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# Making History: Historical Narratives of the Maji Maji

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# MAKING HISTORY

## HISTORICAL NARRATIVES OF THE MAJI MAJI

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This paper analyzes scholarship published in the late 1960's on the 1905-1907 Maji Maji revolt as a case study for exploring the process whereby historians synthesize primary sources and create historical narratives. Following Tanganyika's independence in 1961, scholars and students based at the University College in Dar es Salaam, namely John Iliffe and Gilbert Gwassa, began to develop a historical narrative of the revolt in the southeast of then German East Africa. Historians accepted this narrative as the authoritative account for several decades. This interpretation placed the origins of the movement in German oppression, and emphasized both the unprecedented ethnic unity of the movement and the purely African nature of the *maji*. "The Maji Maji Rebellion of 1905-07," writes Gilbert Gwassa, "is the national epic of Tanzania."<sup>1</sup> Since the mid-1990's, however, research has questioned this "nationalist" narrative, finding the origins of revolt in inter-African politics as much as resentment against Europeans, and challenging long-standing notions of the movement's unity and purely African character.<sup>2</sup> An analysis of both the historiography that precedes the 1960's narratives as well as a collection of papers written by students at Dar es Salaam in 1968 indicates that the historical context in which these works were produced shaped their interpretation. It is the thesis of this work that the combination of pre-existing historiography and post-independence nationalism predisposed the Dar es Salaam researchers to create a Maji Maji national epic, and neglect those aspects of the revolt that did not conform to a vision of unity and anti-colonial resistance.

Implicit in this thesis is the concept that the historical contexts in which historians produce historical narratives shape those

narratives as much as the events they treat. Though historians seek to reconstruct the past, their interpretation of the past is subject to the influences of the present. Expounding on objectivity in history, Mark Bevir says that as historians create historical narratives, “the theories they already hold will influence the way they reconstruct historical objects.”<sup>3</sup> Pure experience being an impossibility, historians necessarily view historical objects subjectively from the perspective of the present, and the resulting narratives therefore reflect theories of the present. Steven Knapp, similarly discussing collective memory, states that “our sense of what is symbolically useful in the past will depend on our present sense of what matters, and the values represented by what we borrow from the past will only be the ones we already have. Aspects of the past that fail to match up with our present dispositions will seem irrelevant.”<sup>4</sup> Although Knapp’s work discusses historical narratives as a source of collective authority, his words are relevant here. Derived from a broader corpus of historical sources, historical narratives require historians to select that which is “important” while abandoning the rest. Since even apolitical scholarly works are interpretations of historical material, the present-day context in which the historian reads and synthesizes that material inevitably influences its reconstruction as a narrative. The context in which the Dar es Salaam researchers conducted their research thus contributed to the narrative that they produced.

The Maji Maji movement provides an ideal opportunity to explore these themes: while the general course of the revolt is well known, the specific sources of discontent and motivations for participation remain mysterious. Between 1905 and 1907, the revolt consumed most of the southeast of German East Africa, a colony established by the Germans in the mid-1880’s that had only shortly before suppressed significant Hehe resistance.<sup>5</sup> The Maji Maji movement takes its name from the *maji* medicine the rebels used.<sup>6</sup> The *maji* medicine originated with the prophet Kinjikitile Ngwale, who lived near Matumbe. Possessed in 1904 by the spirit Hongo, a subordinate to Bokero (the chief deity along the Rufiji), Kinjikitile began to distribute medicine water, the *maji*, which he claimed turned European bullets to water. Rebels that took the *maji* agreed to

respect a set of proscriptions and wore millet stalks on their head as identification. Hostilities broke out in mid-1905, when the Matumbi of Nandete attacked the local *akida*, a German-appointed Arab colonial official, and uprooted cotton crops at a nearby plantation. Although the Germans quickly captured and hung Kinjikitile, the uprising continued as *hongos*, prophets of Kinjikitile's message, spread the *maji* to Liwale, Dar es Salaam, the Mwera plateau and eventually into the Southern Highlands (Maps 1 and 2). By 1907, the Germans violently suppressed the rebellion by adopting a famine policy intended to starve rebels into submission. Although this general narrative was well documented, the execution of the movement's leaders by the Germans and absence of colonial officials in rebel areas during the revolt kept the origins and expansion of the movement mysterious. Questions of how such an ethnically diverse section of the population could accept the *maji* and seemingly unite in a mass movement unprecedented in scale remained largely unanswered for several decades. When historians began to answer these questions in the 1960's, the context in which they wrote heavily influenced the explanation they developed.

