The Ebb And Flow Of Revolution: A History Of Emotions In Early Nineteenth-Century Colombia

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Abstract
This dissertation explores the ways in which emotions shaped people's understandings of the troubled times they were living in. It focuses on northern South America – present-day Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela – between 1808 and 1830. These years saw both the collapse of the Spanish Monarchy’s rule over the region and the rise of new republican nations. Such an outcome was far from being inevitable or from being one desired by all. The dissertation is both a history of emotions that focuses on early nineteenth-century northern South America and a history of the region’s independence process studied from the perspective of emotions. Throughout the dissertation, I reflect on how emotions shaped people's notions of reality and their conceptions of the past and the future. The dissertation poses two main arguments. First, I argue that emotions are a constitutive part of cognition. Emotions shaped the meanings people gave to the world around them at the same time that emotions helped express and impute meaning to people's actions. Second, the dissertation demonstrates that the emotions that circulated during these years, particularly intense fear and confusion, gave form to the republican and national projects that emerged at the time. It claims that independence and the onset of republicanism did not bring about a critical break from the monarchical and colonial past. Widespread feelings of dread and uncertainty led many of the region's residents to seek stability and safety at the expense of their aspirations for social and political reform. The dissertation carries out a microscopic analysis of a series of events, such as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, panic attacks, and funeral rites, in order to grasp the prevailing emotions of the time as well as to get a sense of the different ways in which people understood, experienced, and expressed emotions.

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ABSTRACT

THE EBB AND FLOW OF REVOLUTION: A HISTORY OF EMOTIONS IN EARLY NINETEENTH-CENTURY COLOMBIA

Juan Pablo Ardila Falla

Ann Farnsworth-Alvear

This dissertation explores the ways in which emotions shaped people’s understandings of the troubled times they were living in. It focuses on northern South America – present-day Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela – between 1808 and 1830. These years saw both the collapse of the Spanish Monarchy’s rule over the region and the rise of new republican nations. Such an outcome was far from being inevitable or from being one desired by all. The dissertation is both a history of emotions that focuses on early nineteenth-century northern South America and a history of the region’s independence process studied from the perspective of emotions. Throughout the dissertation, I reflect on how emotions shaped people’s notions of reality and their conceptions of the past and the future. The dissertation poses two main arguments. First, I argue that emotions are a constitutive part of cognition. Emotions shaped the meanings people gave to the world around them at the same time that emotions helped express and impute meaning to people’s actions. Second, the dissertation demonstrates that the emotions that circulated during these years, particularly intense fear and confusion, gave form to the republican and national projects that emerged at the time. It claims that independence and the onset of republicanism did not bring about a critical break from the monarchical and colonial past. Widespread feelings of dread and uncertainty led many of the region’s residents to seek stability and safety at the expense of their aspirations for social and political reform. The dissertation carries out a microscopic analysis of a series of events, such as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, panic attacks, and funeral rites, in order to grasp the prevailing emotions of the time as well as to get a sense of the different ways in which people understood, experienced, and expressed emotions.
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Introduction

In 1809, many Quiteños came to believe that a French takeover of Quito was imminent. Around June and July, in social gatherings as well as in the city’s streets, people talked about “reliable news that the French had disembarked a considerable number of troops in the port of Esmeraldas.”¹ By August, rumors of a French takeover intensified even further. On August 9th, many claimed that there was a conspiracy underway that would eventually lead to Napoleon’s takeover of Quito. On that day, a rumor spread throughout the city alleging that the “Chapetones,” as European Spaniards are referred to here, despite their very reduced number, intended to slit the throats of the Criollos, and would hand over this [Quito] to Bonaparte.”² The following day, on August 10th, amidst widespread confusion and fear, Quito’s residents, led by the city’s patricians, established a government junta. The junta swore allegiance to Ferdinand VII and the Spanish Monarchy and promised to defend the Crown’s sovereignty. Its formation was a response to

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¹ “…avisos efectivos de que los franceses havian desembarcado en considerable numero en el puerto de Esmeraldas.” (Archivo General de la Nación de Colombia (AGN), Sección Colecciones, Fondo Academia Colombiana de Historia, Serie Correspondencia de varias personas de Quito a Camilo Torres, caja 24, carpeta 47, ‘Relación de Xavier Montufar, hijo del marqués de Selva Alegre, en que explica lo que ocurrió en Riobamba y la formación de la Junta. 1810.’, 74-75.) In this case, I translate the term aviso as news. I do so, following the 1726 Diccionario de Autoridades first acceptation of the term: “Aviso. s. m. Noticia dada á otro de lo que sucéde, ó acontece, ó le conviene para algun fin.” (Diccionario de Autoridades, Real Academia Española, 1726.)

² The term was used in a derogatory way to refer to European Spaniards. The 1729 Diccionario de Autoridades defines the term as “the European or Castilian, recently arrived and poor…” (“El Européo, ó el Castellano recien llegado y pobre...”) (Diccionario de Autoridades, Real Academia Española, 1729.)

³ The term criollo was used to refer to people of European descent who were born in the Americas. The 1729 Diccionario de Autoridades defines the term as “he who is born in the Indies from Spanish parents, or from another nation that is not Indian.” (“El que nace en Indias de Padres Españoles, o de otra Nación que no sean Indios…”) (Diccionario de Autoridades, Real Academia Española, 1729.)

⁴ “… el que los chapetones, como aqui llama a los españoles europeos, no obstante de su reducidosimo numero, intentaban degollar a los criollos, y entregar esto a Bonaparte…” (Archivo General de Indias (AGI), QUITO,269, ‘Carta de Fuentes González y Merchante de Contreras al Rey sobre los juicios en contra de quiteños. Quito. 21 de mayo de 1810.’, 2-3.)
Napoleon’s invasion of the Iberian Peninsula and Ferdinand VII’s abdication. Many Quiteños believed it was a way to prevent being governed by Joseph Bonaparte and the afrancesados.\(^5\) In the absence of a rightful and legitimate ruler, Quito’s residents sought to govern themselves until Ferdinand VII returned to throne. Quito’s Junta was the first government junta established in the Americas. Similar to those that came after, the August 10 Junta sought self-government, but it did not pursue absolute independence nor a break from the Spanish Monarchy. On the contrary, many of its supporters were convinced that the junta’s establishment would lead to more autonomy while maintaining the Spanish Monarchy’s rule over Quito and preventing Napoleon from taking over the province and the rest of the Americas.\(^6\)

With a difference of only a few months, rumors similar to those that appeared in Quito in 1809 circulated in Santafé de Bogotá. In February 1810, stories of the arrival of foreign troops spread throughout the city. Most accounts maintained that French ships had been seen sailing up the Orinoco River into the Llanos\(^7\) and that French troops would soon disembark and begin their way towards Santafé. The story ended up being not true. Apparently, someone in the Llanos mistook a small band of rebels for French troops. Rebels from the town of Socorro who had been demanding the formation of local juntas

\(^5\) From the late 1800s and through most of the 1810s, throughout all of Spain and Spanish America, members of the court, public servants, and other vassals who showed explicit or tacit support for Napoleon and the French were referred to as afrancesados.


\(^7\) The Province of the Llanos was located to the east of Santafé and included most of the plains found between the Andes mountains and the Orinoco River. (Marta Herrera Ángel, “Las divisiones político-administrativas del Virreinato de la Nueva Granada a finales del periodo colonial”, Historia Crítica, no. 22 (2001): 77-83.)
ended up in the Llanos fleeing from the authorities’ repression. Some months after this incident, on July 19, just a day before the formation of Santafé’s Junta, rumors of a conspiracy similar to that of Quito circulated throughout the city. Around 7 p.m., many Santafereños began talking about an alleged scheme led by the city’s Chapetones to kill Santafé’s Criollos and hand over the province to Napoleon. The rumor became so widespread that Viceroy Antonio Amar y Borbón and the Royal Audiencia’s magistrates were forced to concede to a town hall meeting. On the night of the 20th, after many hours of disorders, protests, and rampant confusion, many of the city’s councilmen, patricians, members of the Audiencia, and a few plebeians convened in a town hall meeting. The assembly ended up voting in favor of the formation of Santafé’s government junta. Similar to what happened in Quito, the junta declared its loyalty to Ferdinand VII and the Spanish Crown. Viceroy Amar was appointed as its president.

The similarities and coincidences between the rumors and emotions that circulated in Quito and Santafé are remarkable. Thinking in metaphorical terms, it is as if the stories and fears that emerged in Quito in 1809 had taken a life of their own and travelled to Santafé to continue their disruptiveness in New Granada. Of course, these rumors and emotions did not grow and move by themselves. They did so thanks to people’s travels, correspondence, and conversations. At the time, couriers, merchants, and muleteers were


key actors moving rumors and emotions from one place to another. Yet, the expansion of these stories and fears was not simply caused by individual interactions. They were given meaning collectively. Their growth and the shape they took was the result of a series of social, political, and cultural interactions and existing conditions.

This dissertation explores the ways in which emotions shaped how people gave meaning to the troubled times in which they were living.\(^{10}\) It focuses on northern South America – present-day Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela – between 1808 and 1830. These years saw both the collapse of the Spanish Monarchy’s rule over the region and the rise of new republican nations. Such an outcome was far from being inevitable or from being one desired by all. At the time, there were many different understandings of what these political transformations meant and implied. Among many, republicanism and independence were met with uncertainty and caution. For a considerable part of the region’s residents, it was unclear what these political projects meant and what they could bring about. Studying the tensions and contradictions of the time through the lens of emotions sheds light on the milieu in which these discussions took place at the same time that it helps us have a better understanding of people’s actions and the reasons guiding them to support one faction or another.

In that sense, this dissertation is both a history of emotions that focuses on early nineteenth-century northern South America as well as a history of the Colombian, Ecuadorian, and Venezuelan independence processes studied from the perspective of emotions. Throughout the dissertation, I reflect on how emotions shaped people’s notions

\(^{10}\) Throughout the dissertation, I use the terms emotions, feelings, and sentiments as synonymous. Most historians of emotions do the same.
of reality and their conceptions of the past and the future. The dissertation considers how emotions travelled and grew through rumors, collective remembrances, and particular events. It studies the different ways in which specific nineteenth-century societies experienced and understood emotions as well as the ways in which emotional expressions shaped the meanings given to people’s decisions and actions. I understand emotions as a constitutive part of people’s cognition. Emotions shape the meanings people give to the world they live in at the same time that emotions help express and convey meaning.

Paying attention to emotions brings to light the widespread feelings of confusion and fear that prevailed in northern South America during the first decades of the nineteenth century. Uncertainty and fright, along with rage, grief, guilt, and hope, fluctuated during these years. There were moments in which some emotions prevailed over others or in which the pace of propagation of a particular emotion varied. At other times, parts of society experienced fear and confusion with more intensity. Ultimately, such fluctuations shaped the tides of revolution and reform. At certain times, emotions incited and accelerated political transformations. At others, they halted social and political change.

The dissertation argues that the emotions that circulated in the early nineteenth century, particularly the intense fear and confusion that many experienced, gave form to the republican and national projects that emerged at the time. It claims that independence and the onset of republicanism did not bring about a critical break from the monarchical and colonial past. Widespread feelings of dread and uncertainty led many of the region’s residents to seek stability and safety at the expense of their aspirations for social and political reform. The emotional milieu that predominated in the second half of the 1810s and throughout the 1820s hindered the revolutionary spirit that had spread some years
earlier. Such generalized sense of fear and confusion enabled the persistence of monarchical and colonial notions of social order, political stability, and symbolic power.

This project considers the significance and implications of the rise of new republican nations in Latin America. The onset of republicanism came with innovative constitutions and novel endeavors, such as manumission laws and declarations in favor of racial equality. Yet, opposition to these reforms came from a wide variety of sectors of society. In some cases, even those promoting new reforms were sure to enact elusive and malleable policies that would, at best, only bring about partial and gradual changes. In other cases, strong factionalism between different notions of republicanism only led to conflict and violence, delaying even further the implementation of reforms. Such relentless frictions and the unfulfillment of republican promises help explain the persistence of royalist and monarchist notions in the minds and hearts of many of the region’s inhabitants. Many political leaders and citizens ended up favoring despotic projects similar to the monarchic regime that had preceded independence. However, such setbacks should not be simply conceived as failures or acts of betrayal to the liberal and republican projects that many had supposedly supported. These apparent hindrances were, in part, the result of the wide range of meanings and understandings that independence and republicanism were given across society.

The history of emotions

The fears and rumors that circulated in Quito in 1809 and in Santafé in 1810 are a good starting point to discuss some of the methodological, theoretical, and historiographical discussions guiding this dissertation. Georges Lefebvre’s work on the Great Fear of 1789 is especially relevant to think about the connections between these
rumors and fears. In 1932, Lefebvre published *La Grande Peur de 1789* (translated into English as *The Great Fear of 1789: Rural Panic in Revolutionary France*). The Great Fear was one of the first historical works to pay attention to emotions. Perhaps only Johan Huizinga’s 1919 *The Waning of the Middle Ages* could be considered a starting point previous to Lefebvre’s work.¹¹ In his book, Huizinga maintains that medieval emotional life was, to a certain degree, childish as it was full of violent contrasts and impressive forms. In medieval daily life, Huizinga argues, there was a perpetual oscillation between opposite and extreme emotions and expressions.¹² Lefebvre approach was somewhat different from Huizinga’s. In *The Great Fear*, he analyzes a sense of fear that took over the French countryside in late July and early August of 1789. During these weeks, rumors of an aristocratic plot became prevalent. Both citizens and authorities believed that aristocrats had recruited brigands to destroy crops, rob townspeople, and vandalize homes.

According to Lefebvre, this Great Fear had an identity of its own in the sense that people held a total certainty that the rumor was absolutely true and that brigands would at any

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moment break into their homes. These false stories and the fear they produced led many to arm themselves at the same time that many peasants and townspeople began to question the aristocracy’s authority and rights. As a result of this, some peasants even stopped paying seigneurial dues. Lefebvre maintains that the Great Fear spread relatively quickly thanks to couriers and a series of interactions between neighboring towns. Yet, he also implies that there were times in which the fear moved as if it were a living organism. “To travel from Clermont in Beauvaisis to the Seinea, distance of about fifty kilometres,” Lefebvre explains, “it took twelve hours of daylight; it travelled the five hundred kilometres from Ruffec to Lourdes in nine days; its speed here was lesser by a half, but it obviously moved more slowly at night. During the day, it seems to have gone at about four kilometres an hour.”

Lefebvre’s close attention to the expansion of rumors and fears tackled a series of questions Marc Bloch had posed some years earlier, in 1921, in his article, “Reflections of a Historian on the False News of the War.” In it, Bloch analyzes some of the many false stories that circulated among French troops and French society during the Great War. Bloch’s fascination for deception and misperceptions is manifest throughout the article as it would be later on in his 1924 Rois et Thaumaturges. “The masses are aroused by false stories,” Bloch argues, “Items of false news, in all the multiplicity of their forms—simple gossip, deceptions, legends—have filled the life of humanity. How are they born? From what elements do they take shape? How do they propagate themselves, gaining strength as

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14 Lefebvre, The Great Fear of 1789, 155.
they pass from mouth to mouth or writing to writing? No question should fascinate anyone who loves to reflect on history more than these.”

In 1941, almost a decade after The Great Fear’s publication, Lucien Febvre – a colleague of Lefebvre and Bloch at the University of Strasbourg during the late 1920s and early 1930s as well as the cofounder, along with Bloch, of the Annales journal – wrote an insightful article titled “Sensibility and History: How to Reconstitute the Emotional Life of the Past.” In it, Febvre sets out a series of guidelines on how to delve into the emotions and sensibilities of the past. He claims that emotions are not merely automatic reactions to external stimuli, but patterns of activity that can only take place where group relations and social life exist. In the same vein as Lefebvre and Bloch, Febvre argues that emotions are contagious. As Febvre explains, “emotions, by bringing together large numbers of people acting sometimes as initiators and sometimes as followers, finally reached the stage where they constituted a system of inter-individual stimuli which took on a variety of forms according to situation and circumstance, thereby producing a wide variety of reactions and modes of sensibility in each person.”

In his article, Febvre also maintains that emotions could be considered a sort of institution and insists that emotions vary in intensity and shape throughout history. According to Febvre, in a given society there are systems of emotions that set the codes as

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to which attitudes and gestures are accepted and, thus, are prevalent. Febvre was perhaps among the first historians to put forward the idea of thinking of emotions in terms of structures and systems. Other scholars, such as Carol and Peter Stearns, William Reddy, and Monique Scheer, would elaborate on these ideas several decades later. Likewise, Febvre suggests that these systems of emotions evolved in time. He explains that within them there is an ongoing tension between intellectual and emotional activity in which the intellect gradually suppressed emotions. That is to say, much in line with the work of Norbert Elias, Febvre implies that more civilized times were those in which members of society were more successful putting their intellect on top of their emotional impulses.\(^{18}\)

This insinuation is problematic in many ways and has been the object of criticism among historians of emotions, particularly from Barbara Rosenwein. Yet, the fact remains that Febvre was one of the first to reflect on how emotions change in time and to raise questions with regards to the relationship between emotions and the intellect.\(^{19}\)

During the three decades following Febvre’s article, emotions were mostly absent from the historians’ research agenda. It was not until the second half of the 1970s and the 1980s that historians once again began to consider emotions as a subject worth paying attention to. In France, Philippe Ariès and, particularly, Jean Delumeau explored emotions from the perspective of mentalities. Ariès, for instance, studies the different ways in which Western culture has conceived death and how these conceptions have changed over time. Ariès’ work pays attention to the emotions and expressions that death produced. According


to Ariès, there were certain times in the Middle Ages and early modernity in which death was conceived as something ordinary. Most people were prepared for their death and accepted their fate. Yet, towards the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, there was an abrupt change in the way death was conceived. Ariès argues that death began to be feared and avoided. Such rejection was accompanied with a sense of passionate sorrow that led people to cry, languish, and even faint at the death of a loved one. Delumeau, for his part, claims that between the thirteenth and eighteenth centuries Western civilization became obsessed with guilt and sin. He argues that the religious and intellectual elites of the time tried to change people’s behavior by crafting the notion of a vindictive and ruthless God who was ready to punish every sinful act. What resulted from this conception was a shared sense of fear and uneasiness that prevailed for close to five centuries. In that sense, Ariès and Delumeau’s mentalities perspective sought to understand a given civilization or society, and the changes taking place within it through its feelings and expressions of fear, guilt, sorrow, and anguish.

In the 1980s, a similar but somewhat different approach emerged on the other side of the Atlantic. Carol and Peter Stearns proposed studying society’s attitudes and values towards emotions and expressions to uncover social change. The Stearnses argue that paying attention to changes in emotional standards can reveal social transformations and


the ways in which these take place.\textsuperscript{22} Such approach, for which the Stearnses coined the term “emotionology”, focuses “on the social factors that determine and delimit, either implicitly or explicitly, the manner in which emotions are expressed.” By doing so, emotionology tries to “illuminate how and why social agencies and institutions either promote or prohibit some kinds of emotions, while remaining neutral or indifferent to others.”\textsuperscript{23} In that sense, the Stearnses propose analyzing the ways in which diaries, periodicals, and manuals of etiquette, among others, portray and assess emotions and expressions. The goal of such an endeavor, they explain, is to grasp how these assessments change over time and across class, gender, and racial boundaries to better understand social change.\textsuperscript{24} This implies that historians studying emotions from an emotionology perspective must examine relatively long periods of time, at least several decades or even whole centuries, in order to recognize and get a sense of the ways in which emotional standards change over time and how these variations are associated with other social transformations.

The Stearnses were careful to state that emotionology distinguishes between cultural and social standards, on the one part, and the emotional experiences of individuals and groups, on the other.\textsuperscript{25} In an interview with Jan Plamper, Peter Stearns explains that emotionology’s emphasis on this distinction is simply a means to recognize “when we’re dealing with culture and not pretend it necessarily describes actual experience.” Moreover, he maintains that emotionology’s focus on society’s attitudes and values is partly due to

\textsuperscript{23} Stearns and Stearns, “emotionology: Clarifying the History of Emotions,” 813.
\textsuperscript{24} Stearns and Stearns, “emotionology: Clarifying the History of Emotions,” 822-826.
\textsuperscript{25} Stearns and Stearns, “emotionology: Clarifying the History of Emotions,” 824.
the fact “that culture is a lot more accessible” than experience. Nicole Eustace, one of the leading historians from the emotionology side, argues that “there’s the practical problem of how historians can ever determine what people in the past were experiencing internally.” For Eustace, historians should focus on who expresses and has the right to express emotions, which expressions are socially accepted, how each person expresses emotions, and in what ways this reveals relations of power in a given society.

Over a decade after the Stearnses’ article on emotionology came out, several historians of emotions began to move away from the emphasis placed on emotional standards and their ensuing relations of power. Some of these historians, such as William Reddy, Barbara Rosenwein, Javier Moscoso, and Juan Manuel Zaragoza, have delved into interdisciplinary theoretical and methodological discussions as part of their efforts to approach emotional experiences. In doing so, they sought to contribute to ongoing conversations on the nature and essence of emotions. At the time, scholars had been discussing if emotions were merely biological responses taking place in the human body or if emotions were found in the brain and were part of human consciousness. Other
discussions mulled over the universal or relativist character of emotions. Those closer to biological understandings claimed that emotions did not change throughout time and that all societies, regardless of their cultural backgrounds, experienced emotions in the same manner. Relativist views, usually closer to cognitive conceptions of emotions, stressed the role of culture shaping emotions and bringing about a wide variety of emotional experiences. Other scholars discussed if emotions should be deemed irrational or if they should be understood as constituent of rational thought. In the meantime, others considered the issue of understanding emotions as simply individual actions or as part of collective social life. In these discussions, many cultural anthropologists argued that emotions are socially constructed and insisted on the role of culture shaping emotions and informing the ways in which society perceives them. Those who embraced stronger versions of social constructivism ended up maintaining that “natural” and universal emotions do not exist. For them, what exists are a wide variety of socially and culturally assembled ones.

Reddy sought to challenge strong relativist understandings of emotions without denying that culture and social life shape emotions. Reddy’s criticism was aimed at

the prefrontal cortex is connected to the rest of the human body. Emotional responses are possible thanks to the brain’s capacity to map and measure what is happening throughout the human body. (Antonio Damasio, *Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain* (New York: G.P. Putnam, 1994), 15-17.) Philosophers Andy Clark and David Chalmers, for their part, have explained that not all cognition takes place in the brain. They argue that our body and the environment around us also play a central role in driving cognition processes. Clark and Chalmers called this externalist understanding of cognition the ‘extended mind theory.’ In that sense, they argue that an individual’s cognition is made up of the reactions taking place in the brain, the impulses moving throughout the human body, and the stimuli coming from the surrounding environment. (Andy Clark and David Chalmers, “The Extended Mind”, *Analysis*, vol. 58, no. 1 (1998): 7-8.) Catherine Lutz and Geoffrey M. White, “The Anthropology of Emotions”, *Annual Review of Anthropology*, vol. 15, no. 1 (1986): 406-409.

anthropologists such as Catherine Lutz and Lila Abu-Lughod\textsuperscript{33} who, he explains, had ended up espousing antiessentialist views of emotions that refused “to allow for any physiological, psychological, or other universal determinant or influence in emotional life.”\textsuperscript{34} Reddy also maintains that strong constructionist views of emotions disregarded the fact that emotional discourses change over time. In that sense, Reddy claims that it is necessary to acknowledge the “dynamic character of emotional utterances and gestures” which are, he argued, “a universal factor, central to the shaping of and alternation of emotion ‘discourse’ in every context.”\textsuperscript{35}

Reddy put forward the concept of ‘emotive’ as a means to bridge emotional discourses and practices while also drawing attention on both the changing and universal character of utterances and gestures. Reddy defines ‘emotives’ as utterances or speech acts through which individuals describe and characterize emotions. When a person is feeling a series of sensations, ‘emotives’ come into play in the moment in which the individual decides to identify those feelings and label them under a particular category or term. In that sense, an ‘emotive’ is the act in which a person names an emotion in accordance with society’s terminology and understandings of what such emotion implies.\textsuperscript{36} Thus, ‘emotives’ are “utterances aimed at briefly characterizing the current state of activated thought material that exceeds the current capacity of attention. Such expression, by analogy


\textsuperscript{35} Reddy, “Against Constructionism,” 327.

with speech acts, can be said to have (1) descriptive appearance, (2) relational intent, and (3) self-exploring and self-altering effects.”37 One of the main implications that comes with Reddy’s definition is that the act of naming and labeling a feeling realigns an individual’s emotions. When a person experiences a feeling and labels such sensation under a particular term, that person’s feelings are readjusted to fit that term. As Reddy explains, an ‘emotive’ is also an attempt “to feel what one says one feels.”38

Reddy maintains that ‘emotives’ are central to historical change. Society is constantly searching for and coining new ‘emotives’ that will more fully satisfy people’s needs and desires. This process not only implies linguistic transformations and the expansion of society’s lexicon. It also modifies the relation that individuals have with themselves and, thus, it affects the world around them by bringing about new attitudes and new social relations.39 Moreover, ‘emotives’ are also implicated in defining and shaping political systems. Complementary to ‘emotives’, Reddy introduced the term ‘emotional regime’ to describe “the set of normative emotions and the official rituals, practices, and ‘emotives’ that express and inculcate them; a necessary underpinning of any stable political regime.”40 In that sense, an ‘emotional regime’ is an ensemble of approved ‘emotives’,

40 Reddy, The Navigation of Feeling, 129. (In an interview with Jan Plamper, Reddy accepts that the term ‘emotional regime’ has received much criticism. For one part, backlash came from the fact that concept was too dependent on political regimes and on the modern notion of nation-state. Secondly, the term ‘regime’ is considered to be somewhat severe to describe an ensemble of practices and rituals. In the interview, Reddy argues that ‘emotional styles’ might be a better way to describe the set of practices, rituals, and ‘emotives’ that characterize a given society. He also explains that “‘style’ becomes ‘regime’ when the sum of the penalties and exclusions adds up to a coherent structure, and the issue of conformity becomes defining for the individual.” In that sense, Reddy claims that his notion of ‘emotional style’ resembles, to some extent, Raymond Williams’ concept of ‘structures of feeling’ which sought to explain the social acceptability of certain conventions and ways of feeling. Williams studies the tension between official discourses and regulations, on one side, and popular responses, on the other. He focuses on the world of art and literature.
rituals, and practices in which – much in the vein of the Stearnses – those members of society who conform to existing codes are rewarded while those who do not are reproached. For Reddy, every political regime is supported by an emotional regime, but he also explains that changes in ‘emotives’ may lead to transformations in political regimes.\textsuperscript{41}

In Rosenwein’s case, her inquiries were, in part, a response to her dissatisfaction at the way in which previous historians had conceived emotions and her rejection towards universalist views of emotions. For Rosenwein, the “hydraulic” model of emotions that prevailed when Huizinga, Febvre, Bloch, and Elias wrote about emotions posed many problems. This notion conceives emotions as if they were “great liquids within each person, heaving and frothing, eager to be let out.”\textsuperscript{42} The “hydraulic” model still abounds today in everyday language and popular conceptions of emotions. As Rosenwein explains, such conception assumes that emotions are universal and “insofar as it recognizes a history, it encourages a ‘binary’ one in which emotions are either ‘on’ or ‘off’ depending on social, superego, or individually willed restraints. The hydraulic view lies behind the grand narrative, validating its search for a turning point based on restraint.”\textsuperscript{43} For Rosenwein, new and alternative understandings of emotions were required not only to transcend previous metanarratives but also to come closer to society’s emotional life and experiences.

\textsuperscript{42} Rosenwein, “Worrying about Emotions in History,” 834.
\textsuperscript{43} Rosenwein, “Worrying about Emotions in History,” 836.
Rosenwein came up with the concept of ‘emotional communities’ as a way to overcome this disjunctive. The concept highlights diversity over uniformity as it draws attention on the different ways members of a given society experience and understand emotions. Rosenwein defines emotional communities as groups in which “people adhere to the same norms of emotional expressions and value – or devalue – the same or related emotions. More than one emotional community may exist – indeed normally does exist – contemporaneously, and these communities may change over time. Some come to the fore to dominate our sources, then recede in importance. Others are almost entirely hidden from us...”44 As Rosenwein explains, emotional communities define and assess what is valuable or harmful to them, the nature of the affective bonds, and the expressions that they expect, encourage, tolerate, or deplore.45 Communities “are not constituted by one or two emotions but rather by constellations – or sets – of emotions. Their characteristic styles depend not only on the emotions that they emphasize – and how and in what contexts they do so – but also by the ones that they demote to the tangential or do not recognize at all.”46

Amidst these discussions, Javier Moscoso and Juan Manuel Zaragoza have, for their part, made a stand claiming that they are more concerned with exploring experiences rather than standards and attitudes. They define their approach, the “history of experience”,

44 Barbara H. Rosenwein, Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 2. (Rosenwein also explains that emotional communities are in some ways similar to what Foucault called a common ‘discourse’ in the sense that shared vocabularies and ways of thinking have a controlling and discipling function. For Rosenwein, they are also similar to Bourdieus notion of ‘habitus’ as within the communities there are internalized norms that determine how we think and act and these may vary between different groups. Rosenwein explains that she uses “the term ‘communities’ in order to stress the social and relational nature of emotions; to allow room for Reddy’s very useful notion of ‘emotives’, which change the discourse and the habitus by their very existence; and to emphasize some people’s adaptability to different sorts of emotional conventions as they move from group to another.” (Rosenwein, Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages, 25.)
46 Rosenwein, Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages, 26.
as one that focuses on the cultural forms of subjectivity. Moscoso and Zaragoza claim that they are not interested in identifying references to states of consciousness but rather in studying the conditions that make experiences culturally significant. That is to say, they explain that their approach seeks to study the cultural conditions that make emotions, feelings, passions, and instincts possible, at the same time that these conditions allow for their dramatic and rhetoric manifestations. More than a final product, Moscoso and Zaragoza’s “history of experience” sets out a line of research for the future that eagerly advocates for interdisciplinary research with medicine, public health, and philosophy.47 Yet, Moscoso’s published work hints at the where the “history of experience” is going to. In his book about pain, Moscoso claims that, in given circumstances, experiences of human suffering articulate with rhetorical strategies so that pain, as a subjective and intersubjective reality, exist. For Moscoso, the cultural expressions of pain are not only demonstrative, but also performative. Pain needs persuasive tools for the audience to be convinced that the suffering is true. Only then does the audience emotionally respond to pain.48

In general terms, this is where the field of the history emotions stands today. Emotions as patterns of activity, emotions as biological responses, emotions as human consciousness, emotions as offshoots of mentalities, and emotions as markers of social change are some of the definitions that have been laid out by historians since the first half of the twentieth century. Emotionology, ‘emotives’, emotional communities, and “history of experience”, for their part, are some of the concepts and approaches that stand out as

possible channels for historians to explore emotions and the ways in which they change and bring about transformations throughout time.

Where, among these many definitions, notions, and approaches, does this dissertation stand? I consider emotions to be a constitutive part of human cognition. That is, emotions help us give meaning to the world that surround us at the same time that they allow us to express meaning. This depiction builds on Andy Clark and David Chalmer’s theory of the “extended mind” which claims that an individual’s cognition is made up of the reactions taking place in the brain, the impulses moving throughout the human body, and the stimuli coming from the surrounding environment. In that sense, emotions take place in both the brain and body, but they are stirred and inspired by the world that surrounds them. Emotions are not contrary to rationality. Rather, they feed and inform rational thought. My understanding is somewhat similar to what Martha Nussbaum argues about emotions being a subcategory of thought. I would add that emotions are integrated to the thought process and not simply a subdivision of it. Likewise, I deem that emotions exist and take shape in particular cultural and social settings. They are universal in the sense that there are bodily and mental reactions and stimuli that, to some extent, are shared by all human beings regardless of the period of time or the culture in which they take place. Yet, such universalism has its limits. The cultural and social life in which emotions are inscribed end up defining the ways emotions are experienced and expressed at the same time.

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time that they shape how emotions expand and the manners in which society assesses and values them.

The dissertation picks up on many of the questions and reflections historians of emotions have posed. It pays close attention to the ways in which emotions spread across society and the reasons they grew as they did. Much in the vein of Lefebvre, I trace rumors and false news and try to get a grasp of the feelings they incited and the ways in which society gave meaning to these emotions and rumors. As Bloch explains, errors and false news – and emotions, I would add – can only propagate and survive on the condition that they find “a favorable cultural broth in the society where [they are] spreading.” 51 Throughout the dissertation, I try to immerse myself into the milieu of the time, trying to get a sense of the conditions that made certain emotions, expressions, and meanings possible. This milieu was hardly ever homogenous or uniform. There were, as Rosenwein would put, different emotional communities that understood, evaluated, and expressed emotions in different ways. Political divisions were important markers dividing one community from the other, but there were also other elements such as religious interpretations, scientific understandings, and social relations that were at play. Following what scholars such as Catherine Lutz, Carol and Peter Stearns, William Reddy, and Joanna Bourke have explained, I also consider that emotions – their expressions, evaluations, and assessments – are part of relations of power. As Bourke argues, “emotions such as fear do not only belong to individuals or social groups: they mediate between the individual and


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the social. They are about power relations. Emotions lead to a negotiation of the boundaries between self and other or one community and another.”

This dissertation differs from previous work on the history of emotions in various ways. Above all, it lays much more emphasis on the relationship between emotions and the meanings they bring about than has been common in historiography. Throughout, I claim that emotions shaped the meanings people gave to the world they lived in at the same time that emotions, particularly people’s emotional expressions, helped express meaning to people’s actions and strategies. Likewise, I shed light on how emotions shaped society’s notions of the past and the future and brought about new understandings of their collective memory and their horizons of expectation. In addition, somewhat in the same vein as Moscoso and Zaragoza’s proposal, the dissertation is more interested in coming within reach of people’s emotional experiences rather than studying how emotions changed in time. For this reason, contrary to most historians of emotions who usually study long periods of time to grasp changes in emotional standards, this dissertation focuses on a relatively short period of just over twenty years.

Accordingly, throughout the chapters I

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52 Joanna Bourke, “Fear and Anxiety,” p. 124. On emotions and relations of power, also see Sara Ahmed’s work. Ahmed explains that “emotions show us how histories stay alive, even when they are not consciously remembered; how histories of colonialism, slavery, and violence shape lives and worlds in the present. The time of emotion is not always about the past, and how it sticks. Emotions also open up futures, in the ways they involve different orientations to others. It takes time to know what we can do with emotion. Of course, we are not just talking about emotions when we talk about emotions. The objects of emotions slide and stick, and they join the intimate histories of bodies, with the public domain of justice and injustice. Justice is not simply a feeling. And feelings are not always just. But justice involves feelings, which move us across the surfaces of the world, creating ripples in the intimate contours of our lives. Where we go, with these feelings, remains an open question.” (Sara Ahmed. The Cultural Politics of Emotion (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014) 202.) (Discussions regarding emotions also bring about debates about the self and selfhood. For more about the self and modernity, see: Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989).)

53 There are, of course, historians who have also studied emotions focusing on relatively short periods of time. An example of this is: Jan Plamper, “Fear: Soldiers and Emotion in Early Twentieth-Century Russian Military Psychology”, Slavic Review 68, no. 2 (2009): 259-283.
carry out a fine-grained, microscopic analysis that focuses on concrete events and studies the lives and testimonies of specific individuals. This approach seeks to analyze people’s actions, expressions, and moods as well as the milieu in which they lived in. By doing so, it seeks to get a better sense of the ways they experienced emotions and how these emotions gave meaning to the world they lived in.

My work also builds on Monique Scheer’s invitation to think of emotions as practices, following Pierre Bourdieu’s conception of the term. To an extent, Bourdieu’s practice theory does not leave much room for people’s subjective strategies. Yet, he explains that the habitus sets the limits to what is possible but leaves the possibility for individuals to have goals and intentions within the boundaries and conditions imposed by the habitus. In that sense, emotional practices – such as gestures, body postures, and verbal and nonverbal expressions – can also be strategic when individuals and collectivities, within the limits and conditions imposed by the habitus, suggest specific meanings by marshalling and guiding their emotional expressions in certain directions.

Lastly, the dissertation also differs from previous work because it underlines moments of intense emotions and situations in which emotions spread at a frantic pace. There were moments, such as Quito in 1815, in which fear and distrust grew day after day, piling up until they finally burst into a panic attack. This by no means implies that my dissertation subscribes to the “hydraulic model.” Rosenwein’s criticism of Elias and Febvre’s conception of emotions was valid. Emotions, understood as a form of cognition,

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are always active and operating. They are never “off.” They are never above or below rationality because they are part of rational thought. Yet, there are moments in which the environment – with its particular social relations and cultural conditions – produces stimuli and effervescence that eventually brings about intense experiences and passionate expressions. Rosenwein does not deny this. Yet, her criticism of the “hydraulic model” has drawn attention away from the fact that emotions are, at times, experienced more intensely than others and that there are occasions in which certain emotions and their ensuing expressions do not surface immediately. Rather, there are instances in which emotions slowly amass in the hearts and minds of most of society until some sort of stimuli triggers an emotional outburst.

*Independence and the Age of Revolutions in Latin America*

In as much as this is a dissertation on the history of emotions, it is also a history of the independence process in northern South America. It offers a different perspective on the troubled times the region lived in the early nineteenth century. Rather than focusing on foundational constitutions, innovative policies and ideas, political and military leaders, or the role of subaltern groups, this dissertation concentrates on the milieu of confusion and fear that took over the region. It attempts to grasp society’s anxieties and uncertainties as well as its feelings of rage, grief, guilt, and hope in order to get a better sense of people’s decisions and their different understandings of what was happening at the time. Ultimately, fear and confusion gave shape to the republican and national projects that emerged at the time.

In that sense, the dissertation is in dialogue with the work of social and political historians who, in the last few decades, have offered novel interpretations of the Age of
Revolutions in Latin America. In recent years, social historians have built on the pioneering work of scholars such as Alberto Flores Galindo and C.L.R. James, to show definitively that Indians, free blacks, and African slaves were not merely cannon fodder, but dynamic and heterogenous actors who behaved according to their interests and ideas.\textsuperscript{56} In an effort to challenge nineteenth-century and traditional historiographies – which hardly mention the role of Indians, slaves, free blacks, and popular sectors except to emphasize how their alleged “unruliness” and “rowdiness” menaced the independence process –,\textsuperscript{57} social historians have underlined the capacity of nonelite sectors to make their own, rational, and sound decisions.\textsuperscript{58} Yet, as a result of this, many social historians have ended up implying that the actors of the time had an almost absolute certainty of what was happening and were unequivocally sure of what was in their best interests. Thus, social historians have obscured emotions in their work, usually taking them as antipodal to rationality. Many of them have ignored the role of emotions shaping people’s decisions and their understandings of what was happening around them. This dissertation attempts to tackle this gap.

Towards the end of twentieth century, social historians turned their attention towards the role of peasants, plebeians, slaves, and Indians during the Age of Revolutions

\textsuperscript{56} Alberto Flores Galindo, \textit{La ciudad sumergida: aristocracia y plebe en Lima, 1760-1830} (Lima: Editorial Horizonte, 1991); C.L.R. James, \textit{The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L’Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution} (London: Penguin: 2001 (©1938)).


\textsuperscript{58} Throughout the dissertation, I try to highlight the diversity of nonelite sectors. Yet, there are many cases in which the historical records only offer very limited information as to who belonged to the “crowd” and “mob” groups and what were the different positions and interests they represented.
in Latin America. By doing so, many scholars have sought to highlight their contributions to the revolutionary and independence processes. Peter Guardino, for instance, has claimed that peasants in Mexico, particularly in Guerrero, made major contributions to the independence efforts as well as to the liberal reform movements of the 1850s. Throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, peasants gained access to local power thanks to their alliances with regional elites. At the same time, these coalitions enabled liberal elites to push forward reforms at the national level. Eric Van Young argues that in Mexico in the 1810s many popular rural insurgents joined rebel armies with the goal of defending their local culture and their communal autonomy from the growing intervention of Bourbon authorities. Yet, rural plebeians did not completely reject the Spanish Monarchy as was the case of most creole elites. Van Young notes that, at least during the first years of the independence process, Indians made up over half of all rural insurgents. On the other side of the continent, plebeian political participation was also prevalent during these years.

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59 Among social historians, there has also been a growing interest in the role of women during the independence process. Yet, attention to women has been somewhat marginal compared to that paid to Indians, slaves, peasants, and plebeians. Some of examples of this growing literature are: Evelyn Cherpak, “The Participation Of Women In The Wars For Independence In Northern South America 1810-1824”, Minerva, vol. XI, no. 3 (1993); Ana Serrano Galvis, “Las mujeres como sujetos políticos durante la Independencia de la Nueva Granada”, Memoria y Sociedad, vol. 20, no. 40 (Jun 2016): 101-119; Martha Lux, Mujeres patriotas y realistas entre dos órdenes. Discursos, estrategias y tácticas en la guerra, la política y el comercio (Nueva Granada, 1790-1830) (Bogotá: Ediciones Uniandes, 2014).

60 Peter Guardino, Peasants, Politics, and the Formation of Mexico's National State: Guerrero, 1800-1857. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996). (Guardino explains that, in the case of nineteenth-century Oaxaca, many political innovations and changes in hegemonic ideologies came from the elites. Yet, he argues that popular sectors learned about and learned to use the new discourses and arguments that were introduced in the late eighteenth century. As Guardino maintains, “these included visions of citizenship and nationality as well as liberal arguments about individual liberty. Subalterns also participated in elections after the establishment of republics. The point is not that the post-Enlightenment liberal state represented a new era of freedom for the downtrodden masses, but instead that subalterns working to survive and improve their lives were sensitive to the new political ideas bandied about by elites.” (Peter Guardino, The Time of Liberty: Popular Political Culture in Oaxaca, 1730-1850. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005): 3)

Lyman Johnson explains that Buenos Aires’ artisans growingly disapproved viceregal authorities due to their inaction at the rising and unrestrained arrival of imports. Urban workers’ opposition to viceregal officials radicalized throughout the first years of the nineteenth century, helping create an environment favorable to the rise of insurgent movements.  

In the Peruvian case, scholars such as Scarlett O’Phelan and Charles Walker have revealed the complex network of alliances and tensions that came about during the Túpac Amaru rebellion in the 1780s. Plebeian Indians pushed for the abolition of tribute and the mita system while many Indian leaders opposed their elimination out of fear that it could reduce their status as social and political brokers. Túpac Amaru, for his part, tried to navigate these conflicting demands while continuously negotiating and clashing with Spanish and religious authorities. Charles Walker has also argued that, during the wars of independence, Indians from the Cuzco region tried to create alternative projects different to the monarchical and republican systems. Following independence, Indians in Cuzco supported one of these alternative endeavors, that of Agustín Gamarra. As a regional leader and national president, Gamarra celebrated and acclaimed Cuzco’s Inca legacy. Yet, Gamarra’s efforts to bridge the tensions between Indian and non-Indian population in Perú were short-lived. Indians were, in the end, marginalized from full citizenship. Cecilia Méndez, for her part, explains that in Huanta, peasants found new avenues of social ascent

in warfare and political office. During periods of war, peasant communities negotiated material benefits, such as tax exemptions, rights to collect tithes, and control over the agricultural surplus. Huanta’s peasants shifted positions depending on the benefits they could obtain. From their initial monarchist position, many of them ended up fighting for the Peruvian national army.65

Slaves and free blacks have also been at the heart of historians’ inquiries. Peter Blanchard, for instance, has studied the role of slaves in royalist and rebel armies during the wars of independence. He argues that warfare opened the possibility for many slaves to gain their freedom at the same time that it offered them new opportunities for resistance. Many of them took advantage of the prevalent turmoil to escape or to sue their masters when these did not comply with their promises of manumission or with other basic rights. Blanchard explains that in certain regions, such as present-day Colombia and Venezuela, most slaves ended up fighting for royalist armies. In others, such as Buenos Aires, a majority of them were recruited by rebel armies. Close to 40% of José de San Martín’s army that invaded Chile was made up of former slaves.66 Federica Morelli and María Eugenia Chávez have explained that, in the Esmeraldas region, in present-day Ecuador, slaves and runaway communities, for the most part, supported Quito’s insurgents. They did so with the hopes of obtaining freedom and autonomy.67

Even though many slaves in northern South America ended up enlisted in royalist armies, free blacks throughout the region were fundamental pushing provincial authorities to form local government juntas and, later on, to declare independence from Spain. In the case of Cartagena, Alfonso Múnera explains that on November 11, 1811, the city’s free blacks pressured the city’s patricians, even with threats of violence, into signing the province’s declaration of independence from Spain. Múnera argues that these first years of republican life saw the rise of a mulatto consciousness that was in conflict with the privileges of the city’s white elites.\(^{68}\) Aline Helg, for her part, highlights the diversity of ideas and points of view among Cartagena’s people of African descent. She argues that racial solidarity did not exist and that many of the city’s free blacks did not support slaves in their demands for manumission and abolition. Yet, at the same time, most free blacks supported independence and pushed for the adoption of racial equality in Cartagena’s 1812 Constitution.\(^{69}\) Similarly, Marixa Lasso’s work underlines that Cartagena’s free blacks advocated for racial equality and played a protagonist role in the province’s declaration of independence. She argues that creole elites appropriated the discourse of racial equality as

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a means to demand greater American political participation in the Córtes in Cádiz and, later on, to incite patriot nationalism throughout New Granada and Venezuela.\textsuperscript{70}

In Venezuela’s case, scholars such as Alejandro Gómez and Cristina Soriano have stressed the social and racial heterogeneity as well as the political dynamism of the region’s black and mixed-race population. In Caracas and most of its proximities, people of African descent ended up supporting the rebel faction. But they did not do so from the beginning. Once the monarchical crisis began, most pardos beneméritos and pardo militias opposed the creole elites’ projects. Their opposition grew from a series of rumors that claimed that Caracas’ patricians would enslave all free blacks and pardos. Yet, in the following years, most of the city’s mixed-race, free blacks, and slaves joined the rebel side after they were convinced that republicans could better channel their aspirations. In Caracas’ case, Francisco de Miranda’s tertulias and political associations, where racial equality and abolition were constantly discussed, helped move public support in favor of republicanism. In other regions, such as Valencia, many slaves and free blacks backed the royalist faction as they believed it offered better chances of gaining manumission and access to land while also limiting the political power of local patricians.\textsuperscript{71}

In Venezuela, people of all social strataums and racial backgrounds ended up immersed in dynamic political debates. As Soriano explains, in the late eighteenth century


an incipient public sphere emerged in Caracas and neighboring cities. Venezuela’s diverse population ended up in a “wide range of debates questioning the monarchical regime and colonial rule, the socioracial hierarchies of colonial society, and the system of slavery.”\(^{72}\)

Amidst these discussions – and owing to the political and social tensions of the time – the Haitian Revolution became not only a specter, but above all a “common language used by both rulers and plebeian groups to make demands and negotiate change.”\(^{73}\)

In a variety of ways, plebeians, Indians, free blacks, and slaves played an active and dynamic role backing the independence process and the rise of republicanism. Yet, as has been mentioned, nonelite groups were not uniform nor homogenous. Many of them, for a variety of reasons, ended up on the royalist side. In recent years, a number of historians have turned their attention away from the rebel faction to study the different reasons why many slaves and Indians defended Ferdinand VII’s authority and opposed independence and republicanism. Marcela Echeverri, for instance, explores the complex networks of alliances that developed in the Province of Popayán where most Indians, free blacks, and slaves joined royalist ranks as a means to defend their privileges and gain benefits for their

\(^{72}\) Soriano, *Tides of Revolution*, 3.

\(^{73}\) Soriano, *Tides of Revolution*, 5. Among historians of Latin America, those who have paid the most attention to the reverberations of the Haitian Revolution have been historians of Cuba. Ada Ferrer, for her part, argues that for many enslaved people in Cuba, the Haitian Revolution meant that freedom was no longer simply a desired state, it also became a possible legal status. For Cuban slaveowners and Spanish authorities, the Haitian Revolution entailed an opportunity to prosper and replace Saint-Domingue as the world’s main sugar producer. Yet, for many white slaveowners and patricians, Haiti’s case also incited fears and anxieties at the thought that the racial violence that took place in Saint-Domingue could repeat itself in Cuba. (Ada Ferrer, *Freedom’s Mirror: Cuba and Haiti in the Age of Revolution* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

Matt Childs, for his part, studies the Aponte Rebellion that shook Cuba in 1812. Childs argues that slaves and free people of color, coming from different backgrounds and origins, crafted their own ideology of liberation. Such ideology interwove the Haitian Revolution with their own, particular notions of royalism and monarchism. From the insurgents’ perspective, a benevolent, liberating monarch would decree abolition and declare their freedom. This monarch could take the form of the king of Spain, Britain, Haiti, or the Kongo. (Matt Childs, *The 1812 Aponte Rebellion in Cuba and the Struggle Against Atlantic Slavery* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006).
communities. As Echeverri explains, amidst the monarchical crisis, many slaves in Popayán strategically decided to defend Ferdinand VII’s sovereignty in order to uphold their legal right to freedom in a context in which slaveowners had decided to ignore the king’s authority. Moreover, slaves recognized the existence of slavery as an institution only insofar as it was mediated by the monarch’s justice.\textsuperscript{74} Indian communities, for their part, “were eager to participate in the military defense of the sovereignty of the king. In exchange for military service, Indians gained certain concessions and benefits, particularly the reduction of their tribute payment…”\textsuperscript{75} During the first years of republican life, Echeverri explains, Indians in Popayán and in other parts of New Granada opposed universal citizenship and the abolition of tribute. They did so to secure their autonomy and land as well as to maintain the sovereignty of indigenous authorities and the rights of commoner Indians.\textsuperscript{76}

Similarly, Jairo Gutiérrez Ramos has delved into the web of alliances that emerged in the Province of Pasto among monarchist elites, the province’s Indians, and the Patianos (black communities made up of several generations of runaway slaves living in the riverbanks of the Patía River and the shorelines of the Pacific Ocean). Amidst the tensions of the time, each group pursued interracial and interclass alliances to defend their own particular interests. The city’s patricians sought greater autonomy from Quito and Santafé.


\textsuperscript{75} Echeverri, “Popular Royalists,” 255-256. Also see: Echeverri, \textit{Indian and Slave Royalists}, 123-156.

Indians attempted to maintain and increase their political privileges and their access to land. *Patianos* sought political status and recognition of their autonomy.\(^{77}\)

Steiner Saether, for his part, studies royalist decorations given to Indians who fought for the royalist faction. Saether argues that indigenous “support for monarchical rule implied more influence, greater autonomy and more privileges than they had enjoyed previously and certainly more than what they could hope for should the republicans be victorious.”\(^{78}\) Tomás Straka makes a similar argument for the Venezuelan case. He argues that most *pardos*, Indians, and slaves defended the monarch’s sovereignty partly out of a sincere devotion to the king, but also because of their enmity towards Caracas’ patricians. For many of them, the Spanish monarchy was a lesser evil when compared to the possibility of being ruled by local patricians.\(^{79}\) In the Province of Quito, the situation was not much different. Indians took advantage of the tensions of the time to put forward awaited demands such as the reduction of tribute payments, access to the cabildos, and further social status. At times, they supported the republican side, but, for the most part, their allegiances ended up in the royalist faction, where they believed their demands could be better met.\(^{80}\)

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that it was heterogenous, diverse, and highly layered. There were many different versions of popular royalism and not all of them can be considered conservative. Some of them even took a distinctive liberal twist, particularly among those who endorsed the 1812 Cádiz Constitution.\footnote{Marcela Echeverri. “Presentation: Monarchy, Empire, and Popular Politics in the Atlantic Age of Revolutions”, \textit{Varia Historia} 35, no. 67 (2019): 15-55.}

Besides being in dialogue with social historians, this dissertation is also in conversation with the work of political historians of the independence process. In recent years, a series of political historians have challenged traditional, nineteenth century narratives of the independence process as well as mid-twentieth century Marxist analyses. While traditional historians portrayed independence as a heroic deed that should be acclaimed, scholars from the mid-twentieth century called out the independence process as an aristocratic or bourgeoisie scheme that simply transferred power from the Spanish elites to the creole elites. In the last few decades, political historians have shown a much more complex and nuanced story. In doing so, they have paid close attention to nineteenth-century thinkers and political leaders – their writings, ideas, aspirations, and projects – to understand the historical significance of the rise of new republican nations.

The independence process has been a milestone in Colombian and Latin America political historiography. Among political historians and public intellectuals, there is probably no other historical process that has received as much attention. In 1827, only a few years after the formation of the first Republic of Colombia, José Manuel Restrepo published, the \textit{Historia de la Revolución de la República de Colombia}. Some decades later, José María Samper wrote \textit{Apuntamientos para la Historia Política y Social de la Nueva}
Granada in 1853 and José Manuel Groot published *Historia Eclesiástica y Civil de la Nueva Granada* in 1889. Although each one offered different arguments, Restrepo, Samper, and Groot all highlighted and praised the central role that creole elites played during the wars of independence. Restrepo was critical of federalism and defended strong, centralized governments such as the one that Simón Bolívar was erecting at the time. Samper highlighted the French Revolution’s influence on New Granada’s creole elites while Groot argued that Spanish and Catholic heritage were part of the nation’s essence. Ultimately, their different accounts of the independence process portrayed creole leaders as heroes and justified their rule – and that of their descendants – over the new country.

During the first half of the twentieth century, these narratives, particularly Restrepo and Groot’s, continued to be prevalent in Colombian education and people’s imaginaries. It was only towards the mid-century that new interpretations came about. It was during these years that Colombian scholars and intellectuals began to adopt new historical methods, with new questions and ways of understanding the past. Heroes and great leaders stopped being at the center of historical inquiry and were replaced by questions concerning social conflicts and classes. From a Marxist perspective, several scholars began to claim that the independence process did not bring any significant transformation as it left

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economic structures untouched at the same time that land property, public positions, and social standing continued in the hands of the same white, creole elites.\footnote{Reyes, “Balance y perspectivas de la historiografía,” 4-6.} For instance, Gerardo Molina argued that, during independence, the creole bourgeoisie was successful maintaining the established order and upholding their control over political and social power.\footnote{Gerardo Molina, \textit{Las ideas liberales en Colombia: 1849-1914} (Bogotá: Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 1970).} Indalecio Liévano Aguirre, for his part, claimed that many leaders of the independence process betrayed the aspirations of New Granada’s peasants and artisans to maintain their own personal and family privileges.\footnote{Indalecio Liévano Aguirre. \textit{Los grandes conflictos sociales y económicos de nuestra historia} (Bogotá: Ediciones Nueva Prensa, 1961).}

Around the second half of the twentieth century, historians of Colombia and Latin America slowly began to draw their attention away from the independence process. Yet, towards the turn of the century, there was a reawakening in historians’ interest for this period of time. Social historians, as has been discussed, began to explore the role of nonelite groups during the independence process. Political historians, for their part, have tried to push back against analyses that denied that independence and republicanism brought about any sort of political or social transformations.

From a political culture perspective, François-Xavier Guerra was among the first scholars to insist that independence and the revolutionary process brought about a significant rupture from the colonial past. For Guerra, a manifest and irreversible break took place during the 1810s and 1820s, regardless of the shallowness of some reforms or the many setbacks the new republics faced. Guerra claims that this period brought about a
new consciousness along with a new type of human being. As Guerra explains, this new human was individualistic and far removed from the caste and hierarchical society that characterized the colonial period. Guerra maintains that in the early nineteenth century, a new sense of legitimacy emerged among Latin American societies. Legitimacy now came from the sovereign people and the nation. Guerra encompassed all these transformations under the term Modernity. For Guerra, Modernity did not spread uniformly among society. It first consolidated among the elites and slowly spread through the rest of society.  

Guerra’s work inspired many historians to think of the independence process not only in terms of structural social and economic transformations, but also from the perspective of political culture and political discourses. Among Colombian historians, Isidro Vanegas and Daniel Gutiérrez have insistently highlighted that independence and the rise of republicanism brought about dynamic and innovative debates concerning people’s rights and the relation between the government and the people. For instance, Vanegas argues that the dozens of new constitutions that were enacted during those years were, by themselves, a radical rupture from the past. For Vanegas, the advent of these new constitutions reveals the willingness of both notables and plebeians to create their own political communities. Within these new spaces, they were able to rethink what justice and equality meant for them. Moreover, these constitutions brought a new legal status, that of citizenship, which implied a certain equality before the law. Gutiérrez, for his part, has

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89 Isidro Vanegas, El constitucionalismo fundacional (Bogotá: Ediciones Plural, 2012). Several scholars have highlighted the depth and complexity of the debates that gave birth to first constitutions and republican institutions in Spanish America. They have shown that these discussions were relatively eclectic in the sense that they were inspired by the French Revolution, the American Revolution, Spanish liberalism, and local notions of justice and government. A concept that was central in these debates was that of citizenship. Debates
highlighted that during the 1810s there were challenging debates over the sorts of relations of power that provincial governments should have with one another. Gutiérrez’s work underlines the highly federalist spirit that prevailed during these first years of independence. It was, to an extent, a break from the ways in which power had been distributed in the past, when major decisions were usually taken in Santafé and overseas. In a similar vein, Margarita Garrido has explained that independence and republicanism brought about a new language through which people of all social strataums and races could better channel their aspirations and demands for rights. Likewise, Garrido explains that independence came with the advent of new, alternative notions of power.

Historians who have studied Latin America’s first decades of republican life have made similar claims about the liberal spirit and the innovative republican institutions that came about in the years following the independence process. James Sanders, for instance,


90 Daniel Gutiérrez Ardila, Un nuevo reino: geografía política, pactismo y diplomacia durante el interregno en Nueva Granada, 1808-1816 (Bogotá: Universidad Externado de Colombia, 2010). Anthony McFarlane makes a similar case to Gutiérrez’s. McFarlane argues that political culture at the time was more provincial and regional. Very few leaders had a proto-nationalist vision of the territories they inhabited. (Anthony McFarlane, “La construcción del orden político: la ‘Primera República’ en la Nueva Granada, 1810-1815”, Historia y Sociedad, no. 8 (2002): 47-82.)

argues that Hispanic American republican modernity was the bastion and vanguard of popular, anti-colonial liberty in the Atlantic world. Sanders argues that, between the 1840s and 1870s, the true home of liberty, equality, and fraternity was not France, but Spanish America. It was in this region of the world, he claims, that these notions were actually lived in the practices of the people.\textsuperscript{92} For her part, Lina del Castillo shows that, for the Colombian case, the formation of the state was shaped by scientific knowledge. Colombia’s leaders sought to legitimize and impose a scientific project that would place the country in the global vanguard.\textsuperscript{93}

In this vast literature about the independence process and the Age of Revolutions in Latin America, emotions have been mostly absent. There are, however, several exceptions. Margarita Garrido, for instance, has argued that fear of the mob led creole leaders in Santafé in 1810 to contain, manage, and moderate both plebeian and patrician’s aspirations for political change. Garrido has also analyzed a series of patriotic sermons ordered by General Francisco José de Santander in 1819 after rebel troops took over Bogotá. She claims that these homilies sought to ease people’s feelings of guilt by showing them that republicanism was not sinful nor contrary to God’s will.\textsuperscript{94} Pablo Rodríguez, for his part, explains that the 1812 earthquake that shook northern Venezuela caused much fear and guilt among republican supporters and, ultimately, enabled the royalists’ takeover

\textsuperscript{93} Lina del Castillo, \textit{Crafting a Republic for the World: Scientific, Geographic, and Historiographic Inventions of Colombia} (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2018).
of Caracas and other rebel cities. Daniel Gutiérrez has shown that José Manuel Restrepo’s fears towards royalist repression during the monarchical restoration explains why the creole leader abandoned his political activism towards the mid-1810s.

Christon I. Archer argues that around mid-1810 the Bajío region in México lived a sort of collective neurosis. People of all social strata shared the feeling that an impending calamity was soon going to happen. Archer explains that this collective fear, coupled with a sense of intense mistrust among different social groups, helps explain why so many people, particularly European Spaniards and creole elites, fled the countryside and moved to urban centers once the Hidalgo rebellion began. Peter Guardino, for his part, maintains that the rumors and feelings of fear that spread after the onset of the monarchical crisis heightened the sense of crisis that people felt at the time. Ultimately, this collective anguish shaped society’s beliefs and what people considered possible and plausible.

Peter Blanchard’s recent work on Buenos Aires’ urban elite explores the patricians’ strong sense of loyalty towards the Spanish Crown and their class cohesion during the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century. Blanchard argues that the elites’ fear and anxiety of losing their privileges and ascendancy incited a fervent loyalism among them. Despite their many internal conflicts and tensions, such zealous loyalty kept patricians together. With the advent of the monarchical crisis, the element bringing the elites together

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– that is, the Spanish Monarchy – vanished and conflicts between them flourished. Such frictions and divisions, Blanchard argues, would afflict the region for decades.99 Alejandro Rabinovich, from a military history perspective, maintains that a panic attack among rebel troops helps explain the royalist victory in the battle of Huaqui in June 1811. This battle, he argues, was a major defeat to the most radical faction of Buenos Aires’ May Revolution and hindered the rebel armies’ advance into Upper Perú.100

Claudia Rosas Lauro, for her part, has shown that in Perú most people perceived the French Revolution in a negative light. Lima’s residents were shocked and terrified with news of Louis XVI’s execution and the revolutionaries’ constant attacks on the clergy. Among Lima’s elite, there was a great fear that the French Revolution’s bloodshed could spread to the other side of the Atlantic. This anguish was fed by memories of the violence the region had recently endured during the Tupac Amaru Rebellion. Charles Walker, studying a relatively earlier period, highlights the many feelings of guilt and anguish that spread across Lima following the 1748 earthquake that destroyed the city. Walker claims that the earthquake ended up shaping the city’s moral consciousness and brought about new moral controls over its resident’s actions and thoughts.101

Among these historians, it is probably Claudia Rosas and Margarita Garrido who have made the greatest efforts to stimulate the history of emotions in Latin America. Rosas has edited two multidisciplinary books that study emotions – particularly fear, hate, and

100 Claudia Rosas Lauro, *Del trono a la guillotina: el impacto de la Revolución Francesa en el Perú (1789-1808)* (Lima: Institut français d'études andines – Fondo Editorial de la Pontificia, 2006).
forgiveness – in Peruvian history. Rosas also edited, with Manuel Chust, a book on the revolutionaries’ misgivings and anxieties during the independence process. Garrido, along with Javier Moscoso, recently edited an issue of Historia Crítica dedicated to the history of emotions. Most of articles deal with the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. In her opening remarks, Garrido explains that the history of emotions has been steadily growing in Latin America history, particularly in the last decade. She concludes that, among historians of Latin America, the field has a promising future in the years to come.

So much has been said about the independence process and the Age of Revolutions in Latin America that it seems as if nothing new can be claimed about this period. Yet, viewing these times from the viewpoint of the history of emotions offers fresh perspective on how people experienced and understood the world that they were living in. Such an approach sheds light on the prevalent uncertainty that was experienced during the early nineteenth century at the same time that if helps understand the changing tides of revolution and reform. Emotions were not mere reactions nor instrumental responses as is sometimes implied. They were a constitutive part of how people understood and gave meaning to the world around them.

This dissertation makes a contribution to the vast historiography of the independence process in three ways. In the first place, this dissertation puts into doubt the

103 Garrido, “Historia de las emociones y los sentimientos”, 9-23.
sense of certainty that allegedly existed at the time. For François-Xavier Guerra, people in the 1810s were fully conscious of the transformations they were living. They were aware, he argues, that they were creating a new society with a new political order. Vanegas makes a similar claim when he implies that basically everyone understood the language and repercussions of the newly enacted constitutions. Some social historians, such as Blanchard, Múnera, Gutiérrez Ramos, and Echeverri, tend to present a somewhat similar scenario, although more nuanced, in which slaves unmistakably knew which side would best keep their promises of manumission, Indians were certain of which faction would reduce tribute payments and maximize their access to land, and free blacks were fully aware of who offered better chances for them to improve their social standing.

Yet, such a scenario is not consistent with many accounts found in the historical records. People at the time were trying to navigate the troubled times they were living in. Some were simply trying to survive. Others, tried to gain some benefit from the tensions of the time, but they did so with imperfect and, many times, false information. These were, after all, times in which uncertainty and confusion were widespread. Former alliances were constantly falling apart, power was continually changing hands, and legislation was frequently being reformed. Not everyone had a clear sense of what was happening, of what to expect from the future, or of how they and their communities could make the best of the situation. In that sense, this dissertation simply tries to show a more nuanced picture that considers the lack of certitude of the time and that takes into account that emotions, particularly uncertainty and fear, informed and shaped people’s actions and decisions. Individuals and collective groups belonging to all stratums of society assessed the situation
the best they could. Yet, their decisions were informed and shaped by emotions, particularly by the prevalent uncertainty of the time.

Secondly, with respect to the extensive literature on this historical period, my dissertation stresses the persistence of monarchical and colonial notions of order, stability, and power. Guerra, Vanegas, and Gutiérrez, among others, have highlighted the novel constitutions, the innovative projects, and the new language of rights that arose during this period. This dissertation does not completely refute their claims; however, I attempt to present a more nuanced analysis that considers the ways in which different experiences of fear, confusion, hope, and anger both inspired and deterred the establishment of democratic and republican institutions. Despite the many pioneering and democratic ideas and projects that emerged during these years, not all of them survived their establishment and many were distorted and deformed once they were put into practice. Dread and uncertainty led many of the region’s residents to seek stability and safety at the expense of their hopes for social and political reform. The milieu of the time ultimately hindered the revolutionary spirit, enabling the persistence of monarchical and colonial notions of social order, political stability, and symbolic power.

In the third place, this dissertation invites historians of the independence process and the Age of Revolutions who pay attention to emotions to avoid simplistic cause-and-effect evaluations. Among the few historians of the independence process who have considered emotions, most have conceived them from a cause-and-effect perspective. That is to say, they portray emotions as automatic reactions or as igniters to particular responses. Rodríguez, for instance, explains that the 1812 earthquake brought about feelings of fear and guilt and that these emotions ultimately led to the royalists’ takeover of Caracas.
Blanchard claims that Buenos Aires’ elites feared losing their privileges and standing. Such anxiety resulted in the patricians setting aside their differences and uniting around the Spanish Monarchy’s authority to defend their status. These cause-and-effect analyses of emotions are not necessarily incorrect, but they oversimplify what emotions are and how they work. Emotions are much more than mere reactions and triggers. To better understand the implications of the independence process and how people lived and understood this period, historians should attempt to see beyond cause-and-effect analyses of emotions. Those studying this period could benefit from conceiving emotions as part of human cognition that helps give meaning to people’s world.

Dissertation organization

This dissertation is organized into five roughly chronological chapters. The first chapter studies Santafé de Bogotá, between 1808 and 1810. During these months, confusion and fear spread and took a life of their own thanks to the circulation of rumors about the monarchical crisis that had broken out in the Iberian Peninsula. Among them were claims of an impending French invasion of the Americas, the circulation of conspiracies stating that top official had decided to betray Ferdinand VII, and false stories that placed the Viceroyalty of New Granada under the control of the Portuguese monarchs. Amidst this atmosphere of widespread misinformation, uncertainty, and fright, people’s sense of what was real and plausible was distorted. Their horizons of expectations were altered, giving rise to new possible futures. Under such circumstances, some even began to envision the possibility of putting an end to the monarchy and obtaining absolute independence from Spain. In such a context, emotions altered and shaped society’s prevailing hegemonic frameworks.
The second chapter studies the different emotions that emerged following an earthquake in northern Venezuela and a series of volcanic eruptions in Popayán. Both natural disasters produced fear and guilt throughout society. However, not everyone experienced these emotions with the same intensity nor did they give them the same meaning. Moreover, there were some who, amidst the atmosphere of dread and remorse, expressed hope of better times to come claiming these natural phenomena were mere obstacles towards success. The division between “emotional communities”, following Barbara Rosenwein’s understanding of the term, was partly drawn following political lines. Royalists tried to incite feelings of guilt and fear, accusing rebels of having brought about God’s wrath with their sinful ways. They exploited the fact that the 1812 earthquake struck on a Maundy Thursday, that rebel provinces were hit the hardest, and that the tremor killed thousands and destroyed hundreds of buildings. In the meantime, republicans attempted to ease such feelings explaining that republicanism and independence were not contrary to God’s will. However, there was another factor separating one group from the other. It had to do with people’s understandings of the natural world. Those who believed earthquakes and volcanic eruptions were simply natural phenomena had fewer reasons to feel guilt or to fear God’s wrath. Popayán’s different responses to the volcanic eruptions are evocative of this division. While some authorities organized rites of repentance to calm God’s anger, others ordered indigenous peoples to climb the Puracé to clear its cracks so that the volcano could “breathe.”

Emotions are also closely connected to people’s recollections and their notions of the past. The third chapter studies how collective memory shapes emotions and in which ways emotions have an effect on people’s remembrances. On the afternoon of June 27,
1815, a panic attack broke out in the streets of Quito. In previous days, a variety of rumors had been circulating throughout the city. Some claimed that a revolt was soon to happen and that rebels were planning to attack the military quarters. Others maintained that royalist troops were going to ransack the city’s shops and residences. On the morning of the 27th, these rumors gained even more strength. At around three in the afternoon, when the church bells tolled, mayhem broke out. Quiteños ran in all directions trying to find cover. Royalist troops stationed in the city’s outskirts marched into the city to put down the disturbance. In a matter of a few minutes, Quito’s streets were left empty and in complete silence. Royalist soldiers captured a few suspects and went back to their quarters. Besides this, nothing particularly important happened on the afternoon of the 27th. The enquiries into the uproar contain dozens of testimonies explaining some of the motives that led to the panic attack. Many of Quito’s residents linked the rumors with remembrances of past episodes of urban violence. Some claimed that when they heard stories of an impending commotion, they felt that the tragic events of August 2, 1810, when royalist troops killed hundreds, were going to repeat themselves.

In the fourth chapter, I examine a series of strategies employed in rituals and judicial trials during the monarchical restoration (1815-1818). In both scenarios, emotional expressions, such as gestures, body movements, and tone of voice, served as indicators of a person’s standing in society. These expressions could convey someone’s fidelity or disloyalty to the Crown. To improve their place, individuals had to accurately interpret the circumstances surrounding them. In 1817, during the funerary rites of José María Morcillo, a royalist priest killed by rebel troops, those who attended the funeral expressed feelings of grief, rage, and awe. But it was ultimately a sense of elation that prevailed. During the
funeral rites, the vicar’s sermon claimed that Morcillo’s death had been a glorious one that should be celebrated rather than mourned. Thus, Popayán’s residents demonstrated their loyalty to the Crown expressing jubilation over the priest’s murder. Almost a year after Popayán celebrated Morcillo’s funeral, in Santafé, José Ángel Manrique, the priest of the town of Manta, was interrogated for allegedly aiding the Almeyda Guerrilla. Manrique was ultimately sentenced for betraying the Spanish Monarchy. His trial shows that emotional expressions were strategically employed to demonstrate allegiances to one faction or the other.

The fifth chapter studies a series of cases – such as the celebration of the 1821 Constitution in Bogotá when the constitution was placed on a throne – that together illustrate the persistence of colonial and monarchical archetypes. In the 1820s, the inhabitants of the newly formed republic constantly looked back to monarchical representations of power, to colonial notions of what society should look like, and to past events to strategically give meaning to the times they were living. Archetypes coming from previous decades fed and informed political and social tensions at the same time that they guided and shaped people’s emotions. A mental image of a prior symbol of power or of bygone notions of society brought about emotions and emotional expressions associated to those particular archetypes. Drawing on William Reddy’s notion of “emotives” – and expanding on its implications – this chapter discusses how mental images hailing from the colonial past gave form not only to the main debates of the time, but also to the ways in which emotions were experienced, expressed, and understood.
Methodological challenges and reflections

In 2008, José Saramago published *The Elephant’s Journey*, a historical novel about an Indian elephant’s voyage from Lisbon to Vienna. Solomon – or Suleiman, as he would be known during his last years of life – and his mahout, Subhro, were taken from India to Portugal in the 1540s. Around the end of the decade, King Joao III offered Solomon as a gift to Archduke Maximilian II of Austria. Saramago narrates the elephant’s travels from Lisbon to Valladolid, from Valladolid to Catalonia, from Catalonia to Genoa, and from Genoa to Vienna. Towards the end of the novel, as Saramago describes Solomon’s struggles and those of all of his companions climbing up the Alps amidst snowstorms and steep slopes, the author takes a short break from the actors’ physical strains and begins digressing, posing a reflection on the different challenges that novelists and historians face.

“It must be said that history is always selective, and discriminatory too”, he explains, “selecting from life only what society deems to be historical and scorning the rest, which is precisely where we might find the true explanation of facts, of things, of wretched reality itself. In truth, I say to you, it is better to be a novelist, a fiction writer, a liar. Or a mahout, despite the harebrained fantasies to which, either by birth or profession, they seem to be prone.”

Saramago’s digression is pertinent to discuss the many challenges this dissertation and the history of emotions, in general, face. Even though I have claimed throughout this introduction that emotions are fundamental to grasp society’s experiences and people’s notions of reality, emotions are mostly absent from historical accounts. And although I

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consider emotions to be central to the historians’ goal of finding “the true explanation of facts” and the “wretched reality itself”, emotions have a relatively marginal place in the historical records of the early nineteenth century. It is as if those who lived during this historical period did not deem emotions to be important enough to write about them in the records. Emotions occasionally make an explicit appearance in the few diaries of the time which have survived, in sermons and religious treatises, in correspondence, in periodicals, and in court trials. Their presence is explicit in the historical documents in the sense that terms referring to particular emotions or to certain emotional expressions are present in the text. There are other cases in which the text itself, without making any direct allusion to a specific emotion or expression, hints to an atmosphere in which certain emotions are prevalent. In these sorts of cases, labeling the milieu under a specific emotion poses several difficulties as there is always the risk of characterizing it under a term that is distant from what contemporaries actually experienced and felt. In these cases, it is necessary to have as many testimonies as possible in order to have a better grasp of what people were feeling and of the ways in which they would define the emotional atmosphere of the time.

The lack of sources referring to emotions is only one of the challenges that comes up. A second difficulty arises when trying to comprehend what those terms meant and implied at the time. In the past, terms referring to emotions did not have the same meanings and connotations as they now have in the present. For instance, in the early nineteenth century, the term emoción (emotion) that we use today was hardly ever used. Emoción does not even come up in the Diccionario de Autoridades. The terms sentimiento (feeling or sentiment) and, to a lesser extent, sensibilidad (sensibility) appear more often. Yet, they did not always directly allude to emotions. The 1739 Diccionario de Autoridades offers six
definitions to term *sentimiento*. The “action of perceiving objects through the senses”, “the soul’s perceptions of spiritual things, with pleasure, satisfaction, or internal movement”, and “the sadness, or pain, that gravely disturbs” are some of the most common definitions. Terms such as fear and confusion are referred to as disturbances in the spirit. For instance, the 1734 *Diccionario de Autoridades* defines fear as the “disturbance of the spirit, originating from the apprehension of some danger or risk that is dreaded or suspected.” Confusion, for its part, was defined by the 1729 *Diccionario de Autoridades* as a “disorder, disturbance, disconcert, and revolution of things.”

These difficulties of trying to grasp the meanings of the early nineteenth century do not imply that emotions, as we understand and conceive them in the present, did not exist in the early nineteenth century. It is simply that they were referred to and defined using terms that are not necessarily the same as ours and that these terms had somewhat different connotations in the past. The definitions that come up in the *Diccionario de Autoridades* hint at the diversity of meanings and understandings at the same time that they suggest that, in everyday usages, emotions were usually conceived as alterations, perturbations, and responses. These conceptions are, of course, different from the definition I use throughout the dissertation. That is, of emotions as a part of cognition that help give meaning to people’s lives. I have tried to avoid imposing my definition on the actors of the time, simply

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105 “Sentimiento. s. m. La acción de percibir por los sentidos los objetos.” “Sentimiento. Se toma tambien por la percepcion del alma en las cosas espirituales, con gusto, complacencia, ó movimiento interior.” “Sentimiento: Se toma tambien por pena, ó dolor, que immuta gravemente.” (*Diccionario de Autoridades*, Real Academia Española, 1739.)

106 “Miedo. s. m. Perturbación del ánimo, originada de la aprehension de algún peligro o riesgo que se teme o rezela.” (*Diccionario de Autoridades*, Real Academia Española, 1734.)

107 “Confusión. s. f. Desorden, perturbación, desconcierto y revolución de las cosas.” (*Diccionario de Autoridades*, Real Academia Española, 1729.)
using my understanding of the term as a category of analysis to explore people’s emotions and their comprehensions of the times they were living in.

A third difficulty was noted earlier when discussing Peter Stearns and Nicole Eustace’s misgivings on grasping emotional experience. As they have explained, historians face the practical problem of ever being able to determine what people in the past were actually experiencing internally.¹⁰⁸ Sources offer hints of what a person might be feeling, either because the documents tell us that a person is feeling a given emotion in a specific moment or because they refer to a person’s emotional expressions and we are guided to believe that that individual is feeling emotions associated to those expressions. Yet, the historical records will almost always fall short of giving us a complete picture of what that person was really feeling, what they felt in their bodies, what thoughts were in their minds, the intensity of the emotion being lived, how they truly processed those emotions, and how those emotions shaped their conceptions of the world.

One could add to Stearns and Eustace’s reservations that some historical documents not only fail to describe a person’s internal and authentic experience, but they sometimes portray people’s deceptive expressions and feelings as if they were truthful. For instance, there are occasions in which individuals strategically alter their emotional expressions to convey certain meanings. That is to say, there are moments in which historical sources only seem to inform us of the “public transcript”, as James Scott would call it. In these cases, the historical records only end up blurring people’s true feelings and experiences even

Emotions, particularly the ways in which they are expressed, are mediums through which power relations unravel. Subordinate and dominant groups employ their public transcript in rituals and interrogations, among others, to contest or impose power. From Scott’s perspective, one could claim that many of the emotional expressions that we find in the historical records are merely performances to navigate power struggles.

To make matters more complicated, it is worth considering William Reddy’s thoughts about how the act of naming or labeling an emotion leads to a realignment of people’s sensations. That is to say, once we label an emotion that we are feeling, our experiences and expressions of that emotion shift towards what society recognizes as common ways of feeling and displaying such emotion. If an incident is considered to incite happiness, we guide ourselves into feeling and demonstrating sensations that are in accordance with those that society, with its particular cultural and social norms, accepts as happiness. That is to say, Reddy’s claims suggest that the authenticity or sincerity of an emotional experience is always mediated by society’s notions of what such emotion should produce. In that sense, it is safe to say that historians studying attitudes, mentalities, and emotionology, such as the Stearnses and Eustace, are walking on more solid ground than those trying to grasp people’s experiences. Yet, this by no means implies that emotional experiences should be discarded as a subject of historical inquiry.

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110 As Reddy explains, ‘emotives’, by analogy with speech acts, “can be said to have (1) descriptive appearance, (2) relational intent, and (3) self-exploring and self-altering effects. Because of this third property, emotional expressions, which I call emotives, are like performatives in that they do something to the world. As a first suggestion of the significance of the concept of emotives, it was noted that sincerity and self-deception must be redefined and rethought.” This third characteristic also explains why labeling an emotion leads to a realignment of feelings and manifestations. (Reddy, *The Navigation of Feeling*: 104, 111.)
Throughout the dissertation, I try to tackle these challenges in several ways. For the one part, I have kept the *Diccionario de Autoridades* in hand and have also tried to place careful attention at how terms referring to emotions were used in written documents. In doing so, I try to grasp – in as much as is possible – the meanings given by those writing the historical records. More importantly, I have tried to delve into the milieu of the time. It is for this reason that this dissertation, at times, carries out a fine-grained microscopic, ethnographic analysis of concrete cases, trying to immerse myself – and hopefully the reader – into the context and milieu of the time. To an extent, this method is much in the spirit of Clifford Geertz’s “deep description” and Robert Darnton’s “history in the ethnographic grain.”

