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The Downfall of General Giraud:
A Study in American Wartime Politics

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On April 17, 1942, a man escaped from his prison at Konigstein by lowering himself down the castle wall and jumping on board a train that took him to the French border. In November of that year, he donned an elderly lady’s garb and pulled off another dramatic escape from France to Algiers.\(^1\) The arrival of this man, French General Henri Giraud, in Algiers marked the beginning of a power struggle between General Charles de Gaulle and General Giraud for control of the French resistance forces in French North Africa. This personal duel and power struggle involved not only the French, but also the active and repeated intervention of the British and American governments. The United States, under President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, maintained a narrow-minded stance in favor of General Giraud, a position which caused the ouster of their favored general by General de Gaulle in the struggle to control the French resistance forces in North Africa.

In early 1943, Roosevelt’s held an idealistic assessment of the political situation of France, commenting in a conversation with General Giraud on January 17, 1943\(^2\) that he believed that the sovereignty of France rested with the people. FDR further argued that from a legal and constitutional standpoint, there could be “no change in the French civil set-up until such time as the people of France were able to exercise their inherent rights in this regard.” In other words, as Roosevelt retorted when General de Gaulle mentioned the sovereignty of French Morocco,\(^3\) neither de Gaulle nor Giraud could claim to represent the sovereignty of France. Given the German invasion of France and the subsequent establishment of the Nazi-backed Vichy regime in France, President Roosevelt correctly judged that the French people would not be able to exercise their sovereign rights. However, as the war wore on, President Roosevelt based the stance of the United States on this narrow judgment, which turned out to be too narrow-minded.

First, President Roosevelt erred by comparing French sovereignty to that of United States. The Roosevelt Administration tended to view political power in France along the lines of its own post-Civil War voting coalition,\(^4\) a situation that led to a distorted American understanding of the sources of

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political power in the French political landscape. The British, who stood as the strongest ally of the United States during the war, arrived at the conclusion during a War Cabinet meeting in June 21, 1943 that US assessments of the French political situation could not be trusted because “[the Americans] knew nothing about France.”

By single-mindedly claiming that the French could not exercise their sovereignty before the war had concluded, the United States failed to consider the continuity that would exist between the French North African administration and postwar France. The US Administration seemed to ignore the notion that a candidate who enjoyed a greater popularity at home would be most capable of exerting power when France regained her freedom after the war. General de Gaulle was that candidate – he enjoyed a substantial support base in metropolitan France gained due to his efforts to rally the Fighting French instead of collaborating with the Vichy regime. De Gaulle’s base of support included every major party, trade union and resistance organization in France. The activism of de Gaulle’s supporters did not go unnoticed by the British, who noted that “the de Gaullist correspondents had been more active in the press than those who supported General Giraud,” resulting in a perception that newspaper correspondents were disposed to take a view which favored the former.

In contrast to de Gaulle’s wide base of support, General Giraud struggled to establish a broad-based coalition. Giraud drew his strongest support from his fellow generals and senior officers in the army, but this once-powerful group lost influence after French military’s collapse in the face of German invasion. The ambiguous stance of General Giraud toward the Vichy government, combined with his lack of vision for France’s political future caused Giraud to be labeled “a compromise candidate.” In a conversation with American General Wilbur on January 23, 1943, General de Gaulle pointed out that General Giraud could not represent the people of France because he was voted into power by Nogues, Boisson and Chatel, all members of the Vichy government. President Roosevelt did not view the popularity of either general as a determining factor behind backing a post-war French leadership, as FDR did not believe in the continuity between the French North African command and a postwar French government.

