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Sovereignty at Stake: The Rise of Algerians in France and Transnationalism in the French Republic

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Undergraduate Humanities Forum 2009-2010: Connections. 8.
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**Sovereignty at Stake: The Rise of Algerians in France
and Transnationalism in the French Republic**

Julia Enyart

2009–2010 Penn Humanities Forum
Undergraduate Mellon Research Fellowship

A Thesis in International Relations

Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of bachelor of Arts

“Is there really a chemical bond between the human spirit and a man’s native land which makes it impossible to break away from one’s country and, even if one does break away, makes one come back to it in the end?”

~Fyodor Dostoevsky, *Winter Notes on Summer Impressions*

ABSTRACT: The complex ties between Algeria and France, as well as the migrants who transfer from the former to the latter, are grounded in a controversial history. Offering a particularly striking expression of the ongoing strain between the two countries, French president Nicholas Sarkozy repeated his refusal to atone for French colonial crimes in Algeria in December 2007, noting the “loathsome trend of apologies.” Indeed, this North African country gained independence more than four decades ago, and yet a tainted colonial bond still remains. Despite this strain on Franco-Algerian relations, the Algerian population in France continues to grow, as does their manifestation of what it means to be Algerian in France.

By considering the French treatment of Islam and the secular policy of *la laïcité*, as well as Algerian cultural festivals and Berber political associations, this thesis attempts to charter Franco-Algerian national identity. How does this hybrid national identity, and the transnational ties that inevitably accompany it, behave with the French nation-state? Will the French Republic have to learn how to accommodate new forms of identity in an era of increasing globalization? This thesis will conclude that while Algerian transnationalism does not violate traditional forms of sovereignty in France, it does breach domestic and interdependent sovereignty in some capacity. Still, though the French state may implicitly concede some measure of its state power to Algerian migrants, explicitly, the Republic is staging a formidable fight in its effort to regulate and maintain republican citizenship in its purest sense.

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INTRODUCTION

The French World Cup victory in 1998 aroused a deep sense of pride in France. Thousands of French people flooded the streets, waving the “*bleu-blanc-rouge*” of the national flag and chanting the Marseillaise. In tune to the swell of this nationalistic fervor, the Franco-Algerian football star Zinedine Zidane sang along; however, he also dedicated his team’s win to “the thousands of Algerians of my generation who emigrated to Europe, but who never abandoned their culture.”¹ Zidane clearly rejected the French state’s policy of assimilation, which demands the repudiation of an immigrant’s specific culture, language, and identity in return for the assumption of that of the host country.² His negotiation of a national and transnational identity underlines the tension-fraught quality of trans-nationalism, or “the processes by which immigrants force and sustain social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement.”³

The complex ties between Algeria and France, as well as the migrants who transfer from the former to the latter, are grounded in a controversial history. Offering a particularly striking expression of the ongoing strain between the two countries, French president Nicholas Sarkozy repeated his refusal to atone for French colonial crimes in Algeria in December 2007, noting the “loathsome trend of apologies.”⁴ The 132-year colonial rule in Algeria ended in 1962 following the Algerian War of Independence, and yet the French government has never issued an official apology for horrific war crimes and torture. Though the Evian Accords of 1962 did grant the North African country full independence, Algeria remains intrinsically connected to France. First, Algeria’s status as an emerging economy and as a central player in the Mediterranean

¹ Paul A. Silverstein, “*Algeria in France: Transpolitics, Race, and Nation*” (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004) 128.

² Montserrat Guibernau. “The Identity of Nations” (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2007) 65.

³ Laurie Brand, “Citizens Abroad” (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 9.

⁴ “Le poids de veilles rancoeurs,” *Le Monde*, December 4, 2007.

Union- Sarkozy's conceived economic regional treaty with North Africa- remains dependent on a healthy rapport with France.⁵ Reflective of the crooked colonial power structure, Algeria's diplomatic relationship with France appears asymmetric. After all, Algeria's reliance on France for economic stability and access to European markets may hinder the hopes of Algeria ever achieving reconciliation with France over a tempestuous colonial past.

Beyond an economic bond, the high number of Algerians flocking to France yearly also intertwines the colonial empress and the colonized country. Despite the tension accompanying a tainted colonial legacy, France has consistently received a steady influx of Algerian immigrants since 1962, and in 2003, served as the destination of choice for 90% of all Algerians abroad.⁶ In 2006, the Algerian emigrant community in Europe was estimated at over 1 million, but they settle overwhelmingly in France.⁷ Laws governing nationality in Algeria and France accord many Algerians in France dual citizenship. After the war of independence, those born in Algeria before 1963 were considered to have been born on French territory "regardless of whether they were Muslim, and therefore, not French citizens."⁸ A generation later, these Algerians' children were automatically granted French citizenship at the age of sixteen. In addition, these second-generation Franco-Algerians also obtained Algerian citizenship under the *jus sanguinis* laws⁹, thus furnishing a large percentage of Algerian youth in France with dual identities and all the conflicting loyalties that adjoin them. What place do Algerians hold in France today, and what

⁵ Logan Currie, "Franco-Algerian Relations since 2003: a colonial legacy precluding political reconciliation," University of Pennsylvania, 2009.

⁶ Jean-Christophe Dumont, "Immigrants from Arab countries to the OECD: From the past to the future," United Nations Expert Group Meeting on International Migration and Development in the Arab Region (May 16-17, 2006): 5.

⁷ Michael Collyer, "Transnational political participation of Algerians in France. Extra-territorial civil society versus transnational governmentality," *Political Geography* (2006) 25: 840.

⁸ Aaron Erlich, "The French Riots: Plus Ca Change, Plus C'est La Même Chose," *History News Network*, January 9, 2006, <http://hnn.us/articles/19785.html>.

⁹ *Ibid.*

are the consequences of their participation in transnational activities on France? This thesis will explore the impact of Franco-Algerians on the French nation-state, and dissect the intricacies of their engagement with transnationalism.

Franco-Algerians undoubtedly hold a stake in 21st-century France, a nation-state which is increasingly forced to confront its concept of national identity and republican citizenship. In an era where revolutionary technology enables rapid movement, many European metropolises are experiencing transnational phenomena with their former colonial peripheries. The entrance of Algerians into France is paralleled by Pakistanis in Britain, Moroccans in the Netherlands, and Turks in Germany. Naturally, the flow of post-colonial immigrants into Europe has mobilized a call for universalist identities, a campaign which now dominates the European discourse on nation-states. However, these attempts to ‘internationalize’ are often followed by a tendency to pull in locally for fear of cultural homogenization.¹⁰ Indeed, transnational migrants attempt to preserve ties to their country of origin, be they cultural, economic, political, social or linguistic, as “paradoxically, the closer people come in contact [through globalization], the more they may come to rely on these identities to define themselves.”¹¹ Many theorists of transnationalism consider this ‘localization’ by transnational migrants, and thus the fostering of multiple loyalties, a serious threat to the sovereignty of the nation-state.

Still, the backlash against globalization emanates from both transnational migrants *and* countries. In the 1990s, several pro-immigration campaigns dominated Europe, advocating increasing unification amongst countries and integration for migrants. However, some countries responded negatively to incoming foreign nationals, because “as internal borders disappeared,

¹⁰ *Algeria in France*.

¹¹ Patrick O’Neil, “Nations and Society,” Essentials of Comparative Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007) 53.

extra-European borders became increasingly more stringent.”¹² The ability of transnational migrants to spark debate over the nation-state’s role in an increasingly cosmopolitan Europe has convinced many theorists to acknowledge transnational migrants as instrumental actors in the realm of international relations. Though the collision between French nationalism and Franco-Algerian transnationalism first occurred in the aftermath of the Algerian War of Independence, it remains an enduring and powerful phenomenon today.

By concentrating on Algerians who live in France¹³, this thesis will focus on a particularly resistant blend of transnationalism, and consider how it interacts with the uncompromising establishment of French nationalism. I hope to disentangle the reasons for transnationalism’s development and durability in France, as well as use the most comprehensive approach for understanding the movement’s effects. Does a specific quality of French national identity preclude the assimilation of Algerians into French culture? French nationalism, so closely associated with stereotyped images of Gaullist ancestors, the Eiffel Tower, masterpieces by Monet, and wine and cheese at every meal, does not describe or welcome all who seek naturalization in France. Moreover, France’s approach to citizenship discourages deviation from the state-conceived norms. After all, Bauböck purports that “in a strongly assimilationist perspective [like France] there is no place for transnationalism.”¹⁴

On the contrary, does a universal ideology of citizenship travel with an immigrant wherever they go? That is, perhaps crucial to the discourse on transnationalism is the understanding that the one characteristic uniting all transnational migrants is that they neither

¹² Paul A. Silverstein, *Algeria in France*, 2.

¹³ This thesis will study Algerians who live in France, with or without French citizenship. Though Algerians with French citizenship might arguably display a weaker form of transnational ties to Algeria, my case studies do not distinguish between Algerians who live in France as immigrants or as citizens.

¹⁴ Rainer Bauböck. “Towards a Political Theory of Migrant Transnationalism,” *International Migration Review* (Fall 2003), 37, no. 3: 702.

fully renounce their old citizenship nor accept their new one. Moreover, when a universalist ideology of citizenship follows a migrant to the receiving nation, it affects the “collective identities and conceptions of citizenship among the native populations in both receiving and sending societies.”¹⁵ Significantly, as the influx of Algerians into France persists, the staying power of France’s version of nationalism is questioned. Finally, Franco-Algerians negotiate a hybrid identity that positions them between the local, national, and global; this thesis will ask if the wavering status of these transnational migrants is celebrated or resented. Drawing from my thesis’ analysis, I will propose that transnationalism, as practiced by Algerians who reside in France, ties a colonial master and its subject closer together than ever before. Internally, this social movement defies certain types of nation-state authority, such as domestic and interdependence sovereignty. Moreover, Algerian transnational migrants force France to redesign its definition of national identity, as well as consider a universalist prescription in place of republican citizenship.

In seeking to answer this question, I will apply process-tracing to two case studies that illustrate the dichotomous nature of transnational identities, torn between the country of origin and the country of settlement. After evaluating the linkages between transnationalism and sovereignty in the French treatment of Islam, as well as Algerian political formations in France, I will challenge the permanence of traditional French national identity and the potential for coexistence between the nation-state and the transnational migrant. First, however, a theoretical background of transnationalism, and clarifications of the concepts that accompany it, are crucial to an understanding of this argument.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, 720.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS AND LITERATURE REVIEW

Situating Transnationalism in International Relations Theory

As globalization continuously intertwines one country to another in the 21st-century, several political science theorists are ringing the funeral knell of the nation-state. Adherents to the post-national model determine that in an age of increased information and cross-cultural exchanges, the framework of the nation-state, will dissolve alongside the permeable borders of its territory. These theorists also say the nation-state derives power and legitimacy from those living within its territorial borders and their willingness to acquiesce to state sovereignty, a subordination that transnationalism may impede. However, theories of transnationalism remain unresolved in the realm of international relations and deserve further theoretical inspection. For lack of agreement, feasibility or research, theorists often debate the dualistic nature of transnational identities- is a transnational migrant's loyalty to his country of origin necessarily displaced by an assumption of loyalty to his country of settlement? Another debate rests on the longevity of the nation-state: will it remain the principal actor in world events or will transnational forces assume a central and recognizable role in international affairs? Because this paper focuses on the behavior of Algerian trans-nationalism in France, it is significant to consider the role of France's mode of political citizenship, republicanism, in this debate. Republican citizenship specifies a political community founded on a definitive constitution and laws; this type of citizenship admits "newcomers to the community [only if] they adhere to political rules, and are willing to adopt the national culture."¹⁶ Does republican citizenship hinder the process of assimilation, and, in their rejection of the French national identity, what type of belonging do Franco-Algerians seek?

¹⁶ Stephen Castles et al., *The Age of Migration* (London: Macmillan, 1993).

The classic realist paradigm identifies the state as the basic unit in the international arena, and therefore excludes non-state actors, like transnational migrants, from shaping global affairs. Placing faith in the foundations of the nation-state, realists support the merits of republican citizenship and attempt to appease contemporary critics with the liberal nationalism theory. Liberal nationalism theorists believe that nationalism functions as a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for democracy and affirm the value and vigor of state sovereignty.¹⁷ Importantly, some theorists present liberal nationalism as a flexible model: Lind notes that, regardless of ethnicity, the linguistic-cultural nation can be accepted as the “basis for political community,” as it both commands loyal sentiments and provides universal features.¹⁸

On the other hand, social constructivists reject the classical realist approach. By emphasizing the role of non-state actors who resist the nation-state framework, Brand holds that while transnational migrants may be the “forgotten ‘other’ in general accounts of national political development, emigrants have in fact been key actors in [state’s] histories.”¹⁹ From Brand’s social constructivist perspective, transnational migrants, and the communities abroad which they construct, have played an essential role in the evolution and shaping of sovereignty. After all, Brand views legitimacy stemming from a community of sentiment, rather than the boundaries of a nation, thus underscoring the “link between sovereign authority and a defined population.”²⁰

Another theory that contradicts the classical liberal nationalist view is the post-national model and globalization theory, which call the longevity of the nation-state into question. Chun judges that forces of globalization defy the power and monopoly of state sovereignty; this

¹⁷ Michael Lind, “In Defense of Liberal Nationalism,” *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 2004), 73, no. 3: 94.

¹⁸ *Ibid*, 94.

¹⁹ Brand, *Citizens Abroad*, 219.

²⁰ Brand, *Citizens Abroad*, 30.

deterioration results in transnationalism, a movement which post-nationalists recognize as a crisis of the nation-state.²¹ Though forces of globalization diffuse an internationally-minded culture, transnationalism- seen here as a reaction to globalization- prompts local communities to resist integration into the nation-state : “gradually increasing trans-national flows of capital and people created a decay [...] of the modern state that has resulted in ‘a [...] combination of fictitious states without people and people without states.’”²² In other words, despite the theoretical benefits of globalization- integrating less developed nations into the world economy, as well as increasing people’s access to information, goods, and services-, in reality, this process has produced deviations from the traditional nation-building process and doubts about the “presumed rootedness of [national] identity.”²³

Significantly, both the post-nationalism and classical realism model converge on the importance of the nation-state. First, the post-national model also acknowledges the state’s hegemonic use of force. That is, both theoretical frameworks recognize the nation-state as the central actor in international relations that stakes a monopoly over shared values, common identity, and culture. However, in similar fashion to Hobsbawm, Chun declares these qualities of the nation-state as invented traditions and argues that “the advent of post- and transnationalism now, in effect, exposes [the nation-state’s] serious flaws.”²⁴ Simultaneously recognizing the nation-state’s principality in the international system *and* its imagined beginnings, post-nationalists determine that “more than being a norm, nations have produced discourses on normality.”²⁵

²¹ Silverstein, *Algeria in France*, 239.

²² Chun, “The (Post)nation, or Violence and the Norm,” *Communal/Plural: Journal of Transnational & Crosscultural Studies* (2001) 9, no. 1: 8.

²³ *Ibid*, 9.

²⁴ *Ibid*, 6.

²⁵ *Ibid*, 6.

Yet, nation-states may rest on a stronger foundation than post-nationalists would think. As liberal nationalists often point out, post-nationalists tend to underestimate the deep-seated foundation of sovereignty as well as the resistance a nation-state would employ in the struggle to maintain order.²⁶ This resistance might surface through stricter immigration laws, vigilant oversight and regulation of imported influences within the nation-state's borders, and attempts to closely mold national identity by controlling the music, religion, food, language, historical narrative and culture of the state. The post-national model suffers another deficiency: it assumes a severe dichotomy between the country of origin and the country of settlement. Brand notes that the post-national model fails to recognize the "ever increased importance of the home state [...] in creating transnational forms of political and social life, and in maintaining local, ethnic, and national identities linked to the home country."²⁷ According to Brand, transnationalism is characterized by much more fluid movement, as transnational migrants are not fully de-territorialized from either the sending or receiving nation.²⁸ Still, the post-national model demands careful consideration. By challenging the "monolithic narrative of modern nationalism" and celebrating hybridity through the post-modern theory of multiple identities, post-nationalism lays the groundwork for a theory gaining much contemporary attention, liberal universalism.²⁹

Captured best by Kristeva's term "nations without nationalism," the liberal universalist perspective is a movement which attempts to "transfer loyalties from nation to supranational entities" and thus, pronounces the role of universalist institutions, like the European Union which represents supranational interests, in managing transnationalism.³⁰ For the purposes of this thesis, universalism will be defined as a generic form of belonging "that defies historical and cultural

²⁶ Lind, "In Defense of Liberal Nationalism," 89.

