Patrons And Personnel: The Determinants Of Military Recruitment Policies

Abstract
This dissertation examines why some states develop conscript militaries while others rely solely on volunteers. I argue that two variables determine what recruitment decisions states make when initially designing their military. First, either domestic or foreign policymakers can dominate the decision-making process. These actors often have different perceptions about the military’s most important goals and how to achieve them. When foreign powers view new states as sufficiently important enough to their interests, recruitment policies reflect their preferences, rather than those of domestic policymakers. Second, the threat perception of the actor making recruitment policies affects how they approach military design. Major external threats to the new state’s territory constrain recruitment options in the interest of immediate defense, leading to conscription, while lower threat environments permit more freedom to adopt different practices.

I test this argument using an original dataset of 224 cases of state creation and major regime change from 1918–2011, including original variables that measure different types of foreign military influence. I also use qualitative evidence—including archival documents and interviews—to conduct a series of case studies focusing on the Middle East and Europe that are designed to control for alternative hypotheses and establish the causal processes. The results support my initial hypothesis, demonstrating that military design is often affected by hierarchy in international relations. This research suggests important lessons for policymakers interested in effecting military reform by highlighting a role for foreign security assistance in processes of military design.

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PATRONS AND PERSONNEL:
THE DETERMINANTS OF MILITARY RECRUITMENT POLICIES

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PATRONS AND PERSONNEL: THE DETERMINANTS OF MILITARY RECRUITMENT POLICIES

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Dedicated to My Parents, and to Roxanne
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I have heard that a dissertation is not a sprint, but a marathon. It often simultaneously felt like both. Nonetheless, there were many people who made it not only possible, but frequently enjoyable.

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ABSTRACT

MILITARY RECRUITMENT IN NEW STATES

Max Z. Margulies

Michael C. Horowitz

This dissertation examines why some states develop conscript militaries while others rely solely on volunteers. I argue that two variables determine what recruitment decisions states make when initially designing their military. First, either domestic or foreign policymakers can dominate the decision-making process. These actors often have different perceptions about the military’s most important goals and how to achieve them. When foreign powers view new states as sufficiently important enough to their interests, recruitment policies reflect their preferences, rather than those of domestic policymakers. Second, the threat perception of the actor making recruitment policies affects how they approach military design. Major external threats to the new state’s territory constrain recruitment options in the interest of immediate defense, leading to conscription, while lower threat environments permit more freedom to adopt different practices.

I test this argument using an original dataset of 224 cases of state creation and major regime change from 1918–2011, including original variables that measure different types of foreign military influence. I also use qualitative evidence—including archival documents and interviews—to conduct a series of case studies focusing on the Middle East and Europe that are designed to control for alternative hypotheses and establish the causal processes. The results support my initial hypothesis, demonstrating that military design is often affected by hierarchy in international relations. This research suggests
important lessons for policymakers interested in effecting military reform by highlighting a role for foreign security assistance in processes of military design.
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An army raised without proper regard to the choice of its recruits was never yet made good by length of time.¹

Vegetius, *De Re Militari*

Troops are raised by enlistment with a fixed term, without a fixed term, by compulsion some times, and most frequently by tricky devices.²

Maurice de Saxe, *Mes Réveries*

² Ibid.
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND FRAMING OF THE DISSERTATION


The Republic of Korea is well known today for its system of universal male conscription. The origins of this system can be traced to the Korean War, when the sudden disintegration of the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) in the face of the North Korean invasion in June 1950 created an immediate demand for replacements. President Syngman Rhee’s government passed the Emergency Defense Law on July 22, 1950, making all men aged 14 years or older eligible for conscription. While a previous conscription law had been passed in September 1949, it was only implemented for a few months, as volunteers met the military manpower requirements. In fact, the organization responsible for conscription had been disbanded in March 1950.

The theory advanced in this dissertation can explain why South Korea was so unprepared in terms of military manpower when the North Korean invasion came in June 1950. At the time, it relied on a military patron, the United States, which also preferred to use volunteers. In fact, South Korea’s Emergency Defense Law was implemented only

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5 Kim, The Korean War, 286.
6 The United States effectively had a volunteer military itself, and was far from convinced of the utility of peacetime mass armies at this time. While the United States had technically reinstated conscription domestically in the summer of 1948, this was intended as a temporary measure; inductions lasted only three months, and ended in February 1949. No conscripts were called up again until the Korean War, nor were inductions expected to be renewed until the conflict broke out. The United States was still thoroughly in a post-World War II mindset of demobilization during the years in which it helped create the South Korean army. Aaron Friedberg (2000, p.177) argues that “But for Korea, it is quite likely that by the beginning of the 1950s, the US would
after the United States Congress voted to reinstate draft inductions and to extend military
conscription, which it did three days after the war broke out.\(^7\) Conscription in these
circumstances is not necessarily surprising. The immense demands of the highly
threatening military situation likely would have led South Korea to implement
conscription even without the influence of a patron state. Nonetheless, the United States
played an important role in this process. Ultimately, the United States molded the ROKA
in its own image, reducing the ROKA’s readiness and likely contributing to the need for
drastic conscription policies after war broke out.

The United States played a major role in the formation of the ROKA, particularly
through the provision of a large American advisory mission, the Korean Military
 Advisory Group (KMAG). KMAG’s role was so great that it has been described as “the
midwife to a new Korean army.”\(^8\) The first military advisory mission, the Provisional
Military Advisory Group, was established by General MacArthur on the date of South
Korea’s independence, August 15, 1948, and amounted to 100 military advisors.\(^9\) PMAG
grew to 241 members by the end of the year, and increased further to 472 when it became
KMAG with the withdrawal of the last American troops on July 1, 1949.\(^10\) In addition,
the United States furnished arms and equipment to the South Korean army. However, the

\(^7\) Rostker, \textit{I Want You!}, 2006.
\(^8\) Gibby, \textit{The Will to Win}, 13.
\(^9\) James F. Schnabel, \textit{United States Army in the Korean War: Policy and Direction: The First
Year} (Washington, D.C: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1992): 34.
\(^10\) Schnabel, \textit{United States Army in the Korean War}, 34; Robert K. Sawyer, \textit{Military Advisors in
Korea: KMAG in Peace and War} (Washington, D.C: Office of the Chief of Military History,
ROKA consistently recruited greater numbers of soldiers than the United States was willing to support. For example, the ROKA was nearly 100,000 strong in August 1949, although the United States had only agreed to support an army of 65,000.\textsuperscript{11} This discrepancy between supply and demand was a key reason why the Korean experiment with conscription before the war failed.\textsuperscript{12} It indicates that the United States attempted to limit South Korea efforts to recruit a conscript army.

Indeed, while some South Korean leaders wanted a mass conscript army as a source of “population and territorial control” to guard against communism, General Roberts, commander of KMAG, believed that “the Korean military establishment should mirror the American system” and include a relatively small but highly trained army.\textsuperscript{13} Even after the war started and the United States implemented conscription domestically, Americans seemed uneasy about conscription in South Korea. During the war, South Korean requests to expand the ROKA were rejected because American decision-makers, including Generals MacArthur and Ridgeway, were reluctant to increase manpower and thought South Korea should focus on “qualitative improvement in its organizational capacity, especially training and leadership.”\textsuperscript{14} Even at the darkest period of the war, American Ambassador Stephen Muccio reported on September 4, 1950 that President Rhee had ordered all conscription to stop, while Muccio himself bemoaned the use of “forceful impressment.”\textsuperscript{15} This shows that there was still a strong American tradition of

\textsuperscript{11} Schnabel, \textit{United States Army in the Korean War}, 34; Sawyer, \textit{Military Advisors in Korea}, 58.
\textsuperscript{12} Kim, \textit{The Korean War}, 286.
\textsuperscript{13} Millett, \textit{The War for Korea}, 172.
\textsuperscript{14} Taik-Young Hamm, \textit{Arming the Two Koreas: State, Capital and Military Power} (London, UK: Routledge, 1999): 65.
\textsuperscript{15} United States Dept. of State, Office of the Historian, “The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State,” \textit{Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII}. Available at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v07/d489.
limiting the use of conscription, and that these recruitment preferences may have been transmitted, at least in part, to South Korea. Thus, like the United States, which heavily influenced its military development, South Korea went into the Korean War with a primarily volunteer army, and would only use conscription under the most extreme circumstances.

The creation of South Korea’s armed forces demonstrates the importance of foreign powers in influencing patterns of military design, particularly when it comes to military recruitment decisions. More broadly, it points to the role of foreign actors and military recruitment in the process and outcomes of statebuilding efforts. Military recruitment policies are a particularly important example of the many decisions states must make when designing their militaries. These decisions, in turn, are often at the forefront of statebuilding efforts. The world’s most recent new state, South Sudan, has struggled since achieving independence in 2011 to find the best way to transition the former rebel army and militias into a unified military. Similar questions shaped the American Articles of Confederation and later the Constitution, as nationalists and military reformists clashed with more conservative forces over the existence of a standing national army, the method of its recruitment and relationship to state militias, and the length of military service.\(^\text{16}\) While the former group thought the only way to protect the country against external challengers was to maximize the authority of the federal government to create a professional peacetime army, others feared that the existence of

such a permanent force would constitute an unacceptable threat to individual liberties and
democratic governance.

These cases highlight the significance states attach to questions of military design. They also underscore the constraints many countries face when designing their militaries. Each country’s statebuilders had to take into consideration how best to protect against external and internal threats while staying true to the ideological principles that legitimated their rule. This is one of the first and most important decisions confronting any newly independent state. While the international condition of anarchy compels all states to consider this question continuously, it is particularly pressing after moments of independence, revolution, or major regime change. The reconfiguration of domestic power in such contexts ushers in new threat perceptions and new ideas about how to address them. However, policymakers working in these conditions may also lack the prior experience or autonomy to make decisions about what existing institutions or models are appropriate in their local context. These factors can make the process of designing a military in new states particularly contentious, but they also constitute a unique opportunity to adopt new military forms and shape the state’s security for years to come.

This dissertation examines why states choose different policies in response to the statebuilding imperatives described above. In particular, it addresses the question of why states design militaries in different ways. While previous scholarship emphasized the modern state’s convergence on the centralized and capital-intensive standing army, recent research has identified considerable and significant variation in military design.¹⁷ States

often adopt different forms of military organization, despite the need for militaries to achieve similar security goals in new states. Military isomorphism is hardly the norm in the developing world, where many states prefer to decentralize command and control to militias or warlords.\(^\text{18}\) Recent studies have also shown how authoritarian leaders manipulate personnel, training, and chain of command to deter or fend off domestic threats to their control.\(^\text{19}\) Even among developed countries and democracies, local economies and organizational cultural lead to different military practices.\(^\text{20}\) In short, militaries are complex institutions that can be designed in different ways to meet a variety of goals. What explains the wide variation we see in how states design their militaries?

The focus in this dissertation is specifically on variation in the reliance on different recruitment methods: why do some states decide to employ only volunteers, while others choose to draft troops, often in the face of widespread resistance from their population? Military recruitment is an understudied aspect of military organization, despite the fact that scholarship has long argued that it can be especially important for


domestic politics and security, especially regarding a country’s civil-military relations and identity. Thus, understanding the determinants of military recruitment can provide important insights for an array of other characteristics of states’ political institutions and behaviors, as described below. Given this, it us unsurprising that many existing studies characterize military recruitment policies as intimately related to and determined by specific social and cultural features within a country.

Contrary to this account, I argue that new states rarely have full control over how they recruit for their militaries. Rather, more powerful states often influence their decisions—either directly, by ensuring sympathetic people are in charge of decisions related to military design, or indirectly, by making necessary assistance contingent on the adoption of specific military policies. In still other cases, more powerful states may simply use military-to-military ties to model appropriate and effective forms of military organization that new states then learn to emulate. New states are unlikely to have developed the resources and skills that would enable them to guarantee their own security or to ward off unwelcome external interference. More powerful states, in turn, are all too eager to take advantage of this dependence, when it is in their interest, to ensure that the weaker state’s military can do what they need it to. Furthermore, these decisions by foreign states often overpower local evaluations of external threat environments. The result can best be described as the development of a patron-client relationship, in which new states that are dependent on military assistance from a patron end up complying with many of the patron’s preferences, including on issues of military design.21

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This argument highlights a significant disconnect between research on security sector reform, post-conflict development, and statebuilding, on the one hand, and existing literature on military organization and recruitment. While the former often stresses the importance of external stakeholders who can incentivize development and provide enforcement mechanisms, the latter tends to focus on more developed states and domestic or organizational factors that enable reform. As a result, it is difficult to judge the relative importance of external and internal factors in determining military design, or how similar developed and developing countries are when it comes to these issues. By integrating a better understanding of the contexts in which militaries are designed and develop with the statebuilding literature’s emphasis on the importance of international actors in weak states, my theory provides a more accurate and generalizable explanation for observed variation in recruitment patterns across states.

The remainder of this chapter frames my dissertation, focusing particularly on the necessity and added-value of a systemic study exclusively of military recruitment policies. I begin by describing military recruitment policies, specifically conscription, and their consequences for an array of military, political, and social outcomes. I elaborate on the theoretical and methodological advantages of studying recruitment, as opposed to other aspects of military design. From there, I discuss other methodological decisions that were necessary for this study, and justify the tradeoffs these decisions entailed. The chapter concludes with a preview of the dissertation, a discussion of case selection, and its potential policy contributions.

II. Why Study Military Recruitment?

Recruitment and personnel policies are among the most important and diverse tools at a state’s disposal for manipulating the character and role of its armed forces. Although recruitment policies include all the formal and informal guidelines states employ to affect what groups of people join the military, I am specifically interested in cross-national variation in the use of conscription versus all-volunteer armies. There are other aspects of military organization worth studying. However, the decision to use conscription or not is arguably the most fundamental distinction between different recruitment policies, and has immediate and drastic effects on other aspects of military organization.

A. What is Conscription?

Whereas volunteer armies rely on incentives such as salaries, employment benefits, and appeals to patriotism to attract individuals who agree to serve according to contractually-specific provisions, conscript armies are characterized by the use of compulsion—ultimately backed by legal or extralegal punishment and the threat of violence—to enlist individuals who would not otherwise have volunteered. At the most basic level, states that use volunteer recruitment cannot choose who joins their armed forces. They can filter undesirable entrants through various criteria, often based on criminal records, educational attainment and gender. However, they cannot choose who enlists among those that meet their criteria. They must do their best to attract the types of recruits they prefer or need, but can do little if they are not forthcoming—besides attempt to improve the terms of service or try a new marketing strategy. Conscription can allow states to circumvent this problem. If a state is willing to tell people they have no choice
but to serve, it can quickly recruit large numbers of personnel and sort them into their optimal roles. Whereas effective conscript armies must focus on building sufficient administrative infrastructure to ensure compliance, continually train new classes of recruits, and build unit cohesion, volunteer armies must be able to get enough qualified recruits not only to achieve their missions, but also to do so at a reasonable cost.

For most states, this becomes a tradeoff between quantity and quality. Volunteer armies tend to be smaller because recruits must be paid wages that are competitive with private sector civilian jobs, but modern conscripts are not as specialized or professional, because they typically do not serve long enough to learn the necessary skills. Furthermore, while conscript armies can acquire troops more easily, they also require larger civil and military staffs to administer the greater number of recruits and the large reserve force they turn into. These downsides can be overcome to an extent if volunteer armies can improve terms of service to attract more recruits or if conscript armies can enhance training and administrative resources, allowing either type of army to be equally effective. However, this is beyond the resources of most states. Consequently, the choice between conscription and volunteers has repercussions throughout their military system, forcing them ultimately to sacrifice some degree of size, cost, or effectiveness. States must then implement different policies to compensate for these tradeoffs. As Jeremy Black writes, “systems reliant on conscription face different problems in terms of incorporation, in particular with reference to training and discipline, to those confronting militaries reliant on voluntary service.”

Conscript armies, for example, may be more likely to suffer from unit cohesion problems, requiring efforts to create cohesion that

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would not be necessary among volunteers.\textsuperscript{23} This is not intended to imply that the first decision a state makes is whether to use conscription, but does suggest that that decision is intimately connected to other important defense decisions.

One might question the utility of examining conscription as a homogeneous category. In reality, recruitment policies resemble more of a continuum than a dichotomy. Conscription policies can vary along factors including the length of service terms, the use of press-ganging versus institutionalized selective service, the proportion of the enlistees who are conscripts, and the proportion or segments of society to which conscription applies. It can be centrally implemented, through formal procedures that are legally codified and equally applied throughout the national territory, or it can be decentralized, with different provinces, local draft boards, or regional commanders having their own procedures for selecting draftees. Many states also allow conscripts to perform their service in alternative civilian positions instead of in the military. These different policies mean that the experience of conscription can be starkly different from state to state, with appropriately distinct sociopolitical consequences.

While this has led many scholars to call for studying the disaggregation of recruitment policies, the dichotomous distinction between the use of volunteers or conscripts is still an important one.\textsuperscript{24} This is true even for states that conscript in very small numbers. For many states, the advantage of conscription is chiefly in its ability to persuade people to volunteer before they are conscripted—an option that often affords


enhanced occupational benefits. During the period of Selective Service in the United States, for example, the main rationalizations for the draft were based on the numbers it induced to volunteer or re-enlist. Among combat personnel alone, the number of draft-induced enlistees for the year 1970—the year the Gates Commission issued its recommendation to end conscription—was equivalent to the total number of volunteers, constituting 16 percent of enlistees. This suggests that the consequences or necessity of a conscript policy would be difficult to deduce by a simple bean count of draftees. While conscription can take many forms and affect either a large or small proportion of the population, it is still worth studying its determinants more generally.

Furthermore, there are data limitations that prevent deeper cross-national comparisons of different types of conscript systems. Understandably, many authoritarian states do not publicize information about the composition of the military or nature of military recruitment. Such disclosures could undermine official narratives about military service and risk fomenting public unrest, or could reveal private information about military capabilities. Some states may also lack the administrative capacity to institute consistent recruitment policies throughout their territory, or to publicize these policies at all. Additional research on different ways conscription is implemented would provide valuable information on the role of the military in external defense and internal security, but would require substantial investments in time and money to have even a chance of

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feasibility. Nonetheless, there is substantial room in which to enhance existing theories about recruitment without distinguishing between conscript systems. As I discuss more in Chapter 2, few scholars have offered explanations for cross-national variation in the use of conscription and volunteer recruitment. And, as I discuss more below, this distinction remains an important one.

**B. Consequences of Conscription**

Recent research has argued that method of recruitment affects many military, political, and social outcomes. In the realm of international conflict, scholars have linked recruitment to the frequency with which states initiate conflict. Recruitment method may also affect military effectiveness in several ways. For one, it may affect how governments use their armies in campaign and battles, and may alter how those armies behave in combat. Eliot Cohen attributes this to the differing abilities of short-term conscripts versus long-term professionals. Long-term professionals, he argued, are better able to address the requirements of counterinsurgency, including the length of enlistment required by longer campaigns and technical expertise. The shorter service periods of most conscripts, on the other hand, are better suited to situations of major conventional warfare where replacements are needed en masse and quickly; they rarely serve long enough to be effective in counterinsurgencies. Alternatively, others have argued that differences in combat effectiveness come down to the relationship between

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conscription and casualty-sensitivity, particularly in democracies: states are more likely to take risks with conscripts because they are a less-costly investment than volunteers.\textsuperscript{28} However, because conscription also implies that many recruits may be serving against their will and with people with whom they have little in common—except a desire to be somewhere else—it creates challenges for achieving unit cohesion and discipline, which have an important influence on military effectiveness, among other behaviors.\textsuperscript{29}

Aside from its direct effect on the battlefield, conscription may improve a state’s chances in war by contributing to state capacity. States that conscript often do so as a self-conscious effort to expand the central government’s ability to extract vital resources—manpower, and often, in substitution, revenue—thereby increasing their ability to mobilize for warfare.\textsuperscript{30} Finally, conscription affects states’ ability to win wars through its impact on public opinion.\textsuperscript{31} As the United States learned in Vietnam, or Russia learned in World War I, popular support is not only a helpful ingredient for initiating conflict, but is also necessary to continue to wage war when success does not arrive quickly and costlessly.

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\textsuperscript{29} Shils and Janowitz, “Cohesion and Disintegration”; Cohen, “Explaining Rape,”


Conscription can also have many unanticipated consequences for domestic society. While little research has examined the long-term effects of conscription on regime stability, there are several mechanisms through which such effects could occur. First, it is not uncommon for the leaders of states to institute conscription in an effort to unify the population and expand their support basis by treating the army as a “school for the nation.”\(^{32}\) Although the effectiveness of the army as a tool for socialization is open to question, this theory suggests that conscription, when applied widely enough, can cultivate a national identity and eliminate competing ethnic or regional loyalties. This is consistent with popular accounts that cite conscription as creating a true “citizen’s army,” which can be an important factor limiting the army’s ability to use violence against its own citizens—a theory several news agencies suggested during the rapid failure of the 2016 Turkish coup attempt.\(^{33}\) Similarly, Margaret Levi has shown that unfair conscription can lead to mass demonstrations and unrest—a threat not only to regime stability, but also to any concurrent war effort.\(^{34}\) Antonis Adam, on the other hand, suggests that conscription may prevent coups if it creates a large, short-service military, which would disrupt connections among recruits and between the military and political power.\(^{35}\)

Finally, conscription can encourage loyalty by acting as a form of patronage: it can tie a larger portion of the population to the regime by treating the army as a source of


employment (assuming that recruits are paid a reasonable wage), by providing people who complete their term of service with certain societal advantages, and by providing cheap labor and other rents to staff officers.\textsuperscript{36}

The rotation of more people through the military inevitably creates more veterans. Many scholars have shown that veterans have different policy preferences and can play important roles in social movements, suggesting that conscription is important to the extent that it tends to result in higher rates of military participation in society.\textsuperscript{37} When conscription exposes a larger portion of the population to military life and values, it decreases the distance between the military and society, which may improve civil-military relations.\textsuperscript{38} Socialization processes and opportunities may differ in conscript and volunteer armies, with at least one study finding differences in racial attitudes among white civilians and veterans, depending on the era in which they served in the U.S.


army. Similarly, there are micro-level effects for individuals who perform conscript service, which in addition to having important personal consequences, can produce drastic societal consequences when aggregated across large portions of a state’s population. These studies have analyzed the effects on veterans of lost wages or education due to military service, as well as enhanced skills or opportunities afforded to veterans. Recent feminist critiques of conscription have also examined the extent to which the state uses recruitment policies and the benefits associated with them to manipulate and reinforce dominant conceptions of the family and a woman’s place in society, as well as race relations.

Finally, the use of conscription may have an impact on state development over an even longer duration. The advent of conscription has often been viewed as part of a larger military revolution that not only shaped how states fight wars, but the very organization of the state. The rise of large, standing armies and the enhanced demands of states upon their citizens—as well as how states compensated for and imposed these demands—

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influenced whether states developed along liberal or illiberal lines. Frequently, this process entailed a new bargain between state and society, in which the state provided new benefits in exchange for military service. Consequently, extensive social reforms often followed the end of wars and the demobilization of the masses. Such reforms are necessary to reflect the new social roles and awareness that accompany mass mobilization, as people from diverse social backgrounds and classes mingle for the first time in the armed forces, as well as to provide socio-economic safety nets for individuals and their families who were affected by conflict.

To paraphrase Lindsay Cohn, if we believe that who serves in the military is important for operational, political, and social outcomes, then the processes by which people are recruited matters, too. While conscription is not the only important aspect of military organization, the decision to recruit using conscripts or volunteers should not be overlooked. I do not suggest that conscription is necessarily more important than other aspects of military structure, such as the size of the principal unit of operation or the inclusivity of the armed forces. However, because it has not traditionally been emphasized in studies of military innovation and reform, its determinants are less well-understood. Thus, this dissertation builds on a substantial literature on military design,

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44 Cohn, “Who Will Serve?”
innovation, and reform, that not only privileges other military policies, but different explanatory variables.

C. Conscription in the Context of Military Design

There are of course numerous other aspects of military organization with important implications for social development and military effectiveness. A large literature examines how various military innovations have significantly changed the way militaries fight and win, often with significant consequences for society more generally. The decision to organize the military around corps, divisions, or smaller units, the use of meritocratic rather than personal or ethnic criterion for service and promotion, and the nature of military doctrine constitute just a few of the most prominent examples of military policies cited in this literature. However, studies of military design frequently single out the use of conscription as distinct from these other organizational decisions. As I show below, it is often described as more isolated from threat considerations, or more reflective of broader domestic ideologies, civilian culture, and societal concerns.

The choice of specific operational doctrines and the development of professionalization are two prominent examples of more typically studied military characteristics. Numerous studies attribute these outcomes to either threat environments, military culture, or some combination of the two. Elizabeth Kier, for example, argues

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that military doctrines in interwar France and the United Kingdom were influenced by the strategic culture of their respective militaries—notably, in response to predetermined state recruitment policies. These arguments describe militaries as insular organizations, with cultures that are often distinct from that of the rest of society, as well as with the ability to more or less oversee their own institutional design and internal policies.

However, scholars who focus on recruitment argue that it is dependent on the culture within the broader civilian population. John Lynn, for example, argues that recruitment “is more tightly bound up with a state’s basic values and institutions” than other military structures, such as unit organization.48 Any decisions about which individuals should serve in the armed forces inherently invokes questions about ideology and nationality: it entails “broader questions about what should be protected by whom and in which context.”49 These questions may be widely debated, as in the early United States or in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, or they may not be addressed explicitly during debates or policymaking processes because their answers are so obvious to domestic policymakers that addressing them explicitly is unnecessary.

In contrast to these studies, which view recruitment choices as arising out of internal debates and pressures, I argue that new states’ recruitment practices are largely driven by external preferences, especially of stronger foreign powers. The above
literature suggests strong reasons to study recruitment separately from other aspects of military organization. My dissertation allows for an examination of whether recruitment should continue to be viewed so differently. Rather, my theory suggests that the determinants of military recruitment and conscription resemble other aspects of military structure much more closely than has commonly been assumed. By showing how external influences can explain the decision to use conscription, which has often been viewed as a military structure *most* likely to be immune to such factors, my dissertation suggests that my theory is also likely to be able to explain many other aspects of military organization as well. While the broader literature on military design and reform—with the exception of the subfield of security sector reform—has largely neglected the role of external actors—my dissertation shows that such actors can have important explanatory value.

III. Methodology

To this point I have justified my exclusive focus on conscription over other aspects of military design. However, my dissertation also applies a new methodological approach to the study of conscription. Rather than attempt to explain why any state uses conscripts or volunteers in any given year, I examine what factors determine this decision during processes of state and military formation. Thus, I build and test my theory in contexts that might be best described as “new states.”

New states are those that, having previously been under the administrative control of another polity, have gained responsibility for administering their own security forces and defense policies for the first time. The most common way for this to happen is
through processes of decolonization or independence. However, similar outcomes can also arise through certain types of regime change. Social revolutions, for example, transform societal structures and bring new groups to domestic political power, without necessarily previously being under the control of another polity. The termination of major conflicts can also disrupt domestic power relationships, whether due to externally imposed regime change or successful internal rebellions. The important condition these scenarios have in common is a unique opportunity to design or restructure the state’s armed forces. Because new states are relatively unconstrained by existing institutions—which are often weak, if they exist at all—they are more free to adopt a different recruitment system than the actor that previously governed their territory. Moreover, they are also likely to have dramatically different preferences from their predecessors, and thus have motivations to pursue major institutional reform—especially in the military, which may otherwise be a threat to their new regime. In fact, states change their recruitment system more frequently after social revolutions and post-conflict reconstruction than do more stable states. Whereas recruitment systems only change in 1.39 percent of country years between 1918 and 2016, they change 11 percent of the time within two years after the year of a social revolution or situation of post-conflict reconstruction (8 out of 68 cases).

Thus, independence, social revolution, and post-conflict reconstruction are opportunities to design new security institutions and constitute a critical juncture, or a

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50 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge University Press, 1979).
51 Elizabeth Kier and Ronald Krebs, editors, In War’s Wake: International Conflict and the Fate of Liberal Democracy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010). The idea of conflict termination as a major opportunity for institutional change is also evident in the recent rise of post-conflict security sector reform.
period in time during which major institutional changes are possible. The choices become self-reinforcing and continue to have outsized effects, long after the circumstances that shaped their initial adoption have passed. This means military recruitment systems tend to be best analyzed as a path-dependent outcome. Once in place, initial decisions about recruitment systems are self-reinforcing for several reasons. First, as described earlier, other decisions about the intensity and frequency of training and induction, length of service, and other manpower and organizational policies follow directly from the decision to use either conscription or volunteer systems. This means that changing recruitment systems requires changing many other aspects of military organization as well. Second, recruitment systems can empower certain actors and give them a stake in the existing system. For example, conscription can produce bloated but influential military staffs and cheap surplus labor in the form of enlisted personnel. This has contributed to the inability of the Russian military to successfully transform to an all-volunteer force, despite repeated civilian-led efforts to instigate such change.

Recruitment can also influence cultural or organizational understandings about what type of manpower systems are appropriate or effective. While a policy elite’s ideological preferences and beliefs regarding the optimal relationship between the military and society can influence initial military design, once implemented these beliefs become embedded not only within military culture, but also within domestic society more

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broadly, regardless of their initial or continued efficacy. Thus certain myths about the utility of conscription often allow the system to continue in the face of increasing evidence that it does not have the desired social or military effects. Societies that conscript can come to believe that universal military service is a vital element in young men’s (and, more rarely, women’s) socialization and work force preparation—that without it, the population’s sense of civic responsibility and national identity would decline. Conversely, scholars attribute the traditional British reliance on volunteers, even during periods of heightened British intervention on the continent amongst European states that had all accepted conscription as the most preferable recruitment system, to a widespread ideology, traced back to the English Civil War, that distrusted large standing armies. Finally, any uncertainty regarding a different system’s ability to “do better,” combined with the inherent costs and learning curve associated with any transition, can create reluctance to try a new recruitment system.

This is supported by existing cross-national statistical analyses of the determinants of conscription. States rarely change their method of recruitment, even when they expect to fight a major war. Asal et al. identified only 59 instances of states

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switching systems in 6759 country years between 1969 and 2008. My data analysis is consistent with this previous work. Collectively, there were only 71 recruitment system changes for the 205 cases of new states and major regime change for which I found available recruitment data between 1918 and 2005, with some of these new states changing recruitment multiple times. Furthermore, only 53 of those changes occurred more than five years after independence, indicating that a notable proportion of changes—roughly 25 percent—might be associated with early processes of institutional consolidation and strategic defense assessments. In short, the conditions in which many new states must make decisions about their militaries is fundamentally different from the conditions for effecting military reform in more established militaries. Other types of regime change may also offer relatively unconstrained opportunities for redesigning military institutions. By adopting a stricter definition for the unit of analysis, I increase my ability to isolate the immediate factors affecting military design from the inertia of existing military practices.

This focus on new states allows me to isolate the factors that lead states to adopt their initial recruitment systems, which then sets them down a path that makes them more likely to maintain certain military practices. I studied what factors affect these initial military recruitment decisions in two ways. First, I created a dataset of these new states to test existing arguments about military recruitment determinants against my theory of patron-client relations using statistical analysis, which allows me to establish correlational relationships and the generalizability of my argument. These tests can be seen in Chapter 3. Second, I tested the causal mechanisms described in my theory

through several process-tracing case study chapters. Each case study chapter examines a new state from the quantitative analysis that represents a different causal pathway by which states determine their military recruitment systems. While many states have patrons, other states must design their military on their own, either in contexts of high or low international threat. My qualitative analysis in each of these chapters allows me to identify who they key actors in each case of military design were, what their preferences were, and why some actors’ preferences became policy. This allows me to verify that the theorized mechanism is actually behind the correlations established in Chapter 3.

A. Scope

Since even before the innovation of the professional standing army by the Dutch in the seventeenth century—and its subsequent spread across Europe, and later, the world—rulers have in theory had the option of raising their armies through market incentives or physical coercion.59 Indeed, some people have identified evidence of practices resembling compulsory military service in the Old Testament.60 However, I do not suggest I can explain the use of conscription at all times and by all actors. I focus specifically on two scope conditions: the actors whose behavior I attempt to explain are states as opposed to non-state actors, and they are relatively modern.

First, many rebel groups can equally practice forced military service—indeed, many scholars and humanitarian groups have written on the use of child soldiers by states and rebels alike. Yet rebel groups face unique circumstances influencing their military

practices that may not apply to states, most notably, an enhanced collective action
problem, absence of international legitimacy, and fewer resources. Even rebel groups
with patrons may be less likely to emulate their patrons due to an enhanced principal-
agent problem and greater obstacles to high levels of patronage. Not only are there good
reasons to expect rebel military practices to be motivated by different factors than state
militaries, but it is worth also worth studying recruitment as an important and
understudied component of state policies in its own right.

The second important caveat is about the time period in which my argument
should be applicable. Contemporary conscription practices are generally traced back only
to the levée en masse of the French Revolution. Indeed, Andrew Krepinevich identifies
the levée en masse as a vital component of the military innovation that he terms the
Napoleonic Revolution.\(^\text{61}\) Furthermore, it was not until the mid-nineteenth century that
technological and social conditions enabled rulers to compel large portions of their
population into prolonged military service.\(^\text{62}\) This study truncates the period under
analysis even further, focusing on how states design their militaries since the end of
World War I.

While many of the dynamics I describe are likely applicable to earlier periods of
state creation as well, focusing on military recruitment in the last hundred years offers
certain advantages. Most importantly, it is difficult to get reliable data on a wide set of
cases before this period. In addition, cases after this period are comparable for several
reasons. For one, the end of World War I produced a major shift toward norms of respect

\(^{61}\) Andrew Krepinevich, “Cavalry to Computer: the pattern of military revolutions.” \textit{The National
Interest} no. 37, 30-42.

\(^{62}\) Massimiliano G. Onorato, Kenneth Scheve, and David Stasavage, “Technology and the Era of
for self-determination and territorial sovereignty, with corresponding changes in the relationship between citizens and the state. Thus, state creation before and after World War I took place in distinct contexts that limit the nature of insights that can be drawn from comparing cases across the two time periods. It is no coincidence that the majority of independent states today gained independence after 1918. Second, beginning my analysis in 1918 allows me to better hold the technological context constant. Although the innovation of conscription was developed a century earlier and truly demonstrated by Prussia in the mid-1860s, World War I was in many ways the culmination of warfighting principles associated with the mass army and conscription more generally. By the end of World War I, much of the world had been exposed to a system of compulsory military service, and thus was able to observe its consequences both in combat and for society more generally. Thus, limiting my analysis to post-1918 state creation increases the similarities across instances of military design to allow for comparison, while still providing a large enough sample size to make those comparisons generalizable.

IV. Preview of Dissertation

In this chapter I have established the importance of reexamining the factors that lead states to adopt either volunteer or conscript recruitment systems, and have situated this study within the broader process of designing militaries in new states. In the next chapter, I review existing explanations for why some states rely on conscription, including those based on individual case studies, systematic cross-national study, and untested but hypothesized relationships. I argue that this literature fails to account for observed variation in recruitment, and moreover makes certain unfounded assumptions
that are inappropriate with respect to the actual process of military design in new states. More specifically, the most widely accepted arguments downplay the functional advantages of conscription even in the age of modern warfare, and assume too much domestic autonomy over military affairs. Instead, I argue that foreign powers often intervene in new state military design to implement or encourage the use of a recruitment system that suits their security interests.

I argue that military recruitment decisions result from one of three causal pathways. First, when there is a foreign military patron to guide recruitment decisions, states pursue the preferences of the patron, leading to emulation. When there is no patron, one of two things happens, depending on the external threat environment. In the second pathway, a low external threat environment and absence of a patron leaves states unconstrained in the recruitment options they can pursue. In these circumstances, the idiosyncrasies of historical experience, domestic politics, or leadership preference will dominate the policymaking process. In the third pathway, if there is a major external threat to the new state’s territorial integrity, it will usually conscript in order to ensure it can defend its borders, especially in consideration of the inability of new states to build effective volunteer forces.

Chapter 3 uses quantitative methods to systematically test the arguments I advance in Chapter 2. I collected original data on foreign intervention in new states, including the presence of military training and advisory missions, foreign contract officers, and troop deployments. Logistic regression shows that indicators of foreign state intervention have a strong effect on military design. In addition, they show that external territorial threats exert a strong functional pressure on new states to adopt conscription, at
least when states have no patron. This is true even when tests control for the cultural legacy or nature of foreign influence in new states. The findings in this chapter contrast with the expectations of many popular alternative hypotheses, and provide broad support for my argument.

Demonstrating my primary proposed mechanism, though—that foreign states actively intervene to enforce their preferences—requires further, in-depth analysis. The next three chapters examine the process of military design in specific cases, focusing on the debates—implicit or explicit—surrounding the use of conscription. Each one of these chapters process-traces the creation of the military in a different one of my causal pathways. Chapter 4 describes the process of military recruitment policy development in a state with a powerful patron, Jordan. Chapter 5 demonstrates what happens when there is neither a foreign patron nor major external threat to constrain decision making, as was the case in Iraq during the inter-war period. Furthermore, these chapters offer a comparison of Jordan and Iraq that can establish the causal role of British patronage through a most-similar cases research design. Both were strongly influenced by British military culture in the years after World War I, though they both had previously been under Ottoman control and had experience with conscription during that period. Additionally, both Jordan and Iraq envisaged the same types of threats—mainly, those arising out of weak domestic legitimacy and cleavages within society. However, whereas Iraqi domestic leaders strongly preferred to use conscription and implemented this system almost as soon as they were independent, Jordan continued to use a volunteer system. These chapters examine the reasons why despite these ostensibly similar contexts, British influence and a volunteer system prevailed in Jordan but not in Iraq. I argue and show
that the reason is largely due to the difference in a British desire to intervene in military design across the two cases, and hence in the level of British intervention and patronage.

Chapter 6 illustrates the third causal pathway: no patronage in the context of high external threats. It also tests this theory in a more contemporary case of state formation and military design: Bosnia and Herzegovina during its post-independence statebuilding effort that began in 1995. The end of the Bosnian Civil War and the Dayton Accords resulted in a fractured Bosnian state under an international administration. However, the historic experience of Bosnia with conscription seemed to lead to institutional inertia, with all armed actors continuing to conscript despite international intervention and security guarantees. Beginning in 2002, though, the international community essentially enforced several rounds of defense reform on Bosnia. This defense reform concluded with the sudden and complete abolition of conscription at the end of 2005, despite similar levels of international presence and a largely unchanged international environment. I conducted interviews with American and Bosnian officials involved in the defense reform process to determine what changed between 1995 and 2005. This allows me to better understand whether local or international actors matter most for determining military design. It also demonstrates the applicability of my argument that international patrons matter most in different cultural and temporal contexts, including in modern instances of state creation and military design.

My final chapter concludes by discussing the implications of the dissertation’s findings for contemporary international relations theory and for policy practitioners. This research highlights the role of hierarchy and patron-client relations in international relations. It also provides insight for policymakers in government or elsewhere who work
with other countries to support these security goals. It provides insight into how states define their security interests. For example, it is often assumed that militaries are designed to be experts in violence, so that states emulate best practices in military effectiveness. My research indicates that states may sacrifice military effectiveness for other goals, such as social integration, or because they lack the capacity to make an effective defense. By addressing the circumstances in which states prefer these goals, my research illuminates how states understand and respond to their strategic environments using military design. In turn, this provides advice for policymakers seeking to help states design their militaries.

This is especially relevant for new states or those restructuring their military after major regime change or civil war. These are unique opportunities to change military design and organizational culture, and consequently military effectiveness and regime stability. Thus, military training and power-sharing were integral to the peace process in Bosnia, and a failure to adequately rebuild Iraq’s army is often blamed for the rise of the Islamic State. My dissertation contributes to efforts to understand how to better design such post-conflict militaries to support peace, reconstruction, and broader security policies. By highlighting when and why states are likely to view conscripts as contributing to security, I suggest what tools policymakers should focus on to achieve desired security goals.
CHAPTER 2: A NEW THEORY OF MILITARY DESIGN

In December 2002, high ranking members of the international community met at the Hotel Petersberg in Bonn, Germany, to discuss the future of Afghanistan’s armed forces. A general agreement had already been reached on the importance of developing the Afghan armed forces at the previous year’s Bonn conference, which set in motion the transitional process that would result in Afghanistan’s new constitution. It was at Petersberg in 2002, however, that the specific processes to establish a new Afghan National Army (ANA) were decided. Of particular note was the decision to recruit on a solely volunteer basis, with training to be “jointly designed by Afghanistan and the United States or other designated lead nations” and with American responsibility for reviewing the progress of ANA recruitment and training.63

In 2010, amidst heightened security demands that had recently led the United States to commit 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan, Afghan President Hamid Karzai considered adopting conscription.64 Such a change would have been consistent with historical practices, as the army had previously used conscription for decades before the civil war of the 1990s and the rise of the Taliban. However, there was no change in recruitment practices. Despite changing security environments, the Afghan army continues to be recruited on a volunteer basis more than sixteen years after its modern re-founding.

This chapter offers a new theory to explain why countries like Afghanistan and Iraq, which have undergone major changes in domestic regimes and constitute examples

of “new states,” use volunteers instead of conscription by examining the sources of recruitment policies. The recruitment policies used in these cases are particularly puzzling given the contrast to their historically dominant recruitment practices. The fundamental problem addressed by this study is that of military design: how do states determine the form that their military will take, particularly with respect to volunteer or conscript forces? There are many factors that affect what a state’s military will look like. Which ones are most important? To what extent are these factors that states control as opposed to external forces or circumstances? I argue that any effort to understand what recruitment policies a state adopts must account for variation in the identity of the actors who make recruitment decisions and what factors motivate their military goals.

More specifically, two variables define the environment that structures recruitment decisions. First, either domestic or foreign policymakers can dominate the decision-making process. In other words, states can be constrained by a patron-client relationship, in which a stronger outside actor influences their policy choices. This matters because these actors often have different perceptions about the military’s most important goals and the appropriate organizational practices for achieving them. When foreign powers view new or weak states as important enough to their interests to engage them with an extensive military presence or security assistance, recruitment policies reflect their preferences, rather than those of domestic policymakers. Second, if there is no foreign state influence to guide emulation, threat perceptions affect military recruitment. Major external threats to the new state’s territory constrain recruitment options in the interest of immediate defense, while lower threat environments permit more freedom to adopt different practices.
The effects of both variables can be seen in the description of military design in Afghanistan. Several agreements reinforced the United States’ role as a foundational patron of the ANA’s development. At a meeting of the Group of Eight (G8) in Geneva in Spring 2003 it was determined that the United States would take the lead on Afghan military reform. The United States government also appointed American brigadier general John Eikenberry to be U.S. Security Coordinator, a position responsible for, among other things, the “synchronization of the Afghan National Army building program and DDR plans to ensure they were politically and logistically feasible.” Eikenberry was dual-hatted as the Chief of the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan, the office responsible for developing the ANA. The United States made many other important decisions in its capacity as lead nation in the process of Afghan military design, including to dismantle and rebuild all Afghan security institutions, “from the Ministry of Defense to the ground units.” However, as threat levels increased, domestic elites including President Hamid Karzai began to see conscription as the only way to maintain Afghan security. Without American influence and coalition support, it is much more likely that the Afghan army would have returned to conscription to meet its perceived security needs.

I argue that the dynamics that determined military recruitment in Afghanistan are

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not the exception but the norm. My argument describes three pathways of the development of military recruitment practices. In the first pathway, foreign powers intervene in military design to prop up their preferred vision for the new state’s security, whether that is primarily defined by external threats or to reinforce a friendly or strategically important regime. In either case, new states end up emulating the recruitment system the foreign power uses at the time. In the second and third pathways, foreign powers do not see an advantage to intervening in the new state’s military design, leaving the decision to domestic actors. In the second pathway there are neither international powers to intervene nor major external threats. These conditions mean domestic leaders have the most freedom to design their military. Here it is most difficult to predict how they will recruit because they may be influenced by a number of cultural considerations and they need not design the military with traditional notions of external defense in mind. Finally, the third option for the development of a recruitment system is that domestic leaders who control military policy perceive high levels of external threat, leading them to use conscription. The three pathways are best summarized in Table 2.1, below.

**Table 2.1 Summary of Hypotheses**

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<td>Path 1: Emulate</td>
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<td><strong>Low/No Patronage</strong></td>
<td>Path 2: Freedom from Constraints</td>
<td>Path 3: Conscript for Defense</td>
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The remainder of this chapter elaborates on this theory and argues for its greater ability to explain military recruitment practices compared to existing theories that emphasize military effectiveness or domestic politics and historical legacy. It first
addresses the limitations of existing approaches to studying military recruitment. The first of these approaches contends that domestic politics, especially as determined by historical legacies, determines recruitment, while the second holds that military effectiveness alone determines recruitment. Second, it describes the reasons for and means of military patronage and details the logic behind each of the predictive pathways. Finally, it responds to potential counterarguments to my theory.

I. Limitations of Existing Approaches to Recruitment

Existing theories emphasize two main sources of military recruitment policy. One set of theories argues that domestic politics determines how states recruit for their militaries. This approach expects deeply ingrained social and cultural factors or domestic institutions to influence state preferences. In particular, the most persuasive arguments in this school of thought locate the origins of domestic recruitment preferences in prior colonial institutions.\(^6^8\) However, these theories also argue more generally that different domestic institutions and norms support specific recruitment practices. National ideologies, political institutions, and local norms can all lead states to adopt either conscription or volunteer recruitment.