Based on the belief that France could not exercise sovereignty before the war ended, the United States decided that the liberation of France should be a military objective and not a political one. Other factors also contributed to this view – the United States maintained plans to occupy France after its
The captured French General Giraud, during his daily walk. Germany, ca. 1940-41.
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liberation, and had already set up a school in Charlottesville for this purpose. In any case, the military approach to France's liberation led to an American preference for General Giraud as the leader of the French resistance after the assassination of Admiral Darlan, the High Commissioner of France for North and West Africa. As a five-star general, Giraud enjoyed the support of the entire French military, while the French army in North Africa would not submit to de Gaulle's command because of his two-star rank.\(^\text{11}\) Second, the United States remained wary of the political ambitions held by General de Gaulle, who disagreed with the American idea of a strictly military liberation campaign. The United States was not the only country that was wary of de Gaulle – Churchill had also expressed the view during a War Cabinet meeting on March 15, 1943 that de Gaulle had personal motives to have “the title-deeds of France in his pockets.”\(^\text{12}\) In contrast to de Gaulle, General Giraud represented a consensus candidate for the Americans and British – he agreed with President Roosevelt’s view that the most important thing to do was to “get on with the war” and would not let the conflicting political situation divert him from the urgent task of liberating French territory from enemy control.\(^\text{13}\)

During his meeting with General de Gaulle on January 22, 1943, President Roosevelt expressed his view that there existed no irreconcilable differences between Giraud and de Gaulle. In hindsight, Roosevelt’s belief in the potential for reconciliation proved quite incorrect and idealistic – de Gaulle and Giraud could not bridge their differences in a number of critical areas. The administrative structure of the French resistance forces in North Africa was a key area of contention. General de Gaulle insisted that General Giraud should rally to the Fighting French, after which he could be appointed as a member of the French National Committee and command the forces. De Gaulle refused to compromise because he believed doing so would be “a disservice to France” because of Giraud’s cooperation with Vichy representatives.\(^\text{14}\) On the other hand, Giraud held a more flexible stance, even agreeing to a power-sharing agreement with de Gaulle.\(^\text{15}\) In the end, efforts at reconciliation failed; instead, General de Gaulle worked to assert his dominance in the power struggle by leveraging his position on the military committee that had jurisdiction over all the fighting forces.

A simple comparison of the background and beliefs of both Giraud and de Gaulle would have made clear the impossibility of reconciliation between the two generals. General Giraud, who was already sixty years old by the time World War II began, was a five-star general in the French Army. He
was an authoritarian officer who believed in the military rank hierarchy. For example, Giraud informed Harold Macmillan, the British Resident-Minister in French North Africa, that he was confident of fruitful negotiations with de Gaulle since the latter served as a Colonel under his orders.¹⁶ In contrast, General de Gaulle positioned himself as an intellectual officer after labeling Giraud as a practical one. De Gaulle was never one to conform – as a junior officer he advocated the aggressive use of tanks, even though the French high command was opposed to the idea. He also criticized General Gamelin’s defensive strategy and advocated offensive tactics. After the war, de Gaulle placed the blame squarely on the highest ranks of the military for its failure to defend France against German invasion, instead of on the pre-war Republican government. All these views made de Gaulle unpopular with his superiors and peers in the army, a fact that did not appear to bother him in light of his rejection of the hierarchical structure of the military.¹⁷

The Vichy government was another area of substantial disagreement between de Gaulle and Giraud. General de Gaulle maintained a deep-seated resentment for the Vichy administration. On June 18, 1940, de Gaulle aired his views over the BBC, accusing Marshall Petain of inadequately preparing France for war and for seeking an armistice with the Germans. While in exile in Britain, General de Gaulle spent his energies organizing the French Resistance to liberate France from Vichy control. In the aforementioned conversation with General Wilbur, de Gaulle declared that the Fighting French represented the true France and held the responsibility of liberating the nation from Petain, who had become a “pale shadow” of the national hero he had been in World War I.¹⁸ General de Gaulle’s strong views in opposition to the Vichy gained him the support of French political leaders ranging from the communists and socialists on the left to members of the Action Française on the right.

