Conflict And Coexistence On The Edge Of Empire: The Limits Of Sovereignty In The Iberian Colonial World, 1450-1700

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Abstract
This dissertation examines the relationship between theory and practice in the exercise of imperial sovereignty, including during the height of Iberian global hegemony in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. It focuses in particular on remote regions of the Spanish and Portuguese empires. The manuscript opens with an analysis of a range of influential treatises, chronicles, epic poetry, cartography, and iconography, which glorified, amplified, and aimed to legitimize the claims and aspirations of the Iberian rulers to imperium beyond Europe. These texts coalesced to form a common, uniquely Iberian discourse of empire, which crystallized around the turn of the seventeenth century, during the union of the Spanish and Portuguese crowns. Then, through case studies on Southeast Africa, the Philippines, and the Río de la Plata, the study explores how complex jurisdicctional layering, physical distance, and the power of indigenous and local settler groups created situations in which, beyond official centers of colonial power, the crown's effective sovereignty was diffuse, highly circumscribed, and constantly fluid in its geography. Beyond highlighting this dissonant tension between ambition and effective rule, the dissertation demonstrates how, in different moments, local actors on the peripheries of empire rearticulated concepts of Iberian and broader European law and political theory, either to affirm their obedience and belonging within the larger imperial body, or to claim authority as sources of law in their own right and defend their autonomy against the extension of crown power.

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CONFLICT AND COEXISTENCE ON THE EDGE OF EMPIRE: THE LIMITS OF SOVEREIGNTY IN THE IBERIAN COLONIAL WORLD, 1450-1700

Alexander Ponsen

Antonio Feros

This dissertation examines the relationship between theory and practice in the exercise of imperial sovereignty, including during the height of Iberian global hegemony in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. It focuses in particular on remote regions of the Spanish and Portuguese empires. The manuscript opens with an analysis of a range of influential treatises, chronicles, epic poetry, cartography, and iconography, which glorified, amplified, and aimed to legitimize the claims and aspirations of the Iberian rulers to imperium beyond Europe. These texts coalesced to form a common, uniquely Iberian discourse of empire, which crystallized around the turn of the seventeenth century, during the union of the Spanish and Portuguese crowns. Then, through case studies on Southeast Africa, the Philippines, and the Río de la Plata, the study explores how complex jurisdictional layering, physical distance, and the power of indigenous and local settler groups created situations in which, beyond official centers of colonial power, the crown’s effective sovereignty was diffuse, highly circumscribed, and constantly fluid in its geography. Beyond highlighting this dissonant tension between ambition and effective rule, the dissertation demonstrates how, in different moments, local actors on the peripheries of empire rearticulated concepts of Iberian and broader European law and political theory, either to affirm their obedience and belonging within the larger imperial body, or to claim authority as sources of law in their own right and defend their autonomy against the extension of crown power.
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AGI (Archivo General de Indias), Seville, Spain
AGNA (Archivo General de la Nación, Argentina), Buenos Aires, Argentina
AGNM (Archivo General de la Nación, México), Mexico City, Mexico
AHU (Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino), Lisbon, Portugal
ANTT (Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo), Lisbon, Portugal
BA (Biblioteca da Ajuda), Lisbon, Portugal
BNE (Biblioteca Nacional de España), Madrid, Spain
BNP (Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal), Lisbon, Portugal
BPE (Biblioteca Pública de Évora), Évora, Portugal
IHGB (Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
RAH (Real Academia de la Historia), Madrid, Spain
INTRODUCTION

The completion of the peninsular Reconquest in 1492, the expansion of Habsburg possessions across Europe, and the series of conquests in the Americas and Philippines gave rise to an increasingly messianic discourse lauding the exploits of the Spanish Monarchy over the course of the sixteenth century. Portugal’s parallel expansion into the Atlantic, along coastal Africa and Brazil, and across maritime Asia produced a similar discourse hailing the transcontinental dimensions of Portuguese dominion as well. Together, and with Papal blessing, the Iberian monarchies laid exclusive claim to the “discovery” and conquest of the entire extra-European world and aimed to spread Christianity to the globe’s most distant corners. The enthusiastic fervor for Iberian empire reached crescendo in 1581 when Philip II of Spain ascended the Portuguese throne achieving the long sought reunification of the entire Iberian Peninsula for the first time since antiquity and bringing the two hemispheres of Iberian expansion together under his singular sovereignty. By adding Portuguese territories in Africa, Asia, and Brazil to his already sprawling possessions, Philip now looked out from his new Lisbon palace over what contemporary observers and modern historians alike have viewed as the world’s first global empire.

Although the Iberians are recognized as the first Europeans to found lasting colonies on the distant shores of Africa, Asia, and the Americas, their position as pioneers in the emergence of an interconnected world remains surprisingly obscured. In most historiography on early modern or “proto-” globalization, emphasis remains on the empires of northwest Europe in forging the first global circuits of exchange in the mid-seventeenth
According to the conventional narrative, presented primarily through the history of the development of capitalism, the expansions of the Dutch and English helped spread commercial capitalism, the precursor to modern industrial capitalism, to the most distant corners of the earth, giving birth to the first integrated global economy. Iberian expansion is largely seen as medieval, redistributive, and extractive, as a process that simply transposed ancient forms of feudalism from Iberia into the colonial world and failed to integrate the globe in any meaningful way. The recent historiographical turn toward global history, however, has renewed interest in early modern Iberian expansion and its role in the process of global connectivity. Emphasizing commercial, intellectual, or cultural aspects, these scholars have done sophisticated, paradigm-shifting work that has compelled us to revisit earlier assumptions about the origins of global mercantile capitalism, of international law, and of global migration and cultural exchange and mestizaje.

Yet at the same time as we recognize and assess the various contributions of European expansion to the process of globalization, it is also worth asking to what extent European monarchs actually exercised full sovereignty over and within their overseas possessions. What are we to make of vague claims stressing the globality of these empires? These questions are especially relevant in relation to the early modern Iberian monarchs,

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especially Philip II, who, according to several of his contemporaries, was sovereign over the largest composite monarchy the world had ever known.\(^3\)

Despite the truly impressive efforts of a range of actors – including conquerors, missionaries, merchants, royal officials, humanists, jurists, and theologians – in giving physical and ideological meaning to the Iberian empires as they expanded, the process of extending imperial rule was constantly contested and hardly linear. It was marked by violence and setbacks. A gaping divide existed between theory and practice, between the capacious territorial claims of the empires and the monarchs’ ability to impose effective sovereignty over those claims. Beyond the core regions of Iberian colonial authority and settlement, crown rule was highly fragmented, often indirect, and occasionally even inverted. Interestingly, however, the limits of royal sovereignty were in some ways more pronounced in certain autonomous kingdoms and lordships of Europe, including of the Iberian Peninsula, than in distant colonial strongholds like Mexico City, Goa, Lima, or Salvador da Bahia. But nowhere was the crown’s effective authority more circumscribed than in places like Southeast Africa, much of the Philippines and the upper reaches of the Río de la Plata watershed. In many parts of these regions, which were among the empires’ most remote territories far from the main centers of both metropolitan and colonial power, the presence of royal officials and institutions was minimal, transient, or in some cases non-existent. In many areas beyond the reach of official colonial enclaves, Iberian settlers and officials represented but one of a range of forces vying for influence and survival. In many cases, Iberians were far from the hegemonic powers in the region, and their presence was often dependent on the ability to ingratiate themselves with indigenous rulers or integrate within local systems of social and political organization.

But what does it mean to speak about imperial sovereignty in places at great distances from colonial power where the crown had such a limited direct, formal presence? How far did imperial sovereignty extend? In what ways was it circumscribed? How and why did local actors in these regions mobilize the globalized discourses of Iberian empire either to reinforce their belonging within the larger imperial body or to defend their own local authority and jurisdiction? And finally, how did champions of Spanish and Portuguese empire reconcile their capacious claims to sovereignty over non-European peoples and territories with the reality of the crowns’ limited power or subservience to indigenous polities in several of these more remote regions?

The main purpose of this study is to gain a sharper understanding of the diffuse nature of imperial power and its geography, especially at the apex of Iberian global hegemony during the early years of the union of the Spanish and Portuguese crowns. I analyze the methods the crowns used to extend their direct and indirect sovereignty over remote parts of the empires, and I examine the fluid process through which, at different moments, indigenous groups and settlers of European extraction leveraged their power either in support of Iberian colonial rule or against it. In certain colonial core regions the crown achieved undisputed, wide-reaching dominance over local societies and territories. Beyond those cores, however, while missionaries or independent traders and adventurers of Iberian origin may have penetrated deep into the hinterland, the crown’s official presence was limited, its status sometimes reduced to vassal of a given dominant indigenous polity. As I aim to show, each Iberian empire possessed a vast repertoire of sovereignties, which varied widely both across colonies and within them. Yet despite the many limits on imperial

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power, it was precisely this diversity of experience accrued from a variety of colonial contexts in Africa, Asia, and the Americas, which provided champions of Iberian expansion with the new practical knowledge and conditions of possibility necessary for the articulation of a discourse of empire that could be applied, for the first time, on a truly global scale.

This project sits at the nexus of three broad fields of scholarship. First, and most specialized, is the literature on the connected history of early modern Spain, Portugal, and their empires. But is it appropriate to speak of a connected Iberian history and of a singular process of Iberian expansion? Or, should the Spanish and Portuguese empires be considered distinct or even opposed in their structures, methods, ambitions and ideologies? In an influential article published in 2007, Sanjay Subrahmanyam reminded us that although in perpetual competition, and often in direct violent conflict, the Spanish and Portuguese empires also shared much in common, collaborated on numerous occasions, and were surprisingly integrated despite remaining officially closed off from one another in theory. And while this was most obvious during the union of the Iberian crowns from 1580 to 1640, it was also true long before. The connected history of the Iberian empires has roots in the early fifteenth century, with their first parallel movements into the Atlantic and along the west coast of Africa. And the connected history of the various territories of Iberia, of course, stretches back far earlier, at least to when they were united under the Romans, as Hispania, if not before.

Until recently, however, the histories of Portugal, Spain, and their empires were largely presented as separate. In this sense, historiography on the Iberian world had been indicative of larger tendencies across the discipline. The enduring predominance of nation-

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state centered history had largely eschewed studies in which, even in the early modern period, national and imperial lines were blurred, complicating the supposed progressive march toward the modern nation-state. This was even true for historiography on the period of Iberian union. The bulk of that research focused on the court politics of dynastic succession, on the cooptation of Portuguese elites by agents of Philip II, or on the military history of Spain’s 1580 invasion of Portugal and of the subsequent Portuguese revolt of 1640. Moreover, it was largely confined to the peninsular context with little attention to overseas questions. However, the connected history of Spain, Portugal, and their empires has recently attracted new interest from historians led by Fernando Bouza, Pedro Cardim, Serge Gruzinski, Antonio Manuel Hespanha, Giuseppe Marcocci, José Antonio Martínez Torres, Jean-Frédéric Schaub, and Rafael Valladares, among others, who have turned their attention toward the foundational conjuncture that gave rise to the union, and have assessed its consequences in a range of colonial spaces and from a variety of conceptual approaches.

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Building on that new foundation, this present project adopts a global frame in analyzing combined Iberian contributions to the development of a common discourse of empire with attention to the methods through which the Iberians carved out and attempted to consolidate their spheres of sovereignty overseas.

Second, my project builds on the rich and extensive literature on imperial sovereignty and colonial authority, a field reinvigorated by the turn toward global history and the renewed interest in the comparative history of early modern empires. The central question framing this research is how empires attempted to impose control over highly diverse, internally differentiated native polities, as well as over European settler communities often

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protective of their local authority and jurisdictions. Over two decades ago Jack Greene’s study, *Negotiated Authorities: Essays in Colonial Political and Constitutional History*, systematically subverted the idea of an absolutist, centralized structure of early modern European imperial rule.\(^9\) Despite the fact that his work focused on British America and on the crown’s relationship to its European colonial subjects in particular, the fundamental argument that imperial authority was decentralized and constantly renegotiated can also be applied fittingly to the territories over which Spain and Portugal laid claim. In many ways, Greene’s work paralleled that historians like John Elliott, António Manuel Hespanha, and Pablo Fernández Albaladejo, who advanced related arguments for early modern Portugal and Spain and have, along with others like John Leddy Phelan, Tamar Herzog, and Víctor Tau Anzoátegui, both before and after, assessed the dynamics of dispersed, flexible structures of authority in the colonial context as well.\(^10\)

Similarly, Lauren Benton’s more recent comparative work has tied together the disparate fields of geography, law, and cultural history, displaying the ways in which European and non-European empires alike sought to maintain order over diverse dominions through constant compromises between the imposition of top-down centralized forms of rule and the ceding of legal and political autonomy to local indigenous groups within the

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larger structure of empire.\textsuperscript{11} Like Benton, anthropologist James C. Scott has also reminded us of the importance of geography in shaping the contours of imperial (or state) sovereignty, of how rivers, lowlands, and mountains can facilitate the extension of imperial power or resistance to it.\textsuperscript{12} Although Scott’s work has focused on the modern state, it can also be applied usefully here to demonstrate the porosity of boundaries of imperial jurisdiction. Both indigenous peoples and settlers of European origin moved frequently into or beyond the effective reach of Iberian royal authority, sometimes seeking the crown’s protection and other times that of neighboring polities.

The largely ethnohistorical scholarship of the “New Conquest History,” so termed and in part shaped by Matthew Restall, has likewise emphasized the dynamism of native peoples and the persistence of indigenous social, cultural, and political forms in the long, complex process of encounter between Europeans and Native Americans.\textsuperscript{13} In addition, much of the scholarship under the broad rubric of “borderlands history” has shed similar light on the geographic and conceptual limits of European colonial rule, on the multifaceted processes of syncretism and exchange between Native, European, and other non-indigenous peoples, and has challenged historians to take seriously Native claims to sovereignty in both

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{11} See, for example, Lauren Benton, \textit{Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400-1900} (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2001), and Lauren Benton, \textit{A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400–1900} (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
These contributions, among others, have added significant depth to our understanding of the porosity, fluctuation, and imprecision of imperial boundaries, of the limits of European domination, and of the diffusion of power inherent to early modern empires, including that of Portugal and Spain. Inspired by this research, I show how the Iberian empires were built upon a vast and varied constellation of authorities and jurisdictions, how local actors navigated these invariably complex and fluid relations of power, and how Iberian imperial sovereignty was by nature layered, fluid, and uneven across space and time.

Finally, and most broadly, this project also aims to contribute to the booming literature on globalization, which has largely obscured the role of Iberian expansion in that process. Even Immanuel Wallerstein, in his magnum opus, *The Modern World-System*, affords only cursory attention to earlier Iberian expansions in forging the rough contours of that system, arguing that Portugal and Spain shifted quickly from Europe’s, and for him “the world’s,” core to its semi-periphery in the early seventeenth century when the Dutch and English took the lead in successfully developing the first “world economy.” This tendency

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15 See, Wallerstein, *Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century*. For discussion of the transition from early modern to “modern globalization”, forged primarily through the
to separate a medieval, precapitalist Iberian world from a modern capitalist northwest Europe, while not symptomatic of Spanish or Portuguese historiography, continues to frame a range of research in Anglo-American historiography around the history of global capitalism, empire, and the Atlantic world in general. However, several authors including Sanjay Subrahmanyam, Glenn Ames, Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, and others, have explicitly and successfully dismantled particular aspects of the idea of the Iberians as simple medieval marauders as compared to their more “modern” counterparts from England, France, and the Dutch Republic. And in his, *Les quatre parties du monde: Histoire d’une mondialisation*, published in 2004, Serge Gruzinski has examined the transcontinental movement and mixture of peoples, goods, and ideas across the Iberian empires during the period of their union, and

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16 There is a long, distinguished tradition in Spanish and Portuguese historiography, exemplified by the works of Ramón Carande, Vitorino Magalhães Godinho, and Felipe Ruiz Martín, which argues for the existence of a first, Iberian capitalism that took shape at least a century prior to the expansion northwest Europe. For the most influential works, see Ramón Carande y Thovar, *La economía y la expansión de España bajo el gobierno de los Reyes Católicos* (Madrid, 1952); Ramón Carande y Thovar, *Carlos V y sus banqueros* (Barcelona, 1943); Felipe Ruiz Martín, *Pequeño capitalismo, gran capitalismo: Simón Ruíz y sus negocios en Florencia* (Barcelona: Crítica, D.L., 1990); and Felipe Ruiz Martín, *Los alumbres españoles: Un índice de la coyuntura económica europea en el siglo XIX* (Madrid: Fundación Española de Historia Moderna, 2005); and Vitorino Magalhães Godinho, *Os Descobrimentos e a economia mundial* (Lisbon: Editorial Presenca, 1963-1971).

17 See, in particular, Sanjay Subrahmanyam, *The Portuguese Empire in Asia, 1500-1700: A Political and Economic History* (Malden, MA: John Wiley-Blackwell, 1993); Glenn J. Ames, *Renaissance Empire: The House of Braganza and the Quest for Stability in Portuguese Monsoon Asia c.1640-1683* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2000); and Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, *How to Write the History of the New World: Histories, Epistemologies, and Identities in the Eighteenth-century Atlantic World* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001). For a theoretical analysis of the Iberian, especially the Portuguese, empires as baroque and subaltern, see Boaventura de Souza Santos, “Between Prospero and Caliban: Colonialism, Postcolonialism, and Inter-Identity,” *Luso-Brazilian Review* 39, no. 2 (Winter 2000): 9-43. The case of the France, with its early Calvinist Huguenot and later Catholic expansion, is more complicated and therefore quite fascinating. In addition, the 1493 Inter caetera papal bull and 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas were fundamental, not only redefining the conceptualization of the globe, which is well known, but also for their implications in excluding France (not to mention England or what became the United Provinces) from gaining papal legitimacy as propagators of the faith beyond Europe. In the bulls, the Pope sanctioned an exclusively Iberian religious legitimacy to the conquest and subjugation of non-European territories and peoples, a fact, I argue, which has crucial significance in explaining the difference in trajectory taken by the French, not to mention the fact that large-scale French expansion did not begin until somewhat later.
demonstrated that, at least from a cultural and intellectual standpoint, this process represented a first globalization.\textsuperscript{18}

While I argue for the development a globalized discourse of empire and trace how early modern Iberian expansion forged the first globe-girdling flows of people, goods, and ideas, the argument that any early modern empire, including either the Iberian ones or those of northwest Europe, was truly global in any deep, substantive way is far more ambiguous and therefore problematic.\textsuperscript{19} If the simple possession of a series of discontinuous territories and enclaves in Europe, America, Africa, and Asia is sufficient proof that these empires were “global,” then that is a rather low standard of analysis. In his penetrating critique of the scholarship on globalization, Frederick Cooper rightly observed that what is lacking is analysis of the historical depth of interconnections and of the structures and limits of those connections.\textsuperscript{20} He noted that even the domineering empires of the nineteenth century possessed “a strikingly unimpressive colonial capacity to exercise power systematically and routinely over the territories under European rule. A globalizing language [justifying empire] stood alongside a structure of domination and exploitation that was lumpy to the extreme.”\textsuperscript{21}

Just as in the nineteenth century, what was “global” in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, to adapt Cooper’s phrasing, was not the actual ability of Europeans to exercise

\textsuperscript{18}Gruzinski, \textit{Les quatre parties du monde}, see also Gruzinski, \textit{The Eagle and the Dragon: Globalization and European Dreams of Conquest in China and America in the Sixteenth Century}, trans. Jean Birrell (Malden, MA: Polity, 2014 [2012]). For another work which recognizes the role of Iberian expansion in the process of globalization, from a cultural perspective, see Geoffrey C. Gunn, \textit{The First Globalization: The Eurasian Exchange, 1500-1800} (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003). Gunn’s work, however, while purporting to be a global history, focuses on Eurasia and on cultural exchange between Europe and Asia with little attention to Africa or America. And for a work that aims to treat global history from both a European and Asian perspective equally, see Romain Bertrand, \textit{L’Histoire à parts égales: Récits d’une rencontre Orient-Occident, XVIe- XVIIe siècles} (Paris, Le Seuil, 2011).


\textsuperscript{21}Cooper, “Globalization,” 104.
their effective imperial sovereignty on the ground, but the language, or “discourse,” which justified that sovereignty. However, more than simply highlighting the tension and disconnect between theory and practice, between ambition and effective rule, this study aims to interrogate the mutually constitutive relationship between the two and to arrive at a more precise understanding of the geographical and institutional limits of colonial authority in the early modern Iberian empires.

I have employed Michel Foucault’s concept of a “discourse” in describing the wide, polyphonic range of texts produced on the legitimacy of early modern Iberian empire. Following Foucault, I understand a discourse to be a reflection of power relations, which through speaking and writing subjects comes to form a unified system of thought, language, and action that in turn legitimates power. I should emphasize first that in advancing the notion of such a discourse am I not arguing that there was a self-conscious, official “ideology of Iberian empire” in a singular sense. Debates over the legitimacy of both the

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22 Cooper, “Globalization,” 104.
Spanish and Portuguese empire were always polyphonic. Certain themes like the African slave trade were more prominent in debates regarding the Portuguese empire than in those regarding the Spanish, for instance. But even fierce critics like Bartolomé de las Casas, who censured settlers’ abuse of Amerindians, and Francisco de Vitoria, who criticized the Pope’s and by extension the Spanish monarch’s initial claims to sovereign title over the New World, did not advocate the total illegitimacy or abandonment of overseas empire. Instead, in critiquing specific features of Spanish imperialism they sought to reshape and improve the nature of the empire in order to justify it in the eyes of God and according to natural law.

On the other hand, writers like Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, Seraphim de Freitas and Juan de Solórzano Pereira, to name just three, offered more explicit, uncritical support for empire. Although not constituting an official joint Iberian imperial ideology, critics as well as unabashed champions of Iberian imperium did nonetheless draw on a shared vocabulary, grammar, and set of beliefs, which coalesced into a discourse rooted in the religious, juridical, and cultural traditions of early modern Christian Iberia. The process of expansion prompted an array of unique moral and legal questions requiring new interpretations of natural and ecclesiastical law, which slowly developed into a recognizable set of norms and legal precepts, and came collectively to regulate Spanish and Portuguese imperial practice.

Foucault’s notion of a discourse as operating through rules of exclusion and ritual, however, whereby only certain privileged voices are permitted to speak, only holds true to a certain extent for the discourse I propose here. To be sure, highly educated humanists, jurists, and especially theologians, were at the forefront in shaping that discourse, in setting

the parameters of its grammar and in identifying the legal and theological doctrines which carried weight.\(^{25}\) The universities of Salamanca and Coimbra were among the institutions of central importance in this process and produced many of the most influential participants in these debates. But as the discourse gained depth and complexity, it also spread widely and was mobilized by a broad array of actors. As I show, even local officials and settlers in the most remote reaches of the empires, many of whom had little formal education, employed similar arguments and ideas when justifying their actions and demonstrating their obedience to the crown. Most surviving texts projecting indigenous voices were mediated through missionaries or royal scribes and must therefore be analyzed with great caution and scrutiny. But many indigenous peoples too, and not only elites, developed an impressive ability to engage such discourse as they aimed either to protect their own autonomy or obtain the crown’s favor or protection.

Like “discourse,” the terms “empire” and “sovereignty” also deserve clarification. Neither the Spanish nor the Portuguese monarchies defined themselves as empires, after all. In Castilian and Portuguese dictionaries of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, “empire,” as a political unit, referred to the Roman Empire, or to its successor, the Holy Roman Empire. With the exception of Charles V, who was Holy Roman Emperor from 1519 to 1556, no other Iberian monarch ever possessed the title of Emperor. In any case, the Holy Roman Empire was based in central Europe, not Spain, and when Charles’ son Philip II succeeded to the Spanish throne, he did not inherit the Imperial title, which instead passed to his uncle Ferdinand. On the other hand, the early modern “Spanish Empire” of modern parlance refers primarily to the transcontinental possessions of the crowns of Castile and Aragon, including territories in the Mediterranean and North Africa, the Low Countries,

the Philippines, and, of course, the New World. In a strict semantic sense, the Spanish Empire never officially existed in its own day. Instead, contemporaries came to call that political unit, “the Catholic Monarchy,” or “the Spanish Monarchy.” The Portuguese also preferred to label their polity a “monarchy” (monarquia), or “kingdom” (reino), and like the Spanish referred to their non-European possessions as “overseas conquests” (conquistas ultramarinas), regardless of the precise manner in which those possessions had been incorporated. And although already by 1501 King Manuel I had adopted the title, “Lord of the Conquest, Navigation, and Trade of Ethiopia, Persia and India,” indicating his global ambitions, no early modern Portuguese ruler ever held the official title of “Emperor” either.

In its general sense, the concept of “empire” – imperio in Portuguese and Castilian, and imperium in Latin – meant simply, “lordship” and “power,” “to reign” and “to command,” and could be used with a geographical connotation to denote the territorial limits of a given realm. This concept of “empire” as government and command, explains titles like that of the mid-seventeenth century manuscript by Alonso Martínez Calderón, Imperio de la Monarquía de España. So even though “empire” was not the official designation used to describe the transcontinental polities of early modern Spain and Portugal, contemporaries did commonly use the term to convey the general vastness of Spanish and Portuguese monarchical power. The two monarchies had designs to dominate non-European peoples and territories, and sought to extend their power and imperio to all possible regions of the globe. Moreover, if we accept the capacious definition of empires proposed

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27 Pedro Cardim, “La aspiración imperial de la monarquía portuguesa.”
29 Pagden, Lords of All the World.
by Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper as, “large political units, expansionist or with a memory of power extended over space, polities that maintain distinction and hierarchy as they incorporate new peoples,” then the Spanish and Portuguese monarchies were without doubt “imperial.” Thus, and following many contemporaries including Martínez Calderón, Gregorio López Madera and even Charles V himself, when I describe the composite, transcontinental political conglomerations of Spain and Portugal as “empires,” and “imperial,” I employ those terms in the lowercase, not to denote how the monarchies officially self-identified, but as a way of characterizing their expansionary aspirations and their composite, hierarchical political and social structures.

The term “sovereign,” on the other hand, had long been used among the alternatives to “majesty,” “king,” “monarch,” and “lord,” to refer to Iberian rulers in the third-person, implying their supreme power within their respective monarchies. But “sovereignty,” as a political and juridical concept, only slowly entered the European lexicon despite being first theorized by French jurist Jean Bodin in 1576 on the eve of Iberian union. To be sure, several earlier writers, including Ulpian and Machiavelli, had preceded Bodin in arguing for the ruler’s supreme authority, but they did so without explicitly using the term “sovereignty.” In theory, according to Bodin and later Hobbes, sovereign authority was absolute and above all human or positive law, but not above natural or divine law. In its current meaning, sovereignty today has come to refer to the supreme, indivisible authority of the state or the head of state within a defined territory. Although the pursuit of dominion over non-

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European space was central to Iberian expansion since the fifteenth century bulls of donation, the crown’s additional, some might say more immediate, aims were to achieve effective control over colonial vassals and their labor, over resources extracted from the land, and over trade routes, both maritime and terrestrial. The interest in drawing precise boundaries of territorial sovereignty overseas only gathered pace slowly throughout the early modern period, then accelerating significantly in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries with the expansion of various competing empires across the interior of Africa, Asia, and America.