Thus, these arguments maintain that “culturally and organizationally driven prior beliefs about what a military system is supposed to look like” drive recruitment decisions.\(^6^9\) These arguments tend to divorce threat perceptions from military recruitment


\(^6^9\) Horowitz et al., “Domestic Institutions,” 930. Laura Cleary also argues that “every state’s military will be reflective of its own culture, tradition and aspirations,” see “The New Model Army? Bulgarian Experiences of Professionalisation,” in *The Challenge of Military Reform in*
altogether, arguing that states may view the military as an inappropriate tool for dealing with some of their threats, or that states knowingly sacrifice military effectiveness in order to pursue goals related to domestic stability. Otherwise, recruitment systems may reflect practices or values so deeply ingrained that there appears to be only one recruitment option—alternatives would be unthinkable. As Maury Feld wrote, “The decisions—about who is to serve, in what capacity, and for what sort of compensation—describe the social policies of a political system, often long before it is itself aware of the need for or the existence of such a concept.”

A second group of theories predicts that whatever contributes to military effectiveness is the most important variable for understanding military recruitment. These theories often stress the combination of threat environments and available resources to meet those threats. Military recruitment policies, like other facets of military organizations, are influenced by what Samuel Huntington called the functional imperative, which requires the military to be capable of effectively employing physical violence to provide security in the face of external threats.

This is particularly the case in Realist theories, which highlight the security-maximizing tendencies of states. In particular, they emphasize the structural effects of anarchy, which lead to a system of self-help that conditions states to guard against external threats to their security. One way states do this is through internal balancing, which, in contrast to external balancing via alliances, aims to decrease reliance on other


Feld, The Structure of Violence, 18.

Huntington, The Soldier and the State, 2.
states and increase one’s own power and military capabilities.\textsuperscript{72} States must always engage in internal balancing to some degree, because, as many realists argue, it offers a more reliable safeguard given the inherent uncertainty of anarchy.\textsuperscript{73} Moreover, internal balancing tends to reinforce external balancing efforts, since states that have more capable militaries and that are better able to provide for their own defense inspire greater confidence among potential allies.\textsuperscript{74} Thus, these theories contend, states should rationally design their militaries and choose the method of recruitment that does the most to increase their security, particularly against other states that might threaten them with invasion. However, these theories often lack a clear statement of why a given recruitment system would be more effective.

These theories of domestic politics and military effectiveness suffer from two main shortcomings. First, they assume states maintain autonomy over their own military policies. Both sets of explanations emphasize the military or political preferences of domestic policymakers, ignoring the role that international actors often play in military design. Second, and partially as a result of the failure to acknowledge the role of outside actors, they fail to identify realistic processes by which states pursue their preferred recruitment policies. Domestic political theories paint an overly deterministic relationship between political institutions, ideologies, and preferences, on the one hand, and military

recruitment on the other. Similarly, theories that emphasize military effectiveness and threats assume too much efficiency in the way states make decisions; they ignore the diverse ways states interpret security environments and the sub-optimal ways they often respond to them. I return to these shortcomings and address the potential counterarguments these theories propose after introducing my argument, below.

The next section argues that military influence from stronger countries can explain recruitment policy decisions better than either threat or domestic political explanation. It first demonstrates the role of patron-client relations in military policies, then describes how these relationships are created and perpetuated by encouraging emulation or using direct control. It then discusses the causal pathways through which recruitment systems are often adopted, before the final section that details objections derived from existing theories.

II. International Hierarchy and Patron-Client Relations in Military Design

In a 2010 article in *Foreign Affairs*, the Secretary of Defense Robert Gates described security assistance as a fundamental pillar of American foreign policy, by “helping others countries defend themselves or, if necessary, fight alongside U.S. forces by providing them with equipment, training, or other forms of security assistance.”

Indeed, foreign powers often have a determinative influence on many aspects of development and domestic policy in weaker states. As David Lake and others have

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convincingly demonstrated, relationships between many states are characterized not by anarchy but by hierarchy: the degree to which a subordinate, or client, state endows a dominant, or patron, state with authority over its affairs. I demonstrate that in many cases these hierarchical relationships extend specifically to military policies. This indicates the need to view the international system as one in which hierarchy, rather than anarchy and the associated drive to self-help, conditions many states’ behavior.

Relationships that reflect hierarchy in the international system are characterized by shared sovereignty. Thus, the more overlap there is in authority over particular issues between two states, the more one can describe their relationship as hierarchical. Similarly, the more hierarchical states dyads there are, the more the international system can be said to be characterized by hierarchy. A particular form of international hierarchy is the patron-client relationship. In a patron-client relationship, one state voluntarily shares autonomy with or abdicates some autonomy to another state in exchange for certain benefits. Patron-client relationships are distinct from other forms of hierarchy in several ways. In particular, Christopher Carney argues that patron-client relations reflect a degree of affinity between patron and client that may not exist in other dependent


relationships.\textsuperscript{78} In addition, patron-client relations entail a degree of reciprocity: while one state may benefit more than the other, both receive benefits from the relationship.\textsuperscript{79}

More broadly, though, a relationship of patronage requires that a patron attempts to gain compliance from a client state by distributing favors.\textsuperscript{80} According to Shoemaker and Spanier, “the patron, whatever its specific objectives in the relationship might be, seeks to exert some degree of control over the client. This control can take many forms, but in general, it implies the surrendering of some measure of the client’s autonomy to the patron.”\textsuperscript{81} Importantly, there is an asymmetry in power between the patron and the client: the “client cannot, by itself, become a major military power in the international community; nor can it, by itself, guarantee its own security.”\textsuperscript{82} As a result, the patron tends to provide the client with security or security-related goods in exchange for political support. This desire for support from the client gives the client some influence over the patron. However, the client is also fairly dependent on the patron’s support, given the asymmetrical military capabilities. As Carney writes, “the exercise of influence and/or control over a client is one of the patron’s primary concerns and is one of the key features of the cliency relationship.”\textsuperscript{83}

While patron-client relationships entail a two-way transfer of benefits—generally security assistance to the client and political support to the patron—it is the patron’s actions and influence that are most relevant for my purposes. As defined above,

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{78} Carney, “International Patron-Client Relationships,” 43.
\textsuperscript{80} Carney, \textit{International Patron-Client Relationships}, 44.
\textsuperscript{81} Shoemaker and Spanier, \textit{Patron-Client State Relationships}, 17.
\textsuperscript{82} Shoemaker and Spanier, \textit{Patron-Client State Relationships}, 13.
\textsuperscript{83} Carney, “International Patron-Client Relationships,” 47.
\end{flushleft}
patronage entails the provision of goods by a stronger actor to a weaker actor. In particular, I am interested in the provision of goods to bolster the military capabilities of weaker states. The fact that there are benefits to both the client and the patron explain why these relationships may be so common. However, it is the patron’s provision of security goods to a state that becomes dependent on these goods that best explains the influence patrons gain in the realm of military design. Thus it is less important to distinguish patron-client relationships from other relationships of dependency for my purposes. Rather, a patron is simply a state that gains leverage over a client state through the provision of military assistance. The dependency of the client on the patron then endows the patron with greater influence on many aspects of the client state’s policies, including military design.

External interest in how other states organize their armed forces can be motivated by a number of factors. Foreign powers may perceive that helping to develop another state’s military endows them with some security advantage. There may be an interest in creating a strong military to protect the state against external or internal threats because the state offers something of strategic value, whether that is control of or access to resources or the geographic location of the state itself. For example, US military support to Jamaica enhances the Jamaica Defense Force’s ability to maintain internal security and participate in joint operations, which the United States maintains is important “because of [Jamaica’s] location along vital sea lanes, the ability of its government to influence opinion in the English Caribbean, and its role as a major source of bauxite and marijuana.”

Foreign powers often find it simpler and less risky to build up local forces

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in this fashion than to maintain a direct presence. Indeed, local collaboration was the
bedrock of European imperial strategy. In short, foreign powers assist in military design
to ensure the continued survival of a friendly regime in states that they view as
strategically important.

Sometimes, the foreign actor may not necessarily care about actually building a
strong military, but rather views developing the relationship between it and the new
state’s regime as an end in itself. In these circumstances, outside actors may provide
military advice and assistance to create or reinforce a dependent relationship that will
provide leverage for pursuing other policy goals. Or it might simply constitute a signal of
support or a confidence-building measure that can lead to improved relations. In some
cases, the security interest the outside power is pursuing is actually a decrease in the
client-state’s dependency. Thus, the United Kingdom sought to strengthen Kuwait’s
armed forces in the years after Kuwaiti independence so that it could minimize its
commitment to Kuwaiti security. In the words of Alexander Wendt and Michael
Barnett, strong states create informal empires through “dependent militarization, in effect
encouraging the development of certain security means to reinforce hegemonic security
ends.”

Normative preferences can also lead outside actors to intervene in another state’s
military design. Many people believe the military can be an effective venue through

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85 Ash Rossiter, “Britain and the Development of Professional Security Forces in the Gulf Arab
which values can be transmitted to the rest of society. Thus, military reform efforts are often part of broader projects to redefine the domestic political institutions of other states. For example, the OECD describes security sector reform as “based on democratic norms and human rights principles and the rule of law, seeking to provide freedom from fear and measurable reductions in armed violence and crime.” Despite rhetoric emphasizing local ownership of these processes, security sector reform is typically externally-driven, with experts from a handful of countries—typically, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France—leading evaluation and advisory teams. While there can be strategic benefits for engaging in security sector reform, these principles indicate that donor states are undoubtedly also motivated by a normative desire to improve the standard of living in target countries.

The importance of client military practices suggests that foreign powers would also care about client recruitment policies. For one, the decision to use conscription or not is fundamental to many other aspects of military organization, as described in chapter 1. Creating effective colonial and post-colonial militaries is not just a matter of training and weapons, but of determining the best ways to recruit manpower for the intended missions. For example, peacetime conscription can entail risks to domestic stability that undermine the patron’s goals in exerting military influence in the first place. The British

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Defence Attaché’s annual report for 1979 on Saudi Arabian military development articulated such a rationale against using conscripts to address manpower shortages:

Conscription could play a less than helpful part in maintaining the morale and loyalty of the armed forces. It could introduce into the services numbers of resentful men who could subvert some of the regular elements. Their training requirements would affect the competence of the regular soldiers and dilute the expertise now being built up. When the conscripts left they would take away both some rudimentary military skill and a knowledge of the many weaknesses in the command and logistical structure of the armed forces. And they would leave behind regular soldiers better able to compare their own pay and conditions with those offered by companies in the commercial field.⁹¹

Similarly, American officials during the conflicts in both Korea and Vietnam took an interest in the recruitment policies of their local allies. The United States viewed South Korean mobilization policies as a delicate balancing act between defeating the North and placating the Japanese fear of any increase in military power on the Korean peninsula.⁹² This led to frequent American efforts to restrain South Korean conscription efforts. The United States also viewed conscription policies as vital to its success in Vietnam. In the 1950s, American proposals delayed Vietnamese conscription until local infrastructure

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was better established, while they repeatedly sought to enhance mobilization by asking the South Vietnamese government to reduce the draft age after 1964.93

While these examples highlight that foreign powers often care about the recruitment policies that their clients use, this is not necessary in order for the patron’s recruitment policy to matter. Weaker states can also seek out the advice and assistance of stronger outside powers when setting up their militaries. In many cases, creating military dependency is not only viewed as an effective foreign policy tool by stronger states, but also as potentially advantageous for weaker states: it can allow weaker states to focus on statebuilding, provide regime security, and create alliance interdependence.94 The Ottoman Empire sought foreign assistance in implementing European-style military reforms throughout the nineteenth century.95 More recently, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended Liberia’s civil war in 2003 explicitly asked that the United States “play a lead role in organising this restructuring programme [of Liberia’s armed forces].”96 In these cases, local recruitment practices may not be fundamentally important to patron state interests. Nonetheless, foreign advisors may transmit their recruitment practices.

preferences, based on their own experience of what works, when their military assistance is requested.

A. Methods of Foreign Influence

Foreign influence can take many forms. Outside powers can directly determine a state’s security interests and strategic orientation, they can set manpower requirements for contribution to alliances or defense pacts, and they can provide or constrain the resources a state has at its disposal to make its own military policies. These direct and indirect methods of control all allow great powers to leverage a weak state’s dependence on it to influence its military design.

At the least intrusive level, foreign powers can hope to influence a state’s military practices through cultural diffusion and the attraction of soft power. Though this provides no control over the practices states will actually adopt, foreign powers can foster high exposure for their own militaries and hope they model good practices that others will want to adopt. They can try to improve the likelihood that other states will perceive their practices in a positive light by deepening their military-to-military ties, including through joint military operations, contracting or exchanging officers and instructors, and military training missions. Thus the high number of British army veterans serving in the post-independence Irish Army had a strong impact on the latter’s organizational practices. However, this was through their effect on organizational culture, which led to the general acceptance of British professional norms, not through the active manipulation of policies

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98 Farrell, “World Culture and the Irish Army.”
by foreign agents.

While this can properly be described as foreign influence, it falls short of more active experiences of foreign intervention that characterize military development in many new states. Some powerful states take direct responsibility for creating and governing weaker states’ military institutions. One way they do this is by appointing or providing people who have the power to make these decisions. This was a favorite technique of the British, who would frequently decide on or provide the new states’ top military or civilian defense officials. For example, the first two heads of the Ghana Armed Forces were British army officers. Perhaps the most famous modern instance of a foreign military commander is John Bagot Glubb, the former British army officer who led the Arab Legion—Jordan’s national armed forces—from 1939 until 1956.

These experts do not serve as official representatives of their home country, but they frequently pursued policies that were consistent with their home government’s preferences, and maintained extensive contacts there. In other cases, foreign powers provide formal advisors, who, though they may lack institutionalized authority in the new state, can have even greater de facto power arising from their official capacity back home. This can include extensive military training missions, often beginning before independence, such as the American KMAG in South Korea. It can also take the form of a specific individual who is tasked with providing advice to new rulers. For example, a Military Liaison Officer—Freddie De Butts—was the formal military link between the newly independent United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom, tasked with recommending the “shape and size on Independence Day to the Rulers, and to estimate
what it would cost as they and not [the United Kingdom] would be paying."^{99}

While the British typically built small, if weak, native military establishments before independence, former French colonies frequently gained independence with no native armed forces.^{100} As a result, France was more likely to exert control over client defense policies through the implicit threat of intervention it maintained by keeping French troops within newly independent states. This patron-dependence was often formalized in Defence Agreements.^{101} Indeed, France exercised its intervention capabilities numerous times throughout the Cold War—and since then—to maintain “existing patterns of relations” and favorable defense policies.^{102} Regardless of their exact colonial heritages, many postcolonial countries gained independence with only low ranking military officers and no qualified people to lead defense establishments. As a result, they often voluntarily ceded early important defense decisions to foreign experts, especially from former colonizers.

Although the relatively small number of states gaining independence in the last two decades makes more contemporary examples fewer and farther between, similar modern methods of foreigners controlling military design are easy to identify. Military design efforts feature prominently in post-Cold War post-conflict peacebuilding and democratization efforts. For examples, decisions about the reconstruction of the Afghan

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and Iraqi militaries in the mid-2000s were made at international conferences held outside those countries’ territories and sponsored by the occupying powers, suggesting locals were unlikely to be the dominant voice in the process. Similarly, a Rwandan general formed the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s army in 1997, while Russia formed a committee in Tajikistan’s Ministry of Defense to assist with operational training after the civil war there, also in 1997. Changing international norms may make it impractical for great powers to install their own representatives at the head of foreign armies or for new states to hire foreign nationals to prominent governmental positions. However, it is not uncommon for new states or foreigners engaged in security sector reform to hire private security companies to advise on or implement defense policies.103 Since these companies are mostly composed of foreign nationals with experience in foreign militaries, it should be no surprise that they bring with them their prior ideas about effective military organization.104

Foreign influence can come through one more, indirect mechanism. New states that are aware of their precarious strategic position and their dependence on foreigners for security often adopt the preferences of stronger, potential patron states. By subordinating their own beliefs and preferences about defense preparations to those they expect a foreigner to want for them, they hope to maintain the support of a patron and avoid more disruptive and direct foreign intervention. This second face of power effect on military design is most clearly evident during the process of West German

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104 Singer, Corporate Warriors, 76.
rearmament.\textsuperscript{105} The Adenauer government, initially reticent to rearm at all, quickly internalized the need to contribute to NATO’s conventional defense in Europe once it became clear that their previous sources of defense manpower—the United States and France—were intent on drawing down their human and financial contributions. While NATO allies pressured West Germany to increase its contributions to its own defense, there is no obvious evidence to indicate that they cared what recruitment method Germany used to do this. However, Adenauer feared that a German failure to meet its expected contribution to collective defense would weaken NATO’s security commitments. Thus, despite domestic opposition, he instituted conscription as a way to increase NATO’s commitment to Germany security.\textsuperscript{106}

The promise of NATO membership and support has continued to shape states’ military organization practices, even though the alliance may not exert direct pressure on them to change their recruitment practices. Force modernization requirements for NATO membership often require expensive reforms that could be difficult for new states to meet, especially for former Warsaw Pact states. For most of these states, acquiring capital-intensive technologies and undertaking the necessary organizational reforms while simultaneously maintaining force levels through higher-paid volunteers was prohibitively expensive. Faced with this tradeoff, states like the Czech Republic chose to focus its efforts on NATO accession. The government’s Concept for the Development of the Army, approved in June 1993, determined that Czech security would be best served with a smaller, more professional force that could better integrate with NATO. However,

\textsuperscript{105} David Clay Large, \textit{Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era} (University of North Carolina Press, 1996).

\textsuperscript{106} Large, \textit{Germans to the Front}, 235.
the early 1990s saw smaller enlistments that expected, which “reduced the armed forces’
combat readiness, damaged the moral of the military and added to the difficulties
involved in military planning and management.”

Thus, reorganizing and retraining around a new force structure would create an undermanned, underprepared force that was unable to meet the goal of territorial defense. The demands of force modernization presented by the anticipation of allied military preferences constrained the Czech Republic’s ability to adopt its own recruitment preferences for more than a decade after its independence.

B. When is there Foreign Influence in Military Design?

The many forms foreign intervention in military design can take makes it difficult to predict exactly when such hierarchical relationships will occur. The amount of effort that is needed to exert effective influence or control over military design may differ from state to state based on the available resources of the patron, the perceived domestic and international costs, the severity of opposition and associated risk within the potential client state, and the degree of the advantage to be gained. This cost-benefit analysis can lead the foreign power to intervene in military design even when the advantage to be gained appears to be relatively low. Similarly, the form that foreign influence takes does not determine its likelihood of success. While some of these avenues of influence may inherently create more opportunity for the diffusion of military practices than others, the receptivity of the client state to change must also be considered.

When the power imbalance between patron and client is large, or when their interests are well-aligned, it is

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possible to effect military change while expending few resources. How this relationship between patron interest and client receptivity plays out in terms of the patron’s investment in tools of influence can be seen below, in Table 2.2.

Table 2.2 Patterns of Patronage Investment

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Not Strategically Important</th>
<th>Strategically Important</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Not Receptive to Influence</strong></td>
<td>No Foreign Patronage or very low Investment for Low Influence</td>
<td>Large Foreign Patron Investment for Medium or High Influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Receptive to Influence</strong></td>
<td>Low Foreign Patron Investment for Low Influence</td>
<td>Low Foreign Patron Investment for Medium or High Influence</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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My argument does not attempt to explain why foreign powers intervene in some states’ military policies and not others, nor does it seek to predict their method of intervention. Is it possible, therefore, that weak states actually tend to seek military patrons who use recruitment policies that they already plan to implement? This is unlikely, because military assistance is only one part of a larger relationship defined by dependency in a number of policy fields. Geopolitics, economics, and ideology are just as likely to shape the development of hierarchy as purely military concerns. Thus, recruitment practices alone should not determine how these relationships develop. It is even less likely that weaker states should be able to pick their patrons; great powers and former colonizers are in a better position to control the development of hierarchical relations with weak states. While new states may have a say in who influences them, it is still up to the potential patron to reciprocate that interest. More importantly, goals of emulation may not succeed without actual influence from a patron state. Thus the role of foreign influence from the patron remains an important element in explaining military recruitment practices.

Furthermore, outside powers and the states they are assisting often have different
preferences for what the military should be designed to do. As a result, even if weaker states have a good deal of freedom in choosing their patron, there is no guarantee that the recruitment policy that develops would be the one they hoped to achieve. While elites in new states may have prior preferences about how to recruit, these are often overturned on the advice or edict of a foreign power. In both Saudi Arabia and Jordan, for example, local rulers believed conscription would be an effective way to address their internal and external security threats. The influence of British military advisers, however, convinced them otherwise, or at least prevented them from implementing conscription. American policy in South Korea after World War II also downplayed the threat of invasion from the North and prioritized internal threats to the government’s stability. Consequently, South Korea’s armed forces—tellingly named the Constabulary Force—was designed more as a police force than as a military capable of territorial defense. The potential for divergent threat perceptions between patron and client states underscores the importance of identifying who controls military policy in a given case.

Similarly, the number of states that have the potential to influence military policy in new states is also fairly limited. The ability to affect another state’s military policy requires substantial power projection. Patron states must not only have important strategic interests that extend beyond their borders, but also the resources to incentivize compliance from their clients. As a result, the states that can exert influence in the design of other states’ militaries are generally limited to great powers, former colonial powers, and, less frequently, rising regional powers.

110 Gibby, The Will to Win.
III. Patronage, Threat Perception, and Military Recruitment

The examples above suggest that it is necessary to examine the effects that foreign powers have when they intervene in weaker states’ domestic affairs to influence military design. In fact, foreign influence in weaker states’ military policies are common—more than 70 percent of the 205 post-1918 cases I analyze exhibit some sign of foreign influence in military affairs in the first few years after their independence. This indicates that the majority of the variation in recruitment policies can be explained through the processes described by Path 1 in Table 2.1.

I argue that threat perception is the most important variable differentiating how domestic policymakers states view whether conscription will be advantageous. However, I make no prior assumptions about the types of threat that any given actor will prioritize. Rather, I follow other recent scholarship in assuming that whoever is making military policy—whether the new state itself or its patron—will make recruitment decisions based on the greatest threat they perceive at that time. The most important distinction between threat types for recruitment decisions is whether the state’s primary threat is major territorial warfare, most likely arising from invasion from outside its borders. Such existential threats require particularly high levels of military preparation, while nearly any other threat—external or domestic—can be addressed in a number of ways. Thus, major territorial threats constrain recruitment choices so that states without patrons feel

they must use conscription to guarantee their security. I define such major territorial threats as a high external threat environment.

**A. Path 1: Foreign Military Design**

Regardless of threat environment, foreign influence is likely to lead to emulation, the imitation or replication of another actor’s—in this case, the patron’s—practices. As described earlier in the chapter, the presence of foreign support allows the implementation of military design goals in a more stable, secure environment. There are several reasons why a foreign power might prefer to implement its own recruitment system in its client state. One argument follows a cultural logic. Outsiders providing military assistance are more likely to recommend practices that they know best because they view these as better based on a logic of appropriateness—effectiveness is a secondary concern. Alternatively, the patron state may care about effectiveness, and attempt to enact its own recruitment system for bureaucratic reasons. This logic implies that the technicians and policymakers who are actually engaged in military design know that their expertise is limited to the recruitment system with which they are most familiar. They know that the new state’s army will be most effective in the long run if they design a system based on the patron’s policies. Similarly, they may believe that armies based on similar recruitment systems are better able to work together, also strengthening the patron-client ties in the long run.

Furthermore, many case studies have demonstrated that emulation through security assistance does happen. Latin American countries attempting to enhance their war-fighting capabilities in the late 1800s and early 1900s ended up with an array of new military policies that largely reflected the beliefs of the French and Prussian advisors they
hired, including on conscription. During the same period, David Ralston shows how non-Western armies sought the advice of dominant European powers to learn how to implement effective military reforms. More recently, Theo Farrell argues that professional military ties between states may lead to military emulation through the diffusion of cultural norms. Thus ties to the UK and United States influenced Irish notions about what an army should look like.

However, emulation can also derive from a more coercive relationship. In weaker cases of hierarchy the client may adopt recruitment practices because of its exposure to experts from the patron state, as described above. Thus, the greater the professional or political connections between patron and client, the more likely emulation will happen. When the patron has higher levels of authority over the client, though, the patron may actually enforce its preferred recruitment policy regardless of the wishes of the client state—especially if the two actors disagree. This is still likely to result in the adoption of the patron’s system, for the reasons described above.

This pathway suggests three testable hypotheses. The first two hypotheses state that the method of military recruitment in new states should be the same as in their patron state. In other words:

H1: New states influenced by conscript-patrons should be more likely to recruit conscripts than volunteers.

H2: New states influenced by volunteer-patrons should be more likely to recruit volunteers than conscripts.

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112 Grauer, “Moderating Diffusion”; Resende-Santos, Neorealism.
The third hypothesis emphasizes the extent to which having a patron should lead to emulation despite other pressures. When states have patrons, incentives to emulate should overpower other factors, such as threat. In other words:

H3: Threat environment should have a greater effect on states without a foreign patron than on states that have either a volunteer-patron or a conscript-patron.

B. Path 2: Domestic Military Design with Low External Threats

When no foreign power intervenes in military design, domestic policymakers can make recruitment decisions based on their own threat perceptions. The second pathway describes how recruitment policy is made in the absence of either a foreign patron or major external threats. When there are major external threats, states face constraints in terms of the different types of uses to which they can put their military; they must design the military to protect their sovereignty. However, when these threats do not exist, alternative military purposes are possible. This means domestic policymakers have fewer constraints in how they design their military. There are many other states they could potentially use as a model, and leaders’ beliefs about what is effective or appropriate may be decisive. Because these conditions give new states significantly more freedom in designing their militaries, it is more difficult to predict what recruitment system they will use.

In the absence of a major external threat or foreign patron, specific domestic circumstances within each state that can affect recruitment practices will not be overpowered by external circumstances. Thus, when states or regimes perceive that the primary threat to their rule does not come from major external territorial threats, it is less
clear whether conscription or volunteers are more effective. Historical experience and domestic ideologies can shape domestic beliefs about the effectiveness or appropriateness of military practices.¹¹⁴ Jeremy Black extends this argument to recruitment specifically, noting that recruitment systems reflect different strategies for or cultures of establishing security more than any operational function.¹¹⁵ Elizabeth Kier’s book on French and British military doctrine, for example, demonstrates the difficulty of predicting cultural responses to recruitment systems in different states: historical experiences led the Left and Right in the United Kingdom to develop a cultural mistrust of arming the people at large, while the French Left feared a long-term service, professional standing army and viewed “the people in arms” as a safeguard against tyranny.¹¹⁶ Depending on historical experiences, ideological biases, and cultural preferences, then, leaders will develop different beliefs about whether volunteers or conscripts will better protect them against low-level external threats or internal threats.

Notably, Kier argues that the perception that the military’s relationship to society was the most pressing threat that shaped recruitment practices in the interwar period in each of these countries. Unlike massive external threats that require conscription, the internal threats that a state would focus on in lower threat environments do not suggest clear recruitment logics to maximize security. On the one hand, literature on ethnic politics and coup-proofing in authoritarian regimes would lead us to believe that elites who view the greatest threat as coming from within the state should be reluctant to arm the people at large, while the French Left feared a long-term service, professional standing army and viewed “the people in arms” as a safeguard against tyranny.¹¹⁶ Depending on historical experiences, ideological biases, and cultural preferences, then, leaders will develop different beliefs about whether volunteers or conscripts will better protect them against low-level external threats or internal threats.

¹¹⁵ Black, “Military Organisations and Military Change in Historical Perspective,” 892.
¹¹⁶ Kier, Imagining War.
large portions of the population because their loyalty to the regime is dubious.\textsuperscript{117} Leaders may therefore prefer to eschew conscription and stack the military with loyalists, relying on violent repression to stay in power. Conversely, leaders can try to address any of these threats by preempting them: they can use the military as a “school for the nation” in an attempt to create broad-based support for the regime.\textsuperscript{118} Which they choose depends on how conceptions of security and national identity are constructed in different societies or by individual leaders.\textsuperscript{119} Thus, without external guidance or an major external threat, manpower preferences may be fundamentally unpredictable: they are “contingent on the particulars of the case and on the creativity of that leadership as it seeks to navigate between contending images of the nation.”\textsuperscript{120} While it may be possible to predict how different domestic ideologies and circumstances affect recruitment—discussed more below—which domestic factors a new state’s leadership will adopt or respond to may be more difficult to predict.

This pathway does not suggest hypotheses about what should predict military recruitment in the absence of either threat or patrons. Rather, it argues that recruitment becomes difficult to predict in these circumstances, and is subject to the idiosyncrasies of a state’s particular domestic politics, history, and leaders’ preferences. Given the


\textsuperscript{120} Krebs, “One Nation,” 543.
frequency with which the data indicate that foreign patrons control military policy in new
states, relatively few cases are likely to exhibit such unpredictable and contingent
recruitment practices. Indeed, the next chapter shows that foreign influence, and in its
absence, threat perception, explain observable variation in military recruitment.

C. Path 3: Domestic Military Design with High External Threats

In the final pathway, however, the threat of major territorial conflict creates
constraints on domestic military designers. In these circumstances, new states implement
conscription as the recruitment system that is most likely to allow them to maintain an
effective defense in what has the potential to be a lengthy struggle with a powerful
adversary. The absence of a military patron would only exacerbate the challenges that
weak and developing new states must face when mounting a defense against an
existential challenge. Thus, states conceptualize their threat environment in one of two
ways: if there are clear threats to the state’s territorial integrity or the regime’s control
over significant national territory, states perceive a need to engage in territorial defense.
Otherwise, they are free to design the military to engage in other types of missions—for
example, expeditionary or peacekeeping missions abroad, or population control
domestically—that enable them to adopt a freer hand in designing their recruitment
policies.

There are two reasons why major external, territorial threats are likely to lead to
conscription. First, despite advances in the effectiveness and cost-efficiency of capital-
intensive technologies, manpower-intensive strategies remain necessary for territorial

\(^{121}\) When threat is measured using the number of forceful MIDs, only 50 cases of new states fall
into this category, while when threat is measured by the number of land neighbors, the number of
new states in this category falls to 9.
defense. Warfare today is still predicated on successful use of what Stephen Biddle has termed the *modern system*, the “combination of cover and concealment that can allow defenders, though battered, to survive modern firepower in sufficient numbers to mount serious resistance.”\(^{122}\) While Biddle’s modern system requires well-trained recruits, which may be lacking under conscription, his emphasis on modern warfare’s continued focus on holding and defending territory in the face of invasion still requires sufficient manpower. Conscription provides a greater guarantee of security against major territorial-based threats than volunteers, who may not be forthcoming in sufficient numbers in a sudden crisis or prolonged conflict. In other words, given the nature of modern warfare, new states may prefer to ensure they have enough soldiers to than to ensure that they are highly trained. This is particularly true in new states, which may lack the resources to effectively train soldiers in the use of the modern system, as described below. Thus states are likely to perceive conscription as the only way they will have sufficient active and reserve forces to defend or deter aggression, at least in the face of existential conflict in which they will likely suffer heavy casualties and need many replacements. Even if they believe volunteers make better soldiers, conscription allows them to hedge their bets for a longer, potentially existential struggle.

The second reason reinforces the necessity of relying on manpower intensive strategies to defend against invasion. Contrary to existing arguments that describe conscription as more difficult and requiring greater state capacity to implement, I argue that it is actually volunteer armies that require higher levels of state capacity—at least if

they are to be effective.\textsuperscript{123} It is particularly difficult for new states to create highly effective volunteer armies. New states are less likely to have the resources to attract recruits in sufficient numbers or the technical capacity and ability to train volunteers proficiently in capital-intensive technologies and modern military techniques.\textsuperscript{124} They are also less likely to be able to acquire such technologies in sufficient numbers as to be able to make a difference on the battlefield. This magnifies the perception that new or weak states will need to rely on large numbers of troops to mount an effective defense.

Recent events seem to support the notion that states perceive conscription as a safer recruitment option when they are faced with potentially major external conflict. For the first time since their independence in 1971, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar have introduced compulsory military service.\textsuperscript{125} Though other motivating factors are also possible, many officials in these countries seem to fear an increasing threat from Iran. This is reflected in the emphasis in each country’s conscription legislation on protecting “the homeland and its borders.”\textsuperscript{126} Similarly, Sweden recently reinstituted conscription only seven years after abolishing it, citing “a deteriorating security environment” in Europe.\textsuperscript{127} Sweden’s defense minister explicitly compared the country’s defense

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{123} Mulligan and Shleifer, “Conscription as Regulation”; Asal et al., “I Want You!” The argument that conscription requires greater state capacity emphasizes greater institutional and bureaucratic capacity to identify potential conscriptions and enforce conscription policies, as described below.
\item \textsuperscript{124} See Wendt and Barnett, “Dependent State Formation,” for a discussion of manpower-intensive strategies as the optimal choice for weak and developing states.
\item \textsuperscript{126} Barany “Big News!”
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
readiness under both systems: “The all-volunteer recruitment hasn’t provided the armed forces with enough personnel. The reactivating of conscription is needed for military readiness.” These examples suggest that the perception that there may be a major challenge to a state’s territorial integrity can lead states to adopt conscription despite domestic cultural pressures toward volunteerism.

Furthermore, the above examples are states whose governments have relatively high capacity and access to resources. This means that, compared to most new states or those transitioning after regime change, these states should be better able to address threats using volunteers. That they nonetheless chose to switch to a conscript system indicates the continued perceived advantages of conscription in high threat scenarios. States facing high threats with low resources should be even more likely to use conscription, particularly if they control little territory and therefore have a smaller population from which to recruit. This pathway can be summarized by the following hypothesis:

H4: New states without a foreign patron should be more likely to recruit conscripts than to recruit volunteers if they face a dangerous (high external) threat environment than if they face a permissive (low external) threat environment.

Before the statistical tests of these hypotheses, however, the remainder of this chapter demonstrates why existing theories do not provide satisfactory explanations for military recruitment decisions.

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128 Sorensen, “Sweden Reinstates Conscription.”
IV. Alternative Explanations

Theories based in both domestic politics and military effectiveness offer alternative explanations for when states will adopt specific military recruitment policies. I address each of these in turn, below.

A. Domestic Politics

Arguments based in domestic politics suggest that states may have preferences for specific recruitment policies because they fit with domestic institutions rather than due to any functional logic. In other words, recruitment policies should reflect the way policymakers think about the role of the military in society. For example, countries with governments that are rooted in republican notions of citizenship adopt conscript militaries, while those that support more liberal ideologies use volunteers. The republican ethos conceptualizes military service as a requirement of citizenship; the liberal ideals of individual rights, meanwhile, should decrease the state’s willingness and ability to use conscription, a form of property taking.

This is also consistent with the notion that states intentionally use recruitment to reinforce domestic values. Recruitment policies that are inconsistent with domestic values could undermine support for the regime, the military, or both. Because military service makes such extreme demands on individuals, policymakers tend to be particularly concerned with whether the policies that determine who serves are fair. Thus, states often find it convenient to adopt military recruitment policies that reflect broader norms or ideologies, which legitimate the existing government and political system.

How do domestic preferences for recruitment practices arise? Many scholars have argued that colonial experiences endow states with different conceptions of citizenship or norms of appropriateness, particularly in relation to the proper role of the military in society. In particular, scholars have found that distinctive British colonial practices have important consequences for political development compared to the practices of other colonizers. This is also true for military practices, including the development of volunteer military recruitment. One way this could be the case is if colonial histories affect the ideology on which national identity and citizenship are founded. Asal et al. argue that a uniquely English tradition of individual liberties explains the general absence of conscription in former British colonies, while Yael Hadass finds that states with British legal systems are also more likely to use volunteers. Thus, the causal arrow runs from colonization, to domestic culture or institutions, to recruitment.

The colonial legacy argument differs from my argument in several ways. First, as is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, patrons and colonizers are not always the same. Because independence or major regime change is a critical juncture, new actors can become patrons, even if they have no prior relationship with the client state. More specifically, though, the colonial legacy argument highlights the role of things that happened before independence. The colonial legacy argument maintains that what the colonizer did yesterday matters for military design today; my argument is that what the patron does today matters for military design today. Thus, independence and major

regime change is less of a critical juncture for the colonial legacy argument, as historical practices continue to influence contemporary policies.

There are compelling reasons not to expect colonial legacies to transfer norms of military behavior to former colonies, though. New states and transitions often emerge through violent social upheavals or war, which create incentives for dissociation from the prior power.\textsuperscript{132} Even when the transfer of power is peaceful, the diffusion of political culture or institutions is often weak. While they may have adopted elements of the British legal system or culture, it hardly seems the case that governments of the Persian Gulf monarchies, Rhodesia, or Nyerere’s Tanzania were deeply concerned with individual liberties, as these arguments about colonial emulation maintain. Similarly, there is little evidence to suggest that the British themselves considered conscription to be innately inappropriate in their colonies. Europeans living in colonies were conscripted to the British army during the period of National Service in the early 1950s.\textsuperscript{133} The British also supported conscription for both labor use and the army in Egypt, even after the end of the First World War.\textsuperscript{134} Colonial correspondence shows that the British took a pragmatic approach to military recruitment in Malaya, Singapore, and Cyprus, often considering conscription and enforcing national registration even when compulsion was deemed ultimately not necessary.\textsuperscript{135} Even when the outcome is still a recruitment system that is

\textsuperscript{133} TNA: CO 968/408: “Kenya: compulsory military training”; TNA: CO 537/6840: “National Service Acts: Kenya; training of European conscripts in Kenya”
\textsuperscript{134} TNA: FO 141/667/5: “Compulsory recruitment for Egyptian Labour Corps and Conscription for Military Operations”; TNA: FO 141/533/6: “Conscription Law relating to Egypt Army”; TNA: FO 141/765/7: “Egyptian Army: recruitment; revision of existing conscription legislation.”
consistent with the prior ruler’s domestic values, this is often only achieved after highly contentious debates both within the new state and between the new state and its former colonizer. The critical juncture created at independence or major regime change limits any continued effect of colonial institutions and culture. However, where colonial patterns of hierarchy remain due to the continued reliance on security assistance from former colonizers, emulation still occurs.

Existing colonial legacy theories often fail to specify the mechanism through which British domestic preferences would be diffused to its colonies. Indeed, Cohn and Toronto argue that “more work needs to be done on why British origin affects military manpower choices; more detailed case studies and process tracing are required to unpack exactly how the British origin effect came about.”

My argument provides such an explanation by pointing to the overlap between colonial and post-colonial foreign influence. Colonial legacies may matter, but they are most likely to matter by providing a basis for post-independence foreign influence. This could explain important differences across countries in the implementation of colonial preferences. Rates of emulation of colonial practices vary across colonizers, while not all states colonized by the same power adopted the same recruitment system (Table 2.3). States including Cyprus, Israel, and Singapore were governed by the United Kingdom prior to their independence but did not adopt traditional British recruitment policies, while states with a French colonial legacy were nearly as likely to select volunteer systems over the more typically-French conscription. Indeed, scholars have found that the British and French took

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different approaches in their strategies of military assistance in their former colonies.\(^{138}\)

Thus, the lack of volunteerism in states colonized by the United Kingdom could be due to lower levels of British involvement as a patron after independence. Similarly, Eisenstadt and Pollack show that Soviet military influence overpowered colonial legacies of military culture in some Arab countries but not others.\(^{139}\) This suggests that these differing rates of emulation could be due to the different post-colonial strategies for maintaining hierarchy that colonizers adopted in specific colonies.

| Table 2.3 Colonial Legacy and Recruitment Emulation |
|----------------|----------------|----------------|
|               | Volunteer Army | Conscript Army | Total         |
|               | N (%)          | N (%)          | N (%)         |
| French Colonial Legacy | 15 (46.9%) | 17 (53.1) | 32 (100%) |
| French Independence   | 9 (39.1%)      | 14 (60.9%)     | 23 (100%)     |
| British Colonial Legacy | 43 (78.2%) | 12 (21.8%) | 55 (100%) |
| British Independence   | 39 (79.6%)      | 10 (20.4%)     | 49 (100%)     |
| Russian Colonial Legacy | 3 (16.7%) | 15 (83.3%) | 18 (100%) |
| Russian Independence   | 4 (20.0%)       | 16 (80.0%)     | 20 (100%)     |

Legitimating ideologies and domestic preferences do not necessarily derive from colonial practices. However, other arguments about how domestic institutions affect military recruitment are often indeterminate or contradictory. For example, at the most general level, some scholars have expected there to be a relationship between democracy and conscription. However, the exact direction of this relationship, if any, is disputed. Conscription may reflect democratic notions of equal citizenship or it may conflict with democratic notions of individual rights, as described above.\(^{140}\) We may also expect

\(^{138}\) Crocker, “Military Dependence”; Luckham, “French Militarism.”


authoritarian regimes to be more likely to suppress individual rights in a way that allows them to use conscription more easily, though they equally could be hesitant to arm the public.

Another way that democracy or regime type can affect recruitment system is by giving voice or creating accountability to the public. The average citizen prefers to pay for a volunteer force than to risk being conscripted.\footnote{Jonathan D. Caverly, Democratic Militarism: Voting, Wealth, and War (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014): 32.} Thus, regimes that are more responsive to the population should be more likely to use volunteers. However, domestic ideology can also generate mass support for the use of conscription. Lee and Parker show that, throughout the 1960s, more than 50 percent of public opinion supported the continuation of the draft in the United States, while less than 40 percent was opposed.\footnote{Lee and Parker, The Ending of the Draft, 497.} This was true despite the fact that more than 40 percent thought the draft was unfair. Most tellingly, in March 1969, the same month that President Nixon created a Commission on the Volunteer Force, only 38 percent of respondents to a Gallup poll wanted the U.S. military to be based solely on volunteers. Thus, it is not clear whether institutions that support public accountability should lead states to adopt conscription or not. Indeed, Lee and Parker conclude that the President led public opinion on the draft.\footnote{Lee and Parker, The Ending of the Draft, 501.}

In addition, some scholars argue that revolutionary ideology, particularly that espoused by Marxism, requires universal conscription: Marxist ideology makes it clear that “as long as there are evil capitalists to fight, socialists are duty-bound to arm themselves, and they are expected to use military force to advance the cause of socialism whenever they can.” Similarly, militaristic ideologies can also support conscription. Chris
Payne argues that “Regimes that place a high value on the military believe it is proper to compel long periods of military service,” while voluntary systems are more common “in countries where the military is given less importance.”\footnote{Payne, Why Nations Arm, 113.} Victor Asal et al. find mixed support linking conscription to militarization, despite evidence that states using conscription may be more likely to initiate the use of force.\footnote{Asal et al., “I Want You!”; Seung-Wan Choi and Patrick James, “No Professional Soldiers, No Militarized Interstate Disputes? A New Question for Neo-Kantianism,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 47 (2003): 796–816; Jonathan Pickering, “Dangerous Drafts? A Time-Series, Cross-National Analysis of Conscription and the Use of Military Force, 1946–2001,” Armed Forces & Society 37 (2010): 119–140.} However, it is difficult to disentangle whether militarism leads to conscription, or conscription makes states more militaristic. Furthermore, militarism can also manifest itself in the establishment of an exclusive military class, as in pre-Meiji Japan.\footnote{Challener, The French Theory of the Nation in Arms; E. Herbert Norman, Soldier and Peasant in Japan: The Origins of Conscription (International Secretariat, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1943); Gotaro Ogawa, Conscription System in Japan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1921).} While these examples indicate policymakers seem to believe that recruitment systems must reinforce domestic social systems, exactly how they do this differs from state to state.

These explanations run into problems by assuming that the general population extends its normative preferences about the state to its beliefs about military service, or that the government is responsive to popular culture and preferences. Often, domestic ideology is thrown out the window to pursue more pressing or functional goals. Despite the revolutionary and egalitarian rhetoric of Soviet communists, Trotsky’s initial preference for the defense establishment was to rely solely on highly-motivated urban militiamen, in part because mass conscription was associated with the old regime.\footnote{Joshua A. Sanborn, Drafting the Russian Nation: Military Conscription, Total War, and Mass Politics, 1905–1925 (De Kalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2003); Fedetoff White, The}
Similarly, some advocates of the effect of institutions and ideology on recruitment argue that “new forces of revolutionary regimes [are] not formed from colonial forces.” However, a desire to have experienced security forces frequently trumps such ideological goals, and revolutionary leaders find themselves needing to rely on ancien regime forces. This happened after successful rebellions in cases as diverse as the Russian Revolution, Irish Independence, and the post-World War II German rearmament.

This does not imply that pre-independence legacies determine military recruitment. On the contrary, the point is that policymakers are not constrained by domestic institutions, and may ignore revolutionary sentiments and popular ideologies favoring the establishment of new military practices when they see fit. In fact, states often impose conscription on an unwilling and resisting population. In her classic study, Margaret Levi argued that perceptions of fairness determined the extent of popular opposition and noncompliance with wartime drafts. Yet even in cases where the draft was viewed as extremely unfair—or, inconsistent with cultural perceptions of the legitimate demands the state could make on citizens—it was still enforced. Similarly, George Flynn argues that there is a division between Anglo-Saxon and French conceptions of military service, but that “despite fundamental differences in culture,” the United States, United Kingdom, and France all used conscription in the twentieth century.

