inviting the whole group for dinner and okaying my inclusion as a last minute add-on. The four of us climbed into the taxi, greeting the driver with a chorus of hola’s. “Buenas noches,” he replied. Zach, who had taken the front seat, proceeded to tell the driver in Spanish where we wanted to go and to ask him about an upcoming soccer game. In the meantime, Ashley, Erin, and
I had climbed into the backseat, and, after greeting the driver and closing the door behind her, Erin did not miss beat before turning to Ashley and whispering loudly, “That thing about Lorena’s niece’s husband getting sick when she was pregnant? And like, saying that men get like a ‘pregnancy sickness’? That was sooo Ecuad!” “Oh yeah, I know, right?” Ashley responded, laughing and shaking her head. Erin rolled her eyes.

I had gotten into town several days earlier and this was my third evening tagging along with Zach, Erin, Ashley and Aaron, four volunteers that had been placed in a northern sierra city for the year. It was about the fourth or fifth time that Ecuadorian, Ecuadorians, and/or an imagined Ecu-ness had been the butt of a joke between them. “I really think Ecuador is the New Jersey of South America,” Aaron had remarked the other day over a group lunch. As the group had laughed, Ashley had asked him to explain. “Like, oddly placed pride for certain things,” he had replied, to peals of laughter. “I mean I just think like, Ecuador is just surrounded by much cooler places – and like places that actually function.”

The following day I walked around the city with Erin and Melanie, another volunteer who lived in a nearby town and had arrived that morning for the weekend. I asked about the nature and content of the group’s conversations about Ecuador. “What did you guys do last night?” Melanie asked Erin. “I told you we had dinner at Zach’s house, right?” “Yeah, how was it?” “It was fun. Ashley started getting a little tipsy at the table so we ended up leaving just in time.” I took the opportunity to ask about what Erin had been referring to when she mentioned Lorena’s niece’s husband getting sick. “Oh, right,” she said, laughing. “That was just so Ecu – like so absurd. That’s something they say here that I just don’t get, that when a woman is pregnant, her husband actually gets sick, like morning sickness and stuff. Like, that’s just not possible. But people say it all the time.” Melanie nodded her head, “It makes no sense, but people still say it.”

On another occasion, Rachel told me, “Like at restaurants, they bring one thing out at a time.” Melanie began to laugh as she spoke. “One thing out at a time,” Erin continued, “and it’s like it’s just different. Maybe people don’t care as much here so it’s not as big of a deal. The tips aren’t your main motivation at restaurants so that’s not as big of a deal but you ask for the check
and 15 minutes later you get it. Then you want change and I, I don’t know if Ashley told you this but she and I have this joke when we’re waiting for the check. She’s like, ‘What are they, cutting down the trees and making the paper back there to make the check?’ And, when we’re waiting for our juice, she’s like, ‘What are they, grinding the fruit back there to make our batido [milkshake]?’ And it’s just like we’re always just cracking jokes about it, but it’s like whatever. You get used to it, and so when you know that you are going to leave in 10 minutes or 15 minutes, you ask for the check early or you go up to them and you give them the money, you know, help them out a little bit but things are just more laid back culturally.”

Another example occurred on a drizzly grey afternoon, when I sat with Brooke, Stephanie, Matt, and Josh in a brightly lit pizzeria, a soccer match playing on a large television screen that hung from the ceiling. As we waited for our food, the group struck up a conversation, bantering easily amongst each other, and telling stories about Ecuador. Stephanie mentioned that she had recently gone to a concert, and then launched into a mocking imitation of the Ecuadorian singer she had seen perform. “For-giv-ee me,” she sang. The others broke out laughing and she continued with her performance, mimicking his pronunciation of other lyrics. “Mes-ah-gee in a bottle,” she sang, driving the others into hysterics.

A culture of “cracking jokes” about Ecuador and Ecuadorians was something I witnessed again and again throughout fieldwork. A duo or trio of volunteers would meet for lunch, for drinks, or just to run errands and, almost like clockwork, the conversation would turn to recounting a story that teased or ridiculed some aspect of Ecuador or vocalizing a gripe about the country or its “culture” through making a joke and laughing about it collectively. As Nicholas explained it to me during one conversation, “Sometimes we all joke about how the society is like 50 years behind our society in the United States. I think when we say that, I think we’re mostly talking about that kind of a thing, in terms of the average person’s views towards minority groups. That’s a large part of what we mean, I think, when we joke about that kind of thing. I think another part of it is, yeah, I guess maybe how slowly things move sometimes.” In this way, not only complaining about and diagnosing Ecuador but also a performative knowing of Ecuador through a sort of
ridiculing gaze emerged as a key component of the interactional practices and intragroup relations that volunteers formed over the course of the year.

As I learned in private conversations with the volunteers, this social practice of “cracking jokes” on Ecuador was one that co-existed with individual deep seated frustrations with certain daily occurrences that often led volunteers to classify the country and Ecuadorians, themselves, in deficit-oriented ways. Some in fact saw it as a necessary release. One afternoon Brooke alluded to the function that this laughing at Ecuador served in her life:

Well, I mean, it’s just so, it’s different, it’s so different, y’know, like, how things work organizationally, logistically, it’s just so different and if you aren’t patient and if you aren’t, and if you can’t have a sense of humor about it, you’re gonna get totally mired in it y’know, and you have to have a sense of humor about it, like you have to, and like there are times when I get really frustrated, and then like of course I get angry and, and y’know like of course I need to vent, I think that’s a normal thing, I don’t think that’s unhealthy, I think that’s just a natural part of going through it.

7.4 Enframing the Other

On the second day of the Mid-Point Conference, I stood around the top of a lifeguard stand at sunset with a group of 5 volunteers. Morgan, a 25-year-old from Orange County, was to my right. “I don’t know where to put this,” she deadpanned to me, holding an empty martini glass in her right hand. Keeping the glass in her hand, she gazed out at the water and said dreamily, “It’s so pretty here.” She pointed her small silver camera towards the horizon and took a picture. It was the final session of the Conference, one that had been titled on the itinerary as "Re-evaluating Goals." The volunteers had been divided up for small group discussions to be led by fellow volunteer cohort members whom the field directors had solicited in advance. Our discussion leader, Andrea, had suggested heading to the unoccupied lifeguard stand to have our discussion, and the group had obliged, trudging through the pillows of sun-warmed sand and climbing up the white rungs of the wooden structure. At the top we found built-in white benches, which we slowly settled into, admiring the view as we did. Sitting with her back to the water, Andrea began the discussion. “So, what were some of the goals that you guys brought with you to Ecuador?” she asked the group.
People sat and thought for a moment. In the near distance I saw a group of 5 children, perhaps 8, 9 and 10 years old, making their way down the beach, skipping, running, giggling, their hair whipping around their faces in the strong gusts of beach wind. Seeming to have spotted us, they made their way over to where we sat. As they approached the base of the lifeguard stand, the volunteers’ voices were intercepted by the sounds of their laughter. I noticed they were speaking in Spanish and, based on that, as well as the fact that there were no other hotels around (in which they might be staying as guests with their families) and their air of familiarity with the beach, I assumed they were perhaps from the surrounding area. Morgan glanced down at them and immediately lifted her camera, pointing the lens deliberately at their faces. As she began snapping pictures of them, the children continued in their play, gleefully wrapped up in a game of scaling the lifeguard stand and jumping back down, engrossed in their conversation of giggles and dares to climb higher. Two of the boys began climbing the lifeguard stand, each one going up one or two slats and then springing back down to the sand, goading each other to climb further. Morgan soon interrupted their play with broken Spanish. “¡Mira! [Look!]” she barked at them impatiently, pointing the camera at their faces in an exaggerated gesture. The children froze momentarily at the sound of her voice, putting their merriment on pause. Together, they looked up at Morgan, their bodies now stilled. Morgan pressed her finger down on the top of her camera and a low click sounded as the photograph took. She immediately lowered the camera to her lap, and peered down at it, studying the small screen that now presented her with the children’s image. Apparently satisfied with her work, she clicked the camera off and tucked it into her oversized purple beach tote as the children watched. With not another word, she turned away from the children and tuned back into her peers, who had began discussing their desires to become more fluent in Spanish over the remaining 6 months. The children returned to giggling and playing, now in tones that were slightly muted. After a few moments, they all jumped back down to the sand and ran away.

As an onlooker, this moment on the beach, so quick and contained, was striking. Morgan had displayed a great air of entitlement to photograph, and essentially objectify, the children.
Without so much as a greeting, she had begun snapping photographs of them, and had done so without asking their permission. To do so, it seemed, had not even crossed her mind. For her, it seemed, they were simply another photo opportunity, much like the sea that she had photographed moments prior, an aspect of her experience that she was entitled to gaze upon and capture to her liking. Her impulse had not been to perhaps engage the children in conversation, but rather to document them and without their permission, producing them as objects for visual consumption.

Although these practices were taking place in 2009 at the hands of a US-American in Ecuador, they strongly invoke what historian Timothy Mitchell has identified as a particular way of relating to the world that emerged in 19th century imperial northwestern Europe. In Colonising Egypt (1991), Mitchell writes about the 19th century emergence in northwestern Europe of a modern metaphysics that he refers to as “world-as-exhibit.” In accounting for this modern metaphysics, Mitchell links it to the emergence of modern disciplinary power in the 19th century, a phenomenon which gave rise to the emergence of apparatuses that gave an appearance of a certain discernible order and structure that was separate and external to their individual parts, even as it was comprised of them. He provides the example of the “new army” which, thanks to the deployment of disciplinary power, suddenly “appeared to consist on the one hand of individual soldiers and on the other of the machine they inhabited” (Ibid, p. xii). This, he argues, translated into a distinctively modern way of experiencing meaning, in which the representation – that is, the order and structure that appears to exist apart from the individual material components of the thing (the army, the city) – is where one found the meaning of a thing. This bifurcation of reality and representation, Mitchell asserts, had much to do with the onset and continued advance of capitalism and attendant social theories (i.e. Marxism) that argued for the existence of an underlying material reality that was acted upon, manipulated, and represented by human subjects. In this context, the human subject or person was generally understood “as something set apart from the physical world, like the visitor to an exhibition or the worker attending a machine, as the one who observes and controls it” (Ibid, p. 19). This human subject remained
detached from but attentive to an imagined object-world that was there for his observation, manipulation, and representation. As of the mid-19th century a term for this modern Western subject had begun to circulate in Europe: the “objective” person (Ibid).

Moreover, drawing on accounts written by 19th century Arab visitors to Europe, Mitchell notes that what these travellers repeatedly found striking about Paris and London and other European cities was the way in which “everything seemed to be set up before the observer as a picture or exhibition of something, representing some reality beyond” (Ibid, p. 12). Key examples cited by this Arab analysis included the zoo, the museum, the department store, “the countryside encountered typically in the form of a model farm exhibiting new machinery and cultivation methods, the very streets of the modern city with their deliberate facades, even the Alps once the funicular was built” (Ibid). In these accounts the exhibition was treated as “epitomizing the strange character of the West, a place where one was continually pressed into service as a spectator by a world ordered so as to represent” (Ibid).

While Mitchell sees the rise of this world-as-exhibit metaphysics as an effect of disciplinary power and a broader process of capitalist transformation, he also sees it as instrumental to the European colonial project, which of course can never be extricated from either of the two phenomena. Indeed, the instance of this 19th century modern metaphysics that Mitchell selects as most exemplary is the “world exhibition,” a European production where the items on display were so often representations of peoples, animals, quotidian practices, and cultural formations that European subjects encountered in the lands that European states were attempting to dominate through imperial conquest and subjugation. In these exhibitions, one found, “imitation bazaars, Oriental palaces, exotic commodities, colonial natives in their natural habitats, and all the truth of imperial power and cultural difference” (Ibid, p. xiii). Moreover, so strong was this European “objectivity,” and so suffused was the will to exhibit with notions of non-European otherness, that 19th century Middle Eastern travelers to Europe were often forcefully subjected to their deployment, made spectacles of by local producers of Middle Eastern exhibits,
theatrical troupes, intellectual colleagues, and a European public that crowded around and stared in the street (see Mitchell 1991, pp. 1-5). As Mitchell describes it:

Throughout the nineteenth century non-European visitors found themselves being placed on exhibit or made the careful object of European curiosity. The degradation they suffered, whether intended or not, seemed nevertheless inevitable, as necessary to these spectacles as the scaffolding façades or the curious crowds of onlookers. The façades, the onlookers and the degradation seemed all to belong to the organising of an exhibit, to a particularly European concern with rendering things up to be viewed. (Ibid, p. 2)

In the 19th century, Mitchell argues, European travellers to the Middle East carried this metaphysics with them, and in fact, travelled to this region precisely to “experience the reality they had seen so often on exhibit” (Ibid, p. xiv) in Europe. However, while they went to the Arab world with the idea of transcending the representation for the reality, they approached the experience with the expectations of the representation – that is, the orderly, tamed, contained exhibits that characterized European cities – to “grasp the real thing as a picture” (Ibid, p. 22).

Upon arrival, Mitchell argues, 19th century European travelers climbed to high points to achieve views of Middle Eastern cities hoped to replicate the panoramic exhibits they had visited at home; they also searched for spots in bazaars where they could see all and everything at once. Photographers and writers did this with the intention of in fact capturing the reality in a picture or ethnographic account. Moreover, as Mitchell emphasizes, they sought to do this from a position of invisibility and anonymity, taking pains to cover their faces with veils and sunglasses – and it is here, Mitchell argues, that a certain exercise of power took place a la Bentham: “to see without being seen confirmed one’s separation from the world, and corresponded at the same time to a position of power” (Ibid, p. 24). This attempt to conceal oneself, as well as the practice of actually excluding the image of oneself (the photographer, the writer, the gazing voyeur) from the representation rendered, enabled one to embody the exhibit voyeur even as one was ostensibly transcending the exhibit by immersing oneself in reality. In this way, it constituted an attempt to carefully control or orchestrate a reality in which the power position of the voyeur was never relinquished even as he subjected his physical body to the reality of being seen by those
upon he was gazing. Indeed, it was a way of *recreating* the format of the exhibit by attempting to replicate the very power relations between subject and object that are inherent to it.

Mitchell conceptualizes these behaviors and practices of late 19th century European travellers in the Middle East as the manifestation of the objective personhood that had become the norm in late 19th century Western European society. Upon arriving in the Middle East, however, the 19th century European traveler, Mitchell contends, was repeatedly thwarted in his search for a view of reality that replicated the representation (the diorama, the panorama, the mock bazaar). According to Mitchell, senses of European disappointment and despair at not encountering a Middle East that matched the Middle Eastern city replicas of their world exhibits would actually form part of the basis for European claims that the Middle East lacked “order.” From there the colonizing project that would ensue would center in part on imposing order by rebuilding the Middle East in the European image. As Mitchell (1991) writes, “The colonial process would try and re-order Egypt to appear as a world enframed. Egypt was to be ordered up as something object-like. In other words, it was to be made picture-like and legible, rendered available to political and economic calculation” (p. 33).

Mitchell’s account provides valuable historical context in which Morgan’s behavior on the beach that day can be situated. The fact that it can be linked to a broader component of Western subjectivity that emerged during the era of European modernity/imperialism and took shape as a key way in which Western subjects in fact related to and indeed conjured the “other” of European empire suggests that it points to yet another “colonial continuity” – that is a mental construct in which the Western subject is entitled to intervene and tour an inferior other wherever he may reside but also to enframe him, via the camera or the pen and paper, for purposes of exhibition. All of this – intervening, touring, enframing/exhibiting – is contingent on a certain objectifying gaze that Mitchell valuably sheds light on, tracing it to the emergence of the “objective person” in 19th century Europe.

Going one step further, it is important to highlight here that the continued circulation of this enframing/exhibiting stance, in particular, can (like the entitlement/obligation to intervene and
tour) be traced to the international volunteering industry and, in this case, the particular international volunteer program in which Morgan was participating: Global Community Ecuador. Recall from Chapter 6, that the Global Community website (along with the websites of most international volunteer organizations) immediately positions the prospective volunteer, or anyone else who visits the website, as a viewer of Third World “Otherness.” Moreover, in its scores of vivid photographs, the program implicates the act of seeing people as a key element of the volunteer experience. The photographs are themselves mini-exhibits, representing reality and tacitly promising the volunteer that the reality he experiences will resemble the bite-size, manageable representations on the website and, perhaps more importantly, that he will be positioned in this reality just as he is positioned when he is viewing this photographs – as an anonymous viewer of an exhibit. One effect of this website imagery is that it discursively produces a passive Third World “Other” object that exists for the consumption of the First World subject, and conversely an active First World subject that gazes freely upon, follows, examines and documents this Third World “Other” object.

Indeed, what is taking place here is not only the selling of a particular experience to prospective volunteers, but also the discursive entitling of Northern subjects to not only to place their bodies in the physical spaces of developing countries but, once there, to also relate to people they encounter there\(^{31}\) as viewers in front of an exhibit. Through this dynamic, I suggest, the volunteer is implicitly encouraged to participate in the production of local people with whom their paths cross as exhibits, corralling and enframing people into exhibit form by creating representations of them just like the ones found on the website. These photographs are held up to represent the reality that volunteers are to seek out and they are invited to relate to this reality in the same fashion: by creating a representation of it.

\(^{31}\) And through the volunteer-centered lens of the international volunteer industry it is always framed as a Northern encountering of Southern others, rather than or also a Southern encountering of Northern others.
Some effects of this entitling process can be gleaned from what had taken place on the beach that day. Through her statements and acts directed at the children on the beach, Morgan had produced them as objects that existed primarily for her visual consumption. Like the Arab travellers to Europe in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, the children were effectively degraded by her engagement in a world-as-exhibit metaphysics, the difference being that this was being done to them in their own home community. Each child was compelled to, as Gayatri Spivak (1985) has phrased it, “cathect the space of the Other on his home ground” (p. 253). This was not only an exercise of micropower that worked to objectify and other the children. It was a micro-instance of a broader process in which the First World creates the Third World as its other. In light of Mitchell’s account, this practice can be understood not as a sudden development that has emerged with the advent of mass tourism (not to mention the snapshot camera and the internet), but rather as one that is rooted in mental constructs that emerged during the era of European imperialism; worked to structure and shape the ways in which Western subjects related to the peoples and places subjugated by their governments; and, that were accompanied by, and in fact helped form the ideological pretext of, some of the very methods by which European countries proceeded to claim and exercise political sovereignty over Middle Eastern territories for over a century.

On an even broader level, Mitchell’s framework also provides a context in which to situate the events of the Global Community Ecuador Orientation discussed at the beginning of this chapter. In purporting to represent Ecuador in any kind of way, be it derogatory or exalting or somewhere in between, were the field directors not also engaged in a certain enframing of Ecuador? In encouraging them to engage in their own representing of Ecuador amongst each other were they not ushering volunteers into doing the same? Particularly striking is the fact that the diagnosis of disorder articulated by Mitchell’s 19\textsuperscript{th} century European travellers to the Middle East is the very one circulated by Global Community field staff and taken up immediately by volunteers. However, perhaps the more interesting thing about this sort of meta-level 21\textsuperscript{st} century enframing engaged in by the Global Community Ecuador field staff is that it coincided with and was deployed in service of what can be considered to be a contemporary market-oriented
imperative to minimize the possibility that any misfortune would befall the volunteers while under the watch and care of the organization. Indeed, *painting a picture* of Ecuador as a fundamentally dangerous, risky, unsanitary, and unruly place, and thus theoretically scaring volunteers into *always* taking the advised precautions, can be seen as a key way in which the program attempted to secure its governance of them; it was perhaps the primary way in which April, Tim, and Bob Monroe endeavored to keep their lives safe for the duration of the year. In the process, a particular picture of Ecuador had in fact emerged, thus reducing it to an exhibit infused with “all the truth of imperial power and cultural difference” as well as all of the market calculations and personal responsibility ethics of a neoliberal governementality. In this way, it can be understood as yet another point of fusion between the imperial and the neoliberal.

7.5 “What Works Your Last Nerve About Ecuador?” (cont.)

Returning now to the first morning of the Global Community Ecuador Mid-Point Conference, as mentioned above, Trevor and I were on our way to the first official gathering of the day, a session titled on the Conference itinerary as “What Works Your Last Nerve About Ecuador?” Notably, the title seemed to capture just the way in which many of the volunteers had positioned themselves in the narratives they had articulated in interviews with me and in the many conversations with each other to which I had been privy. The title was also striking because it instantly constructed a relation between a volunteer subject and an Ecuador object, and it was a relation in which the former was construed as categorically irritated and put upon by the latter. Moreover, in its direct address and use of colloquialism, the title implicitly professed to know the volunteers in a certain way, to sympathetically understand their emotional states, and offer them an opportunity to vent. In a certain sense, the title played the proverbial “good cop” role to the watchful eyes of an official international volunteer industry discourse that not only paints “cultural exchange” as a generally happy and easy affair, free of conflict, confusion, frustration, or discomfort on either end, but also constructs the Northern volunteer as a wholly capable globetrotter, one who is not only legally and financially able to drop into any international context she may desire (recall the opening question of the Global Community website: “Where on earth
do you want to find yourself teaching?"), but also temperamentally and constitutionally able to do so as well; in this way, the international volunteer industry is also about mobilizing a Northern subject position that surmounts difference, one who remains unfettered and unfazed by borders, both geographical and cultural, one who can quite literally be at home anywhere (the trope of the Third World host family helping to underscore this point). By contrast, the session title (and by extension the field staff who had written it) momentarily lets the volunteer off the hook from this position consummate cultural explorer, allowing her the freedom to not be a good sport, to complain and air grievances that she certainly must have, and to simply “vent” about Ecuador. However, what is important to note about the title is that, in its wording, it immediately makes the country the problem, emphasizing to the volunteer that it is not he or she who is incapable of the kind of cultural adjustment that the Manual and the Orientation sessions seek to instruct him in (such a suggestion would in fact be an existential blow to the discursive narrative of the Northern capability at transcending cultural difference). Rather, the title seems to suggest, it is the broader Ecuadorian context that is “working your last nerve” and is justifiably to blame. In this way, the very title of the exercise creates an imagined Ecuador as a mythic other, a force to be contended and dealt with – an object to be navigated by the volunteer subject, and magnanimously so.

After a minute or two on the gravel path, Trevor and I soon reached a concrete floor covered by a wooden structure, an outdoor common space that was to serve as the setting for the day’s sessions. Black plastic chairs had been arranged in a circle. People trickled in slowly from breakfast, chatting and laughing and gradually finding seats. As the circle filled in, I noticed Tim, dressed in khaki cargo shorts, a faded green t-shirt and black flip-flops, standing expectantly at the designated “front” of the space. Phil, a 25-year-old volunteer from Indiana and the resident sarcastic of the group, was at his side, looking less than enthused. “Phil has volunteered to be the first one in the middle,” Tim soon announced to the volunteers once they had settled into the chairs. Individual conversations came to a lull as people turned their attention to Phil. “Phil is gonna be our first example,” Tim continued. “And what we’re gonna do now, we’re gonna play a form of musical chairs called ‘What works your last nerve in Ecuador?’ So, what we’re gonna do
is, you guys, like, are gonna stand in the middle and you’re gonna say, ‘What really pisses me off about Ecuador,’ – which,” he interjected, “is what we wanted to title this session. ‘What really pisses me off about Ecuador is dot dot dot.’

With the group listening quietly to his instructions, he then added, “Or, you can say, ‘What I love about Ecuador is:...’ And then if you agree, if you feel it, stand up, switch seats. Phil, have you thought of one?”

“No, man,” Phil said, scratching his head.

“Phil has thought of one,” Tim continued. “He’s all ready to go. I think he just needs a little like, round of applause.” Tim began to bring his hands together, widening his eyes with exaggerated enthusiasm as he did. The group immediately joined in, producing a collective, pounding clap that quickly accelerated into a fast, syncopated applause. “Phil! Phil! Phil! Phil!” the group chanted. “Wuuuuuuuu!!” People laughed and then the noise died down into an expectant silence.

“Um,” Phil stalled.

“What works your last nerve?” April called from the side of the room.

“Um,” he repeated.

“You have to stand in the middle of a circle,” one female volunteer called out, breaking the silence. Again laughter rippled through the group.

Staying where he was, Phil responded in his characteristically dry delivery, ”Yeah, I was just thinking that.” People began to laugh and he grinned mischievously, stalling for one last second before abandoning his comedy routine and surrendering to the activity. “No, no, no,

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32 Notably, this alternative option of professing what one loved “about Ecuador” was not part of the session title as it appeared on the Conference itinerary that had been distributed to volunteers (and a copy of which I had just looked over with Trevor a few minutes earlier). Its sudden injection into the activity seemed be less indicative of a copy editing oversight than of a last minute decision on the part of Tim and April to infuse the activity with a dose of political correctness. Recalling that my own cohort had been led through the exact same activity at our own Mid-Point Conference, where it had in fact been called “What Pisses You Off About Ecuador” (and that it had not received any last minute modification), I wondered whether the last-minute change had to do with my presence as a researcher.
“Okay,” he said, throwing up his hands, “Students! They show up fuckin’ 15 minutes late to every—to class everyday, and then they talk the whole time and, I don’t know…”

“Yeah!” Tim yelled out instantly. The space erupted with the sound of chairs scooting across the floor, as about 15 people jumped up from their seats, running across the center of the circle and making bee-lines for the empty chairs that just been vacated by others.

Phil stood where he was, prompting one female volunteer to inform him, “Phil, you gotta sit down, Phil! You can’t just…” People laughed and Phil quickly darted towards an empty chair. Soon, only Melanie was left standing. Walking to the center of the circle, she tucked her hair behind her right ear and looked to Tim for help. “How do I start it?” she asked.

“You can say, “What works my last nerve, what really pisses me off, or what I love about.” She thought for a second. Then something apparently came to her. “What works my last nerve,” she began, “is the endless whining!” Again the group erupted.

“Ooooo!”

“Whining!”

“Teacher, pleeeaaase.”

People scrambled for chairs until Aaron was soon the one left in the middle. He began haltingly. “What, whaaaatt, what really pisses me off about Ecuador is…” He paused, and then, in a high-pitched voice uttered, “Wheewwwwwww.” The room fell silent.

“What is that?” someone asked.

“You don’t get that noise every time you say anything about, “Oh yeah, she’s…”? Aaron asked the group.

“No, I guess not,” someone said tauntingly, inciting laughter and some brief chatter.

“Gee, thank you,” Aaron said, sarcastically, a look of betrayal spreading across his face. Again, he fell silent. He peered out towards the direction of the ocean.

“Tell us something you love about Ecuador…besides your girlfriend!”

“Awww. No! Say that!”

“Wheewwww!”
“Is she pretty?”

“Is she pretty?”

Ignoring their teasing, Aaron tried again, “What I love about Ecuador,” he paused, “is…is…” As he faltered again, people began to laugh.

“Okay, let’s get like a rhythm goin,‘” said April from her seat at the front, her face tightening a bit with thinly veiled impatience. “Tell us somethin’ you love about Ecuador.”

“Everyone start thinking of something that they love about Ecuador,” Tim chimed in.

“Your shirt, I love your shirt,” one volunteer offered.

People fell silent again and the murmur of side conversations started up.

“Perhaps the mangos?” someone suggested.

Still marooned in the middle of the circle, Aaron’s face brightened. He had been saved.

“Yes, I love the mangos,” he said, smiling.

Again, the space erupted with the sound of shuffling, scooting chairs, and laughter, as people dove across the room, playfully pushing each other out of the way to get to an empty chair.

Erin, the next volunteer left in the middle, was prepared. “Um, something I love about Ecuador,” she said immediately, “is my host family!”

The game continued for approximately 10 more minutes, the rhythm now more regular as people came prepared with their likes or dislikes when left without a seat. In addition to jumping from their seats in agreement, people also shouted out forms of verbal affirmation as well as dissenting opinions and requests for clarification.

“I love the nice weather all year round!”

“Me too!!”

“I hate hissing!”

“Ohh!!!”

“Umm, oh, I love reggaeton.”

“Oh, yes!!”
"I love how friendly and welcoming everyone you meet in Ecuador is."

"I like howww...cheap everything is."

"One thing I love about Ecuador is the efficiency of like every single bureaucracy."

"Are you being sarcastic? I don't understand."

"Wait, what did you say?"

"Um yeah, one thing I can't stand about Ecuador is the inefficiency of every single bureaucracy."

"What I love about Ecuador is the awesome soups that come with every meal you get."

"Yeah!"

"I like the dollar DVDs."

"Oh man!"

"I like the dollar CDs."

"I don't like 'em that much!"

"Hey, the same people are doing it every time."

"Ummm, what do I not like, what do I like, uhh...I like gettin' love poems on my lil' cellular phone all the time."

"Trevor likes havin' green eyes in Ecuador!"

"Okay, I dislike excessively forward people with romantic interests."

"I really like the dancing."

"Okay, what I love about Ecuador is how small it is, so you can see mountains and jungles and coastline."

"Yay!"

"I really like how your students wanna be your friends."

"Wanna what?"

"Become your friends."

"I really like that it's close to Colombia."

"Yes. It's next to Colombia. I'll get up!"
"How close it is to Colombia and Peru."

"What I really hate about Ecuador is that no one takes twenties."

"I like the jugos."

"One thing I hate about Ecuador is they put mayonnaise on everything."

"Eww!"

"Go mayonnaise! The mayonnaise is amazing!"

"That's the best part of Ecuador."

"I love how anything in this country is one bus ride away – or two!"

"I don't like how the bathrooms don't have toilet paper."

"One thing I hate are the third party texts I get from advertisers, like Movistar, that make absolutely no sense. They really piss me off."

"Yeah!"

The game finally came to an end after about 20 minutes when Tim interjected, "Two more!"

"I hate that text messages cost 10 cents each," said Phil.

"That's annoying."

"Oh, I really like all the extreme sports you can do in this country."

"Oh yeah."

There was a final mad dash for empty chairs and the activity was officially over. "Can you guys put the chairs back?" Tim asked the group. People slowly stood up and began dragging and pushing the chairs back into rows. The conversation continued for a few moments among some.

"Nobody else loves mustard? What the hell? You can't get mustard anywhere! It's like only ketchup or mayonnaise. No mustard!"

As could have been predicted (given its title), the tone of the 20 to 25-minute-activity that had just passed was one of venting, of getting everything off of one's chest, of speaking candidly and freely, and of blowing off steam. It was indeed a sort of irreverent, real talk rejoinder to both the official, rosy narrative of cross-cultural exchange and the image of the expertly global
volunteer subject (sanguine, unflappable, and endlessly culturally capable), more specifically. However, through an interesting sort of slight of hand, the activity worked to salvage this image of the volunteer subject (if not the reputation of cross-cultural exchange) by, as the title of the activity had suggested, placing the blame for the volunteers’ discomfort squarely on the host country, holding it up as something innately problematic. In the process, multiple things happened. To begin, volunteers were invited to take up an “objective person” subject position vis-à-vis Ecuador, to enframe and critique it and, in requiring the volunteers to state something that “worked” their “last nerves” or something that they “loved” about Ecuador, the activity instantly positioned them, albeit playfully, as knowledgeable experts on the country. Moreover, thanks to the wording of the activity’s catch phrase, not only was the authority and cultural capability of the volunteer subject safeguarded, but her invisibility and anonymity as a Western/Northern and, overwhelmingly, white subject was as well. In this way, not only was the subject position of the capable US-American globetrotter preserved, but so were the constructs of US-American normativity and superiority that are also symbolically destabilized in a national context where to be a US-American subject is simply not the norm. Conversely, Ecuador was reduced in definition to terms of how it delighted or annoyed the US-American volunteer subject, how it did or did not please his discerning tastes.

In addition to preserving the volunteer subject as a capable globetrotter, however, this activity also held up a subject position for the volunteer that invoked a familiar imperialistic foreign policy relation between Ecuador and the United States. Indeed, Ecuador, like all Latin American countries, has been subjected to the judgments of the United States government and US capitalists and corporations. Indeed, as discussed in Chapters 2-4, things that have displeased this latter set of actors have in fact been used as justification for invasion, occupation, and draconian economic practices across the region. Clearly, the volunteers were positioned quite differently from US presidents and diplomats, United Fruit CEOs and US military generals; unlike these actors, they were not in any position to intervene in the country’s political or economic affairs in order to change what displeased them. However, this activity, as trivial and lighthearted
as it may have been, was striking in that it seemed at once palimpsestic of a long history of US-American judging, appraising, and finding fault vis-à-vis US imperial territories in Latin America, but also, in a sense, of a sort of informal initiation of the volunteers into this kind of relating to Latin American countries (and developing countries, more generally) as US-American subjects.

Notably, however, the particular rubric by which the volunteers were instructed to form their critiques — how the country worked their last nerves or how it precipitated feelings of delight — also mobilized a distinctive kind of judging, appraising, and finding fault, one in which Ecuador was discursively placed in service of the volunteers, thus invoking the consumerist bent that is such a strong theme in the world of international volunteering. Indeed, the conversation took on the tone and tenor of a massive reviewing session, and yet the object under scrutiny was not a restaurant or a hotel, but rather an entire country, boiled down to the likes and dislikes of a group of US-Americans who had resided there for roughly five months. On a broader level, it was also produced as an object that was to be evaluated and critiqued by volunteers.

To be certain, this activity was clearly a light-hearted exercise, intended to be playful, silly, quickly done, put away and forgotten. However, it was significant because it acted as a sort of expedient channel for the expression of the Ecuador discourse that had been at play during Orientation that we had all attended roughly five months ago. Only this time, through the particular rules of the activity, it worked to incite the volunteers to speak even more authoritatively than had been the case at Orientation. Interestingly, at the start of the activity, there had been a marked hesitation among volunteers to step into this subject position. However, as the activity had gone on, and more and more volunteers had articulated statements formulated in response to the activity’s question, the easier it had seemed to become. As April had suggested, they had indeed gotten “a rhythm going,” and by the end of the activity nearly everyone had taken a turn speaking expertly as a critical consumer of Ecuador (in the process, reclaiming their capability as travellers by shifting blame to the country and away from whatever might otherwise be experienced and interpreted as personal failings or senses of disorientation for whom there is no one or thing to blame). In a sense, the activity itself acted as a mini-discourse unto itself, a
microcosm of the broader Ecuador discourse that had manifest for the first time at Orientation. Indeed, the rules of the game allowed, and in fact demanded, only certain ways of relating to, thinking about, or talking about the circumstance of physically being in the country of Ecuador, while foreclosing others; if one was to participate, one had to imagine and relate to Ecuador as an object and script one’s thoughts and statements about this object according to the very specific questions put forth at its start. Additionally, this activity was significant because, in light of the volunteers’ zeal and laughter, their obvious enjoyment of the activity, and their hushed anticipation and immediate reactions to each other’s words, it constituted a moment of mutual entrainment (Collins, 2004) vis-à-vis an imagined Ecuadorian otherness. In this way, the active deployment of a particular discourse about Ecuador – one that demanded that volunteers voice complaints or approvals of the country – worked to reassert the volunteers as capable globetrotters by producing them as critical Northern consumers of a developing country. This recovery of authority over an unfamiliar and confusing context seemed to be only further shored up by the intersubjectivity that it had simultaneously created.

7.6 Instrumentalizing Consumption of Otherness - An Entrepreneurial Twist on a ‘Colonial Continuity’?

In her account of international volunteer tourism, Wanda Vrasti (2013) emphasizes the governmental nature of this phenomenon and highlights how in a context of global capitalism, international volunteering constitutes a neoliberal governmental strategy through which young Westerners are ushered into not only treating the self as enterprise but doing so in a way that reflects the particular demands of global capitalism, viewing and treating humanitarian work largely as a career development move that will render them comparatively attractive and able for the particular brand of 21st century late capitalism that emphasizes a multiculturalist, cosmopolitan, and globally mobile workforce.

Additionally, I would argue that it is also important to look how the volunteer organization, in this case Global Community, is implicated in the carrying out of this strategy of government. In the case of Global Community, there were components of the training and the general
organizational culture that pointed the volunteers toward a certain instrumentalization of their experiences with Ecuadorian "otherness" for purposes of self-advancement. For instance, during fieldwork, Global Community held an organization-wide contest in which volunteers were encouraged to submit photographs, videos, and essays that captured the essence of their particular experiences in their respective host countries. While I was not privy to the entries, many winners and runners-up mimicked the style, composition, and content of the photographs found on the organization's website, with children being a common subject as well as landscapes. They also resembled the sort of photograph that could very well have resulted from Morgan's picture-taking on the beach during the Mid-Point Conference. In this way, one could argue, the organization was quite literally offering a certain "objective" (Mitchell 1991) subject position to the volunteers vis-à-vis the people and places of the countries where they were volunteering, urging them to in fact see and produce the Third World as an exhibit, and encouraging their engagement in this practice through competition and rewarding and publicly recognizing the select few who were judged to have done so most impressively.

Through this competition, I would suggest that the volunteer subject is then not only implicitly directed to relate to places, cultures, and peoples of the developing countries through a lens of classification, joking, expert knowledge that has always defined the imperialist subjectivity but also through a lens of competition in which the currency is one's capturing on film or on paper of Third World exoticism, strangeness, spectacle – in a word, otherness. This currency is to be used as a piece of one's human capital, held up competitively against other objectifications of otherness in a contest that will bring recognition and respect among one's other US-American peers.

The organization's annual contest was not the only way in which volunteers were encouraged to instrumentalize their encounters with Ecuadorian cultures, peoples, and lands. There was also a volunteer-produced literary magazine, a project that had been undertaken and printed by members of different volunteer cohorts on an inconsistent basis for some time. During the course of fieldwork, three volunteers took up the work of putting out a call for submissions to
fellow Ecuador volunteers, compiling the entries, and publishing a 14-page issue of the magazine. In striking fashion, the final product actually resembled the tone and content of Orientation, only now the explaining, demystifying, and portraying of Ecuador, Ecuadorians, and Ecuadorian “culture” was being done by the volunteers. In other words, the students (i.e. the volunteers) had become the teachers (i.e. the field staff). Indeed, in addition to brief personal essays, short anecdotes, and a poem, the editors had also included a feature entitled “The Survival Handbook” (a playful appropriation of the program’s Surviving Ecuador text that field directors had presented them with in Orientation), as well as a humor segment entitled “You know you’re in Ecuador when…”

In these segments, as well as the individually authored pieces, the magazine took shape as the expression of a common objective subjectivity vis-à-vis Ecuador. To be certain, this included a fair amount of earnest reflection and slightly self-deprecating humor. For example, in one essay the writer shared the anxieties he had experienced as he had prepared for departure for Ecuador. In another a volunteer poked fun at herself by recounting a particularly awkward mistake she had made when speaking Spanish with her “host brother.” In this way, there was as a sort of self-objectification taking place, that I also found to be a constant in volunteers’ narratives – a self-conscious blend of “look at me floundering in this unfamiliar environment” and “let me share with you my innermost grapplings and reflections around what I am doing.” Thus, on the one hand, the magazine took shape, in places, as a sort of confessional discourse (Foucault, 1990) that worked to enframe both the experience of living in Ecuador for a year as well as the person doing the experiencing.

However, more often than not, the content of the magazine leaned more towards a sustained production of US-American normativity and Ecuadorian strangeness and was in this way a sort of written incarnation of the ongoing process of objectifying and othering Ecuador and Ecuadorians that had been initiated during Orientation and continued throughout the year. Predictably, this was particularly true in “The Survival Handbook” and the “You know you’re in Ecuador when…” segments, both of which were guided by a theme of portraying a perceived
Ecuadorian bizarreness. In these segments, volunteers pontificated on a purported nature of Ecuadorian people, perceived characteristics of Ecuadorian systems, and observed Ecuadorian interpretations of concepts such as time, schedules, and temperature. Themes of unruliness and disorder dominated and they were couched in a sort of knowing affection for these conditions that worked to position the writer as an informal authority on the quotidian aspects of Ecuador, Ecuadorians, and Ecuadorian culture and society. This was also the case in most essays and anecdotes. For example, one volunteer conceded that she should have known better than to rely on Ecuadorian transportation systems. Another recounted the tale of a host sister who insisted that a stray dog was possessed by the devil. Yet another marveled at how an Ecuadorian teacher had excused her students from an upcoming class due to the scheduled televised airing of a big soccer game. Elsewhere, in a personal blog post that would end up being selected to appear on a Global Community website blog, the same writer of this segment wrote about what she described as the generally laid-back culture of Ecuador, and observed that, while this was fun to experience, it was also cause for significant dysfunction in the country.

Like the photograph/video/essay contest, the magazine was a way in which volunteers were thus encouraged to make use of their encounters with Ecuadorian otherness in a way that was less overtly competitive but was also steeped with the neoliberal ethic of self-enterprise that was to be adopted through a marshaling of imperialist discourse about Ecuadorian people, places, things, institutions, and “culture.” Perhaps more importantly, it was informally guiding them to conceive of their daily lives in Ecuador and the purported Ecuadorian strangeness they encountered there as something they were to convert into a product (a comical anecdote, a poignant essay, a funny quip) that brought a particular return, be it recognition from their peers as an author of a magazine submission, a piece of capital that could be put toward future endeavors that may bring them actual income, or a resumé credential (as one volunteer would later use her magazine editorship on her LinkedIn profile), or some combination of the three. In this way, I argue, the photo/video/essay contest and the literary magazine constituted instances where, under the coordination of the Global Community program, “colonial continuities” of othering and
enframing fused with neoliberal ethics of self-enterprise, such that volunteers’ engagement in authoritatively representing Ecuador and creating Ecuadorian strangeness could not be extricated from a project of investing in the self.

7.7 Conclusion

In this chapter I have examined the ways in which program discourses of Global Community Ecuador constructed not only Ecuadorian otherness, but also a volunteer subject that is at once entitled voyeur, critical knower, evaluator, and (endangered) explorer of this Ecuadorian otherness. As discussed in Chapter 6, this is a process that is initiated on the program’s website. However, as this chapter documents, it is one that intensified during the in-country Orientation, where field directors and invited speakers constructed Ecuador through a lens of disorder and danger. Drawing on interviews and participant observation conducted during the post-Orientation portion of the year, I suggested that such a discourse provided volunteers with a particular script with which to deal with their sensations of disorientedness throughout the year, while also establishing group practices of collectively laughing at or “cracking jokes” about Ecuador that volunteers continually engaged for the post-Orientation duration of the year. After discussing this general production of volunteers as entitled voyeurs of Ecuadorian otherness, I also examined an instance in which one volunteer inhabited the subject position of voyeur by photographing Ecuadoran children; here I drew on Timothy Mitchell’s (1991) concept of enframing to situate this practice in a historical Western subjectivity that emerged in the era of European colonialism. I also considered this volunteer’s actions in relation to the objectifying discourse circulated during Orientation and the kinds of photographs that the program features on its website (discussed in Chapter 6).

Throughout this chapter, I have also attended to the ways in which a neoliberal logic appeared to circulate alongside these older imperialist mental constructs (what Heron (2007) refers to as “colonial continuities”) and in such a way that the two worked in tandem, so that production of volunteers as imperial subjects was always intertwined with their production as neoliberal subjects. One example of this was the creation of an Ecuadorian otherness of danger
and disorder embodied in natural disasters, thieves, rapists, irresponsible bus drivers, inept police, and careless municipal officials (who only behaved when the US laid down the law with the threat of posting a security warning for US travelers to Ecuador) that took place during “Safety Talks” aimed at ensuring the volunteers took responsibility for their own personal security (a key principle of neoliberal governmentality). Another example was when volunteers were directed by field staff to collectively relate to “Ecuador” through the lens of likes and dislikes in an exercise that not only defined the country according to volunteer tastes, but also implicitly constructed it as a sort of consumer good that existed in terms of how well it satisfied volunteer tastes and preferences. Another instance can be found in the Global Community photograph/essay contests and the volunteer newsletter; in each of these productions I argue that volunteers were not only compelled to engage in a production of Ecuadorian otherness but to make use of or instrumentalize (or maximize) their encounters with this Ecuadorian otherness in service of winning a competition, achieving a literary publication, and at the very least honing a skill an potentially accruing yet another bullet for the resumé. While these are clearly not particularly impressive accomplishments in the grand scheme, what is more important here is that they helped structure and even bolster the appeal of certain activities through which volunteers were being encouraged to regard the encounter with Ecuadorian otherness as a mechanism of competitive self-development (no matter how big or how small), and this speaks to a more general project of neoliberal subject formation at work, one that was reliant upon the simultaneous cultivation of an imperialist subjectivity that relates to “Ecuador” and Ecuadorians as objects to be known, gazed upon, explored and critiqued from a positional superiority that entitles him to do so.

As stated at the outset of this chapter, post-colonial studies scholar Edward Said (1978/2003) asserted that Orientalism and its discursive production of an us/them binary is one form of domination that has continued to accompany and interact with other forms of domination (political, economic, and moral), which together contribute to the broader exercise of Western imperial hegemony over the East. Central to Said’s argument is his contention that the
construction of imperial territories has enabled the West to proclaim superiority over such territories and, in so doing, to justify imperial occupation of such territories portrayed as incapable of fending for themselves. A key contention of this dissertation is that the US-American international volunteering industry in fact functions as a technology of government oriented toward serving not only the ends of neoliberalism (Vrasti, 2013) but of imperialism as well, much like other forms of humanitarian intervention have done over the course of US-American history (see Chapter 5). As with US-American teachers sent to the Philippines (and Puerto Rico and Cuba) in the late 19th and early 20th century and US-American Peace Corps volunteers sent to Latin America and beyond in the mid-20th century, for early 21st century US-American volunteers, the discursive production of this us/them binary that has been part and parcel of this particular governmental technology apparently continues apace. This study is clearly not the first to arrive at this conclusion (see Heron 2007; Simpson 2005). Nor is it the first to consider how directing US-American subjects to think of and imagine themselves in a particular relation of superiority/inferiority vis-à-vis Ecuadorian subjects works to legitimize for them the broader global inequalities between the United States and its traditional imperial domain of Latin America that have in fact been produced by the United States’ political and economic domination of the region.

What this chapter however has begun to perhaps newly shed light upon are particular mechanics of these processes as engaged in by Global Community Ecuador, and the ways in which these mechanics can be considered in relation to political objectives of the imperial-neoliberal US-American state in which Global Community is based and from where it draws the majority of its volunteers. Indeed, constructing and guiding volunteers as tourists in relation to Ecuadorian people, culture(s), and physical spaces – all defined through a lens of less development, inferiority, backwardness – serves to bolster a subjectivity of US-American superiority while also feeding a thriving Third World tourism industry that has come to constitute a staple of the asymmetrical economic integration that forms the bedrock of imperial relations between the United States and Latin America. At the same time, guiding and directing volunteers to make use of these touristic encounters with Ecuadorian "otherness" in ways that stoke
intragroup competition and subtly abide by a self-investment/self-enterprise imperative not only works to reify the “object-ness” of the Other (now constructed as such through a commodifying gaze that is distinguished and perhaps heightened all the more by a sense of strategic self-investment) that is the bedrock of imperial discourse but also nudges along the formation of a neoliberal subjectivity that indeed, “organize[s] all temporalities of life according to calculations of future gain” (Vrasti, 2013, p. 86).
CHAPTER 8: BECOMING THE OTHER

8.1 Introduction

On the first day of Orientation, at approximately 3:30 in the afternoon, the volunteers stood milling around on a cement parking lot that sat behind the hotel where they had spent their first night in the country. After a group lunch at a local “Mongolian barbecue” restaurant, and as dictated by the printed Orientation schedule, they were reconvening for the “Host Family Session.” Standing cagily by a nearby tree were Michelle, Kara, Ian, and Scott, all current volunteers who had come to Ecuador as part of a Global Community March arrival cohort that had been in the country for roughly 6 months. With promises of a compensatory free lunch, Tim and April had enlisted them to help with Orientation for the September cohort that I would be following for the year. After a few opening remarks, April began the process of dividing the volunteers into small groups. “Okay, everybody, let’s count off by five!” The group obliged. “One!” “Two!” “Three!” “Four!” “Five!” “One!” “Two!” “Okay, find your groups!” “Ones over here!” “Fours? Fours?” “Who’s a Three?” As people drifted toward those who shared their numbers, the veteran volunteers, along with April and Tim, fanned out across the parking lot, corralling their groups as they went. “Threes over here!” “Let’s go Fives! Over here by this big tree!”

I ended up with the Threes, a group of 8 plus our co-leaders, Michelle and Tim. As the session got started, the new volunteers had a range of questions about navigating their imminent living situations – how to handle paying their host family every month, how much of an effort they should make to spend time with their host families, whether it was okay to come home at night, go to their bedrooms and close the door if they wanted some “alone time.” However, after about 20 minutes, the conversation took a different turn when Kayla, a 22-year-old volunteer from a small town in Tennessee raised her hand. “How do the taxi drivers in Quito determine what they charge passengers?” she wanted to know. Michelle, the veteran volunteer who had been quiet for most of the discussion, now piped up bitterly, apparently moved to speak by the question. Her face contorting into a scowl, she snapped bitterly, “Well, I think all the cab drivers are thieves, and they just rake up the price when they see that you’re a gringo.”
It had been over a year since I had been a volunteer, but Michelle’s anger was instantly familiar. As I listened to the rancor in her voice and the choice words she had for taxi drivers and what they did “when they see that you’re a gringo,” I was transported back to the days I had spent with my own volunteer cohort. Her voice rang with the same sense of indignation and hostility that many of my white peers had expressed as they commiserated over the taxi drivers and countless other merchants, bank tellers, bus attendants, people who they believed to be “ripping us off because we’re gringos.” During one of these sessions, one volunteer from my cohort had announced with resentment, “We’re treated like second class citizens because we’re gringos!”

“…when they see that you’re a gringo.” “…because we’re gringos.” Such statements indexed a preoccupied knowing of the contours of their unfamiliar social categorization and the various ways in which Ecuadorians perceived them accordingly. This knowing and the related preoccupation had been handed down to my cohort by fellow gringos – our field directors – in a process akin to what was happening now. Like Kayla and her peers, over the course of our Orientation my peers and I had been educated by the words of field directors and Global Community literature as to what gringos were and how gringos were regarded in Ecuador. As I would witness over the course of the next few days of fieldwork, and as discussed above, my research participants would receive the same education. In the moment, I understood Michelle’s outburst as an effect manifest of not only the gringo training that she had undoubtedly received but also the broader Ecuadorian discourse on gringos to which she was undoubtedly subject in her everyday life as she traversed the public spaces of the country and Quito, more specifically, where she had been placed in March as an English teacher at a local vocational institute.

The preceding chapters have demonstrated that at the heart of the broader international volunteer industry discourse and the multiple program discourses of Global Community Ecuador is a profound othering of “Third World” peoples, places, and cultures of the regions. What I have only touched upon so far, however, is the way in which this “othering” implicitly but powerfully (re)produces a white US-American subject position of racial normativity from which all the world’s “others” are gazed upon, known, helped, improved, and experienced. The irony of course is that,
in the physical spaces of Ecuador, and the developing world more broadly, racial normativity of white US-Americanness/Westerness simply does not stick in the same way that it overwhelmingly does in the physical spaces of the United States, or the global North, more broadly. To be certain, in Ecuador, a country belonging to a region where US imperial hegemony has operated for nearly two centuries, the specter of white US-Americanness as racial normativity is present in particular ways, which I will discuss. However, in the discursive fields that tend to dominate everyday life, white US-Americanness is overwhelmingly produced as outside the norm. The general task for this chapter is to examine the subjectivity formations that transpired among white volunteers (a 90% majority of the entire cohort I followed) as they attempted to immerse themselves (thus following a central governmental injunction of the international volunteer industry) into a context where white US-Americanness is produced as racial, cultural, linguistic, and national difference.

Drawing on the work of Foucauldian scholar Ladelle McWhorter (2005), I first begin with a review of how whiteness has historically been produced as the “norm” in US/northwestern European societies. I then draw on findings from my own ethnographic research into the subject position of the gringa/gringo in order to discuss how white US-Americanness is discursively produced in Ecuadorian society through a lens of difference that is alternately inferiorizing and idealizing (and, in this way, perhaps reflective of the historically hegemonic position of the United States vis-à-vis Ecuador, and Latin America more broadly), and, importantly, always gendered. Here, I draw on Foucault’s discussion of “conscious and permanent visibility” (1975/1995) and its role in the exercise of disciplinary power to conceptualize the subjectifications of white US-Americans in the Ecuadorian context.

In the section that follows, I examine Global Community Ecuador’s efforts to educate (and alert) volunteers on Ecuadorian constructions of gringos and its simultaneous attempt at preparing and training them for being viewed and treated as such; here I argue that even as the program attempted to govern the volunteers through what amounted to a particular kind of subjectification that forcefully emphasized the newness of being “different” (this being a programmatic move that, in and of itself, underscores an implicit assumption of racial normativity
that has been found to characterize white subjectivity), by refusing to name whiteness as a central dimension of the term *gringo* the program discursively maintained the racial normativity that is central to hegemonic constructions and dominant understandings of whiteness, thus engaging in a sort of ontological security that cohered with its defining of Ecuador and Ecuadorians as the Other (in Ecuador, no less!) that was discussed Chapter 7.

In the remaining sections, I turn to the ways in which volunteers experienced *gringo*ness through experiences of othering on the street (often in heavily gendered ways), as well as in customer service interactions. I explore the ways in which they narrated these experiences during interviews with me and the sorts of subjectivity formation processes that these narratives appeared to index. Drawing on the work of W.E.B Du Bois, I suggest that their narratives indexed the formation of a sort of situational, and ultimately temporary, double consciousness. By qualifying it as such, I hope to draw attention to the fact that, even though double consciousness is conceptually useful in theoretically conceptualizing the "sense of twoness" that volunteers often articulated, it was in fact a white US-American double consciousness experienced in a country within the imperial reach of a white supremacist nation, and was thus one that was not only qualitatively different but also clearly produced by conditions quite distinct from a context of US state racism that can be understood as the impetus of the production of black US-American double consciousness conceptualized by Du Bois in the early 19ᵗʰ century.

### 8.2 A Genealogical Approach to Whiteness

In her account of the subjectivity formations of white middle class Canadian development workers in Zambia, Barbara Heron (2007) foregrounds whiteness and white subjectivity as a central unit of analysis. Among other things, she specifically attends to the historic role of a particular kind of bourgeois morality in the constitution of white Western subjectivity (pp. 124-127), and argues that development work serves as a key site for the acting out of the discursive qualities of this morality on the part of Western/Northern subjects racialized as white and gendered as women. What I want to focus on here, however, is the oft-purported *normativity* and related *invisibility* of white subjectivity, as this is the discursive dimension of whiteness that is at
once reproduced by the othering discourses of the international volunteering industry and directly unsettled by the discourses around US-American/Northern/Western whiteness that prevail in the regions where volunteers go and engage in their volunteer stints as racial minorities (see Fechter, 2007; Heron, 2007; Vrasti, 2013). It is also a dimension of subjectivity that seemed especially at stake for the Global Community Ecuador volunteers that I came to know as participants in my own study.

Perhaps the most valuable contribution of the whiteness studies literature that emerged during the 1980s and 1990s was its core assertion that, in pluralistic advanced liberal democratic countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada, whiteness exists as an “unmarked norm,” an invisible and silent standard against which all other groups are measured and judged (see esp. Dyer, 1988; Frankenberg, 1993; McIntosh, 1988, 1989). It is largely through going unmarked, whiteness studies scholars argued, that whiteness dominates so powerfully and that white subjects access, exercise, and experience a profound sort of privilege in their everyday lives and life outcomes, whether they do so intentionally, wittingly, unapologetically or otherwise.

While agreeing with the basic argument that whiteness is produced as an unmarked norm, Ladelle McWhorter (2004, 2005) has more recently critiqued the theoretical perspective of most whiteness studies research for being grounded in what Foucault described as a juridical concept of power. Specifically, McWhorter argues that while most whiteness studies scholars start off on the right track by analyzing whiteness as a particular subjectivity that has been and is constituted through networks of power (i.e. invoking a Foucauldian perspective), their analyses are ultimately stymied when they remain committed to a concept of power as “something that can be used or put aside, something under subjective control rather than first of all producing subjectivities” (2005, p. 548). In other words, according to McWhorter, many Foucault-inspired whiteness studies scholars invoke the same juridical notion of power against which Foucault posited his conceptualization of power. This contradiction, she argues, often leads whiteness studies scholars to prescriptions of divestiture as the solution to racism: if whites simply educate
themselves on the workings of white supremacist racism and give up their related privileges, McWhorter claims this prescription goes, all will be well. McWhorter’s point is that such a prescription paradoxically mobilizes a juridical notion of power and a concept of a sovereign subject as a solution when the problem has been defined, often by whiteness studies scholars themselves, as one of subjectification over which subjects do not have much, if any, control.

In its theoretical commitments, McWhorter contends, such a prescription fails to take seriously the merits of a genealogical approach to disrupting the production of white subjectivity. An unacknowledged pitfall of McWhorter’s own call for a more orthodox application of Foucault is that the adoption of a wholly subject-less notion of power in analyzing whiteness can easily pave the way towards apologist accounts of white subjectivity and the historic and ongoing domination, violence, and oppression that has been waged in its name. If we are all posited as powerless in the face of discursive subject formation, the implication can easily become one of white innocence, which is itself a central construct of white supremacist discourse. However, McWhorter suggests that in continuing to utilize a juridical notion of power and a concept of a sovereign subject, whiteness studies actually keeps us from being able “to understand how white subjectivity is constituted, much less see how we might disrupt it” (Ibid, p. 552). Following Foucault’s methodologies, McWhorter provides a valuable genealogy of white subjectivity and the specific way in which it came to exist as an unmarked norm in Western society. In what follows, I will briefly summarize.

To start, McWhorter begins from Foucault’s assertion that an idea of race in Western European society dates back to the 17th century, and that this original idea underwent a centuries-long transformation that contributed to the emergence of whiteness as the constructed norm. Following Foucault, McWhorter informs us that race in the 17th century was understood as a “matter of lineage, language, and tradition, correlated perhaps with religion in character” (Ibid, p. 540). In the 18th century, it changed to a morphological concept such that being of a particular race meant that one looked a certain way that was understood to be characteristic of that race. In the early 19th century, the concept of race began to shift towards being a biological one. This of
course coincided with the rise of biopower, a modality of power that centered on optimizing, protecting, and preserving the life of the species body (and while McWhorter does not point this out, the consolidation of British and French colonialism).

In particular, McWhorter refers to a group of French scholars who, calling themselves the Société des Observateurs de l’Homme, set out in 1799 (which, as Said (1978/2003) reminds us, was the year following Napoleon’s 1798 invasion of Egypt (p. 42)) to account for differences they observed between northwestern European society and societies of Africa and Australia. They asked why different “races” had occurred and to what was this due. Informed by Blumenbach’s typology of 5 human races (still morphologically conceived) – Caucasian, Mongolian, Ethiopian, Native American, and Malay (see McWhorter, 2009) – they pursued this inquiry through vigorous engagement in observing and classifying people and determining “where each group ranked in civility in relation to other groups” (Ibid, p. 541). Following in their footsteps, came a stream of other northwestern European researchers engaging in massive project of observing human behaviors, collecting, measuring, classifying, and cataloging human body parts (particularly cranial skulls and nasal indices), and the ranking of societies based on what they found. The guiding assumption here was a chauvinistic one that defined non-northwestern European societies as less technologically advanced and less civilized, and the matter these researchers sought to resolve was why this was. Why, they asked, had northwestern European societies advanced whereas all the others of the world had not? And what did “racial” differences have to do with it?

The answers generated by these scholars tended to claim that differences in “levels” of civilization between different groups of people (grouped together as distinct “races” by virtue of their similar physical appearances) denoted different stages in an imagined, universal development that all societies were imagined to be moving through (another guiding assumption). Importantly, as McWhorter argues, the context of their inquiry was the recent emergence and ascendance of biology as the science of life. Reflecting the gaining influence of biological precepts, it was at this time, she points out, that working concepts of race began to be imbued
less with morphological difference and more firmly with biological notions of process and function that corresponded to physical differences. Scientific researchers began to attribute differences in theorized “developmental stages” to “racial differences” that had once been understood as morphological but were now conceived as biological.

In *Racism and Sexual Oppression in Anglo-America* (2009), McWhorter builds on this genealogy of race in northwestern Europe, showing that across the Atlantic, a similar evolution of the concept of race was taking place in the United States, and with much cross-fertilization between the two regions. As in northwestern Europe, *race* had existed in the United States as a signifier of morphological similarity throughout the late 17th and 18th centuries, having shifted from an earlier meaning that had to do with language, lineage, and tradition. As has been widely documented, in the early to mid-17th century the Anglo-American system of chattel servitude was imposed upon Africans, Native Americans, and Europeans, alike. However, this would change in the 1660s and 1670s, as colonies passed multiple codes that had the effect of permitting the imposition of lifelong servitude or slavery (officially outlawed by British law) on blacks and thereby racializing it as such; a frequently cited example is colonial Virginia’s 1670 declaration that allowed the enslavement of any non-Christian who had arrived in the colony by sea (i.e. Africans), but this was not the only one (see McWhorter, 2009, pp. 69-70). Throughout all of this, during which time race was still a morphologically based concept, Anglo planters steadily exploited differences in physical appearance, religion, and language among African and European laborers in order to gain European support for black enslavement, gradually creating political divisions between the “racial” groups as a way of precluding unified uprisings and destabilization of the entire system. By 1705, the revised Virginia Code was dramatically curtailing the rights of free blacks, including rights of self-defense, the right to congregate, and the right to vote in colonial elections, among others (Ibid).

As McWhorter demonstrates, these 17th and 18th century processes of racializing slavery as “Negro” (or “black”) and curtailing the rights of free blacks can be understood as helping to lay the foundation for the particular white-as-norm schema that would emerge as race underwent its
“final transcription” into a biological/developmental concept in the 19th century. In the US, this was a shift compelled in large part, McWhorter argues, by a growing abolition movement against which moved the country’s slave-owners to develop a cogent rationale in defense of the institution of slavery, one that would be grounded in the most current development in the science world: the emergence of biology as the science of life. In the 1830s, one of the most highly educated and influential physicians (and close friend to the anti-abolition South Carolina senator John Calhoun), Samuel Morton was using craniometrics to modify Blumenbach’s typology, theorizing that the 5 races were actually 5 distinct species, the Caucasian species being the most superior and the other 4 existing in various degrees of inferiority vis-à-vis Caucasians. In the case of Africans (a designated sub-group of Ethiopians), Morgan argued that this particular group was incapable of rationality, thus delivering Calhoun a “scientific” justification for the defense of slavery.

It was in through this process of politically and economically invested and biologically oriented researching and claims-making that was unfolding in the United States and northwestern Europe, McWhorter argues, that race was being reimagined in terms of biological norms and that the norm was being constituted as the race of people that was understood as having achieved the highest level of civilization and technological advancement: the Saxons, a designated sub-group of the Caucasian race (or species, depending on which race schema was being utilized). As she states,

From the 1840s forward, race would no longer be simply a matter of physical appearance; instead, it would become a matter of organic function and physiological development. The visible marks of morphological race would become signs of developmental progress or, alternatively, degeneration or arrest. Racial inferiority would become a matter of measurable deviation from established developmental norms. (2009, pp. 120-121)

By 1850 (and the height of the British imperial hegemony), British anatomist Robert Knox was arguing that “races” (plural) were something that occurred in the human species when an entire group became arrested during its progression through the series of normal developmental processes (McWhorter 2004, 51). From here, Knox was also contending that the Saxons were in
fact the only human group that was not developmentally retarded. In other words, the Saxon race was the biological norm. In this framework, non-Saxon groups – or the “races” – were held to be in various stages of developmental arrest or, according to subsequent theorizing, developmental reverse (i.e. “degeneration”) that marked them as deviations from the Saxon norm.

Here it must be said that, in addition to McWhorter’s important qualification (made elsewhere) that, with respect to concepts of race (and sex), “things have changed somewhat since the nineteenth century” (2004, p. 54), in her account of race in the US context, there is a fair amount of slippage between the terms, Caucasian, Saxon, Anglo-Saxon, and white. While she maintains that she does not use the terms interchangeably, she does not always explain why she uses certain terms at certain points, thus making it difficult to know what such terms connoted throughout US history and when and how certain terms became more common and others largely abandoned. In the 18th century, for example, when race was still a morphological concept, Jefferson passionately referred to the colony of Virginia as a “Saxon colony.” By 1899, at which point race was firmly understood in biological/developmental terms, the “Nordic race” had come to be understood as the superior sub-group of the Caucasians. Within this Nordic race, it was maintained, the Anglo-Saxons were deemed the most intellectually advanced, and over the course of the 19th and early 20th century, the US state, claiming that the country had been settled primarily by Anglo-Saxons, dedicated itself to cultivating an “Anglo-Saxon” national identity, with Theodore Roosevelt being one of its most vocal proponents. However, if McWhorter is contending that “whiteness” has long been constructed as the norm, the question then becomes when and how did the norm of Anglo-Saxonness become the norm of whiteness?