Yet while sovereignty is absolute in theory, it has rarely been absolute in practice. As historiography has shown, even during the supposed height of European royal absolutism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as monarchs themselves well knew, their power was often diffuse, delegated, and dependent on constant negotiations with nobles and other elites over financial and military support to the crown, jurisdictional autonomy, and royal recognition of local custom and privilege. This was especially true in Portugal and Aragon, and a substantial body of scholarship has shown this to be true in Castile as well, where royal power had conventionally been seen as having dominated local seigniorial and urban corporate interests.33 As on the peninsula, Iberian crown sovereignty was also diffuse overseas, especially beyond the confines of colonial strongholds, and to some degree even

within them.\textsuperscript{34} This was despite the fact that as “conquests,” most overseas territories were in theory fully subsumed within the legal systems of Portugal or Castile according to the principle of accessory union.\textsuperscript{35}

In grappling with its meaning, therefore, we see that imperial sovereignty existed more in the realm of aspiration than reality. Shaded maps purporting to show the geographical reach of European empires are deceptive in their tendency to exaggerate or distort the geography of imperial sovereignty. They often fail to represent the fact that in many places royal authority was only partial or indirect, extended through alliances and fluid relations of vassalage with local indigenous polities, or through missionaries acting as intermediaries at the vanguard of colonization. Thus, I use the term “imperial sovereignty” primarily as a modern interpretive concept, which, importantly, reflects less an achieved reality than an ambition on the part of the Iberian crowns to exercise full and indivisible rule.\textsuperscript{36}

I have generally preferred the concept of “sovereignty” to a more nebulous one like “power,” which, according to sociologist Talcott Parsons’ definition, refers to “a ‘generalized means’ for attaining whatever goals one wants to achieve.”\textsuperscript{37} Sovereignty, or better yet, the


\textsuperscript{35} Although Bodin’s famous work, \textit{Les Six Livres de la République}, was translated into Spanish as early as 1590, the term “sovereignty” only slowly became common to the vocabulary of early modern Iberian political and juridical culture.

pursuit of it, is more precise for my purposes in that it refers specifically to the aim of the
state or head of state, represented here by the Iberian monarchs and the imperial officials
and institutions, to attain supreme, formalized, and effective legal authority over and within
specific political communities and territories. Early modern Iberian imperial culture was
litigious to the extreme, and even long before Christopher Columbus and Vasco da Gama
reached the New World and India, Spain and Portugal had engaged in a series of pitched
legal and military battles over claims to various Atlantic islands and beachheads along
Atlantic Africa. The monarchies’ appeals to Papal arbitration and endorsement in the early
phase of expansion represent examples of how they attempted to secure and justify exclusive
jurisdiction over newly claimed territorial and maritime spaces. And as the two monarchies
slowly wrested control from Rome over ecclesiastical affairs within their own their extended
jurisdictions, they appointed a series of temporary and semi-permanent councils of
theologians and jurists to debate and rule on a range of questions about the legal, moral, and
theological underpinnings of Iberian imperium, which is to say, about the justness and
legality of Iberian claims to imperial sovereignty beyond Europe.

Michael Mann’s transhistorical theory of “social power,” however, goes beyond
more vague definitions of power and complements the concept of imperial sovereignty in
helping us understand how empires attempted to impose diverse forms of control over vast,
internally differentiated polities and peoples. The overarching idea of social power in Mann’s
model emanates from the interrelation of four component sources: ideological power,
economic power, military power, and political power. He also distinguishes between internal
power, meaning the ability to organize tightly and exercise command within territories, and

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38 As several scholars have pointed out, this notion of an early modern Spanish or Portuguese “state” is
historiográfico de ‘estado moderno’,” Revista de estudios políticos 19 (January-February 1981): 43-57; Hespanha, As
Vésperas do Leviathan; and Albaladejo, Fragmentos de monarquía.
external power, referring to the organization of large numbers of people over far-flung territories to achieve minimally stable cooperation.\(^3^9\) This external aspect of power is obviously key to understanding both the Portuguese and Spanish imperial systems, since both consisted of territories that were not only vast but also discontinuous and spread across several continents. Mann defines economic power as the satisfaction of subsistence needs through control of the extraction, distribution, and consumption of products of nature; military power as the organization of coercive strength and violence for physical defense and aggression; and political power as the centralized, institutionalized, and territorialized organization of the state in regulating many aspects of social relations.\(^4^0\)

As is well known, the Spanish drew much of their “economic power” from the extraction and distribution of precious metals, especially silver. Although perpetually disappointed in the search for their own Potosí, the Portuguese did nonetheless find substantial amounts of gold and other metals and stones in Southeast Africa and Brazil. And through illicit trade with the Spanish in the South China Sea and Río de la Plata they obtained vast quantities of Spanish America silver, a fact that also highlights the impressive degree of informal economic integration between the two Iberian empires.\(^4^1\) Among myriad

\(^3^9\) Mann, The Sources of Social Power, 7.

\(^4^0\) I would add that, as reflected explicitly in the papal bulls of donation and in attempts to regulate Indian Ocean trade through the *cartax* system, the Iberian empires sought not only control over territory, but also over maritime space. In the case of the Iberian empires then, it seems most apt to speak of political power as “spatialized” rather than simply “territorialized.” In fact, the term “thalassocracy”, rather than “empire”, is often used in describing early modern Portugal’s extended political conglomeration.

other products key to Spanish economic power were maté tea in the pampas and Andean foothills of South America, rice in the Philippines, and livestock and tobacco throughout various parts of the empire. For the Portuguese, sugar, and later tobacco, as well as livestock were key products in Brazil, as were an array of spices from across maritime Asia and Africa. And Amerindian and African slaves, also seen by contemporaries as key commodities, provided the basic lifeblood of the Portuguese colonial economy in much of Brazil and Atlantic Africa.42

“Military power” was crucial in several ways too. It provided essential physical force for the initial conquest of territory and subjugation of native communities. It served to protect existing positions against resurgent indigenous groups as well as attacks from European rivals. In addition, it ensured the compliance of subjugated groups in the payment of tribute, in the mobilization of coerced labor, and in securing political obedience and military support during times of conflict.

The “political power” of the Iberian empires was exercised through a complex framework of institutions and officials charged with extending and maintaining relations of vassalage over indigenous groups and colonists of European origin. The viceroy or governor-general was the monarch’s direct, highest representative. Reporting to him was a


42 The crown formally and repeatedly prohibited Amerindian slavery in colonial Brazil, but the practice continued unabated in places like São Paulo and its environs, and even Rio de Janeiro, as I discuss in Chapter 5. And in their recent analysis of the inter-colonial slave trade in the Americas, Alex Borucki, David Eltis and David Wheat have shown the African slave trade to Spanish America was far greater than previously thought; see: Alex Borucki, David Eltis and David Wheat, “Atlantic History and the Slave Trade to Spanish America,” American Historical Review 120, no. 2 (2015): 433-461.
series of officials in charge of various aspects of colonial fiscal, military, and political administration. High courts of appeal were also established in some colonies with jurisdiction over specific territories and communities, and the judges of those courts reported directly to king rather than to the viceroy.

Within the political, fiscal, ecclesiastical, judicial, and military institutions there existed more or less clear orders of hierarchy, and all, with the exception of the regular clergy, were subject to the ultimate authority of the monarch and his advisory councils in Portugal and Spain. But between them, relations of hierarchy were not always clear. Town councils, for instance, could appeal directly to the king if they felt the viceroy or another colonial authority had violated their local rights and privileges. Jurisdictional disputes also erupted frequently between the viceroy and judges of the high courts of appeal, since both reported directly to the king. Rather than provoking anarchy, however, this complex political structure actually produced an impressive cohesion while at same time affording local colonial institutions high degrees of autonomy. And the checking of certain colonial institutions by the power of others served to ensure that ultimate sovereignty remained in the hands of the king.

The possession of economic, military, and political power has been central to the success and survival of all empires, including those of Spain and Portugal. And true to

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43 Francisco Bethencourt coined the term, “nebula of power”, in describing how the Portuguese empire was founded on, “a permanent yet unstable balance among local, regional, and central crown agencies, competing with each other but allowing royal tutelage of the system.” See Francisco Bethencourt, “Political Configurations and Local Powers”, in Portuguese Oceanic Expansion, 1400-1800, eds. Francisco Bethencourt and Diogo Ramada Curto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007): 199. Bethencourt’s work was itself influenced by the earlier works of Luís Filipe Reis Thomaz, who, well before, spoke of network of powers in Asia, and of Antonio Manuel Hespanha, who proposed the idea of a constellation of powers to characterize the Portuguese situation in Asia. See, Luís Filipe Reis Thomaz, “A estrutura política e administrativa do Estado da Índia no século XVI,” in II Seminário internacional de história indo-europeia (Lisboa: Centro de Estudos de História e Cartografia Antiga, IICT, 1985), 511-540; and António Manuel Hespanha and Maria Catarina Santos, “Os Poderes num Império Oceânico,” in História de Portugal, vol. 4, ed. by José Mattoso (Lisbon: Círculo de Leitores, 1993), 395-413.
Mann’s model, in the Iberian empires all these sources of power were interrelated and interdependent. In addition, “ideological power,” also among his four sources of social power, played a particularly prominent role in the development of Iberian imperium. For Mann, ideological power derives from the endowment of meaning and the monopoly on its production, from the development of norms regulating how people should think and act morally, and from aesthetic, ritual practices, which function as visible, physical manifestations of meaning and serve to reinforce it. In these ways, ideological power was intimately tied to the discourse of Iberian empire I propose here.

Not everyone was a zealous defender of Iberian empire, of course. Critics found many creative ways to voice their dissension, albeit often at great risk. Playwrights might deliver subtle, masked criticism, while other authors were sometimes more brash, especially those residing beyond the domain of the Iberian monarchies. The Spanish and Portuguese crowns thus aimed, to the extent possible, to monopolize the production of meaning through a range of strategies, including the appointment of official chroniclers and regulations on the printing and circulation of texts. Direct editorial censorship of a text was also common if it was perceived to have shed negative light on the empire, or simply to have contained information deemed too sensitive to be leaked and potentially seized upon by imperial competitors. For particularly flagrant infractions, authors could face the rigors of the Inquisition. There were, however, certain approved venues for critical reflection, even before the rise of arbitrista literature in the early seventeenth century. Jurists and theologians, for instance, were invited on occasion to debate and openly criticize certain aspects of empire in order to decide on specific questions in the interest of establishing a generally

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agreed upon set of moral and legal standards of imperial thought and practice. And legal, political, and theological treatises contributed in different ways to eulogizing or justifying Iberian expansion, as did epic poetry and chronicles, more overtly. Cartography too, as well as navigational charts and reports, added a spatial, physical dimension to impressions of the vastness of Iberian imperium.

The opinions set down by learned jurists and theologians provided recommended frameworks of thought and action not only for the monarchs and imperial officials, but also for settlers at all levels of colonial society. Ideas of the sacred mission of the imperial enterprise, of the preeminence of royal authority, and of basic belonging within larger, transcontinental Spanish and Portuguese imperial worlds, were disseminated through printed texts, a range of iconography on municipal buildings, churches and other structures, and also, importantly, through ritual and spoken word in religious services, public announcements and casual conversation. Ceremonies marking the conquest of new territories, the founding of new towns, or the arrival of new viceroys who served as “the king’s living image” helped formalize and popularize notions of royal authority. They provided social and political cohesion through constant reinforcement of the notion that, despite being far removed physically from the royal court and centers of colonial power, colonists even in the most distant reaches of the empire all, in one way or another, formed part of a larger imperial whole. This discourse which took shape over the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, and which reached the most distant colonial outposts with varying degrees of intensity, endowed the Iberian empires with extraordinary ideological power.

Throughout this study, I explore the mutually reinforcing relationship between the theory and practice of imperial sovereignty. I argue for the rise of a globalized discourse of Iberian empire through an analysis of texts that substantiated and occasionally challenged the aspirations of the Iberian monarchs to sovereignty over newly incorporated territories and subjects overseas. In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, these articulations coalesced into a sophisticated discourse that identified necessary conditions for the waging of just war, the legitimate subjugation or enslavement of various peoples, the exclusivist control over maritime routes, and the occupation and settlement of overseas territory.

After providing an overview of these various discourses of empire, I then zoom-in to analyze the contested, fluid nature of colonial authority on the ground through three granular case studies of remote regions of the two empires in Southeast Africa, the Philippines, and the Río de la Plata, encompassing the southeastern part of the Viceroyalty of Peru and the hinterland of southern Brazil. I have chosen these three regions from among a range of potential case studies. Similar dynamics of diffuse, indirect, and fluctuating sovereignty were present in many other parts of the Iberian empires, including in Chile, the Bay of Bengal, California, Angola, and Florida, to name just a few. In the interest of examining these dynamics in relative depth within the space of one monograph, however, I have limited myself to three cases. I have specifically chosen one from Africa, one from Asia, and one from the Americas in order to reflect the global dimensions of Iberian expansionary ambition and experience. Southeast Africa, the Philippines, and the Río de la Plata are – and were – vastly distinct in their social, political, and cultural contexts. For precisely this reason, they are indicative of the dizzying array of territories and peoples the Iberians encountered and over which they attempted to extend imperial rule.
Yet despite their diversity, the three cases also reveal a number of interesting parallels representative of similar struggles for sovereignty across the margins of the Iberian empires, which slowly came to define the physical limits of those empires. Such parallels could be seen in the strategies through which the empires attempted to justify claims to sovereignty and extend it in practice, in how indigenous groups reversed or helped shape that extension, and in the constant instability and limits of imperial rule even at the height of Iberian global power around the turn of the seventeenth century. Moreover, Spanish and Portuguese settlers, missionaries, and imperial officials across the globe, including in these places, shared a common worldview steeped in the cultural, theological, and juridical traditions of early modern Christian Iberia. Regardless of their social position, their level of integration within indigenous societies, or their relationship to royal power, they all understood that in one way or another they formed part of larger Spanish and Portuguese imperial worlds. Having expanded beyond the confines of Europe those worlds now extended to some of the globe’s most distant corners and became one under the singular sovereignty of Philip II in 1581.46

In Chapter One, I trace the parallel, connected expansions of the two empires from the late fifteenth century through the early seventeenth. Exploring tensions between political theory, legal frameworks, and practice of government, I describe how the rulers of Portugal and Spain integrated new territories and subject populations within their composite monarchies. I analyze how this process played out in the context of Iberian union, when Philip II of Spain incorporated the Kingdom of Portugal and its extended possessions within his broader imperium in 1580. I examine and compare Spanish and Portuguese institutions of imperial administration, and assess the impact of this union on the two overseas empires. I then interrogate the limits of Iberian imperium writ large through an analysis of the

46 Philip II of Spain, also known as Philip I of Portugal.
incompleteness of “conquest” in core regions of the Iberian settlement and authority as well as on the imperial margins. I analyze the jurisdictional layering and overlapping, the persistence of local autonomy and customary law, and the relative extent of (de)centralization, which came collectively to diffuse and disperse political authority throughout the early modern Iberian world. I also highlight the impact of non-European individuals and groups in the development of Iberian colonial rule, and in shaping the pace and contours of European imperial expansion more broadly, a theme which I explore throughout the manuscript.

In Chapter Two, I examine the development and impact of contemporary debates on the legitimacy of early modern Iberian imperium. The writings of humanists like Gomes Eanes de Zurara, João de Barros, and Luís Vaz de Camões for the Portuguese, and Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo y Valdés, Pedro Mexía, and Francisco López de Gómara for the Spanish, lauded the exploits of their respective sovereigns in extending Iberian Catholic rule throughout the four parts of the world. And the polemical interventions of Las Casas, Vitoria, Sepúlveda, and Fernão de Oliveira, among others, began coalescing to define an increasingly specific set of justifications of Spanish and Portuguese imperial practice. These juridical, theological, and humanistic discourses combined with an array of visual iconography and cartography, which not only helped validate the Iberian monarchs’ claims to overseas empire, but were revolutionary in shaping a new sense of the world as a vast yet now finite space, as confirmed by the first circumnavigation of the globe by Magellan’s crew completed in 1522. Maintaining their deep commitment to the Christian mission, champions of Iberian monarchy slowly shifted from earlier writings that emphasized the universality of
imperial rule in a messianic, extra-terrestrial sense to a discourse that first conceptualized the globe as a bounded unit, with Iberia at its center.47

I then examine the crystallization of this discourse after the union of the Iberian crowns and their extended possessions in 1580. With the empires united, excitement at the unbridled potential of Iberian power reached fever pitch in the first two decades after union and crystallized in the works of Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, Tomasso Campanella, João Baptista Lavanha, and Juan de Solórzano Pereira, among others.48 Over the same period, however, setbacks against resurgent indigenous polities in several regions combined with a dizzying series of defeats to the Dutch and English leading to a general recession of Iberian power worldwide. Despite or arguably as a result of these mounting challenges, some authors became ever more determined to defend the sovereign claims of the Iberian monarchs. Building on the work of their sixteenth century predecessors they extolled and provided moral and legal legitimacy for the wide-ranging claims to Spanish and Portuguese imperium both in Europe and beyond. At no other time was the dissonance between the discourse of empire and the practical limits of Iberian authority more pronounced.

Shifting from the discursive, textual realm to an analysis of the contested, fluid nature of Iberian imperial sovereignty in practice, in Chapter Three, I examine the fraught, incomplete process of Portugal’s attempt to establish its cultural and political hegemony in Southeast Africa. Reports of gold mines and the murder of the Jesuit missionary envoy Gonçalo de Silveira at the order of the Monomotapa “emperor” in 1561 compelled Lisbon to sponsor a quixotic military expedition in 1569 aimed at punishing that native ruler,

48 I also examine the writings of Luis Cabrera de Córdoba, Diogo do Couto and Seraphim de Freitas among others.
expelling local Muslims, and conquering the mine fields of the powerful native kingdoms of the interior. The Jesuits Francisco Monclaro and João Baptista de Ribeira penned impassioned juridico-theological treatises, which fused the globalized discourse of Iberian empire with references to specific circumstances on the ground to justify Portuguese declarations of war on the Monomotapa and the enslavement of his native subjects. They cited the murder of Silveira, as well as the natives’ supposed incapacity for reasonable thought, their resistance to the Catholic faith and their generally barbaric, animalistic nature in order to provide legal cover for an armed expedition of conquest. The expedition failed in the face of local resistance, however, and the crown only managed a direct institutional presence in the interior through the appointment of local captains at a handful of inland trade posts, the most important of which – Massapa – depended on ultimate confirmation by the Monomotapa ruler. The highpoint of Iberian power in the region came in the first half of the seventeenth century, during a period of internecine conflict and fragmentation among local kingdoms. In the vacuum, the crown confirmed a series of land titles in exchange for quit-rents on those lands, officially recognizing the large territorial holdings amassed by Portuguese and Luso-African settlers who served as intermediaries between native polities and the Portuguese crown. But as several local polities were slowly reconsolidated over the second half of the seventeenth century, the Portuguese crown’s direct rule was again confined to Mozambique Island and a scattering of fortified trade posts along the lower reaches of the Zambezi River.

Chapter Four is on Spanish efforts to consolidate sovereignty over the Philippines. Spanish frustrations there were compounded by the archipelago’s mountainous topography and the obvious difficulty of conquering peoples dispersed across thousands of islands.

Although the Spanish managed rather quickly to subjugate the indigenous peoples around Manila, they became embroiled in violent, cyclical conflict with the city’s Chinese merchant community, making even the center of Spanish power in the Philippines perpetually unstable. On the southern island of Mindanao, the local inhabitants successfully repelled Spanish attempts to establish any lasting presence whatsoever. Although by the 1590s Spain claimed sovereignty over the entire northern island of Luzon, where Manila was located, the mountain peoples of the central cordillera always remained beyond the reach of Spanish power altogether. And by the second quarter of the seventeenth century many of the inhabitants of the lowland north had successfully thrown off Spanish rule. As in the New World, a sharp polyphonic debate erupted between missionaries and settlers, theologians and royal officials over Spanish abuse of natives through conquest and encomienda, viewed together as the prime cause of Filipino unrest. The debates over Spain’s sovereignty in the Philippines reverberated all the way from Manila to Mexico City to Madrid and revived questions over the legality and morality of Spanish imperialism, this time in Asia. Yet, despite the multipronged efforts to alleviate native suffering, abuses persisted, rebellions continued, and most of the archipelago remained beyond the reach of the crown and even missionaries until well into the nineteenth century.

The Río de la Plata region, the focus of Chapter Five, lay on the contested boundary line separating the hemispheres of Spanish and Portuguese imperial jurisdiction in America and thus became a site of conflict for sovereignty not only between Iberian and indigenous groups but also between the two Iberian empires themselves. Neither the Portuguese nor the Spanish crown had a significant direct, formal presence in the region and both depended on

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50 An encomienda was a grant bestowed by the crown to an individual for the right to extract tribute in the form of money, agricultural produce or labor from natives of a given area in return for providing protection and instruction in the Catholic faith.
intermediary groups in asserting a degree of indirect, layered sovereignty. In the late sixteenth century, the mostly *mestiço* inhabitants of São Paulo, called Paulistas, began entering the interior on long, devastating indigenous slaving expeditions. In an effort to protect native communities and serve as a buffer against Portuguese movements into territory claimed by Spain, Spanish officials sanctioned the establishment of Jesuit missions east of the Paraná and Uruguay rivers. In response to official crown prohibitions of indigenous slavery, the Paulistas mounted a series of sophisticated legal defenses of the practice through their municipal council, citing the principles of customary law, just war, as well as their jurisdictional autonomy as residents of a seigniorial captaincy. The crown was effectively powerless to curb the Paulistas, became increasingly resigned to their activities, and eventually even came to view them as a key vanguard in advancing its own sovereignty in the region. Unlike in Southeast Africa or the Philippines, the general Iberian presence in the Río de la Plata did steadily increase over the period, without receding. But as in those regions, the crown’s direct, formal presence was limited to handful of isolated royal officials. It was only in 1750 that the Treaty of Madrid enshrined, at least in theory, a more precise line of territorial division between the two respective spheres of Spanish and Portuguese sovereignty. Even then, however, royal authority over much of the interior remained far from complete. Despite being in perpetual conflict, the missionaries and Paulistas remained the prime representatives of Iberian power in the region until well into the mid-eighteenth century and beyond.

In my Conclusions, I close the study with an integrated analysis of the three case studies, reflecting on the re-articulation of Iberian imperial discourses at the edges of empire. I describe and compare the effective reach and limits of colonial authority in those regions. And I assess the implications of such a focus for scholarly understandings of how colonial
authority was constructed, represented, and reinforced, but also how it was circumscribed and undermined. By the mid-seventeenth century, the cumulative challenges to Iberian global hegemony had significantly tempered Spanish and Portuguese imperial ambition as well as its discourse. The limits of Iberian sovereignty, having long been visible in practice, were now increasingly challenged in theory as well. Yet despite having lost global preeminence, the Iberians had nonetheless laid the ideological and structural foundations for the expansion of later European empires across the four parts of the world.

Fashioned over the course of the sixteenth century, the discourse of Iberian empire was sophisticated and wide-ranging and its influence was manifest clearly in subsequent efforts to justify the expansionary rights of competing empires like those of England, France, and the Dutch Republic, mostly through private, chartered companies. Jurists like Hugo Grotius and John Selden drew not only on pan-European theories of natural law and the stylistic precedent of Iberian chroniclers before them. They also mobilized, reinterpreted, or subverted specific arguments of earlier writers who debated the legitimacy of Iberian empire several decades prior. By that time, however, the discourse of empire was evolving. Defenders of Dutch and English expansion tended to advance more secular arguments. Unsurprisingly, the Catholic mission, an institution central to both the practice and theory of Iberian empire, was jettisoned. And by the mid-seventeenth century imperial supremacy and its dominant discourses were moving from Iberia to northern Europe.
CHAPTER 1
GLOBAL EXPANSION

As Christian forces pushed south across Iberia in the late middle ages, consolidating control over the lingering remnants of the former Islamic caliphate that had once reigned supreme over most of the peninsula, Spaniards and Portuguese began looking to new frontiers of expansion overseas, beyond the horizon. Although impelled by a similar combination of commercial and religious motives, and united in the quest to extend the reach of Christendom, early Spanish and Portuguese expansion was halting, incremental, and defined by violent competition at the outset. Well before the Iberians’ arrival in the New World, Portugal and Castile clashed over possessions in the Canaries, Morocco, the Azores, and Cape Verde. These early forays were not the result of a systematic, long-term policy of imperial expansion, but rather of attempts by the Portuguese first, followed by the Castilians, to find new commercial opportunities and trade routes to replace those monopolized or closed by the Ottomans in the Mediterranean, North Africa, and overland across parts of western and central Asia.

The Portuguese took first initiative. By the early fifteenth century they had already expressed their conviction that the best alternative route was that which, beginning in the

52 Historians have long recognized the joint religious and commercial motives behind Castile’s early expansion under Ferdinand and Isabel, but have, until recently, portrayed Portugal’s initial forays into the Atlantic and Indian oceans overwhelmingly commercial in orientation, with their religious missionary element as secondary to what was first and foremost a profit-driven enterprise. For an account of the religious inspiration driving the Spanish conquest of Peru, for instance, see Marcel Bataillon, Le lien religieux des conquérants du Pérou (London: Hispanic & Luso-Brazilian Councils, 1956); and for an analysis of Iberian conquests more broadly, see Pierre Chaunu, Conquête et Exploitation des Nouveaux Mondes, XVVe siècle (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1969).
Atlantic, would eventually round Africa and entered into the vast world of spices in the Indian Ocean and East Asia. As they went, they established an array of strategic strongholds to secure their commercial monopoly over the spice trade. Steeped in the juridical-theological culture of fifteenth century Christian Europe, the rulers of Portugal and Castile shared a common worldview and both sought Papal endorsement of their claims beyond Europe. Portugal’s primacy in the fifteenth century was enshrined in the Papal bulls *Dum Diversas* and *Romanus Pontifex*, of 1452 and 1455, which granted Portugal full secular and ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the lands and seas from northwest Africa all the way to India. The monarchs of Portugal and Castile then ratified the main conditions of those bulls with the signing of the Treaty of Alcaçovas in 1479, which established the first Portuguese *mare clausum* in African and Asian waters.

Within a matter of decades the expansion of each kingdom achieved results viewed by many as nothing short of miraculous. After extending its gold- and slave-trading presence along the west coast of Africa in the late fifteenth century, Portugal established trade links with India in 1498 and laid claim to Brazil with Pedro Álvares Cabral’s landing there in 1500. Over the next half century, the Portuguese attacked and occupied Goa, Colombo in Sri Lanka, and several southeast Asian islands. In addition, they expanded their foothold in Brazil, and established an informal trading presence in both East Africa and Macao. Already by 1501, King Manuel I had adopted the title, “Lord of the Conquest, Navigation, and Trade of Ethiopia, Arabia, Persia and India,” which, although exaggerating the extent of his effective authority, nonetheless indicated his global ambitions.53

The expansion of the Spanish Monarchy was no less impressive. Although not without setbacks along the way, beginning in 1493 the Spanish Monarchy had sponsored,

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organized, or facilitated numerous voyages of exploration, as well as the occupation and exploitation of several Caribbean islands. The pace of expansion accelerated following the victory over the Mexica in 1521, secured by Hernán Cortés with the aid of a large native army, and the conquest of the powerful Inca empire by Pizarro and his companions in the 1530s. As a result of these campaigns, by 1560 the most populous regions and cities in the Americas had been occupied and claimed for the Spanish Monarchy, and virtually all of the future colonial centers or capitals had been founded, or re-founded, including Santo Domingo, Havana, Mexico City, and Lima. Not until the 1620s would other European powers begin to threaten Spanish hegemony in the Indies, and even then only in the Caribbean and the regions that would later form part of the United States and Canada.

Like the Portuguese, the Spaniards also tried their luck on other continents. Between 1519 and 1521 Ferdinand Magellan, a Portuguese in the service of the Spanish monarch Charles I, attempted the first successful circumnavigation of the globe, a feat eventually completed by Juan Sebastián Elcano, a Spanish sailor, and the remaining crew following Magellan’s death in combat. Subsequent explorations led the Spanish Monarchy to claim sovereignty over the Philippines in the 1560s, the Moluccas, to attempt the conquest of the isle of Formosa (Taiwan), to draw up plans for the exploration and conquest of Australia, and even for the invasion of China itself—a proposal mooted in the 1580s, criticized as a chimerical adventure by some Jesuits, and finally rejected by Philip II. Alongside these possessions were the Canary Islands and various territories in North Africa—Ceuta (after 1640, having previously belonged to the crown of Portugal), Melilla in what is today Morocco, and Oran, a city under Spanish sovereignty from 1509 until the end of the eighteenth century, and part of modern Algeria.
In the wake of Columbus’ voyage to the Americas, the comparative power of the two Iberian monarchies began to level off as evidenced in the Pope’s 1493 *Inter cætera* bull of donation, which divided the entire globe into two separate spheres of “full and free” Castilian and Portuguese jurisdiction, including monopolies on navigation. The bull legitimized violent conquest in the name of Christianization by granting such jurisdiction on the condition that the “barbarous nations” discovered “be overthrown and brought to the faith.” The Holy See conceded not only territorial, political, and commercial rights to the monarchs, but also imposed on them an unambiguously colonial agenda or ideology: the obligation to convert all of the non-Christian peoples they encountered, to provide sufficient education for them to become good Christians, and to care for and protect them against the aggression of rapacious colonizers.

With the exception of their early clashes in North Africa and the Atlantic Islands, there were relatively few conflicts between the Portuguese and Spanish prior to the second quarter of the seventeenth century. The primary reason was that, from the beginning of Spanish expansion, both monarchies agreed to a pact creating two separate spheres for jurisdiction and navigation, confirmed in the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas and the 1529 Treaty of Zaragoza. This is not to say that there were no conflicts or misunderstandings. The Segovian jurist and governor Alonso de Zuazo referred to these when he wrote from Santo Domingo to Charles I in 1518 reflecting on “the division of the world as an orange between the King of Portugal and the grandparents of Your Majesty.” Zuazo went on to argue that

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the Portuguese had appropriated lands of the New World (in Brazil) and the “Orient,” which corresponded to Spain, and that Charles should take them by armed force.\textsuperscript{55}

While Portugal and the Spanish Monarchy competed to consolidate imperial authority within their respective spheres, the two empires became increasingly interlinked. Many Portuguese, including Magellan, were essential to the early phase of Spanish discoveries and conquests. And while many Spaniards were at the forefront of the expansion of the Portuguese empire in Brazil, Portuguese settlers usually constituted by far the largest group of foreigners in the cities and towns of early Spanish America.