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149 Sanborn, *Drafting the Russian Nation*; Farrell, “World Culture and the Irish Army”; Large, *Germans to the Front*.

150 Levi, *Consent, Dissent, Patriotism*.
For Flynn, as for Levi, national cultures may affect the ease with which a recruitment system can be implemented, but cannot override the preferences of a determined elite.

Indeed, there are often competing cultures within a country, or even within a policymaking elite. Elizabeth Kier’s book on French and British military doctrine, for example, highlights the existence of competing ideas about military recruitment, particularly in France, where the Left and Right had different views on how conscription would contribute to national security. Her argument demonstrates the difficulty of predicting cultural responses to recruitment systems in different states. Anna Leander similarly argues that culture is malleable, and that the use of conscription depends on the ability to frame legitimizing ideologies about the rights and obligations of citizenship. Such cultural factors may determine the legitimacy of the demands the state can make on the population, as well as what is viewed as a legitimate and necessary mobilization strategy for war. This makes them good at explaining continuity in recruitment practices despite new threat environments because culture and institutions are difficult to change. However, changes in recruitment system can be a problem for these explanations: it is difficult to imagine that French notions of egalitarianism were strong in 1995 and had disappeared in 1997, as would be necessary to believe that recruitment systems are tied to domestic ideology. My theory avoids these problems emphasizing the way national

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152 Kier, *Imagining War*.
culture affects the perceptions and interests of the actors who actually make policy at a given place and time.

Finally, states may also use the military to achieve domestic goals besides ideological consistency—most notably, full or high employment. In this way, conscription can enhance domestic security through non-military means by acting as a form of patronage: it can tie a larger portion of the population to the regime by treating the army as a source of employment, by providing people who complete their term of service with certain societal advantages, and by providing cheap labor and other rents to staff officers. By relying on cheap labor through conscription, especially coupled with a smaller military force, the state may also be able to spend more money buying support from the population (through additional social welfare, economic development projects) or the military (through capital-intensive weapons acquisition, which increases military prestige). In Norway, for example, conscription supports the welfare state: it could increase employment by demanding new military bases “in areas that needed the employment offered by auxiliary services” and offering careers for diverse segments of the population. In these cases, the regime is primarily electing for a security strategy that would minimize the likelihood of popular dissent and that may not require the military to be able to perform well in combat roles. However, this also makes sense from a rational choice perspective: the cost of repressing the population and quelling uprisings increases with the size of the opposition expected to revolt.

If states sometimes appear to use conscription to address chronic unemployment,

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155 Graeger and Leira, “Norwegian Strategic Culture.”
how do domestic labor movements affect this relationship? One study argues that states with strong labor movements are more likely to use conscription. Unions, according to this theory, should advocate for conscription because it takes more people out of the labor force, thereby reducing labor competition for current union members.\(^{156}\) While consistent with expectations about how states use recruitment policies to meet employment goals, there are even stronger reasons to believe unions should oppose conscription. Most significantly, the average worker wants to avoid being drafted. This is not merely because of the personal risk it entails in times of war. Even during peacetime, uncertainty over the timing of a draft notice inhibits long-term career and family planning, and disrupts employment when it does come. Thus, policies pertaining to length of service, age of call-up, and exemptions typically aim to make conscription as tolerable as possible to the groups most likely to be affected by it: students and young people who are entering the workforce and starting families.\(^{157}\) In fact, labor support is usually problematic for democratic governments seeking to implement conscription, even during major conflict.\(^{158}\)

While there are diverse arguments about what aspects of cultural and

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\(^{157}\) Geva, *Conscription, Family, and the Modern State*.

organizational practices matter, in what ways, and where they come from, they make little room for foreign actors to affect military recruitment after independence. Thus these theories ignore not only the actors that make important recruitment decisions, but also the process by which those decisions are made.

**B. Military Effectiveness and Recruitment**

Military effectiveness arguments assume that states will adopt the recruitment practice that is most effective given specific military goals. What is the optimal method of recruitment for enhancing a state’s military capabilities? The problem is that there is no immediately obvious prescription for states to follow. Volunteer militaries tend to incur fewer casualties, but this may be due less to any inherent advantage in using volunteers and more to the greater care and efficiency with which states deploy them as a costly resource—characteristics that states using conscript armies could theoretically adopt as well, regardless of cost.\(^{159}\) However, there are good reasons to believe volunteers are also more effective on the battlefield. For one, they tend to be better trained and have higher levels of expertise, due in large part to their ability to serve for longer periods of time.\(^{160}\) They also have higher morale because recruits all serve by choice. This in turn gives them an advantage when it comes to unit cohesion, which many scholars have argued is among the most important components of military effectiveness.\(^{161}\) Conscript

\(^{159}\) Horowitz, Simpson, and Stam, “Domestic Institutions.”

\(^{160}\) In previous military epochs armies based largely on press-ganging could have career-service conscripts who served for decades. However, modern armies must severely limit conscript service terms to avoid removing large portions of the population from economically productive roles. See for example McNeil, *The Pursuit of Power*; Ralston, *Importing the European Army.*

armies are more likely to have lower levels of cohesion, or at least face greater obstacles to achieving cohesion, due to the fact that recruits often have little in common beyond low morale and a shared desire to be doing something else. Thus, the evidence suggests that volunteer armies may be more combat-effective.

On the other hand, many people argue that labor-intensive military strategies—which provide cheaper manpower through conscription—make just as much sense for states facing high levels of external threat. The anticipation of major conflict may lead states to build conscript armies that provide a steady supply of replacements over larger fronts and for longer periods of time. In other words, while volunteer armies may be the more effective choice based on individual or even unit-level performance, states may prefer to respond to the functional imperative by adopting a strategy of attrition, for which conscription may provide a safer, long-term recruitment basis and a deeper defense. The view that conscription increases the chances of state survival is well represented in the existing literature. Scholars have argued that involvement in interstate wars or rivalries, or the perception of potential threats based on geographical


conditions, like the number of states on its borders and the favorability of terrain for defense or isolation, may lead states to use conscription.

These diverse arguments about volunteer and conscript effectiveness have led many scholars to argue that there is no natural advantage to using one or the other. Lindsay Cohn, for example, has shown that volunteer armies in Europe exhibit wide variation in their levels of effectiveness according to the specific personnel policies countries use, which are in turn determined by the domestic economy and labor markets.\textsuperscript{164} Similarly, states can rely on conscripts and volunteers in different numbers and for different missions, which would indicate that “there are no technical or economic imperatives” that would require states to use exclusively one system or the other to be effective.\textsuperscript{165} This can even take the extreme form of dual military establishments, often combining a national conscript service for territorial defense with an ideological militia for regime protection.\textsuperscript{166} As a result, states often come to different conclusions regarding what recruitment strategies are best, even when they face the same functional imperatives.

Even if there is an advantage to using volunteer or conscripts, policymakers may not agree on what that advantage is. Thus, leaders of states in similar threat environments may adopt different recruitment practices because they believe their decisions will create

\textsuperscript{164} Cohn, “Who Will Serve?”
\textsuperscript{166} Mehran Kamrava, “Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East,” Political Science Quarterly 115:1 (2000): 67–92. Further supporting the argument that there are no technical, functional imperatives driving recruitment strategies, dual militaries can equally be designed with a poorly-trained conscript military intended to transform national identity with little military function reinforced by a highly-trained and ideologically-motivated volunteer cadre that can spearhead military operations.
the most effective military. As Alastair Iain Johnston has convincingly demonstrated, the subjective perceptions of policymakers, particularly across distinct historical and cultural contexts, lead to differences in strategic evaluations.\textsuperscript{167} Jeremy Black extends this argument to recruitment specifically, noting that recruitment systems reflect different strategies for or cultures of establishing security more than any operational function.\textsuperscript{168} This is consistent with the argument in this dissertation, which suggests that the preferences and expectations of influential patron states affect military design. Except in the face of existential threats, the pursuit of military effectiveness may lead states to adopt either volunteer or conscript systems.

It may be the case that different national-level characteristics determine an individual state’s optimal recruitment strategy. This view is not well-developed in cross-national research, but is prevalent in many case study accounts of military design. To an extent, it is a logical extension and modification of arguments that describe how technology affects warfighting practices: if volunteer militaries are better adapted to using capital-intensive technologies and strategies, then it makes sense that states seeking to maximize their military effectiveness will use conscription if they lack access to or the ability to take advantage of existing technology. Developments including the rise of expeditionary and coalition-based military operations, occupational trends in military organization, and decreased public support for military spending may lead to convergence on smaller, volunteer forces.\textsuperscript{169} Using volunteers without the necessary capital-intensive resources would be inefficient and less effective.

\textsuperscript{168} Black, “Military Organisations and Military Change in Historical Perspective,” 892.
\textsuperscript{169} Williams and Gilroy, “The Transformation of Personnel Policies.”
Factor endowments are one way to understand how technology affects the efficiency of military design in response to the functional imperative. Alexander Wendt and Michael Barnett note that capital-intensive military organization in the most industrialized countries of the West “makes sense from the standpoint of factor endowments,” but nonetheless poses many challenges and is “almost impossible for the capital-poor states of the Third World.”\(^\text{170}\) Thus, the fact that new, under-developed states pursue inefficient, capital-intensive military practices poses a puzzle. They argue that this is due in part to the fact that the international environment in which they exist is less competitive, dampening or changing the focus of military design to internal security.

Other ways to explain the technological role in the functional imperative are based in specific aspects of social and economic development. For example, scholars have argued that conscription requires larger populations and higher levels of education, or greater gender imbalances.\(^\text{171}\) Others focus on a more general administrative capacity as a necessity for conscription. Sometimes, this refers to the coercive aspects of conscription, underscoring the extent to which it requires the state to have greater levels of centralization and a well-developed bureaucracy. Mulligan and Shliefer identify several ways in which conscription has higher fixed costs than volunteer systems such as by requiring: “deriving algorithms for enumerating the population subject to the draft, setting up and staffing offices throughout the country to administer the draft, verifying qualifications for exemptions, including medical ones, establishing institutions specializing in catching draft dodgers, and policing the system itself to assure fairness

and avoid corruption.” Similarly, Hillel Soifer argues that systematic and legalized conscription emerged among Latin American states that employed more effective bureaucratic policies. Without this greater coercive capacity, colonial officials were unable to implement conscription successfully. For others, state capacity provides necessary political stability. Amos Perlmutter writes that “public authority must be stable in order to pursue consistent educational policies and to keep alive the popular will to participate in state-sponsored activities, including the military.” Legitimacy is commonly cited as the most important component of capacity and stability. Without legitimacy, states have too much reason to fear opposition and rebellion in response to conscription: any efforts to institute conscription would by necessity be short-lived. It provides a valuable resources states need for coercing their citizens into military service.

However, these supply-side explanations of when states use conscription are insufficient. Their major shortcoming is their failure to consider demand-side considerations. They assume that states that can implement conscription will want to do so, without addressing the purpose of conscription. They also imply that states are more likely to conscript when they have the resources to do it successfully. However, there are many examples, particularly outside of Europe, where state-building rulers instituted conscription despite their weak legitimacy, underdeveloped economies, and unqualified...
It is difficult to imagine a more challenging environment in which to implement conscription than Afghanistan in the 1880s or Iraq in the 1930s, yet the governments in each of these states tried to nonetheless. In many cases, universal conscription was actually viewed as the remedy for low literacy and poor development; the army was to be a school for the nation in both ideology and basic education. Such attempts vary in their success, but they nearly universally experience initial extensive opposition, often resulting in high levels of desertion or even rebellion. While economic development likely facilitated the ease with which rulers could enforce conscription, there is no evidence to suggest that states only implement conscription where they consider it feasible. In short, we should not expect that states will adopt the most efficient military design, any more than we would expect them to adopt other institutions based on optimal efficiency.

V. Conclusion

To sum up, existing literature has expected recruitment policies to be determined primarily by domestic factors. One school of thought argues that domestic politics and ideology exert the greatest impact on recruitment, while another maintains that how states

view their recruitment system will allow them to face certain threats. I argue that both sets of explanations overlook the path-dependent process by which new states design their militaries. As a result, they omit the important role that foreign patrons often play in influencing military design in new states. Thus, I make two arguments. First, I argue that when new states have a foreign patron they will emulate its recruitment practices. Second, I argue threat matters when there is no patron, because policymakers continue to believe that conscription is the best way to secure their territory when they face large threats and have no external patron. This demonstrates that hierarchical relationships between states play out in the realm of military policy, despite the fact that this has traditionally been viewed as a bastion of national autonomy.
CHAPTER 3: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

This chapter uses original cross-sectional data to test the hypotheses about military recruitment preferences that I generated in the previous chapter: specifically, that the presence of foreign military intervention and threat environments predict whether states design militaries based on conscripts or volunteers. The quantitative analysis in this chapter tests this theory by isolating cases in which states make military recruitment decisions after their independence or other major changes in their domestic political regimes—what I refer to for shorthand as new states. Formally, my hypotheses state that:

H1: New states influenced by conscript-patrons should be more likely to recruit conscripts than volunteers.

H2: New states influenced by volunteer-patrons should be more likely to recruit volunteers than conscripts.

H3: Threat environment should have a greater effect on states without a foreign patron than on states that have either a volunteer-patron or a conscript-patron.

H4: New states without a foreign patron should be more likely to recruit conscripts than to recruit volunteers if they face a dangerous (high external) threat environment than if they face a permissive (low external) threat environment.

The results presented in this chapter demonstrate that, as predicted, the influence of foreign actors after independence has an important effect on new state military design that is exerted through pathways of professional emulation. First, the results show that patron-state influence affects military design even when models account for a new state’s
colonial legacy. States tend to emulate the practices of their patrons, especially when their patron uses conscription. Second, this effect does not depend on the threat environment; in other words, patron states support the adoption of their own practices regardless of how threatening the international security environment is. Third, dangerous external threat environments lead states to adopt conscription when they do not have a patron.

In addition, the results demonstrate several more findings beyond those that I hypothesized. First, despite changing technological and economic conditions that others have suggested should have a determinative effect on recruitment practices, the findings in this chapter show that the causes of recruitment do not statistically vary in the period under examination. Second, both internal and external threats affect military design under certain conditions. Finally, while existing research has pointed to unique characteristics of the British volunteer tradition as motivating states to adopt volunteer militaries, this chapter finds little support for this effect.

I. Research Design

The unit of analysis in this chapter is universe of new states created since 1918. New states are states that have recently undergone major changes in their domestic political regimes; there is little or no continuity between new states and the political entities that controlled their territory the previous year. The most obvious examples of new states are those that, having recently been a colony, recently gained independence and are entering the international system for the first time, or those that recently seceded from another state.
However, this is not the only situation in which states are likely to completely redesign their political institutions. Thus, my universe of cases includes two additional types of cases in which states’ domestic politics should have changed substantially enough to demand and allow the redesign of military institutions. Such major changes in domestic politics makes these types of cases comparable to new states that recently gained independence for the purpose of testing my theory.\footnote{My statistical results lose significance when I include a dummy variable for civil war states, but that variable is not statistically significant (see Robustness Tests, later in this chapter).} First, I included cases of social revolution based on Goodwin’s description of a social revolution as entailing “a significant change in the control and organization of state power.”\footnote{Jeff Goodwin, \textit{No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945–1991} (Cambridge University Press, 2001), 11; Jeff Carter, Michael Bernhard, and Glenn Palmer, “Social Revolution, the States, and War: How Revolutions Affect War-Making Capacity and Interstate War Outcomes,” \textit{Journal of Conflict Resolution} 56 (2012): 439–466. The only case I excluded from Goodwin’s list after 1918 was Vietnam, since its social revolution occurred before its independence and when France was still in control.} Second, civil war termination can constitute an important period for the reorganization of security institutions.\footnote{Heiner Hänggi, “Conceptualising Security Sector Reform and Reconstruction,” in \textit{Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector}, edited by Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi, 1–11 (DCAF Yearly Books: 2004); Katherine Glassmyer and Nicholas Sambanis, “Rebel-Military Integration and Civil War Termination,” \textit{Journal of Peace Research} 45 (2008): 365–384.} Post-conflict reconstruction may include a formal process of security sector reform, or bring new actors to power who want to use their own armies. Even if neither of these is the case or the incumbent remains in power, internal conflict can create incentives to restructure existing institutions and may lead to changes in military practices. Thus, I also included cases of civil wars that ended in rebel victory or negotiated settlement, since these forms of conflict termination are most likely to create similar conditions to those that define my other observations. These are the most drastic types of changes in domestic institutions and thus are most comparable to new states.
Indeed, 8 out of 68 of the cases that were not cases that entered my dataset through their membership in the ICOW dataset change their recruitment system within two years after the year of the critical juncture. Since a critical juncture does not require that a state changes its recruitment system, merely that the opportunity to do so is greatly increased, the higher rate of change for these cases indicates that they are also likely to be a critical juncture.

In total, the dataset includes 224 observations of new state creation since 1918. The baseline criterion used to populate the dataset was the existence of an observation in the Issues Correlates of War (ICOW) Colonial History dataset with an independence date of 1918 or later. This constitutes 141 observations, which represent a state’s first entrance into the international system. This dataset defines and dates independence according to when a state gains de facto control of its own foreign policy. This definition better captures the assumption that independence creates institutional freedom in military design compared to the Correlates of War (COW) State Membership dataset, which adopts a more formal definition based on international recognition and population size.

There are in fact few differences between these two datasets during the period under examination. COW includes additional observations because it permits states to enter and exit the system multiple times, in accordance with the loss of sovereignty due to conquest or occupation. For example, France enters the COW dataset at the end of the period of German occupation, in 1944, while the Baltic countries each appear twice in the dataset, at their independence in 1918 and again after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. To supplement the 141 cases in the ICOW dataset, I added to the dataset 22 COW

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observations that were originally excluded from ICOW on the basis of being the reentry of a prior state whose international system membership was interrupted.\footnote{See Appendix B for a list of these cases. After this addition, there are only 15 additional cases of state creation included in COW that are excluded from ICOW. However, these appear to be cases in which states already had independence and sovereignty before 1918 but that enter COW’s dataset after this date for idiosyncratic reasons. Therefore, I excluded them from my analysis. Of the 141 observations of state creation that ICOW and COW share, the years of independence only differ in 19 instances, and only 13 of these differ by more than one year. I adopted the ICOW independence date in all cases but two: For East and West Germany, I used the COW independence dates of 1954 and 1955, rather than the ICOW dates of 1949, because these reflect the formal end of their occupation and legal attainment of full sovereignty.} This adds new states as diverse as post-liberation France in 1944, Morocco in 1956, and reunified Germany in 1990. I also included Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) after the US-led invasions as instances of state creation; although their institutions—including the military—were built essentially from the ground up, they were not in the other datasets I used to populate my own. Finally, there are 12 cases of Goodwin’s social revolution that were not already in my dataset, as well as 47 cases from the COW Intra-State Wars dataset that ended in rebel victory or negotiated settlements. Observations in the dataset are distinguished by the name of the state and the year of its creation.

While in principle my argument should be able to explain recruitment decisions in a given state at any point in time, I limited my empirical tests to new states starting in the year 1918 for both practical and methodological reasons. My use of novel independent variables made data collection a time-consuming enterprise. Acquiring reliable measures for all country-years in the period I examine was not a feasible undertaking and will have to wait to be completed in a future project. Concerns about data availability, reliability, and comparability—especially for data on state capacity—also led me to use 1918 as the cut-off point for my quantitative tests.
In addition, there are methodological reasons to focus on the initial period of military design rather than recruitment at any point in time for a given state. Even if data were available for all country-years, recruitment systems create institutional dependencies that make them difficult to change once they are well established. As a result, the values for the dependent variable would be serially correlated, resulting in severely suppressed standard errors. Other studies have nonetheless attempted to explain recruitment choices in any country-year through time-series analysis by using various strategies to address temporal dependence of their dependent variable values, including lagged dependent variables, count variables to control for the consecutive years a state has used the same recruitment system, time-period average values for the dependent variable, extrapolating from or averaging across regression results from individual years, or country-fixed effects. However, because my theory is primarily about how new states make decisions, none of these alternative approaches is appropriate. Given the extensive findings about recruitment’s path dependence, I am less interested in explaining how states make decisions long after independence, which is more likely to be determined by factors that enable military change more generally. My approach, while reducing the number of observations, circumvents the problem of serial correlation by examining the factors that lead states to adopt initial recruitment systems. Thus, my empirical strategy identifies the conditions that lead states to start down certain self-

reinforcing paths of military recruitment policies. It also permits me to test an argument specific to new states, which make decisions in a distinct institutional context compared to states with more developed institutions.

II. Dependent Variable

The dependent variable in this chapter measures whether a new state developed a military that used conscripts or volunteers. I updated and revised existing data on conscription from Horowitz, Simpson, and Stam (2011) and Nathan Toronto’s Military Recruitment Dataset.\(^{185}\) I followed their coding rules, which treats conscription as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when a state uses any form of a draft to recruit any quantity of its military personnel and zero otherwise. I discuss the reasons for examining conscription as a dichotomous variable in Chapter 1. To summarize, however, the difference between conscription and volunteerism remains an important one that affects other aspects of military design and other sociopolitical outcomes of interest.

My revisions relied on three types of source material whenever possible to verify the coding of these datasets. First, I referenced some of the sources that these datasets used for their coding to verify their accuracy. This included John Keegan’s *World Armies* (1983), as well as documentation from War Resisters’ International (WRI), an international non-profit organization that has periodically published information about military recruitment policies, with a particular focus on conscientious objection.

policies.\textsuperscript{186} The WRI-published \textit{Conscription: A World Survey: Compulsory Military Service and Resistance to It}, by Devi Prasad and Tony Smythe (1968), as well as a more recent survey of country conscription policies found on their website, are the two sources that are most commonly referenced in the quantitative study of conscription.\textsuperscript{187} Second, I referred to the U.S. Library of Congress’s Country Studies, whenever available. Finally, I often resorted to additional secondary source case studies, especially when Toronto and Horowitz et al.’s codings differed from each other.\textsuperscript{188}

Because this chapter seeks to explain choices about military design, and it often takes time to establish sufficient control to evaluate defense policies military needs, it is important to make sure the dependent variable coding actually represents the recruitment policies that a new state uses. Therefore, the coding allows for a grace period of two years after the year of independence in which states could finalize their recruitment system. There was insufficient data to code the value of the dependent variable in 19 cases, limiting the dataset to 205 observations.\textsuperscript{189}


\textsuperscript{187} Toronto, “Military Recruitment Dataset; Choi and James, “No Professional Soldiers”; Pickering, “Dangerous Drafts.”

\textsuperscript{188} The vast majority of these differences were instances in which Toronto coded data as missing.

\textsuperscript{189} Most of these lost observations are small island nations, with the exception of North Yemen (1918), Lebanon (1943), Bhutan (1947), Benin (1960), Equatorial Guinea (1968), and Guinea-Bissau (1974). For a complete list, see Table 3A.1, in the Appendix. While the recruitment decisions in individual micro-nations can seem puzzling and are interesting in and of themselves—what purpose might conscription serve in the Seychelles, for example?—they should offer little explanatory power in terms of the broader phenomenon of military design in states where the military has more than symbolic value.
This coding scheme minimizes the risk of mischaracterizing a country, for example, as using volunteers when strategic or ideological realignment in the first year of its independence led it to institute conscription the following year and it never changed its recruitment policy after that.\textsuperscript{190} For example, West Germany is coded as using volunteers in its first year of independence. However, policymakers enacted conscription in 1956, the year after independence, and never changed its recruitment again. Characterizing West Germany as a volunteer state because of its original recruitment choice would have been highly misleading.

As can be seen in Table 3.1, new states’ choice of recruitment system after two years is split almost exactly equally between conscription (105, or 51\% of cases) and volunteer (100, or 49\% of cases) across all instances of state creation in my dataset. This proportion is similar regardless of whether I allow no grace period for military reorganization in new regimes (106 states chose volunteer versus 99 that chose conscript) or a five-year grace period (100 chose volunteer versus 105 chose conscript). The same is true among cases that meet different definitions of state creation, as can be seen in Table 3.2. Among those cases that that meet the ICOW definition for initial state independence, 55 percent (67 cases) adopted volunteer recruitment compared to 45 percent (55) that

\textsuperscript{190} Decisions regarding the timing of such a cutoff inevitably entail some degree of arbitrariness. However, robustness checks show that alternative cutoff periods do not change my results. While my analyses included multiple dependent variable codings for different assumed grace periods, the exact length of time is ultimately not important, as changes in recruitment policy are uncommon overall. Of the 54 observations of state creation in my dataset that change recruitment practices, 11 of these make changes in the first two years after their independence, and 7 more change in the first five. Moreover, recruitment changes that happen early—in the first five years after independence—seem to result in more stable recruitment compared to changes that happen later. Only one state that changed in its first two years changed its recruitment again after that, and only three of the 18 states that changed in their first five years made further changes. This is in comparison to 9 states that made multiple changes out of 36 that changed their recruitment for the first time after the first five years.
adopted conscription. This gap narrows even further to 50 percent each, or 72 out of 144 total, when COW’s states that reentered the system after membership interruptions are included. The 47 post-civil war states included in the sample also exhibit nearly equal variation, with 23 of them electing to use only volunteers compared to 24 that employed conscription. The distribution of values for the dependent variable is roughly the same when I expand the dataset to include these cases. We should not expect the post-civil war or post-revolution cases to change the results.

Table 3.1: Variation in Recruitment at Different Times after Independence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Year of Independence</th>
<th>2 Years After Independence</th>
<th>5 Years After Independence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>106 (51.7%)</td>
<td>100 (48.8%)</td>
<td>100 (48.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscription</td>
<td>99 (48.3%)</td>
<td>105 (51.2%)</td>
<td>105 (51.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>205 (100)</td>
<td>205 (100)</td>
<td>205 (100)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.2: Variation in Recruitment Among Different Types of New States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All New States</th>
<th>Post-Independence States</th>
<th>Post-Civil War States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>100 (48.8%)</td>
<td>67 (54.9%)</td>
<td>23 (48.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscription</td>
<td>105 (51.2%)</td>
<td>55 (45.1%)</td>
<td>24 (51.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>205 (100)</td>
<td>122 (100%)</td>
<td>47 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

III. Independent Variables

Given the theoretical focus on how foreign intervention influences state design of militaries, a key task involves capturing whether a foreign state controls or exerts a determinative effect on security policies in new states. There are many challenges to identifying the actor (or set of actors) who has the greatest influence on policy.

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191 19 observations are missing.
192 Confirmation can be seen in the Robustness Checks section later in chapter.
decisions. For example, it may not be necessary for a patron state to overtly pressure the emulation of certain military policies because the client knows its patron’s support is contingent on its adopting the right practices. Thus, in many cases identifying whether there is in fact a foreign influence on military practices is best left to in-depth qualitative analysis, as undertaken in the coming case study chapters. The key obstacle to obtaining a definitive indicator of foreign control over military design is that the level of intervention needed to affect a new state’s security policies depends on a variety of circumstances in both the patron and client state. How important is the client to the patron’s interests? How much do their interests overlap? What are the competing domestic and international agendas that may limit available resources for projecting power?

Patrons must consider these questions when they weigh the likelihood of successfully influencing policy against the potential strategic payoffs or losses given limited resources. Thus, patrons may be able to achieve strategic goals with minimal resources—for example, a small military advisory mission or weapons transfers—in particularly weak new states with friendly domestic populations. However, patrons may require a more resource-intensive strategy involving forward-deployed troops and extensive training operations if a new state is viewed as strategically vital but resistant to outside interference in its affairs. In some cases, patrons may view the potential security payoffs of contributing such costly military design interventions as necessary. In other situations, potential patrons may decide the level of intervention necessary for policy success is not worth the trouble it could cause at home or in the new state. This could be because the security payoff is not high enough, the risks are too high, or there are

alternative client states that offer similar security advantages in the vicinity. The effects of these considerations on the likelihood of patronage can be seen in Table 3.3, below.

Table 3.3: Patterns of Patronage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Not Strategically Important</th>
<th>Strategically Important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No Foreign Patronage</td>
<td>Low/Medium Levels of Patronage if costs sufficiently low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Receptive to Influence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receptive to Influence</td>
<td>Low/Medium Levels of Patronage if costs sufficiently low</td>
<td>High Levels of Patronage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The preceding discussion demonstrates plausible variation in strategies of patron-client control. Preferred methods of influence change depending on preferred goals and available resources both across patrons and for individual patrons over time. In his study of U.S. military assistance, for example, William Mott describes how US preferences for securing its interests throughout the Cold War emphasized arms sales, military training, and military guarantees at varying times and in varying regions.194 Similarly, patrons often “develop strategies of force projection and crisis response” outside of “purely military solutions” such as troop deployments to minimize risks of escalation.195

A. Foreign Patronage

While military patronage is difficult to measure, it is possible to identify policy practices that are highly likely to be correlated with or indicate control or influence over military policy. Therefore, I collected original data that measure the tools foreign powers may use to influence military design in new states, which became my variables

measuring the presence and nature of military patronage. As described in Chapter 2, a defining feature of patron-client relationships is the provision of goods—in particular, security assistance—to the client state. Thus, a measure of patronage should capture whether a strong state provides certain goods to a client that can improve the client’s security situation. Patrons use a variety of methods to influence defense and military policy in client states. I identified the presence of military advisory missions, seconded or contract officers, and troop deployments as the three factors that suggest a foreign power is influencing a new state’s military. Below, I explain why I chose each of these factors. I coded each of these factors based on publicly available government assessments, official background documents, and historical accounts focusing on new states’ independence and the history of their armed forces.

The first method of military control I looked for, and arguably the most obvious or effective method, is the presence of troop deployments. This can have a particularly powerful influence through the implicit or explicit threat of withdrawal or aggression, because external forces are often helpful for helping regimes stay in power in the face of internal or external threats. Consequently, overseas troop deployments are frequently used as an indicator of hierarchical, patron-client relations. David Lake, for example, uses deployments as an indicator of hierarchy, arguing that American troop deployments in South Korea, West Germany, and Japan in the early years of the Cold War gave the

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196 See Appendix A for a list of sources used to code the foreign patronage variables.

United States some control over those countries’ security policies.198

These troops can affect an array of policies in both combat and noncombat situations, including economic development, human rights, and foreign policy.199 While troop deployments are important tools for influencing policy, it would be insufficient to rely solely on this as an indicator. Not only would this limit military influence to those great powers with sufficiently global force projection capabilities, but it is also the case that patrons may view troop deployment as overkill: sufficient influence might be achieved with tools that are cheaper and less likely to risk unnecessary escalation.

Therefore, I also looked for additional indicators of foreign military influence. The second indicator that the existing literature identifies is the presence of foreign military training missions. These missions allow great powers to reach a large proportion of the target country’s troops—as opposed to military exchange or education programs that provide for smaller numbers of officers to travel to a patron state for training—and thus have a greater influence on whether states successfully adopt new military doctrines.200 While often difficult to identify and highly secretive by nature, there is a nascent literature exploring the role of American military education and advisory

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198 Lake, *Hierarchy*, 68.
programs on politics in other beneficiary states.\textsuperscript{201} Much of this emphasizes the most public of these programs, the American International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. However, IMET brings foreign military officers to the United States for training—and thus would not be expansive enough based on my coding rules, following Ryan Grauer’s definition of a foreign military mission, in which a state sends:

“a group of officers to serve as trainers, instructors, and advisors….well versed in the military state of the art, [and] are then afforded varying levels of power and influence in the contracting state’s armed forces. Often, members of the mission are assigned to faculty and administrative posts in military educational institutions. Others advise field- and high-level commanders. Still others may act as consultants to the political elite and suggest national-level reforms that might bolster the state’s military capability.”\textsuperscript{202}

Modern examples are common in post-conflict construction and security sector reform, include the United Kingdom-led IMATT effort in Sierra Leone. Similarly, military missions like that under British Major General Stephen Butler following Ethiopia’s independence in 1941 demonstrated an important commitment from the United Kingdom by providing finance, training, and equipment for the Ethiopian army and placing British


\textsuperscript{202} Grauer, “Moderating Diffusion,” 277
officers in all battalions.²⁰³

I also code influence along this dimension as a 1 if a private military corporation (PMC) based in another country plays a significant role in the new state’s security sector reform. This makes sense given the importance of emulation as a potential avenue of indirect influence for my argument. Members of a PMC are often veterans of the country in which the company is based. Therefore they are likely to have internalized many of the same military practices as would trainers who are still active in a patron country’s military. The only case where this coding decision changes the outcome of the variable is Liberia’s post-conflict security sector reform project in 2003, in which the predominantly U.S.-veteran manned DynCorp mission provided both trainers and the American contingent of peacekeepers—though the United States had a role in determining the vetting process for recruits.²⁰⁴ The influence of the PMC in this case is comparable to that of the ex-British soldiers and officers who took on contracts as private individuals in Jordan’s army in the 1940s and 1950s, whose relationship to British policy preferences can only be described as independent in the most technical sense of the word.²⁰⁵

Another case in which PMCs mattered was during the security sector reform

²⁰⁴ International Crisis Group, *Liberia: Uneven Progress in Security Sector Reform*. Africa Report No.148 (January 13, 2009); Sean McFate, *Building Better Armies: An Insider’s Account of Liberia* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Study Institute and US Army War College Press, 2013), 43–45; Adedeji Ebo, “Local Ownership and Emerging Trends in SSR: A Case Study of Outsourcing in Liberia,” in *Local Ownership and Security Sector Reform*, edited by Timothy Donais, 149–168 (Geneva: DCAF 2008), 155. While it is possible that there are other cases in which foreign influence primarily be exerted through private individuals due to the lack of transparency that characterizes many countries’ relationships with PMCs, Liberia in 2003 is the only case in which it was clear that a primary patron relied almost exclusively on PMCs. See Singer, *Corporate Warriors*.
²⁰⁵ See Chapter 4.
process that followed the Bicesse Accords in Angola. Executive Outcomes provided
advising and training for the newly united Angolan Armed Forces beginning in early
1993. However, because veterans came from multiple countries—South Africa,
Namibia, and Angola—the influence from Executive Outcomes does not clearly reflect
the experience of a single country’s military tradition, and so it was coded as having no
patron.

Third, numerous case studies demonstrate that the presence of seconded or
independently contracted officers can also permit foreign powers extensive influence,
since they may have formal or informal loyalties to their home state. Such forms of
control are often part and parcel of larger military advisory missions, as in the above
example of the British mission to Ethiopia. In these cases, it may be difficult to
distinguish between whether foreign officers are acting in an advisory or leadership role.

For example, after Chad’s independence, hundreds of French troops stayed in the country
as advisors, but many also served as commissioned and noncommissioned officers in the
small Chadian armed forces. Military missions can also be so large and so important to
the client state that their leader effectively—or occasionally, even de jure—assumes
command of all the new state’s armed forces. Conversely, a single military figure
contracted to lead the development of a new state’s army may be all that is necessary to
establish effective control. Some combination of these different methods of assigning
foreigners to combat leadership roles—as opposed to merely a training capacity—has

Macmillan 2011), 114.
207 A.F. Mullins, Born Arming: Development and Military Power in New States (Stanford
University Press, 1987); David Wood, Armed Forces of African States (London: Institute for
Strategic Studies, 1966).
been used frequently in post-colonial settings to continue patterns of dominance.208 Allan Millett, for example, lists the following foreign figures who led military reform efforts, many of which are included in my dataset’s scope conditions:


Whether through taking command positions in combat units or developing militaries from scratch, the presence of foreigners in new states’ militaries is an important indicator of outside control. Often it is difficult from historical records, especially of smaller states, to establish the activities with which military figures were primarily tasked. In either case, though, these advisors and officers likely brought their own biases, preferences, and organizational practices with them to their new roles and the institutions to which they were assigned, as happened with John Bagot Glubb in Jordan (see Chapter 4).

As described above, no single measure can adequately capture a foreign power’s intervention in domestic policy in all cases. Therefore, I coded foreign influence as a 1

wherever one of these factors was present, and zero otherwise.\textsuperscript{210} Data on these measures of foreign influence in the first few years after independence was available in 205 observations, with some form of foreign influence present in 65 percent of all cases (146 out of 224 total cases). Of these, 115 new states had either foreign trainers or seconded officers—only nine cases had seconded officers but no trainers. 87 new states were created with foreign troops on their soil, and in 34 of these cases no foreign military advisory or training mission accompanied those troops. The constituent elements of the foreign influence variable and the frequency of their use over the period analyzed by this dissertation can be seen in Tables 3.4 and 3.5.

\textbf{Table 3.4: Percent of New States Experiencing Different Types of Foreign Influence (number in parentheses)}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Foreign Trainers</th>
<th>Seconded Officers</th>
<th>Deployed Troops</th>
<th>Any Foreign Influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Cold War</td>
<td>39.4% (13)</td>
<td>9.1% (3)</td>
<td>39.4% (13)</td>
<td>63.6% (21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>59.7% (71)</td>
<td>32.4% (36)</td>
<td>33.6% (40)</td>
<td>65.9% (89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Cold War</td>
<td>41.5% (22)</td>
<td>15.1% (8)</td>
<td>64.2% (34)</td>
<td>64.3% (36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\textbf{Total}</td>
<td>\textbf{47.3% (106)}</td>
<td>\textbf{21.0% (47)}</td>
<td>\textbf{38.8% (87)}</td>
<td>\textbf{65.2% (146)}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The next step to creating the independent variable was identifying the patron country for each instance of foreign influence and whether that country used volunteers or conscripts at the time of the new state’s independence. Thus, new states influenced by the United Kingdom were coded as having been influenced by a conscript state during the period of the United Kingdom’s National Service, from 1939–1957, as were states

\textsuperscript{210} Results are similar when this variable uses only at troop deployments or only foreign trainers/seconded officers together. In models without the interaction terms, the foreign influence variables are not statistically significant at the .05 level, though the substantive effect is still in the predicted direction. Interestingly, volunteer influence is closer to statistical significance in some specifications.
influenced by the United States when it used conscription.\textsuperscript{211} In most cases identifying the primary military influence on a new state was straightforward: one country was the sole or clearly lead influence on all dimensions of foreign influence. However, coding was more complex when there was more than one patron country exerting military influence. Such efforts by multiple patrons were noticeable in 14 cases. For these cases, I was guided in my coding by the logic used in datasets that code colonial influence: I looked for evidence of which potential patron had the largest and most influential effect on military design.\textsuperscript{212}

**Table 3.5: Number and Type of Foreign Influence Strategies Across States**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Only One Type</th>
<th>Only Trainers</th>
<th>Only Officers</th>
<th>Only Troops</th>
<th>Only One Type</th>
<th>74 (33%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>37 (17%)</td>
<td>6 (3%)</td>
<td>31 (14%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Types</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Only Two Types</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trainers and Officers</td>
<td>16 (7%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50 (22%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trainers and Troops</td>
<td>31 (14%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers and Troops</td>
<td>3 (1%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Three Types</td>
<td>Trainers, Officers, and Troops</td>
<td>22 (10%)</td>
<td></td>
<td>22 (10%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Influence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>146 (65%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For example, Uganda was influenced by both Israel and the United Kingdom at the time of its 1962 independence. Deciding which of these potential patrons had the greatest effect on Ugandan military design is particularly important because their

\textsuperscript{211} The UK continued to conscript in small numbers through 1960, though the number sharply dropped off after the 1957 formal decision to end conscription. It makes most sense to code preferences as changing when formal decisions made, although policy implementation often lags by several years. In this case, it only affects the coding of Ghana (1957), Malaysia (1957), and Nigeria (1960). For more on UK National Service, see Richard Vinen, *National Service: A Generation in Uniform, 1945–1963* (United Kingdom: Penguin Books, 2015).

\textsuperscript{212} See for example, Paul Hensel, 2014, “ICOW Colonial History Data Set, version 1.0” codebook.
organizational preferences were opposite: while Israelis used conscripts, the United Kingdom had decided to return to its traditional system of volunteers several years earlier. Available sources show that the post-independence army was still largely under British command—including the position of army commander—during a period in which there were only two native lieutenants. Meanwhile, Israeli influence was secondary—while Israel seconded fifty instructors to Uganda, they appear to have focused on pilots, artillery, and paratroopers, rather than the main forces. Thus, I coded Uganda as experiencing influence primarily from a volunteer-recruiting patron—the United Kingdom—at independence.

Conversely, Lithuania had a strong Russian influence in the first two years after its independence in 1991, but by August 1993 Russian troops had withdrawn and Lithuania had replaced them with more NATO contacts, including a small American military advisory team. In this case, the early Russian influence seemed most formative. Training courses continued to be taught primarily by former Soviet officers, and many former Soviet officers joined Lithuania’s armed forces. The small size of the American mission (four members) seemed intended to reinforce a local preference for the existing conscript-influence on Lithuanian military design, as it consisted of selective service specialists. Thus, I coded Lithuania’s 1991 experience of state creation as occurring under influence of a patron using conscription.213

Similarly, I coded cases in which the only foreign influence on any of the three constituent influence measures was from an international organization like the UN or NATO as having no foreign influence, because it is unlikely that such diverse

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213 Non-interactive hypothesis results are robust to coding Lithuania as volunteer, while the conscript influence and threat interaction is significant at a 0.1 level.
multinational actors would be able to exert unified pressures on military design. As Michel Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis write, “multilateral peacebuilding, because of its impartial character will not be the choice that states that seek unilateral advantages will choose. It is not the favored means to impose neo-imperial clients, acquire military bases or garner economic concessions.”214 The competing interests within multilateral missions makes it more difficult for the client state to emulate a single set of practices.

For example, the UN peacekeeping mission in Burundi after the settlement of its civil war in 2003 was tasked with creating an integrated national defense force. Ethiopia, Mozambique, and South Africa were all key contributing nations, and it is not immediately clear that the experience of one country would dominate military reform. In many such missions, the contributors also frequently change, further complicating the identification of a primary influencer. The 1992 UNPROFOR deployment in Macedonia, for example, was first supplied by a dispatch of 500 Canadians—a volunteer country—in January 1993. They were withdrawn in February to be replaced by a 700-strong Nordic battalion, which was in turn supplemented by several hundred American infantrymen in July.215 One case I examine in detail, Bosnia and Herzegovina, is coded as having no foreign military influence at independence, despite extensive international involvement in statebuilding there. This is an issue I address further in Chapter 6. However, the diverse interests of actors that were involved as a result of the international nature of military patronage in this case reflects my broader logic for not coding international organizations as having a clear influence on recruitment practices. In total, there were only 15 cases in

which a multinational institution was the primary influencer on one of the dimensions of foreign influence. However, as can be seen in Appendix B, tests using alternative codings for cases of multinational institution influence do not change the results.

The coding process above resulted in a trichotomous, categorical independent variable that coded separate categories if a new state had a primary patron that used volunteers, if it used conscripts, and if there was no military patron or no clear influence. This captures the fact that volunteer influence is expected to decrease the likelihood of conscription (and increase the likelihood of using volunteers) to the same extent as conscript influence is likely to increase the probability that a new state will use conscripts. The absence of foreign influence serves as a reference category for which there is no expected effect on a new state’s military recruitment practices. However, to aid with the interpretation of interactive hypotheses I transformed this variable into two dichotomous variables, coded 1 in the presence of volunteer influence or conscript influence, respectively.

Of the 205 cases for which I was able to gather data on foreign military influences, roughly 20 percent have volunteer influence, 36 percent have no influence, and 44 percent have conscript influence, for a total of 131 foreign-influenced new states. This variation is nearly identical if post-civil war state creation is dropped from the sample, with a breakdown of 20 percent volunteer, 31 percent no influence, and 49 percent conscript influence. The four most common influencers constituting the patron state in 85 percent of states experiencing foreign influence: the United Kingdom (34), Russia (28), the United States (27) and France (22).
B. Threat Variables

According to my theory, another key variable is the extent to which policymakers in the new state perceive major external threats. Threat perception is inherently subjective. Leaders prioritize threats differently depending on their ideology and cognitive biases, so that something that is perceived as highly threatening to the leaders of one state may be benign to others. Fortunately, my theory expects only certain types of threats to have a clear effect on conscription. It is only necessary to distinguish major, external, land-based threats from other types of threat, since these are the only types of threat that should create clear and overriding incentives to conscript their military personnel. Furthermore, there are many existing variables that political scientists use to identify such major threats for cross-national analysis. I employ several of these variables to proxy for potentially-existential threats that are likely to create pressures toward conscription.

First, one way to directly measure a new state’s threat perceptions is its number of contiguous land borders. This measure captures a broader, more accurate conceptualization of external threats compared to the actual existence of conflict at independence. However, it has also repeatedly been linked to interstate conflict, and so also constitutes an appropriate proxy variable.216 This variable represents a similar argument to Eliot Cohen’s speculation that land border length is “perhaps the best (if crudest) predictor” of whether [states] will use conscription.”217 In other words, the more

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217 Cohen, Citizens and Soldiers, 25
land neighbors a state has, the more likely it is to have territorial disputes that can escalate or enemies that may threaten it.

Another way to measure threat is the number of militarized interstate disputes it is involved in at the time of its independence. MIDs data codes any instance in which states threaten or use military force against each other. Because MIDs include shows of force that fall short of war, it provides a more complete conceptualization of threat environments than a variable that only counts major open war—a relatively rare occurrence. In addition, MIDs data includes descriptions of the severity of individual disputes, ranging from “no militarized action” to “war.” This allows for the coding of alternative measures of threat environments that only count disputes that are the most likely to require the type of major military preparations provided by conscription.