²⁷ Brand, *Citizens Abroad*, 11.

²⁸ *Ibid*, 9.

²⁹ Chun, "The (Post)nation, or Violence and the Norm," 7.

³⁰ Lind, "In Defense of Liberal Nationalism," 88.

specificity.”³¹ Liberal universalists reject republican citizenship, urging a multicultural definition instead, and advocate a generic form of belonging that “defies historical and cultural specificity.”³² Best described as extreme cosmopolitanism, Kristeva sees the goals of consolidating French national identity and the integration of transnational migrants as compatible. Although Kristeva professes that “nowhere is one *more* a foreigner than in France,” she encourages transnational migrants to compel the state to “reconcile the individual, the national, and the transnational.”³³

Though less radical, Guibernau equally advocates the construction of integrative identities that can balance multinational and multiethnic ties and warns against the conflation of nation and state. Connecting liberal universalism to liberal nationalism, Guibernau designates ethnic minorities in transnationalist movements as an obstacle to “the state-created myth of a culturally homogeneous people living within its territory” and urges these groups to advance their own distinctive identities.³⁴ With regard to Algerians in France, liberal universalists would advise transnational migrants to break free from the bonds of assimilation, all the while affirming their political rights as citizens: “Being French [...] need not imply accepting the Gauls as one’s ancestors.”³⁵ Extending the argument for liberal universalism, Silverstein, the author of a prominent work on Franco-Algerian transnationalism, *Algeria in France*, emphasizes that transnationalism is, in large part, “a product of the nation-state’s own internal contradictions.”³⁶ According to Silverstein, unresolved tension between national particularism and civic

³¹ Chun, “The (Post)nation, or Violence and the Norm,” 6.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ Julia Kristeva, *Nations without Nationalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) 30, 43.

³⁴ Montserrat Guibernau, *The Identity of Nations*, 26.

³⁵ Silverstein, *Algeria in France*, 240.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 244.

universalism- in other words, between the nation and state- provides the impetus for France and Algeria to partake in “ongoing processes of political and cultural reinvention.”³⁷

Conceptual Clarifications

Convergences of Transnationalism

While theorists have not yet reached a comprehensive consensus on how to articulate and recognize transnationalism, Alejandro Portes, a renowned sociologist at Princeton University, summarizes the five main convergences with which this movement can be understood. First, though transnationalism occurs organically within the specific conditions of a nation-state- therefore differing widely from country to country- (1) certain traits are recurring and can be used to consolidate new typologies and predictions. Second, (2) transnationalism is a grassroots phenomenon that proves distinct from other transnational entities, such as NGOs and business corporations. Third, Portes cautions against exaggerating the scope of this phenomenon, since (3) only a minority of immigrants are *regularly* involved in transnational activities and can therefore be considered ‘transnational.’³⁸

Most importantly, Portes’ last two points expand upon our capabilities to articulate transnationalism’s effect on sovereignty. The fourth observation recognizes that (4) transnationalism has macro-social consequences; Portes construes transnationalism as a “social process of significant economic and social impact for communities and even nations.”³⁹ Portes’ fifth point delineates that (5) transnational activities materialize in heterogeneous ways and vary across immigrant communities. However, Portes judges that the ways in which immigrants are

³⁷ *Ibid*, 245.

³⁸ Alejandro Portes, “Conclusion: Theoretical Convergences and Empirical Evidence in the Study of Immigrant Transnationalism,” *International Migration Review* (Fall 2003), 37, no. 3.

³⁹ Portes, “Conclusion,” 877.

merged into the host society matters.⁴⁰ On one hand, if transnational migrants are dispersed and receive adequate protection from discrimination, they are less prone to engage in transnational activities. Conversely, substantial prejudice encourages transnational migrants- “especially those that have been subjected to a hostile reception by the host society’s authorities and citizenry”- to maintain ties with their home communities.⁴¹ Portes specifies the political, economic, and socio-cultural activities in which transnational migrants engage, as shown in Figure 1; these tangible examples delineate what kinds of actions constitute transnationalism and illustrate a sustained relationship with the country of origin.

Figure 1. Cross-Border Transnational Activity

Type of Activity	Transnational Engagement
Political	a) Non-governmental associations established to monitor human rights globally b) Hometown civic associations established by immigrants to improve their sending communities
Economic	a) Political/cultural celebrations b) Boycotts organized by grassroots activists in First World countries to compel multinationals to improve their 3 rd world labor practices c) Enterprises established by immigrants to export/import goods to and from their home countries
Socio-cultural	a) Grassroots charities promoting the protection and care of children in poorer nations b) Selection of performing groups in immigrant communities to take part in annual hometown festivals

Source: Portes, 2003.

Migration, Territoriality, and Dual Citizenship

As Portes elucidates in his third convergence, not all migrant activities are necessarily transnational. Bauböck develops this distinction by defining migration as an international phenomenon that involves movement of people between “territorial jurisdictions of independent

⁴⁰ *Ibid*, 879.

⁴¹ *Ibid*, 880.

states.”⁴² An interaction between the nation and state only becomes transnational when “it creates overlapping memberships, rights and practices that reflect a simultaneous belonging of migrants to two different communities.”⁴³ For example, Algerians participating in a political protest in Paris that implores the French government to apologize for colonial war crimes exhibits Bauböck’s concept of belonging to multiple nations, regardless of the migrant’s settlement in only one state (France). Importantly, Bauböck argues that the territorial aspect of a migrant’s claim to citizenship rights is derived from their settlement in the state’s territory. Conversely, he argues that a migrant’s demand for multicultural recognition and accommodation is non-territorial, as it does not “involve establishing [his] language or religion in an autonomous political territory.”⁴⁴ Interestingly, Franco-Algerians often *do* seek to establish the teaching of Arabic or the institutionalization of Islam in France, and therefore may not be as deterritorialized from the state as Bauböck claims.

Finally, the subject of dual nationality receives varying degrees of attention in the discourse on transnationalism. Whereas Bauböck believes that dual citizenship formally recognizes transnational membership,⁴⁵ Brand is more skeptical. Perhaps, she claims, European countries treat dual loyalties with increasing tolerance because they view it as primarily symbolic- a diplomatic nicety that momentarily appeases migrants. Though countries generally avoid the blanket exclusion of immigrants, some still consider dual nationality potentially harmful to the receiving state. Countries claim that dual loyalties could possibly violate their sovereignty- after all, Brand argues, when a migrant pledges allegiance to both the receiving and

⁴² Bauböck. “Towards a Political Theory of Migrant Transnationalism,” 705..

⁴³ *Ibid*, 705.

⁴⁴ *Ibid*, 719.

⁴⁵ *Ibid*, 705.

sending state, “how could one continue to argue that ‘the domestic political authorities are the *sole* arbiters of legitimate behavior?’”⁴⁶

With concerns of weakened sovereignty in mind, and under the pressure of changing norms in the European Union about human and immigration rights, several nation-states offer migrants what Brand terms “denizen status.” By definition, denizens are long-term residents affiliated with non-national communities who are accorded less than full citizen rights economically, politically, and socially. Though denizens are not fully integrated, neither are they “fully excluded from the polity for lack of full citizenship.”⁴⁷ The strategy behind granting denizen status is twofold: first, reduce the marginalization of immigrants and therefore mitigate future societal conflict and second, avoid fundamentally restructuring the identity of the nation at all costs.

Understanding National Identity and Nation-State Sovereignty

Nations, regardless of their imagined beginnings or not, all depend on various constitutive elements. Membership of the nation-state depends on the convergence of these qualities, which engenders the process of nation-building and dictates the tenets of national identity. Guibernau describes national identity as the “collective sentiment based upon the belief of belonging to the same nation and of sharing most of the attributes that make it distinct from other nations.”⁴⁸ Of particular importance to this thesis, Guibernau points out that a distinct national identity can be shared among individuals, such as Franco-Algerians, “belonging to nations without states.”⁴⁹ While no single construct of national identity exists, most theorists would delineate shared history, culture, religion, language, and values as key features of national

⁴⁶ Brand, *Citizens Abroad*, 41.

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, 37.

⁴⁸ Guibernau, *The Identity of Nations*, 11.

⁴⁹ *Ibid*, 11.

identity. Contemporary critics of national identity assert its mythical construction, noting that although modern states claim a certain innateness to their communities, “these very concepts themselves must include a [...] ‘invented component.’”⁵⁰ Because France constantly reconciles its national and global representations of identity⁵¹, it has participated in intense and harsh categorization to reinforce its own internal authority. Unfortunately, these cultural politics and attempts to preserve its traditional national identity may have only served to solidify “ethnic, linguistic, and religious differences [of migrants] that [the French state] may have wished to suppress.”⁵²

To gauge the strength of a transnational migrant’s grip on a country, it is essential to view the competing loyalties central to transnationalism as a challenge to nation-state sovereignty. This thesis, by adopting Philpott and Camillieri’s interpretations, will define sovereignty as the possession of supreme coercive authority within a territory.⁵³ A nation-state holds a monopoly over the traditional notion of sovereignty as long as it maintains control over a defined set of exclusive political institutions, such as enfranchisement, citizenship rights, and constitutional law. However, enter transnational migrants and their often frequent refusal to defer to state authority: do increasing transnational communities reshape the claim the nation-state has over a group of foreign nationals? This renegotiation of state power severs the link between state authority and a defined territorialized people, a key feature of sovereignty. Indeed, Brand

⁵⁰ Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 14.

⁵¹ In other words, how the French state reconciles their view of Frenchness and how Frenchness is viewed internationally, both by states and incoming immigrants.

⁵² Silverstein, *Algeria in France*, 243.

⁵³ Daniel Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

concludes that “sovereignty in the international system is being reconfigured [...] by the presence of substantial expatriate communities actively leading transnational lives.”⁵⁴

Theorists confront the future of sovereignty in various ways. Brand’s band of theorists argues that transnational groups abroad work ‘around the state’ both above and below, in order to gradually mold state norms and ultimately, gain a voice in their specific issue areas.⁵⁵

Conversely, some theorists see no novelty in contemporary transnational processes. Krasner maintains that though transnational migrants may propose an alternative source of authority, the dominance of state sovereignty has been repeatedly thrown into ‘crisis’ ever since the Treaty of Westphalia established it in 1648. With regard to transnationalism, Krasner typifies this movement as “simply [a] new form of how sovereignty is violated purposefully.”⁵⁶ Regardless of their opinion on nation-state durability, most theorists concede that the state still boasts a monopoly over several responsibilities, like producing legislation, establishing border and immigration policy, and finally, appropriating and expropriating citizenship.⁵⁷ This thesis will consider how state power is derived specifically in France, and furthermore, what types of sovereignty, if any, that Franco-Algerian migrants breach in their expressions of transnationalism.

Literature on Franco-Algerian Transnationalism

While current literature on trans-nationalism informs a basic discussion of the origins and possible consequences of ‘dual identities,’ very few works focus on the vitality of republican citizenship in an era dominated by globalization and calls for liberal universalism. The few works that do examine the reconciliation of transnationalism and nation-state sovereignty, like

⁵⁴ Brand, *Citizens Abroad*, 222-223.

⁵⁵ *Ibid*, 25.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, 25.

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, 26.

those of Silverstein and Brand, tend to speak in general terms, or exclude France due to the inflexible tenets of republican citizenship. In other words, little reconciliation in France seems possible as the state often refuses to compromise its traditional form of national identity. Moreover, the literature on the mechanics of transnationalism is scarce: are transnational migrants citizens of both the country of origin and the country of settlement? Or are migrants full citizens of neither? Silverstein points out that transnationalism is “related to the nation-state in some intimate way, while itself being constituted in the nation-state’s limits” but does not elaborate whether this wavering status is celebrated or problematic.⁵⁸ This thesis will also explore the ‘traditional’ French version of national identity and ask whether universalism is an essential or even employable option for French nationalism in the 21st century. The majority of France-specific literature articulates a serious tension between the Franco-Algerian willingness- or lack thereof- to assimilate to a French national identity and the unyielding standard of republican citizenship in France. This perpetual contention affects the internal dynamics of France as well as French interplay with Algeria, and broadly speaking, France’s international profile. This thesis aims to detail France’s specific negotiation of state power and ethnic difference, and ultimately, determine the vulnerability of state sovereignty and legitimacy in the face of transnational opposition.

METHODOLOGY

The discussion of transnationalism, and its effects on the sovereignty of the nation-state, as well as on the future of republican citizenship, all require mindful definition. This thesis relies on the Basch, Schiller, and Blanc expression of transnationalism, or “the processes by which immigrants forge and sustain social relations that link together their societies of origin and

⁵⁸ Silverstein, *Algeria in France*, 239.

settlement,”⁵⁹ which most contemporary theorists also cite. Nonetheless, it is important to consider the post-nationalist view of transnationalism as “the processes of globalization that defy if not destroy the nation-state framework.”⁶⁰ For example, Appadurai interprets new emerging patriotisms as an indication of the entrance into a phase of post-national politics, which belittles the importance of the nation-state. However, this study will not assume that transnationalism necessarily leads to a decay of the nation-state. In addition to establishing a clearer causal relationship between transnationalism and a nation-state’s sovereignty, this research will attempt to elaborate on France’s particular reconciliation of local and national identities.

Within existing literature, contemporary theorists huddle around the concept of liberal universalism, a framework which is best characterized by the phrase “nations without nationalism.”⁶¹ This paper adopts these tenets with a particular emphasis on the warning against the conflation of nation and state.⁶² To elaborate, even though France projects one brand of national identity, the state itself harbors many nations, including the French, Swiss, Eastern Europeans, Algerians, Tunisians, Moroccans, Berbers, etc. Liberal universalism describes transnationalism as a fluid, dynamic process between the country of origin and settlement, rather than a dichotomous disavowal of one nationality and a full acceptance of the next.⁶³

Additionally, the experiences of Franco-Algerians in the research should substantiate the post-modern theory of multiple identities; in other words, these transnational migrants celebrate difference and hybridity by challenging the “monolithic narrative of modern nationalism.”⁶⁴

Ultimately, this paper strives to clarify if a universalist prescription of citizenship is essential to

⁵⁹ Linda Basch et al., *Nations Unbound* (Langhorne, PA: Gordon and Breach, 1994).

⁶⁰ *Ibid*, 7.

⁶¹ Kristeva, *Nations without Nationalism*.

⁶² Guibernau, *The Identity of Nations*, 26.

⁶³ Brand, *Citizens Abroad*, 9.

⁶⁴ Chun, “The (Post)nation, or Violence and the Norm,” 6.

full integration into a national identity, and if so, whether universalism is even employable in France.

Predictions about transnationalism's effect on nation-state sovereignty and republican citizenship depend on three main causal hypotheses. The first assertion regards the causal mechanisms of this thesis, which state that the steadfast forces of globalization as well as the historical footprint of decolonization continue to bring Algerians into France. Once in France, Franco-Algerians formulate an ambivalent transnational identity, which the French government views as problematic and incompatible to assimilation. In response to the French nation-state's expectation that they assume republican citizenship, Algerians defy the fictitious historical narrative that articulates a homogeneous French people and pressure France to reconsider its construction of national identity.⁶⁵

To account for the development of transnationalism, theorists invoke institutional, structural, and ideational causal mechanisms. First, the French historical narrative of colonization institutionalized a rosier recollection of the French experience in North Africa than Algerians recall. In the wake of the Evian Accords and a humiliating loss to a colonized power, the French government embraced decolonization as prescriptive only after the fact of defeat.⁶⁶ This positive spin on the sensitive memory of racial politics, colonial crimes, and the rejection of Algerians as 'French' evoked a negative response from Algerians. Working as revisionist historians, the French sought to create a single nation in 1962 "out of the various nations of parts of nations forming it."⁶⁷ It was under this exclusive definition of belonging in France, established under President Charles de Gaulle in 1962, that a close-minded definition of Franco-Algerian national identity first crystallized. The failure to address the incompatibility between Algerian

⁶⁵ Guibernau, *The Identity of Nations*, 4.