In order to place those post-independence narratives in context, it is necessary to understand the colonial historiography they post-date. The Maji Maji revolt came on the heels of a series of revolts and colonial scandals in German colonies, events that Germany's left-wing politicians held up as evidence of the majority party's mismanagement of colonial affairs.<sup>7</sup> As the German Left and colonial reformers emphasized colonial abuses for political gain, the Governor of German East Africa, Graf von Götzen, rushed to absolve himself by labeling the movement irrational and citing disgruntled sorcerers as its primary impetus. Following World War I more than a decade later, Britain resurrected accounts of the Maji Maji revolt to demonstrate the inability of either Germans or Africans to govern and thereby strengthen their bid for control of Germany's pre-war colonial holdings, exaggerating both the brutality of German colonialism and the irrationality of the African water medicine and witch doctors.<sup>8</sup> During the push for independence that followed World War II, the British returned to the history of the Maji Maji in order to ex-



Map 1. Ethnic Groups involved in the Maji Maji Rebellion  
 (Source: Gwassa, "Outbreak," 14)

plain motivations for the latest independence movements. R.M. Bell, in an analysis of the Maji Maji movement published in 1950 again emphasizes the roles of the magic water and German oppression in instigating the revolt, concluding, "The secret of the Rebellion's origins...can be summed up by the one word 'OPPRESSION'."<sup>9</sup> European politics thus inclined colonial analyses to emphasize the roots of Maji Maji as a revolt directed against German colonial oppression and through traditional African means. This allowed both the German left and the British to condemn German colonial policies without undermining colonialism's "civilizing mission." Like earlier colonial-era works, Bell's account depicts a clear African-European polarity at the root of the revolt, while drawing parallels to a new wave of independence movements.

The Tanganyikan nationalists that pushed for independence in the 1950's also emphasized the distinctly African character of the Maji Maji revolt and its opposition to European colonization, only this time invoking it in defense of African liberation and as a source of legitimacy for the fledgling Tanganyikan nation. Describing the revolt in a 1956 speech to the U.N., Julius Nyerere, the leader of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), claimed "the people fought because they did not believe in the white man's right to govern and civilize the black. They rose in a great rebellion...in response to a natural call, a call of the spirit...to rebel against foreign domination."<sup>10</sup> After independence, Nyerere and TANU continued to refine this message. In 1962 Nyerere again claimed, "The Maji Maji rebellion unified the people of Tanganyika so it was not something new to talk about unity in Tanganyika,"<sup>11</sup> and in 1967 Tanzania's *Nationalist* editorialized, "On the ashes of Maji-Maji our new nation was founded."<sup>12</sup> By continuing to stress colonial oppression as the source of revolt and the traditional role and widespread appeal of the *maji* to Tanganyika's diverse masses, the nationalists found in the Maji Maji movement traditions of interethnic unity and grassroots resistance to European rule. As an independent Tanganyika emerged from Britain's colonial holdings, the nationalists used the Maji Maji as a historical precedent for the existence of a Tanganyikan nation.

The Tanganyikans use of history to legitimize their nation's existence and sovereignty is characteristic of nationalist movements and familiar to students of nationalism. Benedict Anderson refers to the paradox of "[t]he objective modernity of nations to the historian's eye vs. their subjective antiquity in the eyes of nationalists."<sup>13</sup> Ernest Gellner also suggests, "nationalism is not the awakening and assertion of these mythical, supposedly natural and given units. It is, on the contrary, the crystallization of new units...though admittedly using as their raw material the cultural, historical and other inheritances from the pre-nationalist world,"<sup>14</sup> and Eric Hobsbawm warns, "modern nations and all their impedimenta generally claim to be the opposite of novel, namely rooted in the remotest antiquity, and the opposite of constructed, namely human communities so 'natural' as to require no definition other than self-assertion."<sup>15</sup> The nationalist is thus predisposed to a teleological interpretation of history in which events naturally and inexorably lead to the creation of the nation. To apply Knapp here, that which is symbolically useful to the nationalists are those events that indicate the formation of the nation; all else is irrelevant. Tanganyikan nationalists were therefore inclined to look to their history for evidence of a historically extant Tanganyikan nation. This is not intended to imply that the Dar es Salaam researchers possessed a conscious nationalist bias; it remains, however, highly relevant that they conducted their research and produced these narratives at a time when Africans looked to their past for ways to define their present.