I created a threat measure that is coded 1 if the state was involved in any MIDs in the first two years after a state’s independence—to match the threshold I used for identifying finalized recruitment policies—and zero otherwise. The inclusion of MIDs after the year of independence means my threat variables may include disputes that occur after some states made their initial military decisions. However, post-independence MIDs should still lead to accurate threat codings. Militarized interstate disputes do not arise from nowhere, and so will generally be the culmination of prior conflictual and threatening relationships. However, the longer the post-independence time period for which my threat variables count MIDs, the more likely it is that the variables will include disputes that are unforeseeable at the time of independence and military design. While I also examine alternative codings that allow for longer time-horizons, I assume that new

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218 Results are robust to using alternative MIDs time periods (see the Appendix).
states will be most concerned with—and better able to predict—threats the closer they are to the year of independence.

**C. Alternative Hypotheses**

The main hypothesis competing with my theory is that domestic politics, through local culture, ideology or previous experiences, has the biggest effect on recruitment practices. In other words, critics would contend that foreign influence after independence should have no effect on recruitment after controlling for historical experiences favoring or disfavoring conscription. Rather than contemporary influence from foreign patrons affecting military recruitment, events from before independence matter most. I control for these arguments in two ways. First, following previous studies of conscription I include dichotomous variables of a new state’s colonial legacy based on Paul Hensel’s Colonial History dataset. This approach uses dummy variables to identify whether a state’s primary colonial/pre-independence power was either the United Kingdom, France, Russia, or Turkey/the Ottoman Empire.

While including these dummy variables allows me to test the effects of specific colonizers, I also created and tested models using a separate dichotomous colonial history variable. This second approach measures whether a new state’s most important prior colonial power traditionally used volunteers, with a coding of one indicating that it did and zero indicating that it did not have this colonial legacy. In practice, this captures whether the state was colonized by the UK (the Pearson R coefficient for the correlation

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220 Hensel defines a state’s primary colonial ruler as “the colonial or imperial power that as most responsible for shaping the development of the entity (or entities) that became this modern state. This is typically the state that ruled over the majority of this territory…or the state that ruled over this territory for the longest time.” Hensel, “ICOW Colonial History Dataset Codebook,” 2.
between conscript tradition and UK colonization is -0.87). Specific colonizer dummies are advantageous because they directly capture some of the existing hypotheses about the relationship between specific colonizers and conscription. However, using all of these dummies also substantially reduces my degrees of freedom, which should be avoided due to my small sample size. As a result, I adopt the dichotomous variable that measures whether there is a history of colonial volunteer recruitment in most models, though the results using specific country dummies can be seen in the robustness checks section.

IV. Descriptive Statistics

A broad overview of my dataset supports the patterns described by my theory. Overall, states that have no land borders—and thus are more secure against land invasions—are more likely to adopt a volunteer system. As Table 3.6 shows, 76 percent of states with no borders rely on volunteers, while only 43 percent of new states that have land borders do. Moreover, all seven states that are both unconstrained by foreign patrons and have no borders use volunteers.\footnote{These states are Dominican Republic (1924), Indonesia (1949), Cuba (1959), Trinidad and Tobago (1962), Mauritius (1968), Solomon Islands (1978), and St. Lucia (1979).} Table 3.7 shows that the percentage of patron-less states that use volunteers when they have borders remains roughly the same, at 46 percent. This shows that when states face threats and have no patron, they are more likely to use conscription than to use volunteers, but not by much. New states facing threats also become much more likely to use conscription or volunteers if they are influenced by a conscript or volunteer patron, respectively.\footnote{See Appendix A for tables.} Among states with land borders that also have a volunteer patron, 75 percent use conscription. However, among states with land
borders that have a conscript patron, 71 percent use conscription. This suggests that the effect of threat environment is drowned out by the influence of patron states. This is consistent with my argument that in cases with an external patron, new states should adopt the patron’s recruitment system, even when the threat is high.

**Table 3.6: Frequency of Recruitment System by Threat Environment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No Land Borders</th>
<th>Any Land Borders</th>
<th>No MIDs</th>
<th>Any MIDs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>76% (26)</td>
<td>43% (74)</td>
<td>52% (64)</td>
<td>44% (36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscript</td>
<td>24% (8)</td>
<td>57% (97)</td>
<td>48% (59)</td>
<td>56% (46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100% (34)</strong></td>
<td><strong>100% (171)</strong></td>
<td><strong>100% (123)</strong></td>
<td><strong>100% (82)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3.7: Patron Influence in States with Borders/MIDs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>No Influence</th>
<th>Volunteer Influence</th>
<th>Conscript Influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Borders</td>
<td>MIDs</td>
<td>Borders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer</td>
<td>46% (30)</td>
<td>40% (12)</td>
<td>75% (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscript</td>
<td>54% (35)</td>
<td>60% (18)</td>
<td>25% (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data looks similar when we used MIDs as a measure of threat. States without a patron and that also experience any MIDs are more likely to use conscripts than volunteers, by 60 to 40 percent. The proportion of states adopting conscription is similar when states face external threats and have patron that uses conscription (64 percent). Unsurprisingly, and consistent with Hypothesis 2, volunteer patrons again manage to drown out the effects of threat, with 73 percent of states with volunteer patrons and facing high threats using volunteer recruitment.

Out of 61 new states that were colonized by a state that has a history of using volunteers, 80 percent use volunteers—roughly the same as the 82 percent of the 38 new states that experience post-independence volunteer influence that choose to use volunteers. Similarly, nearly 69 percent of 89 new states influenced by conscript patrons
design conscript militaries, compared to 66 percent of those that have been influenced by a conscript colonizer in the past. This demonstrates that influence by patron states after independence is at least as plausible a predictor of recruitment policies as historical practices.

Furthermore, patrons are often different from colonizers. States with foreign patrons that were colonized by the United Kingdom had a different foreign patron in 13 out of 41 cases, while French colonizers had a different foreign patron in 11 out of 29 cases. Former Russian colonies with patrons were patronized by Russia in all but one case, but Turkish colonies always had a different patron. This is further evidence of the need to analyze patrons separately from colonizers.

The distribution of patron influences over different threat level in the new state is also notable (see Appendix B). In particular, patrons that use volunteers appear less likely to get involved in military design in states that experience high levels of threat. Only 28 percent of states with volunteer patrons experience any MIDs, while roughly 40 percent of states with either a conscript patron or no patron experience at least one MID.\textsuperscript{223} This amounts to only 11 states in the sample that experience MIDs and have a volunteer patron, compared to 70 other states that face high threat levels. This should not necessarily be surprising. A reasonable explanation is that volunteer patrons are less likely to devote resources to states experiencing higher levels of major conflict, because they realize it increases the chance that their own forces will get dragged into it. In fact, this is consistent with my theory: volunteer states recognize both that volunteer

\textsuperscript{223} However, the p-value for the associated difference in means test is 0.11, suggesting that the null hypothesis that the two mean threat values are not statistically different cannot be rejected at conventional levels. The difference between the mean value of threat based on whether a state has any borders for volunteer and non-volunteer patrons is statistically significant at a 0.0003 level.
Recruitment is less-suited to high risk environments and that it is difficult to change recruitment systems, and thus they try to avoid scenarios that might require conscription. Conversely, it is possible that high levels of patronage deter threats from arising in the first place.

Overall, patron states are more likely to influence states that have a low threat environment, with nearly two-third of states with patrons experiencing no MIDs. Additional summary statistics for the dataset can be seen in Table 3.8. Just over a third of the observations (36 percent, n=74) have no foreign patron, while 19 percent have a volunteer patron (n=39) and 45 percent (n=91) have a conscript patron. However, 33 percent (n=74) have a history of colonization by a state that used volunteers, while 65 percent (n=141) have a history of colonization by a state that used conscription—nine states have no colonial legacy. Nearly 40 percent of observations exhibit a high threat environment as measured by MIDs, and nearly 80 percent have at least one contiguous land border.

**Table 3.8: Descriptive Statistics**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Obs.</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>Years Available</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conscript</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1918–2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Borders</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1918–2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIDs</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1918–2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostile MIDs</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1918–2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Legacy</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1918–2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Influence</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1918–2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscript Influence</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1918–2008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No variables are highly correlated with each other, with the highest Pearson’s R correlation statistic (Table 3.9) for any two variables that would be included in the same model being -0.46, for the relationship between having an historical legacy of volunteer
usage and being influenced by a state that uses volunteers after independence. This is particularly important for my ability to distinguish between the colonial legacy and patronage arguments.

Table 3.9: Pearson's R Correlation Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Conscription</th>
<th>Land Borders</th>
<th>MIDs</th>
<th>Hostile MIDs</th>
<th>Volunteer Legacy</th>
<th>Volunteer Influence</th>
<th>Conscript Influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conscription</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Borders</td>
<td>0.3163</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIDs</td>
<td>0.0990</td>
<td>0.3698</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostile MIDs</td>
<td>0.1535</td>
<td>0.3030</td>
<td>0.8861</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Legacy</td>
<td>-0.4176</td>
<td>-0.2830</td>
<td>-0.1448</td>
<td>-0.1205</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Influence</td>
<td>-0.3241</td>
<td>-0.2045</td>
<td>-0.0660</td>
<td>-0.0683</td>
<td>-0.4609</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscript Influence</td>
<td>0.3021</td>
<td>0.0884</td>
<td>-0.0699</td>
<td>-0.0152</td>
<td>0.3267</td>
<td>-0.4370</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

V. Model Testing

Having found support for my theory in the raw data, I turn to regression analysis. In my main models, I use logistic regression because the dependent variable is binary. I also use clustered standard errors to address the possibility that observations of the same country at different times are correlated with each other. Additional models using OLS regression are available in Appendix B, though results are the same.

A. Base Models

I begin by testing models designed to reveal the impact of foreign influence and threat on military recruitment choice, controlling for recruitment legacy. All models test Hypotheses 1 and 2 by including two dichotomous variables measuring the type of foreign patron influence in a new state during the period of military design. The included
variables measure the presence of a volunteer patron and of a conscript patron, so that
having no patron is the excluded reference category. I would expect the volunteer
influence variable to be negatively correlated with the dependent variable: new states
influenced by volunteer-recruiting patrons should emulate their patron and therefore be
more likely to have a volunteer army, and vice versa. Hypotheses 3 and 4 are tested in
models that include interaction terms (see Table 3.12).

**Table 3.10: The Effect of Patrons on the Probability of Conscription**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 1: Without Threat</th>
<th>Model 2: Borders Dummy</th>
<th>Model 3: MIDs Dummy</th>
<th>Model 4: Forceful MIDs Dummy</th>
<th>Model 5: Borders Count</th>
<th>Model 6: MIDs Count</th>
<th>Model 7: Forceful MIDs Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Patron Influence Volunteer</td>
<td>0.726*** (0.246)</td>
<td>0.704*** (0.259)</td>
<td>0.726*** (0.247)</td>
<td>0.723*** (0.248)</td>
<td>0.745*** (0.266)</td>
<td>0.753*** (0.251)</td>
<td>0.757*** (0.255)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legacy Any Land Borders</td>
<td>-1.602*** (0.451)</td>
<td>-1.480*** (0.464)</td>
<td>-1.588*** (0.462)</td>
<td>-1.593*** (0.454)</td>
<td>-1.391*** (0.481)</td>
<td>-1.552*** (0.461)</td>
<td>-1.548*** (0.451)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any MIDs</td>
<td>0.0855 (0.533)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Forceful MIDs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.125 (0.344)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Land Borders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.253*** (0.363)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total MIDs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.101 (0.0827)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Forceful MIDs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.274* (0.148)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.316 (0.237)</td>
<td>-0.875* (0.527)</td>
<td>0.277</td>
<td>(0.272)</td>
<td>0.273</td>
<td>(0.264)</td>
<td>0.526 (0.352)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The first set of models test my non-interactive hypotheses, H1 and H2 (see Table
3.10). The first way I do this is measures patron influence using a trichotomous variable

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224 Standard errors are in parentheses below the coefficient in each regression table.
that takes the value of 1 if a state has a conscript patron, 0 if a state has no patron, and -1 if a state has a volunteer patron. This captures the fact that the effect of having a patron who uses conscription is predicted to be symmetrical and in the opposite direction compared to the effect of having a patron who uses volunteers. Thus this variable should be positively associated with the probability that a state uses conscription. In Model 1, I regress conscription on only my patron influence variables and an indicator that captures the primary alternative hypothesis, a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if the state’s primary colonizer has a history of using volunteers and zero otherwise.

In Models 2 through 7, I include controls capturing different conceptualizations of the international threat environment. Models 2–7 offer further tests for Hypotheses 1 and 2 by including another potentially important variable that is omitted from the previous model: threat environment. Models 2–4 assume that threat environment is dichotomous. A state may either perceive that its primary threat is a major territorial invasion, or it does not. Thus the first of these models is a general measure of threat based on whether a state has any land borders, while Models 3 and 4 measure threat using the presence of any MIDs and any high hostility MIDs, respectively. Models 5–7 measure threat as a continuum. This is consistent with the way states balance the various threats they often face at the same time: the greater the likelihood of a major territorial threat, the more likely that this will dominate the state’s military design process. Therefore, these three models use continuous measures of the threat variables from Models 2–4. In Model 5, more land borders equates to more potential adversaries and therefore to a greater likelihood of perceiving a high threat environment, while more MIDs and more hostile MIDs should similarly make states more wary of potential threats in Models 6 and 7,
respectively. In all models the variable for patron influence is statistically significant at a p=0.01 level, providing strong support in favor of hypotheses 1 and 2.

Table 3.11: The Effect of Patrons on the Probability of Conscription

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Influence</td>
<td>-0.823*</td>
<td>-0.640</td>
<td>-0.820*</td>
<td>-0.817*</td>
<td>-0.772</td>
<td>-0.817*</td>
<td>-0.819*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscript Influence</td>
<td>0.674*</td>
<td>0.738**</td>
<td>0.674*</td>
<td>0.672*</td>
<td>0.731**</td>
<td>0.719**</td>
<td>0.723**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Legacy</td>
<td>-1.589***</td>
<td>-1.487***</td>
<td>-1.576***</td>
<td>-1.581***</td>
<td>-1.388***</td>
<td>-1.545***</td>
<td>-1.540***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Land Borders</td>
<td>1.343**</td>
<td>(0.465)</td>
<td>(0.464)</td>
<td>(0.456)</td>
<td>(0.484)</td>
<td>(0.462)</td>
<td>(0.455)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any MIDs</td>
<td>0.0844</td>
<td>(0.344)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forceful MIDs</td>
<td>0.123</td>
<td>(0.362)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Land Borders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.253***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total MIDs</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0.0996</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.274*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forceful MIDs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.148)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.350</td>
<td>-0.904</td>
<td>0.311</td>
<td>0.307</td>
<td>-0.516</td>
<td>0.222</td>
<td>0.149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Models 8–14 repeat the analysis in Models 1–7 but splitting the patron influence variable into its constituent parts, creating dummy variables for whether a state had a conscript patron and whether a state had a volunteer patron. This allows me to better examine whether the emulation effect is stronger for some type of patrons than for others. The results, which can be seen in Table 3.11, show that the conscript and volunteer influence variables are statistically significant at a 0.10 level. Both variables have
substantive effects in the predicted directions, with conscript influence having a beta coefficient of 0.67 and volunteer influence having a beta coefficient of -0.82 in Model 8, which only includes a control variable for colonial legacy. This translates into odds ratios that predict that states with a conscript patron are almost twice as likely as states without a conscript patron to use conscription. Similarly, states with volunteer patrons are 0.44 times less likely to use conscription, though the effect is not significant at conventional levels. The results are shown in Figure 3.1, below, with 95 percent confidence intervals.

**Figure 3.1: The Effect of Patron Influence on Recruitment**

While volunteer influence is statistically significant at a 0.10 level in all but two of the models that include threat models, conscript influence remains statistically significant at a 0.05 level in Model 2 and all models where threat is measured as a continuum. It is significant at a 0.10 level in the other models. Furthermore, no form of MIDs threat measurement is statistically significantly associated with military recruitment at the conventional 0.05 level. Having any land borders, however, is associated with an increase in the likelihood of conscription at a .05 level. The number of forceful MIDs a state experiences is significant at a 0.10 level. Furthermore, the results show that the more land borders that a state has, the more likely it is to use conscription, with statistical significance at a 0.01 level. These somewhat conflicting results are likely
due to two things. First, states with no land borders are islands and so may have much less to fear in the way of territorial invasion than other states, regardless of the number of their MIDs. Second, consistent with the theory, the emulation effect of foreign patrons may be sufficiently strong and common as to drown out the effect of MIDs. Therefore it is difficult to get a sense of the effect of threat unless we only look at those cases that do not have foreign patrons, as suggested by Hypotheses 3 and 4.

These results suggest that conscript influencers have the predicted effects on military recruitment. There is some effect of volunteer influences, and though there is less confidence in what that effect is, signs point to it being in the predicted direction. This absence of an effect of volunteer influencers is in contrast to existing arguments that emphasize the unique characteristics of the British volunteer recruitment culture, instead suggesting that conscript militaries drive the emulation effect. In addition, threat environments likely have some effect on military recruitment, and continuous measures of threat may have more explanatory power than dichotomous ones.

However, in order to test the hypotheses about threat correctly, it is necessary to use interactive statistical models. Recall that threat is only expected to have an effect on recruitment practices in the absence of foreign patronage. Model 15 is the first of my interactive hypotheses. Each of the Models 15 through 20 regress the use of conscription on variables that interact threat environment with both conscript influence and volunteer influence from a patron (Table 3.12). This allows me to evaluate Hypotheses 3 and 4. To test Hypothesis 3, which says that threat does not matter when there is a patron, it is necessary to perform a two-tailed difference in means test. This evaluates the difference

---

225 Volunteer influencers is statistically significant at a 0.1 level in all the models except the one measuring threat as land borders when an alternative coding of recruitment legacy is used.
between the volunteer patron-threat and conscript patron-threat interaction terms by testing whether the coefficients for the two influence-threat interaction terms are jointly equivalent to zero. In other words, when this t-test fails to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients for these two interaction terms are jointly equally to zero, there is support for the hypothesis that threat has no effect on conscription when there is a patron state. If there is support for Hypothesis 4, the coefficient for the threat variable will be statistically significant in models that include variables that interact threat and patron influence. In these models, the threat variable captures the effect of threat when there is no patron, while each of the interaction terms captures of the effect of threat when there is a patron. As in Tables 3.10 and 3.11, the first three of these models (15–17) measure threat dichotomously, as the presence of any borders, any MIDs, and any forceful MIDs, respectively. Models 18–20 employ continuous measures of these threat variables and their interactions.

The threat variable is statistically significant at least at a 0.05 level in Models 15, 18, 19, and 20. The only models in which threat is not statistically significant are those that include the presence of any MIDs or any forceful MIDs as threatening. However, it makes sense that the presence of any MIDs would not necessarily be statistically significant. The presence of a single MID does not necessarily reach a threat threshold large enough to affect the design of security institutions, since MIDs can include not only violent conflicts, but also disputes in which there was no militarized action, or in which there were only threats to use force. Indeed, the effect of threats seem to be strongest

---

226 Due to the perfect prediction of outcomes for several variables, the results from logistic analysis cannot be interpreted reliably in Model 8. OLS regression results for Model 8 are available in the Appendix and should be used instead. The results from linear regression models are still valid when the dependent variable is dichotomous.
when they are violent and cumulative. The continuous forceful MIDs variable is
correlated with an increase in the probability of conscription at a 0.01 level. Each
additional high-level MID that a state has is associated with a 1.9 increase in the
probability of conscription, when there is no patron state. Substantive effects and odds
ratios for Model 20 can be seen in Figures 3.2a and 3.2b, below. Thus, there is support
for Hypothesis 4, that states without a patron are more likely to conscript when they face
high threats compared to when they face low threats.

Table 3.12 The Effect of Influence and Threat on the Probability of Conscription
in New States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.485)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Any MIDs</td>
<td>0.574</td>
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<td>0.773</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.495)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.523)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Forceful MIDs</td>
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<td>0.352***</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.126)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Land Borders</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.300**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.147)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Forceful MIDs</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.619***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.217)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Influence</td>
<td>13.60***</td>
<td>-0.725</td>
<td>-0.305</td>
<td>-0.0415</td>
<td>-0.316</td>
<td>-0.306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.104)</td>
<td>(0.586)</td>
<td>(0.536)</td>
<td>(0.754)</td>
<td>(0.545)</td>
<td>(0.564)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscript Influence</td>
<td>15.44***</td>
<td>1.100**</td>
<td>0.990**</td>
<td>1.133</td>
<td>1.084**</td>
<td>1.009**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.901)</td>
<td>(0.479)</td>
<td>(0.432)</td>
<td>(0.700)</td>
<td>(0.428)</td>
<td>(0.408)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Influence*Threat</td>
<td>-14.35***</td>
<td>-0.219</td>
<td>-1.938</td>
<td>-0.236</td>
<td>-0.497</td>
<td>-0.877</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.157)</td>
<td>(1.110)</td>
<td>(1.466)</td>
<td>(0.178)</td>
<td>(0.318)</td>
<td>(0.672)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscript Influence*Threat</td>
<td>-14.89***</td>
<td>-0.987</td>
<td>-0.936</td>
<td>-0.130</td>
<td>-0.384*</td>
<td>-0.523*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.984)</td>
<td>(0.657)</td>
<td>(0.694)</td>
<td>(0.200)</td>
<td>(0.211)</td>
<td>(0.293)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Influence*Threat</td>
<td>-1.52**</td>
<td>-1.533***</td>
<td>-1.629***</td>
<td>-1.453**</td>
<td>-1.592***</td>
<td>-1.583***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.470)</td>
<td>(0.471)</td>
<td>(0.491)</td>
<td>(0.519)</td>
<td>(0.494)</td>
<td>(0.498)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legacy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-15.01***</td>
<td>0.0930</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>-0.817*</td>
<td>0.0100</td>
<td>-0.0402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.441)</td>
<td>(0.350)</td>
<td>(0.325)</td>
<td>(0.467)</td>
<td>(0.331)</td>
<td>(0.322)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
There is also support for Hypothesis 3, which says that threat only has an effect when there is no patron. If threat only has an effect on recruitment when states have no patron and has no effect when there is a patron, then each of the interactions between threat and conscript influence and threat and volunteer influence should be equal to zero. As can be seen in Table 3.13, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that these variables are jointly equal to zero at a 0.05 level in Models 16–20. This means that the effect of threat
on military recruitment is greater for states without a patron than for states that have either volunteer or conscript patrons.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3.13: Hypothesis Testing for Hypothesis 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis Tested</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 15 $\beta_{\text{volunteer influence}<em>\text{anyborders}} = \beta_{\text{conscript influence}</em>\text{anyborders}}=0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 16 $\beta_{\text{volunteer influence}<em>\text{anymids}} = \beta_{\text{conscript influence}</em>\text{anymids}}=0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 17 $\beta_{\text{volunteer influence}<em>\text{anyhostmids}} = \beta_{\text{conscript influence}</em>\text{anyhostmids}}=0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 18 $\beta_{\text{volunteer influence}<em>\text{totalborders}} = \beta_{\text{conscript influence}</em>\text{totalborders}}=0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 19 $\beta_{\text{volunteer influence}<em>\text{totalmids}} = \beta_{\text{conscript influence}</em>\text{totalmids}}=0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model 20 $\beta_{\text{volunteer influence}<em>\text{totalhostilemids}} = \beta_{\text{conscript influence}</em>\text{totalhostilemids}}=0$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures 3.3 and 3.4 shows the substantive effects of threat—measured as both the number of land borders and the number of forceful MIDs—given no military patron. Among states with no patrons, the predicted probability of using conscription increases from 30 percent for those with no land borders, to 65 percent for those with five land borders, like the post-Soviet states Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, and 97 percent for Russia, which has 14 land borders. Similarly, states with no forceful MIDs have less than a 45 percent chance of adopting conscription. States with one forceful MID, however, are more likely to conscript by 12 percentage points, while those with three have a 77 percent likelihood of adopting conscription. China, which is one of five

---

227 Splitting the sample into states that have patrons and those that do not provides similar results. As can be seen in Appendix A, none of interactions between threat and volunteer influence is statistically significant in any of the models that are limited to states that have patrons, while the two stronger indicators of threat are statistically significant at a 0.05 level in the models that are limited to those states without patrons.
states with the most forceful MIDs at 5, had only a 10 percent probability of adopting a volunteer military.

**Figure 2.3: Marginal Effects of Land Borders on Probability of Conscription**

![Figure 2.3](image)

**Figure 3.3: Marginal Effects of Threat on Probability of Conscription**

![Figure 3.3](image)

**B. Additional Control Variables**

While any model must include some measure for each of the variables described above, existing literature on the determinants of recruitment practices is sufficiently scarce and inconclusive as to leave open for interpretation the necessary additional control variables. Below I discuss the available possibilities and reasons for the inclusion or exclusion of various control variables from my final models. Additional variables that
are said to affect military recruitment fall into two broad categories, depending on whether they describe political institutions or economic factors and resource availability.

First, many scholars have argued that there should be a relationship between democracy and military recruitment. However, the exact direction of this relationship, if any, is disputed. Conscription may reflect egalitarian notions of citizenship or it may conflict with liberal notions of individual rights—both of which are more likely to be associated with democratic regimes. While it is possible that democracies are more likely to use a particular recruitment system, the fact that they have successfully used both conscript and volunteer recruitment systems—in war and in peacetime—at various times over the last century should weaken the arguments that associate it with a particular system. Similarly, we may also expect authoritarian regimes to be more likely to suppress individual rights in a way that allows them to use conscription more easily, though they equally could be hesitant to arm the public.

The most likely way political institutions can affect recruitment system is by giving voice or creating accountability to the public. The average citizen prefers to pay for a volunteer force over risking being conscripted. Thus, regimes that are more responsive to the population may be more likely to use volunteers. Yet, states often impose conscription on unwilling populations. For example, Margaret Levi argued that perceptions of unfairness led to noncompliance with wartime drafts, though the draft was still enforced in each of the five democracies she studied, even when it was perceived as

---

228 See Asal et al., “I Want You!” for a review of the literature. See also Pfaffenzaller, “Conscription and Democracy.” Asal et al find that democracy decreases the likelihood of conscription.
229 Kier, Imagining War; Leander, “Drafting Community.”
230 Caverley, Democratic Militarism, 32
extremely unfair.²³¹

### Table 3.14: The Effect of Regime Type on Military Recruitment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Land Border</td>
<td>0.392*** (0.139)</td>
<td>0.393*** (0.141)</td>
<td>0.394*** (0.132)</td>
<td>0.336** (0.151)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Influence</td>
<td>0.234 (0.855)</td>
<td>0.246 (0.846)</td>
<td>0.590 (0.836)</td>
<td>0.565 (0.859)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscript Influence</td>
<td>1.053 (0.761)</td>
<td>1.071 (0.763)</td>
<td>0.860 (0.757)</td>
<td>0.832 (0.789)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Legacy</td>
<td>-1.660*** (-0.569)</td>
<td>-1.649*** (-0.567)</td>
<td>-1.677*** (-0.588)</td>
<td>-1.722*** (-0.598)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Influence*Borders</td>
<td>-0.332* (0.194)</td>
<td>-0.333* (0.193)</td>
<td>-0.371* (0.194)</td>
<td>-0.343* (0.204)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscript Influence*Borders</td>
<td>-0.0967 (0.222)</td>
<td>-0.0940 (0.222)</td>
<td>-0.0658 (0.215)</td>
<td>-0.0506 (0.229)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy (dichotomous)</td>
<td>0.170 (0.405)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy (continuous)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0120 (0.0284)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Excluded Ethnic Groups</td>
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<td>-0.0447 (0.0370)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Excluded Population</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.378 (1.218)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.878* (0.506)</td>
<td>-0.986 (0.609)</td>
<td>-0.726 (0.506)</td>
<td>-0.733 (0.521)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

I tested two version of variables that represent arguments that there should be a relationship between democracy or political accountability and conscription. First, I included a control variable from the Polity IV dataset to measure how democratic a new state is at independence. This variable was never statistically significant and did not change the results of the basic model, whether measured as a continuous variable or as a dichotomous variable with different cutoffs to define democracy. Second, I test the same

²³¹ Levi, Consent, Dissent, and Patriotism.
models using the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset’s measurements for the number of excluded groups and the size of the excluded population. Higher values on each value should indicate that a state’s government is less responsive to the preferences of the population. These variables may also proxy not for regime type but for perceived threat environment, with states being less willing to take the many risks associated with conscription if their hold on power requires excluding large portions of the population. Although the EPR dataset’s more limited timeframe—it begins in 1946—reduces my number of observations to 171, no specification of these domestic regime type variables is statistically significant at a p=0.10 level (see Table 3.14).

Economic factors may also affect recruitment decisions. These theories emphasize supply-side constraints on or prerequisites for conscription. Rational, power-maximizing states should not want to implement a military personnel system unless they have the tools to implement it successfully. Conscription may require the state to have greater levels of centralization, better-developed bureaucracy, or greater domestic stability compared to volunteer systems.232 States with lower capacity or fewer coercive resources may fear opposition too much, and therefore, on average, not even try to implement conscription. Conversely, states with greater economic or administrative capacity would equally be better able to provide sufficient compensation to attract volunteers without using coercion. Given the lower risks to stability volunteers entail, this option may be more appealing to states that have high levels of resources.

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Table 3.15: The Effect of State Capacity on Military Recruitment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 25: Urban Population Control</th>
<th>Model 26: State Capacity Index Control</th>
<th>Model 27: GDP Per Capita Control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Total Land Borders</td>
<td>0.303**</td>
<td>0.293**</td>
<td>0.322**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.145)</td>
<td>(0.136)</td>
<td>(0.145)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Influence</td>
<td>-0.439</td>
<td>-1.319</td>
<td>-0.238</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.834)</td>
<td>(1.037)</td>
<td>(0.952)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscript Influence</td>
<td>0.889</td>
<td>1.321</td>
<td>0.754</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.722)</td>
<td>(1.029)</td>
<td>(0.812)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Legacy</td>
<td>-1.376**</td>
<td>-1.159*</td>
<td>-1.941***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.557)</td>
<td>(0.595)</td>
<td>(0.631)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Influence*Borders</td>
<td>-0.219</td>
<td>0.0217</td>
<td>-0.274</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.197)</td>
<td>(0.183)</td>
<td>(0.196)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscript Influence*Borders</td>
<td>-0.0853</td>
<td>-0.191</td>
<td>-0.0848</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.210)</td>
<td>(0.271)</td>
<td>(0.219)</td>
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<td>Urban Pop. Perc</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(1.468)</td>
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<td>Capacity Index</td>
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<td>GDP per capita</td>
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<td>-1.857**</td>
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<td>(0.488)</td>
<td>(0.916)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

To test these competing hypotheses, I add different specifications of resource capacity to my base models (see Table 3.15). Model 25 includes a variable measuring the state’s urban population percentage. This variable is often used in modernization literature to measure a state’s level of economic development, and consequently its ability to control resources—which should aid in the implementation of conscription.233 Urban population percentage is statistically significant at a 0.01 level. Substantively, this may offer support for the hypothesis that states are more likely to conscript where doing so is easier. Large urban populations may indicate greater state ability to control the

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233 Toronto, “Why War is Not Enough.”
population. Rural recruitment is often challenging, especially in new states that are still establishing their authority, both because it is more difficult to extend control and legitimacy the further from the state’s center and because cities offer a higher concentration of potential recruits. Thus, another interpretation of this variable is as a proxy for responses to certain threats: if states anticipate resistance to conscription among populations they have less control over, then they would only conscript when they perceive that resistance is manageable.

Similarly, a composite measure from the Relative Political Capacity dataset measuring “the ability of governments to appropriate portions of the national output to advance public goals,” is also statistically significant at a .05 level, as seen in Model 26. This is a more direct measure of governmental resources compared to GDP, which is usually used as a measure of state capacity but is not statistically significant (Model 27). However, there is extensive missing data for the RPC variable, reducing the sample by nearly half. Moreover, the missing data is likely not randomly distributed, as weaker and poorer countries are less likely to have the data available that was used for coding.

The statistical significance of some of these control variables suggests the need to test a single model including all control variables. Table 3.16 shows the results from this logistic regression. Model 28 and Model 29 include controls for level of democracy, number of excluded ethnic groups, and the urban population. In addition, I test whether internal ethnic exclusion may function as a pressure on recruitment in the same way as external threats do. This is important because many scholars have suggested that states

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are just as likely to design their security apparatuses in response to internal threats as in response to external threats.\(^ {235} \) Thus Model 28 tests whether Hypotheses 1 and 2 still find support when all additional control variables are accounted for, Model 29 does the same for Hypotheses 3 and 4, while Model 30 tests whether Hypotheses 3 and 4 also apply to states’ perceptions of internal threats.

**Table 3.16: Full Regression Table**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 28: No Interaction</th>
<th>Model 29: External Threat Interaction</th>
<th>Model 30: Internal Threat Interactions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Land Borders</td>
<td>0.298***</td>
<td>0.351**</td>
<td>0.527**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.111)</td>
<td>(0.164)</td>
<td>(0.224)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Influence</td>
<td>-1.355**</td>
<td>-0.153</td>
<td>0.836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.668)</td>
<td>(1.111)</td>
<td>(1.351)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscript Influence</td>
<td>0.630</td>
<td>0.570</td>
<td>0.736</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.392)</td>
<td>(0.823)</td>
<td>(0.839)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Legacy</td>
<td>-1.586**</td>
<td>-1.678**</td>
<td>-1.760**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.626)</td>
<td>(0.677)</td>
<td>(0.734)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Influence*Borders</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.321</td>
<td>-0.456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.243)</td>
<td>(0.384)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscript Influence*Borders</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0227</td>
<td>-0.211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.242)</td>
<td>(0.285)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy (cont.)</td>
<td>-0.0110</td>
<td>-0.00786</td>
<td>-0.00578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0292)</td>
<td>(0.0291)</td>
<td>(0.0288)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Excluded Ethnic Groups</td>
<td>0.0366</td>
<td>0.0425</td>
<td>-0.179**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0360)</td>
<td>(0.0372)</td>
<td>(0.0849)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Pop. Percent</td>
<td>3.780*</td>
<td>3.900*</td>
<td>3.930*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.183)</td>
<td>(2.116)</td>
<td>(2.136)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Influence*Excluded Groups</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.701</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.477)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscript Influence*Excluded Groups</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.217*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.118)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.826</td>
<td>-1.016</td>
<td>-1.201*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.625)</td>
<td>(0.651)</td>
<td>(0.663)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

\(^ {235} \) Greitens, “Coercive Institutions”; Barnett, *Confronting the Costs of War*
The model without interactions still provides support for Hypothesis 2, but not for Hypothesis 1. However, only the control variable for urban population is statistically significant at greater than a 0.1 level. Model 29 shows similar results, though unsurprisingly the patron influence variables are no longer significant when the interaction terms are included. We also fail to reject null hypothesis that the interaction terms are jointly equal to zero at a 0.35 level. Together this provides strong support for Hypotheses 3 and 4.

Interestingly, there is also support that the perception of internal threat, defined by the number of excluded ethnic groups, also affects military recruitment only in the absence of a patron state. When interactions between the number of excluded groups and patron influence are included in Model 30, a country with no patron has a lower likelihood of using conscription with each additional ethnic group that it excludes. Such a patron-less country with no excluded groups—like Yemen after reunification in 1990—is associated with a 63 percent probability of using conscription. Meanwhile, one with ten excluded groups—for example, the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2002—would have only a 34 percent probability of using conscription. Furthermore, the interaction terms between excluded groups and patron influence cannot be statistically distinguished from each other and from zero at more than a 0.05 level. This demonstrates, consistent with Hypotheses 3 and 4, that states are less likely to use conscription when they exclude many groups from power, but not when there is patron influence to overpower local threat perceptions.
C. Robustness Checks

Finally, it is important to check that alternate specifications of my key independent and dependent variables do not affect the model results. The results from the base models remain fairly robust when I account for the possibility that the process of military design may be different for some of the observations in my dataset. The dichotomous variable indicating whether the observation is a new regime that emerged after civil war is not statistically significant, demonstrating that the heterogeneity of my sample is not a problem for my theory (Table 3.17). However, the patron influence variables are also no longer significant at conventional levels.

Table 3.17: Robustness Checks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 31: Civil Wars, No Interaction</th>
<th>Model 32: Civil Wars, with Interaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Land Borders</td>
<td>0.258***</td>
<td>0.360***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0824)</td>
<td>(0.128)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil War State</td>
<td>-0.0936</td>
<td>-0.125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.355)</td>
<td>(0.356)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Influence</td>
<td>-0.782</td>
<td>-0.0433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.490)</td>
<td>(0.751)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscript Influence</td>
<td>0.713*</td>
<td>1.116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.373)</td>
<td>(0.700)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Legacy</td>
<td>-1.383***</td>
<td>-1.447***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.483)</td>
<td>(0.517)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Influence*Borders</td>
<td>-0.240</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.179)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscript Influence*Borders</td>
<td>-0.133</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.201)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.499</td>
<td>-0.799*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.400)</td>
<td>(0.465)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

In Table 3.18, models 33 and 34 tests an alternative measure of foreign influence on military design. I created an alternative variable that more directly measures the
hypothesized process of professional emulation. This continuous variable measures the proportion of a new state’s formal allies that use conscription, using data from the Correlates of War Formal Alliance Dataset.\textsuperscript{236} Values closer to 1 indicate that a higher proportion of a new state’s allies use conscription, while 0 would represent a case in which all allies use volunteers.\textsuperscript{237} Frequent contact between allies should increase the likelihood that norms of appropriateness regarding military recruitment practices diffuse between them. Furthermore, because recruitment practices affect so many other aspects of military design, allies may feel pressured to conform to the same military recruitment practices, which may allow them to benefit from greater interoperability. Model 26 examines whether this measure of foreign influence affects military recruitment. As expected, the ally recruitment variable is statistically significant. It also has a large substantive effect—larger, in fact, than the effect of having a colonial legacy of conscription: the predicted probability of adopting conscription increases from 4 percent to 95 percent across the range of ally recruitment, while it only decreases from 59 percent to 32 percent between states without and with a volunteer legacy.

Model 34 tests the interactive hypotheses 3 and 4 by including additional variables to account for the possibility that a state has allies but no direct military patron. It also includes interactions between these two influence variables and threat perception, as measured by the number of land borders. The ally recruitment variable remains statistically significant at a 0.01 level, providing support for Hypotheses 1 and 2. The interaction between states with no patron and threat environment is statistically


\textsuperscript{237} States with no allies are coded 0.5, to indicate that they have an equal chance of going either way.
significant at a 0.10 level, suggesting some support for Hypothesis 4. Moreover, the
effect is in the predicted direction: states without a patron that experience high threat
environments are more likely to use conscription. There is also support for Hypothesis 3,
as the interaction between ally recruitment and threat is not statistically significant.

**Table 3.18: Robustness Checks**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 33: Alliance Emulation, no Interaction</th>
<th>Model 34: Alliance Emulation, with Interaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Land Borders</td>
<td>0.221**</td>
<td>-0.219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0857)</td>
<td>(0.291)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ally Conscription</td>
<td>7.145***</td>
<td>5.297***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.423)</td>
<td>(1.778)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Patron</td>
<td>-1.457**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.686)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ally Conscription*Land Borders</td>
<td>0.705</td>
<td>0.363*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.539)</td>
<td>(0.219)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Patron*Land Borders</td>
<td>0.363*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.219)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Legacy</td>
<td>-1.622***</td>
<td>-1.675***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.459)</td>
<td>(0.476)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.877***</td>
<td>-2.547**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.852)</td>
<td>(1.019)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Four final models replace the dichotomous variable for whether a new state’s
principal colonizer predominantly used conscripts with four dummy variables indicating
the specific identity of the colonizer as either the United Kingdom, France, Russia, or
Turkey/the Ottoman Empire (Table 3.19). This allows for an investigation of more
specific, cultural influences of colonizers, and thus is also a direct test of my hypotheses
against the common argument that British norms against using conscription led former
British colonies to use volunteer systems.
### Table 3.19: Robustness Checks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 35: Colonizer Dummies, Borders/No Interaction</th>
<th>Model 36: Colonizer Dummies, Borders Interaction</th>
<th>Model 37: Colonizer Dummies, MIDs/No Interaction</th>
<th>Model 38: Colonizer Dummies, MIDs Interaction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Land Borders</td>
<td>0.244*** (0.0827)</td>
<td>0.320** (0.135)</td>
<td>0.232 (0.148)</td>
<td>0.481** (0.190)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Forceful MIDs</td>
<td>-1.079** (0.502)</td>
<td>-0.515 (0.797)</td>
<td>-1.017** (0.509)</td>
<td>-0.634 (0.639)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Influence</td>
<td>0.983** (0.390)</td>
<td>1.293* (0.687)</td>
<td>0.931** (0.395)</td>
<td>1.178*** (0.446)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscript Influence</td>
<td>-0.179</td>
<td>-0.099</td>
<td>0.210</td>
<td>0.196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Influence*Borders</td>
<td>-0.721 (0.529)</td>
<td>-0.739 (0.541)</td>
<td>-0.987* (0.523)</td>
<td>-1.008* (0.565)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscript Influence*Borders</td>
<td>0.773 (0.472)</td>
<td>0.777 (0.469)</td>
<td>0.990 (0.503)</td>
<td>0.908 (0.508)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Colony</td>
<td>1.310** (0.641)</td>
<td>1.320** (0.646)</td>
<td>1.222* (0.647)</td>
<td>1.180* (0.659)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Colony</td>
<td>-0.492 (0.472)</td>
<td>-0.486 (0.469)</td>
<td>-0.354 (0.503)</td>
<td>-0.382 (0.508)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Colony</td>
<td>0.773 (0.713)</td>
<td>0.777 (0.717)</td>
<td>0.990 (0.693)</td>
<td>0.908 (0.710)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish Colony</td>
<td>0.492 (0.472)</td>
<td>0.486 (0.469)</td>
<td>0.354 (0.503)</td>
<td>0.382 (0.508)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.907** (0.419)</td>
<td>-1.147** (0.499)</td>
<td>-0.241 (0.350)</td>
<td>-0.377 (0.373)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

In Models 35 and 36, threat is measured as the number of land borders, and an Ottoman colonial legacy is statistically significant but a British one is not. This may cast some doubt on arguments that emphasize a British cultural heritage as affecting military recruitment. However, Models 37 and 38, which measure threat using the number of forceful MIDs that a new state experiences, show slightly different results. Here, British legacy is significant at a 0.1 level and Ottoman/Turkish legacy are both only significant
at a 0.1 level. This indicates that colonial legacy may affect recruitment less through the ideological or cultural traits of a particular colonizer being passed down to the colony, and more through the way different colonizers interacted with threat environments or behaved after independence. It also demonstrates the need for a reexamination of other arguments that point to French or Russian origins as making conscription more likely. Most importantly, however, there is stronger support for the effect of a conscript colonizer—The Ottoman Empire/Turkey—than for the United Kingdom. Thus, there is little evidence that specific colonizers endowed new states with cultural preferences that led them to adopt certain recruitment practices after independence.

VI. Conclusion

This chapter has tested hypothesis that foreign influence after independence affects how new states make military recruitment decisions. Importantly, the results suggest that, while colonizer recruitment practice remains significant, so is foreign influence after independence. In particular, states that have patrons interested in their military design are likely to emulate the recruitment practices of their patron. Independence acts as a critical juncture: patrons after independence can affect military recruitment decisions.

Threat environments play a role in military recruitment policies, but the relative effect of threat is highest when there is no foreign patron to dictate or otherwise influence policy. This makes sense, not only because states with patrons have actors that may directly guide their military design, but also because new states with foreign patrons can more readily count on foreign help in the event of a major conflict. Having a patron inevitably dampens the effect of threats, while patron-less states are more likely to need
to rely on their own capabilities. It also seems that to the extent that threat perceptions affect military recruitment practices in new states, it is through broad evaluations of the state’s geostrategic position. Having more borders may make a state’s position more precarious, leading to a greater willingness to take on the risks of conscription as a way to increase security. More acute indicators of threat have a less consistent effect on military recruitment practices.

In sum, this chapter has demonstrated an association between the recruitment practices of new states and the recruitment practices of foreign states with influence in the new state in the years after its independence. However, the statistical methods used in this chapter leave several questions still in need of answers. For one, it is not yet clear what role recruitment plays in determining or creating this association. Do new states specifically look at and prioritize the recruitment practices of their patrons when designing their own, or does emulation of recruitment follow from other emulated practices? Does the interest in emulation originate in the new state, or does it occur through a top-down process of pressure from the patron? In addition, it is important to examine the particular logic motivating emulation: what purpose do states have in mind when they adopt recruitment policies, and do these differ for patrons and their clients? Finally, this chapter has only examined recruitment policies at a single moment in time—during periods in which states are likely to be designing military institutions that they expect will last a long time. It remains to be seen whether the initial effect of foreign patrons continues to influence military recruitment policies after independence, as well.