McWhorter, herself, raises the issue of “why it is whiteness (rather than Saxonness, for example) that functions as the racial norm in the USA” (2005, p. 544), but unfortunately does not address it directly, instead directing the reader to the work of historians Theodore Allen (1997), Alexander Saxton (2003), and David Roediger (2005) to glean an answer. In light of Roediger’s work, Working Toward Whiteness, it would seem that the intended explanation most likely has to do with what Roediger describes as the 20th century “great inclusion” of southern European,
eastern European, and Irish immigrants who, in the late 19th and early 20th century (the heyday of Anglo-Saxonism in the discourse of US-American politicians), had been categorized as “ethnics,” ascribed a sort of in-between status with regard to their relation to Anglo-Saxonness and targeted for “Americanization.” As the title suggests, Roediger’s book is a historical study of how certain immigrant groups “became white” in the United States. In his account, he does not deal explicitly with the apparent discursive transition from a norm of Anglo-Saxonness/Nordicness/whiteness to one of simply whiteness, but some things can nonetheless be inferred. Examining a phenomenon that has also been analyzed by scholars such as Mike Davis (1986) and Jennifer Hochschild (1995), Roediger shows how in the 1930s and 1940s descendants of Greeks, Irishmen, Slavs, and Italians who had immigrated to the US in the late 19th century “became white” in various ways. Roediger pinpoints the immigrant restrictions of 1924 as a key turning point, arguing that the climate of anti-new immigrant racism that framed these restrictions focused on the trickle of new immigrants that continued to arrive, thus taking pressure off of those who had emigrated previously and their descendants. Moreover, the image of European immigrants in general also changed “in the minds of experts and laypersons alike” (Ibid, p. 160) as large numbers of rural blacks, rural whites, and Mexican immigrants began arriving in the cities amid the dramatic reduction of European immigrants and capital’s search for an alternative source of cheap labor. In this context, these groups effectively became the new “prototypes of those suffering most acutely from a maladjustment resulting from ignorance and genetics” (Ibid).

In addition to this change in image there were also policies, some existing and some newly introduced, that would enable a European immigrant population, “in which the first generation of migrations bulked less large,” (Ibid, p. 160) to begin to actively exercise and claim whiteness. These included census categorizations that did not include “third generation” immigrant designations (thus leaving the default as white); housing covenant and “redlining” practices that excluded blacks, Mexicans, and Asians from home ownership but not immigrant-descended Europeans, and New Deal policies that purposefully excluded blacks but included those descended from European immigrants through the kinds of jobs they protected. In the
forties, all of these policies would combine with state’s wartime invitation of (white) nationalist unity to its working class European immigrant populations. By the middle of the 20th century the descendants of immigrants who had been deemed not white, or at least not fully white, but rather “ethnic” were self-including and being included in a national identity – or norm – that had once been described as Anglo-Saxon, Nordic and/or white. However, Anglo-Saxon and Nordic are clearly geographically based terms, and are thus glaringly inaccurate with respect to the actual places of origin of these particular European immigrants, so the term itself had to shift in order for it to make sense. In other words, as the composition of the country’s population changed, it was not just that whiteness expanded but that the norm expanded, forfeiting some of its earlier specificity to accommodate and work on those deemed worthy and capable of normalization (i.e. those who had a tenuous but nonetheless “legitimate” claim to whiteness (but not Anglo-Saxonness) by way of their Europeanness), even as the foundational condition of whiteness (now more broadly defined) remained.

In sum, it is in this genealogical account provided by McWhorter and in a critical whiteness-as-norm literature whose findings McWhorter corroborates (but whose guiding theoretical and analytical methodology she valuably critiques), that I situate the narratives of white Global Community Ecuador volunteers (who made up 90% of the cohort I followed) in a broader discourse of white US-American unmarkedness, invisibility, and anonymity. As the following section illustrates, this discourse is one that clashes with the dominant discursive production of white US-Americanness in Ecuador, and Latin American more broadly.

8.3 Gringos in Ecuador

Over the last 3 decades, the Ecuadorian international tourism industry has undergone a sort of extended boom. As the government has channeled increasing funds into developing the country’s tourism industry and loosened laws around foreign investment (see Chapter 5), the number of total foreign arrivals has increased every year, going from a total of 250,000 in 1985 (Hanratty, 1989) to roughly 440,000 in 1995 (Ministerio de Turismo del Ecuador, n.d.) to approximately 630,000 in 2000 (Ibid) and to just under 860,000 in 2005 (Ibid). Foreign arrivals to
Ecuador thus more than tripled in the span of 20 years. For the year of 2010 (which made up the better part of my fieldwork), the World Bank reports that the total number of international arrivals in Ecuador reached just over 1 million (World Bank, n.d.).

During this time, Ecuador has steadily become a something of a magnet for U.S. citizens, drawing an assortment of backpackers, sight-seeing vacationers, retired expatriates, participants in college study abroad programs, volunteers, “voluntourists,” service learners, and short term vacationers. This impression is substantiated by the numbers. In its breakdown of foreign arrivals by nationality (thus controlling for non-US nationalities that traveled to Ecuador from the United States), the Ecuadorian Ministry of Tourism shows that the annual number of arrivals by US-Americans has not only increased every year since 1995; starting in 2005, when US-American arrivals overtook the number of Colombian and Peruvian arrivals for the first time (since 1995), this number has also continually surpassed the respective numbers of arrivals made by nationals from all other countries, thus indicating a continuously high US-American presence in the country, and even suggesting that, for the past 20 years – and at any given time – US-American have comprised one of largest groups of foreigners in the country. As compared to 1985, the year 2005 thus marked the completion of a significant shift. In 1985, 21% of all foreign arrivals (not controlled for nationality) in Ecuador were from the United States and the US sat in second place between Colombia (36%) and Western Europe (18%) as the source of all foreign arrivals for the year (Hanratty, 1989).

By 2009, the year when I officially began fieldwork, the Ecuadorian Ministry of Tourism reported a total of 175,075 arrivals made by US nationals, a number that constituted 26.23% of all arrivals (by nationality) and still surpassed all other disaggregated rates of nationality-based arrivals, with Colombian and Peruvian nationals constituting the second and third highest numbers of arrivals for that year. This number has apparently continued to climb: in the year 2012, the U.S. State Department reported that 250,000 U.S. citizens visit Ecuador every year, and that 50,000 U.S. citizens live there as expatriates.
Anyone who spends a few days in any of Ecuador’s tourist hubs – the well-known Galapagos Islands, the mountain cities and towns of Quito, Cuenca, Baños, and Mindo, the coastal beach towns of Puerto Lopez, Montañita, and Canoa, and the Oriente rainforest town of Tena – quickly sees that white US-Americans constitute an overwhelmingly high percentage of the country’s international tourist population. Moreover, not only are white US-Americans morphologically distinct from most Ecuadorians, but, across the country, they are also continually and intently looked at. This looking is done through multiple channels – the street and other public spaces, the Hollywood movie or television program, the customer service interaction, to name just a few – and it is always contextualized by circulating discursive truths about the country they come from, the practices of its government, and the ways of life, social values, and cultural formations that are imagined to predominate there.

As discussed in the first chapter of this dissertation, Foucault argued that in modern Western society, the emergence of disciplinary power – i.e. that which focuses on the “body as machine” (1990, p. 139), ordering and training its movements so as to optimize its capabilities – is to be located in practices of surveillance that arose within institutions (i.e. the prison, the school, the army barracks) and that worked to produce the human body as an object of observation, judgment, and examination. Through this process, Foucault argued, knowledge of the observed was produced and utilized in perfecting the design and execution of the compulsory practices of discipline – the scheduling, the reward, the punishment, the testing. The systematic collection and organization of knowledge about human subjects in these institutions, Foucault argued, was an important precursor to the subsequent emergence of the human sciences and all of their various discourses. In the meantime, he argued, the act of continual surveillance, in and of itself, turned out to constitute an exercise of power over the observed. Key here was the advent of Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon, a prison watchtower whose design and location purposefully prevented the prisoner in his cell from seeing the watchmen: “he is seen, but he does not see,” (1975/1995, p. 200), Foucault wrote of the hypothetical prisoner subjected to the Panopticon, the effect being
“to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power” (Ibid, p. 201).

What took place, Foucault argued, was a situation of prisoners ordering and arranging their own behavior as though they were being watched at all times, in effect disciplining themselves as a result of an unrelenting sense of visibility. As he stated:

He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both role; he becomes the principle of his subjection. (Ibid, p. 202)

Importantly, Foucault argues that Bentham’s Panopticon did not remain strictly a model for institutions to adopt in pursuit of an “exceptional discipline” to be applied to the bodies of criminal offenders, but quickly became a movement of panopticism that in turn gave rise to a continual and pervasive exercise of “generalized surveillance” (Ibid, p. 209) and “the formation of what might be called in general the disciplinary society” (Ibid).

Notably, Foucault’s argument that Western society became a disciplinary one suggests that all Western subjects must have endured and arguably continue to endure that “state of conscious and permanent visibility” to which only institutionalized populations had once exclusively been subject, and this poses a potential contradiction to the contention that whiteness in Western societies has long existed as an unmarked norm, invisible, anonymous. How did white subjectivity become one of invisibility if white Western people were being made so visible – perhaps not racially, but certainly in other ways – through the pervasive exercise of disciplinary power? Here, McWhorter’s reading of Foucault and her genealogy of white subjectivity becomes helpful. As she points out, “By the mid-19th century, with the emergence of biology and its emphasis on life as process and development, disciplinary power becomes normalizing power, seeking to manage individuals in relation to norms of development set out by natural and human sciences” (2005, p. 539). Recall that this was the context in which the “Saxon race” was deemed as the only one not in a stage of arrested development; so, that at the very same time that the normalizing of subjects according to certain standards took precedence, the meaning of race was
shifting so that it increasingly had to do with norms and *whiteness* was being defined as *the* norm against which all (colonial) others were judged.

All of that now said, I would like to revisit the sentence with which I began this discussion. Across Ecuador, white US-Americans are continually and intently *looked at*. I base this claim on over 2 years spent in Ecuador, one of them constituting an initial phase of informal research, the other a period of methodical fieldwork presented in this dissertation. In the discussion that follows, I elaborate on this claim, but here, and in light of Foucault’s contention that the exercise of disciplinary power lies in a combination of surveillance, information collection, and knowledge production, I suggest that something akin to the deployment of disciplinary power unfolds in the Ecuadorian public space *vis-à-vis* white US-Americans and further, that this something works to disrupt somewhat not only the invisibility of whiteness found not only in the United States but also in the “colonial continuities” (in which whiteness is surely inscribed) which, I have argued, are foundational to the international volunteering industry and the volunteer subject position(s) it discursively produces. Later in this chapter I examine the ways in which volunteers experienced this exercise of power and the ways in which it colored their subjectivity formations. However, here I devote discussion to how this looking happens and the resultant production of white US-Americans as particular kinds of objects that it involves.

In Ecuador, the white US-American exists a sort of familiar stranger. In most spaces of the country, touristic or otherwise, stereotypes precede them and frame them, such that when they are looked at they are always already known through a dominant discourse which I discuss below. In the dominant Ecuadorian parlance *gringo* is the word that is used to refer to white foreigners, even more so when the white foreigner in question has blonde hair and/or blue eyes. In my personal experience and fieldwork data, the word seemed more often than not to carry a connotation of being from the United States. For example, when a white foreigner was known to be from Germany or France or the United Kingdom or Sweden, he or she was referred to by nationality – *alemán/a, frances/a, ingles/a, sueco/a*. When a white foreigner’s country of origin was known to be the United States, however, *gringo* or *gringa* always seemed to prevail. At the
risk of stating the obvious, this naming of white US-Americans constitutes a clear distinction from the positioning of whiteness as the unmarked norm by dominant discourses that circulate in the United States, where whites are generally referred to as “people” and are almost never marked as a certain kind of people, with regard to race or nationality or any other qualifier. In Ecuador, this naming is part of a broader categorization of white US-Americans that works to construct them as racially, culturally, linguistically, and nationally marked others.

However, while gringos are known through a lens of otherness in Ecuador, thanks to the vigorous importation and circulation of Hollywood movies and television series (both of which tend to feature predominantly white casts), they are alternately and contradictorily known through a lens of normativity, albeit one that is presented as existing outside of Ecuador. Like many developing countries, Ecuador imports much of its media from foreign countries, and while other larger Latin American countries such as Mexico and Brazil are key suppliers of the country’s television programming, the United States has dominated this field since at least the early 1980s and is currently reputed to be the source of no less than 66% (see Davis, 2014). In this context, cinematic representations of white US-Americanness are found playing everywhere – on cross-country and intraregional bus rides, at hair salons, convenience stores, bars and restaurants, Sunday afternoon “movie of the week” television programming, convenience stories, restaurants, and movie theaters (which by and large offer selections comprised exclusively of Hollywood blockbuster films). Additionally, DVD copies of Hollywood films and television series are widely available for purchase at the DVD/CD stores that are a fixture in large cities and small towns alike, selling them at the relatively cheap price of $1 to $2 per disc.

The pervasive broadcasting and accessible vending of Hollywood films and television within a non-US context has the uncanny effect of discursively centering the exotic, even if it is only over the course of a 2-hour movie on a bus ride or a more abbreviated glimpse of a television show while sitting in the reception area of hair salon or purchasing a few items at a convenience store. In other words, as the US-American movie or television program effectively centers the stories, dramas, social worlds, and narratives of mostly white US-American
characters in a context where the white US-American person is positioned and produced as an “other,” an “other” version reality is held up as the reality. To be sure, this is a version of reality that viewers might alternately or simultaneously reject, critique, aspire to, contest, or admire. Whatever the decoding engaged in by the viewer, however, through the ubiquitous presence and airing of these films and television programs, white US-Americanness is held up again and again as a sort of distant or global norm, even as it remains a local other. The potential dynamic is something akin to what Spivak (1985) describes as “worlding,” insofar as Ecuadorians are encouraged to “cathect the space of the Other in their own land” (p. 253).

In addition to this sort of contradictory positioning of white US-Americans in Ecuador, there are powerful discursive ‘truths’ about gringos that continually circulate. Perhaps, the most widespread and consistent of these is that gringos are economically wealthy, and within the context of Ecuador, where, at the time of fieldwork, the monthly minimum wage salary was US $240.00 (El Comercio, 2009) and the Gross National Income (GNI) per capita was just under US $9,000 (World Bank), this is a truth that mirrors a material reality with respect to most gringos who are even financially able to travel to Ecuador. Moreover, not only are most gringos in Ecuador probably in possession of greater financial wealth than the average Ecuadorian, but in the context of the country’s price economy (where, at the time of fieldwork, a bottle of water typically cost between $0.25 and $0.35 and a hot and hearty 3-course lunch could easily be found for US $2 in the pricier tourist zones of major cities) they are ushered almost automatically into economic class positions that may surpass the ones they have temporarily left behind in the United States. In other words, one who is of a middle class socioeconomic standing in the United States, is, in Ecuador, instantly positioned as wealthy, able to afford all the pricier creature comforts and consumer luxuries that are otherwise restricted to the nation’s upper classes and elites.

Another prevalent multifaceted ‘truth’ is that gringos, as foreigners, are unable to speak or understand the national language of Spanish and are uninformed about typical prices, fees, and rates – or much of anything for that matter. As a friend told me, “Incluso lo usamos como broma: cuando alguien no entiende algo, decimos, “Ah la gringa”—como diciendo no eres de
We even use it [the term gringo] as a joke: when somebody does not understand something, we say, “Ah the gringa”—like saying that you’re not from here, that you don’t understand.” Over the course of fieldwork, I would hear other variations on this joke such as, “No te hagas el/la gringo/a [Don’t become a gringo/a]”, a phrase which, in its usage and meaning, translates more accurately as, “Don’t purport to be a gringo/a” (i.e. “Don’t play dumb”).

Within the realm of informal economic transactions, this ‘truth’ of gringo language incapability and economic ignorance collides with the ‘truth’ of gringo wealth to shape and steer merchant practices such that in taxis, open markets, and independent micro-enterprises (i.e. food carts, etc.), opportunistic vendors often try their luck, quoting white US-Americans a price or a fee (usually negotiable) that is higher than those quoted to average Ecuadorians.

Another ‘truth’ centers on the gringo physical body. Bodies of white skin, blonde hair, blue eyes – the physical components most frequently associated with gringos – are often imbued with a sense of exoticism in much the same way as non-white “ethnic” bodies are in the context of the United States, not to mention the discourses of the international volunteer industry. Moreover, in Ecuador, as in most patriarchal societies, which include the United States, the exoticization of foreign bodies is centered primarily on the female foreign body – which is twice othered as woman and foreign. In this vein, gringas are generally ascribed a certain eroticism that speaks to a broader objectification of female bodies that is also characteristic of patriarchal societies.

It should be noted that in addition and related to these discursive ‘truths’ there exist a range of multiple and sometimes conflicting opinions, sentiments, dispositions and attitudes toward gringos, all of which are animated not only by widely held ‘truths’ about gringos as wealthy, uninformed, and exotic, but also by certain ‘truths’ about the US government, the imagined cultural space of the United States, and the condition of international inequality that allows gringos to easily be in Ecuador while Ecuadorians are routinely denied entry, whether for their intended travel is leisure-related or migration-related, to the United States. These ‘truths’ and related critiques and/or resentments are sometimes projected onto the individual gringo at the microlevel. There is resentment of gringos and all of their perceived freedoms, mobility, wealth,
and prestige. Also, amid critique of their government and its unilateral tactics with the rest of the world, its tendency to appoint itself “el dueño del mundo (the owner of the world),” there are charges that gringos adopt a similar disposition, and there are micro-retributions for both the global acts of their government and their perceived individual arrogances. There is also outrage at the racism known to be practiced by many gringos in their home country against Ecuadorians and other Latin American populations.

At the same time, within the context of historic United States hegemony and amid understandings of the gringo as a wealthy foreigner, there are also desires to be associated with gringos, to be seen with them, and to be in the presence of their global status as members of the wealthy, superpower nation of the United States. This was underscored during one conversation with Natalia, a young woman who worked in the country’s Ministerio de Educación: Natalia told me that the country was “muy agringado,” which she explained meant “querer mucho a los gringos [to love/have a great affinity for gringos].” Though I had never heard the term, after almost two years in the country, I had picked up on a certain level of interest, which could range from mild curiosity to fascination, in all things gringo – gringo people, gringo culture, and gringo things – that existed in the dominant culture. Moreover, I had seen that this interest sometimes colored the different kinds of social relationships – professional, romantic, sexual, platonic – that transpired between Ecuadorians and gringos. By then, I had seen that this fascination could take different forms depending on the context, the type of relationship at stake, and of course the particular individuals involved. Among the upper classes, for example, there is sometimes a certain degree of platonic fascination/interest in having gringos for friends and associates. Moreover, in the particular language context of Ecuador, where English language proficiency operates as a form of cultural and human capital, connections with English-speaking gringos are one way of performing and affirming upper class status through linguistic associations.

In the Public Space

In addition to marking the white US-American through the use of a specific term (gringo/a) and constructing him or her as Other through a set of discursive truths that purport to
speak to his or her nature, much of the production of the white US-American as Other happens in public spaces where an Ecuadorian gaze meets the white US-American body, taking in its physicality – skin color, facial features, hair color (especially if blond), its height – and thus reading it as *gringo*. This happens most intensely, though not exclusively, in places removed from the tourist hubs. For example, in the smaller, more remote towns, in the less central neighborhoods of the large cities, on the buses, in the malls, at the convenience stores, white US-American people are often produced as objects of curiosity through staring (a practice which works to publicly produce the recipient as visually different) and the occasional salutation made in English (a practice which works to broadcast to passersby and onlookers that the recipient of the salutation speaks a different tongue, is *extranjero*, not of the town or even the nation).

Predictably this public othering unfolds in a gendered way. As white US-American men walk the streets, their physical difference can draw certain forms of attention: some stares from men, women, and children, along with occasional hecklings from other men – caricatured *Hello’s* and mocking *How are you’s*—that might be interpreted as a sort of male homosocial ribbing geared specifically toward marking the racial, linguistic, nationality-based difference of the white US-American male. When white US-American women walk the streets, they are received not only with some stares from some women and some children but also with some degree of ogling, whistling, hissing, and/or sexual innuendo at the hands of some men. *Ssst. Muñecaaaa*[Doll]. *Sssttt. Hello. Psssst. Hola, mi reina*[Hello, my queen]. These utterances and practices cannot be seen as representative of the behavior of all Ecuadorian men engaged in sharing the public space and in the intersexual interactions that transpire there, but they do constitute the sounds that a white US-American woman in Ecuador will usually experience at least once and often multiple times over the course of one instance of sharing the public space (i.e. walking to the store, waiting for the bus, going to the Laundromat, walking through a park).

To be certain, *gringas* are not the only female bodies subject to public objectification and eroticization by an Ecuadorian male gaze; Ecuadorian women are also targeted and on numerous occasions, particularly in urban settings, I was privy to the ways in which the
Ecuadorian male gaze settled on women of any and all nationalities. However, more often than not, when the woman who was the object of the attention resembled the ideal type of the *gringa*, it was undeniably apparent that the male attention was often that much more intense, amplified, and insistent. Indeed, the Ecuadorian male gaze often seemed to make a beeline for groups of white US-American young women that stood out from the crowd or for the lone young *gringa* who walked only a few steps behind the lone young Ecuadorian woman who had just passed and been left mostly alone. During the first few months of fieldwork, a conversation with Verónica corroborated my impression of the particularly heightened male attention paid to white US-American women in public spaces. A repeat volunteer who had participated in the most recent Global Community Ecuador summer program and then come back the following September as part of the cohort I was following, Verónica was a volunteer of Mexican descent who was often assumed by Ecuadorians, she told me, to be Ecuadorian. Upon traversing the public spaces of Ecuador with white Global Community Ecuador volunteers from her first and now her second cohort, Verónica had noticed that she was received and treated in ways that differed dramatically from those directed toward her peers, and she attributed this to the differing ethnic/nationality-based categorizations to which they were respectively subjected. As she told me:

I’m just another person and there’s no hoo-hah about me, celebrating the fact that I’m a *gringa* (laughing), which is fine, but I see the difference. I saw the difference back when I was in Global Community with my friend, the girl, because we would both go out together but Stacy [the friend], who was blond and has blue eyes and curly hair, would get all the attention. Boys would just gravitate to her, and like, “Oh, your hair. Your eyes. Your skin” (laughing). And, I was like, “Okay, I get it. I’ve heard this many times,” and I would not be noticed. I don’t care, like it doesn’t bother me, it’s just interesting.

Here it is pertinent to mention that, particularly as a US-American researcher, I remained ambivalent about how to conceptualize the male attention that women of all races and nationalities receive on the streets in Ecuador. I was well aware that many would argue that any and all of these behaviors constituted a form of sexist street harassment and abuse, but it was often hard to fully commit to that classification, given that it is made from a specific political position that has emerged within the distinct context of liberal democracy and egalitarianism. Further, in the case of the United States, for example, male hailing of women on the street is
often experienced and understood through distinct United States normative constructions of appropriate male-female interaction, official narratives of gender equality, and a paradigm of Western feminism that has been influential at both institutional and cultural levels. Given all of these specificities and the historic legacy of Western/Northern classifying and condemning of behaviors and practices “discovered” in the “Third World,” I was wary of coming to Ecuador and doing what has been done so many times by people from the “First World” – that is, engaging in some sort of self-righteous labeling, judging, and categorizing of unfamiliar social phenomenon through a haze of a chauvinistic universalism, finding fault with behaviors, styles, tendencies that did not match up with my version of how the world should be.

Additionally, over the course of many observations, some intended, many inadvertent, I came to see very clearly that, within the spectrum of male street attention that women volunteers received in Ecuador, there were qualitative differences in form, tone, and content that were, themselves, significant enough to destabilize any sort of blanket categorization. For example, to my own subjective eyes and ears, there were some forms of attention directed at women volunteers that did seem to constitute a menacing sort of treatment that I was tempted to read as “harassment,” but at the same time there were other kinds of male street attention that seemed relatively innocuous. I found myself asking if an “hola” said with a smile by a man to a woman constituted harassment? If the whispering of sexual obscenities by a man into a woman’s ear as she passes by is the same thing as an admiring buenas tardes uttered by a man as they cross paths? What about the tone of voice? Or the body language? Further, there was the interpretation of the woman to account for. Does she feel that she is being harassed? Moreover, how is this behavior defined in the broader context of Ecuador? How do Ecuadorian women and men regard it?

Finally, I was extremely wary of reproducing tropes of white female victimization at the hands of men of color. As is widely acknowledged and as historians and critical race theorists in particular have demonstrated, the myth of “white female suffering at the hands of the hypersexual Black male” (Leonard, 2004, p. 293) is one that permeates US culture, forms a critical and
foundational component of the country’s state racism, and throughout history, has been routinely deployed by white nationalist discourses in service of a racial terrorism that has sought to systematically dehumanize, criminalize, and take the lives of black American men (see Kennedy 2003, as cited in Leonard, 2004, p. 293; Moorti, 2002, as cited in Leonard, 2004, p. 293; and Williams, 2001, as cited in Leonard, 2004, p. 293). In considering and depicting street interactions between Ecuadorian men and white US-American women, I did not want to blindly engage in an unwitting transferal of this myth to a different population of non-white men or unintentionally lead and permit readers of this study to do the same.

Moreover, it is important to situate in this historical mythologizing of the black/brown male predator the sometimes panicked reactions of some white female Global Community volunteers to the Ecuadorian male street attention they experienced (to be discussed below). It must be considered that, although it did not explicitly manifest in their narratives, the historic construction of men of color (particularly black men of all nationalities, but also Latin American men of any race (see Leonard, 2004, p. 295)) as sexual predators uncontrollably drawn to the “pure” white woman, as well as the symbiotic construction of the “pure” white woman who is continually under threat from sexual violence at the hands of men of color, is one that could very well have been working to shape these reactions (to be discussed in Section 8.7). (It also must be considered that such constructions, as well as the equally inextricable construction of the white man as protector of white women from the black and brown man, was perhaps at work in some of the white male Global Community volunteers’ reactions of disgust and sympathy at what female volunteers experienced on the street). At the same time, however, and particularly as a woman of color, I could not help but be particularly sensitized to the ways in which a male gaze was undeniably working to objectify other women, and in ways that seemed to be at once both sexualizing and racializing. In this vein, and as discussed in Section 8.7, because I was often taken to be Ecuadorian or Latin American, I was particularly enlightened when I tagged along with white women volunteers for fieldwork purposes and suddenly became privy and partly subjected to this particular strand of the Ecuadorian male gaze that I had not previously experienced.
In the interest of balancing a portrait of a particularly loaded heterosexual public interaction that could easily lapse into an unintended reproduction of racist imagery, it is important to point out that white US-American women volunteers engaged in their own sexual objectification and exoticization of Ecuadorian men, and Latin American men, more generally. This was illustrated one afternoon when I met for lunch with a small group that included Rachel, as well as Stephanie, Amanda, Brianna, and Matt. Soon after the waitress took our orders, Rachel announced to the group that she had recently gone on a date. The faces of the other women at the table instantly lit up with smiles and inquisitive expressions.

“Really?”

“With who?”

“When?”

“Was this that cute Colombian guy?”

As the others listened intently, Rachel began to tell the story. She had met a man, who was Ecuadorian, in the lobby of her apartment building. “You know I don’t like dogs,” she reminded them, “and he had these two huge terrifying dogs with them, and they started barking at me! I thought they were gonna bite my face off!” As the others giggled at the scenario, Rachel proceeded to tell them that later that day the doorman of the building had relayed the man’s apologies to her and given her the man’s card on his behalf. Rachel called him and a few days later they had met for coffee. But now, she told the other volunteers, she was not sure if she wanted to continue seeing him because he was “younger.” Stephanie had other ideas. “Hit that! Hit that!” she exclaimed, her eyes wide with excitement. Amidst a chorus of giggles, Rachel blushed deep red and laughed softly, responding that that was not “really her thing.”

“Whatever. Just hit it,” Stephanie replied, grinning as she got up to go to the ladies’ room.

With the issue of dating on the table, the women began sharing stories about dating Ecuadorian men. The group listened as Rachel shared another story about a man she had met in the Galapagos. She told them that he called her all the time and that when she did not pick up the phone, this bothered him. “He would be like, ‘You need to pick up the phone when I call.’ And, I’m
‘You need to kiss my ass.’ The rest of the women laughed admiringly. Continuing, she said, “Then I went out dancing without him and I told him about it later, and he’s like, ‘I don’t like you going out dancing without me.’” Brianna offered an explanation, saying, “Infidelity is so common in the culture, that the men just think that if you don’t pick up the phone, something is going on.” She added that she never, however, encountered that problem with Germán, pronouncing the name of her boyfriend with the requisite soft g and an emphasis on the last syllable. “Yeah, German,” Matt said, purposefully pronouncing the name incorrectly so that it came out sounding like the English word for the nationality of citizens of Germany. Brianna laughed self-deprecatingly and said, “He just never calls.”

This instance was the only one of its kind that I observed during fieldwork and the question of romantic relationships was neither one that I broached with volunteers nor one that anyone brought up in our conversations. However, the easy way in which the volunteers had engaged in this conversation led me to hypothesize that it was not an uncommon occurrence, but rather something that was, with the exception of that particular afternoon, perhaps purposefully kept away from my gaze.

In sum, in light of the political implications that surround the act of considering white US-American women as targets of an Ecuadorian male gaze that was often sexualizing and racializing, it was difficult to conceptualize what exactly it was that white US-American women often experience on the street in Ecuador, especially as this was not the overriding focus of my dissertation. In the end, I settled on a fluid commitment to that which I could account for empirically (though some would argue that empiricism, of course, brings its own set of problematic assumptions): that is, that when a young white US-American woman walks down the street in many cities and towns in Ecuador she is likely to encounter some sort of flirtatious verbal address from a man or men, and that, within the Ecuadorian male gaze, or at least one iteration of it, there is an exoticization of white US-American female bodies that exists alongside a sense of entitlement to freely flirt with, comment on, and sometimes taunt them as they move through public space.
Another thing that I decided was necessary was an accounting of the broader historical context in which all of this takes place. As has been widely discussed, a foundational construct of bourgeois discourse is that of “separate spheres,” an ideological gendered division of space and human activity that produces a private sphere of female domesticity and a public sphere of male production and political participation. Over the course of 18th and 19th century bourgeois revolutions, this discourse is one that took root in the post-colonial societies of both the United States and Latin America. In much of Latin America, this happened most intensely in the mid to late 19th century when many Latin American states, by then under the control of Liberal political factions, went about reforming national economies according to liberalist principles and simultaneously launching campaigns to instill bourgeois values among their national populations (see Deutsch, 1991). As numerous historians have shown, with respect to gender norms, this calculated imposition of bourgeois values confronted a lingering colonial elite discourse of honor (see Burns, 1999; Caulfield, 2000, 2001; Chambers, 2000; Twinam, 1999). As Geoffrey Spurling (1998) points out, while this discourse remained fluid and existed in different iterations and with different meanings that varied according to geographical region, time period, social group, there were some core constructs and ideas that “centered on the unequal (but often contested) ties between men and women, with marriage and the family as key concerns” (p. 45). Continuing, he explains that, “For men honor was exemplified by assertiveness, courage, authority, and the domination of women; for women it lay in their possession of shame, retained through discretion and sexual control” (Ibid). As with bourgeois discourse, honor discourse sought to confine women to the home, in part by defining male honor as the duty to protect wives and daughters from the outside world (Findlay, 1999, p. 29; see also Johnson and Lipsett-Rivera, 1998).

Important to consider here is that with the onset of economic liberalization and growing US capitalist penetration, much of Latin America also underwent an accelerated urbanization during the late 19th century, thus creating the city as a new spatial field of subjectification and contestation (Rosenthal, 2000). Amid the dual onset of embourgeoisement and urbanization, the presence of elite women in city spaces was at once sanctioned as a key mode of class
performance and heavily regulated and restricted by norms of respectability that dictated appropriate forms of female presence in public spaces (see Rosenthal, 2000, pp. 57-58).

Notably, the 19th century has been identified not only as the period of embourgeoisement and urbanization in Latin America, but also as the period when the practice of the piropo emerged in the Hispanophone world. As Mariana Achugar (2001) informs us, the piropo is defined by the Real Academia Española as a “lisonja o requiebro,” which she translates into English as a “form of compliment” (p. 127). In practice, the piropo exists as a verbal form of address typically directed by men at women in public spaces and typically crafted to reference the recipient’s physical appearance through the use of metaphor that partakes of male heterosexual discourses of flattery and flirtation. Employing methods of discourse analysis, Achugar situates piropos in what she describes as a Latin American culture of machismo, arguing that they constitute discursive invocations or metaphorical expressions of traditional gender roles that position men as “active producers and initiators” and women as “passive recipients and reactive” (Ibid).

Additionally, Achugar observes that while such remarks are interpreted as sexual harassment in Anglo contexts, in Latin America, “many women have traditionally interpreted piropos as compliments” (Ibid). This claim has been corroborated for example by some of the very limited ethnographic research into piropos in Latin America. For example, Lundgren (2013) found that, in Havana, many women felt a sense of affinity for piropos, deriving from them a sense of ego boost and identifying them as both a point of nationalist pride (i.e. something understood as very idiosyncratically Cuban) and as a valued component of heterosexual interaction that takes place in the public space; Lundgren also reports an emic distinction between piropos bonitos [nice piropos] and groseros [rude/offensive comments].

In other contexts, and over the past 6 years, however, and as Achugar alludes to, there has been a shift in official narratives around piropos, as they have been equated in Latin American media campaigns and Latin American feminist social movements as forms of male harassment consistent with broader patriarchal or machista discourse. To this point, it was in 2010 (the second of two years I spent in Ecuador) that I first noticed Ecuadorian public service
announcements that decisively stated, “Machismo es violencia / [Machismo is violence]” and forcefully urged, “Reaciona, Ecuador / [React, Ecuador].” Since then, during the writing of this dissertation, there has been the launching of a campaign that names, confronts, and protests the specific act of acoso callejero (street harassment) by deploying a frank and earnest slogan of “Quiero andar tranquila. Calles sin acoso / [I want to go/walk in peace. Streets without harassment].” On a related note, Magaly Benalcázar Luna (2012) has recently argued that, in Quito, there has, over time, been a marked sexualization of piropos such that the “piropo tradicional / [traditional piropo]” has taken on a more minimal presence in the streets. This development, she finds, has been accompanied by a recent questioning of the piropo on the part of young adults, and argues that this, in turn, is situated in a new politicization of the public space on the part of women’s activist groups that level demands "calles seguras y sin violencia / [streets that are safe and without violence]. Amid this convergence of events, the piropo, she contends, has come to be seen increasingly among many as a mechanism of violence, even as a foundational condition of heteronormativity remains largely unchallenged.

These accounts notwithstanding, the scholarly literature around piropos remains extremely limited and, in the absence of a genealogy of piropos or much in the way of critical study of its contemporary iterations and derivations, the historically gendered private-public divide and a broader colonial history of honor discourse onto which bourgeois discourse was overlaid serve as helpful framing devices with respect to the male street attention directed at women in Ecuador. In keeping with the disciplinary power framework I am using to conceptualize the cross-gender condition of being continually stared at in the public space, I tentatively conceptualize the sexualized street attention and piropos that women experience in Ecuador as an instance of a disciplinary power that perhaps emerged in Latin America in the 19th century – that is, the broad historical moment when bourgeois discourse was reconsolidating the relegation of women to the private sphere while simultaneously generating new rules for how women could be present in public. In this vein, piropos can be conceived as having emerged as a disciplinary technology applied to female bodies in newly constructed public spaces, where their presence transgressed
the norms of patriarchal bourgeois respectability and lingering colonial discourses of honor. The fact that the limited piropo research has found that many women in Latin America have claimed to enjoy receiving piropos does not negate it as an exercise of power; rather, this finding only speaks to Foucault’s conceptualization of the exercise of power as something that “doesn’t only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse” (Foucault, 1980, p. 119).

Finally, with regard to the particular exoticization-eroticization of white US-American female bodies in Ecuadorian public spaces, this particular exercise of disciplinary power can be considered not only in light of a legacy of colonial honor discourse, bourgeois private/public spheres, and the phenomenon of piropos, but also in relation to a United States patriarchal discourse and the media imagery that it produces and exports. Of particular importance here is the infusion and circulation of movies straight out of an infamously white, sexist, heteronormative, male-dominated Hollywood movie industry that serves up films that are not only populated primarily by white characters, but are also laden with objectifying and sexualizing depictions of white (and non-white) female bodies that pander to heterosexual male fantasy. At the same time, it is important to note that even among the mainstream media productions that proudly claim to depict women as “sexually liberated,” “independent,” and “strong,” the images they utilize to do this can be read in contextually specific ways which work to imbue meanings that diverge from the professed intention. This was illustrated by an account that one Global Community volunteer, Andrea shared with me.

“All American women are like the women in Sex and the City aren’t they?” This was the question posed by a group of Andrea’s students in a class of young post-adolescent women and men during a class party one afternoon. Andrea had responded in the negative, however, her students had remained unconvinced. “No, no,” they had insisted, she told me. “It’s true all women from New York are like that.” Over the course of the conversation, Andrea realized that by “like that” her students meant curiously and problematically promiscuous and sex-obsessed. As Andrea recalled amusedly, “They were very careful to be like, insistent that of course I wasn’t a
big slut like the women on Sex and the City but that [in their opinions] that [Sex and the City] is like a true portrayal of American culture for young, single people.” She had continued to claim otherwise, she recalled, telling them playfully, “That’s the thing about television. They have to show you exciting things to make you want to watch.”

**8.4 “We are all gringos”: Global Community’s Careful Creation of a Conscience**

On the third day of Orientation I sat in a hotel conference room, alongside the volunteers, listening as April, one of the field directors, reviewed the *Surviving Ecuador* text that had been distributed to the group as part of a packet of Orientation materials (see Chapter 7). Reading over the text that appeared on the fourteenth page of the guide, she came to a section entitled, “Gringo Stereotypes.” Looking down at the page, she paused for a second before lifting her head back up and saying cheerily to the group, “We are all gringos.” She then allowed a few moments for the volunteers to read over the guide’s explanation:

Gringo = any foreigner who stands out in a crowd.

Beneath that equation, the text continued:

Gringos are targets for everything – robbery, assault, whistling, declarations of love, attention – both positive and negative. People have certain conceptions about gringos – that we are all wealthy tourists or grubby travelers, and even though you live here they will think that holds true for you too. They think that you are rich, and will assume you cannot speak Spanish. You will be the object of staring. To dispel these stereotypes, always emphasize that you live in the community, have a family, and a volunteer position – this will improve your standing in the town and change how people treat you.

In my notes, I marked this as the official start to Global Community’s in-country efforts at acquainting the volunteers with exactly how they were going to be regarded, read, and treated as *gringos* in Ecuador (and what they could and should do to avoid this fate), a process that would turn out be an awkward dance of confrontation and avoidance with the idea of whiteness, and more specifically, white American-ness, and the ways in which being read as white US-American would potentially influence the ways in which they would be regarded, read, and treated in their day to day lives. On the one hand, both April and the *Surviving Ecuador* guide that she had begun to review with the volunteers directly and candidly engaged the fact that volunteers would
be construed as different from the majority because of their physical appearances ("sticks out in a crowd"). Moreover, both she and the guide explicitly took up how their particular physical appearances would be used to mark, identify, and effectively, make them gringos. However, both April and the Surviving Ecuador text did this without ever daring to print or speak the word white, instead inserting the safer alternative of gringo, a term free of any explicit mention of color or race. In this way, the program carefully sidestepped the issue of whiteness and race, in general, and, in the process, misrepresented the overwhelmingly common definition of the term in the Ecuadorian context.

As mentioned previously, during the two years that I spent in Ecuador and over the course of numerous conversations with Ecuadorian friends and acquaintances regarding what the term gringo actually refers to and many informal observations in social settings in which I zeroed in on when and about who the term was used, it became evident that a gringo or a gringa is imagined not simply as "any foreigner who sticks out in a crowd" but rather, and almost exclusively, as a white person, (often imagined to be from the United States), often blond, often tall, and perhaps with blue eyes. In Ecuador, this is the ideal type, to use a sociological term, of the gringo. To be certain, when the term gringo is verbally applied in conversation to describe or categorize a given person, it is not always reserved exclusively for white US-Americans; on a technicality, as it were, it might also be used to describe a US-American of any race or ethnicity, as well as a person from Canada or a European country (although I never heard or witnessed this). However, these ethnicities and nationalities do not reflect the predominant understanding of the term, how it is generally construed in conversation, or the meaning it is most commonly given. Moreover, on the street, those who are presumed to be foreigners who are not read as white are rarely referred to as gringos or presumed to be from the United States. Additionally, if it becomes known that a non-white person is from the United States, she is often assumed to be an immigrant or the descendant of immigrant parents or grandparents, and thus, not authentically gringo.
In this way, from its very first utterance the program’s attempt to teach volunteers about being *gringos* reproduced the discursive invisibility of whiteness, even as it tried to prepare a group of largely white volunteers for the disruption of this invisibility in their everyday lives. With respect to the individual volunteer (who the program undoubtedly and correctly expects to be most frequently white and US-American), the guide officially invites and allows her to retain a familiar sense of racial anonymity and normativity while living in a country where her whiteness (in its minority status) makes her instantly known and identifiable, and moreover, is viewed as a marker of racial, linguistic, cultural, and national difference. In other words, despite being physically located in a country, where white American normativity is dramatically disrupted, in its official definition of *gringo*, the program resists this disruption, subtly working to maintain the US-American racial status quo through refusing to associate whiteness or American-ness with the marginal subject position of *gringo*. Through the program’s definition, it is not that the *gringo* (and thus the volunteer) is white, or even US-American, but that he is “foreign” and “stands out” in some sort of way that is left undetermined by the program, open to interpretation, and could, technically apply to any person in Ecuador who is not Ecuadorian. It is to a certain extent a negative definition – a *gringo* is any person who does not look Ecuadorian. In this way, the normativity of whiteness per se is not explicitly troubled. Instead the white volunteer is simply ushered into the temporary role of *gringo*, allegedly along with all other foreigners, a dynamic which allows whiteness to continue to reside in a realm of universality and anonymity even in a context where white people are a minority.

Later on, I would realize that the pre-departure Manual volunteers had already received in the mail had begun this process of deracializing the concept of *gringo* that had taken place on that Day 3 of Orientation. “You will probably attract a lot of attention in your town or city,” one excerpt read. “People will know that you’re different just by looking at the way you’re dressed. Word will get around, especially in small towns, that you are the “*gringol/a*” or “NorteAmericano/a.” This text was then followed by a telling combination of parenthesis, asterisk, and note. It read:
(*Note: The term “gringo” in Ecuador is generally used to describe most foreigners, including Europeans and all races of Americans. It essentially identifies you as different from Ecuadorians, and generally has the connotation of being from a wealthy country).

Similarly, another excerpt from the Manual attempted to prepare volunteers for the staring they would experience by spinning it as a form of (carefully de-raced) celebrity and adulation, thus reproduced the US-centric trope of a “Third World embrace” (to be discussed in Chapter 9) that characterizes much of the international volunteer industry’s promotional material:

Why will people stare? Well, you’re probably one of the most interesting things that’s happened to them in years. They’re curious about you. If you’re an American, this increases their interest even more. Most Ecuadorians like Americans and have a family member who lives in the United States. They’ll always ask if you know their relative (“Oh, you’re from Texas. Do you know my brother Enrique? He lives there.”)

All this attention might be too much for you. It’s not easy to be constantly stared at. Just try to keep a sense of humor. According to Andy Warhol, everyone gets 15 minutes of fame. Well, your fame may last a year!

In addition to a preserved condition of racial invisibility, the other significant characteristic of the program’s discourse on gringos was that it constructed the gringo subject as one that needs to be concerned for its safety due to status of visibility and related vulnerability – even as the reason for this visibility and purported vulnerability – being read as white Americans in public spaces – went unnamed, unspecified, unmarked, thus allowing the white subject position to go unnamed, and thus retain some of its invisibility, anonymity. This, I suggest, constituted a way in which the program, itself, ended up resisting an exoticization of whiteness, even as it attempted to alert a group of white subjects to the ways in which they are regarded as different in the Ecuadorian context.

Additionally, the program’s framing of the forms of gringo treatment was significant, as it worked to depoliticize them and instead define them as annoying things done by people who had either inexplicably bad intentions or were naively drawn to the gringo mystique. Indeed, within a critical and reflexive framework, practices of staring at gringos, the stereotypes that surround them, and even the practices of discriminatory price raising could be examined as counter-hegemonic narratives and even micro-forms of resistance vis-a-vis the economic, political, and cultural domination that the United States has continually exercised in Ecuador, and Latin
America, more broadly. Instead, from the "survival" framework of the guide, they were presented as inconveniences for the US-American volunteer that were to be outsmarted rather than confronted, listened to, and engaged. For example, one portion of the Surviving Ecuador text advised volunteers to arrange their style of dress so as to evade conspicuousness and robbery, two potential fates that were repeatedly presented as particular dangers for gringos in Ecuador:

Dress- Ecuadorians usually dress well, and many gringo travelers look scrubby. Look around and dress appropriately—you live here, and should dress accordingly. Err on the side of conservativeness. Remember dressing "well" doesn’t necessarily mean dressing "expensive." Never wear items that shout, "I am rich!" like nice watches or expensive jewelry.

In short, the education volunteers received on their new status provided a run-down of the ways in which gringos are viewed but without critically examining how these views developed, upon what histories they are based, and in what ways they are potentially true. Rather than engaging the views and attempting to understand them and situate them within a context of specific economic and geopolitical power relations between the United States and Ecuador, the focus is on avoiding and escaping them. The perspective remained that of the self-securing volunteer navigating a dangerous environment and the things that he or she can and must do to avoid the ontological harm of being positioned as other and stereotyped and the physical harm of being cheated or even robbed because of it. Underscoring the guide’s “survival” focus, the discussion focuses singularly on what the volunteer can expect with regard to how the Ecuadorian public will view and treat her and how she should navigate all of this. Again, the welfare of the volunteer is positioned as the central dimension of his or her presence in the country.

8.5 “We kinda took over that place…” : Reasserting (Racial) Normativity Through Spatial Othering

As illustrated above, through Orientation sessions and the text of the various guides presented above, the field staff worked to construct and hold up a gringo subject position that was defined as a target, vulnerable and endangered, a perpetual potential victim vis-à-vis an anonymous Ecuadorian public. This was indeed the counterpoint to the dangerous, unruly
Ecuador that had been concocted by the field directors and by Bob Monroe, who had also touched quite frequently and explicitly on the constant vulnerability of the gringo in Ecuador.

Within this discursive context of perpetual gringo vulnerability, it was noteworthy that the volunteers often banded together for the duration of Orientation, going out in groups or “always traveling in packs,” as Phil, a 25-year-old from a small Midwestern college town once put it. Every morning, they would come by bus or by taxi, usually with their housemates, to the hotel where Orientation sessions were held. Upon arriving, some would congregate outside in small groups, while others would enter the hotel lobby where they would lounge on the couches with other volunteers until approximately 9 o’clock. At this time, people standing outside the building would enter and everyone would begin making their way up several staircases to a large conference room. Upon entering the conference room where sessions were held, some would quickly find a seat in one of the rows of chairs, while others would visit the restroom at the back of their room or drift toward the front of the room, perusing the snack table or filling up their water bottles at the water cooler. One or both of the field directors was often positioned by a table at the front of the room, looking over papers, Soon, the first session of the day would begin with field directors asking the volunteers, as a group, how they were doing and making various announcements – changes to the schedule, a location for an upcoming group dinner, reminders about forms that volunteers needed to turn in.

After a morning of listening to lectures and participating in interactive activities, the group would be dismissed for lunch. People would rise slowly from their seats, perhaps conversing with the person next to them. Upon standing, some people would group up or pair up and make their way towards the door, while others made solitary beelines. They would descend the staircase as a loose conglomeration, stepping out into the street where they would usually chat for a few moments in small groups, some waiting for friends who had not yet made it down, others deliberating with others over lunch plans. Eventually, they would begin their trek down Calle Seis de Diciembre, again as a loosely formed mass, making their way to the more central part of the
Mariscal where the restaurants and bars were most plentiful. Upon reaching the popular streets of Calama or Foch, small groups would siphon off, heading to their restaurant of choice.

In these ways, it seemed that the volunteers enacted a sort of physical solidarity as they tended to move through both the public and private spaces of Ecuador together, whether it was en masse as a large loosely formed group or in smaller groupings and pairs. In addition, I found that on the numerous nights that they went out as a group, this forging of solidarity would give way to their frequent creation of spaces of white US-American dominance and centeredness when they descended en masse upon local bars and restaurants. This was illustrated to me at several points during the Orientation, but most powerfully on one particular night halfway through the month.

On this night I climbed a series of concrete steps with Erin, Kelsey, Abby, and Brianna. We had met up a few blocks away and were now arriving at Julio’s, a karaoke bar in the Mariscal. Nicholas, a volunteer from Long Island had invited everyone there to celebrate his 23rd birthday. Always eager to practice her Spanish, Erin spoke briefly to the young man who stood just inside the door. “Buenas noches,” she said rapidly. “Estamos buscando un grupo…” Smiling as though he knew exactly which group she was referring to, he replied, “Si, niña. Pasen. Bienvenidas.” We filed past him into the bar where we were greeted with the melancholy notes of a pasillo and a male voice singing off-key. The room was dimly lit, incredibly warm, and perfumed with a faint smell of cigarette smoke and salty buttered popcorn. The walls were decorated with several mirrors, which had the effect of making the room appear larger than it actually was. The bar was situated right by the entrance and as we went further into the space, we found a room of several round tables with booth seating. There were two large television screens hanging prominently, along with a smaller screen that was showing a soccer game. On the large screens, song lyrics flashed against a backdrop of beach scene video footage. Abby and Erin drifted off toward an empty table to the left, one that was closer to the television screens. I followed Brianna and Kelsey toward an empty table in the back, where we all took seats.
Apart from our group, the bar clientele appeared to be exclusively Ecuadorian. Seated at the table next to ours was a group that appeared to be in their late 40s and 50s, with the exception of one young man who appeared to be in his early 20s. At the table directly in front of us was a group of younger couples, laughing, smiling, and chatting with each other. One woman sat embracing the man sitting next to her, periodically burying her head in his neck. Across the room, at the bar, a handful of men sat nursing pints of beer and tumblers of whiskey, a few of them immersed in quiet conversation.

A waiter soon came to our table and handed us several laminated menus and a large hardcover tome, its pages, also protected by plastic, listing all of the songs that were available to order. We immediately began to pore over the drink selections, hunching over the menus that had been placed on the table in front of us. Within a few minutes, the waiter came back and took our order. Kelsey and Brianna each ordered a Club, a popular beer in Ecuador and Kelsey opened the large book and began to look through the songs.

Gradually, other people from the volunteer cohort began to appear at the door, looking around, spotting us, smiling, waving. Some people came over to join us, while others headed toward the table that was closer to the screens at the front of the room. Tim, the field director, soon came in and made his way over to our table, smiling, saying hi to everyone, and taking a seat next to Kelsey. He immediately started flipping through the songbook, which had been left closed on the table, and Kelsey soon joined him, peering down at the selection. After a few minutes they closed the book. I asked what songs they were going to sing and they showed me a little slip of white paper, reading off the song titles they had written on it. Flashing a smile, Kelsey responded enthusiastically. “Can’t Buy Me Love, One Hand in My Pocket, Livin’ on a Prayer, and Man in the Mirror!”

As we sat around the table, people alternated between chatting with each other and looking up at the screen, reading along with the song lyrics. Others, including myself, looked up at the screen, watching the lyrics of the songs as they flashed by. Sitting to my left was Brianna, a 24-year-old volunteer from Sacramento. “I listen to Spanish radio at home,” she informed me, as
she sang along to a few songs. We intermittently commented to each other on the video background of the screen, which alternated between beach scenes, scenes of butterflies, shots of romantic couples interacting, and what appeared to be scenes of Mexican ruins and London street scenes. The waiter soon returned with a tray of beer bottles. “Club” he began, lifting up a bottle of beer and setting it down in front of Kelsey. “Gracias,” she replied, smiling brightly through long brown bangs. He continued to serve the entire tray in this fashion, announcing the name of each beer before setting it down on the table in front of the person who had ordered it. When he finished serving the drinks, he set down a small bowl of popcorn on our table before retreating back in the direction of the bar.

People from our group continued to trickle in through the front door. Andrea came in, quickly surveyed the room and made a beeline for our table, where she sat down next to Tim and immediately engaged him in a conversation. Melanie, a 24-year-old from California, appeared at the door, spotted us and walked over to our table. “Hi guys!” she exclaimed. More people come in and sit at the other table as well. The names of Tim and Kelsey’s chosen songs suddenly flashed across the screen, prompting exclamations and cheers from our table. Within seconds the waiter arrived with the microphone. Kelsey took the microphone and as she and Tim stood up, the opening bars of Can’t Buy Me Love flooded the room. As they began to sing together into the microphone, the rest of the group at our table joined in.

Soon, the instrumental version of One Hand in My Pocket filled the room and most of the people in Global Community group began to sing along loudly. I noticed that their approach was markedly different than that of the Ecuadorian man who had been singing when we entered the club and of the other Ecuadorian patrons who had followed him while the volunteers were making their song selections. These patrons had given individual performances as their friends and associates had looked on quietly, listening intently. On the other hand, the Global Community volunteers sang loudly as a group and instead of one person’s voice, there was the sound of choral singing that bordered somewhat on shouting.
Soon, the instrumental version of *Livin’ on a Prayer* was playing and the volunteers erupted into cheers. By the time the chorus came, volunteers were exuberant, many beaming while they sang along together with great gusto, closing their eyes as they sang out the lyrics: “Oh oh, we’re half-way there. Oh oh, livin’ on a prayer. Take my hand, we’ll make it, I swear. Oh, oh, livin’ on a prayer.” The performance seemed cathartic for them. The sound was deafening.

In the meantime, I noticed that most of the Ecuadorian clientele sat in stony silence, not smiling or talking as they had been doing previously. They did not look at each other and their faces were drawn into expressions of discomfort, as though they were politely enduring something that was incredibly uncomfortable, something that was suddenly awkwardly amiss in their evening out. Indeed, the *cumbias, baladas, pasillos*, and Latin pop songs that had been playing when we had arrived had now been replaced with the sounds of American pop music and the English language. Moreover, the bar had been infiltrated by roughly 25 *gringos*, their boisterous antics and laughing now permeating the space. Not only were the lyrics suddenly in a foreign language, but the style of doing karaoke had shifted from individual performance in the local language to raucous group expression of foreigners from the United States. No one in our group seemed to be aware of or concerned with the way in which their behavior was being received by the local clientele.

The set of songs finished, and the volunteers remained in the center of the floor, chatting and laughing amongst themselves, excitedly planning what song they wanted to sing next. Their presence filled the room. A new song began and the waiter brought the microphone to the table of middle-aged men and women who were seated at the table next to the one at which I sat. One of the women stood up and reached for the microphone. She was dressed formally, in a maroon collared shirt, black slacks, and black leather pointy-toed boots. Smiling a bit nervously she tucked her hair behind her right ear as she reached for the microphone. As a slow melody began to play, she turned towards the screen. Standing between her and the screen were a few huddles of Global Community volunteers, laughing and sipping from brown beer bottles, apparently oblivious to the fact that they were blocking this woman’s view. Smiling a bit more nervously now,
she began to wave towards them, mouthing something I could not discern, apparently trying to motion to them to step aside. They remained oblivious, their attention fixed on each other, as they laughed at one another's jokes, a few of them nodding along to the rhythm of the song this woman was trying to sing. As the song continued so did this dynamic, the woman continually moving her head from side to side in order to see around the huddles of volunteers so that she could make out the lyrics of her selection that flashed across the screen at the front of the room. The song ended and the woman took her seat. The volunteers did not look up.

Several other Latin American songs were played and the microphone was passed around to different patrons in the establishment. An Ecuadorian man at the bar sang a popular song called Ingrata. When he finished another male voice began to sing With or Without You by U2, pronouncing the English words clearly and with little, if any, trace of an Ecuadorian accent. The volunteers took notice, craning their necks and peering around the room to find the owner of this voice. Next, another man delivered an incredibly dramatic performance of a slow song in Spanish, turning toward the crowd at various moments as he held long notes.

The song choices came back to the selections of the volunteers. Again, they sang-shouted as a group. The songs included The Jackson Five's ABC/123 and Total Eclipse of the Heart, which James, a quiet 24-year-old, explained to me had become really popular after being included on the soundtrack of Old School, a popular comedy film starring Will Ferrell. Some other up-tempo US pop songs played and some volunteers danced and swayed about drunkenly at the front of the room. During this time, two tables of Ecuadorian patrons slowly got up and left. As they exited, the melody of Madonna's Holiday filled the room and Rachel and Amanda, two best friends from Guilford, Connecticut, tipsily began. “If we took a holida-aay. Took some time to celebra-aate…” The festivities continued over at a banquet seat, where six volunteers stood around laughing hysterically as they peered down at Aaron, who lay face up on the seat, completely passed out. “Let’s draw on his face!” someone exclaimed. With a black white board marker in hand, Cody, a tall 22-year-old from Pasadena, began to draw lines on Aaron's face. As Aaron remained prone with his eyes closed, apparently oblivious, I was struck by the fact that he
could sleep through all of this. I turned to James "Was he that drunk?" I asked. Grinning, he replied, "Yeah, he and Verónica were taking tequila shots earlier."

About 15 minutes later, Aaron’s body had somehow become vertical and was being supported by James and Jeremy, who stood on either side of him, propping up his arms with their shoulders which they had jutted into his armpits. His eyes were open but he could not seem to focus them as they walked him out of the bar. When they came back in they were accompanied by Cody, who had gone out ahead of them. A few women from the group circled around him asking what had happened. Cody told them he and the others had put Aaron in a cab. Morgan, Cody’s girlfriend, expressed that this worried her. “Did you get the taxi’s code?” she asked him. He looked at her with irritation. “Yeah,” he said sarcastically. He then laughed and admitted in a less cavalier tone, “No, I didn’t.”

In the meantime, Creep, a popular song by the pop band RadioHead, had begun playing and the whole group had started singing along, once again. “Because I’m a creep!” they shouted in unison and with gusto when the melody arrived at the song’s chorus. Amanda and Rachel sang another US pop song, Mariah Carey’s Always Be My Baby. By this time most of the group had migrated toward the front of the room, and the only Ecuadorians who remained were at the bar. Daniel, a 27-year-old from Miami, took a seat to my left, and I struck up a conversation as we watched the group. Quite intoxicated, he began spouting frustrations about wanting to hang with “the local people” and how “fucked up” it was that “it’s all gringos here.” I asked him if he had noticed that the Ecuadorian patrons had not seemed too happy earlier. He nodded but didn’t say much else. At this point, American Pie began to play. People sang along excitedly and all together as a group. Next the Beastie Boys’ Fight For Your Right to Party was playing and people sang along excitedly. After that came Pretty Fly for a White Guy. As the group sang at the top of its collective voice, it was apparent that the bar had become theirs for the night.

A few days later, I stood in front of small restaurant in the Mariscal with Jeremy, a 24-year-old from Boston. We peered at the lunch menu printed on a white easel that stood at its entrance. “What are bolas de verde?” he asked. After a few moments of conferring and agreeing
that the price of a dollar seventy-five was a “good deal,” we entered, finding a room that was mostly empty, equipped with twelve small tables, six on each side of a small aisle. At the back of the room, a television, hung from the ceiling, played the midday news. Below it was a counter located directly in front of an open doorway that led to the kitchen. Each table was adorned with a white tablecloth and a clear plastic slab laid over top. Gesturing towards a few tables, I asked Jeremy where he wanted to sit. “Here is fine,” he replied, moving toward the table that was directly to our left. We took seats across from one another and within a few seconds, a young woman, dressed in dark jeans and a bright green polo t-shirt, came over to take our order.

Within a few minutes the waitress returned, setting down a small light green plastic basket, containing silverware and napkins, and our desserts of ensalada de fruta – two small dishes of a bright yellow canned pineapples floating in their syrupy juice. A few minutes later, she returned with two large steaming bowls of clear soup flecked with bright green bits of herbs and filled with large chunks of yucca, beef, and round dumplings of mashed green banana. The rims of the white porcelain bowls were decorated with a pink floral pattern that matched the rims of the plates upon which they sit.

In the meantime, Jeremy and I had started to converse. Now, as we began swirling our spoons, I asked him to fill me in on what had happened in Orientation the previous Friday, mentioning that I had been under the weather and not attended. “Yeah, I remember you weren’t feeling well on Friday,” he replied. “But,” he said with a mischievous smile, “You went out that night right?” I conceded that it probably had not been the best idea. “But,” I added, attempting mock sobriety, “I was determined to go to karaoke.” Jeremy laughed and then looked down into his soup. “Yeah,” he said a bit sheepishly and then paused for a moment. “We kinda took over that place.”

Not sure what to say, I nodded and smiled. I was somewhat surprised at his comment, as it had seemed to me that none of the volunteers had been even remotely aware of the impact of their actions on the other patrons or general atmosphere of the bar. “Oh, so you noticed that too?” I asked, treading lightly. His eyes widened, “Yeah,” he replied as though this were something
obvious. Not wanting to let on that I had a similar impression of the evening, lest he conclude that I was judging him or his fellow volunteers, I paused and then said, “I wasn’t sure that people felt that way.” Peering again down into his soup for a moment, he broke off a bit of dumpling with his spoon, before continuing, “I mean it was like, a little place and there were like 30 of us, and we didn’t really follow along with the Spanish songs.” As I nodded, he added, “I don’t know what time you left but I stayed really late, and by the time I left it was just us, I mean maybe there were like 2 or 3 Ecuadorians.” He paused for a moment, working over the situation in his mind before coming up with a redeeming rationalization. “I mean,” he pointed out, “we gave them tons of business.”

8.6 “When they see that you’re a gringo…”

“It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his two-ness…”

- Du Bois (1903/2007, p. 8)

Following the lead of the April and Tim, as well as the language of the guides and invited speakers such as Bob Monroe (introduced in Chapter 7), volunteers almost instantly began to refer to themselves and to each other as gringos. On the one hand, I saw this as the adoption of the local discourse, but I also could not help seeing how it allowed for the whiteness to remain unnamed, unthought even, and thus un-normed, even as the difference of white US-Americanness – particularly, blonde haired, blue eyed white US-Americanness – is the foundational construct of the Ecuadorian gringo discourse. Additionally, by the middle of the year, it was clear that all of the volunteers carried a working knowledge of the “gringo stereotypes” that had been taught to them during Orientation, using it to temper expectations, anticipate discrimination, interpret any and all interpersonal treatment they experienced in their daily lives, and forge a general understanding of the ways in which they were positioned and conceived of in Ecuadorian society.

Whether it was through an emotional register of anger, amusement, bitterness, smugness, frustration, or a sense of indifference, all of the volunteers demonstrated this sort of
acute, continual, and often preoccupying awareness of how they as gringos were regarded, interpreted, and stereotyped by an Ecuadorian gaze. "At the university," Matt told me one afternoon, with indignation in his voice, "this one lady charged me $0.35 for water and the guy who I made friends with charged me $0.30, but sometimes when he’s not there, I have to go to her. It’s like, "Why the hell are you making me pay $0.35? Like you’re just doing it because I’m a gringo." For many of the women, their sense of gringo perceptions was at play in the sense they made of the harassment they experienced on the street. "They do it [street harassment] to gringa—like, to white women because like, we are like told to like ignore it," Brooke told me one afternoon over coffee. “So, to them, it’s just like “Oh, she’s just stupid.” And they’re like, “Oh, she’s an idiot, like, I’ll just keep doing it. I’ll keep harassing her ’cause she’s letting me.” At times, the gringo perceptions they claimed to know were laced with positive connotations. “They see gringos as responsible,” Jeremy informed me one afternoon, as he explained his understanding of a local joke that he had recently heard from his host family, one that maintained that Ecuadorians would sooner trust a gringo to house sit than a fellow Ecuadorian; it seemed beyond him to consider that his host family’s elite class position may have rendered this joke less an ascription of “responsibility” to gringos and more a commentary on elite ideology vis-à-vis the vast majority of non-elite Ecuadorians.