The Dar es Salaam students and teachers thus formulated their theories on the Maji Maji after more than half-a-century of colonial-era research established a sharp African-European dichotomy as the basis for a purely African uprising. It was also a time when colonial emancipation led Africans and Westerners alike to search for the roots of African nationalism in African history. As independence meant the rejection of European rule by Africans, much of the work from Dar es Salaam focuses on German oppression as the initial catalyst of revolt. Iliffe's 1967 article "The Organization of the Maji Maji Rebellion" cites new, large-scale cotton growing projects as the major reason for the first outbreak of revolt in the Rufiji com-

plex.<sup>16</sup> Gwassa and Iliffe's 1968 pamphlet *Records of the Maji Maji Rising, Part One* also emphasizes the cotton-growing projects,<sup>17</sup> and Gwassa's 1973 dissertation on the outbreak of the Maji Maji cites Nandette men uprooting three shoots of cotton as the beginning of active revolt.<sup>18</sup> Despite the fact the uprising quickly led to the exchange of hostilities between African groups, Gwassa and Iliffe largely emphasize European-African conflict as Maji Maji's starting point. That they do so is unsurprising considering the historical context. Until the Dar es Salaam students began to collect oral histories, European colonial records comprised the bulk of Maji Maji source material.<sup>19</sup> As described above, the Germans, as colonial administrators, largely focused on the extent to which the rebellion resulted from colonial mismanagement, and failed to consider other factors. Moreover, decades of colonial rule had clearly demarcated the lines between European colonists and the colonized Africans; in the wake of independence, colonial oppression seemed the obvious root of an uprising. Consequently, in the immediate post-colonial context, Gwassa and Iliffe concentrated on those aspects of the revolt that fit the paradigm of European-African conflict.

The combination of colonial-era literature and modern nationalism also shaped Gwassa and Iliffe's analysis of the role of the *maji*. German and British efforts to portray the rebels as irrational centered on the tradition-based faith in the *maji* water. In the wake of unified African independence movements, however, historians began to search for the historic roots of African unity. Terence Ranger's seminal 1968 work on connections between primary resistance in Africa and mass nationalism provided the foundation for this conceptual framework. Looking for "continuity in mass emotion as well as...continuity in *elite* leadership" between early resistance movements such as the Maji Maji and modern nationalism, Ranger postulates that the ability of prophet-led movements like Maji Maji to "pass rapidly across clan and tribal boundaries, and to sweep people into a unity" provided a foundation for later national unity.<sup>20</sup> While Ranger points out the limitations of this theory and danger in adopting a nationalist historiography with a monopoly on resistance,<sup>21</sup> his theory on the revolutionary potential of reactionary

forces shaped the general direction of work on resistance movements in the 1960's. Noticing the parallels to mass nationalism of resistance movements that preceded nationalism in Africa, historians sought an African basis for cross-ethnic unity beyond imported European nationalism.