To test these aspects of my theory, it is necessary to turn to case studies in the following chapters. The case study chapters provide further evidence to support my
argument that post-independence patrons affect military design through a mechanism of emulation. While they continue my emphasis on new states, they also tease out the role of my explanatory variables beyond initial periods of military design.
CHAPTER 4: JORDAN

I. Introduction

The development of Jordan’s armed forces offers a quintessential case study of foreign intervention in military design, as is described by my first causal pathway for the development of recruitment policies. While there is no doubt that the British influenced Jordanian military development, existing research has not established a clear causal relationship between that influence and the country’s volunteer recruitment. This chapter offers such a test. I find support for my first hypothesis: new states influenced by patrons that prefer volunteer systems are more likely to develop volunteer armies. This chapter also provides support for hypotheses 3 and 4 by showing that the Jordanian army was developed in a high threat environment that influenced the recruitment preferences of local Jordanian officials but did not affect how its British patrons perceived recruitment.

The British maintained high levels of influence on Jordanian military policy both before and after independence. While the constant use of a volunteer military during this period is consistent with an argument about cultural diffusion, I argue that it is actually British policy itself that enforced volunteer military recruitment. The fact that British influence can be interpreted as affecting either culture or military policy directly makes it difficult to identify which mechanism is correct. However, I examine the policy preferences of Jordanian and British officials in each period—before and after independence—to show that a cultural opposition to conscription was unlikely to exist in Jordan, despite British influence.

By contrast, the most common explanations of military recruitment would attribute Jordan’s development of a volunteer army not to active British influence and
control of military policy, but to either domestic factors or the international threat environment. Such explanations emphasize that British influence during the Mandate period diffused a cultural appreciation for individual rights, or, at the very least, the idea that conscription was inappropriate. Thus, these theories predict that Jordan would have developed a volunteer army even without British influence after independence because it had become part of its domestic culture. If archival evidence supported these arguments, there would be little evidence that Jordanian leaders debated whether to use conscription or volunteers, because the cultural expectations would have made volunteer recruitment the only permissible choice. Alternatively, if functional demands determined Jordanian military recruitment, the debates would emphasize the internal security role of the Jordanian army or the absence of a threatening international environment that would require large amounts of manpower. Instead, archival evidence reveals consensus on an external role for the Arab Legion, including debates on the use of conscription and size of its forces.

In fact, a careful examination of the development of the Arab Legion—the name of Jordan’s army until 1956—demonstrates that its volunteer army was far from inevitable. British colonial practices in Jordan may have increased the likelihood that volunteer recruitment would prevail after independence. However, the reason for this has more to do with the way it set the stage for the British to foster a post-independence patron-client relationship than the transmission of colonial values to the new state. Whereas the latter explanation reflects a logic of normative isomorphism and cultural
diffusion, I argue that the policymaking process was far more coercive. Rather, British policymakers designed the Arab Legion. All evidence suggests that Jordanian leaders did not fully internalize their colonizer’s cultural preference for volunteer militaries. Without continued British intervention in military policy after independence, it is much more likely that Jordan would have adopted a conscript recruitment system. Moreover, the British decision to rely on volunteers was informed by a logic of consequences more than by a logic of appropriateness, though one that was strongly influenced by British strategic culture. Correspondence between Glubb and British government officials at the time indicates that the British were reluctant to permit conscription in the Arab Legion despite an increasingly dangerous external environment.

The chapter proceeds as follows, using documents from the British National Archives in Kew, London and the John Bagot Glubb collection at St. Anthony’s College, Oxford’s, Middle East Centre Archive to support my arguments throughout. These archives contain first-hand reports that identify the key decision-makers during the period of Jordanian military design, including the British Foreign Office, War Office, Chiefs of Staff, General Headquarters of the Middle East Land Forces, and the Treasury, as well as the commander of the Arab Legion, John Bagot Glubb. First, I briefly survey the background and initial development of the Arab Legion to describe the extent to which British military preferences dominated the client state. I examine the development of the Arab Legion during the Mandate era and the early years of Jordanian independence, from 1946 through the end of the first Arab-Israeli War in 1949. This section establishes the

high degree of control the British maintained over Jordan’s military policy as well as the threat environment in which both local and British actors believed the Arab Legion would initially operate. It uses archival sources to identify evidence that the important debates and decisions about Jordanian military policy took place between Glubb and officials in the United Kingdom. Second, I demonstrate that Jordanian actors did not internalize the British preference for a volunteer system, and that without British influence conscription may have been the most likely outcome. I find archival evidence that Jordan’s leaders, including King Abdullah, considered implementing conscription but were swayed by the greater influence of Jordan’s British patrons. This supports Hypothesis 1, which argues that it is foreign influence, not cultural legacies, that determine military recruitment. The third section demonstrates that, contrary to the predictions of the colonial legacy, norms-driven argument, Glubb’s preferences for Jordanian military design did adjust to changes in his perception of the threat environment, though they remained dominated by a British preference for volunteer militaries. Finally, I briefly summarize developments in military recruitment policies after the decline of British influence. This section supports my second hypothesized causal pathway, that a focus on internal threats rather than external ones, combined with the absence of a clear patron interested in affecting military design, permitted greater flexibility in recruitment policies. In sum, this chapter shows that it was British domination of Jordanian security policy, rather than the diffusion of British cultural practices, that influenced Jordanian military design.

The early development of the Arab Legion over the course of the two decades before Jordanian independence, coupled with the continuity in its leadership under John
Bagot Glubb after independence, means 1946 may constitute less of a critical juncture for
the purposes of military design than does independence for many other states. As P. J.
Vatikiotis writes, “one could argue in this case that the army created the state.” More
to the point, the British made the army, and continued making the army well after
independence. Whether military design in Jordan began in 1946 or earlier, it is clear that
the military practices of the United Kingdom and its proxies in Jordan determined that
country’s recruitment policies. As Kenneth Pollack wrote in his dissertation on military
effectiveness, “The British had built the Jordanian Army in their own image….Thus just
as Britain traditionally relied on a small, long-term service professional army, so too did
Jordan. Just as Britain had traditionally relied on a purely volunteer force so too did
Jordan.” This chapter will show that Jordan’s volunteer recruitment system was the
result of foreign security assistance and not of the diffusion of a British culture that
viewed conscription as contrary to an ideology of individual rights. Furthermore, it will
demonstrate that the dominant cultural tendencies in Jordan throughout the period of
British military influence would have been more likely to produce a conscript system in
the absence of that influence. In short, it was British influence after independence, not a
legacy of British influence from before independence, that led Jordan to emulate British
volunteer military recruitment.

239 P. J. Vatikiotis, Politics and the Military in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legion, 1921–1957
240 Kenneth M. Pollack, “The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness” (PhD
II. The Development of the Arab Legion

As Mark Heller writes, “it is impossible to overstate the British role in the history of the Jordanian army.”²⁴¹ Jordan’s military was subject to extensive influence from the United Kingdom under the League of Nations Mandate system, as well as after its independence in 1946. According to the Mandate system, territories whose populations were not yet seen fit to govern themselves would be administered by more developed states on behalf of the League. In the case of the former Ottoman territories, like Jordan, the Mandatory system was intended to be temporary, “until such time as they are able to stand alone.”²⁴² Administrative control for the territory that became Jordan fell to the United Kingdom under the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, in which the United Kingdom and France divided their future control of the Ottoman Empire’s territory in the Middle East. It was on this basis that the United Kingdom negotiated the creation of a protectorate of Transjordan that, along with neighboring Palestine, would be governed by the British Mandatory authorities.²⁴³ The British recognized Abdullah bin al-Hussein, son of the Sharif of Mecca, as Emir of Transjordan’s autonomous administration, before he was crowned King following Jordan’s formal independence in May 1946.

Nonetheless, Jordanian military affairs were essentially the sole preserve of the British Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick Peake from 1921 until 1939, when he was succeeded by another British army officer, John Bagot Glubb, who retained control until

his forced resignation on March 1, 1956. Given this British influence, it is not necessarily surprising that Jordan developed a volunteer army—a recruitment choice it continued to rely primarily on even after Glubb’s dismissal and replacement with local, Arab commanders. British culture has traditionally had an uneasy relationship with conscription, so it is only natural that a heavily British-influenced former colony like Jordan would similarly oppose this recruitment system. Yet it is important to realize that the development of a Jordanian volunteer army was based on this British influence during the process of military design, not through vaguer cultural channels.

The forces that would later form the core of the Arab Legion were first raised by Frederick Peake as the Mobile Force in 1921. In 1923, all security forces in Transjordan merged into the Mobile Force and were renamed the Arab Legion; Abdullah appointed Peake as its commander—a position he held as an employee of the Emirate. In 1926, the British formed the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force (TJFF) and declared it responsible for protecting Jordan’s frontiers. From that point until World War II, the British were responsible for Jordan’s external security and the Arab Legion was relegated to providing internal security.

The British maintained effective control over Jordanian military policy during this period. While Peake (and later Glubb), were employed in a private capacity by Abdullah and “technically were not instruments of British policy,” prior to independence they were still “ultimately subordinate to the British Resident.” Furthermore, British financial aid “furnished Abdullah with a solid economic base,” that made him ultimately dependent on

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246 Heller, “Politics and the Military in Iraq and Jordan,” 90.
the United Kingdom: “Annual British aid reached £100,000 by the mid-1920s [and] £2 million by the mid-1940s.”247 Nadav Safran writes that “the dependence of Jordan on outside financial support has meant that outsiders have largely set the pace for the development of its forces and limited its strategic choices.”248 Thus, this British patronage was vital to the development of the Arab Legion, whose support Abdullah relied upon for survival.

With the end of World War II, the beginning of the Cold War, and Jordan’s looming independence, it became necessary for the British to reevaluate the role of the Arab Legion. The British government, not Abdullah, both evaluated what these roles would be and how the Arab Legion would be organized to achieve them. The British actively discussed and determined the organization of the Arab Legion post-Jordanian independence. In particular, throughout late 1945 representatives of different government offices discussed who had financial responsibility for subsidizing the Arab Legion; before the British evacuation of Palestine—in May 1948—the burden was borne by the Foreign Office and War Office, while afterwards it would be only the Foreign Office that paid.249 Until then, but even after independence, the Arab Legion was classified as a “contingent force” by the British.250 This meant that “the War Office undertook to ‘maintain’ [it] and admit at least a certain amount of responsibility for making the arrangements work.”251 Tellingly, the British government internally debated whether the

Arab Legion should continue to be classified as a contingent force or rather as a foreign army—and noted that in the case of the Arab Legion, it made little difference. One report argued that “While ‘camouflaged’ as a foreign army, the Arab Legion is entirely paid for by Great Britain, commanded by British Officers, and is essentially a British interest.”

The size and structure of the Arab Legion was also often discussed in conjunction with the cost of the subsidy, in ways that implied the British would have final say over these issues. For example, in one meeting at the Treasury on March 6, 1946, British Resident in Transjordan Alec Kirkbride is reported to have voiced that “apart from the infantry formations which would be kept on as long as the War Office wanted them, the permanent strength [of the Legion] would probably be two of the three existing mechanized regiments.” Similarly, in April 1946 the Treasury wrote to the Foreign Office to determine how many mechanized units should be the starting point for financial assistance. Glubb’s plans for the reorganization of the Arab Legion in 1947 were also reviewed by the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Land Forces before they received his “full backing and approval.”

During this time the British were planning the subsidy to an independent Jordan based on primarily internal roles. While the British continued to plan that the Jordanian army would have a “subsidiary role to the British army in the event of another world war,” they deemed internal stability a more pressing and more likely mission. In

255 TNA: FO 371/62195: “Future of the Arab Legion.”
particular, several internal security roles were envisioned. In March 1946 the British assessed that the key tasks of the Arab Legion that determined the size of its subsidy included “internal security,” “protection of the [Kirkuk-Haifa oil] Pipe Line,” which ran from Iraq to Palestine, and “sealing off of the frontier with Palestine in the event of large scale troubles,” as well as serving as Abdullah’s private army.\(^{258}\) The need to “keep the tribes in order” to ensure that oil would continue to flow through the pipeline meant stability in Transjordan was important in and of itself.\(^ {259}\) However, Palestine was considered the real vital territory within the British Middle East, and therefore stability in Transjordan was also necessary because instability would inevitably have implications for control over Palestine.\(^ {260}\)

The British perception of the security link between Palestine and Jordan would only increase later. The increasingly uneasy situation in neighboring Mandatory Palestine began to affect British strategic thinking about the Arab Legion. As an impending British withdrawal from Palestine became clear, the long-term shape of the Arab Legion began to be more organized around frontier defense. Glubb had been concerned about the Palestine problem spilling over into Jordan in 1939, and by 1947 he was engaged in comprehensive efforts to prepare for this threat once again.\(^ {261}\) The British recognized that the Arab Legion was vital for stability in Palestine and would need to be used in the event of disturbances in Palestine, which would likely affect Jordan as well. The British decided that “a long term reorganisation of the Arab Legion [was] connected closely with

\(^{258}\) TNA: FO 371/52605: “Future of the Arab Legion. Code 31 File 2099”

\(^{259}\) TNA: T 220/50: “Talks on 1946 Treaty Revision and Financial Assistance to Arab Legion.”

\(^{260}\) TNA: CO 537/1499: “Trans-Jordan Forces: Arab Legion.”

future developments in Palestine” and as a result, believe[d] it was “unwise to embark on any sweeping changes in the strength or character of that force now.”

The eruption of war with Israel in 1948 further changed the Arab Legion’s role toward greater external defense. While the Arab Legion had always been trained to be used in conventional conflict with external forces, by 1948 it had become a corps d’élite fighting force among the Arab powers. This was a result of British planning and reorganization. The British heavily supplemented the Arab Legion with more British officers. Glubb, the only division commanders, both brigade commanders, three battalion commanders, and nearly all other officers ranked major or higher were British. During the war, “Abdullah was completely dependent on Glubb and the other British officers who took orders not only from him but also from London.” This only increased the extent to which the British controlled Jordanian military development.

The outcome of the war—which saw Jordan absorb the West Bank, more than tripling its population—cemented this change in Jordan’s security environment. In early 1948, a meeting of the United Kingdom’s chiefs of staff noted that “Transjordan’s strategic importance would increase if any parts of Palestine, which is of greater strategic importance, were added to it.” Notably, they added that “This would similarly increase the importance to us of the Arab Legion.” These predictions continued to hold true in

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263 Vatikiotis, Politics and the Military in Jordan, 7; Pollack, “The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness,” 362; Safran, From War to War, 233.
265 Pollack, “The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness,” 362
266 Pollack, “The Influence of Arab Culture on Arab Military Effectiveness,” 364
267 TNA: FO 371/75299: “COS Approval of Size and Organization of the Arab Legion.”
1949, when discussions of Jordan’s subsidy focused on the new threat environment. In June 1949, as a direct result of the end of hostilities in the Arab-Israel war, Glubb assessed that the Arab Legion would likely have to deal with urban riots and rural disturbances involving “actions by local gangs or gangs infiltrating from neighbouring states,” such as Israel or Syria.268

The connection to Israel/Palestine and relations with Palestinians were not the only external defense concerns of the United Kingdom at this time. The British also envisioned a “national defense role” and “operational role in a major war.”269 The Chiefs of Staff assessed that any major war in defense of Egypt would likely be conducted mainly in Northern Palestine and Southern Syria, and thus Jordan could “scarcely fail to be embroiled.”270 They also did not rule out the possibility of incursions from Iraq or Saudi Arabia, with whom Jordan had a fraught history. Though some officials considered external defense somewhat as a “bogey,” the Chiefs of Staff continued to plan for it.271 Thus, despite an increasing orientation toward territorial defense and external threats, British policy continued to dominate Jordanian military design.

III. Jordanian Military Preferences

The above discussion supports my first hypothesis by demonstrating the British maintained a decisive role in determining policies related to the size and organization of the Arab Legion. Furthermore, that the Arab Legion remained a volunteer force despite

269 TNA: FO 371/75299: “COS Approval of Size and Organization of the Arab Legion.”
the increasing British recognition of external threats to Jordan’s security supports hypothesis 4—that threat perception is less likely to affect military recruitment when there is a foreign patron. In this case the preferences of the foreign patron were most decisive for determining recruitment.

This is all the more evident when the British role in military design is compared to the Ottoman undercurrents in military culture, which could have influenced military policy if there had been no British patronage. When Peake transferred control of the Arab Legion to Glubb in 1939, it still had strong connections to the Ottoman army. As a result, if there was any effect of colonial legacy on military recruitment in Jordan at the time, it would have prejudiced the military toward a system of conscription—the system the Ottomans employed when they ruled the territory of Jordan. Only 5 of the 47 officers in the Arab Legion were British at the outbreak of World War II, and the following year there were only two.272 Most of the rest were veterans of the Ottoman army and were opposed to British influence.273 In 1944 there were still 15 officers of the former Ottoman army serving in the Arab Legion, and while senior officers were all British after the war, senior Arab officers were still primarily from the Ottoman era in 1946.274 Moreover, new officers received little training under Peake.275 This lack of training, combined with the small number of British officers, meant that there would have been little opportunity or ability to transmit norms surrounding military recruitment to the old guard.

275 Vatikiotis, Politics and the Military in Jordan, 75.
This does not necessarily mean that the former Ottoman officers would have preferred conscription. Indeed, many locals opposed conscription when it was implemented during the brief period of Syrian rule before the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920.\textsuperscript{276} Conscription was enough of an issue to merit a promise from Herbert Samuel, first British High Commissioner for Transjordan under the Mandate system, upon taking office that Transjordanians would not be conscripted.\textsuperscript{277} However, it is possible that this opposition was to the perception of enforcement of conscription by a foreign government, rather than to conscription itself. The tribes of Transjordan enjoyed a high degree of autonomy during the Mandate. Furthermore, it does not suggest that Abdullah would not have tried to implement conscription anyway. In fact, Abdullah’s government sought to extend its control over the tribes by implementing a census and election registrations, which tribal leaders saw as the first steps to conscription.\textsuperscript{278} This resulted in domestic unrest during registration campaigns in 1929. While it is not clear whether Abdullah intended to use a national registry to enforce conscription—and he undoubtedly would have had difficulty doing so—this would have been consistent with his broader goals of extending his power and limiting the independence of the tribes. As Vatikiotis writes, “In its earlier history the function of the Legion was mainly to extend and impose the authority of Amman, i.e. of Prince Abdullah, over a fractious society.”\textsuperscript{279}

\textsuperscript{276} Vatikiotis, \textit{Politics and the Military in Jordan}, 37.
\textsuperscript{278} Alon, \textit{Colonialism and the Modern State} 71–73.
Furthermore, it is also likely that the ex-Ottoman officers of the early Arab Legion shared the preferences of their similarly anti-British and nationalist former colleagues in neighboring Iraq.\textsuperscript{280} There, conscription was strongly preferred over volunteer recruitment. Similarly, Joseph Massad describes the anti-colonial nationalism of non-Abdullah supporters as very similar to the nationalism in Iraq in ways that would likely also create support for conscription. He argues that “for these nationalists, the army was seen as a central institution to unify the nation. Its role was to integrate a varied citizenry within the framework of national defense, the supreme duty of a nationalist.”\textsuperscript{281} Again, while not requiring conscription, contemporary nationalists tended to view conscript service as a great unifier and source of support for the nation.

Similarly, Yoav Alon argues that the Jordanian “experience of statehood stemmed from the Ottoman legacy.”\textsuperscript{282} He further argues that, while the Ottoman influence weakened in the 1930s, there were nonetheless important cultural and institutional continuities in the transition from Ottoman to Hashemite rule: “the authorities drew on Ottoman methods of governing tribal society and further developed them.”\textsuperscript{283} Thus it seems that Hashemite preferences, like those of the Ottomans before them, may have been to use conscription as a way of weakening alternative sources of authority, despite local opposition. In any event, the limited penetration of British military practices below the leadership of the Arab Legion demonstrates that cultural diffusion would not have been sufficient to influence military design toward a volunteer system. It could have been just as likely to support conscription.

\textsuperscript{280} See chapter 5 for more on conscription in Iraq.\textsuperscript{281} Joseph A. Massad, \textit{Colonial Effects}, 163.\textsuperscript{282} Alon, \textit{Colonialism and the Modern State}, 38.\textsuperscript{283} Alon, \textit{Colonialism and the Modern State}, 150.
It was not until the 1940s that British culture even started to take hold in the Jordanian military. In 1939, Peake handed control of the Arab Legion over to another British officer, John Bagot Glubb. Under Glubb and in wartime conditions, the make-up of the Arab Legion shifted. Glubb began to promote officers slowly from within the ranks, providing greater opportunity for professionalization. The Arab Legion was greatly expanded, strengthened with more British officers, and sent to participate in combat elsewhere in the Middle East. After the war, the British saw it necessary to reorganize the Arab Legion to return to its prior focus on internal security—though as shown above this would only be a temporary shift. In January 1946, High Commissioner Sir Alan Cunningham noted that “the special use to which the Arab Legion was successfully put during the war, and which justified its very large expansion, is now at an end.” However, many British officers stayed with the Arab Legion after the war, which provided for some continuity. In October 1947, 41 out of 191 officers were British. Thus, the British continued to influence policy through the provision of a subsidy and officers and the presence of Glubb.

Despite the increase in British influence during World War II, and the substantial continued British influence after independence, Jordanians were still not convinced volunteer recruitment was the best way forward. The negotiations between the United Kingdom and Jordan over the post-independence relationship demonstrates the continued importance of a volunteer system to the United Kingdom, as well as the possibility that

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284 Heller, “Politics and the Military in Iraq and Jordan.”
Jordanians would have implemented conscription if not for British patronage. Abdullah’s concern for the continuation of support for the Arab Legion led him to secret discussions with Iraq to provide an alternative source of patronage if terms with the British proved unsatisfactory or if the British were to renege on their agreement.\(^{288}\) The British feared that, just as British patronage created a British-style army, Iraqi patronage would lead the army to develop more along Iraqi line. In a note on British-Jordanian negotiations, Glubb wrote that Iraqi patronage would include the replacement of British officers with Iraqi officers, and that as a result, conscription would probably be introduced.\(^{289}\) Thus, not only did the British at the time view it likely that Jordan would adopt conscription if not for British patronage, but the British were also strongly enough opposed to conscription to at least note this as a negative consequence of loosening its grip on Jordanian military policy.

Furthermore, even after independence, Jordanian leaders were not inherently opposed to conscription. Indeed, without their dependence on Britain they are much more likely to have implemented conscription. In May 1947, Glubb noted that Abdullah was uneasy about his reliance on the British willingness to continue to supply a subsidy. He wrote: “The Transjordanian government is extremely anxious to have an army of its own….In my previous memorandum on the defence of Trans-Jordan I pointed out how extremely small is the Trans-Jordan Army compared to those of it’s neighbours [sic].” In response to this dilemma, Glubb noted, the Transjordanian government considered the possibility of conscription. He “strongly opposed the proposal” because “Experience has

shown that Arab conscript armies are no use…to transform it into a conscript army would spoil it.”\textsuperscript{290} The British government made a similar assessment shortly before Jordanian independence, arguing,

The Arab Legion is a long service well paid professional force. All other Arab countries have made the fundamental mistake of introducing conscription. Patriotism is not yet strong enough in any Arab country to persuade men to serve willingly in an army without adequate pay. Well paid armies of a fraction of the size of their present conscript armies would be much more valuable to most Arab countries. As long as the other Arab armies are recruited by conscription, the Arab Legion is likely to be the only one efficient and loyal.\textsuperscript{291}

These beliefs would continue to dominate British strategic thinking. This was the British government’s assessment despite the belief that “the greater the contribution which Transjordan can make to its own defence the smaller would be the British effort required to fulfill [their] treaty obligations” to come to its aid.\textsuperscript{292} Thus, despite a perceived role in a major conflict that might necessitate more manpower, the British influenced Jordan to stay fast to the Arab Legion’s volunteer recruitment scheme.

The extensive pre-independence British influence on Jordan was clearly not sufficient to convince Jordanians that the British preference for volunteers was correct. In addition to Abdullah’s questions about conscription, Jordanian Prime Minister Samir al-Rifai also had concerns about the Arab Legion’s current ability to meet the threats it faced.

\textsuperscript{290} TNA: WO 32/15562: “Organisation of Arab Legion on a long-term basis”
\textsuperscript{291} TNA: CO 537/1499: “Trans-Jordan Forces: Arab Legion.”
\textsuperscript{292} TNA: FO 371/75299: “COS Approval of Size and Organization of the Arab Legion.”
faced. British government correspondence notes that Rifai believed that “the Arab Legion must be maintained at a reasonable strength as a measure for collective defence” and that “the Arab Legion as now formed needs complete reorganisation.” This is in direct contrast to the British view, that saw reorganization as undesirable and maintained that small, highly trained mobile forces were ideal. Indeed, there was extensive back and forth among British officials regarding whether reorganization of the Arab Legion was necessary, though ultimately they decided some reorganization would be beneficial.

While this does not show that Rifai or other Jordanian officials necessarily would have implemented conscription had it not been for British influence, it does suggest that they were more eager to engage in the types of military reform that would be consistent with the goals of conscription than were the British. Without British influence it is more likely that Jordan would have resorted to conscription to increase its defensive capabilities. The next section will show that while the British influence kept the Arab Legion itself volunteer, the high threat environment of Jordan’s early post-independence years led to the development of auxiliary forces that would use alternative forms of military recruitment.

IV. The Development of Jordan’s National Guard

Consistent with hypothesis 3, the Jordanian preference for conscription was at least partially a response to their perception of a high external threat environment. Again, this was especially true after the 1948 war with Israel. The West Bank, once absorbed by

Jordan, was “certain to be the first objective of an Israeli attack.” Moreover, it was clear that Jordan would be unable to prevent an Israeli breakthrough into the West Bank.

In fact, the external environment was so threatening that the British did permit a form of compulsory recruitment to be implemented in Jordan. Notably, the Arab Legion, as the principal military force of Jordan, was to remain purely based on volunteer recruitment. However, Glubb proposed, and was permitted to implement, a National Guard system that incorporated at least elements of conscript service. Glubb’s goal was to develop an efficient, well-trained force capable of defending the West Bank. However, as Kenneth Pollack writes, British officers were “completely opposed to diluting the caliber of manpower by adopting large-scale conscription.” Instead, a compromise emerged. The British would accept more volunteers at the same level of training into the Arab Legion, but permit Glubb to implement his plan for a National Guard to enhance readiness.

Glubb’s plan was influenced by the Israeli practice of ensuring that populations living on the frontier were trained and armed well enough to defend themselves. In June 1949 he proposed a plan to develop a “Home Guard” (later named the National Guard) in which civilians in each village would be instructed on how to provide basic training to other villagers. That instructor was then to give basic training for the whole

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295 Safran, *From War to War*, 232.
296 Safran, *From War to War*, 232.
299 TNA: FO 371/75298: “Proposal by Glubb Pasha to form a Home Guard in the Arab villages of Palestine.”
300 TNA: FO 371/75298: “Proposal by Glubb Pasha to form a Home Guard in the Arab villages of Palestine.”
of their village. In 1952 National Guard legislation was passed making one month of training compulsory for every man in every village, without pay.\textsuperscript{301} The goal, according to Glubb, was village defense and as a base of recruitment for the Arab Legion, and would be “of far greater value in the event of a long war.”\textsuperscript{302}

Consistent with my argument that British patronage led to British control over recruitment policy, final approval on the development of the National Guard in 1949 seems to have rested with British officials. This is evident in a series of reports that followed Glubb’s proposal to implement his National Guard plan. A first dispatch from the British Legation in Amman, to Ernest Bevin, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, notes that Glubb required approval for his plan, which demanded the purchase of additional rifles from the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{303} The request was forwarded to the War Office on September 9\textsuperscript{th}, with the handwritten note “As the [Secretary of State] is away, I think that I ought to clear this with the Minister of Defence.”\textsuperscript{304} The proposal was approved on October 4\textsuperscript{th}, 1949.\textsuperscript{305}

King Hussein, who came to power in 1953, also viewed the National Guard as an important element of defense. He asserted that its purpose was to “defend the border in order to allow the better trained and equipped army, in the event of [Israeli] aggression,

\textsuperscript{301} MECA: “Exercise Shems ed Din,” July 1–3, 1952. Lt.-Gen. Sir John Bagot Glubb Collection GB165-0118 Box 31 2006 Accession. Though, this appears to have also been the case at least in 1951. MECA: Robert Melville Collection GB165-577.


\textsuperscript{303} TNA: FO 371/75298: “Proposal by Glubb Pasha to form a Home Guard in the Arab villages of Palestine.”

\textsuperscript{304} TNA: FO 371/75298: “Proposal by Glubb Pasha to form a Home Guard in the Arab villages of Palestine.”

\textsuperscript{305} TNA: FO 371/75298: “Proposal by Glubb Pasha to form a Home Guard in the Arab villages of Palestine.”
to direct its strikes at specific targets." Ultimately Glubb noted that there were sufficient volunteers to avoid conscripting individuals into the National Guard. However, that this system was approved and implemented at all supports the hypothesis that high threat environments encourage conscription. That it was strictly implemented in a military force that was separate from the Arab Legion, however, indicates that British military influence was important for keeping the latter a volunteer force.

V. Post-Glubb Developments in the Jordanian Army

Hussein dismissed Glubb on March 1, 1956. The circumstances that led to his dismissal and the subsequent loss of British military control had developed relatively recently. Part of the explanation has to do with the personality of the new king. Vatikiotis argues that Glubb’s own beliefs about his dismissal—that the young Hussein resented Glubb’s experience and influence over him—“May reflect accurately the feelings of a young monarch struggling under immense and inimical pressure to establish his political primacy.” Lawrence Tal agrees that much of the decision wrested with Hussein and his personal ambitions. Kamal Salibi also emphasizes the identity and age of the new monarch, referring to “the generation gap” between Glubb and Hussein that created differences between them.

All three of these sources agree that these differences were more than merely personal, however, and rather reflected important political developments in the broader Arab world. The rise of Arab nationalism made it increasingly untenable for the army to

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306 Quoted in Massad, Colonial Effects, 205.
308 Vatikiotis, Politics and the Military in Jordan, 118.
309 Tal, Politics, the Military, and National Security in Jordan, 27.
be dominated by the British, both at the level of officers and in terms of broader policy. In the early 1950s—influenced by the nationalist coups in Syria and Egypt—a movement formed in the Arab Legion called the Free Officers, which sought to “sack Glubb and Arabise the Legion.”  

311 Riots in December 1955 and January 1956 centered on the perception that the country was too much under the British thumb.  

312 In this political environment, Glubb’s plan to Arabize by the Legion by 1965 was simply unacceptably slow to many in the political opposition.  

313 Similarly, given this rising anti-British sentiment and the overall decline in British imperial capabilities at this time, the benefits to the British of retaining their influence or of preventing Glubb’s dismissal may have been no longer perceived as worth the increasing cost. 

British influence suffered a notable decline with the sacking of Glubb in 1956. By 1957, the United States had replaced the United Kingdom as Jordan’s principal source of foreign support.  

314 However, the United States did not have the same interest in Jordanian military design as did Glubb, as its leader. One of the key goals of Glubb’s firing was to take back control of the Arab Legion. Hussein wanted to Arabize it, and in doing so wanted to “demonstrate he was breaking the fetters of imperialism” and distance the Arab Legion from its perception as “an alien force, run by British officers, taking orders not from Jordan, but from their British commander.”  

315 Indeed, this was when the Arab Legion was renamed the Jordan Arab Army, and British officers were quickly replaced

311 Tal, Politics, the Military, and National Security in Jordan, 26. 
314 Tal, Politics, the Military, and National Security in Jordan, 3. 
with Jordanian ones. Thus, rather than simply replacing one patron with another, after Glubb’s dismissal Jordan gained much more autonomy over its military than it previously enjoyed.

In addition, the army leadership that replaced Glubb “had little use for the British colonial notion of ‘tradition’” and “saw the army as an instrument of national unification.” This is a goal that conscription is better suited to than volunteer recruitment. Conscription is better able to force the integration of diverse populations compared to volunteer recruitment, which must rely on the segments of the population that are traditionally attracted to military service. Glubb, on the other hand, sought to cultivate a high level of cohesion and corps d’esprit. He ensured separation between recruits from tribes and the sedentary population, and recruited primarily from specific tribes.

The end of British influence created a permissive environment in which Jordanians policymakers were able to make recruitment decisions based on their own ideas about military design. Thus, while military recruitment stayed stably voluntary throughout the period of British patronage, Jordan now began to change its recruitment system more frequently. In 1966 it abolished the National Guard and instituted compulsory military service for the first time. Two years later the service term was expanded from ninety days to two years; two years after that they transitioned back to a volunteer force, and in 1976 conscription was reinstated. These frequent recruitment

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316 Tal, Politics, the Military, and National Security in Jordan, 31.
318 Massad, Colonial Effects, 177.
changes suggest that Jordanian leaders were unconstrained by a patron to guide their military design choices during this time.

This period was characterized by particularly high threat levels for Jordan. Security threats emerged from an ever-shifting array of inter-Arab alliances and the rise of Pan-Arabism. However, the government perceived the dominant threat as coming from within the state. The Jordanian Prime Minister argued that, in addition to the threat from Syria, it was internal security “which made it essential” to maintain high force levels. In order to maintain these force levels he had even discussed the possibility of implementing conscription with Hussein as early as October 1957, though they ultimately decided against it. Notably, however, the tone of reports on debates about conscription contrasts with the earlier report from Glubb. As will be discussed below, recruitment now appeared to be under the control of the King and his Jordanian advisers, rather than adopted according to British interests.

The internal threat became especially severe after the formation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964. The PLO constituted a potential alternative source of authority for Arabs from the strategically important West Bank, who made up most of the country’s population. One demand the PLO made was for stronger defense of the frontier, including compulsory military service. The Jordanian government’s implementation of conscription in the 1960s was designed not only to satisfy these popular demands, but also to “prevent the likelihood of Jordan’s youth joining the

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319 Tal, Politics, the Military, and National Security in Jordan, 5–6.
320 TNA: FO 371/127946: “Arab Army of Jordan.”
321 TNA: FO 371/127946: “Arab Army of Jordan.”
322 Massad, Colonial Effects, 237.
[Palestinian] guerrillas. Again, the British now appear to have allowed recruitment decisions to rest with the Jordanian government. While the British continued to offer advice, reports from the Military and Air Attache’s officer show that the most important policymakers were no longer British advisers but Jordanian advisers: In 1964, one report describes how a chief adviser to Hussein “had no intention of allowing conscription to be introduced,” and that “his plan was to expand the Army…without resort to conscription.” This contrasts with King Abdullah’s earlier consideration of conscription. Then, Glubb’s opposition resulted in an alternative reserve scheme that was adopted by the Jordanian government. Post-Glubb reports on conscription reveal less about British preferences, and instead report Jordanian debates and outcomes as matters of policy.

Ultimately skepticism regarding the risks of arming the entire population prevailed and Jordanians temporarily abandoned conscription in 1970. However, the connection between the initial implementation of conscription in the 1960s and concerns for internal stability show that conscription would not have been possible without the earlier change in leadership. This permitted domestic policymakers with new ideas about the role of the military in society to take power and implement their preferred recruitment policies.

324 TNA: FO 371/175673: “Army.”
VI. Conclusion

Jordanian military policy was for all intents and purposes the sole preserve of British policymakers from the beginning of the Mandate system through the first ten years after independence. The resulting recruitment policies followed a logic that was consistent with how the British tended to think about the role of the military at the time. Although the British themselves used conscription for their own armed forces in the 1940s, British thinking still favored volunteer recruitment. Domestically, conscription was viewed as an unfortunate necessity and was never intended to provide a permanent basis of recruitment.325 It was the government’s “constant aim to increase the proportion of regulars and…our ultimate object [to achieve] smaller active forces based on voluntary long-term engagements.”326 Moreover, the British citizens who led the Arab Legion became officers in a period before National Service was ever implemented. It is unsurprising that, as the evidence in this chapter shows, they preferred to recruit volunteers to the foreign army they were designing, as well.

As British influence in Jordan declined, Jordanian policymakers became freer to experiment with alternative forms of recruitment. Nationalists who viewed regime stability as the primary goal and the military as an important resource for pursuing that goal came to power. They eventually implemented conscription, though only for a few years. Nonetheless, this shows that domestic leaders, when not constrained by high levels of external threat and foreign patrons, are able to adopt recruitment policies based on their own preferences. Moreover, these policies are more malleable, in part because they 325 Vinen, *National Service*, 34.
326 TNA: CAB 21/3478: “National Service Bill: compulsory military service; post war policy.”
are subject to changes in domestic politics rather than to the relatively more stable preferences of a foreign patron.

Therefore, this chapter supports my argument that foreign patrons influence military recruitment in new states. It also supports the hypothesis that threat plays little role in influencing foreign patron’s military recruitment preferences, as the British maintained the Arab Legion as a volunteer force despite changes in threat perception. Finally, I have demonstrated that colonial legacies were not enough to shape recruitment practices in Jordan. Ottoman-era preference for conscription continued to influence Jordanian thinking through much of the post-independence period. The principal factor explaining Jordan’s volunteer recruitment system was the ongoing policy intervention of the British.
CHAPTER 5: IRAQ

I. Introduction

In 2003, the United States dismantled the Iraqi military and rebuilt it from the ground up, electing to design it around a system of volunteer recruitment. This was a stark change from the type of army Iraq had traditionally maintained. In fact, when it last had an army recruited on a volunteer basis, Iraq was under a similar occupation by a different foreign power. Then it was the United Kingdom, in its capacity as the colonial power overseeing a League of Nations Mandate, that oversaw and shaped Iraq’s armed forces. During the entire period of the Mandate, the United Kingdom exercised enormous influence over the entire Iraqi government, including the defense establishment, and sought to shape the army in its own image as a volunteer force. Nonetheless, Iraq adopted conscription nearly immediately upon receiving independence in 1932. Why?

In this chapter I argue that Iraq’s conscript army developed along the lines of my second causal pathway: military recruitment free from external patronage and external threat. Its recruitment policy was a result of Iraqi domestic policymaking, which was in

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turn influenced by policymakers’ familiarity with and preference for Ottoman military practices. Furthermore, this relative freedom to adopt recruitment policies based on historical experiences was made possible by the absence of two key constraints on the Iraqi military. First, neither the United Kingdom nor any other country took on the role of a military patron—while the United Kingdom provided some support to Iraq after independence, as described below, it chose not to exert control over recruitment decisions. Second, there was no major external threat to Iraq’s security.

Iraq’s decision to adopt conscription is even more puzzling given the apparent continuity in Iraqi politics after independence. The United Kingdom remained the paramount force in Iraqi politics well after the Mandate ended, and many scholars argue that it continued to exercise considerable influence over the Iraqi military.\textsuperscript{328} However, I argue that despite the United Kingdom’s continued influence, there was one key difference that characterized the relationship between Iraq and the United Kingdom after the former’s independence. While Iraq was dependent on military support from the United Kingdom, after independence it was granted autonomy to adopt its own military design decisions. The United Kingdom may still have had the capacity to intervene in military design if it wanted to, but it sent clear signals that Iraq could adopt its own preferences for recruitment policies. For the United Kingdom, the costs of continued intervention in Iraqi military design were too high given the history of rebellion and the availability of Jordan as a base of operations for the region.

What, then, explains the Iraqi preference for conscription and its implementation after independence? I argue that the British attitude of non-interference, coupled with an environment of low external threats, created few constraints on Iraqi policymaking. Instead, Iraqi leaders’ personal beliefs about the role of the military in society influenced their decision-making. The recent experiences and education of Iraqi policy-makers fostered beliefs that the military could be a tool for nationbuilding—the process of creating a unified Iraqi national identity—and statebuilding—the strengthening of central state institutions. More specifically, post-independence Iraqi leaders were more the product of an Ottoman military education that stressed conscription’s nation- and statebuilding aspects than of the British advisors that had most recently trained them. In other words, in the absence of external influence after independence, one of Iraq’s competing colonial legacies—that of the Ottoman Empire—played a major role in determining recruitment decisions.

This explanation differs from the most common alternative theory presented in the literature on military organization, that recruitment decisions represent deeply ingrained culture or norms inherited from the colonial period. While both my theory and a colonial legacy argument attribute Iraqi decision-making to domestic ideology, they differ in terms of what constitutes the source of that ideology and how determinative it is. For one, my theory only attributes importance to ideology because two other factors—an interventionist foreign patron and a dangerous external environment—were not present to otherwise constrain policymaking. Furthermore, I do not assume that ideology is automatically passed down from colonizer to colonized. Rather, many states—Iraq included—are characterized by competing colonial or pre-colonial legacies that could
equally have become dominant after independence. In the case of Iraq, for example, it is not clear—until one examines the nature of Iraqi military training and development—why an Ottoman cultural legacy would supersede the more recent British one.

In addition, I recognize independence as an important critical juncture that, under the right conditions, permits new policymakers to act on their own ideas. These ideas may be influenced by cultural legacies, but are at least as likely to have more proximate origins. The fact that in Iraq’s case policymakers were influenced by less proximate historical ideas says more about how the circumstances in which Iraq achieved independence fostered continuity than it does about the prima facie power of a specific colonial legacy.

Moreover, these early decisions have important implications for the modern Iraqi army. Iraq’s longtime reliance on conscription has left deep marks in its security culture. Post-2003 governments have considered re-implementing conscription in Iraq.329 Consistent with my theory, the main obstacle to Iraq’s returning to its traditional form of recruitment is the high level of international involvement in military design and training since the 2003 invasion. The United States currently has hundreds of advisers in Iraq that have trained tens of thousands of Iraqi troops.330 In addition, at least 5,000 American


troops—likely more, given undisclosed deployments—have been participating in the war against Islamic State, which has required extensive cooperation with the Iraqi military.\footnote{Associated Press, “2 U.S. Soldiers Killed in Iraq in Combat Operations,” New York Times, August 13, 2017. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/13/world/middleeast/us-troops-killed-in-iraq-in-combat-operations.html.} If not for this overwhelming presence and advice, Iraq would likely return to conscript recruitment.

However, this chapter focuses on the initial conditions in which Iraq built its military after its 1932 independence. I first describe the genesis of the Iraqi army and its organization during the Mandate era, highlighting the British role in these pre-independence military design decisions. Second, I examine the extent to which British preferences diffused to their Iraqi patrons, arguing that, as in Jordan, the pre-Mandate Ottoman influence remained the dominant ideological force that affected Iraqi thought on military organization. In the next section I address the claims of my theory. I argue first, that the British did not play an active role in military design in Iraq after its independence, and second, that Iraqi leaders who did make military design decisions did not perceive their external threat environment to be particularly threatening. These two conditions created a permissive environment in which Iraqi leaders could design the military based on idiosyncratic factors relating to their prior beliefs about the relationship between the military and society.

This chapter tests my theoretical claims in several ways. First, it highlights the importance of independence as a critical juncture in the process of military design.
Despite high levels of British influence before and after 1932, formal independence increased the costs of direct British interference in the field of military design, especially given divergent Iraqi preferences. Independence permitted Iraq greater control over its military policies, allowing it to deviate from existing British practices.

Second, it emphasizes the freedom domestic political leaders have to design the military based on idiosyncratic preferences when they have neither committed foreign patrons nor major external threats to address. Thus the case of Iraq after independence is illustrative of my second causal pathway for military recruitment decisions. One cannot predict the recruitment practices the Iraqi military would adopt without a detailed understanding of the country’s leaders’ particular preferences.

Finally, this chapter highlights the inability to understand military recruitment based on theories that rely purely on colonial legacy. A more traditional colonial legacy approach ignores two key facts about military recruitment in Iraq. First, it overlooks the immense difference in preferences between Iraqi and British policy elites during the key period of Iraqi military design. Colonial legacy arguments require believing that colonial preferences are passed on to the policymakers in the newly independent state. This was clearly not the case in Iraq. Thus, a colonial legacy argument cannot reconcile the immense British role in all aspects of Iraqi foreign and defense policy—including military design—during the Mandate era with the post-independence Iraqi leadership’s explicit rejection of British colonial practices. Second, an alternative explanation based on colonial legacy could highlight the continuity between the Ottoman period and post-independence Iraqi military practices. However, this argument requires ignoring the very real influence of the British during the intervening Mandate era, as well as the possibility
that the British could have continued to enforce their preferences after independence. While ultimately Ottoman military preferences did influence independent Iraqi leaders’ decisions on military design, this was only possible because the British did not exercise their influence on the Iraqi military after independence. To argue that an Ottoman colonial legacy was the decisive factor leading to conscription in Iraq fails to acknowledge the ability of the British to overpower these underlying preferences for more than a decade during the Mandate era.

II. The History of the Iraqi Army

As with the Jordanian army, the development of the Iraqi army combined powerful Ottoman-era influences with efforts to superimpose contemporary British interests. World War I ended with the United Kingdom in control of much of the Middle Eastern territory of the Ottoman Empire, including the territory that would become Iraq. In 1920 the San Remo Conference formalized this control under the aegis of the League of Nations Mandate system, which made the United Kingdom responsible for overseeing the creation of effective governance and stability in Iraq until it met the criteria for admission to the League of Nations as a sovereign state. Unsurprisingly, the British found the creation of armed forces to be useful for the purposes of establishing stability.