As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, I came to understand this acute awareness as something that resembled what Du Bois described as double consciousness—that is, "a peculiar sensation…this sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity.” As stated at the outset, Du Bois’ developed this concept in relation to the very specific conditions of racial oppression endured by black US-Americans in the late 19th century post-emancipation context of the United States. My intention here is not to falsely equate these conditions or the particularities of black double consciousness that Du Bois was describing with what a group of middle and upper middle class white US-American volunteers experienced in Ecuador in the early 21st century as they suddenly became a racial, linguistic, cultural, and national minority. Instead, I
would like to try and utilize the analytical purchase of Du Bois’ concept to make sense of an apparent “sense of two-ness,” of a continual “looking at one’s self through the eyes of others,” that seemed to materialize among white US-American volunteers as they experienced a new and de-normalizing subjectivization as *gringos* in Ecuador.

A key aspect of Du Bois’ double consciousness is an imposed condition – or, through a Foucauldian lens, what might be considered to be a discursive positioning – of “other” in relation to the norm, even as one is ostensibly or officially categorized as being part of this norm. In the United States of the late 19th century, blacks were technically American citizens, and therefore technically had legal claim to the protections, rights, and entitlements this, but as the categorization of “Negro” positioned blacks as “other” in relation to the normative category of “American,” these claims could rarely be fully realized and were experienced as being quite tenuous, even if they remained strongly desired and attempted on the part of many blacks. In this way, double consciousness might be understood as the continual attempt at reconciling one’s claim on the norm with one’s position as “other.”

For white US-American volunteers in Ecuador, the kind of double consciousness they seemed to experience was produced, mediated, and conditioned quite differently – differently enough that it should perhaps be qualified as imperial double consciousness or privileged double consciousness -- but was nonetheless borne of a continual attempt to reconcile a claim on the norm with an imposed otheredness. For the duration of the time they spent in Ecuador, they were engaged in a constant striving to *inhabit* and in fact *reclaim* the norm, to be treated and regarded as such, to not be in judged in relation to it but to simply *be* it – to not be discriminated against when people “see we are *gringos,***” to not be stared at on the street, etc. Unlike the black US-American consciousness that Du Bois wrote about, the white US-American subjectivities of the volunteers were not engaged in an attempt to reconcile a claim on Ecuadorian citizenship with an imposed *gringo* categorization; but they were, I suggest, very much engaged in a continual attempt at reconciling a claim on the norm (that theoretically, had long characterized their subjectivities) with an imposed positioning as racial others (i.e. *gringos*) in Ecuador. From their
subjective vantage points of the volunteers, being white US-American continued to define the norm, but they simply could not be this in Ecuador, even as they continued to be white US-American. Continual attempts at reconciling the white US-American they were accustomed to being and (i.e. the norm) and the white US-American they were discursively compelled to be in Ecuador (i.e. the decisively non-normal gringo) was, I suggest, what produced their senses of “looking at one’s self through the eyes of others.”

Indeed, as McWhorter’s work contends, for white US-American subjects who live in a white supremacist society, a discursive subjectivization as racially abnormal is theoretically not at play (though the white subject’s positioning in relation to other forms of normativity such as class, gender, and sexuality clearly does factor into the formation of subjectivities). However, it could be figured that when white US-Americans enter societies where white US-Americanness (or white Europeanness) is not the norm (or is perhaps defined as such through the exercise of remote imperial power and is routinely contested by local demographic realities and related counter-discourses), this dynamic changes such that one’s sense of self as “normal” is suddenly troubled. (Here, field director Tim’s rhetorical question, “Are you weird or am I weird?” (discussed in Chapter 7) becomes particularly germane, especially as he leveled it immediately after informing the volunteers that Ecuadorians “all know that gringos have weak stomachs.” It can be interpreted as a sort of rearguard defense against gringo objectification-othering that he had just, perhaps unexpectedly, found himself, a gringo, engaging in). Among the volunteers, the most visceral experience of this change lay in the newly felt “condition of perceived visibility” (to be discussed later), but was also found in the micro-power laden realm of interpersonal interactions to which I turn now.

As it turned out, for many volunteers the negotiation of taxi fares, so lamented by Michelle on the first day of Orientation, was often a flashpoint for perpetual, generalized senses of marginality, a quotidian interaction through which they could be reminded very quickly that they were regarded as different from the majority and that, for this reason, could be subject to discriminatory treatment at any time. In most cities, taxis charged a common flat rate (except for
trips that were uncharacteristically far or lengthy), and upon arriving in their respective cities, the volunteers quickly made it their business to learn what the standard taxi rates were and which, if any, trips were commonly charged a higher rate. In little time they began entering taxis, confident in their knowledge of what the rate “should be,” and armed with an arsenal of tips as to how to avoid being given “the gringo price.” Field directors had instructed them to confirm the price before getting into the taxi, but many often got in first and then verified the price during the first few moments of the ride. If, at this point, the driver quoted them a fare that they found to be higher than what they had come to understand as the normal rate, they immediately presumed that he or she was discriminating against them because of how they looked, “ripping them off” because they were gringos. While the quoted rate could be as little fifty cents or one dollar higher than what they had confirmed as the going rate, for many, the principle of being treated differently was something that they simply could not reconcile. In these moments, many openly protested the circumstance of being treated differently, arguing back with the taxi drivers, insisting that they knew better. In recounting these moments to fellow volunteers, their rage was often striking; so much wrath over amounts as little as fifty cents and as high as a couple of dollars, which all of them, as upper class US-Americans who were downright wealthy in the Ecuadorian economic context, could easily spare. To be frank, it appeared so ridiculous, perhaps not even worth writing about because it was so trivial a matter. However, so much ado over so little rendered it compelling. Through the course of our conversations about these instances, it became evident that what they were fighting was clearly not simply the demand that they pay a few dollars or sometimes just fifty cents (or even less) over what they “knew” to be the going rate. Rather, it seemed that it was a certain production of themselves as the “other,” something which is anathema to dominant US-American constructions of middle and upper class US-American whiteness as the norm. This was clear from Nicholas’ comments:

N: I get really frustrated when taxi drivers look at me or my friends or me and my friends and you know that they’re ripping you off. I mean, not that the prices are crazy, but you know that ‘cause you look American or whatever they assume that you’re loaded and that you have no idea what the prices are supposed to be, like you just stepped off the plane, I can’t stand that. I mean, it is partially culturally prejudice thing. The other week we were
riding a taxi, like a really, really, really short ride, from the Sese Mall basically to the Ecovia stop right by QuiCentro, Quatro de Mayo. So, it obviously should’ve been no more than a dollar, cause the taxi meter probably wouldn’t have read more than 65 cents at the most, not even. And so I’m with a bunch of people, Catherine. Andrea, Trevor and Trevor’s girlfriend, who is Ecuadorian, and so the cab stops, and before he lets us out he goes $2. And we’re like what, you’re kidding, right? And he’s like no, $2. And so we get out, we pay him no more than $1.50, but then Trevor’s girlfriend, obviously fluent in Spanish leans in and confronts the cab driver and says something like just because they’re gringos doesn’t mean they’re millionaires. Yeah. I don’t know.

C: Did he reply anything?

N: I don’t know if he replied. But, yeah, that’s something, I feel like a lot of people look at us or whoever and assume that we’re all loaded, when in fact most of us are not. And like also we’re living on Ecuadorian salaries now, like I am basically going to be living on an Ecuadorian salary when I get home for a month and a half and I’ll be incredibly careful with my spending. But, yeah, that’s kind of annoyed me sometimes.

Nicholas’s comments illustrate not only the formation of a double consciousness that is apparent in the way he looks at himself through the eyes of the proverbial taxi driver, but also the articulation of a sense of collectivity that is not forged through othering Ecuadorians – as was so often done (see Chapter 7) – but rather through the perceived experience of being othered together by Ecuadorians. When he refers to the experience of he and his friends being “looked at” by taxi drivers and subsequently knowing that they are being “ripped off.” Also salient is his sense of anger and irritation at the fact that he and his friends are often perceived as being “loaded,” and his insistence that because he is being paid an “Ecuadorian salary,” which is a fact that would be impossible for a taxi driver or anyone else to ascertain, that he should be treated like everyone else. (Interestingly, he invokes something that is invisible to the outsider to as the reason that he should be treated normally.) Here, there is a clear desire to remain immune from being seen, to avoid becoming visible to the Other with respect to the realities of his socioeconomic status. Once, in another conversation, Nicholas had candidly described himself as having grown up “in a very wealthy neighborhood in probably the wealthiest state and the wealthiest country in the world”; thus, even if he was living on an “Ecuadorian salary” for the moment, he was clearly positioned as a bearer of uncommon material wealth in the context of Ecuadorian wages and Ecuadorian prices. In his narrative, however, there is a sort of implicit appeal being made to a notion of a portable or transferable normativity whereby, as long as he
adapts to the norms of a given context (in this case, the typical Ecuadorian salary) he is entitled to inhabit the norm. This can be read as a significant form of pushback against the imposed subject position of Other – even as his struggle against its imposition works to constitute a subjectivity of otheredness.

As Nicholas’s also narrative illustrates, it was not only being othered as a gringo but being even more profoundly othered as a certain kind of gringo – the gringo “who just stepped off the plane.” Thus, it seemed that during these arguments and their subsequent recounting of them, what was at stake for the volunteers was not only their sense of entitlement to being treated equally, but also, their conception of themselves as a different kind of gringo. This was illustrated in Josh’s account of an altercation with a taxi driver:

So, I had an experience that led to another bad experience with a taxi driver on a Sunday night, pretty late. Got in, and when I got in I told him the address and he sternly, sort of aggressively, told me the price which I learned later, what I know now is actually fairly reasonable but it was the way in which he said it to me that sort of made me feel like it wasn’t a fair price so I told him it always costs a dollar fifty and not two dollars and I was trying to be reasonable like, “No sea malito [Don’t be bad/mean],” trying to use all the best Spanish phrases that I could, and anyways it didn’t work out too well. I ended up just saying, “Okay, just let me out right here,” no more than fifty feet from where he picked me up. I mean that was probably the one time where I specifically felt anti-American [treatment].

And then I’ve had some great experiences in taxis as well where I gave a kid two dollars for what was typically a dollar fifty taxi ride but I tend to do that if the taxi driver is sociable and nice and kind and seemed like just a good person so I did that and he actually said no, it’s only a dollar fifty and I was like taken aback by that. I was like wow. That’s exactly why I’m giving you two dollars. Thank you very much. Of course I know it’s a dollar fifty but thanks. Keep the money. That’s way cool of you because obviously he could have easily taken advantage of me and not only taken the money but said hey it’s three dollars just to see if I’m the gringo who’s been here for two days and doesn’t really know the cab fares. Obviously I know what it costs. I’ve been here long enough now to understand how much things cost but I thought that was cool.

For Josh, it came down to a question of differentiating himself from “the gringo who just got into town two days ago.” ones that were in the know, ones that had immersed in the culture and were their sense of knowing the culture authority being a different kind of gringo, For Josh the distinction of having “been here long enough” – even if it was a matter of months – allowed him to feel he knew certain things and that this entitled them to fair treatment.
As the volunteers went through the year as the perpetual conspicuous "other" in Ecuador, their consternation with being treated "differently" threw into relief just how accustomed they were, as white middle class Americans, to living as the non-other in the United States, how accustomed they were to passing through life without experiencing the sort of attention they received in Ecuador, as gringos.

Further, when volunteers recounted their experiences of being treated "differently" in Ecuador, the specific expectations and assumptions they had cultivated going through life as non-others in the United States were thrown into sharp relief. As they told me these stories, it was clear that what was being challenged were very central assumptions about who they were in the eyes of society and related expectations of interpersonal treatment. Further, the basis of their racial appearance. In this way, their accounts allowed a glimpse into part of what it means, psychologically, to be a member of the socially dominant class, shedding revealing light on the assumptions and expectations that form an integral component of the psyche among those who experience American white middle class privilege. The specific sorts of treatment they protested exposed just what they had learned to expect, specifically as members of the American white middle and professional class.

8.7 Crises of (In)Visibility: Struggles With “Sticking Out”

“In general I feel conspicuous, especially in my neighborhood in St. Carlos up north. It seems like I’m the only non-Ecuadorian walking around usually – and, on the bus too, usually. So, yeah, especially kids. I see kids staring at me all the time.”
- Nicholas

“Like, I stick out because I’m blond and tall.” – Shannon

Over the course of the year, the volunteers often felt a persistent sensation of looking and speaking differently from the general Ecuadorian population and this sensation was accompanied by an awareness of being noticed in particular ways that they attributed to their physical and sometimes linguistic differences. This dual experience of not seeing other people who resembled them and of being stared upon by Ecuadorian people seemed to create, among many volunteers a sense of unease. This sense of visibility seemed to provoke a sort of visceral
sense of anxiety, which volunteers discussed with me in different ways. Some spoke candidly about their sense of anxiety surrounding stares on the street. As Ashley told me one afternoon:

A: Everything has been safe with me, but I’m like this target. I’m more of a target I feel like than Erin. I feel like I stand out more just because, I don’t know, I just feel like I stand out, so.

C: Why?

A: Just tall, American, you just stand out. If someone wanted to do something to me, they could, so that’s been scary.

Ashley’s wording and her seemingly careful avoidance of describing herself as white – choosing instead to employ “tall” and “American” – was characteristic of the ways in which most volunteers talked to me about their experiences and feelings in relation to the sense of “sticking out.” Like the guide and April’s presentation during Orientation, the word was off limits. In this sense, they became the *gringo* subject presented to them by the program, not only a “target,” as Ashley put it, but a person who was without a race or at least a person who did not, in describing her or himself, utilize the construct of race as a key component, even if it was what clearly was drawing the Ecuadorian gaze to settle upon and other her or his physical body.

However, there were different ways of dealing with street othering. While Ashley professed a significant degree of anxiety, there were others who, in their conversations with me, never mentioned stares or perhaps alluded to them as a fact of life that was, at the very least, noteworthy and at most, mildly annoying. They would then quickly brush it off with a shrug of the shoulders, thus evading a more profound discussion of how it felt. This was illustrated by Andrea’s comments one afternoon:

A: In my neighborhood, I mean, I definitely feel conspicuous. But I think my neighborhood has become familiar with me. So like, when I first got here, people would stare or like y’know, cat-call at me, and *now*, like, my walk home from the bus or from the corner when I take taxis is always the same, so people know me. So, I’ve sort of become a fixture in the neighborhood and I don’t feel uncomfortable in my own neighborhood. Like, I don’t feel like people leer at me. But like up north, there really aren’t any *gringos* so, if I like go to the store, I’m usually the only *gringa*.

C: What do you make of that – have you ever experienced that before, like feeling like—

A: I’m being leered at? (laughing) Not to the extreme and it really, it hasn’t made me feel all that uncomfortable. I mean I am going to be happy to go back to a part, at least where
I live in San Francisco where people will not be leering at me and cat-calling. That'll be nice but I mean there’re parts of San Francisco. I’ll go and y’know like, there’s dudes standin’ on the corner shoutin’ out at girls that like happens, it’s kind of a cultural universal. And it just is, it’s not uncomfortable, it’s just annoying. It’s just like, really?

C: Do you feel like it’s because you are the gringa?

A: I think it’s exacerbated because I’m the gringa. I mean, y’know, people leer at me at like all hours of the day and like y’know will whistle at me and stuff. All hours of the day, like, no matter what I look like, what I’m wearing. So it’s like, y’know, kind of this othered kinda thing I feel, but I mean women here deal with that, I’m pretty sure, as well, so. But, yeah, y’know, that hasn’t made me as mad as like, Catherine once flipped off an entire team of soccer players in the park. She was running through [Parque] Carolina and they like all, there were like fifteen of them, and they all like either said something to her, like whistled or whatever. So then she like ran past them, totally flipping them off. And I was like, “Dude, Catherine, really?” and she’s like, “I’m so sick of it!” But I think it was just because it was en masse that really made her mad. But I’ve never had anything happen to me like that, that I’m like, “Really?” That’s ridiculous.

Worse than the discomfort of being stared at, it seemed, was the threat of showing that these stares in fact provoked substantive emotional responses. This was evident in Andrea’s response, as well her reference to the behavior of Catherine, the fellow volunteer who had responded to male comments and whistling by very overtly cursing them with her middle finger; it was as though Andrea was providing this example of more fazed response in order to set herself apart as perhaps unflappable, even as she moved to side with Catherine, empathize with her frustration, and condemn the offending behavior in the end (“But I’ve never had anything happen to me like that, that I’m like, “Really?” That’s ridiculous). This sort of unflappability was also evidenced by Phil’s account of being stared at in the city where he had been placed:

P: I mean of course they’re staring, there’s like you know, some like person with like, who’s (laughing) like a foot taller than them, like y’know, going running, with like and iPod (laughing) in like some neighborhood where like people, nobody’s going running (laughing), like, y’know, like I’d be staring at me, like, y’know. It’s never been hostile, it’s just kinda like, it’ll be like an old man, and he’ll be like “Huh?” (laughing), or like, y’know, like what are you gonna do?

Overall, interpreting some of the volunteers’ silences around and apparent minimizations of the experience of being stared at in public was difficult. What to make of something that is not said? Based on theories of whiteness, I tentatively hypothesized that this experience of being seen and being seen in such a way that marked their whiteness and, more specifically, the difference of their whiteness was incredibly discomfiting. I wondered whether the reluctance of
many to dwell on this topic for more than a few moments, if at all, was a sign that we had touched upon a topic too personal or too sensitive to be discussed at length with someone who was non-white, who was a researcher, or perhaps with anyone at all, except perhaps their closest of friends. At the same time, it could be interpreted as a way in which they discursively maintained the invisibility and normativity of whiteness for themselves.

*Situating Ecuadorian Street Otherings of White US-Americans*

Predictably, among the volunteers, this street attention caused a significant degree of discomfort, which will be examined below. Not surprisingly, no one enjoyed being ogled, stared at, mimicked, or sexualized as they went about their daily lives in the public spaces. As I sat and listened to their accounts of this attention and at other times directly witnessed it (particularly when I went out with women), it was impossible not to empathize with them, especially since I inevitably became involved in getting to know them as people rather than simply abstract research participants. At the same time, however, I endeavored to put their discomfort into context, and consider the street attention not only in terms of what it looked like superficially or how it made them feel, but also with respect to the politics of it all. In attempting to do this, I grappled with conceptualizing what this street attention actually was an instance of, and to do *this*, I tried to interrogate what phenomenon it was responding to or at least being directed toward, what otherwise smooth processes it was unsettling, and what sorts of ruptures it brought about.

I considered the embodied privilege that is represented by the white US-American body that walks the streets of Ecuador, or any other “developing” country. Indeed, whether male or female and of whatever race, the US-American body walking the streets of Ecuador is indeed a sort of privilege in corporeal motion, it is a body that reflects the freedom of upper class Americans to go mostly anywhere in the world, to travel without visas or to easily obtain visas when necessary, to easily insert themselves into communities, either en masse or individually, with little to no bureaucratic hassle. From this perspective, I posited that the street othering of white US-Americans in the “developing world” contexts constitutes a sort of micro-level disruption
of this privilege, a disruption that when directed at Americans who are white, also unsettles the privilege of invisibility, anonymity, and normativity that comes with being white and upper class in the United States. Indeed, this marking of white American bodies in the public space does multiple things at once. It symbolically challenges this (white upper class) American privilege by marking the presence of Americans, their bodies, their personhoods, and their appearance in Ecuadorian spaces as strange. For this reason, I came to think about not only as a form of disciplinary power but also as a form of amorphous resistance, an act which challenges a certain US-American dominance despite the fact that it may not be intended or received as such, a form of resistance which, akin to Foucault’s notion of power, is in some sense “subject-less” but nevertheless at play.

At the same time, however, the gendered nature of this street attention (to be discussed more extensively below) requires a nuanced conceptualization that draws out similarities as well divergences. While such street attention may disrupt the privilege of white US-Americans, it leaves forms of gender domination firmly in place. As white US-American men have their gender go unmarked and white US-American women have their gender sexualized and objectified, the street attention takes shape as an exercise of male domination. In a sense, the marking of the white US-American female body is at once an exercise of resistance and oppression, as it breaks with the discursive production of white US-American global mobility but accords with and continues the sexual objectification of female bodies. By the same token, the marking of the white US-American male body is at once an exercise of resistance and privileging, as it also rejects white normativity but allows the maleness of that body to go unsexualized and unmarked.

8.8 “Like A Piece of Meat”: Subjectivities of White US-American Female Other(ed)ness in Ecuadorian Public Spaces

As already alluded to, the experience of receiving attention on the street was heavily gendered. While men volunteers received stares and the occasional “Hello,” the experience for women volunteers was markedly different. As they traversed the public spaces of their respective towns and cities, often as the lone gringa on the street, many were frequently met with whistles,
kissing sounds, various flirtatious salutations and sexual come-ons that some Ecuadorian men directed their way. I observed this one Sunday afternoon as I walked around the city of Cuenca with Brooke. We had just eaten lunch and Brooke had suggested we go for gelato. “Let me call Josh because he said he wanted to get ice cream,” she said, peering down at her cell phone, pressing a few buttons and then holding it up to her ear. “Voicemail,” she said, after a few seconds, pressing another button and dropping it back into her shoulder bag. We continued walking. “Oh, I’m gonna show you my favorite building in Cuenca,” she said after a brief pause. “It’s made of this specific marble that supposedly is only found in Cuenca. It’s like, breathtakingly beautiful.”

It was a Sunday, the streets were fairly empty and most of the shops were closed. Soon, we walked by a building whose doorway stood open, and as we passed it an avalanche of kissing sounds emanated from inside. Neither of us turned to look, immersed it seemed in a conversation about the latest drunken antics of a few Global Community volunteers during the Carnaval festivities that had recently passed. A few minutes later, Brooke was telling me about the field director’s recent visit to Cuenca. At this point, a man who had been walking in our direction from the opposite end of the block, passed by us by. A teasing grin broke across his face and he widened his eyes performatively, staring intently at Brooke, as though willing her to look back at him.

These two instances, which happened within moments of each other, were striking not because they were particularly new or foreign displays to my ears and eyes, but because they somehow felt qualitatively different than any male attention that I, as a brown skinned woman often assumed to be Latin American, had ever experienced in the streets and other public spaces of Ecuador. They felt more heightened, more exaggerated, more objectifying in ways that are perhaps nearly impossible to convey in words. I recalled Verónica’s account of noticing the unique kind of male attention that she felt was reserved for white women who were identified instantly as gringas. In fact, this would be only one of many moments when I would witness the ways in which the Ecuadorian male gaze calibrated itself in distinctive, apparently
race/nationality-based ways when it settled upon the bodies of women it perceived as gringas.

For example, it became quite clear on the very night of Nicholas’ birthday party at the karaoke bar (presented above in section 6.5) The following field note records the moments spent out on the street looking for the bar with several women volunteers:

Field note
September 17, 2009
9:20 p.m.

On a busy night in the Mariscal, I made my way through a crowded street in the direction of Erin, Abby, and Kelsey, who stood waiting on a corner. Earlier that day, we had made plans to meet up and go together to a local karaoke club where Nicholas, another volunteer, was having his birthday party that night. Erin and Kelsey held their backpacks in front of them, strapped to their chests, apparently following a tip from the field directors on how to avoid being pickpocketed. As I reached them, we erupted into the customary chorus of enthusiastic salutations, sunny how are you?’s, and the ritualistic compliments of each other’s appearance. Kelsey’s earrings were deemed “snazzy,” and Abby’s hair, it was appreciatively agreed, “looked nice that way.” With that settled, Erin held up her arm in front of her face, pointing to her left with her right index finger. “I think it’s that one. Nicholas said it was a red sign. And I don’t see any other red signs.” As we begin to walk, another ritual commenced – the stares, the smiles, the flirtatious salutations and tentative How are you?’s issued from passing men, a continual accompaniment of overt male attention to our female strides, which were now, I noticed, quickening slightly with every step. Their faces and bodies now stiffened, Erin, Abby, and Kelsey bore down, alternating between looking stoically straight ahead and offering each other commiserating exhalations and gritted groans out of the corners of their mouths. Whether intentionally or simply coincidentally, another tip from the field directors was in effect: ignore anonymous Ecuadorian male attention in the street.

Within a minute, we arrived at a glass door that sat below the red awning. “I think this is it.” Erin said. “Let’s check it out.” Gripping the silver metal handle with her right hand, she pulled the door open and we followed her lead, filing across the threshold into a dark room where an off-key male voice filled the air with the plaintive melody of a popular balada. As our eyes adjusted to the low lighting, we found ourselves at the mouth of a narrow corridor, on the verge of being sandwiched between a bar to our left and a wall to our right. Seated at the bar was a clientele comprised exclusively of Ecuadorian middle-aged men, who now stared curiously at this group of gringas, who had suddenly appeared and were clearly out of place—not to mention uniquely bizarre thanks to the backpacks strapped to the fronts of their chests. After pausing for a moment, we formed a single file line and slowly waded into the corridor, carefully avoiding the eyes of the men, who were obviously getting a kick out of our strange and sudden appearance. Flirtatious greetings and come-ons once again started coming our way. Taking charge of the situation, Erin told us she would take a quick look “in the back” to see if the group was here, and with that, charged ahead leaving the rest of us to stand around, painfully aware of being under surveillance of the entire room. Amid a few low whistles and lecherous sounding hello’s and hola’s, we feigned an impossible obliviousness, looking anywhere but in the men’s direction, forcing small talk with each other and occasionally peering determinedly around the small space for members of the group who were quite obviously not there. Within a few seconds Erin returned and made the by now comically obvious announcement, “They’re not here.” With that we each turned in place and filed back through the corridor towards the front entrance from where we had come.
Back out onto the street, Abby got on her phone to call Nicholas and find out where exactly the karaoke bar was. In the meantime, we spotted two other volunteers, Brooke and Julie, walking within fifteen feet of where we stood. Erin, Abby, and Kelsey immediately began shouting their names and we walked quickly in their direction, trying to catch up with them. Finally, they saw us and waved, stopping where they were to wait for us. We approached them and sped through another round of greetings, as there was now a story to be told. Wasting no time, Erin informed them of what had just happened. “Oh my God,” she said in a confidential tone, her eyes wide, “We just went into this bar and got totally cat-called.” The looks on Brooke and Julie’s faces turned to ones of mortification. “Really?” Brooke asked, her eyes equally wide. “What’d they say?” Rolling her eyes, Erin responded with disgust, “Ugh, they were totally gross.” Before she could continue, Abby piped up, “Julio’s is the name of the place,” she said, hanging up her cell phone. “Oh, I see it,” Brooke replied, pointing toward a red neon sign across the street.

Returning now to the afternoon in Cuenca with Brooke, the two instances of male attention that had taken place within seconds of each other, were also significant because, although Brooke had not seemed bothered or even aware of them, they were clear examples of what she had angrily described to me only moments earlier over our lunch, cases in point that had instantaneously materialized as illustration of what she had discussed as being part of her daily reality. (When I asked whether she had noticed she said she had heard the kissing noises but had not noticed the man who had passed, and she attributed this to a point she had made during our interview: “When I’ve hung out with [other women volunteers] and we’ve gotten harassed, like it just like slides right off my back, it doesn’t bother me at all, it’s just for some reason when I’m alone, I mean, I just, yeah.”). In any case, over the course of our two-hour conversation, she had spoken at length about the “harassment” she faced on the street and how she had struggled with it constantly since arriving in Ecuador. “I just feel like I get treated like a dog,” she had said. “It’s like if you wanna talk to a person, you talk to them, you wanna treat, if you wanted to like have some sort of interaction with an animal, you whistle. And it’s like all they do is whistle and it’s like where do you, what makes you think that I’m either in search of these kinds of advances or like, I don’t know, I just, I just don’t understand it.” For Brooke, these experiences were at once demeaning, frightening, and infuriating. In my conversations with other women, several echoed her sentiments. As Ashley told me,

A: I mean it’s hard to be a girl here, I feel like. I still don’t like that. If I like walk on the streets some days just like in normal clothes, if I like showered and put my hair down or something, it’s just like the calls. That I still am uncomfortable with. I hate that. That was
striking to me at first because I was like why are they yelling at girls like this and now I guess it’s just part of their culture. That’s what they do. They drive by and they’ll be with their family and still say things. That I don’t like at all. I’m not comfortable with that.

C: Have you ever experienced that in the states?

A: No. I mean maybe a little, but nothing like—I hate walking by myself, especially in the evening or anything. I just don’t like walking by myself and I have to do it a lot.

Ashley’s discomfort and fear were illustrated one evening when I tagged along to the local mall with her and Alejandra, a friend that Ashley knew from a Bailoterapia class they had both been attending. After an afternoon of roaming the mall and an hour of chatting over a meal at the mall’s food court, we exited with plans to share a taxi to our respective destinations. As we walked through the mall’s parking garage en route to the taxi stand, a shiny black SUV passed by. Seated inside the car were several Ecuadorian young men who now leaned their heads through the open windows and looked our way with broad and somewhat mischievous smiles. A chorus erupted. “Taxi! Taxi! Hello!” the called. To my own eyes and ears, the greeting seemed innocuous enough, but I noticed that a look of sheer panic spread quickly across Ashley’s face. “Let’s wait until they pass by because they’re going to follow us,” she said anxiously. Alejandra and I indulged her and we all paused momentarily, waiting for the SUV to pass before approaching the long line of yellow taxis at the curb of the sidewalk.

For most women, these daily occurrences differed dramatically from what they knew in the United States. I asked Shannon, who had reported being whistled at, hollered at, followed, and grabbed by a man in a store, if this sort of attention had been part of her daily life in Wisconsin, where she had lived her entire life. “Oh God, no,” laughing slightly at the apparent absurdity of the idea.

For many women, experiencing this sort of treatment led them to condemn gender relations in Ecuador and to idealize their home contexts in the United States as bastions of gender equality. It became a way in which they judged the country, and determined that it was years “behind” the United States and “backward” in gender roles. As Shannon explained:

I don’t know, I think that the, the relationship between men and women is not, I mean there’s like machismo here, so then the men feel like they have the right to like say stuff
to the girls, and in Wisconsin it’s very like you’re equal and if someone were to say that to me I would like give them a piece of my mind probably and I don’t think they would ever say that so it’s like, y’know.

Shannon’s comment illustrates the ways in which many volunteers drew on personal experiences to make general claims about the United States and Ecuador. As Shannon did not recall experiencing this particular form of gender/race discrimination on the streets of her home state, she maintained that it simply did not exist.

Sometimes, women attempted to make use of public spaces in ways that were perhaps typical for them in their home contexts, but generally uncommon in the Ecuadorian towns where they were currently living. An example of this was jogging in public. As suggested by Phil’s comments about being stared at while out for a jog (presented in Section 8.7), in the contexts of Ecuadorian towns the combined act of being a white person and running in public constituted a sort of supreme strangeness. As Phil’s comment’s indicated, for male volunteers who chose to do this, the result was a few stares and a few hellos. However, for female volunteers, the act of running while white and female often drew a litany of flirtatious come-ons that felt, to most of the women, like a traumatizing form of harassment. The ways in which these experiences upset the fantasy of slipping into Ecuadorian communities unnoticed and unfettered, to experience the other without being produced as an other by the other was illustrated in Brooke’s secondhand account of what had happened to Shannon one afternoon:

Shannon was telling me last week, or a couple weeks ago, she went running as soon as she got back [from visiting Brooke in Cuenca] and she was like on cloud nine, she was in love with Loja, and she was like refreshed and invigorated and everything and then she went on a run and these men in the park were like harassing her, so she turned around and flipped them off, and all it did was like "Ouu, she’s feisty!" y’know? And, so she ended up like, running further into the park and like crying.

In Brooke’s account there are several threads that require attention. There is a critical outrage at a male gaze that endeavors to control and silence female bodies in public spaces. In this there is an assertion of resistance against male domination. However, at the same time, in her narrative, there is also a claim being made to US-American domination vis-à-vis the developing world. There is a quiet repairing of a momentarily disrupted sense of entitlement that
permeates the multiple discourses of the international volunteer industry; this entitlement is based on a certain discursive truth that maintains it is the right of the volunteer (a proxy for the white Western subject) to enter “Third World” spaces and freely gaze upon (and even perhaps photograph) the people she finds there and have them “cathect the space of the Other” (as we saw in the previous chapter) without the bother or humiliation of being gazed upon or othered herself or (himself). Indeed, the fact that, in her telling of the story, Brooke rhetorically held up this racialization-sexualization experience as a rude and unjust interruption to what she depicted as an innocuous and isolated usage of public space on the part of a fellow volunteer, underscores the ways in which assumptions of invisibility quietly structure the fantasy of dropping into “other” communities for a warm and fuzzy experience – and how attention, particularly the conspicuous, hard-to-ignore or brush off, sexualizing attention from men – unceremoniously disrupts this fantasy. It illustrates a normative expectation of what the volunteer subject’s time in Ecuador should be – a time to freely move about, making use of the public space without concern for local norms (which incidentally, in most settings, do not include jogging in public among women or men), and to do all of this from a position of invisibility and normativity that goes unchallenged. In other words, the volunteer subject (and more broadly the US-American white subject), woman or man, is one that produces the world around her through her gaze – falling in love with it, allowing it to transport her to cloud nine – without having the objects of her gaze do the same to her or him.

For women volunteers who remained undeterred, jogging in public thus often became a key site of gringa subjectivity formation as local men looked upon the spectacle of a white woman running through the streets and responded with sexual come-ons that instantly othered them. Brooke’s account indeed illustrates how traumatic these experiences could be for some women. It also illustrates a way in which women sometimes resisted this othering and objectification by using defiant gestures such as “flipping” men off with a middle finger. Indeed, many women resisted the subject position of the exoticized gringa. Shannon herself recounted to me stories of being harassed on the street and the ways in which she had responded by “flipping men off” (as
she apparently had in the anecdote about her that Brooke had shared with me). The following is one example:

S: Um, just like when I walk like, people like will holler at me or whistle or like, I had one guy follow me home and people like grabbed me before

C: Grab you? Really?

S: Uh huh. Like I was leaving a store and this man like grabbed my waist and like, tried to like move me towards him.

C: Interesting.

S: And, just like. I don’t know. So that --

C: In Loja?

S: Yeah, yeah. And then um, so just, it gets to me I guess, like it, um, like if I had a like, a hard day or something and I’m walking and then someone yells like, “Guapa!” or, it’s just like okay, shut up! You know...like I feel like I’m sort of just like a, like a piece of meat, (laughing) or something, like, it’s, I don’t know.

C: Yeah.

S: And it’s especially like uncomfortable when it’s like older men because then I, it’s like, it’s more, I just wanna tell them like, “what are they, like what are you doing? Like you could be my father.” (Laughing) You know what I mean? Or it’s weird when it’s like 14-year old boys ‘cause I’m like I could be your mother (laughing). Yeah, so like, when the guy was following me home I flipped him off, which was bad.

C: What, like put up your middle finger?

S: I put up my middle finger because he like followed me, he was walking across the sidewalk from me and he followed me like, home and he was whistling or like yelling for like the whole way home, so eventually that like got to me and I was like.

C: Was this during the day?

S: Mm hmm.

C: Was he like your age, or?

S: No, he was like 45. But um, normally I don’t say anything because I think it like eggs them on and then, but I just, I just like pretend that I don’t understand them. Like, “Hola.” Like, “What? What are you saying?” But yeah, it makes me feel like, I don’t know, just like gross, sort of.
I came to understand Shannon's alternate responses of “flipping men off” and feigning that she did not understand what they were saying to her as an oscillation between two divergent subject positions. One was an assertive, strong, self-advocating woman subject as imagined by the specific discourse of Western feminisms that have critiqued, rejected, and troubled conventional US discourses of misogyny and patriarchy. More specifically, it was this subject position in the process of preserving itself – as well as a racial normativity that also defines this subjectivity – in the face of male objectification. This was a position that corresponds to what Chandra Mohanty (1984) has described as the “discursive self-presentation” or “self-representation of Western women as educated, modern, as having control over their own bodies and sexualities, and the freedom to make their own decisions.” Moreover, this position can be understood as cohering with (though remaining distinct from) the volunteer subject constructed by an imperialist-neoliberalist international volunteer industry discourse discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, a discourse that constructs the volunteer subject as one entitled to move freely around the world, to drop in and gaze upon the “others” of empire, to enframe, objectify, and consume “Third World” otherness all as part of a neoliberal project of self-advancement. Constructs of assertiveness, strength (particularly in the face of challenge), and self-advocacy are clearly coherent with notions of seizing one’s self-development and going wherever in the world one desires in pursuit of this.

The other subject position at play here was one which objectifying discursive practices reliably construct and attempt to produce in its targeted “others” – silence, defenselessness, object-ness. As Shannon herself had said, “I feel like I’m sort of just like a, like a piece of meat.” For Shannon, the lived experience of being objectified on the street created not only feelings of anger and fear, but also, it seemed, an internal dilemma between two incommensurate subject positions and a perpetual oscillating between two.

Brooke was one of the volunteers with whom I spoke most frequently. A 26-year-old white woman from a large suburb in Indiana, she was described by some of her peers as “intense.” In all of our conversations she spoke rapidly and with great urgency and decisiveness about everything, peppering her speech with descriptors like insane, hugely, and absurd. Brooke
described herself at various moments as “socially liberal” and as “the girl-next-door, like, apple pie white bread American.” She was passionate about traveling, and attributed this to a desire to “see new things” as well as a childhood in which she moved around quite a few times with her family. By the time I met her, she had started a 4-year travel agenda, an act that she had self-deprecatingly called “absurd.” During her time in Ecuador she had been able to check the Galapagos Islands off the list, and had made plans to travel to Venezuela in March, Colombia in June, and then Argentina for a 6-month stint in the year following the conclusion of her time in Ecuador. Her list of future destinations also included the Alps, Cuba, Croatia, New Zealand, Southeast Asia, and Spain.

Over the course of our 2-hour conversation at a downtown café, Brooke had spoken at length about the male attention that she was currently encountering on a daily basis as she traversed the streets of Cuenca, a city located in the southern sierra region of Ecuador. “One of the biggest challenges for me,” she had said bitterly, “is like, figuring out how to like, go about my daily life without being limited by the fact that I get treated like an animal by men.” Elaborating, she explained, “I just feel like I get treated like a dog. It’s like, if you wanna talk to a person, you talk to them. If you wanted to like, have some sort of interaction with an animal, you whistle. And it’s like, all they do is whistle and it’s like, where do you, what makes you think that I’m either in search of these kinds of advances or like, I don’t know, I just, I just don’t understand it. It’s mostly like walking through Parque Industrial and feeling like, just harassed and accosted. I think it’s probably mostly that. It’s so intensely uncomfortable.”

Parque Industrial, a working class neighborhood located in the southern part of the city, was where Brooke had found housing after being dissatisfied with her first two “host families.” By her account, walking along the streets of the neighborhood was something akin to running the gauntlet. Men on the streets whistled and hissed at her. Some greeted her with suggestive salutations. Others stared lecherously. For Brooke it amounted to a continual and inescapable barrage of harassment. Occasionally, the men’s behavior prompted moments of fear (“There are times when I feel unsafe, walking home, even in broad daylight”), and on one early morning,
when she had felt particularly threatened, she had even taken pre-emptive self-defense measures:

There was one morning when I was walking to class at like six-thirty in the morning. There's like nobody out there, and these two guys were following me, so I started picking up like rocks and putting them in my bag, just in case, because, they kept switching the side of the street, when I would switch, y'know, and I, I mean, there's no need for that unless you're following someone.

When these things happened, Brooke raged within, apprehensive, she said, about openly confronting the men for fear of what they might do. In the states, she believed she would have aggressively confronted the men, but in Ecuador she was not certain that there would not be consequences for reacting in this way. Searching for answers, she had gone to her Spanish teacher, an Ecuadorian woman named Nivia, whom Brooke described as "awesome" – and Nivia had told Brooke not to stand for it:

She [Nivia] was like, "Brooke, you can't." She was like, "If this happens to you again, this is what you should do. Do not take that kind of stuff. No Ecuadorian woman would ever take that." She told me, "Like, if it's, when they're doing kind of minute things, like whatever, just ignore it. But when they say stuff that's really kind of out of line…", I should just like confront them about it, and just like, be a bitch about it, which is usually how I would deal with it in the U.S., but here I just don't, I just don't, because I nev—I mean you *never* know, like, what's gonna come after that.

Brooke continued to endure the treatment in silence, and instead of reacting outwardly she unleashed on the men an internal attack of thoughts, a sort of desperate inner monologue of hateful and vitriolic sentiments directed toward them, one that she felt "pushed to" by the treatment she experienced. She told me:

I mean not these days, but there was a point where it was pushing me to this really ugly place that—it kind of blew my mind, actually—but this place where I was thinking horrible things. Oh, God, I would spend the 15-minute walk imagining like mangling these men. Just totally ridiculous but, massacring them in the most dramatic way possible, and like, wishing of harm upon their families—which is disgusting, like, that's just horrible. Then at other times, the thoughts would—oh, my God, I have not voiced this at all, this is only in my head, but moments where I'd be like, "Well, fuck you all. I'm an American, I'm a white girl. I will get farther than you ever will." I can't believe I just said that out loud.

From Brooke's story emerges an untidy picture of multiple and conflicting power plays. To begin, as a woman, she was perpetually subjected to a form of sex-based domination that objectified her according to her perceived status as a woman. Her objectification was enabled by a discourse
that, in Ecuador and many parts of the world, constructs men as dominant proprietors of the public space. Often the exercise of this male authority is performed through the domination of others – and, through discourses of patriarchy, women are produced as a key “other” that forms the object of this domination. At the same time, however, Brooke’s mere presence as a US-American on *any* street in Ecuador is itself an exercise of profound US-American privilege, a reflection of a certain global mobility that is routinely denied to Ecuadorian subjects seeking to travel to the United States. While she could easily transport herself to the physical space of working-class Ecuadorian men, the reverse is nearly inconceivable under the constraints of U.S. visa and immigration policies. The privilege and accompanying sense of quiet entitlement that Brooke had to simply drop in and take up residence in this neighborhood, is itself worth noting.

Moreover, as working class residents of *Parque Industrial*, the men who were her harassers were themselves subject to multiple forms of class and ethnicity/race based domination that operate in Ecuador according to the prescriptions of a caste-like system that is widely acknowledged and well documented. Moreover, from a global perspective, the domestic social/racial stratification in which the men were positioned is only compounded by forms of economic, political, and cultural domination exercised by Northern countries, such as the United States, within the global political economy.

What is so striking about Brooke’s story however, is that, amid this particular confluence of power exercises, she internally resisted objectification at the hands of male, working class, *Ecuadorian* objectification by mobilizing her claim to white US-Americanness, its unshakeable, reliable normativity back in the United States, and all the places she believed it would take her while her harassers were left in the proverbial dust. Indeed, as in Shannon’s case, Brooke’s personal account on how she responded to being objectified by men in the street illustrates an internal dilemma in which she struggles to reconcile not only a claim on racial normativity, but also the assertive woman she understood herself to be when patriarchal otherings threatened to complicate this normativity. In a sense, Brooke was trying to reconcile the outspoken, savvy woman who would have been “a bitch about it” in the United States with the silent, “stupid” *gringa*
that she believed the men saw and were targeting. Ultimately, she remained silent for fear of repercussion, and was thus, arguably made by the men’s behavior into the silent gringa, a subject formation that by her own account, would be unlikely in her home context of the United States. Through this process, Brooke, in a sense, relegated the assertive, self-defending woman she longed to be – and knew she was in the United States – to the confines of her mind, where it lashed back at the men through all manner of hateful, violent, and derogatory thoughts, but also recovered a sense of a self that was steeped with reassurances of race, class, nationality domination over the men, a self that was a “white girl,” an “American,” a self that, for these reasons, would “go farther than” the working class Ecuadorian men who were objectifying her, ever would.

By the end of the year, Brooke seemed to have developed some analytical perspective on the street attention. During her penultimate month in Ecuador we sat down again for an interview and I revisited the topic:

B: They stuff they say is pretty standard Ecuadorian patán [brat] or whatever. I mean, they stare, they leer, y’know, they say totally inappropriate things, and they just objectify me, to the point where I clearly have no value except for my physical appearance or whatever they can imagine me doing or I don’t even know. And the thing is, it’s not complimentary. It’s not intended to be complimentary. And the only reason I can say that is because of how it makes me feel. And I think, that—and how it makes me feel is not a compliment. It’s intended to intimidate and it’s intended to uhhhh…offend is not the correct word even though that’s what it does. It’s intended to, I guess, marginalize. It’s intended to make you feel horrible. It’s a power play, I think. I definitely get that sense. And that’s why I feel so horrible.

C: Does it make you feel objectified as a woman but also different as a person who’s not Ecuadorian?

B: Yeah.

C: What is that like?

B: Well, what it feels like, and I feel so ridiculous talking about being marginalized as a white American with two physicians for parents, but I equate being marginalized with feeling powerless. In the states I would never, ever let that slide. I would never be treated that way, not without slapping someone in the face first. Here, I can’t do anything. If you do something, it’s either gonna egg them on or in the future they’re gonna see another gringa and they’re gonna be even worse to them. So, you’re literally backed into a corner, you’re between a rock and a hard place. There’s no way to effectively deal with it. At least not with them. It has to be internal. That was the challenge, at least that was the challenge for me. The powerlessness that you feel of having no recourse, figuring out
some way of not becoming blackened inside. I don’t think you can do anything but ignore it, which puts the burden on me. Nothing I can do will make them stop and nothing I can do will change their minds.

Notably, Brooke did not revisit the racially tinged, vitriolic internal monologue that she had shared with me several months prior. However, when perhaps prompted somewhat by my question about being “a person who’s not Ecuadorian,” she did explicitly name her whiteness as a way of qualifying her claims of marginality. Even more interesting, perhaps, was the subtle indication of a sense of gringa solidarity that apparently had taken shape as part of her subjectivity. Her professed concern that if she contested the male attention she experienced on the street, the road would be made that much harder for “the next gringa” illustrates a linkage of her individual behavior to a sense of a shared raced experience with other gringas in Ecuador. I interpreted this as perhaps yet another strand of white volunteer double consciousness produced through their perpetual subjection to a disciplining Ecuadorian gaze, a gaze under whose male iteration Brooke claimed to feel newly “powerless.”

8.9 “More Noticeable”: White Male Subjectivities of Otheredness in Ecuadorian Public Spaces

Unlike the women volunteers, the men in the group did not experience sexualization on the streets, and many of them were aware of this difference. As Nicholas told me one afternoon:

N: I mean I know that my experience in terms of how I’m being treated by other people would be greatly different if I was not a guy. I had this talk with a couple of the girls the other day, like last week, and it’s kind of interesting because I never realized—this is kind of off topic—but I never realized the—it’s not cuckolding. What is it?

C: Cat-calling?

N: Cat-calling. I never see it because I’m with the girls, whenever a guy is with a girl or girls it doesn’t really happen as often. But just the other day I was walking behind a couple of the girls, so this guy didn’t see me, and he whispered “Muñecaaa” to them in this really disgusting way. And I was like wow, that’s insane.

Not surprisingly, the combination of gendered forms of street attention and the undoubtedly gendered subject positions from which men and women experienced street attention translated into distinct ways of talking about these instances. For example, with respect to how they reported feeling and thinking when stared at in public, the men in the group did not share with me
senses of powerlessness, outrage, fear, and hatred that women had reported feeling when they were confronted with stares, whistling, hissing, and sexually objectifying language. What to make of this? For one, the experience of being received with a silent stare might be interpreted as one in which a white subject position of racial invisibility is left more intact than it is when it is confronted with verbal address and overt sexualization. Moreover, the lack of sexual innuendo being thrown their way also worked to leave the men less othered with respect to their gender. There is also the point that, as men, the male volunteers had undoubtedly been subjected to discourses of male stoicism that perhaps prevented them from openly sharing emotional responses with a woman, let alone a woman of color researcher; in a way, my research of them constituted somewhat of a disruption of the (white) male gaze, a violation that was perhaps, in and of itself, received as something to be defended against by adopting a more emotionally guarded stance. In fact, I often wondered if their caveats that the women in the group had it far worse than they did in terms of attention on the streets was a way in which they deflected from admitting and discussing with me the ways in which they experienced the stares and occasional homosocial heckling they received.

In any case, while sensitive to the ways in which the women volunteers in the group had it “a lot harder” and shielded from the kind of sexualizing objectification often experienced by the women, the men who spoke about being the object of street attention nonetheless, regarded it as a problem, something to be avoided. This was illustrated in Phil’s comments:

P: I mean people stare at you, but other than that, I think it’s a lot harder for a girl. I think that, just in terms of like the whistling and hissing and cat-calling, and stuff. And I mean downtown, it seems like if there are gonna be like non-Ecuadorians walking around, like that’s where they’re gonna be, so like maybe there like, it’s not so strange. And like once you’ve been there for a while, like if you have like places that you go to like frequently, like restaurants or like places then like they just start to treat you a lot more normally. Y’know, like the video store, like, that we get like the discount.

Thus even as he framed street attention as something much more difficult for his women counterparts, he also spoke about the staring he experienced as something he had figured out how to avoid by spending time in the city’s downtown, where there were more “non-Ecuadorians walking around” and “it’s not so strange,” as well as visiting the same establishments repeatedly.
and thus becoming known and thus “treated more normally.” Moreover, in mentioning the fact that he and his fellow volunteers were regularly given a discount at a downtown video store, he had discursively claimed a sort of victory over a state of otheredness, ameliorating a narrative of being made strange with an anecdote of just a small instance of preferential treatment, something that was perhaps experienced as resurrecting a subjectivity not only of racial/gender/nationality normativity through experiencing the privileges that define this normativity (but are often taken for granted).

Later in the conversation, however, when I revisited the issue of staring, he took up the Ecuadorian gringo discourse, jokingly engaging in an exercise of looking at himself through the eyes of “them” and momentarily conceded his strangeness in the Ecuadorian context:

I mean of course they’re staring, there’s like you know, some like person with like, who’s (laughing) like a foot taller than them, like y’know, going running, with like and iPod (laughing) in like some neighborhood where like people, nobody’s going running (laughing), like, y’know, like I’d be staring at me, like, y’know. It’s never been hostile, it’s just kinda like, it’ll be like an old man, and he’ll be like “Huh?” (laughing), or like, y’know, like what are you gonna do?

With these comments, Phil in a sense conceded his situational strangeness, and in this way, the Ecuadorian gringo discourse prevailed in his subjectivity formation for a moment. Notably, however, he was not able to explicitly mention his whiteness as part of what rendered him strange under the Ecuadorian gaze, and instead focused on the strangeness of his height and his running in public, an activity that was highly uncommon in Ecuadorian public space.

Special treatment (such the video store discount Phil referenced) was not always received positively. For some male volunteers it was received with distrust and a sense of frustration in having their difference signified through clear and unmistakable privilege. This was illustrated one sweltering afternoon on the outskirts of the large coastal city of Machala, famed as the banana capital of the world. I sat with Jeremy in the backyard of his host family’s home, a large in-ground pool quietly glittering nearby. Taking in the surroundings and having been given the tour of the sparkling, 5-bedroom, 6-bathroom house with a fully equipped kitchen, I remembered that much had been made among some of the volunteers about Jeremy’s host
family placement. When she found out I was going to visit him and Verónica (the other volunteer who had been placed in Machala) that weekend, Casey had burst out laughing, her eyes crinkling with delight, as she told me, “Wait till you see his house! Jeremy is like, livin’ large! He’s livin’ like, ‘Cribs Ecuador!’”

Now that I was in it, I could see that the house, owned by a lawyer and her husband, a wealthy businessman in the banana industry, definitely defied the visions of rurality, material poverty, and makeshift living that had characterized many of the volunteers’ expectations of “typical” life in Ecuador. Jeremy, however, did not disrupt the discursive image of the gringo that prevails in Ecuador. About six feet tall, he had a head of wavy blond hair, and grey blue eyes that often sat behind a pair of thin-rimmed glasses. In my conversation with Verónica that morning, she had mentioned that she was never taken for a gringa and believed that this was because, as a dark-haired Mexican-American woman who was fluent in Spanish, she simply did not look or sound the part. “I feel like because I don’t look and sound American, I have gotten a chance to be a little bit less of the other, and the [Orientation] lectures did not prepare me for that. But, like I said, I think it’s a unique case to people who don’t look gringo.” And, everyone expects the gringo to look how, would you say? I had asked. “Like Jeremy,” she had said immediately, laughing after she said it. “White, tall, blue eyes. It’s even in the way that we dress. Y’know, you can always pick out the gringo in the crowd. Guillermo, my boyfriend, he’s from here, he has told me many times. It’s the way we walk, it’s the way we look around, it’s the way we dress, it’s very different, y’know?”

Chatting now with Jeremy, I asked how he felt he was treated in his everyday life as “a foreigner” in Machala. He told me:

J: Especially here on the coast it’s like people just love gringos because there are none of them and I get so much attention here and it’s just because of the color of my skin and I have blonde hair and it’s just the way it is and that affects everything...Everyone is like, “The Ecuadorians are the nicest people in the world.” Well, it’s because you’re a gringo and they’re staring at you. I don’t know if they’re so nice to each other. I’ve kind of just gotten used to it. It kind of bothered me at first because it seemed like; obviously I look like a foreigner, so I kind of expected it.

C: So, how would you describe the attention?
J: They’re just like staring at you and wanting to talk to you and it’s a different aspect. Just like girls who are just into like foreign guys. It’s the exotic thing. The attention has been like I haven’t—sometimes there are guys when I’m in Porto Viejo in the street and they’re just strung out like bums and they’re just like, “Hey, hello, hey,” and that’s all the English they know. They’re bothering you and maybe they’ll mug you. You’ve got to watch your back and not talk to those people. People will kind of taunt you. That’s the one negative is that people will taunt you sometimes and speak like, “Hey, hello, what’s up.” And that’s all they know but in general it’s been like really nice.

For Jeremy, the most discomfitting dimension of street attention, it seemed, was the homosocial heckling he received from other men, a public interaction that prevented him from passing through anonymously, broadcast his gringoness to anyone within earshot, and invited him to publicly perform his gringoness by conversing in English in the public space. Citing the material poverty and purported addictions of his hecklers, Jeremy read the act as dangerous and potentially indicative of an imminent dispossession, an interpretation that spoke not only to the sense of vulnerability provoked by being made visible and marked as a particular kind of visible but also to an internal othering that Jeremy engaged in vis-à-vis Ecuadorian men he perceived as poor and substance-addicted.

There was another significant aspect to Jeremy’s comments, however. While the heckler attention was experienced as menacing, the attention he received that was “in general really nice” was experienced as suspect because it was also based on his gringoness. His critique of “nice” attention could be interpreted as an uncomfortable and principled rejection of such a glaring instance of white US-American privilege, but there is also a sort of undercurrent of general discomfort with being exoticized and an accusation that the “nice” attention is not real or sincere, in a sense, because it is based on his physical appearance. Ironically, this in fact is the very nature of how interactional white privileging works in the United States; it is based on an assessment of physical appearance. The difference is however, that in the United States it is occurring in a context where whiteness operates as the norm. In this way, the preferential treatment whites receive can masquerade and be experienced as something real – as something that just happens – because the physical appearance upon which it is based constitutes the norm and is therefore symbolically invisible; the role of a “white” physical appearance does not have to
enter the equation when the treatment is being experienced or in the understanding of why it is happening. Conversely, in Ecuador, white US-American privilege or perks can often – though not always – take shape as a form of clear racialization because they explicitly differentiate the recipient from the norm.

Interestingly, for Phil, the perk of the video store discount seemed to be comforting, whereas for Jeremy preferential treatment was somewhat discomfitting, even as he experienced the treatment as “nice.” Perhaps the differences had to do with a qualitative difference in the respective privilegings that were taking place; a video store discount extended quietly and surreptitiously at the counter (which is how it was always done when I accompanied Phil and his fellow volunteers to the video store) is distinct from the spectacle-making acts of noticing, staring, and approaching to strike up a conversation, the former being somewhat were akin to the invisible way in which white privileging works in the United States, and the latter being more dissimilar as it produces the recipient (and white Americanness) as spectacle.

In any case, the narratives of both Phil and Jeremy underscored the ways in which male volunteers experienced street attention in ways that were distinct from those of their female counterparts, but which were nonetheless characterized by a condition of seeing themselves through the eyes of the Ecuadorian public and continually attempting to reconcile this vision of themselves as gringos with a lingering sense of (racial) normativity that had theoretically been produced through years of living as white subjects in the United States.

Indeed, as they pertained to the men volunteers I spoke with, street staring experiences seemed to take shape as sites of a collision between conflicting discourses that worked to produce subjectivities of white male otheredness. At play for the men was a confrontation between an Ecuadorian gringo discourse that “others” white males and a US-American discourse of white (middle/upper class) male racial-gender normativity to which the men volunteers had unavoidably been subject for much of their lives. The sway of the latter discourse was subtly indexed not only in their efforts to avoid being stared at, the comfort they took in receiving subtle preferential treatment, the angst they felt when receiving more blatant race/nationality-based
special treatment, or their impulse to solve the “problem” of white people being stared at in Ecuador with a US development intervention. It was also indexed, it seemed, by the ways in which some described the experience of being stared at in the street. As Nicholas told me one afternoon:

When people stare at me and stuff, that’s a little weird. And, yeah, it’s a feeling that I never really felt before because I lived most of my life in New York or if not in New York on the East Coast of the United States. I’m a white male, so I mean obviously you just don’t get much of that. So, yeah, it’s new.

While Nicholas’ characterizations could be understood as indexing the newness of the experience of being stared at, they can also be taken as evidence that, in the face of being made strange, the men subtly reversed (or re-reversed) the gaze. He did not say something to the effect of “I feel weird” or “It feels weird” but rather spoke more ambiguously, saying “That’s a little weird,” a comment that could be interpreted as referring to the sensation of being stared at or the staring itself. (Unfortunately, in the moment, I did not think to ask him to clarify!). Whatever he may have intended to say – if in fact he was purposefully referring to just one of these things and not, perhaps unwittingly, referencing both at the same time – it is worth noting that, according to the discourse of white male normativity that dominates in the United States, the act of staring at a white US-American man and thus producing him as strange is in fact “weird”; why would someone stare at the norm? How could the norm be strange or made strange? Here, it is worth noting that Nicholas did in fact name his white maleness in discussing these experiences and used that to shed light on why people staring at him was weird; in a sense, through being objectified, he had been pushed to objectify himself, thus illustrating the kinds of interior acts that Du Bois describes as being central to double consciousness. Still, it seemed difficult for him to fully accept this rationalization because the experience of being stared at (as well as seeing people staring at him) continued to feel and seem not only “new” but also “weird” when it happened. It was between the constructs of a now muted and more remotely operating discourse of white (male) racial (gender) normativity and the constructs of the Ecuadorian gringo discourse (“Of course they’re staring”) that the men seemed to they continuously oscillate.
Similarly, Matt also described the experience of being stared at as “weird,” yet in his grappling with the “problem” of being othered he actually went so far as to devise a solution—and one that hinged on US development intervention. This came out not in a discussion of his everyday life in the public space, but rather as he explained to me his feeling that, instead of teaching at a large urban university, he and his fellow volunteers might be of better use in smaller, more isolated, rural communities of the sort that he had recently visited with a fellow volunteer. I asked him to explain this feeling:

C: Something stuck out in my mind when you said you were talking to Gloria [another volunteer] and you guys were saying in those communities you can really make a difference. How so? How do you think teaching English in those communities would help? In your mind, what would that do for those communities?

M: I don’t know, I guess I just feel that they bring in native [English] speakers to the university or the universities because, although I may not be the best teacher ever, it’s easy for me because I speak the language. To know grammatical points and for them to hear a native speaker, and I feel like, and I could totally be wrong but I’m sure in a lot of the really small communities, their English teachers are probably not very proficient in English anyways, and so if me or Gloria or another native speaker would say come in, it’d be very, very different for them but also be better. They’re learning, I don’t know, from a native speaker.

C: So a higher quality of instruction.

M: A higher quality, yeah.

C: Yeah.

M: And I could be wrong I’m sure, some of the schools are great and stuff, but how awesome would it be for them to get a native speaker. Andrew and I, when we were in Quilotoa, went to this little celebration or something at the school. The family we were staying with, they invited us to it and everyone was staring at us and looking at us like we were weird. It’s like, if there was someone there everyday, they would just have much more cultural knowledge about English and the English language. I don’t know. It’d be nice.

For Matt the condition of being stared at as a white US-American in a small town of Ecuador was, it seemed, so personally troubling and disorienting that it amounted, in his mind, to an objective problem that could and should be remedied with a concrete solution—“someone” (i.e. a white US-American) being there “everyday,” essentially acclimating the townspeople to the presence of white US-Americans. In an interesting rhetorical move, however, the imagined success of this intervention was articulated not as a condition in which Matt and other white US-Americans would
no longer be stared at, but rather as one in which the people of the town would “have much more cultural knowledge about English and the English language.” In this way, Matt engaged in his own re-normativization of whiteness as he quietly shifted from an experience of being stared at (and the othering of whiteness that the staring constitutes) into a benevolent discourse about English instruction, something which, itself, is suffused with assumptions of white Western normativity and US hegemony but, in the world of international volunteering and development, has successfully been produced as being a universal, apolitical, basic need that much of the world simply has. Indeed, by hypothetically solving the problem of being stared at/othered as a white US-American with an objective development intervention that ostensibly has nothing to do with whiteness or race at all, the re-normitivization of whiteness was, in Matt’s narrative, already half done.

But perhaps the most compelling instance of how a condition of being publicly othered worked to shape male volunteers’ subjectivities came from a volunteer who drew from his newfound “condition of perceived visibility” (Foucault, 1975/1995) as he imagined himself in a new Ecuadorian city that he planned to move to at the end of the year. On a drizzly Wednesday afternoon in Quito, I sat and talked with Nicholas in the walled off, tented over patio of The Magic Bean, an incredibly popular US-owned restaurant and hostel located in the center of the Mariscal. 

"I'm glad because, like I said before, I don’t really feel like a tourist anymore. Even though I still have trouble speaking Spanish, I feel like I can converse with anyone – not in a very sophisticated way, but I can get what I need, which is nice. So, yeah, I really like getting into cabs and the cab driver probably at first thinks I’m just a tourist who just got here, and then I start speaking Spanish and he’s like “Oh, you speak Spanish?” I’m like, “Yeah, blah, blah, blah.” It’s nice. I don’t know. I like the fact that I’m a little more integrated into this society than I was when I first got here, even though I never will be fully integrated ‘cause look at me, first of all, like, come on. I mean, I don’t look like I belong here. I know that. I understand that. I carry an orange backpack, you know.”
Nicholas had come to Ecuador with little Spanish language ability. At 22 years old, it had been over four years since he had studied Spanish in high school. Upon beginning college, he had tested out of Spanish (despite doing “terribly,” as he put it, on the AP Spanish exam) and had never studied it since. During the first few months in Ecuador, he had felt a sense of nervousness whenever he entered into interactions with shopkeepers, taxi drivers. However, he had persevered, practicing the language with his host family and occasionally with his students during informal group outings to the park for soccer and basketball. By the time I spoke with him at the end of the year, Nicholas brought up his progress in Spanish as something that gave him happiness about living in Ecuador. However, as he continued, it became clear that while improving his Spanish had allowed him to feel less like “a tourist,” it had not brought him a full sense of belonging.

Nicholas had spent the first six months of the year living in a neighborhood of northern Quito, an area far from the tourist district of the city. In this neighborhood, where white US-Americans are not at all present, Nicholas was acutely aware of being the only one. “I feel pretty conspicuous,” he had told me during this period. His sense of being the only one was intensified by the stares. As he moved through the neighborhood – walking to and from the bus stop, waiting for traffic lights and buses, trekking to the corner store – passers-by and lookers-on, women, men, and children of all ages often gazed at him, sometimes turning their heads to follow his figure with their eyes. In the confinement of the public city bus, which he rode at least twice every day, people also stared. Here, it was not uncommon for him to shift his gaze about only to find someone, often a young child, gazing at him stoically. After living in this neighborhood for six months, Nicholas had moved south, leaving the home of his host family for a room in a hostel that was not at the center but well within the fold of the city’s most concentrated tourism district. Here, white US-Americans were a minority but were not quite the absolute anomaly that they were in the first neighborhood where he had lived.