⁶⁶ Todd Shepard, *The Invention of Decolonization* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 272.

⁶⁷ Guibernau, *The Identity of Nations*, 23.

nationalism and French concepts of republican government, citizenship, and constitutional law laid the foundation for future contention.

Another factor that fostered transnationalism in France is the current wave of globalization, a structural mechanism of transnationalism which many theorists argue undermines the function and authority of the state.⁶⁸ Improved transportation and technology, the drivers of globalization, facilitate increased transnational linkages and particularist movements. To compensate for the ‘whitewashing’ effects of globalization, sustaining ties to the home country through transnationalist activities seems a natural reaction. In an increasingly internationally-minded world that promises free trade as much as it does cultural homogenization, transnational migrants salvage ties to the local culture from their home country for economic stability (through formal and informal remittances), a communal sense of belonging, and the reassurance that they can sustain and ameliorate the progress of their country of origin.

Lastly, transnationalism stems from an ideational tension between the nation-state’s “own internal contradictions”⁶⁹ and its inability to bridge the liminality between Algerian and French cultures.⁷⁰ Franco-Algerians self-identify as post-modern mutant hybrids, or ‘Beurs’ (a French slang word describing French population of Arab descent), and seek participation in transnational movements to express their membership. If migrants cannot belong to the nation-state, they increasingly seek membership to the most welcoming nation in that state.

In analyzing the strength of Algerian transnationalism and French national identity, it is important to first distinguish the kind of Algerian activity occurring within the French nation-state that possesses a truly transnational character. Drawing on Bauböck’s clarification, an

⁶⁸ Chun, “The (Post)nation, or Violence and the Norm,” 8.

⁶⁹ Silverstein, *Algeria in France*, 244.

⁷⁰ *Ibid*, 9.

activity becomes transnational when the participants forge and sustain simultaneous belonging to two different nations. The case studies hope to illustrate this dual membership by specifying how Franco-Algerians perpetuate ties to their country of origin, all the while seeking, and expecting, certain benefits from their country of settlement. The first case study considers the treatment of Islam in France, which includes a closer look at the French regulation of Islam in the public space, as well as Algerian reactions to the policy of *la laïcité*.⁷¹ The second case study examines Franco-Algerian political formations as an expression of Algerian civil society. In this thesis, civil society is understood as a ‘third realm’ based on collective action, which functions outside the domains of the state and official market economy.⁷²

However, a mere analysis of instances of Algerian transnationalism in France does not speak to the vitality of nation-state sovereignty. Thus, this thesis will rely on Krasner’s definitions of sovereignty to determine what authority, if any, is being violated by transnational migrants. Krasner outlines four identifiable types of sovereignty: (1) International legal sovereignty relates to the practices of mutual recognition, usually between territorial entities that have formal juridical independence. (2) Westphalian sovereignty means political organization based on the exclusion of external actors from authority structures within a given territory. For the purposes of this thesis, Krasner’s last two kinds of sovereignty deserve the most attention. (3) Domestic sovereignty is the formal organization of political authority within the state, and the ability of public authorities to exercise effective control within the borders of their polity. Especially relevant under the structural mechanism of globalization, (4) interdependence sovereignty

⁷¹ *La laïcité* refers to legislation that institutionalizes the separation of church and state in France.

⁷² Collyer, “Transnational political participation of Algerians in France,” 839.

determines the ability of public authorities to regulate the flow of information, ideas, goods, peoples, pollutants, or capital across the borders of the state.⁷³

Figure 2. Interactions between Algerian Transnational Migrants and the French State

TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVITY	MANIFESTATION IN FRANCE	FORM OF SOVEREIGNTY AT RISK	DEFINITION
The French Treatment of Islam & <i>La Laïcité</i>	Government-mandated mosque building (e.g. the Great Mosque of Paris, the Great Mosque of Marseilles); the French Council on Muslim Citizens (CFCM); Algerian rector Dalil Boubakeur	Domestic sovereignty	Formal organization of political authority within the state and the ability of public authorities to exercise effective control within the borders of their polity
Algerian Civil Society Formations in France	The Beur Movements; the Year of Algeria cultural celebration (<i>Djazair</i>); Beur FM and its president, Nacer Kettane; the Berber Cultural Association (ACB); the World Berber Congress (CMA)	Interdependence sovereignty	Ability of public authorities to regulate the flow of information, ideas, goods, people, pollutants, or capital across the borders of their state

Source: Adapted from Krasner, 1999.

By first identifying the qualities of transnational activity in the case studies, and then discussing their potential repercussions on domestic and interdependence sovereignty, this thesis will illustrate what Algerian transnationalism looks like in action, and then gauge its influence over state power. Because transnationalism, by definition, is an actor-led process, the case studies concentrate on actions taken by individuals, groups, and countries, which respectively include Franco-Algerians and French public authorities; Algerian civil society and Franco-Algerian religious and political formations; and the French nation-state. To comprehend the relations between actors, a discussion of transnationalism's effect on state sovereignty demands a

⁷³ Stephen D. Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).
Penn Humanities Forum Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final Paper April 2010
Julia Enyart, College '10

full review and analysis of the theory's causes and effects in the case studies. Process-tracing proves especially useful as it dismantles a complex chain of events into smaller stages. This sequential breakdown offers a more detailed investigation of cause-effect links and clearly illustrates how "initial case conditions are translated into case outcomes."⁷⁴

However, this thesis seeks to establish a clear conceptual linkage between transnationalism, sovereignty, and national identity, and therefore requires going beyond the mere articulation of transnationalism's manifestation in France. This thesis predicts that the nature of Franco-Algerian transnationalism is unwilling, and unable, to integrate into the French national identity. Moreover, this movement serves to defy certain types of nation-state authority, including domestic sovereignty and interdependence sovereignty. In order to test this assertion, it is also helpful to evaluate the case studies using a convergence within-case procedure. Simply phrased, convergence compares how transnationalism should act in *theory* to how it actually occurs in France in *reality*.

Looking at transnational migrants in one country, versus comparing those in two, is justifiable. While comparative case studies between countries build upon the construction of replicable typologies, the quality of Franco-Algerian transnationalism is dynamic and unique. The singular character of transnationalism that varies from country to country makes it difficult to control for dependent variables when comparing transnational migrants; the enormous variance that results between countries distorts our observations. Still, the study of a distinct strain of transnationalism contributes to an understanding of the movement's function in the nation-state, and generates conclusions essential to the discourse on the fate of sovereignty and republican citizenship in the 21st century.

⁷⁴ Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 64.

Because the 90s were tainted by vicious civil war in Algeria, a surge of Algerians entered France to escape political persecution and economic hardship. Especially because the civil war brought an increasing number of Algerians into contact and conflict with the French state, this thesis will observe the influence of Franco-Algerian transnational migrants in France starting in the mid-1990s. By establishing a chronological framework that covers the most contemporary decade of the transnational migrants' experience in France, the data from case studies will be the most relevant reflection of transnationalism in France. A decade worth of data will also illustrate change over time and therefore speak to the evolution and sustainability of this phenomenon. For the sake of providing sufficient context, the case studies will briefly regard Franco-Algerian transnational activity in France during the 80s as well, covering the building of the Great Mosque of Paris and the Beur Movements. In terms of evidence, the analysis of transnationalism in France will be guided by two concentrations- first, the French treatment of Islam and Algerian reactions to *la laïcité*, and second, Algerian political formations in France.

French treatment of Islam and the policy of *la laïcité*, or the separation of church and state, presents a significant transnational linkage; after all, Islam has ranked as the second largest religion of France since 1990, unseating both Protestantism and Judaism.⁷⁵ This thesis will provide a brief historical examination of *la laïcité* but mainly scrutinize the French institutionalization of Islam- here defined as “Islamization” or “French Islam”- as well as the bargaining of national identity by French Muslim formations, like the Great Mosque of Paris and the French Council of Muslim Citizens (Conseil Français des Citoyens Musulmans, CFCM). By considering contemporary French secularism, the attempt to “republicanize” Islam by the French government, and the impact of French Muslim organizations, this case study will seek to analyze how successfully the government controls their monopoly over traditional French national

⁷⁵ Silverstein, *Algeria in France*.

identity, and more broadly speaking, the political authority of the French government. In parallel fashion, Algerian political formations in France also speak to the vigor of transnationalism and its impact on the nation-state. As “Algerian political engagement has been formed by a long history of transnational political activism,”⁷⁶ Franco-Algerian political organizations and campaigns provide rich material for analysis. Data will include a historical review of the 80s’ Beur Movements, and assess contemporary Franco-Algerian civil society. Cultural celebrations, like the Year of Algeria in 2003, intended to celebrate Algeria’s cultural achievements at a particularly controversial time in France. In addition to a variety of organizations intended to represent some portion of Algerians in France, the Berber Cultural Association and the World Berber Congress both tried to mediate their dual identities against the nation-state’s imposed conception of Frenchness. The sway and success of these political formations will corroborate the liberal universalist understanding of transnationalism and allude to its consequences for nation-state sovereignty. Furthermore, this analysis will reflect upon the status of the nation-state as the main arbiter of social and political change.

Based on the data from my case studies, I will illustrate the sequential development of transnationalism in France through the determination of French national identity with *la laïcité* as well as the influence and membership of Algerian political formations. Whenever possible, I will harness France-based news sources, including *Le Monde*, *Libération*, *Agence France Presse* and *Le Figaro* to provide authentic accounts and opinions. I will also rely on figures of state support for transnational entities, and appeals from transnational organizations that position the nation and state in direct interaction (e.g. the Charter of Muslim in France, the World Berber Congress report to the United Nations). Finally, each chapter features a thorough analysis of a Franco-Algerian figure who exhibits a transnational identity (e.g. Algerian rector Dalil

⁷⁶ Collyer, “Transnational political participation of Algerians in France,” 839.

Boubakeur, Beur FM President Nacer Kettane). Though Collyer notes that it is “unusually difficult to highlight precise impacts of transnational mobilizations,”⁷⁷ the French treatment of Islam and Algerian civil society in France present the best indicators of transnationalism by offering extensive data over more than a decade and measureable instances.

CASE STUDY ANALYSIS: THE FRENCH TREATMENT OF ISLAM

Contextualizing Muslims in France

If a shared religion is conceived as an essential component to the forging of national identity⁷⁸, then a changing religious landscape menaces the nation-state. Though the Republic forbids the collection of data based on “faith,” and thus keeps no official census on religious practices or the beliefs of its inhabitants, numerous polls report that five million Muslims now live in France.⁷⁹ In a country with a total population upwards of 62 million,⁸⁰ this significant percentage of French Muslims will only rise as global integration persists. Moreover, this figure indicates the diversifying demographic of the Republic, as nearly all of these Muslims are “immigrants and their children, and about one-half are foreign nationals.”⁸¹ Significantly, of those residents who identify as Muslim, only 10-30% claim to be practicing.⁸² This important distinction underlines the heterogeneous composition of a French Muslim community that overwhelming self-categorizes as culturally Muslim rather than religiously Muslim. Bonded to

⁷⁷ *Ibid*, 842.

⁷⁸ See *The Identity of Nations* (Polity Press, 2007) by Montserrat Guibernau.

⁷⁹ John R. Bowen, *Why the French Don't Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), 51.

⁸⁰ Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD.org

⁸¹ Bowen, *Why the French Don't Like Headscarves*, 51.

⁸² Mayanthi Fernando, “The Republic’s ‘Second Religion’: Recognizing Islam in France,” *Middle East Report* (Summer 2005), no. 235: 15.

France by a colonial past, *les Français maghrébins*⁸³ compose 60-70% of the French Muslim community, though Algerians constitute the largest portion.⁸⁴

Inflows of Algerians, Moroccans, and Tunisians into France, 1998-2007 (thousands)

Country in the Maghreb	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	Total Residents (1998-2007)
<i>Algeria</i>	16.7	11.4	12.4	15.0	23.4	28.5	27.9	24.8	25.4	23.1	208.6
<i>Morocco</i>	16.1	14.3	17.4	19.1	21.8	22.6	22.2	20.0	19.2	17.9	190.6
<i>Tunisia</i>	5.3	4.0	5.6	6.6	7.8	9.4	8.9	8.0	8.2	7.8	71.6

*Source: Adapted from OECD, International Migration Data, 2009.*⁸⁵

Algerians' particular impetus for flight from their country of origin makes sense given the brutal Algerian civil war that claimed over 100,000 lives from 1992-2002.⁸⁶ Silverstein proposes that because Algerians in France felt stunned and disoriented by the magnitude of loss in their home country, they were "willing to grasp at the first strong organizing principle to arise in this case, Islamic fundamentalism."⁸⁷ Certainly, after the outbreak of civil war in Algeria in the early 1990s, the flow of Muslim workers and refugees into France proliferated, as did missionary work by Muslims within French working-class neighborhoods.⁸⁸

One factor that emphasized the changing landscape of France was that the steady entrance of Muslim North Africans into France aligned with a tumultuous period for French national- and international- security. Two major events profoundly affected the Republic's view of the compatibility of Islam and the French nation-state: first, the 1995 bombings in Paris and Lyon and second, the attacks on the World Trade Center. A failed attack on a high-speed train

⁸³ Residents of France hailing from Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia

⁸⁴ Bowen, *Why the French Don't Like Headscarves*, 52.

⁸⁵ International Migration Data, 2009, "Table B 1.1. Inflows of foreign population by nationality-France," Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

http://www.oecd.org/document/52/0,3343,en_2649_39023663_42274676_1_1_1_1.00.html.

⁸⁶ Silverstein, *Algeria in France*, 75.

⁸⁷ *Ibid*, 75.

⁸⁸ *Ibid*, 120.

from Paris to Lyon on August 26, 1995 was later traced to two ‘beurs’⁸⁹, one of whom was a second-generation Algerian, Khaled Kelkal, who hailed from the Lyonnais banlieue of Vaulx-en-Velin. The notorious “Vigipirate” anti-terrorist measures- measures which explicitly targeted ‘beurs’ as potential threats to national security- were immediately implemented. This security system marked an attempt to calm the swell of French fears, which questioned whether France’s Algerian immigrant population presented yet another pillar of a global Islamist insurgency.⁹⁰ In similar fashion, the Al Qaeda attack on September 11th amplified the supposed connection between violent acts of Islamist terrorists and the potential for this violence to trickle into France. At the local level, September 11th forced the French to consider the susceptibility of marginalized *banlieusards*⁹¹ to international political Islam. Those who identified *banlieues* as the breeding grounds of terrorists often spoke alarmingly of a thriving macro-level terrorist network that linked Algiers to Cologne to Sarajevo to Kabul, all via France’s immigrant suburbs.⁹²

Even before the 1995 terrorist attempts, French anxieties over the spread of extremist Islamism first erupted over *l’affaire du foulard*⁹³ in public schools. Though headscarf debates have dominated the French media over the past twenty years, the most recent proclamation from the French government arrived in early 2004 and prohibits public school students from wearing clothing that clearly indicates a pupil’s religious affiliation.⁹⁴ The French state defends that increasingly restrictive laws are integral in the effort to better define and incorporate the republican principle of *la laïcité*- a principle, some public figures judge, that underlies the founding of the French constitution. Additionally, the state’s stringent regulation of religious

⁸⁹ A French slang word describing French population of Arab descent.

⁹⁰ Silverstein, *Algeria in France*, 1.

⁹¹ Residents of *banlieues*, or French working-class neighborhoods and suburbs.

⁹² *Le Figaro*, 16 August 1995.

⁹³ “The headscarf affair” refers to the battle over laïcité policies. The most recent policies forbid students from displaying ‘ostentatious signs’ of religious practice, like headscarves, in French public schools.