Both Gwassa and Iliffe drew on Ranger's work;<sup>22</sup> as a result, the *maji* and prophet as sources of African unity are common themes in their work. In "Organization," Iliffe focuses on the *maji* medicine that allowed the initial revolt to appeal to a broader population and expand into a multiethnic, religious movement even though this expansion eventually crumbled due to organization along prior political and cultural groups that Iliffe describes as the "tension between ideology and political and cultural reality which is characteristic of mass movements, including later nationalist movements."<sup>23</sup> Gwassa focuses on the important role played by the prophet, Kinjikitile, who, he argues, mobilized and taught unity to Africans. The millennial nature of the movement is stressed in *Records*, as is evident in the following passage:

"The movement had begun in answer to the religious message of a prophet. The power of the *maji*—power over European weapons—depended on religious faith...Theirs' was a revolutionary, or more accurately a millennial, message...It is likely that the people of southern Tanzania had heard such millennial teachings before, but only as attacks on witchcraft. Now this religious tradition was mobilized against the Germans."<sup>24</sup>

Gwassa further refines these concepts in his dissertation, again placing Kinjikitile at the center of the movement for providing a "unitary *ideology* which cut across and discouraged clan and ethnic boundaries. The *Maji* as a war *kinga* was not to be of or for any single group, clan or ethnic identity but of and for all people."<sup>25</sup> Just like Ranger, Gwassa and Iliffe both argue that the rebels adapted traditional cultural objects to colonial pressures, allowing them to cross ethnic boundaries and mobilize the people in ways similar to mass national movements. Gwassa and Iliffe fail to consider, however,

that the rebels may have had a wide variety of reasons for participating in the revolt. Analysis of the unpublished 1968 *Maji Maji Research Project* indicates that even when researchers recorded such examples, they overlooked them in their final conclusions.

The *Maji Maji Research Project* is a collection of oral histories based on interviews conducted in 1968 by students of the University College, Dar es Salaam in nine main areas (see Map 2), and the seminar papers the students wrote based on those reports and outlining the history of Maji Maji in that area. The students carried out the research under the supervision of Ranger and Iliffe and with help from Gwassa, and their analyses draw heavily from the work of these scholars. A comparison of several of the interviews with the seminar papers reveals that in many cases, interviews deviate from the historical narrative developed by Gwassa and Iliffe, yet the seminar papers still conform to the Dar es Salaam narrative. This, again, does not indicate a conscious decision to avoid such accounts, but instead again highlights that the theories the students already held influenced their interpretation and construction of the historical narrative, and led them to unconsciously overlook accounts that did not conform to their preconceived dispositions.

The Ngoni under Chabruma accepted the *maji* from the Hongos that brought it to Songea (Map 2, region 4), yet their motivation for doing so and activity during the revolt challenge the Dar es Salaam narrative. The Ngoni chafed under German rule for a number of reasons, among them colonial limits on the power and authority that the Ngoni used to enjoy, and the end to Ngoni raids on neighboring peoples.<sup>26</sup> According to one interviewee, after establishing their rule the Germans “began to issue orders to the Ngoni rulers. They forbade them to conduct any wars or raids on neighboring tribes.”<sup>27</sup> Another interviewee says that the Ngoni hoped that after success in ridding themselves of the Europeans, they “would be able to resume their customs and old ways of life such as conducting wars and raids on the neighboring tribes.”<sup>28</sup> In their essays, the interviewees cite the Ngoni desire to resume their raids against their neighbors,<sup>29</sup> yet they do not consider the implications this has for the theory of Maji Maji as a mass movement. Although the Ngoni accepted the *maji* and

fought the Germans, the *maji* did not instill in the Ngoni a sense of ethnic unity with other groups in southeastern Tanganyika. Instead, they accepted the *maji* as a means to reestablish their dominance over other ethnic groups. The limits of the Maji Maji appeal to interethnic unity is perhaps best demonstrated by an explanation of why the neighboring Wamatengo and Wanyasa people did not receive the medicine from the Ngoni: "The Ngoni themselves were not interested in spreading the movement to their neighbours as they believed that those were too weak to fight."<sup>30</sup> While the Ngoni sought to use the *maji* to unify the entire body of Ngoni, only after a series of defeats did the Ngoni seek out alliance with other ethnic groups.<sup>31</sup> These interviews fail to demonstrate that the *maji* had some inherent unifying power, and indicate instead that the Ngoni accepted the *maji* to defeat the Germans and resume their position of relative strength vis-à-vis other ethnic groups. The seminar paper, continuing to defend the unifying power of the *maji*, cites Ngoni attempts at unity within their own ethnic group, yet broader inter-ethnic unity is hardly a natural corollary of inter-Ngoni unity.