Through close analyses of funeral rites, judicial interrogatories, rituals, and panic attacks, among others, I try to delve into the societies’ webs of significance. My analyses and conclusions are not as all-encompassing and extensive as Geertz’s when studying a cockfight or Darnton’s when examining a cat massacre. Yet, I do try to plunge myself into the society of the time, closely looking at concrete events and testimonies, with the hope of getting a better sense of the prevalent social relations and cultural conditions.

At times, owing to the limited sources, I have had to recur to a less conventional method, that which Natalie Zemon Davis calls “informed imagination.” In an article discussing her book, *The Return of Martin Guerre*, Davis describes her method in the following way: “I worked as a detective, assessing my sources and the rules for their

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composition, putting together clues from many places, establishing a conjectural argument that made the best sense, the most plausible sense, of sixteenth-century evidence.”

In the case of dissertation, there have been moments in which the sources offer plenty of valuable information but they fall short of presenting enough evidence to put forward conclusive arguments about a particular happening or a specific person. However, when one considers a wider picture and takes into account the ensemble of documents and the context that they refer to, the situation changes somewhat. In many cases, historical documents inform about a given atmosphere – with the generalized feelings and moods. This information complements the evidence that textually appears in specific documents. In such cases, the sum of all this assorted evidence offers the conditions for historians to suggest a conjectural argument. Throughout the dissertation, in the cases in which I have employed my “informed imagination”, I have made sure to make this clear to the reader by using “the conditional – ‘would have’, ‘may have’, ‘was likely to have’ - and the speculative ‘perhaps’, ‘maybe’” – and the speculative ‘perhaps’, ‘maybe’” as Davis does in her work.

These methodological approaches have helped me sidestep, at least partially, the many challenges and difficulties that come about when one delves into the emotional life of the past. Studying emotions and focusing on experiences brings about, without doubt, many problems and difficulties. It might be easier, as Saramago claims, to be “a novelist, a fiction writer, a liar.” Yet, as Febvre argued in a “New Kind of History”, “being a

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historian means never resigning oneself. It implies trying everything, testing out anything that might possibly fill in the gaps in our information. It means exercising one’s ingenuity, that is the word.”

Chapter 1: Emotions, Notions of Reality, and Imagined Futures in the Formation of Santafé’s Junta, 1808-1810.

On February 10, 1810, a rumor spread throughout Santafé de Bogotá claiming that foreign troops were seen in the Llanos\textsuperscript{115} moving towards the viceregal capital. The news caused a terrible stir among the city’s residents. For months, many of Santafé’s inhabitants had been dreading the possibility of falling into the hands of Napoleon and Joseph Bonaparte or some other foreign power. As the rumor was propagated, people in the streets\textsuperscript{116} speculated about what was actually happening. Some stated the foreigners spotted in the Llanos were French. Others, that they were English. Some accounts claimed the Viceroy Antonio Amar y Borbón had just found about the arrival of foreign troops while others maintained that Amar had known of their presence for weeks but was concealing critical information from the public. According to one version, the Viceroy had been informed in previous weeks that fourteen French ships were sailing up the Orinoco River and were eventually going to attack Santafé. The story claimed the French ships had been repelled off the coast of Cumaná in Venezuela and forced to traverse the coast towards Guyana where they entered the mouth of the Orinoco River and began their way up the

\textsuperscript{115} The Llanos was one of fourteen provinces in which the Viceroyalty of New Granada was divided, according to Josef Antonio Pando’s *Ytinerario Real de Correos del Nuevo Reyno de Granada y Tierra Firme*. The Province of the Llanos was located to the east of Santafé and included most of the plains found between the Andes mountains and the Orinoco River. (Marta Herrera Ángel, “Las divisiones político-administrativas del Virreinato de la Nueva Granada a finales del periodo colonial,” *Historia Crítica*, no. 22 (2001): 77-83.)

\textsuperscript{116} The sources constantly refer to what was being said and discussed in the city’s streets. At times, it was used to refer to the general mood and atmosphere of the city. In the 1729 *Diccionario de Autoridades*, the definition of “calles públicas” comes with a phrase that was commonly used in the eighteenth century: “en toda la calle” (“in all the street”). The phrase was equivalent to saying, “in all the vicinity.” In that sense, saying “this is public in all the street is the same as this is known by all the vicinity.” (“En toda la calle. Phrase que equivale a lo mismo que en toda la vecindad: y así lo propio es decir, Esto es público en toda la calle, que decir Lo sabe toda la vecindad.” (*Diccionario de Autoridades*, Real Academia Española, 1729.))
river. It was said that Amar knew that the French troops would, at some point, disembark their ships and begin to cross the Llanos towards Santafé.117

Almost two weeks after the rumor began to circulate, Amar sent troops to the Llanos. Colonel Juan Samano, who had recently arrived from Riohacha with a contingent of soldiers, was given orders to repel the foreigners. Halfway into their expedition, the troops were told to return to Santafé. A few days after Samano’s departure, the viceroy and other officials had been informed that the alleged foreign troops seen in the Llanos were neither French nor English soldiers, but a small group of rebels from the town of Socorro.118 Even though the purported arrival of foreign troops in the Llanos ended up being a false alarm, the episode seems to have given Santafereños and other New Granadians119 further reasons to feel fear and mistrust.

This rumor was not unique in anyway. Ever since news of Ferdinand VII’s detention reached the Americas, stories of this kind were common throughout Santafé as well as other parts of New Granada and Spanish America. For example, the establishment of Quito’s first junta on August 10, 1809 took place amidst growing rumors of a French takeover of the Americas. In the weeks leading to formation of the first junta, stories circulated throughout Quito claiming that thousands of French troops had disembarked in

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118 Caballero, “En la independencia,” 119; de Torres y Peña, Memorias sobre los orígenes de la Independencia Nacional, 104-105.

119 Historians have usually used two demonyms to refer to people from New Granada: New Granadian and New Granadan. I use the demonym New Granadian throughout the dissertation because it is more common to see it used both among present-day historians as well as among nineteenth century writers.
the port of Esmeraldas and were set to begin their conquest of Spanish America. Other rumors maintained that Quito’s Spanish Europeans were planning on slitting the throats of the city’s most distinguished Criollos and then surrendering Quito to Napoleon. Even the city’s churches were sites of much hearsay. In the midst of growing turmoil, Josefa Herrera, the marchioness of Maenza, prayed aloud almost every single day in the Church of Santa Catalina for the soul of Ferdinand VII. Her rather ambiguous prayers sparked rumors that the king had perished and, thus, the Spanish Monarchy was lost. The situation was not much different in Caracas. Rumors circulated among the city’s residents claiming Napoleon and the English had agreed to divide Spanish America between the two empires. Others maintained that Spain and all its possessions were now in the hands of Carlota, Princess of Brazil. In Caracas, speculations regarding an impeding French invasion were common. Such rumors spread throughout Spanish America, from capital cities all the way to towns in the provinces of Neiva in New Granada as well as in

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120 Archivo General de la Nación de Colombia (AGN), Sección Colecciones, Fondo Academia Colombiana de Historia, Serie Correspondencia de varias personas de Quito a Camilo Torres, caja 24, carpeta 47, ‘Relación de Xavier Montufar, hijo del marqués de Selva Alegre, en que explica lo que ocurrió en Riobamba y la formación de la Junta. 1810.’, 74-75.

121 The term Criollo refers to individuals born in the Americas but whose parents and ancestors were European. The term usually had social connotations. Patricians who fulfilled the condition of being the descendants of Spanish Europeans were usually referred as Criollos. In the case of plebeians, this was less common.

122 Archivo General de Indias (AGI), QUITO,269, ‘Carta de Fuentes González y Merchante de Contreras al Rey sobre los juicios en contra de quiteños. Quito. 21 de mayo de 1810.’, 2-3.


124 AGI, CARACAS,437A, ‘Relación con información dada por intendentes Basadre y Navarrete y por anónimo sobre situación en Venezuela y los rumores que circulan. Cadiz. 9 y 11 de julio de 1810’, 2-4.

125 Biblioteca Luis Angela Arango (BLAA), Archivo Emiliano Díaz del Castillo (MSS3350), Serie Archivo Díaz del Castillo, Carpeta 20, ‘Caso criminal en contra del corregidor de Neiva, Anastasio Ladrón de Guevara, por traición a la religión, la patria y al rey. Neiva. 1810-1813.’, 35-40.
Oaxaca\(^{126}\) and the Bajío\(^{127}\) in New Spain. As these rumors were propagated, so did people’s feelings of fear, confusion, and mistrust. Suspicion and distress continued to spread as more news of Ferdinand VII’s abdication and the French invasion of the Iberian Peninsula reached Spanish America. Besides the fear and confusion that arose from the prospect of an acephalous monarchy and the possibility of falling into Bonaparte’s hands, mistrust spread quickly among Spanish America’s residents. Many Americans suspected that European officials were betraying Ferdinand VII and selling out to Napoleon and Joseph Bonaparte. On the other hand, numerous Europeans in the Americas believed Americans were unfaithful to the Spanish Crown and that some among them were French spies and envoys.\(^{128}\)

Mistrust also arose over the circulation of information and the arrival of correspondence coming from Europe. Rival factions constantly accused each other of concealing and distorting news from the Iberian Peninsula. Such accusations were not completely unfounded.\(^{129}\) Officials frequently discussed ways to regulate and even ban correspondence and news coming from Europe out of fear that it could lead to unrest and ungovernability. For example, in October 1808, a *fiscal* from Cartagena advised Viceroy Amar to publish and disseminate all news concerning Napoleon’s tyrannical ways but to


prevent the diffusion of any paper or report that could lead New Granada’s public to doubt reports of Napoleon’s cruelty and mischiefs.  

This chapter explores the emotions that circulated throughout Santafé during the months leading to the establishment of the ‘Junta Suprema de Gobierno de Nueva Granada.’ The chapter studies the period between August of 1808, when news of Ferdinand VII’s imprisonment reached the capital, and the last days of July of 1810, shortly after the junta’s formation. It attempts to grasp the emotions that many of the city’s residents experienced at the time by paying close attention to people’s public displays of emotions as well as to the many rumors, false news, and catastrophic stories that circulated throughout Santafé. In tracing these intense years, I seek to contextualize the establishment of a junta that advocated self-government and higher levels of autonomy from the Iberian Peninsula. In the years leading to its formation, reigning feelings of confusion, unrest, mistrust, and fear shaped people’s support and misgivings for the junta.

Santafé, as the Viceroyalty’s capital, became a nucleus for the propagation and intensification of emotions and rumors. Mariano Sixto, Santafé’s royal accountant at the time, explained in a sworn statement that the capital “was the focal point where revolutionary bolts of lightning got together, and where they acquired the highest levels of malevolence to, once again, spread throughout the whole circumference of the Kingdom of New Granada.”  

Although Sixto might be overstating Santafé’s political fervor and its

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131 “Santafé era digámoslo así el foco en donde se reunían los rayos revolucionarios, y de donde adquiriendo mayor grado de malignidad se volvían a esparcir por la circunferencia del Nuevo Reyno de Granada” (AGI, SANTAFE, 747, ‘ Expediente caso Juan Jurado. Su paso por Caracas, Santafé, Panamá y otras ciudades. 1808-1815.’, 10.)
influence over the Viceroyalty’s territories, it seems that Santafé did gather and reproduce many of the rumors and emotions that were circulating throughout New Granada.

The chapter poses two main arguments. In the first place, I argue that many of Santafé’s residents supported the establishment of a government junta mainly out of fear of a Napoleonic takeover of the Americas. Perhaps even more important than disdain for Spanish rule or antipathy towards the monarchical system, it was a rising suspicion between Spanish Americans and Europeans – who constantly accused each other of treason – and the looming threat of falling into the hands of Napoleon and Joseph Bonaparte that led to the formation of a junta aimed at temporary self-government. During the months leading to its establishment, these feelings of fear and mistrust became even more intense as a result of the confusion and expectation produced by rumors, false stories, catastrophic narratives, and the tardiness with which news from Europe reached Santafé. In that sense, the formation of a junta did not represent a break with the Spanish Monarchy. Sympathy towards the Spanish Crown continued being prevalent. Such political rupture would gradually come about during the years to come.

These claims are not completely new. Other historians, such as Jaime Rodríguez, Margarita Garrido, and Daniel Gutiérrez, among others, have also claimed that the formation of government juntas did not seek absolute independence from Spain and that their establishment was the result of the Napoleonic invasion of the Iberian Peninsula as well as of the growing mistrust between Americans and Europeans. However, by focusing on the emotional milieu of the time, I show that the juntas were not only the result of creoles’ pursuits for autonomy amidst times of crisis, but also the outcome of the widespread uncertainty and fear that came with Ferdinand VII’s abdication.
In that sense, this chapter shows that emotions played a significant role on Santafé’s political culture. This chapter argues that the emotions surrounding the establishment of Santafé’s Junta disrupted society’s existing conceptions of reality, its horizons of expectation, and notions of symbolic violence. That is to say, emotions shaped the ways people gave meaning to the world they were living in. Certain emotions were experienced with such intensity that they altered people’s notions of what was possible and what could be expected from the future. Emotions produced new imagined futures in which the idea of being ruled by a political entity other than the Spanish Crown became more plausible than ever before. However, for many, such possibilities entailed catastrophic prospects. Many Santafereños imagined lawlessness overriding the much-desired public peace they hoped for. In that sense, the redefinition of existing conceptions of reality ended up blurring certain relations of power while reinforcing others.

\[132\] The notions of horizons of expectation, imagined futures, and prospective futures that I use throughout the chapter have been influenced by the work of Reinhard Koselleck, Manu Goswami, and Ernesto Bassi. Koselleck uses the term ‘horizon of expectation’ to analyze changes in society’s notions of time (past, present, and future). In Koselleck’s words, the “horizon is that line behind which a new space of experience will open, but which cannot yet be seen. The legibility of the future, despite possible prognoses confronts an absolute limit, for it cannot be experienced.” (Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time (New York City: Columbia University Press, 2004), 12-13, 260-261) Goswami, for her part, explains that most of the historiography studying anti-imperial movements has tended to conceive anti-colonial struggles as a staging ground for the development of sovereign nation-states. Goswami is critical of such teleological notions and argues that we should consider society’s expectations of the future as an “open-ended constellation of contending political futures.” She suggests studying not only the experiences of a society, but also its expectations by paying attention to the different plausible “past futures” of that given society. (Manu Goswami, “Imaginary Futures and Colonial Internationalisms,” The American Historical Review, 117, no. 5 (2012), 1462, 1484-1485.) Ernesto Bassi uses the term “envisioned potential futures” to argue that the national political institutions and divisions that emerged in the nineteenth century could have taken other paths. Bassi claims that the inhabitants of what he refers to as the transimperial Greater Caribbean envisioned a present and future in which this geographical framework was at the center of their plans and projects. In other words, sailors, merchants, political leaders, and other actors of the transimperial Greater Caribbean used this “geographical framework as a chalkboard on which they conceived analyses of their present and visions of potential futures.” (Ernesto Bassi, An Aqueous Territory. Sailor Geographies and New Granada's Transimperial Greater Caribbean World (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016), 3-4.)
My analysis about people’s notions of reality – of what they consider possible and plausible – is inspired by reconsiderations of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony as well as by Bourdieu’s notion of symbolic violence. In the 1990s, scholars such as James Scott and William Roseberry, among others, reassessed the use of the term hegemony, offering new understandings that contrast from the ones originally posed by Antonio Gramsci and some of his closest successors. More traditional notions of Gramsci’s hegemony consider that dominant groups impose consent and conformity on the rest of society thanks to their control over the material basis of production as well as society’s symbolic production. In other words, through a common discursive framework – including shared education, language, and symbols – dominant groups legitimize their power over society. Under a literal understanding of this theory, hegemony produces a widespread consent in which political and social conflict are basically eradicated.133

Both Scott and Roseberry are critical of such closed conception of hegemony because it implies a social equilibrium in which social conflict and change seem implausible. Roseberry, for example, explains that the concept of hegemony should be used “not to understand consent but to understand struggle, the ways in which the words, images, symbols, forms, organizations, institutions, and movements used by subordinate populations to talk about, understand, confront, accommodate themselves to, or resist their domination are shaped by the process of domination itself.” In that sense, Roseberry

explains that hegemony constructs “not a shared ideology but a common material and meaningful framework for living through, talking about, and acting upon social orders characterized by domination.” Scott, for his part, argues that a more nuanced interpretation of the concept leads to an understanding of the term in which hegemonic domination does not accomplish absolute consent but rather the capacity to “define for subordinate groups what is realistic and what is not realistic and to drive certain aspirations and grievances into the realm of the impossible, of idle dreams.”

For his part, Bourdieu explains that symbolic violence is the coercion that makes relations of domination seem natural. For Bourdieu, consent is not only imposed from above as the dominated may, at times, contribute to their own domination by tacitly accepting relations of domination as inherent to social life. In *Pascalian Meditations*, Bourdieu claims that the habitus creates a series of conditions in which the dominated end up recognizing and acknowledging that there is magical border separating them from the dominant classes. Such recognition predisposes them into domination. As Bourdieu maintains, “the practical recognition through which the dominated, often unwittingly, contribute to their own domination by tacitly accepting, in advance, the limits imposed on them, often takes the form of bodily emotion (shame, timidity, anxiety, guilt), often associated with the impression of regressing towards archaic relationships, those of childhood and the family.” Bourdieu argues that such practical recognition manifests itself in “blushing, inarticulacy, clumsiness, trembling, all ways of submitting, however reluctantly, to the dominant judgement, sometimes in internal conflict and ‘self-division’,

135 Scott, *Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, 74.
the subterranean complicity that a body slipping away from the directives of consciousness and will maintains with the violence of the censures inherent in the social structures.”

These reflections about hegemony, consent, and symbolic violence are useful in thinking about the tensions and conflicts that arose in Santafé between August 1808 and July 1810. During these close to twenty-four months, the capital’s social and political structures went mostly unchanged; however, that was not the case for the city’s notions of reality nor its horizons of expectation. Between 1808 and 1810, the intensification and propagation of emotions, such as fear and confusion, gradually altered people’s conceptions of what was realistic, plausible, and acceptable. Many of Santafé’s residents, both dominant and subordinates, began to imagine and think of prospective futures that were unconceivable a few years earlier. The imagined border dividing the dominant from dominated – and the relations and conducts revolving around it – was temporarily blurred and displaced. In the end, the institution of Santafé’s Junta did not bring immediate and profound transformations in the city’s power relations. Yet, temporary disruptions in people’s notions of political and social order opened the way for a series of political transformations.

Rumors, hearsay, gossip, and pamphlets stirred emotions and conflicts among the city’s residents and, ultimately, prompted the disruption of people’s conceptions of reality. According to James Scott, rumors are some of the techniques through which subordinate groups anonymously present their claims and complaints in public. For Scott, rumors are located somewhere in between what he terms the “hidden transcript” and the “public

transcript.” In other words, they are somewhere in between what subordinate groups may only say, act, and display secretly among themselves and what they are allowed to say and perform in public. That is, rumors constitute a public act of disguised resistance. As Ranajit Guha explains, they record the political consciousness of subaltern groups.\footnote{Scott, \textit{Domination and the Arts of Resistance}, 138-144, 175-181; Ranajit Guha, \textit{Elementary Forms of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India} (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983), 265.}

Rumors not only reveal tensions between dominant and subordinate groups, they also uncover perceived threats that a society faces as a whole. Rumors usually thrive under circumstances of uncertainty in which critical events are taking place and no reliable information or only ambiguous one is available.\footnote{Scott, \textit{Domination and the Arts of Resistance}, 144.} To a certain extent, rumors tend to emerge as a solution to problems of collective relevance and help make the unknown comprehensible. They are not simply a burst of fantasy, they are also rational acts that emerge within a continuum of habitual forms of shared knowledge.\footnote{Jean Delumeau, \textit{El miedo en Occidente} (Madrid: Taurus, 2002), 207; Michel-Louis Rouquette, “Rumour Theory and Problem Theory,” \textit{Diogenes}, no. 213 (2006): 36–42; Luise White, \textit{Speaking with Vampires. Rumor and History in Colonial Africa} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).} In that sense, they have the capacity to bind people by inciting shared understandings and interpretations of the world.\footnote{David Coast and Jo Fox, “Rumour and Politics,” \textit{History Compass}, no. 13 (2015): 230–231.} That is, rumors create a reality of their own, one that combines and blends with what is considered to be the “normal” or “real” reality.\footnote{Hans-Joachim Neubauer, \textit{The Rumour. A Cultural History} (London: Free Association Books, 1999), 52.} The rumors that propagated throughout Santafé between 1808 and 1810 created a sense of community among the city’s residents as a result of the widespread belief that a Napoleonic takeover and the fall of the Spanish Monarchy were soon to come. Yet, frictions also arose from within these shared feelings and beliefs. While some believed the French conquest would happen as a
consequence of the treacherous European officials who had sold out to the Bonaparte, there were others who considered the takeover would come about because Santafé’s most prominent patricians were in fact Napoleon’s envoys. These rumors and the fear and confusion they produced ended up shaping people’s sense of reality, their expectations of the future, and their tacit acceptance of existing relations of domination.

Emotions and rumors during the formation of juntas have not been completely absent from the historiography of the independence process and the formation of government juntas.¹⁴² For instance, in the case of the establishment of Santafé’s Junta, nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century historians such as José Manuel Restrepo and José Manuel Groot sporadically refer to the unrest and fear that came with the institution of the junta. Yet, in their accounts it seems as if only people of lower ranks experienced and expressed emotions. These nineteenth-century thinkers portray plebeians, particularly Indians and blacks, as unruly people whose actions were merely led by their emotions rather than their intellect. They depict the populace as an uncontrollable horde that threatened both political stability and the incipient republican projects. In the meantime, Criollos are portrayed as rational leaders who stood up to the European’s mistreatments and prevented the mob from destroying society.¹⁴³

¹⁴² It is worth noting that the formation of juntas in Spanish America are among the historical events that have received the most attention among scholars as well as among Latin American society. Many Latin American nations celebrate their independence days on the dates on which the first juntas were established in the countries’ capital cities. In Colombia, July 20, when Santafé’s Junta was instituted, is celebrated as the national Independence Day. In Ecuador, August 10, when Quito’s first Junta was established, is the country’s Independence Day. In Venezuela, April 19, when Caracas’ Junta was instituted, is celebrated as the national Independence Day. This is somewhat odd considering that when the juntas were instituted, neither independence from Spain nor republicanism as a form of government were declared.

¹⁴³ José Manuel Restrepo’s Historia de la Revolución de la República de Colombia (1827) and José Manuel Groot’s Historia eclesiástica y civil de Nueva Granada (1889) are two of the most famous and influential nineteenth-century historical works about the independence process.
Historians such as Marixa Lasso, Sergio Mejía, and Daniel Gutiérrez have argued that nineteenth-century thinkers depicted popular sectors in such a manner to justify the elites’ rule over the new nations and to deny plebeians from partaking in political life. Lasso claims that a prejudiced representation of the populace’s emotions led traditional historians to overlook the interests, agency, and rationality of a wide diversity of non-elite groups.\textsuperscript{144} Lasso’s reflections serve as a useful warning to recognize the preconceptions of contemporary witnesses as well as those of nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century thinkers. Nonetheless, Lasso’s caution should not lead us to disregard emotions as a whole when studying this historical period. The few historians who have paid some attention to emotions and rumors during the formation of government juntas – such as Christon I. Archer and Peter Guardino for Mexico, Alberto Flores Galindo and Claudia Rosas Lauro for Peru, and Margarita Garrido and Pablo Rodríguez for New Granada – have implied that emotions were more than mere catalysts of disorders. As they suggest, emotions ultimately molded the political culture and public debates of the time.\textsuperscript{145} By the same token, this


chapter argues that, in Santafé between 1808 and 1810, emotions shaped the behavior, notions, and frameworks of people of all social stratum. Likewise, the chapter explains that the seemingly irrational actions and ideas that nineteenth-century historians exclusively attributed to popular sectors were actually experienced and conveyed by people of all social statuses.

Paying attention to emotions also allows us to reflect on the historical ruptures that took place amidst the formation of juntas. Nineteenth-century historians depict the establishment of juntas in New Granada as foundational events in a teleological timeline leading to independence, republicanism, and the Criollos’ warranted rule over the new nations. Manuel Pareja Ortíz, who has probably written the most detailed account of the formation of Santafé’s Junta, also views July 20th as a breaking point leading to independence and to the creation of a new republic.146 Social, political, and conceptual historians have presented more nuanced understandings and have argued that the establishment of government juntas produced new languages and practices of rights and equality.147 Political historians such as Isidro Vanegas and Daniel Gutiérrez have argued that the formation of juntas came with revolutionary and innovative ideas and

146 Manuel Pareja Ortíz, Testigos y actores de la Independencia de Nueva Granada. 20 de julio al 15 de agosto de 1810 (Doctoral Dissertation: Universidad de Navarra, 2011).
147 Historians such as Marixa Lasso for Cartagena, Alejandro Gómez for Caracas, and Margarita Garrido for Santaña, among others, have studied the variety of social groups that were actively involved in the formation of juntas. (Marixa Lasso, Myths of Harmony: Race and Republicanism during the Age of Revolution, Colombia 1795–1831. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007), 34-67; Alejandro E. Gómez, “La Revolución de Caracas desde abajo”, Nuevo Mundo Mundos Nuevos [Online since May 17, 2008. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/nuevomundo/32982]; Garrido, Reclamos y representaciones, 277-360; Margarita Garrido, “Palabras que nos cambiaron: lenguaje y poder en la independencia”, Banco de la República – Biblioteca Virtual, accessed May 30, 2022, https://www.banrepcultural.org/palabras-que-nos-cambiaron/intro.html.)

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Francisco Ortega, for his part, analyzes the concepts of “colony” and “constitution” to conclude that the establishment of Santafé’s Junta did not bring about a profound rupture with the Spanish Monarchy. Moreover, Ortega explains that independence and republicanism were not unescapable outcomes as they were simply one of many possible paths. The Brazilian and Mexican cases are illustrative of the fact that monarchism could have also been an outcome after independence.

Viewing the institution of juntas from the perspective of the history of emotions presents additional layers to this question. Fear and confusion, among other emotions, disrupted, at least temporarily, people’s notions of reality, their existing conceptions of symbolic violence, and their horizons of expectation. Yet, for the most part, Santafé’s Junta did not transform prevailing social and political structures.

In this chapter, I have attempted to include sources from different social sectors and political stances. The existing source base is mostly made up of documents written by Spanish and Criollo officials as well as by patrician leaders. Among the records that exist, very few accounts were written by women, plebeians, Indians, and blacks. Additionally, not many sources refer directly or indirectly to emotions or emotional expressions. Thus, we are left with a rather limited collection of sources in which women, Indians, and blacks only come up marginally and urban patricians and plebeians, to a lesser extent, are the main

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protagonists. One of the sources most often cited in this chapter is a diary written by José María Caballero, a tailor and shopkeeper from Santafé. Caballero’s entries for the period between 1808 and 1810 do not offer many insights about his political opinions. However, Caballero joined Antonio Nariño’s republican army around 1813 and continued to be a republican supporter throughout the 1810s and 1820s.\textsuperscript{150}

Another source constantly used in this chapter is José Antonio de Torres y Peña’s 1814 \textit{Memorias de la revolución}. Torres y Peña was a priest and fervent royalist born in Tunja in 1767 to an upper-middle-stratum family. When he wrote his account, he was no longer living in a Spanish colony but in the independent and republican State of Cundinamarca. By then, Santafé and its surroundings had endured nearly half a decade of violence and political strife. Throughout northern South America, thousands of people had been killed and displaced. Even churches and clergymen had been attacked and harassed. It is possible that such circumstances explain Torres y Peña’s hostility towards anyone who in past years had shown any sympathy for liberal or republican ideas. Throughout the text, he accused advocates of Santafé’s Junta of promoting profane beliefs and of supporting Napoleon and portrayed independence and republicanism in apocalyptic terms.\textsuperscript{151}

I have also resorted to a series of letters written by Camilo Torres Tenorio, Antonio de Villavicencio, and the Viceroy Antonio Amar y Borbón. In addition to these dispatches, I occasionally draw on correspondence and reports from magistrates of the Audiencia as well as from a few mid-level officials. Camilo Torres – a patrician from Popayán who had been living in Santafé since the late eighteenth century – was, at the time, a famous and

\textsuperscript{150} Caballero, “En la independencia,” 119-130.
\textsuperscript{151} de Torres y Peña, \textit{Memorias sobre los orígenes}, 81-101.
distinguished lawyer. His abundant correspondence deals with a wide range of issues: legal matters with his clients from Santafé and other cities, business with his associates, political discussions and gossip with his family and friends in Popayán, and even astronomy and botany with his brothers and close friends. Torres was among the signees of the act establishing Santafé’s Junta. Some months earlier, on November 20, 1809, he wrote the *Memorial de agravios* (*Memorial of Grievances*) denouncing the Junta Suprema Central for disproportionately limiting American participation in the debates taking place in the Iberian Peninsula. Around 1808 and 1810, one could hardly argue that Torres was in favor of absolute independence from Spain. Yet, he did make manifest his position in favor of greater autonomy and self-government as well as in support of liberal reforms.

Antonio de Villavicencio, a creole patrician from Quito, had been living in Europe since the early 1800s where he attended the Colegio de Nobles and joined the royal navy. In 1810, the Supremo Consejo de Regencia selected him as the *comisario regio* that would travel to New Granada. Villavicencio was sent as a direct representative of the king, with full autonomy from the viceroy, to put an end to Santafé’s growing disturbances. Villavicencio did not categorically oppose the formation of government juntas in the Americas, as was the case of Viceroy Amar and other top Spanish officials in Santafé and throughout all of New Granada. In fact, Villavicencio came to believe that it was useless to oppose their formation and that the juntas could actually help maintain the monarchy’s

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152 The Archivo General de la Nación in Bogotá holds several boxes with part of Camilo Torres’ correspondence. (AGN, Sección Colecciones, Fondo Academia Colombiana de Historia, Serie Camilo Torres). The Universidad Javeriana in Bogotá also has numerous boxes with Camilo Torres’ correspondence.
153 Rodríguez, “Ideas, individuos y emociones,” 33-46.
authority over the region. He arrived at Santafé when the government junta had already been established.\textsuperscript{155} For his part, Viceroy Amar ardently opposed the formation of government juntas in the Americas. Amar, who had been in Santafé since 1803, believed the juntas would ultimately disavow the monarchy’s authority. By 1808, Amar’s good standing with the city’s patricians was already beginning to crumble. The monarchical crisis accelerated this process. Frictions between them would continue to grow until he left Santafé in August of 1810.

\textit{Confusion: misinformation and the monarchical crisis}

News of Ferdinand VII’s detention reached Santafé on August of 1808, just a few weeks after news of his ascension to the throne had arrived in the capital. The city’s first reactions to the fall of Ferdinand VII were of distress and concern. Demonstrations proving the city’s loyalty were carried out during most of September 1808. As of the first week of the month, magistrates, high-ranking officials, clergymen, and nuns began to wear rosettes with Ferdinand VII’s insignia. On September 10, cannons were fired and a portrait of the King, in a frame made of silver and wood, was displayed in the streets. That afternoon, coins with the inscription “Majestic proclamation of Our King Ferdinand VII” on one face and Ferdinand VII’s seal and the label “King of Spain and the Indies” on the other, were thrown to the crowd.\textsuperscript{156} The following day, the swearing-in was carried out. Santafé’s streets and balconies were decorated with banners and flags. Around noon, the city’s patricians rode their best horses and followed the \textit{regidor decano} (interim mayor),

\textsuperscript{155} AGI, SANTAFE,747, ‘Carta de Villavicencio a las Cortes y ministros sobre situación en las Américas. Cartagena. 4 de junio de 1810.’
\textsuperscript{156} “Augusta proclamación del N. R. D. G. por Fernando VII… y por el otro lado tenía las armas del Rey con la corona, y alrededor decía: ‘Rey de España y de las Indias’.” (Caballero, “En la independencia,” 109.)
Fernando Benjumea, through the city’s main streets. Once in the main square, the regidor proclaimed the city’s allegiance to Ferdinand VII. Following the oath, a group of soldiers discharged their rifles. The same ceremony was repeated in the San Francisco, Santo Domingo, and San Agustín squares. That night, Santafé’s streets were illuminated and the city’s notables and main authorities gathered at an alcalde’s residence to continue the celebrations. The city’s streets were once again lighted on September 13 when a bando was published declaring war on Napoleon for betraying Charles IV and Ferdinand VII and for usurping the Spanish throne. Several balconies exhibited messages against Napoleon and in support of the Bourbon House. During the following days, civil and religious authorities invited the city’s residents to offer donations to finance the war against France. According to Caballero, half a million pesos were collected.157

During the coming weeks, the city’s authorities read aloud a series of proclamations coming from the Iberian Peninsula as well as others issued by Santafé’s officials. One of the declarations that arrived from Seville encouraged the city’s residents to murder their rulers if these dared submit to the French. Another proclamation coming from Cádiz invited the provinces to elect their own representatives and made allegations against the viceroy and governors who had oppressed the Americas in the past. Such public statements shocked and puzzled many of the city’s residents and officials, but they also incited discussions with regards to the future of Spain and the Kingdom of New Granada.158 For their part,

157 AGI, SANTAFE,629, ‘Proclama impresa publicada por el Virrey Amar y Borbón. 15 de septiembre de 1808.’, 1-2; Caballero, José María. “En la independencia,” 109-111; Biblioteca Nacional de Colombia (BNC), Fondo Quijano 137, ‘Relación en que Santafé acoge la Junta de Sevilla y declara que solamente acepta a Fernando VII como su monarca. Santafé. 11 de septiembre de 1808’, 1-47.
158 de Torres y Peña, Memorias sobre los orígenes, 86-87.
Santafé’s officials made additional proclamations, including one concerning the French living in the city. The city’s authorities declared that French denizens could continue living in Santafé as they had been doing so before the war began. However, the officials stated that if French residents were seen carrying out suspicious activities or heard making questionable comments, they would be expelled from the city. It seems that during the remaining of the year, Santafé’s French did not raise serious suspicions. Nonetheless, later on, when conflicting news from Europe began to arrive, that began to change.\footnote{Caballero, “En la independencia,” 111.}

Information from the Iberian Peninsula arrived in Santafé in dribs and drabs, encouraging the propagation of rumors and untruthful news. Among the city’s residents, hope of Spain’s victory over Napoleon was fed by false stories of military feats. The first of such instances took place on November 20, 1808. That afternoon, news arrived claiming that the Spanish army had been victorious and Ferdinand VII would soon be sitting, once again, on the throne.\footnote{Carrillo, “Comienzos de una desilusión,” 110-111.} According to Santiago de Torres y Peña – a native of Tunja, priest of Las Nieves Church in Santafé, and brother of José Antonio –, when the city’s officials announced the news, thousands of Santafereños went out to the streets to celebrate despite the pouring rain. During the remaining of the afternoon, church bells did not stop tolling and fireworks exploding. Santiago claimed to have seen many of his parishioners “shedding tears out of joy and affection”, thanking God and the Virgin Mary for their protection.\footnote{“… lágrimas que les hacían derramar el júbilo y la ternura...” (de Torres y Peña, Memorias sobre los orígenes, 191.)} Ten days later, as part of the thanks offerings being carried out, Santiago invited his brother José Antonio – priest in the town of Tabio, near Santafé – to offer a
sermon at Las Nieves. José Antonio’s homily praised Spain’s past, such as the expulsion of the Moors and the conquest of the Americas and suggested that the Spaniards were God’s chosen people. José Antonio claimed that “if God is with us, no one will prevail against us.” The sermon was praised by Santafé’s worshipers to such extent that Santiago, with the endorsement of ecclesiastic and civil authorities, got it published in one of the city’s printing shops. Unfortunately for Santiago and José Antonio, mail refuting the alleged victories reached Santafé during the first weeks of January, about the same time that copies of the sermon were being printed. Despite the upsetting news, 1809 began with new demonstrations of loyalty towards Ferdinand VII and the ‘Junta Suprema Central’, which by now governed Spain and all of its dominions from Seville.

In his *Días de la Independencia*, José María Caballero, the tailor, claims a second case of untrue military exploits reached the city in April of 1809. On the night of April 19 officials received news that Spanish troops had defeated Napoleon and pushed his diminished troops to the city of Ferrol in Galicia. Spain’s victory seemed imminent. At around 10 pm, Santafé’s authorities ordered the city’s church bells to be tolled and the streets and balconies to be illuminated. Thousands of the city’s residents celebrated in the streets while hundreds of fireworks were lit. Music bands with drums and flutes went around the streets and squares. In the midst of the excitement, the San Francisco friars, while standing in the convent’s main entrance, offered the musicians and other people in the streets wine from their pitchers. Cheers in favor Ferdinand VII and the Spanish Crown

162 “… sabiendo que si Dios está con nosotros, ninguno podrá prevalecer contra nosotros…” (de Torres y Peña, *Memorias sobre los orígenes*, 211.)
were heard all night throughout the city. Reports claim Santafé’s residents celebrated in
the streets until four in the morning. The following two nights, additional celebrations were
observed. This state of jubilation came to an end on April 23 when letters disproving
Spain’s supposed military victories reached the city.165

In a letter written on April 20, 1809, the renowned lawyer Camilo Torres Tenorio
explained to his brother Gerónimo that, despite certain skepticism among Santafé’s
residents, the reports that arrived on the night of the 19th had been given credibility due to
the alleged trustworthiness of the source. It was said that an English admiral stationed in
Jamaica had sent the Governor of Santa Marta a letter and a clipping from a Spanish
gazette. From Santa Marta, the letter and clipping were sent to Santafé. Torres’ details
concerning Spain’s victories are somewhat different from those offered by Caballero, but
both agree on the fact that the recently arrived news gave the impression that Spain’s
triump over Napoleon was just around the corner. According to Torres, the English
official in Jamaica stated that Spanish troops had surrounded Napoleon and his army in
Segovia. Napoleon was trapped and was offering to reinstitute Ferdinand VII to the throne
if his troops and himself were spared. The English admiral also stated that Joseph
Bonaparte had been cornered in Madrid and would soon have to surrender. The note
coming from Santa Marta explained that letters from the Junta Suprema Central
announcing the good news had already reached Puerto Rico and it was only a question of
days for the Junta’s mail to arrive in Santafé. Torres claims that this news coincided with
growing rumors that the Habsburgs had declared war on Napoleon and that the French

165 Caballero, “En la independencia,” 112-113
Senate was asking the Emperor to return to France. Thus, when church bells began clanging and the city’s authorities announced the news of Spain’s victories, hundreds of people instantly went out to the streets to celebrate with fireworks and music.166 The letters from the ‘Junta Suprema’ mentioned in Torres’ dispatch finally reached Santafé on the 23rd. Rather than confirm Spain’s victories, they revealed a dramatic situation: Spanish troops were on the run after suffering numerous defeats.167

During 1808 and the first months of 1809, news arriving from Europe was received without much questioning. For many Santafereños, such reports fed their hopes that the Spanish Monarchy would soon be victorious.168 Yet, after this second episode of misinformation and disillusion, the relative unanimity and harmony surrounding the Junta of Seville, the viceroy, and the city’s main officials began to crumble. Many began to feel that Santafé and New Granada should organize to deal with this exceptional situation. On the dawn of June 3, 1809, pasquines were posted on the doors of the Viceregal Palace as well as on the bridges over the San Francisco River. The authors of the ephemeral texts suggested that French troops would move on from the Iberian Peninsula to the Americas to continue their invasion of Spain’s dominions. The papers urged authorities to establish militias to defend the patria (motherland) from the French armies.169 In this case, the term

166 AGN, Sección Colecciones, Fondo Academia Colombiana de Historia, Serie Camilo Torres, caja 1, carpeta 4, folios 28-29, ‘Carta de Camilo a Gerónimo Torres sobre rumores y noticias de Quito y de España.’, 1-3.
167 Caballero, José María. “En la independencia,” 112-113.
168 Carrillo, “Comienzos de una desilusión,” 110-112.
169 Caballero, “En la independencia,” 114.
*patria* was used ambiguously for it could allude to Spain and its dominions as well as to more concrete territories such as New Granada and the city of Santafé.\(^{170}\)

As news of Spanish defeats reached the capital, many *Santafereños* began to suspect the French residents living in the city. Some *pasquines* enthusiastically demanded their expulsion from Santafé and other parts of New Granada. Several ephemeral texts even claimed that in previous days a group of Frenchmen had held a gathering in a residence in the San Victorino neighborhood where they had had a fancy dinner, gotten drunk, and celebrated Napoleon’s victories.\(^{171}\)

Apprehension towards French residents was complemented by growing frictions among the city’s inhabitants. In his *Memorias sobre la revolución y sucesos de Santafé de Bogotá, en el trastorno de la Nueva Granada y Venezuela*, José Antonio de Torres y Peña – the same clergyman who offered a sermon to celebrate the alleged victories of the Spanish army – stated that ever since Santafé received news that Napoleon had captured Ferdinand VII, the city’s residents had divided into three main factions. On one side, there were those who “conspired in favor of independence and liberty of consciousness.”\(^{172}\) According to Torres y Peña, within this group there were so many different opinions and views that its advocates were constantly arguing among themselves. The clergyman claimed that among this first group there were at least three parties. One of its factions was clearly in favor of

\(^{170}\) The 1737 *Diccionario de Autoridades* has three acceptations for the term *patria*. The first acceptation defines it as the place, city, or country where one was born. (“El Lugar, Ciudad o País en que se ha nacido.”) The second definition describes it as the metaphorical place where something belongs, even if it is immaterial. (“Metaphoricamente se toma por el lugar propio de cualquier cosa, aunque sea inmaterial.”) The third definition refers to the authority and control parents have over their offspring. (*Diccionario de Autoridades*, Real Academia Española, 1737.)

\(^{171}\) Caballer, “En la independencia,” 114.

\(^{172}\) “… conspiraban al único plan de independencia absoluta y libertad de conciencias…” (de Torres y Peña, *Memorias sobre los orígenes*, 88.)
the French system and the “barbarous” Napoleon. “They were French at heart”, Torres explains, “or to put it more clearly, they were freemasons, who paid no attention to religion or honor”. A second party was composed of republicans who had been “blindly captivated by the false premises of Rousseau’s *Social Contract*.” They did not seek to follow the example of the British colonies in North America, but rather that of Ancient Athens and Laconia. For Torres y Peña these were “frivolous and gullible men, effeminate schoolboys and pettifoggers whose thoughts had been inspired by a farce and a comedy.”

Thirdly, there was a faction composed of simple men who, without any mischievous intentions, had been deceived by false promises of prosperity and security.

Besides this first faction, which Torres y Peña accused of being insurgents and heretics, there were two additional groups. One was made up of people who were somewhat neutral in these discussions. Some of them had, at certain moments, shown sympathy towards revolutionary ideas, but in other instances had proven their loyalty to Ferdinand VII and the Spanish Crown. Torres y Peña states that many of them had been deceived by the revolutionary leaders but at some point had discovered the rebels’ ill intentions and now opposed their conspiracies. Thirdly, there were those who energetically defended the King and the Spanish Crown. They were known as the *Regentistas*.

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173 “… eran franceses de corazón, o hablando más claro, francmasones, que ningún caso hacían de la religión ni del honor.” (de Torres y Peña, *Memorias sobre los orígenes*, 88.)

174 “Se habían embebido en las falsas máximas del Contrato Social…” (de Torres y Peña, *Memorias sobre los orígenes*, 88.)

175 “¡Hombres frívolos y noveleros, colegiales y abogadillos afeminados cuya reflexión se ha formado sobre la farsa y representación de comedia!”, (de Torres y Peña, *Memorias sobre los orígenes*, 88.)


Torres y Peña depicted independence and republicanism in apocalyptic terms. Yet, he was not alone in this respect. Other accounts also reveal that, towards late 1808 and the first half of 1809, political intolerance and catastrophic visions of the future were on the rise. The intermittent arrival of news and the circulation of rumors and ephemeral texts exacerbated existing frictions among Santafé’s residents. Rival factions accused each other of disloyalty and of joining ranks with Napoleon. Such antagonism got even worse when news of the establishment of Quito’s Government Junta reached Santafé in early September. Such news was not a surprise for most Santafereños. Rumors that Quito’s notables were organizing a plot to establish a junta had been circulating in Santafé since at least April 1809. A story that spread at the time claimed that Juan Pío Montunfar, the Marquis of Selva Alegre, and several of his accomplices had been detained for organizing a plot to declare Quito’s absolute independence from Spain. Similar rumors were heard with regards to Caracas. Camilo Torres and his brother Gerónimo believed these stories were mere exaggerations. However, it seems that there were people in Santafé, Popayán, and other parts of New Granada who believed that all those in favor of establishing local juntas held such radical views that they were actually in favor of ending Spanish rule over the Americas.

In early September, a letter from Juan Pío Montufar arrived in Santafé informing the city’s officials that a junta had been established in Quito. Shortly after receiving the letter, members of the Cabildo as well as several city notables urged the Viceroy Antonio de Torres y Peña, *Memorias sobre los orígenes*, 81-101.

179 AGN, Sección Colecciones, Fondo Academia Colombiana de Historia, Serie Camilo Torres, caja 1, carpeta 4, folios 28-29, ‘Carta de Camilo a Gerónimo Torres sobre rumores y noticias de Quito y de España.’, 1-2.
Amar y Borbón to convene a temporary junta to discuss a response to the Marquis’s letter. Two meetings were carried out: one on September 6 and another one on September 11. The temporary juntas were not without controversy. On September 6, a wide variety of Santafé’s residents (Audiencia magistrates, Cabildo members, clergymen, army officials, landowners, and other city notables) convened at the Viceregal Palace to discuss the situation. Once the meeting was set to begin, nearly two hundred guards surrounded the Palace and eight of them entered the meeting hall. The attendants complained about this act of intimidation, but the viceroy assured them they could speak freely.\(^ {180}\) In the midst of the discussion, some argued that growing frictions would cease if a junta similar to that of Quito was established in Santafé. Others claimed that Santafé should prepare itself to confront Napoleon if all of the Iberian Peninsula fell in his hands. At some point, someone pressed one of the Audiencia’s fiscales, Diego Frías, for his views on this issue. Apparently, the Spanish magistrate responded that “the Americas should follow the fate of Spain, whichever that is.”\(^ {181}\) At some other moment, Frías ambiguously claimed that if Spain was defeated, “we will have an assembly and stipulate what is most convenient.”\(^ {182}\)

Eventually, a majority of those attending the meetings of the 6\(^ {\text{th}}\) and 11\(^ {\text{th}}\) pushed for the establishment of a ‘Junta Suprema Provincial.’ They proposed a junta led by the

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\(^ {180}\) According to the Camilo Torres, the guards had their rifles ready to fire and the building’s exits were blocked to impede anyone from leaving the Palace. (AGN, Sección Colecciones, Fondo Academia Colombiana de Historia, Serie Camilo Torres, caja 1, carpeta 4, folios 26-27, ‘Carta de Camilo Torres a José Ygnacio de Pombo sobre juntas del 6 y 11 de septiembre’, pp. 2-3; Caballero, José María. “En la independencia”, 115.)

\(^ {181}\) “Que la América debía seguir la suerte de la España, cualesquiera que fuese.” (AGI, SANTAFE,629. ‘Carta de Antonio de Villavicencio al Secretario de Estado y del Despacho de España e Yndias. Cartagena de Indias. 24 de mayo de 1810.’, 6.)

\(^ {182}\) “Entonces juntaremos y dispondremos de lo que convenga”. (Pareja, Testigos y actores de la Independencia, 40.)
Viceroy Amar and composed of deputies from all of the Viceroyalty’s provinces. However, the viceroy and Audiencia rejected this idea. Moreover, the magistrates and Amar decided to keep the meetings’ minutes under secrecy out of fear that they might stimulate pernicious ideas among Santafé’s residents and that they could give the impression that the viceroy’s authority was at risk. In the end, the temporary juntas ended up exacerbating existing frictions. It is unclear why the viceroy agreed to these juntas knowing that they would probably intensify political antagonism even further. Some claim that Amar agreed to them in order to identify his opponents and those who he considered disloyal to the Spanish Crown.184 With regards to the response that was to be given to Selva Alegre, Amar decided to send a “minister of peace” – José María Lozano, the Marquis of San Jorge – to negotiate with Quito’s leaders and convince Montufar to put an end to the Junta. Nonetheless, some days after Lozano had left Santafé, the viceroy ordered troops from Cartagena to travel to Popayán and Pasto to confront Quito’s armies.185

Between August 1808 and September 1809, confusion became one of the prevailing emotions among Santafé’s residents. After news of Ferdinand VII’s detention arrived in Santafé, many of the city’s denizens responded with denial. It seems that many doubted that the Spanish Crown could actually be on the verge of falling into the hands of the Bonaparte brothers. This state of mind helps explain why so many residents intuitively ran

183 AGI, SANTAFE.746, ‘Relación sobre el movimiento del 20 de julio. Santafé. 18 de septiembre de 1810.’, 2; AGN, Sección Colecciones, Fondo Academia Colombiana de Historia, Serie Camilo Torres, caja 1, carpeta 4, folios 26-27, ‘Carta de Camilo Torres a José Ygnacio de Pombo sobre juntas del 6 y 11 de septiembre.’, 1-3; Daniel Gutiérrez Ardila, “Revolución y diplomacia: el caso de la primera Junta de Quito (1809),” Fronteras de la Historia, 12 (2007), 356-358.
184 Pareja, Testigos y actores de la Independencia, 143.
185 José María Lozano’s committee only made it to Popayán. The Governor Miguel Tacón issued orders to detain them and to prevent them from continuing their journey to Quito. (Gutiérrez, “Revolución y diplomacia”, 358-359.)
into the streets to celebrate false stories of Spanish victories. Nonetheless, towards April 1809, more news of Spain’s defeats arrived, and discussions about how to face this looming threat and defend the Spanish Crown only worsened tensions and frictions. Those in favor of establishing local juntas were accused of betraying Ferdinand VII and favoring Napoleon’s ambitions while those against their formation were indicted of the exact same wrongdoings. As confusion and unrest became widespread, most of Santafé’s residents began to question what to expect from the times they were living in and the future. Fear and uncertainty began to shape their understandings of the world around them.

*Mistrust: treason, corruption, and the breakdown of the Spanish Monarchy*

Political tensions in Santafé intensified soon after the temporary juntas came to an end. Accusations and rumors sprung from all sides. A letter from Antonio de Villavicencio to the Crown’s Secretary of State in May 1810 sums up the many stories and conspiracies that were circulating. Villavicencio explained that the fiscal Diego Frías became the subject of much hearsay among Santafereños. Due to his controversial statements during the juntas, people in the streets argued that Frías had in fact offended all Americans by implying that they were mere slaves who could not defend themselves nor the Spanish Crown from Napoleon. Others claimed that Frías was willing to sacrifice Spain’s dominions and swear allegiance to Joseph Bonaparte in order to maintain his position in the Audiencia. Many accused Frías of corruption and of ruling in favor of his network of friends, brokers, and clients. In Santafé’s streets, it was rumored that one of his close acquaintances was the Governor of Pamplona, an alleged afrancesado who boasted of his admiration for Manuel Godoy, Charles IV’s favorite. Many of Santafé’s residents also condemned Frías for his hostility towards Quito’s notables. Those in favor of the Quiteños
and their junta argued that, contrary to what Frías and others claimed, Quito’s residents were loyal vassals who had formed a Government Junta to uphold Ferdinand VII’s right to the throne. These Santafereños maintained that the Iberian Peninsula would probably fall and that the Americas would become Spain’s only stronghold. Consequently, if they organized to defend the Spanish Monarchy as Quito’s residents had done so, Napoleon would never be able to conquer Spanish America.  

Other rumors hinted that there would soon be a fight to the death between several magistrates of the Audiencia and the viceroy. Around late September 1809, stories claimed that the Audiencia’s justices were planning on detaining Amar y Borbón and beheading him. The word on the streets maintained the magistrates had found out that the viceroy held secret correspondence with French officials and, thus, were going to execute him. It appears that Amar found out about this alleged plot to behead him thanks to a lieutenant from the town of La Mesa, about 60 kilometers west of Santafé. Apparently, the lieutenant overheard two commoner women talking about Amar’s looming detention and decapitation. The army officer warned his superiors who immediately sent a note to Santafé informing the viceroy of what was being said about him. When the rumor reached Amar, he ordered the number of guards protecting the Palace to be doubled and instructed more patrols to watch the city’s streets.

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In his *Memorias*, José Antonio de Torres y Peña brings up a similar story with some variants. Towards the last week of September, a tailor and a young woman coming from La Mesa to Santafé were overheard saying that that night the viceroy was going to be killed. The two of them were captured and taken into custody. That night, towards 10 p.m., Frutos Joaquín Gutierrez, an American-born magistrate of Santafé’s Audiencia, rushed into Amar’s Palace with news that the viceroy’s life was in danger. The Palace’s sentinels were immediately doubled and other precautions were taken to secure Amar’s life. Yet, these measures were not enough to calm down the old viceroy. Torres y Peña claims that Amar “was up all night, so uneasy that he did not sit down until the crack of dawn, when he was finally appeased. At that point, he could not even articulate a word.”

On September 28, Amar was notified once again of rumors concerning the Audiencia and himself. Yet, this time the stories alleged an agreement between the Audiencia’s magistrates and the viceroy to hand over New Granada to the French. In previous days, *pasquines* had been posted in Santafe’s streets claiming Amar and the Audiencia would soon surrender the Viceroyalty to Napoleon. On the 28th, Luis Caicedo, *alcalde de primer voto* of Santafé’s Cabildo, visited the viceroy with a written note from his cousin Joaquín Ricaurte. Ricaurte’s letter explained that the word on Santafé’s streets was that Cartagena’s Governor had intercepted Amar’s secret correspondence with Napoleon and French officials. The governor had sent the seized correspondence to one of the Audiencia’s magistrates, Juan Hernández de Alba, who had supposedly opened a formal investigation into this matter. The rumor claimed Hernández de Alba had informed

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188 “…estuvo toda la noche tan inquieto, que ni se llegó a sentar hasta que viendo la luz del día, cuando ya no podía articular palabra, se logró serenarlo.” (de Torres y Peña, *Memorias sobre los orígenes*, 95-96.)
the viceroy of his inquiries and that Amar had then organized a secret meeting with most of the Audiencia’s members and several reputed Spanish Europeans. Apparently, in that meeting the viceroy and the magistrates decided they would hand over the Viceroyalty to Joseph Bonaparte once he conquered the whole of the Iberian Peninsula. The conspirators supposedly labelled their plan the ‘Reconquista.’

Amar dismissed the rumor brought up in Ricaurte’s note. That same day he summoned a meeting with the Cabildo and the Audiencia. Ricaurte’s text was read aloud and the assembly decided that a committee should visit Hernandez de Alba’s house to search for Amar’s supposed correspondence with the French as well as for the magistrate’s papers regarding his alleged investigation into the viceroy’s actions. No papers were found in Hernández de Alba’s residence. Amar and the magistrates publicly announced these findings trying to demonstrate that the so-called ‘Reconquista’ was an invention made up by their political rivals. Yet, it appears that many in Santafé believed the purported plot to be true. In the following weeks, not only Amar, but also many of the Audiencia’s magistrates began to feel that they were in serious danger. Some magistrates decided to sleep in the Viceregal Palace out of fear that they would be attacked in their residences. Most of them only went out to the streets escorted by armed guards and soldiers.

It seems that in November of 1809, Amar continued to face sleeplessness as that long September night when he had been warned that there were plans to behead him. The

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191 Caballero, José María. “En la independencia,” 117.
viceroy had reasons to fear the worst. When Amar decided to send troops to the south to confront Quito’s Junta, he instructed Santafé’s troops to stay put and instead ordered a company stationed in Cartagena to travel to Popayán. When Cartagena’s troops took longer than expected, Amar decided to dispatch a company of soldiers from Santafé. A group of them left on October 27. On the 28th and 29th, two additional squadrons left the city. In a letter to the Crown’s Secretary of State, Amar claimed that, as the number of soldiers stationed in the city decreased, social “fermentation grew, so did pasquines, while seditious letters reappeared with even more audacity.” As the viceroy explains, “I was forced to feel as if I were in an enemy country and passed many nights without sleep. The few troops that I had left were constantly on guard. All this for nearly twenty days until reinforcements from Cartagena arrived and imposed some respect, giving us the possibility to have some tranquility.”

According to José Antonio Torres y Peña, the arrival of soldiers from Cartagena actually worsened the city’s growing unrest. In his Memorias, the clergyman complains the troops went around “hungry and naked” and that most of them were dishonorable pardos (free people of color). Torres y Peña argues that, due to the soldiers’ material hardships and lack of honor, city notables easily gained the troops’ trust and esteem by giving them handouts and inviting them to eat at their homes. Ultimately, from the

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192 Caballero, José María. “En la independencia,” 116-117.
193 “En efecto apenas se observó esta disminucion de la fuerza armada, quando la fermentación creció, los pasquines y cartas sediciosas se repitieron con mas osadía.” (AGI, SANTAFE,629, ‘Carta del Virrey de Santafé al Secretario de Estado sobre la revolución de Quito. Santafé. 19 de noviembre de 1809.’, 3.)
194 “… y en suma me he visto precisado como si estubiera en pais enemigo a pasar muchas noches en vela, y sobre las armas la poca tropa que me restaba, hasta que al cabo de mas de veinte dias la llegada del refuerzo de Cartagena ymponiendo algun respeto da margen a estar con alguna mas tranquilidad.” (AGI, SANTAFE,629, ‘Carta del Virrey de Santafé al Secretario de Estado sobre la revolución de Quito. Santafé. 19 de noviembre de 1809.’, 3-4.)
clergyman’s perspective, Amar had simply given Santafé’s dissidents three hundred men to aid them in their plots.\textsuperscript{195} The available sources do not offer any information with regards to the \textit{pardos’} feelings and their political opinions. Yet, it is possible that they – as happened with many \textit{pardos} from Cartagena – viewed the monarchical crisis as an opportunity to improve their social standing and gain further legal rights. Moreover, it is likely that many of them ended up showing their tacit support to anyone who helped them endure Santafé’s cold climate.

During the second half of 1809, the authorities’ measures to stop the propagation of rumors and seditious papers throughout Santafé seemed to have been inefficient. Some weeks after news of Quito’s Junta reached the city, Amar published a \textit{bando} forbidding the city’s residents from reading and sharing proclamations and papers coming from Quito. The viceroy believed texts related to Quito were deepening social unrest and political antagonism. Several weeks after the publication of Amar’s \textit{bando}, the Holy Office of the Inquisition read an edict from the Cathedral’s pulpit stating that all those in possession of letters and proclamations from Quito’s insurgents would be excommunicated.\textsuperscript{196} Based on what happened in the ensuing months, it appears that neither the viceroy nor the Inquisition’s decrees had much effect. Rumors, pamphlets, and other texts multiplied as mistrust and political intolerance grew. For example, on November 20, Santafé’s Cabildo signed and published Camilo Torres’ \textit{Memorial de agravios} in which Torres denounced

\textsuperscript{195} “Estos andaban hambrientos y desnudos…; lo que proporcionó a los directores de la revolución un medio fácil de hacerlos a su partido, siendo ellos gente parda y de poco honor. Comenzaron pues a regalarlos y acariciarlos; los llevaban algunos a comer a sus casas, y así se puede decir que el señor Amar les trajo estos trescientos hombres de tropa reglada para auxiliarles de la insurrección.” (de Torres y Peña, \textit{Memorias sobre los orígenes}, 100.)

\textsuperscript{196} Caballero, “En la independencia,” 116, 118.
the Junta Suprema Central’s discrimination against Spanish Americans. When the Junta summoned representatives from all of the Spanish Empire, it decided that American viceroyalties and general captaincies could each send one representative to the Junta while European kingdoms could send two delegates. Ultimately, this meant that thirty-six Peninsular and only nine Americans representatives would join the Junta. As soon as the Memorial was published, the text quickly circulated throughout the city. Even though Amar and the Audiencia promptly took the memorial out of circulation and prohibited its diffusion, the text and its content continued circulating through underground manuscript copies and oral means.197

As rumors spread and tensions escalated, both Amar and the Audiencia began to seriously suspect the alcalde Caicedo and other city notables. Caicedo had already raised suspicions when he showed up at the Viceregal Palace with Ricaurte’s note. About a month later, his name was once again discussed by the viceroy and several magistrates. One of Amar’s advisors was informed that Caicedo and a multitude of Santafereños were going to gather, without previous notice, in the corner of the alcalde’s house and march to the Viceregal Palace to compel Amar to establish a government junta. The gathering never took place. The viceroy’s advisors claimed it that their precautions had been effective in preempting the protests.198

Towards mid-November of 1809, the viceroy and Audiencia summoned Caicedo to discuss the growing tensions and political intolerance that were spreading throughout

197 Rodríguez, “Ideas, individuos y emociones,” 33-46; Pareja, Testigos y actores de la Independencia, 53-55.
the city. Several magistrates and the viceroy’s advisors had heard rumors that Caicedo was leading a conspiracy to establish a junta with him as its president. Amar and the magistrates hoped to appease Caicedo and have him reveal the names of those creating unrest in Santafé. During the conversation, the alcalde told them that he had not seen or sensed any particular animosity among the city’s residents, but that the clergyman Andrés María Rosillo had been acting suspiciously and had expressed some discontent concerning the viceroy and the magistrates’ governance.199

A few days later, responding to the Audiencia’s insistence, Amar ordered the detention of Rosillo, Antonio Nariño, and Baltasar Miñano. Nariño and Miñano were captured right away and sent to Cartagena.200 Their detention prompted rumors that Spanish officials were planning on decapitating Santafé’s notables.201 Rosillo, for his part, was not found anywhere in the city. Perhaps anticipating trouble, the clergyman had left the city in early November.202 Rosillo was captured some weeks later in his hometown, Socorro, approximately 275 kilometers northeast of the capital. Some accounts claim that in Socorro, the clergyman made public proclamations accusing the magistrate Juan Hernández de Alba of leading a conspiracy to take control of New Granada and surrender the Kingdom to Napoleon. Rosillo invited his fellow countrymen to join him and establish

199 AGI, SANTAFE, 746, ‘Relación sobre el movimiento del 20 de julio. Santafé. 18 de septiembre de 1810.’, 3-4.
200 According to Antonio Obando, nephew of the clergyman Andrés María Rosillo, the detention of these three men put an end to a plan to assault Santafé’s main military garrison. According to Obando, that week, nearly three hundred armed men were marching from La Mesa to Santafé. Once news of their detention was known, Obando was forced to disperse the troops and end the plot. (Antonio Obando, “Autobiografía” in Testigos y actores de la Independencia, ed. Manuel Pareja Ortiz, (Doctoral dissertation. Universidad de Navarra, 2011) 423-424.)
201 de Torres y Peña, Memorias sobre los orígenes, 98.
202 Caballero, “En la independencia,” 117.
an alliance with the English to get rid of the “treacherous tyrants.” He argued that they needed to act promptly, for if they did not do so, they would soon be governed by the French. Some weeks later, when Rosillo was finally captured, he was found hiding beneath a bed and dressed up as an impoverished woman. According to Amar, dozens of papers were found among his possessions. The texts allegedly included many alarming claims: that the Kingdom was in imminent danger of being invaded by the French, that New Granada’s authorities had sold out to Joseph Bonaparte, that a magistrate from the Audiencia – probably referring to Hernández de Alba – aspired to be crowned King of Spain, and that Santafé’s authorities were concealing information of Spain’s defeats to facilitate the Kingdom’s surrender to the French.²⁰³

During the last months of 1809, many of the viceroy’s critics noted that Amar’s response to the growing unrest and political strife could be summed up by the publication of several *bandos* and the detention of Nariño, Miñano, and Rosillo. Caicedo, who was becoming one the most visible leaders of the faction opposing Amar’s leadership and the authority of European magistrates, believed the viceroy’s lack of character would result in a catastrophe. On December 14, 1809, the *alcalde* wrote a confidential letter to the Council of Indies denouncing the viceroy and the magistrates’ “criminal conduct.” Caicedo maintained that they had been oppressing the city’s inhabitants for years. The *alcalde* warned the Council that if timely and prudent decisions were not taken soon, the Kingdom of New Granada’s liberty and security would be at risk. To begin with, Caicedo argued that the viceroy was not taking any measures to defend the Kingdom from a foreign invasion,

nor had he taken matters in hand to stop the “scandalous behavior” of several magistrates. Such lack of governance, Caicedo stated, was generating fear and mistrust among Santafé’s people. Second, Caicedo accused Amar of secretly corresponding with French officers through a navy officer stationed in Cartagena. Third, Caicedo claimed that the Vicereine Francisca Villanova had publicly stated that, with regards to the war in Europe, “the Americas should follow the strongest party.” Fourth, Caicedo informed the Council that Amar’s response to Ricaurte’s note had been deliberately slow and ineffective, almost as if he had been trying to conceal something. Caicedo closed his dispatch stating that he had interviewed several Santafereños about these matters. Most of them claimed that Amar had consistently showed sympathy for the French. Some noted that he even had a French butler. Others stated that the viceroy had offered numerous gifts to Manuel Godoy. Godoy had been Charles IV’s favorite and was considered one of the main culprits behind the monarchical crisis. Godoy was the object of numerous accusations of corruption and treason throughout the Spanish Empire. Many others also shared the belief that that the magistrate Hernández de Alba sought to take control of the Kingdom by killing Amar. Several claimed that the magistrate had already tried to carry out his homicidal plot in at least three occasions but had been unsuccessful due to unexpected circumstances.

A few weeks later, another of the Santafé’s notables, Ignacio Herrera, wrote a letter to the Junta Suprema Central censuring Amar and several of the Audiencia’s magistrates. In his dispatch, Herrera – a native of Cali and recently elected sindico procurador general

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204 “… que la América debía seguir el partido del más fuerte…” (AGI, SANTAFE,746, ‘Relación sobre el movimiento del 20 de julio. Santafé. 18 de septiembre de 1810.’, 4)
205 AGI, SANTAFE,746, ‘Relación sobre el movimiento del 20 de julio. Santafé. 18 de septiembre de 1810.’, 4-5; Gutiérrez, “Revolución y diplomacia”, 360.
(a sort of judicial advisor) – explains that many Santafereños shared his impression that numerous officials in Spanish America, particularly in New Granada, had been appointed by the favorite Godoy. According to Herrera, the viceroy was a mere hechura\textsuperscript{206} of Godoy. The procurador also claimed that suspicions regarding the loyalty of many officials were aggravated even further by the comments they and their acquaintances made in public. For instance, Herrera maintained, city residents usually saw Amar in the company of Frenchmen, including his butler, Francisco Laviña, who allegedly sold vacant posts at a bargain price. Herrera argued that the fiscal Frías and magistrate Herndandez de Alba were not much better off. Apparently, the two of them were constantly heard saying that the Americas’ fate rested on the outcome of the war in Europe and that if Bonaparte ended up being victorious, New Granada would simply have to acknowledge their new ruler.\textsuperscript{207}

Caicedo and Herrera were not alone in their criticism of Amar. Even some of the Audiencia’s magistrates that the alcalde and procurador accused of terrorizing Santafé’s residents were critical of the viceroy’s management of the crisis. The magistrate Joaquín Carrión y Moreno’s patience with Amar seems to have reached its limit towards the last days of 1809 and first days of 1810 when the Cabildo’s elections took place. In a letter to the Secretary of State, Carrión explains that he had been debating with other members of the Audiencia and the viceroy over how to put an end to the rising unrest that had been spreading throughout the city. Likewise, they had discussed how to stop the growing

\textsuperscript{206} One of the acceptations of the term hechura found in the 1734 Diccionario de Autoridades is “a person who someone else has placed in an honorable and suitable position or job. This person owes to the other his fortune and standing.” (“Translaticiamente se dice de la persona a quien otra ha puesto en algún empleo de honor y conveniencia, que confiesa a él su fortuna y ser hombre.”) (Diccionario de Autoridades, Real Academia Española, 1734.) In present-day terms, hechura is similar to that of puppet.

\textsuperscript{207} Pareja, Testigos y actores de la Independencia, 42-43.
influence of individuals they considered to be dangerous to public peace in the Kingdom. According to the magistrate, they had all agreed to actively endorse a group of candidates in the coming elections to the Cabildo. They hoped that the city’s rising political antagonism would soon fade away if candidates close to the viceroy and the Audiencia formed a majority in the city’s council. Despite their efforts, their candidates did not reach a majority. What infuriated Carrión was Amar’s passivity. Even though they had agreed that they would not allow the Cabildo to be under the control of their political rivals, the viceroy did not make use of his legal authority to impede certain appointments and nominations. Ultimately, those suspected of intriguing against Amar and the Audiencia ended up dominating the Cabildo.208

Similar to what Caicedo intimated in his note to the Council of the Indies, Carrión was also exasperated with Amar’s incapacity to put to trial those accused of treason and of inciting unrest in Santafé. The exceptions seemed to be Rosillo, Nariño, and Miñano. In his letter, Carrión explained that, even though there were numerous reports of individuals propagating defamations and of carrying out treacherous activities, the viceroy had not taken any measures to hold them accountable. Such was the case of a Manuel Silvestre, who was found spreading news that the Junta Suprema Central agreed with the French in many respects and that around thirty bishops in Spain were preaching in favor of Joseph Bonaparte. Amar had Silvestre detained only to release him shortly after. During his brief detention, Silvestre explained that he had made up those stories just to see their effect on

208 AGI, SANTAFE,665, ‘Relación de Joaquín Carrión y Moreno, oidor de la Audiencia de Santafé al secretario de Estado. Cartagena de Indias. 31 de agosto de 1810.’, 2.
the city’s public. Amar accepted this answer as true and set him free, at least according to Carrión.\(^{209}\)

Such passivity and indifference, Carrión claimed, generated much mistrust and murmuring among the city’s residents. According to the magistrate, many commoners believed that Santafé’s main authorities had betrayed Ferdinand VII and that high-ranking officials were actually encouraging people’s disloyalty to the Spanish Crown. In the midst of this growing uncertainty, rumors of the viceroy and the magistrates’ secret alliances with French officers quickly spread. Carrión insisted that the Audiencia had done what they could to resolve this situation, but that not much could be done with a sick and old viceroy such as Amar. As Carrión put it, the viceroy “was deaf and inseparable of his wife, who informed everybody who visited the Palace of the Audiencia’s propositions and made everyone believe that the golillas\(^{210}\) were harassing her husband and forcing him to issue rulings.”\(^{211}\) Such was the growing repudiation towards Amar that when news reached Santafé that Francisco Venegas had been named New Granada’s new viceroy, most of the city’s residents received the appointment with relief and hope. According to Carrión, many

\(^{209}\) AGI, SANTA FE,746, ‘Relación de documentos enviados por el oidor de la Audiencia Joaquín Carrión y Moreno.’, 2,4; AGI, SANTA FE,665, ‘Relación de Joaquín Carrión y Moreno, oidor de la Audiencia de Santafé al secretario de Estado. Cartagena de Indias. 31 de agosto de 1810.’, 2.

\(^{210}\) In this case, the term is used to derogatively refer to the Audiencia’s magistrates. The term golilla translates to English as ‘ruff’, which is a large, stiff adornment worn round the neck. The 1734 Diccionario de Autoridades offers three definitions to the term golilla. The second acceptance of the term defines it as someone who wears a golilla. Such was the case of many magistrates, justices, and judges. (Diccionario de Autoridades, Real Academia Española, 1734.)

\(^{211}\) “… de ser el virrey sordo, y de no separarse del lado su muger que hacía empeño en manifestar a quantos concurrían a su casa, lo que aconsejaba el tribunal y de persuadirles que los Golillas ostigaban a su marido para que tomarse providencias.” (AGI, SANTA FE,665, ‘Relación de Joaquín Carrión y Moreno, oidor de la Audiencia de Santafé al secretario de Estado. Cartagena de Indias. 31 de agosto de 1810.’, 2.)
believed that with a new viceroy, New Granada would no longer be under threat of falling in the hands of the French.²¹²

During the last months of 1809, allegations of treason and corruption spread throughout the city. Regardless of social status or political affiliation, it seems that most of Santafé’s residents ended up hearing and talking about these accusations and intrigues. As rumors and hearsay multiplied, so did feelings of mistrust and fear. These emotions spread throughout the city with intensity. It appears that for many, the “reality” depicted by rumors and allegations displaced previously shared conceptions of what was considered to be true and real. Previously shared understandings of the present and the future became blurred by the spread of rumors and accusations arising from all sides. Viceroy Amar’s case exemplifies the effects that growing mistrust and fear had on conceptions of reality. It seems that during Amar’s sleepless nights, the numerous intrigues and rumors that circulated at the time altered his comprehension of what was actually happening in Santafé and Spanish America. Amar was not alone in this respect. Fear and uncertainty shaped many Santafereños’ understandings of what was happening and what they could expect from the future.

**Fear: Napoleon’s envoys and threats of a foreign invasion**

News of Venegas’ appointment arrived in Santafé towards the second half of February 1810, about the same time that rumors spread claiming that foreign troops were in the Llanos moving towards Santafé. According to priest Torres y Peña, it was an hacendado from the town of Firavitoba in the proximities of Tunja and Sogamoso who

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²¹² AGI, SANTA FE, 665, ‘Relación de Joaquín Carrión y Moreno, oidor de la Audiencia de Santafé al secretario de Estado. Cartagena de Indias. 31 de agosto de 1810.’, 2-3.
warned the viceroy of the presence of foreigners in the Llanos. José María Caballero, the tailor and shopkeeper from Santafé, explained that once the word reached the streets, a terrible stir broke out. People in the streets did not know if the foreigners were French or English. One of the rumors that gained force claimed that fourteen French ships had sailed up the Orinoco River and the French troops were now crossing the Llanos towards Santafé. Many believed Amar was hiding vital information from the public. After several days of growing uncertainty, Amar ordered Colonel Juan Samano to lead a contingent of troops that had recently arrived from Riohacha into the Llanos. Halfway into their expedition, Samano and his troops were told to return to Santafé.213

Amar’s decision was based on recent news claiming that the troops seen in the Llanos of Casanare were neither French nor British soldiers, but a band of agitators led by Andrés María Rosillo’s nephews, José María Rosillo and Vicente Cadena. According to another of Rosillo’s nephews, Antonio Obando, locals from the Llanos confused the group of rebels with French troops due to the red uniforms many of them wore. This group of men arrived in the Llanos towards mid-December of 1809, around the same time of Rosillo’s detention.214 Apparently, Rosillo and his nephews as well as other Socorrenos were supposed to meet in the town of Sutatenza, about 100 kilometers northeast of Santafé, to begin their journey into the Llanos. However, this encounter never took place. The clergyman left Sutatenza before the others had even arrived. Fearing his detention, Rosillo returned to Socorro where he was finally captured and driven to a cell in the Convent of the Capuchins in Santafé. Despite Rosillo’s absence, his nephews and other Socorrenos

213 Caballero, “En la independencia,” 119; de Torres y Peña, Memorias sobre los orígenes, 104-105.
met in Sutatenza and moved on to the Llanos. Apparently, they were aided by a several natives of Socorro who had been living in the Llanos since the early 1780s when dozens of them fled the repression that broke out after the Rebellion of the Comuneros was appeased. After finding out that Andrés María Rosillo had been detained and taken to Santafé, the Socorreños carried out several attacks. The most violent one took place in the town of Pore, where they allegedly killed seven people and forced its officials to flee.215

Troops from the Llanos and a squadron sent from Santafé brutally put down the Socorreños. Rosillo’s two nephews were captured, executed, and beheaded. It was said that the two of them were shot without even giving them the opportunity to confess their sins. In a letter to his brother Ignacio, Camilo Torres explains that one of those executed in the Llanos, José María Rosillo, was the young cadet that the two of them had often seen in the corner of the Calle Real. According to Torres, Rosillo and Cadena were executed “without any review of their sentence, and probably without even hearing them, or without any defense of any sort, for in the Llanos there is no one who can read. And to add insult to brutality, they have brought their heads to the capital.” According to Torres, the 13th of May, when their heads arrived in the city, was a day of “weeping and of mourning for all of Santafé, even for those Caribes216 who gave the orders but were then incapable of presenting them to the public, and much less of imposing the same sentence on the other

215 de Torres y Peña, Memorias sobre los orígenes, 104-105; Pareja, Testigos y actores de la Independencia, 49-50; Horacio Rodríguez Plata, Andrés María Rosillo (Bogotá: Editorial Cromos, 1944), 105-110.
216 The 1729 Diccionario de Autoridades defines the term Caribe as a “bloodthirsty and cruel man who infuriates against others, without having any pity nor compassion. The metaphor comes after the Indians from the Province of Caribana in the Indies, where all of them feed from human flesh.” (“El hombre sangriento y cruel, que se enfurece contra otros, sin tener lástima, ni compassión. Es tomada la metáfora de unos Indios de la Provincia de Caribana en las Indias, donde todos se alimentaban de carne humana.”) (Diccionario de Autoridades, Real Academia Española, 1729.)
youngster, their partner, the kid Salgar.”217 Three days after their arrival, José María Rosillo and Vicente Cadena’s heads were buried in the chapel of one of Santafé’s prisons.218

According to José Antonio Torres y Peña, when the troops arrived from the Llanos, rumors spread throughout Santafé claiming that Amar and the Audiencia’s magistrates had given orders to display Rosillo’s and Cadena’s heads in the city’s streets and squares. Some people added that these officials also had plans to execute their accomplice, Carlos Salgar, and behead the clergyman Andrés María Rosillo in Santafé’s main square. Yet, neither Salgar nor the clergyman Rosillo were executed and the two heads were not displayed in public. In his letters, Camilo Torres argued that recent news of further Spanish defeats as well as the “humanist reflections” offered by the magistrate Francisco Cortázar y Lavayen convinced Amar and the Audiencia’s justices otherwise.219 Other accounts suggest that Amar was not in favor of such bloody displays and was actually responsible for stopping them. In a letter to the viceroy, Antonio de Villavicencio – the comisario regio sent to New Granada by the recently instituted Consejo de Regencia – thanked Amar, “in the name of the Your Majesty and all of the Kingdom”, for not allowing the heads of the “miserable Rosillo and Cadena to be fixed in the city’s square.” As Villavicencio explained, “it would

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217 “… sin consultar la sentencia, y probablemente sin oírlos, o sin defensa alguna, pues en los Llanos no hay quien sepa leer; y añadiendo insulto a la barbarie, han traído las cabezas a la capital…ha sido un día de llanto y de duelo para todo Santafé, y aún creo que para los mismos Caribes que dieron estas órdenes, y que no se atrevieron a presentarlas en público; y menos a imponer la misma pena a otro muchacho, compañero de aquellos, al Salgarito…” (AGN, Sección Colecciones, Fondo Academia Colombiana de Historia, Serie Camilo Torres, caja 1, carpeta 2, folios 49-50, ‘Carta de Camilo a Ignacio Torres sobre creación de Regencia y asesinatos en los Llanos. Santafé. 21 de mayo de 1810.’, 3-4.)

218 Caballero, “En la independencia,” 121.

have been the final insult and the greatest vexation carried out against the capital and the whole Kingdom.”

The incident in the Llanos marked a breaking point. For many Santafereños, the decapitations of Rosillo and Cadena testified to Amar and the magistrates’ cruelty against Spanish Americans. Some noted that such pointless brutality was an indication of European officials’ hopelessness. They claimed that their despair was probably due to the fact that Spain had been lost and the French would soon take over the Kingdom of New Granada.

News of the beheadings spread throughout northern South America and became a part of the region’s collective memory. When the Province of Cartagena declared its independence on November 11, 1811, the authors of the declaration alluded to the two decapitations.