On the other hand, the British Secretary of Foreign Affairs Eden characterized Giraud as trying to balance between the Fighting French and the Vichy government, resulting in Giraud having “no position at all” with regard to the legitimacy of the Vichy government.¹⁹ Giraud recognized no need to challenge the legal order imposed by the Vichy government, even though it had incarcerated thousands of Jews in concentration camps with the passage of its anti-Semitic laws.²⁰ A benefit of this ambiguous position was that Giraud could appeal to the officers under Petain who retained power within the French Imperial Council as well as to the members of the political elite in French North Africa who wanted a break from the Petainist past.
without accepting a Gaullist future. When tasked with dismantling the Vichy legal system in North Africa, Giraud proceeded with such a lack of urgency as to incur the irritation of the British.\textsuperscript{21} General Giraud was outspoken in his opposition to the Axis powers, despite his ambiguous stance on the Vichy government. As a side note, the United States, like Giraud, showed tolerance towards the Vichy government – a stance which paralleled the American dislike of de Gaulle’s French National Committee. Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, claimed that relations with the Vichy government yielded important benefits, such as the opportunity to avoid prolonged military resistance to the landings during Operation Torch.\textsuperscript{22}

For the United States, one idealistic belief led to another. President Roosevelt, in correspondence with Secretary of State Hull, outlined his plans for the French North Africa administration. Roosevelt quickly realized that General Giraud had no administrative ability, but at the same time, the French Army based in North Africa would not follow General de Gaulle’s orders. Speaking to General Giraud, President Roosevelt revealed plans to have him and General de Gaulle jointly handle the military situation in Africa by forming a three member “Committee for the Liberation of France” with a third leading civilian member.\textsuperscript{23} This plan seemed to represent an effective compromise agreement for leadership of postwar France, save for the fact that no suitable civilian could be found with a stature comparable to that of Giraud or de Gaulle.

President Roosevelt initially suggested Jean Monnet, but only because he had “kept his skirts clear of all political entanglements during the past two years.”\textsuperscript{24} and would not oppose the American view that the liberation of France should above be a military objective. Cordell Hull exposed the bias in Roosevelt’s thinking in a respectful way, by reminding President Roosevelt that General Giraud’s membership on the British Purchasing Commission would “create doubts in a great many French minds.”\textsuperscript{25} Hull instead advocated Roger Cambon as for membership in the future French leadership tripartite, as someone with outstanding integrity and loyalty to all the “best elements” of France.

Roger Cambon appeared to be all things to all people. To the Americans, his father’s service in North Africa cemented his reputation in the region, while his impartial approach to French groups made him an ideal candidate for Roosevelt’s plans for the French North Africa administration. The British, during a War Cabinet meeting, further investigated Cambon’s political views and his leadership potential.\textsuperscript{26} Mr. Cambon had informed British
representatives that the rising Gaullism in the region had led to a credibility crisis for Giraud in Algiers. Despite holding this view, Cambon added that he had a bitter personal prejudice against de Gaulle and would say almost anything to discredit him. Indeed, Mr. Cambon’s personal enmity for de Gaulle may have persuaded the United States to push for Cambon’s membership on the proposed “Committee for the Liberation of France” as a tie-breaking counterbalance to de Gaulle’s influence.

As it turned out, sources close to Cambon informed Cordell Hull that Cambon had been retired for some years and would be unwilling to accept the responsibilities that President Roosevelt had in mind for him. Hence, the United States placed their hopes on Leger, who had a greater experience in administration and had proved himself a supporter of Roosevelt’s policies in France and North Africa. Secretary Hull proposed a plan to hand the eager Leger the role as chief civil administrator, with Cambon installed as the Cambon’s advisor. Leger and Cambon were known to have a close personal relationship, and the Roosevelt Administration viewed such a union as the perfect plan for succession of the French North Africa administration.

In contrast to the United States, the British adopted a far more balanced stance in the power struggle between Giraud and de Gaulle. The British, unlike the Americans, understood the continued influence of the French resistance in wartime France. Britain, given its geographical location and desire to maintain a close postwar relationship with France, feared being on the wrong side of a French postwar power struggle. This worry led the British to maintain a balanced stance throughout the power struggle between Giraud and de Gaulle. In a meeting between Churchill and the War Cabinet on April 11, 1944, the British spelled out their policy towards the question of Giraud or de Gaulle: they would attempt in all their power to maintain friendly relations between the two generals. The British held this stance until the end of war, even after General de Gaulle had established complete dominance over the French resistance forces, abolished the role of Commander-in-Chief held by General Giraud, and offered Giraud the insignificant post of Inspector-General. The British plan had always been to strengthen the power of the French Committee of National Liberation (FCNL) as a check to the de Gaulle’s power.