\textbf{Integrating New Worlds}

Among the monarchies’ chief concerns in the process of expansion was to resolve the juridical status of newly claimed territories and delineate with clarity how they would be legally integrated within polities that had been exclusively European until almost the end of the fifteenth century. Both the Spanish and Portuguese monarchies had centuries of experience with territorial aggregation and had developed sophisticated frameworks to ensure the legal and political cohesion of their respective polities. Both were “composite monarchies” during the early modern period, the result of the incorporation of diverse territories, first in Europe, and from the mid sixteenth century with extended dominions in Africa, Asia, and America.\textsuperscript{56} As such, new territories became united to the principal part through various means – dynastic marriage, conquest, the voluntary cession of sovereignty –

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.
and their juridical status was determined by their means of aggregation, the geographic situation of the territory, and the ethnic composition of the population.\textsuperscript{57}

In legal terms, the overseas territories were considered to have been acquired by “conquest” or cession of sovereignty, regardless of their true manner of incorporation, and all were considered to be inhabited by populations in a state of civilization inferior to that of Europeans. The Spanish case was in many ways simpler than that of the Portuguese. From the beginning, all the American territories over which Spain claimed sovereignty were in theory incorporated within the Kingdom of Castile, as Granada and the Canaries had been. Isabel confirmed this in her will, declaring explicitly that the Indies, “must remain incorporated within these realms of Castile and León, according to the Apostolic Bull.”\textsuperscript{58} In 1571, Philip II reiterated this, decreeing that the “States [of the Indies] be governed according to the style and regime prevailing in the Kingdoms of Castile and León.” “Because the kingdoms of Castile and the Indies belong to one Crown,” he continued:

> their laws and government system ought therefore to be as alike as possible. The members of the Council [of Indies] shall try, in the laws and institutions which they may establish for those States, to reduce the form and manner of their government to the style and order by which the kingdoms of Castile and León are ruled to the extent allowed by the diversity and difference of lands and peoples.\textsuperscript{59}

The final line is significant. Although the intention was to reproduce Castilian legal and governmental frameworks, the king recognized that the Americas’ distinctive social and geographical characteristics could result in adaptations to those frameworks when transferred across the ocean. One such adaptation regarded social hierarchy.


\textsuperscript{58} Carlos José Hernando Sánchez, \textit{Las indias en la monarquía católica: Imágenes e ideas políticas} (Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid, 1997), 32.

As a result of the penetrating early sixteenth century critiques and debates surrounding the morality and legality of Spanish imperium in the New World, which I discuss in Chapter Two, in American territories controlled by Spain, the so-called *indios*, although considered vassals of the king, came to be regarded as part of the *República de indios*, a separate juridico-political body within the monarchy which maintained certain local indigenous laws and institutions. Whereas the *República de españoles* came to encompass the population of Spaniards, Africans, mulattoes, and those mestizos recognized by their Spanish fathers, the *República de indios* included the entire Native American population. The reality, however, was far more complex. There were, we will see, several key exceptions. But from a legal perspective the institution blurred the distinctions between the thousands of indigenous groups and polities, creating a single overarching category of *indios*, which in theory encompassed all the diverse native peoples from northern California to Patagonia—as well as the Philippines. According to Castilian law, *indios* were viewed as minors, as *gente sin razón* (people without reason), subjugated in theory therefore to a relationship of legal and political dependence on the Castilian crown, and forced to provide tribute, when possible, often in the form of labor.

The situation in the Portuguese empire was distinct, and in some ways, more complex. The Portuguese imperial bureaucracy was smaller, and there were fewer central institutions of imperial government in the Portuguese case than in its Spanish counterpart. As a result, many of Portugal’s overseas territories remained relatively autonomous, especially those in Africa and Asia, as well as Brazil, at least until the seventeenth century. This was not simply a sign of the weakness of the Portuguese crown, however. It was in part

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60 In reality this distinction meant little to most Spaniards with firsthand experience in the New World, who recognized that understanding the complexity of indigenous politics and society was integral to any hope of successful settlement in the Americas.
by design and in part by necessity, a result of the dizzying range of the Portuguese territories overseas and of the diverse juridical statuses they came to possess. As Luis Filipe Thomaz stated, “when confronted with the current notion of empire, the Portuguese State of India [Estado da Índia] presents us with something original and, at times, baffling. More than its spatial discontinuity is the heterogeneity of its institutions and the imprecision of their limits, as much geographical as juridical, which make it unusual.” According to Susana Münch Miranda, what characterized the Portuguese empire was, “decentralization, physical distance, and the jurisdictional autonomy” of each and every one of the officials and institutions.

Distinct from Spain’s practice of treating its overseas territories as part of one whole, Portugal maintained, or was forced to maintain, the differences and idiosyncrasies of each of its component parts. In its African “possessions,” such as Angola for example, the Portuguese were a minority in relation to the native peoples, the vast majority of which were not under Portuguese jurisdiction. In many territories, the Portuguese permitted varying degrees of religious liberty, especially in African and Asian territories, and were also often forced to accommodate the persistence of native political institutions. In others, they were even forced to make voluntary pacts of vassalage with the indigenous populations, subjecting themselves to the will of native rulers in exchange for the right to stay, trade, or evangelize in a given area.

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63 Portuguese settlers overseas had a relation with the metropole similar to that which the Spaniards had with their monarchy, the difference being that the Portuguese in these territories gained the right of representation in the meetings of Portugal’s Cortes. See, Pedro Cardim, “The Representatives of Asian and American Cities at the Cortes of Portugal,” in Polycentric Monarchies, 43-53.
Union

Perhaps the most momentous example of territorial aggregation in the history of the early modern Iberian world was the incorporation of Portugal and its extended possessions Spanish Monarchy in 1580. In the late sixteenth-century, the Iberian Peninsula was composed of three general political-territorial groupings: Castile-León in the center, the kingdom of Portugal in the west, and the kingdom of Aragon (including Aragon, Valencia, the Balearic Islands, and the Principality of Catalonia) to the east. Throughout the preceding century, countless dynastic alliances were proposed between the three territories, some of which materialized. The most prominent was that between Isabella I of Castile and Ferdinand II of Aragon in 1469. John Elliott has reminded us how the fateful decision that united Castile and Aragon was by no means a foregone conclusion, and that a Castilian union with Portugal, was, until the last moment, a distinct possibility. Had Isabella succumbed to pressure to marry Alfonso V of Portugal, instead of Ferdinand, the subsequent course of Iberian and world history would have been drastically altered and the long-sought Portugal-Castile union would have been achieved a century earlier. But although official Iberian unification under a single sovereign did not materialize until 1580, the peninsular kingdoms were already closely linked through a complex series of intermarriages among the royalty and high nobility.


66 For a description of these complex dynastic relationships, see Fernando Bouza, “La relación de la nobleza portuguesa con la Monarquía española,” in *Las relaciones entre Portugal y Castilla en la época de los descubrimientos y la expansión colonial*, ed. Ana María Carabias Torres (Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, 1994), 337-344; and Roger Bigelow Merriman, *The Rise of the Spanish Empire in the Old World and in the New*, vol. 4 (New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1962), 333-34.
Aside from the dynastic alliances that linked the Iberian kingdoms, there also existed an impressive degree of cultural and intellectual interaction. To be sure, Castilian culture during its "golden age" in the sixteenth century was more vigorous and influential beyond its borders, but Portuguese culture, especially through literature, also left its mark throughout Iberia and beyond. A number of leading Portuguese authors found literary success in Castile in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, published in Castilian, and virtually the entire Portuguese elite was either fluent or conversant in the language of their neighbors. In addition, students and professors circulated frequently throughout universities across the Iberian peninsula, further enhancing the degree of intellectual cross-fertilization between Portuguese, Castilians, Aragonese, and others.

Equally significant as the political and cultural ties linking Portugal and the Spanish Monarchy was the extent of economic integration, especially between the overseas empires. From the end of the fifteenth century, writes John Lynch:

Portugal whose empire was essentially a commercial one, needed Spanish American gold and silver for exchange purposes, while Spain had to buy the pepper, spices, and silks from the Portuguese East Indies which her own empire lacked. From then onwards they had a common interest in preserving their colonial monopoly against incursions from the powers of northern Europe, and Portugal collaborated with her neighbor in protecting the Atlantic crossing.

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67 For a discussion of the widespread diffusion of Spanish literary culture throughout Europe before and during the period of union see Roger Chartier, “La Europa castellana durante el tiempo del Quijote,” in España en tiempos del Quijote, eds. Antonio Feros and Juan Gelabert (Madrid: Taurus, 2004), 129-158.
But the exchange of Spanish American bullion for Portuguese India products did not only take place in Seville or Lisbon, as official institutional organization may have intended. But the exchange of Spanish American bullion for Portuguese India products did not only take place in Seville or Lisbon, as official institutional organization may have intended. Even before 1580, boundaries of the two empires were extremely porous. Smugglers in the Philippines redirected copious amounts of Potosí silver intended for the Japan and China trades into the hands of Portuguese India merchants. The illicit trade along the Rio de la Plata, in present day Argentina, was yet another open vein – in the carnal prose of Eduardo Galeano – through which copious amounts of Spanish American silver was bled. As Stuart Schwartz reminds us, the integration between Portuguese and Spanish America long preceded the official union in 1580: “there had always been Spaniards in the Brazilian enterprise just as Portuguese had participated in Spain’s colonization of America.” And already by the second half of the sixteenth century, the Portuguese had established their primacy in the trafficking of African slaves to the Spanish Indies.

Beyond the mere complementarity of their economic systems, moreover, the two empires also experienced a process of convergence in institutional and economic structures decades before their official union. As Sanjay Subrahmanyam has explained, during the 1560s and 1570s, the policies of Portuguese imperial expansion came to resemble those of

Castile in three fundamental ways. First, in 1562-63, the Portuguese crown abandoned its strict monopoly on trade along the Cape route to India and introduced a contract system, more akin to the Spanish model. Second, the crown implemented a concession-system further regulating trade within the Estado da Índia. Finally, crown-sanctioned adventurers began a vigorous new phase of territorial expansion in the 1570s, drastically transforming what was once a diffuse maritime system of far-flung trading posts into a system in direct control of large swaths of territory and local populations. As such, in addition to being complementary, the two empires also bore an increasing resemblance.

From an ideological perspective the two empires shared much as well, and as joint defenders of the Catholic faith, in the late 1570s Habsburg statesmen could justify the impending union of Portugal and Spain on the basis of a common historical destiny. This fact runs counter to traditional portrayals of Portuguese expansion as overwhelmingly commercial in orientation, with the religious missionary element presented as secondary to what was first and foremost a profit-driven enterprise. But in addition to the search for profit, defense and propagation of the faith played as central a role in the early expansion of Portugal as it did for Castile. This was true from the beginning, and the rulers and officials of both monarchies shared a worldview steeped in the juridical-theological of culture fifteenth century Christian Europe, a culture shaped fundamentally by their similar yet not always parallel experiences of “reconquering” the Iberian peninsula from Muslim rule.

By 1580, the devout monarchs of both Portugal and Spain had become convinced of the divine mission of their respective empires. The previous decade had seen the dramatic Spanish-led naval victory of a Christian coalition over the Ottomans at Lepanto in 1571,

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considerable Portuguese territorial expansion into Angola and the Zambezi Valley, and the consolidation of the plantation economy in Brazil. In 1578, inspired by these developments and thirsty for military glory, the young king, Sebastian I of Portugal, led an ill-conceived campaign to establish an “Algarve beyond the sea” in Morocco by overthrowing its Ottoman-backed sultan, Abd al-Malik. Sebastian disappeared in battle, presumably killed, and when his successor, the childless Henry I, fell ill just two years later, the Spanish Habsburg king, Philip II, began advancing his legal claim as rightful heir to the Portuguese throne.

The surging flow of Spanish American bullion to Seville at that moment combined with the prospect of Iberian union to inflate the confidence of several Habsburg advisers, producing a heightened discourse calling for an aggressive new phase of militant imperialism and even rekindled the crusaders’ dream of re-conquering the Holy Land. An anonymous letter from late 1578 advised Philip that union with Portugal would enable him to, “wage war against the Turk through the Red Sea and to enter the provinces of Egypt and Jerusalem.”

Stressing in ever-greater terms the geo-strategic importance of the Portuguese empire to the future of Habsburg Spain, Fray Hernando del Castillo proclaimed that Portugal’s “loss or gain would be to win or lose the world.” Juan de Silva, a key adviser and ambassador of Philip II, echoed these bombastic claims, proclaiming that as king of Portugal, Philip would surpass the Ottoman Sultan to become the world’s undisputed pre-eminent ruler.

77 Subrahmanyam, “Holding the World in Balance.”
78 Fernando Bouza, “Portugal en la política internacional de Felipe II: Por el suelo en un mundo en pedazos,” in A Unión Ibérica e o Mundo Atlântico, ed. Maria da Graça M. Ventura (Lisboa: Colibri, 1997), 34.
79 Author’s translation; original quoted in Bouza, Portugal en la Monarquía Hispánica, 82-83; also in Fernando Bouza, “Portugal en la política internacional de Felipe II: Por el suelo en un mundo en pedazos,” in A Unión Ibérica e o Mundo Atlântico, ed. Maria da Graça M. Ventura (Lisboa: Colibri, 1997), 39-40.
80 Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas recounted this in his chronicle on Portugal and its incorporation into the Spanish monarchy. Antonio de Herrera Tordesillas, Cinco libros de Antonio de Herrera de la historia de Portugal, y conquista de las islas Azores, en los años de. 1582. y 1583 (Madrid: Casa Pedro Madrigal, 1591), 41.
Philip himself was well aware of the implications of his accession, and, in a letter to Cardinal Henry, the ailing interim ruler, he enumerated in marvelous language the benefits that both Iberian nations would accrue once united:

[T]his union brings to the church and to all of Christianity in general one of the greatest benefits and comforts that could ever be offered [...] that joining the forces of my states with those of the Portuguese nation, so valiant and highly esteemed in the world for its military capabilities and conquests by sea and land, and for its industriousness in navigation, will raise Spain’s reputation to such a point that all other nations will recognize and respect it as the most thriving and prosperous province of Christendom.  

Philip’s argument could hardly have been more forceful. In a discourse of fraternity he reiterated the universal advantages that Iberian union promised for the future of Christianity, and fused them with more pragmatic geo-strategic ones, framed in truly global terms. Military integration would enable the Iberians to eliminate the threat of corsairs in the Mediterranean and Atlantic and to challenge the Ottomans on a second front through Portuguese strongholds in India and the Arabian Gulf. He lauded the “valiant and highly esteemed” Portuguese nation for its expansionary prowess and argued that, united, the Iberian nations would be respected worldwide as the “most thriving and prosperous” in all of Christendom.

As the son of Portuguese Princess Isabella and grandson of Portuguese King Manuel I, Philip’s claim was strong and he viewed it as his divine destiny to unite the entire peninsula under one Christian sovereign. The death of Henry in 1580 and the attempts of Dom António to declare himself king of Portugal compelled Philip to order an invasion, but only after having placated most of the Portuguese nobility with bribes as well as informal promises of autonomy and patronage in return for political support. Despite ultimately using force to secure his succession, Philip rejected the advice of his trusted adviser, Cardinal

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81 Philip II [1579], in Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de España [CODOIN hereafter], vol. 6 (Madrid: Academia de la Historia, 1845), 652-653.
Granvelle, to treat Portugal as a conquest, abolish its autonomous laws, and subsume it as a province within the jurisdiction of Castile.

Although by May 1579, Philip was fully determined to add Portugal and its empire to his dominions, he remained adamant that it should be done without war or bloodshed, and that the Lusitanian kingdom remain autonomous and governed by its own laws and customs. Philip ruled over what was perhaps the quintessential “composite monarchy” as defined by John Elliott, listing his titles in one instance as, “King of Castile, of León, of Aragón, of Naples, Sicily, Jerusalem etc., of the Indies and Mainland [America] of the Ocean Sea, etc., Archduke of Austria, Duke of Burgundy, of Brabant and of Milan etc., Count of Abspurig, of Flanders and of Tyrol etc.” Each of his distant possessions from Sicily to Aragon, Flanders to the Indies enjoyed varying degrees of local autonomy and, far from exercising absolute sovereignty over each, Philip was usually forced to respect the dictates of local law and custom. As Elliott has described, there were two methods that monarchs like Philip might use in joining new territories to existing domains. Accessory union, which usually occurred as a result of conquest, meant that newly acquired territory was fully subsumed within the legal framework of an existing domain, as when the Spanish Indies became part of the Kingdom of Castile. *Aeque principaliter* unions, on the other hand, allowed newly acquired territories to maintain their own systems of law, custom, and privilege, these territories being administered as separate kingdoms. The latter arrangement defined the manner in which Philip sought to acquire the Kingdom of Portugal.

Accordingly, under the terms agreed upon at the Cortes of Tomar in 1581, the Habsburg monarch was acclaimed King Philip I of Portugal promising to respect the newly-incorporated kingdom’s existing customs, laws, and privileges. Portuguese officials would

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82 CODOIN, vol. 6, 417-419.
83 Elliott, “A Europe of Composite Monarchies.” For Philip’s list of titles, see CODOIN vol. 6, 376.
continue to administer the kingdom and its overseas possessions, Portuguese would remain the official language in all matters of state, and a permanent Council of Portugal would be established, composed solely of Portuguese councilors, to advise the king on all matters relating to Portugal and its empire.\textsuperscript{84}

While Spain promised not to intervene in the administration of the Portuguese empire, Portuguese subjects would now be officially granted permission to move freely throughout the Spanish Indies, a concession of particular significance given the already increasing if unauthorized degree of commercial integration between the two empires. In addition, throughout the period of union Spanish colonial administrators largely eschewed enforcement of prohibitions on the forbidden traffic of silver and other goods between Brazil and Peru along the Río de la Plata.\textsuperscript{85} Philip promised to remain in Portugal for as long as possible and, in the event he had to leave, his governor would, by law, be either Portuguese or a member of the Habsburg royal family.\textsuperscript{86} Finally, although military and foreign policy with respect to rival states became in effect joint Iberian initiatives for the most part, the terms agreed upon at the Cortes of Tomar guaranteed the Portuguese continued control of the commercial and ecclesiastical administration of their empire.\textsuperscript{87}

Despite Philip's final decision to use forceful means to secure his succession, his conduct before, during and after the military invasion suggests he was keenly eager to win the good

\textsuperscript{84} Bouza, \textit{Portugal en la Monarquía Hispánica}; Jean-Frédéric Schaub, \textit{Portugal na Monarquia Hispánica}, and Pedro Cardim, \textit{Portugal unido y separado}. For the most thorough discussion of the conditions set out at Tomar see Bouza, \textit{Portugal en la Monarquía Hispánica}; and, for a history of the Council of Portugal, see Santiago de Luxán Meléndez, \textit{La revolución de 1640 en Portugal, sus fundamentos sociales y sus caracteres nacionales: El Consejo de Portugal, 1580-1640} (Madrid: Editorial de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 1988).


\textsuperscript{86} Marques, \textit{From Lusitania to Empire}, 315.

\textsuperscript{87} Throughout the subsequent period of union a number of military campaigns were waged with combined Spanish-Portuguese forces in the South Atlantic and East Asia. This military collaboration and the issue of union in general later became an issue of grave contention between the Iberians as with the rise of Dutch commercial and military power in the early seventeenth century, the Portuguese colonial possessions, by virtue of their association with Spain, became viable and repeated targets for Dutch incursions.
graces of the Portuguese public, especially the nobility and urban commercial elite. Rejecting the advice of Granvelle – one of his most trusted and influential ministers – to abolish the autonomous laws of Portugal and subsume the territory within the Castilian kingdom, Philip insisted instead on a highly conciliatory alternative course. With the *aeque principaliter* incorporation of Portugal into the Spanish Monarchy, Philip went from ruling a vast and disparate composite monarchy to become leader of one of the largest empires the world had ever known.

Although tensions between the two empires grew from the 1620s forward, the Portuguese benefited greatly during the first four decades of union. Lusophone slave traders in West Africa gained access to both the enormous Spanish American market as well as to Vizcayan iron, one of the chief items of exchange for the slaves in their African ports of origin. Access to Spanish American silver was perhaps the major draw, both through legal trade conducted on the peninsula, as well as through the largely illicit trade in East Asia and the Rio de la Plata. Beyond that, a military alliance with Spain was a tantalizing prospect in the effort to stamp out the rise of northern European privateering everywhere from the South Atlantic to the Malacca Straits. Finally, the series of steps taken by Spain to facilitate inter-peninsular commerce by abolishing customs duties on the Spanish-Portuguese border and improving navigation on the Tagus River also proved beneficial to both sides.

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89 On the concept of “composite monarchies,” see Elliott, “A Europe of Composite Monarchies.”
90 Schwartz, “Luso-Spanish Relations in Habsburg Brazil,” 44.
91 Bustos, “Los historiadores españoles y portugueses ante de la unidad peninsular de 1580 a 1640,” 172.
Two Empires

Throughout the period of union, however, Portuguese writers also continued to pen celebratory tracts in the tradition of Zurara, Camões, and Barros. In his 1627, *Memorial de la preferencia, que hace el Reyno de Portugal, y su Consejo, al de Aragon, y de las dos Sicilias*, for instance, Pedro Barbosa de Luna argued that, given the breadth of its overseas jurisdiction and conquests in the name of Christ, Portugal deserved a more dignified status than Aragon or Sicily within the composite Spanish Monarchy.92 Four years later, by which time Spanish-Portuguese relations had already shown significant strain, António de Sousa de Macedo raised the patriotic rhetoric further still, describing Portugal as an “independent sovereign Monarchy”, which within its borders recognized neither the authority of the [Holy Roman] Emperor nor the superiority of the kingdom of Castile.93

These defenses of Portugal and its empire, especially during the first decades of the seventeenth century, came largely in response to Castilian attempts to consolidate control over the kingdom and its possessions. They were decades of constant debate about the possibility of abolishing the agreements of Tomar. There were also attempts to introduce Castilian officials into the government of the Portuguese empire and centralize it according to the Spanish model with the creation of a Council of India (*Conselho da Índia*), which existed from 1604 to 1614.94 Some of the most serious reforms were undertaken under the Count-Duke of Olivares, who served Philip IV as royal favorite from 1622 to 1643. In his 1624,

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92 Pedro Barbosa de Luna, *Memorial de la preferencia, que hace el Reyno de Portugal, y su Consejo, al de Aragon, y de las dos Sicilias* (Lisbon: Geraldo de Vinha, 1627). For an analysis of Barbosa de Luna’s work in the context of this larger literature, see Cardim, *Portugal unido y separado*.

93 Curto, “A literatura e o império” (1998); and Cardim, “La aspiración imperial de la monarquía portuguesa.

Gran Memorial, Olivares suggested: “Looking at the way they are nowadays governed, many people would rightly say that Your Majesty’s power would be larger with less lordships.”95 With respect to the relationship between the Spanish and Portuguese overseas empires, Olivares had in mind both an economic integration of the two empires and a union of arms.96 As a consequence of these reforms, besides bringing prestige to the Spanish Monarchy by vastly expanding its imperial holdings, the incorporation of Portugal and its overseas possessions also brought a number of material benefits. Spain gained a number of Portuguese Atlantic ports, including Lisbon, direct access to spices from Portuguese India and slaves from Portuguese possessions in Africa.97 In addition, its colonists at the distant edges of the empire in the Río de la Plata and Philippines benefitted handsomely through intense yet mostly illicit trade in silver, slaves, and spices with their Portuguese counterparts in Brazil and Macao.

However, the period of union was also characterized by the increase of international conflict, or to put it in other words, by the growing expansion of other European competitors, a process which questioned and challenged Iberian imperium worldwide. By the mid-1620s, the Dutch and English had long since broken Portugal’s maritime monopoly in Asia. Beyond the rapid rise of Dutch and English power in the East, the Dutch also occupied Pernambuco from 1630 to 1654 and Angola from 1641 to 1648.

As frustrations mounted in both the Spanish and Portuguese empires, due in large part to the incursions of the Dutch, English, and French, many Spaniards and Portuguese alike came to view each other, and the union in general, as a major cause of their respective

woes. The *consulado* merchants of Seville and their partners in Peru spearheaded the rising anti-Portuguese sentiment by protesting the impressive economic power of the Portuguese.\footnote{Harry Cross, “Commerce and Orthodoxy: A Spanish Response to Portuguese Commercial Penetration in the Viceroyalty of Peru, 1580-1640,” *Americas* 35, no. 2 (1978): 162.}

At the same time, anti-Spanish feeling had gathered force among the Portuguese, due to their sense of being undervalued within the broader body politic of the Spanish Monarchy, and of the many injuries Portugal had suffered in recent years.\footnote{Schwartz, “Luso-Spanish Relations in Habsburg Brazil,” 47.}

Tensions finally came to a head on 1 December 1640 when a group of Portuguese elites seized a well-chosen moment to assassination the Portuguese Secretary of State Miguel de Vasconcelos and imprison Margaret of Savoy, Portugal’s vicereine under Philip IV. Faced simultaneously with another revolt in Catalonia and a war with France and the Protestant powers, Castilian forces were unable to respond adequately after the Duke of Bragança was proclaimed King John IV of Portugal the following day. Despite the persistence of anti-Castilian sentiment among the popular classes throughout much of the period of union, the formal rebellion itself was only made possible once the monarchy had threatened the collective power of the Portuguese nobility, thereby violating the terms of their informal pact.\footnote{Fernando Bouza, “La relación de la nobleza portuguesa con la Monarquía española,” in *Las relaciones entre Portugal y Castilla en la época de los descubrimientos y la expansión colonial*, ed. Ana María Carabias Torres (Salamanca: Universidad de Salamanca, 1994), 344.}

Responses to Portuguese Restoration in the overseas territories were less straightforward. Although in Portugal and its colonial capitals of Goa and Salvador, the lower and ruling classes alike were quick to support the Restoration, colonists in Macao and southern Brazil, at the distant edges of the empire on the border with Spanish realms, were remarkably ambivalent. Macao’s commercial life, if not also its naval protection, had grown far more linked to Manila than to the Portuguese *Estado da Índia*. In 1642, Macao’s municipal
council entered into negotiations with Philip IV to rejoin the Spanish Monarchy on the condition that Castile send a permanent garrison to defend the port and that Macanese be permitted to travel freely to Manila. Likewise, as I discuss in Chapter Five, a faction of pro-Castilian colonists in São Paulo, many of which were of Spanish descent, also offered their allegiance to Philip IV in return for two concessions: first, that they be permitted to continue capturing and trading indigenous slaves, which they viewed as their legal right through immemorial custom; and second, that he approve their 1640 expulsion of the Jesuits, who had vigorously opposed their indigenous slaving activities. Philip ultimately declined the proposals from both São Paulo and Macao, wary of the lack of guarantees and hopeful that he would soon quell the ongoing Portuguese “rebellion” and thereby return the entire Portuguese empire to his dominion without undermining the process through sub-agreements with individual colonies.101

The conflict between Portugal and Castile lingered on through the mid-1660s, with intermittent fighting along the border. But due to the Spanish Monarchy’s weakened financial position and its various military entanglements elsewhere, its hope of reconquering Portugal never came to pass. Portugal’s patriotic identity and pride, fashioned through the history of expansion and the writings of its great poets and chroniclers, remained latent but never faded during the union, and re-emerged with the writings of António Vieira and others who hailed Portugal as a resurrected “Quinto Imperio.”102

101 Valladares, Castilla y Portugal en Asia, 77-80.
102 Cardim, “La aspiración imperial de la monarquía portuguesa.”
Ruling the Empires

Long before the six-decade union of Portugal and Spain, in the early phase of expansion the two polities had experienced enormous, rapid growths in the size of their subject populations and territorial domains. Beyond defining the political status of those newly claimed possessions, the Iberian monarchies’ most pressing objective was to consolidate control over them. To that end, they developed complex institutional frameworks designed to extend and maintain relations of vassalage over both European colonists as well as local indigenous groups. The institutions had initially taken shape in the preceding centuries as Iberian Christians re-conquered territories from Muslim rule, but evolved significantly during the process of expansion overseas. Although Spanish and Portuguese frameworks of imperial administration eventually came to resemble each other, they followed distinct trajectories, and continued to evolve throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

In both the Spanish and Portuguese empires, institutional frameworks of colonial government saw substantial variance across space and time, the result of debates, policies, and objectives emanating from Europe, as well in response to the contingencies and particularities of local colonial contexts and conditions. Spanish expansion in the Americas, for instance, was driven initially by private initiative as the monarchs sponsored expedition leaders, called adelantados, to lead the process on their behalf. The terms of the

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104 For an analysis of how local interactions determined the contours of Portuguese colonial patterns in East Asia, see Francisco Bethencourt, “Low Cost Empire: Interaction between Portuguese and Local Societies in Asia,” in Rivalry and Conflict: European Traders and Asian Trading Networks in the 16th and 17th Centuries, ed. Ernst van Veen and Leonard Blussé (Leiden: CNWS, 2005), 108-130.
crown’s so-called “capitulations” entitled the adelantado to a portion of the bounty accrued through his efforts and delegated him broad jurisdiction and authority over newly conquered territories and subject populations. Beginning in the mid sixteenth century, however, the crown attempted to impose more direct monarchical control throughout the empire, not only by taking an active role in the organizing and dispatching of expeditions of conquest (or “pacification”), but also by establishing a vast institutional bureaucracy of colonial administration. The Portuguese empire was, broadly speaking, less centralized than its Spanish counterpart and defined generally by a diffuse, dispersed structure of colonial authority. Paradoxically, however, Lisbon was arguably more directly involved in the early phase of Portuguese expansion to the east than the Castilian crown was in Spanish movements west. While the Portuguese empire’s far-flung, discontinuous geography provided local colonial officials in Africa and Asia substantial autonomy, the crown nonetheless took significant steps to maintain control over the flows and profits of trade in those regions, and was relatively swift in establishing institutions and offices of colonial administration. In Brazil, on the other hand, Lisbon initially entrusted the task of conquest and colonization to lord proprietors, or “donatory-captains,” with wide seigniorial dominion, only introducing direct crown rule in the territory in 1549.