⁹⁴ Bowen, *Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves*, 1.

symbols offers an opportunity to curb the repressive and distracting quality of Islamic headscarves. Finally, John Bowen asserts that beyond menacing assumed republican principles, government leaders use the headscarf as a scapegoat for several other nuisances to French society, including “anti-Semitism, [...] growing ghettoization in the poor suburbs, and the breakdown of order in the classroom.”⁹⁵ In fact, during the headscarf debates, public leaders attributed headscarves to the growth of “communalism” in *banlieues*, the increasing influence of political and radical Islam in France, and the degradation of women in poorer regions.⁹⁶ Taking these social issues into account, as well as the high-strung concerns over Islamic terrorist hubs in France, and the decidedly uncontrollable nature of headscarves, the French state felt obligated to design a mechanism that could regulate the manifestation of Islam within its borders.

However, what kind of response could the French government craft that would both subdue the strength of Islam in France and actively integrate its adherents? The construction of a moderate strain of Islam, known as “French Islam” (*l’islam de France*), offered a fitting and promising remedy for the French state. Not only would French Islam pave an easy pathway for Muslim residents to become “fully participating citizens in French public life”⁹⁷; it would facilitate this transition with ‘Islamization,’ defined in this thesis as the ‘republicanization’ of Islam for the purposes of assimilation into French citizenship.

Though these efforts have sustained momentum since the mid-90s, taking shape through the formation of official mosque-building, councils, and charters, the French have long practiced the tradition of regulating Islam, and Algerians specifically, in public spaces. Though France first established Algeria as a colony in 1830, from 1871 onward the French policy was to regard

⁹⁵ *Ibid*, 1.

⁹⁶ *Ibid*, 4-5.

⁹⁷ Silverstein, *Algeria in France*, 10.

Algeria as “part of France rather than a protectorate or a colony.”⁹⁸ In fact, until independence in 1962, Algeria was ruled by the Ministry of the Interior, whereas Morocco and Tunisia were monitored by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is important to note that though the Republic treated Algeria as a geographical extension of France, it treated Algerian Muslims as *déclassé*⁹⁹. During the colonization of Algeria, only the colonizers could become full French citizens, while Muslim Algerians remained “a separate, ‘indigenous’ population without a distinct personal status.”¹⁰⁰ This bifurcated approach exhibits even early attempts by the French government to regulate Islam by minimizing its influence within French borders. Establishing a citizenship based on ethnic discrimination, the French placed Muslim Algerians under an *indigénat* system according to Muslim law; Algerians could only circumvent this second-class treatment by renouncing their status and applying for French citizenship.¹⁰¹ Though all Algerians were legally full French citizens by late 1961, they still received derogatory treatment and diminished standards. Exemplifying the worst of this behavior, Paris police chief Maurice Papon issued a directive limiting the freedom of movement of French Muslims in 1961, “reminding officers that Muslims could be detected by their facial features.”¹⁰²

Case study selection: Why focus on the French treatment of Islam and *la laïcité*?

For the purposes of this thesis, it is crucial to recognize that the French treatment of Islam reflects upon the French state and how the state attempts to construct French nationalism. Indeed, French Muslims act as particularly salient agents of transnational conflicts due to “the

⁹⁸ Bowen, *Why the French Don't Like Headscarves*, 36.

⁹⁹ Second-class citizens.

¹⁰⁰ Bowen, *Why the French Don't Like Headscarves*, 36.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid*, 36.

¹⁰² *Ibid*, 36.

simultaneous strength of French Republican ideology and Islamic universalism.”¹⁰³ Not only do the interactions of Muslim and non-Muslim leaders reflect the reach of ‘governmentality’ beyond the confines of the state and into ‘civil society’¹⁰⁴; the processes of republicanizing Islam pose a dual dilemma for Muslims “who seek both to preserve their ties to a global religious field and to adapt to French political demands and social conditions.”¹⁰⁵ Ultimately, the conceived notion of French national identity forces a reaction- generally resistance rather than acquiescence- from Algerians in France. Thus, the features, history, and efficacy of the French treatment of Islam have produced expressions of Franco-Algerian transnational identity, and enhance this thesis’ discussion of the fragility of the French nation-state.

As mentioned in the Methodology, the discord between the French nation-state and Algerian Muslim culture stems from the institutional causal mechanism of historical revision by the French government. Especially after the influx of Algerians into France in 1962, the French state sought to consolidate a homogeneous nation, citing longstanding traditions of *la laïcité* and a resolute commitment to Republican ideals. A notion of an entrenched, time-honored national identity dominated state rhetoric, especially in schools where teachers were trained to advance the idea of a national public life that is “lived in the French language and understood as part of a long-term French history.”¹⁰⁶ Though *la laïcité* was first conceived in the context of the state opposite the Catholic Church, today it is conceived as part of the dialectic between France and Islam. Gordner explains,

“To join the ‘imagined community’ [of the French nation] today requires French Muslims either to forget the formative experiences drawn from their past or to tacitly acquiesce to the

¹⁰³ John R. Bowen. “Does French Islam Have Borders? Dilemmas of Domestication in a Global Religious Field” (2004) 106: no. 1: 43.

¹⁰⁴ James Ferguson and Akhil Gupta, “Spatializing States: Toward an Ethnography of Neoliberal Governmentality,” *American Ethnologist* (2002) 29, no. 4.

¹⁰⁵ Bowen, “Does French Islam Have Borders?”, 43.

¹⁰⁶ Bowen, *Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves*, 12.

connotations loaded in the current understanding of 'Islam' - those remnant of colonial times - that require the acceptance of colonialism as a 'civilizing project.'"¹⁰⁷

In other words, inherent to the Republic's way of understanding French history is a positive recollection of colonization coupled with the commitment to certain republican values. These values include the guarantee of gender equality, the complete removal of religion from the public sphere, and, for the purposes of nation-building, the expectation that citizens will abandon all previous ties in order to assimilate fully into French society. This coupling of integration and *laïcité* clashed culturally with many Muslim Algerians' traditional values that view Islam and national identity as inseparable. Revealingly, in one dramatic speech President Jacques Chirac warned that "France would 'lose her soul' if she went the way of Anglo-American pluralism that recognizes and accepts internal difference"¹⁰⁸ and the 1994 Minister of Education François Bayrou warned, "What is at stake is the idea of the French nation itself."¹⁰⁹ According to contemporary French leaders, the necessity of assimilating to a state-conceived model of citizenship is nonnegotiable. In plain terms, the French government has conceived Frenchness as necessarily encompassing secularism, and expects immigrants to adhere to this definition, even if that requires French Muslims to hide their headscarves.

Naturally, this exclusive form of citizenship has prompted some French Muslims to seek alternative forms of integration. Notably, some Islamist organizations, though guided by a religion that hazards French national security, demonstrably provide a variety of resources to ostracized *banlieusards*. First, Islam functions as a form of organization in underprivileged and isolated areas. In *les cités*¹¹⁰, unemployed men and women work in mosques or sell wares in

¹⁰⁷ Matthew J. Gordner, "Challenging the French Exception: 'Islam' and *Laïcité*," *In-spire Journal of Law, Politics, and Societies* (2008) 3, no. 2: 75.

¹⁰⁸ Fernando, "The Republic's 'Second Religion'", 12.

¹⁰⁹ *Le Monde*, October 15, 1996: 16.

¹¹⁰ Housing projects often located in isolated and underfunded areas outside of French cities.

local markets, underprivileged children attend summer camps for *banlieues* youth, and community members frequent prayer rooms in the basement of public housing buildings.¹¹¹ Second, Islamist organizations offer a social and political network for Algerian immigrants far from their country of origin where family and friends still reside. For example, because travel to Algeria was restricted during the civil war, many foreign journalists fled the country. However, Islamic transnational groups, alongside Berber associations, “functioned [during wartime] as a primary instrument through which news from Algeria circulated to and from France.”¹¹² Finally, Muslim youth organizations offer a distraction in the *cités*, where daily life is overrun by “drugs, delinquency, and prison.”¹¹³ On one hand, if Islam furnishes Algerians in France with so many benefits, their frustration and opposition towards a government trying to muzzle its influence seems rational. On the other end of the battlefield, the French state, aside from the task of managing a burgeoning Muslim community, is seeking stability in an age of globalization where immigrants and citizens alike are questioning the assumption and feasibility of *la laïcité*. Bowen asserts that the crux of tension between Muslim Algerians and the French should be viewed “not in light of a firm legal and cultural framework, but in light of a disappearing sense of certitude about what France is, was, and will be.”¹¹⁴

This chapter will present a terse chronological overview of the history of *la laïcité* in France, from the French Revolution to the law mandated in January 2004, and consider the various interpretations surrounding these regulatory policies. By examining the mechanisms used in ‘Islamization,’ this chapter will expand upon the origins, definition, and expressions of French

¹¹¹ Silverstein, *Algeria in France*, 133.

¹¹² *Ibid*, 133.

¹¹³ *Ibid*, 133.

¹¹⁴ Bowen, *Why the French Don't Like Headscarves*, 33.

Islam. Most importantly, this chapter will review if French Muslims subscribe to this state-conceived version of Islam, and if not, how they illustrate their rejection.

Historical understanding of *la laïcité*

In the wake of a revolution propelled by enlightenment ideals, two modes of thinking guided French society after 1789. On one hand, the French state recognized the importance of a national religion, slowly replacing Catholicism with the secular notions of Reason and Freedom that ruled the French Revolution. On the other hand, the Republic cherished the “right of each individual to follow his conscious.”¹¹⁵ After Robespierre’s fall in 1795, the French church fully retreated from supporting any religion and began the dichotomous practice of both recognizing and curtailing the power of religion. Certainly, Napoleon’s 1801 Concordat with the Pope attempted to charter a strategic balance between religious affiliation and antireligious sentiment; Napoleon recognized Catholicism, Lutheranism, Calvinism, and Judaism, all the while depriving them “of the right to rule over family life.”¹¹⁶

The development of a secular standard was consolidated from the mid-1880s to mid-1920s, when the Third Republic withdrew from funding religious activities and in 1881 established primary education “secular, free of charge and compulsory” through the Jules Ferry education laws.¹¹⁷ Two important laws followed. First, the law of 1901 provided the legal basis for state support of cultural and social activities, including instruction and outreach programs by religious leaders.¹¹⁸ Often, the law of 1901 is employed when forming state-sponsored religious associations. Second, the law of 1905 ensures the freedom of religious practice in the Republic; that same year, the French state formally abolished the Concordat, thus severing the dominance

¹¹⁵ Bowen, *Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves*, 22.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid*, 23.

¹¹⁷ Gordner, “Challenging the French Exception: ‘Islam’ and *Laïcité*,” 74.

¹¹⁸ Bowen, *Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves*, 26.

of any religious influence in the public sphere.¹¹⁹ In 1958 Charles de Gaulle ensured the freedom of religious practice in the constitution of the Fifth Republic, and in 1964 the Church finally retreated.¹²⁰ In response to decolonization and the first wave of immigration into Europe, the Vatican III council terminated its attempts to “forge a confessional state [in France] and finally accepted religious pluralism.”¹²¹ In the 70s, the political climate in France morphed drastically due to high unemployment, the rising popularity of the xenophobic Front National, serious episodes of anti-immigrant violence, and in turn, immigrant activism.¹²² Given these factors, as well as the wave of liberalism and student protests that swept the nation, French state began to adopt *la laïcité* as an approach to issues agitating French society like the headscarf, family divorce, and homosexuality. In sum, though debates over *la laïcité* began as a power struggle with the Catholic Church during the Third Republic (1870-1940), growing concerns over the force of Islam have positioned *la laïcité* in direct opposition to French Muslims.

Most recently, Chirac proposed a law in December 2003 to the Conseil d’Etat that prohibited schoolchildren from wearing “ostentatious” religious symbols capable of proselytizing or disturbing public order.¹²³ In part a reaction to a teacher’s complaint that the headscarf prevented his student from basic school activities and in part a response to the French media’s gathering consensus that Islam endangered *la laïcité*, the Fifth Republic’s rigorous laws speak to the clash between French secularism and manifestations of Islam in France. Stemming from a legacy of combat with the Catholic Church, the French state views the domestication of Islam as imperative in the struggle to both control civic education and forge a common French

¹¹⁹ Gordner, “Challenging the French Exception,” 74.

¹²⁰ *Ibid*, 75.

¹²¹ *Ibid*, 75.

¹²² Silverstein, *Algeria in France*, 159.

¹²³ “M. Chirac prône le ‘sursaut républicain’ et interdit le voile à l’école,” *Le Monde*, December 19, 2003.

identity.¹²⁴ The republicanization of Islam must fit neatly within the constraints of the 1901 law, which justifies state control in the sense of regulating and protecting religion but not in terms of favoring it.¹²⁵ Clearly, state-approved religion in France suffers a tense balancing act between tame public expression and obtrusive proselytization. Nonetheless, Chirac viewed *la laïcité* as a beneficial complexity, judging that it designates a “privileged site for meeting and exchange, where find people [...] can best contribute to the national community. It is the neutrality of the public space that permits the peaceful coexistence of different religions.”¹²⁶

One could argue, however, that *la laïcité* is anything but impartial; rather, it furthers the national interest of state officials who see it as “politically useful precisely because it has no agreed-on definition.”¹²⁷ To be sure, the French state constructs *la laïcité* as a historical object generated from years of hard struggle during the wars of religion and the Revolution, blossoming from a social contract decreed under the Third Republic, and solidified into doctrine under the law of 1905. However, *la laïcité* remains an “essentially contested concept”¹²⁸: some French equate it to a guarantee of public religious practice while others view it as an obstruction to religious expression.

This ideologically conflicted and legally nebulous concept wraps nicely around French Islam, by both designating public spaces of worship for Muslims all the while forcing them to accept Republican values. This chapter considers the efficacy and power of French Islam, again defined as the state-conceived design that regulates and permits Islam in public spaces in France. To better gauge the effectiveness of French Islam, and more broadly, the strength of nation-state authority, this chapter will analyze the clout that Algerian Muslims hold in a reputed Parisian

¹²⁴ Bowen, *Why the French Don't Like Headscarves*, 25.

¹²⁵ *Ibid*, 34.

¹²⁶ *Ibid*, 34.

¹²⁷ *Ibid*, 32.

¹²⁸ *Ibid*, 32.

mosque as well as the decision-swaying capability and tools of the French Council of Muslim Citizens (CFCM¹²⁹). Essentially, this thesis proposes that Algerians' projection of and allegiance to an alternative form of national identity-and thus, repudiation of the French state's authority-will reveal the weakness of France's nation-state sovereignty, and the vigor of Franco-Algerian transnationalism.

Attempting a bifurcated goal, the state's campaign to create spaces for Muslims first aspires to both "unite colonial subjects" as they integrate into French society and disunite proletarian workers in other times of internal class conflict."¹³⁰ Second, in an era where state officials and media perpetuate the notion of Islam as an internal security threat, the state-crafted campaign behind French Islam presents unthreatening examples of Muslims who deftly juggle being Muslim and subordinating themselves to a secular government. In order to spread these images, the state encouraged the creation of prayer rooms in easily-monitored public housing buildings, French Muslim associations who provided jobs to unemployed in *les cités*, and mosque leaders who could mediate a tempered strain of Islam. What does a French Muslim look like to the government? For state officials, 'French Muslim' residents embody good citizens by voting in municipal elections, contributing positively to the job force, and leading healthy lifestyles.¹³¹ Finally, for the French government, French Islam proves the open-minded aspect of the state's efforts, as they allow French Muslims to juggle dual identities in a meaningful and harmless way. José Pinto, the Intercultural Relations advisor to the mayor of Bobigny, summarizes the state's attitude concisely: "Don't just say that we [the French state] discriminate,

¹²⁹ Conseil Français des Citoyens Musulmans, hereby referred to as the Council or CFCM.

¹³⁰ Silverstein, *Algeria in France*, 134-135.