At the time of our conversation at The Magic Bean, the eleven-month duration of the Global Community program was coming to an end and Nicholas had decided to extend his
participation in Global Community and stay in Ecuador for one more year. With the organization’s assistance, he had made plans to move to Riobamba, a smaller town to the south of Quito where he would be teaching English for another year. With a planned relocation in the future, Nicholas’s comments took shape as a blend of reflecting and imagining, a remembering of the year that he had spent in Quito and an anticipating of a future life in a different Ecuadorian city.

He paused for a moment and then continued, as his mind apparently looked into the future. “And I’m sure that that will change,” he said, “I’m sure that, I mean, that will change, not in a negative way, per se, but it’ll just become different, like my place in this society will probably become a little different once I move to a substantially smaller place. I’ll probably be more noticeable. I’ll probably be very noticeable.” As if to substantiate this expectation, he then referenced the accounts of several Global Community Ecuador volunteers from his cohort, three young women, all of whom were white, who had been placed in Riobamba and thus had been living there for almost a year. “I mean, the girls there, they tell me that cabs know who they are, the cab drivers know who they are, cause it’s just a small town and they’re pretty much the only white girl American teacher who is there. So, yeah, it’ll be different.”

Picking up on his anticipation of being “more noticeable” and remembering that he had previously spoken about feeling “conspicuous” in the north Quito neighborhood where he had resided for six months, I asked him if he was at all anxious about this. “I’m a little,” he replied, “I mean, I’m a little curious, I think. I’m not really anxious about that aspect, I’m more curious about that aspect than anything.” As he gave his response, I momentarily regretted asking the question for fear that it had been too leading, potentially providing him with a prefabricated label for whatever emotions he was feeling instead of allowing him to describe them in his own words. In other words, this moment might have been better ethnographically navigated with a more open-ended “How does that make you feel?” question. Nevertheless, Nicholas’s response – his claim that he was more “curious” than “anxious” – bore interesting fruit as he proceeded to elaborate. “When I lived with my host family for like six months up north,” he explained, “I mean, that was a different feel, that had a very different feel than this does right here and even there I felt much
more noticeable. So, like basically I guess it'll be kind of like that, but probably on a grander scale because, yeah.” Finally, he concluded, “So, I guess part of the reason I’m not really that anxious about this aspect is because I feel like I’ve already dealt with it to some degree when I lived with the host family.” Pausing for a moment, he added, “And, whenever you’re on the bus here [in Quito], you see people stare at you.”

8.10 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that through being subjected to a sort of continual exercise of disciplinary power in the public space, white volunteers experienced a heightened sense of visibility that unnerved them. This visibility in conjunction with their sense of being subject to stereotype and discrimination translated into the manifestation of something akin to Du Bois’ concept of double consciousness (1903/2007) – a sort of subjectivity of otherness in which their familiar positions of racial, national, socioeconomic and linguistic normativity were significantly disrupted. At work here were both the Ecuadorian discourse around gringos and the Global Community Ecuador discourse around gringos and, more specifically, around how to navigate one’s newfound gringo-hood. As discussed, Global Community discourse around gringos both deracialized the construct and presented it as a subject position of great vulnerability, a perpetual “target” for robbery, staring, and discrimination. The irony was that even as whiteness was implicitly presented as a source of danger, its normativity was discursively preserved through the refusal of the program to explicitly refer to this whiteness.

Over the course of the year, volunteers struggled with their newfound gringohood, with walks through Ecuadorian public spaces and interactions with vendors (particularly taxi drivers) being particularly heightened sites of gendered subjectivity formation. As discussed, it was through their narratives of these encounters that the “two-ness” that Du Bois (1903/2007) described as being foundational to double consciousness, became apparent. In describing instances of being stared at, cat-called and “ripped off,” volunteers demonstrated that they were acutely aware of common gringo stereotypes (many of them having been taught by field directors over the course of Orientation), and in fact looked upon themselves through the Ecuadorian gaze,
as they understood it. At the same time, even as they remained aware of how they were perceived, they balked at and attempted to resist the subject position of Other, arguing with taxi drivers over minuscule amounts of money, raging within at those who imposed this position upon them, and noting those public spaces where they believed there was less chance of being stared at and ogled. All the while, many experienced feelings of fear, anxiety, and anger at being othered.

Incidentally, throughout the year that I spent listening to, talking to, and hanging out with the volunteers, I was often struck by a sense of awe that almost no one seemed to go through any kind of “a ha moment” with respect to understanding or at least discerning an inkling as to what many minorities in the United States experience and feel on a perpetual basis. It was hard to avoid such a thought as I listened to volunteers describe the sorts of everyday moments of discrimination that sounded so familiar save for the particular person who was articulating them. However, to make sense of this as a sort of failure or missed opportunity to sensitize white youth to processes of racial discrimination would be to, in some sense, lapse into the logic of international volunteer industry, which again, is all about the self-development of the volunteer. One could easily imagine, proponents of Global Community and other similar programs revamping program literature and Orientations to structure and sell the volunteer stint as an opportunity for the development of racial empathy in the hearts and minds of its predominantly white targeted market. As long as international volunteer is going to continue this may not be the worst idea, but it is one that remains loyal to the neoliberal-imperial logic of the international volunteer industry in which the “developing world” is reduced to a sort of catalytic backdrop for the self-investment, self-development, and self-improvement of the Northern volunteer.

To work against this, we could instead look to what did not fail to happen, that is what actually did occur and how so and what broader exercise of power this occurrence may have served. Indeed, the volunteers’ reckoning with being racially (as well as nationally, linguistically, and culturally) othered and their tendency to think – or at least talk with me – about this circumstance in ways that often (though not always) carefully stepped around the color of their
skin and concentrated instead on hair color, height, and Americanness should be considered alongside the ways in which the Global Community program carefully avoided the subject of race in teaching the volunteers about being gringos. Following this thread, it stands to reason that by informing the volunteers that they were now different but doing so in a way that evaded the raced dimension of their newly ascribed difference, the program actually provided volunteers with a race-less framework for understanding what was happening to them. In the end, it may be that this “failure” on the program’s part to name race and/or whiteness as central to the targeting, stereotyping, and staring of which it warned volunteers was actually a success in maintaining the racelessness of whiteness that then enabled many (though not all, with exceptions found in the narratives of Nicholas and Brooke) volunteers to avoid understanding themselves as racialized subjects. In other words, while they clearly knew they were now being subjected to lens of abnormality, under the tutelage of Global Community they could avoid confronting that the source of this abnormality was in fact their whiteness and thus conceivably maintain a sense of racial normativity that has been theorized as the bedrock of white US-American subjectivity.

Taking a page from James Ferguson (1990), the “failure” of the Global Community programming to educate volunteers on the racial dimensions of their gringo status and the reticence and/or inability of volunteers to utilize their experiences to attempt some measure of enlightened sympathy or understanding in relation to the plight of minorities in the United States (and in Ecuador, for that matter) or to perhaps consider the ways in which they, as white upper and middle class US-Americans are themselves implicated in processes of interactional and institutional othering of US-based minorities might be seen as an “instrument effect” that actually “ends up” serving the continued execution of an act that is in fact foundational to the Western imperialist discourse that so powerfully structures the international volunteer industry – that is, the construction of whiteness (or white Westernness/Americanness) as the center, the norm, “the unmarked standard” (Heron, 2007) against which “the races” of the world are constructed, measured, exoticized, judged, and found lacking.
CHAPTER 9: CONSUMING FAMILIES

9.1 Introduction

The day after I arrived in Quito to begin fieldwork I sat in the local Global Community office. Field directors Tim and April sat in matching purple swivel chairs and a sea of orange folders lay fanned out across the hardwood floor. Preparations were underway for the volunteer orientation that was to begin within the next two days. At the moment Tim was peering into an Excel file on the screen of bulky desktop computer, his back turned halfway toward me. “What was the last name of your host family?” he asked, keeping his eyes on the screen. In Quito or Loja?, I asked. “Loja.” After a few seconds, I was able to remember. Guerrerro-Salinas. “Were they a good host family?” he asked. Caught off guard, I paused for a few seconds. It had been over a year since I had heard a question like this. A good host family. The phrase casually produced the Ecuadorian family as an object of consumption and positioned the speakers as objectifiers and critical evaluators of all the complexities of family, in this case Ecuadorian families that provided room and board to Global Community volunteers. It seemed impossible to avoid this uncomfortable subject position without rejecting the entire premise of the conversation, not to mention alienating the field directors upon whose good will I was counting to help me make inroads with the not-yet arrived volunteers. “They were a really good host family,” I replied, smiling. “Are you placing someone with them?”

Later, reflecting on what had happened in the office, another instance of this dynamic came to mind: an excerpt from an e-mail that I had received when I had been placed with the Guerrerro-Salinas family two years prior:

Below you will find the description of your host family in Loja…The last volunteer who lived there really gave the family high ranks. He said that the parents were a little busy but they are always willing to have a good long talk at the end of the day, and that they made him feel very welcome.

And there was another instance. In the Manual that Global Community Ecuador had sent to the current cohort of volunteers during the months before they were to arrive in the country, there had been a section that explained their Quito homestay arrangements for the duration of the
Orientation and prepared the volunteer for possible lengthy commutes to and from their host families’ homes.

Because the host families are located at various distances from the orientation site,” read a sentence from this section, “you may be doing quite a lot of walking and/or have a long commute to and from the family to orientation sessions and back…We have decided that the quality of a host family is more important than their location.

“High ranks.” “A good host family.” “Quality of a host family.” In the world of Global Community, these ways of talking about the families that provide room and board to volunteers are unremarkable, common, and familiar to all. They are not at all strange. However, in this chapter I aim to treat them as such so as to interrogate their underlying assumptions, examine how they come to be uttered, and how they not only produce certain objects but reflect the formation of the particular subjects who speak them.

In the previous chapters, I illustrated and discussed the ways in which Global Community acts as an instrument of government vis-à-vis its volunteers, guiding them towards imagining and desiring a certain experience that is depicted as an encounter with Third World otherness that is both exciting and interesting as well as beneficial to the self in ways both personal and professional. In this way, I have argued, Global Community (and the Northern international volunteer organization, more generally) mobilizes imperial and neoliberal discourses and constitutes the site of a dynamic fusion between the two. In Chapter 6, I argued that this fusion works to produce a volunteer subjectivity that is interested in “experiencing” Third World otherness and simultaneously making use of it in some way that pertains to language acquisition, skills development, resumé building, and general “life experience.” In Chapter 7, I examined how the organization vigorously constructs Third World otherness during the program Orientation and, in the process, constructs a volunteer subject that is a sort of superior explorer, a voyeur from a more advanced society entitled to peek in on and marvel at the strangeness of his temporary surroundings and always from a standpoint of positional superiority (Said 1978/2003). Along the way, the organization ushers the volunteer not only into othering frames of thought and practices but also into an instrumentalizing of Third World otherness and his consumption of it in ways that
not only have to do with accumulating experience that can easily be transposed to a resumé, but also with modeling a particular way of approaching travel to developing countries, more generally.

Throughout this discussion, I have argued that volunteers often related to an imagined Third World otherness as strategic consumers and that Global Community played a key role in producing them as such. In this chapter, I turn to how volunteers positioned themselves and developed similar subjectivities specifically in relation to the Ecuadorian families with whom they resided. Moreover, I examine how Global Community was involved in the cultivation of such subjectivities by guiding the volunteers toward particular subject positions vis-à-vis the Ecuadorian host family.

Over the course of fieldwork and my many interviews and conversations with the volunteers, I heard this reference to a "good host family" over and over again, along with other kinds of assessments. In this chapter, I argue that these references were the expression of what I came to see as a broader, consumerist subjectivity that the volunteers developed in relation to their host families and homestays. I suggest that the formation of a common consumerist subjectivity vis-à-vis the host family was directly linked to a distinct host family discourse that is generated and circulated by the Global Community Ecuador program and the Northern international volunteer industry, more broadly. Considering the broader implications of the formation of such a subjectivity among the volunteers – and the particular actions, practices, and statements through which it is acted out and realized – I argue that the homestay component of the Northern international volunteer stint constitutes not only a certain commodification or commodifying impulse toward families of the global South, but also a site of Northern/Western surveillance over peoples of this vast region, one that extends into the intimate spaces of households and familial relations and is loyal not only to a sort of voyeuristic logic that is often associated with leisure tourism, but also to a neoliberal consumerist logic that emphasizes how the family of the global South serves the self-development agendas of the Northern subject.

9.2 The Host Family Discourse of the Northern International Volunteer Industry
A big motivation for going abroad is to immerse yourself in the culture where you will be working. Projects Abroad knows living with a local host family is the best way to do that... You will not live with just any family. Our families are carefully chosen for security, comfort, and friendliness.

While in the home, you will socialize and eat meals with the rest of the family, becoming an integral member in no time at all. Living with a Tanzanian family is perhaps the most amazing cultural experience you will have and will provide memories that last a lifetime.\(^{33}\)

Within the international volunteer industry, the “host family” has emerged as a central trope (Escobar, 1995). Like “the village” (Pigg, 1992) or the “less developed country” (LDC) (Ferguson, 1990) of the development discourse, the “host family” circulates as a commonly understood entity within the discourse of international volunteering. Yet, in place of policy documents, development campaigns, and scores of statistics, the Third World host family is produced through website descriptions, orientation sessions, tips listed in printed hand-outs and introductory guides for living abroad, copious anecdotes, reflective one-liners, and vivid photographs posted on international volunteer program websites, not to mention an endless stream of volunteer blogs. Moreover, instead of being imagined as a “problem” to be modernized (like “the village” or the “LDC”), the host family is produced as a situation to be experienced, and experienced as is, its imagined traditional-ness and “authenticity” fully intact, and often highly coveted. In addition, the Third World host family is also produced as something the volunteer “gets” in exchange for the money she pays to the volunteer organization.

Perhaps the most vigorous producer and circulator of host family discourse is the promotional website of the international volunteer organization. Typically, program websites inform prospective volunteers that host families will provide them with a private room (which, some programs emphasize, will come with a locking door) and a certain number of meals per day. However, while host families are most explicitly identified as providers of material services, as the excerpts below begin to illustrate, they are also constructed as performers of certain characteristics and suppliers of certain amenities that have to do with emotion and affect:

ProWorld Belize’s homestay families are close community friends who provide warm, safe and authentic Belizean living experiences. While participants may find that within their host family homes only their basic material needs are met, participants encounter a wealth of sharing and strong family relationships. You will have your own room in the house, but will share other living spaces, and a bathroom. Your family will provide you with three home cooked meals a day. A typical Belizean meal includes a chicken dish, rice and beans, fried plantains, and sometimes coleslaw or potato salad. The bonds created with your new family or fellow participants often prove to be one of the most memorable aspects of the ProWorld Belize program!\(^3^4\)

Families in Rock Spring open their homes to give volunteers a true taste of Jamaican hospitality. The host family aspect of the program gives volunteers the best opportunity for cross-cultural learning and to see how people really live in rural Jamaica. Electricity and running water are available at all bed & breakfast facilities. Traditional Jamaican meals will be provided daily to volunteers by host families and many special cook-outs and group meals will take place throughout the week. Volunteers can expect to try chicken-and-rice-and-peas, curried goat, ackee and saltfish, breadfruit, yams, and a variety of other local foods.\(^3^5\)

**Homestay:** Live with a host family in the community and witness firsthand daily customs and home-cooked meals. Homes are typically small, with simple furnishings.\(^3^6\)

Through these sorts of evocative blurbs, in which the volunteer is promised a host family that will provide certain goods/services that are both material and affective in nature, a distinctive myth of the Third World host family begins to take shape – one that is suffused with notions of tradition and authenticity, togetherness and family bonds. For example, through the experience of living with a Rock Spring host family the volunteer will get “traditional Jamaican meals” as well as a “true taste of Jamaican hospitality.” In the second excerpt, the volunteer will experience “an authentic Belizean living experience” with only the “basic material needs met” and a “wealth of sharing and strong family relationships.”

Notably, some of these elements – tradition, basic material needs, and the heavily coded “daily customs” – are often identified as the very sources of “problems” to be solved by Western development interventions. However, in the world of international volunteering, they are imagined differently – as the enriching, sustaining, and perspective-broadening backdrop for the education,\(^3^4\)\(^3^5\)\(^3^6\)

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\(^3^4\) ProWorld Service Corps. http://www.proworldsc.org/3pb_5experience_4homestay.htm  
\(^3^5\) Globe Aware. http://www.globeaware.org/destinations/latin-america-caribbean/jamaica#.Vc5Jb0uFy8E  
\(^3^6\) Global Citizens. https://www.globalcitizens.org/what-expect
hosting, and self-development of the Western volunteer abroad. Such a distinction begins to illustrate how, through the Western gaze, the same social circumstances and the same characterizations (traditional, authentic) of the Third World can be and are manipulated according to the specific project at hand. Instead of being imagined as a “problem” to be modernized (like “the village” and the “LDC”), the host family is produced as a situation to be experienced, and experienced as is, its imagined traditional-ness and authenticity fully intact and highly coveted.

In addition to evocative text, the descriptions of host families are often accompanied by photographs that further construct the Third World host family, typically coded as brown or black, as a sort of natural and infinite reservoir of familial affection and cultural education for the Western subject, who is typically coded as white. In these photographs, people of the community encircle, embrace, and smile brightly alongside smiling volunteers. Children especially are featured in these photographs, and are shown hugging the volunteer, hitching piggyback rides, holding hands, and almost always smiling and laughing. In one photograph, three or four little children of the family may pile around a smiling volunteer, all of them giggling and grinning for the camera.

Together such descriptions and images of host families project, in both literal and metaphorical terms, a sort of Third World embrace of the Western/Northern subject; this is a micro-level embrace in which the broader relations of economic, military, and political domination that exist between first and third world nations are washed out of the picture, which is instead saturated with harmonious and happy bonds between individual people, or more accurately, between the mobile Western/Northern person who travels to exotic locales and the static, fixed-in-place Southern people who happily receive him. It is very much a narrative of reassurance that the Global North tells itself. The people of the Global South, these images seem to insist, are thrilled not only to have a Western/Northern foreigner in their midst but to take care of him as though he were another family member, one more child, as it were, to be fed, embraced, and cared for.
In some sense, these images drape a discourse of affective relations over the geopolitical, spinning a myth of First World/Third World relations of harmony. However, these harmonious relations are cast in a familiar tint, one in which there is an unmistakable centering of the Western/Northern subject as a sort of honored guest who exists as the natural focus of attention and affection for whatever Third World family she happens to drop in on through her participation in international volunteer service. This invokes what Barbara Heron (2007) has described as a foundational component of planetary consciousness that, she argues, is at the center of bourgeois subjectivity and, which I argue, is something that the US state has borrowed from bourgeois culture and attempted to impart upon the broader population in service of imperial projects. That is an assumption of the perennial and innate availability of the Other to be known, experienced, gazed upon, and improved by the Western subject. Writing about how her study participants (a group of Western development workers stationed in Zambia) narrated the relations between themselves and various local residents, she identifies a sort of dramatic swinging between two extremes -- one characterized by anxious boundary setting, the other by an attempted negation of the existence of any and all difference; as she describes it, “movements of recoil from apparently insurmountable difference and embrace of romanticized Otherness, the one through reification of culture and the other through disavowal of disparity (p. 66). Whether one is approaching relations from an othering stance or a difference minimizing stance, the point, Heron contends, is that through either kind of relating, “African people are always construed as available to us [Western development workers], and our assumptions are pervaded by a planetary consciousness such that, just as we assume the right to be in the Other’s space, so are we (self-) positioned as entitled to intervene in the Other’s existence, and to seek relations with whom we choose” (Ibid).

However, what is important to note that in addition to a discourse of voyeuristic experiencing of the Third World host family, there is also an unmistakable language that depicts the host family experience as a vehicle of self-investment for the volunteer. In addition to breathless descriptions of tradition and authenticity, warmth, typical-ness and “true tastes” that
are depicted as pleasurable and interesting in and of themselves, there are also promises of "opportunity." In other words, there are implicit pledges that volunteers will acquire certain tangible, useful, and codifiable things out of the host family experience. The following quotes, excerpted from the websites of major US-based international volunteer organizations, provide powerful illustration:

Volunteers experience daily life with a local family while developing cross-cultural communication skills. ProWorld's homestay families are close community friends who provide warm, safe, and authentic living experiences.

Projects, homestays, cultural activities and adventures also provide an excellent way to learn and improve your Spanish.  

Program participants live with a host family in a community, experiencing day to day life as a local, not a tourist. This authentic cultural and language immersion enables youth to have an impactful and unforgettable summer.

Participating in an international homestay is one of the best ways to experience cultural immersion abroad as you learn about another language, cultural norms and local traditions. Every GSC volunteer has the opportunity to live with a local Tanzanian family and truly be integrated with their local community during an experience volunteering abroad with GSC.

In these ways, what unfolds on these websites and blogs is a powerful imagining of the Third World family as an experience to be had by Northern volunteers – and volunteers are construed as consumers of such an experience – of the Third World family, imagined through the commodifying lens of the all-inclusive volunteer package. Through such text, the volunteer subject that lives in the discourse of the website is thus not only imbued with the conventional sense of entitlement to enter the physical spaces of the territories of empire in order to have a sort of voyeuristic experience, but the Third World host family is constructed as a key service provider whose existence is defined by its eagerness and implied obligation to help pull off the achievement of this experience.

Another important characteristic of this discourse that works to construct the Third World family as a commodity and the volunteer a consumer entitled to a certain features are the claims

38 Amigos de las Americas. http://www.amigoslink.org/summer-programs
made by programs that the families they contract with to host volunteers have essentially been inspected, stringently so, and by the program staff, themselves. This is illustrated by the following extended quote, excerpted from the website of a major US-based international volunteer organization:

> You will not live with just any family. Our families are carefully chosen for security, comfort, and friendliness. Many hosts are associated with our programs - for example, a teacher or principal at one of our partner schools or a doctor at one of our medical placements.

> Your room will be modest but comfortable. Host families live in secure houses and neighborhoods and are closely screened and monitored, with regular checkups, including before every new volunteer moves in.

> We also ensure they can provide you with quality home-cooked meals. Food is at the heart of a society so be ready to eat your fill of local cuisine!

> In line with our commitment to being a positive influence in the communities we work, host families are decently compensated, but are also interviewed for friendliness and to make sure they are motivated by the right reasons. They will welcome you into their family and home and be eager to share their customs with you and have you teach them about your own culture.40

Such allusions to the purported security, comfortability, friendliness, and “right reasons” of host families are objectifying in and of themselves as they present the Third World family as a product that can be broken down into certain features and components that can be itemized, packaged, and delivered to the paying consumer. However, the pledge that host families are subjected to “regular check-ups” and “close” screening and monitoring works to intensify this objectification and commodification all the more (while also suggesting one way in which the Northern international volunteer program acts as an instrument of government vis-à-vis populations of developing countries). Moreover, aside from constructing an image of the Third World family as an anonymous human entity that, if unchecked, is always potentially somehow dangerous to the wellbeing of the volunteer subject, I would suggest, that such a statement – written specifically for the consumption of the prospective volunteer – works to usher the volunteer into her own evaluative stance vis-à-vis the host family to which she will be assigned (and any other host

family she may hear of through peers), urging her to engage in her own monitoring and checking of the host family’s behavior, friendliness, practices, and “reasons.” This dynamic is exhibited even more powerfully in the following quotation, excerpted from the website of another major US-based international volunteer organization:

The vast majority of volunteers live with a host family, and exceptions are approved by the volunteer, family (if the volunteer is underage) and Project Staff. Project Staff members visit communities and host families in advance of the Volunteers’ arrival to determine the best eating and living arrangements. Project Staff say [sic] the night in each host community before the volunteers arrive to ensure the host families and communities are high quality. Volunteers are encouraged to report any problems with these arrangements immediately to the Project Staff.41

Through this kind of text, the conventional entitlement of the Western subject to drop into Third World communities in search of a voyeuristic experience is preserved. However, it is also augmented and emboldened by a certain marketist edge: the volunteer is reassured that there is active surveillance going on to ensure that the Third World host family performs as it should, she is rhetorically empowered to participate in this surveillance, herself, and finally, she is urged to report on her host family should it disappoint and is perhaps even led to believe that if the host family disappoints, she can expect some sort of recourse as a dissatisfied consumer.

9.3 Global Community’s Version of the Host Family Discourse

As an international volunteer organization that uses the homestay arrangement in many of its programs, Global Community produces its own particular iteration of the broader host family discourse that suffuses the Northern international volunteer industry. This iteration is one that becomes more discernible the further along one goes in the application process. For example, on the organization’s informational website, volunteers are simply informed that they will live with host families or in apartments and not much else is said. On the portion of the website that provides specific information about the Ecuador program, the volunteer is informed that she will live with a host family and that most homes will have electricity and running water, but that some may not.

41 Amigos de las Americas. http://www.amigoslink.org/volunteering-faqs#I1L1
With respect to the Ecuador program, where the organization begins to circulate a distinctive host family discourse – where it really begins to construe the host family in particular ways – is in the Manual that is mailed to incoming volunteers who have applied, been accepted, and have paid the first deposit on the program fee. In the Manual the Ecuadorian host family is described in a variety of ways. Living with a host family is described as both a potentially “challenging experience” but also “an excellent opportunity to get accustomed to Ecuadorian household life” and “one of the greatest rewards of your year in Ecuador.” In this way, the Manual subtly constructs the Ecuadorian host family as a product that provides certain returns to the user. And, in this – as with any commodity that is expected to perform in a particular way – the host family is even more subtly construed as an object that is capable of being evaluated, judged, and appraised in certain ways.

This subtler point becomes explicit in certain sections of the Manual. For example, warning the prospective volunteers that some host families in Quito live long distances from Orientation activities and that some volunteers will thus be required to make daily lengthy commutes, the authors of the Manual explain to the prospective volunteer that Global Community has “decided that the quality of a host family is more important than their location.” At the same time, it should be mentioned that in several areas the language of the guide also construes the host family as an important and esteemed actor (or set of actors) that is to be treated with courtesy and respect; volunteers are, for example, advised to seek the permission of their host families before inviting guests over, to give a call if they are going to miss the afternoon meal (included in the host family arrangement), and to generally try and imagine, remember, and consider the perspectives and points of view of their host family members. However, what begins to take shape more powerfully is the image of a host family that, while entitled to respect and courtesy from the volunteer, is ultimately expected to deliver certain benefits to the volunteer. In this way, the construct of planetary consciousness – a sense of entitlement to drop in and gaze upon an exoticized Other that is construed as being of a less advanced and thus inferior culture – is fused with a particular consumerist construct that is neoliberalist in nature because it is
premised on making use of the toured object not only for cultural titillation but also for certain vaguely defined but undeniably palpable purposes of self-gain (see Rose, 1999b). The following excerpts from the aforementioned Manual provide illustration of this:

*Global Community considers home-stays to be an integral part of the program in Ecuador and a component that volunteers appreciate a great deal. Home-stays provide an excellent opportunity to improve language skills in a safe and supportive environment. Host families are accessible interpreters of culture and customs and provide an important layer of safety and security.*

*Living with a family gives you a set of accessible friends and relatives and an immediate positive status in the community, which would take a long time to achieve on your own.*

*Although situations may sometimes be frustrating for volunteers and require patience and flexibility, past volunteers often tell us that living with a host family is one of the most positive aspects of their experience in Ecuador.*

As these excerpts begin to establish the host family as something that is of a particular value for the volunteer and provide some clue as to what this value is (i.e. improvement of language skills, cultural literacy, safety and security), other portions of the Manual simultaneously begin to paint a particular picture of the Ecuadorian host family, thus supplementing its construction as an object of value with its construction as a particular kind of object, imbued with and characterized by certain characteristics, behaviors, and tendencies. In these more descriptive portions, the theme of a *Third World embrace* that is so prominent on the websites of many international volunteer organizations is in fact circulated, but in a tone that is less warm and fuzzy and more cautionary and instructive. "Living with a host family can be a trying experience," reads one tip, "especially if you are used to living very independently. Your host parents may want to know where you are at all times or try to regulate your social life, as they would with their own children. Adjusting to the demands of Ecuadorian family life will take a concerted effort on your part." Another tip reads, "You should expect much less personal privacy than you are used to at home. Ecuadorians tend to be more family and group-oriented than North Americans, and they

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42 Excerpted from the informational booklet mailed by Global Community to new volunteers upon their registration in the organization’s Ecuador program.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
do not easily understand the North American need for personal privacy and space.” The third tip warns: “Ecuadorians are very generous and they often treat you like a member of their family. But this means that you will be the newest and in some cases the youngest member of the family. As such, they might try to order you around like a child.” And finally:

If you are independent enough to come all the way to Ecuador for an entire year, you are probably highly independent by nature and you may have trouble with the level of concern expressed by those around you (ex. comments like “don’t forget to bring a jacket” every time you leave the house). It is best to try to make things as clear as possible from the beginning, maintain open lines of communication and tackle problems as they arise immediately, before they become differences too difficult to overcome. It’s also important to respect their ideas since you are living in their home. If you want the experience of living with a host family you must be willing to adapt, or at least try to find a compromise.

Through these warnings, a particular myth of the Ecuadorian host family begins to take shape, one in which it is depicted as a sort of collective force that is above all hyper-focused on the US-American volunteer that it embraces into its home. In this myth, the volunteer is depicted as an honored guest and newcomer who is folded into the Ecuadorian family unit and showered with instantaneous acceptance and attentiveness, whether she likes it or not. In this way, there is a sort of explicit spelling out of the Third World embrace that is circulated through the photographs, descriptive blurbs, and FAQ’s sections that appear on many websites of international volunteer organizations.

There is also a cautionary exposition of certain purported drawbacks of this embrace. This exposition is based on the working assumption that, as US-Americans, the volunteer subject will expect personal space, independence, privacy and that, as Ecuadorians, the host family will be committed to principles of togetherness, interdependence, communality. The use of such an assumption is not entirely remarkable; it can be read as a riff on commonplace assumptions of so-called cultural differences between US-Americans and Latin Americans. However, what is interesting about this particular iteration of these assumptions and their application is that they are used to construe a particular relation between two parties involved in the homestay arrangement: the US-American volunteer and the Ecuadorian host family. Specifically, the Ecuadorian host family is not only purportedly committed to togetherness and attentiveness unto
its own members; it is also purportedly this way vis-à-vis the Global Community volunteer who comes to stay for a time. In this way, the use of these assumptions about the Ecuadorian host family effectively create a presumption of solicitousness, attentiveness, automatic and unquestioning acceptance, and affective service that is always already expressed and performed by of the Ecuadorian host family toward the US-American volunteer. Moreover, it constructs the Global Community volunteer as a subject that is always already being attended to, cared for, and served by the Ecuadorian host family. What takes shape here is then a very particular relation with particular roles for each party involved. Here, it is important to keep in mind that this particular relation is already suffused with those implicit promises that the volunteer will in fact get something out of living with a host family – Spanish language improvement, cross-cultural skills, safety and security.

Over the course of the Ecuador program orientation that I observed, this mythical relation was further developed during sessions that were devoted to instructive discussions for volunteers on how to live with and negotiate relations with their host families. The first of these was held on the volunteers’ first full day in Ecuador and took place right before their respective Quito host families were scheduled to pick them up from the hotel. Returning from lunch, the volunteers were divided up into small groups, each of which was assigned a discussion leader who, in turn distributed small slips of paper. Printed at the top of each slip in boldface letters were the words: “What Will You Do When…” Below this phrase was a list of 11 fragment statements, each ending in a question mark and thus completing the question alluded to in the heading. The statements painted different hypothetical, “what if” situations between the volunteer and his host family. Among them were scenarios of, for example, not knowing how to operate the shower or being presented with unfamiliar or personally off-putting foods at the family dinner table. There were also scenarios that began to conjure images of an opportunistic or non-trustworthy host family. “What will you do when…Your family complains that they don’t have any money or that Global Community doesn’t pay enough?” “What Will You Do When…Your host father asks you to borrow a little bit of money?” “What Will You Do When…You find out that there is $3 missing from
your night stand?” However, what was most recurrent were fragments that depicted the myth of
the clingy, volunteer-focused Ecuadorian host family that had begun to take shape in the Manual.
“What Will You Do When...You really just want to be alone?” “What will you do when...Your host
cmom keeps coming into your room to tidy up?” “What will you do when...You come home at
midnight and find your host parents waiting up for you?” “What will you do when...Your host
family believes that you don’t spend enough time with them and because you don’t spend enough
with them you don’t like them?”

Here, I should note that, as a researcher, I had been given a sort of “field staff copy” of
the scenario questions. This was a longer 2-page document that fleshed out the aforementioned
scenarios in more detail. In this document, a few of the scenarios had also been accompanied by
notes that spelled out an intended programmatic purpose with respect to what kind of message or
directive it was hoped would be imparted upon the volunteers through discussion of that given
scenario. In this way, the document provided valuable evidence of a real and specific effort to in
fact govern the volunteers’ behaviors and thought processes vis-à-vis their Ecuadorian host
families. It also provided something of a glimpse into actual kinds of behaviors and thought
processes the program hoped to produce among the volunteers.

The particular small group that I observed was led by Tim, one of the field directors. As
we sank into crossed legged positions in a shaded corner of the hotel parking lot, Tim let the
volunteers look over their slips for a moment before beginning. “So guys, what will you do when
your family complains that they don’t have any money or that Global Community doesn’t pay
enough?” A few tickled gasps escaped from the group, along with several looks of surprise and a
few sidelong glances. After a brief silence, Trevor, a 22-year-old from a small town in South
Dakota, tentatively shared that he might tell the host family that he understood how they felt, but
that he had nothing to do with how much they were paid by Global Community. Tim nodded
affirmatively. “Okay, okay, great. Anyone else?” “Has that really happened?” asked Peggy, a 71-
year-old retired teacher from Minneapolis. Without looking at her, Tim quickly nodded his head as
he scanned the group. “Anyone else?” After a pause, Peggy piped up again. “Well, speaking of
paying the family, I’ve been wondering how that works? The paying. It just seems so um, awkward I guess, because we’re guests in their homes but obviously I know they need to be compensated…” She let her voice trail off and turned her head to look around at the others, seemingly checking for their responses. A few people nodded in agreement. “Do you have any tips on the best way to handle that?” she asked. “How did you used to do it when you were a volunteer?” People looked to Tim, suddenly rapt with attention. Tim briefly explained that he always made sure to pay on time and to place the money in his host mother’s hand (as opposed to leaving it on the kitchen table) so as to make sure receipt was acknowledged. “It’s really not a big deal, guys,” he said reassuringly.

The discussion momentarily strayed off topic as volunteers voiced other sorts of logistical questions that soon became entirely unrelated to relations with host families and more pertinent to navigating daily life in Quito. After this went on for about 15 minutes, Tim tried to corral the group back to the list of host family scenarios. After answering a question about typical internet café rates in the Mariscal versus one of the neighborhoods in which one volunteer’s Quito host family was listed as living, he pivoted to the second scenario. “Hey guys, so let’s look at the next one. “What will you do when…your family pressures you to speak English with their 17-year-old daughter?”

Again the group fell into contemplative silence. I noticed that on more than a few of their faces there were looks of slight confusion. After a pause, Casey offered that she would try to speak with the daughter in English as much as she could. “I mean, could that be like an extra project on the side, like, on top of our teaching in the classroom?” she asked. “I know um, there’s a big need in Ecuador. Do a lot of families want us to help their kids out?” Casey seemed to be connecting this question to Global Community’s recommendation that, in addition to their teaching, the volunteers participate in or even initiate additional volunteer projects in their adopted communities for the duration of time that they were in Ecuador. She was certainly drawing on the idea of a “need for English” that was commonplace on the Global Community website and in the pre-departure Manual. Tim nodded as she spoke, “Yeah, yeah, yeah,” he said
quickly. “I like what you’re saying, Casey.” His opened his eyes more widely and raised his eyebrows. “But this is the thing, did you guys come here to be speaking English all the time? I know a lot of you want to learn Spanish or improve those language skills you already have. When I was a volunteer, my Spanish got so much better and that was all from long conversations I would have with my host brothers, and hanging out and stuff. So if your host family is trying to get you to give free English lessons on the side to their daughter, that’s gonna take away from you getting better in Spanish.” A few of the volunteers nodded. Trevor asked, “So, are the host families not supposed to speak in English with us and are we not supposed to speak in English with them, even if they want to improve their English?” Turning to him, Tim replied, “I mean nothing is like prohibited, but when we sign up new host families, we tell them that this is supposed to be an authentic experience for you guys, and that for a lot of you a big goal is to learn Spanish, so they know that they’re not really supposed to make those kinds of requests or demands.” As I listened to Tim answer the volunteers’ questions, I glanced down at my director’s copy of the scenario questions, looking for the filled in notes on this particular scenario. There I found a more explicit representation of what Tim had just said:

The host family knows that they have been told by the FDs that the volunteer is to speak only in Spanish with the host family, and that if the volunteer chooses to speak English with the daughter, it would be as a favor to the family. There is no right or wrong answer, though it is inappropriate for the family to ask and could take away from the volunteer’s Ecuadorian experience.

This question and its related notes were thus perhaps the one that most effectively painted the host family as a sort of service provider that was to be expected to deliver. What was also notable about this question was how it underscored a sort of tension between the two discourses that Global Community simultaneously draws upon – one that directs the volunteer to nobly “help,” educate and “uplift” the people of the communities they enter and another that directs him to treat the volunteer stint and his engagement with the “Third World” community as a catalyst for his own self-development. Here was that tension on display: help the host family’s child to learn English or decline this request out of allegiance to one’s own self-development (embodied here in one’s acquisition of Spanish language skills). The posing of such a question, I
inferred, was perhaps what caused those looks of confusion to spread across some of the volunteers’ faces; they perhaps did not see at first why or how this scenario was being presented as a problem if teaching English was the very work that they were in Ecuador to perform. In fact, one can imagine how the scenario could have come across as a sort of trick question. The particular response that Casey ventured illustrated the persistence and power of the helping discourse in the formation of her subjectivity – or at least in her negotiation of how she wanted to present herself and her priorities to the field director of the program on Day One of Orientation and perhaps, to her fellow volunteers (not to mention myself, the researcher, as well). Tim’s response to Casey’s answer in turn constituted a sort of diversion from this discourse of helping when it came to how the Global Community volunteer was expected to relate to the Ecuadorian host family. In this role, that is in this particular zone of the volunteer experience, the volunteers, he seemed to be saying, were to conduct themselves as strategic consumers, driven by a goal of maximizing the services that host families had been told to provide them with.

With the clarification of this particular scenario settled, Tim checked his watch. Commenting that we were “way over,” he began to wrap things up with a summary statement, informing the group that he and April basically wanted to impress upon them that they needed to “be your own advocates” in the host family setting, but to also “be respectful of your family and the cultural differences.” Looking down at my director’s copy of the handout, I noticed that his words matched up more or less with a prompting device statement that appeared at the bottom of the last page. “Just remember:” it read, “be your own advocates for [your] basic needs, while being respectful to your host family and conscious of their cultural differences. We hope to inspire our volunteers to initiate difficult conversations with their host families to create a healthy, open environment in their new home.”

And with that, I suggest, on the very first day of Orientation, the Ecuadorian host family had been constructed for the volunteers as a knowable entity that could be navigated with a sort how-to guide or user’s manual. It had also been constructed as a provider of at least one service: assistance with Spanish language acquisition. With respect to the former, it bears mentioning that
there were arguably good intentions at work here. While perhaps motivated in part by a desire to maintain working relations with its corps of Quito host families (and thus the success of the Ecuador program itself), it seemed that there was a clear programmatic objective to prevent volunteers from inadvertently causing harm (in the form of offended sensibilities, injured feelings, or confusion) to the people who were agreeing to host them and literally take them in for the duration of their time in a large and busy city that, to them, was new and unfamiliar. Indeed, there were not only discourses of respect and reflexivity being indexed, but also a certain sophistication in the program’s apparent attempt to sensitize volunteers to certain differences that were believed to exist (and to most likely surface in some way at some point) between their guiding assumptions, worldviews, social values, and cultural frameworks and those of the “families” (framed as unitary beings) they were about to meet and go home with. However, these good intentions and attempts at modeling and fostering cultural sensitivity did not negate the simultaneous fact that, in attempting to guide the volunteers on how to interact with their host families, there was an unmistakable, and perhaps inevitable, objectification of the host family as an entity that was known by field directors and was able to be known by new volunteers, an entity that was uniform and predictable in certain ways, that was not heterogeneous but homogenous, and that was maneuverable and manageable in certain ways if one were to approach it and act towards it by following certain rules and principles.

In this way, the aforementioned Manual’s objectification of the host family and the simultaneous consumerization of the volunteer vis-à-vis the host family was only reinforced by this activity. As discussed in Chapter 6, improvement in Spanish language skills was indeed a frequent and often primary motive volunteers listed for applying to the Global Community Ecuador program. In that chapter, I argued that such a motive was generally tied to a broader agenda to make use of the volunteer stint in a way that maximized one’s career opportunities. In this vein, this moment on the first day of Orientation might be read as a way in which the host family was discursively enlisted as a contributing service provider for that agenda.
As it turned out, an even more explicit sort of discursive enlistment of the host family into volunteer self-enterprise agendas would take place much later in the year at the End-Point Conference. On the second afternoon of the conference the volunteers sat in attendance at a session entitled, “Marketing Your Global Community Experience.” Among the different handouts distributed to them was one that focused on how to adapt components of the Global Community stint to résumé bullet format (“Crafting a Dynamic Resume: Bulletizing your Global Community Experience”). While the header of the first page of this handout read “Teaching Specific Bullets,” the second page began with a header called, “Spanish Immersion/Community Involvement Bullets.” Underneath it were listed two examples of how the experience of living with a host family could be spun as a credential for future employment. “Lived with non-English speaking host family, participated in all family gatherings,” read one sample bullet. The other sample framed the experience of living with a host family as a component of a more comprehensive and socially minded engagement in Ecuadorian society: “Became immersed in community. Lived with Ecuadorian host family, pursued weekly Spanish lessons, and volunteered with Instituto Nacional de la Niñez y la Familia (INNFA) in after-school program for child laborers and street children.”

Returning now to Orientation, it became evident that in addition to encouraging the volunteers to approach their host families from the subject positions of revered guest, educated user, and entitled service recipient (all part of a broader consumer subject position), field staff also ushered them into being critics and evaluators of their host families. For example, during an afternoon session on the second to last day of Orientation, volunteers were required to fill out evaluations of the Orientation, and these included a 2-page questionnaire on their Quito host families. A list of the questions contained in the questionnaire provides a sense of how the program effectively casts the volunteer in the role of judge, critic, expert, and evaluator and ultimately a consumer vis-à-vis their host families during the very first month that they are in Ecuador. I have replicated it below:

*Please describe the house and your living situation (size, cleanliness, safety of neighborhood, location, noise, etc.). Please tell us a bit about your family. What do they like to do? What kinds of family activities were you invited to participate in? Please write*
the names and ages of the people living in your house. How far away was your host family from your teaching site (bus, walking)? Please provide information about the public transportation routes near your house (are they convenient? What areas do they serve?) Did you feel like a member of the family or a guest? Was the family flexible and did they accommodate any special needs that you had? Did the family have any religious, political or social views that made you feel uncomfortable? How was the food? Did the family boil the water or use Bacstop/Vitalin? What do you think was the family’s motivation for having a volunteer (financial, cultural exchange)? Was anything stolen from you in the house? Is there anything else about the family you feel we should know (problems or conflicts)? Would you recommend this family for future volunteers? Why or why not? PLEASE write a short, one paragraph description of your family that we can email to future volunteers that will live with your host family.

Finally, this construction of the volunteer as a critic of her host family was also reinforced by Orientation exercises in which volunteers were encouraged and sometimes required to share anecdotes about experiences they had had with their Quito host families. In this way, I suggest, the organization encouraged the volunteers to effectively report on their host families to the group and engage in a sort of group surveillance – even if it was for the intended purposes of teaching them how to navigate difficult interpersonal situations that could arise and avoiding the development of potential conflict between volunteers and host families. Moreover, through these group exercises, volunteers were not simply being subjected in solitude to such discursive construction and governmental instruction. Rather, the nature of the subjectification at work was such that they were propelled to actively inhabit and perform such a subject position in concert with and for the consumption of their fellow volunteers, thus infusing it with the added element of being a sort of currency for interacting with and relating to their peers.

In summary then, I argue that several things happened over the course of the program staff’s extended discussion of Ecuadorian host families and their instructing of volunteers in how they were to approach, conceive of, and manage the experience of living with a discursively constructed Ecuadorian host family. First, the Ecuadorian family that hosts the volunteer was constructed as a sort of commodity or as the catalyst or provider of a certain commodified experience (paid for and expected to deliver in certain ways) that was to be pursued by the Northern volunteer subject. In turn, vis-à-vis the Ecuadorian family that takes him on as a
boarder, the volunteer was constructed as a consumer (implicitly entitled to a certain promised performance on the part of the product: the host family which he is consuming).

Second, as part of its programming, Global Community provided instruction to volunteers on what to expect and literally how to live with an Ecuadorian host family, the implicit premise being that such instruction is necessary for preventing (or at least proactively diffusing) potential interpersonal misunderstandings and tense relations between volunteer and host family. In this way, the Ecuadorian host family was also construed as an object that was to be known, understood, and anticipated in certain ways in order to avoid inauspicious outcomes. In turn, the volunteer was constructed as a subject who was entitled to be informed of and educated on the idiosyncrasies of “the Ecuadorian family,” and particularly those families that take he and his peers in as boarders.

Finally, these instructive sessions were characterized by specific discussion of those purported cultural idiosyncrasies of the Ecuadorian family. Here, the Ecuadorian host family was depicted as being categorically welcoming, attentive, concerned. From this presumption, it was then an easy leap to suggest that, because Ecuadorian families all tend to be this way, they are naturally all this way toward the Northern volunteer. In turn, the volunteer was constructed as someone who the host family instantly catapults into the position of honored guest and adopted member.

In light of both the aforementioned Orientation session and the textual material that appeared in the Manual, I suggest, then, that the Global Community volunteer was also implicitly constructed as a critic and evaluator of his host family through the very act of providing him with a list of behaviors and characteristics to expect, understand, forgive, and ultimately deal with as best he could. In its nature this list was not only a roadmap that objectified the Ecuadorian host family as a sort of terrain to be deftly navigated by the volunteer subject. It also constituted a sort of rubric by which host families were to made sense of, interpreted, compared and judged. This easily lent itself to cultivating a stance of critic and evaluator, a stance that was then more
officially introduced and reinforced by engaging the volunteers in the work of formally evaluating their host families.

In making theoretical sense of all this, we might look to the work of Chandra Mohanty (1984), who has argued that “under western eyes” of Western feminist scholarship there has been a discursive colonization of women of the “Third World” such that the vast heterogeneities that exist among the women who reside within this space are etched out to allow for the production of a “composite, singular ‘Third World Woman’ – an image which appears arbitrarily constructed, but nevertheless carries with it the authorizing signature of Western humanist discourse” (1984, pp. 334-335). This construction, she has argued, not only serves to denote an Other but to mark the authors of such scholarship as non-Other.

While it seems wholly removed from the realm of scholarly texts written for academic publishers and intellectual readership, the construction of the Third World host family in the international volunteering industry can also be understood through such a conceptual framework. Indeed, I came to see the mobilization, teaching, and circulation of the Third World host family (and more specifically, the Ecuadorian host family) as an instance of such a process, one in which the operation of a particular discourse around the Third World host family not only reduces the heterogeneity of families to allow for the production of a monolithic construct but also produces this construct as a commodity and positions the volunteer not only as non-Other, but also as a consumer of the Other as a certain kind of product, one that is expected to deliver certain services, behave in particular ways, and result in certain consumer experiences.

In light of all of this construction of the host family on the part of the Northern international volunteering industry (and Global Community Ecuador, more specifically), I suggest that the host family exists not merely as a trope of the international volunteer industry, but also as the object of a comprehensive discourse which indeed shapes the hearts and minds of both program staff and volunteers, and produces them as particular subjects in relation to the Third World host family. Much like the “experts” of development discourse are compelled to understand and approach certain conditions in developing countries as problems of a technical (rather than political) nature,
within the host family discourse, the volunteer is urged to be an expectant consumer of the Third World family that has taken him on as a boarder, understanding the family in his mind’s eye, his conversations, his reflections, and his actions in terms of how the family serves or does not serve him in particular ways. Within this urging towards a consuming orientation, there is an attempt to educate the volunteers’ desires for a particular kind of host family.

9.4 Evaluating Families

As Andrea had contemplated coming to Ecuador through the Global Community program, she was happy about the homestay living arrangement. As a newcomer to Ecuador, she had expected that her future host family would play a crucial role in her adjustment to living in a new place and would serve as a sort of instant social network that would stave off any potential emotional bumps along the road. As she told me, “I knew that [the host family/homestay] was going to keep me from being really lonely and make me feel protected and like someone cared about me and all that kind of stuff you worry about when you go somewhere on your own.” In fact, for fear that she would otherwise feel “unconnected to people,” she did not think she would have wanted to move to another country without the security of a host family. At the same time, she had mentally prepared herself for the possibility of a host family that did not agree with her, telling me, “I was like alright well if they suck, I can move out halfway through.”

Upon meeting her host family, a middle-aged married couple and their twenty-something daughter, she had quickly determined that they did not “suck” and her contingency plan of moving out quickly evaporated. “I immediately knew I wouldn’t do that [move out],” she told me, “because they were so good.”

In recalling how she had planned to make a critical and decisive assessment of the family and then determining that they were “good,” Andrea expressed a tendency that was common among many of the volunteers. While few reported having concocted a premeditated plan of escape if their host families disappointed, like Andrea, many of them spoke about their host families through a language of assessment that rendered host families “good” or “bad.” In Andrea’s case, her choice of the word “suck” was striking. On the one hand, I interpreted it as an
unremarkable term straight out of white middle class US-American youth slang, one that any 
member of this group might use to talk about anyone who offended or inconvenienced them.
Andrea, in some sense, was simply speaking the language of her peers. At the same time, the 
word, in its bluntness and vulgarity, seemed bizarre as a way of making sense of and talking 
about the vastly layered complexity and humanity more commonly ascribed to the construct of 
family.

The term becomes less strange, however, in the realm of the Global Community host 
family discourse, which is, on the one hand, all about paying homage to notions of tradition, 
sentimental bonds, and human connection but, at the same time, all about rationalizing human 
relations between volunteers and the families that take them in so that the volunteer understands 
that he is getting something *out of* living with a host family and that the host family’s performance 
of inclusion, care, and concern is something that serves him in some calculable way. In this 
discourse, the judgment that a family “sucks” is dehumanizing but is also a crassly worded 
reflection of a dehumanization of the host family that has already gotten under way through the 
rationalizing host family discourse. Notably, Andrea was not the only one who used this particular 
term to describe a host family. As Shannon, a volunteer who had changed host families twice told 
me about her first host family (with whom she had spent two days), “I swear to God, I’m not that 
picky! I swear…That family *sucked*, though.”

In the end, Andrea and Shannon were the only ones to use this term. Still, while some 
volunteers chose words that were less irreverent in talking about their host families (at least in 
their individual conversations with me), the majority tended to engage in the same exercise -- 
forming rationalist assessments under which host families and host family “situations” were 
rendered either good or bad, fantastic or terrible, or sometimes just “okay,” but always judged as 
objects and in terms of how they did or did not satisfy the volunteer’s expectations, desires, 
personal tastes, and calculated goals (i.e. learning Spanish, etc.).

In my conversations with volunteers, this sort of critical consumer voice emerged so 
repeatedly that I came to understand it as a key component of a subjectivity that developed
among the volunteers as they went through the year. Initially, thinking that it was perhaps a function of the actual interviews I conducted with them (which naturally privileged their perspectives, opinions, and impressions), I carefully observed their conversations and group activities led by the staff only to find the same sort of critical, discerning voice at play in their interactions. Again and again it appeared as a shared way of relating to their host families as virtual commodities, a function not of interviews with me but of what I had come to regard as the program’s host family discourse, which subjectifies the volunteer as a discerning critic who experiences, forms opinions and impressions, and continually reports.

In addition to this tendency to cast such judgments, I noticed that, among the volunteers, there was also a set of common standards by which they often judged their host families. This standard warrants some description not only because it provide greater insight into the particular shared preferences and agendas of the volunteers vis-à-vis their host families, but also because it highlights some of the ways in which the standard was in some sense derivative (and thus a possible effect) of the host family discourse that had been most powerfully at play in the textual materials they had received in the months leading up to their departure for Ecuador and in some of the sessions they attended during the month long Orientation. For example, in reviewing her host family, Andrea painted a glowing portrait of a host mother that closely mirrored the depiction of Ecuadorian host families presented during Orientation. From the beginning, Andrea told me, her host mother, María Belén had embraced her, always engaging her in conversation, taking her along on family outings to the family farm where they picked avocados together, and giving her occasional cooking lessons in the comida típica of Ecuador. On the day we talked, Andrea proudly shared that María Belén had just taught her how to make empanadas and that just that weekend, she had made a huge batch of humitas to be shared with the extended family. In addition to including her, Andrea told me, María Belén continually looked after her, insisting that she eat, concerning herself with Andrea’s comings and goings, and advising Andrea against going out alone.
Other volunteers both echoed Andrea’s evaluative voice and focused their comments in similar ways, using the same criterion of how much the host mother cared for and even doted on them. Rachel told me:

They’re just really nice. They were good. I totally recommended them to Global Community again. Definitely. They were really caring and one day, the first time I got sick here actually, I was like throwing up and everything. It was awful; sweating and she [host mother] came up [to my room] like three different times to give me soup, to give me oregano tea and whatever I needed.

As Rachel mentioned how she had “totally recommended” her host family to Global Community, I realized that she was referencing the evaluations that her cohort had recently been required to fill out in reference to their yearlong host families. Rachel’s comments thus revealed how the Global Community program empowered and entitled the volunteer to sit as a sort of consumerist judge and jury in relation to their host families (able to choose between recommending and not recommending them to the program and in this way assume a role that is potentially consequential as to whether a family will continue on as a Global Community host family). It also illustrated how casually some volunteers were able to adopt this kind of stance towards their host families. Finally, her comments also exemplified the common tendency among volunteers to judge their host families in ways that engaged directly with the mythical Ecuadorian host family that had been presented to them in the pre-departure Manual and in the sessions they had attended as part of Orientation.

Indeed, Rachel’s assessment of her host family as “good” was clearly based on certain acts the host mother had performed that were not only apparently appreciated by her when she was under the weather, but also direct manifestations of the mythical Ecuadorian host family that welcomes the volunteer into its home, prioritizes his welfare, demonstrates concern for him, and performs acts of caretaking. In the host family discourse of Global Community and the international volunteering industry, more broadly, this kind of dynamic is depicted as the natural and overwhelmingly common course of events when it comes to the ways in which “Third World” families (not to mention whole communities and societies) receive the Northern volunteer. Notably, such an image conceivably underwrites the broader construct of planetary
consciousness identified by Heron (2007) by discursively entitling the Northern subject to enter and access the most intimate, domestic spaces of the developing world. Indeed, how can the Northern subject not be entitled to a global mobility if the peoples of the developing world are purportedly receiving her with open arms?

However, what Rachel’s comment illustrates is that, in addition to reifying this entitlement to international mobility, such an image – and more importantly, its heavy promotion and circulation as a key feature of the Third World host family package deal – also gives rise to a sort of benchmarking process by which families of the developing world become subject to consumerist reviews and evaluations, and by which the volunteer subject, guided by a market-oriented international volunteer apparatus, is produced as a critical evaluator of families in the developing world. This was also illustrated in Erin’s comments about her host family:

Fantastic. They are. I don’t know what I’d do without them…they feed me and they love me and they’re everything I could ever ask for and I think if I was in a bad situation with a host family I would have gone home a while ago, I just wouldn’t be able to handle it. But they are fantastic, I got there in October and about November they were already saying how sad they’ll be when I leave and it’s like okay. So they’re the best and I’m really grateful for them.

While Erin’s expression of gratitude for her host family somewhat complicates the more rationalistic aspects of her narrative, her emphasis on the host family’s apparent service of her needs and its members’ declared affinity for her is important to note as it points to the sort of affective performance upon which her gratitude is based; it is a performance that entails a sort of automatic and instantaneous act of care, as well as an outpouring of sentimentality that she cites as being critical to her emotional wellbeing.

In addition, to a host family’s perceived level of care, concern, and devotion demonstrated towards the volunteer, there were other criteria that seemed to emerge in the volunteers’ narratives. More specifically, as I talked with volunteers across the 11 different cities and towns where they had been placed, it turned out that a certain level of care, concern, and devotion demonstrated by the host family vis-à-vis the volunteer existed only as a baseline standard that determined a host family’s “goodness.” For the host family to be truly “good,” this
degree of solicitousness had to be tempered with respect for the volunteer’s sense of personal space and independence. In this way, many were indexing the cautionary tales of the Manual and of Orientation, suggesting that they had entered the homestay arrangement dreading the mythical suffocating Ecuadorian host family that had been depicted.

What began to take shape then was an evaluative process in which the volunteers held their respective host families against the image that had been portrayed and against their own personal desires and preferences, and from there proceeded to assess their host family according to how it either lived up to characteristics they found pleasing or how it did not exhibit characteristics they had dreaded as bothersome. Through this process an ideal host family began to take shape, one that did certain things but did not do others. Overall, they also judged their host families and living arrangements according to common criteria that centered on their desires for Spanish practice, a certain degree of privacy, a certain degree of independence, a certain degree of inclusion, and a certain degree of availability. In their minds, the ideal host family, it seemed, struck an equally ideal balance: including the volunteer with invitations to family events and social activities but never pressuring her if she did not feel like participating; giving her some privacy but being always on hand to provide conversation if and when the volunteer wanted; cooking wonderful lunches on a regular basis but not getting upset if the volunteer did not make it home everyday to eat. Underscoring the consumerist tone in the ways they related to their host families, this ideal host family seemed to resemble a sort of “at-your-service” family, one in which the volunteer could pick and choose when he wanted to interact with host family members or drop in on their parties, without any pressure or repercussions attached. Essentially, many wanted the comfort of familial inclusion, but without the obligation or pressure to participate if they did not feel like it at a given moment, allowing them to be a sort of intimate tourist of the family, a surrogate member who experienced all of the support but none of the familial obligation to participate in family activities when she or he did not want to. This was illustrated in Matt’s comments:

My family is amazing. They’re super nice and they welcome me and ask me to do a lot of things but they also give me my space when I need it and want it. They don’t expect me to come with them all the time and so I got a really good host family.
The presence of both an evaluative/reviewing voice and an engagement with the aforementioned criteria was even stronger in a conversation I had with Josh, who prefaced his comments about his host family with a boastful declaration: “I know that a lot of people feel this way,” he said, “but I’m pretty passionate that I got the best situation out of all of the volunteers this year.” He went on to describe why he felt this way:

I’ve never felt like I’ve needed to do anything or I’ve never really felt uncomfortable in the house or in certain situations where I think other host families could possibly make them. She [my host mother] is just a very, like, sweet, like, wise person. Never pressures me to, like, stay up and maybe watch TV with her, or, like, wake up in the morning or even eat lunch with them in the afternoon if I had something else to do. But every time that I feel, like, I need to be a part of the family, she’s open-arms.

Notably, in a sort of ultimate expression of a consumerist subjectivity, some volunteers explained that their host families were "good" not only because they did not pressure them, but also because they were ready and willing to do that if that was what the volunteer desired. Casey told me one afternoon:

My host family’s been great. They’re, like, not, like, overbearing, y’know, like, wanting me to do things with them all the time. I think they would be if I acted like that’s what I wanted, but I guess from the get-go, I’ve kinda been, like, a little distant just because, like, I do like to have my space and my privacy and that sort of thing. So, they’re great, they, like, never ask me any questions, like, they treat me like a queen in terms of, like, feeding me and washing my clothes (laughing slightly). So, I have, in that regard, I guess, like, the perfect family for me.

In addition to further illustrating the ways in which volunteers desired a host family that would structure its treatment of them around their particular preferences, Casey’s comments are striking in that she invokes (seemingly unwittingly) a foundational construct of colonial discourse in which peoples of Spanish America, Africa and Asia were literally declared the distant subjects of Western royalty and made to pay tribute, to defer, and to serve. Clearly, the US-Latin America imperial relation has not involved the construction of a monarchical figure as a supreme ruler over imperial subjects. However, the fact that Casey, as a US-American living in Latin America, would position herself as “queen” to describe the way that her Ecuadorian host family treated her is nonetheless striking in its palimpsestic evocation of the relations of domination embedded in European colonialism.
9.5 Unhappy Customers: Reporting on, Leaving, and (Ex)Changing Host Families

On a Wednesday evening, I leaned against the white formica kitchen counter of Amanda’s apartment. I had arrived approximately 20 minutes earlier to her building, a luxury semi-highrise that appeared to have been recently built. With a commanding view of the Mariscal, Amanda’s apartment was sleek and modern, furnished with several plush couches and a large flat-screen television hanging on the living room wall. The large dining room opened into a brand-new kitchen with a large refrigerator, a microwave, and plenty of cabinets. Amanda, dressed in black leggings and an oversized off-the-shoulder white t-shirt, stood at the counter chopping onions. A large empty silver pot sat on the stove and two saran-wrapped packages of pink ground beef sat behind the cutting board. Amanda had asked that we talk in the kitchen and if she could continue cooking, informing me that she was preparing a dinner of spaghetti and meatballs and she wanted to finish up before leaving for the airport to pick up her mother, who was flying in that evening for a visit. Amanda, who had graduated from college the previous spring with a major in business, was from a wealthy town in Connecticut. Before coming to Ecuador she had done very little international traveling. Early on, she had become a somewhat controversial figure among the other volunteers, some of whom who resented her penchant for heavy partying, her occasional boastings about her designer clothes, and, her personality, which some interpreted as snobby and superficial. In the eyes of some of her peers, Amanda’s priorities were misguided as she was clearly, in their opinion, not “doing this” for the “cultural experience.” In conversations with me several people had quietly criticized her decision to move out of her homestay and head directly for a luxury apartment building in the heart of the city’s tourist-nightlife district.

Over the course of the year, I had not had the opportunity to speak that much with Amanda and I was now curious about her decision to move out. As she reflected on her first few months in Ecuador, she soon brought the issue up herself. Taking a pause from slicing through the onions, she looked up for a moment and said to me flatly, “My host family situation was terrible.” What happened? I asked. Reaching into an overhead cabinet she pulled down a large green can labeled *pure de tomate* and began to explain, her voice ringing with acerbic irritation.
“It was like a new host family, and it was only the host mom, and I think she lied and pretended like her kids still lived with her. They actually lived in Miami, so she spoke fluent English to me, and she had four other gringas living there. So, it was like a hostel, and so I didn’t learn any Spanish there.”

Pausing for a moment, she poured the contents of the can into the pot that sat on the stove. As the tomatoes splashed and settled against the bottom of the pot, she set the can down on the counter, and reached for a match from a small cardboard box. Plucking one out, she struck it and held it under the pot while twisting the burner knob with her other hand. Tendrils of blue flame darted out from underneath. She continued to list the problems that had characterized her homestay situation. “She used to ask me to lie for her.” About what? I asked. “That she had other gringas living there – because she wanted to have another girl move in from another college program, which they make sure that nobody else is living there. She’s like, ‘Can you pretend like you’re my niece?’ I was like, ‘Alright, I’ve got to get out of here. I don’t feel comfortable doing this. I was like, ‘I don’t want to get kicked out of the country.’”