As in the process of expansion itself, Portugal took the lead in developing the first central institutions of imperial administration. Already in the mid fifteenth century, as Portuguese sailors plied the waters south along the west coast of Africa, Lisbon established the House of Guinea (c.1460) to regulate the crown’s monopoly contracts on commerce in the region, collect the royal share of imported merchandise, and serve as a maritime court and warehouse for trade goods, including slaves. The House of India, formed roughly four decades later (c.1500), served a similar purpose, but its jurisdiction covered the Indian Ocean
world. Whereas throughout the sixteenth century the majority of Spanish crown revenue derived from taxes levied on Castile, already by the 1510s, thirty-nine percent of the Portuguese crown’s total income derived from the Asian spice trade alone, making the House of India the kingdom’s single most important economic institution by far.  

In the political hierarchy of both Portugal and Spain, directly below the king was a polisynodal system of councils. The Spanish Monarchy, a composite polity, possessed one such council for each of its constituent kingdoms. As a result, the establishment of its independent Council of Indies in 1524 had both symbolic and practical significance as it acknowledged the prominence of those territories in relation to the monarchy’s various kingdoms in Europe. The Council advised the monarch on everything related to the administration of his American possessions and became the highest authority on all legislative, executive, and judicial matters concerning those territories, subject only to the orders of the king. But because the Indies were considered to have been “conquered,” members of the Council of Indies were not required to be natives of those territories, as they tended to be in realms incorporated aeque principaliter.

The Council of Indies gained jurisdiction over the House of Trade (Casa de Contratación), the first Spanish institution of imperial government founded in 1503 on the model of the Portuguese Houses of Guinea and India. It set and collected taxes and duties, licensed voyages, protected cartographic and commercial intelligence, and served as a court of maritime law. A century on, in 1629, the Spanish jurist, Juan de Solórzano Pereira, defended the existence of a separate council for the Indies with such broad powers, exclaiming in grandiose terms that it was charged not only with “the government of a

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County or Kingdom, but that of an Empire which embraces so many Kingdoms and such rich and powerful Provinces, or, in better words, the broadest and most extended Monarchy the world has ever known, as it actually comprises another world.”

In the early seventeenth century, while under Spanish Habsburg rule, the Portuguese crown established the short-lived Council of India (1604-1614), modeled, in turn, on its Castilian counterpart, the Council of Indies, which in theory held supreme jurisdiction over all political, military, judicial, and commercial affairs throughout the colonial world. In addition, another key central institution of Portuguese imperial government was the Overseas Council (1642). Established after Portugal’s separation from Spain, it possessed the same mandate as the Council of India, but was more powerful than its predecessor and survived into the nineteenth century given its legitimacy as a purely Portuguese creation.

In addition to these central institutions of imperial government located in the peninsula, the Portuguese and Spanish likewise established institutions overseas. The Portuguese again took the lead. Whereas Brazil languished initially as a backwater, providing only modest commercial promise for much of the early sixteenth century, Portugal’s burgeoning commercial empire in the east yielded windfall profits almost immediately. As a result, soon after Da Gama’s voyage to India in 1498, the crown placed a viceroy there with broad jurisdiction over the political, military, judicial, and fiscal administration of the still modest collection of Portuguese footholds across the circum-Indian Ocean. As expansion continued, the crown established governorships in East Africa, the Persian Gulf, and

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106 Juan de Solórzano Pereira, “Memorial y discurso de las razones que se ofrecen para que el real y supremo Consejo de las Indias deba preceder en todos los actos públicos al que llaman de Flandes [1629],” in Obras varias posthumas del doctor Juan de Solórzano Pereyra (Madrid: Imprenta Real de la Gaceta, 1776), 178. Not all observers shared this view. The Count-Duke of Olivares, for instance, argued that the conquest and occupation of the Americas had been a mistake, that it had weakened the monarchy and diminished its overall prestige.


Southeast Asia headed by autonomous governors and captains responsible for political and military administration. The crown also created provincial judgeships and a high court, or *Relação*, in Goa in 1544 to hear appeals from across Portuguese Asia, as well as a similarly structured fiscal administration that reached from the viceregal capital down to the myriad customs houses and trade posts.\(^\text{109}\) Treasury officials managed crown revenues and spending, monopoly contracts, and customs duties and taxation for the entire viceroyalty. In addition, they supervised the *cartaz* system through which Portugal sought to enforce its monopoly on navigation and trade by regulating the inter-Asian commerce of Hindu, Muslim, and Malay merchants across the Indian Ocean. Beyond these civil institutions, the crown also created a system of bishoprics to care for the spiritual welfare of its overseas subjects, a Goan office of the Inquisition (1560) to ensure purity of faith, and a branch of the Lisbon-based Board of Conscience (1570), also in Goa, to provide moral theological guidance to the viceregal administration.\(^\text{110}\)

The first Spanish imperial viceroyalty was not established until 1535, in Mexico City, followed by another in Lima in 1543, signaling the first territorialization of Spanish imperial sovereignty in the New World by defining precise areas over which the crown claimed jurisdiction. Appointed to serve “in the king’s living image,” viceroy{s}, according to the *Compilation of Laws of the Indies*, “had and exercise the same power, mandate, and jurisdiction

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as the King.”111 They were the chief political, military, and treasury authority within their territory, and they confirmed ecclesiastical posts.112

High Courts, known as audiencias, represented the second major institution of Spanish colonial government. The monarchy established its first American high court in Santo Domingo in 1511, followed by another in New Spain in 1527, one in Lima in 1543, and several others throughout the rest of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Audiencia judges maintained direct correspondence with the king through the Council of Indies and thus provided an independent check on viceregal power. In addition to being high courts of appeal for all legal disputes within their jurisdiction, hearing cases presented by both Spaniards and Native Americans, audiencias served a legislative role in issuing laws and local ordinances, as well as a consultative one in advising viceroys and governors.

The royal treasury was another key institution of Spanish colonial control. Prominent cities and every important port and mining town had a treasury office staffed by crown-appointed officials responsible for managing all royal payments and income, including tribute and spoils of conquest. The fact that their appointments came directly from Spain gave them a degree of autonomy from the viceroys, provincial governors, and audiencia judges, and further diffused power among the various colonial institutions, each of which reported directly to the Council of Indies.

Despite Portugal’s early start in Asia, Lisbon waited half a century after Cabral’s first landing in Brazil before establishing direct crown rule in the New World. Bereft of the spices of the great Asian emporia and the silver of Mexico and Peru, the Portuguese crown nonetheless recognized Brazil’s strategic importance with the rise of French incursions. In

111 Recopilación de leyes de los reynos de las Indias (1681), book 3, title 3, law 2.
1534, Lisbon delegated Brazil’s early occupation to fifteen donatory-captains who, in return for financing and executing the conquest, settlement, and defense of their assigned territories, enjoyed wide political, military, and judicial authority and a major portion of the profits from all economic production and trade. After fifteen years, however, only two of the original captaincies had become profitable. Several remained as undeveloped and unconquered as when Cabral first landed in the territory in 1500. One contemporary observer warned in a letter to the king: “If Your Majesty does not succor these captaincies soon, not only will we lose our lives and goods but Your Majesty will lose the land.”

To reinforce Portugal’s sovereign claim to the territory the king sent the first governor-general to Bahia in 1549 to found a capital and implement royal authority throughout Brazil. Given their relative success, Pernambuco and São Vicente were the only captaincies to remain hereditary and governed by their original donatories. The rest were converted to royal captaincies, subject in theory to viceregal rule from Bahia. Although the Portuguese king did not appoint corregidores to oversee Brazil’s municipal councils, as Spain had in its dominions, he did send a single superior magistrate to oversee the locally elected judges. He also sent a royal treasurer with broad authorities in fiscal administration.

Local institutions including the Misericórdia confraternities, municipal councils, craft guilds and even families, the base unit of colonial society, all had their own rules, customs, and leaders. This integrated network of smaller powers was fundamental in determining the

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legal and normative frameworks governing everyday life in colonial society. The *Misericórdias*, for instance, confraternities devoted to charitable works, although protected by the king, were local in origin. In addition to facilitating social cohesion among Brazil’s settler elite, they also served an important administrative function in processing and executing wills. The other key pillar of local society, the municipal council, enjoyed similar powers. The lack of *corregidores* to supervise their activities, however, gave Brazilian municipal councils even more independence with respect to royal authority than those in Spanish America and peninsular Portugal. And their right to correspond directly with Lisbon gave municipal councils a degree of autonomy from the crown’s central colonial institutions. Unlike in Spanish America, there existed no Portuguese equivalent to the *República de indios* in Brazil and therefore no separate indigenous municipal councils. The Portuguese crown did promote the conversion, and at least in theory the protection, of indigenous communities through the creation of Jesuit-run settlements. But since the indigenous populations surrounding Portuguese settlements in Brazil were smaller, less centralized, less sedentary, and relatively less integral to Brazil’s export economy (soon dominated by African slave labor), the Portuguese never created a separate, official juridico-political body for the Amerindian population as the Spanish had.

Only in the early seventeenth century, under Habsburg rule, did Brazil experience a further expansion of its colonial bureaucracy. The process extended crown rule throughout the territory while simultaneously diffusing the governor-general’s power by creating new levels of judicial and fiscal administration that reported directly to Lisbon (and Madrid

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during the period of Iberian Union) rather than to Bahia. Above all, this was an attempt to transform the colony’s government and administration from an operation led by individuals into a more robust and effective hierarchical bureaucracy. To alleviate the judicial demands on Brazil’s sole superior magistrate, the crown created its first and only Brazilian high court (Relação), in Bahia in 1609, roughly a century after Madrid had established its first of many in Spanish America.\(^{118}\) Bahia’s Relação was subject only to the oversight of the king and his supreme court in Lisbon, rather than to the governor-general. At roughly the same time, the crown established a network of provincial judges as an intermediary level between the locally elected judges of municipal councils and the high court. The crown also finally opened a central Bahia office of the royal treasury in 1614. Its officials supported the royal treasurer and oversaw an expanded bureaucracy of intermediate and lower level treasury officers of the captaincies and municipalities.\(^{119}\)

As in other Christian monarchies of the time, royal authority in Portugal and its empire possessed both temporal and spiritual dimensions. Highlighting this duality, Diogo do Couto, the eminent chronicler of Portuguese imperium in Asia, remarked in the early seventeenth century that, “the Kings of Portugal always aimed in their conquest of the East at so uniting the two powers, spiritual and temporal, so that one should never be exercised without the other.”\(^{120}\) The king was regarded as God’s representative within his realm and was charged above all with ensuring justice and preserving the ecclesia, or community of believers.\(^{121}\) Although lacking the power to determine matters of theology, which remained

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\(^{118}\) Bethencourt, “Political Configurations and Local Power,” 239.

\(^{119}\) Anil Kumar Mukerjee, Financing an Empire in the South Atlantic: The Fiscal Administration of Colonial Brazil, 1609-1703 (PhD diss., University of California, Santa Barbara, 2009).

\(^{120}\) Diogo do Couto, Asia, década 6, book 4, ch. 7, p.322 (Lisbon: Regia Officina Typografica, 1781 [1614]).

\(^{121}\) Pedro Cardim, “La jurisdicción real y su afirmación en la Corona portuguesa y sus territorios ultramarinos (siglos XVI-XVIII): Reflexiones sobre la historiografía,” in De Re Pública Hispaniae: Una vindicación de la cultura política en los reinos ibéricos en la primera modernidad, eds. Francisco José Aranda Perez and José Damião Rodrigues (Madrid: Sílex, 2008), 349-388; Bartolomé Clavero, “La Monarquía, el Derecho y la Justicia,” in Las jurisdicciones,
the authority of the Pope in Rome, the king was nonetheless responsible for facilitating the expansion of the faith worldwide and for defending Christendom against threats from infidels and heretics. This sacred duty encouraged a mutually supportive relationship between Lisbon and Rome, and ultimately enhanced the king’s aura of power by imbuing it divine legitimacy.

In recognition of Portuguese exploits in propagating the faith beyond Europe, the papacy institutionalized the king’s ecclesiastical power through a series of concordats in the mid fifteenth century, establishing the *Padroado Real*, the Portuguese version of the Spanish *Patronato Real*, which granted the Portuguese crown expanded powers to appoint bishops and establish new bishoprics and dioceses throughout its dominions. Although Bahia was named a bishopric in 1551, it was the only one in Brazil for over a century. It was not until the 1670s that Bahia was raised to an archbishopric, that new bishoprics were created in Pernambuco, Rio de Janeiro, and Maranhão, and that the first convent (or monastery, for that matter) opened in Brazil. Unlike Spanish America and Portuguese Asia, Brazil never had its own Holy Office of the Inquisition.

**Conquest?**

Despite the globe-girdling expansion of Spaniards and Portuguese across the world in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and despite the vast institutional apparatuses which arose in their wake, the Iberians’ so-called “conquests” in various parts of Africa, Asia, and America were not as rapid, linear, or comprehensive as once thought. Classical
historiography on the conquests of the Aztec and Inca empires, for instance, even if recognizing the violence of events, has often emphasized the heroism of missionaries, or of vastly outnumbered conquistadors who by their faith and grit managed to defeat and subject America’s two preeminent native polities with miraculous speed. Interestingly, many of these nineteenth and early twentieth century histories were based on less than critical readings of writers like Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo y Valdés, Bernal Díaz del Castillo, and other authors discussed in the following chapter, demonstrating the enduring ideological power of early modern Spain’s celebratory discourse of empire. In recent decades, however, scholars have increasingly demonstrated the effective resistance, adaptation, and even collaboration of native peoples. In addition, this “New Conquest History” has underlined the need to conceive of the “conquests” as processes, rather than discrete events, which often played out over decades if not centuries and in many cases never reached completion.

We now know in more concrete terms the fundamental role of native allies in virtually every major “Spanish” victory over indigenous polities in mainland America. In Mexico, for instance, hundreds of thousands of Tlaxcalans, longtime enemies of the Aztecs, seized the opportunity to ally with the Spanish and were instrumental in the series of battles which led to the fall of Tenochtitlan in 1521. From there, many more thousands of

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indigenous allies, including but not limited to Tlaxcalans, Cholulans, and even defeated Nahua groups from central Mexico joined the Spanish in their expeditions south and east into Yucatán, Guatemala, and Honduras, northwest against the Cazcanes and Zacatecas, and later against a diverse confederation of Chichimeca peoples in the region of Bajío, in which Cazcanes fought alongside Spaniards. Likewise, in their various campaigns in South America the Spanish relied on support from Nahuas, Mayas, Nicaraguans of various groups, as well as Cañaris and other local South American societies who had long resented and resisted Inca domination.

African, Asian, and Native American auxiliaries were critical to Portuguese military success as well. In southern Brazil, for instance, the early residents of São Paulo, discussed in Chapter Five, forged alliances with native groups and intermixed with them, a practice which soon became ubiquitous. Already by the late sixteenth century, the population of the town was heavily mestizo. At around that time, local captains from São Paulo began leading massive so-called *bandeiras* of hundreds of Tupi and mestizo troops deep into the hinterland of southern Brazil and the Río de la Plata. Laying waste to Jesuit missions and Spanish settler towns alike, such *bandeiras* frequently brought back hundreds and sometimes thousands of slaves in a single expedition, extending Portugal’s sphere of influence in the region, in this case at the expense of that of Spain.

Despite the Iberians’ technological superiority, the support of so many thousands of Native American allies, and the rapidity with which they deposed the titular heads of the Incas and Aztecs, for instance, it took many decades to consolidate rule over America’s pre-Columbian polities. Soon after the indigenous ruler Atahualpa was captured in 1532, for instance, a large Inca force rebelled, harassed Spanish positions, and eventually established a

124 Matthew and Oudijk, eds., *Indian Conquistadors*; Altman, *The War for Mexico’s West*; Restall, *Maya Conquistador*.
125 Matthew and Oudijk, eds., *Indian Conquistadors*. 
neo-Inca state based in the mountains in Vilcabamba, which successfully resisted Spanish domination for nearly four decades. The effort to subjugate the Maya peoples of Yucatán was an even more complicated affair. Beginning in 1517 the Spanish began sending expeditions into the peninsula, faced pitched resistance, and after a series of violent clashes in the 1520s and 1530s only managed their first permanent settlements there in 1542. Still, Spanish control remained restricted to the northwest part of the peninsula, and was dependent on a fragile alliance with local Maya groups and other indigenous allies from central Mexico.126 Mexico City too, the ostensible heart of Spanish imperial sovereignty in the New World, remained unstable well into the seventeenth century when two major Native American rebellions rocked the city, one as late as 1692.127

In addition to the clear limits of Spanish military power, the empire’s hegemony remained far from complete in other ways as well. Even in central Mexico the Nahua altepetl (city-state), the basis of indigenous socio-political organization, survived well into the post-conquest period, as did traditional kinship and inheritance patterns.128 Indigenous peoples across much of Spanish America continued residing in their traditional towns and villages where they maintained local leaders, customs, and legal norms. Although in reality derived from pre-Hispanic forms of socio-political organization like the altepetl, the semi-autonomy these units maintained were reminiscent of the fueros (local laws and privileges) granted to cities and lordships back in Spain, and were thus intelligible within Castilian legal frameworks as well.

126 Restall, Maya Conquistador.
127 Cope, The Limits of Racial Domination. Also, for an analysis of the 1624 unrest in Mexico City, see Angela Ballone, The 1624 Tumult of Mexico in Perspective (c. 1620–1650): Authority and Conflict Resolution in the Iberian Atlantic (Leiden: Brill, 2017). As Ballone argues, that episode, although unsettling, did not represent an existential threat to Spanish crown rule in the city.
128 Lockhart, The Nahuas after the Conquest.
Despite being regarded in juridico-political terms as a single homogenous population comprising the República de indios, whose institutional origins I discuss in Chapter Two, Native Americans maintained many of their diverse customs, languages, and beliefs, sometimes covertly, and often in the face of systematic attempts to eradicate them. Although in theory claiming the authority to abolish all indigenous laws and customs, the monarchy acquiesced – or was forced to acquiesce – to preserve certain aspects of pre-Hispanic political and social organization. The intention was to provide continuity to facilitate the transition from indigenous to Spanish rule, making the latter more intelligible and legitimate in the eyes of Native Americans. But it was also a response to the reality, of which the monarchy was well aware, that it simply did not possess sufficient power to fully impose its cultural and institutional rule over such vast, varied and complex indigenous societies.

To the extent that Nahuas, for instance, incorporated Spanish social and cultural forms, they did so through a gradual process of selective acculturation throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries at least.\textsuperscript{129} Like the Nahua, the Maya also retained many of their traditions, especially in religion, despite sustained Spanish efforts to impose Christianity.\textsuperscript{130} They adopted certain Christian religious practices but imbued them with Mayan meaning, and they maintained their traditional vision of the universe and concept of cyclical time. Similar processes played out across the empire, where indigenous peoples incorporated varying degrees of Spanish influence, but always maintained certain elements from the pre-Hispanic past.\textsuperscript{131}

As part of the República de indios, indigenous peoples throughout the Americas and Philippines, in addition to maintaining certain forms of traditional legal culture at the local

\textsuperscript{129} Lockhart, \textit{The Nahuas after the Conquest} (1992); see also Horn, \textit{Postconquest Coyuacan}; Gruzinski, \textit{La colonisation de l’imaginaire}.

\textsuperscript{130} Clendinnen, \textit{Ambivalent Conquests}.

\textsuperscript{131} For how this played out in Guatemala, see Lovell, \textit{Conquest and Survival in Colonial Guatemala}. 
level, also had access to Castilian law. Native Americans often utilized this access to protest abusive encomenderos or protect their communities’ local autonomy and customs. The General Indian Court, for instance, founded in Mexico City in 1592 served as a forum for complaints against abusive Spanish settlers, priests, and even royal officials, and, if only in its early phase, dealt with a combination of both Castilian and Native American law.\footnote{Woodrow Borah, *Justice by Insurance: The General Indian Court of Colonial Mexico and the Legal Aides of the Half-Real* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983); and Brian Owensby, *Empire of Law and Indian Justice in Colonial Mexico* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008). By the seventeenth century, however, Spanish judges decreasingly respected pre-Hispanic traditions or legal norms in forming their decisions. See Susan Kellogg, *Law and the Transformation of Aztec Culture, 1500-1700* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995).}

In practice, there were key exceptions to the legal theory which subsumed Native Americans into the single juridico-political category of the República de indios. Particular indigenous nations, like the Tlaxcala, for instance, secured special status in recognition of their collaboration in military campaigns against other native groups. That status exempted Tlaxcalans from certain tribute payments and enabled them to maintain their traditional culture relatively unmolested. Some members of the former indigenous elite also retained their elevated status under the new Spanish political regime. This was a prudent if necessary concession from the monarchy, designed to legitimate its transition to power among native peoples by preserving some of the traditional indigenous hierarchy. These individuals, although in theory prohibited from performing traditional religious functions, maintained their status, property, and power in the native community, and the hereditary nature of their titles, offices, and wealth.
Diffusion of Authority

Even during the height of Iberian hegemony in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, a range of factors coalesced to circumscribe the Iberian crowns’ effective power to exercise control over and within the territories they claimed to possess.\textsuperscript{133} To some extent, this fact is hardly surprising, a result in part of the distance which separated the metropole from the colonies as well as of the dispersed structures of power integral to the institutional and political culture of both Portugal and Spain, which diffused political authority by checking the jurisdiction of specific institutions or offices against that of others.\textsuperscript{134} At the same time, however, the Iberian crowns faced more direct forms of opposition in the colonies, ranging in nature from overt ones, including legal protest and even direct violent action against royal authority, to subtle, passive forms, like refusing to enact certain decrees or legislation. Collectively, these centrifugal forces helped check the expansionary impulse of crown power, defining the limits of imperial sovereignty in both the centers and peripheries across the Iberian colonial world.

Both Lisbon and Madrid organized their imperial administration in such a way that, as their institutional frameworks grew so too did the jurisdictional conflicts between various


competing offices. Within the political, judicial, fiscal, and ecclesiastical institutions of colonial authority, including the bishoprics and missionary orders, there existed more or less clear orders of hierarchy. All, with the exception of the regular clergy, were subject to the ultimate authority of the monarch. Between them, however, relations of hierarchy were not always clear. Disputes erupted frequently between the viceroy (or governor-general) and high court, for instance, over the scope of their respective jurisdictions since both reported directly to the king. Even municipal councils could appeal directly to the king to seek redress, including on behalf of individuals, which they often did successfully, if they felt that the viceroy, governor-general, or another central colonial authority had violated their rights, privileges, or jurisdictions.

To be sure, such jurisdictional layering, alongside factors like physical distance, communication lags, and respect for local custom and privilege, all converged to diffuse the monarch’s effective power and ability to influence everyday decision-making in the local colonial context. While provoking a degree of conflict at the local level and affording overseas institutions of empire substantial autonomy, however, John Leddy Phelan has demonstrated that this complex political structure actually produced a degree of cohesion and stability in the Iberian empires.\footnote{Phelan, “Authority and Flexibility in the Spanish Imperial Bureaucracy.”} In addition, the checking of certain colonial institutions by the power of others helped ensure that no single office or individual was able to amass too much power or threaten the king’s position atop the monarchy’s political hierarchy.

Nevertheless, long after Portugal and Spain had proclaimed victory in conquering various non-European polities and had created their central institutions of imperial administration, political authority overseas remained surprisingly diffuse including among the
European settler population. The monarchs’ power to determine basic decision-making, for instance, was not absolute, nor was it expected to be. Even the highest crown officials, including viceroys, governors-general, and high court judges in the colonial centers, had wide power to interpret royal decrees as they saw fit and were not always required to execute them to the letter. Famous in the Hispanic world, the legal device captured in the phrase, *obedezco pero no cumplo* (“I obey but do not comply”), permitted officials to refuse to implement certain decrees while simultaneously affirming their obedience to the monarch’s supreme authority. According to the 1681 Compilation of Laws of the Indies, “Ministers and judges should obey, but not comply with our decrees and orders” if given local circumstances they seemed imprudent. Such legal devices combined with jurisdictional overlapping between various institutions and the myriad customary privileges and exemptions of indigenous and local settler communities to limit the king’s absolute sovereignty in overseas territories. Practical, tangible forces like physical distance and limited and overstretched resources further diffused that control.

Another key institution among the constellation of colonial authority was the municipal council, referred to by Spaniards as the *cabildo* and by Portuguese as the *senado da câmara*. Although crucial in institutionalizing Iberian authority and influence in a given locale, municipal councils were notable for the jurisdictional privilege and political autonomy they enjoyed from other institutions of colonial government. As Spaniards and Portuguese occupied new colonial spaces, they founded new towns and cities with municipal councils,

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137 *Recopilación de leyes de los reynos de las Indias*, book 2, title 2, law 22.
138 On the importance of local customary law in Spanish America see Tau Anzoátegui, *El poder de la costumbre*.
which provided the settlers limited self-government at the local level. Towns served the same symbolic and administrative functions they had in the peninsula. They were centers of commerce, culture, and power.\textsuperscript{140} Even seigniorial lords with vast rural landholdings often resided in towns, their prestige reflected in the proximity of their residences to the central plaza with its church and municipal buildings, including the town council. Built on grid systems, Spanish American towns in particular held great significance as symbols of European civilization and rational order. And as during reconquista, newly founded towns in America served as bases for further invasions as Spaniards and Portuguese pushed deeper into native-controlled territory. Cortés, in the most famous example, founded Veracruz in Mexico, along with a cabildo, as a means to free himself from the authority of his rival, the governor of Cuba, place himself under direct royal order, and create the legal basis for a new, independent mandate to conquer the Aztec empire. According to Cortés:

\[\ldots\] it seemed best to all of us in the name of your Royal Highnesses to populate and found there a town in which there were justice, so that there were lordship in that land, as in your kingdoms and lordships [in Europe]; because being this land populated with Spaniards, in addition to increasing the kingdoms and lordships of your majesties and your revenues, you might bestow Graces and favors upon us and to the settlers that come from here forward.\textsuperscript{141}

The founding of Veracruz provided a bastion of Castilian law and jurisdiction and an early symbol of Spanish permanence on the American mainland.