The British created two separate armed forces. First, they recruited a force known as the Iraq or Assyrian Levies. Initially formed during World War I, the Levies were under direct British control and were ultimately manned mainly by ethnic Assyrians,
except for the officers, who were British.\textsuperscript{332} The Levies numbered more than 5,000 at their peak strength at the end of World War I, but had only light weaponry and were tasked primarily with guarding British military installations—air bases that were considered vital stop-overs on the way to India.\textsuperscript{333} They were also a major point of contention between Iraq and the United Kingdom. The British viewed the Levies as an important force loyal exclusively to them that could be counted upon absolutely to protect their assets within the country.\textsuperscript{334} For precisely this reason, the Iraqi government viewed the Levies as a major affront to their future sovereignty.\textsuperscript{335}

The British were aware of this tension and had no intention of making the Levies the national armed forces of Iraq. Well-trained locals were too scarce to dilute the ethnic makeup of the Levies, and in any event the British had no desire to give up control of the force that guarded their important military bases. Conversely, local opposition to British rule was too pervasive and powerful to deny Iraqis the important symbol of sovereignty that would come with control over their own military force. This became particularly clear after the 1920 rebellion against British direct rule. Indeed, Abbas Kadhim argues that this was the key memory for the British as they planned their administration of Iraq.\textsuperscript{336} The 1920 insurrection was largely caused by the perception of Iraqis that the British were reneging on their promises of home rule. While the cities remained largely

\textsuperscript{333} Eliezer Be’eri, \textit{Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society} (New York, NY: Frederick A. Praeger, 1970), 326; Silverfarb, \textit{Britain’s Informal Empire}, 3, 47; Main, \textit{Iraq: From Mandate to Independence}, 43.
\textsuperscript{334} Main, \textit{Iraq: From Mandate to Independence}, 120.
\textsuperscript{335} Silverfarb, \textit{Britain’s Informal Empire}, 48.
loyal and under British control, it inflicted major losses on both sides, bringing “almost total anarchy to the countryside.” Pacification required “some months of exhausting British military efforts,” including several “misadventures,” “the summoning of important reinforcements from India,” and expenditure of £40 million: much more than had been spent during contemporaneous conflicts elsewhere in the region. The high cost of the conflict also mobilized British domestic public opinion against intervention in Iraq.

One of the key consequences was the decision that continued intervention in Iraq’s domestic policies would be too costly. The British decided to accelerate Iraq’s transition to home rule, including the establishment of Feisal I as King of Iraq and the reduction of Iraqi reliance on British troops. While the British had more than 60,000 troops in Iraq in 1920, only the Levies remained by 1930. Thus, it became clear that Iraq would need an army not only as an important symbol of home rule, but also to relieve the British of some of the responsibilities of enforcing stability. In addition, one way in which a locally recruited national army would contribute to stability was by providing employment for the “large and articulate group of unemployed and discontented” officers from the recently defeated Turkish army.

An Iraqi national army became an important part of the broader British strategy for disengaging from Iraq. On January 6th, 1921, the seeds of the Iraqi military were

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341 Be’eri, *Army Officers*, 326.
planted when the Council of Ministers created the Iraqi General Staff. However, the key decisions about the development of the army were made by the British two months later when Winston Churchill, as Secretary of State for the Colonies, convened a conference in Cairo in 1921 in which the future of British policy in Iraq, including its defense, was decided. An important outcome of the conference was the determination that Iraq would need an indigenous army: one “staffed, run and funded by Iraqis.”

While the British continued to pay most of the cost for Iraqi defense forces, “the primary and constant goal of those in London was to reduce the costs of the Mandate by forcing the Iraqi government to take greater financial and strategic responsibility for its own defense as soon as it could.” The goals of the army reflected British concerns about maintaining influence at low cost to the British government. The army would be big enough to suppress internal unrest but small enough to prevent the state from revolting against the British. In 1922, 250 former Ottoman officers were inducted into the officer corps, with the army reaching an initial strength of 2,000 volunteer recruits.

The British sought to instill their military preferences in the Iraqi leadership in several ways. First, there was a British military advisory mission, which included at least 46 military officers by 1930. In addition, the British helped set up an Iraqi Military College. The Royal Iraqi Military College opened in 1921 before closing for financial

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343 Ireland, *Iraq: A Study in Political Development*, 302. The Council of Ministers had been created several months earlier to act as a provisional government, though it remained heavily influenced by the British via a formal role for British advisers and the ultimate authority of the High Commissioner for the Mandate. See Ireland, *Iraq: A Study in Political Development*, 280, 286.
reasons and reopening in 1924. The Director of the college and 15 out of 20 instructors were British.\textsuperscript{349} Instruction relied on English textbooks, and even experienced officers were required to redo their training along British lines.\textsuperscript{350} An additional Staff College for senior officers opened in 1928.

Furthermore, the British retained ultimate authority for all Iraqi military matters. According to Marc Heller, “From 1920–1932 the army of Iraq was virtually a British appendage. During this period, it was directly financed by a British grant, and technical decisions about size, training, equipment, and so on were a British Monopoly.”\textsuperscript{351} The 1922 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, ratified in 1924, secured the nature of this relationship, establishing that the United Kingdom would continue to be responsible for the external defense of Iraq. Moreover, a Military Agreement signed as subsidiary to the treaty maintained that Iraq could lose its British military assistance if it failed to follow the advice of the High Commissioner on military matters.\textsuperscript{352} This was no idle threat: The Bonar Law government—formed in 1922—seriously considered a complete evacuation of Iraq during its first few months, and a “fierce” campaign to “Quit Mesopotamia” filled the British press at the time.\textsuperscript{353} While the British were anxious to have the treaty ratified, doubts remained about the British role in Iraq should it not be ratified on favorable terms.

Despite high levels of British influence in Iraq, Ottoman practices continued to dominate Iraqi military thinking. As al-Marashi and Salama write, citing recollections from a graduate of the Military College, the British attempted “to create officers in the


\textsuperscript{350} Tarbush, *The Role of the Military in Politics*, 78.

\textsuperscript{351} Heller, “Politics and the Military in Iraq and Jordan,” 80.

\textsuperscript{352} Main, *Iraq: From Mandate to Independence*, 83.

\textsuperscript{353} Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq*, 53.
British mold, but Iraqis could not isolate themselves from the ideological currents in society." This was also true of Iraqi policymakers. Shortly after independence the new government easily passed a bill calling for conscription. The next section details the failure of the British to inculcate Iraqi leaders with a preference for a volunteer military.

III. Divergent Interests during the Mandate Era

Direct British influence in Iraqi military design ensured that the army would develop along British lines. However, without this British intervention, it is unlikely that the outcome for Iraqi military recruitment during the Mandatory period would have been the same. There were major disagreements between British and Iraqi policymakers throughout this period, explicitly over the form of military recruitment, that likely were resolved in Britain’s favor only due to its direct control over the military.

Iraqi leaders sought to implement conscription throughout the Mandatory period. In fact, conscription was one of the first proposals made by the government after Feisal became king in 1921. Iraqi policymakers wanted conscription because they viewed a strong army as increasing their chances for independence by demonstrating their ability to provide for their own defense. Al-Marashi and Salama note that one of the reasons

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355 Simon, *Iraq Between the Two World Wars*, 111. Simon places the beginning of conscription in 1933, while others describe somewhat different timelines, as late as 1935. Records at the British National Archives indicate that the National Service Law was read at the opening of Jamil Beg-al-Madfa’i’s Parliament in 1933 and was passed early in 1934, though possibly not implemented until 1935 (TNA: FO 371/16903, “Iraq. Code 93 Files 85-105”; TNA: FO 371/20010, “Iraq. Code 93 Files 842-980”). All agree that support for conscription was high after independence and especially after the Assyrian uprising and subsequent government massacre of Assyrians in summer 1933. See Main, *Iraq: From Mandate to Independence*, 121 and Al-Marashi and Salama, *Iraq’s Armed Forces*, 33.
Feisal was so eager to expand the army after independence was that “his kingdom could not ‘stand tall’ without a national army.”

Feisal and his advisors viewed conscription as important not merely because they wanted a large army for military purposes, but also because they expected the military to serve as a unifying force for the nation. Toby Dodge, relying on British archival documents that cite Iraqi leaders’ views on conscription, describes how the “Hashemite vision of a mass conscripted army mirrored their conception of the state and nation. Conscription of the urban population into the army would forcibly create a homogenous and loyal nation through state action. The army was to be the primary tool of education and statebuilding.”

According to Reeva Simon, who examines the background of Iraqi leaders, they “hoped to make the army a school for the nation, an extension of the educational system.” She cites Phebe Marr’s biography of Yasin al-Hashimi—a Prime Minister both before and after independence—as evidence that it became “close to a dogma” that conscription could be used “to achieve national cohesion.”

Iraqi leaders again tried to implement conscription in 1926 by presenting High Commissioner Henry Dobbs with a draft conscription law. In parliamentary debates over the issue, Iraq’s first Minister of Defense, Jafar al-Askari argued that conscription would not just aid defense but would “open the door of participation” and “be more inclusive of the racial qualities and national virtues with which the Iraqi nation is graced than an army built on any other basis.”

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359 Dodge, *Inventing Iraq*, 140.
This belief in the efficacy of conscription can be traced to the continued
dominance of Ottoman thinking in the Iraqi military, which Simon argues was the
intellectual foundation for much of the Iraqi army. For one, strong anti-British currents
continued to run through the military. The majority of army officers had served in the
Ottoman military, with dozens of Iraqi cadets having been accepted to the military
academy in Istanbul.\textsuperscript{364} Even in September 1936, four years after independence, 50 out of
84 officers had served in the Ottoman army.\textsuperscript{365} Exposure to Ottoman military education,
argues Simon, was in effect indoctrination with the principle of “unification of diverse
elements into a nation based on a common language and history.”\textsuperscript{366} Thus the Iraqi
military viewed conscription as the appropriate solution to a domestic statebuilding
problem: how to build support for a weak central government dominated by a minority
group elite. Even mandatory British military training was insufficient to overcome these
influences. Although most instructors were British, the ex-Ottoman instructors at the
Military College still “conveyed to their students Arabism and anti-imperialist ideas.”\textsuperscript{367}

Second, this Ottoman influence in the military was replicated in the ruling class.
Indeed, the British choice for political leadership lay “among the city notables and the
former Ottoman officials and officer class.”\textsuperscript{368} This was not least because many of the
leaders of Iraq under the Mandate were former military officials, like Jafar al Askari and
Nuri Said, both of whom served as prime minister during the Mandate. Paul Hemphill
agrees that continued contact with Ottoman ideas via Ottoman-era military instructors

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\textsuperscript{364} Be’eri, \textit{Army Officers}, 327; Heller, “Politics and the Military in Iraq and Jordan,” 82.
\textsuperscript{365} Tarbush, \textit{The Role of the Military in Politics}, 78.
\textsuperscript{366} Simon, \textit{Iraq Between the Two World Wars}, xii.
\textsuperscript{367} Al-Marashi and Salama, \textit{Iraq’s Armed Forces}, 28.
\textsuperscript{368} Tarbush, \textit{The Role of the Military in Politics}, 43.
\end{footnotesize}
influenced policies: “Officers who had served in the Ottoman and Arab armies continued to mix with former comrades-in-arms….Cadets and junior officers, to whom teachers and instructors had conveyed the ideas of their elders, remained in touch with school friends and family acquaintances who had selected civilian careers.” Thus it is unsurprising that Ottoman thinking about the military and the role of conscription was common among Iraqi policymakers. A British report from the time also contends that “Iraqi politicians of all shades of opinions have long wished to change the system of recruiting for the army. They have inherited continental ideas on [conscription] through the Turks and believe that conscripts are better fighters than professional soldiers,” as well as because “they believe that it will strengthen national unity among the diverse peoples of Iraq and will enable the Government to organize a much larger army without seriously increasing the cost of maintenance.”

It is important to recognize that the Ottoman influence on policymakers did not extend to all sectors of society. Many groups were deeply opposed to conscription. Indeed, one problem with cultural determinism explanations for military recruitment is that the history of opposition to conscription runs just as deep as the history of state enforcement of conscription. Under the Ottoman Empire, conscription disproportionately affected the Shi’a tribes and was “the most resented” of Ottoman institutions.

Similarly, the Iraqi leadership’s desire to implement conscription was a major point of contention with the British in part because of opposition from the Shi’a tribes, whose

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371 Sluglett, Britain in Iraq, 96; Longrigg, Iraq, 38.
support the British relied on to secure the countryside.\textsuperscript{372} These tribes continued to oppose vigorously efforts to conscript their members to the Iraqi national army after independence.\textsuperscript{373}

Meanwhile, despite the preferences of Iraqi leaders, the British remained starkly opposed to the idea of a conscript-based Iraqi army. There are both pragmatic and cultural reasons for the United Kingdom’s interest in keeping the Iraqi army a volunteer force. For one, as Peter Sluglett demonstrates using British archival documents, the United Kingdom’s use of air power allowed them to justify keeping a small Iraqi army that was reliant on them.\textsuperscript{374} Dobbs feared that rapidly expanding the army would lead to major domestic unrest.\textsuperscript{375} Thus maintaining a small army perpetuated the United Kingdom’s position of dominance in Iraq. Ultimately, as the Secretary of State for the Colonies indicated in a letter to the High Commissioner in 1928, the United Kingdom was not prepared to allow Iraq to adopt policies that would make it independent on matters of defense.\textsuperscript{376} Preventing conscription, which the British perceived as enabling Iraq to recruit a much larger army, would keep it dependent on the British. Less cynically, the British were concerned that the adoption of conscription would alienate the Shi’a tribes and lead to internal disorder.\textsuperscript{377} Of course, it is difficult to separate these British attitudes toward conscription in Iraq from their own experience with military recruitment. Dobbs was opposed to conscription on the grounds that it was “A policy

\textsuperscript{372} Main, \textit{Iraq: From Mandate to Independence}, 93; Silverfarb, \textit{Britain’s Informal Empire}, 14; Dodge, \textit{Inventing Iraq}, 143.
\textsuperscript{373} Khadduri, \textit{Independent Iraq}, 115.
\textsuperscript{374} Sluglett, \textit{Britain in Iraq}, 94 and chapter 7; Dodge, \textit{Inventing Iraq}, chapter 7.
\textsuperscript{375} Dodge, \textit{Inventing Iraq}, 141.
\textsuperscript{376} Sluglett, \textit{Britain in Iraq}, 113, 183.
which is against all our traditions.” It is telling that the British opposed conscription despite their belief that “speedy progress with the creation of the army [was] the most important and urgent problem” of the day. This reinforces the idea of a deep-seated British opposition to conscription, which led the British to oppose it despite having some advantages in achieving British goals.

Regardless of the reasons, it is clear that the United Kingdom actively opposed Iraqi leaders’ preference for conscription. Furthermore, it is this opposition that kept Iraq from adopting conscription before independence. As one British report notes, “Until 1932 the Iraqi Government reluctantly gave way to British views.” There were some minority views among British advisors that conscription could be useful, and the issue was actively debated. A key example illustrating the importance of Iraqi military recruitment to the United Kingdom can be found in the debates that followed Iraqi attempts to introduce a conscription law in 1926. British advisors debated the merits of conscription and how it should be implemented. Kinahan Cornwallis, advisor to the Iraqi Minister of the Interior, for example, wrote to the High Commissioner suggesting conscription because there was “no virtue in the maintenance of a large voluntary army without a reserve.” Moreover, he noted the importance of determining whether “the forces of His Majesty’s Government will be available” to enforce conscription. This indicates that military recruitment was important not just to local officials but to the government of the United Kingdom as well.

378 Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq*, 96
380 TNA: FO 371/20010, “Iraq, Code 93 Files 842-980.”
381 TNA: CO 730/94, “Despatches.”
382 TNA: CO 730/94, “Despatches.”
However, this also underscores the fact that British support for conscription was contingent on British willingness to enforce a policy that they deemed would be unpopular in Iraq. Ultimately, the British determined that conscription was not a viable option and that they could not support it. Their concerns principally stemmed from the unpopularity of conscription across much of Iraq. Official correspondence shows that High Commissioner Dobbs feared that “conscription would arouse the intense hostility of the rural population across Iraq.” The result, he predicted, would be that conscription could not be applied to the tribal sections of the population, leading to “urban and suburban sections of society as the only source of possible recruits” and resulting in severe consequences for the available workforce. Worse still, efforts to enforce conscription “would be followed by a widespread tribal combination and rising which might easily bring about a return of the conditions of 1920”—precisely the conditions that the United Kingdom sought to avoid by permitting home rule.

IV. Iraqi Military Freedom after Independence

The British interest in Iraqi military design was strong while the United Kingdom remained formally responsible for Iraq’s stability. This situation changed after Iraq achieved independence. The United Kingdom was no longer willing to exert direct control over the Iraqi military. Moreover, it made this abundantly clear to Iraqis in the years leading up to independence. This, combined with a low perception of external threats that permitted Iraq to focus on internal security, allowed leaders to adopt a

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385 TNA: CO 730/94, “Despatches.”
military recruitment policy based on domestic preferences informed by their idiosyncratic socialization with Ottoman ideas about the role of the military in society.

A. British Involvement After Independence

Many scholars have argued that Iraq continued to be dependent on the United Kingdom well after independence.\textsuperscript{386} The 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty was signed after the British announced their intention to recommend the League of Nations recognize Iraq, ending the mandate establishing the post-independence relationship between Iraq and the United Kingdom. The treaty required Iraq to consult with the United Kingdom in all foreign policy matters. The British also maintained military instructors in Iraq until the 1950s.\textsuperscript{387}

While this may have been the case, the British chose not to exercise their influence in the sphere of military design. As Toby Dodge argues, the “power and role of British advisers changed dramatically” during the middle years of the Mandate, decreasing in influence from “exercising executive control to assisting Iraqi office holders.”\textsuperscript{388} He cites one British civil servant as describing the role of advisor as, “whether you call him an Under-Secretary or Inspector-General or a Director, is an Englishman.”\textsuperscript{389} Indeed, British policymakers did not perceive Iraq to constitute any vital interests. Mark Heller argues that, with no oil production until 1927, “at the end of World War I, British cultural and commercial interests in Iraq were of minor importance,” and that “Iraq was never deemed to be as vital to the imperial system as were, for example,

\textsuperscript{386} Heller, “Politics and the Military in Iraq and Jordan, 78;
\textsuperscript{387} Be’eri, \textit{Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society}, 329.
\textsuperscript{388} Dodge, \textit{Inventing Iraq}, 18–19, 27.
\textsuperscript{389} Dodge, \textit{Inventing Iraq}, 182 fn. 65.
Egypt or Aden.”

Although he maintains that British influence was preserved even after independence, he explains that this influence was insufficiently applied compared to Jordan, and he acknowledges that the British “relinquished direct control” in 1932. Principal British interests were in the maintenance of their several air bases throughout the country. However, they were able to provide security for these using the Levies after independence, and so did not need to rely on Iraqi national forces.

The absence of major strategic interests in Iraq suggests little need for the United Kingdom to have extended the resources necessary to ensure that the Iraqi army continued to implement British-preferred policies after Iraq was granted independence. Dodge argues that from the very beginning, the British “were very aware of the temporary nature of their tutelage” and that “Britain’s primary policy goal from 1927 onward was to unburden itself of its international responsibilities towards Iraq as quickly as possible.”

Others have also argued that the Mandate was clearly not intended to be a long-term arrangement. Ernest Main, writing in 1935, describes how in the subsidiary Military Agreement, both parties agreed that “the Government of Iraq should at the earliest possible date accept full responsibility for the maintenance of internal order and the defence of the country from foreign aggression: British military assistance was to be progressively reduced ‘with all possible expedition’ [emphasis added].” Similarly, the 1924 Military Agreement provided that “Iraq should within four years become entirely self-defending, from both internal disorder and external assault.”

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392 Dodge, Inventing Iraq, 2, 9.
393 Main, Iraq: From Mandate to Independence, 83.
394 Longrigg, Iraq, 143.
emphasized yet again during the renegotiations of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty in 1930, with the High Commissioner declaring that a principle goal was the “acceleration of the assumption of the administrative responsibilities by the Iraq Government so far as consistent with treaty obligations.”

Given the contradiction between the British desire to exert influence and their preference for doing so with minimal commitment, it should come as no surprise that the efforts to instill British military education during the Mandate era were insufficient to change Iraqi beliefs about the utility of conscription. With no diffusion of British beliefs about military effectiveness, only a willingness to exert continued control over military affairs could have led Iraq to continue to use volunteer recruitment after independence. The discussion in this section shows that the British sought to minimize their involvement in Iraq after independence. However, they also made clear statements about their unwillingness to get involved in debates over conscription. As early as 1927, the Overseas Defence Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence determined that the United Kingdom “must leave the Iraq Government, if it thinks it wise to do so, to attempt to enforce [conscription] in sole reliance on its own military forces or police.” This became British policy and was communicated to the Iraqi government by mid-1927. In the context of the Mandate at a time when Britain had yet to formally propose Iraq’s independence, this could be perceived as an effort to coerce Iraq into maintaining Britain’s preferred policies—Iraqi leaders knew that they lacked the capacity to implement conscription effectively, and feared the consequences of attempting to govern

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395 As quoted in Main, *Iraq: From Mandate to Independence*, 95, 97.
396 TNA: CO 730/114, “Reorganisation of Defence Forces.”
397 Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq*, 97.
without British security assistance. After independence, though, when the United Kingdom had even less capacity to control Iraqi decision-making, this should be taken as evidence of the United Kingdom’s unwillingness to act as a military patron. This enabled Iraq to pursue its own policies after independence.

B. Low Threat Environment After Independence

Given the control of local Iraqi policymakers over military design, it is next important to determine whether the external threat environment constrained their recruitment decisions. While there were several potential external threats to Iraq, none was particularly acute, especially when compared to the threat of internal unrest. For example, the border disputes with Turkey and Saudi Arabia had been settled in 1927 and 1930, respectively. According to Sluglett, after these issues were settled, “there were few instances, or threats, of invasion from outside, and in any case the deterrent effect of the British connection was the main bulwark against such possibilities.” The League of Nations, for its part, determined that Iraq did not have sufficient military forces to protect its borders but that its League membership and alliance with Britain would suffice to provide external defense. With the 1930 Treaty of Alliance securing British responsibility for external defense, domestic security remained as the sole responsibility of the Iraqi army.

There is strong evidence that external threats were sufficiently low that the Iraqi military could focus on internal threats rather than external ones. The orientation of the

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398 Dodge notes that Dobbs “summed up his power by claiming that the ‘sheet anchor’ of the British role in the country was the threat to withhold military assistance to the Iraqi government.” Dodge, Inventing Iraq, 140.
399 Sluglett, Britain in Iraq, 184.
400 Main, Iraq: From Mandate to Independence, 106.
Iraqi army towards internal threats indicates that external threats were not a priority. Scholars are in agreement that the army was primarily designed with internal threats in mind. Eliezer Be’eri writes that that “Since the inception of the state, the main occupation of the Iraqi army has been internal policing and repression,” while Nadav Safran goes even further, arguing that “From the time of the creation of the modern Iraqi state after World War I, the Iraqi armed forces were designed exclusively to uphold the authority of the government internally and to keep the country together in the face of strong centrifugal tendencies.”401 Ernest Main assessed that interior threats were more likely to be severe enough to require British assistance than external ones—in particular, “the northern and eastern mountains and the middle Euphrates” where “there live tribes—Kurds and Assyrians in the one case, in the other Arabs—impatient of all political control, raiders and looters by inclination and by tradition, and determined opponents of any regime of law and order. If they feel strong enough to resist it.”402

Iraqi leaders were primarily concerned with internal threats, and in particular sought to use the army as a tool for statebuilding. They viewed conscription as an effective way of increasing the strength of the state vis-à-vis the tribes and of strengthening an Iraqi national identity over minority identities. It has already been shown that Iraqi leaders were influenced by Ottoman principles that emphasized the army’s ability to create a cohesive national identity. This remained the principal goal of the military after independence. In a 1932 paper, al-Askari emphasized that the priority for the military was addressing internal threats by arguing for the need for the state to

401 Be’eri, *Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society*, 327; Safran, *From War to War*, 236.
have a strong military “to protect its institutions.” This paper “stressed that the Iraqi Army’s priority should be devoted to dealing with internal security, enforcing the rule of law, and collecting weapons owned by civilians.”

Similarly, King Feisal was primarily concerned with the army’s weaknesses in relationship to the countryside, where 100,000 rifles were dispersed among the population in comparison to the army’s 15,000. He assessed that the first and second priorities in strengthening the country should be “to increase the numerical force of the army, so that it could suppress at least two simultaneous uprisings,” and to implement conscription. Thus the goals of the army according to two key Iraqi policymakers address internal rather than external threats. This emphasis on internal threats created more flexibility for Iraqi leaders to rely on their personal beliefs about military design. Notably, in this case, Iraqi leaders’ perceptions about military design were based on Ottoman beliefs about the necessity of using conscription to build a strong state and national identity—beliefs which resulted in the same outcome that likely would have occurred if Iraqi policymakers had focused on external threats, since Iraqi policymakers also emphasized conscription’s ability to rapidly expand the army.

V. Conclusion

The story of the Iraqi army’s genesis resembles that of Jordan in many ways. Both countries had weak central administrations with limited public legitimacy. The individuals who constituted the military in both countries also had strong roots in and

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familiarity with Ottoman era military policies. Finally, the United Kingdom played a major role in the redesign of each country’s military institutions in the pre-independence era, and maintained substantial influence in defense policies after independence. However, whereas the Jordanian military continued to develop along British lines, maintaining volunteer recruitment after independence, the Iraqi army quickly deviated from its colonial patron’s plans and instituted conscription once it was independent.

This chapter has argued that the principal difference between the two cases lies in the degree of the United Kingdom’s influence over each state’s military policies. Whereas in Jordan the United Kingdom continued to exert direct control over the military via the presence of British officers and in particular the command of former British officer John Bagot Glubb, there was no analog in Iraq. The British maintained advisors in Iraq, but not in positions in which they had command over troops. Instead, advisors’ roles were “surprisingly limited,” merely requiring Iraqi ministers to consider the advice of their advisors and to consult with them. In contrast, in Jordan British officers continued to lead troops, including during the Arab-Israeli war. The use of native officers with prior experience in a conscript army limited British ability to influence the shape of Iraq’s army. Moreover, the British adopted an explicit policy that distanced them from extensive intervention in Iraqi military and defense policy. Thus, whereas in Jordan the British continued to dominate military organizational decisions, Iraqi leaders were left with a relatively free hand to pursue their personal preferences.

Available resources do not establish explicitly why the British were more willing to engage in extensive military design efforts in Jordan than in Iraq. However, it can be

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surmised that several factors were at play. One reason may simply be that the territories were considered redundant; if all that was necessary was a regional foothold with which to secure communications to India and establish stability in Palestine, the British may have decided that high levels of influence in both Iraq and Jordan were unnecessary.

The decision to invest in control in Jordan but not Iraq was likely also influenced by the relative cost of intervention in each territory. Recall from Chapter 2 that the decision to establish or maintain patronage is essentially a cost-benefit analysis. If patronage is perceived as offering little benefit and requiring high costs, powerful states are likely to try to avoid becoming a patron. High costs can reduce the likelihood that patronage will develop even if there are substantial benefits to be gained. As discussed above, the 1920 rebellion in Iraq played a major role in convincing the British to minimize their interference in Iraq by revealing the degree of opposition to British rule and the costs associated with maintaining it. While there was some tribal opposition to British rule in Jordan, rebellion there never reached the level it did in Iraq in 1920.408 Thus, the British may have evaluated that patronage in Jordan could be achieved at a lower cost.

Iraq’s path toward a conscript army also differed from that in Bosnia, which is discussed in the next chapter. Local policymakers in Bosnia were also able to set military policy for a similar reason—the abdication of control by a potential patron. However, whereas a high threat environment led Bosnian policymakers to rely on conscription for defensive reasons, there were no such constraints in Iraq. On the contrary, Iraqi leaders perceived a permissive external environment. As a result, they designed the military to

maximize their domestic, statebuilding goals. This meant that their ideas about military
design were not constrained by external forces but rather were influenced by their prior
understandings about the role of the military in society.

The development of the Iraqi military since independence is a paradigmatic
example of the path dependency of military recruitment. The Iraqi decision to adopt
conscription after independence can be traced to their leadership’s greater familiarity
with conscription from their experience in the Ottoman military education system. As a
result, they came to view conscription as the best way to achieve their military goals: the
creation of a strong nationally unified state. These preferences held strong despite a
period of British political domination, during which they could not be achieved.
However, once military recruitment was autonomously decided, the same system was
maintained for decades, through multiple political changes. Only when Iraq was once
again dominated by a foreign power, seventy years after its initial military design, did its
military recruitment system change.
CHAPTER 6: BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

I. Introduction

The Bosnian armed forces used conscription throughout the Bosnian war for independence, which began almost immediately upon international recognition of the new state in 1992 and lasted until the signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace—more commonly referred to as the Dayton Agreement—in 1995. Far from merely being a peace treaty, the Dayton Agreement included a constitution for the new state and detailed descriptions of its new political institutions, drafted with extensive oversight from members of the international community—most notably, the United States. Conspicuously absent from this otherwise comprehensive blueprint for statebuilding, however, was any substantial effort to create a centralized military. Instead, each of the three formerly warring ethnic parties—Bosnian Muslims, Croats, and Bosnian Serbs—maintained de facto control over their own armies. The result was a classic ethnic security dilemma. Amidst an atmosphere of extreme mutual distrust, each ethnic army continued to use conscription—despite continually downsizing the number of their enlisted personnel—for a decade after the Dayton Agreement had established the first permanent instruments of government for Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and made three ethnic communities partners in a single state.

This institutional inertia, influenced by high levels of external threat, governed military design for all three communities in BiH until 2002, when the new High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina initiated a process of defense reform. A first defense reform commission permitted conscription to continue when it issued its

recommendations in September 2003. However, the second Defense Reform Commission report required a full transition to an all-volunteer force on January 1, 2006, only a few months after issuing its recommendations. Bosnia remained a virtual international protectorate, which raised the question: what changed? What was different about the initial period of military design that led BiH to build a conscript army?

This chapter compares the conditions in which military design choices were made to explain why policymakers considered a volunteer army both feasible and desirable in 2005, but not in 1995. I also engage in a process-trace of the 2005 Defence Reform Commission’s decision to end conscription. This allows me to determine what actors were responsible for military recruitment decisions and what motivated their preferences at each point in time. By looking forward in time from the initial point of military design to examine a policy change, I can make inferences about the counterfactual: under what circumstances would actors have elected for volunteer forces after the Dayton Accords? In doing so, I am able to gain additional traction in identifying the actors and conditions that influenced the decision to use conscription in 1995.

I find that the actors responsible for military design changed throughout this period. I argue that despite the international involvement in Bosnian independence and political development, external actors intentionally avoided influence over organizational aspects of the new state’s military design. In the absence of a strong, external patron willing to lead the way on these military matters, local preferences determined military design. Furthermore, these local preferences were defined by what the leaders of each ethnic community perceived as a highly threatening environment. A weak central government and continued ethnic mobilization meant conflict and ethnic cleansing could
easily re-erupt on short notice, making it too risky a proposition for any one party to unilaterally reduce its available manpower. Thus, this case of military design is representative of my third causal pathway: Domestic threat perceptions determined the initial recruitment practices in BiH in the context of major external security concerns.

This chapter similarly provides evidence against several alternative explanations about the use of conscription. It suggests, contrary to many realist expectations, that many actors continue today to view conscription as the preferable form of military recruitment, despite advances in technology that have made volunteer militaries more accessible. Furthermore, while historical experiences, including colonial practices, may affect policymakers’ preferences for conscription, they are not determinative. Intervention by foreign actors can overpower these preferences, or even change them.

To support my argument, I rely primarily on memoirs and original interviews with policymakers who were involved with defense reform in Bosnia throughout this period. Interviews, in particular, were important to capture the micro-level causal processes that my theory predicts.410 While much has been written on defense reform in Bosnia, the role of conscription takes a back seat in these studies to the more contentious issues of military and defense integration of former enemy forces. This makes it difficult to discern precisely how recruitment fit into broader debates over military organization and what factors weighed most heavily on the outcome. Indeed, a key goal in using interviews is to determine who made the key decisions about recruitment and why. Therefore, my interviews provided important information about the decision-makers and

their goals that is typical of studies engaging in process tracing. They provided causal process observations that were useful both for determining the values of my independent variables and to challenge arguments emphasizing a culturally deterministic mechanism of military diffusion.

II. Interview Methodology

I began by contacting individuals who were directly involved in Bosnian defense reform processes, and used a snowball technique to identify additional interviewees. While snowball sampling risks biasing data by decreasing the representativeness of the sample, this is not a major concern in my study. My goal is to process-trace the creation of the BiH military. When process-tracing, “one cares less about getting a representative sample” than about learning “who is responsible for causing the particular action” or “how events unfold.” I am not studying responses themselves so much as I am using the interviewees as “expert sources of information.” Moreover, a snowball technique increased my ability to access important respondents.

I spoke with 18 people who were intimately familiar with different aspects of the creation and development of the Bosnian army. This is a substantial portion of those who were influential on issues relating to conscription in Bosnia, and included all those who

were identified in existing literature and through my interviews as the *most* important. It quickly became clear that the community of defense policymakers for BiH is fairly small, and that those focusing on conscription constitute an even more specialized group. By around the fourteenth interview, interviewees were identifying the same set of people as influential or knowledgeable about recruitment decisions—many of whom were people to whom I had already spoken.

Respondents included people working at all levels of policy formulation, from military officials and technical advisors, to ambassadors, civil servants, and Bosnian cabinet ministers. Most were associated with the international community in some form, most often as representatives or employees of NATO or the OSCE, rather than parties representing policymakers for BiH. Twelve interviewees were or are now American nationals, though only five of these represented American interests at the commissions. Indeed, most interviewees stressed their role as members of an organization or institution. They explicitly and preemptively distanced themselves from the preferences or actions of a government they did not represent. Furthermore, two of three Bosnians I interviewed were Defense Ministers, one of whom attained this position as a direct result of the Defense Reform Commissions. Twelve interviewees were directly involved in the Defense Reform commissions as full members of the secretariat or as part of working groups. Information about what periods of defense reform the respondents participated in is available in table 5.1.\(^\text{415}\)

\(^{415}\) Appendix B has more information on my interview methodology. Most interviewees agreed to be identified. Some, however, requested anonymity because they were unsure about the continued confidentiality of some information. I have only used names or other identifying information when I was granted explicit permission to do so.
Erich Bleich and Robert Pekkanen distill the array of critiques often levied at interview methods into three categories of potential concern: how representative are the interviewees of the broader sample population, was the interview of sufficient quality to reveal the right information, and how accurate is the researcher’s report of the interview content?416 I hope to have alleviated concerns about the representativeness and quality of my interviews by having described my methods in this section. However, it is important that I demonstrate that I am not cherry-picking quotes or hearing what I want to hear. To that end, I attempt to be clear about the extent to which the sentiments and facts reported by interviewees reflect responses from others who had similar knowledge.417 I also report responses suggestive of mechanisms other than those that I hypothesize. While some respondents attributed the choice of recruitment system to multiple factors, the weight of evidence from interviews, memoirs, and secondary literature suggests that military threats and international pressure were the most important factors.

III. Military Design and the Dayton Agreement

The military design agreed to during the Dayton Agreement reinforced the wartime status quo. Bosnia’s constitution created a weak central state, with most powers belonging the two Entities—the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Federation) and

416 Erik Bleich and Robert Pekkanen, “How to Report Interview Data,” in Interview Research in Political Science, edited by Layna Mosley, 84–105 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013). While several interviewees noted that their memory was a problem when answering some questions, this only led to the need to end an interview early in one instance. Moreover, many interviewees continued to work in Bosnian defense reform for years after the creation of the all-volunteer army, while others have been interviewed on similar subjects repeatedly since then as well—facts that should decrease recall bias.

417 I also contacted all interviewees to discuss how I was using quotes before publication. Most interviewees replied and continued our dialogue.
Republika Srpska (RS)—which represented the country’s Muslim and Croat population, and Bosnian Serbs, respectively. This allowed the Entities to assume control over military and defense decisions. While the constitution gave the central government control over foreign policy, its responsibility for preserving the country’s “sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence, and international personality” was contingent on the “division of responsibilities between the institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”418 The Entities also had explicit authority to take appropriate measures to “provide a safe and secure environment for all persons” in their territories, as well as residual powers not explicitly assigned to the institutions of the central government.419

Most tellingly, the constitution makes several references to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s multiple armed forces, even establishing a Standing Committee on Military Matters (SCMM) to coordinate their activities. The SCMM was Bosnia and Herzegovina’s sole defense institution in the years after Dayton. The Entities maintained complete autonomy to continue to administer their own armed forces. In fact, the Federation itself was so weak that even the Bosnian Muslim and Croat forces remained separate, meaning there were essentially three armies instead of two. All three continued their wartime practice of conscription.

The international community invested little time and energy in redesigning the military institutions of the newly independent central state it helped to create. However, the United States and its allies devoted substantial efforts to downsizing and demobilizing wartime forces, which they perceived as necessary to reduce overall tension levels and

419 GFAP, Annex 4, Article 3, Sections 2 and 3.
the likelihood of renewed conflict. Annex 1-B of the Dayton accords established strict limits on arms importations, as well as a clear force ratio that would define final military sizes of each of the armies.\footnote{GFAP, Annex 1-B, Article IV.} However, the principal vehicle for achieving demobilization and downsizing was the “Train and Equip” program for the Federation army. This program was intended to recreate a balance of power between the Bosniaks and Bosnian Serbs by improving the capabilities of the Federation forces. By canceling out the RS advantage in equipment, Train and Equip was a major incentive convincing Bosniaks to sign the peace deal.\footnote{Christopher J. Lamb, Sarah Arkin, and Sally Scudder, \textit{The Bosnian Train and Equip Program: A Lesson in Interagency Integration of Hard and Soft Power} (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2014); See also Derek Chollet, \textit{The Road to the Dayton Accords: A Study of American Statecraft} (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005): 164.}

Unlike constitutional provisions such as the SCMM that established new chains of command and organizational procedures, Train and Equip could work within the existing institutional framework of the Federation army. It worked by helping Federation troops to learn new skills, not by redesigning the military and its relationship to society. Nonetheless, the existence of Train and Equip raises the question of why the United States was willing to exert influence in one realm of military policy—capabilities—but not in other realms that could arguably have a larger and longer lasting effect. Changes to organizational policies that would reinforce military power-sharing through unified recruitment mechanisms could potentially reduce the security dilemma, while eliminating conscription altogether would reduce each side’s ability to quickly mobilize large segments of the population.
There are several reasons why this may have been the case. I argue in the next section that the international community viewed changes to military organization—which disrupt both existing domestic power structures and the external balance of power—as too threatening to the fragile peace. Train and Equip, on the other hand, contributed to peace by reinforcing a balance of power. The United States did not believe that a major change such as a transition to an all-volunteer force would reinforce peace, given the volatile security environment. Any effort to make such a drastic change carried too great a risk of backfiring. As a result, international policymakers spent little time thinking about how such organizational changes could even be implemented. While Bosnian leaders clearly also preferred to retain conscription, it was the fact that the international community had other priorities and so approached military change cautiously that led to recruitment continuity, not Bosnian intransigence.

IV. International Interests and Domestic Military Design

Upon first inspection, BiH appears to be a deviant case: its continued reliance on conscription would run in contrast to the expectations of all existing theories about when states should use compulsory recruitment policies.\(^{422}\) Bosnia gained independence at a time when military effectiveness-based arguments would expect the need for conscription to be at an all-time low. The end of the Cold War, coupled with advances in capital-intensive technologies, was reducing the need for states to rely on costly, manpower-intensive armies for defense. At the same time and for the same reasons, the international

environment itself was less threatening, and therefore allowed states to be less concerned with traditional security and territorial defense. The presence of 60,000 NATO-led peace enforcement troops on the ground in BiH should also have eliminated the need for local forces to provide security.

The United States, in particular, devoted time, money, reputation, and personnel—including 20,000 troops—to negotiating and enforcing the Dayton Agreement. One might expect, then, that the international community’s considerable effort to design political institutions in Bosnia would have also carried over to military reform. Cultural or organizational arguments would suggest that the extensive role of the United States in creating and enforcing the Dayton Agreement and training and equipping the new Bosnian army should produce emulation, resulting in the establishment of an American-style volunteer military. Similarly, the heavy-handed influence of foreign actors in completely rewriting the Bosnian constitution and administering political institutions reduces the likelihood that pre-independence practices would automatically be replicated in the new state.

As this chapter will show, local threat perceptions determined military policies in the period of statebuilding that followed the Dayton Agreement. International actors were deeply invested in securing peace in Bosnia. Importantly, however, foreign intervention in the new state’s military design was actually intentionally minimized during the Dayton negotiations, and was essentially absent for years afterwards. The only state with the resources and interests to act as a military patron, the United States, viewed more overt intervention into military policies as too destabilizing to the fragile peace that had been achieved. As a result, it was domestic politicians’ preferences and beliefs about local
security that were most relevant to the continued use of conscription in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the war.

Evidence that Bosnia’s foreign benefactors wanted to distance themselves from military design emerged early in the negotiation process. While the European Union and the United States played active roles in negotiating and implementing the peace settlement, both actors viewed interference in the organization of the post-conflict militaries as a bridge too far. This is somewhat surprising given the extent of foreign military activities in Bosnia both before and after Dayton. This is particularly true for the United States. Ultimately, while Europeans contributed to the peacebuilding effort, it was the Americans who called the shots. As the first High Representative of BiH wrote, it is a “simple and fundamental fact that on key occasions the United States was the only player who possessed the ability to employ power as a political instrument and when forced into action was also willing to do so.”423 If any foreign power was able to expend further resources to reshape the Bosnian army, it was the United States.

This was not something that interested the United States during the mid-1990s. Instead, elites driving Bosnia policy in the U.S. viewed Bosnia as a quagmire that had unfortunately engaged American reputation and its commitment to NATO.424 The best solution was to stabilize the region and get out, with as little commitment as that goal would allow. As one high ranking member of NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR) said,

“Did we want to have 22,000 troops committed to the Balkans in Europe? No! We thought it was a European problem, but to make this work the US had to step up.”

This can be seen in part through the limited American efforts to influence military design during the war. The Americans indicated an initial willingness to engage in military design when it mediated a cease-fire and federation agreement between Bosnian Muslims and Croat forces in February 1994. U.S. policy intended to decrease Bosnian Serb bargaining leverage by ending the conflict between Muslims and Croats and strengthening their military forces. The Federation Agreement signed in Washington on March 1, 1994 called for the unification of their two armies, including the establishment of a joint command. Subsequently, a small advisory mission of 15 American officers, led by a retired U.S. major general, was dispatched at the end of 1994 to integrate the Muslim and Croat forces into a single federal army. However, divisions between the two sides proved insurmountable. As long as they continued to compete for territory against the Bosnian Serbs, there was no shared Federation military for Americans to help develop. Fighting continued to erupt between Bosnian Muslims and Croats, and military cooperation between them was virtually non-existent by the time planning for comprehensive peace negotiations at Dayton began in October 1995. This failure of

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externally-driven military design may have been due to the absence of a strong American belief in its necessity or the existence of extremely high barriers—including animosity between combatants—to successful intervention. In either case, recruitment decisions remained in the hands of local actors throughout the war.

American goals for Bosnian military development at Dayton were even less ambitious. The primary goal of the United States was to end the conflict quickly with the minimal necessary long-term investment. It is easy to lose sight of this due to the broad scope of the Dayton Accords, of which large portions are dedicated to establishing civilian governmental institutions. Some participants, including the United States’ chief negotiator, Richard Holbrooke, preferred a more comprehensive, maximalist approach to the peace agreement. Negotiations at Dayton not only focused on military-security issues relating to the separation of forces and control of territory, but also on establishing and overseeing civilian institutions—including elections and ethnic representation in government—designed to create a lasting settlement in a stable state. As Derek Chollet wrote, “If Dayton’s first goal was to end the war, its second goal was to maintain Bosnia as a single state.” However, this very much remained a secondary goal—one that was a means to the end that was lasting peace.

Wherever statebuilding threatened peace, Americans resolved this conflict of interest in favor of the latter. Although the Dayton Agreement included extensive provisions on new civilian institutions, efforts to enforce major changes to military design were viewed as potentially too destabilizing. The United States viewed the

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military situation as the key to securing peace—and consequently this absorbed most of its attention.\textsuperscript{432} According to this logic, international efforts would be devoted to ending the war and preventing the resumption of hostilities. Furthermore, this could best be achieved not by forcibly integrating hostile forces into a new military, but by establishing an internal balance of power among the existing armed forces.\textsuperscript{433} This led to a hands-off approach to military design that left Bosnians in control of recruitment and other organizational decisions. The active American role in statebuilding did not extend to the realm of military design.