About the same time that Rosillo and Cadena’s heads arrived in Santafé, so did news that the Junta Suprema Central had been abolished and a Consejo de Regencia (Council of Regency) had been established in its place. Apparently, in Santafé the news was met with mixed feelings. For some, such as the magistrate Joaquín Carrión, news of the Consejo’s establishment produced relief and comfort. According to Carrión, most of Santafé’s inhabitants understood that the Consejo was the only institution that could save the Spanish Kingdom and maintain it under Ferdinand VII’s rule. Moreover, as Carrión

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220 “Doy a V.E. a nombre de S.M. y de todo el Reino las gracias por no haber permitido fixar en la Plaza de esa ciudad las cabezas de los desgraciados Rosillo y Cadena, hubiera sido el último ultraje y mas dura vejacion hecho a esa capital y a todo el reino.” (AGI, SANTAFE, 747, ‘Carta de Antonio de Villavicencio al Virrey Amar sobre la opinión pública y noticias de la Península. Cartagena de Indias. 30 de mayo de 1810.’, 3)

221 AGI, SANTAFE, 747, ‘Carta de Antonio de Villavicencio al Virrey Amar sobre la opinión pública y noticias de la Península. Cartagena de Indias. 30 de mayo de 1810.’, 3-5.

222 Cartagena’s declaration of Independence claims that “the bloody scenes in La Paz and in Quito, the cruel assassinations in the Llanos, put our suffering through a last test.” (“Las sangrientas escenas de La Paz y de Quito, los crueles asesinatos de los Llanos pusieron nuestro sufrimiento a la última prueba.” (“Acta de Independencia de la Provincia de Cartagena en Nueva Granada” in Banco de la República. Proceso histórico del 20 de julio de 1810. Documentos., 254.))
explained, the fact that the Council was composed of so many worthy and respectable individuals made many residents feel hopeful that Spain would ultimately prevail.\textsuperscript{223} Yet, there were others who felt quite the contrary. According to Camilo Torres’ letters, news concerning the dissolution of the Junta Suprema Central produced bewilderment and uncertainty in Santafé. To make matters worse, Torres explained, information from the Iberian Peninsula arrived in the city only intermittently. In correspondence with his brother Ignacio, Camilo Torres stated that Santafé first received news that French troops had crossed the Sierra Maestra and entered Andalucía, forcing the ‘Junta Suprema’ to flee from Seville to the Isla de León.\textsuperscript{224} Some days later, letters from Europe claimed that in the midst of the chaos produced by the French advance, the ‘Junta Suprema’ had been dissolved and a Consejo created in its stead. Some of the dispatches stated that the Junta’s dissolution had produced riots in Seville. Throughout Andalucía, people accused the Junta’s members of treason and implored Andalucía’s Provincial Junta to assume power. Another wave of correspondence raised even more confusion in Santafé. Many Santafereños were surprised to hear the reasons justifying the Consejo’s formation as well as the names of its new chairpersons. Many noted that there seemed to be no legal basis for the Junta’s dissolution and added that those individuals who had played a key role in the Junta Suprema Central were absent from the newly formed Consejo. Some questioned if the new Consejo had obtained the King’s endorsement and recognition as had

\textsuperscript{223} AGI, SANTAFE,665, ‘Relación de Joaquín Carrión y Moreno, oidor de la Audiencia de Santafé al secretario de Estado. Cartagena de Indias. 31 de agosto de 1810.’, 3-4.
\textsuperscript{224} AGN, Sección Colecciones, Fondo Academia Colombiana de Historia, Serie Camilo Torres, caja 1, carpeta 2, folios 3-4, ‘Carta de Camilo a Ignacio Torres sobre negocios personales y noticias de la Península. Santafé. 5 de abril de 1810.’, 1-2.
been the case for the Junta. Ultimately, Torres concluded, the arrival of such baffling information simply produced further confusion, for it was “unclear who was truly in charge nor whom we should support.” Everything seemed to indicate, Torres added, that “disorder, confusion, and anarchy” now reigned in southern Andalucía.225

For his part, José Antonio Torres y Peña, explained in his Memorias that news of the Junta’s dissolution intensified the proliferation of speculations and defamations. Ephemeral papers and rumors spread throughout the city claiming that Spanish officials in the Iberian Peninsula had betrayed Ferdinand VII and joined Napoleon’s ranks. Other stories maintained that several of the Audiencia’s magistrates had publicly stated that New Granada’s fate depended on the outcome of the war in the Iberian Peninsula. The word in the streets was that magistrate Diego Frías had once again claimed that if the French took control over the whole of the Peninsula, the viceroy and Audiencia should surrender New Granada without any sort of resistance. Other rumors stated that the European members of Santafé’s Cabildo were also suggesting that New Granada should capitulate to the French. Years later, Torres y Peña maintained that neither the viceroy nor other top officials did much to disprove these rumors and, by doing so, ended up stimulating suspicions of their alleged disloyalty to the Spanish Crown.226

Ultimately, news of the Junta’s dissolution deepened the city’s growing political divisions. Torres y Peña’s fervid description of the factions and reactions that arose in

225 “De suerte que no sabemos quién manda verdaderamente, ni por quien se debe estar… y todo indica el desorden, la confusión, y la anarquía.” (AGN, Sección Colecciones, Fondo Academia Colombiana de Historia, Serie Camilo Torres, caja 1, carpeta 2, folios 49-50, ‘Carta de Camilo a Ignacio Torres sobre creación de Regencia y asesinatos en los Llanos. Santafé. 21 de mayo de 1810.’, 2-4.)
226 de Torres y Peña, Memorias sobre los orígenes de la Independencia Nacional, 107-108.
Santafé after the institution of the Consejo are revealing of this rising antagonism. The clergyman explained that some of the city’s residents received the news with dismay and distress. Torres y Peña described them as “reasonable men” who did not sympathize with the newly formed Consejo for they considered it an irregular corporation, unknown in Spanish legislation. These denizens, first and foremost, felt fear for the fate of the Spanish Monarchy and continued to demonstrate their allegiance to Ferdinand VII in spite of growing uncertainty. Yet, there were also those who Torres y Peña labeled the *Napoleónistas*. According to the clergyman, this group received the news of the Junta’s closure with certain reassurance and satisfaction. In his *Memorias*, Torres y Peña accuses them of openly sympathizing with France. Many of the so-called *Napoleónistas* constantly stated that Spain did not stand a chance against the Bonaparte brothers and most of them willingly approved of the possibility of being ruled by France.\(^{227}\) The clergyman faults them for “taking advantage of the noble and simple character of the people… dazzling them with ideas of liberty, independence, inalienable rights, and sovereignty of the peoples, and by repeating – to annoyance – stories regarding chains of tyranny, three hundred years of slavery, and recurring to the same old frauds and lies.”\(^{228}\) For Torres y Peña, the *Napoleónistas* incited political intolerance through false stories and, thus, generated unrest and discontent as a means to “ease the way for the universal usurper” to conquer the Americas and fulfill his “insatiable ambitions.”\(^{229}\)

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\(^{228}\) “… se abusó del carácter noble y sencillo de las gentes… deslumbrándolas con los nombres de libertad, independencia, derechos imprescriptibles y soberanía del pueblo y con repetir, hasta fastidiar, cadenas de la tiranía, trescientos años de esclavitud y recurrente a la misma engaño y a la mentira…” (de Torres y Peña, *Memorias sobre los orígenes*, 108.)

\(^{229}\) “… para facilitar en todo caso al usurpador universal, los medios de llenar los planes de su insaciable ambición.” (de Torres y Peña, *Memorias sobre los orígenes*, 109.)
Besides Torres y Peña, there were others in Santafé who also suspected of the existence of Napoleonic conspirators within the city. Such was the case of the magistrate Joaquín Carrión. He believed that José Acevedo y Gómez,\(^{230}\) *regidor* in Santafé’s Cabildo, was perhaps one of Napoleon’s covert agents. Carrión had several reasons to suspect Acevedo. In a letter sent to the Secretary of State, the magistrate claimed that José Acevedo and his family had been agitating Santafé’s populace for months, trying to convince them that Spain could not hold long against Napoleon’s most recent offensives and that New Granada would have to come to peace with whomever sat upon the Spanish throne. Moreover, Carrión argues that in a private conversation with Acevedo, the *regidor* had claimed that Mexico and La Habana were also discussing what to do in case Spain was defeated as was Santafé. Carrión took such remarks as an indication that Acevedo had confidential information and was probably in association with other individuals throughout the continent, paving the way for Napoleon’s takeover of the Americas. Carrión grounded such conjectures on reports claiming that Acevedo’s brother in law, Tejada, was part of Joseph Bonaparte’s court in Madrid. According to Carrión’s account, Tejada was plotting with envoys throughout New Granada, Mexico, and Cuba in an effort to generate unrest and political divisions that could lay the foundations for a Napoleonic invasion of Spanish America.\(^{231}\)

Other accounts allude to the presence of French envoys and conspirators throughout the Americas. In May 1810, the Viceroy Amar wrote a letter to Quito’s Audiencia – at the

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\(^{230}\) José Acevedo is considered a national hero by many Colombians and is notoriously remembered as the man who gave the cry of independence on July 20.

\(^{231}\) AGI, SANTAFE,746, ‘Relación de documentos enviados por el oidor de la Audiencia Joaquín Carrión y Moreno.’, 4-5.
time based in Cuenca – informing its magistrates of the imminent arrival of French spies to New Granada and other parts of Spanish America. In previous days, Amar had received a letter informing him that several individuals coming from France had arrived in Baltimore and were soon going to depart to Spanish America to clandestinely spread revolutionary ideas and advocate for Joseph Bonaparte’s reign over the Americas. The dispatch offered the names and physical traits of the French envoys and warned viceroys, governors, and other top officials throughout Spanish America to be vigilant over their ports.\textsuperscript{232} Antonio de Villavicencio, the \textit{comisario regio}, also believed that covert French emissaries had scattered throughout the Americas. According to Villavicencio, through intrigues and machinations, French envoys had been inciting a vicious animosity between Spanish Europeans and Spanish Americans. Such growing rivalry, the \textit{comisario} maintained, would eventually lead to a civil war that would enable Napoleon’s takeover of the Americas.\textsuperscript{233}

Amar had been warned of the arrival of French spies by Luís de Onís y González, Spain’s ambassador to the United States of America between 1809 and 1819. Given that the US did not recognize the Junta Suprema Central nor the Consejo de Regencia, the US Secretary of State did not acknowledge Onís as Spain’s ambassador until 1815. Despite of his initial setbacks, Onís settled in Philadelphia and personally assumed the responsibilities of a rightful ambassador. From the Fall of 1809, when he arrived in the US, until 1812, Onís’ great obsession became Napoleon’s alleged network of envoys and spies in the

\textsuperscript{232} Archivo Histórico Nacional de España (AHN), CONSEJOS,21677, ‘Documento 12, Expediente 1. Cruce de correspondencia entre el Virrey Amar y Audiencia de Quito y el Obispo. Santafé. 20 de mayo de 1810.’, 4.
\textsuperscript{233} AGI, SANTAFE,747, ‘ Expediente caso Juan Jurado. Su paso por Caracas, Santafé, Panamá y otras ciudades. 1808-1815.’, 16-17; AGI, SANTAFE,746. ‘Cartas y documentos de Juan Jurado. Carta con Villavicencio de 23 de agosto de 1810.’, 5-6.
Americas. A few weeks after his arrival, Onís began to search for spies and conspirators among the French and Spanish diasporas as well as among passengers disembarking ships from Europe. In December 1809, Onís was informed that a French ship, *Tilsit*, apparently coming from Bayonne, had recently disembarked in Norfolk. Among its passengers, Onís identified one he believed to be the head of Napoleon’s schemes in the Americas: Joseph Desmolard. Captain Desmolard established in Baltimore from where he supposedly coordinated hundreds of secret agents in the American continent. Through a covert spy, Onís was able to infiltrate Desmolard’s closest circle and obtain a copy of Joseph Bonaparte’s purported instructions to French envoys in the Americas. In March 1810, Onís sent copies of Bonaparte’s instructions to viceroys, captain generals, and governors throughout Spanish America. The ambassador also informed them of additional details he had recollected, such as the names and traits of certain spies, their tactics, and the places where each one of them would try to settle.  

Around early May, Santafé’s viceroy received one of Onís’ letters coming from Philadelphia with a copy of Bonaparte’s instructions. Amar’s reaction to the warning was of both concern and optimism. He hoped such a threat could encourage “the unanimity and good order that has been so shattered.”

During those months, rumors of foreign invasions did not revolve exclusively around France and Napoleon. It seems that several of Santafé’s residents also considered that falling into the hands of the English or the Portuguese was plausible. News of battles

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235 “Podrá suceder que en lugar de asertar en su empresa nos favorescan para que guardemos mas unanimidad y buen orden que tan quebrantado se observa.” (AHN, CONSEJOS, 21677, ‘Documento 12. Expediente 1. Cruce de correspondencia entre el Virrey Amar y Audiencia de Quito y el Obispo. Santafé. 20 de mayo de 1810.’, 4.)
between French and British ships in the Caribbean and reports of England’s conquest of Guadalupe intensified the belief that the English also had an eye on Spanish America. Despite being Spain’s main ally in the war against Napoleon, the prospect of an English invasion did not seem too farfetched for many of the city’s residents. They could bring to mind the dozens of attacks the British had staged in past centuries against Spanish American ports, the constant threat of an English incursion during the Seven Years’ War and subsequent years, and the 46-day takeover of Buenos Aires in 1806.

Regardless of the motives behind the presence of English and French fleets in the Caribbean Sea, their naval movements generated further suspicions and rumors in Santafé. Among the many stories that spread at the time, one of them claimed that Napoleon was not really planning to invade the Americas but merely offering the Spanish colonies protection from an impending English invasion. At least in the case of Camilo Torres, such a rumor produced more outrage than fright. Torres energetically rejected the idea of receiving any sort of aid from Napoleon. As he explained to his brother Ignacio, “we don’t want it, and we don’t need it.” Torres’ remarks replicate the feelings of self-pride and sense of worth that frequently were part of discussions concerning New Granada’s fate. Many of Santafé’s American residents claimed that their future did not solely depend on

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236 AGN, Sección Colecciones, Fondo Academia Colombiana de Historia, Serie Camilo Torres, caja 1, carpeta 2, folios 3-4, ‘Carta de Camilo a Ignacio Torres sobre negocios personales y noticias de la Península. Santafé. 5 de abril de 1810.’, 4.


238 “... con la promesa de su protección, de que no necesitamos, ni queremos.” (AGN, Sección Colecciones, Fondo Academia Colombiana de Historia, Serie Camilo Torres, caja 1, carpeta 2, folios 3-4, ‘Carta de Camilo a Ignacio Torres sobre negocios personales y noticias de la Península. Santafé. 5 de abril de 1810.’, 4.)
the war in Europe, for they too were Spaniards who could uphold the Spanish Monarchy and defend the Kingdom from the Bonaparte’s ambitions. The insinuation that Spanish Americans could not partake in the war in the Iberian Peninsula or even worse, that they could not defend themselves and needed Napoleon’s aid, infuriated many.

Other rumors posed the possibility of Spanish America ending up under the control of the Portuguese. In May 1810, pamphlets circulated throughout Santafé claiming that, in accordance to the laws of royal succession and the fact that Ferdinand VII and his two brothers might never be set free, either Doña Carlota or her son Pedro should be appointed as Spanish America’s new ruler. Carlota, Princess of Brazil and sister of Ferdinand VII, and the Infant Dom Pedro had moved to Brazil in 1807 along with the Portuguese court after Napoleon’s invasion of Portugal. One of the ephemeral texts that spread in Santafé stated that once the Iberian Peninsula fell into the hands of Napoleon, the viceregal capitals should summon delegates from all of their provinces to elect either Carlota or Pedro as their new monarch. The papers maintained that governing officials would continue in their posts for the time being and that anyone who opposed these plans should be considered a rebel.239

The word in the streets was that many of New Granada’s officials and magistrates backed this plot because it would allow them to maintain their positions of power. Such a prospect produced an almost unanimous rejection among the city’s residents. For instance, in his correspondence, Camilo Torres suggests that corrupt officials, to keep their posts,

239 AGI, SANTAFE.747, ‘Transcripción de papel que circuló en Santafé. Anexo no. 2 a la carta de Villavicencio de 4 de junio de 1810.’, 1.
were going to turn Spanish Americans “into the slaves of the Portuguese of Brazil.” 

The *comisario* Villavicencio, for his part, added that the hostility towards Doña Carlota was so manifest that if she ever ended up ruling over Spanish America, civil wars would almost immediately break out in all of the American provinces. 

After almost three centuries of Spanish rule, a complete rupture from the Spanish Crown seemed unconceivable and baffling to many of the city’s inhabitants. For most *Santafereños*, the natural response to news of a French invasion was to reaffirm their loyalty to the Spanish Monarchy and to Ferdinand VII. Yet, despite their faithfulness to the Crown, during the first months of 1810, the possibility of an absolute collapse of the Spanish Crown became more likely than ever before. The confusion and mistrust that had been growing ever since the city learned of Ferdinand VII’s detention were complemented with the mounting fear that New Granada was soon going to be governed by the French, the English, or the Portuguese. The rumors that Napoleonic spies could already be found within the capital and that basically any of the city’s inhabitants could be a French emissary sparked further anxiety, mistrust, and confusion among Santafé’s residents. Amidst growing uncertainty and fear, new understandings of the times they were living in and new imagined futures emerged. Many began to acknowledge the possibility of being ruled by someone other than the Spanish Monarchy.

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240 “y este es efectivamente el plan, según se dice, hacernos esclavos de los Portugueses del Brasil.” (AGN, Sección Colecciones, Fondo Academia Colombiana de Historia, Serie Camilo Torres, caja 1, carpeta 2, folios 49-50, ‘Carta de Camilo a Ignacio Torres sobre creación de Regencia y asesinatos en los Llanos. Santafé. 21 de mayo de 1810.’, 4.)

241 AGI, SANTAFE,747, ‘Carta de Villavicencio a las Cortes y ministros sobre situación en las Américas. Cartagena. 4 de junio de 1810.’, 1.
Expectation: growing animosities and the arrival of the ‘comisionados regios’

During the following weeks of May 1810, feelings of confusion, fear, and mistrust in Santafé grew even further with the news that the comisionados regios Carlos Montufar and Antonio Villaviencio had arrived in the Americas and that Caracas had recently established its own junta. The regal commissioners Montufar and Villavicencio were sent to the Americas with two major endeavors: putting an end to growing political divisions and obtaining New Granada’s recognition of the Consejo de Regencia, Spain’s new supreme governing body which had replaced the Junta Central Suprema. Yet, it seems that their presence in the Americas simply stirred up political tensions. Some reports maintain that the comisionados triggered mistrust and unrest in all the cities they passed through.

Montufar and Villavicencio first arrived in Caracas on April 18. One day later, Caracas established a government junta. On May 8, they reached Cartagena de Indias. About a month after their arrival, on June 14, when Montufar was already on his way to Santafé, Cartagena’s Cabildo removed Governor Francisco Montes from office and put him on a ship to La Habana. Montufar arrived in the capital on June 17 and remained there for the following two weeks before departing to Quito. Villavicencio, for his part, stayed in Cartagena, attempting to reconcile a divided city, until the first days of July. Villavicencio reached Santafé until August 1\textsuperscript{st}, when Montufar was already on his way to Quito and Santafé had, by then, established a junta that had declared its independence from the Consejo de Regencia.\textsuperscript{243}


\textsuperscript{243} Pareja, Testigos y actores de la Independencia, 110.
There are several reasons why the arrival of Montufar and Villavicencio produced so much strife. In the first place, their coming coincided with the arrival of troubling news. Both *comisionados* were bearers of information concerning Spain’s most recent defeats and updates regarding the Consejo de Regencia’s status. Secondly, the commissioners were delegates of a Council that aroused uneasiness and distrust. The Consejo had not been recognized by the Spanish American provinces and many shared the impression that it illegitimately claimed to rule in the name of Ferdinand VII. Finally, the *comisionados* appeared to favor the establishment of government juntas in the Americas. These issues produced conflicting views among many and led to false allegations that Montufar and Villavicencio were probably Napoleonic agents.244

Those who had praised the Consejo but opposed the formation of juntas had a difficult time trying to make sense of the commissioners’ standpoints. Such was the case of the magistrate Joaquín Carrión, who described Montufar and Villavicenio’s responsibilities as inexplicable and mysterious. The magistrate could not understand the reasons why both of them approved of the formation of government juntas or why they were so critical of Spanish Europeans. According to Carrión, ever since they arrived in the Americas, the *comisionados* had been publicly blaming European officials for fueling animosity between Europeans and Americans. Carrión argued that the commissioners seemed to be instigating hatred towards Spanish Europeans instead of promoting

reconciliation. When Montufar reached Santafé, Carrión was even more baffled. Apparently, during his short stay, the comisionado publicly stated that Quito’s example should be followed by other American provinces. Montufar allegedly argued that when Quito formed a junta in August 1809, it was merely doing what many Spanish provinces had done when they found out of Ferdinand VII’s detention. During those two weeks, Carrión was shocked to see Montufar having frequent meetings, both publicly and clandestinely, with individuals suspected of being insurgents. It seems that other magistrates shared Carrión’s concerns and suffered every day of Montufar’s visit. Yet his arrival and some of the news he brought also produced hope among the Audiencia’s members and other of the city’s officials. News that the recently nominated Viceroy Francisco Venegas was on his way to the Americas, that Santafé’s archbishop Juan Bautista Sacristán was finally headed to the capital, and that the comisionado Villavicencio would arrive before long made many believe that the city’s divisions and animosities would soon fade away. Carrión had high hopes that Villavicencio would be able to appease the Cabildo

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245 Juan Bautista Sacristán was appointed as Santafé’s archbishop in 1804. Due to Spain’s war with England, the French invasion, and personal reasons, Sacristán only travelled to the Americas until 1810. He arrived in Cartagena in June of 1810. When he began his way up the Magdalena River towards the capital, he was informed of the conformation of Santafé’s Junta. The archbishop decided to put a stop to his journey and informed Santafé’s Junta he would only continue when he received confirmation that he would not be forced to swear allegiance to the Junta and that the Junta would maintain its loyalty to the Spanish Crown and Ferdinand VII. Sacristán settled in the town of Turbaco, about 15 kilometers southeast of Cartagena, for nearly two years while negotiating with Santafé’s authorities. In 1812, he was finally expelled and forced on a ship headed to the United States. The ship ended up arriving in Cuba, where Sacristán remained the following years, despite his efforts to return to either Cartagena or the Iberian Peninsula. The archbishop finally reached Santafé during the last months of 1816, after the monarchical restoration and Pablo Morillo’s takeover of Santafé. He died in Santafé a few months after his arrival. (AGI, SANTAFE,747, ‘Expediente sobre la conducta y sufrimientos del arzobispo de Santafé D. Juan Bautista. Madrid. 26 de octubre de 1816.’, 1-20; Rodríguez, Andrés María Rosillo, 105-110.)
and the city’s dissident factions. Yet, such prospects vanished on July 20, before either Venegas, Sacristán, and Villavicencio had reached Santafé.

The expectation and uneasiness caused by the arrival of the commissioners was intensified by news of the establishment of Caracas’ Junta. According to the clergyman José Antonio Torres y Peña, in late May Santafé began to receive countless letters and papers coming directly from Caracas. Correspondence from Caracas to Santafé usually travelled by sea to Cartagena and then sailed up Magdalena River. Yet, in order to prevent the seizure of their correspondence, Caracas’ rebels sent their letters and papers to Santafé through a long and rugged trek across the Llanos and Andes Mountains. In his *Memorias*, Torres y Peña claimed that the papers coming from Caracas were mostly “offensive and incendiary bandos… with revolutionary language that… in reality simply exhaled dissension, hate, mistrust and suspicion, persecution, fury, blood, fire, devastation, ruins and widespread disruption, oppression, and violence.”

In addition to bandos and pamphlets, stories concerning Caracas also spread throughout Santafé. Some accounts praised the new Junta, while others denounced the mischiefs and sinful crimes the rebels were committing. The feeling among many Santafereños was that Venezuela was literally burning in flames.

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246 AGI, SANTAFE,665, ‘Relación de Joaquín Carrión y Moreno, oidor de la Audiencia de Santafé al secretario de Estado. Cartagena de Indias. 31 de agosto de 1810.’, 2.
247 “por los papelones insultosos e incendiarios que venian en todos los correos en el lenguaje revolucionario… no respira sino disenciones, odios, recelos y desconfianzas, persecuciones, furor, sangre, incendios, devastaciones, ruinas y trastorno general, opresiones y violencias. (de Torres y Peña, *Memorias sobre los orígenes*, 111.)
Camilo Torres shared similar catastrophic views with regards to the fate of the Spanish Kingdom and the effects its fall would have in the Americas. In a letter to his uncle Ignacio Tenorio dated on June 20, Camilo Torres discussed Montufar’s arrival in Santafé, the establishment of Caracas’ Junta, and the latest news from the Iberian Peninsula. Torres’ distress is manifest. In his letter, Torres claims that “Spain is about to be lost, and if that does come to pass, it would be like the Cotopaxi\(^{249}\) erupting! And what a shock it would produce in that territory!... Heaven forbid that my fears have any basis whatsoever and that such event ever come about. On the contrary, let us hope things calm down and peace be restored.”\(^{250}\)

Others sensed that not only the Iberian Peninsula was about to erupt, but that Spanish America’s growing tensions and animosities were soon going to spiral out of control. The *comisionado* Villavicencio was surprised to see that most Spanish Americans still maintained an untainted loyalty towards the Monarchy in spite of Spain’s most recent setbacks and what he considered to be many years of inequity. Nonetheless, the commissioner argued that New Granada’s standing allegiance was mainly due to the upcoming arrival of the newly appointed Viceroy Francisco Venegas and, in part, to the *comisionados’* instructions to appease enmities and dismiss officials who had abused of their authority.\(^{251}\) Shortly before departing from Cartagena to Santafé, the *comisionado*

\(^{249}\) The Cotopaxi is a volcano located approximately 50 kilometers south of Quito.

\(^{250}\) “España está a punto de perderse; y si esto sucede, ¡qué explosión la de Cotopaxi, y que estremecimientos en aquel terreno... No quiera el cielo que sean fundadas mis temores, y que el suceso lo verifique; sino que todo se tranquilice y componga su paz.” (AGN, Sección Colecciones, Fondo Academia Colombiana de Historia, Serie Camilo Torres, caja 1, carpeta 2, folios 45-48, ‘Carta de Camilo a Ignacio Tenorio sobre situación en Península y en las Américas. Santafé. 20 de junio de 1810.’, 45-46.)

\(^{251}\) AGI, SANTAFE,629. ‘Carta de Antonio de Villavicencio al Secretario de Estado y del Despacho de España e Yndias. Cartagena de Indias. 24 de mayo de 1810.’, 5.
Villavicencio wrote a letter to Venegas, cautioning him about the deplorable state in which he would find New Granada at his arrival. The commissioner began his letter to Venegas noting that he “wished he could fly” to Santafé to save it from an impending disaster.252 Villavicencio informed Venegas that a “storm loomed over the capital and the whole Kingdom, and that only His Excellency’s arrival could bring peace to its unfortunate residents.”253

During the nearly two months since his arrival in the Americas, Villavicencio had witnessed the conformation of a junta in Caracas and the removal of Cartagena’s Governor after a rowdy uprising. Even though the commissioner was able to convince the Cartagena’s notables and officials to swear allegiance to the Consejo de Regencia, he was aware that such endorsement was fragile as it was obtained in the midst of growing political intolerance and rising frictions among the city’s Europeans and Americans. Furthermore, during his stay in Cartagena, Villavicencio received numerous reports from Santafé, Quito, Popayán, and other cities throughout New Granada with complaints accusing top officials of despotism, corruption, and incompetence. The accounts sent to the comisionado gave Villavicencio the impression that authority in New Granada was crumbling and that a tragic outcome was unavoidable.254

As Villavicencio sailed up the Magdalena River, uprisings broke out in Pamplona and Socorro. On July 4, ongoing frictions between Pamplona’s corregidor, Juan Bastús y

252 “…quisiera volar para salvar a aquella Capital…” (AGI, SANTAFE,747, ‘Carta de Villavicencio al Virrey electo, Venegas. Cartagena. 24 de junio de 1810.’, 1.)
253 “…a aquella Capital, y aun a todo el Reyno de la tormenta que le amenaza: solo la llegada de V.E. puede ser el arco de paz para estos desgraciados habitantes.” (AGI, SANTAFE,747, ‘Carta de Villavicencio al Virrey electo, Venegas. Cartagena. 24 de junio de 1810.’, 1.)
254 AGI, SANTAFE,629. ‘Carta de Antonio de Villavicencio al Secretario de Estado y del Despacho de España e Yndias. Cartagena de Indias. 24 de mayo de 1810.’, 4-10.
Falla, and the town’s notables led to riots that resulted in the official’s destitution. Following his removal from office, Pamplona’s Cabildo provisionally assumed control until July 30, when Pamplona established a government junta. A few days later, on July 9, a brawl broke out in Socorr’s streets between a group of soldiers and passersby. The scuffle left eight people dead. For months Socorro’s residents had been protesting the corregidor José Valdez’s despotism as well as the Viceroy Amar’s inability to defend New Granada. Socorro’s notables and commoners, and those from surrounding towns, used the incident of the 9th as a pretext to demand Valdez’s resignation. On the 10th, hundreds of people gathered to protest against Valdez and his oppressive actions. The corregidor and his troops sought safety in the Convent of the Capuchins for hours until Valdez surrendered. On the 11th, Socorro formed a government junta composed of local delegates as well as other deputies from the neighboring town of San Gil. The statute instituting Socorro’s Junta declared that “Socorreños were committed to upholding Ferdinand VII as the province’s legitimate sovereign.” The charter also rejected “the favorite Godoy and all of Bonaparte’s envoys who sought to enslave us by first dividing us.” In a sermon offered during the following days, a parish priest reminded Socorro’s Junta that they had undertaken the responsibility of “sustaining the three sacred objects of our

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256 “… a su legítimo soberano, el señor don Fernando VII, sin peligro de que los favoritos de Godoy, y los emisarios de Bonaparte, nos esclavicen dividiéndonos.” (“Proclamación de la Independencia en el Socorro. 10 de julio de 1810.” in Banco de la República. Proceso histórico del 20 de julio de 1810. Documentos, 137.
independence...: Religion, Fatherland, and the unfortunate Ferdinand VII and his dynasty.”

News of Pamplona and Socorro’s uprisings quickly spread throughout New Granada. In a matter of days, the news reached Santafé as well as towns along the Magdalena River on Villavicencio’s route to the capital. In Santafé, the news produced a combination of fear, expectation, and hope. According to the clergyman José Antonio Torres y Peña, stories concerning the Socorreños’ ruthlessness propagated throughout the city. One account claimed that during the disorders, a group of rebels had surrounded a sick soldier and asked him if he would join their ranks. When the soldier answered that he would not, his head was smashed with a saber. As this story spread throughout Santafé, José Acevedo y Gómez – the Cabildo’s regidor who magistrate Carrión suspected of being a French envoy – published a text discussing these recent events. Torres y Peña argued that Acevedo’s text condoned and minimized the Socorreños’ brutality.

Yet, it seems that Acevedo was not at all pleased with the latest news coming from Socorro and Pamplona. The regidor feared that these events could spark a tragedy in Santafé. Acevedo had dreaded the possibility of other provinces establishing juntas before the capital for a number of reasons. On the one hand, the regidor feared that Amar and the magistrates might repress the city’s notables as a retaliation against other provinces forming their own juntas. In a letter written to the commissioner Villavicencio on July 19,

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257 “Sostener los tres santos objetos de nuestra independencia, que lo son: la Religión, la Patria, y el desgraciado Fernando Séptimo y su dinastía...” (AGN, Sección República, Fondo Archivo Anexo, rollo 11, f. 249r-v. ‘Carta del párroco de Simacota al presidente Lorenzo Plata, 28 de septiembre de 1810.’ Also cited in Martínez “La desigual conducta de las provincias neogranadinas,” 44.)
258 de Torres y Peña, Memorias sobre los orígenes, 112-113.
Acevedo states that, after the latest events in Pamplona and Socorro, he felt as if his “life and that of other citizens were being ambushed from all flanks.”\(^{259}\) On the other hand, Acevedo also believed that some provinces might make questionable decisions. Some might resolve to disallow the capital’s authority, disregard the Consejo de Regencia, or adhere to Napoleon’s envoys. To a certain extent, Acevedo feared that divisions and a dispersion of power could lead to strife and war and, eventually, to the capital’s ruin. Consequently, the *regidor* insisted that the only way to end the city’s growing antagonisms and avoid a catastrophe was through the establishment of a government junta in Santafé.\(^{260}\)

In his letter to Villavicencio, the *regidor* pleads the commissioner to arrive promptly, implying that his presence was needed to institute a junta and avoid a tragedy. As Acevedo tells Villavicencio: “God permit that Your Mercy arrive in time to avoid this storm.”\(^{261}\)

Besides hoping that the *comisionado*’s arrival could enable the formation of a junta, Acevedo also believed that Villavicencio’s arrival would help put an end to the growing antagonism between Americans and Europeans. Acevedo himself resented European officials for a series of reasons. In letters to Villavicencio, the *regidor* charges Viceroy Amar and several of the Audiencia’s magistrates of corruption, despotism, and incompetence. According to Acevedo, officials such as Valdez in Socorro and Bastús in

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\(^{259}\) “… pues mi vida está asechada por todas partes como la de otros ciudadanos.” (“Carta de Don José Acevedo Gómez al Comisario Regio Don Antonio Villavicencio. Santafé. 19 de julio de 1810” in Banco de la República, *Proceso histórico del 20 de julio de 1810. Documentos*, 149.)


\(^{261}\) “Dios quiera que llegue Vuestra Merced a tiempo de poder conjurar la tempestad…” (“Carta de Don José Acevedo Gómez al Comisario Regio Don Antonio Villavicencio. Santafé. 19 de julio de 1810” in Banco de la República, *Proceso histórico del 20 de julio de 1810. Documentos*, 149.)
Pamplona had not been appointed out of merit, but thanks to their close ties to European officials and the favorite Godoy. Instead of worthy and commendable Americans, European afrancesados were being employed in key posts. In his letters, the regidor even blames Amar and other tyrannical European officials of ruining his business by thwarting his cacao and cotton enterprises with arbitrary restrictions and fees.\footnote{“Carta de Don José Acevedo Gómez al Comisario Regio Don Antonio de Villavicencio y Berastegui. Santafé. 29 de junio de 1810.” in Banco de la República, Proceso histórico del 20 de julio. Documentos., 133-136; “Carta de Don José Acevedo Gómez al Comisario Regio Don Antonio Villavicencio. Santafé. 19 de julio de 1810.” in Banco de la República, Proceso histórico del 20 de julio. Documentos., 148-150.} By July of 1810, it seems that Acevedo’s resentment towards European officials was a feeling shared by many in Santafé. Despite the regidor’s hopes that Villavicencio could help reconcile the growing animosity between Americans and Europeans, these enmities had reached a point of no return.

During the weeks leading to July 20, most Santafereños hoped that someone could alter or bring a halt to this dramatic course of events. As they waited for more news from the Peninsula and for the arrival of the comisionado Villavicencio, Viceroy Venegas, and the city’s archbishop Sacristán, the capital’s residents learned that cities such as Caracas and Socorro had established their own government juntas. However, this state of expectation simply led to the propagation of more rumors and catastrophic stories and, thus, exacerbated feelings of fear, confusion, and mistrust. For most of Santafé’s residents, the future seemed more and more uncertain and calamitous. It was under such circumstances that many became convinced that Santafé needed some sort of higher authority that could bring stability and public peace and prepare New Granada against an imminent foreign invasion. If Amar and the Audiencia could not provide that, and the
officials coming from the Iberian Peninsula were taking too long to arrive, someone else should take the lead. Under these circumstances, the formation of a junta became the most reasonable option for many Santafereños. Such an alternative did not denote a break with the Spanish Crown, but it led many to imagine new possibilities and prospective futures.

Unrest: July 20 and the establishment of Santafé’s Junta

News of Pamplona and Socorro’s uprisings and the impending arrival of Villavicencio immersed Santafé in a state of collective confusion, mistrust, fear, and expectation. By July 19, many residents, such as Acevedo, felt their lives were at risk. At the same time, many – including the regidor – hoped that Villavicencio’s arrival could save them from a catastrophe. An anonymous contemporary witness explains in his diary that by mid-July “everyone awaited Villavicencio as the liberator of the patria.” 263 It was in such a tense atmosphere that on the night of the 19th, rumors spread throughout Santafé’s streets claiming the Chapetones 264 were soon going to massacre dozens of Santafereños. The rumor inflamed emotions even further. According to the anonymous diarist, most of the city’s residents accepted the rumor about the Chapetones as true. 265

That same night, as rumors of a Chapetón massacre spread throughout the city, a group of conspirators met in the city’s Astronomical Observatory. For over a month some

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263 “para la entrada del Conde Vülavicencio (sic) a quien todos esperábamos como el libertador de la Patria.” (“Relación de lo acaecido en la capital de Santafé desde el memorable 20 de julio hasta el día de la fecha” in Carmen Pumar Martínez, “Diario de un criollo anónimo sobre el 20 de julio de 1810.”, Anuario Colombiano de Historia Social y de la Cultura, no. 13-14 (1986), 313.

264 The term was used derogatorily to refer to a Spanish European. The 1729 Diccionario de Autoridades defines the term as “the European or Castilian, recently arrived and poor, is given such a name in Mexico.” (“El Européo, ó el Castellano recien llegado y pobre, á quien en el Reino de México dán este nombre.”) (Diccionario de Autoridades, Real Academia Española, 1729.)

265 “Relación de lo acaecido en la capital de Santafé desde el memorable 20 de julio hasta el día de la fecha” in Pumar, “Diario de un criollo anónimo,” 313-314.
of Amar’s most vocal critics had been secretly gathering in residences and in the Observatory to discuss ways to depose Amar and institute a junta in Santafé. On the night of the 19th, those in attendance decided that they would once again push for the establishment of a junta as they had done on previous occasions since August of 1808. Past events – such as the conformation of Quito’s Junta and the disintegration of the Junta Suprema Central – had offered opportunities to force Amar and the Audiencia to agree to the formation of a junta. Yet, for a variety of reasons, these past attempts had failed. The news that Caracas and Socorro had recently established their own juntas while Cartagena and Pamplona had deposed their ruling officials offered yet another breach. July 20th offered an ideal setting to carry out their plans since it was market day when many of Santafé’s residents and those of nearby towns would probably be in the city’s streets. In his *Memorias*, José Antonio Torres y Peña maintains that the plotters also selected the 20th to symbolically emulate the French Revolution, which he deemed as sinful and immoral. Although July 20th is not an important date in the history of the French Revolution, Torres y Peña was probably referring to the Tennis Court Oath of June 20, 1789 and the journée of June 20, 1792.

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266 Pareja, *Testigos y actores de la Independencia*, 63.
268 On June 20, 1789, the Third Estate’s delegates swore an oath to maintain ranks and pressure the other Estates until a constitution was established. On June 20, 1792, Parisian militants marched in arms to the Legislative Assembly and then invaded the Tuileries Palace to intimidate the King Louis XVI. The protestors demanded that the King restore a group of dismissed ministers and sanction the Assembly’s decrees. Louis XVI was forced to wear the red cap of the Sans-Culottes and to drink a toast to the nation. (Georges Lefebvre, *The French Revolution. From its Origins to 1793*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), 112-113, 234-235; William S. Cornmack, “Defending the Liberal Revolution in France: Provincial Reactions to the Parisian journée of 20 June 1792”, *Canadian Journal of History*, vol. 53, no. 2 (2018), 234-235.)
The conspirators who met in the Observatory on the night of the 19th devised two courses of action. They decided that a group of members of the Cabildo would first meet with the viceroy and try to convince him of the urgent need to summon an assembly to establish a junta. If that plan failed, they would incite disorders and, in the midst of the unrest, push for the conformation of a junta. On the morning of the 20th, around 10 to 11 am, several councilmen visited the Viceregal Palace. Amar once again rejected their proposal and dismissed the members of the Cabildo. The conspirators moved on to their second alternative.269

The second plan consisted of instigating a quarrel with the Spanish European merchant, José González Llorente. Around noon, two men – the patrician Luis Rubio and Lorenzo Marroquín, a close friend of González – passed by the merchant’s store in the corner of Santafé’s main square. Marroquín had been entrusted with preparations for Villavicencio’s arrival. Rubio and Marroquín visited González to ask him if he could lend them a vase for a banquet in honor of the _comisionado regio._270 The merchant rejected their request arguing that he was no longer letting others use the vase for it had been damaged from the many times he had lent it. Rubio, who was part of the plot, made a scene after hearing the merchant’s answer, exclaiming that González had not only denied them the vase, but also insulted and humiliated the city’s Americans. Several of Rubio’s

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269 Pareja, _Testigos y actores de la Independencia_, 63; Martínez, “La desigual conducta de las provincias neogranadinas,” 45.
270 José Antonio Torres y Peña explains that Marroquín and Rubio did not ask for a vase, but rather a lacquered jar. (de Torres y Peña, _Memorias sobre los orígenes_, 117.) González Llorente’s vase (el florero de Llorente) plays a central role in Colombia’s foundational myth. The story shared by many Colombians claims that the discussion between González Llorente and several Criollos led to a tussle in which the vase ended smashing into the floor. According to this story, the shattered vase led to a disorder that resulted in Colombia’s declaration of independence.
accomplices stood close by, making sure that Rubio’s outcries would promptly spread through the main square and nearby streets. A few minutes after Rubio’s tantrum, González was attacked by the crowd and forced to hide in a contiguous house. An hour or two later, a wounded and disguised González Llorente tried to covertly reach his home but was identified and chased down the Calle Real all the way to his residence. A crowd quickly formed around his house. The multitude shouted insults and exclaimed that justice should be done. The alcalde José Miguel Pey intervened and imprisoned González.271

During the following hours, at least three other Spanish Europeans were taken to prison. They were accused of organizing a plot with González to massacre dozens of Santafereños. As sunset approached, hundreds of people were still in the streets protesting against Amar and other officials. To maintain the uproar in the streets, some of the plotters, such as the regidor José Acevedo y Gómez, hurried into the main square and began making proclamations in favor of the formation of a junta. At around 6 p.m., church bells tolled peals of fire. Hundreds rushed into the main square hoping to control the conflagration before it was out of control. To their surprise, they did not find a fire but widespread unrest and strife. Councilmen, city notables, and hundreds of plebeians were gathered around the Viceregal Palace, urging Amar to summon an open assembly (cabildo abierto) to discuss the establishment of a government junta. According to magistrate Carrión, pickets with sticks and batons were standing in the square’s four corners, allowing people to enter the

271 de Torres y Peña, Memorias sobre los orígenes, 117-118; Manuel del Socorro Rodríguez, “La Constitución Feliz”, Periódico político y económico de la capital del Nuevo Reyno de Granada, no. 1 (17 de agosto de 1810), 3-4; Pareja, Testigos y actores de la Independencia, 64-65.
main square, but preventing anyone from exiting. Those who attempted to leave the square were violently forced back inside.\textsuperscript{272}

As the multitude continued growing, so did the intensity of the protestors’ demands. Several commissions composed of magistrates, councilmen, and city notables visited Amar, urging him to summon an assembly. However, the viceroy continued refusing to do so. Apparently, it was only until magistrate Juan Jurado spoke to Amar that the viceroy agreed to hold an open assembly. It appears that Jurado told Amar to concede to the multitude’s demands if he wanted to save his life as well as the Crown’s authority over New Granada. The crowd, which by then reached the thousands, celebrated Amar’s decision. Several notables requested the viceroy to preside over the meeting, but Amar refused to do so claiming he was feeling ill. The viceroy ordered magistrate Jurado to lead the \textit{cabildo abierto}.\textsuperscript{273} The assembly convened in the Cabildo’s building, also located on

\textsuperscript{272} AGI, SANTAFE,665, ‘Relación de Joaquín Carrión y Moreno, oidor de la Audiencia de Santafé al secretario de Estado. Cartagena de Indias. 31 de agosto de 1810.’, 5-6; de Torres y Peña, José Antonio. \textit{Memorias sobre los orígenes}, 117-118; Rodríguez, “La Constitución Feliz”, 7-8; Pareja, \textit{Testigos y actores de la Independencia}, 66.

\textsuperscript{273} If there was a person feeling confused and out of place on the evening of July 20\textsuperscript{th}, that was probably Juan Jurado. The magistrate had arrived in Santafé on July 6, only fourteen days before the eruption of these disorders. Before moving to Santafé, Jurado had been a magistrate in Caracas’ Audiencia. He left Caracas a few weeks before the establishment of its Junta. Jurado arrived in Santafé with eleven daughters, one son, and his wife. The long journey and perhaps the altitude left Jurado and his family somewhat indisposed for several days. Despite having just arrived, feeling unwell, and being new to Santafé’s political tensions and intrigues, Amar ordered Jurado to preside over the \textit{cabildo abierto}. During the following years, the different governments that were in place continued to employ Jurado as a magistrate and other posts. Despite several attempts to leave the city, Jurado stayed in Santafé until the first weeks of 1815. When he finally left, he was harassed by Simón Bolívar on his way to Cartagena. His only son, Antonio, was coerced and forced to join Bolivar’s armies. Fortunately for Antonio, a couple of months after his conscription, he was able to escape and join his family. Towards late 1815, Juan Jurado finally made it to Panama, where Santafé’s Audiencia now resided. Over months, Jurado was denied his post in the Audiencia. Other magistrates and local officials accused him of treason. A tribunal in the Iberian Peninsula had to settle the matter. He was acquitted of any crime and appointed in Cuba’s Audiencia. (AGI, SANTAFE,747, ‘Expediente caso Juan Jurado. Su paso por Caracas, Santafé, Panamá y otras ciudades. 1808-1815.’, 1-38; AGI, SANTAFE,747, ‘Interrogatorio sobre el caso de Juan Jurado. Santa Marta. 30 de octubre de 1815.’, 1-34; AGI, SANTAFE,746, ‘Carta de Juan Jurado al Secretario de Estado explicando que no ha podido salir de Santafé. Anexa carta de Antonio Villavicencio. Santafé. 20 de febrero de 1811.’, 1-6.)
the main square. Almost straight away, the cabildo abierto exceeded its faculties and called for the conformation of a junta. From one of the building’s balconies, José Acevedo rallied the crowd and asked it to elect the representatives that would take part in the government junta. In the midst of shouting and yelling, delegates were elected and invited to join the assembly in case they were not already a part of it. As the assembly quickly turned into a junta, several of those participating in the cabildo abierto, such as Jurado, tried to put a halt to this dramatic turn of events. They argued that such an assembly did not have the legal authority to establish a junta. If the cabildo was going reach such a transcendental ruling, Amar’s authorization was indispensable.274

A commission was sent to the Viceregal Palace to ask the viceroy for his approval to debate and decide on the conformation of a junta. The envoys returned with Amar’s oral endorsement, but Jurado asked for a written confirmation from the viceroy in order to continue. At 10 p.m., Amar sent a letter to Jurado authorizing him and the assembly to make the “decisions that the circumstances demanded.”275 During nearly five hours, the cabildo abierto discussed questions regarding New Granada’s recognition of the Consejo de Regencia and Amar’s place in the junta. Jurado claims it was thanks to his persistence that the participants appointed Amar as the Junta’s president and recognized the Consejo de Regencia’s authority. Towards three and half in the morning of July 21, those present signed the act establishing the ‘Junta Suprema de Gobierno de Nueva Granada.’ The

274 AGI, SANTAFE,665, ‘Relación de Joaquín Carrión y Moreno, oidor de la Audiencia de Santafé al secretario de Estado. Cartagena de Indias. 31 de agosto de 1810.’, 5; AGI, SANTAFE,747, ‘ Expediente caso Juan Jurado. Su paso por Caracas, Santafé, Panamá y otras ciudades. 1808-1815.’, 10-12; Rodríguez, “La Constitución Feliz”, 8-10; Pareja, Testigos y actores de la Independencia, 66-68.
275 “… y confiero mi facultad bastante para determinar en él, lo que las circunstancias presentes exijan, para la pública seguridad, y tranquilidad dándome aviso sucesivo del resultado.” (AGI, SANTAFE,747, ‘ Expediente caso Juan Jurado. Su paso por Caracas, Santafé, Panamá y otras ciudades. 1808-1815.’, 32.)
Junta’s members swore to defend the Catholic religion and the sovereignty of Ferdinand VII as well as to prevent divisions among the provinces and to avoid further conflicts between Spanish Europeans and Americans.  

The confusion, fear, and mistrust that had been growing for months created the necessary conditions for the establishment of a government junta; yet, its institution did not appease the rising animosity nor the proliferation of rumors and misinformation. Margarita Garrido argues that during the days following July 20th, many of Santafé’s patricians felt as if their plot had backfired. Garrido explains that before the establishment of the Junta, many city notables had been instigating resentment towards Spanish Europeans and also inciting commoners to partake in political affairs. Once the Junta was finally instituted, these same patricians began to fear that Santafé’s populace was out of control. In several incidents, the capital’s notables even took sides with the Europeans. Many patricians condemned what they considered to be an unreasonable rage against Spanish Europeans as well as what they thought to be excessive demands for justice on behalf of the populace. When Spanish Europeans were detained, several notables intervened to make sure that violence would not erupt, and that Europeans would not suffer any sort of humiliation. Santafé’s notables complained among them that the commoners’ effervescence and intransigence was producing chaos and impeding them from properly governing New Granada.

During the week following the formation of the Junta, dozens of Spanish Europeans were detained in Santafé’s prisons. In the meantime, several Americans, such as the clergyman Andrés María Rosillo, were released from custody. On July 22, responding to demands from a multitude that gathered in the main square, the Junta ordered the detention of magistrates Diego Frías and Juan Hernández de Alba. Rumors had been circulating for months claiming that both justices were planning to hand over New Granada to the Bonaparte. The crowd was not satisfied with news of their detention and insisted on seeing them with shackles. Members of the Junta told the multitude that the magistrates would only be displayed if everyone maintained their composure. After sunset, and following hours of discussions, the magistrates were exhibited to the public from a balcony. According to José María Caballero, the tailor, despite the animosity that Frías and Hernández de Alba produced, the crowd maintained a respectful silence when the handcuffed magistrates were presented to the crowd.278

That same night of the 22nd, a rumor spread throughout the city claiming that an army of black men was approaching the capital. Some claimed the arriving troops would release the European prisoners and attack the Junta’s advocates. Many Santafereños, already concerned with the mounting popular turbulence, feared the city’s destruction. Perhaps, some imagined they would suffer the fate of Saint-Domingue. As the story propagated, Santafé’s residents began to organize to defend the city. In his diary, José María Caballero explains that dozens of women formed squads and insisted on being the

278 AGI, SANTAFE,746, ‘Carta enviada por Juan Hernandez de Alba y Diego de Frías. Piden socorros y narran las dificultades que han afrontado. La Habana. 9 de febrero de 1812.’, 1; Caballero, “En la independencia,” 122; de Torres y Peña, Memorias sobre los orígenes, 123.
capital’s first line of defense, declaring they were willing to sacrifice their lives to save the patria. The story of the incoming black troops ended up being false. Those approaching the capital were simply the residents and priests of neighboring towns travelling to Santafé to offer their allegiance to the newly instituted Junta.\textsuperscript{279}

Unrest and confusion would continue during the following days. All sorts of proclamations were heard from the city’s balconies and squares. According to Caballero, it was all very puzzling “because some said, ‘death to!’, others ‘long live!’: Some demanded one thing, while others something else. One could hardly hear what was said. These moments… were used by others to muddle us and plunge us into disorder and anarchy.”\textsuperscript{280} In the midst of such uproar, the Junta also made public proclamations and published bandos upholding Ferdinand VII’s authority and the Catholic religion. Amar, as president of the Junta, made sure to display an image of the captive king during these public events.\textsuperscript{281}

During the next days, a spiral of accusations and denunciations led to further unrest and even more detentions. On the 24\textsuperscript{th}, the royal mail administrator was captured under charges of hiding mail and concealing information in collusion with Amar. On the 25\textsuperscript{th}, a rumor spread claiming that Amar was preparing an assault against the Junta. Apparently, someone heard cannons being loaded inside the Viceregal Palace and saw Amar’s guards preparing for battle. In a matter of minutes, nearly three thousand people ran into the main

\textsuperscript{279} Caballero, “En la independencia,” 122-123; de Torres y Peña, Memorias sobre los orígenes, 123; Garrido, “Convocando al pueblo, temiendo a la plebe,” 90-91.

\textsuperscript{280} “… todo se volvía una confusión, porque unos decían: Muera! Otros, viva! Unos pedían una cosa, otros otra; nadie se oía con perfección; estos momentos… lo aprovecharon otros para desorganizarnos y para vernos en desorden y anarquía.” (Caballero, “En la independencia,” 124.)

\textsuperscript{281} Caballero, “En la independencia,” 124.
square and surrounded the Palace and Cabildo. People in the streets pleaded the Junta’s members to search the Palace. In the meantime, a mob stormed an army garrison and took dozens of rifles and sabers as well as six cannons. Four of the cannons were placed in main square facing the Palace to counter those allegedly placed inside. As confrontation seemed unavoidable, a group of six delegates from the Junta walked to the Palace and compelled the guards and soldiers defending the Palace to yield. The six men then spoke to Amar and the Vicereine Francisca Villanova and convinced them to accept imprisonment to avoid a tragedy. The people in the streets formed guards of honor through which Amar was taken to the Aduana (customs office) and Villanova to the Convent of La Enseñanza. Caballero claims the people in the streets maintained a deferential silence as the two of them were taken into custody.

Such respectful conduct would not be witnessed on August 13th when hundreds of people forced the Junta to transfer the vicereine from the convent to a cell in El Divorcio prison. That day, as Villanova was taken to the prison, commoner women in the streets insulted the vicereine and even pinched her. One day later, the city’s most recognized patricians tried to make up for the affront. A group of them gathered in the main square and asked the Junta’s members for the liberty of both the viceroy and vicereine. The Junta consented to their demands and ordered they be set free and sent to the Viceregal Palace. According to Caballero, that same day, while most of the city’s residents were busy in the marketplace, some of the most reputed women in the city – the wives of Antonio Nariño,
Camilo Torres, and the marquis of San Jorge – escorted the vicereine from prison back to the Palace.\textsuperscript{284} Amar and Villanova left Santafé a few days after their release. On October 25, 1810, after waiting for several weeks in the outskirts of Cartagena, they boarded a commercial ship that took them back to the Iberian Peninsula.\textsuperscript{285}

On July 26\textsuperscript{th}, just one day after Amar and Villanova’s detention, the Junta decided to declare its opposition to the Consejo de Regencia and to dis-acknowledge it as Spain’s supreme authority. Consequently, the Junta instructed Cartagena’s officials to detain Viceroy Francisco Venegas, with the upmost respect and decorum, once he reached the city. The orders were to prevent the newly appointed Venegas from travelling to Santafé. Likewise, the Junta requested that Santafé’s officials stop all preparations for the awaited arrival of the \textit{comisario regio} Antonio Villavicencio.\textsuperscript{286} In the meantime, Villavicencio was making his way up the mountains on his journey from Honda, on the banks of the Magdalena, to Santafé. When the commissioner finally arrived in Santafé on August 1\textsuperscript{st}, he encountered the scene he had dreaded. A junta had been formed without his presence and, to make matters worse, it no longer recognized the Consejo de Regencia as Ferdinand VII’s legitimate surrogate. Yet, Villavicencio knew that not everything was lost. The commissioner believed that with due time and with the Consejo’s wise decisions, they could eventually regain Santafé’s allegiance.\textsuperscript{287} For the time being, Villavicencio urged loyal officials not despised by the \textit{Santafereños}, such as magistrate Juan Jurado, to stay in

\textsuperscript{284} Caballero, “En la independencia,” 130; Garrido, “Convocando al pueblo, temiendo a la plebe,” 89.
\textsuperscript{285} AGI, SANTAFE, 747, ‘Carta del depuesto virrey, Antonio Amar, al Consejo de Regencia sobre los hechos ocurridos el 20 de julio y la persecución que sufrió. Coruña. 13 de enero de 1811.’, 1-4.
\textsuperscript{287} SANTAFE,746, ‘Carta de Juan Jurado al Secretario de Estado explicando que no ha podido salir de Santafe. Anexa carta de Antonio Villavicencio. Santafe. 20 de febrero de 1811.’, 1, 3-6.
the capital to prevent the situation from worsening. The commissioner commended them to uphold Ferdinand VII’s authority and to aid all the Europeans who had recently been sent to prison.288

The participation of popular sectors during the commotions that broke out on July 20th and subsequent days have given rise to a variety of interpretations in Colombian historiography. Some public intellectuals, such as Indalecio Liévano Aguirre and Rodrigo Llano Isaza, argue that class conflict was underway. Both Liévano and Llano claim that the movement leading to the formation of the junta was in fact a popular upheaval against the city’s oligarchy.289 However, evidence suggests otherwise. Although there were several incidents in which plebeians harassed Santafé’s most important officials and, to a certain extent, menaced the city’s patricians, there are hardly any indications that the plebeians sought to overthrow patricians and take control. Moreover, the Santafé’s Junta of July 20 and the process leading to its formation did not bring about social and political ruptures.

Yet, the emotions that circulated at the time did shape people’s notions of reality, their sense of the future, and their conceptions of symbolic violence. The fear and uncertainty that came about from the circulation of false news and conspiracies made many doubt what was actually happening and what they should expect from the future. Villavicenio, Jurado, and most of Santafé’s residents were uncertain of what to expect of Spain’s fate nor that of New Granada. The possibility of being governed by someone else

289 Indalecio Liévano Aguirre, Los grandes conflictos sociales y económicos de nuestra historia (Bogotá: Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1972); Rodrigo Llano Isaza, José María Carbonell (Bogotá: Editorial Planeta, 1997), 33.
different than the Spanish Crown became more plausible than ever before. At least temporarily, the imaginary line dividing the dominant from the dominated was blurred to such an extent that the dominated ended up insulting and harassing the Vicereine. Amidst such a milieu of anxiety and mistrust, society’s understandings of what natural social relations and the given social order should look like were briefly altered.

The establishment of the junta offered hope and a sense of stability to many and produced new imagined futures. Numerous Santafereños now believed they could defend themselves from the Bonaparte brothers without having to deal with the alleged incompetence and treacherousness of Amar and many of the Audiencia’s magistrates. Moreover, the formation of the junta was also an opportunity to negotiate more autonomy from the metropolis and to regain posts that Spanish Americans had lost to Europeans. In that sense, it can be claimed that the process leading to the establishment of the junta produced new imagined futures. Even though a complete rupture from the Spanish Monarchy was not among the ambitions of most of the city’s residents – as a matter of fact, it was inconceivable to many of them –, the possibility of further autonomy and of new relations of power began to appear in the horizon of expectations of many of the city’s residents.

Conclusions
In his Memorias, José Antonio Torres y Peña refers to those who promoted the formation of Santafé’s Junta as contemporary Quixotes. “Instead of magicians, giants, and scoundrels,” Torres y Peña explains, “our Quixotes have recognized kings, princes, captains, and magistrates as despots, tyrants, satraps, viziers, and pashas.” The clergyman charges the leaders of the junta with behaving as though they were characters in a chivalric
romance, repeating over and over the same ballads and “hallucinating with the novel voices and terms that were arising from the system of the new knights-errant.”

In his text, Torres y Peña accuses the city’s dissidents of tricking Santafé’s plebeians into misery and suffering as a result of their fixations and obsessions.

Torres y Peña used the metaphor of Don Quixote to ridicule and condemn those who had promoted and taken part in the junta. Yet, his allegory serves to reflect on the continuities and transformations that were taking place towards July 20, 1810. According to the clergyman, those who had actively encouraged the formation of the junta had lost their grasp on reality and were seemingly living in a parallel world. For Torres y Peña, their cognitive capacity and understanding of reality had been distorted to such an extent that they could only speak, without respite, of sovereignty, constitutions, liberty, and unalienable rights. Torres y Peña’s satire is not completely mistaken. Of course, those who supported the formation of Junta Suprema de Nueva Granada were not foolish knights-errant who had lost touch with reality. However, the clergyman’s comments highlight that, towards 1810, new conceptions of reality, of the present, and of the future as well as innovative languages and concepts were emerging in Santafé and New Granada.

This chapter has argued that during the almost twenty-four months between August 1808 and July 1810 emotions transformed society’s notions of reality as well as its imagined futures and conceptions of symbolic violence. I maintain that the spread and

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290 “Creyeron que la repetición fastidiosa de esta cantinela era bastante para contestar a todo; y en efecto alucinaron bastante con la novedad de las voces y términos de que los surtía el sistema de la nueva caballería andante… En lugar de encantadores, gigantes y malandrines, se propusieron estos nuestros Quijotes hacer pasar a los reyes, príncipes, jefes y magistrados por despotas, tiranos, sátrapas, visires y bajáes.” (de Torres y Peña, Memorias sobre los orígenes, 121.)

291 de Torres y Peña, Memorias sobre los orígenes, 121.
intensification of emotions such as fear, expectation, confusion, and mistrust altered people’s understandings of the world they were living in and their horizons of expectation. The rupture allowed many to conceive the possibility of being ruled by someone other than the Spanish Monarchy and to imagine living under a form of government different from a monarchical one. Yet, these prospective futures also produced certain apprehension and resistance among some of Santafé’s residents. Many feared that chaos and anarchy would end up spreading throughout New Granada. Consequently, many of the city’s inhabitants also began to imagine and desire relations of power that could ensure stability, security, and public tranquility.

In that sense, the redefinition of existing conceptions of reality ended up displacing certain relations of power while reinforcing others. As Joanna Bourke explains, emotions may create and reproduce relations of subordination at the same time that they can also unravel them. For Bourke, emotions such as fear are social performers through which the distribution of power takes place.292 In the case of the formation of Santafé’s Junta, this seems to be true. Emotions’ redefined people’s understandings of the world around them. This allowed many of the city’s residents to imagine being ruled by new entities and forms of government. Yet, fear of chaos and disorder impeded many from imagining the possibility of bestowing power on Santafé’s plebeians and other subordinate groups. In the long run, prevailing conceptions of how power should be distributed favored the rise of strong, authoritarian figures that could fill in the gap left by European officials and the Spanish Crown.


On March 26, 1812, at around four in the afternoon, while thousands of parishioners celebrated Maundy Thursday, a tremor shook northern Venezuela. The earthquake caused destruction, pain, and grief throughout the whole region. Thousands died and hundreds of buildings, including cathedrals and churches, fell to the ground. Many linked the natural disaster to recent political events. Caracas, the capital of the Captaincy General of Venezuela, had formed a government junta on April 19, 1810. During the following weeks, neighboring provinces did the same. About a year later, on July 5, 1811, Caracas and six other provinces declared their absolute independence from Spain. Among them was the Province of Mérida. In the city of Mérida, located about 650 kilometers southwest of Caracas, the tremor destroyed a substantial part of the city’s buildings and apparently killed over 1,500 people. The city’s bishop, Santiago Hernández Milanés, was among the victims. News of the earthquake spread throughout northern South America. Both royalists and insurgents in Venezuela and New Granada claimed the natural disaster hastened the collapse of republican territories into the hands of royalist troops. The earthquake incited discussions over republicanism, monarchism, and independence that intertwined with debates concerning God’s wrath, eternal damnation, and salvation. For some, the earthquake was simply a natural phenomenon. For others, it was unequivocally

a punishment sent by God to admonish Venezuelans for their many sins and their disloyal behavior.

At the time, seismic events were considered mysterious phenomena without a certain explanation. In the Iberian Atlantic world, the 1746 earthquake in Lima and the 1755 earthquake in Lisbon were emblems of catastrophic tremors. This was so not only because of the destruction they caused, but also because of the debates they produced among those trying to find a scientific explanation to seismic activity and those insisting on religious and moral explanations of the tremors. Although direct allusions to the Lima and Lisbon earthquakes are marginal in the sources concerning the 1812 quake, people in Caracas and Mérida possibly had them as references as they tried to give meaning to the natural disaster they were facing.

The 1812 earthquake was one of many episodes in which people in Venezuela and New Granada struggled to give meaning to the troubled times in which they lived. In the 1810s, throughout northern South America, recent political events and the emotions they

295 Deborah Coen explains that it was throughout the nineteenth century that earthquakes were made and unmade as a scientific object. During the century, numerous scientists and observers began to conceive tremors as a measurable object of study. As Coen argues, “the problem, in an age before reliable seismographs, was how to turn an instant of panic and confusion into a field for the production of scientific evidence. This was the achievement of the permanent networks of seismic observers organized in the late nineteenth century. The result was a natural experiment at the nexus of human behavior and planetary physics.” (Deborah Coen. The Earthquake Observers: Disaster Science from Lisbon to Richter (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013), 3)

produced disturbed people’s understanding of the world they lived in. To try to comprehend and give meaning to what was happening, many looked back in time to understand how they had reached this state of affairs. At the same time, they envisioned possible paths society could take towards the future. As people grappled to understand their place in time, a wide variety of narratives emerged. Different partisan groups and social sectors tried to impose particular interpretations of the times they were living.

All over the region emotions were stirred as a result of growing political and social frictions, conflicting narratives, and the advent of new political projects and symbols. Several concrete episodes are revealing of such emotional effervescence. For instance, on July 16, 1813, in a question of about an hour, Santafé de Bogotá’s residents celebrated Cundinamarca’s declaration of independence from Spain, performed a series of republican rites, and witnessed an execution. A few minutes after planting a myrtle tree in the main square to praise freedom and equality, as French republicans had done in past decades, Antonio Nariño, Cundinamarca’s president, ordered the execution of a slave accused of murdering his master. In a matter of minutes, all sorts of emotions circulated throughout the main square. Gestures of intense joy and happiness were seen among many when Cundinamarca’s independence was proclaimed. However, those who were already hesitant of this political venture became even more concerned as they saw symbols and rituals of the French Revolution propagating through Santafé. Some even began to dread the violence and persecution that had spread through France. The slave’s execution, which was carried out without a trial, shocked many at the same time that it inspired fear and disillusion
among others who began to see their hopes of equality vanishing.297 Another revealing case of emotional ferment is that of Pasto in southern New Granada. A sense of deep fidelity to the Spanish Crown and passionate religious fervor led the city’s residents to change their patron saint from Our Lady of the Immaculate Conception to Our Lady of Mercy. At the time, many Pastusos believed the miraculous intercession of Our Lady of Mercy had saved them from falling into the hands of Nariño’s rebel troops in 1814. During the following years, every May 10th Pasto’s authorities celebrated their new patron saint by lighting up of the city’s main streets and buildings, tolling church bells, offering music in the streets, and inviting its residents to religious celebrations and to observe fasting.298

This chapter studies the different experiences of fear, guilt, and hope that emerged during the years following the institution of government juntas and their subsequent declarations of independence in Venezuela and New Granada. The chapter poses two arguments. First, it argues that mounting discrepancies in understandings of the present, past, and future led to dissimilar emotional experiences. Times of intense political and social unrest such as the ones lived in Venezuela and New Granada in the early 1810s widened the gaps between emotional communities, to use Barbara Rosenwein’s term. Different social groups, in part owing to their own, particular notions of reality, conceived and experienced emotions in different ways. Yet, their own emotional perceptions and

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298 Archivo Histórico de la Universidad de Nariño (AHUN), Fondo Cabildo de Pasto, Caja 10, tomo 5, ‘El Cabildo de Pasto sobre elección de María Santísima de la Merced como patrona de Pasto. Quito. 20 de marzo de 1815.’, 75; AHUN, Fondo Cabildo de Pasto, Caja 10, tomo 5, ‘Respuesta del Fiscal al Cabildo aceptando el nombramiento de la Virgen de la Merced. Quito. 24 de abril de 1815.’, 76-79; AHUN, Fondo Cabildo de Pasto, Caja 10, tomo 6, ‘Alcalde ordinario de Pasto, manda que se publique bando que reconoce a la Virgen de las Mercedes como patrona de Pasto y ordena celebraciones. Pasto. 8 de mayo de 1817.’, 46-47.
experiences also shaped the meanings and understandings people gave to the world they were living in.

The chapter insists on the diversity of emotional experiences, but it also stresses the extent to which these emotions of fear, guilt, and hope, in their many variations, became widespread across society. In that sense, the chapter also argues that, during the years following the formation of government juntas, intense feelings of guilt and fear became ingrained in the hearts and minds of most Venezuelans and New Granadians to such an extent that intense emotions shaped people’s understandings of the times they were living in and contributed to the fall of republican governments throughout the region. This argument puts into question the claims made by nineteenth-century historians and present-day social historians about the role of emotions during the independence process. Nineteenth-century historians, such as José Manuel Restrepo and José Manuel Groot, allege it was only the “naïve” and “superstitious” populace whose thoughts and actions were shaped by feelings of fear, rage, and confusion. In recent years, several social historians have implied that popular sectors acted rationally and that deep emotions did not

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299 Marixa Lasso explains that some of the first historians of the Colombian independence, particularly José Manuel Restrepo, portrayed popular sectors as an obstacle to the creation of modern, independent nations. For Restrepo and José Manuel Groot, the lower classes’ rowdiness compromised the independence process. Their accounts usually present plebeians and free blacks as depoliticized actors who took part in uprisings due to inebriation or because of the handouts they were given for their participation. (Marixa Lasso, “El día de la independencia: una revisión necesaria. Acción política afro-colombiana y narrativas patrióticas criollas, Cartagena, 1809-1815.”, Nuevo Mundo Mundos Nuevos. Debates, [Online], Online since 9 June 2008, connection on November 2018, 2-4.) Daniel Gutiérrez, for his part, argues that many nineteenth-century historians as well as some twentieth-century scholars, such as Juan Friede, viewed popular sectors as apathetic and incapable of thinking in politically rational terms. Ultimately, these historians suggest that such irrationality menaced the formation of new, modern, and independent nations. (Gutiérrez Ardila, Daniel. “Soberana indiferencia. El discurso historiográfico frente al republicanismo popular colombiano.” Anuario Colombiano de Historia Social y Cultura 45, no. 2, (2018): 129-132.)
This chapter shows that intense fear and guilt were widespread among all of society, regardless of social standing.

To explore the ways in which emotional experiences diverge from one another and how emotions shaped people’s notions of reality, this chapter focuses on the 1812 earthquake that shook northern Venezuela as well as on a series of volcanic eruptions that disturbed Popayán in 1817. Among many possible episodes and incidents that could serve as case studies, such as Cundinamarca’s declaration of independence or Pasto’s institution of a new patron saint, the chapter concentrates on these two natural phenomena because they motivated discussions about the humane and the heavenly, the natural and the supernatural. That is to say, these two events offer insights into people’s beliefs, expressions, and practices that allow us to identify and examine an emotional community.

In the 1810s, as emotions intensified and political and social tensions grew throughout Venezuela and New Granada, the gaps between narratives giving meaning to what was happening became more manifest and so did the differences between the ways people experienced emotions. Guilt, fear, hope, pain, and grief were not experienced in the same ways by all members of society. A particular incident or idea could trigger fear and

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300 In an effort to challenge nineteenth century and traditional historiographies, social historians, such as Aline Helg, Peter Blanchard, Marcela Echeverri, Marixa Lasso, and Alejandro Gómez, among others, have insisted on the rationality of nonelite sectors of society. By doing so, they have, to a certain extent, obscured the role of emotions by portraying them as antagonistic to rationality. Thus, they have ignored the role of emotions shaping peoples’ behavior and decisions.

301 In that sense, the chapter follows, to some degree, the path proposed by Charles Walker’s work on the 1746 Lima earthquake. Walker studies the earthquake and subsequent tsunami that destroyed Lima to explore the city’s social relations, its political culture, people’s beliefs, the enlightened absolutism that governed Lima, and the influence of the Bourbon’s reformism on the city’s reconstruction. (Walker, *Shaky Colonialism: The 1746 Earthquake-Tsunami in Lima.*)
guilt among some at the same time that they might incite hope among others. Moreover, this divergence among emotional experiences shaped and deepened political and social struggles, stimulating certain narratives, contesting others, and pushing others out of sight. During these years, the split between what Barbara Rosenwein has termed ‘emotional communities’ widened even further. Rosenwein uses the term emotional communities to refer to the different systems of feeling that coexist within a given society. As Rosenwein explains, there are groups or communities that share similar notions of what is valuable and what is harmful, hold the same modes of expressing emotions, and evaluate others’ emotions in similar ways. Rosenwein claims emotional communities are not sealed clusters, but rather fluid groups in which individuals easily move from one community to another. An emotional community constantly interacts with other communities and, in certain cases, overlaps with those nearby. For Rosenwein, emotional communities are not static but are rather continually changing and adapting. This chapter studies some of the emotional communities that existed in Venezuela and Popayán in the 1810s. It explores the different understandings of the world that prevailed in each community and the different ways in which emotions were experienced and conceived within them. Throughout the

302 Barbara Rosenwein, “Worrying about Emotions in History”, The American Historical Review 107, no. 3, (2002): 840-842; Barbara Rosenwein, Emotional Communities in the Early Middle Ages (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006). (To a certain extent, the concept of “emotional communities” resembles Stanley Fish’s “interpretative communities.” Fish argues that a text is not completely independent and that its meaning comes from interpretative activities. “But this interpretation does not come solely from an individual reader, but from the interpretative community of which he is a member. This community enables and limits the operations leading to interpretations. The community shares a set of interpretative strategies.” In a similar vein, Rosenwein argues that emotions are given meaning not solely by a single individual, but by a community of people with shared values and understandings. (Stanley Fish. Is there a Text in this Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980): 13-14.))
chapter, I suggest that the gaps between emotional communities tend to grow when political and social tensions intensify.

Although Rosenwein’s notion of ‘emotional communities’ is compelling in many ways, its use poses several difficulties. Identifying an emotional community, its members, and its main features is not an easy task. Trying to delimitate a community from others poses further obstacles as divisions between one community and another are blurry. Part of the difficulty also arises from the dynamism with which emotions are constantly changing. Political, social, and even natural events continuously give shape to people’s understandings of the world and, thus, to their emotional experiences. This blurs the limits between one community and another even further.

Another challenge arises from society’s heterogeneity. In the case of Venezuela and New Granada, racial and social diversity was complemented by marked hierarchical divisions which, despite their rigidity, did not completely impede social mobility. Other factors, such as gender, lineage, education, and wealth also helped give form to people’s emotional experiences. If one considers such dynamism and diversity, the task of clustering individuals and social groups according to their ways of experiencing emotions is undoubtedly a challenging and equivocal one. This is particularly true when the historical records offer limited information with regards to certain sectors of society. For instance, in the particular case of this chapter, the documents only make marginal references to Venezuelan and Payanés women, blacks, pardos, and Indians. Unavoidably, such archival gaps obscure the perspectives of many, leaving us in a situation in which we cannot say much about the particular experiences of these social sectors and individuals. We can assume that their emotional experiences resembled in one way or another that of other
members of society. However, there is a breach in our knowledge that holds us back from posing more definite conclusions. Even if one attempts to employ the term with much caution, using the concept of “emotional communities” comes with the risk of obscuring and leaving out many emotional experiences. Even more, there is the possibility that, in an attempt to highlight differences and diversity, the historian may end up homogenizing whole sectors of society by assuming that experiences that were predominant among one cluster of people also prevailed among other groups with which they simply share some common traits.

Nonetheless, if used broadly, Rosenwein’s concept allows us to acknowledge the variety of emotional experiences that coexisted at the time and some of the reasons behind such heterogeneity. Moreover, it invites us to consider how frictions over understandings of particular events shaped the ways different groups experienced emotions and how emotions, for their part, shaped people’s understandings of what was happening around them. In that sense, the concept also reminds us that emotions are not only individual experiences, but they are part of collective and communal ones.

Throughout the 1810s, in Spanish America, discussions concerning independence and republicanism were interwoven with debates regarding salvation. Detractors and critics of independence were quick to claim that an individual or a community’s salvation was at risk if such political endeavor persisted. In the early nineteenth-century Spanish world, as during most early modernity, people were continuously told by the clergy and theologians that no quest was more important than the search for salvation. As Stuart Schwartz explains, “life was all too short and eternity endless, and securing the soul’s salvation was a matter of the utmost urgency. But soteriology, the understanding of salvation, was a
contested issue.” In the face of tragedies such as the 1812 earthquake, even those who tried to ignore forewarnings of eternal damnation from clergymen and officials could not help to avoid feeling some sort of guilt over their views and actions. More frightening than death itself, the prospect of being condemned to eternal damnation due to one’s conduct and opinions was by far the most pressing matter in the minds and hearts of many, regardless of their social status and political views.

By the early nineteenth century, many Spaniards, in both Europe and the Americas, shared the notion that loyalty to the Spanish Crown went hand in hand with faithfulness to the Church and God. It is worth noting that Spanish political culture did not conceive of the monarch as drawing his authority from God alone. Rather, there was a shared belief that power came from God and was transmitted from God to the people who, to preserve social stability, transferred power to the monarch. This conception is somewhat different

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from the one that prevailed in England and France during medieval times and the first
decades of early modernity in which the predominant notion was that the monarch’s power
and authority solely came from God. Moreover, as Ernst Kantorowicz, explains, French
and English kings were at times even conceived as ‘persona mixta.’ That is, monarchs were
viewed as individuals who held both spiritual capacities as well as absolute temporal
authority.\textsuperscript{308} In the Spanish world, that was not the case. Nonetheless, Catholicism and the
Spanish Monarchy were closely integrated. God and the Catholic religion were viewed as
elements that gave unity and stability to society and reinforced the union between the
monarch and the people. In that sense, religion was the basis for the triad “God,
Motherland, and King.” As William Taylor explains with regards to the Spanish world,
religion “provided a focus for authority, a cosmic model for human order in a society where
one’s dying thoughts still turned to confession and salvation, and an institutional
framework for expressing social relationships and mediating inequalities.”\textsuperscript{309} All over
Spain and its dominions, the commonly used phrase “serving God and the King” was
equated with serving the public and the motherland.\textsuperscript{310}

Thus, when provinces throughout Venezuela and New Granada began to declare
their independence from the Spanish Crown and Ferdinand VII, many, including Bishop

\textsuperscript{308} Ernst Kantorowicz, \textit{The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology} (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1997 (©1957)), 45-46. (Marc Bloch’s renowned work on the monarch’s spiritual
and mystic powers in England and France, the “royal touch”, is perhaps the most famous study with regards
to this phenomenon. (Marc Bloch, \textit{The Royal Touch, Sacred Monarchy and Scrofula in England and France}.

\textsuperscript{309} William Taylor, \textit{Magistrates of the Sacred: Priests and Parishioners in Eighteenth-Century Mexico}.

\textsuperscript{310} Annick Lempérière, “República y publicidad a finales del Antiguo Régimen (Nueva España)” in \textit{Los
espacios públicos en Iberoamérica: Ambigüedades y problemas. Siglos XVIII-XIX}, eds. François-Xavier
Guerra (Mexico D.F.: Centro de estudios mexicanos y centroamericanos, 2008), 54; José David Cortés
Guerrero, “La lealtad al monarca español en el discurso político religioso en el Nuevo Reino de Granada”,
Hernández in Mérida, were faced with a frightening moral predicament. People from all social stratum believed that a political rupture from Spain inevitably implied a break in the sacred union between God and the people. Many considered an act of disloyalty towards the king as one of unfaithfulness to God at the same time that an attack on the Crown was conceived as one against the social order and God himself. That is, an interruption in the relationship between the Spanish Monarchy and its vassals also implied a break in the union between God and his congregation. Consequently, many assumed that a rupture of this implicit covenant, which had existed in the Americas for close to three centuries, could only bring about chaos and eternal damnation.311

Such religious background permeated almost all discussions that came about in early nineteenth-century Venezuela and New Granada. Nonetheless, fear, guilt, and hope did not spring exclusively from a spiritual grasp of the world. Emotions also emerged from earthlier matters. Frustration at being unable to organize an army, anxiety at not handling relief efforts efficiently, or annoyance at the incapacity to operate a well-ordered government were some of the feelings that many Caraqueños faced around the time of the 1812 earthquake. These different emotions, including those triggered by religious sensibilities as well as those originating from more mundane matters, shaped people’s grasp of the world around them. Their decisions and understandings were mediated by these emotions.