Importantly, however, Iberian colonial municipalities and their representative councils enjoyed substantial legal, political, and economic autonomy from the crown and from its high institutions of colonial government. Municipal councils held jurisdiction over both the town or city itself as well as the surrounding countryside, and served as bastions for

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{140} Ángel Rama, \textit{La ciudad letrada} (Hanover, N.H.: Ediciones del Norte, 1984).
\end{footnotes}
the protection of local customary law, as in Europe. Describing the wide-ranging authority of the institution, the municipal councilors of Buenos Aires explained in 1674 that:

Cabildos [...], under their royal laws and *ius commune*, are vested with the power to rule the city and hear matters pertaining to it, by governing each and every part of it, paying attention to the protection of its fruits and crop fields, its sustenance and that of its people, peacefulness, price, amounts, and better distribution, in such a way as they may agree at any time, and deciding whatever they may deem convenient.142

Beyond the council existed a range of other small yet no less important institutions as well. Convents, monasteries, confraternities, unions, schools, universities, and even families – the base unit of colonial society – all had their own rules, customs and leaders. Collectively, this integrated constellation of local and regional powers was fundamental in determining the legal and normative frameworks governing everyday life among settler communities across the Spanish and Portuguese empires.143

Iberian royal authority remained relatively entrenched in centers of colonial power like Goa, Mexico City, Lima, Bahia, and Manila. Even these cities came frequently under threat, however, and were never completely secure. Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, they were the target of numerous riots, revolts, and attacks by settlers of Iberian extraction seeking autonomy, by indigenous peoples hoping to reshape or overthrow the colonial order, as well as by competing empires or corsairs, in particular from northwest Europe.

Moving outward from the cities and towns that served as islands of Iberian law and government, imperial sovereignty grew increasingly circumscribed. If throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Iberian crown rule was fragile and circumscribed within

143 Tau Anzoátegui, “Provincial and Local Law in the Indies.”
the core regions of central Mexico, Peru, and the areas around Goa and Salvador da Bahia, it was even more so on the margins of empire. Beyond the confines of fortified enclaves of Iberian authority, the crowns’ claim to sovereignty grew increasingly tenuous and diffuse. Vast seas of indigenous territory often surrounded them. In many cases, armed expeditions of conquest – or “pacification” as Philip II decreed they be called from late sixteenth century – often succeeded in compelling the nominal or temporary submission of a given indigenous group. Despite then claiming such peoples as subjects of the Spanish or Portuguese crowns, however, Iberian colonial authorities often struggled to exercise effective rule over them after their troops had withdrawn.

In these remote regions, like Southeast Africa, the Philippines, and the Río de la Plata, all territories the Iberian monarchies claimed within their extended imperium (and the subjects of Chapters Three, Four, and Five), isolated settlers, missionaries, or itinerant soldier-adventurers often represented the sole Spanish presence beyond fortified enclaves. All these individuals maintained their own unique relationships to the monarchy, and often served as intermediaries in the extension of Iberian cultural and political influence.¹⁴⁴

Missionaries represented the sole sustained European presence in many areas. Representatives of leading orders like the Dominicans and Jesuits, for example, were often fierce critics of empire and defended indigenous communities against the encroachments and depredations of both royal authorities as well as independent settlers. The Orders were also often notoriously independent, and went to great lengths to protect their autonomy against the pretensions of domineering governors or other civil authorities.

At the same time, however, missionaries also represented a key face of Iberian empire, albeit an alternative one that was ostensibly more benign. Moreover, despite looking to Rome and the Pope as the ultimate spiritual authority on earth, the Iberian monarchs also exercised a significant degree of power over the church within their dominions, by virtue of the _Patronato or Padrado Real_.\(^{145}\) As a result, although autonomous from the secular church and crown, missionary orders nevertheless depended on the king’s mandate, goodwill, and to some degree his financial support to sustain their efforts. They served as a key force in facilitating social and religious cohesion among Spanish and Portuguese settlers. Most importantly, they were fundamental in extending the influence of Iberian civilization and Catholic religion among non-European peoples, including in hinterland regions beyond the reach of civil authority.

In addition to the argument for missionary evangelization as the preferable means by which to bring indigenous peoples under the sway of Iberian cultural and political organization, the lack of sufficient military resources and manpower was the primary factor that explains the Orders’ prominent role in this process. Of course, Iberian-led forces were known for their prowess in battle and, in the case of the prominent _conquistadors_, for their defeats of native armies that dramatically outsized them. However, the effective subjugation of new territories and subjects required not simply the ability to wage initial armed expeditions of conquest, but also to leave behind sufficient forces and institutions to consolidate and maintain Iberian rule after the clashes of war had ceased. Despite possessing two of the most advanced militaries of their day, however, neither Spain nor Portugal had sufficient manpower or resources to sustain the long-term costs of conflict on so many fronts in Europe and overseas.

\(^{145}\) According to this arrangement, in addition to powers over the secular church, the crown also gained the monopoly over evangelization in its territories.
Brazil, for instance, like Spanish America, had no regular, centralized military organization. Although a royal defense fleet plied the long Brazilian coast intermittently and modest retinues of trained soldiers guarded the governor-general and certain coastal fortifications, the ground forces protecting the colony were, for the most part, irregular, untrained militias of private settlers raised by municipal councils or provincial governors. It was not until the late seventeenth century in fact that the crown created the first permanent garrisons in Bahia, Pernambuco, and eventually throughout the other captaincies.
As Portuguese and Spaniards expanded across the globe in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, a range of writers, cartographers, and artists dedicated themselves to documenting the numerous new sea routes and territories they “discovered” and charted, the kaleidoscopic diversity of flora, fauna, and peoples they encountered, and their exploits in extending Iberian influence throughout much of Africa, Asia, and America. Many authors set out simply to glorify that expansion. Others questioned specific aspects of its morality and legality. Even the strongest critics, however, sought to influence imperial law and administration with the ultimate goal of improving the conduct of settlers and officials, and of ensuring that the Spanish and Portuguese crowns maintained their claim to moral authority both among their royal subjects and in relation to competing powers like the Dutch, French, and English. Collectively, these texts came to form a discourse that aimed not only to reinforce the crown’s aura of power, but also to demonstrate the globality of that power for having unlocked so many mysteries of cosmography and geography, and for having brought countless new territories and peoples under Iberian imperial rule.

Importantly, despite the tendency of historians to treat the Spanish and Portuguese empires in separation, the two empires shared much in common and were deeply interlinked. This was true not only in terms of their institutions of imperial rule and administration, but also in terms of the impulses that drove them, and the ideologies that afforded them meaning. Despite the clear degree of competition that defined relations between Portugal and Spain throughout the early modern period, champions of Portuguese and Spanish
imperium developed similar discourses of glorification and legitimation. Even before the union of the Iberian crowns in 1580, several prominent observers on both sides of the peninsular divide portrayed Iberian expansion as a singular process, united by the joint mission of spreading the holy gospel and European civilization to the earth’s most distant corners. In terms of official history, Philip II of Spain’s decision to create the position of “chronicler of the Indies” in 1571 marked the institutionalization of historical research and writing as a tool of Spanish imperium. Less than a decade later, when the Spanish Monarchy incorporated the Kingdom of Portugal with the accession of the Philip II of Spain to the Portuguese throne, the Iberian discourse of empire reached its highest level of articulation. Authors and artists made the point of conveying not only Philip’s valor and magnanimity as ruler, but also, quite explicitly, the global dimensions of his imperium for having secured singular sovereignty over two of the most extended empires the world had ever known.

Contemporary discourses celebrating and debating Iberian imperium took a number of forms, both verbal and visual. Chronicles were particularly prominent in representing Iberian imperial power and in impressing a sense of its global dimensions. Natural histories and ethnographies, geographical treatises, and navigation guides and reports were crucial too, as was iconography and other visual imagery, including engravings in printed texts, public monuments, commemorative medallions, and cartography on maps, globes, and nautical charts. Given the tendency among historians, noted by Hayden White, “to treat the imagistic evidence as if it were at best a complement of verbal evidence, rather than as a supplement, which is to say, a discourse in its own right,” it is worth emphasizing the crucial role of visual imagery as well in the construction of Spanish and Portuguese ideological power.\footnote{Hayden White, “Historiography and Historiophoty,” \textit{American Historical Review} 93, no. 5 (December 1988): 1193.} As Roger Chartier has discussed regarding early modern Spain in particular, the verbal text and visual
image “were thought of as two languages using the same grammar, if not the same lexicon, all the while being granted their own specific powers, thus justifying their juxtaposition, imbrications, or exchanges.”

These two discursive forms – the verbal and visual – not to mention that of the spoken word, were mutually constitutive in the representation of Iberian power in general, and in particular that of the ruler.

While some authors, particularly those under crown commission, aimed explicitly to glorify and amplify perceptions of Iberian imperium, others did so with more subtlety and less overt intention. Certain ethnographies and natural histories, for instance, although focused primarily on the native peoples and natural features of specific parts of the world beyond Europe, nonetheless made clear, if only implicitly, that these new troves of knowledge had been uncovered thanks to the efforts of the Iberian crowns in sanctioning and facilitating long-distance voyages of discovery, conquest, and occupation. Moreover, they conveyed the globality of Iberian expansion.

The same was true of cartography, despite the fact that much of it remained secret and guarded by the crown for fear of it being used by imperial competitors to challenge Iberian claims overseas. But the seemingly simple act of naming places on a map, of documenting the creation of new nautical routes, or of charting the contours of lands and seas previously unknown to Europe, reinforced Iberian claims of first “discovery” and “occupation,” key prerequisite pillars in the development of titles of dominion and sovereignty.

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148 In, Portrait of the King, Louis Marin wrote that “the king is only truly king, that is, monarch, in images. They are his real presence. A belief in the effectiveness and operativeness of his iconic signs is obligatory, or else the monarch is emptied of all his substance through lack of transubstantiation, and only simulacrum is left.” See Louis Marin, Portrait of the King, trans. Martha M. Houle (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1988).

149 For an essay distinguishing “world histories” from “universal histories,” and demonstrating that world histories of the sixteenth century were written not only by Spaniards or Portuguese, but also by Arab, Mughal, Chinese, and Polish authors, see Subrahmanyan, “On World Historians in the Sixteenth Century,” 26-57.
Legal and Ideological Foundations of Iberian Empire

Long before the famous 1493 Inter cætera bull of donation, Pope Eugene IV issued a series of lesser-known bulls in 1436-37, which recognized Portuguese claims to the recently discovered territories in the Atlantic (except the Canaries which he awarded to Castile), on the condition that the Portuguese convert the native peoples they encountered to Christianity. Portugal, which unlike Castile was no longer encumbered by its own war of peninsular reconquest, seized the opportunity to extend its presence along the West African coast at Arguim and Upper Guinea, where it began an infamous tradition of slave-raiding and -trading which came to dominate Portuguese activities in Africa for the next four centuries. Portuguese diplomats then successfully lobbied Rome to issue the bulls Dum Diversas and Romanus Pontifex, of 1452 and 1455, which granted Portugal full secular and ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the lands and seas from northwest Africa all the way to India. Subsequently, the main conditions of the Dum Diversas and Romanus Pontifex bulls were ratified when the two kingdoms signed the Treaty of Alcaçovas in 1479, establishing the first Portuguese mare clausum in African and Asian waters, an event that had far reaching consequences on the subsequent course of global history.

As Portugal extended its military and commercial reach in North and Atlantic Africa in the 1460s, Spain was eager to catch up. Between 1475 and 1478, Castile launched a flurry of ultimately failed campaigns against Portuguese targets in Cape Verde, Ceuta, the Azores, and Gran Canaria. And even before any Spaniard had knowledge of the “New World,” let alone set foot there, and before the Inter cætera bulls of donation, Isabel and Ferdinand began

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150 Antonio García y García, “Las donaciones pontificias de territorios y su repercusión en las relaciones entre Castilla y Portugal,” in Las relaciones entre Portugal y Castilla en la época de los descubrimientos y la expansión colonial, ed. Ana María Carabias Torres (Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, 1994), 298-299.
laying the basic institutional and ideological foundations of their imperium over those distant lands and peoples. According to the “Capitulations” agreed upon with Columbus at Santa Fé, the monarchs named him “Viceroy,” “Governor General,” and “Admiral,” in all the “islands and mainlands” which, “by the help of God, […] will be discovered and acquired by [his] pains and industry” during the voyage west toward Asia.151 The terms entitled Columbus to a tenth of all merchandise accrued in “pearls, precious stones, gold, silver, spices, and other things whatsoever,” and delegated him broad jurisdiction “to hear and determine all the suits and causes civil and criminal.”152 In the Capitulations, the monarchs made explicit their intention to settle, govern and exploit the lands economically, and provided a clear articulation of the religious political philosophy underpinning their sovereignty in the possessions they already ruled. The monarchs explained that they derived their sovereignty from God who, as “King over all Kings,” “governs and maintains them.”153 Kings serve as God’s “viceregents,” “set upon earth in the place of God to fulfill justice. So great is the authority of the power of kings, that all laws and rights are subject to their power, for they do not derive it from men, but from God, whose place they occupy in matters temporal.”154

When news of Columbus’ “discovery” of Caribbean islands reached Europe, official legitimation followed swiftly. In May 1493 the Valencia-born Pope Alexander VI issued the Inter cætera bulls of donation, which legitimized Spain’s conquest of the Americas in the name of Christianization and granted jurisdiction on the condition that the “barbarous nations” discovered “be overthrown and brought to the faith.” The bulls granted the “kings of Castile

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152 Ferdinand and Isabella, “Capitulations with Columbus,” 32.
153 Ibid. 29.
154 Ibid. 30.
and León” and their “heirs and successors,” “forever, […] full and free power, authority, and jurisdiction of every kind.”

They linked Spain’s overseas expansion to “the honor of God himself and the spread of Christian rule,” and thereby endowed it with a sacred mission “to instruct the [native] inhabitants and residents in the Catholic faith and train them in good morals.”

The Papal donation provided the first foundation of Spain’s claim to legitimate sovereignty in the New World, and imbued Spain’s imperial enterprise with divine ideological meaning.

In 1496, the same pope bestowed upon Ferdinand and Isabel the title, “the Most Catholic Monarchs,” in recognition of what many saw as their miraculous achievements in overthrowing Spain’s last Muslim dynasty, expelling the Jews, and opening up a new frontier for evangelization in America. His confidence inflated by these events, Ferdinand dispatched a letter with Columbus on his return voyage, addressed to the Taíno-Arawak Indians of Hispaniola which articulated in clear and aggressive terms the aims and justifications of Spain’s presence there. In a few succinct lines, it explained the basis of the Pope’s authority as a successor of St. Peter, God’s appointed leader on earth, and cited the Papal donation, which “gave these islands and mainland” to the Castilian monarchs, making them “lords and master of this land.”

Committed to affirming the legality of its sovereignty in the New World, the crown experimented with various drafts of this declaration to be read to newly encountered natives. The conquistador Alonso de Ojeda is reported to have read a similar document to indigenous peoples on the coast of present day Colombia in 1509, and three years later the eminent Spanish jurist, Juan de Palacios Rubios, penned a refined version,

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156 Ibid. 101.

157 “King Ferdinand’s Letter to the Arawaks” (ca. 1490).
known as the Requirement (Requerimiento). The Requirement reiterated the bases of Spanish dominion in the New World, citing the Papal donation, “required” that natives submit peacefully to Spanish political rule and religious instruction, and threatened extreme force should they refuse to comply. Its key effect was to provide Spaniards with a legal cover for just war by classifying any natives who rejected Spanish rule as rebellious vassals.

Celebration

By the early sixteenth century, authors across Portugal and the Spanish Monarchy, many under crown commission, were already developing a triumphalist discourse that hailed the exploits of their crown and country beyond Europe. Examples of this imperialist celebration took a range of forms from chronicles and treatises to epic poetry and visual iconography, including monuments and engravings in texts, as well as maps, globes and nautical charts and reports. All these discursive forms helped shape and substantiate visions of Iberia’s global imperium.

The genre of the imperial chronicle, while refashioned in the sixteenth century to hail the exploits of Iberian conquests overseas, did not arise as such sui generis. By the sixteenth century, there already existed in both Portugal and Spain established historiographical traditions of virtually hagiographic chronicling aimed at glorifying the character and deeds of their sovereign rulers both past and present. The Portuguese chronicler Fernão Lopes’ 1443,

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158 MacLachlan, Spain’s Empire in the New World, 31.
159 Several contemporaries, including some very influential authors, critiqued “official history” for its bias and distortion. The Genoese scholar, Girolamo Franchi di Conestaggio, for instance, described official historians as “commissioned to lie.” And the eminent sixteenth century Spanish humanist, Juan Luis Vives, compared official histories to legal briefs advocating a particular case, which, while not necessarily untruthful, presented a selective interpretation of facts and evidence. See Kagan, Clio and the Crown, 4-6. See also Hernando Sánchez, Las indias en la monarquía católica, and Diogo Ramada Curto, “A literatura e o império,” in História da expansão portuguesa, eds. Francisco Bethencourt and Kirti Chaudhuri, vol. 1 (Lisbon: Círculo de Leitores, 1998), 434-454.
Crónica d’El Rei D. João I, was one such example, as was João Alvares’, Crónica do Infante Santo D. Ferna
ndo, written the following decade.\textsuperscript{160} In 1450, Gomes Eanes de Zurara, who
succeeded Lopes as official chronicler after his appointment by King Alfonso V of Portugal
and soon emerged as the pioneering defender of Portuguese expansion in Africa, wrote his
own, Chronica del Rei D. Joam I, the third part of which recounted the Portuguese conquest of
Ceuta.\textsuperscript{161} Both Lopes and Zurara portrayed João as a messianic figure, seeking to endow his
kingship with divine legitimacy.\textsuperscript{162}

Chronicle writing on the great deeds of Iberian kings and princes persisted well into
the sixteenth century and beyond. In 1505, Duarte Galvão completed his, Crónica del rei D.
Afonso Henriques primeiro rei destes reinos de Portugal, and several decades on, in the mid-sixteenth
century, Afonso Brás de Albuquerque published his Comentários do grande Afonso de
Albuquerque, Capitão Geral que foi das Indias Orientais em tempo do muito poderoso rey D. Manuel.\textsuperscript{163}
In it, Brás de Albuquerque adapted the style to the overseas imperial context, and extended
his praise from the king to that of the king’s highest direct representative in India, who, not
coincidentally, happened to be the author’s father, Afonso de Albuquerque, the governor-
and captain-general of India from 1509 to 1515. Not only was it the hagiographic eulogy of a
man, but also of the Portuguese nation as a whole for its expansionary successes across
maritime Asia in the early sixteenth century.

\textsuperscript{160} João Álvares, Crónica do Infante Santo D. Ferna
ndo, que morreu em Fez… (Lisboa Occidental: Officina de Miguel
Rodrigues, 1730), available at the Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal [BNP hereafter]. The manuscript was
completed in 1451.
\textsuperscript{161} Gomes Eanes de Zurara, Chronica del Rei D. Joam I de boa memória. Terceira parte em que se contém a Tomada de
Ceuta (Lisbon: Antonio Álvares, 1644), available at the Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal (BNP). The manuscript
was completed in 1450.
\textsuperscript{162} Luis de Sousa Rebelo, “Language and Literature in the Portuguese Empire,” in Portuguese Oceanic Expansion,
1400-1800, eds. Francisco Bethencourt and Diogo Ramada Curto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2007), 358.
\textsuperscript{163} Afonso Brás de Albuquerque, Comentários do grande Afonso de Albuquerque, Capitão Geral que foi das Indias
Orientais em tempo do muito poderoso rey D. Manuel, edited by António Baião (Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade,
1922). The manuscript was completed in 1557.
Spanish writers had their own tradition of royal chronicling. Alonso de Santa Cruz completed his *Crónica del emperador Carlos V* in 1552.\textsuperscript{164} A few years prior, in 1545, the current crown-appointed official chronicler at the court of Charles V, Pedro de Mexía, published his *Historia imperial y cesarea*, which recounted the lives of various Roman – and Holy Roman – Emperors from Julius Caesar to Maximilian I, Charles’ grandfather and direct predecessor to the Holy Roman Imperial throne.\textsuperscript{165} More than simply eulogizing these rulers, in his note to the reader with which he opened the work, Mexía provided an eloquent epistemological justification of the philospohy and value of history. “The major part of our holy law and sacred scripture is history. […] [History] is the basis and foundation upon which everything else is sustained,” he wrote.\textsuperscript{166} “Because as Solomon says, there is no longer anything new under the sun, and all that is, has been, and what will be, will be, as in the past.” In trumpeting the preeminence of history over “the other arts and sciences,” Mexía claimed that “history comprehends all, and is practical,” that “only she [history] can live without the others, and none of them without her.”\textsuperscript{167} In more practical terms, he argued for the utility of recourse to history, including ancient history, in promoting good government: “Aristotle affirmed it to be very helpful to the public senates and municipalities, which […] in deliberating great issues and acts of war, primarily called on and consulted those men who were well-read and wise in the ancient histories.”\textsuperscript{168}

While tales of the valor and virtue of Iberian rulers enhanced perceptions of their persona, nautical charts and reports, geographical treatises, and maps and globes helped

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\textsuperscript{164} Alonso de Santa Cruz, *Crónica del emperador Carlos V* (Madrid: Impr. del Patronato de Huérfanos de Intendencia é Intervención Militares, 1920), originally completed in 1550-52, but was only published posthumously.

\textsuperscript{165} Pedro de Mexía, *Historia imperial y cesarea* (Antwerp: Martin Nutius, 1552), manuscript completed in 1545.

\textsuperscript{166} Mexía, *Historia imperial y cesarea*, from “Note to Reader.”

\textsuperscript{167} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{168} Ibid.
convey the vast spatial dimensions of their imperium. Álvaro Velho’s, *Roteiro da viagem que em descobrimento da India pelo Cabo da Boa Esperança fez dom Vasco da Gama em 1497*, combined geographical and nautical description of maritime Africa and Asia with a laudatory account of Da Gama’s exploits as the first European to reach India by sea. Written in 1538, João de Castro’s manuscript, the *Primeiro roteiro da costa da India, desde Goa ate Dio*, provided a similar treatment of the voyage of the Viceroy of India, Garcia de Noronha, and of Portuguese valor in the victory at Diu. And in his, *Roteiro em que se contem a viagem que fizeram os Portuguezes no anno de 1541, partindo da nobre cidade de Goa ate Soez*, although devoted primarily to “winds, seas, and ports,” the same author opened the work with exaggerated praise of Portuguese triumphs in the region, having won “so many cities there, [and] defeating the Ethiopian, Egyptian, and Arab peoples.”

If navigation guides as a particular genre were less popular in Spain, Spanish authors were nonetheless committed to documenting the rapidly accumulating geographical knowledge made possible by Iberian expansion. Two central texts in this tradition, and in the nascent discipline of geography, were Alonso de Santa Cruz’s, *Islario general de todas las islas del mundo*, and Juan López de Velasco’s, *Geografía y descripción universal de las Indias*, both written in the mid-sixteenth century. Although holding official positions as “cosmographers,” each was keenly aware that, in the wake of the first circumnavigation of the globe by Magellan’s

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171 João de Castro, *Roteiro em que se contem a viagem que fizeram os Portuguezes no anno de 1541, partindo da nobre cidade de Goa ate Soez, no anno de 1541* (Paris: Baudry, 1833). Later in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, Portuguese authors including Luís Teixeira, André da Mota, and António de Mariz Carneiro penned similar texts, but which also covered coastal Brazil and more easterly reaches of maritime Asia. See Luís Teixeira’s, *Roteiro de todos os sinais, conhecimentos, fundos, baixos, alturas, e derrotas que ha na costa do Brazil…* (1582-85); Aleixo da Mota’s, *Roteiro da navegação da carreira [sic] da India* (c.1621); and Antonio de Mariz Carneiro’s, *Regimento de pilotos, e roteiro das navegações da India Oriental* (1642).
172 Alonso de Santa Cruz’s, *Islario general de todas las islas del mundo* (Madrid: Impr. del Patronato de Huérfanos de Intendencia é Intervención Militares, 1918 [1560]), and Juan López de Velasco’s, *Geografía y descripción universal de las Indias* (Madrid: Fortanet, 1894 [completed 1571]).
crew in 1522, the world was now a finite space, as distinct from the broader universe, which had previously fallen within the domain of cosmography.

The study of the earth as a finite, bounded unit required its own science, “geography,” to properly comprehend its limits and complexity. While Santa Cruz’s work was ambitious in its attempt to cover all the islands of the world, Velasco’s was perhaps even more so, as it provided a geographical synthesis of “both Indies,” including the New World and Pacific as well as East Asia, the knowledge of which, it was clear, had been made possible in large part thanks to the efforts of Iberian explorers and missionaries. Velasco not only provided a detailed geographic and ethnographic description of the many lands and peoples beyond Europe over which the Spanish crown claimed sovereignty. He also, interestingly, discussed at length the government of those diverse possessions, known collectively as “the Indies.” With chapters on the Caribbean and mainland Spanish America, the book also contains sections on the Philippines, and territories beyond Spanish control, like Brazil, China, and even New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. Unfortunately for Velasco, however, the crown

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174 Headley, “Geography and Empire in the Late Renaissance,” 1128-1129.
deemed the work to contain sensitive and strategic information, blocked its publication, and reserved it for the exclusive use of the Council of Indies, “on account of the inconveniences that might arise,” wrote Philip II, “if the work circulates among many hands.”

Alongside navigation guides and geographical treatises, maps and globes also provided representations of the extent of Iberian expansion and, in many cases, of the spatial dimensions of Iberian imperium. Maps and nautical charts, although mostly guarded by the Spanish and Portuguese crowns to prevent them from being used by imperial competitors, were occasionally leaked or published inatlases and other works, making their way into the public sphere. The accumulation of knowledge contained in maps and charts was evidence of the Iberians’ voyages of “discovery” and conquest. And the practice of naming particular lands and seas was more than purely symbolic. It often expressed claims to territorial dominion, to one’s right as first discoverer, and bestowed maps and globes with very tangible legal and political power. In the 1570, *Theatrum Orbis Terrarum*, for instance, commonly regarded as the first modern world atlas, its creator, Abraham Ortelius, argued that there is no nation in all the world, “that has navigated more its seas, nor traversed its lands, than the natives of Spain.”

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175 Cited in Kagan, *Clio and the Crown*, 167. As a result, Velasco’s, *Geografía y descripción universal de las Indias*, was not published until 1894.
176 For an analysis that focuses on the centrality of cartography in Dutch expansion with attention to Iberian influences as well, see Kees Zandvliet, *Mapping for Money: Maps, Plans, and Topographic Paintings and their Role in Dutch Overseas Expansion during the 16th and 17th Centuries* (Amsterdam: De Bataafsche Leeuw, 1998).
Ortelius, a Flemish cartographer and subject of the Spanish crown had provided visual evidence not only of the vastness of the globe but also of the unprecedented reach of Spanish sovereignty. His 1588 Spanish edition of the work was dedicated to Philip II, “in whose dominion and government God [had] put the major part of all that inhabits the continents and islands of the earth.”

Globes represented the prime visual representation of Iberian claims to imperium and hegemony, this despite the fact that they did not possess the detail or accuracy of navigational charts or other more focused maps found in atlases. Coincidentally, the German geographer Martin Behaim produced the first known globe on the eve of Columbus’ voyage in 1492. And although not depicting the New World, it did contain representations of Asia and Africa, and notes on the Indian spice trade, one of the prime motivating factors behind

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178 Ibid.
both Spanish and Portuguese expansion. In negotiations over Spain and Portugal’s competing claims to the Moluccas, agents from both sides preferred the globe to two-dimensional maps as a means of better representing “the shape of the world” and of settling their dispute over the precise location of the anti-meridian separating the two Iberian hemispheres of conquest and navigation. Engravers and artists increasingly included globes in symbolic representations of Spain’s unprecedented power, and as early as 1495 the Portuguese king, Manuel I, incorporated the armillary sphere into his kingdom’s official royal iconography in order to convey the globality of Portuguese imperium as well.

But as Iberians moved out into the Atlantic, Indian, and eventually Pacific ocean worlds, as they discovered lands and peoples previously unknown to Europe, subjugated some and entered into relations of alliance or exchange with others, there soon emerged a new genre of historical writing which complemented the more traditional chronicle and the recent developments in cartography and nautical literature. And like the new works in geography, it also often reflected a profound curiosity in the rich tapestries of flora, fauna, and peoples that inhabited those newly encountered lands, which slowly yet profoundly challenged traditional, classical knowledge of cosmography, history, and other forms of human and natural science. Above all, this new literature contributed to enhancing the aura and prestige of the Iberian sovereigns. If at the turn of the fifteenth century Portugal

181 Ibid. 77.
and Spain were considered internally divided, relatively isolated kingdoms at the edge of Europe, by the sixteenth century each of their respective rulers were increasingly seen as reigning over composite empires that far outstretched the great empires of ancient Eurasia and had, for the first time in history, achieved truly global dimensions. Even if the authors of each individual work did not make this point explicit, the vast and ever growing body of Iberian literature on Africa, Asia and America, and on Spanish and Portuguese activities there, nonetheless came collectively to convey a sense that the Iberians were the undoubted pioneers in the fashioning of a truly global world and in the effort to bring that world under the cultural, religious, and political sway of Christian Europe.