A chief advantage of this minimalist approach was that it limited the American commitment to a process the Clinton administration had little desire to be a part of. The United States had few if any tangible security interests to protect in Bosnia. Its decision to intervene in 1995 was ultimately motivated by concerns over the credibility of American leadership and the future of the NATO alliance, both of which had been challenged by the intractability of the Bosnian conflict.\textsuperscript{434} As a result, American policy was very much constrained by domestic support and interest. Having already felt compelled to engage in Bosnia, “policy was driven by the need to get out” and avoid a long-term military presence.\textsuperscript{435} The administration thus had little interest in devoting the resources necessary for sweeping military change. American policymakers were unhappy with the need to deploy 20,000 troops to Bosnia and would have preferred to rely on a unified and effective Bosnian military for local security.\textsuperscript{436} However, that would have

\textsuperscript{432} Chollet, \textit{The Road to the Dayton Accords}; Bildt, \textit{Peace Journey}.
\textsuperscript{433} Daalder, \textit{Getting to Dayton}, 144, 150.
\textsuperscript{434} Chollet, \textit{The Road to the Dayton Accords}, 13; Daalder, \textit{Getting to Dayton}.
\textsuperscript{435} Daalder, \textit{Getting to Dayton}, 150; Bildt, \textit{Peace Journey}, 385.
\textsuperscript{436} Gen. William Crouch, June 22, 2016, Interview #7.
required a longer period in which more American peacekeepers and military trainers would have needed to be present in Bosnia. The Clinton administration had even less of a desire to provide the more substantial commitment of military resources that would be necessary to reform the Bosnian military.\textsuperscript{437} It wanted solutions that would allow it to disengage as quickly as possible, with low costs and limited public attention.

One of the most difficult and controversial examples of this is the debate over the length of the American-led peace enforcement force’s (IFOR) mission. Before participants even arrived at Dayton, the White House had decided and publicly announced that IFOR would complete its mission and withdraw within twelve months. The NSC Principals Committee made this decision after little debate, and with the goal of preventing “mission creep” and repeats of the disastrous 1993 intervention in Somalia.\textsuperscript{438} According to Ivo Daalder, the NSC staffer responsible for formulating U.S. policy on Bosnia at the time, “just as IFOR’s narrow mission was framed around more limited objectives, so the one-year deadline was constructed on the basis of an exit strategy that had a more limited purpose than advocates of a durable peace in Bosnia had in mind.”\textsuperscript{439} While the administration ultimately extended the deadline for withdrawal and transitioned IFOR into a “Stabilization Force” (SFOR), its initial deployment was only possible on the understanding that its authority was driven by a short-term mission designed to ensure a military balance, not nation-building.\textsuperscript{440}

\textsuperscript{437} Bosnia and Herzegovina Delegation Member at Dayton, May 17, 2016, Interview #3; Marshall Harris, June 14, 2016, Interview #4.
\textsuperscript{438} Chollet, \textit{The Road to the Dayton Accords}, 128.
\textsuperscript{439} Daalder, \textit{Getting to Dayton}, 149
\textsuperscript{440} Daalder, \textit{Getting to Dayton}, 148; Chollet, \textit{The Road to the Dayton Accords}, 160; Bildt, \textit{Peace Journey}, 300.
Another advantage to avoiding questions of military design at Dayton was that it set goals that seemed more feasible. Holbrooke would later lament not devoting more effort to insisting on greater military reform.\footnote{Holbrooke, \textit{To End a War}, 361.} However, my interviewees suggested that, with or without greater foreign assistance, not much more could have been accomplished in terms of post-war defense reform. Clifford Bond, the American ambassador to Bosnia during the first Defense Reform Commission, summarized this common sentiment: \textquote{It was a peace agreement. They did what could be done. The sides weren’t about to disarm.}\footnote{Amb. Clifford Bond, May 9, 2016, Interview #1.} The relationships between the three ethnic groups were not conducive to the level of cooperation needed in an integrated military. They were too fraught with hostility and distrust—\textquote{just what you would assess at the end of a war, with all of the emotions that were attached to that.}\footnote{Gen. William Crouch, June 22, 2016, Interview #7.} The perception was that this made compromise on military reform more difficult than compromise on other areas. The United States insisted that when it came to military reform, any more room for disagreements could potentially derail the entire peace process. American policymakers rejected military reform as too dangerous.\footnote{Chollet, \textit{The Road to the Dayton Accords}, 193–4.} Consequently, issues like military design were a lower priority than political compromises. As one interviewee who participated in the Dayton negotiations described the atmosphere there, \textquote{For most of the things at Dayton, we were like, ‘can we get this done now?’}\footnote{Bosnia and Herzegovina Delegation Member at Dayton, May 17, 2016, Interview #3.} For the United States, the answer to this question when it came to military reform was “no,” allowing for greater domestic control over recruitment issues.
These debates are important evidence in favor of the argument that Bosnian preferences were decisive. Military design was not at the top of the agenda for American policymakers during the Dayton Agreement negotiations. Given existing Bosnian military practices and the likelihood of renewed conflict, reforming the military in any way was considered a costly endeavor that few members of the international community desired to undertake. The threat environment made major military reform particularly risky. Thus, the main reason there was no push from the international community toward a volunteer army in 1995 was that such an effort had too high a probability of undermining peace.

Conversely, it is less likely that Americans simply encountered too much resistance from Bosnians to enforce their agenda. For one, local actors were not inherently opposed to volunteer forces, but rather wanted to maintain a balance of capabilities. The main Bosniak goal was to maintain high levels of readiness with large reserve forces to prepare for potential conflict with an RS force that, with reinforcements from Serbia, would outnumber them. Bosniak leaders ideally preferred a single army for both Entities, which by virtue of their larger numbers within the country, they believed they could control.\textsuperscript{446} Conscription, then, was only viewed as necessary so long as an independent Serbian force continued to be a threat. Indeed, this was ultimately the compromise that was struck at the 2005 Defence Reform Commission. However, as the discussion earlier in this chapter shows, the United States clearly preferred to stay out of military design altogether, and was not interested in potentially disrupting the peace by forcing the dismantlement of the Entity armies.

\textsuperscript{446} Lamb et al., \textit{The Bosnian Train and Equip Program}, 38.
Not only did the United States want to avoid excessive interference in Bosnian military affairs, but it is likely that the Bosnian army would have looked very different if the United States had viewed military reform there as a worthwhile investment. Many interviews noted that American preferences were to have a single, professional military in BiH. One high-ranking American military commander said, “The long term intent was to have a single entity that was capable of providing defense inside of Bosnia and that three warring factions were disarmed and contributing to a peaceful political unit.”447 Other interviewees stressed that Americans were uncomfortable with the idea of three armies in one state, but that more time would be needed to build support for such drastic change.448 While negotiators do not appear to have debated the merits of interfering in Bosnian recruitment practices, there is little reason to expect that they would have, given their attitude toward making changes in other aspects of military design. Thus, it is difficult to speculate how American perceptions might have differently evaluated the role and purpose of conscription in an environment more conducive to reform. However, ultimately it is clear that a lack of willpower or resources led the United States to subordinate its preferences about military design to the more urgent goal of peace.

Even though some members of the international community realized that the long-term stability of Bosnia depended on creating a unified and professional military, key international actors viewed such reform as too demanding and risky in the short-term. Instead, “ending the war, separating the armies, and preserving Bosnia and Herzegovina were the driving motives of the negotiators, not necessarily building a sustainable

447 Gen. William Crouch, June 22, 2016, Interview #7
448 Bosnia and Herzegovina Delegation Member at Dayton, May 17, 2016, Interview #3; Amb. Robert Beecroft, July 26, 2016, Interview #12; Defense Reform Commission Secretariat staff member, July 26, 2016, Interview #14
peace.” For now, international actors cared most about establishing peace; ensuring it could be sustainable would only complicate matters. Military reform would have to be a problem for a later date.

V. Local Threat Perceptions after Dayton

The failure to integrate the wartime armed forces of the three ethnic groups had important consequences for their recruitment practices. It meant each group maintained the capacity to restart the war. This in turn incentivized both sides to stay armed and able to fend off renewed invasion on short notice, exacerbating an already unstable and tenuous peace. Thus, the most formative years for military design took place in a dangerous environment, in which both the Federation and the RS perceived that major territorial conflict still threatened their independent existence. Bosniaks continued to view conscription as vital for its role in creating a large reserve force that could be called upon for defense on short notice.

The widespread perception that war could easily erupt again was reinforced by indicators of the international community’s shaky commitment, represented most clearly by the efforts to limit IFOR’s authority and deployment. As Roberto Belloni writes, “third parties’ passive, short-term and less than daring approach did little to help a population traumatized by years of war,” allowing nationalists to continue to engage in ethnic cleansing. Indeed, “no one had much confidence that peacekeeping forces

would easily deter another round of fighting.”[451] Instead, the American approach to peacebuilding immediately after Dayton single-mindedly focused on creating a balance of military capabilities between the Bosniak and Bosnian Serb communities. The Americans’ preferred program for achieving this goal was the Train and Equip program. However, it was not intended to make structural changes to the army or its relationship to society. According to Jim Pardew, who led the Train and Equip program, recruitment “was their job, not mine. The military had to raise their army. They were in the position of needing to figure out how to raise their army and what kind of army they could afford.”[452]

These decisions from the international community both reflected and reinforced a mutually threatening atmosphere within BiH and the expectation that peace would be temporary. Rohan Maxwell and John Andreas Olsen, both of whom served in advisory roles during various stages of post-Dayton Bosnian defense reform, argue that “high levels of mistrust…shaped the military structure of BiH,” causing both entities to maintain “relatively large, conscript-based forces that regarded each other as potential enemies.”[453] The Train and Equip program was intended to create a military situation in which both sides could feel comfortable demobilizing troops, but was viewed as necessary precisely because the security environment was so precarious.[454]

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ultimately achieved its goal of permitting downsizing, tensions remained high. By February 1998 the Federation army included only 45,000 active duty troops, whereas this number was 100,000–200,000 higher less than a year earlier. However, conscription permitted all sides large numbers of reserves to be called up on short notice. If downsizing was to take place, Bosniaks would only allow this in a manner that would permit fast remobilization and immediate territorial defense. Although Pardew reported Bosnian politicians like Izetbegovic (the first president of BiH) preferred a smaller, better trained force, they felt constrained by popular demand to maintain a larger, war-ready force even in peacetime.455

Even while the armies were demobilizing and the balance of power was shifting, wartime threat perceptions persisted.456 Responses during my interviews support Maxwell and Olsen’s view that local policymakers built the military with fears of renewed conflict in mind. Interviewees repeatedly emphasized the high level of tensions and mistrust immediately after the Dayton Agreement. They made statements like “The sides weren’t about to disarm,” and “they wanted to mobilize, not demobilize!” to explain why the Entities did not engage in more aggressive military reform in the mid-to-late 1990s.457 One respondent who worked closely with entity army commanders for SFOR in the late 1990s as the Chief Inspector General for the entity armed forces said that Bosniaks resisted reform “because they always thought in the back of their mind that they would have to go back to war, so they wanted to sustain numerical and weapons and

455 Lamb et al., The Bosnian Train and Equip Program, 38, 106, fn 659.
457 Amb. Clifford Bond, May 9, 2016, Interview #1; Bosnia and Herzegovina Delegation Member at Dayton, May 17, 2016, Interview #3.
equipment superiority."\textsuperscript{458} The first BiH Defense Minister, Nikola Radovanovic, also argued that the precarious situation between the neighbors continued to dominate how the entities thought about the defense through the early 2000s, during the first Defense Reform Commission: “the argument was that following the experience in the ‘90s it was important to be able to defend.”\textsuperscript{459} He also suggested that major reforms that would reduce readiness were unlikely in this environment: “In 1995 there was civil war. Ten years after that we were talking about a single military. It was a surprise.”\textsuperscript{460}

VI. The Transition to an All-Volunteer Force

In the immediate aftermath of the war, the threat of invasion continued to loom, causing Bosnian politicians to want to maintain an army that had the capability to mobilize quickly. However, there was almost no overt discussion among policymakers about the use of conscription in these early years after independence. I argue that this is consistent with the advantages of maintaining conscription in such highly charged and uncertain security environments. If policymakers were preoccupied with security, one reason for an absence of debates about recruitment policies is that there was nearly universal agreement that it would be necessary for preparing an adequate defense against renewed Serbian aggression.

It is particularly clear that this was the case once the international community began to urge greater defense reform. The process leading to Bosnia’s abolition of conscription on January 1, 2006 offers a useful point of comparison for evaluating my

\textsuperscript{458} Robert Tomasovic, May 13, 2016. Interview #2.
\textsuperscript{459} Nikola Radovanovic, August 17, 2016, Interview #17.
\textsuperscript{460} Nikola Radovanovic, August 17, 2016, Interview #17.
arguments. The same variables—international intervention and threat perception—can explain this change in recruitment practices. But, precisely because international actors began to pressure explicitly for the reduction and elimination of conscription, recruitment practices featured more prominently in debates among Bosnian policymakers. The explicit role of conscription during the process of defense reform that began in 2003 also demonstrates weaknesses in alternative explanations of conscription based on culture.

Between the Dayton Agreement in 1995 and the first Defense Reform Commission in 2003, the international community ramped up not only its interest in affecting military practices in Bosnia, but also its institutional ability to enforce military reform. At a December 1997 meeting in Bonn, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC)—the group of fifty-five countries and agencies that underwrite the peace process in Bosnia—enhanced the powers of the High Representative in BiH, the office established by the Dayton Agreement and appointed by the PIC to oversee civilian implementation of the peace treaty.461 These new “Bonn Powers,” as they became known, gave the High Representative broad powers to enact binding decisions in BiH and to remove public officials who violated the Dayton Agreement.

As other scholars have noted, international influence was responsible for nearly all the outcomes of the defense reform process.462 This was also the case for the abolition of conscription. A public scandal in which it was discovered that an RS-owned firm had been selling weapons to Iraq—known as the Orao Affair—coupled with the investiture in

461 Maxwell and Olsen, Destination NATO, 6.
2002 of a new and activist High Representative—Lord Paddy Ashdown—led to renewed interest from the international community in using its influence to enact change in BiH military structures. This shifted control over BiH military structure back to the foreign powers, and in particular, to the United States. Europeans staffed many of the bodies that were influential in defense reform, including the Office of the High Representative, from which the impetus for reform initiated, and the OSCE, which had chief responsibility for assisting with military downsizing and parliamentary oversight. However, American influence in NATO, control of SFOR, and institutionalized responsibility for military aspects of the Dayton Agreements again gave the United States an outsized role. The OSCE representative at the first Defense Reform Commission was an American, Ambassador Richard Beecroft. Similarly, the United States insisted that an American lead the first Defense Reform Commission. As a result, while the broad goals of defense reform were set by Ashdown, many of the specific policy changes implemented by the commissions reflected American strategic thinking.

Defense reform occurred in two main phases, arising out of two internationally-initiated and -led Defense Reform Commissions that issued their reports in 2003 and 2005. While these commissions ostensibly only made recommendations that then had to be enacted by the BiH Parliament, they were *de facto* binding. The American chairmen of each commission were careful to craft recommendations and agreements that they

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464 James Locher III, July 30, 2016, Interview #15

knew would make it through Parliament. One said, “I made sure that members of the commission had political authority to make commitments on behalf of their parties or governments, so it was *politically* binding.” Furthermore, international actors were unified in their insistence on reform, and although Ashdown had publicly declared he would not use his Bonn powers, it was widely recognized that he was prepared to impose change if it was not forthcoming.

The international community was active at all levels of the Defense Reform Commissions. General policy level discussions and formal decisions were made by the full membership body, which included high-ranking representatives from the United States, each of the Entities, the SCMM, the OSCE, SFOR, and the EU, or else in informal meetings outside the commission. Much of the work to generate specific policy prescriptions and technical language was done by the Secretariat and various working groups, which were similarly made up of national representatives and technical advisors. The core team of the Defense Reform Secretariat was primarily made up of international actors.

Working groups included representatives from each entity—as well as the Ministry of Defense once it was established—their lawyers and legal advisors, interpreters, and technical or military experts, often from the OSCE, depending on the group or issue being discussed. They met off-site every few weeks. Politically difficult

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466 Raffi Gregorian, June 16, 2016, Interview #6. However, this does not mean gaining approval was always easy. Jim Locher noted that the first Defense Reform Commission’s recommendations had to be approved by the BiH, Federation, and RS governments, as well as by each parliament: “These were not easy tasks. Defence Reform was a highly emotional and controversial topic.” It is consistent with my argument (that the transition to conscription required high levels of international influence) that Locher seems to have found the process more contentious—see below.

issues tended to be hashed out in a top-down fashion before the working groups presented possible models to the commission. Members of each working group were present at all commission meetings, and some members of the working groups participated in both commissions. Details of legislation were often decided in working groups that adopted a technical and non-partisan approach to the issue.\footnote{Raffi Gregorian, June 16, 2016, Interview #6; Lena Andersson, July 4, 2016, Interview #9; Rohan Maxwell, July 21, 2016, Interview #11.}

The first Defense Reform Commission left conscription in place, though it cut the number of conscripts in half and reduced the service term for conscripts from six to four months.\footnote{At the time of the first Defense Reform Commission, the Federation army included 13,200 professional soldiers and 8,400 conscripts. Defence Reform Commission, \textit{The Path to Partnership for Peace}, Defense Reform Commission 2003 Report (Sarajevo: September 2003): 87.} The second Defense Reform Commission, whose recommendations were issued only two years later, eliminated conscription altogether. At each commission, military recruitment was a contentious issue for representatives of the Federation and RS. Federation representatives continued to prefer conscription, which they viewed as vital to their security. The RS, meanwhile, was less \textit{prima facie} opposed to a volunteer force, but was nonetheless wary of any measures that would further decrease its power and autonomy relative to the Federation.\footnote{Legal Advisor at Second Defense Reform Commission, June 21, 2016, Interview #8; Rohan Maxwell, July 21, 2016, Interview #11; Selmo Cikotic, July 27, 2016, Interview #13; Defense Reform Commission Secretariat staff member, July 26, 2016, Interview #14. One interviewee described the Serbs as the most attached to conscription of all parties at the first Defense Reform Commission. However, this could have been strategic opposition: my discussions with other interviewees suggests that the RS’s stated opposition to abolishing conscription at this time may have been contingent on the fact that the Federation clearly had no intention of ending conscription at that time. Lena Andersson, July 4, 2016, Interview #9.} However, for the members of the international community who guided the defense reform process, it was only one among many aspects of the defense infrastructure that needed to be reformed. Only once the first Defense
Reform Commission made headway into unifying the Entity armies and reducing tensions between them did international actors demand a complete end to conscription.

A. Foreign Actors’ Goals for Defense Reform.

With foreign powers now choosing to intervene in Bosnian military design, it was their threat perceptions that would shape military recruitment practices. While members of the PIC did not necessarily concern themselves with whether BiH would use conscription, this did become an important issue for the bureaucrats and diplomats who implemented defense reform. These foreign actors were tasked with creating a unified and affordable *peacetime* BiH army that could participate in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. They knew that PfP was a particularly attractive goal for the Bosniaks, as full NATO membership would provide a firm security guarantee. Consequently, the international community focused heavily on this goal. The international actors designed the BiH defense reforms based on their own understandings of what an army with these goals should look like.

Defense reform efforts began in late 2002, when then High Representative Paddy Ashdown seized upon the Orao scandal in RS to demand greater strides towards military professionalization and the strengthening of the civilian chain of command. The possibility of NATO membership was the principal carrot offered by the international community that motivated the reform process. During the 2003 Defence Reform Commission, the international committee focused on enhancing state-level controls and the affordability of the BiH armed forces as the main requirements for PfP membership.

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471 Rohan Maxwell, July 21, 2016, Interview #11; James Locher III, July 30, 2016, Interview #15; John Drewienkiewicz, August 15, 2016, Interview #16
While the international actors driving defense reform believed conscription was inefficient, they adopted a similar attitude as during and immediately after the Dayton Agreement: conscription took a back seat to operational reforms that were viewed as higher priority. According to Jim Locher, the Chairman of the first Defence Reform Commission,

We thought that eliminating might be an outcome but we were pleased to secure a 50 percent reduction. There was only so much you could do in the first commission. Again, when the first Defence Reform Commission started, no one thought there was any possibility of defense reform. I remember a meeting with all of the ambassadors from European Union countries on my second day in Sarajevo, and each one of them told me defense reform would not happen.

Another interviewee intimately familiar with Bosnian defense reform during the entire period under examination expressed similar sentiments, noting that administrative unification was not achievable in 2003 and it was not clear whether this would change in the future. The reductions in conscription at the first Defence Reform Commission were not necessarily viewed as an intermediate step on the way to all-volunteer force. NATO would not concern itself with the state’s domestic recruitment policies as long as there was force reduction.

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472 Haupt and Fitzgerald, “Negotiations on Defence Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina”; DRC 2003; on Dayton: General William Crouch, June 22, 2016, Interview #7; Defense Reform Commission Secretariat staff member, July 26, 2016, Interview #14; John Drewienkiewicz, August 15, 2016, Interview #16.

473 James Locher III, July 30, 2016, Interview #15.

474 John Drewienkiewicz, August 15, 2016, Interview #16.

475 Ric Bainter, July 26, 2016, Interview #14; John Drewienkiewicz, August 15, 2016, Interview #16.
This suggests that in 2003 the international community appears not to have been fully prepared to impose change for which Bosnians were not yet ready. While PfP membership was an established goal, the attitude to change remained cautious. These external reformers agreed conscription was bad for Bosnia, but still allowed local preferences to dominate military design. James Locher described conscription as “just not that important to me at the time.”\footnote{James Locher III, July 30, 2016, Interview #15. Locher added, “There were much higher priorities, such as placing all military forces under national control, creating a national Ministry of Defense, Joint Staff, and Joint Command, and reducing the size of active and reserve forces.” This is consistent with the priorities described by other interviewees and in existing literature on Bosnian defense reform.} The Bosniak fear of Serbian aggression remained high; this deterred members of the Defence Reform Commission from insisting on the elimination of conscription.\footnote{Andrew Radin, “The Limits of State Building: The Politics of War and the Ideology of Peace” (PhD diss. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2012): 110–111; Ric Bainter, “The Elephant in the Room: Defense Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” in Deconstructing the Reconstruction: Human Rights and Rule of Law in Postwar Bosnia and Herzegovina, edited by Dina Francesca Haynes, 235–256 (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2008).} Locher said that this was “not a case of the international community forcing its vision on everyone. For defence reform to be effectively implemented, the ideas needed to be owned and advanced by the Bosnians. This was their commission, and it had to be and be seen as their commission.”\footnote{James Locher III, July 30, 2016, Interview #15.} Rohan Maxwell similarly described the 2003 Defence Reform Commission as the best outcome achievable given Bosnian political opposition at the time: it was “a lowest common denominator thing” and “there was no appetite” for eliminating conscription.\footnote{Rohan Maxwell, July 21, 2016, Interview #11.} Another interviewee argued that conscription was left in place because “we wanted them to make their own decision based on financial logic.”\footnote{John Drewienkiewicz, August 15, 2016, Interview #16.} While one interviewee who worked on
both Defence Reform Commissions characterized the changes to BiH military design as subject to enormous external pressure—to the extent that the parties “felt they had to come to those compromises,”—he concurred with others’ conclusions that agreements about conscription were limited by locals’ threat perceptions in 2003.\footnote{Ric Bainter, July 26, 2016, Interview #14.} This sufficiently raised the cost of enforcing a volunteer army on the unwilling Bosnians to lead an already skeptical international community to temper its goals.

**B. The Tipping Point**

This international attitude changed at the beginning of the 2005 Defence Reform Commission. The initial mandate of this second commission was to enforce the decisions made in 2003. It was not a given, after that commission, that a second round of reforms would be necessary. Rather, Ashdown called for a new Defence Reform Commission after another scandal highlighted the shortcomings of existing implementation efforts: evidence emerged that Bosnian Serb forces had been assisting in the protection of war criminal Ratko Mladic.\footnote{Bainter, “The Elephant in the Room,” 252.} As a result, there was no initial focus on transitioning to an all-volunteer force.\footnote{Rohan Maxwell, July 21, 2016, Interview #11; Nikola Radovanovic, August 17, 2016, Interview #17.} However, the international community was even more determined to enforce its desired reforms at this point in time: “The entire frame of reference had shifted….It was no longer a question of whether the state could assume complete control of all armed forces, but rather a question of how and when it would happen.”\footnote{Bainter, “The Elephant in the Room,” 252.}

Raffi Gregorian, the American choice to co-chair the second Defense Reform Commission, was a particularly powerful force behind the change in the international
community’s attitude toward conscription. While the international community’s perception by the First Defense Reform Commission was that conscription provided no benefit to BiH, its members were not prepared to eliminate it. According to Rohan Maxwell, “2005 was the year we started thinking about it [conscription],” though there was “no mandate to do anything.” He added that one of the first things Gregorian did, before the commission even started its work, was to present a document to him that included ending conscription as a big picture goal. Gregorian himself acknowledged that ending conscription and reinforcing the professionalization of the armed forces was “not a requirement but we [members of the reform commission and Bosnian political leaders who signed it] went above and beyond,” to make the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina more efficient. The motivation was designing a military that was cost efficient and effective at its likely missions with NATO. Gregorian said the international community “did not see a continuing need for conscription because it doesn’t actually help [Bosnia]. You’re not actually facing invasion.” It was the greater power of the international community in 2005, and particularly how those goals were implemented by American policymakers, that allowed for the transition to an all-volunteer force at that time.

Therefore the reforms of the second Defence Reform Commission reflected the international community’s—especially the United States’s—perceptions of how the BiH armed forces should address the country’s most pressing threats. The international

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485 Amb. Clifford Bond, May 9, 2016, Interview #1.
486 Rohan Maxwell, July 21, 2016, Interview #11.
487 Rohan Maxwell, July 21, 2016, Interview #11.
488 Raffi Gregorian, June 16, 2016, Interview #6.
489 Raffi Gregorian, June 16, 2016, Interview #6.
architects of the new and unified Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH) did not perceive renewed ethnic conflict to be particularly likely, and saw BiH as facing a low threat of major land conflict. In sum, “The AFBiH [was] not designed to provide stand-alone territorial defense against regional neighbors.”490 As early as the 2003 Defence Reform Commission, international actors had recognized that the Bosnian military’s force size and structure was inappropriate to the types of missions it would likely have to participate in: peacekeeping and support operations, not major land warfare.491 Even in the 1990s, according to the international community, “there was not a lot of military purpose” for the entity armies.492 SFOR was meeting all the country’s security requirements. Bosnian policymakers had little ability to withstand the redoubled efforts of the international community, which was now committed to military reform.

Moreover, it is worth noting that there was substantial opposition within Bosnia, especially among Federation officials, to ending conscription. Gregorian argued that “the issue of conscription was a big deal. Right up to the last minute there were retired generals who were trying to push civil defense training in high schools, et cetera…”493 Gregorian also cited the importance of providing for a reserve force of exactly half the strength of the active forces as part of the final deal that ended conscription, as this may have at least symbolically compensated for the loss of compulsory military training. Maxwell’s perception was that there were fewer obstacles to this reform. However, his

491 Maxwell and Olsen, Destination NATO, 35–6, Vetschera and Damian, “Security Sector Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina”; Lord Ashdown, October 6, 2016, Interview #18.
492 James Locher III, July 30, 2016, Interview #15.
493 Raffi Gregorian, June 16, 2016, Interview #6
account of events also emphasized the importance of first convincing Bosniaks that they were not getting tangible benefits from conscription and that it was unaffordable in the long run.\textsuperscript{494} Similarly, some of the actors who were opposed by the time the commission issued its recommendation may have had less influence on policy outcomes by this time. The BiH Presidency—under possible international pressure—“had decided that all general officers would be retired” before the new commission.\textsuperscript{495} This indicates that Bosnia would not have eliminated conscription if not for the work and preferences of the international community.

As a result, there was a permissive environment in which the policymakers at the second Defence Reform Commission could recommend, and in fact enforce, the abolition of conscription—once they had decided this was an important goal. With no security logic underpinning support for conscription to prepare for extended land warfare, the particular preferences of the international reformers determined BiH recruit practices after 2005. The international actors who dominated Bosnia’s defense reform process came from countries where conscription was seen as a policy only necessary for high threat environments. Their preference for volunteer forces in low threat environments is evident in the arguments they emphasized during the Defence Reform Commission negotiations. Volunteer recruitment was widely touted by the international community as more economically efficient and appropriate for other military missions. Defense reformers emphasized in their conversations with Bosnians that conscription was not giving them the security value that they thought it did.\textsuperscript{496} They focused particularly on its

\textsuperscript{494} Rohan Maxwell, July 21, 2016, Interview #11
\textsuperscript{495} Maxwell and Olsen, \textit{Destination NATO}; Rohan Maxwell, July 21, 2016, Interview #11
\textsuperscript{496} Raffi Gregorian, June 16, 2016, Interview #6.
high cost but low yield, especially given limited training requirements.\textsuperscript{497} The high costs of conscription also failed to provide even basic amenities for recruits, who were often sent home on the weekend because the entity armies could not afford heating. Additionally, a member of the conscription working group of the first Defense Reform Commission noted that the advisors limited their analysis of potential recruitment policies to their implications for defense; they did not consider whether conscription would affect opportunities for nation-building or other consequences for society.\textsuperscript{498}

These arguments are consistent with a process of military design that is heavily reliant on the professional experience and prior beliefs of those leading the reforms, who were from countries that favored volunteer systems and did not view military recruitment as a tool for reshaping society. Maxwell argued that the multilateral nature of the Defence Reform Commissions limited the “tendency on the part of some international actors to offer solutions that replicate those of their home countries.”\textsuperscript{499} Nonetheless, the beliefs of the reformers about the proper uses of conscription seem to have had an important effect on how they molded the Bosnian military. This is evident in the Conscription and Reserves Information Paper that prefaced the 2005 Defence Reform Commission’s report. It concluded, “Forces based on compulsory military service are mainly suited for territorial defence purposes, as a generally acknowledged internationally principle. No NATO country deploys conscripts abroad unless they have specifically volunteered for such service. Conscript forces would be almost useless for the most likely future missions

\textsuperscript{497} Maxwell and Olsen, \textit{Destination NATO}; James Locher III, July 30, 2016, Interview #15; Interview #6; Nikola Radovanovic, August 17, 2016, Interview #17.
\textsuperscript{498} Lena Andersson, July 4, 2016, Interview #9.
\textsuperscript{499} Maxwell, “Bosnia-Herzegovina,” 185.
This document reflected the beliefs of the American co-chairman of the second Defence Reform Commission, Raffi Gregorian, and guided his efforts when it began. Rather than a large, readily expandable military, Bosnian forces would need to be highly professional to prepare for peacekeeping missions and interoperability with NATO. This was the point of helping Bosnia join PfP.

The international community clearly entered the second Defence Reform Commission with the perception that BiH would not need a military capable of meeting major land warfare and renewed ethnic conflict. However, there is reason to believe that had the threat environment been different, the international community would not have been as concerned with transitioning BiH to a volunteer force. Ashdown, the principal driver and final arbiter of Bosnia’s defense reform, explicitly highlighted the pointlessness of conscription for BiH’s anticipated peacekeeping missions, and countered, “If the state was threatened like any other state then it [conscription] would have been reasonable.”

Another interviewee who was influential throughout the defense reform process raised the similar points, referencing in particular his experience advising defense reform in other countries that did face such threats and maintained conscription. It was the international community’s emphasis on force reduction and affordability in light of a low threat environment that led to Bosnia’s transition to an all-volunteer force.

501 Rohan Maxwell, July 21, 2016, Interview #11.
502 Lord Paddy Ashdown, October 6, 2016, Interview #18.
503 John Drewienkiewicz, August 15, 2016, Interview #16. Drewienkiewicz has also worked on defense reform in Armenia—“which maintains a very effective conscript system”—and South Sudan.
C. Implications of Bosnian Resistance to Reform for Initial Recruitment Decisions

Importantly for the theory, these reforms were implemented despite continued Bosnian perception of high threats that they believed would necessitate conscription. Americans had to work hard to enforce their version of a peacetime army over Bosnians’ “inherited wartime mentality.” The reasons interviewees gave for Bosnian resistance to these efforts reinforces the argument that local preferences for conscription were for military and security, rather than cultural, purposes. In the words of one interviewee, “Bosniaks wanted a large force and large reserve force because that’s the only army they had to defend themselves. Getting [them] to agree to dramatic reductions in reserve or overall force or reduce conscription was a tough sell.”

As noted above, senior BiH official emphasized “the experience in the ‘90s” as placing a premium on the entities’ belief in defense, especially given the continued existence of war time units. Bosniak officials adamantly sought assurances at the first Defence Reform Commission that they would not be required to give up conscription until there was state-level control over all armed forces—in other words, until there was no longer a separate RS army that could threaten them.

Some people have argued that local elites recognized that the NATO presence eliminated threats to their security by the time defense reform began. However, the reluctance of entity actors, especially Bosniaks, to end conscription before the state

505 Lejla Gelo, June 21, 2016, Interview #8; Similar sentiments by Ric Bainter, July 26, 2016, Interview #14; Raffi Gregorian, June 16, 2016, Interview #6.
506 Nikola Radovanovic, August 17, 2016, Interview #17.
507 Bainter, “The Elephant in the Room,” 248
established a monopoly on force suggests that the local threat perceptions still saw war as likely. In addition, Bosniak acquiescence to ending conscription did not indicate a fundamental shift in their threat perceptions. As described above, “the enormous amount of external pressure” meant that “there’s no real buy-in from anyone.” This risk of backsliding has led to efforts to limit the size of the army altogether, as the only option for reducing the likelihood that the ethnic communities will once again view reignited conflict as a serious possibility. This offers further evidence that the international community’s willingness to enforce its preference for a volunteer military fit for a low threat environment has played a major role in BiH military design.

VII. Alternative Hypotheses

Bosnian policymakers’ fear of renewed existential conflict is not the only factor that could have led them to adopt strong preferences for conscription after Dayton. There are two other ways they could have settled on a policy of conscription. First, pre-existing cultural norms or organizational practices could have led them to view conscription as the most effective military practice for establishing security given the severe threat environment. In other words, would other actors in the same position have also used conscription to defend against a potential Bosnian Serb threat, or might a volunteer force have served just as well? Such an explanation would stress the particular military heritage of policymakers within Bosnia. This account parallels the common argument that former British colonies use volunteers because of an internalized distaste for citizen armies or a respect for individual rights: did Bosnians prefer conscription not because it was the best

509 Ric Bainter, July 26, 2016, Interview #14.
solution to a highly threatening environment, but because of a Yugoslav culture that perceived conscription as appropriate or effective?

This counterfactual is impossible to test with certainty, but there are some indicators that Bosnians were constrained by the existing threat environment, not by historical experiences, when designing their army. On the one hand, many people have suggested that Bosnian defense planners were strongly influenced by their experience in the Yugoslav army, which in turn had adopted many Soviet-style traits. According to this view, Bosnian policymakers may have just wanted to continue using the recruitment practices with which they were most familiar. Indeed, “it was clear that conscription was something they were accustomed to,” and financial constraints on the Bosnian army meant that there was “no plan for the future of the Federation after the war.”

Falling back on historical experience or perceived cultural tropes could be particularly tempting during periods of uncertainty and speedy potential mobilization, since adopting new recruitment practices would require many other changes to the way the military trains and functions.

The Bosnian experience with conscription ran deep. Both the Bosniak and Bosnian Serb armies were offshoots of the Yugoslav People’s Army, “which was deliberately used as an integrative tool,” reinforced by conscript service—outside the recruit’s home region—that ensured “most males experienced a common rite of passage.” As one senior American participant in the second Defense Reform Commission said, “All of the Entity army people on both sides had ‘grown up’ in

510 First quote from Lejla Gelo at Second Defense Reform Commission, June 21, 2016, Interview #8; Second quote from Lamb et al., The Bosnian Train and Equip Program, 108.
511 Maxwell in Licklider, “Bosnia-Herzegovina,” 183. See also Hoare, How Bosnia Armed, for the history of the Bosniak and Bosnian Serb armies.
Yugoslavia, where you had a core army but the entire population was armed and trained and after your service you joined the reserves and had huge stockpiles in anticipation of partisan warfare and invasion. And that’s the framework in which they all thought about this stuff.” A senior OSCE representative pointed to an even deeper historical basis for conscription: He recalled that the reason military recruitment policies weren’t addressed earlier was that “it was just assumed due to the cultural history of Yugoslavia, Austria-Hungary, that we thought conscripts would have to be retained.” Radovanovic supported this view, arguing that “what is mentioned quite often here is not necessarily about culture and socialization, but is more to prepare young boys and maturation.”

However, Bosnians were also exposed to American military practices both during the war and after Dayton. Familiarity with certain military practices did not stop them from adopting reforms in other areas, or from wanting to adopt more NATO-esque policies. The Train and Equip program made particular strides toward changing Bosnian perceptions about what military practices to emulate. The program was administered primarily by the private military contractor MPRI, which was comprised of former U.S. military personnel and “took pride in the facilitating the execution of U.S. foreign policy.” The aim of this policy was “to build a NATO-type military,” and was a rare point on which Bosniaks, Croats, and Americans agreed. Through the Train and Equip Program, according to Rohan Maxwell, the Federation “had largely bought into the notion that, ‘this is the US system, this is a better system.”

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512 Raffi Gregorian, June 16, 2016, Interview #6.
514 Nikola Radovanovic, August 17, 2016, Interview #17
515 Lamb et al., The Bosnian Train and Equip Program, 29.
516 Lamb et al., The Bosnian Train and Equip Program, 36, 107–109.
517 Rohan Maxwell, July 21, 2016, Interview #11.
Bosnians were eager to adopt new military practices and it came down to the OSCE to adjust their advice given Bosnian history to facilitate this process: “You can’t just take US or German practices and apply them. What would work in a Bosnian context? But they said they want to look like a NATO military, so ‘what do we need to do to move in that direction?’ But we needed to modify it.”\textsuperscript{518} Thus, the post-Dayton period created an opportunity for Bosnia to deviate from historical military practices. Bosnian officials were clearly not constrained by or wedded to these past practices, and actively sought to emulate new models in many other, non-recruitment, areas. This is evident in their acceptance of the Train and Equip program, as well as in the fact that they wanted greater integration early in the reform process. As Clifford Bond said, “Bosniaks did not believe reforms went far enough....[Bosniaks] thought that ‘Everyone else is moving in the direction of Europe and do we want to be left out?’”\textsuperscript{519}

The fact that Bosnians prioritized effective defensive capabilities and still sought to retain conscription, despite efforts to emulate the United States in other ways, suggests that military circumstances created incentives for conscription. Interviewees repeatedly emphasized the threat environment as the major determinant of Bosnian preferences. One Defense Reform Commission working group member said “Bosniaks believed that Croats and Serbs could rely on Croatia and Serbia for protection, while they did not have a protector. They felt that if they got rid of conscription they wouldn’t be able to defend themselves.”\textsuperscript{520} Without these threat perceptions, there would have been less commitment to maintaining conscription.

\textsuperscript{518} James Locher III, July 30, 2016, Interview #15.  
\textsuperscript{519} Amb. Clifford Bond, May 9, 2016, Interview #1  
\textsuperscript{520} Lejla Gelo, June 21, 2016, Interview #8.
Second, might conscription have served some purpose other than territorial defense that was more important to those responsible for Bosnia’s military design? If this was the case, the threat of renewed conflict merely may have been useful rhetoric designed to justify a potentially unpopular policy that would serve other interests of the political elite. This is a particularly important possibility to evaluate because NATO’s security guarantee could have reduced the need for the Entities to optimize their militaries for conflict. One recurring concern in security sector reform and disarmament programs is unemployment: if there are not enough economic opportunities in post-conflict situations, a surplus of ex-soldiers can be destabilizing.\(^{521}\) Thus, it may be the case that states that are already in the process of demobilizing and weakening the military may nonetheless choose to conscript to reduce unemployment and maintain control of armed individuals. A participant at the Dayton Agreement negotiations said that participants wanted to make sure that enough former combatants had career paths into the army or police, while an observer at the first Defense Reform Commission noted that a fear of what newly unemployed soldiers would do in civilian society characterized many of the debates at that time.\(^{522}\) However, these concerns ran up against the broader emphasis on demobilization and cost-saving.

The more common non-military argument in favor of conscription was that it had cultural value as a vehicle for socializing youth, especially young men. All entity actors viewed mandatory military service as an important mechanism, if not for active political

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\(^{521}\) Pietz, “Overcoming the failings of Dayton,” 163.

\(^{522}\) Bosnia and Herzegovina Delegation Member at Dayton, May 17, 2016, Interview #3; Amb. Clifford Bond, May 9, 2016, Interview #1. See also Lamb et al., who reference veteran opposition to demobilization programs due to “bleak” job prospects in the civilian economy. The Bosnian Train and Equip Program, 106.
indoctrination, at least for turning boys into men: “There was this perception in Bosnia that it was part of becoming a man.” While this likely meant Bosnian politicians had an emotional or cultural attachment to conscription that made them more reluctant to abandon it, ultimately these arguments served a more fundamental military logic, and were not intended to support state-level integration. As one interviewee involved in defense reform in Bosnia for more than a decade noted, “all the reasons for conscription were to keep the communities divided.” This meant that conscription took on added significance for Bosniaks, who viewed conscription’s “stamp on young men” as providing additional cohesion and reserves that were necessary given the fact that they were the only ethnic community with “no big brother to come to their aid.” Thus, conscript socialization focused on the ethnic communities, and no one ever suggested expanding this logic in service of integration or unification across the communities.

VIII. Conclusion

Conventional wisdom would attribute the Bosnian preference for conscription to the institutional legacy of the country’s Yugoslav heritage or other aspects of its domestic culture. Such arguments, while consistent with some actors’ preferences, obscures the real preferences that motivated conscription, and the possibilities for broader reform, within Bosnia. Local security concerns and territorial defense, not domestic statebuilding, dominated debates over military design in the years following the Dayton Agreement.

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523 James Locher III, July 30, 2016, Interview #15; John Drewienkiewicz, August 15, 2016, Interview #16; Nikola Radovanovic, August 17, 2016, Interview #17; See also Maxwell and Olsen, Destination NATO, 24.
524 John Drewienkiewicz, August 15, 2016, Interview #16.
525 John Drewienkiewicz, August 15, 2016, Interview #16.
The threat of major, renewed land warfare was so high that the peace treaty’s international guarantors largely intentionally avoided the issue of military design, leaving multiple armed forces in place that continued to view each other as enemies. While the resolve and interest of the international community—in this case, essentially the High Representative and the United States—in creating a more effective and efficient BiH military increased with time, it was not until 2005 that it enforced its recruitment preferences. This was particularly challenging because Bosnian and American perceptions of the threats facing BiH and the purpose its army should serve differed so dramatically. International policymakers did not see a need for a Bosnian military capable of fighting a major war, and worked hard to extract concessions that would support their preferred deference reform policies. Without this external pressure, which overcame the institutional inertia of entrenched defense attitudes within the country, there is no indication that Bosnia would have adopted an all-volunteer force.
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

Reestablishing effective national security forces was among the most important priorities after the American-led invasion of Iraq and ousting of Saddam Hussein in 2003. American military commanders and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) began planning what the new Iraq armed forces would look like even before President Bush’s famed “Mission Accomplished” speech. The army that they decided to build was remarkably different from that of the pre-Occupation era. Hussein’s army—like every previous Iraqi army since its independence from the United Kingdom in 1932—was a large, conscript-based force, characterized by heavy rank inflation and ethno-religious divisions. The new force was configured to focus primarily on border defense. It was reduced from 350,000 to 40,000 personnel, organized in three divisions equipped with limited heavy weapons, and lacked the capacity to function effectively away from bases. The CPA was particularly concerned that the new army would reflect the ethnic and religious makeup of society.

These decisions were based on American understandings of the post-war regional security environment and how to dampen sectarian grievances. However, these were not the only ways to design the new military in Iraq. While the decision to disband all Iraqi security forces, including the Ministry of Defense, forced the CPA to build the armed

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528 Bensahel et al, After Saddam, 142.
529 Bensahel et al, After Saddam; James Dobbins, Michael A. Poole, Austin Long, and Benjamin Runkle, After the War: Nation-building from FDR to George W. Bush (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008).
forces from the ground up, the pre-war plan had been to recall and retrain demobilized and surrendered soldiers. Despite continued debates about recruitment and organization in the new Iraqi army, the CPA held fast to ideal of a small, heavily-vetted, and Ba’athist-free volunteer force.

The story of Iraq’s recent experiences with military recruitment is a familiar one. As this dissertation shows, similar dynamics occurred in Iraq during the Mandate era, in Bosnia in the mid-2000s, and in Jordan in the years surrounding its independence. This dissertation demonstrates that this kind of foreign influence on military recruitment is surprisingly common. There are countless examples of powerful states frequently using military advisors, troops deployments, and even direct control to ensure new states adopt their preferred military policies. Pakistan and India were both led by British generals in the years after independence, and British officers remained in both places to assist with training. Many post-Soviet states continued to be dependent on Russian assistance after their independence, including a large Russian military presence or Russian command over troops. France played a similar role in many of its former African colonies.

530 Dobbins et al., After the War, 120.
I examine these patron-client relationships and describe their effect on important military policies, focusing particularly on the use of conscription. The military is an important actor in international relations. However, it is undertheorized in political science literature, often treated as invariant across states. Similarly, political science has traditionally emphasized the way militaries are similar, without in-depth analysis of the many ways in which they differ. The challenges associated with collecting data on militaries around the world has further inhibited large-n studies of the military. This has limited analysis to comparative case studies that often make no effort to provide a generalizable account of military organization beyond the cases at hand. Therefore, my dissertation provides a notable foray into large-n statistical comparisons of different types of militaries.

I chose to focus on an understudied but particularly important military policy, the method of recruitment. There has been little research into why some states use conscription while others use volunteers, especially compared to the volume of work on other aspects of military organization, such as the development of specific doctrine or the advent of the standing army. This dissertation is situated in a similar vein to both this literature and more recent work on variation in military policies, for example, the adoption of female integration into armed forces. Like this other work, this dissertation explains why not all militaries adopt the same policies.