Equally interesting were the diverse motivations for individual Ngoni leaders to participate in the movement. One of the interviewees cites political conflict between the leader of the Ngoni, Chabruma, and Chabruma's brother, Parangu, as underlying Ngoni acceptance of the *maji*. Parangu made several attempts to take power from Chibruma by instigating war with the Wabena. Failing, he persuaded the Wangindo to bring the *maji* to Chabruma hoping his brother would fruitlessly attack the Germans.<sup>32</sup> The interviewer expresses doubt over these reports, citing a note compiled by British colonial officials in Songea, which indicates that a neighbor of Parangu brought the *maji* to Chabruma having received it from a man named Nakinjala. According to the interviewer, "this account crushes the belief hitherto held by some of the Ngoni elders that maji maji in Ungoni was engineered by a conspiracy (*sic*) of Parangu against his brother Chabruma."<sup>33</sup> Despite these doubts, the interviewer lists several other rumors of personal grievances motivating war with the Germans, notably as a means for Chabruma and Songea Mbano, another Ngoni leader, to punish the Germans for outlawing



the death penalty for adultery and thereby preventing the two leaders from killing those they suspected of sleeping with their wives.<sup>34</sup> These accounts further challenge interpretations of the *maji* as a unifying force. Rather than generating a unified, anti-European movement, the arrival of the *maji* may have instead given the Ngoni leaders an opportunity to visit very personal revenges upon the Germans. The interviewers reference these personal motives in their seminar papers, but fail to consider the significance of these accounts in challenging Iliffe and Gwassa's theories on *maji maji* engendering ethnic unity. Despite excellent analyses of the accounts, the interviewers do little to challenge the prevailing themes as they place these oral histories in the broader historical narrative.

Accounts from Msongozi and Kilosa Town (Map 2, regions 1 and 2) also indicate that the rebels coerced sections of the population into participating in the revolt. Yet the interviewers, although referencing violence leveled at locals by rebels, continue to portray participation as based on faith in the liberating power of the *maji*. A man from Msongozi explains that in the region the people call the rebellion "Homa Homa," – referencing a stabbing motion – because "Chitalika's followers would stab anyone who seemed unwilling to offer assistance." He then describes an incident at Vigugu in which rebels razed a village when the residents refused to accept the *maji*.<sup>35</sup> Another resident of Msongozi describes fleeing from the *maji* rebels with his parents and village elders; in response, the "Homa homa people" set their food, homes, and the millet crops of a neighboring village on fire.<sup>36</sup> Near Kilosa Town, an employee of the Kilosa District Officer named Farahani refused to take the *Maji*, although, according to the source, he did not prevent the Hongos from providing it to others. The interviewee then says, "On hearing this refusal, one courageous man instantly stabbed Farahani in the stomach, and he fell down dead... Chaos started and fights began between Farahani's relatives and Hongo's people. It was during this incident that some people started to burn homes, destroy shambas and crops."<sup>37</sup> The concluding remarks of the interviewers acknowledge that fear of the *hongos* played a role in motivating people to resist, yet, somewhat paradoxically they maintain that German cruelty inspired the people

to welcome the appeal of the *hongo*'s to fight the German.<sup>38</sup> The coercion of sections of the population into participating in the revolt may have resulted in a mass movement, yet coerced action is not conducive to the development of a mass, national consciousness. These interviews indicate that inter-ethnic unity may have been only surface deep. Yet the interviewers do not bring attention to the fact that such accounts diverge significantly from Iliffe and Gwassa's work.