¹³¹ *Ibid*, 150.

that you are the victims of racism. We propose [French Muslims] solutions, take them! [...] They have to accept the Republic.”¹³²

Institutionalizing Muslims in France with “French Islam”

State-mandated mosque-building

Through what mechanisms does the French state implement *l’islam de France* and thus propel their imagined vision of national identity? State-mandated mosque-building is one reflection of how the French government navigates the boundaries of French Islam. Historically, France has embraced mosque-building as a tool of foreign policy. State officials intended to symbolize the “empire’s commitment to its Muslim subjects”¹³³ with the erection of *la Grande Mosquée de Paris*¹³⁴, a regal mosque and cultural center adorning the fifth arrondissement. The mosque explicitly paid homage to the 26,000 Algerian colonial subjects who sacrificed their lives in World War I, serving as a “highly publicized [...] symbol of a peaceful Islam.”¹³⁵ However, underlying its public presence, state officials hoped its construction would clinch the loyalty of the *les colonies maghrébines*¹³⁶ and spotlight France as a ‘great Muslim power,’ essentially currying favor with Arab nationalists post-World War II. Significantly, the Great Mosque exemplifies the dichotomous nature of French Islam from its inception. Illustrating that state-ordained Islam was accommodating and collaborative, the Great Mosque was inaugurated in 1926 by the Moroccan sultan, the president of the French republic, and the ruler of Tunisia to highlight the shared purpose among the leaders of French territories.¹³⁷ Relevant to the discourse on the authority of Algerians in France, the Great Mosque was

¹³² Bowen, *Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves*, 34.

¹³³ Silverstein, *Algeria in France*, 131.

¹³⁴ Hereby referred to as the Great Mosque of Paris

¹³⁵ Bowen, *Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves*, 37.

¹³⁶ Coloinés in Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria.

¹³⁷ John R. Bowen, *Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves*, 38.

assigned to and has received ongoing financial support from the Algerian government since 1982.¹³⁸ Originally, the mosque was directed by Algerian rector Abdelkader Ben Ghabrit, who blatantly strove to steer the Great Mosque out of Moroccan and Tunisian influences and into the hands of Algerian national interests- not a difficult task in a mosque “where the majority of worshippers were Algerians either in origin or citizenship.”¹³⁹

Given the substantial ties of French mosques to their North African counterparts, the French state’s success in garnering a monopoly over its major mosques is debatable. The state attempted to appoint Muslim leaders brandishing republicanized ideas of religion; these figures freely practice their religion but ultimately yield to the state’s authority. Significantly, these leaders are not always viewed in the French Muslim community as ‘legitimate’ mouthpieces for the Muslim faith.¹⁴⁰ Moving from the mosque to the factories, Islam undoubtedly functions as a rallying point around which Muslim intellectuals, mosque attendants, and workers organize themselves in France. As North African immigrants migrated to the Republic in the 1970s, workers started to join more unions and syndicates, uniting in national labor confederations.¹⁴¹ Evidently, the state’s paternalistic strategy involved mosque-building to not only draw French Muslims into allegiance, but to “defuse potential immigrant labor unrest.”¹⁴²

Because French Islam does propose an alternative form of integration into French society, the Great Mosque seems to possess a type of unrivaled authority over Algerians in France. Recognizably, the Republic is compromising some portion of state power, as it “accepts that the major mosques and Islamic associations in France are funded by foreign governments

¹³⁸ “L’Arabie saoudite invitée à participer au financement de la rénovation de la Mosquée de Paris,” *Le Monde*, December 6, 2003.

¹³⁹ John R. Bowen, “Does French Islam Have Borders?” 47.

¹⁴⁰ Catherine Coroller, “Le Conseil français du culte musulman reste sans voix.” *Libération*. October 6, 2003.

¹⁴¹ Silverstein, *Algeria in France*, 132.

¹⁴² *Ibid*, 132.

(principally Morocco, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey).”¹⁴³ In total, these foreign donations furnish close to 50%¹⁴⁴ of funding sources for mosques, though the multi-million dollar *mosquées-cathédrales*¹⁴⁵ receive almost full funding from foreign Muslim countries.¹⁴⁶

The Grand Mosque of Marseilles, for example, costs \$30 million and, at 92,500 square feet, regins as France’s largest mosque.¹⁴⁷ Its construction, though primarily funded by foreign entities,¹⁴⁸ was enabled by the mayor of Marseilles, Jean-Claude Gaudin, who enthusiastically approved the building permit on November 6, 2009.¹⁴⁹ In response, Ronald Perdermo, a right-wing lawyer and Marseille politician, called the *mosquée-cathédrale* a “symbol of non-assimilation” whose 75-foot tall minaret would only nourish the region’s 200,000 Muslims’ to impose their religious norms.¹⁵⁰ Despite these seemingly potent displays of French Muslim power, Muslim intellectuals and leaders seem to realize the fragility of their authority in French borders. Asserting an assimilable version of Islam, French Muslim leaders generally advocate temperate expressions of Islam, like shaping one’s life around private prayer or nourishing an appreciation of Arabo-Muslim history and civilization.¹⁵¹ Detailing the establishment, function, authority, and efficacy of the French Council of Muslim Citizens refines a depiction of how the French state envisioned French Islam developing, and how this moderate strain of Islam behaves in reality.

¹⁴³ Bowen, “Does French Islam Have Borders?” 47.

¹⁴⁴ Cécilia Gabizon, “Enquête sur le financement des nouvelles mosquées,” *Le Figaro*, November 12, 2008.

¹⁴⁵ Elaborate mosques in France that are both reputed for their grandeur and criticized for their excess.

¹⁴⁶ “En France, les difficultés autour de la construction de mosquées sont essentiellement d’ordre financier,” *Le Monde*, December 1, 2009.

¹⁴⁷ Edward Cody, “In Marseille, unease over mosque project,” *The Washington Post*, November 26, 2009.

¹⁴⁸ “En France, les difficultés autour de la construction de mosquées sont essentiellement d’ordre financier.”

¹⁴⁹ Cody, “In Marseille, unease over mosque project.”

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁵¹ Leila Babés, *L’Islam Positif: La Religion des Jeunes Musulmans de France* (Paris, France: Les Editions d’Atelier, 1997).

The French Council of Muslim Citizens (CFCM)

As the last years of the Algerian civil war dwindled down, the French state grasped the advantages of a state-authorized council on Islam for several reasons. First, the state feared that political Islam and Islamist terrorism would cascade from the Mediterranean into France; in defense, the French government should establish a “single, national body [of Islam] with which to negotiate and from which [the state could] draw legitimacy for its decisions.”¹⁵² Second, the Council fulfilled a promise the then-Interior Minister Sarkozy had made to M. Sayyid Tantawi, the imam of Cairo and a figure considered to be Sunni Islam’s highest authority. To repay Tantawi’s approval for Chirac’s ban on headscarves, the Interior Minister created a council that could serve as the interlocutor between the French state and France’s Muslims. In a speech to the Stasi Commission of 2003¹⁵³, Sarkozy emphasized the importance of creating a respectable and fair society for Muslims to worship and be held accountable: “How can we expect them to obey the law if we don’t invite them to the table?”¹⁵⁴ The third reason behind establishing CFCM hinges on Sarkozy’s connection of Muslim practice in France to the darker side of extremist Islam. By harnessing images of al-Qaeda, Sarkozy poses the Council as a chance to “fight the Islam of cellars and garages- an underground, clandestine Islam that feeds fundamentalism and extremism.”¹⁵⁵ With all these incentives persuading French policymakers, the CFCM and its five regional councils were established in 2003, but whom did they represent and what was their role?

According to the 2003 Chief of the Central Bureau of Religions, Vianney Sevaistre, the Council’s major function is the institutionalization of Muslim tasks like resolving disputes about Muslim cemetery plots, organizing flights to Mecca for pilgrimage, and training imams for

¹⁵² Bowen, *Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves*, 48.

¹⁵³ A committee established to determine the role and application of *la laïcité*

¹⁵⁴ “Jean-Pierre Raffarin charge le Conseil français du culte musulman d’un ‘rôle modérateur.’” *Le Monde*, May 6, 2003.

¹⁵⁵ *New York Times* January 15, 2003: A4.

mosques. Some believe that the role of the council is to make judgments on various theological matters; others pointed out that through the national body of CFCM the French government accorded French Muslims a precious fragment of legitimacy. However, Sarkozy strategically keeps the power of the Muslim council tightly bounded. The President confirmed the legitimacy of the Council in the government's eyes but also noted its limits by admitting that the Council only represents mosque attendants in France: "Muslims in France spend little time mosques, [...] [they] could hardly feel represented by a mosque-based council."¹⁵⁶

Therefore, if the CFCM only reflects the views of a mosque-attending Muslims¹⁵⁷, how does the Council effectively design and inculcate French Islam into the minds of French Muslims? After the Council's conception, Sarkozy went as far as determining that "five million Muslims in France have finally become citizens."¹⁵⁸ Though French Muslims recognized the Council as an opportunity to "legitimize and normalize the presence of Islam in France,"¹⁵⁹ international news channel France24 reported that despite its lofty goals, the CFCM has achieved very little and that few French Muslims understand its purpose or feel a belonging to its membership.¹⁶⁰ Surely it is difficult for the Council to project legitimacy given its undefined jurisdiction, representatives that do not truly represent all French Muslims, and Sarkozy's appropriation of the leaders. Moreover, even when an issue falls within the CFCM's jurisdiction, Sarkozy may choose to circumvent it. Completely disregarding the Council's decision-making power, Sarkozy traveled directly to visit Egyptian grand sheikh of Cairo's al-Azhar University in

¹⁵⁶ Bowen, *Why the French Don't Like Headscarves*, 59.

¹⁵⁷ According to Silverstein, the Council is supported by an estimated 80% of mosques in France, p. 145.

¹⁵⁸ Fernando, "The Republic's 'Second Religion': 15.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid*, 12.

¹⁶⁰ K. Hakiki. "The French Council of the Muslim Faith crisis." France24. www.france24.com/en. May 24, 2008.

2003 in order to obtain an edict legitimizing Chirac's headscarf ban.¹⁶¹ Lastly, the CFCM's success is plagued by internal ethnic divisions. The Council, composed of the Grand Mosque, the National Federation of French Muslims (FNMF), and the Union of Islamic Organizations in France (UOIF), often acts into a battleground for these ethnically-divided groups, representing Algerians, Moroccans, and Tunisians respectively. In one instance, the organizations failed to agree on a national Muslim chaplain for prisons after much deliberation in April 2005,¹⁶² and in another example, the FNMF and UOIF blocked a worthy Charter of the Muslim Faith in France, headed by the Grand Mosque. These intra-Islamic tensions weaken the Council's agency and will be discussed at length later.

The accusation that the Council symbolizes merely another podium for the French state, rather than an opportunity to 'invite Muslims to the table' as Sarkozy promised, may hold valid considering the CFCM's organization and construction. One argument conceives the Council as an extension of the Franco-Algerian colonial power structure, which organized and governed "indigenous communities through ethnic and racial categories."¹⁶³ Resonant of colonial days, the French state appointed questionably legitimate leaders and ministers to the Council who were intended to speak for the French Muslim community. The Council is also illustrative of attempts by the French state to reduce the impact of foreign influence by "bringing Islam in France under the purview of the state rather than that of 'foreign powers.'"¹⁶⁴ For instance, when the majority of seats in the 2003 Council elections went to the FNMF- a predominantly Tunisian organization- and the UOIF- an organization dominated by Moroccans and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood- over Sarkozy's much-favored and French-controlled Algerian Grand Mosquée,

¹⁶¹ Fernando, "The Republic's 'Second Religion': 15.

¹⁶² Bowen, *Why the French Don't Like Headscarves*, 62.

¹⁶³ Fernando, "The Republic's 'Second Religion': 14.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid*, 16.

Sarkozy threatened to expel any incoming imam whose views challenged *la laïcité*.¹⁶⁵

Manipulating the opinions of the leaders of the Council as much as the organization itself, Sarkozy explained his anger at the electoral results by charging that French Muslims “should not have to depend on foreign countries [like Tunisia, Morocco, and Egypt] to obtain imams who do not speak a word of French.”¹⁶⁶

Muslim Algerian rector Dalil Boubakeur

Tracing the appointment and actions of the rector of the Great Mosque, Dalil Boubakeur, enhances a discussion of the consciously-bounded role that state officials have designed for Muslim leaders in France. Months before creating the officially-sanctioned Muslim Council (CFCM), President Nicholas Sarkozy handpicked Boubakeur as president, but only after strategic discussion with the ambassadors of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia who jointly agreed to “work to keep ‘the extremists’ out of the process [of the formation of the Council].”¹⁶⁷ Sarkozy’s insistence on Boubakeur’s leadership exemplifies the simultaneously explicit and implicit weight of the French state in Muslim affairs. Boubakeur’s role in the 2003 Council elections elaborates upon this point and suggests the importance of French Islam to the foreign policy of Algeria. After the Great Mosque ranked third in the elections, Boubakeur was “summoned back to Algeria to ‘explain himself.’”¹⁶⁸

Why is Algeria so invested in the influence of the Great Mosque over the French state and French Muslims? Foremost, Algeria wants to remain in good favor with France to reap the economic benefits, and ensure that France continues to welcome Algerian immigrants; filling the Council with Algerian delegates from the Great Mosque would have awarded the Algerian

¹⁶⁵ Silverstein, *Algeria in France*, 145.

¹⁶⁶ Fernando, “The Republic’s ‘Second Religion’: 16.

¹⁶⁷ Bowen, *Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves*, 56.

¹⁶⁸ Bowen, “Does French Islam Have Borders?” 48.

government with a prime pedestal. The 2003 Vice President of CFCM and Secretary-General of the UOIF, Faoud Alaoui, spoke plainly about Boubakeur's coveted position: "Boubakeur, though his legitimacy is fragile amongst Muslims, receives much more authority now that he is president of the CFCM. But he will not encourage [any inter-Muslim unity] at all. [Mainly] his position allows him to restore the emblem of the Great Mosque."¹⁶⁹ Aside from strengthening Algerian Muslims' reputational value, French Islam serves as a valuable tool of assimilation and empowerment for Algerians in France by allowing French Muslims to conjoin public religious practice all the while celebrating French national identity. First, French Islam designates a moderate and unthreatening version of Islam for Muslim Algerians who simultaneously seek devotion and integration; second, the government's interest in controlling Muslims ironically gives them a greater voice. Many Algerians and French state officials alike recognize Boubakeur as the spokesperson for the Algerian government and the privileged interlocutor for French Muslims.¹⁷⁰ Thus, the more power Algerians can acquire through the Great Mosque, and essentially the Council, the greater the stake they hold in determining the future of French Muslim identity.

Beyond intra-Islamic strife in the Council, French Islam may become the battlefield in the broader power struggle between Algeria and France over French Muslims. In Sarkozy's view, Boubakeur's appointment expands the French state's power. Indeed, Sarkozy's incentive to contain Muslims in France by working with a 'moderate' Algerian rector constructs French Islam as an internal policy dictating citizenship and domestication.¹⁷¹ Furthermore, Algeria's harsh reaction to the Great Mosque's mediocre electoral results in 2003 crafts French Islam as "a

¹⁶⁹ Catherine Coroller, "Le Conseil français du culte musulman reste sans voix." October 6, 2003.

¹⁷⁰ Fernando, "The Republic's 'Second Religion'", 16.

¹⁷¹ Bowen, "Does French Islam Have Borders?" 48.

[French] foreign policy aimed at encouraging governments to control ‘their’ Muslims.”¹⁷²

Central to this thesis’ discussion of transnationalism, Boubakeur’s position as a rector responsible to both Algeria and France advances Brand’s idea of a transnational identity, as he belongs completely to neither country of origin or settlement.¹⁷³ In one related example, Boubakeur reported to Eric Besson, the French Minister of Immigration, Integration, National Identity, and Solidarity Development, on February 3, 2010 in order to present a progress report on the state of national identity amongst French Muslims. Dually upholding the right to Muslim expression as well as prioritizing French national identity, Boubakeur recalled the still-positive role of religion in French society and its compatibility with republican values, so crucial to the “ethic and civic formation of the citizen.”¹⁷⁴

The Charter of the Muslim Faith in France

Of course, few understand the republicanization of Islam better than Boubakeur: Interior Minister Pasqua teamed up with Boubakeur in 1995 to establish the Advisory Council of French Muslims. Responsible for institutionalizing a variety of features surrounding Muslim life in France, the Advisory Council fixed the dates of Islamic rituals and awarded a monopoly to certain slaughterhouses over *halal* meat. Under Pasqua’s guidance, Boubakeur published the Charter of the Muslim Faith in France, a piece that contained 37 articles and delineated the characteristics of French Islam. This charter trumpeted the emergence of French Islam “into the national community on an equal basis with other religions” and assured that “French Muslims, loyal to the most authentic Muslim tradition, dissociate themselves from all extremisms and

¹⁷² *Ibid*, 48.