As Amanda continued, she assured me that this had not been what she had expected or wanted in her homestay. When I asked her what she had been expecting, she replied, “I was expecting little kids, like family dinners, and really learning a bulk of my Spanish there, which I didn’t.” I asked her how she had handled moving out. Placing a clove of garlic under the flat side of the blade of her knife, she pressed down firmly. “Oh, I just told her. She went back to Miami.” Did April and Tim know that she had moved out? I asked. Nodding her head, she told me, almost as though to reassure me, “Oh yeah, they know everything. They’re never going to use her again.” And with that, she began the final steps of the recipe, mixing bits of chopped onion and garlic into the raw ground beef. As she rolled chunks of the mixture into meatballs, she asked for my opinion as to whether they would cook all way through or not. We talked for about an hour longer, until the meatballs were all rolled and carefully placed into the sauce and Amanda politely announced that she needed to get ready, as her mom would be arriving within the hour.
This conversation with Amanda illustrates the ways in which volunteers often mentally held host families to particular expectations with respect to how their behavior, the environment in the household, and the service and satisfaction of particular desires and goals. Her story also illustrated a common response among volunteers when their expectations grated up against the realities they encountered. Like Amanda, many volunteers ended up in a state of dissatisfaction (and disgruntlement, even) upon realizing that their anticipated host family experience was not materializing. Many times, their displeasure and frustration evoked the tone and tenor of unhappy customers who had purchased a service that had then failed to deliver. In this case, Amanda had clearly expected more than food and lodging that the woman she referred to as “the host mom” provided. Specifically, she had wanted Spanish practice and had expectantly envisioned “family dinners” and “little kids.” She had apparently constructed, in her mind, a sort of mythical image of the “host family situation,” replete with shared meals, the presence of children underfoot, and the sound of Spanish. Instead, she encountered a different reality whose elements have undoubtedly become more common in Ecuador over the last 20 years: an Ecuadorian woman who spoke English, who had family members in the United States, and who lived a bi-national existence between Ecuador and the United States.

As this dissertation seeks to foreground the understudied role of the international volunteer program in volunteer subject formation, it is worth noting that Amanda and her peers did not form these expectations or desires in a vacuum, but under the sway of what I have conceived as a host family discourse that prevails in the international volunteering industry and was clearly riffed upon by Global Community Ecuador. Importantly, the way in which Amanda’s “host mom” had approached the living situation had unceremoniously destabilized the discursive image of the Third World host family. Equally significant is the fact that Amanda had remained committed to the legitimacy of this image, even as she had been confronted with its destabilization. Moreover, her sense of entitlement to experiencing and consuming this image had remained intact; months after having moved out, she was still firmly committed to the idea
that her host family situation had been “terrible” because it had deviated from what she had envisioned (and been led to expect) when she signed on to be a Global Community volunteer.

Such themes were also powerfully illustrated over the course of several days in Loja, when I became privy to Shannon’s story about exiting the household of her assigned host family. This was a case in which I was first informed about the situation not by Shannon, herself, but by a relative of the host family she had decided to leave. My familiarization with its details began on the day I returned to the home of the host family with whom I had lived during my own volunteer stint – Raquel, Tomás, and their teenage daughters Cristina, Liliana, and Amelia. Upon hearing through the Global Community grapevine that I was in Quito and would be coming to Loja, Raquel had invited me to stay with them again (along with Peggy, a 71-year-old volunteer who would also be staying with Raquel and her family) and I had gratefully accepted. I arrived at their door at 9 o’clock in the morning, dragging from a 4:30 AM wakeup, a 40-minute 6 AM flight from Quito and a 90-minute drive from the local airport. Dressed in grey velour sweatpants, a light pink cotton tee-shirt, and pastel blue wedge flip-flops, Raquel had appeared at the door and I had inferred that after getting her daughters off to school at 6 AM, she had kindly stayed up or rewoken up to welcome me in. Upon seeing each other we had promptly erupted into a sleepy flurry of embraces, smiles, and exclamations, and Raquel had warmly directed me to the room I had been given, gently telling me, “Decansa no más, Catí [Rest, Catí]. In the meantime, I was admittedly struck by how the scene in some ways partook of the very same elements of the discursive host family/volunteer discursive that I was trying to critically suss out.

Two hours later, Raquel and I sat at the kitchen table, sipping horchata from white porcelain cups, a pot of chicken broth simmering on the gas stove. Raquel was filling me in on the latest chisme about the volunteers and it felt like old times, when we had talked and talked at this same table, swapping tidbits and speculating on the multiple goings-on, melodramas, and momentarily titillating predicaments of los chicos de Global Community, both those who had lived

45 From living in her home before, I knew Raquel’s normal routine was to catch a few more hours of sleep before continuing with her day.
in Loja at the same time that I had and those who had come before me and whom Raquel had encountered, known or known of – and, sometimes, those who had never even lived in Loja or crossed either of our paths, but whose stories had somehow found their way to either Raquel or myself. Now, back at the table together, we had wasted no time in resurrecting our old daily ritual. Raquel had begun immediately with what had happened between Shannon and Mari. Shannon was a Global Community volunteer in the cohort I was following, and Mari was Raquel’s cuñada (sister-in-law) who lived with her two adolescent sons a few blocks away in a large house. In the year that I had lived with Raquel and her family, Mari, who had hosted Global Community volunteers in the past, had not done so. But this year, Raquel told me, Mari had been hosting Shannon, something which I had also heard through the volunteer grapevine. As it turned out, however, Raquel informed me, Shannon had recently moved out of Mari’s house. As we sipped our horchata and the soup bubbled on the stove, she told me the story.

Apparently, the situation had started when Shannon had fallen ill. "No salía de su cuarto" [She didn’t come out of her room46].” Raquel began. “Solo dormía, dormía, dormía. Estaba bien mal y nadie sabía lo que tenía. [She just slept and slept and slept. She was really unwell and nobody knew what she had].

“¿Oh, sí? [Oh, really?]” I asked.

“Ah-ah [Uh-huh],” she continued, “No tenía nada de energía, no quería hacer nada, pues por fin se fue al médico y resulta que tenía…mono? [She didn’t have any energy, she didn’t want to do anything, so finally she went to the doctor and it turns out she had…mono?]” A grin spread across Raquel’s face and we briefly dissolved into light giggles, tickled by the sudden and unlikely appearance of a primate in our conversation. Raquel continued. “Sí, mono. Entonces como Mari se preocupó por la salud de sus hijos [Yes, mono. And then since Mari worried for the health of her children],” she said, lifting her eyebrows, “separó sus cubiertos de los de Shannon/ [She separated their silverware from Shannon’s].” I waited for the looming apex. “Bueno/Well,” she

46 This translation, as well as all others that appear in this dissertation, are mine.
said, pausing for a moment, “Shannon se resintió con ella [Shannon resented it],” she said, adding even more emphasis to the already accented last syllable. “Se puso brava, se ofendió bastante. Entonces, se fue de la casa para ir a vivir con otra familia [She got angry, she got really offended. So, she left the house to go live with another family].”

“Guauuu [Wow],” I said, taking in what Raquel had told me, and placing myself alternately in the proverbial shoes of both Mari and Shannon. “Pero, porque se resintió con Mari? [But why did she resent it?], I asked. Inwardly, I imagined that being relegated to separate silverware might bruise one’s feelings, particularly in a household one has just newly come to inhabit. At the same time, I could also imagine being concerned for one’s children in the face of an ill boarder/houseguest one has just met. Treading lightly, I tried to stay neutral, but admittedly sided outwardly a bit more with Mari, with whom I knew Raquel was close. “Bueno/ [Well],” I said, “me imagino que le hizo sentir un poco aparte tener los cubiertos separados, pero al final tenía que entender el punto de vista de Mari como madre [Well, I imagine that it made her feel a little excluded to have the silverware separated, but in the end she had to understand Mari’s point of view as a mother].”

Shaking her head, Raquel replied, “No sé, no sé. Pero, yo sí le entiendo a Mari. Quería protegerles a sus hijos para que no se enfermaran, pero bueno, parece que le ofendió a Shannon, la pobre. Entonces se fue [I don’t know, I don’t know. But I do understand how Mari feels. She wanted to protect her children so that they didn’t get sick, but well, it seems it offended Shannon, the poor thing.” We continued to chew over the tidbit for a few more moments, before moving onto the next topic.

Approximately two weeks later, I walked with Shannon along the crowded mid-day streets of Loja. “I basically want to match my roots to the color of my ends,” she said, holding up the ends of her hair to her scalp. “But I want it done as highlights.” I had run into Shannon two days prior, when I had been out to lunch with Peggy. “Caitlin’s writing a book,” Peggy had announced. “So, she wants to sit down and interview everyone.” Shannon had nodded, offered a cheerful “Sure,” and then asked me if I knew of a place where she could get her hair colored. I
had suggested that we make a trip to a local hair salon, owned by Natalia Reyes, a woman who had been a host mother to a volunteer in my own cohort. Now, as we weaved through the busy streets on our way to see Natalia, Shannon casually said, “We can do the interview today, too.” We made plans to go for lunch after her consultation with Natalia, settling on a local establishment about two blocks from the salon and on a corner where Shannon could catch the bus to the university, where she had to teach that afternoon.

About an hour later, we listened as the waiter explained the menu of the day. *Sopa de lentejas*, followed by a choice between *seco de pollo* or *guatita*. “*El seco de pollo, por favor,*” Shannon ordered. “I never understand what food I am getting,” she confided as the waiter left us. “I just go with *pollo*.” Two bowls of soup soon arrived and we began to eat, conversing about a range of different things that spanned from finding Spanish classes in Loja to tales of dating and relationships in the United States to Shannon’s anxieties about coloring her hair in Ecuador. By the time we finished eating and the waiter had cleared the plates, it seemed that the ice had been broken, and we began the official “interview.” As the lunch crowd emptied out and things quieted down, the conversation turned to Shannon’s homestay arrangement. “I stayed with one family for the bulk of the time, like two months,” she explained, referring to Mari, Raquel’s sister-in-law. I listened expectantly, waiting for her to recount how she had fallen sick, how Mari had separated the silverware, and how she had taken offense, just as Raquel had told me. However, the account she told would be significantly different than the one I had expected to hear.

“Right off the bat,” she continued, “I sort of got a weird, like it wasn’t uncomfortable, it was just not as um, welcoming and friendly as I wanted it to be. Like, um, she [Mari] didn’t pick me up from the train station or like—er, the bus station—or really like help me out and, she just like told me to take a cab even though she has a *car* and she lives like so close. I just thought, I mean, she doesn’t have to, but it would have been nice, and then like when I got into the house, the host brother was like *really* annoyed that he had to help me like bring my bags up, ‘cause he was so tired, and I was like, ‘I’m sorry, so am I.’”
As Shannon went on, she continued to list Mari’s failures on that first day. “And, then I had like tea with Mari, the mom, right when I got there and she like, told me the rules. She didn’t like, ask me where I was from or like how my trip had been, because I had traveled a little bit and I had contacted her and told her that I wasn’t going to be in Loja for like a week because I was traveling, like, she didn’t ask me any of that, or like, really anything about myself.” According to Shannon, instead of asking her about herself, Mari had begun “laying down the law,” asking her to help keep the house clean and to make sure that her feet were dry when she got out of the shower. Already disappointed with the reception of her arrival, for Shannon, the final insult then came in the moments following the tour of the house that Mari gave her. Once the tour was over, Shannon assumed that they would keep talking and had continued to follow Mari around, at which point Mari had promptly informed her that her room was downstairs. Shannon was disappointed. She recalled, “Like it, I just felt like, I mean, it just felt like really not friendly off the bat, I guess.”

After Shannon described the day of her arrival, she continued on, recalling the first week she spent in Mari’s house, telling me that she had spent much of the time home alone and pointing out that she often “had to” prepare her own meals. “I always had to prepare my own breakfast and just sort of like find things. Sometimes Mari would make food and like heat it up and sometimes she would just have bins of rice and like, and then I would have to sort of like make do. Like, she’d show me where like tuna cans were, and like I was just supposed to like mix it up if she didn’t have time to come home. And so, for like, the bulk of the day she was gone and the brothers were at school, and so I was like, alone, and then I would have lunch alone. Then the brothers would come home and eat at like 2:30 or so, and then they would usually go with their dad to like the gym, and then I worked at 4.”

By the end of the first week, Shannon told me, she called the field directors to report on her host family, charging that the “family was gone every day” and that she did not think that this was going to change. According to Shannon, April and Tim promised to find her a new host family, but encouraged her “stick it out” in the meantime and suggested that she was perhaps
experiencing “culture shock” that would soon pass, a comment which irritated Shannon, who felt that she was justified in her assessment of the situation and insulted by the insinuation that her unhappiness with the living arrangement had somehow to do with her own difficulties in adjusting to the new environment. Recalling to me what she had told the field director when she called to request a new host family, she said emphatically, “I’m 23, I’ve like traveled before, I’ve like lived with a host family before. Like, this is not right.”

However, with no alternative, Shannon stayed in the house, and as the weeks passed, the situation turned into what sounded like a sort of one-sided stalemate. “I got to the point where I just felt like I was gonna be on my own anyway, so like even when they were around, it was like too much time had passed where it just seemed like uncomfortable, I guess. And they didn’t really make much of an effort, and I didn’t feel like comfortable enough with my Spanish to like be annoying... And like, like I sort of feel like it’s their responsibility to like include me a little in the beginning and then I’ll take, I’ll go from there, like I wanna be part of the family, and I wanna like, I’ll participate if you like include me, but I’m not gonna be like, ‘Can I come to the mall with you?’ I’m not gonna ask. So, um, I don’t know. It was just like very isolating.” Pausing for a moment, she then added, “And then I got mono and I was so sick. And they didn’t really like do anything about it or like, I don’t know, they weren’t sympathetic or anything like that, and I just was like, um, I think I was resenting them a little bit.”

Shannon had finally mentioned her illness, the detail that had formed the pinnacle of Raquel’s story. Yet unlike Raquel’s story, the silverware separation never came up. Not wanting to let on that I had already heard one version of the story, I said nothing about it and simply listened to her impression of how things had gone wrong. By this point in the conversation I was struck by the ways in which she described the homestay as a sort of service that had failed to deliver. Shannon had picked apart the experience, starting with the day she arrived by bus, ticking off the things that, in her eyes, Mari and her sons had not done or not done right. It was in essence a negative review of a family.
As I talked to volunteers across the country, many told similar stories, often in the same register that pervaded Shannon’s story – one that was evaluative, discerning, critical, and above all, focused on how the conditions of their living situations and the attributes and behaviors of host families, themselves, did or did not enable them to have a particular experience they had envisioned and expected to have. Moreover, as it turned out, leaving host families was not an uncommon occurrence. By the time I spoke with Brooke she was living with her third host family.

During Orientation, the volunteers had visited their sites and host families for a few days, and it was during this time that Brooke decided she could not live with the family she had initially been placed with. “During my site visit, actually, I um stayed with the family I was initially supposed to be with, and, y’know, it was really awkward, and really weird, and so I just—their house wasn’t clean, it was just, they were really strange.”

Upon returning to Quito, Brooke went directly to the field directors, Tim and April. During their impromptu meeting, she told me, she became emotional to the point of tears as she explained that she did not want to stay in the household to which she had been assigned. According to Brooke, Tim and April had then called upon a single woman named Mónica, who lived to the south of Cuenca’s central area. They negotiated an arrangement with Mónica that did not include meals because, according to Brooke, Mónica shared with them that she “didn’t cook much.” After Orientation, Brooke returned to Cuenca and moved into Mónica’s home, but after a few weeks she decided that this household was not the right fit either. She dreaded the morning commute that began with a 5 AM wake up and an hour-long bus ride. As she recalled, because of the long trip she would stay in the city to eat lunch and then wait around until the 6 o’clock evening class she had to teach. After teaching two hour-long classes she would arrive back home by 9:30, exhausted. Brooke soon called April and Tim and informed that she needed to move again. She explained to me:

You know, she [Mónica] was really cool, but I saw her maybe once every two weeks, so like I was getting no cultural nourishment, I was getting no Spanish practice, I was getting no food, I wasn’t sleeping, so it was like, there’s really no point to this, like, I might as well live in town, and like, be closer, and not have to have such a, like a strained lifestyle… I was just like, you know, she’s [Mónica’s] awesome, but like I’m getting nothing out of this
Brooke’s account underscores the ways in which volunteers generally expected to get certain things out of host family situations, things that went beyond the basic necessities of sleep and food, (which she also mentions as things she was not getting enough of). Just as Shannon had done, Brooke evaluated the host family situation according to whether it had come with these desired attributes. In this way, the household was again positioned as a specific consumer item, expected to include certain aspects. Like Shannon, Brooke effectively decided to continue shopping – and not only because of her physical exhaustion and felt need for a more regular diet, but also because of her professed desire for particular services that she expected the host family situation to deliver – “cultural nourishment” and “Spanish practice.” In this way, not only does the household of the developing country become a sort of commodity, but so does the culture and language.

9.6 Openings and Closures: When Host Families Reject the Volunteer…And Global Community Responds

On a chilly afternoon in Quito, I sat down for coffee with Nicholas. As we sat on the rooftop terrace of a popular restaurant in the Mariscal, electronica music pumping away and the warmth of towering heating lamps floating down from overhead, Nicholas described living with a family that was now his second host family, a single woman, Marielena, and her 30-year-old son, Carlos, along with two dogs, two cats, and a few songbirds.

They’re really nice. I’m their 15th volunteer I think. They’re like a staple of this organization. It’s nice because my host mom has pictures of past volunteers in one part of the house and she talks about them from time to time. When Tim and April came over to have lunch, like a week before Tim left, she spoke for like a half hour about how each volunteer has been different and she’s learned different things from every volunteer. So it’s nice. Even though I know that they do in some ways need the money that I give them, they’re not only doing it for the money. They’re really not. It’s not even that much. It’s 200 a month.

With these last few statements – “They’re not only doing it for the money. They’re really not.” – Nicholas quietly communicated a working conception of the good host family, one that was not motivated solely or even primarily by the money that volunteers paid them every month (in
exchange for room and board and a certain degree of human interaction and concern for the volunteer’s wellbeing) but by something else, the imagined pleasure, perhaps of hosting and getting to know a foreigner from the United States. In Nicholas’s words was the quiet articulation of a certain schema that formed part of the host family discourse, the good host family who hosts volunteers purely for the imagined pleasure of getting to know them and having them in their household, and the bad host family that do it primarily “for the money” and care little, if any, about the non-economic aspects – such as, forming affective bonds with volunteers and perhaps, as in the case of Marielena’s claims, learning from the volunteers. This sort of schema was one that I heard surface repeatedly in my conversations with volunteers.

Returning now to Nicholas, after describing his current family as ideal he then held them up in comparison to his first host family, the Ramos-Mejías, pointedly saying,

Whereas the first host family I had for like a month, they were really nice and the food was amazing. It was a bigger house and everything like that. Everything was great until during the last week of September when April called from the office like, “So, your host mom wants you to pay more than double. Unless you can do that you have to find a new host family.” Even though they had signed a contract—I don’t know. I mean not to like whatever, but the host mom apparently went with a friend of hers into the Global Community office and confronted April and was like, “200 is not enough. I need 600 a month”. And April was like, “We can’t do that.”

He went on to describe the last week that he spent in the house, telling me:

So awkward. Oh my god. Because my host mom didn’t know that I knew. And I was with Brooke and Shannon. We were all in the same house. So they were about to leave. It was about five days before they left for their perspective sites. And then this happened so the dynamic just totally changed. It became a tension filled household because we all knew that they basically screwed me over. Like they signed a contract and then totally went back on it. And we all expected, especially I expected, at least the host mom to at least say something. Nothing was said until the day before I left. I knew that I was going to be packing my bags in like a day and I was going to leave and the host mom never said a thing to me. She didn’t even say goodbye to me actually. It was ridiculous. And the host mom, the last thing she said to me, as I had my suitcases at the door going to the cab—which it’s really close to where I live now—and I was getting into a cab and she goes “Me da pena,” like, “It gives me pain.” And then she basically said it was Tim’s fault. I was like okay, see you later. It was really weird.

The whole ordeal had led Nicholas, along with his volunteer housemates (along with the rest of the cohort who heard the story through the grapevine) to evaluate, judge, and assess the host family according to his desires to feel welcome, appreciated, cared for and not viewed as an
economic opportunity by the Ecuadorian host. "They seemed like fantastic and the situation was
good," Shannon, who had lived with Nicholas in the Ramos-Mejía household, told me
independently. She continued:

We all had like our own rooms, I had my own bathroom, like, um, they seemed well off
and like, and when we all went on our site visit, we like felt comfortable to like, we wanted
to come back home, which was like Quito to us. Like, it felt like, very comfortable. But
then at the end they like kicked out the Global Community volunteer who was supposed
to stay in Quito. They told him – well, they never told him, they told Tim, because they're
passive aggressive – that they wanted more money so they were gonna let— there was
like another student from China or something that was studying Spanish and was willing
to like pay a lot more, so they like, told him [Nicholas] he couldn't live there. So, it was
like really fun, but then looking back, it seemed sort of tainted.

Echoing Shannon, Brooke (who also lived with Nicholas and Shannon during Orientation) told
me:

The host family in Quito was amazing, actually. It was kind of like, too good to be true
and then it ended up being too good to be true… they wanted more money from him
[Nicholas], so, like, I mean, so it just got weird at the end because we found out like the
week before we left they were not gonna have him….And, we were like obsessed with
them, so it was kind of sad…And they were pretty wealthy, so it was kind of like, "What
are you talking about?"

In this light, the whole ordeal had ultimately reproduced the hegemony of "western eyes,"
the practice of Northern populations judging Southern populations according to Northern
assumptions, desires and fantasies of how Southern populations should behave, and in this case
behave towards the Northern subject as a sort of service provider. Further, while it was entirely
possible that Nicholas had entered the experience with this sort of schema in place, it seemed
that this was only strengthened as Nicholas had, with Global Community’s assistance, been able
to leave their house and find a replacement host family that could successfully prove to him that
they were “not only doing it for the money.” In the replacement homestay that Global Community
had subsequently provided, he now had evidence that there did exist “good host families” who
met his desires; the “problem” thus remained not his discursively formed expectations, but rather
the bad behavior of the Ramos-Mejía family that had not comported with them.

In light of Nicholas’ story (and several others like it), I suggest that, while broken
expectations symbolically troubled the controlling notion of the host family, the ways in which a
situation of broken expectations was dealt with by Global Community (not to mention the
reporting volunteer subject) in some sense strengthened these very notions around the host family – namely, that there were “good” and “bad” host families; that in the face of a “bad” family there was always an ideal “good” host family out there to be found and experienced; and, perhaps most importantly, that volunteers were in fact entitled to a good host family as part of their experience. This response constituted a sort of fabrication of reality that avoided and altered the kinds of tensions and misunderstandings (which were predictable enough given the inevitable collision of varying personal agendas, expectations, assumptions nurtured by all parties involved in the homestay situation) by acknowledging them briefly but then ameliorating them with a homestay situation chosen because it was expected to be less abrasive. The implicit message here was that, for the paying Global Community volunteer, the reality of living in Ecuador could, to some extent, be manipulated, customized and selected in accordance with his wishes, comfort, and fantasies.

Here, it should perhaps be considered that this manipulation of reality is similar but ultimately distinct from simply removing oneself from an uncomfortable environment, which is something that a vast array of differently positioned subjects might do or at least try to do, regardless of whether they are participants in any sort of organized program. While exiting an unpleasant living situation is one sort of move, relocating from one “host family” setting to another (and sometimes another) “host family” setting in search of Spanish practice, certain prescribed social dynamics (i.e. gregariousness), “cultural nourishment,” or any other discursively constructed and governmentally imparted desires, all while reporting and rating the “experienced” host families to the program, suggests a sort of ordering of reality which is a distinct feature of the sorts of processes that unfold amid a host family discourse that is in constant operation throughout the Global Community Ecuador volunteer stint. This dynamic was also illustrated in Abby’s story.

One afternoon, I sat in a gymnasium with Erin and Melanie, cheering Abby on as she played in an intramural basketball game. Our seats were in a small set of bleachers that were about half filled with the family and friends of the players. The atmosphere was lively and loud,
filled with the cavernous echoes of hoots and hollers and clapping that bounced off the gym’s blue concrete walls. Every time a player made a point, it was met with jubilant cheers. During the slow moments, Melanie asked me which other volunteers I had visited and fished for any gossip I might have and want to share, asking if I had heard about what happened between two volunteers who were rumored to be “hooking up” and about another volunteer who was rumored to have a serious Ecuadorian girlfriend. The game soon ended in victory for Abby’s team, dressed in royal blue and white jersey uniforms. Melanie, Erin, and I got up from our seats and made our way over to Abby, greeting her with an enthusiastic chorus of congratulations. Abby stood panting and smiling, simultaneously ecstatic and exhausted. “Oh my God,” she said, breathing heavily and opening a bottle of water, “I thought I was gonna pass out.” We stood around for a few more minutes, while Abby talked with her teammates and snapped a few group photographs.

Abby lived in the small highland town of Guaranda, where she had initially been placed with a family of four: a woman, her husband, and their two young children. The first few weeks were full of invitations that Abby had happily accepted – basketball games, weekend trips to the countryside, lively card games, and shopping trips to the market with Carmen, the “host mother.” Then, things began to change. The family became, by Abby’s account, “unfriendly, unloving, and just like really distant and cold. My host mom would make weird faces at me when I would tell her things or share things with her. You know, she was -- I hated her. And they just weren’t attentive.”

Trouble often brewed around food. Abby had been a vegetarian for 5 years before coming to Ecuador, and when she informed Carmen that she did not eat red meat or pork, this, she felt, had caused tension and precipitated bad feelings towards her. She told me:

I feel like one of things that I am suspecting that put tension between us and made them not like me is that I didn’t want to eat red meat and pork at the time when I was living there, and I had been a vegetarian in the States for five years. And I honestly think it like pissed them off and that they -- that was one of the things of like, ‘Who’s this girl?’...And, not being able to finish my plate at first when I moved in, which I tried so hard because I knew they wanted me to. But I think it would make them mad that I wouldn’t, you know?

Soon, she recalled, the family stopped calling her to the table for lunch, the most important meal of the day.
Finally, there was the issue of watching television. "And, that I didn't watch TV, Abby told me. "I would watch TV with them, but I expressed that – because I was trying to share cultural differences – like, 'In the U.S., I don’t watch TV, but here, I am! Woo-hoo!' You know what I mean?" After several weeks, Abby claimed, the family had stopped inviting her to do anything, to come to the table, to watch television, or anything else.

For, Abby the effect was devastating. As she told it, she felt a sense of total rejection from people that she had been expecting to “love” her upon meeting her. As the weeks went by, she began to dread going home at the end of the day to a house which, in her words, she actually began to “fear” for the loneliness and sadness that it made her feel. She made mental lists of all the things the host family had “done wrong,” the “bad things” they had done, and the ways in which they had been “mean” to her. Reflecting on her feelings, she surmised that she was taking things so hard largely because she had never anticipated living with a host family that did not “accept” and “love” her. This, as she told it, had never occurred to her. Ultimately, Abby ended up confiding in one of the field directors, who responded by reassuring her that she “deserved an amazing family” with whom she would feel “comfortable and happy.”

Once Abby made the decision that she wanted to leave the first host family, the field director arranged for her to move in with the Calderones, a family of four with an extended family of cousins and grandparents that lived nearby. For Abby, the change was bittersweet because, upon meeting them, she concluded that while they were in fact much friendlier than her current host family, they were also, in her words, “Westernized” or, at the very least, again in her words, “not typically Ecuadorian,” and this latter detail did not fit into the vision of Ecuadorian host family that Abby had come to the country anticipating and desiring. "First of all, they have money" she said to me one afternoon, as she explained why she had viewed them as “Westernized” or “not typically Ecuadorian. (In this way her comments underscored how, like those of many of her peers, Abby’s expectations of Ecuadorian typicality were suffused with controlling notions of material poverty (discussed in Chapter 6)). For Abby, the Calderones' possession of wealth was evidenced by the large house in which they lived, the neighborhood where it was located, and the
maid they employed. In addition to material wealth, Abby also based her assessment of atypicality on what she described as an air of “open”-ness. “Like, they’re more open,” she told me, “I think it’s because they’ve been more exposed to the international world through traveling and through friends and family who have lived abroad and who have come back and have told them about their experiences.”

For Abby, her impression of the Calderones as “not typically Ecuadorian” was cause for some ambivalence about what she would do:

I think I hesitated moving in with this new family because I didn’t want to isolate myself from a typical experience because I came here kind of for typical-ness and to learn, but at that point, I was so hurt by my other family and so uncomfortable living there, my first priority was a loving family where I would feel comfortable. And, I feel that way with them and that’s like really important when you’re in a foreign country and that’s awesome. And unfortunately, it wasn’t exactly the experience I was looking for, but what’s important is that I feel comfortable there.

Within weeks of moving in with the Calderón family Abby was gushing to her peers about her new host family. In her words, the family was “incredible” and “the best.” She loved them, she said, and they loved her, and further, she could not bear the thought of the day when she would have to leave them. She told stories about the time she spent with them, including an anecdote about one particular evening when she had attended a quinceañera where she had been introduced to Carmita, an elderly great aunt, who at the age of eighty-nine never missed a family gathering. As Abby told it, Carmita had greeted her cheerily and invited her to sit next to her on the small couch where she was stationed. The two of them sat there for much of the evening, Carmita’s delicate arm laced through the crook of Abby’s bent elbow. Carmita talked at length to Abby, quietly describing the different cities in Ecuador where she had lived, how Ecuador had changed in the past thirty years, and how much joy it gave her to see her family having such a good time together. In the meantime, other family members dropped by periodically, each time giving Carmita a peck on the cheek or a warm embrace and checking on Abby, seeing if she was hungry, bringing her drinks, and inviting her to get up and dance with them, which she did happily several times, with cousins and aunts and uncles, and, for one song, with her little “host brother” who had just turned eight. For Abby, it was an unforgettable experience, one that flooded her with
feelings of joy, contentment, and love for the grandmother and the rest of the family, whom she had only just meet several weeks ago. As she shared with a few of her friends, "When I was considering switching host families, I knew there was a better host family out there, but I didn’t think that I would actually get it – and not only better, but my host family has ended up being the absolute best host family that there could be!"\(^{47}\)

There are several striking themes about Abby’s story. One of the most central is the expectation that she had cultivated surrounding the homestay and more specifically, the way the host family would feel and behave towards her. As she put it, she had never expected to not be loved and accepted by her host family. Outside of the international volunteer industry, such an expectation about a group of people one has never met and with whom one has no pre-existing bond might sound patently bizarre. However, within the host family discourse that circulates within this industry it is not all that strange and even perfectly sensible. In fact, an instantaneously and unconditionally loving and embracing family is, in part, precisely what the international volunteer industry is selling, and it is through the sorts of evocative textual descriptions and photographs discussed above that it endeavors to convince prospective volunteers to cultivate such fantastical expectations. Abby was not alone in cultivating such expectations, as many volunteers often assumed that particular sorts of relational dynamics with a host family would simply fall into place. This was suggested by the fact that, when discussing their homestays, many often spoke about how the host family did not turn out to be. Similarly, after a month of Orientation, this failure upon the part of host families to adopt an overbearing, clingy, unconditionally worried and loving stance was what was remarkable to Abby, and at the heart of her heartbreak was a most extreme and unceremonious disruption of these assumptions.

Another theme of Abby’s story is how, as with Nicholas’s story, such an intense disruption of carefully cultivated expectations had raised the possibility of a momentary opening in the host family discourse. Here, the construct of the Ecuadorian/Third World host family had been

\(^{47}\) Some details of this story have been changed for purposes of anonymity and confidentiality.
symbolically destabilized by a lived reality in which the volunteer, while granted entry into the household of a family she had never met\textsuperscript{48}, had not been embraced, looked after, welcomed and loved in the ways depicted on the websites of international volunteer organizations or in the ways that she had expected. Or more accurately, as Abby told it, the family performed all of this affective work initially, but soon retreated from doing so. In other words, for a moment the whole orchestrated nature of the homestay was dispensed with. However, as it turned out, this was an incidence when the host family discourse may have momentarily crumbled, but was never truly in danger. As with Nicholas, Abby’s subjectivity as an entitled consumer of an Ecuadorian host family’s discursively ascribed kindness, “love,” and inclusion had been preserved by the comments and actions of a field director who had reassured her that she unequivocally “deserved a host family” with whom she would be “happy and comfortable” and who had then set about finding her a host family that indeed, by Abby’s account, qualified as amazing. In this way, the nascent opening created in the host family discourse had quickly morphed into a discursive closure.

9.7 Conclusion

In this chapter I have examined the particular patterns of subjectivity formation that volunteers exhibited in relation to the Ecuadorian families that provided them with lodging as part of the Global Community volunteer stint. I argued that the Northern international volunteer industry circulates a discourse that constructs both a mythical Third World host family and a Northern volunteer who enters and resides with these families as part of their volunteer stint. This discourse draws on imperialist discourse that both depics the Northern subject as entitled to explore, drop in upon, and voyeuristically examine the peoples of “other” lands (all while constructing these others as objects of a Western gaze) and neoliberal discourse that emphasizes an ethic of self-enterprise. This host family discourse does this all while newly

\textsuperscript{48} The question of instant entry into the home of the “host family” is a foundational assumption of the host family discourse that was in fact never troubled in Abby’s case, as the family had not actually asked her to leave.
constructing the “Third World” family as a sort of commodity or service provider that is to be made use of in particular ways by the Northern volunteer.

The irony of the host family discourse is that it professes a sort of reverence for affective bonds, which (in accordance with age old imperialist truisms) are depicted as being automatically and naturally extended by the Third World “other” to the Western subject, even as it rationalizes human relations between volunteers and peoples of the global South. In the case of Global Community, this occurred not only through the circulation of truth statements about the purported nature of the Ecuadorian host family and how it behaves and relates to volunteers who stay with them, but also in the program’s efforts to instruct and govern volunteers in relating to, conceiving of, thinking about, and behaving toward their host families. Overall, I argue, volunteers were guided towards a multifaceted subject position in relation to their host families, one that was comprised of 4 main intertwining components – privileged guest, knowledgeable user, entitled recipient of services rendered, and critical evaluator.

Drawing on interviews conducted with volunteers and observations of their conversations with each other, I argued that their subjectivities vis-à-vis their host families indexed these subject positions that had been laid out for them in Orientation insofar as their narratives around their host families often coalesced around a common impulse to try and get something out of the homestay. Moreover, this impulse was underwritten by a casual sense of entitlement to drop into the homes of host families and be taken care of as a sort of privileged guest. Thus, as with the ambitions to self-develop through dropping in on and “experiencing” a carefully constructed and vividly imagined “Third World” otherness, planetary consciousness played a supporting role for a project of neoliberal self-enterprise. The manifestation of what I came to regard as a volunteer consumerist subjectivity vis-à-vis the Ecuadorian host family was particularly apparent in volunteers’ tendencies to review and judge their host families as commodities that did or not deliver in particular ways, often using a common set of criteria and standards to assess them as “good” or “bad.”
Their consumerist subjectivities vis-à-vis their host families were perhaps, however, played out to their fullest in those instances when volunteers effectively shopped around for different host families: disappointed with their assigned host families, these volunteers proceeded to complain about and report on their host families to Global Community staff, sometimes moving out and sometimes requesting new host families that they hoped would deliver an experience that more closely resembled what they had in mind. Alternatively, there were several volunteers who were instead rejected by their assigned host families, an event that worked to disrupt the host family discourse that I outline in the Sections 9.2 and 9.3. However, as I show in the presentation of their stories, these discursive openings quickly led to prompt closures, as Global Community staff scrambled to reassure these volunteers and find new host families that could and would more closely meet the standard that volunteers had been guided to expect, thus reasserting the power of the host family discourse by demonstrating that any glitch that may occur could easily be remedied. This, of course, was further situated in the broader industry assumption that the international volunteer organization can, despite any glitch or setback, orchestrate reality in the global South in such a way that delivers a particular experience to the Northern/Western subject who enters its physical space.

Overall, through all of the living arrangements that took place during the time that I conducted fieldwork, both those of the volunteers who stayed in their originally assigned homestays and those of volunteers that left, consumeristic judgments and assessments of host families were continually being made by volunteers and the articulation and circulation of these judgments and assessments happened through a range of channels (host family evaluations required by the program, conversations with each other, reportings on host families to field staff, and interviews with me). For this reason, we might consider how the homestay arrangement that prevails in the Northern international volunteering industry fosters a discursive production, surveillance, and evaluation of the Southern (host) family “under western eyes” (Mohanty, 1984).
10.1 An Apparent Intervention

On a balmy, grey afternoon, the volunteers sat assembled on a large swath of concrete under grey thatched roof, held up by beams of light yellow bamboo tree trunks. Damp sea air hung heavily and ocean waves growled nearby. It was the second day of the Mid-Point Conference, a three-day meeting held at an eco-hostal situated on an immense private beach in Southern Ecuador. The session we had gathered for was entitled on the conference itinerary as “OMG! My Classroom is Out of Control!” April, dressed in an oversized royal blue t-shirt and white shorts, stood at the front of the open-air room, leading the first session of the morning. “Okay everyone!” she began. “Okay everyone! Okay everybody.”

“Come on guys, we gotta get this going!” said Kayla from her seat in the second row.

“Yeah we do, we do,” April said. “Sorry, we’re running low on time. So, um, this session is about classroom management. If you look on your uhuhh, schedule it’s called something like “OMG—”

“Oh my God!” yelled a male voice.

“Out of control!” seconded another.

April smiled as she continued. “Right?” she said. “Because, this is something that Tim and I overwhelmingly noticed when we came to visit your classes, is that you guys are all totally, totally awesome teachers, but there are some classroom management issues. So, we are going to revisit that today. So, let’s spend just a couple minutes getting started thinking about: What is so hard about classroom management? Why is it so frustrating? What’s at the root of the problem? And, do we ever completely lose control of our classrooms totally a hundred percent? And we’re gonna get to what we do to correct that. Why is classroom management so hard?

“Teacher!” a male voice called out, mimicking the form of address that many young adult Ecuadorian students tend to use with US-American English teachers. “Because kids are jerks,” offered Leslie. “Because kids are jerks,” April responded sarcastically. “So it’s all their faults. It has nothing to do with the teachers, right?”

Tim laughed loudly from where he sat: a black plastic chair to April’s left that had been turned to face the rows of volunteers.

“When you get mad they can’t understand English,” said Casey. “When you get mad and start talking fast, like, it doesn’t really help.”

“Oh my God!” yelled a male voice.

“Okay,” April replied. “So you’re saying like, as soon as you lose control and you’re like, ‘Hey you guys, everybody calm down, everybody stop, everybody get quiet!’ And then they’re like, ‘I don’t know what she’s sayin’ anyways,’ ‘cause it’s like you’re going fast and you’re getting angry. Okay, good.”

Shannon offered another factor. “Cause you can’t really, I mean if you have older students, it’s kind of strange to be really, you can’t really yell at adults.”

“IT’s all about the first day,” Kayla added.

April then responded to Shannon’s contribution. “Okay, so you’re feeling like you’re in your early to mid-twenties and you have students who are older than that and you feel like you can’t really impose upon them to be like, ‘I’m the authority figure here.’” At this point, April then asked the volunteers to think of problems they encountered in the classroom.

“Cheating” was the first issue raised. Melanie, a 24-year-old volunteer from Los Angeles, raised her hand. “I have the problem with cheating,” she said, “where like, they all share like, white-out or something [during an exam] and then they’re like, ‘No, I’m not talking, I just like, I just want the white-out.’
As she listened to Melanie, April nodded intently and then restively swooped her hair out of her face and twisted it into a quick bun, fastening it with a metal clip. When Melanie finished speaking, she was ready with a response. “Okay, but that’s why if you have that problem, you just say, ‘Your bags go in the front, nothing comes with you.’ There’s no shared white-out if nobody has white-out. Right? The room erupted into murmurs. Apparently the solution did not sit well with everyone.

“But then they get all stressed out if they can’t erase it,” Andrea, a 23-year-old volunteer from San Francisco said. Erin, a 22-year-old from Bethesda, Maryland, seconded this, piping up sarcastically, “But they can’t take a test without white-out! What if they make a mistake?!?”

The group laughed, people nodding their heads and murmuring in agreement. “Exactly,” someone said, drily.

“You’re right, they won’t like it,” said Nicholas, 23-year-old from a wealthy town on Long Island. April, however, was undeterred. “But this is about like, re-training the way that they’re thinking,” she said. “Right?”

In the meantime, Annie, a seasoned 32-year-old teacher from Austin, Texas turned to face Melanie from her seat in the front row, offering her own advice. “But you’re the authority,” she said. “If you say no white-out, there’s no white-out.”

Upon hearing this, April’s eyes darted down toward Annie, her face brightening. “Okay, could you, could you say that again? Everybody, could we, could we quiet up and listen to what Nicole was saying? Because this is really at the heart of classroom management.”

Side chatter slowly ceased as heads turned and necks craned collectively toward Annie. The space quieted. “What you just said,” April said, encouragingly.

Annie turned her head to face the group. “You, like, you are the authority,” she began, a bit of heat in her voice. “Who cares if they give you a, ‘Teacher, please.’ You stop them. There. And you’re consistent. And so if they’re like, ‘Oh, I really need white-out!’ No. No, like. No! And, you walk away. Like, you just stop it there.”

As she spoke, she let her gaze move around the room, settling on various faces. “If you let them whine and complain they will continue to whine and complain and annoy the shit out of you,” she continued. But if you just stop it there, they’ll stop. Eventually.” The space was silent. “That’s right,” April said after a moment. Annie continued. “It might take like one more test, or whatever, but eventually they will stop.”

Nodding her head, April looked around the room, “That’s right,” she repeated. “Because that’s what’s at the, that’s what’s at the heart of this.

Suddenly, Gloria, a 65-year-old retired teacher from Vermont, spoke up. “That’s true,” she said, measuring her voice, “but I think that you have to understand that, in the past, in their high school experience, they have not been allowed to cross out.”

April nodded vigorously, apparently conceding the point. “Right, right,” she said, speaking directly to Gloria. “We do, we totally understand that, and this is a cultural thing, but I think that the point that Annie is making, which I really agree with, and this is what’s at so much of the heart of classroom management, is you have to believe in yourself as the authority in that classroom. You have to know that you are the authority, so if you say, ‘There’s no cell phones,’ there’s no cell phones. And, once you start letting them talk on cell phones, and texting, and answering their phone in class, then you are giving up your authority, right? If you are like, ‘There are no cell phones. I’m not kidding—’”

Interrupting herself, April suddenly turned to Trevor, a 22-year-old volunteer from a small town in South Dakota who was seated to her left.

“I saw this in your class and I loved it,” she said to him, smiling. “Trevor had a friend,” she began telling the group, “a student who he had been social with, he was a friend. And, the guy was like texting, or calling or whatever it was. And, you were like, ‘There’s no cell phones. Give me your cell phone.’ And, he’s like, ‘No, teacher!’ And, you’re like, ‘Give me your cell phone.’ And, he’s like ‘No, teacher!’ And, you’re like,
'There's the door. You leave or you give me your cell phone.' And, you didn’t get mad, you didn’t scream, you didn't raise your voice, but you were very stern and what'd he do?”

“Uhh, he gave me that fancy cell phone,” Trevor responded.

“He gave you that fancy cell phone,” April echoed. “Because you are the authority figure in that class. Right? Was he on his cell phone for the rest of that class? No. Of course not. 'Cause you had his cell phone. Right? ‘Cause you just gotta be stern. And, believe in yourself as the authority figure in this class.”

10.2 Introduction

Over the course of my remaining time in the field, I often mentally returned to the afternoon described above. The scene was striking. A group of largely white, middle-upper class US-American twenty-somethings being coaxed, cajoled, and commanded by a US-American trainer to believe in themselves as the “authority” in the classrooms of the “developing” country of Ecuador. Could such a scene ever take place with a similar group of Ecuadorian volunteers: young adults, previously untrained and inexperienced in teaching, requested by the United States Department of Education and sent to the United States to teach Spanish at colleges, high schools, and vocational institutes?

To begin, the very idea of a group of young adult Ecuadorian volunteers being permitted, let alone invited and entrusted, by the United States government to come and be teachers in United States classrooms is, itself, unimaginable, as it contravenes all of the assumptions of US empire, the more explicitly adhered-to paradigm of “development,” and the discursively imagined relationship between “developing” and “developed” countries. However, in the world of international volunteering, the reverse is unremarkable, taken for granted, normal. On nothing more than the basis of being native English speakers and college graduates, having the means to pay a hefty program fee, and completing a four-week training program (which is carried out with no visible or acknowledged oversight or input from the Ecuadorian Education Ministry or local Ecuadorian teachers), Global Community volunteers are in fact deemed and declared teachers, and are thus ushered into positions of authority in Ecuadorian classrooms and education institutions. As teachers, they are, upon setting foot in their new classrooms, officially entitled to

49 With the exception of Gloria, who was 65; Annie, who was 32; and, Peggy, who was 71.
set rules and standards, determine curriculum, police student bodies, mouths, behaviors, and attitudes, disciplining them as they see fit, making assessments, and ultimately, making decisions as to whether a student passes or fails, something which clearly can have a significant bearing on their students’ lives. In this way, this moment by the beach powerfully evoked and echoed enduring histories of United States imperialism and international development, projects through which the nation has continually declared itself an authority in developing countries through the deployment of various officials, experts, volunteers, and development workers.

At the same time, this moment was also striking because it seemed to index something so central to what the volunteer stint – the volunteer “experience” – was all about, something I was coming to understand more clearly with regard to what Global Community does with respect to the volunteer on the day-to-day – that is, that the program creates opportunities for its Western volunteers to attempt, negotiate and assert subjectivities of authority, specifically over Southern students in Third World classrooms. As I spoke to volunteers about their teaching, it became clear that becoming an authority in these ways – controlling their students according to certain criteria – was a central component of their subjectivity formations in the classroom. Some wanted very badly to do so, others were ambivalent, and still others were quite uncomfortable, but all of them, to some degree, related to it as something they had to do as teachers, and most of them used it as a gauge of their success in the classroom. How well they could get their students to do what they wanted and how well they could discipline and control students were often held up as indicators of success and self-worth, as well as evidence as to whether one was good or bad at teaching. If one’s students did not do what one said or follow one’s rules or respond to one’s teaching methods, it was a crisis that needed to be resolved.

What this moment at the Mid-Point Conference does not make immediately clear, however, are the specifics of this authority, exactly what it licensed the volunteer to do, upon what justification it was based, how its production was alternately realized or thwarted in the classroom, and how it colored volunteers’ subjectivities. What I knew from my own experience, from the Orientation I had observed 5 months prior, and from my conversations with volunteers
during fieldwork was that volunteers were not simply vested with the authority to communicate content to students, to compel them to follow their instructions, to assess them on their mastery of certain skills, to set classroom rules, to mete out consequences, and to pass and fail students—basic things that, in both US-American and Ecuadorian society, most teachers are authorized to do. They were also vested with the authority to do all of this in ways that knowingly and intentionally went against how these things were “known” by Global Community field staff to be done in the “typical” Ecuadorian classroom. Volunteers were officially authorized, in other words, to break cultural and social norms, impose strange ways onto their students, and judge, police, and assess their students according to how they did or did not conform. As the ethnographer 5 months into fieldwork, this beachside moment at the Mid-Point Conference threw all of this into sharp relief. But this was not all. At the same time, the moment also indexed something else I had been finding out from the volunteers, which is that while the program does everything it can to produce volunteer subjectivities of authority, the successful accomplishment of such subjectivities was always up in the air, often stymied, sometimes successful, always conditional and never complete.

In this chapter, I explore the uneven and incomplete makings of this authority, thinking past the narrow construct of “teacher authority” and considering more broadly the ongoing exercise and production of United States hegemonic authority vis-à-vis Latin America. It is this broader production of hegemonic authority in which this scene by the beach, and US international volunteering, more generally, is situated. As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 of this dissertation, David Harvey (2003) argues that a country’s status as an imperial hegemon is one that rests on a base of “three legs” of dominance—industrial supremacy, unequaled financial wealth, and unrivaled military capacity—vis-à-vis its international peers. Drawing on Gramsci, he argues that actual hegemonic practice through which this dominance is leveraged and exerted takes shape as a blend of both consensus and coercion. As Chapters 2-4 go on to show, in the case of the United States and Latin America, the hegemony of the former has been exercised by way of capital penetration, “gunboat diplomacy,” military invasions and occupations, customs house
takeovers and “dollar diplomacy,” post-WWII policies that sought to stifle competition by “under-developing” Latin American economies, CIA-coordinated and backed coups, US-led reformations of national police forces, “dirty wars,” and the more recent “war on drugs.” In Chapter 5, I explored the ways in which humanitarian interventions and tourism have also constituted key US hegemonic practices in Latin America. Following Edward Said and other postcolonial scholars, in this chapter I want to emphatically suggest that the effects of this hegemonic praxis have not only worked to shape Latin American societies in particular ways, but that they have also worked to produce authority over Latin America, and the “Third World” more generally, as an important dimension of US-American culture and subjectivity. In this way, the authorizing of Global Community Ecuador volunteers as teachers was not merely a microcosm (i.e. a representation writ small) of that imperial authority; it was rather, I suggest, an instance of its actual production carried out at the microlevel.

In this chapter, I turn to the specifics of this process, examining how the program authorized volunteers to be English teachers in Ecuador through the deployment of a particular program discourse that circulated by way of pre-departure guides and materials, training sessions held during Orientation and the Mid-Point Conference depicted above. In the section that follows, I examine the ‘truths’ of this discourse and consider the ways in which they embody broader ‘truths’ of neoliberal discourse and age-old United States imperialist discourse that has not only entitled (Heron 2007) but also authorized middle and upper class US-Americans to enter territories of US empire, impose practices conceived as US-American, and police imperial subjects accordingly, all in the name of the improvement of an inferiorized Other (Ibid). As in previous chapters of this dissertation, I attend specifically to how, in the Global Community discourse, these ‘truths’ appear to work together in almost interdependent fashion, so that the robustness of each discursive formation is conceivably scaffolded and strengthened by the deployment of the other. In this section, I also discuss the particulars of what it is, exactly, that volunteers were being authorized to do in Ecuadorian classrooms, examining specifically how the particular teaching methods they are encouraged to use in their classrooms can be understood
as being loyal to certain neoliberalist pedagogies that have ascended over the last several decades.

Following this discussion of the program discourse around teaching, I turn to the post-Orientation duration of the year, examining different cases and instances in which the authority vested in volunteers faced various kinds of disruption, and not only in the form of student receptions to volunteers but, in some cases, in the form of volunteers’ personal insecurities with respect to their abilities as novice teachers as well as interior grapplings with the politics of doing certain things they had been directed to do in their classrooms by the Global Community program, things that they were in fact proceeding to do even as they sometimes internally questioned them. What I argue here is that, in all of these instances, what was at stake was not simply their “teacher authority” subjectivities, but, in a broader sense, certain strands of the imperialistic authority that is proclaimed and assumed by the entire project of inexperienced, US-American volunteers entering Ecuadorian classrooms to teach English in ways that are understood to go against dominant Ecuadorian classroom norms and pedagogical styles.

How did volunteers respond to these potential disruptions? More often than not, I found, they mobilized certain imperial and neoliberal ‘truths’ that could be traced directly to Global Community’s program discourse on US-Americans teaching English to Ecuadorian students in Ecuador. In this way, I argue that as volunteers worked to recover and repair their own claims to authority as teachers, a broader production of US authority in the developing world was also being negotiated. Because volunteers ultimately remained officially empowered and authorized as teachers (i.e. no institution ever fired a volunteer or required a volunteer to fundamentally modify his or her teaching methods/classroom rules to accommodate or conform with local practices), this production was generally upheld even in the face of symbolic disruptions. (In fact it was precisely through confronting and overcoming these challenges, one could argue, that this authority was continuously produced.) As is illustrated in the final section of this chapter, this was evident even in the case of one volunteer who, upon confronting numerous symbolic disruptions to her authority in the classroom, actually recalibrated her understanding of her teacher role; in
this case, an assumption of authority, as backed up by an implicit sense of US authority vis-à-vis Ecuador, was still quite strong in her modified subjectivity.

10.3 Authorizing the Volunteer with Imperialist and Neoliberal ‘Truths’

Late one afternoon during the month of Orientation, Melissa shared with me how she had decided to apply to Global Community. She told a story that would become increasingly familiar to me through conversations with other volunteers who, like Melissa, had applied several years out of college in the throes of what some might view as a sort of anomie brought on by life in the post-college “real world.” At the time, Melissa was three years out of completing her education at a small liberal arts college and had been working in what she referred to as a “dead-end job.” As she told me:

I just felt so stagnant in my life. I felt like I needed more, I needed to experience more, I needed to understand more of the world of which I’m a part. Um, because being a part of like a global community was really appealing, as opposed to just like feeling like I was in this bubble. Um, I don’t know. Yeah, it was just something I really wanted to do. I think I would’ve gone through life and not have been as content if I hadn’t had done that, and I recognized that in myself, to sort of have the experience. Ecuador just happened because of the timing of the program. I was looking into Costa Rica too, but it left in summer or something?50

What she said next was not something I had heard from many of the volunteers:

I did have a lot of, kind of like a conflict with the whole teaching English. Like, how like, superior of me to think that like, because I’m fluent in English I can better the lives of these people, y’know, whatever. Yeah, like, I knew I wanted to do it because it seemed like a good means to fulfill my goals of getting abroad and going abroad, but yeah I sort of felt, I thought about it for a while, like “What is it that I’m really doing? Teaching? Am I really a teacher? I don’t know how to teach. And why English? Why am I teaching English?” y’know, like, but…It exists. People wanna learn it. If that’s their goal, then I would like to help them with that.

As she recalled her thoughts, Melissa provided a revealing glimpse into how she questioned, rationalized, and ultimately authorized her own decision to become a Global Community volunteer. As only a few of her peers had also recalled doing, she had apparently questioned the implications of teaching English, posing the loaded question of “Why English?”, an inquiry that at once implicitly interrogates the commonsense truism that English is a necessity in non-English

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50 A portion of this excerpt is also referenced in Chapter 6.
speaking countries and demands a fuller disclosure of the politics surrounding its ascension as such. Unlike any other volunteer I spoke with, however, Melissa also divulged that she had questioned her own entitlement to even be a teacher when she had no knowledge of “how to teach.” With these questions she was essentially challenging the more general truism of an international volunteer industry logic that contends that inexperienced, untrained people from the United States are innately equipped and entitled to serve as volunteers in developing countries, whether in the teaching of English or in the realm of many other socially oriented lines of work. “Teaching?” Melissa recalled asking herself. “Am I really a teacher? I don’t know how to teach.”

Melissa’s account of posing these questions to herself at the time of applying to the program underscores how the act of simply imagining oneself entering a classroom as a teacher, particularly with no experience or previous training, can involve an internal negotiation of one’s authority to do so and may demand at least a partial claiming of such authority in order to go through with it. It also suggests that while Global Community cajoles untrained, inexperienced US-American youth to be teachers of English, this does not mean that its intended targets are always automatically or easily convinced. In fact, Melissa’s account illustrates how disruptions to this attempted conferral of authority can actually come from some of the volunteers, themselves, and, before they even apply or arrive in-country, thus tasking Global Community with a problem it must rectify in order to pull off a key element of recruitment: that is, providing the untrained, inexperienced US-American youth, who may be critically aware of (or at least somewhat sensitive to) the politics of international English language teaching, with the nerve to apply and actually follow through with becoming an English teacher.

Indeed, Melissa’s questions highlight two central tensions of Global Community’s work (and Western international volunteering, more generally). First, as Melissa put it so succinctly: “Teaching? Am I really a teacher? I don’t know how to teach.” These questions underscore the fact that, as mentioned in the introductory chapter of this dissertation, Global Community does not require previous teaching experience or teacher training on the part of the volunteer and, as I learned through conversations with the volunteers, the vast majority in fact had neither. Second,
as Melissa put it simply, “Why English?” These questions highlighted certain tensions around the defining of English language ability as a “need” in a country where the national language is Spanish and where the additional constitutionally recognized languages are Kichwa and Shuar (both of Amerindian origin). The oft-unasked question then becomes: Why do nationals of this country need or want to learn this language to the point that the government invites US-American “volunteers” to teach it and subsidizes their monthly stipends (which, incidentally, are higher than those typically paid to Ecuadorian English teachers working at the same institutions (and with greater responsibilities) as the volunteers?

Again, these questions Melissa raised and the tensions they drew out can be considered as potential disruptions to the authority of Global Community Ecuador and the authority which invests in its volunteers to be English teachers in Ecuadorian classrooms. In this section, I explore the ways in which the program works to resolve these potential disruptions through the deployment of certain neoliberal and imperialist ‘truths’ that are in circulation at every step of a volunteer’s foray into becoming and being a Global Community Ecuador volunteer and thus a teacher of English in the country of Ecuador.

To begin, Melissa’s account indicates that while she had been troubled by a lack of knowledge of how to teach and the implications of teaching English, ultimately an interest in self-development had prevailed over her initial qualms, thus illustrating the way in which Global Community’s neoliberal framing of the volunteer stint perhaps works to mute the specter of imperialism from the minds of contemporary volunteers who want nothing to do with such a legacy but do want to travel, invest in themselves, and even “help” out where they can and how people in the developing world presumably “want” them to (see Chapter 6). Indeed, Melissa explicitly acknowledged that volunteering would satisfy her “goals” and then reasoned that teaching English “exists,” that people want to learn English and that, “If that’s their goal then I would like to help them with that. This win-win rationale is one that in fact dominates the international volunteering industry and, as discussed in Chapter 6, it is quite present on the website of Global Community. It was this rationale in part, it seems, that worked to enable
Melissa to mentally authorize herself to apply to the program and thereby imagine herself an English teacher in Ecuador, despite her apparent concerns over the implications of teaching English and her apprehension over whether she was entitled or equipped to serve as a teacher.

So far this accords in some ways with the findings of Wanda Vrasti (2013), who has argued that voluntourism in fact constitutes a technology of neoliberal government in that is “helping [volunteers] develop various affective and entrepreneurial competencies needed to navigate the challenges of flexible capital” (p. 4). Lest it go unnoticed or unaddressed, however, it is not only a neoliberal ‘truth’ of self-investment and citizen responsibilization that the Global Community website deploys to authorize prospective volunteers to imagine themselves as teachers in the developing world. As this section will show, at work are also certain imperialist ‘truths’ that in fact interplay with additional neoliberal ‘truths’ in the program’s authorization of the volunteer in the particular project of teaching English and the specific role of teacher.

With respect to teaching English in Ecuador, the portion of the Global Community website that pertains to the Ecuador program in fact devotes a few paragraphs to explaining that, due to the country’s growing tourism industry and a general desire on the part of Ecuadorians for increased access to the global economy, there is a great deal of value placed on English proficiency. Breaking this down into less abstract terms, the website then notes that, with respect to business ventures, English language ability assists Ecuadorians in reaching a larger number of people and therefore results in greater opportunity. So far, these claims draw on a neoliberal logic insofar as language learning is rationalized specifically in terms of marketplace success rather than some other kind of endeavor (see Duchene and Heller, 2012); for example, learning English is not touted as something that assists Ecuadorians in say, critically examining US foreign policy vis-à-vis Ecuador, Latin America, or any other region of the world.

Here, it must be noted that, working in tandem with this neoliberal conceptualization of language learning that the Global Community website deploys to convince volunteers to imagine themselves as teachers of English in Ecuador, is a powerful imperialist logic through which the particular marketplace in which many Ecuadorians purportedly want to participate is uncritically
presented as a “global economy,” leaving silent any mention of the historic imperialist processes through which this economy has been produced and been made more “global,” not to mention the specific imperialist practices through which the Ecuadorian economy has been most recently (and asymmetrically) (re)integrated into this global economy (see Introduction and Chapter 4), or the particular geopolitical relationship between the United States and much of Latin America that renders English language ability a highly valued and “necessary” skill. The fact that these processes, practices, and conditions are left unsaid works to naturalize them, thus bringing awareness to them but simultaneously presenting them as neutral conditions that simply and unproblematically are the way they are. In this way, as US hegemony is at once acknowledged but naturalized (and, in this case, for the consumption of US nationals rather than imperial subjects) an age-old, foundational move of imperialist discourse is carried out.

In these ways, then, there is a deployment on the Global Community website of a neoliberal-imperial discourse that works to authorize the inexperienced prospective volunteer to even imagine himself as a teacher of English in Ecuador, thus providing an answer to Melissa’s question of “Why English?” While Melissa did not cite the website as having helped her come to this conclusion, it is evident that the rationale she articulated corresponds with that which the website provides to any prospective volunteer who may have similar doubts. As Melissa had said, “It exists. People wanna learn it. If that’s their goal then I would like to help them with that.”

As it turned out, this very issue would be taken up by April and Tim on the fourth day of Orientation, when they led a session entitled “Global Community Mission Statement.” On a crisp, sunny morning, April and Tim stood at the front of the conference room, counting the volunteers off into groups and instructing them to discuss what they believed to be the Global Community mission. After about 10 minutes of small group discussion, April, ready with a black marker, asked that each group share its ideas. As April called on the different hands that went into the air, volunteers offered well-worn phrases that immediately invoked the promotional materials of any number of volunteer organizations. The first of these came from Shannon, a 23-year-old
volunteer from Wisconsin. “Contributing to the community?” she volunteered when called upon.

April quickly wrote this down on the whiteboard and then requested more responses.

“Great. Who else?” she said. “Kayla?”

“Maintaining a professional attitude?”

“Yes. Okay. Other ideas?”

“Creating a cross-cultural experience.”

After a few minutes of writing down their responses and taking pains to use their exact wording, April had compiled the following list:

- Contributing to the community
- Maintaining a professional attitude.
- Creating a cross-cultural experience.
- Opening doors, creating opportunities for others.
- To serve developing countries through education.
- Opportunity to contribute to the individual development of others
  *For others and selves
- Develop international understanding and relationships.

After writing the last phrase on the board, April placed the cap back on the black marker, and smiled warmly at the volunteers. “You guys have great ideas,” she told them.

At this point, Tim came to the front of the room and turned the white board around to reveal another set of bullet pointed phrases that had already been written on the other side, presumably by him or by April.

- To respond to a request for educational assistance in developing countries.
- To provide opportunities for university students and graduate students to gain experience living and working in the developing world.
- To strengthen relationships between English speakers and people of the developing world.

This, he told them, was the “official” Global Community mission. While April had solicited the volunteer version of what the mission might be, Tim would now review this official one. Gesturing to the first phrase (To respond to a request for educational assistance in developing countries), he began by approving of their ideas that had pertained to this particular point, telling them, “I liked that when people were sharing their ideas, it wasn’t just about, okay, developing a business plan and getting into Harvard business school.” He then informed the volunteers that Global
Community had been invited to come to Ecuador to teach English. "Why," he asked were we invited to teach English?" Responding to his own question, he exclaimed, "People want English!"

Next came another question to the volunteers. "Why do people want English?" he asked them. Again, he took responses from raised hands.

"Business."
"Education abroad."
"To immigrate."
"People want money."

Tim then shared a brief anecdote of a former student of his who had not had “the best English.” The student had reportedly owned a lamp business in China, and when he would travel there all of the meetings would be conducted in English. Tim recalled that after one of these trips the student had come up to him and thanked him, telling him that he realized that his English comprehension had improved since he had started taking Tim’s class.

Tim then moved on to the second bullet point of the mission: To provide opportunities for university students and graduate students to gain experience living and working in the developing world. Here, Tim pointed out that the program was "not so altruistic where you guys give, give, give, and get nothing in return." The program also had to do, he told them, with “those bullet points on your resumes.” He asked people for their thoughts about what they could gain or learn from the experience. Again, hands went into the air and Tim again transcribed what volunteers said, occasionally summarizing people’s comments into terms or phrases that neatly answered the question of what could be gained or learned by the volunteers. For example, Rachel shared that she had noticed that people in Ecuador were “much more affectionate.” She pointed out that while she had grown up in a home where the whole family ate dinner together every night, perhaps not everyone in the volunteer group had grown up with that experience. She noted how close her host family was with each other, pointing out that her host brother “nuzzled his mom,” and that when her own biological brother was 13 “he never would have done that.” Concluding, she said that she liked this aspect, asking, "Why be so distant?"
Nodding, Tim responded, “Yeah, family values,” and turned to write this on the board. Matt then raised his hand. “Get involved with local activities,” he said, “like soccer, sports.” To this Tim responded enthusiastically, saying that this was the volunteers’ “chance to really goof around with the locals” and “throw around the football.” Turning to another male volunteer, Aaron, he then said jokingly, “Because I know you brought one.”

Another volunteer, Gloria, a 65-year-old volunteer from Vermont, subsequently shared that she had observed a lot of economic disparity in Quito. To this Tim simply nodded his head, writing nothing on the board. After taking a few more response, he had written a number of phrases on the whiteboard:

- Learn Spanish.
- Learn to be an effective teacher.
- Assess that people have learned.
- Get involved in communities.
- Experience local culture and share one’s own culture. Family values!
- Get involved with sports
- Broaden perspectives, time abroad.
- Becoming able to teach better at home.