The account of the siege of Image by the Sagara (Map 2, region 3), a subgroup of the Hehe, indicates that in some regions acceptance of the *maji* may have contributed more to interethnic competition than to cooperation. Only some of the Sagara initially accepted the *maji* when the *honga* brought it to Uhehe. The Jumbe of Image, Mvinge, who was "also sort of Head Jumbe over Usagara" attempted to warn the Germans, but they ignored him. Mvinge attempted to fight the rebels alone, but rebels led by Lihoha defeated him at Mahenge; as a result, the rest of the Sagara joined the rebellion, and decided to attack Image. Following defeat at the hands of the Germans, the Sagara fled Image only to be pursued by the Hehe, who cooperated with the Germans.<sup>39</sup> Another interviewee explains that the Hehe pursuit of the Sagara derived from the brief presence of the Sagara in Image, during which the Sagara took women captives and burned houses and stores, an event that "was very short but disastrous and shameful to us."<sup>40</sup> This account is substantiated by a man from Malangali, Mzee Kawosa Mwamakasi, who claims that the people of Malangali went to fight after hearing of Mvinge's death, because "they were going to revenge the death of Mvinge."<sup>41</sup> The arrival of the *maji* in Uhehe thus initially led to hostilities between the Sagara and Hehe, and only later involved the Germans. The interviewer argues that the Hehe only cooperated with the Germans against the Maji rebels because the rising "occured [*sic*] at the wrong time for them," and, having resisted the Germans in the 1890's and suffered major military defeats, the Hehe, unlike other tribes, understood the extent of Germany's military capabilities.<sup>42</sup> In the first exchange of hostilities, however, Mvinge took the initiative to attack the rebels without German support, ignoring the advice of the German admin-

istrators of Usagara to wait for German troops. An interviewee states that Mvinge “was impatient and was determined to fight the Sagara alone.”<sup>43</sup> This does not demonstrate Hehe accommodation of a superior German power, but rather the exacerbation of existing interethnic rivalries by the *maji* movement. Moreover, the Sagara rebels did not initially attack the Germans, but the Hehe at Imaga, indicating that for the Sagara, the Maji movement was not entirely an anti-European movement, but also derived from existing ethnic tensions.

The outbreak of rebellion in Uzungwa (Map 2, region 3) demonstrates the dual forces of coercion and cooperation at work; some of the population sided with the Mbunga and Pogoro Maji rebels from Mahenge and Ifakara, while others resisted the *maji* and collaborated with the Germans. One interviewee recalls, “fights occurred in Uzungwa even before Germans came to help those who resisted the Mbunga.”<sup>44</sup> Significantly, the interviewees do not refer to the rebels in terms of *maji* or *hongu*, but as the Mbunga, the ethnic group that brought the *maji* to Uzungwa. Two other accounts additionally reveal both that the Zungwa associated the Maji rebellion with the Mbunga, and that this association proved a source of discontent with the movement itself. One interviewee says, “The people hated them [the Maji rebels]; even their allies were suspicious. The Mbunga simply took whatever they found in Uzungwa – food, cattle, sheep, goats, women, etc. They really did a lot of harm.”<sup>45</sup> The other supports this, saying, “These people [the Mbunga] were very rough and cruel; on their way they could take anything they wanted – cattle, sheep, goats, chicken, women, grain, etc.”<sup>46</sup> The interviewer argues that most Zungwa refused to participate in the movement due to recognition of Germany’s military superiority.<sup>47</sup> The use of “Mbunga” to describe the movement, however, indicates that the Zungwa did not view the Maji as a cross-ethnic movement, but rather as a more limited anti-German revolt localized to a single ethnic group. Moreover, Mbunga treatment of Zungwa rebels is not characteristic of a mass movement sweeping aside ethnic differences; instead, Mbunga participation might have been at least in part motivated by the opportunity to steal goods from other ethnic

groups. These accounts thus paint a more complicated picture of both Zungwa hesitation to join the movement and Mbunga motivation for participation.