Before de Gaulle established complete dominance over the French military, the British had refused to support the narrow anti-de Gaulle stance adopted by the United States. Churchill and his government understood that de Gaulle enjoyed a strong reputation throughout France as the spirit
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of the Resistance. The British recognized that none of the other French leaders had “a prestige and position comparable with that held by General de Gaulle,” even though he had an attitude that made him difficult to work with. Hence, the British refused to pin all their hopes on Giraud despite the clear preference of their American allies for him.

There were many instances when events tested the balanced stance of the British. In the prelude to the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, General de Gaulle recognized the importance of meeting General Giraud to develop a common platform for French Resistance, but was reluctant to do so under the auspices of an Allied forum. The British stepped in to show de Gaulle that they were committed to bridging the differences between de Gaulle and Roosevelt, taking pains to ensure that they would not be seen as dictating who should be the leader of the Fighting French movement. This approach appealed more to the senses of de Gaulle than the high-handed insistence of the United States that de Gaulle be present at the conference or pushed out of the running for leadership of the French North Africa administration. The British communicated the same message, but with their balanced stance they succeeded in encouraging de Gaulle to attend the Casablanca Conference. In another incident, General Eisenhower, for the purpose of coordinating military operations with the French Army based in North Africa, met with both generals on 19th June 1943 and insisted that the control of the French forces remain in the hands of Giraud. Although Eisenhower tried to deliver this message gently, his point angered General de Gaulle, who viewed Eisenhower’s demand as a breach of French sovereignty. Consistent with their balanced stance, the British chose to delay further discussions on this issue until the FCNL had reacted to Eisenhower’s statement.

Who did the British prefer? This question can only be answered by peeling away the layers built up by their balanced stance and looking at the heart of their French policy. In a meeting on April 11, 1944, the British War Cabinet investigated the fundamentals of their policy on Giraud versus de Gaulle, concluding that they opposed General de Gaulle in full command of the French military. The British preferred to place General Giraud in charge of military affairs, believing that he had showed himself to be adaptable to persuasion, logic, and influence. Thus, the British decided that they would allow General de Gaulle to remain the joint President (with General Giraud) of the FCNL, so long as he did not gain lone command of the army.

Given that the British shared a dislike of General de Gaulle with the American administration, the reasons the British did not part with de Gaulle
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present an interesting example of wartime pragmatism. The British War Cabinet meeting held on May 23, 1943 involved an extensive discussion of British policy vis-à-vis General de Gaulle. First, British sources at the time indicated the existence of 80,000 Fighting French troops positioned in different parts of the world, a fact which complicated a break with de Gaulle because of the importance of these forces to British operations in French Equatorial Africa. Second, French Trade Unionists feared the increasing influence of the United States. The British, as an outgrowth of their fear of supporting the losing side in the wartime struggle to control the postwar French government, lent their support to the Fighting French because of the loyalty the resistance group commanded among the French trade unions and working class. In addition, the British believed that if they sided with Roosevelt and broke with de Gaulle, many Frenchmen opposed to de Gaulle would rally behind him as a show of national pride. This situation could have reinforced de Gaulle as the symbol of the Republic, backfiring on the potential plans of the British to isolate him. Moreover, if the British broke with General de Gaulle, their actions would be interpreted in the court of public opinion as a capitulation to the United States and a signal of British diplomatic weakness. The fact that de Gaulle sat in exile in London proved an additional complication to the British government’s ability to break with the Fighting French, as such a move would likely have harmed British credibility with other wartime allies. Although the United States did not allow the British to sway its stance on Giraud versus de Gaulle, the British did on many occasions weigh the American stance before setting its policy vis-à-vis the French Resistance. While the British were balanced in their support of de Gaulle and Giraud, the Americans were quite narrow-minded in their insistence on Giraud as their preferred leader of the FCNL. Little did the Americans expect that in the final power struggle, their narrow-minded support for Giraud would backfire against their preferred candidate and cause him to lose ground against de Gaulle.