The onset of guilt and fear in Mérida

On March 26, 1812, the residents of Mérida observed Maundy Thursday with processions, prayers, and mass. That afternoon, Mérida’s Bishop, Santiago Hernández Milanés, led the washing of the feet and gave mass in the city’s cathedral. A few minutes before four in the afternoon, Hernández and several priests walked from the cathedral to the episcopal palace. Shortly after going inside, an earthquake shook northern Venezuela, destroying dozens of Mérida’s buildings and churches, including its episcopal palace and cathedral. The palace’s walls and ceilings crumbled, killing Bishop Hernández and the clergymen that had been accompanying him that afternoon. Hundreds of the city’s residents suffered the same fate. Some were able to reach the streets and squares before being buried under the ruins of the city’s edifices. Only a few were lucky enough to see their homes and shops standing after the earthquake. During the following hours, aftershocks continued to shake the city. While some of Mérida’s residents tried to rescue survivors from beneath the rubble, others simply awaited with anticipation in the city’s squares. That night, almost all of the Mérida’s inhabitants slept in the streets and squares out of fear that their residences might collapse at any moment or that another tremor would finally demolish their homes.³¹²

On the morning of Friday March 27, many of Mérida’s residents moved to haciendas and empty plots of land in the city’s outskirts trying to seek safety and escape possible outbreaks of disease. Those who stayed in the city woke up to a conflagration on the morning of Saturday 28. Fortunately for them, they were able to put out the fire before it caused yet another tragedy. By then, many began to fear imminent famine. As an

eyewitness explained, many of those who survived had been forced to ask for handouts and most believed that if nearby towns and villages did not send food and provisions, Mérida’s residents would soon perish. Many sent letters to Maracaibo, Caracas, and New Granada asking for aid and giving reports of widespread desolation. They were unaware that other cities such as Caracas and Barquisimeto had also been destroyed by the tremor. One of the dispatches sent during those days stated that Mérida no longer existed and that half of its inhabitants were buried beneath ruins.\footnote{McCook, Stuart. “Nature, God, and Nation in Revolutionary Venezuela: The Holy Thursday Earthquake of 1812.” in Aftershocks: Earthquakes and Popular Politics in Latin America, eds. Jürgen Buchenau and Lyman Johnson (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2009), 44-45.} Another account claimed that more than 1,500 people had perished and that most of the city had been destroyed.\footnote{AGI, Caracas,108, ‘Relatos sobre el terremoto de 1812 y los destrozos que causó en Mérida. Maracaibo. Marzo-Abril de 1812.’, 6.} Other reports placed the death toll somewhere between 400 and 5,000 people.\footnote{Jaime Laffaille and Carlos Ferrer, “El terremoto de Mérida de 1812: escudriñando entre las páginas de una novela inconclusa en busca de información acerca de una historia real”, Revista Geográfica Venezolana 46, (2005): 221-222.}

Among the hundreds of deaths, beyond those of family and friends, it was probably Bishop Hernández Milanés’ decease that caused the most distress and anguish among Mérida’s residents and those of neighboring towns and cities. The city’s inhabitants could hardly believe the bishop had died. On the 26th, soon after the earthquake came to an end, hundreds of people from all over the city arrived at the main square looking for their loved ones while they tried to understand what had happened. In the square, they found a shattered cathedral and episcopal palace. There was much confusion with regards to who lay beneath the debris. Almost instantly, speculations of the bishop’s death began to be heard. Through word of mouth, the rumor quickly spread throughout the square and
surrounding streets all the way to Mérida’s fringes. Stories of the tragic death continued circulating for two to three days until the tragic news was finally confirmed in a sermon given on the city’s outskirts.\footnote{AGI, CARACAS,108, ‘Relatos sobre el terremoto de 1812 y los destrozos que causó en Mérida. Maracaibo. Marzo-Abril de 1812.’, 1-5.}

Hernández’s death caused affliction and anguish not only due to his rank, but also to his avid loyalism and his well-known reservations concerning the establishment of Mérida’s Junta and its subsequent declaration of independence from Spain. His life and death are revealing of some of the feelings of guilt and fear that many in Venezuela had been nurturing since 1810, when provincial juntas were established throughout the region. To an extent, the 1812 earthquake simply brought to the surface the emotions many had been nourishing for months. Hernández had arrived in Venezuela towards mid-1802 when he was appointed Mérida’s Bishop. In 1806, Hernández became renowned among many Venezuelans for his fierce opposition and criticism of Francisco de Miranda, who on August 3, 1806 had disembarked in the proximities of Coro with an army of close to four hundred men. At the moment of Miranda’s landing, Hernández was visiting the Province of Coro, one of the territories ascribed to his bishopric. Hernández and his companions fled the region out of fear that they might fall into the hands of Miranda. During the following weeks, Hernández offered several proclamations and sermons against Miranda, accusing him of being “unfaithful to the Sovereign and his fatherland, an irreligious man, an atheist, a monster accompanied by a gang of foolish men.”\footnote{“…infiel al Soberano y á su misma Patria, un hombre irreligioso, un ateísta, un monstruo acompañado de una gavilla de insensatos…” (Ana Hilda Duque, “El Obispo Hernández Milanés ante la Expedición de Miranda”, Boletín de del Archivo Arquidiocesano de Mérida, no. 26 (2006), 122.)} Hernández even indicted and

A few years later, Hernández fared a conundrum when Venezuelan provinces began to form government juntas and then declared their independence from Spain. The bishop’s correspondence documents his unwillingness to adhere to Caracas’ 1810 Junta and his suspicions and fears with regards to Caracas’ 1811 declaration of independence. As a matter of fact, his correspondence shows that Hernández began to nurture a sense of remorse ever since discussions regarding the formation of government juntas reached Mérida around 1809. Following the example of Caracas’ Archbishop Narciso Coll y Prat, who on September 14, 1810 unwillingly swore allegiance to Caracas’ Junta, Hernández pledged his adherence to Mérida’s Junta on September 21. In his oath, Hernández explained that given the demanding circumstances, “he vowed once again to recognize only the sovereignty of Ferdinand VII and his dynasty, and to obey those governing in his name, in this case the Junta Suprema established in this capital…”\footnote{“…reiteramos el juramento muchas veces hecho de no reconocer otra soberanía que la del Señor Fernando 7º y su legítima Dinastía, y de obedecer á los que gobiernen en su nombre, y en este concepto á la Junta Suprema erigida en esta Ciudad Capital.” (Edda Samudio A. (comp.). “Documentos”, Procesos Históricos. Revista de Historia y Ciencias Sociales 19 (2011), 127.)}

Almost a year later, on July 5, 1811, the provinces of Caracas, Mérida, Cumaná, Barinas, Margarita, Barcelona, and Trujillo declared their absolute independence from Spain and established the ‘Confederación Americana de Venezuela.’ On August 21, Hernández sent a letter to a
group of Mérida’s clergymen consulting them whether he should embrace Mérida’s independence, bearing in mind that he had previously sworn allegiance to Mérida’s Junta. Under these new circumstances, he inquired, what was he to do to maintain his loyalty to Ferdinand VII, the Spanish Crown, and the Catholic Church while also upholding his vows of allegiance to the junta that now governed the Province of Mérida?320

The clergymen’s response came two days later. In their answer, they argued that Hernández was not obliged to endorse Mérida’s independence because his previous vows had been made under the assumption that the junta would maintain its loyalty to the King and the Spanish Monarchy. Moreover, the clergymen claimed that two of the bishopric’s provinces, Coro and Maracaibo, had not declared independence and still continued to be loyal to the Spanish Crown. If Hernández embraced independence, they explained, he would be leaving these provinces without its rightful spiritual leader. The letter urged the bishop to follow the example of Pope Pio VII who lost his liberty as well as his authority over the Papal States after Napoleon’s invasion but refused to concede to the emperor’s immoral desires.321 Despite the clergymen’s arguments and Hernández’s manifest unwillingness to support independence, the bishop ended up reluctantly adhering to Mérida’s declaration of independence a few days after receiving their reply.322

Hernández’s doubts and worries are revealing of the concerns shared by many Venezuelans and New Granadians. For many, recent events not only meant a rupture from Spain; they also implied a break from the Catholic Church and from God. From their

perspective, not only political and social stability were at risk, so was people’s salvation. It seems that some in Hernández’s flock, the parish priests, and the city’s friars evaluated and assessed the juntas and their independence in similar ways. Apparently, a number of Mérida’s residents were beginning to nourish similar feelings of guilt and fear and also believed these political ventures would lead to chaos, misery, and eternal damnation. Yet, it is worth noting that not all in the city shared these sentiments. Some of Mérida’s nuns enthusiastically supported the provincial junta and its declarations of independence despite catastrophic warnings coming from other members of the clergy.

Once the earthquake took place on March 26, remorse became widespread among Mérida’s residents, regardless of whether their allegiance to the provincial junta and to its independence from Spain had been halfhearted or enthusiastic. The devastation caused by the tremor almost immediately made many imagine that their disloyalty to Ferdinand VII and the Spanish Crown had brought about this tragedy and condemned them to eternal damnation. Shortly after the earthquake, horrified residents “ran out of their homes, screaming in the streets, ‘mercy Ferdinand VII!’” Perhaps the city’s inhabitants had, for

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323 Pablo Rodríguez explains that some clergymen and clergywomen who initially supported the formation of government juntas in 1810 would later oppose and resist them. Many members of the clergy considered that some of the junta’s policies, such as regulating the clergy’s legal status or declaring freedom of worship, could incite sinful behavior and cause serious harm to society. Nonetheless, there were others who continued to support the juntas and their decision to declare independence. Rodríguez highlights the case of Mérida’s nuns among the members of the clergy who continued backing the juntas. (Rodríguez, “Miedo, religiosidad y política: a propósito del terremoto de 1812,” 244.)

324 “...otros en el acto de la trepidación salieron despavoridos de sus casas gritando por las calles ‘misericordia Fernando VII.’” (de Urquinaona y Pardo, Pedro. Relación documentada del origen y progresos del trastorno de las provincias de Venezuela. Hasta la exoneración del Capitán General don Domingo Monteverde hecha en el mes de diciembre de 1813 por la guarnición de la plaza de Puerto Cabello. Madrid: Imprenta Nueva, 1820, 71. For a brief analysis of some of the emotions that come up in Urquinaona’s account, see: Carlos Alfredo Marín, “Pasión, terror y cuerpos en Venezuela. Bosquejo para una nueva lectura de la Guerra de Independencia (1810-1814),” Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios sobre Cuerpos, Emociones y Sociedad 19 (Diciembre 2015-Marzo 2016): 70-79.)
months, been nurturing a certain sense of guilt that they only expressed after the tremor. According to students from Mérida’s seminary, on the evening of March 26th, many of the survivors who were gathered in the main square cried and pled for God’s mercy and forgiveness. Rumors of Bishop Hernández’s death deepened fears that residents’ sufferings were the result of the city’s disloyalty. Some of those standing in the main square commented that the bishop’s unfaithfulness had brought about his tragic end. Maybe, some even speculated that Hernández’s last thoughts and feelings were of remorse for having endorsed Mérida’s junta and its independence. In the following days, many seminary students fled to Maracaibo where they claimed God had destroyed Mérida in wrath. In the meantime, Mérida’s residents made “public displays of repentance, proclaiming that the tremor had been a visible punishment from God for the revolution.” In Mérida and neighboring towns, people commented on “the coincidence that it [the earthquake] had occurred the same Maundy Thursday, and at the exact same hour in which the insurrection was published two years before.”

*Emotional communities and widening gaps: Caracas after the Maundy Thursday earthquake*

Similar remarks and emotional outbursts were seen across most of Venezuela after the earthquake. Caracas, along with Mérida and Barquisimeto, was probably the city that suffered the most from the tremor. In the capital, the quake destroyed the city’s cathedral.

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326 “hicieron demostraciones públicas de penitencia gritando que el temblor era un castigo visible de Dios por la revolucion…” (de Urquinaona y Pardo, *Relación documentada del origen y progresos*, 71.)
327 “… y la casualidad de haber de sucedido en el mismo día de Jueves santo y a la misma hora en que dos años antes se publicó la insurrección…” (Urquinaona y Pardo, *Relación documentada del origen y progresos*, 71-72.)
as well as nearly two thirds of its buildings. Approximately 10,000 of the capital’s 30,000 inhabitants perished on the afternoon of the 26th and subsequent days. Some claim the death toll would have been higher had most of the city’s residents been in their homes instead of out in the streets and squares. That day, Caraqueños were not only celebrating Maundy Thursday, but also the second anniversary of the formation of Caracas’ Junta. The city’s streets and houses had been decorated with flags and banners. In Caracas, as in Mérida, displays of fear and guilt were seen soon after the earthquake. Royalists, particularly clergymen, were quick to argue that the tremor could only be understood as divine punishment and insisted that it was not a coincidence that the quake had taken place on the same date that the province’s junta was instituted. Shortly after the tremor came to an end, a Franciscan friar was seen in Caracas’ street with a crucifix in his hands claiming that the earthquake was a punishment sent by God for their many sins against Ferdinand VII. The friar apparently pronounced a phrase that quickly spread throughout Venezuela and New Granada: “On Holy Thursday they did it! On Holy Thursday they paid for it!”

Many in Caracas and surrounding cities embraced such understandings of recent events. The revolutionary government had a relatively poor reputation and people in general were predisposed to believe independence was sinful and corrupt. These sorts of preconceptions were so ingrained among some Venezuelans that proclamations arguing the tremor was the result of God’s fury found an ample reception soon after the earthquake.

330 “¡Jueves Santo la hicieron! ¡Jueves Santo la pagaron!” (Rodríguez, “Miedo, religiosidad y política, 240).
came to an end. On the 26th, in addition to the Franciscan friar with his crucifix, a Dominican abbot was seen in Caracas’ streets preaching against the republican government. An audience quickly formed around him. Witnesses claimed that many in the crowd nodded their heads in approval as they listened to the cleric argue that that quake had been caused by the rebels’ immorality. It seems many in Caracas had also been nourishing feelings of guilt and fear similar to those Bishop Hernández and Mérida’s residents experienced but that they only began to express them after the tremor came to an end. Most of Caracas’ residents, however, were somewhat more constrained than the Dominican and Franciscan friars when voicing their views and emotions.

As happened in other regions of Venezuela, not all Caraqueños shared the same understandings of what was happening, nor did they experience emotions in the same manner. Similar understandings of the times being lived brought about analogous experiences of remorse and dread. Three broad emotional communities, to use Rosenwein’s concept, became visible in Mérida, Caracas, and other Venezuelan cities in the months leading to the earthquake as well as during its immediate aftermath. Each of these groups assessed their place in time and interpreted recent events in their own manner. Correspondingly, each group experienced guilt and fear in their own, particular ways. Hernández and his congregation as well as Caracas’ friars and their closest parishioners are but an example of one of the emotional communities that surfaced during these years. In their case, they linked recent political happenings and republican projects with divine punishment and eternal damnation. Despite the extent to which these understandings and

332 Pablo Rodríguez, “Miedo, religiosidad y política”, 240-241.
feelings of guilt and dread spread, they were not shared by all members of society. Others also experienced religious guilt and fear, but they did so in a more individual manner. They believed it was their personal behavior, rather than collective political ventures, which had unleashed God’s wrath. Several republicans, however, felt fear and guilt that their internal divisions and their incapacity in governing were bringing down the Venezuelan Confederation.

In Caracas, frictions about the meaning of the earthquake began almost immediately. That same afternoon, the rebel government began to repress and censor those who blamed it for the natural disaster. For instance, the Franciscan friar seen in the streets with a crucifix – and who accused republicans of being responsible for the quake – was captured and sent to prison. It seems that the friar’s words and insolence enraged republican officials. Some even pushed for his execution. Apparently, among those insisting on an exemplary punishment was Simón Bolívar. Several scholars argue that on the 26th and subsequent days Bolívar led a counteroffensive to stop the diffusion of proclamations claiming the earthquake was the product of God’s wrath. At the time, Bolívar was a mid-level army officer relatively unknown in Caracas. Traditional Venezuelan historiography as well as several contemporary scholars claim that Simón Bolívar was present in Caracas on the 26th and was seen picking up debris and helping rescue those found beneath the ruins. It is said that at some moment, Bolívar exclaimed “if nature opposes us, we will struggle against her and force her to obey us.” Although the phrase has become part of Venezuelan historical memory, it is unlikely that he uttered such words. Historians such as

334 “Si se opone la naturaleza, lucharemos contra ella y haremos que nos obedezca”. (McCook, “Nature, God, and Nation in Revolutionary Venezuela,” 43, 50; Rodriguez, “Miedo, religiosidad y política,” 240.)
Michael Zeuske claim that it is possible that Bolívar was not even in Caracas when the earthquake took place. Zeuske argues that the renowned phrase belongs to the vast mythology surrounding Bolívar’s figure. Among these numerous myths one finds claims such as that Bolívar and Alexander von Humboldt were close friends and inspired each other in their political and scientific ventures.  

Regardless of Bolívar’s whereabouts on the afternoon of March 26th, the fact is that immediately after the tremor came to an end, republican officials did what they could to put a stop to the spread of stories asserting the earthquake was God’s punishment for Venezuela’s many sins. Through different means they attempted to transmit the idea that the earthquake was merely a natural disaster unrelated to divine will or political events. Giving meaning to the tremor as well as to the feelings of guilt and fear it produced became yet another battleground between royalists and republicans. In their efforts to spread their message and appease growing feelings of dread and remorse, republican officials ended up locked up in an argument with Caracas’ Archbishop, Narciso Coll y Pratt. The

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authorities’ infructuous efforts and the clergymen’s obstinacy are revealing of a growing gap between dissimilar understandings of recent events as well as of the widening of the breach between different experiences of guilt and fear.

Coll y Prat was one of the most ardent advocates of the narrative claiming the tremor was a consequence of God’s wrath. On a report written to Ferdinand VII on August 25, 1812, Coll y Prat maintains that the earthquake was a horrendous disaster, but ultimately, a warranted one. According to the archbishop, as Caracas’ residents fell into greater “depredation, pride, and disturbances, the divine omnipotence chose to look upon them with clemency and to admonish these residents so that they return to the bosom of their former common mother, and graciously acknowledge their two sovereigns, both celestial and human.” For Coll y Prat, the destruction of Caracas merely “corroborated the prophecies that God had revealed to men, upon the ancient, sinful, and arrogant cities of Babylon, Jerusalem, and the Tower of Babel.” In his letter, the archbishop claimed that all sorts of immoralities had been on the rise ever since ideas of independence began to circulate throughout Venezuela. The archbishop’s list of grievances included the closure of the Holy Office of the Inquisition, the new government’s “exacerbated religious tolerance”, a series of measures restricting the regular clergy’s disciplinary jurisdiction over its own members, and proclamations on behalf of rebel officials favoring a “democratic” Gospel.

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337 “… quanto mayores eran las iniquidades e ideas de depredacion, orgullo y trastorno; tanto se dignó la omnipotencia divina mirar con clemencia y amonestar a estos naturales a que volviesen en el seno de su antigua madre comun, reconociendo altamente las dos soberanías divina, y humana… dexando confirmados en nuestros días las profecías siempre vigentes, reveladas por Dios a los hombres sobre las antiguas ciudades impias y orgullosas, Babilonia, Jerusalem, & y la Torre de Babel. (AGI, CARACAS,953, ‘Relación del arzobispo de Caracas al Rey. Caracas. 25 de agosto de 1812.’, 10.)

On the top of Coll y Prat’s list of complaints was the suppression of a pastoral in which he depicted the earthquake as a fair punishment by which God sought to morally cleanse Caracas from its many sins. Interestingly enough, the sermon was originally requested by republican officials. In order to put a halt to the growing feelings of fear and guilt that were spreading throughout Caracas and Venezuela, authorities asked Coll y Prat to prepare a pastoral explaining that earthquakes were natural phenomena not related to political affairs. In a petition sent on April 4, 1812, rebel officials complained that the enemies of the republic had been creating unrest by spreading superstitions and by convincing many of the city’s “simple-minded” that the natural disaster was God’s message in favor of the monarch’s restitution. In their letter, officials implored the archbishop to explain to his flock that earthquakes “were as common in the natural order as rain, hail, or lightning.” Just a day after their first dispatch, republican officials sent another letter to Coll y Prat insisting on the urgency of the matter and explaining that ruinous falsehoods and rumors condemning Caraqueños to eternal damnation were out of control among the less educated people. Moreover, authorities asked the archbishop to order all his priests to preach against these noxious superstitions and to explain to their congregations that the revolutionary government was, contrary to what its enemies claimed, striving to extirpate all sorts of vices and immoral customs.

Coll y Prat intentionally delayed his response as well as the preparation of the pastoral. He believed that by doing so he could provide enough time for rumors to spread

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339 “tan comun en el órden de la naturaleza, como el llover, granizar, centellear…” (de Urquinaona y Pardo, Relación documentada del origen y progresos, 71-72.)
claiming the tremor had been God’s penance for Venezuela’s independence and its adoption of republicanism. On April 10, the archbishop responded to the officials’ request arguing that he knew quite well that earthquakes were natural phenomenon and that he was also aware of the republican government’s dispositions to eradicate sinful and immoral conduct. Yet, in his reply the archbishop claimed that God was the driving force behind nature’s actions and that God admonished sins and aberrant behavior through natural disasters as had happened with the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah. Corruption, arrogance, lust, and irreligiosity, the archbishop argued, had propagated among the capital’s residents to such an extent that he could only be thankful that God had been so merciful and had not unleashed all his wrath on the city. What is more, he explained he was making the most of the fear the earthquake produced among his flock, urging them to stop their sinful ways and exhorting them “to put an end to all cases of concubinage, to abandon enmities, to retract from impiety and erroneous philosophical libertinage, to maintain order and public tranquility, and to aid each other as good citizens…”

The archbishop closed his dispatch saying he had been spreading this message among his congregation and had ordered his bishopric’s priests to do the same.

During the following month, republican officials continued pressing the archbishop for a pastoral and Coll y Prat kept on eluding the commission with all sorts of excuses. On April 13, authorities sent a letter to the archbishop claiming a pastoral from him would help

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341 “… exhortando a todos a dejar los concubinatos, abandonar los partidos o facciones de enemistad, a restituir los caudales mal habidos, a abjurar la impiedad y los errores de la fisíosofía del libertinage, a mantener el orden y pública tranquilidad, a socorrerse mutuamente como buenos ciudadanos…” (de Urquinaona y Pardo, Relación documentada del origen y progresos, 73-74.)
342 de Urquinaona y Pardo, Pedro. Relación documentada del origen y progresos, 73-74.
“destroy the bad impressions that the discourses of some evildoers have produced on these inhabitants. Such enemies of our liberty and independence have tried to blame the phenomenon that took place on March 26 on the sacred cause we have undertaken.”

Three days later, Coll y Prat responded claiming that he had not forgotten the task assigned to him, but that he had fallen ill and had been awfully busy. On May 10, republican official sent a new request framed as a gentle kind of ultimatum. In the letter, rebel officials claimed that more than ever Caracas’ congregation needed some sort of reassurance from someone as respected as the archbishop and, that they hoped he would not snub their request once more. A couple of days later, Coll y Prat replied that he was working on the pastoral but had not been able to finish it because of his poor health and his many responsibilities as archbishop.

It was only on June 8 that Coll y Prat finally sent his much-promised pastoral. In the dispatch, the archbishop excused himself for his delay but claimed that, to a certain extent, he had already begun complying with their request. The clergyman argued that, as already stated in his letter from April 10, he had been offering encouragement and support to his congregation since the earthquake took place. In the dispatch, Coll y Prat somewhat sarcastically praised the government’s generosity and wisdom for allowing him to remain close to his flock to offer them the reassurance they needed in these uncertain times. Yet, going along with the unwillingness he showed in previous letters and adopting a rather

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343 “… destruir las malas impresiones que hayan producido en estos habitantes los discursos de algunos malvados, que enemigos de nuestra libertad e independencia, han querido atribuir el fenómeno del 26 de marzo, a la santa causa que hemos emprendido.” (de Urquinaona y Pardo, Relación documentada del origen y progresos, 75.)

344 de Urquinaona y Pardo, Relación documentada del origen y progresos, 76-77.
cynical tone, the pastoral came nowhere close to fulfilling the officials’ wishes. Coll y Prat’s sermon insisted that the suffering Caraqueños were undergoing was without doubt a punishment from God. Nonetheless, he maintained that God had acted as a loving and merciful father who simply sought the repentance of those who had behaved licentiously. The archbishop argued that Caracas’ residents had brought the disaster on themselves for they had been informed multiple times to put an end to their pride and sins but had ignored all forewarnings. Coll y Prat accused Caracas’ people of having “run without restraint and without fear along the path to iniquity”, “adding crime to crime, scandal to impudence, and irreligion to sacrilege.” Some of its denizens, he maintained, “iniquitously believed that the almighty was one of their equals.” The archbishop sustained that he had perceived the city’s intolerable corruption ever since he disembarked in the port of La Guaira – about 30 kilometers north of Caracas – and found himself among Caraqueños. Since then, he had been advising them to change their customs and end their depravation, but his many edicts and admonitions had been ignored. In the end, Coll y Prat believed that, given Caracas’ rampant sinfulness and immorality, the earthquake or some other natural disaster had been bound to happen.

Although the archbishop’s pastoral did not allude directly to the government junta, republicanism, or the declaration of independence, Coll y Prat blamed the new government for the tragic earthquake and the imminent damnation Venezuelans would suffer in the

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345 “… corriais sin freno y sin temor por el camino de la iniquidad: vuestra gloria estaba en añadir delitos a delitos, el escándalo a la impudicia, y la irreligión al sacrilegio... Pensasteis inicuamente que el altísimo era semejante a vosotros,” (de Urquinaona y Pardo, Relación documentada del origen y progresos, 79.)
future. Coll y Pratt had arrived at Caracas in April 1810 shortly after the formation of its government junta. He had been received in the port of La Guaira amidst the widespread confusion caused by news of the junta having been established in the Venezuelan capital. Thus, in alluding to decadence sensed since his arrival, Coll y Prat is implicitly referring to the new government. Moreover, the archbishop’s sermons suggest that the spread of immorality, pride, and decadence coincided with the propagation of licentious ideas and the rise of rebel governments. The archbishop took aim not only at Caracas’ Junta but also at a series of civil societies that had been established in previous years. Among them was Francisco de Miranda’s Sociedad Patriótica, an organization that outraged both royalists and republicans, particularly white aristocrats, clergymen, and certain middle sectors. To them, the Sociedad Patriótica was promoting Jacobin ideas and inciting racial friction with its lectures and texts about equality and manumission. Moreover, free blacks and pardos were invited to join its meetings and to become members.

In the end, republican officials were quick to claim Coll y Prat’s pastoral encouraged narratives maintaining the earthquake had come about as a result of Venezuela’s independence and its adoption of republicanism. Ultimately, they decided to censure the sermon and notified the archbishop of their decision stating that “the pastoral Your Honor has sent does not fulfill the part that this government desires and has requested

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348 Alejandro E. Gómez, “La Revolución de Caracas desde abajo. Impensando la primera independencia de Venezuela desde la perspectiva de los Libres de Color, y de las pugnas político-bélicas que se dieran en torno a su acceso a la ciudadanía, 1793-1815.” Nuevo Mundo Mundos Nuevos. (2008), http://journals.openedition.org/muevomundo/32982, 15-17. In the 1790s and early 1800s, there were several societies and leagues that could be understood as precursors of the Sociedad Patriótica. Cristina Soriano’s Tides of Revolution explores many of these civil associations. (Cristina Soriano, Tides of Revolution. Information, Insurgencies, and the Crisis of Colonial Rule in Venezuela (Alburquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2018).)
from you. Hence, it has decided to inform you that it has archived the pastoral for being antipolitical, and it has absolutely prohibited its circulation.”

The pastoral seems to have been the straw that broke the camel’s back. On May 16, 1812, republican officials decided to banish Coll y Prat from Caracas and to send him to either the United States or Gibraltar. Authorities hoped his absence would stop the rumors that were generating so much unrest and mistrust towards the new government. To avoid an outbreak of disturbances that could upset public peace even further, officials came up with a plan to capture the archbishop at midnight and carry him to the port of La Guaira with an escort of around seventy-five soldiers. To prevent neighbors and bystanders from hearing or seeing the archbishop’s detention, officials would announce curfew for after sunset and would order Caracas’ residents to shut their doors and windows after dusk. Once in La Guaira, Coll y Prat would be shipped out in the first vessel leaving to the United States or Gibraltar. In the end, despite their careful planning, republican officials decided not to banish the archbishop.

There are several reasons why Caracas’ authorities might have changed their minds with regards to Coll y Prat’s exile. One reason clearly had to do with their concern that such a measure could eventually deepen divisions and animosities. But it also seems that officials concluded that the archbishop’s banishment would be useless. Even before the sermon’s censorship, narratives blaming the republican government for the earthquake

349 “… no siendo la pastoral que V.S. Ilma. ha remitido, el papel que desea y ha pedido el gobierno, éste ha acordado hacérselo así presente, mandando archivarlo por antipolítico, y prohibiendo absolutamente su circulación.” (de Urquinaona y Pardo, Relación documentada del origen y progresos, 82.)
350 AGI, CARACAS,953, ‘Relación del arzobispo de Caracas al Rey. Caracas. 25 de agosto de 1812.’, 12; de Urquinaona y Pardo, Relación documentada del origen y progresos, 82-83.
were already widespread throughout Caracas and other Venezuelan regions. As seen in Mérida and Caracas, several of the city’s residents were seen in the streets asking for God’s mercy and Ferdinand VII’s forgiveness only minutes after the earthquake.\textsuperscript{351} Feelings of guilt and fear surfaced immediately after the tremor, but they had been growing in the hearts and minds of Venezuelans for months. In the end, censoring the sermon had been a pointless undertaking as would be the archbishop’s exile.

Coll y Prat left Caracas in November 1816, when his appointment came to an end, amidst displays of gratitude and esteem. Many Caraqueños saw him as the man who had saved them from impiety and chaos. In a farewell pastoral letter, the archbishop claimed that during his time in Venezuela he witnessed the rise and fall of immoral political projects and suffered the violence and persecution they brought about.\textsuperscript{352} Coll y Prat died in Madrid on December 30, 1822. On his deathbed, the clergyman asked for his heart to be removed and shipped to Caracas so that it could be buried in the city where he faced so many ordeals. In 1844, Caracas’ Cabildo unexpectedly received a wooden container with Coll y Prat’s embalmed heart. Such was the resentment the citizens of the new nation felt towards the royalist clergyman that the Cabildo abstained from carrying out his last wishes. At the time, Venezuelans remembered him as the archbishop who paved the way for the royalist takeover of 1812. It was only in 1892 that Coll y Prat’s heart was buried in Caracas’ cathedral with proper funeral rites.\textsuperscript{353}


\textsuperscript{353} Rodriguez, “Miedo, religiosidad y política: a propósito del terremoto de 1812,” 256-257.
Coll y Prat’s correspondence with republican officials offers a glimpse into the growing gaps between different interpretations of recent events as well as an increased divergence between experiences of guilt and fear. For people such as Caracas’ archbishop, Mérida’s bishop, and part of their flock, recent political happenings had broken the holy union that linked their polity to God. For them, divine punishment and even eternal damnation were likely results. Yet, for others, experiences of guilt and fear were not closely tied to discussions of republicanism and independence. This does not mean that those defending the juntas and their declarations of independence did not experience any sense of religious guilt or fear of eternal damnation. After all, in the nineteenth century Catholic world, these feelings were inscribed in the hearts and minds of almost everyone. Following a disaster such as the Maundy Thursday earthquake, it was almost inevitable for people to suspect that their thoughts and actions might have unleashed God’s wrath. Yet, there were many who believed their endorsement of republicanism and independence did not explain the divine penance they were facing. Rather, their individual, everyday conduct – such as immoral and sinful behavior they might have committed – would have set off God’s fury.\footnote{McCook, “Nature, God, and Nation in Revolutionary Venezuela,” 53-54; Rodríguez, “Miedo, religiosidad y política: a propósito del terremoto de 1812,” 246-250.}

In the days following the tremor, dozens of Venezuelans showed repentance for their moral conduct, but not for the political transformations that were taking place. The documentary records refer to Caraqueños who sought spiritual consolation but in doing so did not express any view in favor or against republicanism or independence. Joseph Felix Roscio, a priest in Puerto Cabello, claimed that during the weeks following the earthquake, his congregation asked him to hear confessions for days and days. On some occasions, he
listened to his flock nonstop from three in the morning to midnight. Apparently, politics were mostly absent in the confessionals. Stuart McCook claims that, above all, Roscío’s congregation repented their own personal conduct. Another account from a British witness residing in Caracas suggests that Venezuelans’ behavior changed. He noted that many living in concubinage decided to marry while others made public displays of penitence and poured into the confessional, promising to change their immoral ways. Other accounts from Caracas mention thieves returning stolen goods, women discarding their luxurious clothes for more modest ones, and men carrying wooden crosses on their backs. As McCook argues, this introspective twist in people’s conduct suggests that there was a considerable group of people who were interpreting God’s punishment in individual terms rather than collective ones.\footnote{McCook, “Nature, God, and Nation in Revolutionary Venezuela,” 53-55; Rodríguez, “Miedo, religiosidad y política: a propósito del terremoto de 1812,” 253-254.} That is to say, they believed it was up to them to avoid further divine punishment and to shun eternal damnation by changing their own conduct. Such self-focused understandings differed from some of the displays seen in the streets of Caracas and Mérida, in which people blamed the whole of society for their sufferings and begged King Ferdinand VII to forgive Venezuelans for their disloyalty. However, interpretations that centered on individuals’ actions should not be counterposed to collective ones as though the two were opposed. Archbishop Coll y Pratt had criticized both Caraqueños’ sinful “philosophical libertinage”, including their adoption of republicanism and independence, as well as their concubinage.\footnote{AGI, CARACAS,953, ‘Relación del arzobispo de Caracas al Rey. Caracas. 25 de agosto de 1812.’, 10-12, 26; de Urquinaona y Pardo, Relación documentada del origen y progresos, 71-79.}
Yet, republican officials’ epistolary exchange with Coll y Pratt as well as some of the displays of emotions seen in the streets also suggest that for others, feelings of guilt and fear had even fainter religious overtones. Many republicans and critics of Spanish rule insisted that the earthquake was merely a natural phenomenon. The guilt they felt hardly had to do with divine punishment, but rather with their own incapacity to organize and efficiently respond to the tragedy. More than dread of God’s wrath or of eternal salvation, it was fear that the government would soon collapse and that they would once again fall into the hands of royalist forces. That is to say, conceiving the earthquake as a natural event brought about experiences of guilt and fear that were different from those prompted by religious interpretations. They were, to a certain extent, earthlier notions that revolved around people’s physical survival as well as that of the recently established republican government. Such feelings of guilt and fear came about with hints of both powerlessness and hope. At the same time that many fell into despair and impotence seeing that they were unable to resolve urgent matters, there was also hope that their political endeavors would ultimately prevail as many of them became convinced that republicanism and independence were not sinful in the eyes of God.

Such notions of guilt, fear, and hope ended up surfacing in different mediums. Despite their failed attempt to have the archbishop write a pastoral that would help them spread their arguments, republican authorities used other channels to disseminate their claims. One of the means used was the Gazeta de Caracas, a periodical that royalist government officials founded in 1808. The tabloid circulated until 1822. During the

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troubled 1810s, the Gazeta continually changed political sides: from being the spokesperson of the Captaincy General to one of the republican’s main written channels of communication. On April 25, almost a month after the earthquake, the Gazeta’s front page reproduced a seventeenth-century report written by the city’s procurador general, Juan de Revolledo y Ponte. In it, Revolledo described the state of destruction and misery in which Caracas had befallen after an earthquake shook the city on June 11, 1641. The procurador explained that over two hundred people perished, most of Caracas’ buildings collapsed, and scarcity and hunger spread throughout the city and surrounding towns. The Gazeta’s edition inserted three descriptive footnotes to Revolledo’s text arguing that the 1641 tremor had been fiercer and stronger than the 1812 one, proportionally killing more people and destroying more buildings. For the editors, the fact that the 1641 quake had taken place when Caracas was ruled by the Spanish Monarchy simply proved that independence and republicanism were not to blame for the 1812 tremor. “Let’s hope it serves as a lesson to the superstitious”, one of the footnotes claims, “so that they understand that in all times we have had earthquakes, phenomena that undoubtedly contribute to embellish nature.”

358 During its first years of existence, from 1808 to the first months of 1812, the periodical was directed by Andrés Bello and printed by Matthew Gallagher and James Lamb’s printing press in Caracas. Conway explains that the Gazeta’s history can be divided into several periods: late colonial period (1808-1810), the First Republic (1810-1812), the royalist period of Monteverde (1812-1813), the Second Republic (1813-14), Boves’ counterrevolution and Pablo Morillo’s (1814-1821), the rebel José Francisco Bermúdez’ takeover of Caracas (1814-1821), and the end of royalism and the restitution of republican control (1821-1822). (Christopher Conway, “Letras combatientes: género epistolar y modernidad en la Gaceta de Caracas, 1808-1822.”, Revista Iberoamericana LXXII, no. 214 (2006): 77-79.) The spelling of the periodical’s title also varies throughout these years. During its first years, it is common to see the title spelled with a ‘z.’ Later on, the acceptance with an ‘c’ (Gaceta) becomes more frequent.

359 “Que sirva de lección a los supersticiosos, para que se penetren de que en todos tiempos hemos tenido terremotos, fenómenos que indisputablemente contribuyan a hermosear la naturaleza.” (“Terremoto del año de 1641”, Gazeta de Caracas, no. 11 (sábado 25 de abril de 1812): 5-6.)
cruelty following the 1641 earthquake, accusing them of collecting taxes and fees in spite of the desolation and scarcity that Caracas’ residents were facing.  

Of the four pages that make up the April 25 edition of the *Gazeta*, close to three are dedicated almost exclusively to the earthquake. In addition to Revolledo’s account, the edition includes a letter written by an anonymous citizen to a friend, a short news article, the transcript of a ‘bando’, and a copy of a decree. The letter, which was probably apocryphal, echoes some of the same arguments posed in the footnotes to Revolledo’s report. The anonymous citizen, who was perhaps one of the *Gazeta*’s editors, brings up a conversation he recently had with a wise, one-hundred-year-old friend. In what appears to be a fictitious dialogue between the two, the elderly friend informs the citizen of the many earthquakes that shook Venezuela and other parts of the Americas in past centuries. The old man explains that the 1641 earthquake caused as much destruction as the 1812 one. With regards to the 1737 tremors, which he personally experienced, the elderly friend claims that quakes shook Venezuela for over a month. Most of them were shorter than the one they recently suffered on March 26, but some were as harsh in intensity. They were so intense that the 1737 tremors completely destroyed Barquisimeto while they also tumbled dozens of Caracas’ buildings. The old man’s account continues with descriptions of a longer but less destructive tremor that shook Venezuela in 1766, the 1746 earthquake that devastated Lima, a 1751 quake that is described as having sunk half of Guatemala, and a

361 As Conway explains, one of the most common genres that appears in the pages of the *Gazeta* is the epistolary genre. The periodical usually published letters written by government officials and military leaders as well as correspondence coming from abroad. In some cases, it would add comments and reflections and even sarcastic remarks to the letters to underline the point they were trying to make. Often, following didactic and propagandistic objectives, it would publish apocryphal letters such as the one written by the anonymous citizen to his close friend. (Conway, “Letras combatientes: género epistolar y modernidad,” 85-89.)
1797 earthquake that struck Quito. His relation carries on with other earthquakes that shook Lisbon, Egypt, Jerusalem, and other regions of the world. Ultimately, both the wise man and the anonymous citizen conclude that these sorts of movements of the earth “had no connection whatsoever with ancient and old governments, with kings and republics, with evildoers or good men. God rewards and punishes in his kingdom as we do our own in ours. The Earth always moves, there have always been tremors, causing greater or lesser movements of the Earth, depending on the larger or smaller fires it holds in its entrails…”

Besides making the case that the earthquake was a natural phenomenon unrelated to political intrigues, the Gazeta’s editors also drew attention to the government’s numerous foes and accused them of inciting fear and turmoil against the republic. An article in the April 25 edition talks about nine Franciscan friars who were seen on the afternoon of March 26th rescuing dead bodies from the ruins, carrying the corpses on their shoulders, and then performing funeral rites. Such commendable conduct, the Gazeta explains, was in no way similar to that of “many other individuals who have relentlessly intimidated and disturbed the city’s miserable inhabitants by proclaiming views that were absolutely contrary to reason and to Religion.” The Gazeta’s insinuation was above all an attack on royalist clergymen who they accused of spreading baseless rumors and superstitions against the republican system.

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362 “no tiene conexión con los Gobiernos antiguos y nuevos, con los reyes y con las repúblicas, con los malos y con los buenos: Dios premia y castiga en su reyno, y nosotros en el nuestro. La tierra siempre se mueve, siempre tiembla, causando mayor o menor movimiento, según su mayor o menor incendio de sus entrañas…” (“Carta de un ciudadano a un amigo suyo”, Gazeta de Caracas, no. 11 (sábado 25 de abril de 1812): 6.)

363 “muchos otros individuos que se empeñaron en intimidar y consternar mas y mas a estos infelices inhabitantes, proclamando principios absolutamente contrarios a la razón y a la religion.” (“Rasgos de humanidad”, Gazeta de Caracas, no. 11 (sábado 25 de abril de 1812): 7.)
Seeing that the rebels’ control of Caracas and other provinces was beginning to falter, the Gazeta’s editors included texts enumerating the most imminent threats they were facing. Besides pointing out what they believed to be their rivals’ lies and bad blood, the Gazeta’s pages also discuss the government’s military and financial troubles. The bando published in this edition suggests that with the spread of catastrophic prophecies and news that royalist troops were subjugating rebel territories, republican soldiers had begun to flee the army garrisons. As the bando explains, despite the numerous punishments against deserters, countless pusillanimous soldiers had abandoned their posts in past weeks, ignoring their responsibilities to society and, in many cases, falling prey to the “ill advertisement by some of the perverse enemies of the Venezuelan cause.” The prospect of enduring God’s wrath or falling into the hands of royalist troops seemed to be on the minds of many of these defectors. The bando encouraged deserters to return to their posts claiming they would be pardoned for their crimes because of a recent amnesty proclaimed by the Venezuelan House of Representatives. In addition to the bando, the Gazeta also published a decree regulating the price of gold and silver and creating a mechanism through which the city’s residents could pawn their valued objects for cash and aid. By doing so, the government sought to have access to pawned gold and silver to finance its many needs.

A sense of despair coupled with hope surfaces in the Gazeta’s pages. While the editors included an article, a bando, and a decree alluding to the troubling times they were

364 “los malos consejos de algunos perversos enemigos de la causa de Venezuela…” (“Decreto del R. Poder Ejecutivo - Bando”, Gazeta de Caracas, no. 11 (sábado 25 de abril de 1812): 8.)
facing, they also added pieces implying that, contrary to what most royalists claimed, God was not against republicanism or independence and the earthquake had no relation whatsoever with their political projects. Yet, hints of guilt also surface. It is a sort of remorse different from the religious guilt experienced by those who believed that either their sinful conduct or their betrayal of the Spanish Monarchy had unleashed God’s wrath and brought about the Maundy Thursday earthquake. Rather than remorse for having failed God, it was a sense of guilt for being unable to fulfill the ambitions and aspirations they had set out to accomplish. In other words, the Gazeta’s editors expressed feelings of remorse for their inability to govern and to put an end to internal divisions and fulfill the futures they had envisioned.

The collapse of the Venezuelan Confederation: guilt, remorse, and blame

It is not easy to measure the degree to which each of these different interpretations of the earthquake were accepted as true. Nonetheless, we can claim that within specific clusters, certain narratives prevailed over others, and thus the emotions attendant on a given interpretation outweighed others. As will be seen in this section, as time moved forward, some of these interpretations and emotional experiences began to put down roots, others faded, and many took on new forms. For some, feelings of guilt grew into a sense of collective repentance. For others, remorse ended up peppered with hints of reproach. Among other Venezuelans, hope, compassion, and fear became prevalent. In the meantime, some others took advantage of this widespread sense of guilt to improve their standing with the Crown and God himself. The persistence and adaptability of such understandings and emotional experiences are revealing of both the narratives’ multiple receptions as well as of the ebb and flow of emotions and that of the revolutionary tides.
In the months following the earthquake, Venezuela’s political situation changed dramatically. On April 23, amidst growing despair and chaos, Francisco de Miranda was named dictator of Venezuela. Those promoting the dictatorship hoped that a stronger, more centralized authority could save the newly founded republic. Almost three months later, following the royalist troops relentless advance, Miranda’s government signed the Capitulations of San Mateo and surrendered Caracas to General Juan Domingo de Monteverde. On July 29, Monteverde entered Caracas while Miranda and republican officials fled to La Guaira. On July 31, Simón Bolívar and other army officers organized a conspiracy to hand Miranda over to Monteverde. After almost two years of existence, the first Republic of Venezuela had come to an end. By then, hundreds of republicans were on the run, fleeing to islands in the Caribbean, the southern Llanos, and New Granada.  

These political happenings substantiated and encouraged some of the narratives and emotional experiences that had surfaced since the Maundy Thursday earthquake. During the second half of October 1812, Caracas celebrated a series of religious rites and acts of penitence to plead for God’s forgiveness. An article published in the November 8 edition of the *Gazeta de Caracas* – which now endorsed royalism – offers a detailed description of these ceremonies. The piece begins by claiming that after months of disavowal, the capital’s residents had finally “distinguished the physical causes of earthquakes from the moral ones” and had at last “been persuaded that all of Earth’s harms were the product of people’s sins.” Ever since *Caraqueños* came to terms with their misdeeds, the article continues, many had tried “to heal these harms from their roots” and had accepted “their

Paredes Muñante, “La conspiración contra Miranda del 31 de julio de 1812,” 242-245.
penitence to sooth God’s wrath.” Nonetheless, as the *Gazeta* explains, Caracas’ collective acts of contrition had had to wait weeks because the destruction caused by the earthquake and the outbreak of war had impeded city residents from properly celebrating the much-awaited rites of penitence.

It was only in mid-October that Archbishop Coll y Prat considered it appropriate to begin Caracas’ long-due acts of repentance. On October 15, the archbishop published an edict decreeing three days of fasting, ordering public prayers, and inviting all the city’s residents to take part in praying of the holy mysteries. On the 19th, the image of Our Lady of the Rosary, considered by many as a patron saint for protection against earthquakes, was taken from the chapel of Saint Dominic to that of Saint Peter. That same afternoon, Franciscan and Capuchin friars led public prayers in Caracas’ main square. Fasting was observed on the 21st, 23rd, and 24th of October. From the 19th to the 30th, the sacrament of penitence was offered day and night while rites of rogation were performed without interruption. On the 30th, the archbishop personally offered the holy communion to hundreds of members of his flock. That afternoon, the image of the Our Lady of the Rosary was returned to Saint Peter’s chapel. According to the *Gazeta*, “Caracas had not witnessed such an inspiring religious act in over one hundred years. An infinite crowd, with the upmost order, the greatest composure, and profound silence” escorted the virgin back to Saint Dominic’s. Choirs, Hail Marys, and prayers embellished the procession every time it

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368 “… supo distinguir bien la causa física de la moral de los terremotos con que se ha visto afligido desde el 26 de marzo último y persuadido de que todos los males de la tierra son efectos del pecado, ha procurado desde entonces curar el mal en su origen, acogiéndose a la penitencia para aplacar la ira del Señor.” (“Penitencia Pública”, *Gazeta de Caracas*, no. 7 (domingo 8 de noviembre de 1812), 7.)

369 “Penitencia Pública”, *Gazeta de Caracas*, no. 7 (domingo 8 de noviembre de 1812), 7-8.
came to a stop.\textsuperscript{370} With such acts of repentance, the article concludes, Caracas was sending a message to people on both sides of the Atlantic, warning them that God rewards virtue and punishes vices in the present and throughout eternity. As the \textit{Gazeta} maintains, those who had abandoned their alliance with the Spanish Crown or who had distanced themselves from the Catholic Church could find in Caracas’ repentance an example to follow.\textsuperscript{371}

To an extent, Caracas’ acts of penitence were manifestations of feelings of guilt and remorse that had gestated since the formation of government juntas and their declarations of independence. Moreover, narratives claiming the Maundy Thursday earthquake had been the result of Venezuela’s betrayal of the Spanish Monarchy and of its residents’ sinful conduct found additional grounding after the fall of the first Republic of Venezuela. For many, the collapse of the rebel government simply proved its immorality.

Yet, there are some differences between the experiences of guilt that were attendant on these rites of repentance compared to those feelings that appeared soon after the earthquake. Many acts of penitence carried out in October sought to soothe both individual and collective feelings of guilt. Certain rites, such as fasting, were both personal and communal acts. Their observance depended on each individual’s compliance, but it was the shared spirit of fasting that gave it its significance. Correspondingly, there were individuals who decided to take their observance of public prayers and shared rogation a step further: publicly weeping and overplaying their gestures to share with others their remorse for their past immoral conduct. It is as if many of Caracas’ residents believed they

\textsuperscript{370} “Tal vez en cien años no se ha visto en esta capital un acto religión mas edificante. Un gentio infinito, el mayor orden, la mas grande compostura, y un profundo silencio.” (“Penitencia Pública”, \textit{Gazeta de Caracas}, no. 7 (domingo 8 de noviembre de 1812), 8.)

\textsuperscript{371} “Penitencia Pública”, \textit{Gazeta de Caracas}, no. 7 (domingo 8 de noviembre de 1812), 8-9.
had to repent for their own personal behavior as well as for the fact that Venezuela’s provinces had together endorsed “sinful” political ideas and government systems.

Some months earlier, during the weeks following the earthquake, people’s displays of guilt had suggested a slightly different picture. March and April had seen a clearer separation between those who believed the earthquake was God’s penance for their individual sins, for whom guilt was more personal and private, and those who claimed the tremor had occurred due to Venezuela’s adoption of republicanism and independence. The latter felt remorse not for their individual actions but for those committed by society as a whole. By October 1812, this division between different understandings of the earthquake as well as between distinct emotional experiences seems to have faded. When Caracas’ residents celebrated public prayers, processions, and fasting, it appears that their expression of guilt encompassed both their own individual sins as well as Venezuela’s alleged wrongdoings.

This variation is meaningful in the sense that it implies that emotional communities are not and that the already hazy lines dividing them at times blur even further. In this particular case, it is as if two distinct but similar emotional communities, both with manifest religious undertones, ended up merging. The insistence with which many clergymen maintained that republicanism and independence were immoral as well as their endless claims that Caracas’ residents had been behaving immorally might have converged in many people’s subjectivity. Furthermore, one must also consider meanings of selfhood in the early nineteenth-century Spanish world when most people still understood their place in the world in collective terms. Although these were decades of seeming transition toward an emerging individualism, many aspects of an individual’s life were still shaped by a sense
of collectivity. Individualistic experiences were, to an extent, shaped and determined by collective experiences of guilt.

Towards late 1812, other experiences of guilt, those without manifest religious undertones, had also taken on new forms as hints of reproach began to be apparent in them. Among many republicans and critics of the Spanish Monarchy, the earthquake inspired a combination of despair, hope, and remorse. Soon after the tremor, many felt guilt because they thought that their internal divisions and the government’s ineptitude was leading to the inevitable fall of the Confederación Americana de Venezuela. Among many Caraqueños and Venezuelans, this sense of guilt became even more manifest months later when the first Republic of Venezuela collapsed. By late 1812, however, these feelings seem to have morphed into a sense of remorse peppered with feelings of anger against those who they believed had enabled the fall of the republican government.

Simón Bolívar’s Cartagena Manifesto, for example, is revealing of such combined feelings of guilt and reproach. Written on December 15, 1812, the Manifesto warns New Granadians of the threats they face, explains the reasons behind the fall of the short-lived Venezuelan Confederation, and sets out a plan to reconquer Venezuela. Bolívar’s text is one of the most thorough analyses of the causes for the collapse of the first Republic of Venezuela. The Manifesto considers a variety of elements such as the government’s excessive use of paper money and the distortions it caused for the value of goods, the

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Republic’s lack of military strength, its adoption of a federalist system, its many political divisions, and the Maundy Thursday earthquake. Bolívar begins his declaration claiming that the greatest mistake the Venezuelan government committed was its “fatal adoption of a system of tolerance. A system that is disapproved of and was known to be weak and inefficient by all sane people from the beginning but was tenaciously maintained until the last moment with unequalled blindness.” Following this line of thought, Bolívar condemned the government’s incapacity to censure and control the spread of narratives blaming republicanism and independence for unleashing God’s wrath. Furthermore, he argued that the clergy played a central role inciting uprisings in dozens of towns and cities and opened the way for the arrival of enemy troops by propagating deceitful stories about the quake as well as all sorts of allegations against republicanism. According to Bolívar, many clergymen “sacredly took advantage of the sanctity of their ministry in favor of those instigating civil war.” Yet, he explains that these “treacherous priests” committed such crimes because the republican government had allowed them and even encouraged them to do so. As Bolívar put it, “the impunity of such crimes was absolute, even finding outrageous support in Congress.”

373 “la fatal adopción que hizo del sistema tolerante; sistema improbado como débil e ineficaz, desde entonces, por todo el mundo sensato, y tenazmente sostenido hasta los últimos periodos, con una ceguedad sin ejemplo.” (Simón Bolívar, “Manifiesto de Cartagena.” (1812) in Manifiesto de Cartagena. Memoria dirigida a los ciudadanos de la Nueva Granada por un caraqueño. Exposición temporal. Casa Museo Quinta de Bolívar. (Bogotá: Ministerio de Cultura de la República de Colombia, 2012), 26-32). In this case, I take the term ‘improbado’ to mean disapproved of. (“IMPROBADO, DA. part. pass. del verbo Improbar. Lo así reprobado, desaprobado o reprehendido.” (Diccionario de Autoridades, Real Academia Española, 1734.))

374 “…abusando sacrílegamente de la santidad de su ministerio en favor de los promotores de la guerra civil. Sin embargo, debemos confesar ingenuamente, que estos traidores sacerdotes, se animaban a cometer los execrables crímenes de que justamente se les acusa porque la impunidad de los delitos era absoluta; la cual hallaba en el Congreso un escandaloso abrigo.” (Bolívar, “Manifiesto de Cartagena,” 30.)
Throughout the *Manifiesto*, Bolívar insistently blamed Venezuela’s former government for its downfall explaining that officials’ lack of authority and determination smoothed the way for Monteverde’s invasion. He criticized them for their lack of military strength and for not subjugating the loyalist Province of Coro when they had the chance. Bolívar also questions why republican rulers adopted a federalist system rather than a robust, centralized government that could inspire respect among all peoples. Furthermore, he scorns their lack of pragmatism and their misapprehension of the society they were ruling. “We had philosophers for chiefs”, he explains, “philanthropy for legislation, dialectics for tactics, and sophists for soldiers. With such subversion of principles and of things, social order was profoundly disturbed. And of course, the State ran towards its complete dissolution with giant steps.”\textsuperscript{375}

For Bolívar, the Maundy Thursday earthquake was an immediate cause of the Confederation’s downfall. The tremor simply hastened the Republic’s inevitable collapse. Throughout his *Manifiesto*, Bolívar insists that the tremor would not have had the catastrophic effects it had, had republican provinces been governed by one single, centralized authority capable to act with promptness. As Bolívar proclaims, “if Caracas, instead of a languid and insubsistente confederation would have established a simple government as the political and military situation merited, you, Venezuela, would still exist and would still enjoy your freedom!”\textsuperscript{376} Bolívar was not alone in his belief that the

\textsuperscript{375} “Por manera que tuvimos filósofos por jefes; filantropía por legislación, dialéctica por táctica, y sofistas por soldados. Con semejante subversión de principios y de cosas, el orden social se resintió extremadamente conmocado, y desde luego corrió el Estado a pasos agigantados a una disolución universal…” (Bolívar, “Manifiesto de Cartagena”, 27.)

\textsuperscript{376} “Si Caracas, en lugar de una Confederación lánguida e insubsistente, hubiese establecido un gobierno sencillo, cual lo requería su situación política y militar, tú existirías ¡oh Venezuela! y gozaras hoy de tu libertad.” (Bolívar, “Manifiesto de Cartagena”, 30.)
earthquake was circumstantial to the Republic’s collapse. For instance, *Fiscal José Costa y Gali* claimed that the immediate causes of Caracas’ defeat could be found in the earthquake and the misuse of paper money, but that it was ultimately the republicans’ foolishness and incompetence that led to its downfall. For his part, royalist official Pedro de Urquinaona argues that the earthquake was not the main cause behind the Confederation’s collapse, but claims that the widespread dread that overtook Caracas and other provinces certainly eased their conquest. Many present-day scholars seem to agree with such analyses of the earthquake’s share in the collapse of the Confederation. McCook, for example, argues that the tremor was somewhat incidental in the first Republic’s fall. As he explains, the natural disaster possibly helped tip popular opinion in favor of the royalist flank, but that the main shift was motivated by the republican government’s incapacity to deal with the military, economic, and political crises. In that sense, the earthquake simply aggravated these crises.

Along with Bolívar’s many grievances and reproaches, a certain sense of personal guilt is implicit in his declaration. After all, Bolívar could hardly claim he held no responsibility whatsoever in the fall of the Venezuelan Confederation: as an army officer he actively took part in the intrigues against Francisco de Miranda during the last days of the Venezuelan Republic. By pointing out the many errors supposedly committed by the Confederation and by insisting on the urgency of reconquering Venezuela, Bolívar was

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377 AGI, CARACAS,459, ‘Concepto del fiscal José Costa y Gali sobre el indulto que se debe dar a los rebeldes de Venezuela. Valencia. 16 de diciembre de 1812.’, 1-3.
380 Paredes Muñante, “La conspiración contra Miranda del 31 de julio de 1812”, 244-246.
perhaps trying to redeem his own faults. Bolívar insists on freeing “New Granada from Venezuela’s fate” and on rescuing “Venezuela from its current suffering.” Throughout the Manifesto, Bolívar urges New Granadians to join his efforts to reconquer Venezuela, telling them that Caracas’ peoples impatiently await them as their redeemers. As he proclaims, “let us all run together to break the shackles of those victims that cry in the dungeons awaiting your salvation… to give life to the dying man, to set free the oppressed and to give freedom to all.” To a certain extent, Bolívar is the one seeking redemption and liberation from the guilt he is experiencing.

Much more explicit in the Manifesto is Bolívar’s aversion to and apparent fear of federalism and of certain republican traits that he considered to be too advanced for Venezuelan society. As he explains at one point, “our fellow citizens do not have the aptitudes required to fully practice their rights by themselves, because they lack the political virtues that characterize a true republican. Such virtues were not acquired during absolutist governments for these do not recognize the rights and duties of the citizen.” Bolívar’s mistrust of both republicanism and of the capacities of his “fellow citizens” was a recurring concern in his political life and that of other leaders of the independence process. As chapter 5 explains, Bolivar was among those who avidly opposed granting

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381 “Libertar a la Nueva Granada de la suerte de Venezuela, y redimir a ésta de la que padece, son los objetos que me he propuesto en esta Memoria.” (Bolívar, “Manifiesto de Cartagena,” 26)
382 “Corramos a romper las cadenas de aquellas víctimas que gimen en las mazmorras, siempre esperando su salvación de vosotros; no burléis su confianza; no seáis insensibles a los lamentos de vuestros hermanos. Id veloci a vengar al muerto, a dar vida al moribundo, soltura al oprimido y libertad a todos.” (Bolívar, “Manifiesto de Cartagena,” 33.)
383 “… todavía nuestros conciudadanos no se hallan en aptitud de ejercer por sí mismos y ampliamente sus derechos; porque carecen de las virtudes políticas que caracterizan al verdadero republicano: virtudes que no se adquieren en los gobiernos absolutos, en donde se desconocen los derechos y los deberes del ciudadano.” (Bolivar, “Manifiesto de Cartagena,” 29.)
slaves their freedom and who resisted the expansion of rights to people of all social and ethnic groups. Furthermore, towards the late 1820s, Bolivar even sought to put an end to the republican government and to reinstate the monarchical system.\textsuperscript{384} It seems that some of his apprehensions towards republicanism and equality grew from the feelings of guilt and fear he endured in 1812 when he witnessed the collapse of the Venezuelan Confederation. In the end, Bolívar, as many of his contemporaries, came to associate republicanism and independence with a sense of turmoil and instability. The earthquake helped shape these misgivings, pushing Bolivar and many others into viewing social and political transformations in a negative vein.

While exiled republicans reproached their former rulers for the Confederation’s downfall and many in Caracas joined the city’s collective acts of repentance, there were others, particularly in cities and provinces not as affected by the tremor, who gave such feelings of widespread guilt, fear, and reproach other meanings. Valencia and Guayana’s officials, for instance, sought to distance themselves from insurgent cities and aspired to portray themselves in a more favorable light to gain the Crown and God’s indulgences. A few months after the fall of Caracas into royalist hands, Valencia’s Cabildo wrote a letter

to General Monteverde – who by then had been designated Venezuela’s new Captain General – asking him to consider moving the Captaincy’s capital to Valencia. In the dispatch, the councilmen claimed that it was not a coincidence that a loyal city such as Valencia – located about 175 kilometers west of Caracas and 200 kilometers east of Barquisimeto – was spared from God’s wrath while Caracas and other disloyal cities were destroyed by tremor. In the dispatch, the members of the Cabildo accused Caracas’ residents of harboring a rebellious spirit and of continuously sponsoring independence. “Despicable principles have reproduced in their bosoms”, the letter explains, “and these have spread among the city’s youth to such an extent that they cannot assure us that Caracas will not surprise us once again and depose their legitimate authorities.” Or at least this will be the case, the councilmen clarify, “until many years pass by and they regenerate from their libertine customs and ideas.”

The Cabildo’s members maintained that, in addition to Caracas’ incessant insubordination, there were other reasons why Valencia should be designated as the Captaincy’s capital. For one part, Valencia’s loyalty deserved some sort of reward in the same manner that additional admonishments against Caracas – more earthly ones, such as losing the status of capital – were also merited. In the second place, they explained that while Caracas’ port, La Guaira, had been devastated by the quake, Valencia’s port, Puerto Cabello, was left intact, including its castle and fortresses. Moreover, the councilmen

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385 “… y que en su seno ha procreado inmensa juventud, nutridas con principios tan detestables, no puede asegurarnos (sin que transcurran muchos años, que hayan regenerado sus libertinas costumbres e ideas) que no volverá a sorprender y deponer las legítimas autoridades.” (AGI, CARACAS,459, ‘Los miembros del ayuntamiento de Valencia le piden a Monteverde que considere mudar la capital de la capitania general a Valencia. 7 de septiembre de 1812.’, 2.)
foresaw future natural catastrophes happening in Caracas due to the city’s proximity to Mount Ávila.³⁸⁶ The letter ends stating that Valencia’s “innate fidelity, calm, quietness, submission, and its residents’ zeal in favor of the conservation of the King’s sovereignty will maintain this province’s harmony without ever exposing the government to vacillations of any sort.”³⁸⁷ Despite their insistence, the Cabildo’s aspirations were only partially accomplished. Around August of 1812, magistrates from Caracas’ Royal Audiencia began to move, one by one, from Caracas to Valencia. Some weeks later, the Audiencia began to preside from Valencia. Yet, it only remained in the city for close to two years. From 1814 to 1821, the Audiencia settled in Puerto Cabello. Despite the Cabildo’s insistence, Monteverde and other top bureaucrats and army officers continued governing from Caracas as they prepared future expeditions to subjugate rebel provinces.³⁸⁸

In Guayana, about 650 kilometers southeast of Caracas, officials also stressed the fact that the city had not suffered the same fate as Caracas and other rebel cities. On December 1, 1812, the province’s governor, Matías Barrera, issued a *bando* underlining Guayana’s loyalty and peacefulness as opposed to Caracas’ alleged sinful and criminal conduct. Although the governor reproached the insurgents’ behavior, he also pled the city’s residents to feel compassion towards rebels who had survived the earthquake. As the *bando*

³⁸⁶ The councilmen erroneously refer to Mount Ávila, a 2,750-meters high mountain looming over Caracas, as a volcano. This was probably not an act of bad faith on their behalf, many contemporaries also considered it be a volcano that would one day explode and destroy Caracas.
³⁸⁷ “… la innata fidelidad, reposo, quietud, sumicion, y zelo de sus habitantes por la conservacion de la soberania podrán sostener toda la armonia de esta provincia, sin exponer jamas el gobierno a vacilaciones.” (AGI, CARACAS,459, ‘Los miembros del ayuntamiento de Valencia le piden a Monteverde que considere mudar la capital de la capitania general a Valencia. 7 de septiembre de 1812.’, 1-5.)
³⁸⁸ AGI, CARACAS,459, ‘Los miembros del ayuntamiento de Valencia le piden a Monteverde que considere mudar la capital de la capitania general a Valencia. 7 de septiembre de 1812.’, 2.
states, “there is no reason to hate those victims who suffered from God’s admonitions, those who had their towns ruined, even if they caused you any sort of harm.” Furthermore, the governor demanded the city’s residents to abstain from hurting anyone who happened to arrive to Guayana fleeing territories devastated by the earthquake, regardless of their former political ideas and conduct. “Treat them like brothers, I tell you once more,” the governor insists, “for the Almighty has left them for you so you can exercise charity with them. But be wary. Watch their conduct, propositions, words, and seductive songs, and promptly and discretely report them to the judges so they take the appropriate measures.”

In the end, what Barrera’s decree demanded from the city’s residents was “patriotic” and “respectable” conduct that would eventually be rewarded by both God and the Spanish Crown.

Valencia’s Cabildo and Guayana’s governor offer a glimpse into the ways in which royalists residing in regions that were hardly touched by the earthquake tried to gain some sort of benefit from the natural catastrophe at the same time that they reveal other sorts of emotions that emerged in the months following the tremor. Valencia’s councilmen highlighted the city’s loyalty as a way to inspire Monteverde’s confidence and that of other officials, while they also underscored Caracas’ long-established unfaithfulness and turmoil to stir up a sense of fear. Governor Barrera spoke of the compassion that Guayana’s

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389 “Ya comprendeis (no obstante) que no hay motivo de odiar a aquellas victimas que libró la prevencion de mi Dios, de la ruina de los pueblos, si les causó daño alguno… tratados como a hermanos vuelvo a decir pues que el altísimo los ha dejado para que exersais con ellos la caridad pero estad alerta, velad sobre su conducta, su parte, palabra y canciones seductivas y denunciad con presteza y reserva a los magistrados, para que tomen providencias oportunas.” (AGI, CARACAS,437A. ‘Proclama que el gobernador publica como bando en que resalta la fidelidad de los guayaneses. Guayana. 1 de diciembre de 1812’, 2.)

390 AGI, CARACAS,437A. ‘Proclama que el gobernador publica como bando en que resalta la fidelidad de los guayaneses. Guayana. 1 de diciembre de 1812’, 1- 2.
residents should feel towards former insurgents while he also implied that the city’s benevolent conduct could gain them both God and the Crown’s grace. Thus, Valencia and Guayana’s efforts to gain confidence and offer compassion also sought to give a sense of hopefulness. Provincial authorities were trying to offer a sense of assurance and stability to republican refugees and those living in territories recently occupied by royalist troops.

Towards late 1812, the feelings of fear and guilt associated with the earthquake had begun to take on new forms and meanings. In some cases, guilt was transformed into a certain sense of repentance as was the case of many Caraqueños. Among others, feelings of guilt ended up peppered with reproach against former governors and, implicitly, against their own past actions as was Bolívar’s case. In other cases, particularly in regions not as affected by the tremor, hopefulness and compassion may have prevailed as seen in Barrera’s *bando*. In the months to come, as violence intensified, other emotional experiences became widespread. Rage as well as fear of physical violence spread throughout the region. Royalist officials failed to fulfill the armistice established in the Capitulations of San Mateo and began an outright persecution of republicans. Complaints and protests against Monteverde and his officials arose throughout the Americas. Some of them even reached the Iberian Peninsula. In Cádiz, delegates in the juntas discussed allegations claiming Monteverde was not complying with the armistice as well as accusations charging him of defying the Constitution of Cádiz and the liberal principles it represented. Reports claimed that those who had surrendered and capitulated

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391 AGI, CARACAS,459, ‘Concepto del fiscal José Costa y Gali sobre el indulto que se debe dar a los rebeldes de Venezuela. Valencia. 16 de diciembre de 1812.’, 1-7.
were being arbitrarily detained and that some were even tortured and executed.\(^\text{392}\) Yet, brutality did not arise only from the royalist flank. On June 15, 1813, Bolívar issued his infamous decree of “War to Death” proclaiming that all Spanish Europeans, including natives from the Canary Islands, would be killed unless they publicly demonstrated their support for the republic and independence.\(^\text{393}\)

Throughout most of 1813 and 1814, violence reached new levels of cruelty and viciousness. In the beginning of January of 1813, Venezuelan rebels, with the support of New Granadians, began an unceasing advance toward royalist territories. The so-called Admirable Campaign successfully came to an end towards early August 1813 when republican troops conquered Valencia and Caracas. This military campaign led to the formation of the short-lived Second Republic of Venezuela. The Republic lasted from August 1813 to December 1814. Throughout this period, mass executions, decapitations, and other acts of brutality multiplied throughout the region. In September 1813, Bolívar had hundreds of Spaniards and Islanders rounded up and detained in La Guaira. Witnesses claimed that at least five hundred Europeans were beheaded and that those prisoners who were not executed died from suffocation caused by the thick smoke from the burning bodies. Royalist General José Tomás Boves undertook his own retaliation. In July 1814, after conquering Valencia, Boves invited the city’s patricians to a formal dinner and ball.

\(^{392}\) AGI, CARACAS,437A, ‘Representación al presidente de las Corte de Cádiz escrito por Miranda desde la prisión. Puerto Rico. 30 de junio de 1813.’, 1-5.

At some point during the evening, he had the wives of republicans stand up and dance while their husbands were escorted outside and shot. Apparently, Boves repeated similar acts in other sites. Boves was also charged of having human heads paraded through city streets. Apparently, republicans did the same on more than one occasion. Cruelty also spread throughout the battlefields. Rape and theft proliferated as invading armies conquered rival territories. Soldiers from both sides began to collect the ears of dead and gravely wounded enemies. In an inquiry into Boves’ abuses, royalist soldier Esteban Guevara claimed that, after a battle with rebel troops, soldiers received “the order to leave no one with ears.” As Guevera explained, “amidst the heat of victory and the joy we were feeling, we left no one alive… we put their heads down and cut many ears.” Another witness summoned to the interrogatories, María de Jesús, a Spaniard woman living in Cumaná, explained that she heard stories that royalist official Antonio Suazola would “cut the ears [of rebel soldiers] with an old razor, and would then sit them in a bench and would laugh at them telling them ‘you look so pretty now’, and then others would come and would cut their heads [of the rebel soldiers].”

395 AGI, CARACAS,459, ‘Oficio de Level de Goda al secretario de Estado contándole sobre el teatro de sangre que se está viviendo en Venezuela. Puerto Rico. 2 de febrero de 1814.’, 1-3; AGI, CARACAS,459, ‘Oficio de José Francisco Heredia al Secretario de Estado contándole sobre la violencia que se está viviendo en Venezuela y los problemas de la justicia. Valencia. 18 de diciembre de 1812.’, 1-3.
396 “dio orden… para que no le dejara a nadie con orejas… calientes con la victoria y con la alegria que tenían, no dejaron viviente… y les hecharon abajo la cabeza y cortaron muchas orejas…” (AGI, CARACAS,437A, ‘No. 3. Interrogatorio que hace Andrés Level, jefe político de la provincia de Cumaná, a soldados. Cumaná. 8 de mayo de 1813.’, 1-2.)
397 “cortando las orejas con un pedazo de navaja vieja, y después los sentaba en un banquillo y les hacía burla diciendo ‘que bonitos estas ahora’ y después venían otros y les cortaban las cabezas;” (AGI, CARACAS,437A, ‘No. 4. Declaración de María de Jesús, española de Cumaná, sobre la orden de cortar la oreja a los rebeldes. Cumaná. 28 de julio de 1813, 1-2.)
Karen Racine argues that the armies fighting over the control of Venezuela used symbolic forms of corporeal humiliation to gain military advantages and “also to define who belonged to the national body and to eliminate those who did not.” For her part, Véronique Hébrard explains that Bolívar and Monteverde’s rhetoric exacerbated existing divisions and vindicated the extermination of the rival faction. To a certain extent, such symbolic and physical violence was an extension of the different interpretations and disagreements that arose in previous years when each side accused the other of being immoral, unpatriotic, and of not being on God’s side.

In the end, the earthquake would not be easily forgotten. The physical devastation it caused continued to be visible to people’s eyes for decades at the same time that the different understandings, emotional experiences, and frictions that arose from the quake persisted during the years to come. Ultimately, the tremor’s memory and the interpretative and emotional divisions that emerged from it ended up justifying and even encouraging extreme violence at the same time that they helped perpetuate prevailing notions of reality and understandings of the world.

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400 Pablo Rodríguez explains that a French traveler who visited Caracas in the 1820s found ruins and even bones belonging to victims of the earthquake in the city’s streets. Stuart McCook, for his part, refers to the testimony of Sir Robert Ker Porter, a British diplomat who visited the city in the 1850s. Porter claims that ruined churches, monasteries, and houses were still part of the city’s landscape when he reached Caracas. According to McCook, the physical traces of the earthquake were not completely erased until the 1870s and 1880s following President Antonio Guzmán Blanco’s urban renewal program. (Rodríguez, “Miedo, religiosidad y política: a propósito del terremoto de 1812,” 240; McCook, “Nature, God, and Nation in Revolutionary Venezuela,” 63.) (Also see: Cochrane, Charles Stuart. Journal of a Residence and Travels in Colombia during the Years 1823 and 1824 (London: Printed for Henry Colburn, 1825); Alexander Walker, Colombia: Being a Geographical, Statistical, Agricultural, Commercial, and Political Account of that Country (London: Baldwin, Cradock, and Joy, 1822)).
Puracé and Popayán: convergence between the natural and the divine

The different understandings and emotional experiences that followed the Maundy Thursday earthquake offer a glimpse into the ways emotional communities are shaped, how they interact with one another, and how they evolve in time. Such analysis is possible thanks to the existence of numerous historical sources alluding to the tremor, particularly to its reverberations in Caracas and Valencia. Other cases of seismic activity that took place during these troubled times are not as well documented. This is probably so because the destruction they caused as well as their magnitude were nowhere close to that of the earthquake that shook northern Venezuela in 1812. However, a few documents referring to Puracé Volcano’s activity in 1817 offer additional insights into some of the emotional experiences that surface among different social groups when tremors and deep political tensions coincide in time and place.

Popayán – located about 550 kilometers from Santafé and one of the most important cities in southwest New Granada – was frequently shaken by the Puracé in the early nineteenth century. Contrary to Caracas and Valencia’s case in 1812, at the time of the tremors, Popayán was under the control of royalist troops. In Popayán’s case, feelings of religious fear and guilt intertwined with naturalist understandings of volcanic activity. Interestingly enough, both interpretations were seen as complementary rather than conflicting notions. From this combination emerged a certain sense of assurance that deemed that, despite the city’s alleged previous sins, God’s mercy and their knowledge of nature would keep them out of harm’s way. Such eclectic understanding of the volcano’s activity, and the emotional experiences it produced, arose in a milieu in which political and social tensions were not as manifest as in the Venezuelan case. These frictions were not
completely absent. They were merely concealed under a prevalent sense of fear and repression as well as beneath the avid royalism of many of Popayán’s inhabitants.

Soon after the formation of government juntas throughout New Granada, Popayán became a battleground territory. Between 1811 and 1816, the city constantly fell into the hands of belligerent armies. All through 1810, Popayán, contrary to what happened with many provinces throughout the region, maintained its allegiance to the Consejo de Regencia. In January 1810, the Consejo had replaced the Junta Central Suprema as Spain’s governing body in the absence of Ferdinand VII who was held captive by Napoleon. Popayán was first occupied in 1811 when rebel troops from the ‘Ciudades Confederadas del Valle del Cauca’, a coalition that was loyal to Ferdinand VII but rejected the Consejo’s authority, invaded the city. In August 1812, troops backing the Regencia’s authority conquered the city only to lose it once again in October. A few weeks later, in November, loyalist armies retook Popayán once again but lost its control in December. On July 1, 1813, royalist Juan Samano reconquered Popayán. About six months later, on January 16, 1814, Cundimarca’s republican troops invaded the city. Popayán would fall back to royalist hands in December 1814 and then back to republican control in July 1815. Samano retook the city once again on May 13, 1816.⁴⁰¹ Amidst such political instability, most of Popayán’s Indians, slaves, and free blacks ended up joining the royalist side.⁴⁰² Similar to what

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happened throughout the region in 1815 and 1816 during the monarchical restoration, many republicans were detained, expelled, and, in some cases, executed. Yet, the violence inflicted by Samano’s troops were but the continuation of a bloodshed that had begun in previous years.

It seems that in 1817 many of Popayán’s residents viewed Puracé’s activity and the tremors it produced both as a natural phenomenon as well as the product of God’s wrath. On September 8, 1817, Matías Cajíaó, the city’s sindico procurador, issued a letter urging the Cabildo to take actions to calm people’s grave concerns after the “terrible explosion and the movement of earth that was felt yesterday during the early hours of the night.” In his dispatch, Cajíaó invited the Cabildo to declare a day of public prayers and processions so that the city’s “faithful could raise their pleas to the Father of Compassion”, hoping that he would take pity on such an afflicted city. The procurador also advised the Cabildo to organize a committee that would “travel to the town of Puracé, climb to the paramo with the town’s Indians, and thoroughly clean its mouths in order to vent this volcano that is so close to us.”

Cajíaó – and apparently others in Popayán – believed that if the volcano’s...
crevices and cracks contiguous to the Puracé’s crater were kept clear and unclogged it would properly vent its fume and lava and, thus, would not erupt as often nor would it explode with excessive intensity.\footnote{Thus far, I have not been able to determine if this was a shared belief as well as a common practice that was carried out with the hope of taming volcanic activity. Alexander von Humboldt and Francisco José de Caldas both wrote about volcanoes and mountains in the Andes, particularly about their altitude, air pressure, and vegetation. However, I have not found their thoughts and hypotheses regarding the internal workings of volcanoes or about ways to control their eruptions.}

Popayán’s Cabildo agreed with the procurador’s proposal. That same day, the Cabildo decreed a day of public prayers and pleas. In its edict, the Cabildo explained that there is no “Christian or religious means as powerful and worthy as that of running to the temple to prostrate ourselves and ask with all our hearts to the All Mighty so that he appease his anger and look upon us with benevolence and compassion, even in these times of extensive calamities so as to soothe the divine justice, which has manifested itself irascibly through such horrible tremor.”\footnote{“… el recurso mas poderoso y digno del christianismo y religion, correr al templo a prosternarnos y pedir de corazon al todo-poderoso mitigue su colera y nos mire con ojos de benignidad y clemencia aun en medio de las calamidades comunes para aplacar la justicia divina que justamente se ha manifestado irritada con el espantosos extremecimiento de tierra…” (CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, folio 69, ‘Rogativos y procesiones para calmar la ira de Dios. Popayán. 18 de septiembre de 1817.’)} Hence, the city council called for public prayers and communal acts of repentance to be carried out on September 20th. Likewise, it requested city convents to celebrate their own acts of supplication and to then lead public processions throughout Popayán’s main streets and squares. The archbishop, for his part, was to perform similar acts on the 21st. Additionally, the city council commissioned two alcaldes de barrio to travel immediately to Puracé, find assistance among the local Indians, and clear the volcano’s “mouths” so that it could breathe appropriately. One of the alcaldes appointed to this duty asked to be spared from this responsibility claiming that he was tan inmediato a nosotros.” (CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, folio 69, ‘Rogativos y procesiones para calmar la ira de Dios. Popayán. 18 de septiembre de 1817.’)
already in charge of collecting donations for the victims of the tremor and that he himself was occupied repairing the cracks the eruption caused on his house. The second alcalde accepted the commission and asked for beasts of burden and a travel allowance for him to begin his way up to the town of Puracé.408

A year later, the Cabildo saw itself discussing a similar issue. The Puracé and its crevices come up in the minutes of the September 17, 1818 session. On the 17th, the city council was mostly busy examining requests to attest the loyalty and good conduct of several Payaneses. These individuals sought some sort of official document confirming that during the past revolution they had not supported the rebels nor endorsed republicanism. Amidst such requests and other administrative issues, a plea from the procurador and regidor asking for the maintenance of the mouths of the Puracé comes up. As the officials explain, “it is an urgent need to clean the mouths of the paramo of Purace, for they are clogged with the sulfur the volcano sprouts. A whole county will be exposed to an unexpected ruin, and above all, the inhabitants of the town of Puracé.”409 The Cabildo backed the request and immediately sent out orders to clear the volcano’s crevices.