In addition to Gloria’s comment about economic disparities, there had been one other suggestion that had not made the cut. One volunteer had made reference to negative attitudes in the United States toward foreigners and said that this experience could help people “to realize that people are the same.” Here, April had interjected to say that volunteers would also realize that “there are differences.”

With the second component of the official Global Community mission covered, Tim then moved on to its third and final aspect: To strengthen relationships between English speakers and people of the developing world. He asked the group how they understood this aspect. Again, hands went into the air and Tim called on them, transcribing and summarizing their comments on the board. Within a few minutes, he had compiled the following list:

- Challenging stereotypes about Americans
- Being nice, affectionate
- Not getting too trashed
- Field trips with students
- Cooking for them (“cultural”)
- Showing genuine interest, appreciation
To close, April came back to the front of the room and spoke for a few minutes about the founding of Global Community, sharing the history that was printed on the website. The organization’s first unofficial program had been launched in a Southeast Asian country in 1986. The following year, a great number of people had expressed interest in participating and from there the program had grown. The first Ecuador program had been launched in 1991, she said, and there were currently four programs in South America. She also mentioned that the founder was now an economics professor at a prestigious university.

This collective production of the reasons that Ecuadorians “want English” indexed a classic move of imperial power insofar as it constituted a US-American defining of the Ecuadorian subject’s desires and subjectivities. This is something that has characterized the broader US-American imperial project that has unfolded since the very formation of the United States nation-state. Once Tim, as a US-American, had proclaimed the “fact” that Ecuadorians “want English,” he had put the task of identifying the reasons why Ecuadorians allegedly wanted English to a group of US-American volunteers (who, not insignificantly, had just landed in Ecuador 4 days prior and had no link to Ecuador to speak of, other than a desire to explore its terrains and cultures, possibly “help,” and ultimately capitalize on what it could offer in the development of certain skills and credentials). In this way, Tim was allowing, even commanding, them to speak for an undifferentiated Ecuadorian “people” and define the value that this “people” presumably placed on speaking English. As the ideas flowed forth (undoubtedly informed by reasons provided by the Global Community website), Ecuadorians were produced as people who unanimously and uncritically wanted English for reasons that cohered with neoliberal imperial ‘truths’ about the market-oriented value of English in a profoundly asymmetrical global economy in which the United States continues to be the hegemonic power vis-à-vis Latin America, overall. In the meantime, by conjuring this need or demand and substantiating it with concrete reasons, volunteers were implicitly being authorized to respond to it. At this point (and having already signed to be English teachers) no one dared argue with Tim’s claim that “People want English.”
Turning now to the other tension Melissa’s questioning had drawn out – “Teaching? Am I really a teacher? I don’t know how to teach” – how did Global Community attempt to authorize volunteers to even imagine themselves as teachers and thus transcend the potential disruption to this authorization that was embodied in her concern? Like the authorization to teach English in Ecuador, this is a process that also begins on the website. Recall, for example, the question that appears on the website’s opening page: “Where on earth do you want to find yourself teaching?” With this question, the prospective volunteer is already discursively constructed as a teacher before she even goes any further into the website. Once the volunteer does click on the tab for Global Community’s Ecuador program, this initial authorization is supplemented with yet another in the form of the program’s assurances that, in exchange for program fees, the volunteer will receive an in-country Orientation that will include TEFL training and a 2-week teaching practicum. With this promise of in-country training to come (discussed below), the program thus makes an implicit vow to actively shore up, legitimate, and in fact generate the volunteer’s authority to teach by turning him from a novice non-teacher into a capable, experienced, trained teacher in a matter of weeks through its in-country program of preparation.

Here, it should be noted that, while such an abbreviated period of training seems highly questionable, it in fact takes a page directly from the book of neoliberal educational reform (see Lahann & Mitescu Reagan, 2011), which, since the 1980s, and as part of an effort to cut state funding for university teacher education programs, has rolled out a steadily growing number of “alternate-route,” “fast-track,” or “non-traditional” private sector teacher certification programs that recruit college-educated individuals to be teachers in public schools, preparing them for certification with an accelerated course of teacher training and then placing them in “high-need” urban and rural primary and secondary educational institutions (see Lahann & Mitescu Reagan, 2011; Sleeter, 2008; Weiner, 2007). Teach for America, which was founded in 1990 and champions itself as a speedier, streamlined alternative to traditional university-based teacher

51 Rescripted for purposes of anonymity.
certification programs and prepares its recruits for the classroom with an 8-week Summer Institute (see Darling-Hammond, 1994; Teach for America, n.d.), is perhaps the most well known example of these controversial programs.

Situated in broader neoliberal policy reforms that seek to cut government expenditures and propel the market into playing an ever-increasing role in the mediation of social welfare, the widespread promotion of such teacher certification programs often rhetorically mobilizes the neoliberal doctrine of deregulation, privatization, and “freeing the market to find, train, and place the nation’s teachers” (Lahann & Mitescu Reagan, 2011, p. 10). In fact, much like Global Community places emphasis on volunteers’ first language fluency in English and their possession of a college degree (both being the only two minimum requisite qualifications for applicants to its year-long programs), neoliberalist proponents of alternate-route teacher certification programs such as the Heritage Institute tout what Christine Sleeter (2008) refers to as a “deregulation conception of teacher quality” (p. 1953) that “defines teacher quality in terms of academic ability only, arguing that little or no professional pedagogical knowledge or value can be learned other than through experience” (Ibid).

In addition to this neoliberal ‘truth’ of a deregulated, privatized, accelerated model of teacher education, however, the Global Community website also marshals certain imperialist ‘truths’ in the authorizing of the volunteer as teacher in the developing world. These appear on the portion of the website that explains to the prospective volunteer the actual mechanics of how Global Community partners with the governments and educational ministries of developing countries. Here, the text informs the prospective volunteer that Global Community sends volunteers to teach in institutions and communities that request their assistance and “would otherwise be unable to afford or locate qualified teachers.” With the use of this phrase – which some volunteers in fact repeated back to me as they explained how they had worded fundraising letters (a strategy recommended by Global Community to help offset the cost of program fees) or described how they understood the mission of the organization – the volunteer is instantly constructed not only as qualified, but also as categorically more qualified than any other national
teacher she will encounter in her future host community and more qualified than any teacher her future students would otherwise be faced with if it were not for her presence in the host community.

It is with this statement, which provides a concrete, explicit rationale for Global Community’s specific intervention, that the circulation of Heron’s (2007) “colonial continuity” of bourgeois entitlement and obligation to intervene for the betterment of an inferior Other wherever he may reside (already hinted at strongly in the photographs and other text of the website) takes on a particular intensity and specificity. In no uncertain terms, the program is stating, there is a shortage of qualified teachers in developing countries. The unspoken but heavily implied other half of this assertion is one that the program perhaps does not even need to make explicit: young people who have never taught before, but who are college-educated and from the United States (which constitutes Global Community’s chief market) can, should, and must fill this void. This unspoken other half is clearly suffused with assumptions of United States superiority vis-à-vis the developing world, but as they are situated in a historic US discourse of exceptionalism that has helped construct this superiority as commonsense truth, these assumptions are arguably not ones that even have to be spelled out. To the contrary, if they were in fact spelled out to the prospective volunteer who is situated in a post-Iraq Invasion context where explicit claims of US supremacy have increasingly come under attack as fits of arrogance, such a move could conceivably work to alienate the volunteer; better, perhaps, for Global Community recruitment efforts that they are left implied.

In sum, I suggest that this website statement about a lack of qualified teachers works to subtly authorize prospective volunteers as teachers in the specific contexts of the developing countries with which Global Community partners, even before they have applied to the program, been accepted, and begun and completed the in-country training that the program provides. What I also want to emphasize here, however, is that the pairing of this imperialist ‘truth’ with the aforementioned neoliberal ‘truth’ of accelerated teacher training results in a sort of discursive symbiosis, such that the alleged lack of qualified Ecuadorian teachers potentially works to deflect
potential criticism from the abbreviated teacher training, and likewise, the confident promise of weeks-long teacher training implicitly scaffolds the claim of how desperately unqualified Ecuadorian teachers are made out to be. In other words, if Ecuadorian teachers are believed to be categorically unqualified, then 2 weeks of teacher training to be a teacher in Ecuador perhaps begins to look less egregious and more legitimate; conversely, if 2 weeks of training is believed to be all a novice needs to be a superior, in-demand teacher in Ecuador, then more credence is theoretically lent to the notion that Ecuadorian teachers really are all unqualified. In this way, the imperialist discursive move of casting Ecuadorian teachers as inferior works to assist the other, perhaps less immediately explicit, neoliberal discursive move of defining such brief teacher training as something legitimate. Together, the two moves work in concert to construct the US-American volunteer as both superior to Ecuadorian national teachers and perfectly qualified after minimal teacher training, thus constituting an act of subject formation that is both imperialist and neoliberalist with regard to its operating discourses. In the process, the volunteer is discursively authorized as a teacher in Ecuador, despite having no previous experience or training.

Moreover, Ecuador is in the meantime painted as an educationally inferior country where volunteers can unproblematically “test out” teaching with little worry of doing worse than their Ecuadorian counterparts and moreover, with the sense that they are in fact “helping” a country with its purportedly inferior education system. The operation of such an image in the volunteers’ subjectivity formations was in fact suggested one afternoon by the comments of Annie, an experienced teacher in her thirties who had been surprised by the lack of experience among her fellow volunteers. After reasoning that perhaps this did not matter because it was comparable to what Ecuadorian students were “used to getting anyway,” she proceeded to tell me that she was in fact telling all of the fledgling teachers she knew to be currently enrolled in US teacher education programs that they should apply to the Global Community Ecuador program precisely because “here, it doesn’t really matter if you mess up.”

*The Continued Case Against Ecuadorian Teachers and “Characteristic” Ecuadorian Teaching Methods*
The discursive hailing of the Global Community volunteer as a superior teacher-to-be (with respect to Ecuadorian teachers) continues by way of the printed materials that the organization sends to incoming volunteers. Here, an as discussed in Chapter 1, Ecuadorian teaching methods are held up as woefully “traditional” and the guide informs the volunteer that Global Community “discourages the use of two major characteristic Ecuadorian teaching methods: the creation of structured and rigid classroom environments and the use of rote memorization.” In this way, the volunteer is more strongly invited to take up a superior position vis-à-vis the Ecuadorian teacher—that is, if she simply follows the advice of the guide and does not take up the methods that the Ecuadorian teacher typically uses. (In the following section I examine how this idea of a shortage of qualified teachers continued to circulate by way of the in-country training received by the cohort of Global Community Ecuador volunteers that I ethnographically followed.)

Importantly, in doing what can only be described as a cursory amount of investigation into the language teaching methodology (which is not the substantive focus of this dissertation), it becomes almost immediately clear that the “characteristic Ecuadorian teaching methods” that the Global Community guide references are situated in the now widely criticized but nevertheless well-established and internationally utilized methodology known as the Audiolingual Method (see Richards and Rodgers 2007, Chapter 14). By coding them as “traditional,” however, the Global Community guide both simplifies them as a sort of generic, mysteriously vague formation that has no place in the “modern” world, and instantly sets them against the notion of “progress,” thus reifying the First World/Third World binary and implicitly defining the volunteer’s role as one of bringing progress to Ecuadorian classrooms – authorizing her to do so.

As discussed in Chapter 5, the ascription of lack or inability to certain populations and societies has been a historic tactic in the authorizing of US-American humanitarian workers in US territories of empire. In the case of the Philippines (as well as Cuba and Puerto Rico) in the late 19th century, the US state more explicitly tied the imposition of English instruction to purposes of empire building (see Chapter 5), framing it as a vehicle for cultivating Filipino compliance and
consent with US colonial rule (see Wesling 2011). In this way, a lack of English was already problematized as something that the US colonial administration would magnanimously remedy. However, this was not the only deficiency to be resolved. Also problematized was the pedagogical style that had been utilized by the previous Spanish colonial administration. This was a style that was framed by US colonial administrators as misguided based in principles of rote memorization and drills and held up as inferior to the educational progressivism that prevailed in the US at the time. In this vein, both a lack of English language and an inferiority of teaching methods were deployed as key ‘truths’ in the authorizing of US-American teachers who were sent to the Philippines to teach English (along with other subjects) in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

Similarly, in the 1960s and beyond, various humanitarian projects (which included English instruction) were framed as keys to staving off and/or reversing Soviet influence and instead maintaining and strengthening US hegemony in developing countries. Here, the US state deployed ‘truths’ of technological inability, inferior “feudalistic” economic systems, and a lack of democratic governance to authorize Peace Corps volunteers to travel to developing countries and help communities develop economically and socially. As discussed in the introduction of this dissertation, in the late 20th century and into the new millennium, the NGO movement was hailed as the solution to inefficient developmental state bureaucracies in developing countries. Here, the inability of the developmental state to respond to conditions of spiraling poverty, massive unemployment, and related humanitarian crises (all triggered by neoliberal shock therapy) were used to authorize the deployment of Northern NGO development workers; the phenomenon of international volunteering was situated in this authorization. With respect to the specific program of Global Community, it is the inability of the developing country’s state apparatus to afford or locate qualified teachers (and thus the implied inability of those “locatable” teachers to teach effectively) that is held up to authorize the US-American, college-educated, inexperienced, briefly trained, native English speaker to enter classrooms and teach Ecuadorian students the English language.
Constructing “Typical” Ecuadorian Student Behaviors Through A Problem Lens

In addition to discrediting Ecuadorian teaching methods and teachers, the introductory guide also engages in the equally historic imperial practice of defining the targets of the intervention through a lens of problematic behaviors. In the late 19th century, Filipino students were constructed as “savages” in need of correction and nothing less than cultural transformation (see Chapter 5; see Zimmerman, 2006; Wesling, 2011), as were the Amerindian students who were compelled to attend the Indian Boarding Schools (see Chapter 5, see Adams 1995). Similarly, African American students of the Freedmen Bureau schools were constructed as lacking in morality due to their previous condition of slavery (see Butchart, 2010). In the case of Ecuadorian students today, the Global Community guide constructs them in similar, albeit more carefully articulated, terms, acquainting the volunteer with certain problematic behaviors – constructed as typically Ecuadorian – by way of several sections, which are excerpted (with the exact headings used by the guide) and then discussed below:

Cheating

Almost all volunteers have encountered problems with cheating. Students copy neighbors’ papers openly, as people in Ecuador generally do not look down upon cheating. Many Ecuadorians cheat even in classes without grades. In fact, many people consider cheating a social norm since Ecuadorian culture is much more community-based than individual-based. However, this bad habit will prevent many students from learning or processing any information on their own. Thus, explaining to your students from the beginning why you are opposed to and will not tolerate cheating in any form makes for an excellent idea.

Attendance

Poor attendance can be another serious problem in Ecuador. Sometimes half of the class simply does not show up. Many students, such as working professionals, have other responsibilities that conflict with their classes (such as physicians with a medical emergency, deans with an important meeting, executives with a business trip, etc.), so do not take absences personally. These people really want to learn English, but their job responsibilities frequently interfere with that desire. To keep the classes moving forward despite numerous absences, consider implementing additional measures (i.e. make-up classes, a buddy system, handouts, additional homework for missed classes, etc.)…If the university does not have an attendance policy, set up your own and inform students of the policy on the first day of class. Hold students accountable! When someone arrives late or comes back from a long absence, make him/her explain it. Insist students give you a note if they say they have to go to the doctor or dentist. Keep track of attendance in your own book and give failing grades after students reach a certain number of
unexcused absences or give an additional point to the final grade for students who attend 95% of classes (positive reinforcement!).

Tardiness

Both Ecuador and Ecuadorians have notorious reputations for tardiness. Although professionals have full schedules, students are busy with other university classes, and slow overcrowded buses crawl along the streets, do not allow students to be tardy on a regular basis. Set rules at the beginning of the course that will create the most productive learning environment. If students feel they can meander in at any time during your class, providing an engaging teaching atmosphere will be impossible. You may want to close the door 10 or 15 minutes into class time so that stragglers cannot enter. Have students who are late to class three times attend a make-up class or do extra homework. Advise students unable to arrive to class on time to improve their punctuality or register for classes at a more convenient time.

In these excerpts, which effectively speak for themselves, volunteers are clearly being authorized to act as a policing force vis-à-vis their students. An equally compelling aspect about these excerpts, however, is that they all follow a certain structural pattern, thus engaging Foucault’s concept of discourse as a system of knowledge with its own rules and relatively predictable order. In what follows, I briefly discuss the apparent patterns of this system.

First, there is a clear categorization in that each behavior is granted a heading and at least a paragraph of text. The headings not only categorize the behaviors in question, they also work to alert the volunteer to them. The volunteer is greeted with the headings: Cheating, Attendance, and Tardiness. In the case of “Cheating” and “Tardiness” there is a clear problematization; in the case of “Attendance” the problematization is more implied, but the mere fact that “Attendance” is given its own category suggests that it is in fact a problem. In the first few sentences of each section, each behavior is further defined as problematic; “Cheating” is re-introduced as “cheating” and is then briefly explained as “copying” and is then re-labeled as “cheating”; “attendance” is introduced in the first sentence as “poor attendance,” and “tardiness” is re-introduced as “tardiness”). In each section, the text then proceeds to offer the reader an explanation for the offending behavior; there is a rationalization of each behavior that is characterized by a tone of understanding: “cheating” is attributed to the purported “community-based” nature of Ecuadorian culture, “poor attendance” is attributed to students’ busy schedules and numerous professional responsibilities, “tardiness” is attributed to the demands of additional
university classes and slow public transportation; all of these explanations render the problems perfectly understandable in a sort of abstract sense and even grant the offending a student a modicum of empathy.

Next, however, the text orders the volunteer to not accept the behavior and to control and eliminate it by prohibiting and punishing it. This sort of 1-2 punch of explaining the behavior and then commanding the volunteer to punish it strikes a note of attempted pre-emption; it is as though the text of the guide anticipates an empathetic reaction on the part of the volunteer towards the offending student, and in a sense, allows this empathy or understanding to exist but then seeks to enervate its potential effect over the volunteer’s classroom management decisions. As the text instructs the volunteer on how to go about prohibiting and punishing the offending behavior, it reminds her that the behavior in question (cheating, absence, tardiness) is in fact a problem, no matter how understandable it may be: the “bad habit” of cheating “will prevent many students from learning or processing any information on their own”; “poor attendance” will keep the class from “moving forward”; and, with respect to “tardiness,” “if students feel they can meander in at any time during your class, providing an engaging teaching atmosphere will be impossible.” Then, the text instructs the volunteer on how to go about prohibiting and punishing, offering suggestions (many given in command form) as to how to do this through the establishment of specific policies and the use of certain practices. Importantly, failing students is strongly suggested as a useful method of disciplining two of the three problem behaviors (“cheating” and poor attendance).

The discursive effect of this text is multiple. For one, it immediately encodes the Ecuadorian student as a problematic pupil and works to put the volunteer on defense (or really, offense) against the Ecuadorian student before he has ever even entered the country, let alone met his students. Again, the Manual in which this text appears is one that, depending on date of application/acceptance/counter-acceptance is sent out to volunteers weeks, maybe months in advance of their departure for Ecuador. It conceivably creates an expectation or an image of the Ecuadorian student that may become ever more entrenched in the volunteer’s imagination as
time goes on. Secondly, as mentioned before, this text is clearly authorizing the volunteer to enter Ecuadorian classrooms and police behavior that he or she is led to believe is typically Ecuadorian. It thus subjectifies the volunteer as both a moral and a sort of institutional (as well as international) authority, vesting in him or her the right to make decisions that undoubtedly can wield a great deal of influence and consequence in the lives of other individuals (i.e. their students). Indeed, failing a student is no small matter, and it is worth noting that the act of encouraging volunteers to abruptly impose such an extreme punishment for these behaviors while simultaneously purporting to volunteers that students are not typically failed for “cheating” or for “poor attendance” can be read as constituting an institutional licensing (and commandment, even) of volunteers to commit a sort of symbolically violent “shock therapy.”

On a similar note, and also in a very clear way, volunteers are more generally being advised to not conform to or respect the rules and practices of the host society. Rather, they are being instructed to enter the Ecuadorian teaching institution and consciously contravene certain teacher rules and teacher practices that are being defined for them as foundational and typically Ecuadorian (i.e. treating the student behavior of copying in class as a social norm that is not particularly egregious; allowing students to arrive after a class has begun; tolerating a certain degree of student absences). In this way, they are not merely being instructed to engage in a form of symbolic violence; more specifically, they are being instructed to do so consciously and intentionally, to do so from a position of understanding that they are not just policing certain behaviors, but that they are policing behaviors to which their students are purportedly accustomed and which Ecuadorian society purportedly treats as normal and not at all problematic. Whether or not these behaviors are actually common, “typical,” and/or non-problematized in Ecuador is not really the point here; the more salient matter is that in these textual excerpts of the Global Community Manual there is an instance of attempted subject formation going on whereby the US-American volunteer is being constructed as an authority in the Ecuadorian classroom and is being instructed to exercise this authority by intentionally going against what are being constructed as Ecuadorian cultural and social norms by remaining loyal to
what are subtly being constructed as superior US-American teaching norms (i.e. not tolerating cheating, lateness, or absences) and by resisting any impulse to exercise empathy or culturally sensitivity in devising and carrying out his or her practices of classroom management.

“Student-Managed” Classrooms and the Communicative Language Teaching Approach

The foregoing section illustrated the ways in which Global Community Ecuador authorized the volunteers to venture to Ecuador, enter Ecuadorian classrooms as teachers, and conceivably imagine themselves as regulators of behaviors presented to them as characteristically Ecuadorian. But what else was it that the program was authorizing them to do once they entered the classroom? Having discredited Ecuadorian teachers and Ecuadorian teaching methods and problematized Ecuadorian student behaviors, what was it that (in addition to prohibiting and punishing certain student behaviors) volunteers were in fact to do as individuals that had been enlisted and authorized to help ameliorate such conditions? The answer to this question was illustrated in large part on Day Four of Orientation (and was reinforced repeatedly on many days thereafter).

At 10 o’clock on a sunny Thursday morning, Tim stood at the front of the hotel conference room that would serve as the Orientation location for the next few weeks. On the white board that stood to his left he had written the “title” of the session: “Oh no! How in the world do I manage my classroom?” Modeling in explicit fashion the lesson-planning format that April had taught the volunteers the day before, Tim had followed the “title” (step one in the standard lesson plan) with a clearly labeled “objective” (step two):

Objective: To give you tools to create a classroom environment in order to prevent problems from occurring. To introduce you to strategies for dealing with problems when they occur.

After giving the volunteers a few moments to read the text he had written, Tim then announced that they were going to do a “warmer” (the third component of the lesson plan format they had been taught). “For the next two minutes you’re going to work with a partner,” he told them. “One person will talk for 60 seconds about their concerns about what they will face in the classroom and I want you to base this on teaching experience and what you are seeing and
hearing about Ecuadorian society. During this time, the other person can only listen. After sixty seconds, you’re gonna switch and the other person who was listening is going to share their concerns while the first person listens. Okay, you can just work with the person next to you.”

Looking at his watch, he announced, “Okay, go!”

The volunteers turned to one another and the room began to fill and reverberate with the sounds of their voices. After some time had passed, Tim checked his watch and called out, “Switch!” The volunteers obliged until sixty more seconds had gone by. “Okay guys,” Tim announced, “we’re short on time, so we’re just going to move directly into the “Diagnostic” portion of the session” (again modeling the flow of the lesson plan format the volunteers had been taught the day before). Looking down into the front row, he asked, “Can you pass these around?”

Holding a stack of white paper, Tim then divided it into two thinner stacks and give one to Daniel, who sat in the front row to his left and the other to Melanie, who sat in the front row to his right. When one of the stacks came to me, I took one, passed, and looked down at my sheet of paper where I found a printed chart (Figure 1).

**FIGURE 1. Teacher’s and Learner’s Roles**
Teacher’s and Learner’s Roles - Task 1: Look at the following list of activities that are carried out in the language classroom

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>T’s Responsibility</th>
<th>SS’ Responsibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Handing out papers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Using visual aids</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presenting a new language point</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reviewing a language point</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forming groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deciding on breaks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allocating turns to speak</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choosing materials</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choosing activities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creating materials</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giving feedback</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correcting work</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintaining discipline</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moving furniture</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Testing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giving praise</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Writing on the board</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Once all of the sheets had been distributed, Tim announced that they were going “work on this as one group.” He continued, “The point is to think about which activities are the responsibility of the teacher and which are the responsibility of the students. What do you guys think—well, as Daniel and Melanie just demonstrated, the first one can obviously be a student responsibility. What about the next one? Using visual aids?” Hands went into the air. “Yeah, Leslie?”

“Well, one of the March volunteers was telling me how you can involve the students in making up the classroom rules and then have them make posters that have the rules listed on them, and that way, it’ll hold them more responsible because they were involved in making them and like, making them part of the classroom.”

“Yup,” Tim replied, nodding. “That’s great, so having students help with setting classroom rules and then making them do a dope poster or two with the rules on it. That way, they’re invested and whenever anyone breaks a rule, you can say, “Well, you know you helped come up with that rule, so what are you doing?” A few people laughed. “Good, anything else? Volunteers studied the handout in silence for a few moments. Then, Josh raised his hand and pointed out that all of the activities could be “student responsibilities.” At this, Tim smiled brightly, as though a puzzle had been solved. “Yeah, this is really the trick. Most of these can be the responsibility of the students. Make the classroom as student-managed, as student-run, as student centered as possible – and not teacher-focused.” For the next 20 minutes, he continued to lead them through the sheet, with volunteers now directed to come up with ways in which each activity could be made the responsibility of the students.

After they had completed the sheet, Tim gave them a “stretch break.” When they reconvened, he brought up a new issue: “So what about the possibility of students rejecting teacher authority?” The room remained quiet, as volunteers seemed to mull this over. Tim continued, “What you guys should consider is this: Do the students have a stake in the rules or not? Are you, the teacher, offending them in some way? Do you, the teacher, have a connection with them or no connection with them?” He advised the volunteers that with respect to classroom
management, they should never lose their tempers, as students would lose respect for them and would probably find it funny. At this point, Aaron raised his hand and shared that when he was in the third grade, he and his classmates had been really proud of the fact that they had made their teacher cry.

Checking his watch, Tim quickly closed the session by touching upon the Global Community approach of “English through English,” telling them, “As you guys know, we really, really encourage you to speak only in English in your classrooms because this is really the way that they are going to learn the language. And, once you bring Spanish into your classroom, it is never going out. It is never leaving.” At this point, a hand drifted up.

“Yeah, Jeremy?”

“Is it appropriate to tell them I will not speak Spanish or respond in Spanish for the entire semester?”

“Yes.” After a pause, Tim continued, “Talk to April, she will tell you that in all her years of teaching ESL in Latin America – and she’s taught a lot more than I have – she never spoke Spanish in her classrooms, right April?” At this April looked up from her seat at the back of the room, where she had apparently been busy with some paperwork. Without missing a beat, she adopted a wide-eyed expression of earnesty, and said to the volunteers, “It’s true. If you write the word manzana on the board, they will speak to you in Spanish for the rest of the year. I promise.” Her face then breaking into a grin, she said, “I mean, come on, your parents did not sit with you when you were a baby with flashcards until you learned to talk!” At this several people in the group laughed.

As this vignette begins to ethnographically illustrate what it was exactly that field directors Tim and April were authorizing volunteers to do in their classrooms, it is critical to situate this “what” in broader educational paradigms and consider the ways in which these paradigms relate to political objectives of the neoliberal state. First, the exercise of making virtually all classroom activities the “responsibility” of the student and Tim’s command that volunteers make their classrooms “as student-managed, as student-run, as student centered as possible” might be
considered to be indexing an apparent commitment to what has been termed Self Regulated Learning (SRL). According to leading self-regulation proponent Barry Zimmerman (2002), Self Regulated Learning developed by way of educational psychology studies that found that when students were asked to set goals for themselves and self-record their progress towards meeting them, those who set specific goals demonstrated advanced achievement and senses of self-efficacy. In the meantime, just asking students to self-record prompted “spontaneous” improvements in functioning” (p. 65). As Martin and McLellan (2007) have pointed out, the advent of Self-Regulated Learning has prompted a number of different interpretations and thus a fair amount of “conceptual confusion.” However, as Zimmerman describes it, “self-regulation is not a mental ability or an academic performance skill; rather it is the self-directive process by which learners transform their mental abilities into academic skills. Learning is viewed as an activity that students do for themselves in a proactive way rather than as a covert event that happens to them in reaction to teaching” (p. 65).

As Stephen Vassallo (2013) has argued, Self Regulated Learning can at first glance appear to make common cause with Paulo Freire’s (1968/2000) oft-cited pedagogy of the oppressed, which rejects what Freire famously conceived as the traditional “banking model” of education. As the name suggests, under this model, students are treated, Freire argued, as passive recipients of information being deposited into them by their teachers. Citing the affirmation of student (and teacher) humanity as the broader objective of education, Freire argued for what he described as a liberating pedagogy, which assists students in becoming active participants in their own education. In this pedagogy, the teacher’s role is to engage students in a process of simultaneously adapting to but also critically transforming their realities as they do so; Freire referred to the latter process as integration. Moreover, as Vassallo interprets Freire, adaptation without integration is conceived as a “mechanism of control, subordination, and domination because the focus of change is on the consciousness of the oppressed, not the situation that oppresses him” (Vassallo, 2013, p. 566). Freire insisted on a dual process and
rejected adaptation by itself, citing it as being "symptomatic of dehumanization" (as cited in Vassallo, 2013, p. 566).

Thus, as both Self Regulated Learning and Freire’s pedagogical model put forth visions of a student-centered learning process, one can see how many could champion Self Regulated Learning as a liberatory pedagogy that has much in common with that of Freire; (one can also see how Self Regulated Learning advocates could co-opt the Freirean perspective). However, as Vassallo cautions, this would be a misguided move, as Self Regulated Learning not only tends to focus exclusively on adaptation, but is also characterized by a will to impart upon students “homogenized and preformulated ways of being, knowing, and doing;” in other words, Self Regulated Learning is premised on teaching students particular strategies and having them utilize them on their own volition, it is not oriented towards having students question or critically transform the strategies they are taught or the fact that they are required to utilize them. Finally, in its focus on adaptation Student Regulated Learning, Vassallo (2013) argues, “aligns with the neoliberal logic to produce adaptable, self-interested, responsibilized individuals so they can operate within environments that are characterized by choice, competition, and personalized learning” (p. 568). In this light, the uncritical promotion of “student-run” classrooms on the part of Global Community (via Tim and April) takes on heightened significance, and this is particularly so when considering the context of neoliberal imperialism in which international volunteering is currently taking place. Here, one can hypothesize that the particular governing of US volunteers that happens by way of the governmental instrument of Global Community is one in which the former are theoretically being subjectified as conduits of a neoliberal subjectification of Ecuadorian students while at the same time being subjectified as neoliberal citizens who, under the tutelage of the program, come to believe fervently in the value of self-administered and self-managed education and the importance of responsibilizing “misguided” citizens of Third World countries so that they too adopt these values and behaviors.

Returning to that fourth day of Orientation, Self Regulated Learning was not the only method being implicitly referenced by Tim and April’s statements. In their jointly leveled injunction
that volunteers banish Spanish-speaking from their classrooms and speak only to their students in English, Tim and April were also indexing the particular version of the Communicative Language Teaching (CLT) approach that forms the cornerstone of Global Community approach to language instruction. As April described this approach to me one day:

…this communicative approach, teaching the target language through the target language, letting the students talk rather than you, and keeping them active, activities and all of that. And, I totally believe that’s the way to teach a language and learn a language.

In their discussion of the Communicative Language Teaching approach, Richards and Rodgers (2007) point out “there is no single text or authority on it, nor any single model that is universally accepted as authoritative” (p. 155). Generally speaking, they inform us, the Communicative Language Teaching approach has been championed as one that posits an interdependent relation between language and communication, prioritizes absolutely the ability to communicate in the target language (also known as “communicative competence”), and calls for teaching techniques that engage the student in continual practice of the language. To this end, telltale classroom techniques of the Communicative Language Teaching approach include the use of pair work, role-playing exercises, and small group activities, all of which are held as interactional activities through which using the language is in fact prioritized.

To provide some background to this approach, the Communicative Language Teaching paradigm emerged in the 1970s as part of a response to new critiques of structuralist linguistic theories that had prevailed in the West over the course of the 20th century. In the late 1950s, Noam Chomsky, for example, had argued that structuralist linguistic theory could not account for “the creativity and uniqueness of individual sentences” (Richards and Rodgers, 2007, p. 153), which, Chomsky argued, was a fundamental aspect of language. Around the same time, British applied linguists critiqued Audiolingual approaches to teaching language for overlooking the “functional and communicative potential of language” (Richards and Rodgers, 2007, p. 153); as Richards and Rodgers state, this group “saw the need to focus in language teaching on communicative proficiency rather than on mere mastery of structures” (Ibid). As Richards and
Rodgers also highlight, another critical factor in the paradigmatic shift toward a communication-oriented approach to language teaching was the accelerated economic integration of the European countries that had joined the European Common Market, which was essentially an intra-European “free trade” agreement of the mid-20th century. By the 1970s, the Council of Europe was lobbying for the development of new and alternative foreign language teaching approaches that would better equip European adults with the skills to communicate in the major languages of the Common Market (Ibid).

In this context, the idea emerged that Audiolingualist approaches were flawed, and that a more effective language teaching methodology would be one that placed less emphasis on grammar and attend more seriously to cultivating communicative abilities among students. In short, as the principle of communication came to wield tremendous influence in the linguistics field, there ensued in the world of language teaching what Claire Kramsch (2014) has referred to as the “communicative revolution of the 1970s and 1980s, an event which forcefully emphasized the need for learners to acquire usable skills, contrasted with previous approaches that taught how to master the intricacies of the linguistic system without any concern about its use value as a mode of communication” (p. 301).

As with Self Regulated Learning, in recent years, scholars have argued that Communicative Language Teaching also adheres to a neoliberal logic. Specifically, it has been contended that in prioritizing the communicative ability of the student, CLT easily falls into neoliberal schemes of human capital development that have overtaken the industry of foreign language education, more broadly. For example, in their fascinating account, Heller and Duchene (2012, cited in Kramsch 2014, p. 301) show how, at least since the mid-1990s there has been a sea change in how many nations frame the purpose of foreign language education. In the past, they claim, foreign language ability among citizenries was often framed as a point of nationalist pride, whereas, at the end of the 20th century, the ability to speak multiple languages became more heavily associated with maximizing the profit-making capabilities of citizens. In this light, one can see that, in its focus on the development of language as a practical skill (as opposed to a
kind of intellectual mastery), the Communicative Language Teaching approach coheres with the broader reframing of foreign language learning as a means to the neoliberal end of enhanced marketplace participation on the part of the individual.

**Erasing and Replacing Ecuadorian Teachers and Ecuadorian Teaching Practices/Methods**

As the previous section illustrated, by the time that volunteers began Orientation in Ecuador, the case against Ecuadorian teaching methods and teachers had already been made on the website and in the guide that volunteers had received in the mail. During the Orientation of the cohort that I followed, I found that talk of Ecuadorian teaching methods and teachers was kept to a minimum (which may or may not have had something to do with my presence). Unlike, the Manual, which had explicitly discredited Ecuadorian teaching methods, during the Orientation teacher training the field directors actually said very little about Ecuadorian teaching methods and instead focused most of their sessions on promoting and teaching the “student-centered” teaching methods and “Communicative Language Teaching” approach that is officially advocated by the program (both discussed below). In this way, whereas the Manual had condemned and advised against Ecuadorian teaching methods, thus establishing them as a “problem,” field directors now went about the business of imparting the “solution.”

However, the persistent silence around Ecuadorian teaching methods produced its own effect. It did not simply leave Ecuadorian teaching methods in some sort of neutral territory. Rather, it powerfully delegitimized them, rendering them unknown and irrelevant, unworthy of being known or considered in any way other than the simplistic descriptions of “traditional,” “rote memorization,” and “structured and rigid classrooms” that the Manual employed. Like the Manual, there was no mention of how memorization for example partakes of a specific, recognized school of teaching methodology known as the Audiolingual approach. Further, the practice of not talking about Ecuadorian teaching methods with the volunteers, conceivably managed whatever interior resistance, doubts, or questions the volunteers may have been grappling with regarding the ethics, legitimacy, and implications of imposing teaching methods that were understood to contravene the “typical” Ecuadorian teaching methods. This marginalization of Ecuadorian
teaching methods, also conceivably allowed field directors to avoid reconciling the act of imposing a foreign system in Ecuadorian classrooms with the organization’s official ethos of cultural sensitivity and respect for the host culture.

Additionally, by keeping Ecuadorian teaching methods off the table, the field directors averted or at least did not invite any critical engagement on the part of the volunteers with the ethical implications of utilizing teaching methods that would be culturally and pedagogically unfamiliar to most students, or the political implications of US-Americans carrying out such an act in Ecuadorian classrooms. Finally, this silence also invited the volunteers into a particular way of approaching and intervening in Ecuador (and conceivably the entire developing world of which Ecuador was understood to be a part). This way was characterized by avoiding any serious consideration or engagement with the Ecuadorian educational institution and simply assuming deficiency, which in turn worked as justification enough for them to impose an alternative method. Moreover, the volunteers were being encouraged to do all of this uncritically and unreflexively, simply following the mandate of the field directors.

There was one exception to this overwhelmingly prevalent pattern of silence, however, when one morning, April’s low opinion of Ecuadorian teacher’s came to the surface. At the end of Tim’s session on classroom management (discussed above), Tim had been called away by a semi-urgent text pertaining to Global Community business, and April had then closed the hour by taking some questions from the group. Almost immediately, Jeremy raised his hand. When April nodded at him, he asked, “How do schools and families react to student-centered methods?” Smiling, April responded, “It’s not that the national teachers are all bad. It’s just that they haven’t been trained in TEFL methods.” After a brief pause, she then added reassuringly, “The universities we send you to, they love you.”

Again, this moment was unique, the exception to the bulk of the teacher trainings sessions, which instead of criticizing Ecuadorian teachers outright, were focused on fervently training the volunteers in the methods of Communicative Language Teaching approach, sharing ideas on how to teach speaking, writing, reading, and pronunciation in a CLT-appropriate way,
and conducting some review of English grammar tenses. Indeed, other than this afternoon, I would not hear either of them talk about or against Ecuadorian teachers or Ecuadorian teaching methods. Still, April’s comment stayed on my mind as a moment when the implied briefly became explicit; a moment when her words, so brief, so direct, and so certain, had powerfully pulled it all together with a sort of breathtaking ease. Her comments not only acted as a verbal confirmation to the case that had already been made against Ecuadorian teachers and methods, but also hung in the air as an open invitation for volunteers to understand themselves as the superior alternative vis-à-vis their Ecuadorian counterparts.

**Becoming Teachers**

Over the course of the month-long Orientation, the volunteers I followed passed through a total 17 instructional sessions led by field directors, current volunteers, and invited speakers. In addition to these sessions, and as promised by the website, volunteers also completed a two-week teaching-practicum at a local vocational institute, which offers the classes to students at no cost. Held at the Quito branch of a nationwide Ecuadorian public vocational institute, the teaching practicum took place five days a week for the final two weeks of Orientation. Field directors divided the volunteers up into teams of three, and each team was assigned to a class of adult students, who had enrolled specifically for the two-week practicum and received the classes free of charge, as well as a certificate of completion. By the end of the practicum, each volunteer had co-designed a syllabus and curriculum with her teammates and independently taught an entire class three times. Generally, the last day of class was given over to a farewell class party. Additionally, each volunteer had observed at least one class of a fellow volunteer, as required by field directors.

During the practicum period, I sat in on the classes of seven different volunteers, observing what turned out to be a good degree of variation in teacher performance. Up in front of students for the first time, some projected an easy confidence at the front of the classroom, seeming to take to the task with ease and managing to give the impression that they had been teaching for years. Others fidgeted nervously and appeared to want to be anywhere but standing
in front of their students. Some awkwardly stumbled their way through “teacher talk time,” but pushed forward, feigning confidence as they awkwardly copied the language, gestures, and activities that field directors were modeling for them. Some spoke loudly and clearly, their voices easily ringing across the classroom to the back walls. While some were friendly and warm towards their students, others were more reserved. Some people were able to capture their students’ attention, while others failed to do so. Regardless of their performances, most seemed to be trying to do their best to adopt the Communicative Language Teaching blueprint they had been provided with.

When volunteers faltered, I suspected a confluence of factors — a case of nerves, uncertainty of what steps to take in order to lead a classroom, an understanding of what steps to take but a lack of practice. This two-week period was indeed called “practice teaching.” However, regardless of their performances in the classroom, I noticed that, upon accomplishing the requirement of teaching three classes alone, many exuded a great sense of accomplishment, which seemed to instill in them a new measure of confidence going forward.

For Leslie, whom I never observed during the practicum, practice teaching had been “scary,” but she had come out of it “excited.” “I liked student teaching,” she told me, “That was good, that was scary but like, I’m glad we did it there, glad we got observed.” Similarly, Shannon told me, “In Quito when I did my practice teaching I was like, ‘Okay, I’m gonna be a teacher.’ Like, I was like super excited about it but that was sort of a fake environment. It was like five students and I taught them for like a week and everything was great (laughing) and I was like, ‘Oh I love it.’ I felt comfortable in front of them, I felt like I was — they understood me. I had an advanced class and so I was like, ‘Great! I’m gonna be a teacher!’ Abby echoed Shannon’s comments, declaring, “I’m a teacher now!” and marveled at how just a few times in front of a class had helped to actually feel like a teacher.

By the end of the teaching practicum, many volunteers professed a sense of confidence about going into the classrooms at their respective field sites. Moreover, it appeared that most of them had taken the lessons of their teacher training to heart and had become full-fledged
advocates of them. As Ashley told me one afternoon, “I feel like that’s what Global Community preaches is, get them to speak a lot, get them to do activities a lot so they can learn on their own so they’re actually going to remember it. I like that a lot.” Many were excited about the teaching methods they had been trained to use, and, apparently without stopping to think about the implications of implementing them in Ecuadorian classrooms were such methods were purportedly quite foreign, most seemed eager to implement them in their own classrooms. Indeed, for many of the volunteers the methods seemed to agree with their sensibilities that learning should be “fun”; to many of them the methods made sense and felt comfortable. “I can give you adjectives,” Josh told me when I asked him to describe the Global Community methods. “Active, engaging, thought-provoking. Fun, also. Which a lot of educators, I think now, fun was always word that was sort of shunned in the classroom, like classrooms aren’t supposed to be fun. I understand that argument. But, if you make a classroom engaging, it becomes fun. And I think the strategies and activities that Global Community, that we focused on specifically this year, focusing on activities was, yeah, very beneficial.”

10.4 “Hoop”

One Saturday night in March, Melanie, Abby, Erin and I stood around a large red-tiled kitchen, chatting about the current goings-on of their cohort. We were in the small northern highland city of Guaranda and we had gathered at the home of Melanie’s host family, who was out of town for the weekend. Erin and I had taken the bus into Guaranda that morning, traveling about an hour southwest from Ambato, the mid-sized sierra city where Erin, along with three other volunteers had been placed. I had arrived in Ambato two days earlier to conduct interviews and participant-observation, and was happy to accept Erin’s invitation to tag along with her to visit Abby and Melanie, two other volunteers with whom she had become good friends during Orientation.

Like most U.S.-American volunteers, Erin was in her early twenties, college-educated and of a background that was distinctly upper middle class. She had grown up in a wealthy neighborhood of Bethesda, Maryland and after graduating from high school she had attended a
liberal arts college, majoring in Spanish and Anthropology. Like many of her friends, she had studied abroad during college, living in Chile for one semester and completing a stint in Spain the following summer. She had plans of becoming a physical therapist and thought she might like to work with Spanish-speaking populations. It was during her senior year of college that Erin had discovered Global Community.

In her 23 years, Erin had never taught before but after one month of training, and as promised by the program, she had been placed as an English teacher at a vocational school in a mid-size city, presiding over four English classes that amounted to a total of 80 students, a group that included adolescents enrolled by enterprising middle-class parents, twenty-somethings and thirty-somethings who needed to provide English certification for their jobs, and more senior students in their sixties and seventies who professed to Erin an enjoyment of learning English for the sake of learning English.

Upon arriving in Guaranda, Abby had met us at the bus station and led us back to her host family’s home, a large structure of white adobe walls, a sloping terra cotta roof, and the protection of an iron gated perimeter. There we had hung out in her room, discussing the new group of volunteers before going downstairs to eat lunch with Elizabeth, Abby’s “host mother.” After lunch Erin and I had accompanied Abby to a basketball game that she was scheduled to play in. Melanie had met up with us at the school gymnasium where it was being held, and sat with us on the bleachers, cheering for Abby’s team and grilling me for any news of the other volunteers. After the game, we had all hung out for the rest of afternoon, accompanying Abby back home, waiting for her to shower and change, visiting a local café, and finally making a trip to the local supermarket in search of ingredients for brownies. Now, in the kitchen of Melanie’s host family the scent of baking chocolate drifted through the room and plans had been made to go out to a local discoteca later. As we stood around, I listened as they swapped volunteer gossip, gasping over who had hooked up with whom, exclaiming at how drunk some of their fellow volunteers had gotten at recent Carnaval festivities, and questioning the credibility of the new assistant field director. It was the sort of conversation I had heard many times in various iterations
among different volunteers. Everyone in the cohort, it seemed, enjoyed catching up on whatever tidbits were traveling through the volunteer grapevine at any given moment. Soon however, when we had exhausted our collective knowledge of group gossip, Erin was telling us a different kind of anecdote.

“Oh my God,” she began, her eyes wide as she addressed Melanie and Abby, “I told Caitlin this already, but I’ve been meaning to tell you guys this, the funniest thing. My host sister told me that the other day her English teacher taught them the word “huge” and she told them that it’s pronounced ‘hoog!’” Her eyes crinkled as she burst out laughing. The others joined immediately. “Oh my God!” “Are you serious?!” “That’s hilarious!”

It was my second time hearing Erin tell this story. The night before, over beers at a bar in Ambato, I had listened as she had told it to a group of acquaintances -- a fellow Global Community volunteer named Karen and two Ecuadorian English teachers, Sonia and Mauricio, who had befriended her over the last few months. Interestingly to me, Erin had not seemed to feel any compunction at ridiculing her host sister’s Ecuadorian English teacher in front of two Ecuadorian English teachers – and, for their part, Sonia and Mauricio had simply laughed along with her, as she exclaimed in Spanish, that “hoog” was her new favorite word. It was not until our interview the following afternoon at a local café back in Ambato that I began to glean something about the significance of the story for Erin’s sense of herself as a teacher and her authority to actually work as a teacher without ever having taught before. This had come out when I had mentioned that I was interested in learning how she and her peers thought about any “larger impact” that they (and the organization, more generally) might be having in Ecuador. Erin had responded:

E: I mean, I definitely do things differently than other Ecuadorian teachers do, like I mean like I said I wasn’t an education major, like I’m not a model teacher by any means, but I consider myself way better than some Ecuadorian teachers that I’ve just heard about. I can’t say I’ve ever sat in on a class, but like my host sister is in level eight and she’s in the highest level and they just send her home with these multiple choice problems to do and she says the teacher just doesn’t really teach us anything, we just kind of sit there and do these grammar problems. And I mean, I don’t know, so that’s in the Técnica program. Her high school English teacher, which she’s technically part of the bilingual secretarial program, technically bilingual, her teacher told them to pronounce the word
“huge” as “hoog.” I was dying when she told me this. “hoog” is my new favorite word. And she sits in class and cringes and so it’s kind of nice for me to know that even if I don’t have a master’s degree in education, even if I don’t really know what I’m doing, I’m doing a better job than my Ecuadorian counterparts. And I think, I don’t know, just having my students realize that learning English can be fun and that your teachers, I don’t know, are not dictators or I don’t know, like, the way were taught in Orientation was to use activities and make it fun for the students and actually get them speaking English in class, and not have it be so teacher-centered the way Ecuadorian teachers do. I try to make it student-centered and I think that’s a big difference.

C: Yeah. Well, that’s interesting. Can you talk a little more about the Global Community approach and more of like, how that’s different from what you’ve kind of gleaned about the Ecuadorian approach?

E: Yeah. I mean, it seems like they just copy off of the board for most subjects, and even for English, apparently their teachers clearly don’t speak English. How are they going to learn English from people who don’t speak it? And even the particular teacher who teaches her [host sister’s] level eight class speaks fantastic English, I’ve had great conversations with her in English, but she’s not a great teacher. And I don’t know, the Global Community approach that I learned in orientation is to play games with your students, get them interested, yes, teach them grammar, but have it be interesting, keep them engaged and keep them talking and to keep them moving, all of these things that I feel like Ecuadorian teachers are not trained or even think of doing. So and that definitely makes an impact on the students that we have. Plus just I show up on time to my classes, which is not something that all Ecuadorian teachers do.

C: How did you figure that out?

E: From hearing stories from the different students or my host sisters and when I tell my students I start my class, I know it says 7 o’clock, I start my class at 7 o’clock. I don’t shut them out, they can always come in, but I mark them late and if you come past 7:00, at 7:02 you’re late, which is not something that they’re used to.

What is striking about Erin’s remarks is that, when asked about “larger impact,” she immediately referenced the ways in which she did things “differently” than Ecuadorian teachers, thus not only invoking a key precept of the Global Community Ecuador discourse around the teaching stint but also conflating an imagined broader change (presumably understood as beneficial to Ecuador) with something that would contravene an imagined Ecuadorian typicality. In this way, the starkest assumptions of the civilizing mission/international development project are laid quite bare: the impact being sought requires and is brought about by a decisive and intentional break with what the majority of the country’s leaders and authorities are doing and how they do it.
However, equally significant was the way in which Erin’s remarks were couched in her own sense of insecurity as a novice teacher and how the imperialist ‘truth’ of sub-par Ecuadorian teachers/superior US-American Global Community teachers seemed to swoop in to provide a chauvinistic salve for what appeared as a somewhat fragile sense of confidence in her abilities as a teacher. Having been subjected to a discourse in which she was led to step into a teacher subject position that was constructed as categorically superior to Ecuadorian teachers because of a particular methodology (as well as a native speaker fluency in English required of all Global Community volunteers) and then fixing on cases that she perceived as proving this point (an Ecuadorian teacher’s alleged teaching incorrect pronunciation, tales of an Ecuadorian teacher overly fixating on grammar, impressions of Ecuadorian teacher permissiveness with respect to student lateness), it appears that Erin was able to stake, bolster, and even derive a sense of pleasure from, an otherwise tenuous claim to authority precisely by understanding herself as unequivocally superior to “most Ecuadorian teachers.” What is striking is not only the brazen chauvinism, but also the fact that it is being engaged in by someone who, before arriving in Ecuador, had never taught before.

When one takes a step further back, this dynamic becomes even more compelling as it reveals the ways in which the self-authorization of the volunteers as teachers was not an act that had to be accomplished once, but was rather an ongoing process to be perpetually engaged and amid the chatter of interior disruptions leveled by doubts about one’s ability. (As Erin said: “I’m not a model teacher by any means …”; “…even if I don’t have a master’s degree in education, even if I don’t really know what I’m doing …”). Such a dynamic also points to the ways in which a discursive production of Ecuadorian teacher inferiority is critical not only to the early phases of this self-authorization that take place during volunteer recruitment (where theoretically volunteers must begin to imagine and thus authorize themselves as future teachers, despite having never taught before) and pre-departure preparation (where Global Community continues to authorize volunteers by constructing Ecuadorian teaching methods as “traditional” and actively discourages volunteers from emulating Ecuadorian teachers), but also to the ongoing self-authorization
processes of some Global Community volunteer teacher subjects once they are in the classroom and well along into the teaching stint.

To be certain, it is entirely possible that Erin could have arrived at similar or identical ideas about herself in relation to Ecuadorian teachers had she come independently to Ecuador to teach English. As post-development scholars have demonstrated, this assumption of superiority over nationals of the host developing country is an engrained truism of US imperial discourse that shapes most Western interventions; it is in many ways, the premise of the entire post-World War II development project. This discourse operates independently of Global Community, undoubtedly coloring the ways in which many Northerners/Westerners think when they contemplate the idea of Northern/Western people doing work in developing countries. That notwithstanding, it is evident that as an institution that I am conceiving as an instrument of government, Global Community does nothing to challenge or disrupt such a chauvinist discourse, but rather reproduces and scaffolds it. According to Global Community’s particular iteration of this discourse, the idea that volunteers are superior to Ecuadorian teachers is a mundane and commonsense assumption and it is by way of the deployment and circulation of this discourse that volunteers are informally authorized not only to enter Ecuadorian classrooms as teachers but moreover, to come to understand themselves as being superior to experienced Ecuadorian teachers (despite their abbreviated training, limited time in the classroom, and whatever struggles they have in the classroom) and, in so doing, claim a certain moral and pedagogical authority over Ecuadorian teachers. Further, it was as a subject situated in this discourse that Erin was both ready with one, a notion of her role in Ecuador when I asked her about “larger impact” and two, an apparent balm for interior anxieties about teaching ability that symbolically disrupted any claim to authority that had been so carefully cultivated by Global Community discourse. In this way, it becomes clear how the construction of Ecuadorian teacher inferiority is both critical to the production of volunteer authority and US authority (and implied supremacy) vis-à-vis Ecuador (and the developing world more broadly) that is at the heart of the Global Community Ecuador teaching stint – and the ways in which the production of the two is inextricably intertwined. Notably, it was with the help of this
discursive truth that Erin was able to express with a knowing, if tenuous, certainty that she was doing a better job than her Ecuadorian counterparts and to marshal this idea to serve at least two purposes at once, even as she conceded the possibility of personal shortcomings due to lack of experience and the fact that she herself had never actually been in a class taught by an Ecuadorian teacher.

10.5 “Deathly dry”

Another example of the ways in which volunteers defended against self-generated questionings of their authority with certain imperialist ‘truths’ that had been circulated during Orientation was illustrated in Abby’s narrative. On the night that followed the day of Abby’s basketball game, I walked with Abby, Melanie, and Erin through the streets of Guaranda. Traipsing through the cool damp air of the evening, we made our way through the dark and windy streets of the centro, the narrow cobblestone walkways soon giving way to wider sloping streets bathed in soft orange light of towering street lamps. A few moments ago we had been wandering through the bright aisles of the local supermercado, drawing stares as we searched for ingredients for brownies that Melanie had wanted to make. Now as we climbed towards the home of Melanie’s host family, Abby commented, “Oh my God, I’m so out of shape!” The rest of us commiserated with a breathless chorus of So am I’s and Me too’s, and Abby went on to reference her performance in the game that afternoon, laughing as she exclaimed, “Oh my God, I thought I was gonna faint today! I still can’t believe how good that other team was!”

As mentioned in Chapter 9, Abby was a 22-year-old volunteer from the suburbs of southern California. Describing her hometown as “your typical, terrible, American suburb,” she explained that it was “not diverse at all, pure white people, really Christian, really Mormon, really conservative.” A recent college graduate who, in the US-American context, would probably be read as “white” by most, Abby had also told me that she had always wanted to volunteer because “that’s basically the kind of work I do, always with people and usually trying to improve their situation to those who do not have the same opportunities or less opportunities.” During her
tenure as an undergraduate, she had worked with a legal aid organization and volunteered with several other non-profit organizations, but never as a teacher.

Disarmingly chipper and friendly to everyone, her voice carried a slight “Valley girl” inflection that juxtaposed perhaps unexpectedly with what she described as a lifelong interest in issues of “social justice.” When I commented that her interests and perspective seemed unlikely based on her description of her hometown, she laughed and agreed, noting that her boyfriend had said the same thing and then explaining, “I felt different because my parents are immigrants. I was one of the only Jewish people and I just felt different my whole life, and there was actually some prejudice against Jews. And I think that kind of shaped where I went from there, I think when you feel different, you become a critical thinker.” Indeed, apart from Melissa, Abby had been the only volunteer to question the politics of teaching English in Ecuador during our interview, telling me,

Honestly, I did not know about the teaching English thing. Honestly, I was even kind of-- I’m surprised I came because I was really skeptical of teaching English abroad because I don’t like the imperialistic aspect of it, even though it’s like a reality of international life. I mean obviously that’s what we have to recognize, but I still felt uncomfortable with the idea of helping people through learning English instead of more like a social program that maybe like Peace Corps would do.

When I had asked her to elaborate, she had explained, “Just like, English dominating the world and the United States having like a lot of power and me being an American and coming to another country and teaching English feels like – it’s a very sensitive thing to me. And so, I just – and the fact that like historically, when someone colonizes, they impose their language on the people.” She had quickly then added that she had come to realize that she and her fellow volunteers were not imposing, but rather responding to a real demand. “Obviously, we’re not imposing,” she had continued. “I mean, obviously, none of these things really apply because the people want to learn English, it’s a necessary language for lots of people all over the world and obviously that’s why I came, because I knew these things, but these are the things that still made me feel uncomfortable.” Ultimately, Abby said, she had been able to “get over” her “problems”
with the program, motivated in part by a desire to learn Spanish, a language she wanted to utilize in her intended career path.

By her own account, Abby had a great enthusiasm for the Global Community teaching methods. “Everything that we learned in that month of orientation,” she told me during an interview, “I think I have applied because I’ve never taught before and I’ve never had any training, so I just used the training that I was given and so I applied it, and I agreed with it. I agree with basically the Global Community philosophy and approach to teaching.” In describing her classroom, Abby used the lingo of Global Community, calling it “active,” “dynamic,” and “student-run,” but here, she paused and interrupted herself to qualify her description, “but even more than just like student run – because even though I feel like I usually decide what we’re going to do and then tell them what to do – I feel like it’s very interactive and dynamic and active, so I know what they want.” Thus, in an interesting way, Abby’s sense of authority had surfaced, seemingly inadvertently and/or unwittingly, in her narrative; in other words, even as she was committed to the idea of a “student-run” classroom (something which is perhaps never truly possible as long as there actually is a teacher to which students are accountable) she was clearly cognizant and felt the need to disclose a certain level of control she exercised in deciding what her students were “going to do” and telling them “what to do.” This moment underscores the point that, even for a volunteer most committed to “student-run classrooms,” there was embedded sort of authority-making that unfolds in the classroom as volunteers step into the role of teacher, deciding what their students are going to do, telling their students what to do, and managing how they do it.

This was not the extent of Abby’s authority, however. She was also engaged in a process of utilizing atypical teaching methods and requiring her students to conform. As it turned out, Abby’s authority to do this had been sanctioned from day one by the Ecuadorian director of the English department where she taught. “My boss actually introduced my first class,” she told me, “and in the introduction, he was like, ‘Global Community teaches really differently. They have a different methodology. Be open to it. They only teach in English. Help each other. Don’t be afraid.’ Like, he gave this little introduction, which I thought was funny, and I think they all knew, too,
because they’ve heard about us and they know that the classes are. Like, everyone knows Global Community here has classes that are like fun with games and that are interactive and active, so they know.” This vouching on the part of Abby’s boss illustrates how the actions of host country officials can figure as an important factor for whether with respect to volunteers’ negotiations of authority in the classroom. When I asked Abby how her students had responded to her methods

I think they knew what to expect, but at the same time, I think-- it was funny, my students were definitely shy in the beginning, like it was weird for them. They liked it, but it was like, “You’re kind of crazy.” But they’ve loosened up so much and they just-- you know what I mean? They love it and they expect that energy in the classroom. And they always, from the beginning, have come up to me and told me, “Your methodology is excellent. It’s so much better than the way we’ve ever learned English. We’ll apply this in our classroom,” which I think is so cool because sometimes, I meet students of the teachers in my classrooms and they would like tell me about a game that we played and it was automatically the next week applied in their classroom. So, sometimes it’s interesting because I feel like Global Community is spreading the methodology because we’re coming here and teach, and then if all my teachers begin teaching the way we teach, it’s really interesting that these stupid orientation games are like finding their way into like all of Ecuador’s classrooms. But yeah, they were shy. But I think they liked it.

Here it must be emphasized that without talking to the students Abby referenced or, even more preferably, having been in earshot at the time of their alleged comments, there is no way of validating that they actually uttered them or sincerely felt that her methods were superior to any other English teaching they had experienced. However, if we are to momentarily take Abby at her word and take her students’ comments at face value, what becomes salient is the way in which she narratively marshaled her students’ comments as a sort of self-spoken rejoinder to her own admission that her students were “shy in the beginning”, apparently unnerved by her methods. In Abby’s narrative it seems that this initial student reaction perhaps unsettled her sense of authority to utilize what she understood to be atypical teaching methods, but by the same token her students’ apparent affinity for her methods functioned as a source of reassurance about the legitimacy and ethics of what she was doing in the classroom. Even though her students had been shy in the beginning, they (or at least some of them) had also from the beginning come up to her and praised her teaching methods as being “better than the way we’ve ever learned English.” Still, as she continued to describe her time in the classroom, Abby effectively
questioned the legitimacy of her sanctioned authority and what she suspected as its basis. As she next told me:

Sometimes I feel, and I still feel this way, I feel like, because my coworkers at the university are all Ecuadorian professors, and I feel like I’m kind of like this random person there. They know I’m Global Community and I’m allowed to do whatever I want. Like no one would ever stop me because they want us there so bad. And so, sometimes I feel like they must see me as this crazy North American -- you know what I mean? Because sometimes if they walk by my classroom and music’s blasting and they’re running in and out of the classroom for like a running dictation and it’s like, “Who is this crazy woman and why is she teaching like this?”

With these comments, Abby expressed a clear understanding of the sort of privilege and authority she is granted because she is a volunteer from Global Community. Further her comments underscore a latent cognizance of the politics of it all. Specifically, she linked the fact that “I’m allowed to do whatever I want” in the classroom to a presumption that “they want us here so bad,” thus suggesting an impression on her part of a sort of exploitative relationship in which she as the US-American enjoys a certain freedom and autonomy to do what she likes as a teacher thanks to a certain desperation for and idealization of US-American teachers among her Ecuadorian colleagues. Such a realization posed a sort of internal disruption to Abby’s authority to do what she was doing in her classroom, and thus a sort of discursive opening. However, within seconds of uttering these reservations to me, Abby returned to the reception of her students as a justification for what she was doing:

But, they’re all interested. I have lots of students in the university that come to my class just to try to peek in and see what’s going on because it’s fascinating to them. So, it’s kind of funny. I like that. But it’s interesting.

With that last sentence – “But it’s interesting” – Abby indicated yet again her lingering ambivalence. At this point in her narrative, I was struck by an impression of an unresolved sense of authority on her part that was emergent in this pattern of oscillation on her part between feeling that she was authorized (by her boss, by her students’ reactions) and feeling that this authority was bogus, simply the product of US-American/Global Community dominance which she previously referenced. What she said next indicated the way in which she was nevertheless
equipped with imperialist truths about inferior Ecuadorian teachers and a related sense of self as
the bearer of superior teaching methods:

But when I look into their classrooms when I walk by, I would want to die. It's like men in
suits with a PowerPoint or a projector up and the students just in their desks, it's so quiet
and they're just like, "Blah, blah, blah." It just seems like-- I mean, our universities at
home are definitely like that, but they felt more lively than what I see here, in the U.S.
Because, of course, they're lecture-based, but there's something that seems so deathly
dry about it. I don't know.

Like Erin, Abby could certainly have arrived at the same or similar conclusions about her
Ecuadorian colleagues, their teaching methods, and the self-ascribed superiority of those she
used. However, what must be recalled is that such a description and classification of “Ecuadorian
teaching methods” was one that had been not only sanctioned by effectively fed to Abby and her
peers and indeed formed a large part of the basis of the subject formation of the Global
Community volunteer as a superior teacher in relation to Ecuadorian teachers. Having been led to
believe in the inferiority of Ecuadorian teaching methods and the innate superiority of the
methods she had learned, Abby was ready to defend her authority against her own self-
questioning with an imperialist ‘truth’ that had formed the basis of her training as a Global
Community volunteer English teacher.

10.6 “Problem” Student Behaviors as Symbolic Disruptions to Volunteer Authority and the
Deployment of Imperial ‘Truths’

As previously discussed, in Global Community’s printed materials and during Orientation,
the volunteers had been advised to expect certain “problems” from their students – cheating
among students, students missing class, students being late to class, and students speaking in
Spanish even after the volunteers had communicated to them the “English-only” – which (with the
exception of the last problem) were always implicitly and explicitly, attributed to Ecuadorian
culture. Another, less frequently mentioned “problem” centered on how Ecuadorian students
might respond to the use of unfamiliar teaching methods prescribed by Global Community’s
version of the Communicative Language Teaching approach. While this issue was not touched
upon (actively avoided, even) in Orientation, in the pre-departure guide, a lone sentence warned
the reader that, "Keep in mind that Ecuadorian students might be initially hesitant about your
teaching methods, as they may seem completely unfamiliar."