The papers of the *Maji Maji Research Project* provide an interesting perspective on the role of historical context in the creation of historical narratives. Interviews with Ngoni participants and witnesses reveal that anti-German sentiments derived from pre-existing interethnic conflict, and that personal reasons for participation sometimes overshadowed sentiments for greater cross-ethnic unity. Accounts from Mzongi and Kilosa Town that demonstrate the use of coercion in encouraging participation likewise throw into question the ability of the *maji* to inspire interethnic unity. Descriptions of Hehe-Sagara and inter-Zungwa conflict also challenge the movement's anti-colonial roots and degree of interethnic unity. The seminar papers prepared by the Dar es Salaam students, however, largely conform to the historical narrative developed by Iliffe and Gwassa, stressing the unifying power of the *maji* and the movement's anti-colonial origins. The variations between Maji Maji sources and 1960's narratives thus demonstrate the influence of the historical context of the historian's construction of historical narratives. Recently, new works are pointing out some of those variations. James Monson's 1998 article on the Maji Maji in Tanzania's southern highlands, and Felicitas Becker's 2004 work on "Big Men" in southeast Tanzania both challenge longstanding views on Maji Maji's anti-colonial character, and Thaddeus Sunseri's two articles in 1999 and 2000 on the creation of the Tanzanian resistance tradition question the unifying power of the *maji* and the purely African nature of the movement.<sup>48</sup> Several decades removed from the immediate post-colonial period, it is now an opportune moment to reexamine this moment in history, reconsider the prevailing historical narrative, and reveal some of the long-neglected complexities of Maji Maji.

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<sup>1</sup> G.C.K. Gwassa and John Iliffe, *Records of the Maji Maji Rising, Part One* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968), 3.

<sup>2</sup> For example: Jamie Monson, "Relocating Maji Maji: The Politics of Alliance and Authority in the Southern Highlands of Tanzania, 1870-1918," *The Journal*

of *African History*, 39, 1 (1998), 95-120; Thaddeus Sunseri, "Majimaji and the Millennium: Abrahamic Sources and the Creation of a Tanzanian Resistance Tradition," *History in Africa*, 26 (1999), 365-378; Sunseri, "Statist Narratives and Maji Maji Ellipses," *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 33, 3 (2000), 567-584; Felicitas Becker, "Traders, 'Big Men' and Prophets: Political Continuity and Crisis in the Maji Maji Rebellion in South-east Tanzania," *JAH*, 45 (2004), 1-22.

<sup>3</sup> Mark Bevir, *The Logic of the History of Ideas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 78.

<sup>4</sup> Steve Knapp, "Collective Memory and the Actual Past," *Representations*, 26 (1989): 130.

<sup>5</sup> John Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 88-122.

<sup>6</sup> This brief summary of the Maji Maji movement is largely based on Iliffe, *A Modern History of Tanganyika*, 168-202.

<sup>7</sup> For a description of this, see Pakenham, *The Scramble for Africa* (New York: Avon Books, 1991), especially pp. 622-627.

<sup>8</sup> Sunseri develops this argument in "Statist Narratives and Maji Maji Ellipses," 568-571.

<sup>9</sup> R.M. Bell, "The Maji-Maji Rebellion in The Liwale District," *Tanganyika Notes and Records*, 28, (1950): 55

<sup>10</sup> Julius Nyerere, "Statement to the U.N. Fourth Committee, 1956", in *Freedom and Unity* (Dar es Salaam: Oxford University Press, 1966), 41.

<sup>11</sup> Cited in Gwassa, G.C.K. 'The Outbreak and Development of the Maji Maji War 1905-1907.' Ph.D. thesis, University of Dar es Salaam, 1973. Edited by Wolfgang Apelt and reprinted by Köln: Rüdiger Köppe Verlag, 2005, 289-90.

<sup>12</sup> Cited in Terence Ranger, "Connexions [*sic*] between 'Primary Resistance' Movements and Modern Mass Nationalism in East and Central Africa. II," *The Journal of African History*: 9, 4 (1968): 636.

<sup>13</sup> Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 2006), 5.

<sup>14</sup> Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 49.

<sup>15</sup> Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 14.

<sup>16</sup> John Iliffe, "The Organization of the Maji Maji Rebellion," *Journal of African History*, viii, 3 (1967): 496-9.

<sup>17</sup> G.C.K. Gwassa and John Iliffe, *Records of the Maji Maji Rising, Part one* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1968), 3.

<sup>18</sup> Gwassa, "Outbreak," 135.

<sup>19</sup> For example, Iliffe's 1967 "The Organization of the Maji Maji Rebellion" almost exclusively cites secondary sources or German colonial records; in contrast, his chapter on the Maji Maji rebellion in his 1979 *Modern History of Tanganyika* cites Gwassa's "Outbreak" and the collected works of the 1968 Maji Maji Research Project in addition to German records.