Whereas in Venezuela there seemed to be a rather manifest division between those who believed the 1812 earthquake was nothing less than divine punishment and those who considered it to be a natural phenomenon with no relation whatsoever to God’s will, in

408 CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, folio 69, ‘Rogativos y procesiones para calmar la ira de Dios. Popayán. 18 de septiembre de 1817.’; CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, folio 52, ‘Rogativas por el temblor. Popayán. 18 de septiembre de 1817.’
409 “… la limpieza de las bocas del Páramo de Puracé es de urgente necesidad porque nada menos que si se hallan obstruidas con el azufre que brota, se expondrá toda esta comarca a sufrir una ruina improvisa, y con más razón los habitantes del pueblo de Puracé.” (CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 59, folio 43, ‘Sobre certificados de buena conducta y limpieza de las bocas del páramo. Popayán. 24 de septiembre de 1818.’)
Popayán such a split was not as evident. It seems that many in Popayán believed the Puracé’s eruptions had come about both as a divine punishment for the city’s past support for independence and republicanism as well as a consequence of the volcano’s congested and clogged crevices. That is to say, such religious and naturalist understandings were seen as complementary rather than opposing interpretations.

Venezuela and Popayán’s different grasps of seismic activity are partly explained by the political context in which the tremors took place. On April 26, 1812, most of Venezuela was governed by republicans who had recently declared independence from Spain. When the tremor took place, not even a year had passed by since the provinces’ declaration of independence. Following the earthquake, many royalists, such as Coll y Prat, continued inhabiting republican cities and towns where they persisted in their defense of the Spanish Monarchy through rumors, pamphlets, and sermons. Frictions were exacerbated even further as disagreements inside the republican faction became rife. In such a context of widespread political antagonism, notions of the natural world also ended up diverging. Popayán’s political context in 1817 and 1818 was somewhat different from that seen in Caracas and Valencia in 1812. In most of New Granada, the monarchical restoration was swift and merciless. Several former leaders of the republic were detained and executed. Many others fled to the Llanos or the Caribbean. Countless of them sought to be pardoned by either denying any involvement in the juntas and the republican governments or by claiming they had been forced to support the republic but that deep in their hearts they had never fully endorsed the rebels’ political undertakings.410 Thus, by

410 A revealing case is that of José Manuel Restrepo, who enthusiastically supported republicanism and independence in the early 1810s and even official posts during the first republican governments. During the
1817, within Popayán one could hardly find voices openly criticizing the Spanish Crown or royal authorities. Perhaps some did not speak up out of fear of repression while others were possibly convinced that the monarchical system provided the stability and order they sought for. Although Popayán’s political tensions had not disappeared, it seems they had been buried and put out of sight. Such a context of relative political uniformity, even if superficial, created the conditions in which natural and religious interpretation of seismic activity could more easily converge.

Such dissimilar grasps of the political context and the natural world also brought about different emotional experiences. As seen earlier, in Venezuela some experienced religious fear and guilt while others sensed earthlier feelings of fright and remorse. Some understood these emotions in relatively individual terms whereas for others a certain communal consciousness gave meaning to such feelings. The limited number of documents referring to Puracé’s activity and the emotions it produced in Popayán does not allow us to classify and trace emotional communities in the same manner as I have attempted to do for the Venezuelan case. Yet, this handful of historical sources reveals that in Popayán fear of divine punishment circulated along with feelings of guilt for having endorsed republicanism and, thus, having inflamed God’s wrath. That is to say, a communal sense of remorse similar to that seen among some Caraqueños seems to have prevailed among

monarchical restoration, Restrepo took advantage of his family’s wealth and social contacts to avoid being sent to prison. During the following years, Restrepo concealed his past political views and tried to keep a low profile. In the 1820s, Restrepo wrote the first texts on the history of the Colombian Independence. His somewhat traumatic experience towards 1815 might help explain some of the conservative views that come up in his texts as well as his avid defense of Simón Bolivar. (Daniel Gutiérrez Ardila, “El arrepentimiento de un revolucionario: José Manuel Restrepo en tiempos de la Reconquista (1816-1819)”, Anuario Colombiano de Historia Social y de la Cultura 40, no. 2, (2013): 49-76. For more information on the monarchical restoration in New Granada, see: Gutiérrez Ardila, La restauración en la Nueva Granada (1815-1819), pp. 37-104.)
many Payaneses. However, other forms of guilt that surfaced in Venezuela apparently did not come about in Popayán. Guilt peppered with reproach became widespread among many Venezuelan republicans who considered that their incapacity to govern and to put down their rivalries had hastened the republic’s downfall. It seems such a form of guilt was not produced in Popayán. If it did arise, it is not present in the sources. Its absence is possibly due to the fact that many republicans fled the city and those who stayed would not have publicly expressed any sort of disapproval concerning the republic’s breakdown.

Both in Popayán and Venezuela a sense of hope arose in the months following the Puracé eruptions and the Maundy Thursday earthquake. Nonetheless, while in Venezuela conflicting factions experienced a sense of confidence for being on God’s side, in Popayán such assurance was complemented by the belief that their naturalist knowledge would also protect them from the Puracé’s ire. The experience of hope that spread through Popayán is one of assurance that they could eventually tame the volcano’s activity through God’s mediation as well as with their efforts to maintain its crevices clear and unclogged.

The absence of perceptible political tensions in Popayán’s case partly explains why emotional communities and the gaps between them are not as visible when compared to the Venezuelan case. Together, these two cases demonstrated that political frictions tend to widen and accentuate the differences between one community and another. When such tensions are not as manifest, disparities between emotional communities tend to decrease and distinct communities tend to blend with one another.

Conclusions

During the first decades of the nineteenth century, social and political strife coincided with intense seismic and volcanic activity. The 1812 earthquake and the Puracé’s
eruptions were but two episodes among many others. As a matter of fact, two of the most explosive volcanic eruptions of the last two centuries took place during these years. One of them came about during the last days of 1808, just a few months after Napoleon’s invasion of the Iberian Peninsula. The exact location and date of this eruption is unknown, but it apparently took place somewhere in the tropics, possibly in the southwest Pacific Ocean, around late November and early December of 1808. Scholars refer to this volcanic explosion as the ‘unidentified eruption of 1808.’ The other eruption came about on April 1815 when Mount Tambora in Indonesia exploded. In fact, this eruption is considered to be the largest one to have happened in the last millennium. Such was the magnitude of these two volcanic explosions that temperature decreased throughout the whole globe. Recent studies have shown that the 1810s were the coldest decade the Earth has faced in the last five hundred years. The decline in global temperature was particularly manifest after the eruption of Mount Tambora.\textsuperscript{411} Following the 1815 volcanic explosion, global temperature dropped between 1 and 2.5° C. In some places, this descent was close to 10° C.\textsuperscript{412} It is due to such circumstances that 1816 has been labeled ‘the year without summer.’ This situation was particularly palpable in large parts of Europe and North America.\textsuperscript{413}

Two of the most recognized Spanish American scientists at the time, Francisco José de Caldas in Santafé and José Hipólito Unanue in Lima, wrote about the anormal opacity of the sun and other odd meteorological happenings that took place between late 1808 and


early 1809 as a result of the ‘unknown eruption of 1808.’ Naturally, people at the time were unaware that an unidentified eruption was behind these phenomena. Unaune reported having seen vivid afterglows at sunset during the last weeks of 1808 and first ones of 1809. Caldas described his observations in an article written in the Semanario del Nuevo Reino de Granada in February 1809. The piece explains that a thin cloud obscured the sun in Santafé as well as in other New Granadian cities such as Neiva, Pasto, Popayán, Santa Marta, and Tunja. As Caldas explains, “as of 11 December of last year, the disk of the sun has appeared devoid of irradiance, its light lacking that strength which makes it impossible to easily observe without pain. Its natural fiery color has changed to that of silver, so much so that many have mistaken it for the moon.” Caldas highlighted that this unusual phenomenon was particularly manifest at sunrise and sunset. According to his report, when the sun is at “its zenith, it shines more brightly and cannot be looked at with the naked eye. Near the horizon, it has been seen to take on a light rosy hue, [or] a very pale green, or a bluey-grey close to that of steel.” This thin cloud even disturbed Santafé’s temperature. Caldas writes that, “we have experienced very cold mornings, far colder than should be the case in this city, given its altitude and geographic location. Many mornings the fields have

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414 The Semanario was founded in 1808 by Francisco José de Caldas and several of Santafé’s patricians. The periodical was edited by Caldas and was published almost on a weekly basis. The Semanario promoted and sought to distribute practical knowledge that could make New Granadian society more “useful” and “productive.” It dealt with topics relating to geography, demography, natural history, and climate. (Mauricio Nieto Olarte, Orden Natural y Orden Social: ciencia y política en el Semanario del Nuevo Reino de Granada (Madrid: Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia – Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2007); Mauricio Nieto Olarte, Diana Ojeda, and Paola Castaño, “Ilustración y orden social: el problema de la población en el Semanario del Nuevo Reyno de Granada (1808-1810)”, Revista de Indias 65, no. 235 (2005): 683-708.)
been covered in ice, and we have all seen trees and other particularly sensitive crops damaged by the frost.”

In the *Semanario*, Caldas explained that many in Santafé believed this strange phenomenon to be an omen of countless tragedies that were soon to come. Many city residents approached him and anxiously consulted him about the matter. Caldas had to reassure many, telling them that there was no reason to fear because this natural happening conformed to the basic principles of physics. He explained that they should not be alarmed by the effects of this atmospheric phenomenon for it was simply the result of vapors that would sooner than later disappear without leaving any disastrous consequence. In the end, Caldas concludes that, “when we are as enlightened about other phenomena as we are about eclipses, then we will look on the opacity of the sun and the loss of its rays as calmly as we do a rainbow after a storm.”

In the small town of El Trapiche, about 100 kilometers southwest of Popayán, clergyman Domingo Belisario Gómez also noted that the sun’s glow had changed and

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415 This translation was taken from Guevara et al. Caldas’ original text is also transcribed in this article. The original text in Spanish is the following: “Desde el día 11 de Diciembre del año último se comenzó a observar el disco del sol desnudo de irradiación y de aquella fuerza de luz que impide mirarlo con tranquilidad y sin dolor. El color de fuego que le es natural se ha cambiado en el de plata, hasta el punto de equivocarlo muchos con la luna. Este fenómeno es muy notable al nacer, y principalmente al ponerse este astro. Cuando corre la mitad del cielo, su luz es más viva y no permite mirársele a ojo desnudo. En las cercanías del horizonte se le ha visto teñido de un color de rosa muy ligero, de un verde muy claro o de un azulado gris que se acerca al del acero. Se ha sentido generalmente por las mañanas un frío pungente y muy superior al que exigen la altura y posición geográfica de esta capital. Muchos días ha amanecido el campo cubierto de hielo, y todos hemos visto quemados los árboles y demás vegetales que por su organización son demasiado sensibles a este meteoro.” (Guevara-Murua et al. “Observations of a stratospheric aerosol veil from a tropical volcanic eruption in December 1808,” 1716-1717.)

416 This translation was also taken from Guevara et al. The original text in Spanish is the following: “Cuando estemos tan ilustrados sobre los demás fenómenos como lo estamos sobre los eclipses, entonces miraremos las opacidades del sol y la pérdida de sus rayos con la misma tranquilidad que vemos el iris después de una tormenta.” (Guevara-Murua et al. “Observations of a stratospheric aerosol veil from a tropical volcanic eruption in December 1808,” 1716-1718.)
turned more opaque. In a letter written on February 28, 1809, Gómez discussed a hypothesis posed by his interlocutor and friend, Santiago Pérez de Valencia, an alcalde ordinario in Popayán. Pérez believed the sun’s opacity was caused by vapors set off by the winter. It is not clear if Gómez and Pérez were referring to the Northern Hemisphere’s winter or to the rainy season in present-day southern Colombia. In any case, Gómez’s answer is one of disbelief. As Gómez argues, “during other winters, even stronger than the current one, when the sun found itself in the tropics as it is right now, the same incident should have had happened. But I am speaking without knowing much about this matter.”

Almost twenty years later, Gómez would present a series of observations that could have helped him explain the sun’s opacity in 1808 and 1809. During the last months of 1827 and 1828, Popayán, El Trapiche, and their surroundings were shaken by a series of tremors. Apparently, these were caused by the Puracé’s activity as well as that of other volcanoes. Gómez’s letters mention explosions that were heard south of El Trapiche, in direction of Putumayo. It is possible that the clergyman is referring to the Doña Vieja Volcano, located about 55 kilometers south of El Trapiche. Gómez noted in his letters that on the nights of 22nd and 27th of November, he observed strange figures and colors when looking at the moon. On the 22nd, the clergyman claimed to have seen a second, scorched-yellow semicircle at the feet of the waxing moon during close to five minutes. Gómez’s impression was that there was a second, smaller moon beneath the moon. The two

417 “…en otros mas inviernos, acaso mayores que el actual y cuando el sol hubiera estado en el trópico como ahora, habría avido igual suceso. Pero ya sabe V. que yo hablo sin conocimiento de la materia.” (Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), Sección Colecciones, Fondo Canónico Domingo Belisario Gómez, folios 12-13, ‘Carta a Santiago Pérez de Valencia sobre asuntos de negocios, temas eclesiásticos y opacidad del sol. El Trapiche. 28 de febrero de 1809, 2-3.)
semicircles later joined, but there was still a clear demarcation between them, as if the moon were cut in two. Gómez states that on the 27th the moon turned red and orange for a matter of a few minutes. It seemed as if were on fire, the clergyman maintained. At the same time, red, curved lines appeared in the sun’s center. Gómez believed these anomalies were brought about by some sort of alteration in the light. Although the clergyman did not pose a connection between the tremors and the moon’s abnormalities, it is highly possible that, similar to what happened in late 1808 and early 1809, recent volcanic activity produced a disturbance in the atmosphere that eventually created the moon’s odd shapes and colors.

In early nineteenth-century Venezuela and New Granada, natural phenomena, such as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and atmospheric disruptions, brought about awe, fear, guilt, pain, grief, and even a sense of hope and confidence. Yet, in the face of natural catastrophes as well as social and political conflicts, not everyone experienced the same emotions, nor did they live through them in the same manner. Nonetheless, despite this diversity of emotional experiences, fear and guilt became prevalent throughout Venezuela and New Granada. These were experienced with such intensity that they ended up shaping people’s understandings and meanings of the world they were living in, enabling the collapse of republican governments throughout the region.

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419 AGN, Sección Colecciones, Fondo Canónico Domingo Belisario Gómez, folio 134, ‘Carta a Santiago Arroyo sobre noticias de una sublevación en Popayán, temblores y color de la luna. El Trapiche. 16 de enero de 1828.’, 1.
Chapter 3: Quito. June 27, 1815: Emotions and Memory.

On June 27, 1815, Francisco Cruz left his house around two in the afternoon and began walking down Quito’s streets. Shortly after he crossed the threshold, Cruz, a secretary to Quito’s President, felt a certain uneasiness in the atmosphere. Although it was still relatively early, he saw several street vendors picking up their goods and shopkeepers abruptly closing their stores. During the short walk from his residence to a shop where he had to run an errand, Cruz heard people murmuring that disorders were soon going to take place. Cruz finished his business and started on his way to his office in the Presidential Palace. It was only a few seconds after he was back on the street that Cruz heard a deafening uproar. Dozens of people began running up and down the street. Cruz was shocked. Panic had taken over the city. He rushed into the Presidential Palace and stood by a window looking towards the main square. From it, he saw Indian women warning one another as they picked up the potatoes and fruits they had been selling during the morning. As the Indian women disappeared from his sight, he saw people clumsily running out the cabildo (city council) as well as out the shops surrounding the square. It seemed as if some serious incident had taken place inside.420

When the church bells rang at three in the afternoon, confusion grew even further. People ran out of the main square, some towards Quito’s hills, others simply hid behind the square’s corners where they could take a glimpse at what was happening around. In the middle of the commotion, the army’s call to arms was rallied. When the troops marched

420 Archivo General de Indias (AGI), QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815’, 16-17.
into the main square, Cruz saw that many of those who had been running around in despair stayed completely still. The troops remained in the square for about half an hour. Gradually, people began to disperse. Cruz claims that during the following hours, absolute silence and tranquility took over Quito. When he walked back home around 11:30 pm, Quito’s streets were empty and quiet.\textsuperscript{421}

Although Francisco Cruz was stunned by what happened, he cannot claim that this disturbance took him by surprise. During the days leading to June 27, people in Quito had been expecting either an insurrection or widespread ransacking to break out at any moment. Cruz had been warned by acquaintances of imminent disorders in the city. However, when questioned about these rumors, he explained that he had not paid much attention to them because he considered them to be “vague voices.”\textsuperscript{422} Cruz, as most of Quito’s inhabitants, heard news of the forthcoming revolt by means of the “common voice.”\textsuperscript{423} That is, through everyday conversations, murmurs, and oral exchanges. For many Quiteños, it was not only what was being said that made them fear an impending upheaval, it was also what they saw that concerned them. Certain gestures, meetings among the city’s notables\textsuperscript{424}, people lowering their voices when others approached them, and outsiders coming into the city reinforced the feeling that looting or a revolt were going to break out any day. Many Quiteños ended up viewing basically any broadside, news, gesture, and unusual behavior

\textsuperscript{421} AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815’, 16-17.
\textsuperscript{422} “…pero que el declarante no hiso caso de semejantes exprecciones por parecerle que eran voses vagas.” (AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815’, 16.)
\textsuperscript{423} “… se anunciaba generalmente por vos común.” (AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815’, 17.)
\textsuperscript{424} The term notable was used at the time to refer to the city’s most important and honorable patricians.
as a prelude to mayhem. When the city woke up on the 27th, Quito was immersed in an atmosphere of widespread and collective unrest and panic.

Despite the emotional explosion that broke out on the 27th, nothing particularly important happened that day. As Cruz’s testimony explains, some minutes after the disorders began, peace and silence took over Quito’s streets and squares. When the army division stationed in El Panecillo, a hill located in the southside of the city, marched into the main square, not a single shot was fired. In the meantime, most of the city’s inhabitants ran up the hills or hid in their homes and shops waiting for things to calm down. While the army surveilled the streets, it detained two of Quito’s notables, Manuel Larrea y Jijón and clergyman Don Francisco Rodríguez Soto. By sunset, the streets were, once again, calm and quiet. During the night and early hours of the following morning, army officials imprisoned a few other individuals, including a couple of notables.

The inquiries into the disturbances that broke out on June 27, 1815 began shortly after the crowd had dissolved. That same afternoon, Toribio Montes, President of Quito’s Royal Audiencia, summoned an investigation to find those responsible for the commotion that had just taken place. The President put León Pereda de Saravia, the Asesor General, in charge of the investigation.425 Several days later, after interrogating dozens of Quito’s residents, Pereda reached the conclusion that what had taken place on the 27th had been a

425 The asesor general acted as a judge in trials that the Audiencia’s magistrates could not lead, either because they were overwhelmed with other trials, conflicts of interest arose during the process, or due to other extraordinary reasons. Since the mid-eighteenth century, viceroy and presidents of Audiencias stopped having a say in the nomination of asesores and these were usually designated by the Council of the Indies. León Pereda de Saravia, who was born in Buenos Aires, held several positions in the Audiencia of Buenos Aires during the early 1800s. From 1810 to 1812, Pereda de Saravia served as magistrate to the Audiencia of Guatemala. (José M. Mariluz Urquijo, “El asesor letrado del Virreinato del Río de la Plata”, Revista de Historia del Derecho 3 (1978): 188-192, 224-226.)
failed uprising. Nonetheless, he explained that there was not enough evidence to point out who had led the insurrectionary plot nor what had actually sparked the disorders. Despite this, as a precautionary measure, Pereda sentenced several of Quito’s notables to prison and others to exile. Montes approved Pereda’s verdict and stamped his signature on the Asesor’s ruling.426

However, about four months later, President Montes submitted a letter to the magistrates of Quito’s Audiencia, who, at the moment, were stationed in Cuenca,427 denouncing that the judicial process had been seriously flawed and that he had only endorsed it to prevent a tragedy. Montes accused Pereda and army officials of altering testimonies and of pressuring witnesses to make false claims. Moreover, he charged several army officers of insubordination and of unlawfully detaining Quito’s most loyal and respectable notables. To prove his claims, Montes ordered new interrogations. A first series of inquiries were carried out during November 1815. A second set took place during the first months of 1816. Some of the new testimonies claimed that they had not really seen signs of an uprising. Rather, they explained that the rumors that had been circulating were about a group of soldiers planning to ransack the city’s stores and homes. During the new interrogations, some stated that on the 27th army officers defied the President’s authority. Others claimed that during the first interrogation the inquirers had altered certain details of

426 AGI, QUITO.269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815’, 49-51.
427 After the formation of the State of Quito in December 1811, Quito’s Audiencia moved to Cuenca. When Toribio Montes retook control of Quito in November 1812, one of his tasks was to reestablish the Royal Audiencia in Quito. In order to avoid frictions between Quito’s notables and the Audiencia’s magistrates, Montes continually delayed its establishment in Quito. He ordered the magistrates of the tribunal, the Audiencia’s main body, to stay in Cuenca and only allowed a few advisors, judges (such as the asesor), and other mid-level public servants to move to Quito. The rest of the members of the Audiencia did not move back to Quito until mid-1816. (Claudio Mena Villamar, El Quito rebelde: historia de Quito de 1809 a 1812 (Quito: Ediciones Abya-Yala, 1997), 198.)
their accounts to give the impression that a failed uprising had in fact taken place on the 27th.\textsuperscript{428} Accusations of wrongdoing, disloyalty, and insubordination sprung from all sides. The Council of the Indies, annoyed with the situation, urged Quito’s President to reach a definite and unequivocal ruling. Finally, in November 1817, Juan de Ramírez, Quito’s new President, put an end to the inquiries citing a royal decree of January 24, 1817 which declared general pardon for the crime of insurrection in all of the Spanish territories. Nonetheless, in his closing remarks, Ramírez argued that it was clear that on the 27\textsuperscript{th} an unsuccessful insurrection had taken place and that some army officials, in an act of insubordination, had defied the President’s authority.\textsuperscript{429}

The confusion and widespread panic that took over Quito on June 27, 1815 are thus obscured even further by these seemingly conflicting and ambiguous testimonies. Even though such contradictory accounts might prevent us from getting to the root of what actually happened on the 27\textsuperscript{th}, they offer a glimpse into the emotions that were flowing among Quito’s residents, into people’s memories, and into what they considered to be plausible under the circumstances they were living in. These testimonies make manifest the atmosphere of mistrust and fear that propagated throughout Quito, the existence of underlying tensions among royalist factions, and the fact that the threat of a rebel uprising or generalized ransacking were impending prospects for many of the city’s inhabitants.

\textsuperscript{428} AGI, QUITO,269. ‘Quaderno Tercero sobre lo ocurrido el 27 de junio último. Noviembre 1815’; AGI, QUITO,275. ‘El Presidente y Comandante General de Quito da cuenta de lo obrado en su provincia de lo ocurrido el 27 de junio último. Marzo 1816’.

\textsuperscript{429} AGI, QUITO,275, ‘El Presidente de Quito: Ynforma con documentos de los poderosos motivos que le han asistido para suspender la formación de la causa’, 3-4.
In this chapter, I pose two arguments. First, I argue that there is a symbiotic relation between collective memory and emotions. The disorders that broke out on June 27th can only be understood if one considers that previous episodes of violence and repression left a stamp on the collective memory of Quiteños. Remembrances of the past shaped people’s emotions at the same time that fear and confusion gave form to their understandings of the past. In that sense, emotions informed people’s conceptions of the times they were living in. This argument implies that emotions such as fear, confusion, anger, and panic spread and reproduced not only through rumors, but also through memories of past events. Thus, when the panic attack broke out on June 27th, it was in part the result of the circulation, multiplication, and intensification of both emotions and remembrances of the past.

In the second place, I claim that this episode highlights the persistence of animosity and mistrust among Quito’s competing royalist factions. Despite being considered by traditional scholars as a hotbed of the independence movement in the Spanish America, and in spite of being accused by royalist authorities – such as the Asesor Pereda de Saravia – of being an epicenter of revolution, this incident shows the prevalence of royalism among most of the city’s inhabitants. Nonetheless, the events of the 27th reveal the growing tensions and fractures among royalist factions. Resentment and suspicion within royalist ranks were prevalent, particularly between one faction composed mostly of Quiteños and another made up mainly of outsiders hailing from the Iberian Peninsula, Guayaquil, Lima, and other parts of the Americas. In the years to come, such divisions between these two

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430 Throughout the chapter, I use Maurice Halbwachs’ conception of collective memory. That is, as a common domain composed of shared remembrances of past events, atmospheres, experiences, and codes. (Maurice Halbwachs, *La memoria colectiva* (Zaragoza: Prensas Universitarias de Zaragoza, 2004 (©1950)), 48.)
factions would enable independence leaders to gain support for their cause. Yet, as studied more closely in the fifth chapter, independence did not necessarily bring an end to royalist feelings and archetypes in northern South America.

Perhaps because of its apparent historical irrelevance, most scholars who have studied Quito during the independence process have ignored the commotion of June 27, 1815. I have only found two references to this incident in published texts. In La Revolución de Quito del 10 de Agosto de 1809, José Gabriel Navarro, a twentieth-century Ecuadorian diplomat and intellectual, explains that the events of the 27th were a spiteful intrigue led by General Brigadier Juan Samano and Colonel Juan Manuel Fromista, both royalists, to challenge Montes’ authority, also a royalist. Navarro explains that Samano was bitter with Montes for having ordered the Brigadier to return to Quito after Samano’s defeats in Palacé and Calibío in late 1813 and early 1814. Moreover, Navarro argues that Samano resented being in trial for misconduct during the military campaign in Popayán while at the same time Montes had pardoned the Quiteño notables involved in the Juntas of 1809 and 1810. Navarro concludes that Samano and Fromista’s plot was but a “weave of lies” that proved their vicious and treacherous ways.431

The commotion of the 27th also comes up in Pedro Pérez Muñoz’s Compendio de la rebelión de la América, a collection of thirty-five letters in which Pérez offers his account of some of the main events that took place in Quito during the tumultuous period between 1809 and 1815. The letters were presumably written in Guayaquil during the last

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431 José Gabriel Navarro, La Revolución de Quito del 10 de agosto de 1809 (Quito: Plan Piloto del Ecuador, 1962), 483-488.
In 1998, historian Fernando Hidalgo-Nistri transcribed and published these letters. In his introductory remarks, Hidalgo does not refer to the disorders that broke out on the 27th. He does explain that Pérez Muñoz was one of Quito’s most fervent royalists. In his letters, Pérez mentions the commotion in one paragraph in which he claims that the disorders were simply a rebel plot to kill Quito’s royalists, their children and servants, and even President Montes. Pérez maintains that the scheme was discovered in time and some of the culprits, such as Manuel Larrea y Jijón and other nobles, were captured while the remaining rebel notables fled the city. Throughout the letters, Pérez implies, without proof, that President Montes had become an ally of Antonio Nariño and of Quito’s main insurgents.

The scant attention given to this episode has focused on the intrigues among army officials, President Montes, and Quito’s notables. Yet, this incident offers an opportunity to explore more profound aspects of Quito’s society beyond these political machinations, such as its collective memory and the relation between emotions and remembrances. This chapter tackles these questions through a fine-grained ethnographic study of the commotion that broke out on the 27th. I try to disentangle and bring to light the experiences,

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432 Pérez Muñoz’s letters are found in the Archivo General de Indias along with a set of letters from the 1810s and two essays written by Pérez in the late 1830s and early 1840s in which Pérez discusses his project to establish a shipyard in the Cachabi River basin in Ecuador. Pérez describes the trees found in the region, the properties of their wood, and the investments required to establish this enterprise. In the 1830s, while in Spain, Pérez undertook a series of judicial trials through which he was able to gain back land in the Cachabi region that belonged to his family. (AGI, Diversos, 42.)

433 Pérez Muñoz and his family-in-law suffered violence in the hands of rebels in Cartagena de Indias in 1811 and 1812. Pedro Pérez was held in a prison cell for several months. He was sentenced to ten years in prison but was later liberated by royalist troops. His father-in-law and brother-in-law were executed on October 29, 1812. His wife, Teresa Calisto, was held in prison for several months. In Cartagena, a mob humiliated her. (Pedro Pérez Muñoz, Compendio de la rebelión de América. Cartas de Pedro Pérez Muñoz. ed. Fernando Hidalgo-Nistri (Quito: Ediciones Abya-Yala, 1998), 9-10, 17-39, 121; AGI, Diversos, 42, ‘Compendio de la rebelión de América’, carta 31; AGI, QUITO, 269, ‘Carta de Pedro Pérez Muñoz sobre fusilamientos. Guayaquil. 15 de septiembre de 1813’, 1-3.)
meanings, and significance that this emotional outburst had for the inhabitants of Quito
and those of neighboring towns and cities. In that sense, its methodological approach is
both an “incident analysis” and a “history in the ethnographic grain”, to use Robert
Darnton’s terms. Darnton refers to “incident analysis” as one in which a historian focuses
on a specific incident, narrates it as a story, traces the different paths leading to its
manifestation, and then follows its repercussions through the social order. In that sense,
this chapter’s approach is also inspired by Karl Jacoby’s Shadows at the Dawn and Frances
Ramos’ article on the 1744 riots that shook in Puebla in New Spain. In his work, Jacoby
studies one event, the Camp Grant Massacre of 1871, and offers four different narratives.
In the case of the 1815 panic attack, there are two grand narratives – that the disorders were
the result of a failed insurrection or that they were the consequence of alleged looting –
and several complementary accounts. Ramos, for her part, poses a connection between
emotions and memory to understand why a festive celebration ended up in violent riots.

Before plunging into Quito in 1815, a short note concerning the source base is
warranted. This chapter is based on a relatively limited number of documents. Carlo
Ginzburg argues that there are cases in which the reading of a relatively small number of
texts related to a circumscribed phenomenon can be more rewarding that the massive

Darnton. The Great Cat Massacre and Other Episodes in French Cultural History (New York: Basic Books,
1984), 3. Three examples of ‘incident analysis’ in Latin American historiography are: Matt Childs, The 1812
Aponte Rebellion in Cuba and the Struggle Against Atlantic Slavery (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2006); Alejandro Rabinovich, Anatomia del pánico. La batalla de Huaqui, o la derrota de la
Revolución (1811) (Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 2017); and Charles Walker, Shaky Colonialism: the 1746
Press, 2008).
436 Frances L. Ramos and Adriana Saltoveña, “Memoria colectiva y disensión política en la Puebla del siglo
XVIII, México: el ‘motín’ en honor del obispo Juan de Palafox y Mendoza”, Historia Mexicana 62, no. 3
accumulation of repetitive evidence.\textsuperscript{437} With regards to this chapter’s goals, his reflection seems to be true. The chapter studies the three interrogatories concerning the commotion of June 27\textsuperscript{th}: the one led by Asesor Pereda shortly after the disorders broke out and the two succeeding inquiries that Montes ordered in November 1815 and the first months of 1816. In addition to these records, I also turn to several letters between Pereda, Montes, magistrates of Quito’s Audiencia, and members of the Council of the Indies. These documents all sit in in the Archivo General de Indias in Seville.

During the first inquiry, seventy-six people were interrogated by a small tribunal led by the Asesor Pereda. Of the seventy-six people interviewed, twenty-nine are women and fifty of them are referred to as “Doña” or “Don”. The youngest person interviewed is a 10-year old girl by the name of Vicenta Rojas. The oldest person is the 62-year old Colonel Juan Manuel Fromista, who had first arrived at Quito in 1809 along with the troops sent from Lima to put down the Government Junta that was established in Quito on August 10, 1809. He returned to Quito in November 1812, when royalist troops took over the city and put an end to the short-lived State of Quito. Of the seventy-six people interrogated, two are described as “black”, four of them as clergymen, and forty-nine knew how to sign their name. Thirteen were interrogated on June 27, just a few hours after the disorders broke out.\textsuperscript{438} During the second set of interrogations that took place in November, twenty men were summoned to court. They are all clergymen, army officers, and bureaucrats. In the third group of inquiries, twenty-six people were interrogated. Twenty of them had already

\textsuperscript{437} Carlo Ginzburg, \textit{Clues, Myths, and the Historical Method} (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013), 145.

\textsuperscript{438} AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815’.
been questioned during the first inquiry in June and July of 1815. Of the six new witnesses, two are women, three belong to the army, and five are referred to as “Doña” or “Don.”

I highlight these details simply to draw attention on the number and diversity of witnesses and observers of the commotion of June 27th and of the events leading to it. Groups that are usually underrepresented from “official” sources, such as women, servants, and low-ranking military and bureaucratic officials, have a somewhat relevant voice in this inquiry. Throughout the interrogation, those summoned were asked if they had heard rumors of upcoming disorders and if they had seen suspicious activities or behaviors during the previous days. Likewise, they were told to describe what they had been doing on the 27th and what they saw and heard during the course of the day. Their different backgrounds seem to have shaped their understanding and experience of these events. However, the growing feelings of fear and confusion crossed all social and political divisions and was shared by basically all of Quito’s inhabitants. The existence of contradictory testimonies simply underscores the state of collective panic, mistrust, and unrest that had spread through Quito. Their accounts reveal the ways in which rumors and memories of past events fed these feelings of fear and uneasiness.

Emotions are perceptible in the documents in more than one way. In addition to the many allusions to the panic and confusion people experienced on the 27th, the interrogatories themselves seem to have incited fear and consternation among many of those summoned to trial. Carlo Ginzburg uses the term “archives of repression” to refer to the documents produced by inquisitorial trials and other sorts of hearings in which the

439 AGI, QUITO,269. ‘Quaderno Tercero sobre lo ocurrido el 27 de junio último. Noviembre 1815.’; AGI, QUITO,275, ‘Expediente relativo a la conmoción del 27 de junio de 1815. Marzo 1816’.
interrogators resorted to torture, threats, and intimidation. Although in this particular case there are barely signs of physical punishment or violent threats, one cannot ignore that the prospect of suffering some sort of judicial sentence – such as prison, banishment, or a simple verbal reprimand – was a possibility feared by those summoned to the courthouse. After all, many of them had witnessed previous cases of extreme repression such as those that took place on August 2, 1810. Likewise, most of those interrogated in the days following the 27th knew that as a consequence of the commotion some of Quito’s notables had been imprisoned. As Ginzburg explains, the characters who spoke in these sorts of hearings – in this particular case, President Montes, the Asesor Pereda, other judicial and army officials, and the witnesses who were summoned – were not on equal footing.\textsuperscript{440} This helps explain why some answers seem to be mere echoes of the interrogators’ concerns and why many witnesses in June and July of 1815 declared to have seen signs of an insurrection but six months later claimed otherwise. In some cases, it seems as if the crossexaminers transmitted their mistrust and resentment to the witnesses, either to make them claim that a failed uprising had taken place or to state that army officers had acted inappropriately. However, there are also several exceptions in which dialogues takes place and we can see challenging voices in which the interrogators seem to be shocked by what the witnesses are talking about.

Ultimately, as Ginzburg explains, these documents are not neutral and do not convey entirely objective information. They are the product of a “peculiar utterly unbalanced interrelationship.” To decipher them, Ginzburg suggests, historians must try to

\textsuperscript{440} Ginzburg, \textit{Clues, Myths, and the Historical Method}, 142, 144-147.
grasp the “subtle interplay of threats and fears, of attacks and withdrawals”.

At the same time, we must take advantage of these unbalances of power to explore the emotions and memories that emerge from within the inquiry itself.

**Antecedents and memory**

By 1815, Quito had a relatively long tradition of social and political strife. As Jaime Rodríguez explains, this does not imply that Quiteños unceasingly challenged Spanish sovereignty. On the contrary, Rodríguez argues that throughout these disturbances, Quito’s residents demonstrated strong feelings of loyalty to the Spanish monarchy. At the core of these disturbances, however, there was a long and gradual process of economic and political decline. Towards the beginning of the eighteenth century, Quito was one of the most prosperous cities in South America. Through most of the seventeenth centuries, its textiles and ceramics supplied the silver mines in Perú as well as other parts of the Americas. However, towards the beginning of the eighteenth century, Quito’s once thriving economy began to decline due to a sharp fall in the demand for its products. Peruvian mines had recently entered a state of stagnation. At the same time, due to the transition from the Habsburg dynasty to the Bourbon House, cheap French textiles began to flood Peruvian markets and those of other South American regions. Quito’s economic problems were followed by political setbacks. When the Viceroyalty of New Granada was established for a short period between 1717 and 1723 and definitely in 1739, Santafé rather than Quito was picked as its capital. On 1717, Quito’s Royal Audiencia was closed down for a period of five years. During the century, Quito’s bishopric also lost provinces under its influence.

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441 Ginzburg, *Clues, Myths, and the Historical Method*, 145.
as well as the collection of dues coming from them. In 1779, Cuenca’s bishopric was established. In the following years, several other territories that used to respond to Quito’s bishopric passed to be under the jurisdiction of Lima, Cuenca, and Popayán’s bishoprics. In few words, for Quito, the eighteenth century was one of economic and political decline. Its aspirations of autonomy as well as of economic and political status were constantly frustrated.\(^{442}\)

Such situation led to social and political conflict. The first significant indication of discontent broke out on May 22, 1765 when a group of rioters attacked and raided the royal sales tax administration and aguardiente distillery. The so-called ‘Rebellion of the Barrios’ was one of the largest urban rebellions ever experienced in the Americas. Anthony McFarlane claims that the revolt was both a constitutional crisis and a response to the fiscal measures imposed by Santafé’s Viceroy Pedro Messia de la Cerda. To a certain extent, Messía de la Cerda’s tax reforms challenged the patrician’s traditional right to negotiation and consultation that had existed under the Habsburgs. Not only did the Viceroy overlook their observations and criticism, he also ignored Quito’s notables in the implementation of the tax reforms. However, the strongest opposition against the reforms came from the fiscal measures themselves. In the midst of the Bourbon Reforms and the Spanish Crown’s efforts to increase tax revenue, Messia de la Cerda decided to put an end to a system controlled by private tax-farmers and replace it by one in which royal officials would have direct management over tax collection. By doing so, Messia de la Cerda sought to reduce

corruption and tax evasion. The reforms were mostly focused on the collection of the *alcabala* (sales tax) and the establishment of a new aguardiente monopoly.\(^\text{443}\)

By May 22, when the riots began, tax collectors had begun to enforce the *alcabala* on goods and economic areas that were previously exempt from its payment. Such a situation led to higher taxes on Quito’s residents, particularly on the city’s poorest inhabitants. Rumors began to spread throughout the city claiming that authorities were planning to impose taxes on the river stones used by washerwomen as well as on children still in the womb. Others asserted that officials were going to establish government monopolies on salt, tobacco, potatoes, sugar, and maize. The imposition of an aguardiente monopoly also generated discontent, especially among Quito’s landowners who provided most of the sugarcane used in the distilleries as well as among shopkeepers and monasteries who were involved in the unauthorized distilling and selling of aguardiente. In the end, the new aguardiente monopoly meant higher prices for most consumers and left many former manufactures and traders out of business.\(^\text{444}\)

On May 22, thousands of people hit the streets. Some of the rioters threatened Quito’s officials. Others attacked and ransacked the *alcabala* and aguardiente monopoly offices. Magistrates of the Audiencia and royal officials, with the help of clergymen and several of the city’s notables, were able to regain control of the situation after promising a general pardon and the suppression of Messía de la Cerda’s tax reforms. Nonetheless, in the following days, Quito lived in a state of commotion. Several mobilizations took place and pamphlets and *pasquines* spread throughout the city. On June 19, following the sound


\(^{444}\) McFarlane, “The ‘Rebellion of the Barrios’: Urban Insurrection in Bourbon Quito”: 292-293.
of bells and fireworks, rioters stormed a jail and tried to release prisoners taken into custody. Guards and soldiers forced the multitude to disband and the assault ultimately failed.\textsuperscript{445}

On the night of June 24, another riot broke out. That day, Quito’s streets had been filled with people celebrating Saint John’s Day, one of the city’s main festivities. Indians from Quito’s vicinities had come into the city to pay their half-yearly installment of tribute. During the day, rumors began to spread claiming that a riot was probably going to break out later that day. In the midst of large gatherings and celebrations, a clash broke out between the crowd and a patrol composed mostly of Peninsular Spaniards. The row turned into a massive riot. Thousands of people attacked the Audiencia’s Palace as well as the residence of a Peninsular merchant. Several rioters and at least two people defending the Palace were killed. This second riot was not only more violent than that of May 22, anti-European sentiments as well as the enmity of the poor toward the wealthy were more manifest. Moreover, after St. John’s night, royal officials basically lost control of Quito. During the following days, an informal government ruled the city and the Audiencia had to rely on creole notables to sustain some influence over Quito’s residents. Only until October, royal authority began to be reinstated. Creole notables were successful negotiating with the leaders of the populace and convincing them to expel the unruliest individuals from their ranks. Most rioters accepted the notables’ authority at the same time that Messía de la Cerda acknowledged them as intermediaries. During the following months, tensions persisted, but the city lived a state of relative peace. Royal authority was slowly

\textsuperscript{445} McFarlane, “The ‘Rebellion of the Barrios’: Urban Insurrection in Bourbon Quito”: 308-310.
reinstituted. Quito was definitely pacified on September 1, 1766 when troops from Guayaquil arrived at the city. That same year, an army garrison was permanently established in the city. Finally, on February 14, 1767, the aguardiente monopoly was reinstated.446

In the 1780s, when the Tupac Amarú rebellion exploded in Upper Perú and the Comunero Revolt in New Granada, Quito did not experience any serious disturbance. Likewise, during the 1790s, when several conspiracies broke out in Caracas and Santafé, Quito continued to live in a state of apparent peace and harmony. Yet, following Napoleon’s invasion of the Iberian Peninsula, Quito was the first province in the Americas to establish a Government Junta. On August 10, 1809, conspirators swiftly apprehended high-ranking civil and military officials and deposed the president of Quito’s Audiencia, Manuel Ruiz de Castilla. That same afternoon, without shedding blood, a Junta was established. Jaime Rodríguez claims that the leaders of the conspiracy deliberately prevented the participation of popular sectors out of fear that the plot could get out of control as had happened in the 1765 ‘Rebellion of the Barrios.’ During its nearly three months of existence, the Junta maintained its loyalty to the Spanish Crown; however, it did eliminate and reduce certain taxes and levies. On October 24, under the pressure of rival troops laying siege on Quito, the Junta’s members decided to reinstate Ruiz de Castilla under the agreement that he would absolve them of any crime. In the following days, Ruiz de Castilla dissolved the Junta and reversed its tax reforms. By early December, troops sent from Lima arrived at Quito and arrested the main leaders of the Junta and dozens of

446 McFarlane, “The ‘Rebellion of the Barrios’: Urban Insurrection in Bourbon Quito”: 310-324.
residents who had been involved in its establishment. The *Fiscal* in charge of the trial, Tomás Aréchaga, resolved that forty-six of them should be sentenced to death and thirty to exile. Ruiz de Castilla was supposed to confirm the verdict but preferred to leave such decision in the hands of Santafé’s Viceroy, Antonio Amar y Borbón.\textsuperscript{447} By August 2, 1810, when violence and repression broke out, Amar had not reached a decision.

During the months leading to August 2\textsuperscript{nd}, the existing animosity between Peninsular Spaniards and Americans intensified even further. Quiteños’ resentment towards royal officials such as Aréchaga and Ruiz de Castillo, as well as towards the army troops that had arrived from Lima, grew by the day. This was particularly true among imprisoned notables and their families. To make matters worse, some of Quito’s residents complained that zambo, mulatto, and black soldiers were stealing livestock, not paying acquired debts at stores, and breaking into houses to steal valuables. Quiteños also claimed that soldiers verbally harassed them in the streets, accusing them of disloyalty and other wrongdoings. Such was the growing mistrust towards the troops from Lima that on July 7 rumors spread that the soldiers were going to ransack the city’s shops and houses. A short-lived commotion broke out in the San Roque neighborhood where people began running to protect their homes and shops. Fortunately for them, that day looting did not take place.\textsuperscript{448}

The disorders of July 7 were but a forewarning of what would happen on August 2\textsuperscript{nd}. During the following weeks, other rumors began to propagate. Among Peninsular


\textsuperscript{448} Archivo Histórico Nacional de España (AHN), CONSEJOS,21677, Expediente 1, Documento 56, ‘Testimonios que se incluirán en el caso en contra del sacerdote Batallas’, 1-10.
Spaniards and fervent royalists, news that Carlos Montufar – the regal commissioner sent from Cádiz by the Regal Council – would soon arrive at Quito caused unrest. Some believed he would offer a general pardon to all those involved in the August 10 conspiracy. At the same time, people in the streets began to claim that some of the prisoners had already been executed. In the midst of growing uneasiness and uncertainty, a group of Quiteños organized a scheme to free the detainees. On August 2, shortly after the church bells tolled at 2 p.m., a band stormed the main prison while another one attacked the army barracks where the troops from Lima were stationed and where most political prisoners were held captive. The mutineers were successful in freeing several prisoners from the prison, but their assault on the quarters failed. Soldiers and guards responded by executing nearly all the inmates of the August 10 plot. Following Ruiz de Castilla’s commands, the troops marched into the city’s streets. It is not clear what the soldiers were ordered to do, but the fact is that troops fired at will, killing somewhere between 200 and 300 people. At the same time, soldiers ransacked several houses and shops. According to Quito’s Bishop, José de Cuero y Caicedo, army officers merely stood by while zambo soldiers shot innocent bystanders and finished them off by beating them with their rifle butts and running over them with their horses.

News of the events of August 2\textsuperscript{nd} travelled through South America. Rebel leaders in Santafé and Caracas wrote stories of the carnage as a way to exacerbate the growing

449 AHN, CONSEJOS,21677, Expediente 1, Documento 28, ‘Carta del Obispo de Quito al Virrey sobre los hechos del 2 de agosto. 6 de agosto de 1810.’; Cevallos, Resumen de la Historia del Ecuador, 271-284; Mena Villamar, El Quito rebelde: historia de Quito de 1809 a 1812, 147-162.
450 AHN, CONSEJOS,21677, Expediente 1, Documento 30, ‘Carta del Obispo de Quito al Virrey sobre los hechos del 2 de agosto. 21 de agosto de 1810’, 1-2.
enmity between Europeans and Americans. Simón Bolívar’s 1813 “War to Death” proclamation portrays August 2nd as a foundational event that not only justified the American’s violent retaliation but placed all blame of future tragedies on the Spaniards. In several cities in New Granada, funeral rites were celebrated to honor those killed in Quito. In Caracas, a monument was erected in their honor.451

In Quito, the consequences of August 2nd were twofold. For one part, it paved the way to the conformation of a second government junta. On August 4, 1811, an open cabildo was instituted. Members of the Audiencia, army officials, city notables, and clergymen took part in this assembly. The cabildo concluded that peace could only be obtained if authorities put an end to the persecution of those involved in the conformation of the first government junta. Likewise, most voices claimed that the troops from Lima should leave the city as soon as possible. President Ruiz de Castilla and other officials were receptive to these claims. The detachment from Lima was expelled and judicial trials concerning August 10 were suspended. It was in this more peaceable atmosphere that a second government junta was established on September 18. The junta appointed Ruiz de Castilla as its president, recognized the authority of the Consejo de Regencia (Regal Council), declared the province’s autonomy from Santafé, and conferred on junta viceregal authority. In December 1811, Ruiz de Castilla was forced to resign as president and the junta formed the State of Quito. The newly established state declared its independence from the Regal Council and the American Juntas but continued to recognize Ferdinand VII as its sovereign.

451 Morelli, “Quito en 1810: la búsqueda de un nuevo proyecto político”, 122, 133.
The short-lived State of Quito came to an end on November 8, 1812 when Toribio Montes and his troops took control of the city.\textsuperscript{452}

A second consequence of August 2nd was that it left a long-lasting imprint on the memory of most \textit{Quiteños}. In some cases, such memory made itself manifest in acts of rage and vengeance. Such was the case of the events leading to Ruiz de Castilla’s death. Even though Ruiz de Castilla submissively endorsed the establishment of the second Junta and did not oppose his deposition, by mid-1812 many still held him in their minds as the main culprit of the tragedy of August 2\textsuperscript{nd}. On June 15, after rumors spread denouncing that Ruiz de Castilla was involved in a plot against the State of Quito, a riot stormed La Recoleta del Tejar convent where the former president had retired following his removal from power. The multitude beat Ruiz de Castilla with sticks and batons, leaving him a dying man. He passed away three days later.\textsuperscript{453}

By June 27, 1815, when the panic attack took place, Quito’s residents had accumulated countless memories of disorders and riots. These recollections were part of the city’s collective memory. Of course, due to its cruelty and proximity in time, August 2\textsuperscript{nd} was in the foremind of most \textit{Quiteños}. However, it was not only remembrances of concrete events that were in the memory of the city’s inhabitants. Certain atmospheres, feelings, and codes also made part of a common repertoire or inventory shared by most \textit{Quiteños}. The swift propagation of rumors was seen by many as a forewarning to disorders.

During tense moments, the clanging of church bells or the sound of gunpowder was understood by many as the secret signal used by conspirators to launch their plot. White and mixed-race Quiteños considered the arrival of large groups of Indians or the presence of zambos and blacks in the streets as a premonition to trouble. This prejudiced depiction of Indians, zambos, and blacks as dangerous troublemakers is partially explained by the racial discrimination that existed at the time. Some Quiteños saw these groups as part of the mob and rabble and, thus, associated their presence in Quito with disorders. Moreover, it is also likely that some of the city’s residents made a connection between the arrival of Indians and zambos and the racialized violence that took place in Upper Perú during the Tupac Amaru Rebellion and in Haiti during Revolution.

The city’s residents knew that once disorders broke out, they could take a wide variety of turns: from widespread looting to an organized uprising. To use Maurice Halbwachs terms, Quito’s inhabitants recollected from the “common domain” – that is, from a repertoire of shared remembrances and experiences – to understand what was happening.454 When the disorders broke out on June 27, Quiteños recalled past disturbances, particularly the violence that took place on August 2nd, to try to give meaning to what was happening and to envision what could come to pass. During the inquiries into the commotion of June 27, the testimonies continually alluded to the city’s collective memory, to its shared remembrances, experiences, and perceptions.

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It seems that on the morning of June 27 practically everyone in Quito knew that that day or the following, or perhaps sometime during the coming week, disorders were going to take place. Rumors, written notes, and broadsides disseminating news of an imminent revolt had been circulating for weeks. Likewise, in the days leading to the 27th, rumors began to spread claiming that the soldiers stationed in El Panecillo were planning to ransack the city’s shops and residences. Street brawls, the retailing of knives, and meetings among the city’s notables set off feelings of fear and restlessness among the city’s residents.

On the morning of June 27, Quito’s Cabildo prepared a decree urging President Toribio Montes to take the necessary precautions to ensure Quito’s peace and advised him to pay attention to the many rumors and pamphlets that had been disturbing the city’s harmony and proper order. The decree only reached Montes’ hands a few days later. Although the decree was ready to be sent to Montes, it had not been signed by most of the councilmen and the Cabildo’s secretary decided to postpone its delivery until the following day. The decree insisted that Quito was a “peaceful city, loyal and subordinate to Ferdinand VII” and grateful of Montes’ authority and government. It claimed that a few “enemies of public tranquility” were spreading, at their desire and without any basis whatsoever, libels and slander against Montes. These false accusations, they claimed, were breaking the city’s peace. The Cabildo urged Montes to discover the persons behind the seditious messages and to impose on them a severe and exemplary punishment so that Quito’s inhabitants
could continue living their “simple and judicious lives, demonstrating day by day their truthful vassalage to the sovereign.”

As the decree explained, during the days leading to the 27th, many of Quito’s residents had been speculating about a forthcoming uprising in the city’s streets, markets, shops, and residences. For example, about a month before the disorders broke out, a Doña María Bandembergh was in a store when two men came in talking about the many people that had been coming into the city. At one point, she believes to have heard one of them mention that some people were coming from Cuzco. It is possible at that precise moment, this reference to Cuzco made Bandembergh remember stories of the violence that Upper Peru experienced during the Tupac Amaru Rebellion. When these noticed she was paying attention to their conversation, the two men turned around and began whispering. Some weeks later, while standing by the window of her room, Bandembergh saw a black man and Indian walking down the street. They caught her attention because they were speaking loudly. She was not able to understand most of what they said but she picked up a phrase that startled her: “we have armed the houses” as they pointed towards her residence.

Another woman, Josefa Carrera, declared that on the morning of the 23rd she overheard three unknown men speaking loudly in the street saying that there was going to be an uprising on Saint John’s Day – that is, on June 24. Carrera, full of fear, shared this

455 AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815’, 29.
456 “…las casas las tenemos armadas…” (AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815’, 6.) (María Bandembergh was interrogated on the first and third set of interrogations. In the third one, she explained that imprecise information was added to her first testimony. She pointed out that Pereda de Saravia’s record incorrectly stated she had heard the two men in a store claim there was going to be an attack on the army quarters. (AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815’, 6.; AGI, QUITO,275, ‘Expediente relativo a la conmoción del 27 de junio de 1815. Marzo 1816’, 7-8.))
news with the first person she saw walking down the street: Doña María Manuela Vicuña’s housemaid. Both Carrera and the domestic servant informed Vicuña of the news, who, for her part, notified some of her neighbors of what was being said in Quito’s streets. On the night of the 23rd, Margarita Navarro, a shopkeeper, heard similar remarks. While sitting on her store in the proximities of the Merced Church, she saw the silhouette of three tall men. At one point, one of them cried out that they would soon “stage an attack on the army barracks, death or victory!” She was unable to identify the men. It was dark and they left soon after.

During those days, these sorts of public and impulsive comments were not at all uncommon. About a week before the commotion, a Feliciano Santos went out to buy wood to repair his master’s house. Santos’ master, Don Juan José Guerrero y Matheu, 5th Count of Selva Florida, had held the presidency of Quito’s first Junta for twelve days in 1809. He received office from Juan Pío Montufar and, once in power, offered the position to the deposed president of the Royal Audiencia, Count Ruiz del Castilla. He was considered by most Quiteños the reputed monarchist who had returned power to Ruiz del Castilla after the fall of the first Government Junta in 1809. After walking around the city trying to find wood suitable for the repairs, Santos decided to take a break and sit on the corner of the San Roque Square. At that moment, a woman by the name of Josefa came out a house and began chatting with him. When Santos told her that he was looking for wood for his

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master’s house, Josefa smiled and asked him why he was wasting his time on such errands seeing as his master’s house was going to “tumble anyways.” According to Santos, Josefa was suspected of favoring the insurgency.

It seems that the fate of Guerrero’s house was the source of much hearsay. A Doña María Ruiz claimed that one day, not long before June 27, she was walking down a street when an unknown Indian man passed by and greeted her. At that instant, the Indian pointed towards Guerrero’s house and told her that it “was soon going to be over.” Ruiz did not know what to answer and simply responded “we will all be over.” The Indian told her to be careful given that she was known to be a royalist.

Others were more cautious when talking in the streets about the impending disorders or so they recalled. One night, three or four days before the commotion, a Don Juan Guerra was walking by the San Francisco Square when he saw Gabriel Puente walking with a group of people. As soon as Puente noticed Guerra, he gave a few steps to the side and approached Guerra. Speaking softly, making sure his companions would not hear him, Puente told Guerra that he should be careful and seek shelter because there was going to be an uprising in the following days. Puente briefly explained to Guerra that at a social meeting someone said that the revolt was against the royalists and that Antonio Nariño was coming to take over the presidency of Quito.

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460 “...se estaba cayendo por si...” (AGI, QUITO,269, ‘ Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815’, 33)
461 AGI, QUITO,269, ‘ Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815’, 1, 20, 32.
462 “…sabía que todo esto se habia de acabar... haviendole respondido la declarante que todos nos haviamos de acabar...” (AGI, QUITO,269, ‘ Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815’, 8.)
463 Guerra was interviewed in the first and third interrogations. He was among those who confirmed their testimonies. Guerra claimed that what was written in Pereda’s record was what he had actually said during
In the midst of the proliferation of idle talk and the circulation of pamphlets and other written notes, many began to share the feeling that rebels were covertly preparing an uprising. Someone such as Colonel Juan Manuel Fromista, for instance, believed that these rumors, gestures, and actions hinted the existence of a synchronized and coordinated insurrectionary scheme. When interrogated by the tribunal, Fromista argued that in the days leading to June 27th he had had too many premonitions indicating that an uprising was going to break out before long. In the first place, groups of Indians – some of which were unfamiliar to Quito’s residents – had been coming into the city in higher numbers than usual. The presence of these *cholos* and *cholas* (Indian men and women) became even more suspicious after some of them were seen repeatedly visiting Don Guillermo Valdivieso, a reputed rebel. The Indian’s involvement in some kind of conspiracy became even more manifest, according to Fromista, when some of them launched threats to the troops on the streets, yelling at “the troops that they would soon be finished.”

Fromista’s long list of forewarnings continued with accounts of attacks and insults on the President and his troops. On the night of June 19, 1815, a group of people gathered outside Toribio Montes’ residence. They knocked on the door several times asking if Montes was home. Surprised by their outrage, the sentinels inside the Presidential Palace asked them if they were drunk. The group outside vociferously responded by shouting that Montes was a “scoundrel, deceitful man who would soon pay for his misdeeds.” After hearing such insults, the guards promptly opened the door with the purpose of capturing

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464 “…a la tropa de que en brebe acabarian con ella…” (AGI, QUITO, 269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815’, 12.)
these men, but by the time the sentinels set foot on the street the crowd had dispersed and disappeared from their sight. Yet, it is also possible that the guards imagined having heard these insults as a result of the tense atmosphere they were living in.

Some weeks earlier, on the night of May 12, Lieutenant Colonel Don Miguel de la Piedra was attacked by a group of six men who had been following him on his way from the army quarters to his residence. De la Piedra heard their footsteps behind him once he left the barracks and started walking down the streets. On the corner of the San Francisco Square, he decided to confront them. De la Piedra took out his saber and turned around. One of them asked him if he had fire for his cigarette and approached de la Piedra. The Lieutenant Colonel slapped the man and the other five men swiftly joined the brawl. Three of them threw rocks and mud at the officer, while the remaining three used their swords to attack him. Fortunately for de la Piedra, he was successful defending himself, stabbed one of the attackers, and made them retreat. De la Piedra was only left with a minor wound in one of his fingers.

In a similar case, Lieutenant Juan Bautista Heredia was also assaulted in Quito’s streets on June 25. That night, Heredia was walking around the city with his sister, Josefa, and a friend. Unexpectedly, an Indian jumped towards them and tried to steal the cigar that Josefa had just lit. Juan Bautista slapped the man, but a group of Indians came out in the man’s defense. Seeing that the Lieutenant was unarmed and had been wounded in his arms, Juan Bautista and his companions were forced to withdraw. As they retired, the Indians

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465 “…que era un picaro Morlaco y que dentro de pocos días la pagarían…” (AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815’, 36.)
466 AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815’, 12, 21-22.
yelled at Juan Bautista: “you scoundrel, we know who you are, you’re day will soon come, you’ll die!” Only a few days before the 27th, another soldier was verbally assaulted while walking down Quito’s streets with two women. As they strolled along the city’s streets, the three of them got caught up in an argument with a youngster. The young man, who apparently was inebriated, screamed at the soldier that “within fifteen days no one was going to be left breathing.”

Fromista’s list of misgivings continued with Don Antonio Ante’s suspicious purchase of sixteen razons during the first days of June. News of this purchase quickly spread among retailers and customers and, eventually, reached Quito’s officials. Apparently, after selling the razors to Ante, the black merchant Toribio Palencia was left with only one razor in stock. When his customers passed by to ask for razors and saw that there was only one left, they questioned Palencia about this, pushing him to talk about Ante’s ample acquisition. It seems that during the days leading to June 27, the tribunal tried to interrogate Ante to ask him why he had bought so many razors, but Quito’s authorities were unable to locate him.

For Fromista, these were not isolated events, but rather symptoms of a coordinated insurrectionary plot. The conspirators, the Colonel argued, were the same notables who established the government juntas and who, on August 2, 1810, had led a mutiny against the royal authorities. In the course of the first months of 1815, Fromista, other members of

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467 “…Morlaco, ya te conocemos, ya ba llegando tu día, presto moriras,” (AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815’, 31-32.)
468 “… que dentro de quince días nadie respiraría…” (AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815’, 2-3)
469 AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815’, 9, 24, 27, 32.
the army, and city officials shared a growing concern over the recurring clandestine meetings among Quito’s notables. They worried that these meetings were ideal venues for the propagation of rumors as well as the site where notables such as Pedro Montufar and Guillermo Valdivieso were planning an uprising.\textsuperscript{470}

According to several testimonies, Don José Barba’s residence was one of the settings where most of the intriguing among notables was taking place. Soldier Manuel Castro, who owned a small shop located on the first floor of Barba’s house, claimed to have seen visitors constantly going into Barba’s home, both at daylight and nighttime. Castro never heard a word of what was being discussed, but he knew that most of those visiting Barba were reputed rebels and that basically everyone living in Barba’s residence – including all the servants except for one – were known to “have ideas in favor of uprisings and to have an aversion towards the legitimate government.”\textsuperscript{471}

Don Andrés Fernández Salvador’s testimony corroborated the soldier’s allegations. A couple months before the events of June 27, Fernández visited Barba’s house to talk about a question concerning the upcoming festivities of St. John’s Day. The Cabildo had designated Barba to find pasturelands where the bulls could graze during the days before the bullfights. When he entered Barba’s house, one of the servants ran ahead to notify his master. Fernández tried to follow the servant’s pace but was quickly left behind. From afar, Fernández noticed people leaving the room where Barba was expecting him. He was able to greet Guillermo Valdivieso and recognized several Popayanejos who had been banished

\textsuperscript{470} AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815’, 11-12.
\textsuperscript{471} “… concerban siempre las ideas de alsamiento y abercion al govierno legitimo…” (AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815’, 17-18.)
from Popayán in 1813 by General Juan Samano. At the sight of this scene, Fernández’s first thought was that a plot, similar to the one that took place on August 2, 1810, was being devised.\footnote{AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815’, 43-44.}

Throughout Quito, the belief that the incidents of August 2, 1810 could repeat themselves produced anxiety, unrest, and sorrow. In a conversation between a Doña María Azechna and a Don Manuel Larrea y Jijón, the latter claimed to be distraught with the thought that they might experience another day similar to August 2\textsuperscript{nd}.\footnote{AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815’, 4.} However, others viewed the imminent uprising with hope and expectation, wishing, nonetheless, that this time the rebellion would not have such a tragic ending. For example, at a meeting at Doña Margarita Peres’ home about a week before the 27\textsuperscript{th}, a Don José Venegas ended up talking about the forthcoming uprising with Friar José María Surita from the Mercedarian Order. Surita told Venegas and Peres that in a few days royalists in Quito would suffer another defeat and that none of the royalists were going to be able to escape. Surita claimed, with apparent hope and anticipation, that Simón Bolívar and other rebel leaders were on their way to Quito to finish with all of the city’s royalists. When summoned by the tribunal, Surita denied he ever said any of this, but Margarita Peres confirmed that the friar had in fact stated that all of Quito’s royalists were going to be killed.\footnote{In the interrogations that took place during the first months of 1816, Francisco Cruz claimed that José Venegas was drunk when he was interrogated and that he was taken into the tribunal against his will. (AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815’, 2-3.; AGI, QUITO,275, ‘Expediente relativo a la conmoción del 27 de junio de 1815. Marzo 1816’, 4-5.)}

Fromista’s list of suspicions ended with a series of warnings he had received from Quito’s residents. A few days before the 27\textsuperscript{th}, he received news that a woman in a
confessional had declared that there would soon be an uprising and that royalists, such as
the Mercedarian priest that was listening to her confession, should avoid the Calle del
Correo. Other of his acquaintances, such as Priest Pedro José Peres and a Don Jose Antonio
Cevallos, contacted Fromista to inform him of rumors of an impending uprising. The word
on the street was that the rebels would first attack the army barracks and then move on to
control the rest of the Quito. Cevallos added that the Montufar House was probably
involved in the plot. Due these warnings and his intuition, Fromista doubled the number of
guards securing the barracks and advised his officers and soldiers to be vigilant.475

As these rumors spread throughout the city, many Quiteños also began to take their
own precautions. Jose Antonio Cevallos, Fromista’s acquaintance, was cautioned by his
aunt for not doing so. A few days before the 27th, Doña María Álvarez passed by her
nephew’s house to visit his family. She was surprised to see their calmness and composure.
She could not avoid asking them why they had not hidden their valued objects or why they
were not preparing for the forthcoming disturbances. Álvarez warned them that the rumor
was that many soldiers were going to surrender once the uprising broke out. In those same
days, María Álvarez also cautioned her cousin, Ignacia Enriquez, about the news she had
been hearing. Álvarez suggested that both should leave Quito and head to her hacienda to
avoid any risk.476

Agustín Enríquez, an Augustinian friar, received a similar forewarning in the course
of those days. Enríquez’ father had moved to Cuenca some years ago and had left his house
in Quito in charge of María Peres, his domestic servant. Around June 23 or 24, Peres

475 AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815’, 12.
476 AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815’, 5-6, 24.
informed Agustín that she had received a letter from Enríquez senior, ordering her to leave the city as soon as possible and to travel to the town of Cayambe taking with her the chests he had left behind. Agustín did not understand his father’s orders nor what was happening. By the 25th, before Agustín could question her further, Peres left the city with the much-treasured chests.477

María Peres and Agustín Enríquez were not the only ones receiving information from nearby cities and towns. Through letters and word of mouth, information continuously circulated between Quito and its surroundings. For example, José Antonio Cevallos, Fromista’s acquaintance and María Álvarez’s nephew, received news of an imminent uprising through a series of letters coming from Riobamba, a city located approximately 200 km south of Quito. One of those letters, sent on June 18 and signed by ‘El Astro’, alerted Cevallos that trouble was soon coming to Quito. ‘El Astro’ expressed his concern over the rebels’ latest victories in the Province of Popayán and the possibility that Quito’s insurgents, encouraged by these reports, would decide to attack the military quarters based in El Panecillo hill. ‘El Astro’ urged Cevallos to discreetly warn Colonel Fromista, commander of the troops stationed in Quito, that disorders were inevitably coming to the city and that they would probably break out during the celebration of bullfights and other festivities. ‘El Astro’ closed his note asking Cevallos to shred the letter to pieces once he had read it and to avoid mentioning its existence to anyone, including Fromista. ‘El Astro’ feared that the letter would get him into trouble.478

477 AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815’, 4-5, 40.
478 AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815’, 39-40.
For one reason or another, Cevallos did not destroy the letter and it became a piece of evidence in the tribunal’s investigation. The inquiry later found that ‘El Astro’ was a Lieutenant Don Jose Luzero who, at the time, was living in Riobamba. When summoned to explain his letter, Luzero said he had four reasons to warn Cevallos and exhort him to talk to Fromista. First, because a widespread rumor of an imminent uprising and attack on Quito’s military quarters had been circulating in Riobamba during the last days. Secondly, because it was recently known in Riobamba that Don Carlos Montufar was now a fugitive and had joined, with his own troops and weapons, the rebel armies in the Cauca Region. The news that had reached Riobamba was that Montufar was planning to attack Popayán and then move on to Pasto and Quito to continue “spreading the revolutionary system that he so obstinately defended.” Luzero explained that the Montufar family had much support in both Quito and Riobamba and that several of his relatives lived in Riobamba. Luzero insisted that these facts were surely connected to the “general voice” that had been propagating throughout Riobamba and surrounding towns.  

In the third place, Luzero claimed that there was also news that Juan Pío Montufar, father of Carlos and one of the main leaders of the 1809 Junta, was now living in his hacienda of El Chillo and not in Loja where he was supposed to be detained. Luzero feared that Juan Pío had moved closer to Quito and Riobamba in preparation for the uprising that was going to take place. Luzero recalled that in 1814, when Juan Pío was still held in Loja and Antonio Nariño’s troops were approaching Pasto, Juan Pío wrote a letter stating that the time had come to take back what belonged to them. Luzero insisted: if last year Juan

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479 “…a continuar el cistema revolucionario en que estan obstinados…” (AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815’, 52-54.)
Pío had incited an attack on Quito’s royalists while being in Loja, this time, that he was closer to Quito and his son was leading a rebel army in Cauca, he had an even greater reason to actively take part in the forthcoming insurrection.

Luzero’s fourth reason dealt with a conversation he had had in recent days with a Don Carlos Larrea, former army captain and nephew of Juan Pío Montufar. Luzero explained he ran into Larrea while walking with two women. According to Luzero, people remembered Larrea as one of the rebels who took part in the attack on the royalist army barracks in Quito on August 2, 1810 and for detaining members of the Royal Audiencia during the assault. Larrea told them that he was travelling to Quito in two days to attend the bullfights that were going to be celebrated during Quito’s festivities during the first weeks of July. After a short silence, one of the women responded that he was most certainly going to encounter a “castle of fire.” Larrea claimed that “he would probably see some of that” and added that he was planning on spending some days in Quito before travelling to El Chillo hacienda, where Juan Pío Montufar was apparently hiding. Before parting, Larrea exclaimed that in fifteen days they would all embrace in Quito.480

In his closing remarks, Luzero explained that there were other signs that hinted the imminence of disorders in Quito. In Riobamba, those known to be rebels had been acting strangely during the last weeks. Loyalists had noticed that when they approached groups of reputed rebel supporters, the latter would lower their voices or would simply break up the meeting. For Luzero, there was no doubt that an uprising was going to break out in the midst of bullfights when people from Quito and neighboring towns gathered to enjoy the

480 “… que sin duda vería a algun castillo de fuego y entonces el contextó, que algo de eso…” (AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815’, 53.)
festivities. Thus, he decided to warn Cevallos, urging him to advise the city’s authorities, particularly Fromista, to take all necessary measures to prevent a new insurrection.\textsuperscript{481}

In Ambato, Latacunga, and other towns located between Quito and Riobamba, the atmosphere was not much different. Among its inhabitants, the question was not if a new uprising was going to break out in Quito, but when and how it was going to erupt. Many claimed it would begin once the Santafereños took over Pasto. Once this happened, Quiteños and peoples from contiguous cities and towns would stage an insurrection, expel all royalists living in the Province of Quito with the help of the rebel armies coming from Santafé, and then move on to conquer Riobamba, Cuenca, and Lima.\textsuperscript{482}

A Don Roque Martínez witnessed the propagation of rumors and feelings of hope and uncertainty in Ambato, Latacunga, and their surroundings. Martínez, a native of San Gil, a town approximately 325 km northeast of Santafé, ended up in Latacunga thanks to a series of unfortunate events. Martínez was a military officer of the army belonging to the recently founded State of Cundinamarca. When Antonio Nariño travelled south to conquer Popayán and Pasto, Martínez was among the officers accompanying him. In May 1814, Cundinamarca’s army was defeated in Pasto. Martínez, Nariño, and dozens of other rebels were captured by royalist troops. The rebel prisoners were first sent to Quito and then remitted to Guayaquil where they would be incarcerated or, as was Nariño’s case, shipped to Cadiz. When the prisoners were about halfway through their journey to Guayaquil, in the proximities of the village of Guaranda, Martínez fell seriously ill. Due to his critical state, the officer in charge prisoners decided to leave Martínez in Guaranda under the care

\textsuperscript{481} AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815’, 52-54.
\textsuperscript{482} AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815’, 86-91.
of a physician from Lima. Martínez’s health gradually improved and about two months later, he left Guaranda and established in Latacunga. By mid-1815, he had been living in Latacunga for over five months and had spent several weeks in Ambato and neighboring towns and haciendas. After June 27th, he wandered around the region for a few days until he travelled to Cuenca where he was captured by royal authorities and was interrogated by the Audiencia on August 6, 1815.

During the interrogation, Martínez seemed to be trapped in a difficult position, incapable of denying his rebel past while also trying to demonstrate he had not been involved in the disorders that had taken place in Quito. He claimed that the “revolutionary spirit” was in full effervescence throughout the Ambato and Latacunga regions. Martínez possibly over-embellished his testimony to conform to the magistrates’ animosity towards criollo elites, particularly Quiteños and Santafereños. In Latacunga, he explained, there were no more than four people manifestly loyal to the Spanish Monarchy. All over the region, Antonio Nariño’s name generated admiration, hope, and expectation. Many viewed Nariño as the redeemer who would free Quito from the tyrannical government of Toribio Montes. Martínez himself was greeted with esteem and deference when he mentioned he had fought alongside Nariño. Around Latacunga and Ambato, many asked Martínez about Nariño’s whereabouts, claiming that the General had not been captured by royalist troops and was gathering forces to stage another attack on Pasto. Even though Martínez told them this was not true, that he himself had witnessed Nariño’s detention and seen how Nariño was being driven to Guayaquil, few believed him. Such was their enthusiasm that many

\[ \text{\textsuperscript{483}} \text{AGI, QUITO,269, \textquote{Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815}, 86-87.} \]
rebel supporters mentioned they were making plans to join Nariño’s troops. During a conversation a Don José Lamas had even commented that he was so eager to fight that “he wished he could become a small bird or a witch” so he could fly all the way to Pasto and join the Santafereños. In the meantime, the few royalists that still lived in the region acknowledged that Quito was probably lost; however, they believed they could still organize an army to stop Nariño’s advance towards Cuenca.484

Similar to what had happened in Riobamba, in Latacunga and Ambato there were also rumors that Juan Pío and Carlos Montufar were involved in this new insurrection. However, by now, their leadership seemed to be fading—in these districts. In Latacunga, Martínez overheard people claim that they enthusiastically expected Carlos Montufar’s arrival so they could join his troops and attack Quito. Nevertheless, these same people argued that once they expelled the royalists from Quito, Carlos should be put in trail for his treacherous conduct. As they explained, in 1812, when the rebel troops marched from Quito to Cuenca, “they were not able to capture Cuenca because of Montufar’s fault, despite being so close they could even see the city.”485 This time, many acclaimed, with the help of the “courageous” Nariño and the Santafereños, things would be different.486

Martínez highlighted that the peoples living in these towns, villages, and the countryside seemed inexplicably coordinated. In Latacunga and Ambato, as well as in the smaller villages and haciendas he visited, people repeated similar rumors and news, and

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484 “…deseaba ser un pajarito o una bruja para ir a incorporarse con las tropas de Santafé…” (AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 90.)
485 “… porque por su causa no entraron en Cuenca después que la tuvieron casi a la vista…” (AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 89.)
486 AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 89-90.
most shared the same opinions with regards to the incoming insurrection. Although Martínez saw anonymous letters circulating throughout the region, he was unable to discover where they came from or who had sent them. One of his closest acquaintances, a Don Prospero Bascones, mentioned that some of those letters were sent by Santafereños informing Ambato and Latacunga’s rebels how and when the new uprising was going to take place.\textsuperscript{487}

In Quito, rumors of an imminent uprising were complemented by hearsay of widespread ransacking. Towards mid-June, clergymen, army officers, and royal administrators heard inebriated soldiers exclaiming that in the following days there would be extensive looting. Most of them ignored these remarks arguing that they were simply the product of the soldiers’ drunkenness and arrogance. Don Gerónimo Andrade, a lieutenant ascribed to the Cuenca militias, claimed that about fifteen days before the 27\textsuperscript{th}, Colonel Fromista began to spread the word that there would soon be an uprising. According to Andrade, once Quiteños saw that there were movements and preparations within the quarters, they began to show signs of consternation. Apparently, some of Quito’s residents feared not only a possible uprising, but also that soldiers could take advantage of the situation to ransack shops and houses.\textsuperscript{488}

Thus, by late June 1815, the scene was set. Fear, confusion, anger, and hope had been piling up, accumulating to a point in which a mere remark or gesture could spark an outbreak of collective panic. For some, such as Martínez and Fromista – and possibly the

\textsuperscript{487} AGI, QUITO,269, ‘ Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 90.
\textsuperscript{488} AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Quaderno tercero. Expediente para aclarar los desórdenes del 27 de junio 1815.’, 10, 12-14, 19-21.
tribunal carrying out the first interrogation – rebel leaders were covertly organizing and coordinating people’s actions and thoughts towards an insurrection. Others, such as the Cabildo’s members, argued that the growing atmosphere of discontent and turbulence was the responsibility of a few agitators who were disturbing the city’s peace and loyal spirit. Some believed that soldiers would soon ransack the city’s shops and residences. In the days following the 27th, as Quito’s residents tried to understand what had actually happened on that afternoon, other explanations came up. Joaquín Gutierrez, the Procurador General Síndico (a sort of judicial advisor), argued that this kind of disorders were not uncommon during the days previous to bullfights and festivities when people usually got overly excited. In this occasion, he claimed, mayhem was sparked by the slaughter of dozens of pigs that had been roaming the city’s streets for months. Gutiérrez’s claims will be analyzed later on in the chapter.

Regardless of the different explanations that appeared during the interrogations, most agreed that in the course of June 1815 a growing sense of unrest, turmoil, and fear had been steadily expanding in Quito and its surroundings. The circulation of rumors, letters, libels, and other written notes fed into this sense of collective confusion and panic. Remembrances of past events, symbols, and atmospheres – particularly those related to August 2, 1810 – stimulated these feelings of uncertainty and fear. Under these circumstances, emotions piled up, shaping people’s understandings of what was happening. As fear and confusion grew, many Quiteños began to conceive the possibility that a violent outbreak could soon happen.

489 AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 34-35.
An outburst of emotions

Quito’s residents experienced the disorders that broke out on June 27 in different ways. Most accounts agree that confusion was widespread, people ran in different directions, and an uproar traveled through the city’s streets. However, not all witnesses concurred on what sparked the disorders and what actually happened during the half an hour or so that the commotion lasted. While some claimed that it all began with people screaming “bull, bull!”, others argued that the church bells or some other sign triggered the upheaval. Some witnesses saw street brawls and traces of imminent violence. Some saw soldiers capturing several of Quito’s notables and planning to ransack the city’s stores and houses. Others only perceived a state of intense panic and agitation without clear signs of hostilities against the army, royal authorities, or the city’s notables.

On June 27, 1815, since the crack of dawn, rumors of an impending uprising and of widespread looting had begun to circulate with even more intensity than during previous days. Many Quiteños started claiming that an insurrection was bound to happen that same day or the following one. For example, Doña Dolores Cornejo, a nineteen-year-old woman, woke up to a warning from Teresa Garzón, who had been her caretaker as a child. Teresa Garzón urged the “Niña Dolores” to take shelter and hide her valued objects because an uprising was going to break out that same day or the next one. According to Garzón, the insurrection was going to begin once a bullock was set loose in Quito’s streets. Cornejo was not sure what to make of this warning. However, later in the day, when she heard an uproar and people screaming “bull, bull!”, she realized that her former babysitter’s admonition was true.490

490 AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 5.
When the tribunal asked Garzón about the message she sent to Cornejo on the morning of the 27th, Garzón explained that, in previous days, a rumor had spread throughout the San Roque neighborhood alleging that the soldiers and officers stationed in the army quarters had been cautioned about an impending insurrection. On the morning of the 27th, seeing that these rumors were gaining force, she decided to caution “Niña Dolores.” By the early hours of the afternoon, Garzón and most her neighbors were certain that the uprising was going to break out in a question of minutes or hours. The situation became even more tense when an army patrol walked around the neighborhood’s streets claiming to be safeguarding the city’s public tranquility. According to one of Garzón’s neighbors, not long after the patrol had moved on, two men on horses passed by screaming “bull, bull!” Some minutes later, pandemonium broke out.491 Cornejo and Garzón do not explain what happened once they heard the uproar and people in the streets saying an uprising had just erupted. Apparently, once the disorders began, both of them hid in their homes.