Again, and due to the fact that they took first systematic initiative in overseas expansion, it was the Portuguese who gave birth to the narrative literature dedicated specifically to Iberian expansion beyond Europe. As was common, many of these works circulated as manuscripts only, some not published until centuries later, due to the fact that authorities often deemed them too controversial in their criticism of particular royal officials or members of the settler elite, for example. Authorities may also have suppressed their publication if judged to contain informative sensitive for strategic reasons. The first of these published works was Gomes Eanes de Zurara’s, *Chronica do Descobrimento e Conquista da Guiné*, completed in 1453. It remains one of the earliest and most detailed accounts of various sub-Saharan African societies inhabiting the westernmost region of the continent. Beyond simply providing ethnographic description, Zurara’s main objective was to justify and indeed exalt Portuguese claims and activities there, including the trade in gold and especially in slaves, as well as slave-raiding, an issue to which we return later. Duarte Pacheco Pereira’s,

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Esmeraldo de situ orbis, was another.\textsuperscript{184} Although not published until 1892, Pereira composed the work between 1505 and 1508, recounting his voyages along coastal Brazil, West Africa, and India, where he captained a ship in the fleet of Afonso de Albuquerque. Pereira emphasized his own religiosity and praised the heroism of the Portuguese in battle, such as that of the 1504 “defense of Cochin.” And in his detailed descriptions of diverse territories in Africa, Asia and Brazil, and of the sea routes which connected them, he lent eye-witness support to the priority of Portuguese navigators in the definitive “discovery of the Roundness of the earth, and of the sea,” as he wrote. Pereira referred to his sovereign as “Caesar Manuel,” in a rhetorical nod to the greatness of Portuguese power after the “discovery” and domination of so many distant lands and seas.\textsuperscript{185} Tomé Pires’, Suma Oriental, written between 1512 and 1515, extended the description of the world and of Portuguese expansion even further to encompass the Far East, including both the Spice Islands and China, where he led the first official European embassy, to the Ming Dynasty.\textsuperscript{186} In addition, in 1526, Antonio Pigafetta, a Venetian writer and explorer and member of Magellan’s crew, completed his, Relazione del Primo Viaggio Intorno Al Mondo, which provided the earliest firsthand account of the roundness of the world, made known through the efforts of a Portuguese navigator and his crew sailing for the Spanish crown.\textsuperscript{187}

Although the Portuguese took the lead in developing this literature, Spanish writers were not far behind. Curiously enough, the first such work by a Spaniard was not written in praise of his own countrymen’s efforts in Spanish-claimed territories, but instead in recognition of Portuguese successes in Asia. In 1512, Juan Agüero de Trasmiera, edited the

\textsuperscript{184} Sometimes translated as “On the places of the world.” See, Duarte Pacheco Pereira, Esmeraldo de situ orbis (London: Hakluyt Society, 1892).
\textsuperscript{185} Marcocci, A consciência de um império, 94.
\textsuperscript{187} Antonio Pigafetta, Relazione del Primo Viaggio Intorno Al Mondo (Venice: 1536).
eyewitness account of Martín Fernández de Figueroa, a fellow Spaniard, entitled, *Conquista de las Indias de Persia e Arabia que hizo la armada del rey don Manuel de Portugal*. As firsthand testimony, Férnandez de Figueroa’s account necessarily did not reach the broadness of knowledge or scope of synthesis of later historians, but is nonetheless significant as it anticipated by some four decades or more the famous works of Fernão Lopes Castanheda and João de Barros, as well as that of Brás de Albuquerque, mentioned above, all of which aimed specifically to praise Portuguese conquests in Asia. Equally significant, if Pigafetta’s work chronicled the efforts of a Portuguese (Magellan) in the service of Spain, Férnandez de Figueroa’s provided further evidence of the unofficial integration of the Iberian empires, as he dedicated nearly a third of his work to the toils of Pedro de Añaya, a fellow Castilian, in establishing and securing the Portuguese presence in Sofala, a key entrepot of gold trade in southeast Africa.

Then, between 1516 and 1530, the Milanese historian and official royal chronicler of Charles V, Pietro Martire d’Anghiera, debuted the first Spanish imperial history, his *Decadas de Orbe Novo*, in which he recounted Spaniards’ early explorations and conquests throughout the circum-Caribbean and Pacific coasts of America, and Magellan’s global circumnavigation under Spanish authority. Anghiera marveled at the great potential of this process and its implications for the faith: “Oh God: how large and far shall our posterity see the Christian Religion extended?” Anghiera appealed to his young prince, the soon-to-be Charles V, that he “embrace this new world,” so that, “all the world shall be under your obeyance.” The divine providence, from the time He first created the world,” wrote Anghiera in the most

190 Anglería, *Decadas de Orbe Novo*, 105 and 63, respectively.
providential terms, “has reserved unto this day the knowledge of the great and large Ocean sea […] unto you (most mighty Prince).”

Around the same time Anghiera was at work, Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo y Valdés composed his own comprehensive, *Historia general y natural de las Indias*, which presented a providential vision Spain’s mission in the New World. “It was not without cause that Jesus Christ illuminated the heart of Caesar to entrust his occidental empire of the Indies to Your Revered Lordship,” wrote Oviedo, where “[Your Majesty] commands and governs with such broad power and integrity.” Having claimed sovereignty over the “strange and remote regions” of the New World, he saw Spain’s sixteenth century empire as far surpassing that of the ancient Greeks, having expanded “so many thousands of leagues farther than ever did Hercules.” In his 1534, *Verdadera relación de la conquista del Perú*, Francisco de Jerez praised the great heroism of his countrymen in the conquest of South America and, like Oviedo, thought his nation deserved a place among, and indeed ahead, of all the great empires of antiquity. “Because if the Romans subjugated so many provinces, it was […] in lands known, and well-supplied [with] paid captains and armies,” wrote Jerez. But “our Spaniards,” he continued, were “few in number, [and] never went together but with 200 or 300, and sometimes 100 and even less.”

At the same time, Portuguese writers were developing their own proud tradition of imperial chronicling, which mirrored that of the Spaniards. Damião de Góis’ 1539, *Comentarii

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191 Anglería, *Decadas de Orbe Nvo*, 63.
192 Published in parts in the sixteenth century, the complete work was not published until the nineteenth century: Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo y Valdés, *Historia general y natural de las Indias*, ed. José Amador de los Ríos (Madrid: Real Academia de la Historia, 1851-1855).
193 Oviedo y Valdés, *Historia general y natural de las Indias*, ex-cxi.
196 Ibid.
rerum gestarum in India citra Gangem a Lusitanis anno 1538, for instance, written in Latin, praised the Portuguese for spreading Christianity in Asia. And the 1550s saw the beginning and partial publication of masterpieces by three foundational chroniclers of Portuguese Asian imperium: Fernão Lopes de Castanheda, Gaspar Correia, and João de Barros. In his, *História do descobrimento e conquista da Índia pelos Portugueses*, written from 1551 to 1561, Castanheda documented Portuguese conquests all the way from southeast Africa across the Indian Ocean world to the Spice Islands and China. The frontispiece to the first volume of Castanheda’s work lists several of the “miraculous feats” of the Portuguese across Africa and Asia in order to convey a sense of the globality of those deeds. And in his prologue to volume eight he repeated his sovereign’s rhetorical title: “King of Portugal and of the Algarves, of the Sea near and far in Africa, Lord of Guinea, and of the Conquest, Navigation and Commerce of Ethiopia, Persia, Arabia and India.”

197 Damião de Góis, *Comentarii rerum gestarum in India citra Gangem a Lusitanis anno 1538* (Louvain: Rutgerus Rescius, 1539).
Fernão Lopes de Castanheda, *História do descobrimento e conquista da Índia pelos Portugueses* (Coimbra: 1552), frontispiece to book 1 and prologue to book 8

Castanheda further emphasized the global, maritime orientation of Portugal’s Asian imperium, distinguishing it from the more terrestrial empires of the Greeks and Romans.

“India was made by sea and by our captain[s],” he wrote, “[who] beginning from the end of the Occident [i.e. Portugal] and sailing to the Orient without seeing more than water and sky, [circled] all of the sphere, something never done by mortals, nor imagined to be done.” Having braved the “fury and impetuosity of the winds” and seas, “they saw in India and other places amazing and cruel battles with the most ferocious people.”

Beyond praising the divine aura of the king himself, Castanheda portrayed Da Gama’s voyage as providential in order to convey the early idea that Portugal’s burgeoning overseas empire was part of God’s will as well.

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199 Ibid.
If Gaspar Correia’s work, *Lendas da Índia*, was seemingly more factual and straightforward, its sweeping descriptions of Portuguese successes and tribulations across the Indian Ocean world nonetheless contributed to an impressive view of the breadth of Portugal’s Asian imperium.  

João de Barros’ work, however, while similarly wide-ranging in its factual description, also contained numerous examples of explicit praise of the empire.  

For Barros, who began publishing his multivolume work, *Décadas da Asia*, in 1552, Portugal, in its Asian enterprise, had taken upon “its shoulders […] a world […] that could make it bow with the great weight of the land, the sea, the wind, and the ardor of Sun […] and, […] more significant than these elements, the variety of the many people that inhabit it.” He presented Portuguese expansion within a larger, longer-term historical drama dominated by the struggle against Islam, and thereby justified Portuguese conquests in the East in the name of the broader crusade against the infidel.  

Barros went on to suggest that even if Portuguese power might slowly erode over time given the enormous challenge of maintaining such a vast Asian imperium, certain key Portuguese cultural elements would persist. Echoing the maxim that “language [was] the companion of empire,” articulated over half a century earlier by the eminent Spanish scholar and grammarian, Antonio de Nebrija, Barros exclaimed that, no glory in history could compare to the fact that “Ethiopians, Persians, Indians […] are now learning our [Portuguese] language.”  

And in dividing the work into ten-year periods, or *décadas*, Barros mimicked the Roman historian Livy in order to

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201 Gaspar Correia, *Lendas da Índia*, edited by Rodrigo José de Lima Felner (Lisbon: Typographia da Academia Real das Sciencias, 1858-1866 [1556]).  
202 João de Barros, *Década Primeira da Asia* (Lisbon: Iorge Rodriguez, 1628 [1552]).  
203 Quoted in Marcocci, *A consciência de um império*, 15. See João de Barros, *Década Primeira da Asia* (Lisbon: Iorge Rodriguez, 1628 [1552]).  
convey a sense of the Portuguese as heirs to a glorious tradition stretching back to ancient Rome.206

Then, in 1572, the great Portuguese poet, Luís Vaz de Camões, who had served as a soldier in both Africa and Asia, further amplified these sentiments by celebrating the explorations, voyages, and conquests of his compatriots in one of the most influential texts of the early modern period, Os Lusíadas [the Lusiads].207 In the form of epic poetry, it was an ode to the history of his Portuguese homeland, to the discoveries, the expansion of Christianity, and the actions of Vasco de Gama and Magellan, all of which portrayed Portugal as predestined to accomplish great deeds and impose its law throughout the world.208 Although not withholding certain critiques and preoccupations about the present and future state of the empire, Camões nonetheless rhapsodized that, “Heaven is determined to make Lisbon a new Rome,” reinforcing the idea that Portugal’s ever expanding imperium was a reflection of divine providence and heir to that of the Romans.209

Those decades, the 1550s to the 1570s, saw the steady maturation of Spanish imperial chronicling as well. Francisco López de Gómara, commissioned by Hernán Cortés to write his own, Historia General de las Indias, opened his work with the grandiose exclamation that, “the greatest event since the creation of the world, apart from the incarnation and death of the creator himself, is the discovery of the Indies.”210 Gómara lauded his countrymen for undertaking the duties of preaching and converting with as much

207 Luis de Camões, Os Lusíadas (Lisbon: Antonio Gonçalvez, 1572).
208 Ibid.
209 Ibid., canto vi, 7.
210 Francisco López de Gómara, Hispania Victrix: Primera y Segunda Parte de la Historia General de las Indias, con] todo el descubrimiento, y cosas notables que han acaecido desde que se ganaron hasta el año de 1551, con la conquista de Mexico, y de la nueva España (Medina del Campo: Guillermo de Millis, 1553), quoted in Ponsen and Feros, “The Early Modern Iberian Empires.”
zeal as in “discovering and conquering.” Alluding to the combination of temporal and ecclesiastical power that the king held over the Indies, he referred to his sovereign as “absolute lord” there. Thanks to the collective efforts of Spaniards across the empire, Gómara claimed that, “no nation has extended as much as the Spanish its customs, its language, and its weapons, nor ventured as far by sea and by land.” The frontispiece to Gómara’s work displayed the Pillars of Hercules bearing the words “Plus Ultra,” (“Farther Beyond”), symbolizing the expansionary ambition of Charles V.

Figure 5
Francisco López de Gómara, *Hispania Victrix* (Medina del Campo, 1553), frontispiece

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214 Spain’s Habsburg rulers subsequently adopted this motto from Charles and it remains on Spain’s modern national flag.
Finally, two works of particular significance were Antonio Galvão’s 1563, *Tratado dos Descobrimentos, antigos, e modernos, feitos até a Era de 1550*, and Bernardino de Escalante’s 1577, *Discurso de la navegación que los portugueses hazen a los reinos y provincias del oriente, y de la noticia que se tiene del reino de China*. Alongside the work of Fernández de Figueroa, these were noteworthy as early exceptions to the dominant focus of authors on the discoveries and conquests of their own countrymen, reflecting the interest of readers in the global expansions of their Iberian neighbors across the peninsular divide. Escalante, from the northern Spanish region of Cantabria, opened his book praising the “valor and determination” of his fellow Spaniards for having traversed virtually all of the “seas, islands and kingdoms,” in all the “entire roundness of the world.” The prime focus of the work, however, was the exploits of Portuguese expansion in North and West Africa, India, Brazil, Southeast Asia, and China. Galvão, for his part, produced the first integrated history of Spanish and Portuguese conquest and imperium. Within the context of a broader history of imperial expansion over the *longue durée*, beginning with the ancient Greeks and Phoenicians, he brought the story up to the sixteenth century, presenting “the discoveries of the Spaniards in the Antilles and Indies” as a continuation of those of the Portuguese in maritime Africa and Asia.

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215 António Galvão, *Tratado dos Descobrimentos, antigos, e modernos, feitos até a Era de 1550* (Lisbon: João da Barreira, 1563); and Bernardo de Escalante, *Discurso de la navegación que los portugueses hazen a los reinos y provincias del oriente, y de la noticia que se tiene del reino de China* (Sevilla, 1577).

Controversy

Yet despite the celebratory literary trends in Portugal and Spain, already in the first years of expansion this triumphalism was accompanied by sharp debates about the justness of the expansion, about the institutions of imperial rule and subjugation of native peoples, and about the titles by which both monarchies justified their dominion beyond Europe. The main issues under scrutiny also reflected the general models the two respective empires came to adopt. While Spanish debates revolved around territorial title to the Americas and the abuse of subjected indigenous populations, debates over Portuguese imperium centered primarily on the African slave trade and on exclusive control over navigation routes and the distribution of Asian spices. Nevertheless, Portuguese and Spanish jurists, humanists and theologians all drew from a common juridical-theological discourse in justifying their imperial enterprises.

The controversy was perhaps most intense when its focus was the abuse of the natives. In 1501, in an effort to consolidate control over the burgeoning colony of Hispaniola, the crown dispatched a new governor, Nicolás de Ovando, whose main priority was to introduce a system of forced indigenous labor to sustain the colony and make it profitable. The system soon became known as encomienda, after a similarly named institution from the reconquista, which assigned newly conquered Muslim villages to Spanish Military Orders. It differed in its New World adaptation in that it referred not to grants of lands or villages as it had in Spain, but to the crown’s allocation of forced native labor to Spanish settlers, in recognition of their efforts in bringing new indigenous societies and territories.

217 Ponsen and Feros, “The Early Modern Iberian Empires.”
under Spanish control. In return, the encomendero (the recipient of encomienda) was charged with defending the land and instructing his native charges in Catholicism and the ways of Spanish civilization. The encomienda became one of the most important institutions of Spanish imperial rule, especially when transferred to mainland America. But, as James Lockhart has explained, it also became the focus of intense scrutiny as recipients of these grants, “leaping over technicalities, made their encomiendas the bases of great estates even if they did not legally own the land,” and thereby slowly came to threaten royal sovereignty in the New World with the rise of a local elite that was dangerously autonomous from the crown’s point of view. More immediately, the institution provoked penetrating criticism since many viewed abusive encomenderos as the main cause of the alarmingly precipitous decline of native populations across the New World.

In 1511, Antonio de Montesinos, a Dominican priest in Hispaniola, was the first to publicly denounce the natives’ harsh treatment at the hands of rapacious settlers. “Tell me, what right have you to enslave them?” he decried in a fiery sermon. “What authority did you use to make war against them who lived at peace on their territories? […] And why don’t you look after their spiritual health, so that they should come to know God? […] Aren’t they human beings? Have they no rational soul?” In these brief lines, Montesinos defined the basic terms of a debate that would rattle Spain’s imperial conscience for the next four decades.

Bartolomé de las Casas, also a Dominican, a former encomendero himself who had been converted by Montesinos, soon catalogued the numerous crimes committed against

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Native Americans. His, *Brevíssima Relación de la Destrucción de las Indias*, written in the 1540s and first published in 1552 although without license, provided the first systematic account of the horrors of the conquest, and of the exploitative colonial regime which arose in its wake.\(^{221}\) In it, Las Casas catalogued the crimes committed by Spaniards in each of the regions conquered until that time: “On the mainland, we know for sure that our fellow-countrymen have, through their cruelty and wickedness, depopulated and laid waste an area which once boasted more than ten kingdoms. The whole region, once teeming with human beings, is now deserted. […] Among these gentle sheep,” he wrote, “the Spaniards appeared […] like famished wolves, and tigers, and lions,” killing everybody and destroying everything.\(^{222}\)

In 1536 Pope Paul III declared that the Indians were fully human, and in 1542 the Spanish ruler officially rescinded all previous decrees that allowed the enslavement of Indians. Henceforth only specific Indian populations could be legitimately enslaved—those designated as savages or barbarians, but in reality all those who resisted Spanish domination—and in later decades even these distinctions were abolished in favor of full freedom for all natives. That same year the movement spearheaded by Las Casas succeeded in pressuring the crown to issue the so-called “New Laws,” a sweeping set of reforms aimed at protecting the natives from abusive settlers and abolishing the *encomienda* altogether within a generation. Several authors did rise to support the *encomenderos*, however. The most prominent was Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda.\(^{223}\) Drawing primarily on Aristotelian philosophy, in his 1547 *Demócra tes Alter*, written in Latin, Sepúlveda argued that Spaniards were “natural

\(^{221}\) Bartolomé de las Casas, *Brevíssima Relación de la Destrucción de las Indias* (Seville: Sebastián Trugillo, 1552).

\(^{222}\) Bartolomé de las Casas, *Brevíssima relación de la destrucción de las Indias* (Buenos Aires: Stockcero, 2006 [1552]).

\(^{223}\) Fray Toribio de Motolinía was another. Writing a decade or so later, Motolinía, among the first Franciscans in America, was a staunch defender of the *encomenderos* and a fierce opponent of Las Casas.
masters,” whereas the natives, as subhuman “barbarians,” were “natural slaves.” And in 1550 Charles V convened a public debate on the issue between Las Casas and Sepúlveda, and decreed that all conquests cease until a ruling was made on the justness of Spanish conduct in America. Both Las Casas and Sepúlveda were forbidden from publishing or voicing their arguments, but the fact that the 1573, Ordenanzas de descubrimientos, nueva población y pacificación de las Indias, upheld the crown’s long-professed intention to protect Native Americans shows that Las Casas and his camp had effectively prevailed. The 1573 Ordenanzas, like the 1513 Leyes de Burgos and the 1542 Leyes Nuevas, while aiming to shield Native Americans from mistreatment and thereby bolster the monarchy’s claim to moral authority, also sought to curb the rise of an autonomous settler elite, which threatened the primacy of crown power in the New World. Settler abuse of Native Americans persisted across space and time, however. Intense, often violent opposition from settlers in Peru and Mexico compelled royal officials to rescind, delay or soften several of these laws’ key provisions. The series of laws and decrees failed to effectively eliminate such abuse, but it did represent a systematic effort by the crown to consolidate its position as a benevolent moral authority among both its own subjects and imperial competitors.

If Portuguese expansion elicited less controversy in the beginning, part of the reason was that, unlike in Spanish America, many Portuguese conquests in Africa and Asia were directed against local peoples that were either Muslim or were considered so barbarous that,

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as Zurara first argued, their conquest and enslavement was easily justified in the name of conversion and civilization. Zurara began his, *Chronica do Descobrimento e Conquista da Guiné*, completed in 1453, with a description of the motivations compelling Prince Henry the Navigator to sponsor Portugal’s early expansion.\footnote{Gomes Eanes de Zurara, *Chronica do Descobrimento e Conquista da Guiné* (Paris: J. P. Aillaud, 1841 [originally published in 1453]).} First was Henry’s “zeal for the service of God,” which he sought to achieve through “increasing the faith” through conversion and establishing contact with lost Christian princes in Africa.\footnote{Zurara, *Chronica do Descobrimento e Conquista da Guiné*, ch.7, 27.} In addition, there were more material inspirations, including the search for commercial opportunities on the continent, and more strategic ones, like the goal of ascertaining the reach and strength of Muslim power in sub-Saharan Africa. Finally, Zurara listed above all the merit of discovery for its own sake, guided by “heavenly” forces in “seeking out things that were hidden by other men and secret.”\footnote{Ibid.}

Among Portugal’s chief activities in Africa, however, was the procurement of slaves. Despite seeing these Africans as living in a state of barbarism, Zurara understood this as temporary, and moved beyond the Aristotelian theory of natural slavery in implicitly acknowledging their humanity and arguing that through baptism and conversion their souls might be saved.\footnote{Marcocci, *A consciência de um império*, 53-54.} He provided a vivid if wrenching account of the sale of African slaves upon disembarkation in Portugal, describing the captives with “faces bathed in tears, […] groaning dolorously,” being torn apart “parents from children, husbands from wives, siblings from siblings,” making “lamentations in the manner of a dirge.” “And though we could not understand the words of their language,” he continued, “the sounds of it right well
accorded with the measure of their sadness.” Yet, despite these tragic scenes, and the regrettable horrors of slavery that Zurara acknowledged, he nonetheless accepted, foreshadowing the arguments of apologists of African slavery for centuries to come, that for these “innocent souls” the punishment of slavery while on earth was nonetheless justified by their baptism and conversion, which ensured the liberation of their souls in the afterlife.

Zurara’s views were widely shared among contemporaries, and despite the persistence of Portuguese slaving activities in Africa and the expansion of that traffic to America, Asia, and Europe, roughly a century passed before the publication of works openly critical of the practice, all of which couched the question of slavery within larger discussions about just war and commerce. Even Bartolomé de las Casas, so renowned for his tireless advocacy against the plight of Native Americans, continued to sanction African slavery as a necessary evil until relatively late in his life. The first work directly critical of the practice appeared in 1555, with publication of the *Arte da Guerra no Mar*, by the Portuguese Dominican, grammarian, and prolific author on range of subjects, Fernão de Oliveira. If Oliveira’s prime focus in the work was naval warfare, he nonetheless dedicated substantial discussion to African slavery, which he saw as not only immoral but also illicit. Although accepting the legality of enslaving Muslims (who by nature of their religion in theory had knowledge of and therefore had rejected Christianity), he nonetheless decried African slavery, tying it to the question of just war. For this reason, he wrote, “taking lands, [and] capturing peoples that did not even blaspheme Christ, is manifest tyranny.” Even more scathing was that, as Oliveira saw it, the Portuguese were the very “inventors of such bad

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230 Zurara, *Chronica do Descobrimento e Conquista da Guiné*, ch. 25, 80-83
231 Ibid., ch. 2, 6.
233 Fernão de Oliveira, *Arte da Guerra no Mar* (Coimbra: João Alvares, 1555), part 1, ch. 4, 14v.
trade,” and had created a demand for it on an unprecedented scale. “If there were no buyers [a reference to the Portuguese],” he reasoned, “there would be no sellers, no thieves that robbed to sell.” Moreover, he decried as tragically disingenuous the argument of Zurara and others that maintaining them in slavery was justified by the act of “making them Christians, and […] delivering them from savagery” with the claim that “their souls are worth more than their service.”

A decade and a half later, in his 1571, *Summa de Tratos y Contratos*, the Andalucian Dominican Tomás de Mercado criticized the unjust violence through which the Portuguese crown obtained its “lordship, empire, and authority” in West Africa, and protested uniquely that the Iberians’ slaving activities contributed gravely to the social and political instability in the African regions where the slaves were procured. He concluded by censuring the hypocrisy of his co-religionists for their own barbarity toward enslaved Africans. “After frightening ourselves with the cruelty the Turks use with Christian captives, putting them by night in their dungeons,” he wrote, Christian merchants “treat these blacks much worse, who are already among the faithful, because they were already baptized on the shore at the time of their embarkation.”

Just two years later, the Spanish historian and jurist of the School of Salamanca, Bartolomé Albornoz, published his, *Arte de los contratos*, which presented one of the toughest attacks yet on how Europeans obtained slaves. He censured as “manifest robbery,” against “conscience” and “all natural and divine law,” the practice of slave raiding undertaken by certain Portuguese in West Africa since it was a violation of the principles of just war “to

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234 Ibid., part 1, ch. 4, 14v-15r.
235 Tomás de Mercado, *Summa de Tratos y Contratos* (Sevilla: Fernando Díaz, 1587 [1571]). For an extended discussion of Mercado’s work, see Marcocci, *A consciência de um império*, 417-424.
236 Marcocci, *A consciência de um império*, 422-424.
enter into the land of another kingdom without authority [and] anger those who had not angered one first, and even more so to deprive them of their liberty and place them in servitude, which is equal to death."\textsuperscript{238}

Although the debates among the Portuguese over expansion were not as intense or public, and in general did not provoke an institutional response as profound as that in the Spanish case, they did elicit the creation in 1532 of the \textit{Mesa da Consciência}, its aim being “to resolve and settle any possible conflict between secular power and moral theology.”\textsuperscript{239} In his recent work on the Portuguese imperial conscience, Giuseppe Marcocci has demonstrated how, alongside references to the papal donation and legitimations of just war against infidels, the theologians assembled in the \textit{Mesa da Consciência} came to play the important role of substantiating Portuguese claims to dominion beyond Europe, in particular by supporting the crown in jurisdictional and theological disputes with the papacy in Rome.\textsuperscript{240} This continued until the Spanish Habsburgs stripped the effective power and influence of that body after the incorporation of Portugal within the monarchy in the late sixteenth century.