¹⁷³ For further discussion, see *Citizens Abroad* (Cambridge University Press, 2006) by Laurie Brand.

¹⁷⁴ Accueil, “Rencontre avec Eric BESSON, Ministre de l’Immigration, de l’Intégration, de l’Identité nationale et du Développement solidaire,” Grand Mosquée de Paris, <http://www.mosquee-de-paris.org/>.

witness their attachment to the State.”¹⁷⁵ While the Charter’s promises certainly mitigated anxieties over the future role and boundaries of Islam in France, Boubakeur’s efforts were ultimately opposed by the FNMF and the UOIF. Recalling the limits of state power, these organizations rejected the state-friendly definitions of the Charter, thereby refuting the government’s alleged authority to control the expression of Islam in public space.

Considering domestic sovereignty

This chapter analyzed a variety of features of the French treatment of Islam with the intention of alluding to the contemporary capacity of state power in France. Reviewing expressions of Islam in France with regard to domestic sovereignty¹⁷⁶ is especially significant. In several ways, the public authorities of France maintain a firm grip on their monopoly of sovereignty. Consider the Council: though Sarkozy explicitly appropriated legitimacy to this Muslim national body, he simultaneously chooses to supersede them in the decision-making process. As discussed earlier, Sarkozy often speaks directly to the sovereign imams of Muslim countries in order to secure the approval for headscarf bans, rather than seeking approval from the Council itself. Even the 2003 Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin alerted Muslims during the creation of the CFCM that “there is only one authority in France, and it’s that of the Republic.”¹⁷⁷

To the French state, and often Muslims in France, the authority of and allegiance to the Council seems anemic. Naturally, the state-approved Muslim leaders guiding the Council exude state-approved views and therefore lack validity in the French Muslim community. Further

¹⁷⁵ Dalil Boubekar, *Charte du culte musulman en France* (Paris: Editions du Rocher, 1995) Article 24; Article 27.

¹⁷⁶ Defined by Krasner as the formal organization of political authority within the state and the ability of public authorities to exercise effective control with their borders. See *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* by Stephen D. Krasner (Princeton University Press, 1999).

¹⁷⁷ “Jean-Pierre Raffarin charge le Conseil français du culte musulman d’un ‘rôle modérateur auprès de...’ *Le Monde*, May 6, 2003.

diminishing the CFCM's efficacy, the Council grants a voice to a mere minority of French Muslims as only one to three million Muslims in France are practicing, and of *les croyants*¹⁷⁸ who practice, few may do so in the highly visible mosques represented by CFCM. Finally, the Council suffers serious internal ethnic divisions, stalled by a central power struggle pitting the predominantly-Algerian Great Mosque against the Tunisian FNMF and Moroccan UOIF. The fact that very little consensus has been reached certainly lessens the Council's role in France, a disadvantage for the French state as documents like the Charter of the Muslim Faith in France would have pushed French Muslims one step closer to total republicanization. In essence, this republicanization would have officialized boundaries for Islam in France through legislation. One might say that, through the Charter, the French state was attempting an effect similar to that of the law of 1905 on Catholicism during the Third Republic.

However, in the French state's battle to protect domestic sovereignty, some compromises must be made. First, Boubakeur's dual role as an interlocutor for the Franco-Algerian Muslim community and moreover, the Algerian government, *as well as* a loyal French citizen exemplifies the French state's confused approach to transnationalism. Indeed, the French state requires that Boubakeur both repudiate and reinforce his allegiance to Algeria for the purposes of harnessing him as a moderate symbol of 'assimilable' Islam. In doing so, the French state must accept that it cannot integrate a French Muslim resident without heeding and tolerating some portion of his foreign roots and religion. Second, though laws regulating *la laïcité* intend to expand the scope of the state's authority, they often have inadvertent consequences and perpetuate transnational ties. Because the law of 1901 prohibits state funding of organized religion, *grand mosquées* in France- ripe with constituents retaining ties to their countries of origin- often receive support from their North African counterparts. According to an estimation

¹⁷⁸ Believers, or religiously Muslim French residents.

by the French Ministry of the Interior, public authorities only subsidize around 30%¹⁷⁹ to the building of all *lieux de culte*.¹⁸⁰ This prudent contribution, though not insignificant, removes the French state from the Muslim community enough for foreign entities to enter the ring with their influential funds. The French state dare not finance mosques more than it already does however; public opinion reflects that the government may have already gone too far in appeasing the French Muslim community. In a November 2009 poll taken in France, 41% were opposed to the construction of simples mosques, 46% were opposed to the construction of minarets¹⁸¹, and 40% generally judged the practice of Muslim religion as wholly incompatible with the French lifestyle.¹⁸² Reviewing Algerian civil society in France enhances an understanding of the clout of the transnational migrant in the nation-state.

CASE STUDY ANALYSIS: ALGERIAN CIVIL SOCIETY IN FRANCE

Orienting Algerian Civil Society in France

As the previous chapter outlines, it is arguable that the French state compromised some portion of state power in order to accommodate, co-opt, and appropriate Islam in France. In parallel fashion, the French state struggles in its effort to both embrace and constrain Algerian transnational politics in France. For the purposes of this thesis, civil society, again defined as “the ‘third realm’ outside of the domains of the state and the economy,”¹⁸³ comprises cultural festivals, cultural associations that advance the linguistic and historical education of an ethnic community, and political organizations interacting with the state through a variety of means to further their respective agendas. Equally central to this chapter, transpolitical theory considers

¹⁷⁹ Gabizon, “Enquête sur le financement des nouvelles mosquées.”

¹⁸⁰ Places of worship for organized religions in France.

¹⁸¹ An architectural luxury often found on grand mosques and considered too luxurious and threatening (in the sense that it mimics the spirals of cathedrals)

¹⁸² “Pour le droit du culte musulman en France à l’indifférence,” *Le Monde*, February 11, 2010.

¹⁸³ J. L. Cohen and A. Arato, *Civil society and political theory* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994).

the various forms of direct cross border participation by transnational migrants both with their country of origin and the political institutions of their country of settlement¹⁸⁴; some theorists maintain that transpolitics threaten certain types of sovereignty underlying the nation-state's legitimacy. Brand stresses the importance of civic engagement, emphasizing that "it provides [a means] for migrants and their children to register demands [...] and receive recognition; and, it creates a public sphere within which to create alternative identities to the stigmatized ones the dominant society often assigns them."¹⁸⁵ Moreover, Silverstein boldly asserts that "Algerian transpolitics calls into direct question the cultural makeup French nationality and citizenship [...]. In the face of the growth of such transnational social formations, [French] national sovereignty is increasingly at stake."¹⁸⁶ In order to analyze this rather severe prescription, it is essential to understand the history of the Algerian immigrant community in France, the context of Algerian politics in the Republic, and previous political movements fueled by Franco-Algerians.

The French state has harbored several waves of Algerian immigrations. During the 1950s, and especially after the war of Independence, *harkis*¹⁸⁷ and *pieds noirs*¹⁸⁸ entered France with the hopes of finding employment and a refuge from brutal war violence. Algerians continued to exit Algeria in the early 90s, especially political exiles fleeing Islamist death threats as well as Islamists escaping government repression have flooded the Republic.¹⁸⁹ Offering a liberal and democratic breeding-ground for political discussion, France has witnessed the blossoming of a thriving Algerian civil society since the early 60s. After 1962, the primary

¹⁸⁴ Adapted from Rainer Bauböck, "Towards a Political Theory of Migrant Transnationalism," *International Migration Review* (Fall 2003), 37, no. 3.

¹⁸⁵ Brand, *Citizens Abroad*, 12.

¹⁸⁶ Silverstein, *Algeria in France* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 238.

¹⁸⁷ Algerians who actively supported French rule during the war of independence and had to leave Algeria for their own safety

¹⁸⁸ Colonial settlers, most of whom left Algeria in 1962

¹⁸⁹ Catherine Lloyd, "Multi-causal conflict in Algeria: National Identity, Inequality, and Political Islam," Working paper no. 104 (Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford, April 2003), 27.

political party in Algeria, the *Front Libération Nationale* (FLN), institutionalized a system to organize Algerian political formations abroad, called *Amicale des Algériens en France* (AAF). AAF assumed a complete monopoly over the organization of the Franco-Algerian emigrant community in France until October 1981,¹⁹⁰ when foreign nationals were permitted to form organizations without the French Minister of the Interior's consent.¹⁹¹ In AAF's decline, no new organization emerged to replace it, though several Berber and Islamist organizations sprung to life in its wake. Civil society is certainly still active as the consistent influx of Algerians to France and Algerian engagement in civic society has assured "offices for most of the major Algerian political parties in France and [...] a presence at major [French] political events."¹⁹² Beyond the efforts of Algerians immigrants, the Algerian state makes provisions for their expatriates to vote abroad, thus furnishing a community of 680,000 registered Algerian voters in France with a powerful voice in Algeria.¹⁹³

It is no surprise that a robust Algerian civil society has developed in France, considering the cultural, economic, and political ties between Algeria and France. Undoubtedly, France remains the most influential country in Algeria. The main French news channel, TF1, is watched by more Algerians than any Algerian station¹⁹⁴ and advancing technology allows Algerians in France to communicate easily with their relatives in Algeria "so that activities that take place in one country are almost instantly relayed in the other."¹⁹⁵ Economically, France accounts for 1/5 of Algerian imports and exports and politically, the 1999 election of Bouteflika, considered the

¹⁹⁰ Michael Collyer, "Transnational political participation of Algerians in France," 840.

¹⁹¹ From 1936 to October 1981, French law required the French Minister of the Interior to individually approve all organizations founded by, or with a membership of more than 20%, foreign nationals.

¹⁹² Lloyd, "Multi-causal conflict in Algeria: National Identity, Inequality, and Political Islam," 27.

¹⁹³ *Ibid*, 28. 680,000 voters in France who were also registered in Algeria as of 2003.

¹⁹⁴ Collyer, "Transnational political participation of Algerians in France," 841.

¹⁹⁵ Catherine Lloyd, "Transnational mobilizations in contexts of violent conflict: the case of solidarity with women in Algeria," *Contemporary Politics* 5, no. 4 (1999): 373.

most Francophile of presidents since Algeria's independence¹⁹⁶, "renewed support from France [for Algeria], with the reopening of embassies, and the resumption of regular flights between Algeria and France."¹⁹⁷ In response to the onset of the Algerian civil war, more than a hundred organizations were established in France directly in response to the crisis. These organizations varied from those based on small-scale solidarity, which worked in collaboration with a region or village in Algeria, to national political democratic movements, which were openly critical of the Algerian government.¹⁹⁸ However, Franco-Algerian civil society first emerged during the 1980s in response to the wave of extreme anti-immigrant violence and political xenophobia sweeping the Republic.

History of the Beur Movement

Amidst the backdrop of police brutality in *les banlieues* and the gaining popularity of the immigrant-wary political party *Front National* (FN), Algerians in France collectively organized to fight against racist state policies and for a fair legal system. Anti-immigrant attacks in the early 1980s were directed towards the second generation and characterized by unnecessary use of force by police and security officers in the *banlieues*. Particularly explosive incidents during *l'été meurtrier*¹⁹⁹ of 1983 included the killing of nine-year-old Tawfik Ouanes by a subway security officer in La Corneuve, the serious injury of twenty-four-year-old Kader Layachi in Tourcoing by an off-duty police officer, and the killing of nineteen-year-old Djamel Itim by a former security guard.²⁰⁰ As the perpetrators often received lessened sentences on the basis of

¹⁹⁶ Said Mahrane, "Sarkozy: la carte algérienne," *Le Point*, November 6, 2007.

¹⁹⁷ Lloyd, "Multi-causal conflict in Algeria: National Identity, Inequality, and Political Islam," 26.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid*, 9.

¹⁹⁹ Bloody summer

²⁰⁰ Silverstein, *Algeria in France*, 160.

“legitimate defense,”²⁰¹ Beurs- defined as the Muslim youth of first-generation North African immigrants- framed law enforcement and the legal system as prejudiced and unequal.

By challenging these practices as well as negotiating an “intermediary position between North Africa and France,”²⁰² Beurs served to agitate the French government’s fears regarding the cultural cohesiveness of the nation-state. The French state viewed Beurs as “carriers of potentially incommensurable ethnic and religious identities”²⁰³ who challenged the FN’s racial and exclusivist politics as well as cherished cultural and political French values that FN claimed to uphold. From free rock concerts publicizing racist state policies to the first North African women’s grassroots organization²⁰⁴, the Beur Movement mobilized Algerian civil society in the early 80s and provided opportunities to challenge the state through civic engagement. For instance, Beur organizations, with the support of France-Plus and the Socialist Party, developed campaign strategies to increase participation and civic awareness amongst other Beurs and to promote Beur candidates up for political office.²⁰⁵ Most importantly, the two-month-long March for Equality and Against Racism in October 1983 served as the apex of the Beur Movement. Thousands of Beur youth paraded from Marseille to Place de la République in Paris, with the purpose of demanding equal inclusion in French political and civil societies, the receipt of immigrant rights, and the protection against racist violence.²⁰⁶

In response to these massive marches, the pro-immigrant President, François Mitterrand, favored local initiatives that allotted education, housing, and training programs to unemployed

²⁰¹ Farid Aïchoune. *Nés en banlieue* (Paris: Ramsay, 1991).

²⁰² Silverstein, *Algeria in France*, 153.

²⁰³ *Ibid*, 153.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid*, 160.

²⁰⁵ Bloul, "From Moral Protests to Religious Politics," 13.

²⁰⁶ Silverstein, *Algeria in France*, 161.

youth.²⁰⁷ Moreover, Mitterrand implemented improved social policies, such as the abolition of deportation laws, the formal recognition of Beurs as citizens with full rights²⁰⁸, the funding of large-scale *banlieue* rehabilitation programs, and the creation of Education Priority Zones (ZEP) with the goal of expanding immigrant student access.²⁰⁹ Elected under a campaign slogan defending *droit à la différence*,²¹⁰ Mitterrand spoke of a multi-cultural *France au pluriel*²¹¹ in which, he claimed, “respecting her diversity will prevent her undoing. One and diverse, that is France.”²¹² In this tolerant atmosphere, Beur activists, novelists, and musicians flourished and assumed the function of political and cultural mediators between France and Algeria. In theory, these ‘mediators’ would chart *une troisième route*²¹³ between the French state’s controlling schemes of integration and the forceful attempts by Algerian political parties to transplant immigrant political life to France.²¹⁴ One organization, the National Union of Algerian Youth (UNJA), was run by official representatives of the Algerian government in France and had endeavored to unite Algerian immigrants around Algerian nationalism since the mid-1960s. The UNJA sponsored cultural events, offered Arabic classes to immigrant children, and sought to monopolize state-related services, such as the repatriation of corpses in Algeria.²¹⁵ In the end though, the level of the state involvement in Beur organizations, and the strength of each organization’s success in lobbying the state mattered little; the majority of associations formed during Mitterrand’s presidency were disbanded by the late 1980s and today, most Beur militants

²⁰⁷ Bloul, "From Moral Protests to Religious Politics," 12.

²⁰⁸ Though the majority of Beurs, as second-generation immigrants to France, already held French citizenship at this point, Mitterrand’s reiterated recognition of their rights was largely rhetorically significant.

²⁰⁹ Silverstein, *Algeria in France*, 163.