Others, such as Colonel Fromista, were among the multitude running up and down Quito’s streets once the disorders broke out. That day, fearing that an uprising could explode at any moment, Fromista ordered almost all soldiers and officers stationed in the army quarters in El Panecillo to stay inside the barracks until three in the afternoon. Fromista, for his part, left the quarters in the early hours of the afternoon to attend a social

491 Tereza Garzón was interrogated in June 1815 as well as in February 1816. In her second interview, she insisted that a commotion had not taken place on June 27th, but she did not deny that that morning, rumors of impending disorders spread through her neighborhood causing unrest among her neighbors. (AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 7; AGI, QUITO,275, ‘Expediente relativo a la conmoción del 27 de junio de 1815. Marzo 1816.’, 11.)
meeting at a Doña Teresa Calisto’s home. Shortly after he arrived at Calisto’s residence, people in the street started to scream that an uprising had just begun. Fromista went out to the street with a pistol in his hand. He saw dozens of people screaming and running in all directions. As he stood in the middle of the street, paralyzed by what was happening, some of those running down the street approached him and hastily advised him to run and hide before he got killed by a group of Indians that was tailing him. At that moment, Fromista remembered that on his way to Calisto’s home, he had seen a group of Indians covertly talking among themselves on the corner of Don Juan Ante’s house. At the sight of this scene, Fromista could only imagine that these Indians were up to something. After all, Ante was known to be an insurgent and the Indians arriving to Quito in previous days had been acting suspiciously. Now, that he was standing in the street, in the midst of the commotion, Fromista remembered this group of Indians and imagined they were going to ambush him. He feared the worst and began running towards the army quarters. It seems Fromista believed the Indians coming into Quito were allied with his rivals or were perhaps part of a larger scheme to attack the Spanish Monarchy.

Sergeant Jose Paredes was walking around the San Agustin Square when the commotion broke out. Amidst growing turmoil, he recognized Colonel Fromista in the middle of the rowdy crowd. According to Paredes, Fromista was running in distress, with a saber in his hand, up a street leading to the army barracks. A group of youngsters wearing capes and ponchos, and apparently unarmed, were running behind Fromista. The Colonel

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492 Teresa Calisto was the wife of Pedro Pérez Muñoz, the royalist who wrote a collection of thirty-five letters with his account of what happened in Quito between 1809 and 1815.
493 AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 12.
abruptly turned when he reached the corner of the square. The youngsters did the same and continued their pursuit. Paredes felt the situation was getting out of control and that he should return to the quarters as soon as possible. He took a shorter path than the one followed by Fromista. When he reached the barracks, Paredes saw Fromista arriving safe and sound along with two soldiers.494

One of those two soldiers was Manuel Tapia. When the disturbances broke out, Tapia was visiting the house of Priest Teodoro Navarrete. While talking with Navarrete, they heard people screaming that an uprising had begun. Tapia leaned out the balcony and saw a large number of people down the street. Among the crowd, he noticed Colonel Fromista dashing up the street with a naked saber on his hand. Behind him, following his steps, was a group of six to seven men wearing capes and ponchos. Tapia quickly ran down to the street to aid Fromista. He accompanied the Colonel all the way to the army quarters. Fortunately for them, they arrived without a scratch.495

The commotion surprised other soldiers and officers while walking in the streets or visiting acquaintances. Second Lieutenant Don Francisco Benito Camba, for instance, was visiting a friend in the vicinities of the Santo Domingo Church when he heard the call to arms being rallied. As he ran to the army quarters, he saw in the distance a mass of people made up of nearly two hundred men. When interrogated on June 30, 1815, Camba claimed that most of the multitude seemed to be advancing towards the barracks while others were doing so towards the Santo Domingo Square. On the 27th, people around him commented that a new uprising had just exploded. A man he knew, Don Miguel Oramas, claimed that

494 AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 26.
495 AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 27.
he had heard from an Indian woman that the President Toribio Montes had just been assassinated. After hearing this news, Camba unsheathed his saber and continued his path to the quarters.\footnote{In his second interrogation, on February 12, 1816, Camba explained that he did not claim that the multitude was moving towards the quarters and that Oramas did not state that President Montes had been killed. Nonetheless, he accepted that a multitude was moving through the streets and people around him were talking about a new uprising. (AGI, QUITO,269, ‘ Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815’, 13-14; AGI, QUITO,275, ‘ Expediente relativo a la conmoción del 27 de junio de 1815. Marzo 1816.’, 6.)} Another Second Lieutenant, Don Antonio Buendía, was walking to the army quarters from his house when he heard the call to arms coming from the barracks. Shortly after, he heard an uproar coming from down the street. In the distance, he saw a crowd rowdily running around the streets. Buendía hurried his pace and reached the barracks in time to join the formation that was going to march into the main square.\footnote{AGI, QUITO,269, ‘ Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 16.}

For his part, Sargent Manuel Andrade was in the Cruz de la Piedra neighborhood when he heard the call to arms. People began running in different directions. Among the crowd, a one-eyed man with a pistol caught his attention. Later on, as Andrade was headed to the quarters, he saw an Indian renowned as ‘\textit{Capa Redonda}’ (‘Round Cape’), standing in the door of his house, with his face partially covered, and holding a stick and a rock in one of his hands. Andrade overheard ‘\textit{Capa Redonda}’ say to a woman: “\textit{comadre}\footnote{The \textit{Diccionario de Autoridades} explains that the term \textit{comadre} was used to refer to a midwife as well as a neighbor or close friend. In this particular case, \textit{Capa Redonda} was probably using the latter definition.} the time has come to get rid of these deceitful men. Until when, until when!”. Andrade continued his way to the quarters, without hearing the \textit{comadre}’s response and without seeing where ‘\textit{Capa Redonda}’ was headed to.\footnote{“...\textit{comadre}, ya llegó la hora de salir de morlacó, hasta cuando, hasta cuando...” (AGI, QUITO,269, ‘ Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 10-11.)}
Those inside quarters were as confused as those who were surprised outside the barracks. Once the call to arms was rallied, soldiers and officers inside began to speculate about what was happening in the city’s streets. From the watchtower, those on guard could see crowds flowing around the city’s squares and dozens of people running up the city’s streets, trying to find shelter in the hills and creeks. The word among the troops was that a numerous mob was headed to the barracks. As they deliberated over the size of the mob, those outside – such as Fromista, Paredes, Tapia, Camba, Buendía, Andrade, and a few others – began to arrive to the barracks. Fromista ordered soldiers and officials to form in military formation and prepare to march into the city. Not long after the disorders had begun, the troops marched from El Panecillo into the city’s main square.

As they passed the Cathedral, Second Lieutenant Buendía noticed that its doors were open and that someone had just rushed inside. Buendía and other officers separated from the troops, went into the Cathedral, and ordered the Cathedral’s sacristan to close its doors. Once inside, Buendía saw two men hanging from the dormer next to the steps leading to the tower. He ordered them to come down. One of them surrendered immediately, while the other one tried to escape and hid beneath the main altar. During the struggle to detain him, Buendía banged his forehead against the altar. The man was finally captured and handed over to the city’s judges.

500 AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 10, 28.
501 There is no explicit reference to the exact time in which the army began marching into the city nor accurate estimations of the time that transpired between the beginning of the disorders and the moment in which the troops reached the main square. My reading of the different accounts leads me to conclude that about twenty to thirty minutes passed from the outbreak of the commotion to the moment in which the troops marched into the main square.
502 AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 16.
The officers suspected these two men were the bell ringers who triggered the commotion. According to an army official, they had been paid by the conspirators to toll the bells. That same night, the two of them were taken to the tribunal for questioning. Surprisingly, they do not come up in the records of the first interrogation. We know that they were interrogated thanks to Francisco Cruz’s second testimony given on January 15, 1816. According to Cruz – with whose account we began this chapter –, during the inquiry, the two men explained they were not bell ringers and that they knew nothing of the commotion that had just taken place. One of them claimed to be a carpenter, while the other one a button maker who worked in a shop next to the Cathedral. They told the tribunal that once they saw that a disturbance had broken out, they decided to hide inside the Cathedral. Cruz states that soldiers and army officers threatened the two men with a whipping if they did not confess they were the bell ringers. Both men insisted they had not been involved in the commotion. Regardless of their pleas, the two men were whipped. Seeing that they did not relinquish, they were set free and the tribunal was unable to press any charges against them.

Cruz’s remarks with regards to these two men seem somewhat problematic. On January 16, 1816, Cruz claimed that on the night of the 27th, the tribunal altered and embellished several testimonies and statements in order to give the impression that a failed insurrectionary plot had actually taken place. They did so by tricking the witnesses, asking them to sign their declarations without reading their statements aloud. In at least one case, they intimidated the witness into signing the declaration without him knowing what had been written in the records. Yet, in the case of these two men who were allegedly whipped, the tribunal did not add their testimonies, even distorted ones, to corroborate the existence
of an insurrectionary plot. Perhaps, on his second interrogation, Cruz exaggerated the tribunal’s arbitrariness and corruption to gain Montes’ favor. It is also possible that Cruz’s claims are true, and that the two men were in fact interrogated and tortured, but the tribunal then decided not to include them in the records for reasons that are unknown to us.

There are other accounts that seem to corroborate the troops’ suspicion that on the afternoon of the 27th an insurrection broke out. For example, the daughters of a Jose Ximenes, Mariana and Ignacia, claim to have seen from their window a group of Indians walking towards the main square and one or two zambos – they could not agree on the number – marching in front of them. The zambo or zambos were armed and held a knife in their hands. In her first declaration given on June 30, 1815, Mariana explained that the zambos incited the Indians, telling them to “advance, to die before long” and then moved forward as if they were leading an attack. On her second statement, given on February 15, 1816, Mariana claimed that the zambos did not make such remark, but that she did hear a similar comment when a group of Indians passed by her house as they left the city after the commotion broke out. Such was the anguish they suffered at the sight of these seemingly dangerous men, that Ignacia stumbled and hurt herself.

The children of Doña Isabel Tovar witnessed a similar scene. Not long before the commotion began, Tovar’s son, Miguel, saw four Indian men and an Indian nursing woman arguing on the street. According to Miguel, one of the men was crying out, “everything

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504 “… abansen para morir breve…” (AGI, QUITO,275, ‘Expediente relativo a la conmoción del 27 de junio de 1815. Marzo 1816.’, 10.)
505 AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 8, 13-14; AGI, QUITO,275, ‘Expediente relativo a la conmoción del 27 de junio de 1815. Marzo 1816.’, 10.
should be finished, not a single one should be left.”

The nursing woman, in her knees and with a baby on her hands, implored the man not to get into trouble, telling him he would surely get killed if he got involved in any sort of disturbance. Another of Tovar’s children, Ignacia, saw one of the Indian men talking to another woman. Ignacia claims to have heard the man explain to the woman that the Santafereños were on their way to Quito. From the window, she saw the Indians continued their way towards the main square. Shortly after, the disorders began. Sheltered in their home, located in the second floor of a house, the Tovar family saw people running up and down the street. Among them was Leandro, an Indian youngster whose family lived in the first floor of the Tovar’s residence. Leandro walked up to the closed doors and begged his sister, Vicenta, to give him a knife. Vicenta resisted and tried to convince his brother otherwise, advising him that he would probably lose the knife and get into trouble. Leandro insisted so much that Vicenta was forced to hand it over through a small window. With the knife in his hands, Leandro run up the street in the same direction as the other Indians. Once the commotion had ceased, Leandro and Vicenta’s parents went back to the streets, found Leandro, and recovered the knife he had taken.

Margarita Navarro, the shopkeeper who on the night of the 23rd had heard three men talking about an attack on the army barracks, also saw Indians stimulating disorders.

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506 “…hasta todo se hade acabar, yno hade quedar ninguno…” (AGI, QUITO,269, ‘ Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 18.)

507 The Tovar family (Isabel, Miguel, and Ignacia) were interrogated on July 1, 1815 as well as on February 17, 1816. On their second questioning, they confirmed most of the details offered on the first interrogation. Nonetheless, they clarified that an uprising did not take place and that these Indians were probably running and acting rowdily out of fear that troops might hurt them. (AGI, QUITO,269, ‘ Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 18-19, 25, 33; AGI, QUITO,275, ‘ Expediente relativo a la conmoción del 27 de junio de 1815. Marzo 1816.’, 13-14.)
on the 27th. That afternoon, Navarro was chatting with a soldier named Joaquín. They were standing in the shop’s doorway when they saw two Indian men pass by. They heard the Indians exclaim “they will all fall” as they beat their hands. Both Navarro and Joaquín knew these Indians were probably referring to the impending attack on the army quarters. Navarro demanded the soldier to capture them and take them to one of his officers. Joaquín claimed that he was alone and unarmed and would be unable to deal with the two of them. Not much time elapsed after this scene when they heard an uproar coming from the end of the street and saw people running in different directions.

Ardent comments alluding to the fall and destruction of Quito’s royalists continued even after the commotion had come to an end. When the streets were mostly empty and the troops were standing in the main square, María Josefa Salomé, a black woman, went out to buy cigars. On her way to the store, Salomé claims to have heard a group of men stating that, “since we’ve been unable to advance, we will throw the royalists out one by one, all the way to the underworlds.”

These accounts – such as those of several soldiers and officers, the Ximenes daughters, the Tovar family, Navarro, and Salomé – suggest that the disorders were related to an insurrectionary plot in which Indians apparently were going to play a central role. Other accounts, nevertheless, offer a somewhat different picture. Some believed that looting was taking place. Others, that troops were carrying out arbitrary detentions and

508 “… havian de caer…” (AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 9.)  
509 AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 9.  
510 “…ya que no hemos podido abansar haremos hechando a los realistas uno a uno a los infiernos…” (AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 20.)  
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committing all sorts of misdeeds. Several thought that some fortuitous event, unrelated to political conflicts, had triggered the commotion. Their diverse testimonies hint that disorders were perhaps produced by the growing unrest, mistrust, and fear that had been circulating and piling up for weeks. Under such uncertainty and prevention, it seemed that any minor incident could spark some sort of commotion.

For example, street vendors and shopkeepers encountered a tense environment in Quito’s streets. It seemed that any gesture or action could lead to a violent outburst. On the morning of the 27th, as he did several times a week, José Antonio Terán travelled to Quito to sell wheat, fruits, and vegetables. As usual, he left some of his products at a store and then wandered around Quito’s streets selling wheat. That morning, few people bought wheat from Terán. Some told him they did not have any money, many claimed that this was not a suitable day to be carrying out business. Towards one in the afternoon, Terán went back to the store where he left his fruits and vegetables with the intention of collecting his part of the share. The saleswoman, Mariana Losa, assured Terán that she had hid his money out of precaution and urged him to leave immediately because general looting was going to break out soon. Terán followed her advice and began his way back home. As he was leaving Quito, he heard a loud uproar in the distance.\textsuperscript{511}

Mariana Losa, for her part, had been warned by another saleswoman. While doing business in her store, a street vendor came in and asked Losa why she was so calm despite warnings that disorders were going to take place soon. Losa glimpsed out the door and saw dozens of women street vendors picking up their goods and hastily leaving the site. A Paula

\textsuperscript{511} AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 11.
Ninsunta saw a similar scene. Shortly after midday, Ninsunta had gone out to the street with her nursing boy. She was reaching the main square when an unknown woman approached her and told her to leave immediately for an uprising was soon going to take place. She then noticed that all stores were closings their doors and street vendors were also picking up their products and stands. Ninsunta left the square with her baby and was able to find shelter just before the mutiny began.\footnote{AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 7, 23.}

On the afternoon of the 27\textsuperscript{th}, Jose Ximenes, the father of Mariana and Ignacia, was doing business in a store when a small Indian woman went in. She seemed to be agitated and inconsolable. The Indian woman told the shopkeeper that widespread looting was about to take place and that some of her acquaintances were moving their merchandise and valued objects into the Santo Domingo Convent. Just as the Indian woman had explained, the disorders broke out shortly after she left the store.\footnote{AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 8, 13-14.}

Many believed that, similar to what had happened on August 2, 1810, the troops would be the ones ransacking shops and residences. Most Quiteños were wary of foreign troops and still remembered the viciousness with which the troops from Lima acted on August 2\textsuperscript{nd}. Once the commotion broke out on the 27\textsuperscript{th}, Don Mauricio José de Echanique, a royal accountant, hurried towards the army quarters with his son, an army officer. On their way to join the troops, they saw people fleeing the city’s squares. The few residents he saw standing on the streets were saying that it was all an artifice schemed by the army’s officers and soldiers. These bystanders claimed that the officers had made up stories of an uprising to discredit President Montes and to ruin the festivities the city was preparing to
demonstrate its fidelity to the recently restituted Ferdinand VII. Minutes later, after realizing that the uproar had been a false alarm, Echanique walked back to his house on the main square. He found the troops standing in front of the Presidential Palace. When they retired, he noticed the troops were taking a couple prisoners with them. Among them, he identified the clergyman Francisco Rodríguez Soto. In his testimony, Echanique explained that, at that precise moment, he felt President Montes was not the one calling the shots.  

On the 27th, Toribio Montes was having lunch when one of his assistants informed him that a commotion was soon going to break out. He was shocked to hear this news since he had not felt any notorious sign of discontent among the city’s residents. When he heard the uproar, he looked out the window and saw dozens of peoples running up and down the streets. Nonetheless, he did not see anyone carrying weapons or any indication that they were planning to attack the troops or royal authorities. As he watched what was happening, Francisco Rodríguez Soto, Manuel Larrea y Jijón – one of the city’s main notables –, and judge Don Antonio Aguirre entered his office. They came to inform him that, despite the commotion, there was no reason to worry for there were no signs that an uprising was taking place and the situation was calming down. According to Montes, as they discussed the state of affairs, a group of soldiers stormed his office and detained the three men. They held Rodríguez Soto prisoner in his house, let Aguirre free, and locked up Larrea in a cell in the army quarters. As this happened, the troops patrolled the city’s streets and detained another group of Quito’s notables. In letters sent to the Secretary of State in Madrid in

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514 AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Quaderno tercero. Expediente para aclarar los desórdenes del 27 de junio 1815.’, 15-16.
November 1816, Montes explained that General Samano and Colonel Fromista defied his authority and put people’s lives in danger. Montes argued that on that afternoon he decided to be prudent and avoid further frictions with the army’s officers to prevent a tragedy as had happened in previous years. He feared that if anyone, particularly him, responded to these acts of insubordination, the troops would end up murdering dozens and even hundreds of Quito’s residents.\footnote{AGI, Quito, 275, ‘No. 35. El Presidente y Comandante General de Quito da cuenta de lo obrado en su provincia de lo ocurrido el 27 de junio. 7 de noviembre de 1815.’, 1-4; AGI, Quito, 275, ‘No. 37. Carta de Toribio Montes al Secretario de Estado sobre los eventos del 27 de junio. 7 de diciembre de 1815.’, 1-6.}

Some accounts suggest that Montes was not exaggerating when he said that a tragedy almost took place on the 27\textsuperscript{th}. Sometime after the commotion broke out, Captain Agustín Galup was policing the streets with Lieutenant Ventura Llaguno. When they reached the alcabala office, Llaguno insisted on opening fire and began to cry out that they should move on to the San Roque neighborhood and “kill all the mischievous rebels.”\footnote{‘…que deseava matar alos picaros alsados y dirigirse al barrio de San Roque…” (AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Quaderno tercero. Expediente para aclarar los desórdenes del 27 de junio 1815.’, 20)} Galup was successful stopping him. Francisco Campos, the chief administrator of the alcabala, saw the scene from his office. According to his testimony, without any apparent reason, Llaguno began to point his rifle towards the bystanders at the end of the street. When Galup stopped him from shooting, “all that could be heard were his allegations of insurgents he wanted to kill.”\footnote{‘…le oya las expresiones de insurgentes aquienes queria matar…” (AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Quaderno tercero. Expediente para aclarar los desórdenes del 27 de junio 1815.’, 20)}

That afternoon, Captain Galup witnessed the army carrying out other arbitrary actions. Besides the detention of Rodríguez Soto and Larrea in the Presidential Palace, other notables were captured for no apparent reason. Galup himself was ordered to visit the
residences of the Montufars and arrest the family’s adult men. According to Galup, the officers giving the order justified their detention claiming that the family had been involved in previous uprisings and that there were rumors that Carlos Montufar had joined the rebels in Popayán. Captain Ygnacio Valladares claims that these arbitrary detentions and the army’s actions disallowing the President’s authority were part of a carefully premeditated plot led by Fromista and other officers. Apparently, the plan was twofold: to incite Quito’s notables to an energetic reaction that could be violently repressed and to place Fromista in command of the city. In such state of uncertainty, in which it was not clear who was in command of Quito, the rumor that General Samano’s troops were holding President Montes in custody began to spread through the city. Many began to fear a repetition of August 2nd.\(^{518}\)

When the commotion broke out, people in the streets as well as those in their residences and shops did not have a clear idea of what was happening: if an insurrection had begun, if looting was taking place, if the army was harassing Quito’s residents, or if the disorders had some other explanation. Among the latter, there is Clara Montenegro, a shopkeeper, who first imagined that the uproar she heard was related to the killing of the pigs that had been roaming the streets for the last weeks. Even though she had been warned during the morning that looting was possibly going to take place, her first reaction was to connect the boisterous screaming with the rowdiness she usually heard when pigs were sacrificed on the streets.\(^{519}\)

\(^{518}\) AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Quaderno tercero. Expediente para aclarar los desórdenes del 27 de junio 1815.’, 12, 18–20.

\(^{519}\) AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 27.
Among those who questioned the idea that the events of the 27\textsuperscript{th} were related to an organized rebellion or to widespread looting was the \textit{Procurador General Síndico} Joaquín Gutiérrez. During the first set of inquiries, Gutiérrez sent two petitions to Pereda de Saravia and the tribunal offering his views on what had happened on the 27\textsuperscript{th}. In both appeals, Gutiérrez insisted on Quito’s loyalty to Ferdinand VII and argued that there are few reasons to believe that the commotion was related to a revolutionary plot. In his first petition, sent on June 30, Gutiérrez explained that the disorders were simply the product of the uneasiness and nervousness that usually spread throughout Quito during the days previous to the city’s festivities when it was not uncommon for disorders and unruly behavior to happen. According to Gutiérrez, “that vulgar commotion was a momentaneous sprout, a shock that people felt when they saw others run without any apparent reason. It was mere confusion without malice nor hostility.”

As the \textit{Procurador} explained, people in the streets simply ran and yelled as they tried to find shelter amidst the agitation and confusion that broke out that afternoon.

For Gutiérrez, there were two reasons to believe that the disorders were not the product of an insurrectionary scheme. First of all, during the disorders no one was assaulted, people were not seen carrying weapons, and no one within the crowd was seen leading the multitude. To some extent, other testimonies given to the tribunal portray a different scenario in which Fromista was chased by a group of men, Indians and zambos were seen with bladed weapons, several men were heard rallying others to attack royalists,

\footnote{\textit{“… aquel movimiento bulgar fue brote momentaneo de puro sobresalto que sintieron las gentes deber correr mas a otras sin causa formal: fue confucion sin malicia ni animo ostil…”} (AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 30.)}
\footnote{AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815’, 29-31.}
and troops were seen harassing the city’s notables. Nonetheless, Gutiérrez is not mistaken when he claims that no one was physically hurt during the commotion (the exceptions might be Ximenes’ daughter who stumbled due to the fear she experienced and the soldier who bumped his head against the altar), that firearms were not seen among the crowd, and that there was no visible leader giving orders or running the scene among the multitude.\(^{522}\)

In the second place, the Procurador maintains that Quito’s plebeian women, instead of the city’s notables, were the main instigators of the commotion. For Gutiérrez, the fact that Quito’s nobles and “most respected residents” were not involved in the disorders implied not only their innocence, but also that the commotion had no association with the revolutionary plot others were talking about. As Gutiérrez claims, plebeian women were responsible for spreading fear by announcing around the city that mayhem and looting were soon going to take place. They were the first ones to pick up their goods, close their shops, and rush out of the city’s squares. However, Gutiérrez clarifies, they did not act with “sinister intentions” in mind. According to the Procurador, these women “lacked judgement” and “the hesitance associated to their social condition and sex made them susceptible” to easily falling into panic and confusion. Moreover, Gutiérrez claims that, while most of the city’s inhabitants run up and down the streets, members of Quito’s nobility could be found resting in their homes. Additionally, Gutiérrez explains that on the morning of the 27\(^{\text{th}}\), Quito’s Cabildo – comprised of city notables – had prepared a letter for President Toribio Montes warning him of the rumors and slander that had been

\(^{522}\) AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815’, 29-30.
circulating for weeks. All of this implied, according to Gutiérrez, that the commotion was not the outcome of a failed insurrectionary plan.\textsuperscript{523}

In his first petition, Gutiérrez does not deny that people in Quito had been talking for weeks of an impending uprising. However, the \textit{Procurador} dismisses them as the work of a few seditious criminals and adds that these messages had hardly transcended and had been rejected by almost all \textit{Quiteños}. Gutiérrez urges the tribunal to examine who was behind the subversive rumors and texts instead of accusing the whole city, particularly Quito’s most esteemed residents, of treachery. The \textit{Procurador} concludes his petition inviting the tribunal to abandon their animosity and mistrust towards Quito and encouraging its members to promote gratitude and confidence among all Spaniards, American and Peninsular, so that peace could reign over the city.\textsuperscript{524}

Gutiérrez sent a second petition on the 3\textsuperscript{rd} of July. In the appeal, he continues insisting that the commotion was not related to an insurrectionary plot and that Quito’s loyalty was indisputable. He asks the tribunal to continue its investigation to capture those who had been disturbing public peace through rumors and pamphlets and to vindicate the city’s honor by ratifying its fidelity to the Spanish Crown. What stands out in this second petition, however, is an alternative explanation regarding the events of the 27\textsuperscript{th}. In his petition, the \textit{Procurador} requests the tribunal to take into account that, “to a certain extent, what motivated the sudden turbulence of the mob, widespread bewilderment, and people rushing to find shelter was Judge Don Camilo Caldas’ decision to slaughter the dozens of

\textsuperscript{523} AGI, QUITO,269, ‘ Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 30.
\textsuperscript{524} AGI, QUITO,269, ‘ Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 30-31.
the pigs” that had been roaming the city’s streets.\textsuperscript{525} In early nineteenth-century Quito, as well as many other American and European cities and towns, it was not uncommon to find swine and cattle in urban streets. Every once in a while, to ensure hygiene and public order – the term used at the time was \textit{policía} –, authorities would issue the order to slaughter stray livestock. Such measures were not welcomed by many residents. Some of them owned these animals and actually lived with them inside their households. When the animals were not inside a residence due to lack of space or any other reason, city dwellers would simply let their pigs and cattle loose in the streets.\textsuperscript{526} By mid-1815, Gutiérrez explains, Quito had not slaughtered stray swine for a long time. By then, entire herds of pigs were wandering the streets, filling them with rubbish and even damaging the street’s stone pavement.\textsuperscript{527}

According to Gutiérrez, on the 27\textsuperscript{th}, around 2 p.m., news that Judge Caldas was going to slaughter pigs that same afternoon began to spread. Word of the forthcoming slaughter stirred people’s emotions to such extent that many “began running like sheep, one after the other. Meanwhile, others began closing their stands and shops. And in doing so exacerbated fright in the streets.”\textsuperscript{528} Rodríguez compared those running for their pigs

\textsuperscript{525} “…o que en cierto modo ocasionó aquel movimiento instantaneo de la plebe, sus afanes, turbacion, y deceso de refugiarse fuel el haver salido el regidor jue de policia Don Camilo Caldas a hacer matar puerços…” (AGI, QUITO,269, ‘ Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 34.)

\textsuperscript{526} Adriana María Alzate Echeverri, \textit{Suciedad y Orden. Reformas sanitarias borbónicas en la Nueva Granada, 1760-1810} (Bogotá: Editorial Universidad de El Rosario - Universidad de Antioquia - Instituto Colombiano de Antropología e Historia (ICANH), 2007), 89-95.

\textsuperscript{527} AGI, QUITO,269, ‘ Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815’, p. 34.

\textsuperscript{528} “…empesacen a correr como las obejas unas tras otras, serrando las mercaderas sus puertas de tiendas y haciendo con esto que se exasperace mas la timides de las de las calles.” (AGI, QUITO,269, ‘ Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815’, 35.) The 1739 \textit{Diccionario de Autoridades} defines “timidez” as a sense of fear and fright. (TIMIDEZ. s. f. Temor, miedo, encogimiento, è irresolución. (\textit{Diccionario de Autoridades}, Real Academia Española, 1739.))
with sheep perhaps to illustrate their hectic manners, but also possibly to highlight what he believed to be the mob’s foolishness. As Rodriguez explained, many ran to find their swine and hide them from Caldas and his band of guards. For some of Quito’s plebeians, their swine were their sole possession and material patrimony. Wherever packs of pigs were seen, dozens of people arrived to conceal the pigs from the officials. According to the Procurador, there was a swift contagion of panic in the streets and many began to run out of fear and despair. From his balcony, Gutiérrez saw people running in all directions. He was able to ask some of them what was going on. In almost all cases, they answered that disorders had erupted because Judge Caldas was about to slaughter stray pigs.\footnote{AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 34-35.}

For the Procurador, all clues supported the idea that the commotion was not the manifestation of an insurrectionary plot. The disorders were merely an explosion of emotions that had been agitated by either the forthcoming festivities, plebeian women’s propensity to panic, or news that stray pigs were going to be slaughtered. Additionally, Gutiérrez considered there were other clues aiming in the same direction. In his second petition, he explained that it was worth drawing attention on the fact that, when the call to arms went out, a small contingent of soldiers carrying a few drums and a small sword left the army quarters to go into the city for a short period of time. None of the soldiers were attacked even though not all of them were armed nor prepared for battle. Likewise, the several soldiers who were dispersed throughout the city when the commotion broke out made it back to the army barracks without being attacked or suffering any serious menace. Not even a rock was thrown at them. Moreover, Gutiérrez argued that if rebels were
actually thinking of carrying out an insurrection, they would have not planned it for the 27th, but would have waited for the festivities to begin. On 1815, Quito’s festivities had been scheduled to begin on July 10. During these days, Quito’s residents as well as those living in its proximities gathered in the city’s main squares and streets. Usually, many wore costumes and masks that concealed their identity. Such days, Gutiérrez maintained, offered an ideal venue for a revolutionary scheme to be carried out. On the contrary, the 27th posed no strategical advantages.530

As in his first plea, the Procurador closed his second petition urging the tribunal to acknowledge that the events of the 27th were not a failed uprising or the materialization of a rebel plot. Rather, Gutiérrez demanded the tribunal recognize Quito as a loyal city where only a few individuals were responsible for spreading “ridiculous rumors resulting from their bitterness and resentment.”531 Such a faithful city, Gutiérrez concluded, did not deserve to be dishonored by being labeled an insurrectional city. Pereda de Saravia and the tribunal, for the most part, dismissed Gutiérrez’s arguments. Despite the Procurador’s claims, they withstood the decision to incarcerate several of Quito’s notable such as Manuel Larrea y Jijón, Manuel Matheu, José Barba, Joaquin Sanchez, Guillermo Valdivieso, and a few others.532

Thanks to the testimony of Roque Martínez, the native of San Gil who ended up in Ambato and Latacunga, we know that news of the commotion and the subsequent arrests of several of Quito’s most esteemed notables quickly spread throughout the region. The

530 AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 35.
531 “… los ridiculos chismes organizados todos del rencor y resentimientos particulares…” (AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 35)
532 AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 50-51.
days previous to the commotion, Martínez had been travelling. On the 27\textsuperscript{th}, he arrived at the house of Don Próspero Bascones in the vicinities of Ambato. Martínez’s original idea was to stay there for a few nights before going back to Latacunga. However, on the night of the 28\textsuperscript{th}, towards 8 p.m., Próspero’s brother, Don Francisco arrived from Quito with pressing news. Francisco showed up barefoot and claiming to have walked a considerable part of the way. He had left Quito at around four in the morning, fleeing the city because soldiers were storming into the residences of notables to capture them and sent them to prison without any apparent reason. When Próspero and two of his other brothers heard Francisco’s account, they decided to hide before they were also arrested. Francisco and the other two brothers left shortly after. Martínez and Próspero left around 9 p.m. That night, the two of them slept in the house of an acquaintance in Huachi, a few kilometers south of Ambato. The following morning, when they returned to Próspero’s household, the Bascones women told them that all the men in Ambato and vicinities had left, and they should do the same—they were in imminent danger. During the two following days, Martínez and Próspero moved between haciendas, hiding from royal authorities. On the 30\textsuperscript{th}, Martínez visited Latacunga by himself to speak with the priest and some of his neighbors. But when he reached the town, none of them were there. He was only able to talk to his landlady who told him that all of Latacunga’s men had fled and that he should do the same and hide in a hacienda. Martínez thought about going back where he had left Próspero but changed his mind and decided to head south, towards Cuenca. Martínez
reached Cuenca some days later. On his third day in the city, he was arrested under charges of sedition and was interrogated by the Royal Audiencia a few weeks later.\textsuperscript{533}

\textit{A finale to chaos}

Besides ordering the detention of Larrea, Valvivieso, Barba, and other of Quito’s most reputable notables, the Asesor Pereda de Saravia, President Toribio Montes, and other officials took additional measures to assure public tranquility and capture those responsible for the commotion. On June 28, authorities issued a \textit{bando} informing Quito’s inhabitants that those who had left the city or had changed their place of residence as of the 27\textsuperscript{th} had eight days to return to their homes. If they did not do so, they would be considered suspicious of disturbing public peace. Those who returned and were not found guilty of any crime, would be pardoned. Secondly, the \textit{bando} stated that those who owned firearms, blades, and knives should present them to the authorities. Those who did not do so, and were later found in possession of a weapon, would be condemned accordingly. In the case of those concealing pointed knives, the sentence could be up to six years in prison, as established by a Royal Pragmatic. Lastly, the proclamation declared that curfew was in place, that no one was to go out to the streets after curfew began (starting hours would be announced each night), and that no one could walk in the streets after 7 p.m. without a torch in their hands that would allow others to identify them. The \textit{bando} was signed by Montes, but, given the circumstances, it is unclear if he authored it. As usual, the \textit{bando} was posted on the city’s most visible walls and announced through a public crier.\textsuperscript{534}

\textsuperscript{533} AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 86-88.
\textsuperscript{534} AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 54-55.
There are two possible reasons for the bando’s insistence on identifying those in possession of pointed knives and other weapons. One has to do with the news that had spread through the city of Antonio Ante’s purchase of sixteen razors during the first days of June. On the 27th, when army officers visited Ante’s residence to interrogate him, they found an empty house with traces that he had recently fled the city. As of that moment, Pereda and several officers considered Ante a serious suspect. The second reason has to do with an unresolved theft of weapons and ammunition. During the first weeks of 1815, gunpowder, hundreds of cartridges, and several knives were stolen from a warehouse within the army quarters. Several people were captured in relation to this theft, but most of them ended up fleing from prison and the weapons and ammunition were never found. According to the authority’s investigation, the stolen ammunition was sold to the notables Guillermo Valdivieso and Manuel Larrea. Apparently, the stolen ammunition was meant to supply a new insurgent army in the vicinities of Quito as well as the rebel troops from Cauca.535

The bando’s note regarding those who had left the city underlines the authority’s concern over the continuous flow of people coming in and out of Quito. Fromista, Pereda de Saravia, and other officials believed that rebels and renegades were creating unrest within the city and then hiding in the haciendas and villages found in its proximities. They supposed that rebels were using these networks between Quito and its vicinities to move

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535 Francisco Pereira, one of the burglars who escaped from prison, told his cellmates that the theft was led by two soldiers. They stole a total of sixteen thousand cartridges and three hundred cannon grapeshot. Pereira claimed that most of the ammunition was sold to Valdivieso and Larrea and hidden underground in one of Valdivieso’s properties. (AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 32, 80-82.)
people, information, and weapons. Yet, it seems that most of those who left the city on the afternoon of the 27\textsuperscript{th} and early hours of the 28\textsuperscript{th} were fleeing imminent detentions or an impending outbreak of extreme violence. Among the former, there were several of Quito’s notables. Such was the case of Francisco Bascones, the man who Roque Martínez saw arriving barefoot with news that a commotion had taken place in Quito and notables were being detained.\footnote{AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 54-55, 86-88.} Many others believed that the short-lived commotion that broke out around 3 p.m. was but a warning of impending violence. On the night of the 27\textsuperscript{th}, Isabel Tovar, who lived just outside the city, saw dozens of people leaving the city. She offered shelter to a few of them who said they were hiding out of fear that the troops would vandalize the city.\footnote{AGI, QUITO,275, ‘Expediente relativo a la conmoción del 27 de junio de 1815. Marzo 1816.’, 13.}

During the following days and weeks, Quito lived a tense peace. Rumors of a forthcoming uprising, of widespread looting, and of violent repression continued to spread throughout the city. On July 19, a small commotion broke out. Apparently, the disorders were caused by rumors that that the troops were planning to ransack shops and residences. A group of people were seen running in the streets. Shortly after, the city’s streets went back to tranquility. In the meantime, the troops stayed inside the barracks.\footnote{AGI, QUITO,275, ‘El Presidente de Quito Juan Ramírez envía respuesta a la solicitud de que se abra causa a Fromista. 21 de noviembre de 1817.’, 1.}

In the midst of this tense atmosphere, Pereda de Saravia’s tribunal continued interrogating people and prosecuting those who had been detained. Finally, towards the second week of July, the tribunal led by Pereda reached a verdict and decided to opt for an
intermediate resolution. Many of the imprisoned notables were transferred to their homes and most of them were granted limited mobility within the city. The tribunal established that some of the detainees could only go out to the streets escorted by soldiers or guards. Those who were considered the leaders of the failed uprising – Manuel Larrea, Manuel Matheu, José Barba, Joaquin Sanchez, and Guillermo Valdivieso – were sentenced to exile. The tribunal explained that their continuous meetings, questionable loyalty, and considerable influence over Quito’s residents made them highly suspicious as well as a threat to the city’s public peace. The five notables were given three days to choose a destiny outside of the Province of Quito where they would spend an undetermined amount of time while things settled down. The Procurador General Síndico, Joaquín Gutiérrez, tried to mediate, but was unsuccessful convincing the tribunal otherwise.539

The tribunal also passed judgement on Juan Pío Montufar and his brother Carlos Montufar. Both of them were charged of relapsing into criminal activity and of generating restlessness within the city. Even though the Montufar were not in Quito on the 27th or on previous days, the tribunal’s members argued that it was highly likely that they had been involved in the propagation of seditious rumors such as those claiming that rebels from Cauca and Santafé were about to take over Pasto and would soon invade Quito. Some of these rumors stated that the Montufar had joined rebel troops in Popayán or that they were organizing an army close to Quito to carry out a coordinated attack on the city. This hearsay caused extensive agitation throughout the city. Yet, the tribunal’s reasoning was somewhat paradoxical. At the same time that they claimed that the rumors were not true, the tribunal

539 AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 46, 50-51, 56.
gave them credibility when accusing Carlos and Juan Pío of plotting, in coordination with the *Santafereños*, against Quito’s royalist authorities.\footnote{AGI, QUITO,269, ‘ Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 54, 84.}

The tribunal’s final discussions with regards to this issue acknowledges its incapacity to identify those who actually instigated the commotion. One of its members claimed that the disorders “had not been clarified, nor who had been their authors, because such sort of crimes are difficult to prove, and only in rare occasions can they be confirmed. And because those who could offer information concerning this matter had fled.” Thus, the judge declared that this affair had reached a state in which it was “completely unverifiable, impossible to find the individuals who had actually fomented the sedition and agitated people to commit a crime that had been previously announced.”\footnote{…resulto de lo actuado indudable, y solo no aparece esclarecido quienes hayan sido sus autores, o por que estos crimenes son de muy dificil provansa, y raras veces pueden justificarse; o por que haviendo profugado aquellos que podian ministrar algun conocimiento sobre este punto, se halla el negocio en un estado de ser enteramente inaverguiable quales fueron las personas que realmente fomentaron la cedicion y alarmaron al pueblo para cometer un crimen que ya anteriormente se anunciaba…” (AGI, QUITO,269, ‘ Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 49.)} The judge admitted that there was no evidence against the notables who had been detained but noted that the tribunal had the authority to sentence them merely based on their suspicious activities. As a matter of fact, he recognized that their detention and exile could help bring peace and tranquility to Quito.\footnote{AGI, QUITO,269, ‘ Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 49-50.}

A few days after a verdict was reached, Pereda de Saravia’s comments regarding the trial reveal a combination of frustration, perplexity, and relief. In a report sent to Montes, Pereda de Saravia explains that the disorders did not end up in a full-scale revolution thanks to the troops’ vigilance and wise measures. His report also claims that
there were more than enough reasons to believe that the commotion had been incited by Quito’s notables. Nevertheless, the advisor admitted that his conclusions were merely based on his own suspicions. Although he acknowledged that the culprits had not been identified, he argued that everyone suspected of Valdivieso, Larrea, and others because of their questionable attitude in past episodes. Thus, the Asesor concluded that the tribunal’s decision to exile these notables and detain others in their residences was a prudent and fair ruling that would ensure Quito’s peace.543

Another report written from Cuenca on August 3 by the Audiencia’s Fiscal Interino reached a similar conclusion. In this document, the Fiscal claimed that it was undoubtable that the events of the 27th were incited by Quito’s insurgents but explained that the instigators were still unknown and further investigation was needed to identify the culprits. So far, he argued, the authorities’ only piece of evidence was that many of these notables had been involved in previous subversive episodes. However, the Fiscal Interino did not dismiss these suspicions as gratuitous and even suggested that the tribunal use the notables’ reputation and criminal records as a parameter from which to decide the sentence that would be imposed on each suspect. Individuals such as Valdivieso and Larrea, the Fiscal implies, deserved the harshest punishments for their alleged participation in past seditious actions.544

Those who were detained on the 27th and 28th insisted on their innocence and their loyalty to Ferdinand VII. They requested the tribunal and President to reconsider the verdict and pled for house arrest while a definite decision was made. In the meantime, their

543 AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 46.
544 AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 55-56.
families did the same. Wives, mothers, sisters, and brothers sent dozens of letters asking for mercy. The letters claimed that it was not true that a failed uprising had taken place on the 27th and, thus, argued that it made no sense to accuse their relatives of disloyalty, insurgency, or any other wrongdoing. Likewise, the letters portrayed their loved ones as loyal vassals who had served the Spanish Crown in many ways. Some highlighted the military services they had performed, others the bureaucratic positions they had held. Several letters also discussed their relatives’ health issues in an effort to convince Pereda and Montes to grant their loved ones their freedom or, at least, house arrest. Medical notes explaining their relatives’ conditions – from abscesses to chest pains – were attached to the letters. During the first two weeks of July, even before the tribunal reached a final verdict, several suspects were let free or granted house arrest. Once the tribunal reached a decision, several prisoners were declared innocent but warned that if the tribunal received any incriminating evidence, they would be detained once again.545

However, with regards to the main suspects, Pereda and the tribunal did not yield. Towards mid-July, Larrea, Matheu, and other of the prisoners sentenced to banishment were informed that they had three days to indicate where they would be spending their time in exile. Manuel Larrea and Manuel Matheu answered in written letters that they wanted to be exiled in Madrid. In his letter, Larrea explained that for a long time he had wanted “to go to the Peninsula, cradle of our elder, and seat of our King and Father. Following this proclivity, I choose the kingdoms of Spain, specifically the city of Madrid, as my place of

545 AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 49-50; AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Quaderno segundo. Sobre los tumultos del 27 de junio de 1815. 22 de septiembre de 1815.’, 1-6; AGI, QUITO,275, ‘Anexo 2. Peticiones de capturados y familias. 7 de diciembre de 1815.’, 1-5.
residence.” Montes agreed with their decision and granted them passports to travel to Spain.\textsuperscript{546}

Yet, Larrea and Matheu were not able to travel to Madrid. Before they left Quito, the tribunal changed its ruling and decreed that those sentenced to exile should be put back into prison. Larrea and Matheu fled the city before being detained once again. During the following months, they hid in haciendas in the outskirts of Quito. While they were hiding from the army, their names came up, for different reasons, in the Councils in Madrid. On August 6, 1815, the Spanish Crown conferred Manuel Larrea the title of Marquis of San José.\textsuperscript{547} Some months later, when news of the commotion and the subsequent detentions reached Madrid, Juan José Matheu – Count of Puñonrostro and former deputy at the Cortes of Cádiz – brought up his brother’s case to the Council of Indies. The Count insisted on his brother’s innocence as well as on that of most Quiteños. He argued that the commotion of the 27\textsuperscript{th} had been a plot led by General Samano and other army officers who wanted to repress Quito’s nobility. The Count explained that his brother, Manuel, had been put in charge of that year’s celebration of the Quito’s annual festivities in which the city was going to acclaim Ferdinand VII’s restitution to the throne. Due to this commission, Manuel had been in contact with all sorts of people and had gained the admiration of Quito’s populace. Pereda and Samano used Manuel’s approval as proof of his alleged intrigues. Yet, the Count explained, this in no way meant that Manuel was planning an uprising.

\textsuperscript{546} “… deseo vehemente de conocer la península, al cuna de nuestros mayores; el asiento de nuestro Rey y nuestro padre; siguiendo esta inclinacion, elijo los Reynos de España, y señaladamente la Villa de Madrid…” (AGI, QUITO,275, ‘Anexo 2. Peticiones de capturados y familias. 7 de diciembre de 1815.’, 18)

Despite the Count’s pleas, the Council did not decide on Manuel Matheus’ fate and insisted that Quito’s Audiencia resolve the issue.\textsuperscript{548}

It seems that towards late August and early September of 1815, the emotions the commotion of the 27\textsuperscript{th} stirred were by then waning. However, the tensions among Quito’s main authorities persisted during the following months. On one side, there was President Toribio Montes, royal administrators, mid-level bureaucrats, and several army officers and soldiers, mostly from Quito. On the other, there was the \textit{Asesor} Pereda de Saravia, General Samano, Colonel Fromista, and dozens of army officers, particularly those from Lima, Guayaquil, and the Iberian Peninsula. Many of the members of the Royal Audiencia stationed in Cuenca sided with the latter group, while most of the Quito’s notables and commoners did so with Montes.\textsuperscript{549}

The commotion of the 27\textsuperscript{th} was at the heart of these tensions. Montes accused Samano and Fromista of instigating a commotion to imprison Quito’s notables and depose him from the presidency. In letters sent to the Secretary of State, Montes explained that the officer’s insubordination was manifest. First of all, the army rallied the \textit{generala} (call to arms) without his consent. Then, they stormed his office and captured Rodríguez Soto and Larrea without even asking him for his approval. Their arbitrary and defiant actions continued, Montes argued, with the \textit{Asesor} Pereda’s tribunal. According to Montes, Pereda’s trial was biased and inaccurate. Montes claimed that during the night of the 27\textsuperscript{th},

\textsuperscript{548} AGI, QUITO,275, ‘Carta del Conde de Puñonrostro al presidente del Consejo de Indias. 6 de septiembre de 1816.’, 1-3; AGI, QUITO, 275, ‘Consejo habla sobre distintas versiones de los desórdenes del 27 de junio de 1815. 10 de octubre de 1816.’, 1-6.
\textsuperscript{549} AGI, QUITO,269. ‘Quaderno Tercero sobre lo ocurrido el 27 de junio último. Noviembre 1815.’; AGI, QUITO,275. ‘El Presidente y Comandante General de Quito da cuenta de lo obrado en su provincia de lo ocurrido el 27 de junio último. Marzo 1816.’

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army officers intimidated and deceived several witnesses, forcing them to submit untruthful testimonies that gave the impression that Quito’s notables had planned an insurrection. From there on, he maintained, Pereda had continued a trial full of imprecisions that unjustly ended in the detention and conviction of several innocent Quiteños. To make his case, Montes ordered new interrogations that could disprove the allegations made by Pereda’s tribunal. These inquiries were carried out on November 1815 and during the first months of 1816.\footnote{AGI, QUITO,275. ‘El Presidente y Comandante General de Quito da cuenta de lo obrado en su provincia de lo ocurrido el 27 de junio último. Marzo 1816.’, 1-4.}

Montes’ allegations were perceived as an affront by Pereda, Samano, and Fromista. In a letter sent to the Spanish King on January 7, 1816, Pereda accused Montes of being the “commander of the treacherous insurgents.” Pereda questioned why Montes’ crimes were tolerated and what special privileges allowed him to contravene judicial sentences imposed on criminals. He demanded that Montes be deposed and ordered to leave Quito immediately, for such as an “outrageous” servant, with “his despotic and abusive government should not be allowed to pass such a pernicious example on to posterity.” Both Samano and Fromista censured Montes for his close ties to those who took part in previous insurrectionary plots and accused him of trying to form a despotic government that would persecute his personal enemies.\footnote{‘…se ha convertido en caudillo de estos traydores insurgentes… de cuyo gobierno despótico y abusivo, no debe dexarse tan pernicioso exemplo a la posteridad.’ (AGI, QUITO,269. ‘Muy reservado. Oydor Honorable Asesor general y auditor de Guerra de Quito. Da cuenta con testimonio del escandaloso atentado cometido por aquel señor presidente. 7 de enero de 1816.’, 1.)}

In Cuenca, Lima, and Madrid, judges and other officials went over the judicial records as well as the accusations made by both factions. Most resolved that Pereda’s
conclusions were accurate, dismissed several of Montes’ allegations, and concluded that a failed uprising had in fact taken place in Quito on June 27th. For example, the Audiencia’s Fiscal in Cuenca argued that, even though Samano and Fromista did not act accordingly, their poor behavior did not disprove that on the 27th a failed insurrectionary plot had actually broken out. The Fiscal maintained that similar to what had happened in previous uprisings, on this occasion, there had been too many rumors and voices talking of an impending insurrection. The Fiscal jumped to the conclusion that the existence of rumors proved that there was in fact an insurrection. “This has always been Quito’s way,” he explained. “There has never been a movement without preceding voices or other precursory signs announcing that there will soon be a novelty.”

Nonetheless, most officials who reviewed the case also found fault in Samano and Fromista’s acts. Some, such as the Fiscal, believed their actions had been inappropriate, but did not push for an inquiry to examine their conduct. Others, such as the members of the Council of Indies in Madrid, thought otherwise. On February 1817, the Council ordered Quito’s Audiencia to investigate Samano and Fromista for their insubordinate actions and for inappropriately intervening in Pereda’s trial. A formal and thorough investigation was never carried out, probably out of fear that it could lead to further frictions and violence among the two factions. Towards November 1817, Juan Ramírez – who replaced Montes as president of Quito’s Audiencia on July 26, 1817 – closed the case arguing that a royal decree of January 24, 1817 declared general pardon for the crime of insurrection. Ramírez

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552 “…siempre ha sido este el metodo de obrar de Quito: Jamas ha ocurrido movimiento sin iguales antecedentes voses o signos precursores de la novedad…” (AGI, QUITO,269. ‘Quaderno Tercero sobre lo ocurrido el 27 de junio último. Noviembre 1815.’, 22.)

553 AGI, QUITO,275. ‘El Consejo de Indias pide que se le abra causa a Fromista. 18 de febrero de 1817.’, 1.
made use of this decree to put an end to all judicial trials related to the commotion of the June 27th. In spite of this decision, Ramírez’s closing remarks also reveal that he believed that an unsuccessful insurrection had taken place and that several army officials, in an act of insubordination, had defied the President’s authority.\footnote{AGI, QUITO,275, ‘El Presidente de Quito: Ynforma con documentos de los poderosos motivos que le han asistido para suspender la formación de la causa.’, 3-4.}

The frictions between the two factions were left unresolved. Despite the accusations of treason and disloyalty that both sides hurled at each other, it seems that these were merely disagreements among royalist ranks that went back to August 10, 1809 and August 2, 1810. At least among these two groups, the Spanish Crown and Ferdinand VII’s sovereignty over the American territories was not at stake. It was a matter of how to confront and deal with the monarchical crisis that erupted on 1808. The frictions that arouse in 1809 over the recognition of the \textit{Consejo de Regencia} and over the establishment of a government junta left a stamp in the memory of most Quiteños. Despite Montes’ efforts to put behind these events and erase them from Quito’s memory, remembrances of these past events – with the atmospheres, feelings, and codes they reminisced – were at the core of Quito’s collective memory.\footnote{During the interrogations that took place on November 1815, several witnesses claimed that President Montes had made great efforts to erase previous incidents of violence and repression from people’s memory as a way to promote peace and reconciliation. (AGI, QUITO,269. ‘Quaderno Tercero sobre lo ocurrido el 27 de junio último. Noviembre 1815.’, 10-20.)} Anger, mistrust, and fear arouse among most Quiteños when they recalled August 10th and, particularly, August 2nd. On June 27th, these memories shaped the ways they experienced the emotional outburst that broke out that afternoon as well as their grasp of what was happening and of what to expect from the future. The commotion of the 27th, with the panic and repression it produced, fed the growing tensions
between these royalist factions. On both sides there were individuals trying to prove their fidelity to the Spanish Crown at the same time that they attempted to portray their rivals as disloyal insurgents. In the years to come, these frictions would open the doors for the expansion of pro-independence and republican projects.

**Conclusions: reflections on memory and emotions**

The commotion that broke out on June 27, 1815 may be considered a rather irrelevant historical event. Nonetheless, the hundreds of written pages of judicial records and letters it prompted offer a unique glimpse into the emotions and memories of Quito’s residents and those from its vicinities. Contradictions and inconsistencies arise throughout the trial, and many witnesses are unable to remember certain details of what they saw or heard. Through the types of questions asked, the open or implicit intimidation inflicted on the witnesses, and the statements that were included, altered, or omitted, ambiguity and bias stand out in the historical record. To a certain extent, the accounts that ended up in the documents are a combination of what the witnesses recall having seen and heard, their own preconceived notions, and the tribunals’ prejudices.

In that sense, each testimony is both a recollection of individual and collective memories and understandings. When the witnesses were summoned by the tribunal, the testimonies they offered were based on the scenes, conversations, and other details they remember to have seen and heard on June 27th and the days before and after the commotion. However, there are gaps in their narratives, either because their memory fails them, because certain details do not sum up in their reasoning, or because there are certain issues that they prefer to adapt to gain the tribunals’ favor. It seems that to fill in these gaps, some resorted to a common domain composed of recollections of events, atmospheres, codes, and
symbols. From this repertoire or inventory, some picked out the memories that best suit their grasp of the present or that best fit the explanation they wanted to reach. Yet, it appears that this selection of memories is not a completely conscious and intentional process. It seems that part of it responds to each individual’s unconscious biases and prejudices as well as that of their more intimate social group.

At this point, Paul Ricoeur’s discussion on memory and recollection is worth bringing up. Ricoeur explains that the act of remembering comes about in two distinct ways. For the one part, there is the notion that some memories appear passively and pop into the mind without any conscious effort. He designates this act of remembering with the Greek term mnémé. On the other hand, there is anamnésis or the act of consciously searching for an object in our memory.556 Halbwachs, whose reflections on memory came before Ricoeur’s, argues that the elements found in the common domain can be recollected whenever one wants to and that these remembrances are easier to recall than individual ones. Halbwachs does not explicitly divide the process of remembering between the spontaneous and the deliberate. Nonetheless, he argues that recollections from the collective memory do not require much effort.557 At least with what regards to what was going on in people’s minds on the 27th as they ran up the streets or hid in their homes, this seems to be the case. It appears that when rumors began to circulate and when the disorders broke out, shared memories popped into people’s mind without any deliberate effort. However, when they were interrogated by the tribunals, it appears that certain memories

557 Halbwachs, La memoria colectiva, 50.
appeared spontaneously while others did require a deliberate effort, particularly when witnesses wanted to underscore or disregard certain elements.

In as much as a society’s collective memory offers tools that allow individuals to understand and give meaning to what was happening during a certain event, collective memory also incites and shapes particular emotions. That is, recollections from the common domain shape people’s experiences and the emotions they feel at a given moment. The emotions that memory motivates usually correspond to those a person or society experienced during similar incidents in the past. For example, we have seen that rumors played a central role engendering unrest, fear, and mistrust. In Quito’s collective memory there were remembrances of the widespread uneasiness and suspicion that rumors had generated in the past. Many recalled that disorders usually erupted in the midst of such overwrought environments as happened in 1809 and 1810. As the Fiscal from Cuenca explained in his assessment of the commotion of the 27th, in Quito “there has never been a movement without preceding voices or other precursory signs announcing that there will soon be a novelty.”558 Those remembrances not only influenced their understanding of their present, but also shaped their emotions. For instance, a few days before the 27th, Manuel Larrea y Jijón – the notable who was imprisoned and ended up fleeing the city – claimed to have felt grief-stricken at the thought that August 2nd could repeat itself.559 As Larrea, several other witnesses associated memories of the past, such as rumors and the tense atmosphere they generated, with imminent disorders and, thus, these recollections produced fear and distress among them.

558 AGI, QUITO,269. ‘Quaderno Tercero sobre lo ocurrido el 27 de junio último. Noviembre 1815.’, 22.
559 AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 4.
This relationship between memory and emotions comes up in dozens of accounts. When the witnesses offered details of what happened on the 27th, they constantly alluded to recollections from the common domain to explain what they saw and heard as well as the emotions associated to these collective remembrances. An interesting example is that of the children interrogated by the tribunal: Miguel Tovar who was eleven years old at the time of the events, Ignacia Ximenes who was fourteen, and Vicenta Rojas who was eleven years old. The sisters of the first two were also interrogated but were fairly older: Ignacia Tovar was eighteen and Mariana Ximenes nineteen. Due to their young age, Ignacia Ximenes, Vicenta, and Miguel probably did not have personal recollections of previous disorders in Quito. Nonetheless, it seems that their understanding of what was happening and the emotions they felt when the commotion broke out were shaped by a common domain of remembrances. Their familiarity with this collective memory was perhaps partial and limited if compared to that of an older person, but it seems that through conversations with their elders, relatives, and other members of their community, they grasped certain memories of past events. When Ignacia and Miguel saw groups of Indians in the streets, they seem to have immediately associated the scene with trouble and impending disorders. The sight of four Indian men and an Indian woman crying in her knees instantly made Miguel fear that riots were soon going to break out. In the case of Ignacia, the sight of zambo men holding knives and leading and rallying the Indians caused such intense fear and anguish in her that she stumbled and hurt herself. It is as if at that precise moment, recollections from August 2nd – particularly the remembrance of zambo

560 AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 18-19, 33.
and black soldiers from Lima opening fire at the multitude on the streets – sprung into her mind and made her panic and stumble.\textsuperscript{561}

Vicenta’s case is somewhat different. The records refer to Ignacia Ximenes as Doña and Miguel Tovar as Niño, implying that both of their families were of a relatively high social standing. Likewise, the documents do not refer to their race, which leads us to suppose they were probably white or mixed-race. We know that Vicenta’s mother was a covachera (small shopkeeper)\textsuperscript{562} and that her brother, Leandro, is referred to in the records as a cholo or Indian. Thus, contrary to Ignacia and Miguel, Vicenta was apparently a commoner and an Indian. Vicenta’s account focuses on the moment in which Leandro showed up and asked her through the closed door to give him a knife. After his constant pleading, she was forced to give it to him. In her statement, Vicenta explains that her concern at that instant was that Leandro would probably lose the knife and get into trouble. Vicenta implies that she was worried at the sight of her brother pleading for the knife and people running in the streets.\textsuperscript{563} Yet, she does not talk about potential violence, looting, or turmoil. It seems that her worries and fears were not the same as Ignacia and Miguel’s, neither in intensity nor in subject matter. Perhaps, this is due to fact that the remembrances she received through her parents and relatives were not the same as those that Ignacia and Miguel held.

\textsuperscript{561} AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815’, pp. 13-14.
\textsuperscript{562} Covachas were small shops located in the first story or the main hall of a house or building. Towards the year of 1800, there were thirteen covachas in Quito. Most of them were found relatively close to the main square. (Manuel Lucena Salmoral, “Las tiendas de la ciudad de Quito, circa 1800”. Procesos. Revista Ecuatoriana de Historia, no. 9 (1996): 125-128.)
\textsuperscript{563} AGI, QUITO,269, ‘Expediente sobre alzamiento y tumultos en Quito el 27 de junio de 1815.’, 13-14.
Two issues arise from these three testimonies. One has to do with the racial
predispositions that were at play in this relationship between memory and emotions.
Several testimonies claim that Indians were seen in covert meetings, harassing royalists,
chasing General Fromista, preparing for battle, and rallying people to attack the troops.
The few zambos that come up in the records are also accused of inciting violence. Yet, not
a single Indian or zambo was sentenced or even captured in relation to the commotion of
the 27th. Apparently, racial prejudice was involved in these testimonies. Yet, it seems that
memories of the past also help explain why white and mixed-race residents so insistently
associated the presence of Indians and people of African descent with an impending
uprising. Previous riots and disorders in Quito, such as those of the Rebellion of the Barrios
and August 2nd, coincided with the arrival of numerous Indians into the city. Moreover,
stories of distant events, such as the Tupac Amaru Rebellion and the Haitian Revolution,
were possibly also incorporated into the city’s collective memory. In the end, recollections
of Indians and people of African descent involved in riots and extreme violence ended up
being part of Quito’s common domain. Thus, many Quiteños ended up feeling fear and
unrest at the sight of groups of Indians and zambos in the streets partly due to recollections
of previous disorders popping to their mind.

These three testimonies also bring up questions with regards to the relation between
individual and collective memory and the diversity of ways in which different members of
a society relate to the common domain. Apparently, Vicenta Rojas did not have the same
recollections as Ignacia Ximenes and Miguel Tovar despite the fact that they had almost
the same age and lived in the same city. As a matter of fact, Ignacia and Vicenta lived in
the same house: Vicenta’s family on the ground floor and Ignacia’s on the second story.
However, there were deep social divisions that set them apart. It seems that these social differences shaped the memories each one recollected from the past and, thus, the emotions they felt at the sight of certain scenes. While most white and mixed-race Quiteños felt fear at the sight of a congregation of Indians, for the Rojas family such a scene did not bring up memories of violence and disorders nor did it produce feelings of fear. It is as if there were more than one collective memory and Vicenta did not have access to the same collective memory as Ignacia and Miguel. Or, as Halbwachs would explain, there is only one collective memory, but the remembrances each one calls to mind were not the same due to each person’s place in society. Memory and the act of remembering are social and take place in a given social context.\footnote{Barbara Misztal, \textit{Theories of Social Remembering} (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 2003), 10-13.}

Halbwachs claims that the collective memory obtains its force and continuity from an ensemble of people who are constantly feeding the shared repertoire with memories. Although it is a collective act, remembering is an individual action. In this act of recollecting from a shared pool of memories, not all remembrances have the same effect on all individuals. Some memories might leave a significant imprint on certain individuals while they might barely reach others. As Halbwachs argues, each individual memory is merely a point of view from the totality of the collective memory. Such point of view changes depending on the individual’s social standing and her or his relations with the rest of society. Thus, Halbwachs maintains, it is not surprising that not everyone makes use of this shared instrument in the same manner.\footnote{Halbwachs, \textit{La memoria colectiva}, 49-50.}
To sum up, the commotion of the 27th offers a glimpse into the ways in which people in Quito experienced fear, panic, unrest, and other emotions during a particular incident. Likewise, it shows the ways in which these emotions travelled and reproduced through rumors and memories. The disorders that broke out that day also highlight the persistent frictions among royalist fractions. Moreover, the events of June 27th bring to light a connection between collective memory and emotions. Previous cases of repression and violence left an imprint in the collective memory of Quiteños. Remembrances of these past events helped Quito’s residents give meaning to what was happening at the same time that these recollections shaped the emotions they were feeling. Yet, not everyone accessed the collective memory in the same way. An individual’s place in society influenced that person’s remembrances and, thus, the emotions she or he felt. In that sense, memory could be considered an additional element to add when studying Barbara Rosenwein’s “emotional communities”, which was explored in the previous chapter.566

On June 7, 1816, Friar Juan José Merchán, a member of the Order of the Hospital of Saint John in Santafé de Bogotá, was put on trial accused of betraying the Spanish Crown. Several witnesses claimed they saw Merchán publicly swearing allegiance to Cundinamarca’s constitution and its declaration of independence. Moreover, the witnesses maintained that the friar was even elected to Cundinamarca’s Assembly as a delegate of Chocontá, a town 75 km northeast of Santafé. A few of them recalled that when news of royalist victories reached Santafé, Merchán was seen upset and disappointed. In his defense, the friar stated that he had sworn in favor of the constitution and declaration of independence because he was left with no other option. He justified his involvement in the Assembly by claiming it had been simply a way to prevent the rebels from making radical decisions that would have led to a definite break from Spain.567

Furthermore, Merchán explained that he joined the Assembly because he believed he could aid and care for even more Spaniards and royalists than those he had already been helping as a member of a hospitaller order. All through his defense, the friar constantly claimed that after the formation of Santafé’s Junta, he protected dozens of Spaniards and royalists. He insisted that, thanks to his aid, many were able to hide in the Convento Hospital de San Juan to escape from the republicans’ harassment and incarcerations. Several of these royalists offered their testimonies in court or sent notes corroborating Merchán’s help and protection. Throughout the trial, the friar also emphasized the

567 Archivo General de la Nación de Colombia (AGN), CO.AGN.SAA-1.10.26 – Fondo Eclesiásticos, ‘Interrogatorio Caso Juan José Merchán del Convento Hospital de San Juan.’, 841-849.
sufferings and persecutions he had endured at the hands of rebel forces. According to the clergyman, in December 1814, amidst the final stage of the war between Cundinamarca and the Provincias Unidas de la Nueva Granada, he suffered General Bolívar’s siege and an assault on his hospital. After being captured, Bolívar’s troops insulted and humiliated him. Despite the ample evidence in his favor, royalist officials found Merchán guilty of treason and sentenced him to solitary confinement in the Saint John’s Convent Hospital.

The friar’s case was not unique in anyway. Throughout the monarchical restoration in New Granada, between 1815 and 1819, hundreds of people were brought to court to explain their conduct following the formation of local government juntas and their association with rebel leaders. Some years earlier, between 1811 and 1813, most provinces in New Granada had declared their independence from Spain and formed new republican states. Throughout the region, hundreds of cities, towns, and villages held ceremonies to swear allegiance to the new republics, their leaders, and their newfound constitutions. The swear-ins were attended by multitudes. Some people genuinely joined the celebrations.

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568 In November 1811, after most of New Granada’s provinces had established government juntas and some of them had even declared their independence from Spain and formed republican governments, New Granada’s provinces created a federation uniting them. The federation took the name of the Provincias Unidas de Nueva Granada. From the beginning, Cundinamarca was unwilling to join the federation and many of the Provincias Unidas’ leaders opposed the idea of accepting Cundinamarca into the coalition due to its centralist constitution. In 1812, there was a period of close to five months in which the State of Cundinamarca joined the federation. The alliance disintegrated when the other provinces ordered Cundinamarca’s leader, Antonio Nariño, to change the State’s legislation. In the following two years, there were periods of war and peace between Cundinamarca and the Provincias Unidas. In December 1814, troops from the Provincias Unidas, led by Simón Bolívar, took over Santafé de Bogotá, putting an end to the war between the two factions. Cundinamarca was annexed to the Provincias Unidas. (Patricia Cardona Zuluaga and Liliana María López Lopera, “Las capitulaciones de diciembre de 1814 en Santafé de Bogotá”. Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política, Humanidades y Relaciones Internacionales, no. 40 (2018): 813-819.)

convinced that independence and republicanism would bring better times. Others showed up out of curiosity or even out of fear that republicans would reproach them and condemn their absence. Around 1815, as the tides of revolution began to change, most of New Granada’s residents, such as Friar Merchán, were left in an odd position. Even though many of them had recently sworn allegiance to the Free State of Cartagena, the Republic of Cundinamarca, or other independent states, by 1815 and 1816, they were now, once again, vowing loyalty to the Spanish Crown. Those who had taken a part in republican loyalty oaths were left with a stain on their reputation, regardless of their alleged reluctance to attend the ceremonies. Amidst these trouble times, expressions and manifestations of emotions became strategies to navigate the period’s frictions and tensions.

At the time, there were hundreds of testimonies throughout New Granada claiming that rebels intimidated them and coerced them into swearing republican constitutions and declarations of independence from Spain. It is possible that some exaggerated such acts of intimidation to justify any wrongdoing they could have committed during previous years. Others may have portrayed the rebels in the worst possible terms to go along with the rhetoric that came with the monarchical restoration. Yet, it is undeniable that republicans did force many into pledging constitutions and declarations of independence. Some of the harshest testimonies concern the ceremonies that took place in Santafé de Bogotá in July 1813. On July 16, Cundinamarca declared its independence from Spain and formed a new state with Antonio Nariño as its dictator. As part of the ceremony, Nariño planted a “tree of liberty” in the city’s main square and then executed, without trial, a slave accused of having killed his master. The following day, a desk and a dock were placed next to the tree. During the ensuing days, all residents were expected to attend the main square to swear the declaration of independence. A secretary sitting on the desk took note of every person who swore the declaration. The dock was placed next to the tree so that republican soldiers could, without any delay, execute anyone who refused to pledge Cundinamarca’s independence. Apparently, no one was put to death, but one can imagine the dock’s presence – and the memory of the executed slave – compelled many into swearing the declaration of independence. (Archivo General de Indias (AGI), SANTAFE,747, ‘Carta de Gerónimo Fernández aparentemente a Fr. Andres de Aras, monge capuchino residente en la Havana. Kingston. 20 de noviembre de 1813.’, 1-3.)

This chapter pays attention to New Granadian clergymen who were put in trial for having publicly sworn republican constitutions and declarations of independence. The records of dozens of these judicial cases are found in the Archivo General de la Nación de Colombia. But it was not only clergymen who were put in such a situation. Even high-level bureaucrats with credentials attesting their loyalty and services to the Spanish Crown faced repudiation and condemnation for having pledged constitutions and declarations of independence. An intriguing case is that of Juan Jurado de Lainez. Jurado arrived at Santafé a few days before July 20, 1810, when Santafé formed its government junta. Jurado had been recently appointed as the Royal Audiencia’s new oidor (magistrate). He remained in Santafé until January 1815. During that time, he held a variety of posts for the different governments that ruled the province. Apparently, in more than one occasion, he tried to leave Santafé but the city’s officials did not give him permission to do so. Moreover, the fact that
This chapter studies two cases in which individuals and collectivities strategically expressed fear, elation, and anger while they also tried to incite similar manifestations among others. Clergymen are the main protagonists throughout the chapter. In early nineteenth-century New Granada, the clergy played a leading role spreading information and advocating for what they considered to be proper values and forms of conduct. Their symbolic capital came not only from being religious men, but also from their position as social and political mediators. The first case revolves around priest José María Morcillo’s he had eleven daughters and one son living with him and his wife made him dismiss the option of fleeing. He claimed that during these years he used his position to aid and protect Spaniards from any sort of repression and that he did what he could to maintain Cundinamarca as a province loyal to Ferdinand VII. He explained that he only swore the republican constitutions and declarations of independence because he was left with no other option. It was only until January 1815, after being harassed by Simón Bolívar and his troops, that he was given permission to leave. On his way to Santa Marta, Bolivar’s troops abducted his 14-year-old son. The son was later released shortly after Jurado departed to Panamá around mid-1815. In Santa Marta, Cartagena, and Panamá, royalist officials rejected him and accused him of treason. In Panamá, where Santafe’s Audiencia was convening at the time, magistrates rejected his requests to join the Audiencia. It was only after over a year of requests to Spain’s courts and councils that Jurado was absolved of any crime and was given a post in Cuba. However, it seems that in the following years, other magistrates and bureaucrats did not completely pardon him for his alleged treachery. (AGI, SANTAFE,747, ‘Expediente caso Juan Jurado de Lainez. Panamá. 3 de agosto de 1815.’, 1-38; AGI, SANTAFE,747, ‘Oficio Fiscal del Consejo de Gracia y Justicia sobre restitución de Jurado. 18 de mayo de 1816.’, 1-4.)

Both monarchist and republicans acknowledged the clergy’s importance as social and political mediators. An example of this is seen with the hundreds of sermons that were pronounced in favor, or against, independence and republicanism between 1808 and the early 1820s. In 1819, shortly after republican troops regained control of Santafe de Bogotá, Francisco de Paula Santander issued a decree that ordered clergymen all through New Granada to offer sermons in favor of independence. In the sermons, the clergymen were expected to explain that independence did not go against Christ’s doctrine and the supporting independence was not sinful. Republican officials demanded priests to send copies of their sermons to prove they had obeyed with the decree. Over two hundred of these sermons are found in the Archivo General de la Nación de Colombia. Many of them were recently compiled in a book published by the Colombian National Archives. To an extent, Santander was simply following the example set by royalist authorities who, during the monarchical restoration as well as during the first years of the monarchical crisis, demanded clergymen to praise Ferdinand VII, the Spanish Crown, and the monarchical system in their sermons and treatises. (Viviana Arce Escobar, “El púlpito entre el temor y la esperanza: ideas de castigo divino y misericordia de Dios en la oratoria sagrada neogranadina, 1808-1820”, Anuario de Historia Regional y de las Fronteras 17 (2012): 83, 85; José David Cortés Guerrero, “La lealtad al monarca español en el discurso político religioso en el Nuevo Reino de Granada”, Anuario colombiano de historia social y de la cultura 37, no. 1 (2010): 45-48; Margarita Garrido Otoya, “Los sermones patrióticos y el nuevo orden en Colombia, 1819-1820”, Boletín de Historia y Antigüedades 41, no. 826 (2004): 462; Armando Martínez Garnica (comp.), Sermones patrióticos en el comienzo de la República de Colombia, 1819-1820 (Bogotá: Academia Colombiana de Historia-Archivo General de la Nación, 2019.).

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funeral rites in Popayán in 1817. The second case studies a series of interrogations revolving around a priest, José Ángel Manrique, and his involvement in the rise of a guerrilla group north of Santafé in late 1817. The questioning is one of hundreds of trials that took place between 1816 and 1818 when royalist authorities interrogated clergymen who were accused of supporting the rebellion and of swearing republican constitutions and oaths of independence.573

This chapter poses a premise and an argument. In the first place, this chapter presents the premise that public expressions and manifestations of emotions help shape the meanings given to people’s actions and conduct. That is to say, our understandings of what others say and do is shaped by their displays of emotions. This claim has several implications. On the one hand, it implies that emotions and strategy, following Bourdieu’s understanding of the term, are inseparable. Emotional expressions, due to their capacity to affect meaning, may be marshalled and guided in certain directions as part of a person’s efforts to improve their standing and reputation. During the monarchical restoration in New Granada, people from different social status and political positions turned to expressions of fear, elation, and anger as means to convey their faithfulness to Ferdinand VII. Many of them, in as much as they could, strategically sought to conceal, exaggerate, or twist their emotional manifestations to persuade others of their indisputable loyalty to the Crown. By doing so, they were also inciting those around them to follow their lead, tacitly persuading

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573 The Archivo General de la Nación in Bogotá holds several boxes filled with interrogatories carried out by royalist authorities against clergymen suspected of having betrayed the Spanish Crown and of having supported the formation of local juntas and republican governments. These interrogatories were carried out between 1815 and 1818. There are over fifty trials against clergymen. Most of them relate to clergymen stationed in the provinces of Santafé and Tunja, but there are also several cases from other provinces throughout New Granada, including Cartagena and Popayán. (AGN, CO.AGN.SAA-I.10.23-32 – Fondo Eclesiásticos.)
them to employ similar emotional expressions. Another implication that arises from this premise is that emotions are not separated from rationality but are constitutive of rational thought. Emotions do not blur or distort rationality. On the contrary, emotions are part of people’s cognition as they inform and guide a person’s thought processes and shape the ways in which ensuing actions and behaviors emerge. Emotions help people give meaning to the world they live in at the same time that emotional expressions bestow meaning on people’s actions and behavior.

Secondly, the chapter argues that the widespread atmosphere of fear and confusion that took over New Granada during the 1810s partly explains why the monarchical restoration was so swift and why the political tides of the time changed so abruptly. Even though most political and military leaders were convinced of the causes they defended, it seems that for many members of society, the discussions between monarchy and republic or between independence and belonging to the Spanish Crown were secondary issues. For many, these political discussions lost their relevance when personal or family survival was at stake, or when safeguarding property required unusual measures. Although there are numerous cases of people willing to die for their political cause, it appears they were a minority. Many denied and rejected their past allegiances without posing much resistance. The uncertainty they experienced and the fear they felt when faced with the possibility of being imprisoned or executed led many to publicly repudiate past actions. Although it is possible that some were simply performing and hiding their true feelings and thoughts, the fact remains that they publicly rejected their previous loyalties. In that sense, despite the growing political tensions of the time, the prevalent milieu of fear and confusion that spread throughout the region hindered the spread of fervent political allegiances.
In New Granada, the monarchical restoration was swift. In a matter of a few months, almost all republican territories fell into the hands of royalist forces. Hundreds of rebel leaders were captured and executed while many others fled to the Llanos\textsuperscript{574}, Jamaica, and other Caribbean islands.\textsuperscript{575} As royalist forces took over cities and towns, countless bureaucrats, clergymen, and civilians who had hardly taken an active role in the rebellion ended up becoming suspects. Although many of them had collaborated some way or another with the republican governments – either working for them, doing business with them, or simply attending their ceremonies – only a few of these New Granadians could actually be considered fervent pro-independence republicans. In spite of this, royalist officials in regions such as Cartagena, Santafé, Tunja, and Popayán decided to go after almost anyone suspected of aiding or supporting the rebels.\textsuperscript{576} Officials basically distrusted anybody who had attended the rebel loyalty ceremonies or who had publicly pledged loyalty to a republican constitution. Many suspects were accused of treason and put on trial. Those facing charges of treachery tried to demonstrate their innocence by emphasizing their loyalty to the Crown while also claiming that their alleged acts of infidelity had been done against their will.

\textsuperscript{574} The Province of the Llanos was located to the east of Santafé and included most of the plains found between the Andes mountains and the Orinoco River. (Marta Herrera Ángel, “Las divisiones politico-administrativas del Virreinato de la Nueva Granada a finales del período colonial”, Historia Crítica 22 (2001): 77-83.)

\textsuperscript{575} Daniel Gutiérrez Ardila, La restauración en la Nueva Granada (1815-1819) (Bogotá: Universidad Externado de Colombia, 2016), 172-193.

\textsuperscript{576} Gutiérrez Ardila, La restauración en la Nueva Granada (1815-1819), 135-145; Biblioteca Nacional de España (BNE), ‘Con motivo de la reconquista de la plaza de Cartagena de Indias el 7 de Febrero de 1816 por las tropas Reales fueron arrestados en ella varios individuos que influyeron en la substracción de dicha ciudad de la obediencia al Gobierno legitimo. México. 12 de enero de 1818’, 1-4.
Amidst the monarchical restoration, it was not only those facing charges in court who found themselves in a situation in which they had to prove their innocence and demonstrate their loyalty to the Spanish Crown. Whole towns and cities came under suspicion for having hosted republican governments with their numerous celebrations and ceremonies. To repair past harms, royalist officials promoted collective rites in which populations as a whole could publicly demonstrate their repentance and their renewed loyalty to the Crown. These were communal acts through which provinces, cities, and towns could cleanse their offences and restore their lost reputation. The public ceremonies became means for improving a city’s standing in the eyes of authorities in both the Iberian Peninsula and the Americas, as well as in the view of all those living in nearby provinces. Nonetheless, it was not only a city’s standing that was at stake but also that of its residents. For those living in these cities and towns, such public rituals were opportunities to demonstrate to royalist officials and to their monarchist neighbors that there was no doubt about their longstanding support in favor of the Spanish Crown.