The most prominent of all the debates over Iberian imperium was the so-called “Controversy of the Indies,” centered on Spain’s lawful title to the Americas. Throughout the sixteenth century humanists writing in the celebratory tradition had frequently justified Spanish sovereignty in America on religious and historical grounds. Oviedo, for instance, cited the papal donation and, in an effort to provide a longer term historical basis for Spain’s claim on the basis of first discovery, claimed that mythical sailors had reached the Caribbean

\textsuperscript{238} Ibid., book 2, 130r.
\textsuperscript{239} Marcocci, “Conscience and Empire,” 477.
\textsuperscript{240} Marcocci, “Conscience and Empire.”
Antilles from ancient pre-Roman Hispania. Gómara, commissioned by Hernán Cortés to write his own, *Historia general de las Indias*, cited the more recent past in glorifying Spain’s religious imperial mission and portrayed Spaniards’ efforts in the New World as a continuation of those in the Old. They “began the conquest of the Indies having completed that of the Moors,” he wrote, “because the Spaniards always warred against infidels.” Gómara, like Oviedo, also invoked papal donation as a basis of legitimacy, and in his recounting of the invasion of Mexico told of miraculous interventions by Spain’s patron saint Santiago in the battles of Cintla and Tabasco to convey the sense that God had preordained the “conquest.” The idea of willful *translatio imperii* of indigenous empires to Spanish rule was another motif mobilized with increasing regularity to complement claims based on papal donation and divine providence. Gómara, for instance, echoed Cortés in describing the voluntary relinquishing of the Aztec throne by Montezuma in favor of Charles V. In America itself, municipal and royal officials in the third quarter of the sixteenth century also sought to substantiate Spain’s claim to lawful dominion in the Indies by sponsoring early histories of the conquest. Francisco Cervantes de Salazar’s, *Crónica de la Nueva España*, and Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa’s, *Historia de los Incas*, commissioned respectively by the City of Mexico and the Viceroy of Peru, Francisco de Toledo, both supported Spain’s claim to legitimate dominion of the Amerindians, citing the tyranny and

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242 Francisco López de Gómara, *Historia General de las Indias* (Medina del Campo: Guillermo de Millis, 1553). Full title: *Hispania Victrix: Primera y Segunda Parte de la Historia General de las Indias con todo el descubrimiento, y cosas notables que han acaecido desde que se ganaron hasta el año de 1551, con la conquista de Mexico, y de la nueva España*.
243 Ibid., 3r.
244 Alberto Pérez-Amador Adam, *De legitimatione imperii Indiae Occidentalis: La vindicación de la empresa Americana* (Madrid: Iberoamericana, 2011), 260.
245 Alongside that of Mexico, the conquest of Peru elicited a similar outpouring of laudatory discourse celebrating that event. The *Verdadera relación de la conquista del Perú*, (Seville: Bartolomé Pérez, 1534), by Pizarro’s personal secretary, Francisco de Jerez, was one example. In his 1553, *Parte primera de la chronica del Perú* (Seville), Pedro Cieza de León portrayed the monarchy as a civilizing force. And two years later, in the, *Historia del descubrimiento y conquista del Perú* (Amberes, 1555), Agustín de Zárate provided his own laudatory interpretation of the event.
246 López de Gómara, *Historia general de las Indias*, 53v-54r.
barbarity of the native rulers and the alleged original consent of those newly conquered peoples.247

When tackled by theologians, however, the question of Spain’s title to the Indies enjoyed a raised level of sophistication, and of polemic. In 1534, in a famous lecture at the University of Salamanca, the eminent theologian, Domingo de Soto, when asking himself by what right Spain held such title, answered flatly: “In truth, I do not know.”248 That same year, Francisco de Vitoria, another leading theologian and colleague of De Soto’s at Salamanca, forcefully denied the Pope’s authority in secular affairs. Although possessing authority in the spiritual world, he argued, “the Pope is not civil or temporal master of the whole world in the proper meaning of ‘dominion’ and ‘civil power,’” so the rights he awarded Castile in the Inter cætera bull were null and void.249 He argued further that Castile’s seizure of American territory was unlawful because the natives, as rational beings by nature, had held it as legitimate owners. “Even if the Emperor [Charles V] were the lord of the world,” which he was not, Vitoria asserted, “he could not on that account occupy the lands of the barbarians, or depose their masters and set up new ones, or impose taxes on them.”250

Yet, despite his penetrating critique of the prevailing theories of Spain’s title to the Americas, Vitoria did not categorically reject such a title. Drawing on theories from natural law he argued that Spanish war against Native Americans and the seizure of their territory would be considered just and legitimate if the natives’ had impeded Spaniards’ natural right to travel, trade and preach the gospel in their lands. He also recognized that “Indian

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247 Both circulated as manuscripts only throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Francisco Cervantes de Salazar’s, Crónica de la Nueva España (Madrid: Hispanic Society of America, 1914), although written in the 1560s or 1570s, was not published until the nineteenth century. Likewise, Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa’s, Historia de los Incas (Barcelona: Miraguano, 2001), although completed and first read publicly in early 1572, remained unpublished for centuries. See MacLachlan, Spain’s Empire in the New World, xii.


250 Ibid., question 2, article 1, 258.
aborigines could have come under the sway of the Spaniards through true and voluntary election [choice],” or by a title of alliance or friendship. On this point, however, Vitoria forcefully denounced as legal fiction the claims of Cortés, Pizarro and several humanists, including López de Gómara, that the Aztec and Inca empires were transferred to Charles V through wilfull acts of *translatio imperii*.

Melchor Cano, also a Dominican theologian and a student of Vitoria, took the argument a step further. Although according to the law of nations, travelers and traders were permitted free passage in foreign lands, the Spaniards had arrived to the New World as neither, but instead as conquerors. He accepted Spanish claims based on the right to preach and defend the innocent, but argued that these were not sufficient to confer property rights. Therefore, as Anthony Pagden has explained, Cano stressed that even if the Spanish crown could claim political sovereignty in America, it did not possess dominion over the land or subsoil any more than it did in any of the monarchy’s constituent kingdoms in Europe, like Naples or Aragon.

Just one year after the early lectures of De Soto and Vitoria, however, the Franciscan bishop of Michoacán in New Spain, Vasco de Quiroga, produced his treatise, *Información en Derecho*, which addressed the question in remarkably similar terms but arrived at an altogether distinct conclusion. Laying the groundwork for the pro-encomendero discourses that Sepúlveda and Toribio de Motolinía would articulate in subsequent decades, Quiroga argued that because Indians were not civilized, their politics were not legitimate and thus could not

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251 Ibid., question 3, article 6, 288; and question 3, article 7, 289.
253 This treatise was never published, although the manuscript was widely read. See Anthony Pagden, *Spanish Imperialism and the Political Imagination* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 25-27, for discussion of Quiroga. See also Hernando Sánchez, *Las indias en la monarquía católica*, 58.
hold legal dominion over the land. When the Spaniards arrived in America, therefore, regardless of whether they had arrived there initially as conquerors or as innocuous traders and travelers, that land was, according to Quiroga, legally unoccupied and therefore justly seized by Spain, the first civil polity to claim legitimate dominion there.

Even Las Casas, the sensational yet eminently influential critic of *encomendero* abuse, did not categorically reject Spain’s right to rule the New World. He did warn that the crown could lose its legitimate title to sovereignty should abuses persist. But his enduring, underlying faith in the monarchy’s ability to curb settlers’ violent exploitation of the native population ultimately served to legitimize Spanish royal authority in America.

The first three quarters of the sixteenth century saw the development of a range of discourses aimed at celebrating and debating Iberian imperium. Despite fraught controversy over particular issues, chronicles, natural and ethnographical histories, geographical, legal and political treatises, and a range of visual iconography coalesced to define an increasingly specific set of theories and practices to document discoveries, legitimate methods of expansion and conquest, justify titles to sovereignty, and defend claims to territorial dominion and occupation. The period also saw the consolidation of the idea of the Iberians as the joint defenders of Christendom and the prime agents in the common mission of spreading the gospel beyond Europe. Importantly, the frontiers for evangelization and for the expansion of temporal imperial rule, while still vast, were no longer infinite or universal. For the first time, the limits of the earth had been established and, having divided the globe into two separate but complementary hemispheres of exploration and conquest, the Iberians now set to the task of consolidating civil and ecclesiastical rule within their respective dominions.
Alongside debates over the legality and morality of Iberian imperium, which persisted well into the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the purely celebratory discourse of empire continued to develop as well. This imperial celebration reached a new level of sophistication and clarity when the Iberian crowns and their empires were united, from 1580 to 1640, under the singular sovereignty of Philip II.\footnote{Philip II of Spain, also known as Philip I of Portugal.} This resulted both from the fact that during those six decades Iberian explorers discovered numerous new territories and peoples, bringing several under their rule, as well as from the heightened integration of the two empires, a phenomenon reflected clearly in the writings and representations of a range of Iberian authors and artists of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Enthusiasm for Iberian imperium reached crescendo in the immediate wake of Iberian union. Hardly a coincidence, two separate Spanish translations of Os Lusíadas were published that same year, 1580.\footnote{Luys de Camões, Las Lusiadas de Layz de Camoes; traduzidos en octaua rima castellana por Benito Caldera, residente en Corte ... (Alcalá de Henares: Juan Gracián, 1580); and Luys de Camões, La Lusiada de el famoso poeta Layz de Camões; traduzida en verso castellano de portugues por ... Luys Gomez Tapia (Salamanca: Ioan Perier, 1580). Both editions are available at the Biblioteca Nacional de España.} Camões’ work enjoyed rapid popularity among Spaniards as well, many of which viewed it as a celebration not only of Portuguese, but of broader Iberian accomplishments in extending Christendom.\footnote{Rebelo, “Language and Literature in the Portuguese Empire,” 370-371.}

The famous 1583 medallion emblazoned with the phrase, *Non Sufficit Orbis* (“The World is not Enough”), was another example of this imperial celebration.
It memorialized the events of 1580, showing Philip “on one side and a globe surmounted by a horse on the other [over the year, 1580], together with the boast—originally dedicated to Alexander the Great—Non Sufficit Orbis (The World is Not Enough).”\(^{257}\) Such medals were often minted to commemorate important events in the history of a kingdom or nation and were generally not intended to be a medium of payment, meaning that their circulation tended to be limited to the nobility and moneyed merchant elite.\(^{258}\) For Louis Marin, perhaps more potent than any other visual or verbal-textual form, “the medal is perfect representation.”\(^{259}\) Its imprint – the monarch’s effigy or emblem, and his name and title – is, for him, not only a trace or sign, but “an index that gives to the marked object its own potential, that makes of it an efficacious sign, and very precisely a power.”\(^{260}\) It is “a representation-power in the primitive sense that—carrying in its matter (and not on its surface

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\(^{259}\) Louis Marin, *Portrait of the King*, translated by Martha M. Houle (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1988), 126.

\(^{260}\) Ibid. 127.
like layers of paint or traces of ink) by imprint, engraving, and inscription the mark of a
sovereign authority, indicating by that the legitimate presence of that authority and
authorizing that authority— […] it is in itself truth and law.”

In addition to projecting a discourse of global power, the medal is unique among
contemporary representations of 1580 in that it contained no reference to religion and thus
ought not be misconstrued as promoting a “messianic” vision. Rather than referencing
religion, the medal’s prominent text was an adoption of Alexander the Great’s famous
shibboleth, *Non Sufficit Orbis*, which, since antiquity, defined the imperial quest for universal
government under a single ruler. Even if the medal did not see wide circulation, its
inscription did nonetheless become incorporated within the official heraldry of Philip II after
his accession to the Portuguese throne.  

![Figure 7](image)

*Figure 7*

*Símbolos de España*, edited by Faustino Menéndez Pidal y Navascués, Hugo O’Donnell, and
Begoña Lolo, (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 1999): 94

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261 Ibid.
262 Parker, *The World is Not Enough*, 11.
Philip’s official coat of arms now included the royal seals of Castile, Aragon, and Portugal – representing the entire Iberian Peninsula – all above the motto, *Non Sufficit Orbis*.

Fused to the idea of expanding the reach of Christendom and of Habsburg territorial sovereignty in Asia was a fixation on the access that the Portuguese empire would provide to the exotic goods of the Orient. Considering the high prices fetched for such imports throughout Europe, many considered East Asian spices and silks as comparable in value to Spanish American silver. Juan de Silva waxed eloquent about these “precious riches […] which provide splendor, health, authority and also [income] to the state treasury, these stones and pearls, amber and other aromatic things, drugs and spices, and the other curiosities brought from Persia and China.”

Support for unification, however, did not emanate solely from the Iberian Peninsula. In the early years of union, several colonial officials in Portuguese Asia also stressed the great gains to be made through closer cooperation overseas. In 1584, the Portuguese Bishop of Malacca, Dom João Ribeiro Gaio, presented a detailed plan stressing the ease with which a joint Iberian force could conquer and become lords of all the lands from India to Japan. The following year, another Portuguese India official, Jorge de Lemos, echoed the militant discourse of Castillo, Silva and Gaio in claiming “that the conquest of Atjeh [in present-day Indonesia] would give the dual Iberian crown the economic resources for a war […] to recover all Christian territory lost to the Muslims (including Jerusalem), and to overthrow the Ottoman empire.” Regardless of their plausibility, these designs are central in highlighting

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263 Bouza, “Portugal en la política internacional de Felipe II,” 41.
265 Ibid.
the emergence of a militant imperialist discourse promising to elevate Spain to a level of

global hegemony the world had not yet known.

In a striking visual example of the persistence of the celebratory discourse on union

nearly four decades later, royal authorities commissioned the construction of a grand

monument in 1619, the “Arco de los orifices y lapidarios” (Arch of the Goldsmiths and

Stonecutters), to commemorate the arrival in Lisbon of Philip’s son – Philip III of Castile

(Philip II of Portugal).266

Figure 8

João Baptista Lavanha, “Arco de los orifices y lapidarios,” in

*Viagem da catholica real magestade del Rey D. Filipe II* (Madrid: Thomas Junti, 1622): 48a

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266 “Arch of the Goldsmiths and Stonecutters,” or “Arco de los orifices y lapidarios,” in Spanish, in João

In the Arch’s center, Philip was depicted standing before the same ceremonial brocade with which he first entered the city in 1581. An elaborate representation of his royal elegance and authority, Philip held the royal scepter in his left hand and, in his right, two bejeweled crowns symbolizing the equality of the two kingdoms within his composite monarchy. Over his left and right shoulders, respectively, were the Castilian and Portuguese royal arms, suspended at equal height.

Beyond these more traditional representations of European dynastic authority, references to the global dimensions of Iberian power abounded. Echoing the same laudatory discourse Philip employed in his praise of the Lusitanian kingdom’s expansionary achievements in his final plea to Cardinal Henry, Philip is depicted here as flanked to his right by the Portuguese explorer Vasco da Gama, and, to his left, by Christopher Columbus. More than simply recognizing their exploits in navigation and conquest, the Arch depicts each explorer lifting a cloak from over the eyes of a native, an extraordinary visual reference to the joint Iberian mission to spread civilization (and Catholicism) to benighted peoples worldwide.

Moving appropriately upward, a last detail worth mentioning is the female representation of Catholicism at the monument’s apex. Undergirding the similarly gendered reference below, the woman is depicted in a flowing gown holding the Holy Grail in one hand and, in the other, a human-size cross, while standing atop a globe supported in turn by what appear to be ancient kings of Portugal and Castile. If the depictions below of the explorers allude to the temporal, global dimensions of Iberian power, the monument’s apex makes explicit reference to the spiritual, universal dimensions of that power. As in the earlier discourse employed by Philip and his ministers, neither he nor the Iberian kings of antiquity

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are shown here to possess God-like qualities themselves, but rather, in a particularly
gendered portrayal, they are represented as the chief protectors and advocates of the true
faith in the secular world. Antonio Feros has made the subtle yet crucial distinction that even
discourses “that described the monarch as God’s representative on earth,” were interpreted
by many, “not as proof of the sacred nature of majesty but rather as proof that the king’s
legitimacy was based on his ability to protect the Church and his kingdoms.”

The Arch’s imagery could hardly be more explicit as it elaborately combined all
central aspects of the Habsburg discourse on Iberian union that had emerged in the wake of
Sebastian’s death in August 1578. It represented a crystallization of four decades of
discursive posturing. When Philip III (Philip II of Portugal) entered Lisbon in 1619, it served
as a potent reminder, both to himself and the broader Lisbon public, that he had inherited
from his father the largest empire the world had ever known.

In Praise of Iberian Imperium

In addition to the discursive celebration around the promise of peninsular union
itself, Spanish and Portuguese authors throughout the Iberian world continued to pen the
chronicles, treatises and a range of other texts, which collectively reinforced notions of the
globality of Iberian power and expansion. In the case of Spain, the separation of the Holy
Roman Empire from the Spanish monarchy with the abdication of Charles V in 1556 gave
Spaniards the chance to define their own identity as a European power. Spain’s new ruler,
Philip II, despite not inheriting the title of Emperor, nonetheless inherited what several observers regarded as an unofficial empire, the gravitational center of which was not in central Europe but extended across the Atlantic, uniting Spain and America. Proclaiming Spain “an empire in itself,” Gregorio López Madera argued that the Spanish monarchy had in effect eclipsed the nearly powerless Holy Roman Empire as the preeminent power in Europe.⁷⁷⁰ And in a rhetorical nod to their vast American empire, he called the Spanish monarchs, “Emperors of the New World,” a symbolic, not official title. The overseas possessions became increasingly prominent in a variety of representations of Spanish imperium, including those in Africa and Asia after Philip’s succession to the Portuguese throne.

Although by the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, Iberian authors increasingly embraced a new style of chronicle that lauded the exploits of their countrymen beyond Europe, more traditional chronicles praising the character and deeds of the king himself did persist. The 1586, *De rebus Emmanuelis, Lusitaniae Regis*, by the Portuguese humanist and theologian Jerónimo Osório was one example of this persistence, and Philip II showed a particular interest in his Lusitanian dominions by appointing a series of historians to write chronicles of the kings of Portugal. Duarte Núñes de Lião’s, *Primeira Parte das Chronicas dos Reis de Portugal*, which legitimated Philip’s actions in securing the Portuguese throne, was one example, as was Bernardo de Brito’s, *Monarchia Lusitana*, although it was not published until 1609, during the reign of Philip III.⁷⁷¹

There are also several examples of this persistence of royal chronicling in Spain, most prominent among them Prudencio de Sandoval’s, *Historia de la vida y hechos del emperador

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⁷⁷⁰ Gil Pujol, “Spain and Portugal,” 442.
Carlos V, published in 1614, and Luis Cabrera de Córdoba’s, Historia de Felipe II, published a decade and a half later.²⁷² If Osório’s 1586 chronicle was for the most part simply a Latin translation of Damião de Góis’ earlier work on the reign of Manuel I, Cabrera de Córdoba’s history of Philip II proved more innovative. The frontispiece introduced the work with a visual representation, now common, reinforcing a sense of the ruler’s divine legitimacy.

Figure 9
Luis Cabrera de Córdoba, Historia de Felipe II (Madrid: Luis Sánchez, 1619), frontispiece

²⁷² Jerónimo Osório, De rebus Emmanueldis, Lusitaniae Regis (Coloniae: Officina Birckmannica, 1586); Prudencio de Sandoval, Historia de la vida y hechos del emperador Carlos V (Pamplona: Bartholomé Paris, 1614); Luis Cabrera de Córdoba, Historia de Felipe II (Madrid: Luis Sánchez, 1619).
Philip II was represented, sword drawn, defending the holy faith, which was in turn symbolized visually through female personification. As stated in the introduction, Cabrera aimed to provide an exemplary history for prince Philip (the future Philip IV) to learn from the behavior, methods, and policies of his grandfather. Interestingly for a book purporting to examine the state of the world and of the Spanish monarchy when Philip II took power, aside from brief discussions of the Pizarrista rebellion in Peru and the pacification of Chile, the Indies remain virtually absent from this otherwise ambitious history of the reign of Philip II.

The Indies (both East and West) increasingly formed part of histories of Portugal and the Spanish monarchy, and during the period of Iberian union a substantial number of works appeared which recounted the action and presence of Iberians beyond Europe, or surveyed the natural or ethnographic history of those distant lands. In the nearly two centuries since Zurara’s pioneering chronicle on Portuguese navigation and slaving in coastal Guinea, sailors, missionaries and adventurers under the Portuguese banner had charted and explored much of the rest of the West and East African coasts, and in the roughly half century from the 1590s to the 1640s Portuguese authors set to documenting those “discoveries.” Filippo Pigafetta’s 1591, Relatione del reame di Congo, et delle circonvicine contrade, although written in his native Italian, drew on the writings of Duarte Lopes and provided a sweeping history of the native peoples, politics, and natural features of the region, as well as of Portuguese crown and missionary efforts to spread commercial, political, and religious

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273 Cabrera de Córdoba, Historia de Felipe II, dedication.
274 Juan de Mariana’s, Historia general de España, published in 1601, was another example of a history devoted to the greatness of the Spanish monarchy and nation with little to no attention to overseas questions. Mariana, widely considered one of early modern Spain’s most influential historians, did attempt to integrate the history of Portugal (and Aragon) within that of Spain, but by deciding to end history in 1492, a conscious choice to avoid reflecting on matters of the present day, the discovery and conquest of the Indies did not form part of his grand narrative. For discussion of Mariana’s work, see Kagan, Clio and the Crown, 117-123.
influence there.\textsuperscript{275} Works by André Álvares d’Almada and André Donelha, published in 1594 and 1625 respectively, provided natural and ethnographic histories of Cape Verde and Sierra Leone.\textsuperscript{276} Domingos de Abreu e Brito published his, \textit{Sumário e Descrição do Reino de Angola, e do Descobrimento da ilha de Loanda, e da Grandeza das Capitanias do Estado do Brasil}, in 1592, covering the broader Portuguese South Atlantic, and Antonio do Couto devoted his 1642 work to praising the success of the Portuguese missionary efforts Angola.\textsuperscript{277} In their separate works on East Africa, from 1609 and 1633, João dos Santos and António Durão provided detailed surveys of the missionary and military history of the Portuguese, especially around the island of Mozambique and the Zambezi Valley, as well as of the cultural traditions of the region’s native peoples.\textsuperscript{278}

Already from the 1590s there appeared two more detailed descriptions on Brazil, by Francisco Soares and the German-born mercenary and adventurer Hans Staden. The latter, taken captive by the local Tupinambá people in São Vicente, served as an early intermediary between those native peoples and the Portuguese before escaping and returning to Europe in 1555.\textsuperscript{279} Ceylon and the Moluccas also received exclusive coverage, in the writings of

\textsuperscript{275} Filippo Pigafetta, \textit{Relazione del reame di Congo, et delle circonvicine contrade} (Rome: Bartolomeo Grassi, 1591).
\textsuperscript{276} André Álvares d’Almada, \textit{Tradado breve dos rios de Guiné do Cabo-Verde} (Porto, Typographia commercial portuense, 1841 [1594]); and André Donelha, \textit{Descrição da Serra Leoa e dos rios de Guiné do Cabo Verde} (Lisbon: Junta de investigações do ultramar, 1977 [1625]).
\textsuperscript{277} Domingos de Abreu de Brito, \textit{Sumário e Descrição do Reino de Angola, e do Descobrimento da ilha de Loanda, e da Grandeza das Capitanias do Estado do Brasil} [1592], Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa (BNL), Manuscrito 294; and Antonio do Couto, \textit{Gentio de Angola sufficientemente instruido nos mysterios de nossa sancta Fé} (Lisbon: Domingos Lopes, 1642).
\textsuperscript{278} João dos Santos, \textit{Ethiopia Oriental e varia historia de cousas notaveis do Oriente} (Évora: Convento de S. Domingos de Évora, 1609); and António Durão, \textit{Cercos de Moçambique defendidos por Don Estevam de Atayde} (Madrid: Por la viuda de Alonso Martín de Balboa, 1633).
\textsuperscript{279} Francisco Soares, \textit{Coisas notáveis do Brasil} (Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, 1904), written between 1590 and 1596; and Hans Staden, \textit{Americae tertia pars: memorabilium provinciae Brasilieae historiam continens germanico primum sermone scriptum a Ioanne Stadio} (Francofurti ad Moenum: De Bry, 1592). See also, Alida Metcalf, \textit{Go-between and the colonization of Brazil, 1500-1600} (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005).
Constantino de Sá Miranda and Bartolomé Leonardo de Argensola. And China proved another key site of interest, and not only among Portuguese writers, but also and indeed especially among Spaniards. These histories of China focused on the cultural and political history of the Chinese peoples themselves, reflecting a remarkable degree of respect on the part of the European authors for the state of Chinese civilization and political and economic organization. The histories also focused in large part on the (often exaggerated) efforts of Jesuit missionaries in spreading the holy gospel throughout those sprawling territories, frequently within the same volume. In his 1586, *Historia de las cosas mas notables, ritos y costumbres, del gran reyno dela China*, for instance, the Spanish Augustinian, Juan González de Mendoza, marveled at the vast imperium of China’s emperor and the absolute power he held. González de Mendoza estimated the total number of tributaries in China at some 35 million and expressed a millenarian desire, encouraged by the Jesuits’ early if limited successes, for “the reduction of the entire Kingdom of China to the Catholic Church,” and to remove its inhabitants “from the tyranny of the Devil in which they are.”

If territories across Portuguese Africa, Asia and Brazil received their fair treatment, so too did specific ones in Spanish America. Late sixteenth and early seventeenth century texts by Spanish and Native American historians and epic poets, including Bernardino de Sahagún, Bernardo de Balbuena, Enrico Martínez, and Domingo Francisco de San Antón

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281 Juan Gónzalez de Mendoza, *Historia de las cosas mas notables, ritos y costumbres, del gran reyno dela China …: Con un itinerario del nuevo Mundo [del padre custadio Fray Martín Ignacio … que paso alla China]* (Barcelona: Joan Pablo Manesca, 1586); Padre Duarte Sande and Padre Alessandro Valignano, *Um tratado sobre o Reino da China* (Macau, 1590); Francisco de Herrera Maldonado, *Epitome Historial del Reyno de la China* (Madrid: Tomás de Junta, 1620); Pedro Morejón, *Historia y relación de lo sucedido en los reinos de Japon y China…desde 1615 hasta 1619* (Lisbon: Iuan Rodríguez, 1621); Adriano de las Cortes, *Viaje de la China* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1991 [1625]); and Álvaro de Semedo, *Imperio de la China i cultura evangelica en él, por los religiosos de la Compañia de IESV* (Madrid: por Iuan Sánchez, a costa de Pedro Coello, 1642).

282 Juan Gónzalez de Mendoza, *Historia de las cosas mas notables, ritos y costumbres, del gran reyno dela China …: Con un itinerario del nuevo Mundo [del padre custadio Fray Martín Ignacio … que paso alla China]* (Barcelona: Joan Pablo Manesca, 1586): at beginning, after prologue, before table of contents.
Muñón Chimalpahin Quauhtlehuanitzin described in mellifluous prose (and rhyme) the beauty and diversity of New Spain. Balbuena, as Serge Gruzinski has shown, presented New Spain not simply as a dependent possession of the Spanish monarchy but as a dynamic center in its own right, especially in a commercial sense, within an increasingly globalized world. “With Peru, Maluco and with China, the Persian, the Scythian, the Moor, and others farther and closer; with France, with Italy and its treasure, with Egypt, the great Cairo,” wrote Balbuena, “with Spain, Germany, Barbary, Asia, Ethiopia, Africa, Guinea, Brittany, Greece, Flanders and Turkey; [New Spain] trades with everyone.”

Several other authors devoted their efforts to South America, either by documenting for posterity Spanish military and spiritual conquests there, or by preserving knowledge of the histories of the continent’s indigenous peoples. The Inca Garcilaso de la Vega achieved both these objectives in his two-volume, *Comentarios reales que tratan del origen de los yncas*, published in 1609 and 1617, respectively. In the first volume he examines Inca culture, and in the second, the Spanish “conquest” of Peru. And although publishing the first two parts of his three-part epic poem before the union of the Iberian crowns, Alonso de Ercilla published the third and final part of his *La Araucana* – on Spain’s largely frustrated efforts to conquer the autonomous native Mapuche people in southern Chile – in 1589. In this last section of his work, Ercilla justified Spain’s “just war” against these “rebellious infidels” and, in inserting stanzas on the victory at Lepanto and the “conquest” of Portugal, raised the

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283 Bernardino de Sahagún’s 1585 *Historia general de las cosas de Nueva España*; also known as the *Florentine Codex*, available at: <https://www.wdl.org/en/item/10096/>; Bernardo de Balbuena, *Grandeza Mexicana* (Mexico: Melchior Ocharte, 1604); Enrico Martínez, *Reportorio de los tiempos y historia natural desta Nueva España* (Mexico City: Enrico Martínez, 1606); and Domingo Francisco de San Antón Muñón Chimalpahin Quauhtlehuanitzin, *Las ocho relaciones y el memorial de Colhuacan* (Mexico: Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia, 2010 [1607-1637]).


286 Inca Garcilaso de la Vega, *Comentarios reales que tratan del origen de los yncas* (Lisbon: Pedro Crasbeeck, 1609).

significance of Spanish efforts in this remote corner of South America to that of some of the more famous campaigns in Europe and the Mediterranean, including against Spain’s prime enemy of the era, the Ottoman Empire. In addition to the monumental works of Ercilla and Inca Garcilaso de la Vega, we also have less known texts by authors like Alonso de Ovalle on Jesuit evangelization in Chile, and Martín del Barco Centenera on the Spanish military efforts to subjugate the native peoples and territories of the Río de la Plata.

Alongside these histories of particular locales in the overseas colonial world, Iberian authors also expanded on the approach fashioned earlier in the sixteenth century by chroniclers like Oviedo and Barros, which surveyed the exploits of their countrymen across the entirety of Portuguese “India” (including East Africa and places as far afield as Macao), or of the broader Spanish Indies (which from the 1560s included the Philippines). More importantly still, it was no coincidence that, during the union of Portugal and the Spanish monarchy, Iberian authors also began writing histories of their empires on a planetary scale.