²¹⁰ “The right to be different”

²¹¹ Plural France

²¹² Parti Socialiste, *La France au pluriel* (Paris : Entente, 1981).

²¹³ A third route

²¹⁴ Silverstein, *Algeria in France*, 165.

²¹⁵ *Ibid*, 165-166.

reject these associations as “irrelevant to their daily lives.”²¹⁶ Why did the Beur Movement deteriorate, and what types of collective action, if any, now govern Algerian civil society in France?

Franco-Algerian Civil Society in the 90s

Considering Silverstein’s description of transpolitics as a powerful force in the nation-state, it is informative to disentangle the failure of the seemingly once-thriving Beur Movement. Most argue that the primary culprit behind its dissipation is the nation-state itself, which appropriated and institutionalized various elements of Algerian civil society. Thus, as Beur civic engagement built, so did state intervention and co-option. The French administration offered Beurs jobs in welfare state bureaucracies, requiring them to compromise “the capacity to represent neighborhood youth who accused [the Beurs in bureaucracy] of co-option.”²¹⁷ Indeed, many Algerians saw government-affiliated Beurs as being “purchased” by the state, or selling out the *banlieues* youth for their own personal political advancement.²¹⁸ Moreover, the Beur Movement was not achieving enough concrete realities to draw in second-generation Algerians who sought substantial “political mobilization for immigrant cultural and political rights in France”²¹⁹ and expected results. These results might include increased state funding for Beur cultural centers, legislation articulating the rights of Beurs in France, and the creation of an official Beur council to serve as an interlocutor with the government. For example, Beur negotiations with the state failed to culminate in a “politically representative Beur elite which could serve as mediator between the French government and the maghrebi population,”²²⁰ that

²¹⁶ *Ibid*, 166.

²¹⁷ Bloul, "From Moral Protests to Religious Politics," 15.

²¹⁸ Silverstein, *Algeria in France*, 170.

²¹⁹ *Ibid*, 154.

²²⁰ Bloul, "From Moral Protests to Religious Politics," 14.

might imitate a rapport with the Beur population similar to that of the French Council on Muslims and the mosque-attending population in France.

Disillusioned by the shortcomings of the Beur Movement, and aiming to bypass state intervention, many contemporary Beurs attached themselves to transnational ethnic or religious social movements such as the Berber Movement, which “more often than not reject[s] the premises of integration shared by the Beur Movement and the French state.”²²¹ For Berbers, or the tribal Berber-speaking people living in the Maghreb,²²² their main battles surround the abuse of state authority, the state’s exclusion of immigrant youth, and general neglect of Berber culture, history, and language in France. Independent of the Berbers’ efforts, hundreds of other types of transnational organizations also developed during the 90s, as political mobilizations by Franco-Algerians were a natural feature of Algerian civil war.²²³ Algerians in France were concerned with repression and violence externally, establishing a network of associations for phone-ins with news of the civil war, and as alarm over atrocities grew, organizations collected medical supplies to send to Algeria.²²⁴ For instance, the *Comité International de Soutien aux Intellectuels Algériens* provided legal and administrative advice to people trying to enter France, while the *Fonds d’Action Sociale*, which was formed in the 1960s to specifically aid Algerian immigrants in France, continues to serve as the most important immigrant support group in the Republic.²²⁵ In the summer of 1999, a group of Algerians without official documents organized a hunger strike followed by a march in Toulouse to draw attention to their circumstances as *sans-papiers*.²²⁶ Finally, cultural and artistic projects associated with Franco-Algerian civil society in

²²¹ Silverstein, *Algeria in France*, 173.

²²² Lloyd, “Multi-causal conflict in Algeria,” 2.

²²³ Collyer, “Transnational political participation of Algerians in France,” 841.

²²⁴ Lloyd, “Transnational mobilizations in contexts of violent conflict,” 367.

²²⁵ *Ibid*, 370.

²²⁶ *Ibid*, 372; *sans-papiers* is an illegal immigrant.

the 90s perpetuated dualistic identities as they “affirmed [Algerians’] origins, brought memories to life and attempted to create a more positive image of Algerians in France.”²²⁷

Case Study Selection: Why focus on Algerian civil society in France?

Though this thesis strives to focus on Algerian civil society actions directed towards France and *not* Algeria, it is relevant to consider that transnational political theory predicts a reinvigorated relationship between the country of origin and transnational migrants, especially when sending states “encourage sustained contact with migrants.”²²⁸ Therefore, the leverage of the Algerian state, and the principal political parties within it, certainly influence the agenda and interest of Algerian actors in France. Returning to Silverstein’s assessment of transpolitics as a formidable challenge to nation-state sovereignty, it is crucial to determine how much power civil society actually possesses. Contrary to Silverstein’s claims, Ferguson warns against assuming the sovereignty of the rising transnational migrant: “Transnational actors don’t always win their fights. National states are not necessarily incapable of exercising their authority over their localities.”²²⁹ According to some theorists, the duties of the state are nonnegotiable and will always hold an upper hand against transnational forces. Florini argues that the state’s legitimacy stems from a monopoly over coercive force within a clearly defined physical territory, the legal recognition of other states, and the ability to call upon patriotism “to cement the loyalties of their citizens.”²³⁰ Nevertheless, Ferguson retorts that in an era of neoliberal globalization, it is worthwhile to acknowledge the power of *all* forms of government, whether emanating from the

²²⁷ *Ibid*, 370.

²²⁸ Collyer, “Transnational political participation of Algerians in France,” 837.

²²⁹ James Ferguson and Akhil Gupta, “Spatializing States: Toward an Ethnography of Neoliberal Governmentality,” *American Ethnologist* (2002) 29, no. 4: 995.

²³⁰ Ann Florini and P.J. Simmons, *The third force: The rise of transnational civil society*, ed. Ann Florini (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000), 7.

daily practice of the government or the imposition of transnational forces on the territorial jurisdiction of the state.²³¹

This chapter will review Algerian civil society in France by first looking at the design and implementation of the January 2003 Algerian cultural festival, *Djazair*. By employing process-tracing to understand the impetus, reality, and significance of this government-mandated celebration, this thesis will gauge the sway and success of Algerian responses to the event as well as the vigor of nationalistic manifestations that unfolded during *Djazair*. Next, this chapter will pinpoint various cultural and politic arrangements and each one's unique negotiation of dual identity and state power. The prominent Beur radio station, Beur FM, and its owner, Nacer Kettane, present a revealing instance of how one Algerian organization attempts to elude the French state's monopoly on interdependence sovereignty. The organized activities of the Berber Cultural Association (ACB) depict how Berbers foster a national community in France and, despite all odds, nourish dual identities in an assimilationist state. Finally, the petition from the World Berber Congress (CMA) to the United Nations devises how transnational organizations transcend national authorities and illuminates the character of appeals that Berber organizations make to the French state. After analyzing these diverse threads of Franco-Algerian civil society, this chapter will appraise their threat to domestic and interdependent sovereignty, and evaluate the fragility of the French state's grip on transnational voices gathering momentum within its borders.

Djazair: the Year of Algeria embraced in France

Djazair, or the Year of Algeria, highlights an especially rich instance of Algerians in France cultivating their transnational identities. Paying particular attention to the government's involvement in this cultural festival, one must question why the state supported an event clearly

²³¹ Ferguson, "Spatializing States," 996.

advancing Algerian nationalistic links. Though not a novel concept,²³² the Year of Algeria incited considerable controversy in France; understandably, a massive cultural celebration for Algeria, a country which had just emerged from the rubble of a ruthless civil war, prompted loud protest.²³³ Regardless, preparations for *Djazair* carried on with substantial support from the French state, including oversight from the French Association for Artistic Action (Afaa) and two million Euros in funding.²³⁴ Effectively attempting to institutionalize the Algerian festival, the French state handpicked a senior civil servant from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Françoise Allaire, to serve as the commissioner of the event, and associated the Ministry of National Education with *Djazair*. Additionally, the cultural celebration received significant financial support from all Algerian consulates in France.²³⁵ Of course Algerian authorities had good reason to support *Djazair* as it boasted three valuable goals. First, it ameliorated the reputation of a war-torn country, and second, gave Algerian authorities an opportunity to “act as arbiters and guardians of ‘Algerian culture’ for the Algerian community.”²³⁶ Finally, the legitimization that *Djazair* attributed to the Algerian regime would bolster its international status as a “success story”²³⁷ in the War on Terror.

In scale, *Djazair* reached an immediate audience of an estimated six million,²³⁸ a figure that comprised the three million Algerians living in France in 2003, the harkis, Algerian-born French citizens, the repatriated Sephardic community, and thousands of French international aid workers. To accommodate this massive group, almost 2,000 events were scheduled, beginning with an opening mega-concert wrought with Algerian nationalism. On opening night, Nacer

²³² France hosted the Year of Morocco in 1999 and the Year of Brazil in 2005.

²³³ Collyer, “Transnational political participation of Algerians in France,” 845.

²³⁴ Monique Perrot-Lanaud, “Djazair 2003, a year of Algeria in France,” *Label France* (2003), no. 50.

²³⁵ *Ibid.*

²³⁶ Collyer, “Transnational political participation of Algerians in France,” 845.

²³⁷ *Ibid.*, 845.

²³⁸ Monique Perrot-Lanaud, “Djazair 2003, a year of Algeria in France.”

Kettane, the director of the Beur FM radio station in France, declared that “Algeria is part of the history of France and vice-versa.”²³⁹ Despite Kettane’s recognition that the two countries are inextricably linked, the evening was marked by passionate showings of solely Algerian patriotism, ranging from the resounding chants of “one, two, three, viva l’Algérie,” to an audience dotted by Algerian flags, and balloons bearing the image of a star and croissant.²⁴⁰ Reinforcing the dual ties of Algerians who live in France, *Djazaïr* also spotlighted an array of vibrant Algerian arts that thrive in the Republic. From the film screening of an Algerian film that had won the Palme d’Or in Cannes to the performance of 350 musicians from the Institute of the Arab World to an Algerian heritage exhibit featured in the Tuileries gardens,²⁴¹ *Djazaïr* rejoiced in and garnered attention for Algerian arts within French borders.

Under the premise of cultural appreciation, the Year of Algeria certainly underlined the importance of Algerian identity to a large portion of France’s population and applauded those who had already started dialogues on the transnational experience. One singer, Than Than No, was honored for his lyrics expressing the difficulties of being an Arab in France.²⁴² Beyond cultural recognition, *Djazaïr* also confronted Algeria’s unresolved historical tensions with France, even offering a symposium on “Suffering and Memory” led by the First Franco-Algerian Congress of Psychiatry.²⁴³ All things considered, the French state seemed surprisingly unalarmed by the extent to which Algerian national identity was fostered during *Djazaïr*. Rather, commissioner Allaire encouraged “the French to stop being frightened of Algeria and to understand that Algerians are in a [cultural] dynamic that nothing will stop.”²⁴⁴ The President of

²³⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁰ Judith Veil, “L’Algérie des voix bouleversantes,” *Le Figaro*, January 2, 2003.

²⁴¹ Monique Perrot-Lanaud, “Djazaïr 2003, a year of Algeria in France.”

²⁴² *Ibid.*

²⁴³ *Ibid.*

²⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

Djazair explicitly aimed to highlight the “friendly ties between Algeria and France”²⁴⁵ and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dominique de Villepin, hoped the Year of Algeria would “pass a message to the world of openness, tolerance, and peace.”²⁴⁶ In the festival’s aftermath, a host of French government officials, including President Sarkozy, increasingly visited the Algerian regime;²⁴⁷ whether these frequent exchanges symbolized a true political friendship or the strategic maneuvering of a French state cognizant of its unbreakable bond to Algeria remains to be determined.

Cultural and Political Formations for Algerians in France

Beur FM

As mentioned earlier, Algerian political mobilizations in France unfurled during the 90s, providing ample opportunities for transnational expressions and civic engagement with the state. Though these formations were often actively in dialogue with their Algerian counterparts, their activities concerned the plight of Algerians in France as well. Radio Beur exemplifies a meaningful structure in Franco-Algerian civil society that facilitated transnational linkages and challenged state power. Known in 1988 as a round-the-clock news service accessible to Algeria, Radio Beur “mobilized associative networks in France [which were] structured through neighborhood associations, cultural groups and political associations.”²⁴⁸ Radio Beur functioned as the primary diffusion for North Africa musical production in France, and a center of organization for political action, especially during the Beur marches and demonstrations of the

²⁴⁵ Bernard Stasi, “Bienvenue à l’Année de l’Algérie,” *Libération*, January 8, 2003.

²⁴⁶ Claude Casteran, “En marge de Djazaïr, le Fnac publie un Livre blanc sur la culture an Algérie,” *Agence France Presse*, May 1, 2003.

²⁴⁷ Collyer, “Transnational political participation of Algerians in France,” 845.

²⁴⁸ Lloyd, “Multi-causal conflict in Algeria,” 29.

80s. A decade later, the station emerged as the principal node of communication between Algeria and France in a period when a scarcity of information available on civil war conditions.²⁴⁹

When Radio Beur lost its operating license in 1992, its president, Nacer Kettane, reconstituted the association as a professional radio station financed by corporate advertising, as opposed to its previous government funding. Radio Beur transformed into Beur FM, the Paris-based operation expanded to the national level, and smaller North African channels were absorbed into Kettane's association, forced to rent time from his mega-station.²⁵⁰ Originally an organizer behind the 1985 March for Civic Rights, Kettane fashioned himself as an engaged Beur activist even as he gained acclaim. Though using the French state as a platform from which to broadcast Algerian news and music, Kettane seemed to have bigger plans for Beur FM. Kettane was able to circumvent the Carignon audiovisual laws, which dictate that French stations must devote 40% of their musical programs to Francophone productions.²⁵¹ One could argue that the Carignon laws are designed to monitor the cultural influences that impact France's national identity; thus, by rejecting these restraints, Kettane, and Beur FM, are cast as challenges to state power and its monopoly over interdependence sovereignty.²⁵²

The Berber Cultural Association

When discussing the Algerian community in France, it is important to understand the internal divisions that have undermined their solidarity movements. For example, Kabyle expatriates²⁵³ have not always connected well with *banlieues* youth, but they have achieved intergenerational unity through the Berber movements. Though it would be disproportionate to

²⁴⁹ Paul A. Silverstein, *Algeria in France*, 170.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid*, 170.

²⁵¹ *Ibid*, 171.

²⁵² Determines the ability of public authorities to regulate the flow of information, ideas, goods, peoples, pollutants, or capital across the borders of the state.

²⁵³ An ethnic group in northeast Algeria who have historically lived in Kabylia, a Berber-speaking region in Algeria.

describe all Algerians in France as adhering to the Berber movements, those who do participate maintain explicit transnational ties to Algeria and thus offer a vibrant display of how Algerians in France express their dual identities. One such organization, the Berber Cultural Association (ACB), was established in 1979 by a group of second-generation Kabyles who hoped to respond to the immediate interests of France's Kabyle population.²⁵⁴ Though the ACB's immediate audience rests at 600 members, the association interacts with a much larger community. Initially striving to celebrate cultural hybridity, the ACB grew to become a civic organization that nourished transnational engagement. The association organized forums for discussion and the exchange of news for Kabyles living Paris, and compiled an agenda advocating "the end of police violence, the release of [Kabyle] students arrested, and the official recognition of Berber linguistic and cultural rights in Algeria."²⁵⁵

The ACB enables and embraces the Franco-Algerian transnational identity in several ways. During the 90s, ACB became the center of the Berber revival in France, functioning as a meeting place for Kabyle scholars, journalists, authors, artists, musicians, and political activists fleeing persecution in Algeria.²⁵⁶ Today, the association oversees the study of Berber language, initiations to Berber chants and traditional dance, several football teams, scholarly support in French, help finding employment, and a community network.²⁵⁷ A strong didactic dimension also accompanies ACB's service. To better educate the Berbers in France, the association publishes a monthly newsletter, hosts a weekly radio program on Beur FM that includes updates on Berber activism in Algeria, distributes short essays on Berber history, and administers

²⁵⁴ Paul A. Silverstein, *Algeria in France*, 175.