General Giraud despite, or perhaps because of his military experience, was a malleable character whose beliefs could be easily influenced. Roosevelt and the British appreciated the pliability of Giraud; they realized that despite General Giraud’s status as a political neophyte, he “showed himself to be adaptable to persuasion, logic and influence.” Stemming from this belief in Giraud’s flexibility, the British trusted that it would be easy to alter Giraud’s ambiguous attitude toward the Vichy government, a stance which de Gaulle exploited in order to win the support of the French people against Giraud.
General Charles de Gaulle shaking the hand of General Henri Giraud in front of Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill at the Casablanca Conference (January 14, 1943)
Roosevelt utilized General Giraud's malleability in order to convince him of American plans for the French North Africa administration. FDR extended Giraud an invitation to the President's villa for a discussion on January 17, 1943 of the American vision of postwar France. Although Giraud “habitually shied away” when a foreigner discussed the internal politics of France, Roosevelt’s stature as the President of the United States dissipated Giraud’s ego and convinced him to adopt Roosevelt’s judgment that the French people had to wait until the end of the war to exercise their sovereign rights. Convinced by Roosevelt’s view that the liberation of France should be a military objective, Giraud stated his belief that the most important and urgent goal of the French Resistance was to “get on with the war.” When Giraud shared his plans for French North Africa with Catroux, the General emphasized the primary goal of the proposed FCNL: to wage war and attain victory against the Axis powers. General Giraud maintained that complications of war with the Axis made it impossible to have two French commanders in charge, and recommended himself for leadership because he had lived in France more recently than General de Gaulle and was thus more familiar with the situation in the country.

The malleability of General Giraud’s beliefs made him the ideal candidate in Roosevelt’s eyes to lead the French forces in North Africa during the war. However, in molding Giraud into an ideal leader, Roosevelt caused him to be less capable of competing with de Gaulle for leadership of the French forces. Even barring Roosevelt’s influence, Giraud did not possess a strong, coherent vision of the postwar political situation in France. The only aspect of the Vichy government that Giraud felt strongly enough to condemn was its ties with the Axis powers. By convincing Giraud that the liberation of France should only be a military objective, Roosevelt painted in General Giraud’s an idealized notion of a quick liberation and transition to political stability. However, Roosevelt’s influence over Giraud in convincing him of the military nature of French liberation caused Giraud not to develop a coherent vision for the political future of postwar France, a great weakness for him in the power struggle with de Gaulle.

This gaping weakness was exploited by General de Gaulle in his political maneuvers against General Giraud. By consistently proclaiming his goal of overthrowing the Vichy government, de Gaulle rallied support from communists and socialists on the left and members of the Action Francaise on the right. By building a strong political coalition, de Gaulle wiped out the support base of his opponent Giraud, who ended up with “no effective
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organization of loyal followers within France itself.” In other words, Roosevelt’s influence over Giraud left the American’s as his most influential and loyal supporters.

Besides molding General Giraud’s views of French liberation in a manner that put him at a disadvantage to General de Gaulle, the narrow-minded stance of the United States also served to increase de Gaulle’s popularity. The British, understood the negative feelings among the French that arose from the US support for Giraud. In a meeting between Churchill and the War Cabinet on May 23, 1943, six months before Giraud lost his position as co-President of the FCNL, the French Minister of Labor and National Service informed the British that the Trade Unionists had been showing “considerable fear of growing United States influence.” Although the unionists did not fully support General de Gaulle, the Fighting French movement enjoyed strong support among the French working class as the strongest resistance force. Hence, the negative perceptions that grew out of American support for Giraud hurt his reputation in France against the wily de Gaulle.

By June 1943, the British concluded that the American reputation in France stood at an all-time low. Churchill and his government attributed the unpopularity of the United States to their strong belief that the liberation of France should be a purely military objective, despite lacking American knowledge of domestic French politics. Roosevelt’s open anger at de Gaulle for the General’s expansion of the committee which presided over the administration of French North Africa only exacerbated tensions. The British linked the plummeting reputation of the United States in France to the rise in popularity of de Gaulle, and refused to break their relations with the General for fear of damaging their own reputation in France.