Over the course of the year when I visited and spoke with volunteers at their respective
sites, most had indeed encountered these behaviors among their students and had identified
them as problems that needed resolution. It was here that many of them staked their claims to
authority in the classroom and it was here that their authority to impose certain rules and teaching
methods contrived as contra-Ecuadorian was often symbolically disrupted by students' violations
of their rules and teaching styles as formulated in accordance with Global Community Ecuador
mandates. In this section, I examine how three different volunteers responded to three distinct
symbolic disruptions: student lateness/absence; student “cheating”; and, a perceived lack of
student receptivity to Communicative Language Teaching methods. I examine not only the
actions volunteers took in response to these disruptions, but also the ways in which they
narratively couched these actions in the imperialist Global Community discourse that constructs
the teaching stint as a cultural, moral, and educational intervention of sorts. In this way, this
section reveals how the program’s discourse contributes to the production – and preservation in
the face of disruption – of US authority in the Ecuadorian English classroom.

In the introductory chapter of this dissertation, I referenced a volunteer named Amanda
and her disapproval of latenesses and absences of her students. I suggested that, in criticizing
this behavior and resolving to prohibit it despite the fact it “culturally makes sense,” Amanda had
crafted a role for herself as an improver of Ecuador, contributing to what she constructed as a
much needed change by insisting that her students arrive on time and keep absences to a
minimum. Returning now to Amanda’s narrative, as our had conversation continued it had
become evident that in her classroom, Amanda felt completely justified in imposing her own rules
that deviated from what she explicitly understood to be dominant cultural norms. Moreover, to
force students to comply with these rules, she devised specific techniques for monitoring them
and strictly administered consequences for violations:
I actually developed a policy where I would give them -- I explained to them my attendance rules. Same as Técnica's [the local university that many of Amanda’s students attended]. Maybe a little more strict. As in, if you were 11 minutes, you were marked late. Some teachers are like, “Oh, whatever,” but it’s an interruption. So, I started giving them their attendance sheet as soon as all the kids—as soon as I walked in the room I’d give the attendance sheet. At like five after I would take it away, and then wait till the end of class, and then I would call out the names on the attendance sheet to allow them to leave, and then all of the other students would have to make up those minutes just sitting there. And they have to sign the sheet to get credit for being there so they couldn’t leave. “[mimicking students] Teacher, I have class.” Then come on time to mine. And then that started working. As long as you’re consistent with it, it works.

Over the course of the conversation, Amanda’s narrative also illustrated the ways in which volunteers drew on imperialist ‘truths’ of superior Americanness and problematic Ecuadorianness in asserting their claims on authority to discipline their students. Specifically, Amanda implicated lateness and absences of her students, and, more specifically, a societal tendency toward permisiveness around lateness and absences as cultural defects that needed to be eradicated:

A:  The tardiness and the absent policy, I know culturally that makes sense, but if you culturally say that that’s okay, then no one’s ever going to change. Because it’s not okay. My class doesn’t start at ten after or quarter after. It starts on the hour, and I let you go ten minutes early. But if a culture in a country allows that to happen, then everyone’s just going to keep pressing it five more minutes. 80 percent attendance is atrocious. Being absent for 16 out of 80 hours…

C:  You mean that’s the maximum…

A:  …the maximum. They can be absent eight times. They can be absent 35 times. They could be absent every class as long as they get a 73 percent.

C:  Oh, on their tests.

A:  Yes. And I mean university level in the states, they took attendance in college even if you were paying for it. It’s like if you have the maturity to be in college then you should be in class.

Another area in which the authority of volunteers was challenged by students’ behavior was when students violated their rules around “cheating.” On a Friday afternoon, I walked with Aaron through the busy streets of downtown Ambato. Everyone was out – young mothers and fathers leading toddlers by the hand; groups of teenagers playfully jostling each other, laughing and joking as they did; women in aquamarine bank uniforms clicking across the pavement in black high heels and men in dark business suits weaving through the crowds. The action unfolded to a steady, thundering symphony of cumbia, reggaeton, and merengue, an infectiously
festive mishmash provided by the dozens of proprietary storefronts that lined the streets and sold an assortment of clothing, shoes, and electronic goods, all artfully arranged behind large plate glass windows.

Aaron was a 23-year-old volunteer from Newton, Massachusetts. A recent college grad from a large northeastern university, he had plans of applying to law school and exhibited a sort of oblivious self-assurance that bordered on, and was often read by some of his fellow volunteers as, cockiness. Several months ago during Orientation, he had agreed to talk to me for my research and we had walked to a coffee shop in the Mariscal one afternoon in the hours following the volunteers’ practice teaching sessions. We had chosen a two-seated couch positioned next to a wall and behind a low-sitting lounge table. “Is it okay if we sit next to each other?” Aaron had asked, laughing. As we had taken seats on the couch, he had immediately reclined back and propped his left leg up on a small, upholstered ottoman that sat nearby. Dressed in a key lime Polo with a navy blue insignia and dark blue cargo shorts, he had peered at the menu. After a brief discussion of what we were going to order, he had settled on a beer and I on a mint tea. In the meantime, a waiter, dressed in black trousers and a bright orange T-shirt, had spotted us when we had come in and soon approached our table. “Buenas tardes,” he had said, smiling. “Buenas tardes, we had replied. “¿Algo para tomar? [Something to drink?]” Aaron had brusquely ordered “un Club,” (a popular Ecuadorian beer) and taken it upon himself to order a tea for me.

As the conversation progressed, he had made a point of quizzesing me on things he had said, as though testing my credibility or aptitude as an interviewer, not to mention turning the tables in a certain sense by explicitly subjecting me to examination. At the end of our conversation he had jokingly shared that he feared he had shared too much. While Aaron presented himself as a sort of testy even offensive interviewee, I nevertheless appreciated his candor and interpreted his air of arrogance, which was on full display as he immediately propped his leg up on the ottoman at the coffee shop, as a discursive dimension of white upper class male subjectivity that would become increasingly salient to my research as the questions of the study evolved. During that initial conversation Aaron had described his background as “Irish” and...
mentioned tangentially that his father was a medical doctor. He had also told me that before leaving for Ecuador, his grandfather had warned him “not to come home with an ‘Ecuadorian princess.’” Aaron professed a love for travel, and he prided himself on immersing into the local scene of wherever he went, consciously seeking out a more “authentic” experience. After sharing this with me, he had provided the example of when he had previously gone to France and had “wanted to live like a Frenchman”; to this point he had also shared that after returning from a semester abroad in Spain and having peers ask him if he had visited certain well-known bars, he had replied pointedly, “No, I went to the bars that Spanish people go to.” A Spanish major, he had applied to Global Community during his senior year in college and had told me that he was “doing this” mostly to improve his Spanish language ability and to experience “something different” (see Chapter 6) – and to do so decidedly before he applied to law school, which he planned to do in the near future. Without any prompting and as though making a confession, he had preemptively conceded that he did not see how Spanish language ability really related to his future career plans as a lawyer (other, he had said, than being able to communicate with potential Spanish-speaking clients); however, he had exhibited an interest in improving his Spanish language ability for the sake of personal accomplishment in perfecting a skill that he felt had gone underdeveloped in his undergraduate university’s Spanish language program, which he described as “terrible.” He had mentioned, however, that he had considered someday living in Spain.

As far as his interest in teaching, when I had asked Aaron how this had figured into his decision to apply to Global Community he had told me quite bluntly that it “had really nothing to do with it.” Now, however, several months later, when Aaron spoke about teaching it seemed that he did put a great deal of effort into preparing his lessons, engaging his students, considering feedback he had received from his institution director (who, after consulting with Aaron’s students, had told him that his students wanted more grammar practice), and modifying his teaching practices accordingly. In addition, Aaron had also set certain rules in his classroom. As he told me:
A: Like, I do a lot of things to prevent them [students] from cheating. I’m a pretty laid back teacher, I’m not really hard core, I don’t really have any rules for my classroom, just like, don’t talk on your phone. And I don’t care if it rings and you then literally get up and leave and take it outside. That doesn’t bother me, I’m really pretty lenient about it. The only thing is the cheating. And so, I like make several versions of the test and I separate them and I watch them. Originally it was: if I catch you cheating, you get a zero, or take away your test, you get a zero. And that didn’t work ‘cause that was an empty threat. I’m not really going to do that, ‘cause that would cause too many problems. So, then I changed to, if I see you talking to someone, if I see you mouthing to someone, if I see anything that seems to me like cheating, even if it’s not [cheating], I don’t care, I’m taking one point off. And that works. I’ve done it, I’ve only ever taken one point—like, I think maybe once a test I might have to do it to one person—but they’re so afraid of losing that one point, so that works. Plus, I think it’s also gotten to the point where they’ve had a test and they realize that they can’t cheat anyway.

C: The way you divide your tests?

A: Yeah. Every one near them has a different test and they can’t just be like, “What’s number two?” They would have to explain what the question is. The person’s probably not going to know the answer anyway, so it’s not worth losing one point or two points or three points every time you get caught, when it’s not even going to help you. I also take all their bags and everything, like, everything that they have with them has to go in the corner. So there’s nothing they can look at, either. But it was funny, I would catch them, particularly when I had the zero policy, I would catch them and I would kind of be like “Hey, be careful,” and one thing that would happen so much—and when I now tell them, when I’m explaining not only talking, but doing this: [furtively directing his eyes downward and to his right]. And I impersonate it for them because they always laugh because they know they do it, is this [repeating action]. And so it’s like, they see me looking at them and then they just smile.

Listening to Aaron recount the evolution of his “cheating” policy and related practices it was clear that while he had retreated from an extreme stance of a “zero policy” because of a realization that it “would cause too many problems,” he had relinquished neither his bequeathed and subsequently claimed authority to define his students’ collaborative test-taking behavior as “cheating” nor his authority to police and punish this behavior as such. He had instead come up with a different policy of fining students one point per cheating offense, as well as a practice of designing different tests and distributing them so that students could not easily help each other. In what context, however, and using what kinds of constructs had Aaron laid claim to this authority and then endeavored to preserve it when it was symbolically disrupted by students’ persistent efforts to seek help and to help each other during exams?

To answer this question, we can look to an earlier moment in my conversation with Aaron, one in which I had asked him if he remembered whether field directors and/or invited
speakers had imparted to him and his fellow volunteers any particular characterizations of Ecuador during the Orientation. Almost immediately, he had recalled that an invited speaker named Felipe Cabrera had given the group “a lot of stereotypes of Ecuadorians.” Felipe Cabrera was the academic coordinator of the English language department at one of the Quito institutions where Global Community volunteers are routinely placed as teachers. Originally from Ecuador, he had attended college in Quito and earned a master’s degree from a university in the Midwest region of the United States. By the time he was addressing Aaron’s cohort in a session entitled “Ecuadorian Education System,” he had also authored several English language textbooks used by the Quito institution where he worked.

As Aaron had ticked off the stereotypes that Felipe had shared with the group during that Orientation session, he had quickly arrived at the topic of “cheating,” telling me:

One of the things he [Felipe Cabrera] said that was definitely true is cheating. It’s definitely, I’ve noticed in general, that, I mean, different cultures have different—I feel like I’m going to use the same word twice—they have different value for values. I’m trying to think of a better way to put that. Their values and principles have different priorities in different cultures. And I think honesty is really, really important in our culture in the United States and that’s less important here, I found that. And I think that’s where the cheating’s involved. Like, it’s not really seen as really that bad. It’s just like we [in the United States] have like newer schools that have honor codes and stuff. Like, you can take the test in your bedroom and they trust you not to cheat.

To substantiate his claim of the heightened importance of honesty in the United States, Aaron had then referenced a Hollywood film – School Ties – in which the central drama, he told me, surrounded an incident of cheating at an elite US boarding school. After briefly explaining the plot to me, he reiterated his earlier point. “I remember when I was looking at colleges, I remember one of the schools had an honor code, I can’t remember where it was, I think it was Duke or something like that, whereas down here honesty is not wrapped up in your honor as much.” For a few minutes, Aaron had then continued to identify what he perceived as clear differences between Ecuador and the United States, asserting that the former was characterized by a lesser degree of accountability, a greater amount of passivity (a conclusion he based largely on what he understood as a more frequent use of the grammatical passive voice), a greater propensity to believe rumors, and certain rules around etiquette that had been new to him when he had arrived,
but which he had progressively incorporated into his behavior over the course of the past several months. As I followed Aaron along on his impromptu exposition, I remained curious about his comments about “honesty” and “honor” and when he finished I tried to revisit them:

C: Yeah. And I have another question. How did you kind of figure out about the honesty? You said something, honesty’s not so wrapped up in your honor here?

A: Yeah.

C: And you kind of connect that to the cheating that goes on in the classroom? How did you figure that out? Do you remember like, little things that happened?

A: Well, I think Felipe, he was the first one who said that. He was the one who said about cheating and he kind of said it was culture thing, like, “We [Ecuadorians] don’t really understand that cheating’s a bad thing.” It’s like I help you, you help me, no big deal, blah, blah, blah. I guess he was more along the lines of it’s more of a social culture and learning something like a new language is something that you’re not always going to have all your friends around with you, so you really do need to learn it yourself, but people are so accustomed to helping each other, different things like that. But it is still kind of—like, they know they’re not supposed to cheat.

_Felipe._ As Aaron mentioned his name, it occurred to me that, upon being pressed by my curiosity, he was perhaps defensively citing Felipe, thus abdicating some personal responsibility for his own critical remarks about the value of honesty in Ecuadorian society. (The maneuver struck a similar tone to something Aaron had done in our initial conversation during Orientation, when, in asking me whether he was part of the “white power structure,” he had inexplicably cited an African-American friend who had spoken disparagingly to him about African-Americans). Listening to him talk, however, I was also transported back to that moment during the Ecuadorian Education System session when Felipe (as he had told the volunteers to call him) had indeed broached the topic of “cheating,” told volunteers that their students would in fact “cheat,” and offered an explanation whose phrasing Aaron had more or less correctly recalled: in Ecuador, Felipe had told them, “we don’t really understand that cheating’s a bad thing.” What had been striking about Felipe’s statement was not that he had condemned “cheating,” but rather the particular language that he had used to do so, casually casting Ecuadorians as a people that did not and perhaps could not “understand” a principle that he framed as being a universal – that “cheating” is a “bad thing.” In this way, his statement clearly partook of an imperialist discourse.
that defines the imperial subject as backward, deficient, and in need of correction and transformation administered by way of an infusion of norms that cohere with the official value system of the imperial hegemon’s official value system, in this case the perceived official value system of the United States.

Aaron’s invocation of Felipe’s comments is significant because it underscores the ways in which constructs of an imperialist Global Community discourse around the teaching stint assisted the volunteers not only in making critical assessments of Ecuadorian culture, but also in helping them to forge a sense of authority in the classroom to regulate “Ecuadorian” student behaviors. When these behaviors persisted in the face of Aaron’s classroom rules, this authority was symbolically disrupted. It was with the continued help of those imperialist constructs that had underwritten the original conferral of this authority to Aaron and his peers that, I suggest, Aaron had not retreated from preserving his authority vis-à-vis his students and what he imagined to be typical – and dysfunctional – Ecuadorian behavioral traits.

However, Aaron’s invocation of Felipe’s statement is all the more compelling because it also illustrates the ways in which the circulation of an imperialist discourse (which again, clearly shaped the Global Community Ecuador discourse around the teaching stint) works not only on the subjectivities of US-Americans recruited to “help” Ecuadorians but also on the subjectivities of Ecuadorian nationals who are aligned with this particular helping project that volunteers are there to do. In this case, one such Ecuadorian subjectivity was in fact deployed in service of Global Community Ecuador’s subjectification of Aaron’s cohort, thus creating a sort of feedback loop for imperialist discourse and related subject formation that was further strengthened by the respected stamp of “insider” confirmation and approval from Felipe, an Ecuadorian national. Here it is worth pointing out that for Aaron in particular, and perhaps others in his cohort, the notion of Ecuadorian norms and “insider” knowledge was something that seemed to carry significant weight in his endeavor to gaze upon and make sense of an imagined Ecuadorian culture, or any foreign culture for that matter. Recall that Aaron prided himself on always trying to “experience” visited cultures as the “locals” did; to this point, during that aforementioned initial conversation with me,
he had actually been critical of the Global Community Ecuador Orientation because, as he had put it, he would have preferred “a high level Ecuadorian English student” to come in and share and explain “local idioms” rather than “April reading from a sheet.” In listening to Aaron now reference Felipe (and noting that he did so right away when I asked him about his own comments on “cheating” in Ecuador), I inferred that the fact that Felipe was an Ecuadorian national indeed lent his statements about Ecuadorians a certain degree of credibility in Aaron’s eyes – as it probably would do in the eyes of many. Indeed, it seemed that Aaron had jumped right to Felipe’s condemnation of cheating – and Felipe’s pathologizing description of Ecuadorians as people who “don’t understand that cheating’s a bad thing” – as a way of substantiating what he himself was saying to me about his own practice of outlawing “cheating” in his classroom of Ecuadorian students.

Finally, another symbolic disruption to volunteer authority could be found in those instances where students were perceived as not responding receptively to their use of Communicative Language Teaching practices. An illustrative case was that of Brooke, a volunteer who, like many others, had great enthusiasm for the teaching methods she had learned during Orientation. At the time of our conversation, Brooke, a 26-year-old from a large Midwestern city, was the teacher of four adult English classes at a vocational institute located in Cuenca, a large city in the country’s southern highlands. While she had been excited about the style of teaching she had been taught during Orientation, her implementation of it her classroom had initially not gone over well with her students – or at least that is how it seemed to Brooke. With mounting exasperation, she recounted what had happened as she had initially entered the classroom and attempted to use the kinds of group activities, pair work exercises, and role-play methods she had learned during Orientation.

B: They didn’t wanna do anything. They didn’t wanna do any activities. They didn’t wanna get up out of their seats. They wanted like rote memorization and like working from the board, doing worksheets, and so, like, I literally, I mean I tried and tried and tried for the first two or three weeks and I just – nothing. Like, I had all these amazing, like my favorite activities I would throw at them and they were just not interested. And so, and I wasn’t building a rapport with them, they, so, it was just really frustrating and then, so it was
literally like I fought tooth and nail, like, I gave them what they wanted initially, so I gave them worksheets, and I gave them stuff on the board, and—

C: How did you figure out that’s what they wanted? Did they say—

B: They wouldn’t do anything. That’s the only thing they would do. Like, I’d have a full two hours planned, and have like these interactive activities, and the only thing that they would get excited about was doing worksheets. The only thing that they would actively like energetically participate in was filling out worksheets. So that’s what I would, so like that’s what I did. And so I started to kind of like base it around those kinds of activities, so literally just like anything to get them participating in class. And like slowly but surely I kind of started to integrate more of those interactive like more dynamic kind of things…. I mean I thought, I just expected that they would never have had this kind of class before and so they would realize pretty quickly that it was more interesting and more, what’s the word in English, just y’know, more involved and more variable and that they would just take to it. And, they just didn’t. And so I was like, “Well, what the hell do you wanna do instead?” Like, you wanna sit and look at the board and you wanna sit quietly and like fill out paperwork, like. I think I just didn’t know what to do. Like, why would you not wanna do the things I’m teaching, why would you not wanna involve yourself in these activities, like.

Considering that we were speaking several months after this phase of time had transpired, the aggrieved and exasperated tone of Brooke’s voice was striking, as was the dismissive way in which she spoke about how her students apparently preferred to learn (i.e. “doing worksheets”), the way she instantly decried her student’s perceived preferences with labels borrowed straight from the Global Community discourse around Ecuadorian teaching methods, and the certitude of her initial expectations that her students would simply see that the methods she was introducing were “more interesting” and that “they would just take to it.” For Brooke, her students’ reactions to her initial teaching methods had clearly been a source of frustration and stress that was perhaps only heightened by an unwavering commitment to the methods she had learned from Global Community and her sense of authority and entitlement to implement them in the classroom. In fact, the way she spoke about the situation evoked a sort of frustrated missionary zeal, so strong was her commitment to the methodology. In this vein, as I listened to her emit such frustration with not being able to get her students to do what she wanted them to do (at least not at first), I could not help but wonder if the predicament had ever prompted her to question the value or suitability of the methods, the insistence on activities and games that field directors had promoted
so fervently but which seemed to hold such little resonance or comfort level for her students.

When I asked her the question, she had this to say:

Not really, not really, it was more like, I really do believe, like I believed in their method and I just wanted to get back to it so it was kind of like, it was basically manipulating the class into doing what I wanted by like initially giving them what they wanted and then like slowly but surely like, y’know, like introducing what I actually wanted to do, so (laughing) I guess that sounds kind of horrible, but it worked, I mean it worked for the most part (laughing).

Thus, in the same way that Amanda drew on a ‘truth’ of Ecuadorian cultural backwardness to assert authority with respect to lateness and tardiness and Aaron drew on a ‘truth’ of Ecuadorian moral ignorance to punish “cheating,” when faced with symbolic disruption to her authority by way of her students’ apparent apprehensiveness Brooke apparently drew on a ‘truth’ of methodological superiority to remain committed to getting them to do what she “wanted to do,” albeit through what she described as manipulation. As is clear by now, like cultural backwardness and moral inferiority of Ecuadorian students, this claim of methodological superiority had also been a key imperialist ‘truth’ that Global Community had circulated in authorizing the volunteers to work as English teachers in Ecuadorian classrooms and moreover, to impose a pedagogical style that was understood to be different from what their Ecuadorian students were accustomed to and distinct from the ways in which their Ecuadorian counterparts taught.

10.7 “Humiliation Tactics”: An Intervention Continued...

Another way in which the Global Community Ecuador program contributed to the making of international US authority was illustrated on that second day of the Mid-Point Conference with which this chapter began. As the group discussion proceeded, volunteers were led further into sharing their techniques of classroom management. “I think something that’s important is you don’t have only one solution, right” said Trevor, “and you’d have kind of a graduated series so like, if they’re dicking around on their cell phone, you stand next to ‘em, if they don’t put it away, you draw attention to them and like embarrass them in class, and then if that doesn’t work, you
take them outside and you lecture them outside in the hallway, and then if that doesn’t work, you kick ’em out of class.”

“Okay, let’s be honest,” April replied, looking at the rest of the volunteers. “How many of you use humiliation tactics in your class to get students on board?”

“Get ’em up!” Tim chimed in from his seat in the back row. April repeated her question, “What do you do that is particularly effective that is a humiliation tactic?” Matt raised his hand.

“Yes, Matt, whaddya do?” April asked expectantly.

“Uh, when my students come in late sometimes, I get my whole class to boo them.”

“To boo them?”

“Yeah, and if it’s a girl and a guy walking in late, then it’s even better, ’cause everyone’s like “Uuuuuuu.” At this point, other volunteers chimed in, (thus collectively producing the high-pitched sound Aaron had tried unsuccessfully to cite the day before as one of the things that worked his ”last nerve” about Ecuador).

April continued. “Good. James what do you do for humiliation tactics?”

“If my students talk I make them stand up and go all the way to the back of the classroom and face the wall.”

As people laughed, April responded approvingly. “Okay, like they’re just like, totally, like they’re not gonna be on board, so they’re like hardly a participant in the class, alright. If these things are working – what else is working? Yeah, Leslie?”

“Uhh, I had a lot of classroom management problems last semester,” Leslie began, “and I mean like, it was terrible. Uh, and some things worked, and one that worked really well was the Spanish crown. I bought a little princess crown, and I made them wear it when they spoke Spanish and the last person to wear it had to get up and sing a song and dance reggaeton. And it worked. I mean they quit talkin’ Spanish like that! Unless my back was turned and I couldn’t see who was talking and then they would talk.”

“Okay, but this is the idea,” April said with intensity, ”like a dunce’s cap. And a lot of people use this in their classrooms, like the Spanish crown or whatever, right? Lots of people
were using that. I’ve seen that a lot on site visits. Gooooood, other ideas?” The effect of the conversation was striking. The energy of the group had perked up considerably. People were sitting rapt with attention, waiting to hear the next tactic their peers used to humiliate their students. Those who did recount their own practices had done so eagerly, almost boastfully, the prospect of being celebrated by the group for using humiliation tactics on their students apparently egging them on. Even those who seemed like unlikely participants in such a scene got caught up in the excitement. Josh, for example, who had previously intimated to me that he felt uncomfortable disciplining students who were significantly older than him (“It’s definitely different being 25 years old and trying to discipline, not only discipline, but like maintain control of a classroom where you have people that are older than you, that I’ve always been taught to respect. I’ve always been taught to just basically not discipline people that are older than me…” he had told me during a one on conversation) was soon raising his hand to contribute his own brazen tactic of humiliation. “Uh, I have them write their name on the wall with their butt,” he said, laughing, “and spell it out.”

The group burst into laughter. “You have them do what?” one male volunteer asked incredulously. “Where do they put the marker?” asked another. Amid the clamor, Josh turned in his chair to look at the group and began to explain, “Yeah, for basic,” he said, “you know we’re doin’ letters, and uh, they have to spell their name like if they were goofin’ off or doin’ whatever. Instead of yelling…”

The group’s laughter picked up again, overtaking Josh’s trailing voice. “Do it! Do it!” one volunteer called from the second row. Tim got in on the action. “Do it! Do it!” he called from his perch. Eyes twinkling delightedly, April echoed the requests. “So, can we have an example?” she asked Josh.

The group waited. Then Josh replied. “I’ll do my first letter, right?” He stood up from his chair, faced the group, and began moving his “butt” in the formation of a “J”, hypnotizing the volunteers into silence. He finished and laughter erupted. Josh continued, “And they do their whole name on the wall, right? Spelling it out.”
“Cool,” April said with a smile and an approving nod.

“--so it’s like letter practice,” Josh continued, “and—and you sort of explain that before, I guess, and, everyone laughs.”

“And that’s if they’re talking?” April asked.

“Well, it depends on like how I feel.”

“If they’re like off track?”

“Yeah, yeah, but like it could be for a variety of stuff.”

“Okay. And, after they spell their names on the wall with their butts?”

“They get a round of applause and sit back down.”

“And, when they sit back down, this is my question though, are they on track?”

“Usually.”

“Okay.”

“Yeah. I mean like it depends on the person, I guess. And I mean like some people love it, ‘Oh man, I wanna do that baby.’ But I haven’t had any issues with it.”

And with that, April brought Josh’s performance to a close. Turning from Josh to face the entire group of volunteers, she said, “’Cause I mean, ‘cause what we’re talking about is, if these are things that are working in your classroom, that’s why we’re sharing these ideas, right? These are things that you could try. If it works in Josh’s classroom, it may work in yours. It may not work in yours. But it’s something that we’re just trying to, y’know, come up with some ideas about tools and things that we can do to try to get our students back on track.”

From a Foucauldian perspective, the practice of “classroom management,” itself, can understood as an exercise of disciplinary power. It is a clear instance of the attempted making of docile bodies and their “integration into systems of efficient and economic controls” (see Foucault 1990, 139) that unfolds as part of the broader exercise of disciplinary power that occurs within the school. In looking at the scene depicted above, one could argue that the volunteers were simply, though not innocuously, being encouraged, instructed, and subjectified as conduits of this kind of exercise of power. They were being trained in how to practice surveillance over their students, to
take note of what they did, and to mete out punishment with the intent to order their behaviors so that it conformed to a certain standard of order. No talking on one’s cell phone. No lateness. No speaking in Spanish. These can all be conceived as violations of the classroom orders that volunteers had been authorized, as teachers, to impose upon their students, and like any teacher, they were now dealing with the reality of disciplining their students accordingly.

However, I think that there was something additional unfolding in this particular, extended exchange between the field directors April and Tim and the volunteers. In this scene by the beach on the second day of the Mid-Point conference, there was an appeal being made to the exercise of a power that was not simply disciplinary but also suffused with strands of racism, perhaps not fully formed or articulated, but palpable nonetheless. In this way, the attempted subject formation of volunteers as disciplining teachers was one that drew not only on a conventional construct of the teacher-student relation but also on the historic construct of the relation between the US/Western subject vis-à-vis the imperial subject.

I make this claim of racism for several reasons. First, several of the student behaviors that so strongly vexed the volunteers (and which April and Tim were urging them to correct) were understood by all involved to be characteristically Ecuadorian. As previously discussed, coming late to class was clearly identified during the Orientation as a distinctly Ecuadorian behavior, which, moreover, volunteers were all but obligated to expel from their students. Speaking in Spanish was clearly framed as a behavior specific to Ecuadorians, not merely because it was the national language of the country, but also because it was reflective of the non-immersive style of teaching English that was held to be so faulty and which volunteers were there to help improve upon. Second, the nature of the methods to be used on students was intentionally humiliating.

In Discipline and Punish (1975/1995), Foucault in fact mentions “humiliation” alongside with other tactics that were a standard part of the disciplinary power that ascended in the 17th and 18th centuries. At that time, humiliation was part and parcel of a number of tactics that were framed by reformers as being more “humane” than the standards of the past (though one of Foucault’s central arguments is that discipline in general is not the kinder, gentler form of power
that it was consistently made out to be). In the United States of today, however, the standard of acceptable discipline of today is different from that of the 18th century. Leading US-American figures in the world of US-American education now problematize and condemn the use of humiliation tactics in elementary and secondary school classrooms (see Darling-Hammond et al., 2005). This is not to say that it is no longer used, but that it, along with other “authoritarian” kinds of classroom management practices are not officially sanctioned and championed in the ways they were in another time. In this way, it has become a practice that is beyond the pale for how teachers are supposed to treat students. Specifically, it is often cast as dehumanizing and drawing on Foucault’s concept of modern racism, it might be understood as the kind of treatment that is reserved for those considered to be a threat to the race, those whose existence, according to the state, needs to eliminated to preserve and optimize the life of the population that are either “normal” or capable of being “normalized.”

Indeed, studies by sociologist Ann Arnett Ferguson (2001) and others (see Ferguson 2001, 3, n. 3 and n. 4) have shown that black male students in the United States are disproportionately subjected extreme forms of discipline that include not only humiliation in the classroom, but also outright banishment from the classroom, suspension from school, and expulsion. Here, it perhaps becomes particularly salient that before becoming field director April had previously worked “teaching seventh grade, inner-city, in L.A.,” as she described it to me. Sharing with me that a majority of her students had been Mexican-American and Central American, she told me that she had originally been motivated by a desire to “be helpful by being able to speak to their [students’] parents and grandparents in their native language, in Spanish” (thus honing a skill she had developed as a Latin American Studies major and as a previous Global Community Ecuador volunteer, herself). (The experience, however, she had informed me, had been “really depressing because that’s [seventh grade] when they [the student population] get jumped into gangs.” In the end, she had said to me, “those kids kind of ate me alive.”)

In light of these recent studies that have illustrated the ways in which disciplinary power is exercised quite differently according to a student’s race, it could thus be hypothesized that there
is in fact a sort of continuum of discipline in the US-American school system, whereby all students are subjected to discipline (as this is the nature of the modern school) that is controlling, but that those students who are viewed through a lens of racism are subjected to those forms of discipline that have been eschewed as inhumane. Here, it is worth acknowledging that removing a student from a classroom or humiliating him while he remains in the classroom are clearly very different acts from that of taking the actual lives of students (which, according to Foucault, is what state racism is deployed in service of when taken to its extreme). But in a way, these acts of humiliation are symbolic enactments of this taking of life, as they are intended to either literally end that student’s existence in the classroom (for the moment or even permanently if expulsion becomes the next step) or to demolish a part of his living existence through an act of ridicule that effectively marks him as less than in relation to the other students. Particularly illustrative here is James’ tactic of making students walk to the back of the room and stand facing the wall, thus making them, as April had glowingly translated, “like, hardly a participant in the class.” Moreover, the fact that humiliation tactics were being advocated by the field director as a way of stamping out or eliminating certain student behaviors that she, Tim, and the Global Community Ecuador literature had already defined as quintessentially Ecuadorian suggests that there was something more than simple classroom management being taught here: volunteers were not simply being subjectified as “disciplining teachers” but as “disciplining teachers of Ecuadorian students.” In fact, what was going on could be understood as something not totally unlike to the infamous “kill the Indian, spare the man” paradigm of the late 19th century, in which US reformers sought to save the humanity of the Amerindians through conscripting them into a “civilizing” education (and subsequent incorporation into US mainstream society) that would expunge their perceived Indianness and allow them to be “[white, US-American, normal] men.” During this Global Community Ecuador session, the Ecuadorianness of the students was not referred to explicitly by anyone but, in light of the Orientation training and introductory materials that problematized certain student behaviors as “Ecuadorian,” it did not have to be. Moreover, as April had quite
tellingly said earlier in the session (presented at the beginning of this chapter), “This is about like, re-training the way that they’re thinking. Right?”

Undergirding Tim and April’s concerns was thus a key imperialist ‘truth’ that had defined the Global Community teacher preparation and training: Ecuadorian students were infected with a certain cultural propensity toward various behaviors: “cheating,” speaking Spanish, tardiness and US-American volunteers were the rightful monitors and correctors of these behaviors. However, if it had not been emphasized sufficiently before, April and Tim were now impressing upon the volunteers that they needed to claim, demonstrate, and exercise their authority over their students. The fact that so many had “lost” their authority or never even claimed and exercised it was a serious problem that had to now be fixed. The use of humiliation tactics, considered by many in the world of education to be dehumanizing, was the means by which volunteers were not only to control their students’ behavior but also to recover and reassert their authority in the classroom. In this way, the imperialist ‘truth’ that was implicitly being employed was not only that Ecuadorian students were problematic and in need of correction and transformation on the part of US-Americans, but that, Ecuadorian students were also, in some sense, fair game for dehumanization. While I do not believe that April or Tim, Global Community higher ups, or the volunteers would readily agree with this interpretation, one has to consider what is really being done when dehumanizing tactics are being recommended to teachers and carried out by these teachers in their classrooms. There is an implicit message that the targets of this dehumanization are already not fully human – that they are something less than human, that they are animalistic, savage, etc. – and that for this reason it is okay to treat them as such.

Legal scholar Saby Ghoshray (2011) contends that a key part of dehumanizing practices is the “transformation of ordinary, typical people into undesirable entities,” This transformation, he argues is one that involves two processes: the construction of such entities as “the very personification of evil so that stripping them of their humanness becomes a much easier process” (183, n. 99); and the application of certain practices to the physical body of the “undesirable entity” that further works to dehumanize it. In this way, Ghoshray argues, "perpetuation of evil and
dehumanization have to work together to develop efficiently a construct of certain individuals, be it an ethnic minority, certain religious groups, or certain individuals, such that projecting them as non-human and mere entities makes it easier for the oppressor to deny them basic human rights” (Ibid). To be clear, April and Tim were clearly not making Ecuadorian students out to be the “personification of evil;” nor were they advocating the use of corporeal punishment or the kinds of torture carried out by the US state against military detainees and with which Ghoshray’s argument is directly concerned. These important points notwithstanding, April and Tim did construct the students of their volunteers as deserving targets of dehumanizing “humiliation tactics,” and this extended speech act might be understood as constituting a much milder (though compelling nonetheless), iteration of the dehumanization process that Ghoshray describes.

Indeed, by identifying volunteers’ students as legitimate objects of dehumanization, April and Tim were in some sense skipping the step of explicitly constructing them as being ascribed with particular characteristics (evilness or otherwise) – though, as the foregoing discussion has shown, they along with the Global Community literature, and the volunteers, themselves by this point in the year, had certainly as constructed them as being culturally and morally deficient. However, even without such a characterization, Tim and April were nevertheless “making it easier” for volunteers to engage in such practices by simply advocating them, without so much as a question as to the ethical and moral (to say nothing of political) implications of doing so. In this way, the act became all the more brazen as it allowed for the patent celebratory endorsement of dehumanizing practices that actually did the work of not only making it easier to inflict them, but also implicitly constructing students as “undesirable entities.”

Given the history of US empire in Latin America and this exercise of inciting (US-American) volunteers to claim and exercise their authority in and over (Ecuadorian) students, this point is critical to consider because the construct of the sub-human imperial subject has of course been used repeatedly in the rationalizing, making, and preserving of US imperial authority around the world, deployed specifically in US state efforts to repress those who explicitly challenged it, those who did not readily comply, and those who were simply presumed to oppose it:
independence fighters and civilians in the Philippines during the late 19th century Filipino War for Independence (see Kuzmarov, 2012, Chapter One; Wesling, 2011); self-declared rebels, rebel suspects, and presumed rebel sympathizers in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua during the early 20th century US occupations of those countries (see Kuzmarov, 2012, Chapter Two; Renda, 2001, pp. 150-164); guerrilla combatants, suspected communists, and their presumed sympathizers in Latin America during the duration of the Cold War (see Beggar 2009, pp. 268-271; Gill, 2004, pp. 54-56), and, most recently, insurgents, suspected insurgents, and their purported allies in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo over the course of the “War on Terror” (see Ghoshray, 2011; Puar 2013; Said, 2002). In this way, the field directors’ enthusiastic endorsement to volunteers of a dehumanizing praxis and the volunteers utilization of such techniques in their classrooms constitutes yet another way in which an imperialist ‘truth’ (i.e. that the imperial subject is not only pathological but also less than human and is thus both in need of and fair game for treatment that further dehumanizes him) was marshaled in the micro-level preservation of US authority in the face of symbolic challenge and potential disruption.

Before concluding this discussion, it is important to point out that the celebration of humiliation tactics soon gave way to a sort of implicit rejoinder leveled by several volunteers, who seemed behooved to counter the turn of the discussion with examples of decidedly non-humiliating tactics of discipline. Kelly, a 24-year-old volunteer from Santa Fe shared how she had made a point of getting to know each of her adolescent students on a personal level and had thus purposefully created individual bonds that no student wanted to break by disappointing her or flouting classroom rules. Similarly, Annie shared that she had strategically expressed interest in her students’ interests and, in so doing, attempted to form bonds that disposed her students toward listening to her and doing what she wanted in the classroom. Soon, this implicit rebuffing of humiliation gave way to a full-blown rejection on Annie’s part. After a few more volunteers contributed comments, she raised her hand again. “Um,” she began, “so this is not coming from Ecuador, this is coming from suburban California, entitled kids that don’t wanna do anything for you but you just, you have to make them accountable.” She continued:
You have to make sure they all think that at any point in time they can be held accountable and so that’s, even working in groups, they don’t know who, and like I’ll walk around if they’re in pairs of two and I’ll just put a number behind my back and say, “Okay, pick one through five and whoever’s closest is the one who talks,” um, or y’know, like, whoever’s closest to the wall is the person who’s gonna talk but you don’t tell them until you get to that point, so they just, you constantly have to build that into, the accountability factor into your classroom. It’s not just like, “Okay, who wants to share what they wrote?” It’s got to, you have to build that into what you do, um, and that, I think, personally for me, like, the humiliation stuff is humiliating and that’s a negative word, and I don’t like that at all, and so I’d rather hold them accountable and that’s a different type of way of making them feel like they are, they need to do it. But there are, there will always will be that class, like Leslie’s, like the classroom that you first taught, you’re gonna have those classes where nobody wants to be there because we’ve all been forced and that’s a whole different monster but I don’t think everybody has only classes like that.”

Here, Annie’s statements were clearly following a contemporary US-American education discourse that rejects humiliation tactics in the classroom. Interestingly, however, it is worth noting that she implicitly qualified her rejection of such tactics by framing her entire comment with the caveat that it was not based on working with Ecuadorian students but rather on working with “suburban California, entitled kids.” While Annie’s intention may have been to abide by the well-received and discursively dominant position that education should not be designed according to a “one size fits all” approach, what is subtly accomplished by her caveat is a distinction between two groups of students: one that, in the “us-them” context of Global Community Ecuador, is instantly imbued with us-ness (suburban California, entitled kids) and constructed as being problematic in its own way (they “don’t want to do anything for you”) but not in a way that actively rebels against the teacher’s authority or crosses over into a zone of perceived unruliness; and another group of students who are already understood as different from “us,” and are constructed as being problematic in another kind of way, one that is disorderly, unruly, culturally pathological, and thus, beyond the pale, so to speak. Moreover, Annie’s comment was implying that while the purportedly less humiliating tactic of “making students accountable” was a worthwhile one to try in Ecuadorian classrooms, she could only vouch for its effectiveness with a group of students that was by its very definition (suburban California, entitled kids) more familiar, more capable of being normalized, less foregone, not Ecuadorian, and thus more “like us.”
After Annie finished speaking, April, replied directly to her, perhaps a bit embarrassed at having the “humiliation tactics” she had just been unapologetically advocating now being called out by a fellow teacher in front of the volunteers. “Y’know,” she said to Annie, “this is a really good point that you make, because the humiliation tactics, lots of teachers use ‘em. I was never a fan of ‘em myself, and I didn’t use ‘em, but lots of teachers do.” Then, however, even after suddenly (and less than convincingly) distancing herself from such methods, April would not back down from the legitimacy of humiliation as a classroom management technique. She continued:

If they’re working for you then I’m not gonna tell you that you shouldn’t use them. If you can build an environment where you don’t have to use them, I think it’s preferable, but it can be really, really hard especially because we’re like half way through the year, just about, and if you have totally lost control of your classroom and now you’re gonna try to reign it in, which is much harder than starting with it already in line, if you have lost control and you’re gonna try to reign it in then like these are ideas that we can share with each other. If it works for you then like, God bless you, more power to you, but if it doesn’t work for you then this is something you can do, try to build these communities, like a community in your classroom where everybody’s on board, but it can be hard if you’ve already completely lost control. Right?

In concluding this discussion, it is important to point out that over the course of the year, I never observed a class taught by a volunteer in which the volunteer appeared to purposefully employ humiliation tactics. Clearly, this could easily have been because those volunteers who did employ them from time to time or even routinely, chose to refrain from doing so in my presence – and the design of my study was not such that I conducted yearlong, daily observations of volunteers’ classrooms. (This was on one hand a weakness, but it was a calculated one, as I had determined that gaining the volunteers’ trust and frankness as a researcher was facilitated in large part by distancing myself from any kind of evaluative stance; in other words, I had to position myself as being “on their side” rather than as someone interested in assessing their teaching abilities). Still, on several occasions I witnessed the ways in which many volunteers appeared to genuinely care about their students and their academic progress, many of them forming close bonds with those students to whom they were similar in age (even as this transgressed a prevailing norm of teacher-student relations in Ecuador). With the exception of a few, none of the volunteers expressed any kind of sustained resentment toward their students.
and none appeared to harbor an active desire to systematically humiliate their students. Moreover, in several cases, students effectively took volunteers under their proverbial wings, acting as gracious hosts and concerning themselves with the emotional and physical wellbeing of the volunteers as well as their progress in the Spanish language. In these cases, I found it unlikely that such expressions of student good will would have accompanied classroom environments characterized by a culture of humiliation and degradation – though this is admittedly an assumption and moreover, does not mean that these same teachers did not sometimes engage in humiliation tactics on certain days or with certain “problem” students. Moreover, it is possible that intended humiliation was not experienced as such by students.

However, this scene by the beach illustrated that some volunteers did (or at least claimed to) employ classroom management tactics that they knew or presumed to be “humiliating” – there was an apparent intent, which is important to interrogate, regardless of the effect, which is harder to determine as the study did not focus overwhelmingly on classroom environment. Also important here is the fact that those who did not contribute comments listened with awe and amusement, seeming to viscerally enjoy and sanction the ways in which their peers claimed to humiliate their students. In fact, as I looked around the space during the discussion, with the exception of Annie and also, Peggy, the retired teacher from Minneapolis, I did not notice any outwardly ambivalent faces. (After that session, in fact, Peggy came over to me and, visibly upset, expressed her dismay at what had just taken place. “That was just terrible,” she said, shaking her head and knitting her eyebrows together. “You never humiliate kids, you never do that, never. I mean, come on.”) Moreover, in this instance, the field directors were the active ringleaders, not simply sanctioning such tactics but actively encouraging them and rewarding those who claimed to use them with very public affirmation.

10.8 Casey’s Story: A Recalibration of Authority

Field Note
June 22, 2010
4:00 p.m.
On a sunny afternoon I sit in Aula [Classroom] 11 where a volunteer named Casey will soon begin teaching her 4:00 class of intermediate level students. Bright sunshine peeks through long white plastic panel blinds that hang in front of plate glass windows. Every few minutes a soft breeze blows through the drawn blinds, flapping about and filling the air with a flutter of quiet thwacks. The classroom walls are two-toned, the top half painted butter yellow and the bottom half a creamy grey. They are plastered with signs and student work. “No Spanish” “Be respectful” “10 minutes late = lateness.” “3 latenesses = 1 absence. 15 absences = Fail.” In the room there are ten students, seven young women and three young men, seated quietly at the small metal desks, grouped in pairs. They have filled in the back row of chairs, leaving the remaining three rows sparsely populated.

Casey, dressed in a knee-length khaki skirt and a three-quarter sleeved light blue blouse, stands at the front of the room chatting with Shannon, another volunteer who teaches across the hall. Soon Shannon departs and Casey steps out from behind the wooden desk in the corner. “Where is everybody?” she asks with a smile, her voice tinged with befuddlement and mock distress. The students murmur a collective acknowledgement of her question. Several smile and laugh softly, looking around the room. “Listen for your names, okay?” Casey says as she begins to take roll, looking down at a clipboard. A call and response ensues. “Ronal?” “Present.” “Fernanda?” “Present.” “Veronica?” Silence. “Miguel?” Silence. “Beatriz?” “Present.” After a minute or two, the roll is finished and she looks up from the clipboard. Smiling again, she asks another question, carefully enunciating each word, “Have you watched any soccer games?” A quiet chorus of scattered yes’s ripples around the room. The World Cup soccer tournament, currently taking place in South Africa, has generated a sense of excitement in the city, where local restaurants and stores keep their televisions tuned to the daily matches and updates on the wins and losses of the day are on everyone’s lips. “Who is playing?” Casey continues. “Argentina y Grecia” the students say in another chorus, this time slightly louder. “Who will win?” Casey asks, smiling. The collective opinion is Argentina.

The walls of Casey’s classroom were a window into the past year and her repeated attempts to assert authority over her students. Casey was a 23-year-old volunteer from a small town named Holly Springs, just an hour outside of Atlanta. A self-described “huge perfectionist” when faced with a “job or a duty or a task,” she had told me several months earlier that she liked “things a certain way” and that she had come to Ecuador with expectations of being a certain kind of teacher, one that embodied certain qualities she had always admired in her own teachers.

“Organization,” she had listed. “Like, I really always appreciated that.” Continuing she had said:

I always really appreciated like a teacher who would put time into class as much as I did, or y’know, like, if I write a paper, I want the teacher to like actually read it and not just put a check on it. So, things like that. I guess, like, patience and understanding, that sort of thing, y’know and um, ‘cause I really, y’know, like I hated like in high school, I hated teachers who just automatically off the bat were like, “You’re not doing what you’re supposed to do,” and like, tried to set ground rules. And, so in college it was really nice, the professors and the students were on a more even playing field so, that’s kind of the environment I wanted to build. Like, I wanted to be organized but at the same time I wanted them to have their space.
In Loja, where Casey had been placed as an English teacher for four different classes of mostly adolescent students, her vision of becoming the ideal teacher was quickly disrupted as she began her teaching assignment. After telling me what kind of teacher she had imagined being, she continued:

And y’know, and then I’m thrown in there at the Institute, and there’s like, y’know I have this tiny little classroom and we’ve learned all these activities in like Orientation and I’m pumped about ‘em and they’re great activities but then you have this classroom that’s like, you can’t even stand up, at the same time as all of the students and so there’s absolutely no way to do a lot of y’know things that you want to do. Um, and then y’know like last semester I had, let’s see four classes like, two level twos and two level threes, so it’s pretty low level, and my class, my practice teaching class in Quito, I mean they were slightly, like relatively low level but like leagues ahead of (laughing slightly) my class here.

And, so that was like, I had, coming into it, I knew like level 2 and level 3, but I had absolutely no idea what they had learned in the past, like what they knew, and I just remember coming in there and it’s like 4 classes back to back and of like 25 students each, and just the first day, like comin’ in and I was just like, “Oh, my God, you all look the same. There’s a hundred of you,” and it’s just, there’s no break between the classes so it’s just like one after the other.

So it really took me like probably three weeks to even get like organized, because I didn’t know any of their names, and I just remember coming in there and it’s like 4 classes back to back and of like 25 students each, and just the first day, like comin’ in and I was just like, “Oh, my God, you all look the same. There’s a hundred of you,” and it’s just, there’s no break between the classes so it’s just like one after the other.

And, also too, I had like high school kids, and I guess in my mind, I was expecting like university kids because there’s a huge difference between a 13-year-old and a 21-year-old, and especially like, the kids that I had in high school, they come to me after they’ve been in school all day long. So like, I understand that they don’t wanna be there, y’know, but then I also have like classes that had colegio [high school] kids, and like 40-year-old adults.

Casey’s account strikes as a series of trial and tribulations to be experienced by any novice teacher overwhelmed by a teaching assignment beyond his or her perceived capabilities. To put it briefly, Casey was seemingly in over her head. Having never been a teacher and now suddenly teaching four consecutive classes of 25 students, with “no break in between,” her reaction is not surprising. There is also, in her statement, “Oh my God, you all look the same,” the suggestion that part of Casey’s disorientation came from seeing her students through what Albert Memmi (1965/2013) termed the “mark of the plural” (p. 129) whereby “the colonized is never
characterized in an individual manner; he is entitled only to drown in an anonymous collectivity” (Ibid). Psychologists have termed this the “other-race effect,” or the “own race bias,” in which human beings have difficulty distinguishing the faces of people of racial groups that were not heavily represented in their everyday worlds of childhood and/or that do not enter their everyday worlds at present (see Malpass and Kravitz, 1969; Anzures et al., 2013).

However, one chooses to think of this “they all look the same” phenomenon, it remains that in the white supremacist, majority white context of the United States, whites are often not required to be around people of other races (this being one of the invisible knapsack privileges identified by McIntosh in her discussion of whiteness), thus relieving them of the necessity to even be able to distinguish between members of other races. Then there is the point that because of the ways in which whites are often positioned vis-à-vis non-whites in racially pluralistic settings, there is still significantly less political pressure or to distinguish non-white faces (a position supported by social-cognitive psychological perspectives on this phenomenon; see Adams, Pauker, & Weisbuch, 2010; Hugenberg, Miller, and Claypool, 2007; Young & Hugenberg 2012). Moreover, whereas certain faces are widely circulated and granted individual subjectivity in mainstream media outlets such as film, television, and magazines, while others are comparatively absent, sidelined, or banished to special “ethnic” media venues. Thus, whether it is intentional or not, a brazen withholding of individuality or an inadvertent, embarrassing mistake, an obedience to colonialist/racist discourse or a effect of “normal” human brain functioning, the phenomenon of certain people more frequently tending to confuse the faces of certain other people has to be understood as indexing a broader systemic imbalance of power relations, which in the United States, is that of white supremacy.

Importantly, from a conversation with Aaron I had gleaned that Casey hailed from a community that was quite racially segregated. Moreover, as Aaron had inexplicably decided to mention to me, Casey had intimated to a group of volunteers that her family “would disown her if she brought home a black guy.” In this light, it is perhaps not at all surprising that she both had this reaction to her students during those first few weeks and that this reaction contributed to her
feeling of disorientation as she was (self)-plunged into an atmosphere where she was morphologically “different” for the first time and where, to perform the job that she had signed on for, she suddenly had to make it her business to distinguish individuals from the sea of non-Anglo faces that she read as “other.”

In addition to this unseating of racial normativity, there were other unceremonious disruptions of certain expectations and assumptions around what teaching in Ecuador would be like. For Casey, all of these disruptions combined to constitute a powerful blow to her plan of becoming “a good teacher,” as this plan had apparently depended upon the realization of such expectations and assumptions. She felt that the small classroom she was presented with rendered impossible the activities she had learned in Orientation and planned to implement with her students. Her assumption that all of her students would come to class everyday was quickly intercepted by the reality of half-full classrooms. The fact that her students were mostly high school students (taking supplemental classes), had intercepted her expectation that she would have university students – an expectation that had perhaps invoked a secondary expectation of her own college classes that had been, for her, a welcome reprieve from her high school environment where teachers had frustrated her with their excessive “ground rules.”

In this context, the immediate source of Casey’s frustration spanned several major areas – the nature of the facility (small classroom), the behavior of her students (what she perceived as absenteeism), and her own perceived inability to perform in particular ways or to have a firm handle on certain details in particular ways (an inability to remember her students’ names, the dizzying grind of back-to-back classes, and a lack of clarity around the level of her students). As I listened to her story, I learned that, in addition to the size of her classrooms, there were other facility circumstances that unsettled her. “Oh, and we had like power outages for like these allotted times, so there would be like two of my classes everyday wouldn’t have electricity, so it was like, there was no way I could use a CD player or a CD, just like things like that, um, I don’t know.”
In addition to the attendance rates of her students, there were also other student behaviors that unnerved her. "They would talk during class, and like, that’s really disrespectful. You don’t do that. Like, that’s not how I was raised. And it was to the point where like, then when it’s time to do something they have no idea what I said, ‘cause they weren’t even trying to listen." When I would like, be trying to like lesson plan and that sort of thing, and like I’d like plan a lesson and then half the class doesn’t show up or then I plan a lesson and the power’s out, y’know. I was just like, y’know what? It’s…” She sucked her teeth and laughed, shaking her head.

Finally, there were additional, interior circumstances – emotions and behaviors on her part that erupted in response to everything she was encountering and having to manage. By her own admission, the situation had influenced the ways in which Casey felt toward her students. "So, I guess in the beginning, like, in my mind I was gonna be this like, everything organized and have lesson plans and like, it wasn’t that, and so that really like frustrated me, and really made me like really bitter towards my students like for the first like, it was the first month." By her account, her feelings of frustration and bitterness often translated into fits of lost patience, particularly when her students engaged in side conversations while she was speaking. "I had one like terrible class last semester. It was just like a group – there were maybe like two adults, a couple university students, but like twenty colegio kids, and most of ‘em were girls, who were like the chattiest ones. Like, my guys, I normally don’t have problems with like my guy students, but the girls—and they weren’t good at English, they were way below the level of the class, y’know, and so, I lost my patience with that class so many times, like in that class and then the class after that, ‘cause I was always in a bad mood."

Casey continued on like this for several weeks, until she had what she described as an awakening of sorts. She told me:

C: Finally, I just like, I don’t know, one day I woke up and I was like, y’know, like, “I came here to like teach, not like change an entire educational system,” and so like, y’know, just because it’s not the way I want things to be done, if they’re gonna learn, like, I have to work within their system, and so I guess, almost like a pride thing a little bit, or, y’know like, stepping aside and being like, “Okay, so we’re not gonna do it this way.” Like, I don’t know, that helped a lot.
CA: How did you come to that kind of moment?

C: I don’t know. I just got really frustrated, and I was like, y’know what (laughing), like, like, “Screw this. Like, this is not, like, whatever I’m trying to do, like, it’s not gonna work,” y’know. Um, yeah, I don’t know, I just kinda woke up one day and I was really frustrated and just kinda like gave up, and I was like, “Y’know what, I’m just gonna have to play by their rules.” I like woke up and was like, “Alright, Casey, you’re not gonna be (laughing) able to like, be the superstar like, American teacher, that you like were expecting.” I mean I wanted to like, be like, really responsible and have like all my, y’know, just be organized and like a good teacher, um, so that was really hard to do because I felt like I wasn’t doing a good job like if I played by like their rules.

Casey’s account invokes the familiar story of the civilizing mission that is part and parcel of imperialist discourse and strongly invoked in the teachings of the Global Community Ecuador program. Even before she had arrived in Ecuador, Casey had already begun to authorize herself as a “superstar American teacher” and such a self-imagining cohered strongly with what she had read in the pre-departure guides and what she was taught during the in-country Orientation. Casey’s narrative illustrates how such a self-imagining was suffused largely with a certain way that she wanted to be and, while there was a clear consideration of her students’ potential needs and preferences this was tied, perhaps predictably, to her own ideas of how she liked to be treated as a student and what she felt worked well for her. Nowhere, it seems was there a contemplation of waiting to meet and get to know her students before determining her course of action as their teacher. Instead, Casey had entered her classroom with an agenda to be “organized” (as defined in her own terms). In some sense, and particularly in light of her self-described perfectionism, such a resolve to be “organized” strikes as something she herself may have needed and had devised as a sort of pre-emptive coping strategy for confronting an existence as a novice teacher in an unfamiliar setting. However, it must be noted that her agenda to be “organized” also coheres with the content of the pre-departure materials, which had in fact implicated a lack of “organization” as being characteristic not only of Ecuadorian educational institutions but of the country overall. In no uncertain terms, the guided had painted images of cheating, late, absent, Spanish-speaking Ecuadorian students whose behavior was in need of order, of relatively permissive Ecuadorian educational institutions in need of reform, and of a generally disorganized Ecuadorian society in need of transformation.
After weeks of encountering resistance to her way, however, Casey concluded that her efforts were misguided and far-fetched, and she effectively re-ordered and reformed her sense of authority to impose certain rules and classroom practices that she understood as American and counter to the typical Ecuadorian classroom. As she tells it, she realized that she was there to “teach,” and not to “change an entire educational system.” Her epiphany is admirable in some respects, as it begins to challenge the imperialist notion of the US volunteer as savior to the developing world. It is a partial retreat from a full exercise of symbolic violence vis-à-vis her students. At the same time, however, the content of Casey’s epiphany stops short of questioning a deeper imperialist premise which maintains that Ecuador (and the entire developing world) is characterized by dysfunction and assumes an authoritative role for the United States in the fixing of this condition; instead Casey’s revelation merely questions the pragmatic feasibility of such an undertaking for someone in Casey’s limited position. For Casey, the problem did not lie in whether she, as a US-American, had the authority to “change an entire education system,” but rather in the fact that such an undertaking was simply beyond her capacity.

Further, as it turned out, Casey’s epiphany stopped short of a full retreat from othering what she perceived as the Ecuadorian way of teaching and the lionization of what she considered to be the American way. As she told me:

C: But it’s like, now I do—I don’t feel like a lazy teacher. I mean, by like American standards, I am, like, and what I’m able to do.

CA: Why is that? How is—

C: Well, just like, for example, last Friday, I came to class and I had all my like lesson plans together and um, I was even gonna have, we were gonna have like a test review and have like a test on Monday for this one class, and it like turns out it was like the intercolegio dance competition. So there were like, y’know half of my students weren’t there, so it’s like, what can you do? And I was like, “Okay, guys we’re gonna watch a movie,” y’know, so like, just things like that, where I have to just like give in and be like, “Whatever, we’re just gonna watch a movie today.”

CA: Right, and in the states, how would that be different?

C: Well, like when I was in high school, my Spanish teacher, I mean I didn’t learn any Spanish in high school because all we did was watch movies. He would just like turn on a movie, or he would like sit there and read out of the book, or you know, like, just things
like that, I guess I feel like a sell-out just putting on a movie but sometimes there’s nothing else to do.

CA: ’Cause you always thought of him as lazy, like a lazy teacher?

C: Mm hm, yeah.

CA: I see. Yeah.

C: Yeah, so, yeah, I don’t know.

Thus, while Casey had begun to “play by their rules” and even emitted an air of having been humbled in the process, she clearly still regarded these rules as fundamentally wrong and moreover, that her abidance by them rendered her a “lazy teacher” according to what she held to be “American standards,” to which she implicitly grants a sort of fundamental legitimacy even as she simultaneously frames the entire matter as being relative. In this way, Casey’s story illustrates how some volunteers could accept their temporary existences amid “different” rules and even bend to these rules, relinquishing their authority to impose certain rules that they understood as being non-Ecuadorian and thus foreign to their students. However, as with Casey, the imperialist ‘truth’ of American superiority lived on in their minds and in their words (to me, to fellow volunteers), thus preserving in their subjectivities a sense of US-American moral authority vis-à-vis Ecuador, and the developing world, more broadly. In other words, despite resistance from students and related modifications of teacher practices and senses of one’s role as a US-American English teacher in Ecuador, the sway of US moral authority in the volunteers’ senses of themselves did not attenuate; rather, their perceived failure to exert this authority generally did not cause or allow them to fully break its discursive hold but rather compelled them to imagine themselves as fallen US-American subjects, not able to successfully be the “superstar American teacher” that forms the stuff of US imperialist fantasies and to which they had aspired as Global Community volunteers.

10.9 Conclusion

When I originally approached the ethnographic and interview data that concerned the classroom, the Global Community teacher training, and the volunteers’ teacher narratives, I
tentatively conceived of it as the one domain of findings where the imperial prevailed overwhelmingly over the neoliberal in the constitution of their subjectivities. For example, when recounting their day-to-day classroom practices and the thought processes, intentions, and self-imaginings that surrounded them, volunteers did not talk about an imagined or intended self development that they felt was taking place or perhaps being thwarted. (Though, as Chapter Four illustrated, such a vision did manifest in some narratives surrounding the decision to apply to and participate in Global Community in the first place). Nor did they rate or review their students in consumerist fashion as they did when talking about their host families. To be certain, and taking a page from Wanda Vrasti (2013), the entire teaching stint might nonetheless be broadly conceived as a site of neoliberal governance insofar as, in exchange for a large fee and brief training, the volunteer gains experience and develops skills (on the backs of Ecuadorian students and Ecuadorian English teachers who are passed over in favor of native English speaking teachers) that translate into “human capital” that can be deployed to her benefit in the future, whether he or she is sensitized, cognizant, or intentional about this process or not. Underscoring the role of imperialist discourse in the construction of the teaching stint as an opportunity for the volunteer, the constructed deficiency of Ecuadorian teachers can work to silence questions around the legitimacy of inexperienced, untrained youth presiding over classrooms; recall that it was her perception of this very deficiency that prompted Annie to recommend Global Community to novice US-American teachers on the premise that “it doesn’t matter if you mess up.” Moreover, it is true that whether or not one “messes up,” one still gets to put the credential on one’s resumé or grad school application and even obtain a letter of recommendation from field directors if, as Amanda highlighted in the Introductory chapter of this dissertation, she completes the entire year.

Still, with respect to the Global Community discourse around the teaching stint (as circulated on its website, in its program materials, and in its in-country trainings), more present than any directive to make use of the teaching stint for self-development, it seemed, was an authorizing of inexperienced, untrained US-American volunteer as an English teacher and an accompanying injunction that volunteers assert and practice a certain authority in their
classrooms in several ways: by imposing certain teaching methods understood to contravene "typical" Ecuadorian teaching methods; by imposing certain rules understood to contradict "typical" Ecuadorian behaviors and assumptions; and by policing their students accordingly, making it clear that they were the authorities when student behaviors disrupted their agendas. As discussed in this chapter, such directives instantly invoke the kinds of mandates granted to previous generations of US-American teachers and humanitarian volunteers deployed in service of US empire at the turn of the 19th century and the middle of the 20th. Further, the rationale upon which this authority was being vested into volunteers drew from the same imperial logic used to authorize those previous generations. Having never taught before, volunteers were vested with the authority to be English teachers in Ecuador on the implicit basis that: Ecuadorian teachers and Ecuadorian teaching methods were deficient; that Ecuadorian students were culturally backward and in need of correction and transformation; and, that English language ability was a neutral, apolitical means of advancement for Ecuadorians. As this chapter has emphasized, when volunteers faced various kinds of challenges and symbolic disruptions to their authority in the classroom they frequently recovered by dredging up these very 'truths,' holding them up in ways that repaired the legitimacy of what it was they were doing vis-à-vis their students and their authority to do so.

However, while imperialist 'truths' seemed to figure more heavily in volunteers' recoveries of authority in the face of its contestation, it should not be overlooked that in authorizing them, Global Community Ecuador actually fused these longstanding imperial 'truths' with more recent neoliberal 'truths' of deregulated teacher training, human capital conceptions of English language learning, and pedagogical models that emphasize a market-oriented approach to language learning and the responsibility of the student. Indeed, as I discussed in this chapter, volunteers were deigned teachers after only seventeen teacher training sessions and two weeks of practice teaching; Global Community touted English education for Ecuadorians as a vehicle of greater marketplace participation; and the particular teaching methods they were instructed to adopt were ones that invoke the paradigms of Communicative Language Teaching and Student Regulated
Learning that have been associated with neoliberalist visions of education. In this light, the program’s authorizing of volunteers as teachers and its inciting of them to practice authority were carried out not only through the marshaling of certain imperial ‘truths’ but also through the mobilization of certain neoliberal ‘truths,’ both of which seemed ready to play off of each other in a sort of symbiotic tandem.