²⁵⁵ *Ibid*, 175.

²⁵⁶ *Ibid*, 175.

²⁵⁷ "L'Association de Culture Berbère sous le Choc," *Le Monde*, February 9, 1995.

vocabulary and grammar lessons in Berber.²⁵⁸ One of ACB's main concerns is transmitting Berber culture and language to *banlieues* youth, a group for whom political Islam movements also compete. In fact, in April 1996, the ACB organized a conference on "Berberity in France" where attendees questioned, "Are there any other referents other than Islam for the current generation of Algerians in France?"²⁵⁹ Fifteen scholars and association representatives responded with their own personal views.

By purporting this Berber national identity, the ABC's refusal of full assimilation into the French state seems clear. However, the president and Berber of French nationality, Cherif Benbouriche, justifies that the ACB ultimately reveres the Republic and assures that Berbers "have the will to live in harmony with one another."²⁶⁰ Yet the ACB is widening its scope of influence through expansion into the lower-class *banlieues* in Saint-Denis, Créteil, and Mantes-la-Jolie, as well as developing a larger network of Berber associations in metropolitan areas, like the Federation of Amazigh Cultural Associations in France (FACAF). In defense of ACB's broader motivations, one spokesperson from ACB-Mantes-la-Jolie assured that "our children can be integrated into French society while maintaining our [cultural] distinctions."²⁶¹ Yet the ACB's motivations certainly include the pursuit of a more privileged mouthpiece from the government, even suggesting in an open letter to political candidates in the 1995 French presidential elections that the government support Berberity in *banlieues* schools as an effective barrier against radical Islam. To the Berbers' dismay, they never did receive their privileged mouthpiece; in their frustration, Berbers often point to the state's hypocrisy of awarding a large voice to Muslims given the divisive fundamentalism of radical Islam. For Berbers, advancing their dual identities

²⁵⁸ Silverstein, *Algeria in France*, 180.

²⁵⁹ *Ibid*, 179.

²⁶⁰ "L' Association de Culture Berbère sous le Choc," *Le Monde*, February 9, 1995.

²⁶¹ Silverstein, *Algeria in France*, 180.

and protecting the Republic are aligning goals so long as France adopts a secular and multicultural approach to assimilation.

The World Berber Congress

Though many Berber movements cooperate with and ultimately defer to the interests of the French states, the World Berber Congress (CMA)²⁶² offers an instance of a transnational organization which attempt to transcend national authorities. Frustrated by the level of discrimination against Berbers in France, the CMA presented a report to the United Nations Convention on Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) in Geneva on February 22, 2005. Examining this report supplements an understanding of the character of appeals that transnational organizations are making. The report begins by recounting the considerable contributions of two million Berbers to French society in economic, scientific and artistic domains, recalling French celebrities of Berber descent like Edith Piaf, Marcel Mouloudji, Daniel Prevost, and Zinedine Zidane.²⁶³ Next, the CMA argues that the Berbers face racism in the Republic despite their merited French citizenship and shared values of “democracy, liberty, laity, and equity.”²⁶⁴ The CMA concludes that the state owes fuller recognition and improved treatment to Berbers who face a secondary level of discrimination “by the fact that they are assimilated to other groups of [less deserving] immigrants.”²⁶⁵

Moreover, the CMA registers several complaints with the French state. First, the state has accorded the French Muslim Council as a privileged interlocutor, though the Council only represents 10% of the Muslim community in France and “insures the unequal treatment of

²⁶² Congrès Mondial Amazigh; Amazigh is synonymous for Berber

²⁶³ Congrès Mondial Amazigh, “France: Discrimination against imazighen (Berbers),” official report presented to the United Nations International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), February 22, 2005, http://www.congres-mondial-amazigh.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=536&Itemid=51

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

Berber citizens.”²⁶⁶ Second, the CMA reproaches the French state for their urban policy in *les banlieues* where residential ghettos trap immigrant populations, especially those hailing from North Africa. These policies, according to the CMA, have only threatened “social peace and republican values, while preventing trust between communities and fostering xenophobic and racist feelings.”²⁶⁷ Finally, the CMA decries the dismissal of Berber history and civilization in French schools and cites the 2003 Stasi commission’s recommendation to teach Tamazight²⁶⁸ in recognition of substantial interest from students. Policy recommendations to the French state include the restoration of full rights for Berber citizens, the teaching of Berber language and history by the Office of National Education, the inclusion of Berber holidays on the calendar, increased funding for Berber cultural centers, and widened support for Berber political activism. Realizing the state response has been inadequate in the past, the CMA also goes above the state by appealing to the UN, suggesting that the CERD “request from the French government that it give satisfaction, without any further delay, to the [...] demands of Berbers of France.”²⁶⁹ Given the CMA’s rejection of the Republic’s authority in these matters, it is essential to question whether this expression of Franco-Algerian transnationalism deteriorates French state power.

Considering domestic and interdependence sovereignty

This chapter featured various cultural and political arrangements within Algerian civil society in France that spoke to the navigation and manifestation of dual identity in the Republic. Keeping Krasner’s definition of domestic sovereignty in mind, how do political formations by Algerians in France challenge the political authority and control of the state? The Beur Movements of the 80s was weakened by state institutionalization as part of France’s broader

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

²⁶⁸ The Berber language.

²⁶⁹ Congrès Mondial Amazigh, “France: Discrimination against imazighen (Berbers).”

integration efforts. Successfully co-opting Beur leaders and widening the rift between first- and second-generation Algerians, the state targeted North African immigrant communities who were considered the most susceptible to “sectarian violence imported from across the Mediterranean.”²⁷⁰ With the rise of the anti-immigrant Front National in France and political Islam in Algeria, as well as the fear amongst younger Franco-Maghrebis that their older siblings had been ‘purchased’ by the state, the Beur movements fizzled out of France as civil war violence in the 90s trickled in. However, the horrific torture and civil injustices associated with the civil war cultivated a robust Algerian civil society. As the 21st century approached, the newer generations found themselves politically mobilized in transnational associations, like those of the Berber movement, which thrust a greater challenge to nation-state sovereignty. What defines the Berber movements is their assertion that complete integration into French society is neither probable, nor ideal. Rather, Berbers nourish their dual identities all the while claiming they ultimately uphold and revere republican values, especially when compared to political Islam movements. The Berbers’ multicultural approach may seem harmless to the state, but the Berbers’ demands are real. As proven by the CMA’s report to the UN convention, the Berber organizations are not afraid to circumvent the national level in order to attain justice. From Collyer’s perspective, Franco-Algerian political formations do infringe upon France’s state power as nationals abroad force “governments to reconfigure traditional practices of spatial control”²⁷¹ and thus, their territorial jurisdiction.

Equally relevant, Krasner outlines interdependence sovereignty, which encompasses the ability of public authorities to regulate the flow of information, ideas, goods, people, pollutants,

²⁷⁰ Silverstein, *Algeria in France*, 183.

²⁷¹ Collyer, “Transnational political participation of Algerians in France,” 847.

or capital across the border of the states.²⁷² At *Djazair*, vibrant displays of Algerian nationalism abounded within the French borders, serving to normalize the transnational identities of Algerians living in France. The French state's reasoning for supporting this multicultural celebration may have been to appease its own Algerian population as well as bolster the reputation of Algeria, France's closest ally and asset in the North African region. Nacer Kettane's manipulation of the Carignon telecommunication laws also displays a direct challenge to interdependence sovereignty: if the French state cannot control the cultural influences within its borders, how can it effectively construct the national identity of its inhabitants? Finally, the proliferation of Berber cultural centers in France increases the vulnerability of state power. The ACB, for example, employs didactic campaigns that inevitably challenge the state's determination of civic education. By teaching an alternative historical narrative to the ones ordained by the French state, Berber cultural associations question the idea of a French people united by one homogeneous background. In sum, Algerians in France, through their engagement with political and cultural arrangements, refuse the total repudiation of their Algerian identities, and in turn, this defiance renders total assimilation into the French nation impossible.

CONCLUSION

The idea of transnationalism completely toppling the nation-state is an alarming prediction. In effect, prophetic theorists who adhere to this prescription have brought the transnational migrant to the forefront of international debates on the future of national identity. Broadly, this thesis considered the role of transnational migrants in a constantly-mobilized, interconnected, and heterogeneous world. Indeed, globalization makes localized communities increasingly dependent on influences located outside the nation-state's boundaries, which in turn complicates the regulation of national identity. Specifically, this thesis contends that Algerians in

²⁷² Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*.

France challenge the permanence of the nation-state model by threatening domestic and interdependence sovereignty within France.

Transnationalism certainly impacts the Republic's grasp on state-conceived national identity by offering a hybrid version which flourishes within the Franco-Algerian community. This thesis recognizes the vulnerability of the state-created historical narrative, cultural constructs, and social boundaries to those imagined by Algerians in France, mainly because the French elements of national identity originated from imagination as well.²⁷³ Because of the French state's active engagement with Algerians in France, transnational migrants force the state to compromise some portion of its state power. Thus, while international legal and Westphalian sovereignty are still solely attributed to the French state, France must nonetheless reconfigure traditional ideas of republican citizenship and spatial control. However, the staying power and magnitude of the nation-state framework is evident. Foremost, France unquestionably satisfies the traditional requirements of sovereignty by retaining ultimate legal jurisdiction and the monopoly of force within its territories. How does France respond to potentially powerful actors within their borders? More implicit findings from the case studies reinforce that rather than suppressing and isolating transnational sentiment, France recognizes and institutionalizes certain features of it. By appropriating and expropriating qualities of Algerian transnationalism, the Republic remains the ultimate authority in deriving sovereignty from its citizens and subordination to the state-conceived vision of national identity.

With regard to the French treatment of Islam, France's legacy of *la laïcité* positions the state in a dual struggle to both recognize and restrain organized religion. *La laïcité* achieved greater control over Islam for public officials but also prompted unintended consequences. Certainly, the French treatment of Islam both supports and refutes the categorization of nation-

²⁷³ Benedict Anderson, "Imagined Communities" (London: Verso, 2006).

state sovereignty as ailing. On one hand, the republicanization of the Council and Boubakeur demonstrates the state's successful cooptation, and often circumvention, of French Muslim leaders. Even if the Council did possess legitimate power, the intra-Islamic rivalries wracking its membership would diffuse it. On the other hand, by fashioning the Council and Boubakeur as the closest link to five million French Muslims, the French state acknowledges the capacity to be Muslim *and* French, and moreover, the staying power of Islam in France. In essence, by creating a privileged Muslim Council, permitting Boubakeur to reassert his ties to Algeria, and allowing foreign donors to dominate French mosques, it is undeniable that France is redesigning Frenchness to include foreign roots and religion- even if to a limited degree.

Algerian civil society suffers a similar tension to the first case study. In parallel fashion, transnational migrants strive to manipulate state power, all the while resisting state cooptation and communal divisions. The rising Berber movement of the mid-1990s offered a forum for transnational sentiment and a blatant objection to the purported notion of French national identity. In addition, the ACB successfully facilitates the perpetuation of a dual Franco-Algerian identity by nourishing Berber language, culture, and history, by simultaneously citing republican values, thus avoiding state antagonism. The CMA transcended the authority of the national level by presenting their demands to the UN, which illustrates the CMA's consciousness of the fallibility of the nation-state. In a grand blow to interdependence sovereignty, Beur FM and *Djazair* championed and facilitated the celebration of transnational links in a state that defines its citizenry as 'homogeneous.' Despite these transgressions of certain categories of nation-state sovereignty, it is crucial to note the overarching weakness to all Algerian transnational efforts: internal divisions. Specifically, the Berbers' efforts in France often work in opposition to the

Islam movement, therefore dividing Algerians amongst the two camps and diminishing the power these transnational migrants would garner if they organized collectively.

This thesis was guided by the theoretical framework of liberal universalism, asserting that Algerians in France formulate an ambivalent transnational identity and compel the state to reconsider its construction of national identity. While Algerians' voice and momentum is gaining in France, it would be an embellishment to describe these transnational migrants as singlehandedly dismantling the nation-state framework. In terms of conceptual limitations, the nature of transnationalism is extremely difficult to measure, as what qualifies as transnationalism ranges in scope, power, and frequency. To elaborate, not every Algerian in France is as engaged transnationally as are the leaders of French mosques or the participants in Franco-Algerian civil society. Moreover, the frequency with which a migrant engages transnationally will directly affect the strength of the transnationalism which he practices. As noted by Portes in the Literature Review, not all migrants are necessarily transnational, thus underlining the tendency to exaggerate the scale of this phenomenon.

Turning to case selection, this thesis analyzed two specific sectors of French society that display particularly robust instances of transnationalism, however several other components of an Algerian's experience in France also contribute to this discourse. A burgeoning industry of Algerian literature in France discussing historical consciousness, referred to as 'Beur writing,' exemplifies how transnational migrants negotiate identity. Similarly, football matches in France between Algeria and France, or even between a Maghrebi and French player, often spark intense clashes between French citizens and Algerians in France. Articulated another way, the rivalries erupting over football matches often reflect grander conflicts between nations, and for Algerians in France, an opportunity to repudiate their French ties. Despite these alternatively rich instances

of transnationalism, my case selection was justified by my case studies' ability to connect to international politics and my theoretical framework. Beyond this thesis, future avenues of research should pay special attention to intra-Islamic and intra-Algerian community rivalries. For instance, comparing the quality of transnationalism of Berber associations to radical Islamic organizations would speak to the relationship between secularism, fundamentalism, and transnationalism. With regard to internal divisions, the future cohesion and efficacy of the Council will reflect upon how strongly sectarian tensions undermine Algerian transnational efforts. Moreover, future endeavors should track the French government's legal and political responses to the Algerian civil society as a legitimate and formidable force.

The imposition of transnationalism on nation-state sovereignty, even if in a limited capacity, carries several implications. In the domestic political realm, France views Muslims and much of Algerian civil society as recognizable actors. Will Algerians in France help mold a new historical narrative that crafts 'Frenchness' to encompass features of Algerian nationalism? This reconfiguration could affect civic education, the languages tolerated in the state,²⁷⁴ state funding for cultural influences like art, music, dance, and literature, as well as the political agendas of municipal, regional, and national candidates.

If the Republic continues their current strategy of cooptation, will the French state mediate a durably moderate version of Islam and Berberity? Through the negotiation of their dual identities, Algerians in France belong neither fully to Algeria or France and their liminality may not seem appealing in the long-term. However, despite an expanding immigrant community, France publicly refuses to budge their assimilationist approach to citizenship. Contemporary solutions include Prime Minister François Fillon's rather unrelenting initiatives, announced in February 2010. Newcomers to France would be forced to sign a declaration of values, espousing

²⁷⁴ Currently, most sermons at state-ordained mosques are given in both French *and* Arabic.
 Penn Humanities Forum Mellon Undergraduate Research Fellowship, Final Paper April 2010
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gender equality and proficiency in French, as well as swear to adhere to a list of republican values in a solemn ceremony.²⁷⁵ In an especially revealing instance, Immigration Minister Eric Besson recently denied citizenship to a foreign national on the grounds that he forced his wife to wear the full Islamic veil. Reasoning that anyone seeking naturalization must demonstrate their desire for integration, Besson sees “radical religious practice”²⁷⁶ as adverse to republicanism. These recent developments all point to a common finding recurring throughout this research. Though implicitly the French state may concede some measure of its state power to Algerian migrants, explicitly, the Republic is staging a formidable fight in its effort to regulate and maintain republican citizenship in its purest sense.

The implications of this research also apply to the changing landscape of the ‘New Europe.’ The flow of post-colonial immigrants into Europe is driving most Western European countries to redesign their approach to national identity, whether through liberalizing its definition or, more likely, tightening its tenets. Though conventional types of sovereignty remain intact in France today, the assimilation of a substantial Algerian community into the exclusive French nation warrants the state’s prioritized examination of national identity and the staying power of republicanism.

²⁷⁵ “France unveils national identity plans,” *The Economist*, February 9, 2010.

²⁷⁶ “France refuses a citizenship over full Islamic veil,” *The Economist*, February 3, 2010.

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