<sup>20</sup> T.O. Ranger, "Connexions Between 'Primary Resistance' Movements and Modern Mass Nationalism in East and Central Africa. Part I," *Journal of African History*, IX, 3 (1968): 451; Ranger, "Connexions. II," 631, see also 636-7.

<sup>21</sup> Ranger, "Connexions. II," 636.

<sup>22</sup> Ranger is mentioned in the Preface of Gwassa, *Records*, 3; the last paragraph of Iliffe, "Organization," 512; and many of Ranger's works are cited in Gwassa, "Outbreak."

<sup>23</sup> John Iliffe, "The Organization of the Maji Maji Rebellion," *Journal of African History*, VIII, 3 (1967): 495, 512.

<sup>24</sup> Gwassa, *Records*, 17.

<sup>25</sup> Gwassa, "Outbreak," 91.

<sup>26</sup> Mzee Motoulaya Ngonyani, Bwana Albert Kangala Tawete, Mzee Issa Ngula Fusi and Mzee Hussein Ndunya, and Mzee Lukonjilunonga Moyo in MMRP Nos. 6/68/4/3/2, 6/68/4/3/6, 6/68/4/3/10, 6/68/4/3/14, respectively.

<sup>27</sup> Mzee Martin Nchamo in MMRP No. 6/68/4/3/4.

<sup>28</sup> Mzee Rashid Katungai in MMRP No. 6/68/4/3/12.

<sup>29</sup> O.B. Mapunda and G.P. Mpangara, "The Maji Maji War in Ungoni," MMRP No. 6/68/4/1, pp. 6, 10-11.

<sup>30</sup> Mzee Daudi Kuambiana Mwimba in MMRP No. 6/68/4/3/8.

<sup>31</sup> Mapunda, "The Maji Maji War in Ungoni," MMRP No. 6/68/4/1, p. 13.

<sup>32</sup> Mzee Motoulaya Ngonyani in MMRP No. 6/68/4/3/2,

<sup>33</sup> Mapunda, "The Maji Maji War in Ungoni," MMRP No. 6/68/4/1, p. 8.

<sup>34</sup> Mapunda, "The maji Maji War in Ungoni," MMRP No. 6/68/4/1, p. 11.

<sup>35</sup> Mzee John Yogelo in MMRP No. 1/68/2/4/2, p. 1.

<sup>36</sup> Asmani Mananga in MMRP No. 1/68/2/4/12.

<sup>37</sup> Mrisho in MMRP No. 2/68/1/4/3.

<sup>38</sup> I.A.S. Mananga, "The Maji Maji Rising at Msongozi," MMRP No. 1/68/2/1,

p. 5; D.L. Chipindulla, “The Maji Maji Rising in Kilosa Town,” MMRP No. 2/68/1/1.

<sup>39</sup> Mzee Abraham Mavesa in MMRP No. 3/68/1/3/11.

<sup>40</sup> Mzee Kwadanalamu Mwachula in MMRP No. 3/69/1/3/9.

<sup>41</sup> Mzee Kawosa Mwamakasi in MMRP No. 3/68/1/3/19.

<sup>42</sup> Pascal T.V.N. Mhongole, “The Hehe and the Maji Maji Rebellion,” MMRP No. 3/68/1/1, especially pp. 16-17.

<sup>43</sup> Mzee Stephen Chang’ a in MMRP No. 3/68/1/3/1.

<sup>44</sup> Simbayang’ula Mwakikove in MMRP No. 3/68/2/3/4.

<sup>45</sup> Bangimilimo Mwawubamba in MMRP No. 3/68/2/3/9.

<sup>46</sup> Yehoswa Mwakikoti in MMRP No. 3/68/2/3/10.

<sup>47</sup> Carlo J. Ngalekumtwa, “Maji Maji in Uzungwa,” MMRP No. 3/68/2/1, p. 3.

<sup>48</sup> Monson, “Relocating Maji Maji”; Becker, “Traders, ‘Big Men’ and Prophets”; Sunseri, “Majimaji and the Millennium”; Sunseri, “Statist Narratives and Maji Maji Ellipses.” (See footnote 2).