Drawing on Foucault, I argued at the end of Chapter Two that, in considering the 19th and early to mid-20th century era of liberal governmentality, we might think of imperialism as a “strategy of security” which enabled practices of liberalism to flourish precisely through violating its principles of “freedom” and non-intervention. Indeed, as Chapter Two showed, the 19th and 20th centuries were replete with economic interventions and violations of freedom visited upon the governments and populations of Latin America by the United States state. In Foucault’s account of neoliberalism, he argues that where liberalism was driven by a principle of non-intervention (which “strategies of security” necessarily violated), neoliberalism is an art of government that actually mandates intervention in the economy in the interest of cultivating, enabling, and safeguarding market competition. From this theoretical point of departure, contemporary imperialism becomes less a strategy of security that contradicts the currently prevailing rationality of rule and more a direct expression of its central principle: state intervention. In this light, whereas the mid-20th century state-led volunteer program of Peace Corps may have constituted a strategy of security, the late 20th century and early 21st century phenomenon of a state-endorsed, but privately coordinated, international volunteering industry no longer violates the art of government that prevails but rather does its bidding. Moreover, in the specific case of Global Community Ecuador, which is the focus of this dissertation, the fact that this US-American program has the Ecuadorian government subsidize the stipends of the volunteers is not a violation of neoliberal principles but rather a direct application of them in that the state is enabling the teaching of English (by those presumed to be the best instructors on account of their native speaker fluency) ostensibly to render its citizens more competitive in the global marketplace and
perhaps less explicitly, to improve its own competitive odds in the attraction of foreign investment (see Chapter One).

However, if one is to take seriously the claim that the US-American state endeavors to not only foster greater competition within its own domestic economy but to also continually “open up” new overseas opportunities for capitalist competition to take place, then it theoretically follows that critical to the success of this latter objective is the state’s successful assertion and exercise of the international authority to do this. This is where Harvey’s account of capitalist imperialism becomes relevant and where the continual production of US authority over extra-continental imperial territories can be understood as a key component of the interventionism that, Foucault argues, the neoliberal state deems necessary to ensure that competition takes place. In this light, authorizing US-American youth as teachers in Ecuadorian classrooms and directing them to in fact assert authority vis-à-vis their students can be understood as a governmental technology applied in service of the political objective of enabling market competition. However, even as Global Community volunteers were governed in ways that serve the production of US authority to go in and create the conditions for market competition to flourish (something which is often linked directly with benefiting the welfare of US citizens and the world’s population, overall), I would submit that they were also being governed in ways that served the neoliberalist demand that citizens not only be made ready to engage in marketplace competition for their own purposes, but also to be willing and able to regard education and foreign language ability in ways that in fact cohere with neoliberal reforms.
CHAPTER 11: CONCLUSION

As this dissertation has demonstrated, the late 20th century resurgence of United States international volunteering unfolded within a context of neoliberal restructuring that championed private, NGO-led international development over state-led models of the mid-20th century. This event also transpired within a context where advanced liberal states became increasingly invested in producing a certain kind of citizen – one that was no longer a partner of exchange in the classical liberal sense but rather an entrepreneur of himself. As has been widely theorized, the entrepreneur of the self does not exchange her labor for a wage, but rather receives a return on her human capital. In this vein, the entrepreneur of the self is also always investing in the development of her human capital with an eye toward maximizing her return. The credit for these critical observations goes to Foucault, but British sociologist Nikolas Rose has developed them further, observing, that this individual “was to conduct his or her life and that of his or her family, as a kind of enterprise, seeking to enhance and capitalize on existence itself through calculated acts and investments” (1999, p. 164).

In the last decade or so, as academic interest in Northern international volunteering has intensified, some scholars have argued that it is in fact a phenomenon loyal to a neoliberal logic of self-enterprise in which volunteers engage in a form of self-directed continuing education, investing in the development of their own human capital with an eye toward enhancing their job marketability. In this vein, international volunteering has been conceived by Wanda Vrasti (2013) as a technology of neoliberal government applied most frequently to Northern middle class and elite youth who have the funds to engage in it. However, in this dissertation I have argued that international volunteering also involves a strategic regulation of the population – particularly of those members who are white, middle and upper class, and relatively young – in ways that accord with the objectives of US imperialism. First, however, what is imperialism? How have I used this term?

In this dissertation, I drew upon David Harvey’s concept of capitalist imperialism as “a contradictory fusion of ‘the politics of state and empire’ and ‘the molecular processes of capital
accumulation in space and time” (2003, p. 26). In other words, capitalist imperialism is an often conflictive merging of the territorial and population-oriented interests of the state and the profit interests of the capitalist class, which is always looking for new sites of investment and new markets. A key aspect of Harvey’s definition is that, in this arrangement, capitalist logic seeks to exploit uneven geographical conditions under which capital accumulation occurs and make use of related economic asymmetries that take shape. In the meantime, state logic seeks to preserve those patterns of asymmetrical exchange that serve its own territorial and population related interests.

Global Community set up operations in Ecuador in the early 1990s and at the height of a dramatic neoliberal restructuring that was precipitated and mandated by the US-led IMF and World Bank. The ostensible idea behind this restructuring was to “help” the Ecuadorian government repay a massive foreign debt owed to US-American and European commercial banks, and this was to be accomplished not only by requiring that it slash public services and lay off government workers, but also by compelling it to open the country up to foreign investment, which soon came flooding in to exploit the country’s untapped petroleum reserves, as well as other natural resources. At the time, English language instruction was recognized in the international community as a way of signaling openness to foreign investment, and the initial sponsoring institution of Global Community was PetroEcuador, Ecuador’s at the time recently decentralized but still state-owned oil company. By the mid-1990s, the company was indeed privatized as foreign investment in the country’s oil industry continued to pour in. Many of the massive profits produced by this opening of the Ecuadorian oil industry went to US multinationals. In this way, Global Community Ecuador volunteers can be understood as having played a concrete role in a key instance of US neoliberal-imperialist practice.

However, as the field of post-colonial studies has asserted and Harvey also underscores, imperialism is about more than economic, political, and military domination. It is also about the generation, circulation, and deployment of discourses that operate alongside these forms of control. As Edward Said (1978/2003; 1993) and others have argued, central to Western
imperialism has been a construction of an “us/them” dichotomy, as well as the construction of imperial subjects and societies through a lens of backwardness and deficiency and the assertion that imperial territories are in dire need of guidance and intervention from the Western world. At the same time, there has also been the production of a Western bourgeois subject that “infers relations of comparison with the Other on a global scale, comparison in which the Other always comes off as somehow lacking or not quite up to an unmarked standard. Operating alongside this sense of comparison and simultaneously authorized by it are a sense of entitlement and an obligation to intervene for the “betterment” of the Other wherever he or she resides” (Heron, 2007, p. 7). This is what Barbara Heron (2007) has conceived as a planetary consciousness and identified as a “colonial continuity” that persists to this day.

What I have tried to do in this dissertation is to situate the discursive production of this bourgeois subject and what I have referred to as its mainstreaming to non-elite white middle and upper class US-American subjects in what Nikolas Rose has referred to as “the field of power that is codified as the state” (1998, p.46). In this vein, I have sought to consider these acts as constituting the application of a governmental technology that is in fact oriented toward securing the achievement of certain visions of population welfare. Specifically, I suggest that, like technologies of government that seek to regulate and produce citizens in accordance with the ends of neoliberalism, there are also technologies of government that aim to regulate population conduct and subject formation in ways that comport with objectives of imperialism.

As I discuss in this dissertation, humanitarianism can be understood as one of these technologies. At the end of the 19th century, the United States’ acquisition of a formal overseas empire was understood as a vital part of securing naval outposts and granting the domestic population with improved access to Asian and Caribbean markets. As part of this undertaking armies of US teachers were recruited and sent to the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Cuba, and Hawaii where they were to pacify resistance to US rule and garner affinity for the United States as a benevolent ruler. As part of this initiative, imperial subjects were defined through a lens of
savagery, backwardness, and general inferiority in relation to the white population of the United States. Meanwhile, US teachers were constructed as bearers of civilization and progress.

Then, in the Cold War context of the mid-20th century, US hegemony in Latin America faced mounting resistance and this was interpreted by US corporations and state actors as a threat to American capital and the advance of Soviet communism. Following Castro’s revolution in 1959, the Peace Corps was born in 1961. Again, volunteers were tasked with pacification – enlisted to fight poverty that sowed the seeds of leftist agitation by carrying out technological transfers, circulating capitalist economic principles, and organizing communities against feudalist systems of labor purported to prevail in the region. Like the humanitarian initiatives of the late 19th century, the Peace Corps was also premised on notions of Latin America and the “Third World” in general as a place of backwardness, tradition, and lack of progress. Volunteers were constructed as invaluable modernizers.

In the late 20th century, the explosion of private international volunteer organizations happened at a time when, under the leadership of what has been called the Washington-Wall Street complex, the IMF and the World Bank were intent upon cultivating amenable environments for foreign capital investment in developing countries. This came on the heels of the gradual closing of Latin American economies that had marked the post-war era, the economic crises of the 1970s, and a movement among US corporations to marshal US state power in the re-opening of Latin American markets to foreign investment and trade. A key part of this transition involved shifting the governments of these countries toward a private sector/NGO model of social service delivery. As I discuss in this dissertation, the instruction of the English language – which is the work that Global Community engages in most frequently – has been cited by several as a key move through which developing countries in fact signaled openness to foreign capital investment in the 1990s.

More recently, in the wake of the globally unpopular Iraq war, international volunteering has been actively promoted by the Brookings Institution, which has explicitly cited the deployment of American volunteers as being critical to the security and wellbeing of the US population and to
the achievement of US “public diplomacy objectives abroad” (Rieffel & Zalud, 2006, p. 1). To this end, it spearheaded a 3-year initiative between 2006 and 2009 which sought to increase annual numbers of US-American volunteers overseas. Again, volunteers, typically imagined as white, were constructed as well-meaning, natural helpers and even saviors to black and brown international populations often constructed as exotic, traditional, rural, and materially poor. This Initiative later became the Building Bridges Coalition, a consortium of “international volunteer organizations, corporations, universities and colleges, government agencies, policy makers, and other stakeholders” that work “to advance the quality, impacts and scale of international volunteering” (Building Bridges Coalition, n.d.).

Humanitarianism has not been the only governmental technology deployed in service of imperial objectives. As I have also discussed in this dissertation, there is also tourism. Touching on this briefly here, I will just point to two key examples I have discussed in the dissertation. First, in the years during and directly following World War II, the US government actively promoted US tourism to Latin America out of an interest in exporting US dollars to Latin American economies. These dollars, it was anticipated, would be spent on purchasing US finished goods, thereby averting a post-war economic crash and preserving patterns of asymmetrical economic integration that had come to define the relation between the two regions. Then, at the end of the 20th century, the US-dominated World Bank promoted tourism as a mode of international development and an alternative to industrialization in the developing world. In the coming years, US state bodies such as USAID promoted international tourism projects in Latin American countries, and the industry became a key source of profit for US companies and a key site of US economic domination. In both of these instances, I have suggested, the construction of Latin America as an object of exploration for the US-American traveler was key, as was the exoticizing and inferiorizing of Latin America through a lens of primitiveness, traditionality, and under-development. But so was, I have also argued, the shaping of US conduct in such a way that included the cultivation of a sense of entitlement to be in and gaze upon the physical and cultural spaces of Latin America -- and to do so from a stance of ascribed normativity and superiority.
In this dissertation, I have argued that contemporary international volunteering, which involves a blend of humanitarianism and tourism, constitutes a technology of government in which rationalities of imperialism and neoliberalism merge together. My formulation of this argument is based not only the historical material I have just discussed, but also the ethnographic fieldwork I conducted as I followed a cohort of Global Community Ecuador volunteers from their in-country Orientation through their field placements and the program’s Mid-Point Conference and finally, to the End-Point Conference that Global Community holds at the end of each cohort’s stint. It is through drawing on this fieldwork, that I also have argued that the US international volunteer program itself plays a critical role in the application of the governmental technology of international volunteering and the related subject formations of Northern volunteers.

This argument is based on a general finding that volunteer subjectivities – as expressed and performed through volunteer practices and narratives – often indexed key ‘truths,’ assumptions, directives, and injunctions that comprised the content of program discourses deployed in recruiting volunteers, educating them about Ecuador, and instructing them on how to order their behavior and expectations over the course of the stint. In particular, I became interested in the relational components of volunteer subjectivity – that is, how they thought about, imagined, and mentally interacted with an Ecuadorian otherness that was constructed for them by Global Community. In this construction, there was in fact also the construction – and *instruction* – of a volunteer subject that was always relating in some way to this Ecuadorian otherness in its various conjured manifestations – Ecuador writ large, the Ecuadorian host family, the Ecuadorian classroom, student, and teacher. It was in this relating that I found a continual interplay of neoliberal and imperial ‘truths,’ assumptions, and practices. As I discuss in this dissertation, this interplay often appeared to be symbiotic or mutually reinforcing.

For example, in describing their paths to Global Community, volunteers typically echoed the assumptions conjured on the program website. What happened, I have argued, was that there emerged a will to make use of a discursively constructed Ecuadorian otherness for purposes of self-investment. The idea of helping an inferior “Third World” country was not the
driving aim but was taken for granted as something that the volunteer simply had the right and capacity to simply drop in and do, thus sustaining imperial truths even as they were somewhat muted by neoliberal ambition. But a critical point here is that this neoliberal ambition was very much dependent upon an imperialist assumption of a “Third World” in need of US-American help and of a “Third World” physical space that was openly accessible to the US-American subject. In the meantime, Ecuador was imagined through a lens of strategic consumerism, thought about largely in terms of how it could or could not serve the particular self-enterprising agenda of the volunteer.

With respect to conjuring and constructing Ecuadorian otherness, in Chapter 7, I discussed Global Community’s construction of an us/them dynamic, defining Ecuador through a lens of inferior otherness and painting volunteers as explorers, knowers, and evaluators of this otherness. This is a classic characteristic of Western imperialist discourse, however, over the course of fieldwork I found that this was deployed in service of neoliberal subject formation. For example, field staff encouraged volunteers to also make use of this otherness in ways that were applicable to resumés and through practices that required volunteers to compete against each other, thus bringing a neoliberal ethic to an imperial practice of producing the other through a lens of spectacle.

An acute instance of this was also found in the volunteers’ subjectivities in relation to the homestay component of the volunteer stint and the Ecuadorian host families that participated in this arrangement. This was the focus of Chapter 9. Here, the organization constructed the volunteer as an intimate tourist and critical consumer of the Ecuadorian host family – itself a distinctive subject position of the broader international volunteer discourse – and instructed him on how to go about adopting and inhabiting these subject positions. Importantly, volunteers were not only directed to drop in and touristically gaze upon and immerse themselves with host families, which were constructed as instant, endless, at-your-service sources of affection and care for the Northern volunteer. They were also directed to relate to the homestay and the host family in terms of how they served particular self-investment agendas, namely acquiring and
improving Spanish language skills, but also achieving a certain cultural experience that volunteers were at one point directed to turn into a resumé bullet.

Over the course of the year, I found that volunteers generally related to their host families in just this way. Host families were discussed by volunteers as consumer products or services that did or did not deliver on certain expectations that were, to a large extent, conjured up for the volunteer by Global Community. And when host families did not deliver, volunteers often complained to Global Community staff, requested new families, and were in fact relocated. On the flip side, when host families rejected volunteers, field staff intervened and found replacements, all the while reassuring volunteers that they were entitled to and deserving of “good” host families.

I have suggested that this not only translated into the production of a consumerist subjectivity in relation to already othered Ecuadorian subjects now imagined through a commodifying lens, but also into a US-American consumerist engineering of “Third World” reality in which the most tenuous strands of the host family discourse were actually re-fortified when in danger of breaking apart. Moreover, insofar as the homestay involved volunteer practices of evaluating and reporting on host families, it also constituted the production of a distinctive kind of consumeristic US-American surveillance of Ecuadorian spaces of domesticity, family relations, and home.

Then there was the classroom. In the teacher narratives of the volunteers, neoliberal self-enterprise was not so apparent. Instead, it was the abbreviated teacher training and the particular teaching methods that Global Community instructed volunteers to use that cohered with neoliberal education reforms. This was bound with a broader production of volunteers as authorities vis-à-vis their students and Ecuadorian counterparts. As I discussed in Chapter 10, the exercise of volunteer authority vis-à-vis their students was in fact a key ethic that Global Community field staff attempted to instill in the volunteers. Thinking beyond the narrow construct of “teacher authority,” I argued that this constituted a would-be production of US authority in the
space of the Ecuadorian English classroom through a particular kind of subject formation of the volunteers.

Specifically, I conceived of this subject formation as the discursive and governmental authorizing of volunteers to do certain things in the classroom. Briefly, they were authorized to be teachers, even though most of them had no previous experience; they were authorized to police and discipline student behaviors presented to them as typically Ecuadorian, and they were authorized to utilize teaching methods that were presented to them as running contra to typical Ecuadorian teaching methods. The basis of this authorizing was one that drew on certain discursive truths of US imperialism – the construction of Ecuadorian English teachers as inept; the construction of Ecuadorian students as culturally backward, morally inferior, and in need of US-American uplift; and the construction of English instruction as an apolitical service removed from geopolitical relations of domination. Here, the particular teaching methods volunteers were authorized to implement – the Communicative Language Teaching approach and Self-Regulated Learning – have been theorized as products of neoliberal education reform. In this way, the production of volunteer authority to override local Ecuadorian teaching methods and implement foreign ones as superior models was tied to the production of volunteer subjectivities that were committed practitioners and champions of neoliberal educational practices. Importantly, in responding to internal disruptions and symbolic challenges to their authority, volunteers tended to marshal key imperialist ‘truths’ (in the form of certain contentions explicitly imparted to them by Global Community) that bolstered their entitlement to be teachers in Ecuadorian classrooms and to do what they were doing.

In relating these particular findings to the broader theoretical concerns of this study, I submit that if we are to take seriously the claim that the US-American neoliberal state endeavors to not only foster greater competition within its own domestic economy but to also continually “open up” new overseas opportunities for capitalist competition to take place, then it theoretically follows that critical to the success of this latter objective is the state’s successful assertion and exercise of the international authority to do this. In this light, authorizing US-American youth as
teachers in Ecuadorian classrooms and directing them to in fact assert authority vis-à-vis their students can be understood as a governmental technology applied in service of the political objective of enabling market competition on asymmetrical terms that benefit US capital and producing US citizens that are ready to engage in marketplace competition for their own purposes, but are also willing and able to regard education and foreign language ability in ways that in fact cohere with neoliberal education reforms. In the meantime, there is also the production of a volunteer subject who condones and supports the local level exercise of US authority on the grounds that Ecuador, and the developing world in general, is deficient and in need of US intervention.

The final finding of this study that I want to touch upon here concerns the ways in which the othering gaze that Global Community worked to instill in volunteers was troubled as volunteers moved through the physical spaces of the cities and towns where they were placed. As discussed in Chapter 8, program staff in fact attempted to prepare a mostly white cohort of volunteers for the ways in which the Ecuadorian gaze would read and construct them as gringos, a subject position that, in addition to being used to denote a particular kind of racialized white US-American otherness, is also ascribed a number of qualities, including exotic-ness, ignorance, gullibility, and material wealth. Despite the racialized dimension of the gringo subject position, however, Global Community staff carefully avoided this aspect, instead presenting gringo-ness as a generic sort of foreign-ness that had to do merely with “sticking out in a crowd.” In this way, I argued, the program discursively preserved the racial normativity of whiteness, even as it implicitly flagged it as the reason behind the discriminatory treatment for which it was preparing its predominantly white corps of volunteers.

With respect to their whiteness, I have argued, volunteers were, over the course of the year subjected to an exercise of disciplinary power as they moved through the Ecuadorian public space. Most were in fact stared at and produced as strange through varying forms of verbal address that were often gendered in nature. This, in combination with the experience of finding no one around who physically resembled them, led most to feel an acute sense of conspicuousness.
akin to what Foucault described as a “state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power” (1975/1995, p. 201). This, combined with experiences of discriminatory treatment, worked to produce subjectivities of otheredness, which volunteers repeatedly contested even as they became increasingly familiarized with how they were read and regarded by the Ecuadorian gaze. In describing instances of being stared at, cat-called and “ripped off,” they demonstrated that they were acutely aware of common gringo stereotypes (many of them having been taught to the volunteers by field directors over the course of Orientation), and in fact looked upon themselves through the Ecuadorian gaze, as they understood it. At the same time, even as they remained aware of how they were perceived, they balked at and attempted to resist the subject position of Other, arguing with taxi drivers over minuscule amounts of money, raging within at those who imposed this position upon them, and noting those public spaces where they believed there was less chance of being stared at and ogled. All the while, many experienced feelings of fear, anxiety, and anger at being othered. Here, I draw on a qualified application of Du Bois’s concept of double consciousness to think about the subjectivities of otheredness produced among the volunteers. Significantly, however, most remained unable or unwilling to name their whiteness as a key way in which they were read and regarded by the Ecuadorian gaze. I have argued that this must be considered in light of Global Community’s deracialization of the gringo construct and that it might also be thought of as an instrument effect that ended up preserving senses of and claims to racial normativity among white volunteers, thus enabling them to maintain a claim on racial invisibility and normalcy even as their lived realities as gringos continually destabilized it.

Questions for Future Research

In this dissertation I examined the relational subject formations of one cohort of Global Community Ecuador volunteers as they appeared to unfold with respect to several distinct “contact zones.” A concept of postcolonial scholar, Mary Louise Pratt, “contact zones” can be understood as “social spaces where disparate cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in highly asymmetrical relations of domination and subordination – such as colonialism and
slavery, or their aftermaths as they are lived out across the globe today” (1992/2007, p. 7). To do this work, I drew upon the narratives of volunteers and their accounts of things that had happened in these contact zones and I held this data up against the program discourses and governmental injunctions circulated as a matter of course by the Global Community program.

While conducting the research upon which this dissertation is based, I made several decisions that had implications for the scope of its findings and arguments. Early on, I decided that I wanted to learn about the perspectives of the volunteers I followed. This focus eventually morphed into a more theoretically informed interest in the discursive and governmental relationship between the institutional program of Global Community Ecuador and the subjectivities of the volunteers with respect to how they related to Ecuadorian participants of the Global Community arrangement.

Another research decision I made was that in order to both foster and preserve the ethnographic depth of the data I was collecting and to cultivate trust between the volunteers and myself, as the researcher, I would generally *not* attempt to interview members of their host families, their institutional directors, their fellow Ecuadorian teachers, or their students (this last decision was qualified to some extent by my interviewing of some students who were volunteered by their volunteer-teacher, Peggy, and who kindly agreed).

Inevitably, these research decisions carried both strengths and limitations. On the one hand, I was able to achieve a great deal of analytical insight into the subjectivities of the volunteers and the ways they appeared to produced in relation to program discourses and behavioral prescriptions. On the other hand, with the exception of a few instances, I generally only heard one side of the story from the "contact zones" upon which I chose to focus.

Thus, future research would also do well to hone in on the meetings, clashings, and grappling that transpire in "contact zones" and examine more fully the multidirectional kinds of lived effects that play out as they take place. The value of such research was illustrated to me one afternoon when I interviewed Doctora Beatriz Castillo, director of one of the educational institutions where several Global Community Ecuador volunteers were routinely assigned to
teach. At one point during our conversation, she alluded to differences between US culture and Ecuadorian culture and observed that a key challenge for Global Community volunteers was in fact overcoming their lack of familiarity with the latter. I asked if there had been any specific situation that had occurred that caused her to feel this way, and while she began by responding that there had not been any particular problem, she then quickly interrupted herself, apparently reminded of a situation that had, indeed, come up that year. “Ah, últimamente / [Ah, recently],” she said, “el problema que hubo es que la compañera que fue designada para aqui en el Instituto no quiso venir. Se llama Shannon Adams” / [the problema was that the colleague that was assigned here to the Instituto did not want to come. Her name is Shannon Adams].

With this statement, I knew that Doctora Castillo was referring to a situation that had occurred several months prior. By the time of our conversation, I had heard one version of the story from Shannon, who was the compañera/colleague in question. I was now interested to hear Dra. Castillo’s side of the story. I asked what had happened and she went to explain that at the start of the school year, when Shannon and her fellow volunteers had arrived, student enrollment levels had not panned out as she had expected and as a result, when Shannon came to the Instituto there were no classes for her to teach. With an extra English teacher on hand, Dra. Castillo had arranged for Shannon to work in the carera de ingles [English department] of the university to which the Instituto which was related but separate. However this arrangement was only to be for the first semester. As Dra. Castillo recounted, “Yo le había prestado a carera en el primer semestre, o sea, le preste de septiembre a febrero. Y le he dicho ’Vaya arriba, es de la universidad misma, en calidad de préstamo. Pero en marzo regresa aca.’ / [I had lent her [Shannon] to the English department in the first semester, that is, I loaned her from September to February. And I’ve told her, ‘Go up there, it’s part of the university, in the spirit of a loan. But in March, come back here.’ ”

In March, Dr. Castillo would be counting on Shannon to fill a vacancy that would be created at the Instituto with the scheduled departure of Caroline, a Global Community volunteer from a previous cohort who had been teaching two classes at the Instituto, Monday through
Friday, from 3:00 to 5:00. However, as Dra Castillo told me, “Llegamos a marzo y [Shannon] no quiso venir / [We got to March and she [Shannon] did not want to come.]

Over the course of the next few weeks, Dra. Castillo and Shannon had engaged in a series of negotiation talks. When I asked each separately about the conversations, the centrality of Shannon’s desires (as opposed to contractual or institutional obligations) came up in both of their recollections. When I asked Dra. Castillo that afternoon why Shannon did not want to come to the Instituto, she recalled, “Porque dijo que no, que los chicos ellos de ella ya están acostumbrados con ella, que mejor le conviene quedarse arriba, que no se que.”[Because she said no, that her kids [students] were accustomed to her, that it suited her more to stay up there, that I don’t know what.” According to Dra. Castillo, one conversation had prompted tears from Shannon,

Yo habló con ella, ella se puso molesta hasta lloro, que no quiere. Entonces, claro eso molesta y […] en las angustias de que no debería llorar, y ella dijo: “No” y que no se que. Entonces, ese fue mi problema mayor pero bueno después ya, se solucionó y ella se quedó arriba.” En cambio los alumnos de aquí se quedaron sin profesor. Hubo que ver que profesor darles. Eso es el problema mayor que subió ahora pero yo pienso que para el próximo año ya—yo también no voy a ser tontita en prestar (riendose) porque uno a veces por prestar es, por prestar es…el problema es, ese de que uno cuando es buena abusa la gente y ya no quiso venir, y vi la necesidad y tuve que hacer reajustos aquí entonces se hizo un problema.

I talked with her, she got irritated to the point that she cried, saying that she doesn’t want to. Then of course that bothers me, and [I was] anguishedly telling her that she shouldn’t cry. And she said, “No,” and I don’t know what. So, that was my biggest problem, but after that, it was resolved and she stayed up there [at the University]. On the other hand, the students here remained without a teacher. The issue of which teacher to give them had to be resolved. That’s the biggest problem that came up, but I think that for the next year now—I, too, am not going to be foolish enough to loan (laughing) because sometimes to loan is, to loan is…The problem is that when one is kind, people abuse you, and she didn’t want to come anymore, and I saw the necessity and I had to make some readjustments here, so it became a problem.

Having talked with Shannon around the time that all of this was transpiring and hearing her side of the story, I was able to infer that at the time when Dr. Castillo was counting on Shannon to take over two classes that were now without a teacher at the Instituto, she had become engaged in actively pursuing friendships and social bonds with her students at the university. This had been part of an attempt to realize a sort of ideal “experience” that she had
originally intended to make happen but which had eluded her during the first semester due to her frequent travel out of the city where she had been placed. As Shannon told it, during the first few months of the volunteer stint she had spent a lot of weekends traveling the country, trying to see as much of it as she could and visiting other volunteers. By January she had run out of disposable cash and at that point, it had dawned on her that she had spent too much time “running around the country” and not enough time taking in her immediate surroundings and trying to form relationships with the Ecuadorian people who lived there (the latter being the primary motivation in her decision to apply to and participate in the Global Community program). Dr. Castillo’s moment of necessity, then, it seemed, had collided head on with Shannon’s pursuit of a particular “experience.”

This story of what unfolded between Dra. Castillo and Shannon thus illustrates a struggle between two agendas which were simultaneously at play within the Global Community volunteer arrangement, one belonging to the educational institution that takes on the volunteer and one formulated by the volunteer. While the discourse of international volunteering famously suggests that these agendas are compatible and equally met, in this case it was clearly not so. As the director of the Instituto, Dra. Castillo was invested in providing an English teacher for two classes that had been scheduled to take place and been enrolled in by students. Shannon, on the other hand, was invested in realizing a particular experience that she wanted to have, one that had been the primary motivation behind her whole decision to apply and participate in the Global Community Ecuador program.

While Shannon had reported feeling conflicted, ultimately she decided to stay at the university. I suggest that her decision was enabled or, at the very least, framed by a quiet sense of entitlement to pursue a particular experience, even if this meant going against the wishes, requests, and scheduling needs of the director of the institute that she had signed on to “serve” as part of this experience. Also important to understand here is the fact that at a certain point, Shannon had called on April, one of the field directors of Global Community Ecuador, to report
what was happening and, while April did not intervene directly on her behalf, she told Shannon that she would if she wanted her to do so.

Thus, while Shannon had wanted to “help” she was ultimately most vested in her own desires for a particular experience, and with the support of one of the Global Community program directors and within the context of the volunteer-centered discourse of the program which in fact emphasizes the self-advancing and fulfilling “experience” that the volunteer will have, she felt entitled to place her own agenda for an “experience” above the wishes of the director of the institute that she had signed on to serve as a volunteer English teacher. The implication was that she was ready to serve as long as her service fell in line with her own wishes for a particular “experience.”

In other words, what are some of the outcomes that result when competing agendas collide with each other? How are these negotiated by discursively distinct and differently positioned subjects? What are some of the other kinds of ripple effects of these confrontations? How do they potentially work to not only provoke discursive openings and/or closures and color subjectivities, but also potentially effect and alter human and institutional practices on either side – those of Global Community and those of the educational institution that takes on Global Community volunteers or, for another example, those of the host family that takes in the Global Community volunteer and those of the Global Community field staff that liaison with host families? The pursuit of such questions (with regard to Global Community Ecuador or other programs like it) is obviously critical to advancing the scholarship around the contemporary iteration of Northern international volunteering that this dissertation has begun to examine.

Other valuable questions that this dissertation has begun to raise have to do with the relational subjectivity formations of Ecuadorian participants in the Global Community program (or of host country participants in other US international volunteer programs) vis-à-vis the volunteers, the Global Community program itself, as well as notions of US-American “otherness.” For example, how do Ecuadorian institutional providers of English language education come to take on largely inexperienced, briefly trained US-American volunteer English teachers? How does an
Ecuadorian family come to be a “host family” for a volunteer? How does the consideration of such a decision even come to pass? What are the discursive fields and rationalities of rule in which such considerations and decisions around whether or not to engage with US-American volunteers in any capacity – be it as “host family” member, institutional administrator, or student – (and perhaps how to go about doing so) negotiated and made? How do host family subjects, administrator subjects, teacher subjects, or student subjects imagine and relate to these volunteers and from what kinds of subject positions do they do so?

An endeavor to explore such questions would ideally involve an examination of the distinct political and economic histories, rationalities of rule, and discourses in which Ecuadorian participant subjects are situated. For example, like the United States, Ecuador is a country with a history of liberal democracy and capitalism. However, the two countries clearly have distinct political and economic histories, with Ecuador having passed through periods of Spanish (as opposed to British) colonialism, heavy clerical influence, domestic military rule, neoliberalism, before arriving in a current phase of what has been described as 21st century socialism. By the same token, Ecuador’s capitalist economy has been characterized primarily by agriculture, natural resource extraction, and more recently international tourism, a point which leads to another critical distinction: as a perpetual target of US imperial practice, Ecuador is a country whose arts of government have been heavily tempered by foreign relations of domination with a distant hegemon rather than with remote imperial territories, as has been the situation of the United States.

In light of these points, some questions for future research on the Ecuador operations of Global Community would not only explore the relational subjectivities of the Ecuadorian teachers, administrators, students, and “host family” members vis-à-vis Global Community volunteers and staff, but would also examine these subjectivities in terms of the theorized specificities of Ecuadorian liberalism, the discursive constructs and governmental injunctions that have taken shape under its reign, the ways in which these may have shifted and re-shifted during periods of more explicitly illiberal rule, and the forms they currently take in this era of global neoliberalism.
Again, at the same time, clearly important for such a pursuit would be a critical consideration of the country’s longstanding and continued subjection to US hegemony and the related controlling discourses and governmental technologies that have emerged and taken root under this particular historical condition. This line of inquiry, as well as the aforementioned examination of contact zone activity and its multidirectional effects, would greatly contribute to efforts at deepening our intellectual understanding of the phenomenon of US-American international volunteering, and Northern international volunteering, more generally.
APPENDIX A: METHODOLOGICAL OVERVIEW AND REFLECTION

Emergence of Research Questions, Research Focus, and Selection of Research Site(s)

As discussed in the introduction to this dissertation, the research questions guiding my study took shape over the course of my own involvement as a volunteer with Global Community’s Ecuador program. For this reason, I always understood the actual study as an extended, more thorough, and evolving pursuit of issues that had emerged during my year as a volunteer; the more formal “part two” or follow-up study to the comparatively more organic and informal pilot project that had preceded it. For this reason, Global Community as the focus organization and Ecuador as the geographic location had always been the logical and intuitive choices with respect to the research site. These choices were further informed by my sense that, because I had been a volunteer, I had effectively established some credibility with the organization, thus laying the groundwork for gaining permission to conduct the study. Indeed, negotiating access was greatly facilitated by the fact that at the time of typing up those first few e-mails to formally request permission from program field directors to follow a group of volunteers for one year for my doctoral research, I was already well acquainted with both individuals: one had held the position when I was a volunteer (though by the time I started field work, she had moved on and been replaced by a new person) and the other had actually been a fellow volunteer in my cohort. Both would turn out to be receptive to my proposal and were instrumental in forwarding my request to the higher-ups who would ultimately grant permission.

A final factor that influenced my selection of Global Community as the research focus and Ecuador as the research site was a general sense of familiarity and facility with numerous things: with the Global Community organization and its Ecuador program; with Ecuadorian Spanish; with some of Ecuador’s physical terrains and its extensive transnational bus system; with some of the country’s dominant social and cultural norms; and finally, with several of the geographical sites and one of the educational institutes where Global Community Ecuador volunteers are placed as teachers. All of this, I expected and hoped, would be a tremendous asset during the fieldwork process. In general, I believe it was. When I arrived in Quito to begin fieldwork in August 2009, I
was able to get my bearings quickly and was not impeded by a sense of disorientation that might have detracted from focusing on the content of orientation sessions, establishing rapport with the volunteers, and retaining a keen eye to the human processes unfolding. It was during orientation, actually, that my attention to subjectivity formation among the volunteers was able to take shape. No longer a newcomer to the country or a new pupil of the organization, and already well-acquainted with the sort of the content that the field directors and invited speakers would be sharing during orientation sessions, I was able to divide my focus more equitably between my own critical readings of the content and the ways in which the volunteers appeared to be responding to the material, as well as what they were saying, doing, emoting, and projecting, and how they were interacting with each other.

**Fieldwork**

Between late August 2009 and late August 2010, I conducted an ethnographic study of the Global Community Ecuador yearlong program. Over the course of this roughly twelve-month period, I essentially followed one cohort of 36 volunteers, from Orientation in September through their year of living and teaching at various sites in Ecuador to the End-of-Service Conference in June. Over the course of fieldwork, I utilized multiple methods of participant-observation, qualitative interviewing (of field staff, volunteers, students of volunteers, and Ecuadorian teachers who worked in the same institutions as volunteers), and document analysis (of program materials such as guides and manuals provided to volunteers by Global Community staff).

Orientation (August 28, 2010 – September 25, 2010) was a month-long period that constituted an important phase of sustained fieldwork. The majority of official Orientation activities took place Monday through Friday, from the morning through the late afternoon. Every morning, all volunteers and field staff convened in the conference room of a local Quito hotel, where field staff led volunteers through various sessions that included group activities, informational talks, and teacher training. There was for example, a Scavenger Hunt around Quito, a city tour of Quito, a visit to the Guayasamin Museum, salsa classes at a local dance studio, and group lunches. Informational were given by the field staff and invited speakers (including an American Peace
Corps consultant, an Ecuadorian English professor, and a U.S. Military Personal Recovery Specialist). Several talks were focused on the topics of Ecuadorian history, Ecuadorian culture, and Ecuadorian politics. In other talks, speakers gave volunteers advice on maintaining personal safety, physical health, and mental health while in Ecuador. With respect to teacher training, this was carried out by field staff and a few veteran volunteers that had already been in the country for approximately six months. These sessions were centered on explaining and training the volunteers in the Communicative Language Approach, which the program officially advocates as the pedagogy volunteers should follow. They also included sessions on English grammar, classroom management, and tips for teaching under particular circumstances that field staff expected volunteers to encounter as English teachers in Ecuador.

The atmosphere of orientation often mimicked something akin to the first few weeks of college. No one (save for just three volunteers who had gone to college together) knew anyone—and everyone, it seemed, wanted to fit in, to make an impression, and to be considered cool. Over the course of the four weeks, I noticed a perpetual dynamic of volunteers sizing each other up, feeling each other out, and jockeying amongst each other for attention. Drinking often seemed to be not just an extension of college party life, but also a salve for an unrelenting condition of excited and over-stimulated nerves. Brooke, a 26-year-old volunteer from a large Midwestern town, later corroborated my impression that the group seemed to attempt to quell some of its collective nerves with collective drinking. Describing Orientation as a “like frat, like shit-show, like, let’s all get wasted,” she went on to tell me, “I think it was just, I think in part, I think it was an easy way for people to relate to each other, and it was an easy way for people to get past their own issues and just like cut loose, so of course the drinking…and I think a lot of people were graduating, just like graduating from college, so they were kind of still in that mentality.”

As the former volunteer turned researcher, I often felt particularly unsure as to how to navigate what often felt like a force field of nervous energy, endless anxious small talk, and competitive scrutiny. Often, my way in was through acting as a resource, a position that the volunteers often created for me when they engaged me in flurries of questions about the details
of my year as a volunteer. Where were you placed? What was your level of Spanish when you got here? Do you feel like your Spanish improved a lot? Did you live with a host family? What is the weather like in Guaranda? This was often our modality of conversation.

I also tagged along, whenever possible, on small group lunches at the small comida tipica restaurants that offer hearty three course afternoon meals for several dollars each. Over midday meals at these “almuerzo places,” as the volunteers quickly dubbed them, I was privy to a number of things -- group gossip, anxious wonderings about what the year held, urgent information swapping about host families and site placements, grappling with culture shock, tentative tries and performative displays of their varying levels of Spanish, and, sometimes, what seemed to be a direct application of orientation teachings to phenomena they observed or encountered around them. In addition, through these lunches, I gleaned a great deal of insight into the volunteers as a group with respect to cultural norms and codes, specifically the distinctly upper-middle class youth habitus by which they all abided in their interactions with each other and myself. I also picked up bits and pieces of their personal backgrounds and histories, gradually learning more about their lives, what had brought them to Ecuador as a Global Community volunteer and how they were digesting and making sense of their first few weeks in the country. In addition to tagging along for lunches, when I was in the right place at the right time, I was able to drift along for the aforementioned post-orientation drink sessions at local bars and I attended several loosely organized outings to local karaoke bars and discotecas.

While I was able to gain a lot of information and build rapport during the month of orientation, I was continually reminded of the fieldwork axiom that the ethnographer’s presence must be considered as a factor in whatever group dynamics play out while she is among the group. While I always counted lunches as valuable up-close-and-personal encounters with the volunteers, I was also always quite aware of how my presence seemed to affect the group dynamic. Indeed, while there were some meet-ups with some volunteers when things just seemed to flow quite easily, there were certainly other days when people seemed to literally clam up with people becoming more careful and guarded about the things they did and said.
This happened less on the few occasions that I was able to have a one-on-one lunch or cup of coffee with a volunteer. It was during these more private meet-ups, away from the gaze of other volunteers, that I felt that volunteers were more receptive to personal questions from me. In these encounters, I was not only able to find out more about the person, but I was also able to begin building particularly strong rapport with some individual volunteers. Given the size of the group, the abbreviated length of time, my admittedly more introverted nature, and the various levels of interest and willingness among the volunteers to interact with “the researcher” during their free time, the cultivation of a close individual relation with each and every one of the thirty-six volunteers did not happen during Orientation. However, I later realized that the healthy number of individual relationships that I was able to bring about during Orientation did in fact prove to come in handy over the course of the year, particularly when I began to plan visits and interviews and when I attended each of the two mandatory conferences hosted by program directors for the volunteers (one held in the middle of the year and one held as the year drew to a close). Often, having an already established close tie with one or two volunteers would give me an “in” to a site where there might be one or more other volunteers whom I had not gotten to know so well during the Orientation. In these cases, I think that the social capital I had built with one or two volunteers at a particular site undoubtedly contributed to the willingness of the others to “hang out” during my visit and perhaps even their receptivity to sitting down for an interview. Then, during the conferences, when all thirty-six volunteers would convene en masse it was the individual relationships built with various volunteers during the Orientation and the subsequent site visits, that always seemed to help when I needed a point of entry into the small group socializing and side conversations that took place in the hours before, between, and after sessions.

To summarize, the rapport I built during the first month of Orientation was always a work in progress, with alternating moments of success and setback, and it occasionally felt somewhat tenuous. I often spent time pondering the potential reasons for this. On the one hand, I could see that there was a certain camaraderie emergent among the volunteers that was defined
specifically by going through particular common situations – living in pairs and trios with host families, practice teaching at the local vocational institute, learning the streets of Quito as newcomers, and, often going out and “getting wasted” together. As they went through these situations together, their co-experiencing came to define the sociality of the group, and I, as the researcher, was simply not in the trenches of those situations with them. However, the thing that made matters particularly challenging, I thought, was the inescapable nature of my presence among the group. Indeed, I was there, as all of the volunteers were well aware, to essentially study them. While I attempted to be as low-key, unobtrusive, and friendly as possible, the unavoidable fact was that I was sitting in on Orientation sessions and hanging out with them as a researcher who, presumably, would be recording and writing about the things they did and said. Thus, while smiles and friendly conversation were always forthcoming – particularly when they were asking me the questions – I did get the distinct sensation that some were not sure what to make of me, and perhaps felt a bit uncomfortable being subjected to the intrusive research gaze, particularly, perhaps, as white upper-middle class young adults in a Third World country who were suddenly under the eye of a young brown woman. My reading of post-colonial studies literature led me to consider more seriously the ways in which my fieldwork constituted a sort of “reversal of the gaze” that could in fact be discomfiting to my study participants, particularly as they had all come to Ecuador with a certain expectation of gazing on people who are in fact commonly depicted on the Global Community website as brown and black.

These considerations of “reversal of the gaze” pushed me to consider how my study was deviating from dominant constructions of social research as the investigation of a problem as experienced from the standpoint of the socially marginalized, the vulnerable, the disadvantaged. None of these labels would ever be applied to the volunteers I followed – and I was sure this was not lost on them. Did my presence as a researcher leave them thinking, I often wondered, “What is it then that this young brown woman could want with us? What problem does she want to explore vis-à-vis us?” In a U.S. context where there has been an unprecedented excavation and dissection of white privilege in mainstream scholarship and media, I felt there was a strong
chance that, in the face of an “Other” person researching them, their minds would go almost immediately to an assumption that their whiteness and their privilege was on trial, and that this was what was behind my research interest in them. I contemplated this possibility when the volunteers engaged in what I sometimes thought was a sort of strategic maneuvering to escape and avoid my gaze and it was strengthened by a few hints made by volunteers that my presence as a black woman researcher did somehow seem to bring out inner reckonings with senses of whiteness and privilege. For example, one evening during Orientation, during an end-of-day beer session, Aaron, a 23-year-old volunteer from Newton, Massachusetts, seemed keen to engage me in a conversation/debate about affirmative action and, at some point, asked me if he was somehow “part of the white power structure.” Another example came during a conversation with Josh, a 25-year-old from Claremont, California, who wanted to talk about his experiences with “reverse racism.”

In the end, however, this hypothesis about the reasons behind some of my research participants’ early reticence had to remain largely inconclusive, even as it remained a strong one in my mind. This was partly because it was complicated by my realization that at least a few of the volunteers were concerned that I would share things they did and said with their field directors, that I was effectively going to act as an informant on their behavior for the Global Community organization. As was one volunteer greeted me one afternoon, “Hey stool pigeon!” On another occasion, when I broached with another volunteer the possibility of conducting an interview at some point later in the year, I was told that this would “probably be alright” but that “some people” might be concerned that I would tell the field directors certain things that were said during interviews. I reassured this particular volunteer that I would not be sharing anything said during interviews with anyone and that I would be providing him with a proper consent form that would place all of this writing (i.e. an IRB form) at the time of the interview; ultimately, he did grant me the interview. Thus, a combination of volunteer concerns about confidentiality, the fact that they had only just met me, and the context of an Orientation in which they were being acquainted with certain Global Community expectations and policies was undoubtedly another possible
explanation for any hesitancy they may have in talking to me. In sum, however, despite the highs and lows of building rapport during Orientation, I was able to maintain a steady engagement with a number of volunteers, with some members of the group more so than others.

*Phase Two of Fieldwork*

At the end of the Global Community Orientation, volunteers dispersed to their respective sites (eleven in total). At this time I accompanied those volunteers who had been placed in the city of Loja, which I had selected as the primary field site for my research. Loja is a mid-sized city with a population of approximately 170,000. A twelve-hour bus ride from Quito, it is located in the southern region of the country where it sits nestled in the Andes mountains chain that runs through Ecuador. It is an eight-hour bus ride from the Peruvian border that lies further south. As in most other major Ecuadorian cities, there are a number of different institutions, both private and public, that offer English language instruction to children and adults. These include the city’s two universities -- *Universidad Nacional de Loja (UNL)* which is a nationally renowned public university that was established in 1869, and *Universidad Técnica Particular de Loja (UTPL)*, a newer, private university that was established in 1971. Global Community places volunteers with both institutions.

My decision to select Loja as the primary field site was based on several factors. A major one was my sense of personal familiarity with the city, which I acquired as a result of living and working in Loja for one year as a Global Community Ecuador volunteer. During this time I developed a higher degree of ethnographic familiarity with the sociocultural landscape of the city than with any other Global Community Ecuador site. Going into fieldwork, I expected that my familiarity would render me a resource in the eyes of the 2009-2010 Loja volunteers. I expected that as they learned that I was previously a Global Community volunteer in Loja, they would view me as someone who could answer questions they would have and/or as someone who could identify with what they were currently experiencing as newcomers to the city. I expected and hoped that this would produce some initial incentive to converse with me and grant me easier access to their social worlds. I also expected that if volunteers did view me in this light, it would
aid in the development of friendly and personal rapport with them and also allow for a more in-depth view not only of their most pressing questions and concerns but also the ways in which they went about attempting to resolve them.

Second, over the course of the year of living and working in Loja as an English teacher, I had developed relationships with several local contacts, which I hoped would aid and enhance my research in important ways, providing levels of access that would be difficult to achieve in other cities where I would have had no pre-existing contacts. For example, my previous host family, who ended up hosting a member of the volunteer cohort that I followed, invited me to live with them a second time. Through this arrangement, (which I explained to and cleared with the volunteer they were hosting), I was able to observe one case of volunteer-host family relations on an ongoing, intimate basis. Additionally, through this arrangement, I was able to live as most volunteers were living – as the “guest-child” of an Ecuadorian “host family;” this, I felt, worked to lend me a sort of ongoing fluency with the housing situation of the volunteers, some of the broadly common rhythms and routines of the homestays they were placed in, and the kinds of negotiations that can ensue in the host family/guest child relationship. It also created a common, shared situation between the volunteers and myself. This, I think, worked to my advantage with respect to the continual process of building rapport.

In addition to living with my previous hosting family, I also selected Loja because I had maintained communication with the director and faculty of the educational institutes where Loja-based volunteers typically work. I had hoped that this would help in achieving access to school grounds and classrooms, and also aid in successfully arranging interviews with the Ecuadorian English teachers who work (and have worked for some time) alongside Global Community volunteers in these institutes. While the perspectives of these teachers are not the primary focus of this project, interviews with some of these teachers contributed valuably to deepening my understanding of local receptions and interpretations of Global Community volunteers and what it is they are doing in Loja, specifically, and Ecuador, more broadly. One interview in particular, with the director of one of these educational institutes, proved to be particularly enlightening. As a
volunteer, I had taught in the classroom across the hall from the French classroom of this
director, and we had always waved and smiled to each other from our posts at the fronts of our
respective rooms; when I arrived in Loja for fieldwork she graciously agreed to be interviewed for
my research. I do not think that she would have been quite so candid if she had known nothing of
me and had been meeting me only for the first time.

As part of the fieldwork conducted in the primary field setting of Loja, I visited volunteers'
classes at La Universidad Nacional de Loja[National University of Loja] or UNL, which is the local
public university, and at the Instituto de Idiomas[Language Institute] or the Instituto, which is a
satellite language institute of the UNL that serves both college students and provides open
classes to members of the local community. The breakdown of classes taught by volunteers was
the following. At the university, one volunteer taught Conversation classes to students who were
pursuing the English Language major offered by UNL; she taught a different class everyday for a
period of four hours. Another volunteer taught an Educational Research Methods class to fourth
year English Language majors; she taught the same group of students everyday for a period of
four hours. The two other volunteers each taught in the Peritaje program of the Instituto. The
Peritaje is the Instituto’s program of classes that is open to the public. At the time of fieldwork,
classes in this program met five days per week for one hour each time. Each volunteers who
taught in the Peritaje taught four, hour-long classes, everyday of the five-day workweek.

The intended purpose of these classroom observations was to observe how volunteers
approached their work, to observe what sorts of rapport developed between them and their
students, to observe how students both responded to volunteers in the classroom and engaged
the activity of studying English (i.e. their apparent perceptions of and dispositions toward the
English language, as gleaned through classroom comments, questions, jokes, and responses to
the teacher’s lesson and classroom activities). In my study design, I had indicated that before
establishing a regular observation schedule, I would consult with the volunteers and take into
consideration their preferences and comfort level as well as the preferences and comfort level of
their students. In addition, I had planned to establish a sample of classes that reflected the
diversity of levels and types of students taught by volunteers. Ultimately, I hoped to observe one class of each Loja volunteer on a regular basis. Once in the field, however, I quickly determined that classrooms observations would potentially compromise the rapport I was building with them. With the exception of one volunteer, none of the Loja volunteers had taught before and it seemed that my presence in the class saddled them with senses of discomfort. While each had granted me permission to observe their classes, it quickly seemed that they had perhaps done so because they had not wanted to offend me by saying no. As the last thing I wanted was for volunteers to be associating my presence with a sense of dread or discomfort (and keeping in mind that the volunteers likely associated “classroom observation” with the one-time evaluative classroom observations conducted by field directors on site visits), I decided to forego a regular schedule of weekly classroom observations, deciding to instead focus my fieldwork efforts more on tagging along for social outings and hang-out sessions. After a few weeks, the Loja volunteers seemed to relax a bit more with the idea of having me around as a researcher, and at this time I did resume with some classroom observations. Overall, however, as the specter of a classroom visit seemed to complicate the research relationships I was cultivating, I ultimately made the conscious decision to reposition this aspect of fieldwork so that it was not so central to the study design.

Phase Three of Fieldwork

In March, I relocated briefly to Cuenca at the invitation of Peggy, a 71-year-old retired teacher (and enthusiastic supporter of my research endeavors) who had been placed in Loja and had also been living with my former “host family” as a Global Community Ecuador volunteer. Several months into her time at the Universidad Nacional de Loja, Peggy had not received the monthly stipend that UNL had contracted to pay her, and for this reason, the field directors had orchestrated her transfer to Universidad de Cuenca. In mid-December, Peggy informed me of all this and thoughtfully suggested that I accompany her, framing it as an opportunity to spend time with the group of volunteers who had been placed in Cuenca; I imagined she was also a bit cowed at the prospect of living alone in a new city. At the end of February, she relocated to
Cuenca, having found an apartment located in a modestly upscale neighborhood near the city center and close to the university. I arrived in early March and was able to room with her for what would turn out to be her last month in Ecuador, as she ultimately decided to return to the United States prematurely.

During this period in Cuenca, I spent time with the group of five volunteers who had been placed there, conducting participant-observation and in-depth interviews with them. I also began journeying from Cuenca by bus to visit the volunteers who had been placed at other sites, logging many hours and miles on the road. Since volunteers were placed in groups of two, three, four, and five, when I visited a particular town or city, I typically interviewed all of the volunteers who lived there. By the same token, because the volunteers in each city tended to hang together socially, a visit to one town often meant that I was dropping into the distinct social worlds that each group of volunteers had formed in their respective cities. In general, these groups would collectively play host to my visit, extending invitations to me for group lunches and dinners at local restaurants, outings to bars and clubs, and occasionally, meals in the homes of their host families. Generally, these visits lasted between four and six days, and included visits to the households where volunteers were being hosted, spending time with them during periods of socialization, and conducting in-depth qualitative interviews. On these visits, I also observed the classes of some volunteers. Because these were just one-off observations, I considered and treated them as important glimpses from which much could be learned and which could also be used to provide additional perspective on things volunteers said in interviews and when socializing with fellow volunteers, but I did not count them as being necessarily representative of the volunteer’s teaching practices and his or her relations with students.

After approximately one month in Cuenca and on the road, I moved back to Loja, which would be my home base for the rest of fieldwork. For the remaining four months of fieldwork, I continued my participant-observation with the volunteers there, while continuing to visit other volunteers by bus. During this time, which was the most sustained period of time that I spent at any one site, my daily life seemingly began to fall more into step with the rhythms of the lives of
the volunteers – like them, I lived with a host family, my everyday reality involved traversing the streets of the city, and I spent much of my time hanging out with them, before and after their classes (which I sometimes observed) and on the weekends.

Over the course of the final four months I spent in Loja, I was also able to visit the volunteers in Cuenca intermittently, collecting additional data through participant observation, informal conversations, and second interviews with them. Near the end of the year, I attended the program’s closing conference that was held in Quito. As with orientation and the mid-point conference, I sat alongside the volunteers during the daily sessions and tagged along for lunches, dinners, and nighttime bar hopping and clubbing in the hours between and after. At the end of the conference, I stayed on in Quito to conduct second interviews with the volunteers that had been placed there.

By the end of fieldwork, I had conducted in-depth interviews with 26 of the 36 volunteers; with 10 of these 26 volunteers I conducted second interviews later in the year. While I had not conceived of this project as a longitudinal study, with the conducting of “follow-up” interviews it perhaps became something of one. However, more than trying to identify and trace any particular trajectory among the volunteers, I used the second interviews to follow up on and further explore emergent themes of the first interviews – themes that had become salient in relation to what I was hearing from all of the volunteers and themes that warranted further interrogation. In addition to the volunteers, I also interviewed one of the in-country field directors.

Personal Reflection

Given my discussion of the origins of this study that appears in the Introduction to this dissertation, it could seem that I had stumbled onto the topic of this dissertation. Indeed, when I filled out my application and embarked upon a year as a Global Community volunteer, I had no intention of studying the program or my fellow volunteers for the purposes of a research project. However, what caught my attention and emerged as my original angle on the Global Community Ecuador program and its volunteers as a research topic was undoubtedly shaped by my own particular positionality (Chiseri-Strater, 1996) as an upper-middle class US-American woman of
black-white parentage. My father, the grandson of black Southern sharecroppers, grew up the son of a domestic worker and an auto factory worker. My mother, the granddaughter of white Midwestern farmers and factory workers, grew up the daughter of a kindergarten teacher and a college professor. By the time I was born, my mother was pursuing a career as a writer and my father was just beginning a career as a university professor at an elite Ivy League university. Suffice it to say, my childhood, adolescence, and young adulthood were all indelibly colored by the unfolding social mobility of my parents and the contradictory mix of advantages, exclusions, opportunities, and “otherings,” of class privilege as experienced through the lens of being a “1.5 generation” member of the upper classes, a racial minority, and not insignificantly, as a “light-skinned” black woman with parents of two different races.

This personal biography was the context of my fascination years later with the othering processes that defined the teachings of the Global Community program of which I was a participant and the interactions of my peers. Again, distress, bafflement, fascination characterized my reaction to what I witnessed. However, looking back, my reaction also allowed me to avoid confronting and interrogating my own particular ways of orienting toward the people, places, and systems with whom and with which I crossed paths in Ecuador. Perhaps because of the way in which I was positioned in the United States, the education I had received, the politics I had cultivated, I had come to Ecuador ready to love everything about it. In my critical stance toward European and United States colonialisms and imperialisms and my understanding of post-colonial Ecuador as country that was distinctly non-imperialistic in its relations with the rest of the world, in my abhorrence of US systems of white supremacy, and my own discomfort with the

52 Here, my intent is not to draw a false equivalence between processes of class formation and processes of immigration (though clearly, they are often inextricably bound). Rather, I employ Rombaut’s (1997, cited in Ghaffar-Kucher, 2008, p. 15-17) decimal ordering of immigrant generations as a heuristic device to refer to the distinct circumstance of childhood “migration” from one class to another by way of the social mobility of one’s parents. In Rombaut’s framework, “1.5 generation” refers to a child born in one country and relocated to another country while still a child (specifically aged 5-11); it thus lends some specificity to the grey space between more absolute categories of “1st generation” (a person born in one country who then immigrates to another country as an adult) and “2nd generation” (a person born to and raised by 1st generation parents) designations.
often alienating, hypercapitalist culture of mainstream US society and my admittedly simplistic and misguided understanding/fantasy of Ecuador as a harmoniously brown and black country, with a reputation for communalism, and a distinctively less cutthroat orientation toward life, I had predictably enough looked to Ecuador as a Third World alternative to those things with which I had grappled in the United States. With this romanticized image of the country in my head, I had come there ready to embrace and love everything about it. Predictably, however, this fantasy was quickly intercepted by my immediate realization of the particular systems of racial hierarchy and economic inequality that exist in Ecuador.

Given my particular background, perhaps it is no surprise that I was most discomfited by the pervasive anti-black racism that characterizes Ecuador’s mainstream culture and the pervasive and severe social, economic, and cultural marginalization of Afro-Ecuadorian citizens. In fact, this realization led to the formation of an earlier dissertation topic that was completely different: an examination of the experiences of Afro-Ecuadorian college students, to be considered in light of the inherent tensions between the conventional ideology of mestizaje and the relatively new multicultural reforms that the national government had been implementing since 1998. This project ended up falling through for various logistical and methodological issues that came up in the preliminary phase of making arrangements to carry out the research. However, my initial ventures into planning that project had begun to raise questions that ultimately contributed to the formulation of the study that I ended up doing.

Specifically, over the course of planning the initial study I had grown increasingly nagged by the feeling that what I was beginning to undertake and the way in which I was beginning to position myself vis-à-vis Ecuadorian society was feeling uncomfortably familiar. Who was I, as a US-American, to go into Ecuador and conduct critical research on its racial hierarchy? With relatively minimal time spent living in the country and speaking the national language and with even less understanding of the political context or history of the country, what exactly qualified or entitled me to perform this research. These kinds of questions were amplified for me one day.
during a conversation with Miguel Rojas\textsuperscript{53}, an Afro-Peruvian NGO worker who had befriended me at a conference on Afro-Latin studies in the United States. At the time, Miguel actually worked in Ecuador with the country’s leading Afro-Ecuadorian non-governmental organization, and upon learning of my dissertation topic, he had extended his assistance: meeting with me in Quito during a preliminary research trip to Ecuador and effectively taking me under his wing, helping me get a meeting with the president of the university where I had planned to conduct fieldwork (a public institution located in a major city two hours away from Quito) and arranging a meeting between myself and several NGO higher-ups who were based out of the city where I planned to conduct fieldwork. It was over lunch one day during this trip that Miguel mentioned to me how many US-American scholars and graduate students had worked with the NGO in recent years. I had not been aware of this and when I expressed slight surprise, he went on to tell me how so many scholars had passed through, done their research, and then gone home, never to be heard from again, never to share their research with the organization. Whether Miguel was testing me or whether he was just speaking off-handedly, I am grateful that he shared this detail with me, as it gave me important pause.

It struck me at this point that what these researchers did or what I was planning to do was not entirely different from what I had witnessed during my year as a volunteer with Global Community. Were we not all dropping into an “other” place, marveling, observing, criticizing, judging in a way that was largely self-interested and reproductive of what has been a long tradition of Westernizers gazing critically upon the exotic “other” without interrogating the collective exercise of power that unfolds in the process? This is not at all to say that I am arguing that research into the hierarchical systems and experiences of marginalized populations in Ecuador or any other non-US-American context is somehow unwarranted or should be off limits to US-American researchers. However, it is true that, on a personal level, the political implications of what I was endeavoring raised uncomfortable questions which slowly began to take shape as a

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\textsuperscript{53} A pseudonym.
new dissertation topic. As the first project became less feasible, I remained intrigued by the idea of interrogating this sustained phenomenon of Westerners – specifically, US-Americans, specifically – entering “Third World” locales as various kinds of gazers or voyeurs or observers: tourists, academic researchers, religious missionaries, development workers, and international volunteers. Given my year’s worth of first-hand experience as a volunteer with Global Community, my instinct was to start there. My hypothesis was that the program entailed a the production and circulation of a body of knowledge about Ecuadorian peoples, cultures, and overall society, a veritable discourse that was inevitably informed by and perhaps often unreflectively derivative of broader, historic ways of thinking about, classifying, categorizing, problematizing, and often inferiorizing “others,” a practice that has often had the simultaneous effect – whether intended or not – of not only reasserting controlling notions of Western superiority but also, in their cumulative volume, leaving the Western gaze – its biases, its agendas, its anxieties, its intentions – uninterrogated.

At this point, I would like to make clear that although I am attempting a critical examination of their subjectivity formations through the lens of neoliberal governmentality, imperialism, and the subject formation effects of the Global Community Ecuador program, I am not attempting to position myself as being or having been somehow morally superior to my own cohort peers or the participants in my study or any more or less susceptible to the various constructs which shaped their subjectivities. I may have engaged with these constructs in ways that were related to my particular nationality/race/class/gender-based subjectification and related subjectivity, both of which were quite distinct from those of my peers and research participants, but like most of my research participants, when I sought out the Global Community program in 2007 I had nurtured my own desires to escape into an imagined Ecuadorian utopia. Perhaps because I participated in the program at the age of 28 and in the middle of a doctorate program (rather than at the age of 22 and fresh out of a bachelor’s program) I did not go into the volunteer stint with fantasies of what it would do for my resumé. Nevertheless, I admittedly had looked forward to an imagined linguistic-cultural immersion through which I expected to inevitably
improve my ability to communicate in Spanish. Unlike many research participants, but like a small minority of them, I had grappled with the project of teaching English in Ecuador and the kind of political act in which my participation in such a project might implicate me. I had fretted about the potential “imperialistic” nature of what I was going to Ecuador to do. However, in the end, I had allowed myself to accept the rationalization that many people around the world actually do want to learn English (not an untrue point) and that what I was involving myself in was not all that problematic or bad. Moreover, the desire to partake of a society that I had admittedly romanticized in my head and the additional rationalization that I would at least “be critical” of what was going on worked to override my misgivings.

All of this is to say that, as prickly as it is to confront, for all of the critical perspective I developed during my first year in Ecuador and then in subsequent fieldwork and for all the sorts of arguments I am attempting to make in this dissertation, it is true that I had gone into the volunteer stint from a vantage point that was in many ways similar to many of the research participants I would come to know two years later when I returned to carry out fieldwork. I too had been taken in by the idea of a year long experience of living in Ecuador and the sorts of stimulation, learning, and self-fulfillment that might lay in store—even as I remained uncomfortable, as did some of my research participants, about the premise of my presence in the country as a US-American English teacher and some of the ways in which the “experience” was framed and depicted by the organization. It is possible, however, that because of my initial unease around the whole endeavor – not to mention my years of graduate coursework – that this discomfort was what led the way to the particular interrogations that form the focus of this study.
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