My approach to this puzzle differs substantially from traditional political science explanations for variation in military policies. Existing research explains military design
as either a product of threat environments or domestic politics. However, I emphasize the need to look to beyond these factors. I demonstrate the important role of outside actors in influencing how states design their militaries. Military design is an important realm in which international hierarchy—or shared sovereignty—plays out. As a result, we should understand militaries not simply as the product of the environments in which they develop, but as affected by powerful forces often outside their control. Other studies of different military policies would also benefit from consideration of the powerful states that influence how states and their militaries develop.

I. Summary of Arguments

In chapter 1, I introduced my goal of developing a theory of military design. I established the importance of conscription as a military policy and justified my focus on conscription over other possible policies. The method by which a state will recruit its military personnel is one of the first decisions it must make when designing its military, as it has important implications for training, length of service, and military administration. Existing research also shows that the decision to use conscription has implications for an array of social and political outcomes. At the interstate level, conscription can affect military effectiveness and the frequency of conflict initiation, while domestically it has been linked to national identity, state formation, and political participation.536 Lastly, conscription has important social consequences given the

different quantity and portion of the population that it exposes to military service, even when it is not universal. Even ignoring the consequences for states and militaries, conscription certainly has drastic implications for the young men—and occasionally, women—who are called upon for military service.

While the decision to use conscription is a particularly notable component of military design, it is also a useful focus from the perspective of testing the theory of military design I developed in chapter 2. My theory explains why militaries are designed in different ways and predicts differences in their military recruitment policies. The argument I developed in chapter 2 describes military design as a product of patron-client relationships. Strong states with security interests in weaker states use their military influence to ensure that the weaker state adopts their preferred policies. This results in the emulation of patron state practices by their clients, either through direct control by the patron or the diffusion of patron-held values in training. Patron states are particularly able to affect recruitment policies during periods in which their clients’ military institutions are in flux—what I call “new states”—for example, after independence, after social revolutions, or during period of post-conflict reconstruction.

For example, negotiations with West Germany to end its post-World War II occupation provided an opportunity for NATO, led by the United States, to influence its recruitment policies. As the return to full West German sovereignty neared, it became increasingly urgent to settle on a process of German rearmament that was deemed necessary for Western Europe’s security vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. While the United

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States had ultimately decided that the question of conscription or voluntary enlistment was one for German authorities, NATO security requirements left Germany with little option.\footnote{United States Dept. of State, Office of the Historian, “The United States Deputy Representative to the North Atlantic Council (Spofford) to the Secretary of State,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Western Europe, Volume III. Available at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v03/d286.} More specifically, the United States “demanded West German rearmament as a price for American reinforcements to Europe.”\footnote{Large, Germans to the Front, 82.} At the London and Paris Conferences on West German sovereignty and rearmament, West Germany had agreed to contribute five hundred thousand men to NATO and the European defense.\footnote{Large, Germans to the Front, 220.} However, with few volunteers forthcoming, the “quantitative logic” was paramount in the West German decision to introduce conscription.\footnote{Ute Frevert, A Nation in Barracks: Modern Germany, Military Conscription and Civil Society (Oxford: Berg, 2004).} Similar dynamics were at play in Jordan at the moment that it gained independence, when the British used direct control over military decision-making as well as command over the military’s budget to ensure that it adopted particular recruitment practices.

The adoption of conscription is a particularly useful test of this theory because conscription’s implementation is so often attributed in the literature to domestic culture or ideology. Thus, conscription constitutes a hard test of the theory: if conscription is actually determined by foreign actors, then my theory should be at least as likely to apply to other types of military policies, less associated with a state’s domestic attributes, as well. Thus, as described above, the United States did not only determine the post-2003 Iraqi army’s recruitment practices, but also how big it would be, how mechanized it would be, and what units it would be organized around. Similarly, the Defense Reform...
Commissions in Bosnia addressed additional issues, including changes to command and control, size of active and reserve forces, ethnic balance, and the number and type of brigades that constituted the army.

I theorize several mechanisms that lead client states to adopt the patron’s military recruitment practices. These include direct control by the patron as well as normative emulation and learning by the client. Sometimes patrons actively intervene in the recruitment policy of their clients, as in the case of Jordan; other times, clients elect to adopt the patron’s policies on their own or with less overt interference, as in the case of West Germany.

In addition, my theory makes predictions about recruitment in the absence of a foreign patron. When there is no foreign patron, I argue that threat perceptions determine military recruitment. States that fear major territorial invasions from other states are more likely to use conscription to safeguard their security. States that perceive that they face low threat environments, on the other hand, are unconstrained in the choices they make about military recruitment. Under these conditions—no foreign patron and no interstate threat—leaders’ personal preferences and beliefs or domestic political factors will determine recruitment outcomes in idiosyncratic ways.

Chapter 3 provided a quantitative test of my theory. The findings provided powerful support for my initial hypotheses. First, they demonstrated that states are more likely to use conscription if they are influenced by a patron state that uses conscription after independence. There was also somewhat weaker evidence that there is a similar emulation effect for states influenced by patrons that use volunteers. These findings take into consideration and control for alternative arguments, including threat environment
and colonial recruitment legacy—which is most often associated with domestic political culture—of the client.

The most common of these counter-arguments is the claim that British colonies adopted volunteer militaries because they internalized a British cultural antipathy towards conscription.\footnote{Asal et al., “I Want You!”; Cohn and Toronto, “Markets and Manpower.”} As Victor Asal et al. write, “an anticonscription precedent set during the English Civil War….defined state power and individual rights in the English context, and England passed it on to its many colonies through the institutions of colonial governance.”\footnote{Asal et al., “I Want You!,” 2.} This argument is unsatisfying for several reasons, which I laid out in chapter 2, including that it ignores powerful incentives for dissociation from prior regimes and the importance of independence as a critical juncture.

My results in chapter 3 confirm that there is unlikely to be a causal chain from British volunteerism to volunteerism in former British colonies. For one, I found that there is a more consistent effect across different model specifications of conscript patron states. This indicates that new states are less likely to use volunteers simply because their patron does, which likewise should weaken the connection between volunteerism in the United Kingdom and its former colonies. Furthermore, in regressions that include my patron state variables and a dichotomous measure of whether a state was a former British colony, the latter was not found to be a statistically significant predictor of military recruitment. In other words, there is no evidence, once my explanatory variables are taken into consideration, that being a former British colony is associated with volunteer military recruitment.
Second, I find that the effect of having a patron state does not change with different threat environments; whether clients face a dangerous or stable external threat environment, patrons tend to lead clients toward adopting their own recruitment policies. Third, when there is no foreign patron, major external threats lead states to use conscription. This is important evidence that helps adjudicate conflicting theoretical predictions in the literature on military recruitment: while some theories argue that modern technology makes conscription obsolete, leading states to use volunteers to cope with threats, others argue that increasing volunteerism in Europe is a product of the declining threat environment of the post-Cold War period.\textsuperscript{544} My findings suggest that states still view conscription as their best option when they face major territorial threats.

To establish these findings, I built a dataset of cases in which states have the opportunity and interest in redesigning military institutions, including instances of military design after independence, after social revolution, and after civil wars that ended in negotiated settlements or rebel victory. These are the most likely instances in which foreign actors should be able to influence military design. I also collected original data to measure whether a military patron is present in a given case. These variables identify who the patron state is, whether it used conscription or volunteers, and whether it used military deployments, advisors, or seconded or contract officers to influence the client state.

Chapters 4 through 6 presented case studies that represent each of the causal pathways described by my theory. The first of these three chapters examines the

formation of Jordan’s military. This chapter shows the way military recruitment policies can result from the emulation of a foreign military patron. Jordan’s army was strongly influenced by British military preferences. British officers commanded Jordanian units, and the army was led by a former British officer, John Bagot Glubb. Local preferences and historical practices would have prejudiced Jordan towards adopting conscription. However, these factors could not overpower the efforts of British officers to design the Jordanian military as a volunteer force after its independence. In fact, there is strong evidence that in the absence of this British influence, Jordan would have adopted conscription, like its previous colonial power, the Ottoman Empire, or its next most likely patron, Iraq. Instead, Glubb implemented the volunteer system with which he was most familiar. He explicitly resisted requests to use conscription, limiting any compulsory policies to the supplementary National Guard reserve force.

Chapter 5 told the story of military recruitment in the absence of either a military patron or major external threats. This chapter analyzed the creation of Iraq’s army after its independence in 1932. While Iraq had a military patron during the Mandate era in the form of the Mandatory power, the United Kingdom, it had no patron after independence. While the United Kingdom fought vigorously against Iraqi efforts to adopt conscription during the Mandatory period, it made it clear that it had no desire to assist in Iraqi military design after the latter’s independence. Consequently, domestic preferences could determine Iraqi military design. Moreover, Iraqi leaders did not perceive there to be major external threats after independence. Instead, Iraq’s Minister of Defense, Jafar Al-Askari, believed the army’s priority should be internal security, and that a strong army
was the precondition for other strong institutions.\textsuperscript{545} Iraqi leaders sought to create a military that could aid with internal pressures by integrating the country’s diverse populations and tying them to the regime. In particular, they were strongly influenced by their education in the Ottoman military system, which convinced them that conscription was the best system for meeting this goal. Thus, Iraq had no military patron, faced no external constraints on its military design in the form of major external threats, and as a result was unconstrained in the recruitment policies that it could adopt.

Finally, chapter 6 demonstrated the importance of threat perceptions when there is no foreign patron that dominates military design but when there is major external threat. It applied my theory to the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Despite an extensive international presence in Bosnia at the end of the civil war that established its independence, no single power emerged to guide military design. In fact, the United States, which led the statebuilding process in Bosnia, intentionally avoided questions of military design in the 1990s, preferring to allow the Bosnian Entities to make their own decisions. This resulted in the perpetuation of the status quo, which was the adoption of conscription by each of the Entities to prepare for renewed hostilities that were perceived as inevitable. Once the United States took a more active role in military design, spurred by the High Commissioner’s introduction of the defense reform process in 2002, Bosnian recruitment practices shifted to implement the volunteer practices of its new military patrons. By illustrating a change in military recruitment practices after an initial period of military design, this chapter also demonstrates the potential for my theory to explain military recruitment policies beyond cases of new states.

\textsuperscript{545} Al-Marashi and Salama, \textit{Iraq’s Armed Forces}, 30.
Overall, this dissertation contributes to political science literature by providing a new theory of institutional design, focused specifically on militaries. It demonstrates that military design is subject to forces often outside the control of the state, indicating limitations to state sovereignty and emphasizing the hierarchical nature of the international system. The remainder of this chapter details the contributions this dissertation makes to important debates in political science and insights it provides into relevant policy debates. It concludes with a discussion of avenues for further research.

II. Implications for Scholarly Literature and Policy

While this dissertation was intended to identify the factors that determine whether a country develops a military that relies on conscripts or volunteers, its findings speak to broader academic and policy communities. More specifically, it adds to a growing body of work urging scholars to “see” hierarchy in international relations. In addition, it implies relevant policy prescriptions for security force assistance and cooperation, especially in post-conflict and weak state settings.

A. Hierarchy in International Relations

In arguing for the role of outside actors in affecting military design decisions, this dissertation also bolsters the view that hierarchy constitutes an important component of international order. Viewing the international system as characterized by hierarchy means recognizing the ways state sovereignty can be limited or overlap with that of other states. As a result, states can have different roles within the international system. Militaries in subordinate or client states may serve very different functions from those in dominant or

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546 Lake, Hierarchy.
patron states, or from any state that can make a more independent defense policy. Hierarchy implies that some states may not need to provide for their own defense, but can rely on others to guarantee their security for them. Others have shown that interstate relations are often characterized by hierarchy. As Paul Macdonald wrote, “unequal imperial relations in which great powers seize sovereignty from less powerful states are here to stay.” This dissertation shows that hierarchy often plays out in the realm of military affairs. Traditionally, developing and controlling national militaries has been viewed as a chief response to the constraints imposed by anarchy. I show that in many states it is an institution characterized by shared sovereignty, not one that arose solely or primarily out of the requirements of self-help.

This emphasis on hierarchy and patron-client relations also has relevance for research into the security sector in weak states. While I developed my theory by thinking about newly independent states and the process of military formation, my theory applies beyond these circumstances to conditions that states are likely to continue to experience today. The universe of cases I examined in Chapter 3 included not only states after they became independent, but also the comparable circumstances of social revolution and post-conflict reconstruction. These latter two conditions capture the broader phenomenon of weak or fragile states. I found that 65% of the states in my universe of cases exhibit some form of foreign military patronage, indicating that weak states are very likely to lack full control over the design of their military institutions. Moreover, my results show that emulation is a common result of this influence. This means that foreign sponsors of

security sector reform have the ability to affect military design in weak states in a lasting way, especially given how rarely recruitment practices change.

**B. Policy Implications**

This relevance to security sector reform means that my findings have implications for policymakers. Decisions about military recruitment are but one example of the many decisions states need to make when they design or reform militaries. Thus, this dissertation demonstrates the importance of foreign actors during the security sector reform process. In particular, foreign governments can play an important role by controlling security practices in or modeling practices to states they target for security sector reform. For example, the United States has a long history of attempting to build militaries in other states, and it appears that it will continue to attempt to do this for the foreseeable future. However, its record of building successful militaries is, at best, mixed. As Biddle et al., point out, many U.S.-assisted militaries have failed in the missions they have been assigned; the Iraqi army collapsed in the face of the Islamic State offensive in 2014, while the Afghan army has been unable to prevent the resurgence of the Taliban. Therefore security force assistance, they argue, has not led to the emulation of successful warfighting practices.

However, this dissertation indicates that security force assistance can lead to successful emulation with sufficient engagement from the foreign patron. The Afghan and Iraq armies, after all, adopted many of the formal design policies that the United States preferred. This of course does not necessarily mean that patron states will always

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549 Gates, “Helping Others Defend Themselves.”
pursue the right, or most militarily effective, policies for their clients; patrons will base their military design decisions on their own experiences and biases rooted in their own history and strategic culture. Regardless of whether this external influence is good for the new state, though, when patron states are committed to providing assistance, new states are more likely to emulate their practices. Indeed, this is consistent with a forthcoming argument by Mara Karlin, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development in the U.S. Defense Department. Karlin argues that one of the necessary conditions for successfully building a foreign military is deep engagement, which includes selecting personnel for senior military leadership in the new state. One of the key goals of military advisory missions and seconding officers is to train the next generation of military leaders in the new military. Thus, if sufficient attention is paid to training and selecting military leaders that have been exposed to the practices of the patron state, security force assistance is especially likely to be successful.

In particular, recruitment policies can contribute to conflict resolution and security in war-torn and divided societies through integration with efforts to support human rights, power-sharing in the military, and broader security sector reform and training efforts. Thus, my research highlights an important role for external actors in helping states design or restructure their military after major regime change or conflict. For example, military training and power-sharing was integral to the peace process in Bosnia. Military recruitment policies are an important feature of military power-sharing that have implications for other aspects of post-conflict security sector reform agreements. My dissertation contributes to efforts to design such post-conflict militaries

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to support peace and domestic reconstruction. In short, my dissertation addresses an important, recurring problem for policymakers: how to assist other states in the design of militaries that support domestic stability and international peace.

There is another potential challenge for policymakers. I show that when states do not have a foreign patron, they prefer to respond to highly threatening environments using conscription. This demonstrates that, despite technological advances that appear to favor capital-intensive military strategies, many states perceive conscription—a labor-intensive strategy—as still their best bet in the event of major foreign threats. Therefore, this dissertation says something about how states respond to threats. Capital-intensive, volunteer militaries may appear to be the best practice in the international system because of the success of the system’s most powerful actor—the United States—in using these techniques. However, we should not necessarily expect states to adopt capital-intensive militaries to address external defense in the international system without direct military influence from a patron who already follows those practices. New states in particular may prefer to pursue other goals, such as promoting a national identity, or may perceive their capabilities as better suited to labor-intensive military organization. In reality, we should still expect states to try to maximize their military effectiveness in the face of threats using conscription. Indeed, there is some evidence that this is happening around the world today, with several countries apparently implementing conscription in response to rising threats from regional rivals. This has happened, for example, in countries as diverse as Sweden and the United Arab Emirates, responding to a resurgent Russia and Iran, respectively.\footnote{Martin Selsoe Sorensen, “Sweden Reinstates Conscription, With an Eye on Russia,” New York Times, March 2, 2017. Available at} As a result, foreign patrons who use volunteers may have a
particularly challenging time affecting military policies in states that perceive they face major foreign threats. This may change however, if states perceive there to be a decline in the likelihood of land-based territorial wars. As these conflicts become less common and threats to invade countries become less credible, fewer states may design their militaries around conscription.

This is important because military policies determine the extent to which the United States can rely on allies to contribute effectively to foreign deployments and collective security: conscript and volunteer armies have different levels of effectiveness, or rather, may be better in different types of conflicts.\footnote{Horowitz et al., “Domestic Institutions and Wartime Casualties”; Cohen, \textit{Citizens and Soldiers}.} If volunteer militaries are more effective in long counterinsurgency campaigns—as Cohen suggests—or in any type of conflict—as Horowitz et al. argue—then the United States should want its allies to adopt volunteer recruitment policies. The U.S. has an interest in whether coalition or alliance partners use either conscription or volunteers. Military design and recruitment policies can also foster domestic stability, which in turn facilitates more predictable long-term relations, when they support democratic and civilian-controlled regimes. Understanding what conditions make a preferred recruitment system more or less likely is useful for policymakers designing foreign aid to affect these policy outcomes. For example, if Afghan leaders consider reinstituting conscription—as they recently have—but US policymakers prefer a volunteer Afghan army, my research identifies feasible ways to achieve that goal. For example, maintaining an Afghan army that is consistent with

American perceptions of military organization may require a heavy U.S. security presence, either with local advisors that have some degree of control over the Afghan military, or with sufficient numbers of trainers to teach their Afghan counterparts about American military practices. Whether for advising allies or assisting security sector reform, it is important to know what conditions make it easier for a country to adopt a recruitment system successfully.

Similarly, this dissertation provides insight into how states define their security interests. It is often assumed that militaries are designed primarily to be experts in violence. However, my research demonstrates that there are cases where states sacrifice military effectiveness to pursue other goals, such as social integration. My research suggests in what conditions states may be freer to sacrifice military effectiveness for other goals. When states have patrons, domestic preferences will have little effect on how they design their military. Instead, the patron will dominate military design with its own perceptions of military effectiveness in mind. Conversely, states with no patrons but which face major external threats are also constrained, but by the international security environment—they have no choice but to rely on themselves for military defense. Only when there is no foreign patron or external threat are states relatively free to design their militaries based on their own preferences. When there are no constraints from patrons or external threats, states have more freedom to use the military to address less strictly military goals. In these cases, some states facing high levels of domestic threat use loyal volunteers to suppress rebellion violently, while others seek to tie the population to the regime through a conscript system that treats the army like a “school for the nation.”
However, my dissertation shows that the circumstances in which states can make military decisions based on these factors are relatively rare.

III. Extensions for Future Research

The argument and findings of this dissertation offer several possible extensions for future research. In addition, there are also several aspects of my theory that are amenable to additional empirical testing.

First, I only focused on the broadest level of recruitment policy—whether states used conscription or not at the national level. However, other aspects of recruitment policies are also worth studying, and may in fact be related to the decision to use conscription. For example, length of service, exemptions, and recruitment criteria are all additional ways that states affect who serves in their militaries. Personnel policies that make the military more or less open to diverse societal groups, especially policies relating to gender or LGBT equality, is a particular area that is likely to be important for many armies around in the world in the near future. It is reasonable to believe that if the decision to conscript or not is determined by foreign influence, so might these other, related policies. Thus, we could expect gender-inclusive military policies to occur in new or post-conflict states whose security sector reform processes are being overseen by patrons that have adopted similar policies. Similarly, my theory could also be extended to test policies that are less directly related to recruitment. Any aspect of military organization that is subject to variation across states, such as the main organizational unit or level of mechanization, could be equally affected by patron-client relations or, in their absence, by threat perceptions.
Second, my theory could also apply to the timing of recruitment system changes. In this dissertation I focused primarily on initial military design decisions based on the empirical finding that recruitment changes are rare and self-reinforcing. Thus, it is particularly useful to understand the contexts in which states initially design their militaries. However, it is also important to study military reform by addressing when or why states change their recruitment system. It may be that foreign patrons can affect military design even after the initial period of military design. Thus, when a state loses a foreign patron and regains control over its military design, my theory would imply that threat perceptions should determine how it will choose to recruit. This is consistent with the findings of my case study chapters on Jordan and Bosnia, which examined the trajectory of these countries’ armies after the initial period of military design. In addition, when a state switches between foreign patrons that use different recruitment methods, we should also observe the state adopting the new patron’s recruitment method. Indeed, in related work, I find that countries that participate in the American IMET program are more likely to change their recruitment system to use volunteers, and are less likely to change to conscript service if they already use volunteers.\footnote{Max Margulies, “The Politics of Military Reform: Explaining Changes in Military Recruitment Systems.” Working Paper. Available from author at margm@sas.upenn.edu.} Thus, my theory may be equally applicable to cases of recruitment change as to cases of design.

Third, my dissertation reveals additional avenues of exploration in terms of how foreign patrons can affect military design. I argue that emulation is the effect of having a patron state, but emulation can come about either via direct intervention or through more indirect pressure, or exposure to successful techniques. Additional research could determine which of these mechanisms happens under what conditions.
Fourth, there is similar room for additional research on the nature of recruitment decisions that are defined by my second causal pathway. While I argue that recruitment under conditions of no patronage and no major foreign threat is fundamentally determined by leaders’ idiosyncratic preferences, it may be possible to theorize factors that further constrain their decisions. For example, some types of domestic threats may more closely resemble the kinds of foreign territorial threats that create pressures toward conscription. This may have been the case in Iraq for much of its history: a Sunni Muslim minority ruled over a Shi’a majority, which may have created incentives to attempt to use military conscription to create a national identity. In fact, there is some support for the argument that ethnic representativeness may affect leaders’ strategic calculus regarding conscription; Chapter 3 indicated that states with larger politically excluded populations may be less likely to use conscription when they have no patron. Similarly, this is also likely to be the pathway followed by many powerful states with more developed militaries, particularly in an age when nuclear weapons have decreased the probability of major territorial invasions. Thus, the foreign patronage portion of my theory applies best to weaker, developing states, though one could imagine that a similar emulation argument could explain military design in stronger states as well.

Fifth, my dissertation advances a theory of military design that can equally apply to non-state actors. Great powers around the world have been involved in creating or supporting rebel group proxies, often to avoid contributing troops of their own. Most recently, the United States announced that it would create a new Kurdish-led and
“professionally well trained” force in Syria. While other American-backed Kurdish forces have reportedly relied on conscription, it appears that their regular forces—as opposed to border and civil police—are comprised of volunteers. Whether non-state actors tend to adopt the same recruitment practices—or other military practices—of their sponsors remains to be seen.

Finally, it is only worthwhile to understand the determinants of military recruitment strategies if this variation affects other important characteristics of the state or aspects of state behavior. While existing research, as described in Chapter 1, establishes that conscription has important effects on interstate relations, including conflict onset and outcomes, there is much room for additional research on the consequences of conscription. In particular, there is little research on how conscription affects domestic political outcomes at the state level. Given its broad effects on military design and its relationship to civilian society, conscription can be expected to affect many domestic outcomes, including coup propensity, responses to mass demonstrations, state capacity, and individual political participation. While conscription is often cited as a factor that could affect these outcomes, there is little cross-national research to support these arguments.

557 For example, see Ece Toksabay and Paul Taylor, “Turkey’s Bungled Putsch: A Strangely 20th Century Coup,” Reuters, July 16, 2016, Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-coup-analysis-idUSKCN0ZW0V0; Soifer, Statebuilding in Latin America.
Similarly, the merits of conscription are still frequently debated in the United States.\textsuperscript{558} It is rare for a Veteran’s Day or Memorial Day to pass without at least one op-ed in a major US news publication asking whether the United States should reinstate the draft.\textsuperscript{559} Typical arguments in favor of such a policy state that a draft would lead to greater cross-cultural understanding and would create better civil-military relations, in part by ensuring more Americans are connected to the military and thus have “skin in the game” when it comes to foreign policy decision-making. However, these arguments have not been tested empirically. Additional research on the domestic consequences of conscription would provide important information about how countries should design their militaries in the future.


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APPENDIX A: PARTIAL LIST OF SOURCES
CONSULTED FOR PATRONAGE VARIABLE

Austria 1918


Czechoslovakia 1918


Estonia 1918


Hungary 1918


Latvia 1918

Lithuania 1918

Poland 1918

Yemen Arab Republic 1918

Afghanistan 1919

Mongolia 1921


**Egypt 1922**


**Ireland 1922**


**Dominican Republic 1924**


**Honduras 1924**


**Saudi Arabia 1926**


**China 1928**


**Mexico 1929**


**Iraq 1932**

**Haiti 1934**
Logan, Rayford W. *Haiti and the Dominican Republic.* Oxford University Press, 1968

**Spain 1939**

**Ethiopia 1941**

**Lebanon 1943**


**Albania 1944**


**France 1944**


**Greece 1944**


**Iceland 1944**


**Luxembourg 1944**


**Yugoslavia 1944**


**Belgium 1945**


**Czechoslovakia, 1945**


**Netherlands 1945**


**Norway 1945**


**Poland 1945**


**Jordan 1946**

**Philippines 1946**

**Syria 1946**

**Bhutan 1947**

**Pakistan 1947**

**India 1947**

**Costa Rica 1948**

**Israel 1948**

**Myanmar (Burma) 1948**

**North Korea 1948**

**South Korea 1948**

**Sri Lanka 1948**

**China 1949**

**Indonesia 1949**

**Taiwan 1949**

**Libya 1951**
Bolivia 1952

Japan 1952

Cambodia 1953

Laos 1953

East Germany 1954


**North Vietnam 1954**


**South Vietnam 1954**


**Argentina 1955**


**West Germany 1955**


**Austria 1955**


**Morocco 1956**

**Tunisia 1956**

**Sudan 1956**

**Ghana 1957**

**Malaysia 1957**


**Guinea 1958**


**Cuba 1959**


**Benin (Dahomey) 1960**


**Burkina Faso 1960**


**Cameroon 1960**


Central African Republic 1960

Chad 1960

Congo (Brazzaville) 1960

Cote d’Ivoire 1960

Cyprus 1960

Democratic Republic of the Congo 1960
**Gabon 1960**

**Madagascar 1960**

**Mali 1960**

**Mauritania 1960**

**Niger 1960**

**Nigeria 1960**

**Senegal 1960**

**Somalia 1960**

**Togo 1960**

**Sierra Leone 1961**

**Tanzania 1961**

**Kuwait 1961**


**Algeria 1962**


**Burundi 1962**


**Jamaica 1962**


**Laos 1962**


**Rwanda 1962**


**Trinidad and Tobago 1962**


**Uganda 1962**


**Kenya 1963**


**Zanzibar 1963**


**Malawi 1964**


**Malta 1964**


**Zambia 1964**

**Gambia 1965**

**Singapore 1965**

**Maldives 1965**

**Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) 1965**

**Barbados 1966**

**Botswana 1966**


**Guyana 1966**


**Iraq 1966**


**Lesotho 1966**


**Yemen People’s Democratic Republic 1967**


**Mauritius 1968**


**Swaziland 1968**


**Fiji 1970**


Scarr, Deryck. Fiji, A Short History. Laie, HI: Brigham Young University, Hawaii Campus, 1984.

**Iraq 1970**


**Bahrain 1971**


Bangladesh 1971

Qatar 1971

United Arab Emirates 1971

Sudan 1972

Bahamas 1973
“History of the RBDF.” Available at http://rbdf.gov.bs/history/.

Chile 1973


**Ethiopia 1974**


**Grenada 1974**


**Guinea-Bissau 1974**


**Cape Verde 1975**


**Angola 1975**


**Cambodia 1975**


Comoros 1975

Mozambique 1975

Papua New Guinea 1975

Sao Tome and Principe 1975

Suriname 1975

Seychelles 1976

Djibouti 1977

Afghanistan 1978

**Dominica 1978**

**Solomon Islands 1978**

**Nicaragua 1979**

**Iran 1979**

**St. Lucia 1979**

**St. Vincent and Grenadines 1979**
https://cdn.loc.gov/master/frd/frdstdy/is/islandsofcommonw00medi/islandsofcommonw00medi.pdf.

**Zimbabwe 1979**

**Belize 1981**

**Antigua and Barbuda 1981**

**St. Kitts and Nevis 1983**

**Chad 1984**

**Brunei 1984**

**Lebanon 1984**

**Uganda 1986**

**Yemen People’s Democratic Republic 1986**

**Albania 1989**

**Bulgaria 1989**
https://cdn.loc.gov/master/frd/frdcstdy/bu/bulgariacountrys00curt_0/bulgariacountrys00curt_0.pdf.

**Hungary 1989**


**Poland 1989**


**Romania 1989**


**Chad 1990**

Germany 1990


Lebanon 1990


Namibia 1990


Yemen 1990


Angola 1991


Armenia 1991


Azerbaijan 1991

Belarus 1991

Cambodia 1991

**Croatia 1991**

**Estonia 1991**

**Ethiopia 1991**

**Georgia 1991**


**Kazakhstan 1991**


**Kyrgyzstan 1991**


**Latvia 1991**


**Lithuania 1991**


**Macedonia 1991**


**Moldova 1991**


**Slovenia 1991**


**Tajikistan 1991**


Turkmenistan 1991

Ukraine 1991

Uzbekistan 1991


**Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992**


**El Salvador 1992**


**Moldova 1992**


**Eritrea 1993**


**Czech Republic 1993**


**Slovakia 1993**


**Angola 1994**


**Georgia 1994**


**Rwanda 1994**


**Liberia 1999**


**Russia 1996**


**Liberia 1996**


**Democratic Republic of the Congo 1997**


**Tajikistan 1997**


**Algeria 1999**


**Guinea-Bissau 1999**


**Sierra Leone 2000**


**Afghanistan 2001**


**Philippines 2001**


**Democratic Republic of the Congo 2002**


East Timor 2002

Indonesia 2002

Sri Lanka 2002
Scott, David, ed. Handbook of India’s International Relations. Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2011.

Burundi 2003


Iraq 2003


Liberia 2003


Cote d’Ivoire 2004


Sudan 2005

Montenegro 2006

Nepal 2006


Pakistan 2006

Kosovo 2008


South Sudan 2011
### APPENDIX B: SUPPORTING DATA FOR CHAPTER 3

Table A.1: Universe of Cases

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<th>COW Code</th>
<th>Name</th>
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<td>1968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonga</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>1974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuvalu</td>
<td>1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vincent and Grenadines</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiribati</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu</td>
<td>1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall Islands</td>
<td>1986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palau</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
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<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>2011</td>
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Table A.3: Frequency of Threat Environment by Foreign Influence

<table>
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<th></th>
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<th>Volunteer Patron</th>
<th>Conscript Patron</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Any Land Borders</td>
<td>65 (87%)</td>
<td>25 (64%)</td>
<td>80 (87%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any MIDs</td>
<td>30 (41%)</td>
<td>11 (28%)</td>
<td>40 (43%)</td>
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Table A.4: OLS Results for Table 3.9, The Effect of Patron Influence on the Probability of Conscription in New States

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<th>OLS Model 11</th>
<th>OLS Model 12</th>
<th>OLS Model 13</th>
<th>OLS Model 14</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Volunteer Patron</td>
<td>-0.144*</td>
<td>-0.0962</td>
<td>-0.143*</td>
<td>-0.142*</td>
<td>-0.115</td>
<td>-0.140*</td>
<td>-0.137*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0791)</td>
<td>(0.0828)</td>
<td>(0.0796)</td>
<td>(0.0799)</td>
<td>(0.0824)</td>
<td>(0.0806)</td>
<td>(0.0821)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscript Patron</td>
<td>0.150*</td>
<td>0.158**</td>
<td>0.150*</td>
<td>0.150*</td>
<td>0.158**</td>
<td>0.159**</td>
<td>0.158**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0793)</td>
<td>(0.0772)</td>
<td>(0.0794)</td>
<td>(0.0795)</td>
<td>(0.0765)</td>
<td>(0.0802)</td>
<td>(0.0788)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Volunteer Legacy</td>
<td>-0.345***</td>
<td>-0.314***</td>
<td>-0.342***</td>
<td>-0.343***</td>
<td>-0.289***</td>
<td>-0.334***</td>
<td>-0.330***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0918)</td>
<td>(0.0934)</td>
<td>(0.0943)</td>
<td>(0.0931)</td>
<td>(0.0959)</td>
<td>(0.0949)</td>
<td>(0.0932)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0932)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Any MIDs</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>0.0150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0709)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Any Forceful MIDs</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Land Borders</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Total Forceful MIDs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>0.368***</td>
<td>0.575***</td>
<td>0.574***</td>
<td>0.413***</td>
<td>0.556***</td>
<td>0.542***</td>
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<td>(0.0715)</td>
<td>(0.0867)</td>
<td>(0.0749)</td>
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<td>199</td>
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<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.214</td>
<td>0.238</td>
<td>0.214</td>
<td>0.214</td>
<td>0.254</td>
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<td>0.226</td>
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Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.5: OLS Results for Table 3.11, The Effect of Influence and Threat on the Probability of Conscription in New States

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<td>Any Land Borders</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0819)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.112)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Forceful MIDs</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>0.0614**</td>
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<td>Total Forceful MIDs</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Volunteer Patron</td>
<td>0.206**</td>
<td>-0.106</td>
<td>-0.0481</td>
<td>0.0133</td>
<td>-0.0454</td>
<td>-0.0504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0951)</td>
<td>(0.0917)</td>
<td>(0.0938)</td>
<td>(0.110)</td>
<td>(0.0933)</td>
<td>(0.0950)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscript Patron</td>
<td>0.459**</td>
<td>0.244**</td>
<td>0.219**</td>
<td>0.225</td>
<td>0.237**</td>
<td>0.221**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.118)</td>
<td>(0.194)</td>
<td>(0.199)</td>
<td>(0.0297)</td>
<td>(0.0508)</td>
<td>(0.0954)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer</td>
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<td>-0.0967</td>
<td>-0.351*</td>
<td>-0.0488</td>
<td>-0.103**</td>
<td>-0.158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patron*Threat</td>
<td>(0.205)</td>
<td>(0.142)</td>
<td>(0.147)</td>
<td>(0.0330)</td>
<td>(0.0428)</td>
<td>(0.0455)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscript Patron*Threat</td>
<td>-0.336</td>
<td>-0.215</td>
<td>-0.206</td>
<td>-0.0209</td>
<td>-0.0791*</td>
<td>-0.0945**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0937)</td>
<td>(0.0961)</td>
<td>(0.0958)</td>
<td>(0.0984)</td>
<td>(0.0994)</td>
<td>(0.0969)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Legacy</td>
<td>-0.315***</td>
<td>-0.330***</td>
<td>-0.346***</td>
<td>-0.301***</td>
<td>-0.338***</td>
<td>-0.331***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0722)</td>
<td>(0.0835)</td>
<td>(0.0780)</td>
<td>(0.0923)</td>
<td>(0.0790)</td>
<td>(0.0768)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.135*</td>
<td>0.522***</td>
<td>0.525***</td>
<td>0.360***</td>
<td>0.508***</td>
<td>0.499***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0722)</td>
<td>(0.0835)</td>
<td>(0.0780)</td>
<td>(0.0923)</td>
<td>(0.0790)</td>
<td>(0.0768)</td>
</tr>
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<td>199</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.250</td>
<td>0.223</td>
<td>0.228</td>
<td>0.260</td>
<td>0.235</td>
<td>0.243</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.6: The Determinants of Military Recruitment on Recently Independent States Only

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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dvdummy</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Land Borders</td>
<td>0.249**</td>
<td>0.498**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.116)</td>
<td>(0.215)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Volunteer Patron</td>
<td>-1.312</td>
<td>-1.192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.896)</td>
<td>(1.072)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscript Patron</td>
<td>0.491</td>
<td>1.627*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.465)</td>
<td>(0.843)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Legacy</td>
<td>-1.020*</td>
<td>-0.954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.603)</td>
<td>(0.597)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Influence*Borders</td>
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<td>0.00346</td>
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<td>(0.327)</td>
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<td>Conscript Influence*Borders</td>
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<td>-0.397</td>
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<td>Constant</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.675)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.7: Determinants of Military Recruitment when foreign influence is based on tradition, rather than contemporary system

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<tr>
<td>Total Land Borders</td>
<td>0.234***</td>
<td>0.354***</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.0819)</td>
<td>(0.127)</td>
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<td>Volunteer Patron</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.364)</td>
<td>(0.595)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conscript Patron</td>
<td>0.870**</td>
<td>1.218*</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.418)</td>
<td>(0.719)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Patron*Borders</td>
<td>-1.571***</td>
<td>-1.561***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.442)</td>
<td>(0.476)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conscript Patron*Borders</td>
<td>-0.336**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.165)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Volunteer Legacy</td>
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</tr>
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Robust standard errors in parentheses

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### Table A.8: The Effect of Recoding Cases of UN Influence

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<td>Total Land Borders</td>
<td>0.254***</td>
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<td>0.262***</td>
<td>0.440***</td>
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<td>(0.0840)</td>
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<td>(0.0800)</td>
<td>(0.131)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Patron (including influence of US if it is involved in multilateral missions)</td>
<td>-0.498</td>
<td>0.316</td>
<td>(0.439)</td>
<td>(0.712)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscript Patron (including influence of US if it is involved in multilateral missions)</td>
<td>0.760**</td>
<td>1.221*</td>
<td>(0.370)</td>
<td>(0.716)</td>
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<td>(0.539)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Patron (including influence of UN lead nations in multilateral missions)</td>
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<td>-1.179**</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.779)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscript Patron (including influence of UN lead nations in multilateral missions)</td>
<td>0.675*</td>
<td>1.325*</td>
<td>(0.377)</td>
<td>(0.697)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>-0.359*</td>
<td>(0.216)</td>
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<td>Volunteer Patron*Borders</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>-0.218</td>
<td>(0.204)</td>
</tr>
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Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.9: The Effect of Longer Threat Time Horizons on Military Recruitment

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<th>(4)</th>
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<td>dvdummy</td>
<td>dvdummy</td>
<td>dvdummy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Forceful MIDs (within 3 years of independence)</td>
<td>0.147*</td>
<td>0.289**</td>
<td>(0.0851)</td>
<td>(0.133)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Patron</td>
<td>-0.784*</td>
<td>-0.392</td>
<td>-0.770*</td>
<td>-0.287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscript Patron</td>
<td>0.728**</td>
<td>1.047**</td>
<td>0.735**</td>
<td>1.154***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Legacy</td>
<td>-1.546***</td>
<td>-1.546***</td>
<td>-1.529***</td>
<td>-1.508***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Patron*MIDs</td>
<td>-0.359</td>
<td>(0.453)</td>
<td>-0.359</td>
<td>(0.453)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscript Patron*MIDs</td>
<td>-0.282*</td>
<td>(0.170)</td>
<td>-0.282*</td>
<td>(0.170)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Forceful MIDs (within 5 years of independence)</td>
<td>0.123**</td>
<td>0.267**</td>
<td>(0.0577)</td>
<td>(0.105)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Patron*MIDs</td>
<td>-0.309</td>
<td>(0.284)</td>
<td>-0.309</td>
<td>(0.284)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscript Patron*MIDs</td>
<td>-0.249**</td>
<td>(0.118)</td>
<td>-0.249**</td>
<td>(0.118)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>-0.0368</td>
<td>0.0833</td>
<td>-0.173</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>199</td>
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Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.10: The Effect of Foreign Influence and Threat on Recruitment at Different Times

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Recruitment at Independence</th>
<th>Recruitment at Independence</th>
<th>Recruitment at Year 5</th>
<th>Recruitment at Year 5</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Robust standard errors in parentheses)</td>
<td>(Robust standard errors in parentheses)</td>
<td>(Robust standard errors in parentheses)</td>
<td>(Robust standard errors in parentheses)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Land Borders</td>
<td>0.198** (0.0827)</td>
<td>0.359*** (0.124)</td>
<td>0.191** (0.0782)</td>
<td>0.284** (0.116)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Volunteer Patron</td>
<td>-0.649 (0.467)</td>
<td>0.138 (0.771)</td>
<td>-0.727 (0.503)</td>
<td>-0.0694 (0.758)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscript Patron</td>
<td>0.622* (0.359)</td>
<td>1.500** (0.750)</td>
<td>0.704** (0.352)</td>
<td>1.125 (0.716)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Legacy</td>
<td>-1.414*** (0.482)</td>
<td>-1.488*** (0.526)</td>
<td>-1.586*** (0.456)</td>
<td>-1.651*** (0.480)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0782)</td>
<td>(0.124)</td>
<td>(0.0782)</td>
<td>(0.124)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Patron*Borders</td>
<td>-0.245 (0.179)</td>
<td>-0.277 (0.167)</td>
<td>-0.245 (0.179)</td>
<td>-0.213 (0.179)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscript Patron*Borders</td>
<td>-0.277 (0.204)</td>
<td>-0.277 (0.190)</td>
<td>-0.277 (0.190)</td>
<td>-0.135 (0.190)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.463 (0.397)</td>
<td>-0.970** (0.472)</td>
<td>-0.274 (0.395)</td>
<td>-0.561 (0.468)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.397)</td>
<td>(0.472)</td>
<td>(0.397)</td>
<td>(0.472)</td>
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<td>199</td>
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Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A.11: The Effect of Technological Era on Recruitment

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
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<th>(2) dvdummy</th>
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<tr>
<td>Post-1973</td>
<td>0.341</td>
<td>0.353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.3468)</td>
<td>(0.3446)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Land Borders</td>
<td>0.234***</td>
<td>0.335***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0852)</td>
<td>(0.1272)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Patron</td>
<td>-0.789</td>
<td>0.420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.5016)</td>
<td>(0.7746)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscript Patron</td>
<td>0.797**</td>
<td>1.208*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.3648)</td>
<td>(0.7031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Patron*Borders</td>
<td>-0242 (0.1789)</td>
<td>-0.132 (0.1960)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conscript Patron*Borders</td>
<td>-0.132 (0.1960)</td>
<td>-0.132 (0.1960)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volunteer Legacy</td>
<td>-1.384***</td>
<td>-1.451***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.4837)</td>
<td>(0.5188)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.639</td>
<td>-0.952**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.4101)</td>
<td>(0.4754)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>199</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
APPENDIX C: INTERVIEWS

On average, interviews lasted 30–40 minutes, with only one interview lasting less than 20 minutes. One interview was in-person and lasted several hours, while the rest were conducted either over the phone or via Skype. Interviews were semi-structured: I went into them with a list of questions to ask or topics to cover, but the tone was generally conversational and sought “to retain sufficient indeterminacy in the interview to allow for unanticipated insights.” I began most interviews with an open-ended question asking the interviewee to tell me about his or her role in Bosnian defense reform, focusing on a specific episode or institution when applicable. Following Matthew Beckmann and Richard Hall’s advice about interviews with policy elites, I focused my efforts on “extract[ing] systematic information about [their] actual behaviors on specific issues….“ I asked them to recall their goals in initiating certain decisions, whether those goals changed, and about any obstacles to their implementation. Often, one of the most useful questions I asked was toward the end, when I would inquire about who else was involved in specific decisions or whom else I should talk to. This allowed me to identify the pivotal figures in recruitment decisions and to triangulate key information about the actions and attitudes of other important policymakers.

560 Martin, “Crafting Interviews,” 110.
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<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Clifford Bond</td>
<td>US Ambassador to Bosnia</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Robert Tomasovic</td>
<td>Inspector General for Entity Armed Forces</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Anonymous</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina Delegation Member at Dayton</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Marshall Harris</td>
<td>President of Acquisition Support Institute</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Jim Pardew</td>
<td>Negotiator at Dayton; Head of Train and Equip</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Raffi Gregorian</td>
<td>Director of Bosnia Policy at U.S. State Dept; Co-chair of Second DRC</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>William Crouch</td>
<td>Commanding General, SFOR</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Lejla Gelo</td>
<td>Legal Advisor for DRC Secretariat</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Lena Andersson</td>
<td>OSCE Advisor; DRC Working Group Member</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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\textsuperscript{563} Note that many interviewees were involved in policy at different levels at different times. The information here refers to their position during the most important period on which my interviews focused.
<table>
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<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
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<th>Yes/No</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Vanja Matic</td>
<td>OSCE Interpreter and DRC Working Group Member</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Rohan Maxwell</td>
<td>Senior Political-Military Advisor &amp; Chief, Politico-Military Advisory Section, NATO HQ Sarajevo</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Robert Beecroft</td>
<td>Special Envoy for Federation, OSCE Representative</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Selmo Cikotic</td>
<td>Negotiating Team for Bosniaks at Dayton, Defense Minister of BiH</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Ric Bainter</td>
<td>Legal Advisor and Chief of Staff at DRC</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>James Locher III</td>
<td>Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, DRC Chairman</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>John Drewien-kiewicz</td>
<td>Military Advisor to High Representative, 2005 DRC Vice-Chairman</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Nikola Radovanovic</td>
<td>Defense Minister of BiH</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Lord Paddy Ashdown</td>
<td>High Representative, 2002–2006</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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