In July 1943, the British War Cabinet discussed another development in the struggle between Giraud and de Gaulle. The United States government had been accused of leaking a public statement to the press in their attempt to break up the FCNL and remove General de Gaulle from power. The public statement revealed confidential information regarding Britain’s stance on the struggle between Generals Giraud and de Gaulle. Churchill sent the secret document to Washington as a gesture of goodwill for the reference of Roosevelt, and was quite perturbed at the release of the document. The British government feared the leaked document would harm their relationship with the FCNL, especially at a time when the authority of the committee was increasing daily. This action by the United States ran the risk, the British believed, of further “strengthening de Gaulle’s position at the expense of the
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Committee,” in particular because the United States suffered a declining reputation in France.

The traditional historiography of Giraud’s marginalization contends that de Gaulle’s vision for a postwar French government, combined with his strong anti-Vichy stance, allowed de Gaulle to outmaneuver his Giraud’s narrow focus on a military liberation. But the United States in fact holds responsibility for shaping Giraud’s narrow focus on the military aspects of liberation. Furthermore, the declining wartime reputation of the United States in France caused American support for Giraud to become a political liability in his power struggle with General de Gaulle. Despite the consistent support of the President Roosevelt for General Giraud, the American press often challenged the narrow approach of the Roosevelt Administration to France’s political future. The July 1943 issue of LIFE magazine features an article which discusses the pro-Giraud stance adopted by Roosevelt and the United States government on the leadership of the French Resistance in North Africa. The editors of the magazine believed that the United States was not “acting in its best interests” by supporting Giraud against de Gaulle. LIFE’s editorial staff argued that while General Giraud should earn the respect of the United States for his escape from German territory, Roosevelt’s insistence that the liberation of France should be a military pursuit was naive because of the inevitable political implications of liberation. As a result of this insistence, the article argues, Roosevelt and the State Department based their policy on France on Roosevelt’s dislike for de Gaulle. Roosevelt it seems overlooked one key fact: millions of Frenchmen and women “never stopped resisting the Germans.” This fact cemented de Gaulle’s popularity among the French people who disliked the Nazi-backed Vichy government. Thus, the narrow support of the United States for General Giraud, who had in fact never enjoyed a wide following in France or North Africa, caused the General’s downfall and the accompanying failure of US policy regarding France’s postwar leadership.

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5 Public Record Office (PRO), CAB/195/2, W.M. (43) 87th Meeting, 21 June 1943.
7 PRO, CAB/65/34/36, W.M. (43) 82nd Meeting, 7 Jun 1943.
12 PRO, CAB/192/2, W.M. (43) 40th Meeting, 15 Mar 1943.
14 PRO, CAB/65/37/2, Telescope No. 87, 17 Jan 1943.
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26 PRO, CAB/65/38/9, W.M. (43) 75th Meeting, 23 May 1943.
28 PRO, CAB/65/42/5, W.M. (44) 47th Meeting, 11 Apr 1944.
29 PRO, CAB/195/2, W.M. (42) 91st Meeting, 1 Jul 1943.
30 PRO, CAB/195/2, W.M. (43) 87th Meeting, 21 Jun 1943.
31 PRO, CAB/65/37/2, W.M. (43) 9th Meeting, 18 Jan 1943.
32 PRO, CAB/65/37/3, W.M. (43) 11th Meeting, 19 Jan 1943.
33 PRO, CAB/65/38/15, W.M. (43) 87th Meeting, 21 Jun 1943.
34 PRO, CAB/65/38/9, W.M. (43) 75th Meeting, 23 May 1943.
35 FRUS, Conferences at Washington, 1941 – 1942, and Casablanca, 1943, p. 655: Churchill had proposed that the French provisional regime be left under the leadership of de Gaulle, but Roosevelt would have none of that.
36 PRO, CAB/195/2, W.M. (43) 87th Meeting, 21 Jun 1943.
42 PRO, CAB/65/38/9, W.M. (43) 75th Meeting, 23 May 1943.
43 PRO, CAB/195/2, W.M. (43) 87th Meeting, 21 Jun 1943.
44 PRO, CAB/65/35/9, W.M. (43) 99th Meeting, 14 Jul 1943.