During judicial trials as well as public ceremonies, facial expressions, gestures, and even bodily postures conveyed messages of repentance and of loyalty to the Crown. Because the context was a struggle for standing and reputation, emotional manifestations were one of several means people used to persuade others. Those sent to trial or attending

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577 The idea to study the relationship between public ceremonies and a city or town’s status builds on the work of Lisa Voigt as well as that of Alejandro Cañeque and Ernst Kantorowicz. Voigt examines festivals in Potosí and Minas Gerais during the eighteenth century. She argues that festivals were opportunities to display wealth and power as well as to demonstrate relations of subordination. Voigt explains that written accounts of festivals illuminate the multiplicity of agendas pursued by all of those involved in these sorts of events. (Lisa Voigt, Spectacular wealth: the Festivals of Colonial South American Mining Towns (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2016); Alejandro Cañeque, The King’s Living Image: The Culture and Politics of Viceroyal Power in Colonial Mexico (New York: Routledge, 2004), 54-55; Ernst Kantorowicz, The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997 (©1957)), 45-46.)
the ceremonies manifested fear, awe, and elation following the social norms and habits of the time. Yet, their expressions were not completely mechanical. Individuals navigated the times they were living the best they could. Their emotions and expressions were but tools at their disposal. Amidst the atmosphere of repression that prevailed during the monarchical restoration, many tried to conceal their emotions, exaggerate them, or give them some sort of twist to persuade others as to the standing they deserved. In rituals and trials, many employed their emotional expressions strategically so that they could position themselves as loyal vassals who did not have a single stain on their reputation, regardless of any alleged wrongdoing they might have committed in the past.

In that sense, this chapter pushes back against the way traditional historians have portrayed the monarchic restoration or the Reconquest (as this period is generally referred to). Nineteenth century historians, such as José Manuel Restrepo and José Manuel Groot, depicted the Reconquest as a period of intense repression in which dozens of martyrs sacrificed their lives for Colombian independence. Many school textbooks and public intellectuals continued this narrative. Even some recent scholarly work follows this

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578 Daniel Gutiérrez argues in favor of using the term “monarchical restoration” to refer to this period rather than other terms such as the “Reconquest” or the “Pacification.” He argues that the terms “Reconquest” and “Pacification”, contrary to what happens with the term “monarchical restoration”, tend to highlight the violence committed by royalist forces while obscuring that performed by rebels. Likewise, the “Reconquista” tends to homogenize experiences of violence. That is to say, it ignores that levels of violence varied according to the region. Provinces such as Antioquia, Pasto, and parts of the Caribbean did not suffer violence with the same intensity as Santafé, Popayán, Cali, and Tunja. Moreover, the term “monarchical restoration” offers a more global depiction of what was happening at the time. While the “Reconquest” simply alludes to happenings that were taking place in northern South America, the term “monarchical restoration” considers events that were unfolding both in the Americas and the Iberian Peninsula, such as Ferdinand VII return to the Spanish Crown. (Gutiérrez Ardila, La restauración en la Nueva Granada (1815-1819), 37-45.)

579 Nineteenth century narratives tend to praise Simón Bolívar and other Libertadores for saving Colombians from the royalists’ vicious violence. Moreover, these historians exaggerate the skills of Bolívar, Francisco de Paula Santander, and other members of the army to justify their rule over the new republics. (Mejía Macía, Sergio. La revolución en letras: La Historia de la Revolución de Colombia de José Manuel Restrepo (1781-1863) (Medellín: Universidad EAFIT-Universidad de los Andes, 2007).)
And dozens of plaques and monuments dot the colonial districts of cities such as Bogotá, Cartagena, Popayán, and Tunja, honoring those executed during the Reconquest. This chapter presents a different picture. It pays attention on those who publicly gave up their political preferences and used the multiple strategies at their disposal, including their emotional expressions, to survive.

This does not imply that people were indifferent to New Granada’s destiny or to the different paths that society might take. Rather, it appears that for many New Granadians there were many different issues at stake, besides the disjunctions between monarchy and republicanism and between independence and subordination to Spain. This point raises questions with regards to some of Isidro Vanegas’ reflections regarding people’s level of involvement in the major political discussions of the time. It is true that people from all social stratum participated in debates concerning New Granada’s independence and the forms of government the new nations should adopt. Yet, there were many who quickly evaded these discussions once hints of repression appeared. As Daniel Gutiérrez’s work shows, such was the case of the historian and bureaucrat José Manuel Restrepo, who abruptly abandoned his participation in the revolution when facing the monarchical restoration. Likewise, there were countless communities in which actions and decisions...

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580 In 2016, the Universidad del Rosario published a compilation of essays revolving around the outbreak of violence during the monarchical restoration. Even though several of the chapters are critical of the narrative that emphasizes the lives and sacrifices of Colombian martyrs, the book’s title (1816: Terror and Exalted Blood) and the introduction suggest otherwise. (Rodrigo García Estrada, and Juan Felipe Córdoba Restrepo (eds.). 1816: El terror y la sangre sublime (Bogotá: Universidad del Rosario, 2016.).

581 Isidro Vanegas Useche, Todas son iguales. Estudios sobre la democracia en Colombia (Bogotá: Universidad Externado de Colombia. 2010), 87-149.

were framed outside of direct struggles over independence and republicanism. As Marcela Echeverri has argued, many groups assessed the situation of the time to advance their own interests. Some Indian communities sought protection of their communal landholdings and lower tribute payments. In the meantime, slaves of African descent in the Pacific pursued emancipation.\textsuperscript{583} In these cases, as was for many, it seems that concerns over a variety of social, economic, and cultural issues overshadowed any misgivings about reinstituting the Spanish Monarchy or over the formation of new, independent republics.

In addition to these historiographical reflections, the chapter offers a series of reflections on emotions. Previous chapters have explored how rumors, information, recollections, and certain events – and the interpretations given to them – incited and produced particular emotions and how such emotions shaped people’s understandings of the past, present, and future. In the first chapters I have tried to avoid a mechanical explanation of how emotions emerge and materialize. It is not simply that an event, the uttering of a word, or the reminiscence of a past incident automatically sparks certain emotions and forms of experiencing and expressing them. Emotions are present and take shape in particular contexts, under specific social relations, conditions of symbolic power, and political settings. Additionally, past experiences also explain why certain feelings and expressions emerge in the ways they do. To use Pierre Bourdieu’s words, the habitus – a

product of history and of past experiences – shapes society’s schemes of perception, thought, and action.\textsuperscript{584}

Following some of these reflections, Monique Scheer has proposed understanding emotions as practices. Such approach helps explain the first premise posed in this chapter. Resorting to Bourdieu’s practice theory allows us to reflect on the reasons why individuals and collectivities express certain emotions during specific circumstances and why they experience and perform them in the way they do.\textsuperscript{585} Moreover, it helps us think of the interaction between emotions and strategies. In Bourdieu’s practice theory, strategies do not necessarily follow an intentional, goal-oriented logic; rather, strategies are guided by the habitus that embodies and enacts past coping strategies.\textsuperscript{586} One might be somewhat tempted to think that the planned and oriented actions that constitute objective strategies are guided by people’s motivations to shape the upcoming future. Yet, as Bourdieu argues, this partly an illusion. Strategies are generated by the habitus and are, thus, governed by the past conditions of production. As Bourdieu explains, the generative principles of practices and strategies are “adapted in advance to the objective conditions whenever the conditions in which the habitus functions have remained identical, or similar, to the conditions in which it was constituted. Perfectly and immediately successful adjustment to the objective conditions provides the most complete illusion of finality, or – which amounts to the same thing – of self-regulating mechanism.”\textsuperscript{587} In other words, strategies inform

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\textsuperscript{584} Pierre Bourdieu, \textit{The Logic of Practice} (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 56.
\textsuperscript{585} Bourdieu, \textit{The Logic of Practice}, 69.
\textsuperscript{587} Bourdieu, \textit{The Logic of Practice}, 62.
\end{flushright}
individuals and collectivities of the predominant ways in which society experiences, expresses, displays, and interprets emotions. Thus, strategies confer individuals and collectivities with the awareness to conform to the prevailing norms and conventions.

Bourdieu’s practice theory implies that strategies are mostly determined by past experiences and by the conditions enacted by the habitus. Moreover, Bourdieu explains that strategies do not always follow an intentional, goal-oriented logic. In some cases, people’s actions are strategic simply in the sense that they align with the goals presented by the social script and the standing conditions of symbolic power.\textsuperscript{588} To an extent, Bourdieu seems to not leave much room for people’s subjective strategies. Yet, he explains that the habitus sets the limits to what is possible but leaves the possibility for individuals to have goals and intentions within the boundaries and conditions imposed by the habitus.\textsuperscript{589} In that sense, emotions and emotional practices – such as gestures, body postures, and verbal and nonverbal expressions – are also strategic when individuals and collectivities, within the limits and conditions imposed by the habitus, attempt to suggest specific meanings by marshalling and guiding emotional expressions in certain directions. In that sense, this chapter focuses on these breaches in which people’s subjective strategies come about in the form of manifestations of emotions.\textsuperscript{590}

\textsuperscript{588} Scheer, “Are Emotions a Kind of Practice,” 201-203.
\textsuperscript{590} The interaction between emotions and strategies raises questions concerning the genuineness and sincerity of emotional manifestations. If an emotional expression is altered to convey a certain meaning, is it an authentic emotion? This question, among other methodological issues, is discussed in the dissertation’s introduction, particularly in the “Methodological challenges and reflections” subsection. William Reddy’s concept of ‘emotives’ suggests that the authenticity or sincerity of an emotional experience is always mediated by society’s notions of what such emotion should produce. According to Reddy, when an individual labels an emotion, that act leads to a realignment of feelings and manifestations. For James Scott’s perspective, many of the emotional expressions that come up in the historical records are simply part of the ‘public transcripts.’ That is, they are merely performances through which subordinate and dominant groups
Amidst the context of repression and violence that spread during the monarchical restoration, those involved in the ceremonies and trials strategically moved their emotions, particularly their expressions, to improve their reputation and standing. Through sermons, rituals, printed texts, and the subtle and not so subtle answers given during interrogation, clergymen and other individuals deliberately sought to prove their loyalty to the Spanish Crown and avoid prison and capital punishment. Those involved in interrogatories and funeral rites attempted, through all sorts of strategies – including emotional gestures, expressions, and rhetoric that were characteristic to this specific period of time and region –, to portray themselves as loyal vassals. In this interplay, emotional manifestations worked as social markers that bestowed symbolic capital on those seeking recognition as passionate loyal subjects.

*Emotions to prove one’s loyalty: the case of Morcillo’s funeral rites in Popayán*

On May 9 and 10, 1817, civil and religious authorities held funeral rites in Popayán’s cathedral to bury the remains of José María Morcillo, a clergyman murdered five years earlier in the town of El Tambo. Morcillo had been the priest of La Cruz, a small town located about 40 kilometers northwest of Popayán. Sometime around late 1811 and early 1812, as political violence swept the region, Morcillo left his parish in La Cruz and joined the royalist army as one of its chaplains. In early May 1812, republican troops captured Morcillo in the outskirts of El Tambo, about 35 kilometers west of Popayán.⁵⁹¹

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⁵⁹¹ Centro de Investigaciones Históricas José María Arboleda Llorente de la Universidad del Cauca (CIH-UC), Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, folios 73-81, ‘Relación de exequias y asesinato del cura José María Morcillo.’, 11.
After detaining the priest, rebel soldiers dragged him into El Tambo, held him prisoner in a damp room inside the town’s chapel, placed him in stocks, verbally harassed him, and then executed him on May 9\textsuperscript{th}. According to Julián Anchinte, a resident of El Tambo who witnessed the execution, the priest was killed “due to his faithfulness to the Sovereign, without there being any other cause for the rebel troops to have committed such an act.” Simón Rojas, another inhabitant of the town, declared that he did not witness the killing but that he helped bury the clergyman’s body. Anchinte and Rojas’ familiarity with Morcillo’s murder would come in handy five years later when the priest’s body was exhumed and transferred to Popayán’s cathedral.

The rites and ceremonies honoring Morcillo shed light on the inner workings of emotions in the period. In 1817, royalists were attempting to avenge the rebels’ wrongdoings and trying to erase any trace of support in favor of the republican faction. In such a context, the funeral rites were meant to give the impression that Popayán was a faithful city while also attempting to compel rebels and disloyal subjects to publicly embrace the Spanish Crown. To an extent, the rites’ ardent rhetoric and magnificent ceremonies were a form of absolution. They were a way to demonstrate that despite falling to rebel armies, and despite some residents’ embrace of the republican cause, infidelity had been wiped out from the city’s memory and the province was once again loyal to the Spanish Crown. In that sense, the ceremonies served as a channel through which city

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593 “… fue baleado en este Pueblo por su fidelidad al Soberano, sin haber habido otra causa para semejante atentado cometido por las tropas rebeldes al Rey.” (CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Relación de exequias…’, 11.)
594 CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Relación de exequias…’, 10-11.
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officials could gain symbolic capital in the eyes of its residents, authorities in Santafé, other neighboring provinces, and the Iberian Peninsula. Likewise, the funeral offered Popayán’s residents a means with which to contend for symbolic capital through their gestures and other emotional expressions.

The funeral rites, from their conception to their execution, sought to manifest and induce certain emotions, such as elation, anger, and grief, as well as particular ways to experience and perform them. The officials’ rhetoric, full of metaphors and allegories stressing the rebel’s cruelty and emphasizing Morcillo’s martyrdom, helped craft a milieu in which the city’s residents were inclined to publicly praise the priest’s death. This does not imply that language and symbols unequivocally define emotional practices and strategies, but simply that they may instigate an atmosphere in which certain manifestations prevail over others.

In that sense, Morcillo’s funeral also offers a glimpse of the emotional expressions and ways of feeling that prevailed at the time. Every part of the rites – from the exhumation of the body to the sermon – is illustrative of some of the ways in which Popayán’s residents might have experienced and expressed emotions such as grief, rage, and jubilation. For instance, during the ceremonies, grief was overshadowed by a hue of gratitude and admiration for Morcillo’s martyrdom. Consequently, grief for the priest’s death was eclipsed by expressions of awe and elation towards Morcillo’s sacrifices. The implicit message throughout the rites was that if tears were going to be shed during the funeral, they were generated by the exaltation produced by the priest’s life rather than the melancholy his death produced.
Some ramifications that arise from these assertions merit further discussion. The officials’ accounts undeniably show us a partial and biased picture of the range of plausible emotional expressions and understandings that existed in early nineteenth-century Popayán. Even though there existed a shared repertoire of expressions, terms, and understandings, emotional practices were not homogenous among all members of society. This was particularly true in the case of Popayán’s diverse and complex society. Amidst a context of political and social strife, dominating groups, such as Popayán’s civil and ecclesiastic authorities, were inclined to keep emotional expressions and manifestations within a delimited domain. They did so by favoring certain emotional expressions and disallowing others. By doing so, they sought to convey the image that Popayán was loyal to the Crown in spite of tacit acts of defiance that could have appeared.

A limited number of sources allow us to explore the emotions and expressions that emerged during Morcillo’s funeral. Written traces of the rites are found in a few manuscript documents and, primarily, in the two printed texts that Popayán’s authorities published in the city’s only printing press. The first text, “Relación de las exequias consagradas por el Excelentísimo Cabildo de Popayán,” is a nineteen-page document that includes Popayán’s procurador’s plea to transfer Morcillo’s body, Cabildo debates about the transfer, correspondence with army and ecclesiastic officials concerning the ceremonies that were to take place, and a brief summary of the funeral rites. The second text, “Oración funebre. Pronunciada por el D.D. José María Gruesso Rodríguez, provisor y vicario capitular, en sede vacante,” is a twenty-eight-page document with the sermon that was

595 CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Relación de exequias…’.
proclaimed on May 9th during Morcillo’s funeral rites. Since the bishop’s position had been vacant for some time, the cathedral’s vicar, Gruesso Rodríguez, was charged with the sermon. An indeterminate number of copies of each one of these two documents were printed in Francisco de Paula Castellano’s printing press.

Although we do not know the exact number of facsimiles that were produced, the decision to publish the vicar’s sermon as well as records belonging to the Cabildo’s private realm – such as its minutes, correspondence, and instructions concerning the funeral rites – was a strategic act carried out by Popayán’s civil and religious authorities. Their aims were twofold. First, officials sought to register their own loyalty and zeal for the Spanish Crown. These texts were means through which Popayán’s civil and ecclesiastic authorities could gain symbolic capital by proving their emotional fervor for the Monarchy while also inducing others into such interplay of emotional practices. Likewise, with its publication, authorities meant to spread their accounts of the rebels’ brutality and of Morcillo’s courage. It was an overt attempt to take control over the many possible interpretations, experiences, and expressions that could arise from the funeral rites. The sermon and the Cabildo’s discussions described Morcillo’s heroism and his many sacrifices at the same time that they

596 CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Oración fúnebre en las exequias…’.
597 Scholars of Colombian literature have claimed that José María Gruesso was one of the first Colombian Romanticist writers. Gruesso was born in Popayán in 1779. He graduated from Jurisprudence in 1804 at the Colegio Mayor de San Bartolomé in Santafé. During his time in Santafé, he was an avid attendant of some of the literary tertulias (gatherings) that existed at the time. In the time when he was studying, he got engaged with the Santafereña Jacinta Ugarte. Her unexpected death in 1804 led him to join the clergy. During his first days of mourning and voluntary retirement, he wrote Las Noches de Geussor, a manuscript with thirty poems written in hendecasyllable. After independence, he taught ecclesiastical history at the Universidad del Cauca. He was critical of independence in the 1810s and continued to be so in the 1820s. Yet, in the 1820s he was much more moderate in his criticism of the Libertadores and defended their project to form an educated and cultured youth. (José María Vergara y Vergara, Historia de la literatura en Nueva Granada (Bogotá: Echavarría Hermanos, 1867), 94-102; Alejandra García Dios, “El Romanticismo en el movimiento artesano de mediados del siglo XIX (1838-1854) en Santafé de Bogotá.” Revista Ciencias y Humanidades 4, no. 4 (2017): 113-114.)
conveyed a series of morals in which loyalty to the Crown ultimately prevailed over the rebel’s principles. These were lessons that Popayán’s officials were trying to make known among anyone within their reach. The fact that these texts ended up in the printing press indicates that civil and ecclesiastic officials were trying to reach those who could not attend the ceremonies at the same time that they were attempting to reinforce particular understandings of Morcillo’s death among those who witnessed the funeral rites and sermon.

Discussions concerning the transfer of Morcillo’s body from El Tambo to Popayán’s cathedral began months before the exhumation. On February 14, 1817, Mathias Cagiao, the city’s síndico procurador general (a sort of judicial advisor), presented a plea to transfer the clergyman’s remains from El Tambo to the cathedral. According to Cagiao, he was merely presenting a request endorsed by all of Popayán’s clergy as well as many of the city’s loyal subjects. The procurador explained that faithful Payaneses had always looked upon Morcillo’s execution with the greatest pain and consternation. They believed, he added, that the priest’s assassination would forever mark the rebels’ infamy. In his address to the Cabildo, Cagiao argued that Morcillo’s assassination “had established for eternity the bloodthirsty, ferocious, irreligious, and cruel character of the rebellion.”

Such viciousness, the procurador continued, would prove to future generations that the rebels knew no limits as they went so far as to destroy that which was most holy and worthy of esteem to society. Cagiao claimed that “those men who, to their misfortune, opened their hearts to the rebel’s depraved principles ceased to be men. Their sensibility, tenderness,

598 “Ella fixara, para siempre, el carácter sanguinario, feróz, irreligioso y cruel de la Rebelión…” (CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Relación de exequias.’, 1.)
and compassion disappeared the exact instant the fatal echo awakened them and armed them with the dagger which knows how to tear apart the insides of their own brothers.”

Throughout his exposition to the Cabildo, Cagiao argued that the killing of a priest was one of the worst crimes anyone could commit and that only those men who had fallen to extreme depravity could dare do such a thing. The procurador contrasted the rebels’ brutality with the royalists’ respect for the clergy, including towards those believed to have betrayed the Spanish Crown and committed numerous abominable crimes. Cagiao explained that royalist troops captured dozens of clergymen accused of the most horrendous offences. Yet, they never dared think of executing them. On the contrary, the procurador maintained that the sinful clergymen who refused to repent were treated with respect and sent to Spain to be put on trial and, only then, punished for their crimes. Cagiao claimed that contrary to what happened with Morcillo, who was executed without a trial, rebel clergymen found guilty after trial were merely sent to confinement. The procurador continued his exposition insisting that such a crime could not go unpunished. In the Catholic world, he added, when clergymen were murdered the perpetrators were punished, at least, with excommunication. It is worth noting that the procurador’s claims were not fully accurate. Although it seems to be true that royalist troops did not execute any clergymen during the monarchical restoration in New Granada, the truth is that dozens of priests were imprisoned and coerced. Many ended up confessing crimes they had not

599 “El hombre dexa de ser hombre, si por su desgracia, abre su corazón a sus máximas depravadas, y la sensibilidad, la ternura, la compasión desaparecen desde el momento, en que resuena el grito fatal, con que despierta a los Pueblos, para armarlos con el puñal, que sabe despedazar las entrañas de sus mismos hermanos.” (CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Relación de exequias.’, 1.)

600 CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Relación de exequias.’, 2-3.
committed or pointing the finger at innocent men and women.\textsuperscript{601} Moreover, as Daniel Gutiérrez has explained, the monarchical restoration in New Granada brought about a significant rise in violence and oppression in comparison to that of previous years.\textsuperscript{602}

Cagiao finished his presentation claiming that Morcillo was nothing less than a martyr who deserved the highest honors. As the \textit{procurador} argued, the body of a man who had given his life in the name of the Spanish Monarchy and the Catholic Church should not be left to rot in a deserted chapel but buried in Popayán’s cathedral. Cagiao suggested that transferring the priest’s remains would bring justice to his life and memory at the same time that it would also help raise Popayán’s residents’ sense of loyalty and religiosity. The \textit{procurador}’s plea did not merit much discussion and the Cabildo approved it promptly.\textsuperscript{603}

The \textit{procurador}’s intervention was successful not only gaining the Cabildo’s support to his request but also putting into motion a series of interactions through which officials and other individuals could demonstrate their loyalty to the Crown. The explanations, letters, and rites that would follow from there on – and the printed texts that resulted from them – picked up on Cagiao’s words and expressions. They did so to spread his message and to demonstrate, as the \textit{procurador} had done in his intervention, their zeal for the Spanish Crown. Several officials and clergymen reinforced and spread Cagiao’s arguments and expressions, but more importantly, they helped bolster a collective mood and ambience among the city’s residents. In this atmosphere, the \textit{procurador}’s rhetoric

\textsuperscript{601} In the Archivo General de la Nación in Bogotá there are dozens of interrogatories that reveal that clergymen suspected of aiding the rebellion were not treated with the upmost respect as Cagiao argues. It seems to have been common for royalist troops to coerce and intimidate captured clergymen. (AGN, CO.AGN.SAA-1.10.23-32 – Fondo Eclesiásticos.)

\textsuperscript{602} Gutiérrez Ardila, \textit{La restauración en la Nueva Granada (1815-1819)}, 95-102.

\textsuperscript{603} CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Relación de exequias.’, 5-6.
ended up guiding others as to how they should understand Morcillo’s death and exhumation as well as how they should express their feelings in order to be recognized as faithful subjects. Cagiao’s strategy highlighted the insurgents’ cruelty while also emphasizing the clergymen’s courage and loyalty. In the months following his intervention, officials, clergymen, and other of Popayán’s residents would come up with their own strategies, mostly to go along with the procurador’s insinuations and emotional expressions, as they joined this interplay of recognition and symbolic capital.

In the following weeks, the Cabildo issued orders to transfer the body to Popayán and delivered instructions to prepare funeral rites worthy of the clergymen’s honorability. Throughout its proceedings, the Cabildo’s members referred to the act of honoring Morcillo’s life and martyrdom as one of recollection. As the Cabildo’s minutes explain, the burial was to be carried out with the highest magnificence and “should produce a memory, although a sad one, one that is highly commendable to the Spanish Monarchy’s right cause as well as to the martyr’s family and the royalist armed forces.” Furthermore, the Cabildo instructed its scribes to add an account of the ceremonies into the council’s minutes so that such register serve as a “monument to honor the victims of this crime as well as to point out, as an indelible public note of infamy, the execrable authors of such an abominable event.” Ultimately, the Cabildo expressed a combination of awe and rage with glints of sadness. Popayán’s councilmen were, as the procurador before them,

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604 CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Relación de exequias…’, 5-6.
605 “debe causar una memoria, si triste, la mas honorifica a la causa justa de la Monarquía Española, como a la buena familia de el Martir, y cuerpo de Realistas.” (CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Relación de exequias.’, 6.)
606 “… un monumento que los honre, e ilustre, no menos que de un padron de infamia indeleble a los execrables autores de hecho tan nefando…” (CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Relación de exequias.’, 6.)
demonstrating their loyalty to the Crown and inviting others into this interplay of emotions, practices, and expressions.

The first steps to celebrate Morcillo’s funeral rites began in early May of 1817. Manuel María Rodríguez, El Tambo’s priest, following a request from Popayán’s Cabildo, asked Rojas and Anchinte for their assistance to find and identify Morcillo’s remains. Rojas recalled the tomb was behind the pulpit, about a meter from the wall, between the altars of Our Lady of Sorrows and Saint Barbara. Anchinte corroborated Rojas’ indications and explained that one year earlier, when burying another corpse in the chapel, he found bones, shoes, clothes, and a biretta close to the spot signaled by Rojas. Anchinte was quite confident that they were Morcillo’s remains. On May 6, 1817, after hearing these testimonies, El Tambo’s priest had the tomb opened. In it, Rodríguez and those aiding him found bones, shoes, and what was left of a rotting biretta. According to El Tambo’s priest, Morcillo’s bones were apparently mixed with those of a royalist man who had been buried next to him. Due to the difficulty to identify which bones were Morcillo’s, Rodríguez ordered that all the remains be put into the same urn and sent to Popayán. On May 7th, the Cabildo received the sealed urn along with a report written by Rodríguez in which he described the exhumation and informed the Cabildo of the testimonies that allowed him to locate the priest’s remains.607

Two days later, on May 9th, ceremonies took place in Popayán to honor Morcillo’s loyalty and sacrifice. The organizers invited civil, ecclesiastic, and military officials to join the funeral rites. Regular and secular clergy were asked to take part of the processions and

to pray for the priest’s soul from their churches, convents, and monasteries. Army officials
and their troops lined up in the city’s streets to accompany the chaplain’s body as it was
transferred to the cathedral. General Ruperto Delgado, commander of the troops stationed
in Popayán, willingly backed the army’s partaking in the funeral rites. Delgado explained that the army was always ready to aid Popayán in its efforts “to exalt the heroism of their brothers who have gone so far as to seal their love to the Sovereign with their own blood and who have opened, with their example, a path towards loyalty and justice.”

On the 9th, the ceremony began at three in the afternoon when the cathedral’s bells and those of the other churches began to toll. Top military, civil, and religious authorities gathered in the temple of the Monastery of the Incarnation, about two blocks from the cathedral. The urn with Morcillo’s remains had been placed in this temple upon its arrival at the city. That afternoon, Popayán’s priests, properly dressed for the occasion, placed the urn on a platform, took the platform on their shoulders, and began their way to the cathedral. During the short procession, the battalion’s band played martial notes to confer the funeral rites with the solemnity they deserved. In the backdrop, the city’s churches and convents incessantly tolled their bells. Once in the cathedral, the urn was placed on a high pedestal decorated with black silk and supported by four Tuscan columns. As the Cabildo’s minutes explain, the monument was “striking and admirable to the observer, who is filled by the magnificence that inseparably accompanies the consecration of everything related

608 CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Relación de exequias.’, 15-18.
609 “…modos de exaltar el heroísmo de los hermanos nuestros, que han sellado hasta con su sangre el amor que profesaban al Soberano, y abierto con su ejemplo la senda de la fidelidad, y de la justicia…” (CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Relación de exequias’, 15.)
to the celebration of the triumphs of death.”610 That night, the vigil was celebrated with music and singing. On the 10th, a requiem was held for the soul of Morcillo. José María Gruesso, the cathedral’s vicar, read a sermon and, thereafter, Morcillo’s remains were buried in the cathedral’s presbytery. A plaque with an inscription in Latin was placed on the tomb. The word “Fidelitatis” (fidelity in English) stood out on top of the inscription.611

The sources only offer limited information concerning the ways in which Popayán’s residents understood and reacted to the ceremonies they were observing. There are some indirect references to the sense of solemnity and magnificence that the music and the bells tolling produced among the audience. There is also an allusion to the feelings of awe the pedestal allegedly produced among the spectators. However, these may be intimations of the emotions and expressions that authorities displayed and hoped to incite rather than close depictions of people’s reactions during the ceremonies. In that sense, the printed texts regarding Morcillo’s funeral served as proof that Popayán’s officials and residents had publicly demonstrated their ardent loyalty to the Crown. Likewise, the texts acted as a sort of manual or guidebook suggesting the emotional expressions and understandings that were expected and considered appropriate under such circumstances. These efforts to publicly display certain emotions and expressions while also attempting to incite them among a wide audience are even more manifest in the sermon’s rhetoric, with the vicar’s harsh descriptions and constant analogies and metaphors.

610 “… lo hacían vistoso y respectable al observador que se penetra de magestad, que acompaña inseparablemente a todo lo que se consagra, para celebrar los triunfos de la muerte.” (CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Relación de exequias.’, 18.)
611 The text on the plaque was the following: “Fidelitatis Monumentum in Ossibus. D Joseph Marie Morcillo. Juxta, Exmi, Coetus Acta. Translatis et Sepultis. Anno. 1817” (CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Relación de exequias…’, 18-19.)
Gruesso’s sermon was heard by hundreds of attendees and was read or heard by an indeterminate number of people who were in contact with the sermon’s printed copies. The homily reinforced claims and accusations that came up in the procurador’s plea and the Cabildo’s discussions. Throughout the sermon, Popayán’s vicar argued that Morcillo’s murder exemplified the rebellion’s cruel spirit. “So come with me,” he stated, “and I will explain to you what the rebellion is all about. Do you see this monument? This lugubrious apparatus that is decorated with all the splendor and majesty of religious ceremonies? It is dedicated to the memory of a distinguished son of Popayán who was faithful to the sovereign up to his death…”

The sermon emphasized the rebels’ cruelty and unrestraint as well as Morcillo’s martyrdom. Gruesso exclaimed that the chaplain “was an irreprehensible man, one of the victims to the rebellion’s fury, a priest of the Almighty… A priest! A minister of the Lord! Such a holy person! Is it possible? Can one believe such atrocious act?”

As Gruesso continued his accusations against the rebels’ brutality, he underlined the nexus between the republicans’ disloyalty and their ruthlessness. “Infidelity manifests itself with such bloodthirsty expressions!”, he called out, “and in what ways does it defy that which is most sacred merely to obtain its ends! Will posterity be able to believe such

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612 “Venid pues conmigo que yo voy a manifestaros lo que es la rebelión. ¿Ves ese monument? ¿Ese aparato lugubre que está nimado con toda la pompa, y la magestad de las ceremonias religiosas? Pues el está consagrado a la memoria de un hijo benemérito de Popayán, que fue fiel a su soberano hasta la muerte;” (CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Oración fúnebre en las exequias,’ 5)

613 “de un hombre irreprehensible, que sirvio de víctima al furor de la rebelión; de un sacerdote de el Altísimo… ¡Un sacerdote! ¡Un ministro de el señor! ¡Una persona tan sagrada! ¿Es posible? ¿y podrá creerse un atentado tan atroz?” (CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Oración fúnebre en las exequias,’ 5)
an event as that of May 9…?”

For Gruesso, Morcillo’s assassination was the consummation of numerous misdeeds condensed into one crime: “irreligion, sacrilege, impiety, profanation, hate, revenge, defamation, homicide, cruelty… all of them, all of them got together to make the fatal blow that fell upon that gentle, innocent man, who did nothing to deserve such a disastrous death, even more dreadful…”

The vicar strongly believed that the maxims that republicans endorsed produced numerous crimes such as Morcillo’s murder. The clergyman maintained that the republican system created much confusion and contempt and that such state of affairs led its supporters to commit all sorts of vicious offences such as this “clericide.”

Yet, Gruesso also argued that in such circumstances in which so many had fallen prey to the rebels’ principles, Morcillo’s loyalty and martyrdom was an example to be praised and honored. Popayán’s vicar exclaimed that the priest’s death was “too glorious for it to not to be celebrated with all the enthusiasm” and admiration it deserved. Gruesso’s sermon placed Morcillo at the same level as royalist generals who reconquered

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614 “¡Con que expresiones tan sangrientas se sabe explicar la infidelidad! ¡Y como atropella por lo más sagrado, con tal de que sus fines se realicen! ¿La posteridad podrá creer el suceso de el nueve de Mayo, y hallará palabras enérgicas, para encarecer su deformidad?” (CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Oración fúnebre en las exequias.’, 7)

615 “Por que ¡quantos delitos, en un solo crimen! Irreligion, sacrilegio, impiedad, profanación, odio, venganza, calumnia, homicidio, crueldad… todo, todo se reunió, para hacer mas horroroso el golpe fatal, que se descargó sobre aquel amable inocente, que por ninguna de sus acciones había merecido un fin tan desastroso.” (CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Oración fúnebre en las exequias.’, 7)

616 “Todo se reunió, para hacer más odioso, y mas detestable el sistema, que supo inspirar máximas tan depravadas, para que se hollase el Santuario, sin ningún extremecimiento, y sin un solo temor. Todo se reunió, para que se descubriese la hipocresía de la rebelión, y para que se desconfiase de una causa, que con tanta sangre fría era capaza de cometer semejantes excesos. Y todo se reunió en fin, para llenar de oprobio, de confusión, y de vergüenza a los autores de el espantoso sacrificiod, mientras que el martir de la fidelidad se llenó de gloria por su heroico sacrificio.” (CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Oración fúnebre en las exequias’, 8.)

617 “Su muerte es demasiado gloriosa, para que dexe de celebrarse con todo el entusiasmo de la admiración.” (CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Oración fúnebre en las exequias.’, 8)
vast rebel territories, such as Calzada, Samano, and Morillo. “But allow me to place among such immortal men,” the vicar declared, “a humble priest who has also triumphed against the rebellion, who died for refusing to consecrate their deplorable maxims.” The vicar then asked, “could there be a more glorious death?... Is this not also a triumph? Is it not also worthy of the praise offered to the heroes of the century?”

His answer to these questions was unambiguous. “He deserves them, certainly,” Gruesso argued, “for his death was so glorious as it fulfilled the duties imposed by religion and vassalage…” Moreover, the vicar insisted, “the priest of La Cruz, in his efforts to obey such duties, voluntarily headed towards torture, preferring a glorious death rather than the dishonorable life that he would have faced had he decided to emmesh himself with the atrocious crime that the rebellion represented.”

Gruesso praised Morcillo not only for his martyrdom but also for his courage when he organized his flock and incited it to put an end to the rebel’s advance. According to the vicar, the priest prevented his congregation from being seduced by the republican’s promises and convinced many to take up arms against the rebels. Morcillo “ran, flew, from one side of his parish to the other,” Gruesso exclaimed, “and succeeded inflaming his flock with the holy and beautiful fire of fidelity. He stirred some, exhorted the others, arouse

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618 “…pero que se me permita colocar al lado de estos hombres inmortales, a un humilde sacerdote, que también ha triunfado de la rebelión, muriendo, por no consagrar con sus máximas detestables, ¿puedo haber una muerte más gloriosa? Y este, ¿no es también un triunfo? ¿y no será digno de las alabanzas que se tributan a los héroes de el siglo?... (CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Oración fúnebre en las exequias.’, 9.)

619 “Él las merece, ciertamente, y para consagrárselas diremos, que su muerte fue gloriosa, por que con ella cumplió con los deberes que impone la religión, al vasallage, o más claro... con estos tantos deberes el cura de la Cruz, voluntariamente, se encamina al suplicio, prefiriendo una muerte gloriosa, a una vida que le hubiera sido infame si se hubiera mezclado en el crimen espantoso de la rebelión.” (CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Oración fúnebre en las exequias.’, 9.)
some others, and did not lose heart with the rest.” According to the vicar, the priest persuaded his congregation, showing them that it was their obligation as loyal vassals to defend the Crown and convinced them that an attack on the King was in fact an affront on the Catholic religion. Amidst his efforts to mobilize his flock, Morcillo allegedly claimed that giving one’s life for the Sovereign was in reality a sweet death. In the end, “sixty victims accepted the compromise to sacrifice themselves in the altars of fidelity” and left the town of La Cruz to join the Patíanos and the diminished royalist army.

In the same manner that Morcillo had insisted to his congregation that dying for the Sovereign was a “sweet death”, Gruesso claimed that Morcillo’s death had been the utmost magnificent episode of the priest’s lifetime. As the vicar explained in his sermon, “the most glorious time in Morcillo’s life” began the minute rebel troops captured him and displayed him as if he were a valuable prey. “With what modesty! With what humility!”, Gruesso exclaimed, “With what presence of the soul did he sustain the enraged glares, the offensive insults, the arrogant ways of his irreconcilable foes.” The vicar continued, “with what

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620 “… corrió, voló de un extremo a otro de su curato, y logró inflamar a sus feligreses, con el santo, y hermoso fuego de la fidelidad. El animaba a los unos, exortaba a los otros, levantaba a estos, y no desmayaba con aquellos. (CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Oración fúnebre en las exequias’, 13.)

621 In the early 1810s, the Patíanos, black communities made up of several generations of runaway slaves living in the riverbanks of the Patía River and the shorelines of the Pacific Ocean, were among the most important royalist forces in the Province of Popayán. Marcela Echeverri and Jairo Gutiérrez Ramos have argued that during the 1810s and early 1820s, the Patíanos opposed republicanism and independence from Spain in the hopes of obtaining land privileges, social and political status, and other benefits from the Spanish Crown. Moreover, many Patianos disdained and mistrusted the slave-owning families who actively took part in the rebellion. (Echeverri, Indian and Slave Royalists in the Age of Revolution, pp. 157-190; Jairo Gutiérrez Ramos, Los indios de Pasto contra la República (1809-1824) (Bogotá: Instituto Colombiano de Antropología e Historia, 2007), 176-181.)

622 “… sesenta victimas se comprometieron a sacrificarse en los altares de la fidelidad…” (CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Oración fúnebre en las exequias’, 13.)

623 “Aqui señores comienza la época más gloriosa de la vida de D. Jose Maria Morcillo. ¡Con que modestia! ¡con que humildad! ¡con que presencia de Alma sostuvo las miradas furiendas, las expresiones insultantes, los modos altaneros de sus irreconciliables enemigos!” (CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Oración fúnebre en las exequias’, 19.)
coolness did he face the approaches of furor!... With what composure did he confess that, if the republicans believed that being loyal to the King was a crime, he loved his crime and would commit it thousands and thousands of times again, even if it would result in him enduring all of life’s miseries and all sorts of anguishes.”

Gruesso made it clear that the priest defied the rebels with wit and courage. According to the vicar, Morcillo enraged his captors by telling them that he had inflamed his flock’s hearts with passion for their Sovereign when he warned his congregation that they had “the obligation to defend His cause and to die for it.” To infuriate his captors even further, Morcillo presumably said: “I have promised them [his flock] that I will endorse such doctrine with my death. I will soon receive it. Do with me whatever you like.”

For Gruesso, the moral of the story was unambiguous. “Royalists of the Province of Popayán!” he proclaimed in his sermon, “Privileged men who thanks to heaven’s mercy have not been dragged by the torrential rebellion that has embroiled New Granada’s first and best men! There you have it, a model that you should imitate in order to maintain, at all costs, the purity of the beautiful fire of fidelity that divine religion has deposited in the best corner of your heart.”

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624 “¡Con que indiferencia vio aquel aparato de furor... ¡Con que serenidad confesó, que si para los republicanos era un crimen ser fiel a su rey, el amaba su crimen y que lo cometería mil y mil veces, aunque para ello fuera necesario sufrir todas las miserias de la vida y toda suerte de tormentos!” (CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Oración fúnebre en las exequias’, 19.)

625 “... he inflamado en el amor a su Soberano. Les he dicho que tienen obligación para defender su causa, y morir por ella. Les he prometido, que confirmare esta doctrina con mi muerte. Yo estoy pronto a recibirla. Que se haga de mi lo que se quiera.” (CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Oración fúnebre en las exequias.’, 21.)

626 “¡Realistas de la Provincia de Popayán! ¡Hombres privilegiados, que por pura merced de el cielo no habéis sido arrastrados por el torrente de la rebelión, en que han sido embueltos los primeros y mejores hombres de la nueva Granada! Allí tenéis el modelo que debéis imitar, para mantener puro, hasta el ultimo trance, el fuego hermoso de la fidelidad que la religión divina, depositó, en el mejor lugar de vuestra corazón.” (CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Oración fúnebre en las exequias.’, 28)
betrayed the Spanish Crown. As Gruesso exclaimed, “deplorable and dear revolutionaries (because despite your delusions and our differences, you will always be my cherished and sweet brothers…), there you have a model to emulate. Condemn your previous conduct and craft for yourselves a new heart, one that serves as refuge for the fidelity you betrayed in the excess of your frenzy.” For the vicar it was clear that Morcillo’s death and sacrifice set an example for both royalists and rebels to pursue. “Let us ask heaven that such glory [Morcillo’s martyrdom] be conceded to all of us”, he pungently said in his closing remarks.627

Gruesso’s sermon, with its passionate praise for Morcillo’s life and his fervent condemnation of the rebels’ principles, was but the prolongation of a series of strategic actions the procurador had set in motion a few months earlier. The vicar’s insistence on the rebels’ cruelty and his exaggerated depiction of the priest’s sacrifices were ways to manifest his outrage and ire at the insurgents’ alleged crimes against the Catholic Church and the Spanish Crown. Gruesso’s sermon was not only aimed at gaining personal recognition as a fervent loyal vassal. It also sought to bestow symbolic capital on Popayán’s bishopric and its grey. As one of the heads of the diocese and one the city’s main spiritual guides, the vicar’s claims and expressions were meant to demonstrate that Payaneses had overcome their previous misdemeanors and had erased any trace of republicanism from their province.

627 “Deplorables y queridos revolucionarios! (porque a pesar de vuestros delirios, y de nuestra desemejanza de opinión, series siempre mis queridos y mis dulcísimos hermanos…), allí tenéis el modelo que debéis imitar, detestando vuestra conducta pasada y creando un nuevo corazón, para que sirva de asilo a la fidelidad, que ultrajasteis en el exceso de vuestro frenesi… ¡Ah! Pidamos al cielo que nos la conceda a todos, en su misericordia.!” (CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Oración fúnebre en las exequias…’, 28-29.)
By doing so, the vicar was also offering those hearing and reading the sermon an opportunity to join him in this interplay of emotional practices to publicly display their feelings of elation and indignation. All through Morcillo’s funeral rites, authorities expressed, in a variety of ways and through different means, a sense of admiration and jubilation for Morcillo’s life while also conveying feelings of rage for the rebel’s crimes and resentment for the priest’s violent death. The officials’ rhetoric, such as Gruesso’s usage of certain terms and metaphors, as well as the adornments, music, and other symbolic language that accompanied the funeral hinted at the expressions and manifestations that were expected under such circumstances.

The terms, symbols, strategies, and emotional practices that come up throughout the rites were a product of their time and of Popayán’s particular social and political context. Each feeling that came to light was conceived, experienced, and expressed following the period’s conventions and overall attitudes. According to Philippe Ariès, around the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, attitudes towards death in the West underwent a series of transformations. People became less concerned with their own death and more worried with the decease of others. Likewise, death ceased to be a banal affair and was exalted and dramatized beyond what had been usual for more than half a millennium. A new passion stirred attitudes towards death. Ariès maintains that actions and behaviors revolving around death “were described as if they had been invented for the first time, spontaneously, inspired by a passionate sorrow which is unique among sorrows.”

Death began to be understood as something insurmountable, as a very grave

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wound that led people to cry, faint, languish, and fast. As Ariès explains, “it was a sort of return to the excessive and spontaneous demonstrations – or apparently spontaneous demonstrations – of the Early Middle Ages… The nineteenth century is the era of mourning which the psychologist of today calls hysterical mourning.”

Adriana Alzate, for her part, underlines how death in New Granada during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries began to be viewed as an event that was not inevitable thanks to recent developments in scientific knowledge as well as to the expansion of hospices and shelters where the sick and the deprived could seek assistance. In that sense, Alzate explains that death was conceived as contrary to the happiness that life implied. That is, under normal circumstances, death was not an episode that was celebrated but rather mourned.

Pablo Rodríguez reaches a similar conclusion in his analysis of eighteenth-century wills in New Granada. He argues that death was shocking and distressing for the deceased as well as for the family members, friends, and servants who aided the defunct during his or her last moments of life. Many eighteenth-century wills revealed the anxieties and agonies that came with widowhood and old age, especially if they were combined with poverty.

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629 Ariès, Western Attitudes toward Death, 67-68.
630 Adriana María Alzate Echeverri, Geografía de la lamentación: Institución hospitalaria y sociedad. Nueva Granada 1760-1810 (Bogotá: Editorial Universidad del Rosario, 2012), 22-25. (Alzate also claims that in New Granada during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries there was a gradual change in the ways in which suicide was perceived. In the first decades of the eighteenth century, suicide was severely condemned by both religious and legal authorities. The suicide victim, Alzate explains, was viewed as a social monster. By the mid-nineteenth century, suicide was no longer found in New Granada’s Penal Code. It was still rejected and anyone who attempted to commit suicide could be socially chastised and legally penalized. Yet, Alzate maintains that in the course of these hundred years, there was a slow process of humanization and understanding towards suicide. By the mid-nineteenth century, the suicide victim was no longer perceived as a monster. (Adriana María Alzate Echeverri, Repertorio de la desesperación. La muerte voluntaria en la Nueva Granada, 1727-1848 (Bogotá: Editorial Universidad del Rosario, 2020), 241-242.))
Only some of the attitudes that Ariès, Alzate, and Rodriguez draw attention to are found in Morcillo’s funeral. The grandiose displays of passion that Ariès speaks about are clearly present. Yet, manifestations of intense sorrow and mourning do not stand out from the records. Terms such as “pena”, “desazón”, “congojo”, “tristeza”, “dolor”, and others used to describe feelings of sadness and grief are mostly absent from the sermon and the Cabildo’s minutes. Other of the funeral’s components, such as the church bells tolling and the ornamented pavilion, apparently sought to induce a sense of magnificence rather than of sorrow. Such an attitude towards death, deprived of manifest demonstrations of sadness, was probably not widespread among Payaneses in the 1810s. It seems that Morcillo’s funeral was somewhat exceptional in that sense.

Amidst the consolidation of the monarchical restoration, certain royalist authorities strategically tried to give Morcillo’s death a particular meaning. By emptying the funeral of demonstrations of sadness and mourning, the city’s officials reworked and adapted existing notions of death in order to produce a milieu of jubilation in which they could acclaim the priest’s martyrdom and his loyalty to the Crown. Such a twist consisted of praising Morcillo’s life and sacrifices on top of the rebels’ alleged cruelty or the sadness a clergyman’s death should produce. As a matter of fact, officials insisted on Morcillo’s purported glories even more than on the insurgents’ ruthlessness. Gruesso went so far as to claim that the priest’s death was the most glorious moment in the clergyman’s life and that his demise was so glorious that it should be celebrated.632

632 CIH-UC, Fondo Cabildo de Popayán, Tomo 58, ‘Oración fúnebre en las exequias.’, 8, 19.
Cagiao and other members of the Cabildo expressed admiration for the priest and his martyrdom, but it was Gruesso who took such praise a step further by insisting that Morcillo’s death should be considered a glorious and even jubilant event. The 1734 *Diccionario de Autoridades* offers two definitions for the term “glorioso” (glorious) which the vicar consistently used throughout the sermon. The first entry defines it as someone or something “illustrious, famous, worthy of honor, praise, and recommendation.” The second acceptation defines the term as “he who is enjoying the glory of the blessed.” To an extent, Gruesso’s usage of the term follows both definitions. The vicar not only praised Morcillo and his honorable death, but even suggested that the priest’s providential life placed him among Spain’s greatest heroes.

Popayán’s officials – with their strategic understanding of the priest’s death – seem to have been successful crafting a milieu within which they could set the sorts of emotions and expressions that were to abound during the rites. In such an atmosphere, manifestations of extreme sadness and sorrow during the funeral were not encouraged and, thus, were somewhat uncommon to see. On the contrary, such milieu favored demonstrations of elation to celebrate Morcillo’s martyrdom at the same time that it fostered sparks of rage to condemn the rebels’ wrongdoings as well as hopefulness for better times to come, thanks to the priest’s example. One can imagine that if tears were shed during the rites, they owed not to sadness, but to admiration for the priest’s sacrifices and profound love for the

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633 “Glorioso, adj. Ilustre, famoso, digno de honor, alabanza y recomendación.” (*Diccionario de Autoridades*, Real Academia Española, 1734.)

634 “Glorioso. Significa también el que está gozando la gloria de los bienaventurados.” (*Diccionario de Autoridades*, Real Academia Española, 1734.)
Spanish Crown. Other manifestations of emotions, such as passionate cries and gestures of anguish, were also meant to celebrate rather than grieve Morcillo’s death.

Within such a milieu, many in Popayán expressed feelings of jubilation as part of their efforts to improve their standing in the eyes of authorities and fellow residents. They did so by following the path officials set out through processions, adornments, and sermons. It is possible that some Payaneses genuinely felt elation and that their gestures of excitement were sincere. However, some of them might have embellished their emotional demonstrations to leave no doubt with regards to their loyalty to the Crown. Others who attended the ceremonies and who heard or read Gruesso’s sermon might have not felt such strong feelings, but they participated in the overall atmosphere and replicated some of the practices and manifestations they saw among officials and other residents. Either way, authorities’ efforts to produce a specific milieu simply set the stage so that people of different social stratum and political positions could enter this interplay of strategies and emotional expressions to portray themselves as loyal vassals.

_Procurador_ Cagiao triggered this struggle for symbolic capital when he demanded the exhumation of Morcillo’s body and its transfer to Popayán’s cathedral. His intervention to the Cabildo set the stage for the interplay that followed. Cagiao’s request to honor the clergyman, as well as his fervent condemnation of the rebels’ alleged cruelty, shaped practices and strategies during the ceremonies. Others replicated his insinuations and reinforced his intimations. Gruesso’s sermon celebrated Morcillo’s death as a glorious event rather than a tragic one. Popayán’s authorities furthered these notions and attitudes by printing the sermon as well as the council’s records and correspondence. In the end, they crafted a milieu in which expressions, gestures, and words of elation and jubilation
concerning the clergyman’s death became a token through which the city’s residents could compete for symbolic capital. The re-consecration of Morcillo’s remains became a struggle for good standing and reputation, to prove Popayán’s indisputable loyalty to the Spanish Crown.

*Emotions and cover-up strategies: José Ángel Manrique and the Almeyda Guerrilla*

During the first half of 1816, most republican territories in New Granada fell into royalist control. Following the siege of Cartagena de Indias from August 1815 to the subsequent occupation of the city in December 1815, royalist troops gained control of vast territories in a matter of a few months. By May 1816, the Expeditionary Army had conquered Santafé de Bogotá. Amidst the royalists’ quick advance, hundreds of rebels and republicans were forced to flee, dozens were executed and imprisoned, and many decided to hide and deny their former allegiance to republican governments. Many who had previously supported pro-independence and republican regimes ended up publicly expressing their loyalty to the Spanish Crown. That is to say, the restoration was expeditious not only in military and political terms, but also in the way a tide of public support in favor of republicanism and independence quickly dissipated. In New Granada, Quito, and Venezuela, foci of insurgency quickly moved from the region’s main urban centers to frontier territories. Among the hundreds who escaped the Expeditionary Army’s rapid advance, many ended up in the Llanos – where rebels tried to reorganize after their many military setbacks. Others fled to Jamaica and other islands in the Caribbean.

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Despite the monarchical restoration’s success putting the rebels on the run and wiping out public support in favor of republicanism, by 1816 and 1817 there were minor cases of rebel resistance to the monarchical restoration in the vicinities of New Granada’s main cities. Guerilla groups emerged in the proximities of Socorro, Honda, and Popayán. Although eradicating these rebel groups proved to be arduous and time-consuming, and even though royalist troops were never able to wipe out the Socorro guerilla, none of these groups resulted in a serious threat to the Expeditionary Army or to the Crown’s authority.  

It was only the so-called Almeyda Guerrilla that really set off alarm among royalist officials in Santafé and its vicinity. In November 1817, a guerrilla group emerged in Machetá and Tibiritá, two towns located halfway in-between Santafé and Tunja. The group was led by Ambrosio Almeyda and his brother Vicente. The guerrilla’s quick advance towards the viceregal capital and the support they summoned in towns along the way forced royalist officials to reassess the authority they genuinely had over these territories. In a matter of days, the Almeyda Guerrilla grew to have over 300 hundred mounted men – most armed with lances – and amassed more than thirty firearms. The guerrilla was successful taking control over the towns of Chocontá and Suesca as well as several villages in the valleys of Tenza, Turmequé, and Ubaté. Authorities sought to avenge this affront in the strongest terms possible. In less than two months, the guerrilla was defeated; however, none of its main leaders were captured. Most of them made it to the Llanos, where they joined other rebel groups. Authorities detained, interrogated, and sentenced to prison dozens of people accused of being members or collaborators of the guerrilla group. Several

of them were even executed. Officials confiscated almost all horses found in the region out of fear that the animals would end up in the hands of rebel groups. Additionally, as a way of symbolic chastisement, royalist authorities organized the execution of effigies of the guerrilla’s leaders in Santafé’s main square.637

Among those accused of aiding the Almeyda Guerilla was José Ángel Manrique, the priest of Manta, a town located about 25 km southeast of Machetá and 15 km south of Tibiritá. Manrique allegedly summoned his flock to aid the rebels with horses, provisions, and iron to manufacture lances. It was said that Manrique traveled twice to Tibiritá and Machetá to meet with the Almeydas and that from Manta the clergyman continuously sent letters to the rebels. Manrique was captured in December 1817 and was interrogated during the following months. Several of Manta’s residents and those of its vicinities were also questioned as part of this trial. The priest was eventually sentenced to prison, first in Santafé and then in Santa Marta. He did not spend too many years in captivity thanks to the republican takeover of Santa Marta in late 1820.638

In a petition written in December 1820, in which Manrique requested he be appointed as the dean of Santa Marta’s Cathedral, the clergyman described all the miseries of the Nueva Granada Campaign.637 Gutiérrez Ardila, 1819. Campaña de la Nueva Granada, 27; Oswaldo Díaz Díaz, Los Almeydas: episodios de la resistencia patriota contra el Ejército Pacificador de Tierra Firme (Bogotá: ABC, 1962), 13-25. (These sorts of symbolic executions were not at all uncommon at the time. Daniel Gutiérrez has shown that, in 1813 and 1814, there were several cases of symbolic regicides in which portraits and images of King Ferdinand VII were destroyed. In many cases, the images were executed employing the same rituals and formalities traditionally used in official executions. Gutiérrez argues that these symbolic executions should be understood as performances of the annihilation of the monarchical system. (Daniel Gutiérrez Ardila, “Matar a un rey ausente. Los regicidios simbólicos durante el interrégno neogranadino (1808-1816)”. Economía y Política 1, no. 2 (2014): 5-37; Gutiérrez Ardila, La restauración en la Nueva Granada (1815-1819), 209-240).)

and torments he underwent after being detained. Manrique claimed that when royalist troops captured him, they seized his possessions and books. While in prison in Santafé, the priest explained, he was treated without consideration for his sacred rank and was dealt with as if he were the most villainous criminal. During the long journey to Santa Marta, the affronts and humilations continued and was left barely naked and almost starving. Manrique claims that during the unending marches there were countless occasions in which he felt he was about to die. When he reached Santa Marta, he was confined to a cell in the island of El Morro, just off the city’s shore. He was lucky enough that his captivity in Santa Marta did not last long. In November 1820, a few months after Manrique’s arrival, rebel troops occupied the city and set him free. After his release, Manrique wrote a petition to Simón Bolívar. General Francisco de Paula Santander first received the request and endorsed it arguing that he was well aware of Manrique’s many pains and sacrifices. Bolívar, for his part, sent the request to Bogotá’s ecclesiastic authorities asking them if he was authorized to make such sort of appointments. It is unclear what happened to Manrique and his request. It appears that his petition was among dozens of others that put the newly formed government in a quandary over their authority to appoint clergymen without the Vatican’s official approval.

Throughout Manrique’s trial, emotions such as fear and distress were strategically used by all sides. Some, such as the clergyman, claimed they were coerced into supporting

the Almeydas. Manrique justified his apparent infidelity and alleged wrongdoings by appealing to the rebels’ acts of intimidations and pressing demands. Others also drew on their purported fear to the Almeydas to explain their actions, or inaction, as the guerrillas expanded throughout the region. In that sense, those interrogated tended to highlight, and perhaps exaggerate, the dread they experienced during these times. Similar to what happened during Morcillo’s funeral when officials and city residents recurred to emotions to prove their loyalty, those interrogated employed them to demonstrate their innocence and allegiance to the Spanish Monarchy.

Such feelings of distress and fear not only emerged in the testimonies the witnesses put forward but also in the interrogations themselves. The trial and the corresponding inquiries took place in Manta and Santafé during December 1817 and March 1818. They were ordered by Viceroy Juan Samano and led by Simón Muñoz, Lieutenant Colonel of the Royal Army. The records do not offer much information concerning the gestures or the tone of voice of those being interrogated nor of those carrying out the interrogations. We cannot fully grasp if those called to testify felt confident or if they felt intimidated by the officials’ questions nor do we know if the authorities in charge of the interrogations attempted to daunt the witnesses with bodily movements, tone of voice, or with the way arranged the room in which the inquiries were taking place. Nonetheless, we can picture the interrogations as a sort of interplay of emotions, practices, and strategies amidst a context of repression and violence. The witnesses’ descriptions, their apparent

contradictions, and their emphasis on certain details hint at some of the emotions they might have experienced while testifying.

Fear and distress surface throughout the records. In the case of some witnesses, glints of rage and spitefulness blend with a sense of fright. Among the officials carrying out the interrogations, there seem to be traces of mistrust and ire. The witnesses’ responses are illustrative of their struggles to express and internalize the dread they were possibly experiencing. Under a context of repression such as the one New Granada had been living for the past few years, one can imagine that those called to testify attempted to suppress their fear to avoid creating the impression that they were guilty of any charge. At the same time, many strove to show that they were fully cooperating with royal authorities and ended up offering somewhat credible responses that would not incriminate themselves, their kin, or close friends. In the meantime, one can presume that the interrogators were following orders to repress the rebels and their collaborators at any cost, be it through intimidation or persuasion. Inflicting some fear among the witnesses was something the interrogators were possibly looking for, regardless of the interviewee’s rank. As Carlo Ginzburg explains when talking about what he calls “archives of repression” – that is, records produced by inquisitorial trials and other sorts of harsh and menacing hearings – those being questioned were not on equal footing as those carrying out the interrogation. 642 Yet, Ginzburg claims that from these unbalanced interrelationships, historians can attempt to grasp the “subtle

642 Carlo Ginzburg, Clues, Myths, and the Historical Method (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013), 142, 144-147.
interplay of threats and fears, of attacks and withdrawals.” Or, to put it in other words, one can explore the emotional practices and strategies that were at play.

Almost all testimonies claimed that Manrique left Manta just after the Almeydas rose up and took arms. Most witnesses argued that, at some moment, the priest met with the rebel brothers in Tibiritá and Machetá. Some of them added that they had seen Manrique on the trail leading to these towns while a few others claimed to have seen him coming back from them. The majority of testimonies maintained that they personally did not see Manrique inviting his flock to take up arms and join the Almeydas. Yet, many witnesses claimed that they overheard others saying that Manrique had been seen requesting iron, horses, and provisions for the Almeydas. Other witnesses even stated that they heard some say that Manrique told Manta’s residents they should meet with the guerrilla leaders as a way to show their tacit support and save the town from their wrath. As more witnesses were called upon to testify, the details of what Manrique said and did after returning to Manta become blurrier and somewhat contradictory. It seems that most witnesses, with a few exceptions, were trying to avoid incriminating themselves, the town’s priest, or any of their fellow neighbors. This was possibly done not only out of consideration for existing relations of friendship and kinship but also out fear that political tides could once again turn back and that anything they said or did could eventually be used against them.

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643 Ginzburg, *Clues, Myths, and the Historical Method*, 145.
The controversial and conflicting claims concerning Manrique’s conduct revolved around his statements about the Almeyda Guerrilla and his alleged efforts to aid the guerrilla group with horses, iron, and other provisions. The discrepancies appeared early in the trial. The first witness called to testify, Pedro José Piñeres, opened his testimony claiming that “Doctor Manrique has not preached in favor of the bandits, but that he [Piñeres] knew that he [Manrique] had traveled to the town of Tibiritá and from this one to that of Machetá where the offenders of the Sovereign’s rights” were found.\(^{645}\) Despite stating that the clergyman had not spoken in favor of the bandits, Piñeres closed his testimony declaring that once Manrique returned to Manta, he gathered his flock and told them to “try to make some lances to aid the vandals.”\(^{646}\) Another witness, Tomás Cárdenas, asserted “that he had not heard Manrique preach in favor of the rebels” but that he did hear others say that the priest had “requested they make lances” and that “he told his flock that they should head out and serve the traitors.”\(^{647}\) Yet, in his final remarks, Cárdenas added that some of the town’s residents also claimed that Manrique had met with the rebels and had made those public comments to prevent the guerrilla from destroying Manta.\(^{648}\)

Another witness, Pedro Ignacio Méndez, also offered rather inconclusive testimonies both times he was questioned. During his first statement given on December

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\(^{645}\) “… que no ha sido predicar a favor de los bandidos al doctor Manrique, pero que si save se trasladó al Pueblo de Tiribita y de este al de Machetá en donde se hallaron los contraventores de los derechos del soberano” (AGN, CO.AGN.SAA-I.10.30 – Eclesiásticos, ‘Causa criminal contra el cura de Manta. 1817-1818.’, 561)

\(^{646}\) “… procurasen a que se hicieran algunas lanzas, para dar auxilio a los Bandalos” (AGN, CO.AGN.SAA-I.10.30 – Eclesiásticos, ‘Causa criminal contra el cura de Manta. 1817-1818.’, 561)

\(^{647}\) “… que no le ha oído predicar a favor de los rebeldes… que oyo decir que havia mandado hacer Lanzas y que asus feligreses les havia dicho que fueran a servir a los traidores…” (AGN, CO.AGN.SAA-I.10.30 – Eclesiásticos, ‘Causa criminal contra el cura de Manta. 1817-1818.’, 561)

\(^{648}\) AGN, CO.AGN.SAA-I.10.30 – Eclesiásticos, ‘Causa criminal contra el cura de Manta. 1817-1818.’, 561)
27, 1817, Méndez claimed that he did not know if Manrique had provided horses to the Almeydas nor if the rebels had forced him to do so. Yet, he maintained that when Méndez returned to Manta, the priest “made a formal appeal that said: ‘Machetá is full of people in favor of the patria, you should encourage a meeting, for if you do not, these leaders will burn your rooms and destroy all your possessions.’”\(^{649}\) Méndez was quite certain that Manrique had asked his flock to produce lances for the Almeydas and added that one day he even came across a poor farmer who was taking his shovel to the priest so that they could use its iron to build lances.\(^{650}\)

A month later, on January 29, 1818, Méndez was interrogated for the second time. On this occasion, Méndez claimed that he did not know if Manrique had provided horses to the rebels, but that he did know that the priest’s two horses had been with him until José Jaramillo, a royalist official, captured the clergyman and took the horses along with the apprehended priest. Moreover, Méndez argued that he was unaware that Manrique exhorted his flock to support the rebels or that the priest ordered the town’s residents to provide lances to the rebels. In Méndez’s second testimony, the story about the poor farmer and his shovel comes up again. However, this time, Méndez stated that the farmer simply said that Manrique had requested iron but that the man never commented on the priest’s reasons or alleged intentions to produce lances.\(^{651}\) In this second declaration, Méndez mentions a short dialogue he had with Manrique and Juan Nepomuceno Guerrero, the

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\(^{649}\) “… haciendo una exortacion formal que decia: Macheta esta lleno de gente a favor de la patria ustedes propendano ala reunion por que esos Gefes si no lo hacer quemaran sus abitaciones y concluiran con sus bienes…” (AGN, CO.AGN.SAA-I.10.30 – Eclesiásticos, ‘Causa criminal contra el cura de Manta. 1817-1818.’, 563)

\(^{650}\) AGN, CO.AGN.SAA-I.10.30 – Eclesiásticos, ‘Causa criminal contra el cura de Manta. 1817-1818.’, 563-564.

\(^{651}\) AGN, CO.AGN.SAA-I.10.30 – Eclesiásticos, ‘Causa criminal contra el cura de Manta. 1817-1818.’, 569.
town’s mayor. According to Méndez, he was talking to Guerrero when the priest came up to them and urged them to meet with the rebels for if they did not “they would motivate the patriots to come in, burn the town, and take away all your stakes.”

Pedro Miguel Medellín, the farmer Méndez claimed he saw with a shovel, was also called upon to testify. Medellín explained he did not really own a shovel, but merely three pounds of iron with which he planned to have a shovel made. When he was taking the iron to the blacksmith’s, he came across Manrique, “who asked him to show him the iron and told him to hand it over because he needed it for something and paid him at a rate of three and half reales per pound, but that he who testifies did not know why he [Manrique] needed it.” Medellín’s following answers are relatively ambiguous and vague as his other responses and those of other witnesses. In one of his answers, the farmer explained that during those days he had hardly been in town due to his work in the ranch and that for that reason he was unaware of what Manrique had been saying or if the priest had handed over his horses to the rebels. Yet, other of his responses imply that Medellín was quite informed of what was being said in Manta. About the same time that the rebellion began, the farmer’s wife attended Sunday mass. According to what she told Medellín, that day the priest told all his flock that he required them to attend an offering of gratitude to take place the following Thursday. During Thursday’s service, Medellín’s wife heard the clergyman exclaim to all the audience “that if they did not go along with him, he would soon leave.”

652 “... como no van ustedes a opearse tanto con sus personas como con sus haciendas, daran lugar a que vengan los patriotas y quemen el pueblo, y les quiten sus intereses.” (AGN, CO.AGN.SAA-I.10.30 – Eclesiásticos, ‘Causa criminal contra el cura de Manta. 1817-1818.’, 569.)

653 “…que le mostrase el fierro y le dixo que selo cediera a causa que lo necesitava para cierta cosa el que le pagó a razón de tres reales y medio por libra, pero que ignora el que declara con que fin lo compraría...” (AGN, CO.AGN.SAA-I.10.30 – Eclesiásticos, ‘Causa criminal contra el cura de Manta. 1817-1818.’, 566.)
Neither Medellín nor his wife understood what the priest meant by this. A few days later, the word in town was that Manrique had gone to Tibiritá and Machetá to meet with the insurgents.654

The first testimonies, with their apparent contradictions and ambiguities, point at some of the strategies and practices that were at play. The witnesses drew attention on the growing atmosphere of distress that spread through Manta once claims of a rebel invasion began to take force. By alluding to such milieu, witnesses offered a seemingly truthful fact as well as a justification to any improper behavior they or other of Manta’s residents may have committed. These testimonies also hint at some traces of the fear and mistrust that surged during the interrogations. It is likely that during the questioning royalist officials attempted to pressure and intimidate the witness into giving valuable information or even incriminating someone else. In the meantime, it is possible that those being questioned believed that they could end up among the hundreds of people who had been imprisoned, tortured, and even executed in the past few years. In that sense, the seeming contradictions and vague remarks were merely a reaction to the intimidating atmosphere some faced during the interrogations. The witnesses offered any sort of information to confront and appease the interrogator’s growing pressure. By doing so, they could demonstrate their willingness to collaborate without incriminating themselves or any of their friends, relatives, and neighbors.

Yet, the persuasiveness of their answers depended not only on the faithfulness of their accounts. Other emotional practices were also at play. Their facial and body gestures, 654 AGN, CO.AGN.SAA-I.10.30 – Eclesiásticos, ‘Causa criminal contra el cura de Manta. 1817-1818.’, 566.
their tone of voice, and other expressions – of which we have no record but can imagine given the circumstances of the time – could substantiate the witnesses’ answers and, thus, their standing in the eyes of the tribunal. Yet, these emotional practices, if not played correctly, could lead to their doom. A trembling voice or an expression of fright could produce further mistrust and hostility on behalf of the officials leading the questioning. In the end, the witnesses’ strategy to avoid their incrimination or that of their acquaintances was one in which emotional practices were not separated from the rational but acted as an essential part of it.

Contrary to what was seen with the first witnesses, there were others who, perhaps owing to personal enmities or political reasons, sought to move emotions in other directions other than to avert repression on any of the town’s residents. Such was the case of Manta’s mayor, Juan Nepomuceno Guerrero. His responses seem to have been guided by feelings of fear and resentment as well as by his efforts to produce a certain sense of compassion and comradery among royalist officials. During the interrogation, Guerrero declared that once news of the Almeydas’ uprising reached Manta, Manrique asked the town’s residents for alms so he could offer mass to implore for the Virgin Mary’s protection of Manta. The mayor himself supported the priest with six pesos. The following Thursday, while most of Manta’s inhabitants were working the fields and occupied in their trades, Manrique gave mass to a few parishioners. Guerrero, who was among the few attendees, recalled that when the clergymen finished preaching the Gospel, “he turned his face to the people, and the doctor said: ‘men, you might as well get together, for the time of our liberty has arrived.’

655 AGN, CO.AGN.SAA-I.10.30 – Eclesiásticos, ‘Causa criminal contra el cura de Manta. 1817-1818.’, 569.
And he said various other things which, when brought together, [implied] that we aid the insurgents that were found in the town of Machetá. But the people stayed silent, and the mass ended, and each one went their own way, without paying attention to anything.”

In contrast to the first testimonies, Guerrero was quite unambiguous when talking about Manrique’s behavior. According to the mayor, following the priest’s homily, Manrique left town and went to Machetá and Tibiritá. Once the clergyman came back, he went around Manta talking to its residents. At one point, while the mayor was talking to Ignacio Méndez, the priest came up to them and said: “sirs, why don’t you try to present yourself to the patriots that are in the town of Machetá. For if you do not, you will incite them to come and burn the town and your estates.” Guerrero alleged that the clergyman made many other contentious claims such as that “Manta was the only town that did not belong to their [rebel] party for all the towns in the territory’s jurisdiction were following the faction of the patriots.” While Méndez’ testimony with regards to this conversation were quite ambiguous, Guerrero’s statement was conclusive.

According to Guerrero, while talking to Méndez and the priest, the mayor tried to ignore Manrique’s comments. Yet, at some point during the priest’s jabber, Guerrero intervened saying that he was a loyal vassal and would not meet with the rebels and added

656 “…volvió la cara al pueblo y dixo el doctor: señores bien pueden ustedes reunirse pues ya llego el tiempo de Nuestra livertad y otras varias que todo se combinaba que se le diese auxilio a los ynsurgentes que se hallavan en el pueblo de Machetá pero el pueblo se mantubo callado, y luego que se concluyó la misa, cada uno se fue a su destino, sin hacer caso de nada…” (AGN, CO.AGN.SAA-I.10.30 – Eclesiásticos, ‘Causa criminal contra el cura de Manta. 1817-1818.’, 570.)
657 “Señores como no tratan ustedes de presentarse a los patriotas que se hallan en el pueblo de Macheta por que si no daran lugar a que vengan y quemen el pueblo y sacrificuen sus haciendas.” (AGN, CO.AGN.SAA-I.10.30 – Eclesiásticos, ‘Causa criminal contra el cura de Manta. 1817-1818.’, 570.)
658 “…que Manta era el solo el que no quedara a su partido, pues todos los pueblos de las jurisdicciones de este territorio estava su vando de dichos patriotas…” (AGN, CO.AGN.SAA-I.10.30 – Eclesiásticos, ‘Causa criminal contra el cura de Manta. 1817-1818.’, 570.)
that his impression was that Manta’s residents felt no sympathy for the insurgents. The clergyman allegedly left them after the mayor’s intervention. Guerrero thought the priest had gone home and had stopped making allegations in favor of the Almeydas. However, two or three days after such incident, the mayor received a letter coming from Machetá written by the priest. According to Guerrero, along with Manrique’s note came a message from one of the rebel commanders stating that if Manta “did not put itself under the obedience of the intrusive government, they would burn the town and tie all of the town’s vecinos and take them to Machetá…” Guerrero kept the letter and handed it over to José Jaramillo, the royalist official who eventually captured Manrique. The priest’s dispatch and the rebel leader’s note were later appended to the trial’s records along with a letter from Guerrero to Lieutenant Colonel Simón Muñoz.  

Manrique’s letter left few doubts of his apparent backing of the Almeydas. In the dispatch, dated November 13, 1817, the priest stated that he “found himself ashamed of the apathy and lack of interest that Manta’s vecinos had shown for the common cause and the little interest they showed for the happiness of their patria even as all the towns in the canton obstinately came together and pled, as a favor, to be admitted into the Liberators’ troops.” Manrique’s request to Guerrero was straightforward: “I beg of you, in the name

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659 The Diccionario de Autoridades defines the term vecino as “someone who has his house and home in a town and partakes in its responsibilities and contributions…” (“… el que tiene casa, y hogar en un Pueblo, y contribuye en él en las cargas, ú repartimientos…” (Diccionario de Autoridades, Real Academia Española, 1739.)

660 “…que si no se ponia pronto a la obediencia del Gobierno yntruso quemarian el pueblo, y que llevarian los vecinos de este pueblo amarrados para Macheta…” (AGN, CO.AGN.SAA-I.10.30 – Eclesiásticos, ‘Causa criminal contra el cura de Manta. 1817-1818.’, 570.)

661 AGN, CO.AGN.SAA-I.10.30 – Eclesiásticos, ‘Causa criminal contra el cura de Manta. 1817-1818.’, 573-574.

662 “Me hallo avergonzado si en la apatía, y el poco ynterés, que los vecinos de Manta, toman en la causa comun, y lo poco que se interezan en la felicidad de su Patria, quando todos los pueblos de todo el Canton,
of the patria and of humanity, to do whatever is at your disposal to invigorate these peoples, to send us weapons, mounts, and money to pay for our expenses.”

Manrique even asked the mayor to send them the many shotguns and pistols that the rebel commander claimed were found in Manta, “regardless of who they belong to, for the commander and I will answer for them to their owners.”

In another fragment, the clergyman encouraged Guerrero to “not be afraid of the enemies, for they have too many places to deal with and they are hated by all the towns that are urging us and inviting us.”

Manrique finally concluded saying, “let us not be this region’s stain. You must look out for the wellbeing of your country of birth. You must not allow for it to be buried in opprobrium.”

A few days later, Guerrero received another letter from Machetá. This time it was dated November 18 and signed by Vicente Almeyda. The rebel leader began his dispatch claiming that the cause he defended was “for the common good and for the benefit of all the Kingdom, and in revenge for the affronted humanity and the blood of American victims dreadfully shed by Godo bandits…”

Almeyda claimed to be shocked to see how
Manta’s residents refused to support their endeavor while many others throughout the region backed them and even sent men and provisions. “I am well persuaded,” he explained, “that this is not on the priest’s side, for I know that he has done what is at his disposal to help us and he has obtained nothing. And I now see that the methods of benignity and condescendence that we have used to the present, which have been so successful in other towns, are futile in this parish.”

Almeyda announced that he would send “a carabineer and four lancers, for them to round up and remit all the useful horses [found in Manta], even if they belonged to the Roman Pope himself, as well as saddles, ammunitions, and provisions.” Additionally, the rebel commander requested lances and iron as well as cash from the royal revenues and tithes. If these five men were not sufficient, the rebel commander made clear, he would send “enough men to take by force that which will has denied, and we will carry it out even if we must set the parish on fire. We must follow the example of the Godos…”

Almeyda’s threats and Manrique’s insistence seems to have been somewhat successful. According to Guerrero, in a couple of days the town’s frightened residents collected 77 pesos, one cow valued at 17 pesos, and around 50 pesos worth of silver. Yet,
despite these efforts, rumors took hold claiming the town’s aid had been insufficient.672

The word was that the rebel troops would soon unleash all their fury against Manta due to the town’s refusal to fully support the insurgents. While some residents feared looting, others dreaded abduction and even murder. Amidst these frightening perspectives, dozens of Manta’s dwellers decided to leave town and hide in the forest. Both Guerrero and Manrique, one posing as the town’s most royalist subject and the other accused of backing the rebels, were among those who hid in the forest out fear that a bloodshed was soon going to happen. José Cecilio Castañeda, a peasant who also fled into the forest, explained that “he, as well as all of the vecinos, went into the forest because they had heard that they [the rebels] were coming to burn the town and capture the mayor, Juan Nepomuceno Guerrero, and take him to the town of Machetá.”673

Guerrero, for his part, declared that the arrival of a carabineer, his assistant, and three lancers on November 18th was what prompted many to leave their homes. The town’s residents, the mayor explained, were already fearful due to the priest’s many threats and his claims that if Manta did not recruit enough men or collect sufficient provisions the rebels would destroy the town. Once the five rebels arrived at Manta, they apparently stole horses and were seen plotting and saying they would return with more men. “I could only suspect,” Guerrero explained, “that they were going to bring more thieves to take my life away and to destroy this locality, and thus I found no other option than to run into the forest

672 AGN, CO.AGN.SAA-I.10.30 – Eclesiásticos, ‘Causa criminal contra el cura de Manta. 1817-1818.’, 575. 673 “… que tanto el como todos los vecinos se fueron al monte a causa que havia oydo decir que benian a quemar el Pueblo, y a llevarse al Señor Alcalde Don Juan Nepomuceno Guerrero preso para el pueblo de Machetá.” (AGN, CO.AGN.SAA-I.10.30 – Eclesiásticos, ‘Causa criminal contra el cura de Manta. 1817-1818.’, 571.)
with my family, which is composed of my woman, four daughters, two male offspring, one
married and the other a seven-year-old minor…”674 Guerrero remained hidden in the forest
for about five days until November 23rd when he received news informing him that
“royalist troops had exterminated the mob of thieves” and “that commander Don Simón
Muñoz had arrived at the town of Tibiritá.”675 Finding himself safe and sound, he wrote a
letter to Muñoz putting himself at his service. According to the mayor, following the
Lieutenant Colonel’s requests, he eventually sent sixteen horses and four saddles to the
royalist troops stationed in Guateque.676

The mayor’s testimony, like those that took place before his, was an interplay of
emotions. Even though Guerrero’s resentment and insinuations against Manrique stood out
from other testimonies, his strategy was not far removed from that of others witnesses. For
instance, the mayor also highlighted the milieu of fear that spread through the town and
explained that under such circumstances he even offered alms to the priest to implore for
the Virgin Mary’s protection. Likewise, Guerrero tried to employ emotional practices to
his benefit. It is likely that due to his position and the evidence he had presented
beforehand, such as Manrique’s compromising correspondence and the letter he sent to
Lieutenant Muñoz, the interrogators were much more lenient with him. Even if the royalist
officials were more indulgent and believed in his innocence even before beginning the

674 “... no puedo yo menos que sospechar que hivan a traer mas ladrones para quitarme la vida y acabar con
este vecindario, y luego no hallé otor adbitrio que fue el meterme a los montes con mi familia que se compone
de mi muger, quatro niñas, dos hijos varones, uno casado y otro menor de siete de años...” (AGN,
CO.AGN.SAA-I.10.30 – Eclesiásticos, ‘Causa criminal contra el cura de Manta. 1817-1818.’, 575.)
675 “ya havian exterminado a la turbu de ladrones… que el comandante Don Simón Muñoz se hallava en el
Pueblo de Tibiritá...” (AGN, CO.AGN.SAA-I.10.30 – Eclesiásticos, ‘Causa criminal contra el cura de
Manta. 1817-1818.’, 575.)
676 AGN, CO.AGN.SAA-I.10.30 – Eclesiásticos, ‘Causa criminal contra el cura de Manta. 1817-1818.’, 575.
questioning, Guerrero had reasons to feel some distress during the interrogation. It was not
his life or liberty that was at stake, but his social and political standing. The questioning
was an opportunity for the mayor to prove his fervent loyalty to the Spanish Crown to
improve his political position. That is to say, his decision to offer incriminating information
might have been due to some sort of animosity towards the priest, but also from his efforts
to portray himself as someone who was supportive of the Crown’s interests and, thus,
worthy of recognition. As happened with previous testimonies, his persuasiveness not only
depended on what he said, but on how he said it. We can imagine that in this interplay of
emotions, his gestures and expressions were part of his efforts to render himself as a loyal
vassal.

Manrique was interrogated following the testimonies of dozens of witnesses who
dubiously pointed at the priest’s purported improper conduct and a few other declarations,
such as Guerrero’s, who unambiguously highlighted the clergyman’s allegiance with the
Almeydas. Before starting the inquiry, the clergyman was told to put one hand on his heart
and another on his head and to swear that he would answer truthfully to every question
asked to him. It is unclear if it was common for investigators justice tribunals to have
suspects place their hands to their head and heart. However, such symbolic practice is
illustrative of one of the claims put forward in this chapter regarding the indissoluble
connection between emotions and rationality. It is as if by placing his hands in his head
and heart, Manrique was representing through his body the notion that emotions are
constitutive of the rational.

During Manrique’s interrogations, emotional strategies and practices similar to
those seen among other witnesses also come up. It is clear the priest was trying to save his
own skin by trying to convince the interrogators of his innocence and of his loyalty to the Spanish Crown. All through the interrogation, the priest highlighted his loyalty to the Crown, downplayed others’ fidelity, and blamed the rebels’ incessant coercion for his purported misconduct. Moreover, he probably did this attempting to conceal any sign of fear or wariness that could make the investigators even more suspicious. At certain moments during the inquiry, the clergyman was confronted with other witnesses and their testimonies, making the situation even more tense. The interrogators, for their part, seemed to be convinced of Manrique’s culpability and attempted to induce him, with certain harshness and insistence, to confess his alleged wrongdoings.677

Throughout the inquiry, Manrique constantly tried to argue that his actions only sought to save Manta from the fury of the rebels. From the beginning, the clergyman confessed he had visited Machetá and Chocontá and had met with the Almeydas. However, he clarified that he only did such things because he was convinced the rebels “were going to send people to Manta for them to proceed against this town for not taking part in their complot.” The priest claimed that when he met with Vicente Almeyda, he tried to convince “him to not do such a thing such as to send men to exterminate the place, that instead he should commission the mayor to give them aid and send supplies.”678 With regards to the aid given to the rebels, Manrique first argued that he had not given them supplies of any kind. Nonetheless, when asked about the iron he bought from Medellín and about his

678 “hivan amandar a la parroquia de Manta gentes para que prosedieran contra este Pueblo, por que no había entrado en su compló… le dixo que no hiziere tal cosa de mandar hombres a esterminar el lugar que en tal caso comisionase a el Alcalde y le diera auxilios para sacar recursos…” (AGN, CO.AGN.SAA-I.10.30 – Eclesiásticos, ‘Causa criminal contra el cura de Manta. 1817-1818.’, 576.)
requests asking Manta’s residents to send provisions to the insurgents, the priest was forced to admit that he had in fact sent iron and had asked several of the town’s inhabitants to do the same. However, the clergyman quickly asserted that he had done this against his will and only because “the Almeydas had agreed that they would not harm the locality under the condition that they [Manta’s residents] give them some provisions.” What is more, the priest argued that it was the mayor, “who encouraged the people to do so and to gather weapons, and the vecinos did as they were told.”

Under such circumstances, Manrique explained, when the town’s residents were gathering supplies, some commented that the priest was not making any contribution of any sort. To avoid further recriminations, the priest bought three to four pounds of iron from Medellín and gave them as his offering.

With respect to the most compromising evidence against him, such as the letter and the controversial homily, the priest simply argued that the rebels forced him to carry out numerous actions against his will. The clergyman admitted that he wrote and signed the damning letter; however, he declared that it was written in such bellicose terms because the rebels pressed him to do so, telling him that they would attack Manta if he did not comply with their request. Manrique claimed he repeatedly told the Almeydas that the epistle would be futile due to the town’s faithfulness to the Crown, but the insurgents allegedly forced him to write the hostile note.

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679 “Almeidas solo assendieron a no perjudicar el lugar con la condicion de que se le diesen algunos auxilios… el Alcalde, de quien fusitó la gente, y la hizo manifestar la comicion de juntar armas por lo que los vecinos contribuyeron…” (AGN, CO.AGN.SAA-I.10.30 – Eclesiásticos, ‘Causa criminal contra el cura de Manta. 1817-1818.’, 576.)
The priest also declared that he offered an eucharist to implore for the Virgin Mary’s protection simply to fulfill the rebel’s demands. During the interrogation, the clergyman was asked once and again who had come up with the idea to host the mass. Manrique first pointed at the mayor, claiming Guerrero was the one who proposed the idea and asked Manta’s residents for contributions to pay for the service. The interrogators refuted the clergyman twice and showed him testimonies that claimed that it was he who invited his flock to the eucharist and he who had been seen asking townspeople for contributions. The records do not describe Manrique’s reactions once he was controverted. It is possible that his voice began shaking and his face quivered out of dread once he heard the incriminating testimonies. Or perhaps the clergyman maintained his composure despite being put against the wall. Nevertheless, we know that after two rebuttals and incessant questioning of his remarks during the sermon, Manrique accepted he was the one who had summoned Manta’s residents to mass. Instantly after, he confessed that during mass he pronounced a rather ambiguous homily with some seditious remarks. As Manrique explained, “and although it is true that after the Gospel I said some words, they were not in the terms I have been reproached for, but rather in amphibolic terms which each one can interpret according to their apprehension.” The priest then continued, “it is true that something was said about this issue [of aiding the rebels], but I did so because it was one of the conditions the Almeydas imposed for them to not proceed against Manta. And that I suspected they had spies to verify this.”

682 The term amphibological (anfibológico) refers to terms and phrases that are ambiguous, equivocal, and can be interpreted in more than one way.
683 “… y que aunque es cierto que después del Evangelio dixo algunas expresiones no fue en los terminos que se le recomiende si no en los terminos anfiboloxicos que cada uno interpretaria según su malicia, pero
In the end, Manrique tried to portray himself as a loyal vassal whose mediation saved Manta from the Almeydas’ wrath. In his final remarks, the priest explained that he had never been unfaithful to the Crown nor tried to persuade his flock to join the rebel side. The clergyman insisted that he traveled to Machetá to prevent the Almeydas from raiding Manta and added that the reason why he visited the rebels from the very beginning was due to his efforts to save the life of Francisco Pérez, a Spaniard sentenced to death by the rebels. Manrique claimed he was unsuccessful in this endeavor as Pérez was executed before he reached the town. Yet, the clergyman clarified that upon his arrival, he “publicly reproached Vicente Almeyda, mainly for having killed him without sacraments.”

Manrique then picked up on the mayor’s claims about his flight into the forest when the rebels’ attack seemed imminent. As part of his strategy, Manrique downplayed others’ efforts to protect Manta’s population. The priest dismissed Guerrero’s retreat claiming it held little significance as several of the town’s residents, including himself, had done so even before the mayor’s withdrawal. Through his recurrent remarks against the mayor, Manrique not only unveiled his animosity towards Guerrero, but also drew attention on his efforts to protect his flock from harms’ way. Ultimately, the priest was attempting to stir the tribunal’s sympathies, instigating aversion towards the mayor while trying to gain its favor by portraying himself as Manta’s most loyal vassal who, thanks to his shrewd actions, saved Manta from the rebels’ mayhem.

que es cierto que algo dixo sobre el particular y le hizo por ser una de las condiciones que le pusieron los Almeydas para no proseder contra Manta y sospechava tenian espías para ello…” (AGN, CO.AGN.SAA-I.10.30 – Eclesiásticos, ‘Causa criminal contra el cura de Manta. 1817-1818.’, 577.)

684 “… el reprendio publicamente a Vicente Almeyda principalmente por haverlo matado sin sacramentos.” (AGN, CO.AGN.SAA-I.10.30 – Eclesiásticos, ‘Causa criminal contra el cura de Manta. 1817-1818.’, 577.)

In the long run, Manrique’s efforts were futile. The priest was unable to persuade the interrogators of his innocence. Perhaps, royalist officials considered the evidence against him to be too ample and too damning. We can only conjecture whether Manrique’s interrogations made matters worse or not. Perhaps, his continuous allusions to the Almeydas’ coercion to explain almost all of his actions might have raised more questions than they answered. It is also possible that his emotional expressions and gestures complicated matters even further. When the interrogators refuted him, Manrique almost instantly accepted his inaccuracies and provided different and sometimes contradictory answers. It is as if the intimidation and distress he was undergoing led him to change his narrative in more than one occasion. As his answers became even more unpersuasive, the interrogators’ hostility grew, and one can imagine that the priest’s expressions of fright became even more palpable. This, in turn, possibly raised further misgivings among the tribunal’s members.

Amidst this interplay, emotions and emotional expressions were part of the strategies employed throughout the interrogation. That is to say, the fear and intimidation Manrique experienced all through the questioning, and his gestures and expressions throughout, gave form and meaning to his answers. These feelings of dread did not necessarily blur his thoughts. Rather, they were an input that guided the clergyman toward displaying compelling behavior during the trial, not only offering convincing answers but also displaying persuasive gestures and expressions. As Joanna Bourke would put it, emotions, such as fear, do not necessarily disrupt processes of rationality, but rather
animate rationality.\textsuperscript{686} Or, as was discussed in the chapter’s introduction, Bourdieu’s practice theory implies that thoughts and feelings are inseparable and both emerge, hand in hand, from “inductive states of the body.”\textsuperscript{687}

In the end, the committee led by Lieutenant Muñoz finished its work in March of 1818. The testimonies and evidence collected reached the viceroy’s office in the following weeks. The Viceroy Juan de Samano and the tribunal did not reach a verdict. Rather, on late May they decided to pass on the case to the ecclesiastical authorities claiming that Manrique, as a clergyman, had been granted immunity and could not be condemned by a civil tribunal. Yet, despite not reaching a ruling, the viceroy’s decree demanded “the strict and prompt administration of justice… for the fulfillment of the public’s reprisal.”\textsuperscript{688} In the following weeks, an ecclesiastic tribunal sentenced Manrique on charges of infidelity. He was reproached for betraying not only the King and the Spanish Crown, but also the Catholic Church and God himself.

Manrique’s efforts to prove his innocence and his indisputable loyalty to the Crown proved to be somewhat futile. Yet, his case underscores the ways in which emotions and emotional expressions helped give meaning to actions and conducts. The testimonies given throughout the interrogations, and the interpretations that arose from them, were shaped by fear. Many continuously referred to situations of distress in which they claimed to have been forced to carry out acts that were contrary to Crown. At the same time, the fright and

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\textsuperscript{687} Bourdieu, \textit{The Logic of Practice}, 69.
\textsuperscript{688} “… la recta y pronta administracion de Justicia… para la satisfaccion de la vindicta publica.” (AGN, CO.AGN.SAA-I.10.30 – Eclesiásticos, ‘Causa criminal contra el cura de Manta. 1817-1818.’, 587)
\end{flushright}
anxiety many faced during the interrogations shaped the sorts of answers they gave and the ways in which they expressed these answers. The thought of ending up in prison or among the hundreds who had been executed, led to contradictory answers and fairly incomplete responses. Possibly owing to the growing intimidation and fear they were facing, all those who were questioned were quick to deny any sympathy or assistance towards the Almeydas or any rebel groups before them. In the blink of an eye, traces of support for republicanism and independence vanished once the inquiries began. Manrique was lucky enough that his hardships and confinement did not last long. In late 1820, almost two years after being sentenced and after being sent from Santafé to Santa Marta, rebel troops freed Manrique. He was once again seen speaking in favor of republicanism and the rebel faction.\footnote{AGN, CO.AGN. SR.35,24 – Curas-Párrocos, ‘Postulación de José Ángel Manrique. 17 de noviembre de 1820. Bogotá.’, 545-549.}

Conclusions

During the monarchical restoration, in regions such as Cartagena, Santafé, Popayán, and Tunja, royalist officials ended up viewing almost everyone as a suspect. Their intense distrust was particularly manifest during the beginning of the restoration when the Expeditionary Army began to take control of former rebel territories. In some cases, somewhat minor details raised royalists’ hesitations. Such was the case of Andrés Suárez, the priest of Aguada de Pablo, a town about 70 km east of Cartagena de Indias. In November 1815, while royalist troops laid siege of Cartagena for the third consecutive month, army officials began an investigation against Suárez. Royalist authorities had received complains from soldiers and town residents accusing the priest of behaving improperly and of refusing to aid royalist troops. Some rumors claimed the clergyman
dressed inappropriately, wearing short, loose white pants that exposed his legs. Other
claims maintained that he lived with a mulatta woman and that he harassed dozens of the
town’s women. Furthermore, officials were informed that the priest had advised the town’s
residents to turn down any of the Expeditionary Army’s requests for food or lodging.
Apparently, he went so far as to incite Aguada de Pablo’s inhabitants to take down or burn
any abandoned house so that royalist troops could not use them for shelter or to treat their
ill. Some of the allegations that reached monarchist officials even accused Suárez of killing
a convalescent army officer. The word was that Suárez visited the ill and wounded to offer
them spiritual comfort. Amidst his acts of religious relief, he gave an officer some sort of
medication that quickly deteriorated the officer’s health and eventually killed him.690

Those called upon to testify corroborated some of these rumors. Two of the
witnesses claimed that Suárez mostly wore his habits, but that due to his “philosophical
character”, he sometimes dressed somewhat peculiarly. They explained that he was often
seen wearing white pants and a worn out, light blue, linen frock coat. Several witnesses
confirmed that the word around town was that Suárez lived with a mulatta woman, but
most of them stated that it was not true that he mistreated the town’s women. The witnesses
were even more unequivocal when explaining that Suárez had always been a faithful
royalist. Moreover, they maintained that the priest offered all sorts of assistance and
support to the Expeditionary Army once it reached Aguada de Pablo. They all denied that

690 AGN, CO.AGN.SAA-I.10.26 – Eclesiásticos, ‘Interrogatorio a testigos del caso del presbítero Andrés
Suárez. 27 de noviembre de 1815. Sabana Larga.’, 399-402.
Suárez held any responsibility with regards to the officer’s death or concerning any other inconvenience the royalist troops might have had when passing the town.691

The interrogation was sent to the Viceroy Francisco José de Montalvo. The Viceroy absolved Suárez of any crime. It seems Montalvo was not pleased with the way the investigation and interrogations were carried out. In a letter written on December 9, 1815, Josef Barcenas, the army officer who led the inquiry and who was in charge of some of the troops stationed in Aguada de Pablo, apologized to Montalvo for any wrongdoing he and his men might have committed. At some point, Barcenas explained that he had always tried to treat the town’s residents with the upmost respect and that he had only threatened to death those few who had been captured under charges of treason. The officer also clarified that his soldiers did take wine from one of the town’s residences but that they did so with the owner’s permission and blessing. Additionally, Barcenas accepted his mistake for having allowed his men to drink and dance the same night that another one of his subordinates was dying.692

To an extent, Andrés Suárez was lucky that his case reached Montalvo and not one of the tribunals set up by the Expeditionary Army. Montalvo did not pay much attention to Suárez’s idiosyncratic behavior and preferred to absolve the priest and ignore the accusations made against the clergyman.693 Daniel Gutiérrez has argued that during the first years of monarchical restoration, there were continuous tensions between Viceroy

Montalvo and the generals leading the Expeditionary Army. Montalvo as well as his advisors and some of Royal Audiencia’s magistrates were in favor of a conciliatory approach to the restoration. They favored general pardons and believed they could gain authority through peaceful means. General Pablo Morillo, commander of the Expeditionary Army, and his closest circle preferred other, more violent and pugnacious methods. In the regions where Montalvo was able to impose his authority, executions and imprisonments were somewhat limited. In those in which Morillo and his generals enforced their methods, violence and repression were rife.\textsuperscript{694}

There are several possible reasons why the Expeditionary Army and so many royalist commanders decided to impose their authority through violent means. Perhaps some were simply replicating the intense violence they experienced in the Iberian Peninsula during the war against France or in Venezuela during ‘War to Death.’ It is also possible that the rhetoric coming from the French Revolution as well as from other previous episodes of terror also influenced their conduct. In any case, emotions such as rage and resentment shaped the strategies they used to navigate through the monarchical restoration. These emotions helped built a milieu in which repression and brutality became means to demonstrate their commitment and loyalty to the Spanish Crown. In the end, Morillo’s approach proved to be counterproductive. By 1819, many New Granadians were fed up with the royalists’ terror and persecution and embraced the rebels’ efforts to put an end to Spanish rule. For many, it was not necessarily republicanism and independence guiding

\textsuperscript{694} Gutiérrez Ardila, \textit{La restauración en la Nueva Granada (1815-1819)}, 105-145.
them into the battlefields, but their hope to put an end to the unending violence and oppression.

Manifestations of fear, rage, elation, and resentment, along with other emotional expressions, were part of people’s strategies during the monarchical restoration. The ways in which emotions were expressed and displayed gave meaning to particular actions and statements. Exaggerating, concealing, or twisting certain emotional expressions could demonstrate a person’s good standing and their loyalty to the Spanish Crown. In certain circumstances, playing the correct keys and displaying certain emotions in particular ways could save a person from imprisonment and even from capital punishment. That is to say, emotions not only shape society’s understandings of the times being lived, emotions – in their different manifestations – also bestow meaning on certain conducts and acts. This premise reinforces the idea put forward throughout the dissertation that emotions are part of people’s cognition. They are intrinsically linked to the act of giving meaning, both helping people understand the world around them and bestowing meaning on their actions and behavior.
Chapter 5: The Constitution on the Throne: Emotions and Archetypes in the First Republic of Colombia

On the morning of December 2, 1821, Bogotá’s residents gathered in the city’s main square to acclaim the recently enacted Cúcuta Constitution.\textsuperscript{695} At around 9 a.m, the city’s councilmen marched towards a throne resting on a platform that had been placed in the middle of the main plaza. Those leading the procession carried the standard of Bogotá with a constitution hanging from its rod.\textsuperscript{696} When they reached the platform, two of them, Bernardo Pardo and José León Licht, carefully set the standard and the constitution on the throne. They then picked up the constitution and began reading it aloud. When they finished reading the text, the crowd cheered “long live the sacred constitution of the Republic of Colombia” and exclaimed promises to uphold, obey, and respect the constitution and the Republic’s magistrates and officials. Amidst the cheers, some yelled that that they would defend the constitution “with their interests, with their blood, and with their own lives.”\textsuperscript{697} Once the praises and acclamations came to end, councilman Pardo grabbed the standard with the constitution affixed to it and walked back to the building. He

\textsuperscript{695} The Cúcuta Constitution was sanctioned on August 30, 1821. The new constitution formally established the first Republic of Colombia. In 1821, the Republic of Colombia was composed of present-day Colombia, Panamá, and Venezuela. The provinces of Quito and Guayaquil (roughly present-day Ecuador) were annexed one year later. Among other things, the Constitution adopted a gradual policy of slave manumission that paved the way for a freedom of wombs law, the formation of manumission committees, and the abolition of slave trade. (Marcela Echeverri, “Esclavitud y tráfico de esclavos en el Pacífico suramericano durante la era de la abolición”, Historia Mexicana 69, no. 2 (2019): 627-628.)

\textsuperscript{696} It is unclear if this particular copy of the constitution came in the form of a bound book, a leaflet, or a scroll. The scribe’s account does not offer any details on how the councilmen handled the text, how it dangled from the rod, or other information that could give us some lights about the copy’s physical form.

\textsuperscript{697} “… viva la sagrada constitución de la República de Colombia, sostengamosla guardandola, obedeciendola y respetando en ella a nuestros magistrado… sostengamosla con nuestros intereses, con nuestra sangre y con nuestras propias vidas…” (Archivo General de la Nación (AGN), NEGOCIOS-ADMINISTR:SR.71,5,D.99, ‘Relación del escribano sobre celebraciones de la Constitución de Cúcuta. Bogotá. 2 de diciembre de 1821.’, 510.)
then mounted a horse and began his way towards the city’s main street while displaying the standard and the constitution. All the other councilmen as well as Bogotá’s top civil and military authorities and several city notables followed Pardo’s lead. According to the scribe’s account, onlookers cheered and expressed their happiness as they watched the constitution and the procession pass by. The scribe explained that the Indians standing on the sides of the streets were “particularly satisfied as they saw their holy desires fulfilled with the Republic’s reestablishment along with the publication\textsuperscript{698} of the constitution that would govern them.”\textsuperscript{699}

Even though Bogotá’s residents were celebrating a republican constitution, the festivity built upon colonial and monarchic notions of symbolic power. During the celebration, the throne placed in the city’s square stood out as a visible symbol of power. In Bogotá in 1821 a throne entailed authority and legitimacy for a variety of reasons. It not only represented the seat from which monarchs imparted commands and enforced their authority but also denoted religious authority. Catholics believed there was only one throne in heaven and that that throne belonged to God. Moreover, kings and queens who sat in the throne were usually regarded as blessed and consecrated beings.\textsuperscript{700} In this case, however,

\textsuperscript{698} In the early nineteenth century, as well as in previous centuries, the term publication (or to publish) had somewhat different connotations to those that exist in the present. The term not only implied writing and printing a given text, but also transmitting and passing on information, particularly through oral means. The 1737 edition of the \textit{Diccionario de Autoridades}, for instance, defines the term “publicar” as the act of “making notorious and clear, through the voice of a public crier, or by other means, something that must be known by all. (“Publicar: v. Hacer notória y patente, por voz de pregonero, o por otros medios, alguna cosa que se desea venga a noticia de todos.” (\textit{Diccionario de Autoridades}, Real Academia Española, 1737)).

\textsuperscript{699} “… una singular complasencia en ver cumplidos los santos deseos del reestablecimiento de la República y la publicación de la constitución que debe gobernarlas” (AGN, NEGOCIOS-ADMINISTR:SR.71,5,D.99, “Relación del escribano sobre celebraciones de la Constitución de Cúcuta. Bogotá. 2 de diciembre de 1821.”, 510.)

\textsuperscript{700} It is worth noting that the level of “sacredness” of kings and queens varied in time and depending on each particular monarchy. In Spanish political culture, power came from God and was transmitted from God to the people who, to preserve social stability, transferred power to the monarch. (Alejandro Cañeque, \textit{The
the throne was not meant for a monarch or for God but for a constitution. Similar to the meanings it brought about in monarchical regimes, the throne sought to bestow the constitution with a certain sense of legitimacy, authority, and sacredness. Those who attended the public ceremony referred to the charter as “the sacred constitution of the Republic of Colombia.” The scribe even explained that the Indians viewing the procession and praising the constitution held a “holy desire” to see its publication. In that sense, in spite of replacing the monarch with a republican charter, the ceremony could hardly be considered a disruption from colonial and monarchic conceptions of symbolic power.

Similarly, the celebration built on colonial social hierarchies and relations of power. During the rite, direct contact and access to the constitution was unequal. The constitution was carried, displayed, and read aloud by the city’s councilmen. Those who were closest to the charter, both when it was read and when it was displayed during the procession, were top authorities and city notables. Plebeians and Indians were expected to see the constitution from a distance and to hear its content through the mediation of Bogotá’s patricians. Their part in the festivity was a somewhat passive and ornamental one. They cheered and celebrated the charter as Bogotá’s patricians presented it to them.

The celebration of the 1821 Constitution is an example of the persistence of monarchical and colonial archetypes after the onset of republicanism. This chapter argues

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701 “… viva la sagrada constitución de la República de Colombia…” (AGN, NEGOCIOS-ADMINISTR:SR.71,5,D.99, ‘Relación del escribano sobre celebraciones de la Constitución de Cúcuta. Bogotá. 2 de diciembre de 1821.’, 510.)

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that during the first years of republican life, people’s notions of power – and their conceptions of how power was supposed to be represented – were still shaped by models and mental images of monarchical symbols and colonial social relations. The political changes that were taking place in the 1820s did not bring about immediate transformations in society’s conditions of symbolic power nor in people’s notions of social organization. Such conceptions could not be easily erased or altered in people’s minds. At the time, the new republic’s citizens as well as those denied complete citizenship were still coming to terms with what independence and republicanism meant and how power and social order were to be understood and represented under these new political circumstances. The language of rights, equality, and citizenship imbedded in the new constitutions was given different meanings across society. However, this new language did not produce an abrupt transformation in society’s different understandings of power.

The chapter draws on William Reddy’s concept of ‘emotives’ to discuss the ways in which archetypes from the past shaped people’s emotions and their understandings of what was happening around them. The chapter claims that models and mental images from the past shaped not only rituals, such as the celebration of the 1821 Constitution, but also people’s emotions and their notions of reality. In the 1820s, the inhabitants of the newly formed republic strategically looked back to monarchical representations of power, to colonial social hierarchies, and to past events to give meaning to the world they were living in. Archetypes from the colonial period informed discussions and public debates and guided people’s emotions. A mental image of prior symbols of power or of bygone notions of society brought about emotions and emotional expressions associated with those particular archetypes. For instance, patricians, slaveowners and even middle sectors
alluded to an ideal and bygone social order to justify their dread of slave manumission and of any reform leading to racial equality. At times, debates over the republic’s political stability ended in insinuations in favor of powerful absolutist leaders. Some did not hesitate to suggest that stability could only be achieved by returning to a monarchical form of government. They waved the threat of anarchy, as monarchists had done some years earlier, to justify absolutist projects. In the end, such allusions to ideal models of society and to past notions of political stability shaped the emotions that emerged and the ways in which such feelings were understood, experienced, and expressed.

Reddy’s notion of ‘emotives’ helps us understand how the act of labeling a feeling – or, in the case being made in this chapter, the act of opting for a particular reference or model – ends up guiding and shaping emotions. For Reddy, ‘emotives’ are utterances or speech acts through which individuals define and characterize emotions. When a person is feeling a series of sensations, ‘emotives’ come into play in the moment in which the individual decides to identify those feelings and label them under a particular category or term. In that sense, an ‘emotive’ is the act in which a person names an emotion in accordance with society’s terminology and understandings of what such emotion implies. 702 Thus, Reddy claims that ‘emotives’ can be “considered as utterances aimed at briefly characterizing the current state of activated thought material that exceeds the current capacity of attention. Such expression, by analogy with speech acts, can be said to have (1) descriptive appearance, (2) relational intent, and (3) self-exploring and self-altering

One of the main implications that comes with Reddy’s definition is that the act of naming and labeling a feeling realigns an individual’s emotions. When a person experiences a feeling and labels such sensation under a particular term, that person’s feelings are readjusted to fit that term. For instance, when the attendees at the acclamation of the 1821 Constitution began to acclaim the charter, it is possible that some identified and labeled what they were feeling as happiness and joyfulness. Following Reddy’s line of thought, this act of labeling would have brought about a realignment in their emotional experiences and expressions in order to match the meanings and implications that happiness had in such a context.

Reddy argues that ‘emotives’ are both managerial and exploratory. They are managerial in the sense that people’s decision to label a feeling is not only determined by practice and structure. People’s strategies and interests, even if marginally, also come in play. The fact a person can partially decide how they want to name a sensation gives them some relative control over the types of emotions and expressions they and those around them may experience. One could add to Reddy’s argument that some individuals and collectivities, depending on their standing and power, have a larger capacity to act managerially with regards to their emotions. Reddy argues that emotions are also exploratory because they may guide people into unexplored territory. As Reddy explains, an ‘emotive’ can be understood as an attempt “to feel what one says one feels. These attempts usually work, but they can and do fail. When they fail, the emotive expression is

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‘exploratory’ in the sense that one discovers something unexpected about one’s own feelings.”

The archetypes and models that pop up into people’s minds shape emotions in an analogous way as Reddy’s ‘emotives’ do. When an individual labels a particular situation with a mental image, such as a shared remembrance or a prevailing notion of social order, that action ends up guiding emotions and shaping the ways in which they are experienced and expressed. In 1821 in Bogotá, the throne brought up mental images associated to the reverence and awe that kings and queens produced. These archetypes steered people’s emotions into feeling some sort of happiness and joy at the sight of the Cúcuta Constitution resting on the throne. As people struggled to understand and give meaning to the world they were living in, the archetypes that came up in their minds ended up managing and directing their emotions and forms of expressions.

Recurring to William Reddy’s ‘emotives’ to analyze the ways in which archetypes from the past shape emotions comes with its limitations. In the cases studied in this chapter, part of the problem comes from the source base. Historical sources leave many unanswered questions and may be vague with certain details. Thus, there is usually not enough information to closely go over Reddy’s cycle: first seeing how an emotion is labeled and then studying how those feelings adjust to what that particular emotion is supposed to mean in a given context. These limitations are particularly true when trying to analyze the perspectives of women, plebeians, and slaves, among other social sectors, who had limited access to literacy and whose testimonies come up less often in the archival records. Despite

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the many constraints this approach might have, Reddy’s ‘emotives’ allow us to think about how archetypes and mental images from the past shape people’s emotions and their notions of reality. In that sense, this relationship between mental images, emotions, and understandings of the world supports the claim that emotions are part of cognition and that emotions help society give meaning to the past, present, and future.

In the 1820s, archetypes and models of stability, order, and security hailing from the colonial and monarchic past continually popped up into people’s minds. In Bogotá and other parts of northern South America, feelings of uncertainty and insecurity had become prevalent among many of the region’s residents. Despite the hopes and dreams that emerged with the advent of new republican nations, years of violence and unrest had left many feeling doubtful and hesitant of the future ahead of them. Independence and the adoption of a republican form of government furthered peoples’ misgivings. For many of them, symbols such as the throne, a painting, or a school’s reputation not only inspired authority and sacredness, but also a sense of certainty and security amidst the turmoil they were living. Aspirations for social and political stability became recurrent among people of different social stratum and political inclinations. They actively sought references of what order and security were supposed to look like in times in which Colombian society debated central issues such as the expropriation of Church properties, racial equality, slave manumission, and the government system the country should adopt.

*The Ecce Homo: religion and education*

For instance, in the town of Villa de Leyva, about 150 km northeast of Bogotá, the persistence of archetypes from the colonial past gave shape to religious and political tensions and people’s ensuing emotions. In 1828, Villa de Leyva’s residents and those of
neighboring villages rioted against national officials over a sacred painting.\textsuperscript{706} During the first years of republican life, the new government sought to establish new schools and universities. Funding for these institutions partly came from the expropriation of properties belonging to the Catholic Church, including religious objects and images.\textsuperscript{707} One such object was the Ecce Homo, a painting taken by Spanish troops during the 1527 sack of Rome and brought to the Americas in the early seventeenth century. Juan de Mayorga Casallas donated it to the Dominicans as part of his contributions for the foundation of a convent in the vicinities of Villa de Leyva. The convent eventually took the name of the Ecce Homo.\textsuperscript{708} In 1825, as republican officials sought funds to finance the newly established Universidad de Boyacá, a rumor spread throughout the region claiming that the University was going to sell the painting. Residents in Villa de Leyva and nearby villages protested against such prospect. They ended up assaulting the convent, seizing the painting, and hiding it in Villa de Leyva. Local authorities explained that the situation became so tense that they feared a continued outbreak of violence throughout the region.\textsuperscript{709}

\textsuperscript{706} AGN, MINISTERIO-INSTR-PUBL:SR.62,109, ‘Respuesta del Rector de la Universidad de Boyacá en cuanto a las asonadas que han tenido lugar en el Valle del Ecce Homo. Tunja. 21 de mayo de 1828.’, 193-195A.

\textsuperscript{707} Law 6 of 1821 established that buildings belonging to suppressed convents were to be passed on to schools and houses of education (“casas de educación”). The law determined that any remaining buildings would be given to public charities. It also stated that all the movable properties, pensions, rights, and shares that belonged to these convents would be given to the new schools and academic institutions for their endowment and subsistence. (AGN, MINISTERIO-INSTR-PUBL:SR.62,109, ‘Relación de Intendente de Boyacá sobre bienes que deben pasar al Colegio de Boyacá. Tunja. 11 de enero de 1823.’, 164.)


\textsuperscript{709} AGN, MINISTERIO-INSTR-PUBL:SR.62,109, ‘Respuesta del Rector de la Universidad de Boyacá en cuanto a las asonadas que han tenido lugar en el Valle del Ecce Homo. Tunja. 21 de mayo de 1828.’, 193-195A. (A similar case to that of Ecce Homo painting happened in Tunja, capital of Boyacá. The painting of the Virgen de Piedra, which belonged to the suppressed Convent of El Topo, was one of the most venerated images in Tunja. The city’s residents protested against the Colegio de Boyacá’s attempts to take property of the sacred image. Local authorities and the school’s principal reached an agreement that the painting would be given to Tunja’s clergymen for them to protect the image and to allow the city’s residents to continue their...
In April and May of 1825, Villa de Leyva’s officials, the Intendant of Boyacá, and the president of the University of Boyacá exchanged a series of letters seeking a solution to this problem. Despite some frictions among them, they all agreed that it would be unwise to sell the painting or to remove it from the region. Throughout their dispatches, officials claimed to echo local residents’ feelings and thoughts about the issue. They explained that many of the region’s inhabitants believed the painting and convent gave them protection, status, and wellbeing. Locals referred to the convent as a place of pilgrimage and to the painting as a sacred object. For many, losing the painting meant they would be deprived of a sacred tradition. The Intendant claimed that people from the region were “accustomed to worship God in such adorned temples, and it would be very painful for them to see their temples naked and ruined.”

The University’s president, Bernardo María de la Motta, argued that the institution’s administrators would not want to see local residents “deprived of an ornament to which they professed unlimited devotion.”

The officials agreed that under these circumstances, they should act with the highest prudence and caution. They hoped to avoid an outbreak of violence at the same time that they aspired to gain local residents’ esteem. As de la Motta explained, “taking these ornaments from their corresponding places would cause discontent among locals and veneration of the virgin. Given its popularity and veneration, civil and religious authorities organized a ceremony to transfer the image from the Convent of El Topo to the city’s main parish. (AGN, MINISTERIO-INSTR-PUBL:SR.62,109, ‘Sobre intento de rector del Colegio de Boyacá de llevarse la imagen de la Virgen de Piedra del Convento del Topo. Tunja. Enero, 1823.’, 156-159.)

710 “…aquellos templos adornados donde están acostumbrados a adornar a Dios, así como les es muy doloroso verlos desnudar y arruinar…” (AGN, MINISTERIO-INSTR-PUBL:SR.62,109, ‘Respuesta del Intendente Boyacá sobre veneración y traslado de la imagen del Ecce Homo. Tunja. 30 de abril de 1828.’, 190.)

711 “…jamás ha querido que aquellos pueblos se priven de una alaja que le profesan una devoción ilimitada por estos…” (AGN, MINISTERIO-INSTR-PUBL:SR.62,109, ‘Respuesta del Rector de la Universidad de Boyacá en cuanto a las asonadas que han tenido lugar en el Valle del Ecce Homo. Tunja. 21 de mayo de 1828.’, 195A.)
would raise certain apprehension against this scholarly institution.” Thus, Villa de Leyva’s officials, Boyacá’s Intendent, and the University’s president, after considering the views of the Ecce Homo’s devotees, decided to transfer the painting to the region’s clergymen for their protection and veneration. The residents of Villa de Leyva and surrounding towns, the officials argued, would see such a decision as an act of generosity and fraternity on behalf of the University and the national and provincial governments.

In Villa de Leyva, archetypes from the colonial past moved and shaped people’s emotions as well as their understandings of what was happening. According to local officials, protesters demonstrated feelings of despair and fear while those who stormed the convent seized the painting with fury, enraged at the authority’s alleged arbitrariness. Although we do not have accounts of what was going on in the minds and hearts of those protesting and seizing the painting, we do have some hints that help us understand their feelings of fear and rage. In 1828 many in Villa de Leyva still associated their security and wellbeing with the protection and status a religious image, such as the Ecce Homo, conferred on their community. This sense of stability and safety was based on archetypes from preceding decades and centuries. When they saw that the painting’s permanence was in danger, they felt that their security and stability were also at stake. In the 1820s, following many years of war and political strife, uncertainty held all sorts of negative

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712 “…quitar estas alajas de sus respectivos lugares sería un motivo de disgusto para los pueblos y prepararía una alarma contra este plantel literario…” (AGN, MINISTERIO-INSTR-PUBL:SR.62,109, ‘Respuesta del Rector de la Universidad de Boyacá en cuanto a las asonadas que han tenido lugar en el Valle del Ecce Homo. Tunja. 21 de mayo de 1828.’, 193, 195A.)

implications as it was associated to violence and disarray. Thus, among most of the region’s dwellers, the prospect of a rupture did not produce expectation and hope at the possibility of better times to come but rather fear, apprehension, and even rage.

Almost all those involved, from the locals who seized the painting to the officials involved in this case, were seeking some sort of stability and security. It was not only authorities and the University’s president who asked for prudence and caution. Local residents demanded the same from their authorities. They did not want to sacrifice a sacred image that brought about wellbeing and protection for their community in exchange for the republic’s new and unfamiliar projects. Their notions of what stability and security meant, and the emotions that revolved around them, were still shaped by a series of archetypes from the colonial past. In the end, the republican plan to establish new schools and universities ended up being relatively short lived. Many educational institutions were forced to close towards the end of the 1820s. In most cases, lack of financial and political support led to their extinction. In Tunja, for example, most of the Colegio de Boyacá’s properties and tasks were passed on to the religious order of the Augustinians. By the 1830s, the Church regained its almost absolute control over the education system.

In this case, archetypes from the past – embodied in a religious painting – ended up moving people’s feelings of uncertainty, fear, and rage. For many of Villa de Leyva’s residents, the Ecce Homo provided a sense of wellbeing and security that universities and schools could never offer. The national government’s efforts to portray educational institutions as symbols of wellbeing and moral growth fell short when confronted to the

714 AGN, MINISTERIO-INSTR-PUBL:SR.62,109, ‘Oficio sobre pasar bienes y responsabilidades del Colegio de Boyacá a los agustinos. Tunja. 1 de septiembre de 1830.’, 170.
region’s religious beliefs and devotion. Thus, the prospect of losing schools and universities – symbols of the republic’s new and uncertain projects – did not produce apprehension, anxiety, and fury as happened with the Ecce Homo.

*Racial discrimination and slavery*

There were other cases in which colonial archetypes shaped racial and social tensions and the emotions that emerged from those frictions. An illustrative example is that of a black student who suffered all sorts of acts of discrimination from school administrators and students in Caracas. In 1824, José Álvarez, a *pardo* (a mixed-race person with African descent) from the town of San José, decided to enroll his child of unspecified age in a school in Caracas. As happened with many schools at the time, the institution was owned and administered by the clergy. Both father and son faced innumerable obstacles as soon as they came in contact with the school’s directors. At first, the principal claimed there was no room for the student. The principal then tried to convince the student to change his mind, asking him to pray so that the Holy Spirit would enlighten him and guide him in the right direction. Seeing that such efforts were futile, the principal explained to father and son that the school’s reputation would suffer from his enrollment. The principal even sent a petition to Caracas’ authorities asking them to stop the *pardo* student’s enrollment. The request was apparently ignored and Álvarez’s son was finally admitted despite the principal’s countless efforts to stop his entrance.\(^\text{715}\)

The acts of discrimination against the student only worsened once he set foot in the school building. A printed leaflet describing the case explained that Álvarez’s son immediately faced “the affronts, the slanders, vituperation against the zambo, the annoyance of his classmates, the displeasure of their parents, their desire to retire their children to avoid staining them with the company of the zambo, the slanderous accusations [of committing] the darkest vices.” The text claimed that the student’s admission saw “the rise of a particular genre of vile malevolence with the only goal of exasperating the father and compelling the son to leave.”

The student suffered so many insults and offences that he ended up abhorring the school. Seeing the child’s distress, the archbishop’s provisor made the most of the situation and induced the student to write a letter describing all his sufferings and requesting his own discharge. With the letter in hand, the provisor and other school administrators accepted the student’s request and – without consulting Álvarez senior – they put an end to the child’s matriculation.

This case of racial discrimination became publicly known in Caracas and even reached Bogotá. A series of letters requesting justice to be made were sent to congressmen in the capital. Annexed to one of those dispatches was the printed leaflet commenting Álvarez’s case. The pamphlet was signed by “unos patriotas pardos” (pardo patriots) and was titled “La Humanidad Ultrajada” (“The Affronted Humanity”). The text was published

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716 “Allí los ultrajes, la injuria, el vituperio de zambo, el disgusto de los condiscípulos, el desagrado de sus padres, el querer retirar sus hijos para no ensuciarlos con la compañía del zambo: allí las acusaciones calumniosas de los mas negros vicios; y allí en fin se desarrolla todo género de vil maldad á fin de lograr desesperar al padre y compelir al hijo a su salida.” (AGN, CONGRESO:SR.24,12, ‘Impreso La Humanidad Ultrajada. Caracas. 9 de septiembre de 1825’, 346.)

by Valentín Espinal’s printing press in Caracas in 1825.\textsuperscript{718} Apparently, this was one of several papers the group of black patriots published at the time.\textsuperscript{719} Towards the end of the leaflet, they explained that they had denounced, time after time, how the enemies of independence continuously tried to incite strife by perpetuating fanaticism and “fostering in their hearts the inhumane Spanish system.”\textsuperscript{720} The black patriots energetically repudiated all those who opposed the new republican government and who contested the ideas of racial equality it allegedly endorsed. At one point, the leaflet reminded the republic’s opponents that they were “legally equal to the miserable black who had previously been their slave” and invited them to “sacrifice their foolish pride” for the wellbeing of the nation.\textsuperscript{721}

In Bogotá, Álvarez’s complaints were met with reluctance. Members of Congress and other public servants condemned what had happened to Álvarez and his son but were,

\textsuperscript{718} Valentín Espinal is known as the first republican Venezuelan printer. Between the 1820s and 1860s, his printing press published hundreds of books, periodicals, treatises, and pamphlets. Many of them of political content. (Saldivia, Gabriel (comp.). \textit{Impresos de Valentín Espinal}. (Caracas: Instituto Autónomo Biblioteca Nacional y de Servicios de Bibliotecas, 2009), 3-6.)

\textsuperscript{719} By the 1820s in Caracas and other parts of the Venezuelan Caribbean Coast there existed a somewhat established tradition of free blacks and other people of African descent writing political texts and participating in public debates. Cristina Soriano and Alejandro Gómez have studied the role of free blacks and slaves in the public discussions of the late 18\textsuperscript{th} and early 19\textsuperscript{th} centuries in Venezuela. Soriano shows that, although not a widespread phenomenon, there were numerous cases in which blacks and people of mixed-race in Caracas had access to books, periodicals, pamphlets, and other texts. Likewise, she argues that literacy rates among free blacks were lower than among the rest of society; however, many of those who were illiterate were still able to access written texts through oral means. Additionally, she highlights several cases in which pardos and other free castas ended up taking part in the production of written texts. Gómez, for his part, studies the participation of free blacks and other people of African descent in clubs, leagues, and ‘tertulias’ in which people of different social and racial backgrounds talked about the French Revolution, the Haitian Revolution, manumission, and racial equality, among many other topics (Cristina Soriano, \textit{Tides of Revolution. Information, Insurgencies, and the Crisis of Colonial Rule in Venezuela} (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2018), 1-12, 41-46, 50-75, 79-85; Cristina Soriano, “‘A True Vassal of the King’: Pardo Literacy and Political Identity in Venezuela during the Age of Revolutions”, \textit{Atlantic Studies} 14, no. 3 (2017): 275-295; Alejandro E. Gómez, “The ‘Pardo Question’”, \textit{Nuevo Mundo Mundos Nuevos} (2008): http://journals.openedition.org/nuevomundo/34503.)

\textsuperscript{720} “… que animan en sus corazones el inhumano sistema español…” (AGN, CONGRESO:SR.24,12, ‘Impreso La Humanidad Ultrajada. Caracas. 9 de septiembre de 1825.’, 346.)

\textsuperscript{721} “…ya sois legalmente iguales al miserable negro que antes era vuestro esclavo… y sacrificadle vosotros también vuestra necio orgullo. (AGN, CONGRESO:SR.24,12, ‘Impreso La Humanidad Ultrajada. Caracas. 9 de septiembre de 1825.’, 346.)
at the same time, unwilling to do much to address his grievances even though Congress in 1823 had declared that it was unconstitutional to discriminate against *pardos* in admissions to universities and seminaries.\textsuperscript{722} Moreover, following the 1821 Constitution, racial categories from the colonial past, such as *castas*, had been erased from laws, censuses, and legal documents. Only Indians and slaves were left as legal categories.\textsuperscript{723} The case was initially sent to the House of Representatives’ committee in charge of looking after the proper observance of the constitution and its laws. The committee’s response was somewhat ambiguous. It censured the acts of discrimination that the *pardo* student had endured but also requested caution and discretion from all those involved. The committee explained that “it is necessary for the Republic to suffer, for some time yet, from the aristocracy’s evils. For enlightenment cannot spread from one single stroke nor, correspondingly, can apprehensions fade away instantaneously.” “Prudence from all citizens,” their answer continued, “is the antidote or the precise remedy to finally put an end to these evils …”\textsuperscript{724} Following such line of reasoning, the committee decided that the provisor who had misled Álvarez’s son into requesting his own discharge should not be punished. From their point of view, the clergyman had simply acted prudently, trying to


\textsuperscript{723} Helg, Aline. “Simón Bolívar and the Spectre of Pardocracia: José Padilla in Post-Independence Cartagena”, *Journal of Latin American Studies* 35, no. 3 (2003), 449.

\textsuperscript{724} “…que es preciso se resienta aun por algún tiempo la republica de los males de la aristocracia, por no poderse difundir las luces de un golpe, ni consiguientemente desvanecerse al momento las preocupaciones. La prudencia en todos los ciudadanos es el antídoto o el específico remedio de estos males que deben cesar al fin…” (AGN, CONGRESO:SR.24,12, ‘Solicitud y respuesta al caso de discriminación contra hijo de Álvarez. Septiembre 1825-Enero 1826.’, 344.)
put an end to the black student’s unhappiness as well as to the other students’ reckless behavior.\textsuperscript{725}

Both the Colombian Congress and members of the executive branch concluded that it was unnecessary and undesirable to take any concrete actions. The committee’s dispatch maintained that a formal accusation against the school’s administrators was pointless and that passing a law or decree that could prevent similar situations from happening again would be futile. However, the note explained that congressmen could, with their cautious conduct, “set an example of the prudence they expected from others.” Their letter made it clear that they would also “point out to the school’s principal the discontent with which the national legislature received these complaints and request him to educate his students and to conform them to the liberality and equity of our institutions, as these do not exclude any Colombian from enlightenment…”\textsuperscript{726} The committee’s conclusions were sent to the Secretary of Interior for his consideration. In a short message, the Secretary ordered the Intendency of Venezuela to take matters into their own hands. The Secretary instructed the Venezuelan Intendant to “decree, with the upmost caution, all the necessary edicts so that the school in Caracas admits youngsters of any class – while also ensuring that they will

\textsuperscript{725} AGN, CONGRESO:SR.24,12, ‘Solicitud y respuesta al caso de discriminación contra hijo de Álvarez. Septiembre 1825-Enero 1826.’, 344.
\textsuperscript{726} “Solo dando ella ejemplo dela prudencia que desea en los demás indicar al rector de aquel colegio al rector de aquel colegio el desagrado con que se oyen estas quejas por la representación nacional y encargarle la instrucción de sus alumnos y el acomodamiento de ellos a la liberalidad y equidad de nuestras instituciones, que a ningún colombiano excluyen de la ilustración…” (AGN, CONGRESO:SR.24,12, ‘Solicitud y respuesta al caso de discriminación contra hijo de Álvarez. Septiembre 1825-Enero 1826.’, 344.)
not be bothered in anyway – as long as their vices will not make them worthy of being expelled from school.”

Alvárez’s case was representative of the racial and social anxieties of the time. In Venezuela, frictions over the standing and rights of non-whites had been growing throughout the eighteenth century and early nineteenth century. The rise of new republics, with their language of rights, citizenship, equality, and freedom, exacerbated these tensions. The concepts and notions that emerged at the time clashed with archetypes from the past. Each group held different mental images that helped them understand the world they lived in. Sometimes, the same model was given different interpretations. For instance, while almost everyone held the Haitian Revolution as a mental reference, some viewed it as a symbol of extreme violence while others as a dream of equality. From these frictions between a new language and past archetypes – and conflicting interpretations of these mental images – arose fears of racial conflict and violence among Venezuelan and New Granadian patricians and middle sectors. In the meantime, many slaves, free blacks, pardos, and other people of mixed-race faced a combination of expectation and frustration seeing that promises of equality and rights were being abandoned.

In the 1820s many in Venezuela and Bogotá still envisaged social and racial order in accordance with colonial archetypes. Notions from the colonial past, such as sociedad

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727 “...dicte con la mayor prudencia todas las providencias necesarias a fin de que en el colegio de Caracas sean admitidos y que de ningún modo se moleste a los jóvenes de cualquiera clase que sean, siempre que por sus vicios no se hagan acreedores a que se les espela de los colegios…” (AGN, CONGRESO:SR.24,12, ‘Solicitud y respuesta al caso de discriminación contra hijo de Álvarez. Septiembre 1825-Enero 1826.’, 343.)

728 Ada Ferrer, Cristina Soriano, and Matt Childs, among others, have explored the spread of news and different interpretations of the Haitian Revolution in Cuba and Venezuela. (Soriano, Tides of Revolution; Ada Ferrer, Freedom’s Mirror: Cuba and Haiti in the Age of Revolution (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Matt Childs, The 1812 Aponte Rebellion in Cuba and the Struggle Against Atlantic Slavery (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006).)
de castas\textsuperscript{729} and limpieza de sangre, shaped the racial tensions that surfaced throughout Álvarez’s case. During the colonial period, a person’s status was determined by a series of factors such as place of birth, wealth, conduct, and education, among others. A central aspect to determine a person’s standing in society was their racial lineage. Europeans and their direct descendants as well as those closer to “whiteness” took up the upper strata of society while those with the most pronounced African lineage were placed on the bottom of the social scale. In this abstract social stratification, anyone of mixed ancestry was considered to belong to one of many categories of castas. People’s rights and privileges, such as their occupations, the types of clothes they could wear, their access to education, and the place they sat in during mass, were, in theory, defined by their casta. Classifying and categorizing people according to their racial lineage was at the root of the conception of sociedad de castas.\textsuperscript{730}

Complementary to the notion of castas was that of “blood purity.” Christians in the Iberian Peninsula, who for centuries were in close contact with Jews and Muslims, developed the concept of limpieza de sangre to refer to those who were not “stained” with Jewish or Muslim blood. In the Americas, such term took other connotations over time. It

\textsuperscript{729} In Spanish America, the term casta was informally used to refer to someone of mixed race. The 1729 Diccionario de Autoridades defines the term as the “generation and lineage that come from known parents.” (“Casta: Generacion y lináge que viene de Padres conocidos.” (Diccionario de Autoridades, Real Academia Española, 1729).

was not only used to refer to Christians whose ancestors did not include Jews or Muslims, but also to denote whites whose lineages had not been “tainted” with indigenous or, particularly, African blood. In the same manner that in the Iberian Peninsula “Jewish blood” was seen as a “permanent stain”, in the Americas “African blood” was viewed as an “inerasable mark.” This was particularly true during the first half of the colonial period. Towards the late eighteenth century, such “inerasable mark” became ever more erasable as there were numerous cases of people of African descent “passing” as if they had no African blood or even “purchasing their whiteness.” Yet, despite this growing fluidity, still in the early nineteenth century in Spanish America those who could not prove their “blood purity” were barred from entering schools and universities or from taking up certain trades and posts. The sociedad de castas and limpieza de sangre were roughly enforced through numerous and usually disconnected laws and decrees. Some of them were issued by royal courts and councils in Madrid, others by Royal Audiencias in the Americas, and a few others by local cabildos. 731

Despite the rigidity that characterized the society of castas, social mobility was relatively common. Those belonging to a casta could move up and down the social scale depending on a variety of factors such as their economic success, their conduct, and the racial mixtures in which they were involved in. Certain lineages moved, generation after generation, closer to “whiteness” and, thus, ascended in the social scale. Other lineages moved away from “whiteness” and, thus, moved downwards in the social hierarchy. 732

Towards the late colonial period, Caracas and Venezuela were among the main foci of socioracial frictions and mobility in Spanish America. In the late eighteen and early nineteenth centuries there were, proportionately, more *pardos* and free blacks in Caracas and Coastal Venezuela than perhaps any other region in the Americas. Towards the turn of the century, the free population of African descent in Caracas was somewhere around 40 to 50% of the city’s total inhabitants. Among such a large population of free blacks, there were numerous cases in which *pardos* and other *castas* were able to move upward in the social scale thanks to their economic success, their services to the Crown, and by whitening through intimate connections. Caracas’ elites vigorously responded to such social mobility as they attempted to ensure their status and the persistence of the existing social order. Through different means, such as decrees from the cabildo and complaints to the King, the city’s elites actively sought to restrain the social ascent of *castas* by limiting their access to education, sanctuary goods, physical spaces, and certain occupations.\(^{733}\)

Caracas’ elites were relatively successful at obstructing *pardos’* vertical mobility. Yet, people of mixed ancestry found ways to sidestep such barriers. One of them was through petitions of *gracias al sacar* with which some *pardos* were able to, as Ann Twinam would phrase it, “purchase whiteness.” People of mixed ancestry who could afford it paid a fee and presented documents demonstrating that their lineage had been “whitened” through successive generations. Petitioners requested authorities to revise their legal status and to decree that they should no longer be considered part of a *casta*. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, royal courts in Spain received more petitions of *gracias al*  

\(^{733}\) Twinam, *Purchasing Whiteness*, 81-123, 198-234.
sacar from Caracas than from anywhere else. Likewise, the courts also received more complaints and objections against these gracias al sacar from Venezuela than from any other place in Spanish America. According to Twinam, Caracas’ case was unique. Few other cities saw so many cases of casta social ascent at the same time that there was possibly no other Spanish American city in which the elites resisted to this social mobility with such hostility and antagonism.734

Racial discrimination is blatant all throughout Álvarez’s case, from the moment in which he sought his son’s enrollment all the way to Congress’ inaction and the Secretary of Interior’s insinuations against black students. As in previous examples, archetypes from the colonial past were at play. The racial tensions that surfaced in Álvarez’s case were shaped by colonial notions of racial order, such as sociedad de castas and pureza de sangre. Despite the advent of republicanism and its language of equality and liberty, in the 1820s most members of Caracas’ elites and some of the city’s middle and lower sectors continued to categorically oppose pardos’ vertical mobility. For many of these Caraqueños, castas’ access to education was out of the question. They believed that allowing a black student to enroll and attend school was a disruption in society’s order and propriety. They not only believed that the school’s reputation or that of their sons that was at stake, but they also feared that pardos’ access to education could mark the beginning of the collapse of the social order they defended. This prospect simply fueled their anxieties and suspicions, as archetypes of social and racial order from the colonial past guided and shaped these feelings of fear and disquiet.

734 Twinam, Purchasing Whiteness, 198-234.
In Bogotá, congressmen and the Secretary of Interior tried to cope with Caraqueños’ anxieties as well as with their own apprehensions. Their recurrent calls for prudence and caution were merely demonstrations of their fears at the possibility that free blacks could abruptly ascend in the social scale. The Secretary’s response, implying that the “vices” of black students could upset the schools’ harmony, is illustrative of their reservations. But the congressmen and Secretary’s concerns were twofold, for they also feared that their decisions in this matter could upset Caracas’ elites as well as the city’s pardos. In that sense, their claims for caution sought to prevent any break from the constitution’s promises of equality at the same time that they tried to avoid defying Caracas’ implicit norms of racial discrimination. With their requests for prudence and their inaction regarding Álvarez’s grievances, congressmen and the Secretary sought to offer a sense of stability among all those involved. By doing so, they were managing their own anxieties and fears as well as those of many Caraqueños.

Throughout the 1820s, dreams and promises of racial equality and manumission were constantly broken. Álvarez’s case was simply one of many. The first years of republican life saw the onset of several laws, policies, and promises of gradual manumission and racial equality. The first of such laws was the Free Province of Antioquia’s freedom of wombs law of 1814. All through the decade, amidst times of war, both republican and royalist military leaders promised slaves that they would be granted their liberty if they joined their armies. In 1821, the Colombian Congress passed a

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free wombs law similar to Antioquia’s 1814 law. Amidst discussions over the Cúcuta Constitution, political leaders made numerous declarations in favor of racial harmony and passed laws that eliminated racial identification from state records.\textsuperscript{736}

Yet, despite this apparent enthusiasm for racial equality, many of these policies and promises were short lived or not fully implemented. For instance, in the 1820s several slaves who had fought in the wars of independence or who had been granted their freedom during times of unrest ended up in legal disputes trying to obtain their formal manumission. Such was the case of José Joaquín Texada, a slave from the Province of Popayán. Texada’s master, Antonio Gil de Texada, supposedly granted José Joaquín his liberty around 1817 or 1818. After Antonio’s death, the slaveowner’s widow, Ana Sandoval, pursued a legal case trying to regain her ownership over several slaves, among them José Joaquín. She argued that amidst times of violence, when many slaves and runaways had risen against slaveowners, her husband made some vague and informal declarations claiming he would free his slaves. Some of them, she explained, understood Antonio’s statements as their formal manumission. Sandoval maintained that there was no proof that her husband had granted José Joaquín his liberty and that Antonio had only made those ambiguous declarations to appease his slaves out of fear that they would rise up against him. On June 8, 1828, after close to three years in court, a judge finally concluded that there was no proof that Antonio had granted José Joaquín his freedom. The judge ordered José Joaquín to continue under the possession of Ana Sandoval. This decision was taken despite the fact

that José Joaquín had been living as a freeman for some years. Similar to what happened to Álvarez, the obstacles José Joaquín found in his pursuit for freedom were the product of the fears and anxieties of the time. Models of social and racial order — such as that of *sociedad de castas* — and mental images of past events — such as the violence that shook Haiti or the dreams of equality it symbolized — guided and shaped people’s emotions. In some cases, past archetypes gave form to feelings of fear and unease, in others they produced frustration and disillusion.

Numerous barriers obstructed the implementation of policies promoting manumission and racial equality. For instance, laws leading to the abolition of slavery were gradually reformed or derogated in favor of the economic interests of slave-owning families. Slaveowners in Popayán and other regions sabotaged manumission committees and prevented many slaves from obtaining their liberty. As Marcela Echeverri explains, in the 1840s slaveowners from Popayán were even successful at eliminating a law that banned slave trade. Between 1843 and 1847, hundreds of slaves were exported from Colombia to Perú and the United States. Aside from that, public support in favor of racial equality quickly faded away. Simón Bolívar, who in the 1810s made several speeches in favor of racial equality, by the mid-1820s was constantly waiving the flag of racial war and making numerous references to the extreme violence that had taken place during the

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737 Centro de Investigaciones Históricas José María Arboleda Llorente de la Universidad del Cauca (CIH-UC), Fondo Independencia, Tomo Judicial-Civil (I-I, 4207), folios 1-24, ‘Caso de negro Jose Joaquín Texada, que fue esclavo del Doctor Antonio Gil de Texada. Popayán. 1825-1828.’


739 Echeverri, “Esclavitud y tráfico de esclavos en el Pacífico suramericano,” 627-630; 667-673.
Haitian Revolution. Bolívar often alluded to the term *pardocracia* to refer to a government run by *pardos* knowing that it would arouse fears towards the social ascent of free blacks and to the possibility that they could hold positions of power. The many barriers that hindered the way to racial equality and manumission, from Ana Sandoval’s legal claims to Bolívar’s overtly racist declarations, were the outcome of the anxieties that surfaced among Colombian upper and middle social sectors in the 1820s. These feelings of fear and distress were, to an extent, shaped by colonial archetypes that many still held in their minds.

*The monarchical plot*

Bolívar’s anxieties not only revolved around his fears of racial mobility and racial war, but also around the Republic’s lack of political stability. Colombians from all strata of society shared this feeling of uneasiness at the Republic’s apparent fragility. Bolívar, other political leaders, and their supporters sought ways to have a stronger, more centralized national government that could face threats such as a Spanish invasion or the rise of secessionist movements within Colombian borders. Moreover, they also aspired to have a powerful president that could enforce order and security and put an end to the many intrigues that made Colombia seemingly ungovernable. Aline Helg argues that around the mid-1820s, Bolívar and his followers began to profess the idea that only by adopting a semi-monarchical constitution would Colombia be able to cure itself from the many ills typical of a young, multiracial, and mostly illiterate nation. Around 1825, Bolívar’s

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A constitutional project consisted of a federation of authoritarian republics under the supreme authority of a president for life. In his project, the lifelong president would be himself.\textsuperscript{741}

By 1829, Bolívar openly endorsed the idea of adopting a monarchic government with a European monarch sitting on the throne. In a series of letters, the Council of State, the Council of Ministers, and Bolívar’s secretary discussed the president’s instructions regarding the possibility of transferring control of the Republic of Colombia over to a European monarchy, other than the Spanish one. One of the dispatches from the Council of Ministers reflects on these instructions:

“It has been ordered to the Council of Ministers for the second time to choose the means to obtain for Colombia the protection of one or more of the great powers that may contain the torrent of anarchy that deviates the Americas – former Spanish territory – and keeps them headed towards destruction, for it undoubtedly will destroy them if prompt and efficient measures are not adopted. The Council has paid long attention and the most serious reflections to this important issue with the goal of choosing the proper means, without being contrary to national independence, to open negotiations that will draw to Colombia the support and aid of one of the great nations.”\textsuperscript{742}

The councils also discussed Bolivar’s ideas on which form of government could work best for Colombia. All those involved concluded that Colombia should become a constitutional monarchy. As the Council of Ministers explained, they had “unanimously decided that a constitutional monarchy offers all the vigor and stability that a well-

\textsuperscript{742} “…se encarga por segunda vez al consejo de ministros que escojite medios de conseguir para Colombia la protección de una o mas grandes potencias que contengan el torrente de anarquia que devasta ala americ antes española i que la preserven de la destrucción a que la conduce, pues sin duda nos destruirá sino se adoptan medidas prontas i eficaces. Este importante materia a cuyo largo tiempo la atención i las mas serias meditaciones del consejo, a fin de escojitar un medio decoroso i que en nada sea contrario a la independencia nacional para abrir una una negociación que atraiga a Colombia el apoyo i auxilio de alguna o algunas de las grandes naciones…” (Biblioteca Luis Angela Arango (BLAA), Archivo Emiliano Díaz del Castillo (MSS3350), Serie Archivo Díaz del Castillo, Carpeta 22, “No. 26. Documentos del Consejo de Estado sobre propuesta del General Simón Bolívar. Bogotá, septiembre-diciembre de 1829.”, 3.)
established government should have at the same time that if gives its peoples and citizens all the necessary guarantees to ensure their wellbeing and prosperity.”

By late 1829, the councils’ ministers and magistrates had apparently been discussing for some time the best ways to contact the English and French monarchies in order to present them a formal request. Yet, for a variety of reasons, the councils decided that it would be more appropriate to present their request to the French monarchy. For one part, the French, as the Colombians, were Catholics. Likewise, members of the councils had close relations with the Duke of Montebello who could personally present their request to the French monarch. The plan anticipated that, once the French accepted their request, Bolívar would be named temporary monarch of Colombia. After his death or abdication, he would be replaced by a new monarch chosen among the French dynasty.

The councils’ debates also touched on other details such as the need to have Congress reform the Constitution so that constitutional monarchism become Colombia’s new form of government. They also discussed how other American nations could react to their project. Members of the councils believed that most countries would initially condemn their decision, but they assumed that in the long run most of them would end up seeing Colombia as an admirable example. As they argued, Colombia with its European

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743 “…había acordado por unanimidad que una monarquía constitucional presenta todo el vigor i estabilidad que debe tener un gobierno bien cimentado, al mismo tiempo que da a los pueblos i a los ciudadanos cuantas garantías necesitan para asegurar su bienestar i su prosperidad.” (BLAA, Archivo Emiliano Díaz del Castillo (MSS3350), Serie Archivo Díaz del Castillo, Carpeta 22, ‘No. 26. Documentos del Consejo de Estado sobre propuesta del General Simón Bolívar. Bogotá, septiembre-diciembre de 1829.’, 4.)

monarch would “inspire security and confidence, for [Colombia] would be free from the anarchy that agitates other states, guaranteeing our enjoyment of social goods…”

In the 1820s, this attempt to reinstate the monarchy and European control over northern South America was perhaps the most explicit and manifest example of the persistence of colonial and monarchic archetypes. Throughout the 1810s, republican leaders, time after time, had to refute royalists who claimed that republicanism would only bring about anarchy. By the late 1820s, some of these republicans ended up dooming independence and the republican system, accusing them of simply bringing about chaos and many other ills. By the 1820s, so many years of violence, unrest, and political factionalism had left many feeling hopeless and fearful. Yet, in the case of many, these fears and apprehensions also grew out of the fact that their references and models of stability and security were now missing. The absence of a monarchy, a Crown, and a throne fueled people’s misgivings, anxieties, and fears. In that sense, the persistence of these monarchical archetypes helps explain why Bolívar and so many others believed that returning to a monarchical system would bring about the political stability and wellbeing they had been missing.

Conclusions

The persistence of colonial and monarchic archetypes helps explain why independence and the rise of new republican nations did not bring about profound changes in existing social relations and structures. Notions of power and symbolic representations

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745 “…que inspire seguridad i confianza quedará libre de la anarquia que ajita a los otros estados i nos aseguraria el goce de los bienes sociales…” (BLAA, Archivo Emiliano Díaz del Castillo (MSS3350), Serie Archivo Díaz del Castillo, Carpeta 22, ‘No. 26. Documentos del Consejo de Estado sobre propuesta del General Simón Bolívar. Bogotá, septiembre-diciembre de 1829.’, 1.)
of power continued mostly unaffected. Change and reform were often met with uneasiness and uncertainty, particularly among patricians and middle sectors of society. The idea that some reforms could produce even more violence and strife than that they had already endured in past years made many hesitant of change. Amidst the troubled times they were living, many continued viewing colonial and monarchical archetypes as sources of stability and security. Many members of society did what was at their disposal to uphold these models, even if that meant storming a convent and seizing a painting or harassing a student and forcing him to resign. After all, many believed they were safeguarding society’s proper social order and defending their own personal safety. The archetypes that many held in their minds also shaped emotions, guiding people into feeling fear, rage, and even hope in accordance with these models and mental images.
Chapter 6: Conclusion

I had never seen Manhattan’s streets so empty and quiet. The sun was only beginning to rise as I made my way from the bus stop in Bryant Park towards the Colombian Consulate. In just a few hours, thousands of tourists would be walking up and down 5th Avenue. Some hours later, around noon, hundreds of Polish Americans would be celebrating the Pulaski Parade in those same streets. As I hurried my pace, I could not help thinking that my day was possibly not going to be as entertaining as that of those parading or visiting New York City’s main sites. It was not only the idea of spending all day sitting inside the consulate that worried me. For days I had been feeling both hopeful and anxious about the outcome of the peace plebiscite. Even though I was aware that the peace agreement with the FARC guerilla would not solve Colombia’s many problems – as President Juan Manuel Santos and some of his advisors sometimes implied throughout the campaign – I was convinced that its ratification would be highly beneficial for the country. I was hopeful that it would be a first step towards a gradual decrease in violence and that it would open the way for a series of much needed reforms. Yet, despite my hopes that the peace accord could mark the beginning of a new Colombian society, I worried that the plebiscite would not be approved. In the weeks leading to it, opposition against the treaty had gained ground and become ever more fervent and pugnacious. The last polls before the elections simply confirmed the opposition’s growth as well as the rising divisions within Colombian public opinion.

That morning of October 2, 2016, I entered the Colombian Consulate just before 7 a.m. There were dozens of other people coming into the consulate, including some friends.
from Penn who had also volunteered as electoral juries. After all, it was the only way those of us who were not registered to vote in a Colombian Consulate in the US could cast our ballot in the plebiscite. For almost an hour we were given a brief training on our tasks as jurors: from how to check a person’s ID before voting to how to fill out the required forms after counting the ballots. The polls officially opened at 8 a.m. Electoral jurors were allowed to cast their vote at the same time that the first voters slowly began to arrive. After a first few minutes of hustle, things calmed down and jurors began to talk with one another. After talking about our lives and the reasons we were living in the US, we began discussing the plebiscite. Tensions quickly faded away as the jurors sitting in my table as well as those around us all claimed to be in favor of the peace agreement. To deal with the monotony and boredom, we began guessing each voter’s preferences. After some time, we reached the conclusion that those coming in smiling and joyful were voting in favor while those who came in annoyed and grumpy were voting “no” to the peace accord. Some of the voters’ comments when depositing their ballots or when leaving simply confirmed our hunches. One of them, a pregnant woman, shed tears as she deposited her ballot. As she cleaned her cheeks and apologized for her outburst, she looked at her belly and began telling us that she could not help getting emotional at the thought of her son growing in a Colombia in peace and not one torn by war and violence as had happened to her as a child. Those of us hearing her were left with a lump in our throats and close to having an emotional outburst similar to hers.

The polls closed at 4 p.m.. We counted and recounted the ballots and filled out the forms in a few minutes. As I had imagined with the two other juries, in our table the “yes” won by a wide margin. Many of my apprehensions were eased as I heard that in other tables
the same had happened. That afternoon, I began my way back to Philadelphia hopeful that the peace agreement would be supported by a majority of the electors. Just before going into Lincoln Tunnel, the first results showed the “yes” winning by a small margin. When I recovered phone signal after close to twenty minutes of heavy traffic crossing the tunnel, the outlook was quite different. The “no” was winning by a small, but definite margin. That night, many young Colombians who had gathered in the cities’ main squares to celebrate the peace treaty ended up crying out of sadness and impotence at the results. Yet, many other Colombians celebrated. In Medellín, Colombia’s second largest city, fireworks exploded all night long as many went out to the streets in their cars and motorcycles honking to celebrate what they believed to be a victory over impunity, corruption, and communism.\footnote{\textit{\textit{Con pólvora y caravanas en Medellín celebran que el No ganó en el plebiscito}}, Caracol, October 2, 2016, https://caracol.com.co/emisora/2016/10/03/medellin/1475452518_745613.html.}

The following morning, Colombia was perhaps even more divided than the previous night. Many woke up feeling a sense of sorrow and despair. In social media, supporters of the peace process claimed that they were heartbroken and compared what they were feeling to the melancholy that came about after a difficult breakup. Some even went so far as to connect their sadness with the sense of grief that comes with the loss of a loved one. Right-wing political leaders were jubilant with their victory. Among them was Juan Carlos Vélez, the chair of the “no” campaign. That morning, Vélez gave several interviews to the press. In one of them, he explained that their strategy had been to make people cast their votes feeling “verraca.” The term is used by Colombians in many different ways; however, in this case, Vélez was referring to one of its most common usages: a sense
of rage and anger. Vélez explained that while the promoters of the “yes” had tried to incite feeling of hope, the “no” campaign had sought to stir outrage and ire. Throughout the interview, Vélez’s confidence and excitement grew, and he began to reveal details and anecdotes of how they had stimulated indignation and anger among Colombian voters. For instance, he talked about an image sent out by the campaign that quickly became viral on social media. It was an image with the pictures of President Santos and ‘Timochenko’, a guerrilla commander, and a message claiming that the Santos administration was going to give out thousands of millions of pesos to the guerrillas despite the country’s financial troubles. Vélez explained that among lower classes, the campaign spread stories of how the government was going to cut pensions, social programs, and subsidies to give out those resources to the demobilized guerrilla. In the Caribbean Coast, Vélez maintained, “the message was that we were going to become Venezuela” if the peace accord was ratified.747

Vélez’s interview immediately caused an uproar in Colombian public opinion. Supporters of the peace process accused Vélez and the promoters of the “no” campaign of having deliberately lied to Colombian voters. Some even claimed that so many voters had been misled with false accounts and fake news that authorities should repeat the plebiscite or simply disregard its results. Members of Vélez political party, the Centro Democrático, publicly reproached him and insisted that Vélez’s comments were not true or that they were mere exaggerations. One of them went so far as to accuse Vélez of being drunk when he

gave the interview.\textsuperscript{748} In the end, Vélez was forced to quit the Centro Democrático. During the following months, Vélez defended himself claiming he never said such things and that the interview had been edited to discredit him.\textsuperscript{749}

Regardless of what Vélez said or did not say during the interview, the fact is that emotions played an important role in the plebiscite. As my fellow jurors and I noticed the day of the elections, those voting in favor of the peace agreement came into the consulate displaying a sense of happiness and hope, while those opposing the treaty seemed to be outraged and annoyed – or verraca, to use Vélez’s words. To an extent, the campaigns were successful diving public opinion into two opposing and irreconcilable factions. So much that not only ideas and policies divided one from the other, but also people’s lived emotions and emotional expressions.

The Colombian peace plebiscite was not unique in any way. Some months earlier, on June 23, 2016, electors in the United Kingdom voted to withdraw from the European Union. Similar to what happened in Colombia, in the United Kingdom the “leave” campaign also spread misinformation and tried to incite feelings of outrage against the European Union, immigration, and free trade agreements. About a month after the peace plebiscite, on November 8, Donald Trump was elected president of the United States in a campaign in which false stories and feelings of fear and hate were also prevalent. Recent elections in Brazil, France, Hungary, and other parts of the world have not been much

\textsuperscript{748} “Ernesto Macías se retracta de decirle borracho a Juan Carlos Vélez”, \textit{El Tiempo}, February 8, 2021, https://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/cortes/ernesto-macias-se-retracta-de-decir-que-juan-carlos-velez-estaba-borracho-al-hablar-de-plebiscito-565573

different. This, of course, is not a new phenomenon. Misinformation, hatred, and fright were also widespread in Europe during the interwar period as they have been in many other periods of time, including the early nineteenth century that I study in this dissertation.

When Brexit, the peace plebiscite, and Trump’s election happened, I was undergoing a transition in my intellectual interests. I had abandoned my previous research topic, US-Latin American relations in the twentieth century, and was now studying vagrancy during the Bourbon Reforms. The Bourbon’s efforts to create a new, useful vassal and their endeavors to put an end to vagrancy had caught my attention and had become my main research topic. About this same time, I began to think about written and oral culture in the late eighteenth century. The role of orality transmitting information and moving people’s actions was at the top of my mind. Towards mid-2017, as I started to think of a possible dissertation topic, I came up with the idea of exploring the transition from “useful vassals” to “virtuous citizens” in present-day Colombia. One of the goals of the project was to explore how artisans, poor merchants, slaves, Indians, and other middle and lower social groups experienced the rise of constitutionalism and the emergence of citizen-centered republics. My questions revolved around how these members of society experienced this transition and in what ways their lives changed or remained relatively the same. I sought to tackle some of these questions by exploring the materiality and circulation of texts relating to citizenship and constitutional rights. In that sense, the project explored how the form and materiality of symbols, rituals, texts, and ideas shaped the different meanings given to citizenship and constitutional rights.

Even though this dissertation is in many ways different from the project I envisioned in 2017, it is, in part, its outcome. Even if only marginally, some of my original
questions are present throughout this dissertation. Similarly, the dissertation is also an offshoot of the emotional milieu that emerged from the 2016 elections in Colombia, the US, the UK, and other parts of the world. These elections as well as others that have taken place in recent times have continuously reminded me of the power of emotions shaping people’s decisions, actions, and notions of reality. Hate, fear, anger, and other emotions give form to the ways people understand the world they live in.

Ever since I began writing the dissertation, a series of events continued to shape my sensibilities and questions about emotions. The protests that took place in Colombia in November of 2019 and May of 2021, the killing of George Floyd on May 25, 2020, and the global pandemic of 2019-2022 are only some of these happenings. On November 21, 2019 – as I was beginning to write about the panic attack that took place in Quito in 1815 – thousands of Colombians hit the streets to protest against President Iván Duque’s administration. What began as peaceful protests ended up in riots, vandalism, and police repression. The following days, authorities in Bogotá and Cali declared night curfews in an effort to stop violence and disorders. In both cities, rumors spread claiming that vandals and rioters were breaking into residential complexes to steal and destroy private property. The accounts ended up being not true. Yet, dozens of videos circulated in the news and social media showing residents screaming, arming themselves with sticks and kitchen knives, and blocking the entrance to their complexes to avoid intruders from coming in. The videos showed neighbors running, shouting, and crying, but there was never a trespasser at sight. Not a single residential complex was vandalized or sacked. Only a couple of people got hurt after being attacked by their own neighbors who confused them
for vandals.\textsuperscript{750} The questions of why these rumors were believed to be true by so many people and why they spread so quickly inspired me to think about the cultural and social conditions that make a panic attack possible. In the case of Quito in 1815, part of the answer laid in the city’s collective memory.

Most of this dissertation was written amidst a global pandemic. These were times of much uncertainty, fear, and grief. There were long periods of time in which it was unclear what was going to happen or if the pandemic was ever going to come to an end. During the initial stages of the pandemic, it was not even clear what measures should be taken to prevent its spread. Scientists and health authorities were constantly coming up with new policies and measures. At times, it was safe to say that basically no one knew what was happening nor what the future would look like. Later on, when the vaccination process began, many felt joy and hope at the prospect that we would, once again, return to our normal lives. Yet, going back to “normality” has been a slow and gradual process, with much insecurity and confusion.

This atmosphere of widespread uncertainty and anguish has reinforced my thoughts on how confusion and insecurity shaped the ways in which people in the early nineteenth century gave meaning to the world they were living in. The feelings of uncertainty that the pandemic brought about made me reflect on how people in Santafé experienced the news that Ferdinand VII had been abducted. Although not the best comparison, the shock and impotence that many felt once they knew that there was no longer a king and that they were

now facing the threat of falling into the hands of Napoleon and Joseph Bonaparte may have been somewhat similar to some of the emotions we have experienced amidst the pandemic. Despite the many differences between the two cases, there are some similarities. In both cases, uncertainty and confusion shaped the meanings society gave to what was happening as well as to its prospects of the future.

In that sense, this dissertation maintains that emotions shaped the rise of new republican nations in northern South America. As I explain throughout, emotions are a constitutive part of people’s cognition. Emotions influence the meanings people gave to the world they live in at the same time that emotions help express and convey meaning to people’s actions. In the early nineteenth century, emotions, particularly fear and uncertainty, shaped people’s meanings of the troubled times they were living. Rather than focus on the apparent certainty and self-assurance of people’s decisions, interests, and ideas – as has been done by most of the historiography –, I have stressed the feelings of confusion, perplexity, and anguish that many of them experienced at the time.

Thus, this dissertation argues that the emotions that circulated during these years gave form to the republican and national projects that emerged at the time. During these years, there were moments in which certain emotions predominated over others or in which their pace of propagation accelerated or slowed down. At times, parts of society experienced fear and confusion with more intensity than in previous times. Ultimately, these fluctuations shaped the tides of revolution and reform. At certain moments, emotions incited and hastened political transformations. At others, they halted social and political change. Likewise, I claim that independence and the onset of republicanism did not bring about a critical break from the monarchical and colonial past. Widespread feelings of dread
and uncertainty led many of the region’s residents to seek stability and safety at the expense of their aspirations for social and political transformations.

This dissertation has shown that in the early nineteenth century the ebb and flow of emotions ended up shaping periods of reform and counterreform. In recent times, as hate, fear, and mistrust have taken over the political scene throughout most of the world, many seemingly gained rights are now, ever more, at stake. Hopefully, new emotional tides will come in the future, bringing with them better times.
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