Although broad in their geographic frame, some of these works did have a specific thematic focus. Those by Aleixo da Mota and António de Mariz Carneiro, focused on navigational routes and techniques, for instance, or, in the case of António Bocarro, on presenting a comprehensive view of the myriad fortresses and settlements that formed the backbone of the Portuguese Estado da Índia. Other texts, including those of João de Lucena, Luís de Guzmán, and Fernão Guerreiro and Cristóbal Suárez de Figueroa, focused

288 Hernando Sánchez, Las indias en la monarquía católica, (1996), 100.
289 Martín del Barco Centenera, Argentina y conquista del Río de la Plata con otros acaecimientos de los reinos del Perú, Tucumán y el Estado del Brasil (Lisbon: Pedro Crasbeeck, 1602); and Alonso de Ovalle, Histórica relación del reino de Chile y de las missiones y ministerios que exercita en él la Compañía de Jesús (Roma: Francisco Caballo, 1646).
290 Aleixo da Mota, Roteiro da navegação da carreira [sic] da India, Mss. c.1621, Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal; António de Mariz Carneiro’s 1642, Regimento de pilotos, e roteiro das navegaçoes da India Oriental (Lisbon: Lourenço de Anveres, 1642); António Bocarro and Pedro de Resende, Livro das plantas de todas as fortalezas, cidades e povoações do Estado da Índia Oriental (1635) Mss., Biblioteca Pública de Évora [BPE hereafter].
on the efforts of the Jesuits, or even more specifically that of their co-founder, Francis Xavier, to spread the gospel throughout Asia. The works of Guzmán and Suárez de Figueroa are particularly notable since, written by Spaniards on the history of the Jesuits in Portuguese Asia, they demonstrate the globality of the Jesuit order and its mission in extending beyond the limits of Iberian imperial sovereignty and thereby transcending the boundaries of temporal empire. Again, it is no accident that such histories appeared during the union of the Iberian crowns when, despite the legal and theoretical separation of the two empires, their boundaries were increasingly blurred in practice.

There were also, however, a series of authors in the period, some under crown commission, who presented more comprehensive histories of the commercial, spiritual and military expansion of the Portuguese empire, either within certain pre-defined periods or over the long term. Diogo do Couto, for instance, was tasked with continuing the *Décadas da Ásia*, begun by his predecessor, João de Barros. *Década Quinta da Ásia*, published in 1612, contains a revealing representation of Couto himself, plume in hand and sword in sheath, a reference to his dual career as soldier and historian, and symbolizing, more subtly, the inseparability of the pen and sword in the defense of Iberian imperium.

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291 João de Lucena, *História da Vida do padre Francisco Xavier do que Fizeram na Índia os Mais Religiosos da Companhia de Jesus* (Lisbon: Pedro Crasbeeck, 1600); Luís de Guzmán’s 1601, *Historia de las missiones que han hecho los religiosos de la Compania de Jesus [...] en la India oriental* (Alcalá de Henares: La viuda de Juan Gracián, 1601); and Fernão Guerreiro and Christóbal Suárez de Figueroa, *Historia y relacion annual de las cosas que fizieron los padres de la Companhia de Jesus por las partes de Oriente y obras en la propagacion del santo evangelio los años de 607 y 608* (Madrid: Imprenta Real, 1609).

292 Diogo do Couto, *Décadas da Ásia*, 4-8 (Lisbon: Regia officina typografica, 1778-88 [1602-]); Antonio Bocarro’s *Década XIII da História da India* (Lisbon: Typographia da Academia Real das Ciencias, 1876 [c.1625-1635]); and Manuel de Faria e Sousa’s, *Asia portuguesa*, vol. 1 (Lisbon: Officina de Henrique Valente de Oliveira, 1666), vol. 2 (Lisbon: Officina de Antonio Crasbeeck de Mello, 1674), and vol. 3 (Lisbon: officina de Henrique Valente de Oliveira, 1675); and *África portuguesa* (Lisbon: Antonio Crasbeeck de Mello, 1681). Although written earlier, most likely in the 1640s, both of Faria e Sousa’s works were published posthumously.
In the epistle dedicated to his patron, the “Invictissimo Monarch of Spain Don Philip, King of Portugal,” Couto explained with great clarity his mission as author. “I desire […] more than anything,” he wrote, “the conservation of your own name,” and “to leave for eternal memory the heroic deeds and works” of the Portuguese across Asia. He also sought to substantiate the idea, already cultivated by earlier writers like Barros and Camões, that the Portuguese (and Spanish) were heirs to the Greeks, Romans, and other great polities, not only in terms of their temporal power, but also in their efforts to record their achievements for posterity. The “glory of statues, and of […] coats-of-arms was passed later by the Athenians into writing, because they saw that images and paintings were mute,” he wrote. “From here the Romans and all other nations of the world understood, so desirous of

293 Diogo do Couto, Década Quarta da Ásia, Parte Primeira (Lisbon: Regia officina typografica, 1778 [1602]), xxvii-xviii.
perpetual fame,” that they ought to record history in writing. “Only our Portuguese lacked
this glory,” he continued, “the loss of which we are so much ashamed.” And “your
commanding me to bring the deeds [of the Portuguese] to light, [an act] which seems to
imitate God, resuscitates the dead and brings them to life.”

Two of Manuel de Faria e Sousa’s most famous works, Asia Portuguesa and África
Portuguesa, although published posthumously several decades later, appear to have been
written – or at least completed – in the 1640s, in the immediate wake of the separation of
Portugal from the Spanish monarchy. Despite the circumstances, Sousa continued to
display his great respect for Spain, composing these two works (among others) in Castilian.
In the third of his three-volume work, Asia Portuguesa, Sousa reflected with pride on the
global dimensions of Portuguese sovereignty in its own right:

Fortune […] found it necessary to increase their Dominions by adding to
them at one time great part of Mauritania; then a greater part of Ethiopia; at
another time that vast extent of Asia, and lastly that not inconsiderable
Region of America, called Brazil or New Lusitania. Having conquered the
West, they passed to the South, and having subdued this they went on to the
East. […] At length these Great [Portuguese] Spirits spread themselves over
all the Land and Seas, and to make the whole circumference of them their
bounds, overrunning that vast distance that is from the Coasts of Spain to
those of China, and filling both the Hemispheres with the Glory of their
Name.

Evoking the now famous trope of the empire on which the sun never set, Sousa proclaimed
in the preface that the Portuguese “followed the Sun from its Setting to its Rising, and
equaled its Course.” More importantly, in an attempt to justify the acquisition of Portugal’s
vast overseas imperium, he explained that the Portuguese considered it “a greater happiness

294 Ibid.
295 Manuel de Faria e Sousa’s, Asia portuguesa, vol. 1 (Lisbon: Officina de Henrique Valente de Oliveira, 1666),
vol. 2 (Lisbon: Officina de Antonio Craesbeeck de Mello, 1674), and vol. 3 (Lisbon: officina de Henrique
Valente de Oliveira, 1675); and África portuguesa (Lisbon: Antonio Craesbeeck de Mello, 1681).
296 Faria e Sousa’s, Asia portuguesa, vol. 3, preface.
297 Ibid.
to gain voluntary Friends, than to make forced Slaves. “By express Orders from our Kings,” he wrote, the Portuguese “endeavored to heap great Riches, extend our Dominions, and acquire Glory rather with Politick Reason than Odious Violence.” Yet, beyond simply praising Portuguese achievements, in his examination of the period of Iberian union from 1580 to 1640, Sousa marveled at what he saw as the unmistakably global dominion of Philip II. “The Kingdom of Portugal,” wrote Sousa in his description of the process of unification, “now bringing that Precious Scepter from the East [a reference to Portugal’s Asian imperium], puts it into the Hands of Philip in Spain, who had the Fortune to be the great Ocean to which run all the great […] and small Rivers of so many Empires, Kingdoms, and Sovereignties, spread over the whole Face of the Terrestrial Globe.”

The decade or so around the turn of the seventeenth century also saw the publication of a series of monumental histories of Spain’s expansion, which intended to demonstrate the global dimensions of Spanish imperium as well as to justify it. Gregorio López Madera, for instance, in his 1597, *Excelencias de la monarquia y reyno de España*, was innovative in presenting an integrated history of Spanish expansion both in Europe and overseas. Arguing that Spain constituted an “empire in itself,” he proclaimed that, “one cannot compare the Kings of Spain to any others in the world” given the fact that, in addition to their European dominions, as “Emperors of the New World [a rhetorical not official title], they possess more lands and kingdoms than any past monarchs.” Not satisfied with portraying the Spanish simply as heirs to the Romans or any other great empire of antiquity, for that matter, López Madera insisted that Spain was without doubt the most powerful in history. “The Romans were never lords of all the world,” he wrote. It was no

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298 Ibid.
299 Ibid.
300 Gregorio López Madera, *Excelencias de la monarquia y reyno de España* (Valladolid: Diego Fernández de Cordova, 1597), 16r-16v.
more than vanity and arrogance, he decried, “with which the Persians attributed lordship to their Kings, the Greeks to their Princes, the Tartars and Turks to their lords, and the Romans principally to their Emperors.” Moreover, and in direct counter to what he identified as “the calumny of Jean Bodin, who affirms that our Kings are not Sovereign Princes,” López Madera cited the gospel alongside theories of Roman jurists and political philosophers, Ulpian and Cicero, to insist that as “kings,” “majesties,” and “sovereign lords” the Spanish rulers were “Gods on earth,” or at least his “Vicars,” and that their power was “absolute,” “supreme,” and “superior” to all others “in the temporal.” He also noted, in an attempt to legitimize such sovereignty, that the kings were “not absolute to destroy justice, but rather to govern according to it.”

Over the first decade of the seventeenth century, Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas and Giovanni Botero each published multi-volume works, which together represented the culmination of nearly a century of chronicle writing on Iberian imperium. Both, although presented as world histories and being indeed global in their geographic scope, nonetheless placed Spain, very intentionally, at front and center. Herrera’s appointment as royal chronicler marked the true apex of the monarchy’s effort to shape and control its historical image, and in his celebration of Spanish greatness, which then included all of Portugal’s extended possessions, he emphasized the significance of the overseas imperium. Between 1601 and 1612, Herrera, who had gained notoriety in Spain for his translation of Botero’s, *Della ragion di Stato*, published a three-volume global history of the Spanish monarchy.

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301 Ibid. 10, 2.
302 Ibid. 15 and 16, 1.
303 Ibid.
entitled, the Historia general del mundo del tiempo del Rey Felipe II, el prudente. Without naming these authors specifically, Herrera wrote that one of his primary goals was to counter the writings of “foreign historians,” who treat “the Spaniards only half-heartedly, highlighting their failures,” and he opened the work with a comprehensive list of officials and institutions, civil and ecclesiastical, that the crown had established in the Indies, and highlighted its dual commitment to the temporal and spiritual welfare of Amerindians (despite acknowledging encomenderos’ early abuses) in order to impress upon readers the monarchy’s success in promoting good governance there as well as the fundamental morality and legality of its title to sovereignty in the New World.

In addition, Herrera echoed López Madera in arguing for Spain’s global preeminence. Spain’s power was, he asserted, “the greatest any Prince ever had in the world.” And he stressed the providential nature of this preeminence, noting that, “for some great mystery,” “God had given the Indies to the Kings of Castile before others.”

Equally notable, Herrera set his history of the reign of Philip II across a broad geographical canvas and examined in meticulous (if occasionally exaggerated) detail not only Spanish conquests and setbacks in Chile and the Philippines, but also the Portuguese king Sebastian’s ill-fated invasion of Morocco, the altogether unconnected war between the Polish and Muscovites, as well as that between the Persians and Turks. Herrera’s was a truly global history, remarkable for its time in that sense, and in it, Spain remained the central protagonist.

304 Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, Historia general del mundo del tiempo del Rey Felipe II, el prudente, desde el año de 1554 hasta el de 1598, 3 vols. (Madrid, 1601-1612). For an in-depth discussion of Herrera y Tordesillas and his work, see Kagan, Clio and the Crown, 135-149.


306 Herrera y Tordesillas, Historia general del mundo, vol. 1, ch. 8, 476.

307 Ibid.
Botero, an Italian priest and political philosopher perhaps most famous for his 1589 treatise, *Della ragion di Stato*, also composed an influential work of history, his *Relaciones universales del mundo*, which appeared in 1603.\(^{308}\) The latter work was foundational as the first integrated history of Spanish and Portuguese expansion on a global scale. Within this single text, Botero traced the parallel expansions of the two Iberian nations across Africa, Asia, and the Americas. While also providing detailed discussions of indigenous empires and societies throughout the non-European world, including those of China and East Africa, Botero was mainly interested in celebrating and explaining the rise of Iberian power globally. In praising the grandeur of Spain’s imperium at that moment, he stressed the importance of the incorporation of Portugal and its possessions in augmenting Spanish hegemony. “Since the world was created until today there has never been a larger Empire nor Monarchy than that which God our Lord has given to the Catholic King [Philip III], principally after the union of the Kingdom of Portugal to the Crown of Castile.” According to Botero, Spain’s unprecedented power was demonstrated by the fact that “it embraces extremely wide provinces in Europe, extremely noble states of Africa, and extremely wealthy Kingdoms in Asia, in addition to being lord without any contradiction in the New World.”\(^{309}\) He then went on to list the myriad polities and territories the Iberians claimed throughout these regions. But Botero did more than simply proclaim Spain as the largest monarchy in history by virtue of its seemingly countless possessions throughout the four parts of the world. He also described Spanish squadrons as “invincible,” and attributed Castilians’ military success to the protection of their patron saint, Santiago, reinforcing the idea of Spanish imperium as


\(^{309}\) Botero, *Relaciones universales del mundo* (1603), part 2, 92.
divinely ordained, and providing it therefore with, as he saw it, an indisputable justification.310

By the second quarter of the seventeenth century, the Iberian discourse of empire had reached such an extent in its volume and sophistication that the renowned Spanish American jurist and historian, Antonio de León Pinelo, produced a comprehensive bibliography of historical, geographical, and nautical works on the “Oriental” and “Occidental” Indies of Portugal and Spain. In his, Epitome de la Biblioteca Oriental i Occidental, Nautica i Geographica, published in 1629, Pinelo compiled a list of hundreds of published and unpublished works, several of which have not survived to the present day, proof that the production of and interest in texts on the non-European world was even more substantial than the existing record suggests.311 He organized his work by region and theme, with separate sections on works devoted to “general histories” of the east and west Indies, to the Indians themselves, to their conversion, to collections of laws, political and moral-theological treatises, to surveys of particular regions of the Iberian colonial world including New Spain, East Asia, Peru, Chile, and the Río de la Plata, among other places.

310 Botero, Relaciones universales del mundo (1603), part 1, 3a and 13a.
311 Antonio de León Pinelo, Epitome de la Biblioteca Oriental i Occidental, Nautica i Geographica (Madrid: Juan González, 1629). This to some degree tempers the theses of Anthony Grafton, John Elliott and others that the overseas colonial world attracted little interest among contemporary readers. See Grafton, New Worlds, Ancient Texts; Elliott, The Old World and the New; and Scammel, “The New Worlds and Europe in the Sixteenth Century.”
Pinelo, although born in Spanish Peru, was of Portuguese judeo-converso descent, and maintained an integrated view of Iberia’s global imperium. The frontispiece engraving made this abundantly clear, containing human representations of the East and West Indies, collectively termed “India Ibérica,” over smaller such symbols of “Geography” and “Navigation” – both sciences integral to Iberia’s overseas conquests and discoveries – the former holding a geographer’s geometry set-square over a globe, and the latter a navigator’s compass above a celestial sphere.
Maturation of the Debate

By the turn of the seventeenth century, the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588, the ongoing Dutch Revolt, and increasing challenges from northern European competitors to Iberian claims beyond Europe combined with mounting economic troubles in the peninsula to provoke serious internal reflections on the state of the monarchy. At the same time as the crisis produced a heightened sense of self-doubt and calls for reform, however, it also compelled many Iberian authors to take up the pen in defense of their empire and its claims to sovereignty beyond Europe. The debates that took place during the period of Iberian union were more than simply a continuation of those begun the previous century. In many ways they represented a crystallization of those earlier discussions. Iberian authors continued to debate key issues of conscience including slavery, conversion, monopolies on commerce and navigation, and the subjugation of non-European peoples and the legal title to their ancestral lands. And as they did so they built upon, synthesized, and to a certain degree resolved several of the main controversies that had preoccupied their sixteenth century predecessors.

Some authors, like Bernardo de Vargas Machuca, continued to promote the aggressive, Aristotelian arguments of Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda. Machuca justified Spanish domination of Amerindian peoples – and implicitly of their territories too – by what he regarded as their condition as sub-humans, as “brute animals.” He lauded the superiority and virtue of Spanish culture and conquest, blamed Amerindians’ “aggressions” and “betrayals” for their ultimate subjugation, and denounced “the discourse” of Las Casas in

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particular for fueling anti-Spanish rhetoric throughout Europe, which described “the Indies
with various forms of cruelties, citing the Bishop of Chiapa[s].”

On the frontispiece of his work, Machuca portrayed Philip II with one hand on his sword,
and the other with a compass atop a globe, with the phrase, “To the sword and the compass,
More and more and more and more.” This combined montage of image and text
represented the relation between discovery and conquest, between arms and the science of
navigation and exploration, as well as Spain’s insatiable ambition for further expansion.

Other authors, however, although equally effusive in their praise of Spanish
imperium, were less interested in denigrating the nature and condition of indigenous
peoples. Tomás Cerdán de Tallada and Tomasso Campanella, for instance, in addition to

313 Vargas Machuca, *The Indian Militia and Description of the Indies*, 246.
lauding and legitimizing Spain’s imperial greatness, also offered strategies for its conservation in the face of mounting threats from northern Europe. In his 1604, *Veriloquium en reglas de estado*, the Valencian jurist, Cerdán de Tallada, explained how, guided by the precepts of “divine, natural, canonical, civil law, and the laws of Castile,” Philip III could set about ensuring the “conservation […] and increase of the Royal State,” and the “tranquility of Spain and […] the rest of Christianity.” Among the series of general strategies Cerdán de Tallada proposed was to enhance the power of viceroyls and limit that of titled lords. The latter approach was intended to avoid the potential that powerful elites might “disturb the authority, and greatness of the Royal dignity, or put the said State […] in turmoil.” Cerdán pointed to “the case in Portugal of don Antonio,” the Prior of Crato, who had resisted Philip II’s claim to the Portuguese throne in 1580. He might also have cited the New World revolts of encomenderos who, while not officially titled for the most part, did nonetheless amass sufficient power to oppose and occasionally reverse royal decree. All this was aimed at reinforcing “the authority and jurisdiction” of the king, and ensuring that he remain “absolute and powerful over his vassals, without exception.”

Perhaps the most famous of these treatises was, *De Monarchia Hispanica: Discursus*, by the Calabrese Dominican theologian and political philosopher, Tommasso Campanella. Campanella opened his tour de force by referring to Spain as the “Universal Monarchy of the World, […] having passed through the hands of the Assyrians, Medes, Persians, Greeks and Romans.” In justifying his use of the term, “Universal,” Campanella cited “the
Discovery of the New World,” and emphasized in particular the significance of “the joining of the Kingdom of Portugal [and its possessions] to Spain, all of which rendered the [Spanish] Monarchy both Illustrious and Admirable, and also […] made Her Lady of the Seas.”\footnote{Campanella, De Monarchia Hispanica, ch. 2.}

Drawing a subtle if no less significant distinction, however, between the universality of Spanish power in an abstract, rhetorical sense and its still incomplete reach in practical terms, he explained that “the King of Spain might grow more Powerful yet, and might attain to the Dominion of the Whole World, if he would but endeavor in the Overthrow of the Turkish Empire; as Alexander […] did of the Persian, and the Romans of the Carthaginian.”\footnote{Ibid.}

In addition to defeating the Ottomans, and after defining the fundamental prerequisite that the Spanish king declare his dependence on the ultimate authority of the Pope, Campanella laid out a series of ten guiding principles to help Spain become “the Empire of the whole World.”\footnote{Ibid. chs. 5 and 7.} First, the king must remain virtuous and prudent. Second, his laws must remain fair and just. Third, councilors must be wise. Fourth, officers of the state must promote justice. Fifth, the Barons [nobles] must be obedient. Sixth, soldiers and commanders must be many and disciplined. Seventh, the treasury must remain full. Eighth, the People must maintain a mutual love among themselves and toward their king. Ninth, preachers must promote obedience to the king in their sermons. Tenth, the monarchy’s constituent kingdoms must remain in mutual accord, and its neighbors in discord. According to Campanella, “the present Disagreement among the Enemies of Spain, and [the king’s] Power at Sea all over the World [made possible by the union with Portugal], have rendered translation, see: Thomas Campanella, an Italian friar and second Machiavel, his advice to the King of Spain for attaining the universal monarchy of the world, edited by Edmund Chilmead (London: Philemon Stephens, 1660).
very feasible the attempt not only of maintaining, but of enlarging, this so great a
Monarchy.”

Anticipating the Count-Duke of Olivares’ suggested reforms by some two decades,
Campanella also urged further Spanish crown control over Portuguese realms, a shift in
policy that would clearly violate the terms agreed upon at the Cortes of Tomar. “Over such
Countries as have been conquered by Portugals,” he wrote, including those overseas, there
should be placed Spanish Governors.” Thus uniting the two Kingdoms the more, [...] the
Kingdom will be the more happily and the more safely administered.”

Outlining a truly integrated, global approach to maritime defense, Campanella advocated for a more robust
navy to protect Iberian shipping and promote commerce between Spain and America, as
well as to enforce Portugal’s monopoly on navigation and trade throughout maritime Africa and Asia.
Finally, he also suggested a multipronged approach to reinforcing Spain’s
sovereign rule over the peoples and territories of the New World as well. This consisted of
curbing the rise of a settler elite, of maintaining checks and balances between viceroys and
captains, of promoting occupation of the land and the expansion of agriculture, and of
erecting fortifications in all harbors and at the mouths of rivers.

In addition to increasing concerns about the monarchy’s conservation, the period of
Iberian union also saw important developments in debates over issues of conscience,
including African slavery. Interestingly, despite clear interest among Spaniards in the subject,
no Portuguese author devoted a theological or legal treatise specifically to the issue of

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322 Ibid. ch. 8.
323 Ibid. ch. 31.
324 Ibid. chs. 28 and 32.
325 Ibid. ch. 31. We know that Philip III did not read Campanella, nor did his advisers, most likely. But there
were many others close to the king, including his advisers, who proposed similar reforms. See, Antonio Feros’,
*Kingship and Favoritism in the Spain of Philip III, 1598-1621* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000),
and *Speaking of Spain* (2017).
African slavery until the eighteenth century.\textsuperscript{326} In a section of his wide-ranging treatise, 
\textit{Tractatus de iustitia et de jure}, the Spanish Jesuit, Luis de Molina, echoed Oliveira, Mercado and Albornoz in his critiques of the unjust manner by which the Portuguese acquired slaves in West Africa.\textsuperscript{327} Molina, the famous defender of human liberty who had spent two decades as professor at the Portuguese universities of Coimbra and Évora, censured Portugal’s royal Mesa da Consciência for what he saw as its moral laxity on the issue of slavery. Like Oliveira, he denounced the widely held view, first advanced by Zurara, that regardless of the legality of their initial procurement, Africans’ enslavement was ultimately justified by their conversion.\textsuperscript{328} And he chastised earlier Portuguese kings for failing to convocate debates on African slavery similar to those facilitated by Spanish rulers around the treatment of Amerindians.\textsuperscript{329}

Alonso de Sandoval, for his part, also a Spanish Jesuit, despite reflecting on the diverse arguments of Molina, Mercado, José de Acosta, and Juan de Solórzano Pereira, and despite recognizing the slaves’ condition as “miserable,” never quite rejected the morality or legality of African – or any other form of – slavery outright. On the contrary, his \textit{De instauranda Aethiopum salute} contains detailed chapters on the ancient origins of the institution and its justifications in the Bible and in natural law. “There is no doubt that in Christian Republics slaves are permitted,” he wrote. “What should be attempted, however, is to treat them with good government, [and to ensure] that their number does not grow too large.”

This concern with limiting the population of slaves in society was not so much due to moral concerns but rather to pragmatic ones, in order to prevent their uprising, “as happened to

\begin{footnotes}
\item[328] Marcoci, \textit{A consciência de um império}, 426.
\end{footnotes}
the Romans [...] under the dominion of Spartacus.” Sandoval did nonetheless agree with Molina, quoting him directly, on the need to improve methods of ascertaining the true manner in which Portuguese merchants obtained captives on the African coast. This was in order to establish the status of those individuals as free or enslaved. His prime motive behind the work, however, was “to ignite the fire in the hearts of the Ministers of the Church so that they communicate” to slaves the holy gospel, and thereby to ameliorate slaves’ condition, especially in the afterlife.

Alongside the debate over slavery, the most intense controversy surrounding Portuguese imperium in particular concerned the issue of monopolies on trade and navigation, broadly speaking. On the one hand this consisted of internal Iberian debates over commercial monopolies, free trade, and the economic integration of the Portuguese and Spanish empires. On the other hand, although not unconnected, it consisted of the well-publicized international dispute between defenders of mare clausum and those advocating freedom of the seas. These questions were most hotly debated during the period of Iberian union, and were in large part provoked by the rise of naval and maritime commercial competition from the Dutch, French, and English.

Perhaps the most emblematic figure in public discussions over the state of the Iberian imperial economy and its future was Duarte Gomes Solis. After an early career as a }

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330 Alonso de Sandoval, Tomo I. De instauranda Aethiopum salute. Historia de Aethiope, naturaleza, policia sagrada y profana, costumbres, ritos y catechismo evangélico de todos los Aethiopes conque se restaura la salud de sus almas. Dividida en dos tomos: ilustrados de nuevo en esta segunda impresion con cosas curiosas y Indice muy copioso por el P. Alonso de Sandoval, de la Compañia de Jesús, natural de Toledo (Madrid: Alonso de Paredes, 1647): book 1, ch. 27, 118. A first version of this work was published in 1627 as, De instauranda Aethiopum salute: Naturaleza, policia sagrada y profana, costumbres i ritos, disciplina i catechismo evangélico de todos etiopes (Seville: Francisco de Lira, 1627). The work has been frequently translated and reprinted into Spanish and English with the inadequate title, Un tratado sobre la esclavitud, and, Treatise on Slavery.

331 Sandoval used the term “Spaniards” to refer to all inhabitants of the peninsula, and only occasionally used “Portuguese” in reference to those of that particular kingdom.

332 Sandoval, Tomo I. De instauranda Aethiopum salute, from the penultimate paragraph in the Note to Reader.
merchant in Portuguese India and later as royal administrator there of the pepper trade (an important crown monopoly), Solis subsequently relocated to Madrid where he began a new career as an *arbitrista* in the early seventeenth century.\(^{333}\) Considered a pioneering theorist of mercantilism, his writings cannot be dissociated from those of his reformist predecessors and contemporaries, including, for example, more widely known figures like the Spaniards Martín de Azpilcueta and Sancho de Moncada.\(^{334}\) Solis, however, who had spent a significant amount of time in Asia and Africa, distinguished himself by presenting a truly global plan for economic reform that encompassed both the Spanish and Portuguese empires and which aimed, by extension, to rejuvenate the peninsular economy as well. Writing in Spanish, the Lisbon-born Solis directed his works at the king and his prime minister, the Count-Duke of Olivares, and demonstrated his erudition through numerous references to the great chroniclers of Portuguese expansion, like João de Barros and Damião de Góis, as well to Roman and Greek authors of antiquity, including Cicero, Aristotle, Plato, and Tacitus.\(^{335}\)

Arguing that, as a major oceanic port, Lisbon was better situated than Madrid for the management of the two empires, he advocated the transfer of the royal court there.

Regarding the Portuguese empire in Asia in particular, he urged royal authorities to focus less on territorial dominion, conquest and the costly maintenance of forts, and to concentrate instead on control of the sea, which would, in turn, more effectively protect Portuguese maritime commerce against increasing threats from northern European corsairs and chartered companies.\(^{336}\) In terms of global imperial commerce, he urged the king to

\(^{333}\) Nathan Wachtel, “The ‘Marrano’ Mercantilist Theory of Duarte Gomes Solis,” *Jewish Quarterly Review* 101, no. 2 (Spring 2011): 164-165. The *arbitristas* were a group of authors in seventeenth century Spain who proposed economic and political reforms to reverse the monarchy’s perceived decline.

\(^{334}\) Duarte Gomes Solis, *Discursos sobre los Comercios de las dos Indias* (Lisbon: 1622); and his *Alegación en favor de la Compañía de la India oriental* (dedicated to the Count-Duke of Olivares) (1628). There is no mentioned publisher of Solis’ *Discursos*, nor publisher or publication place of his *Alegación*.


\(^{336}\) Solis, *Discursos sobre los Comercios de las dos Indias*, 77v.
prohibit the export of silver from Mexico to China via the Philippines for two inter-related reasons. First, according to Solis, the plan would ensure that more silver flow back to Spain itself and therefore increase Castile’s royal coffers. Second, it would limit the adverse effects that Spain’s increasing share of the China trade had on the economic health of the Portuguese Estado da Índia, which was increasingly threatened by the rise of northern European competition as well. Finally, in a bold, pioneering critique of the purity of blood statutes, Solis lauded the contributions of both New Christians and Jews to Portugal’s rise as a global imperial power, and argued as well that the distinction between New and Old Christians should be abolished since the former proved so fundamental to the Portuguese imperial economy in particular.

In addition to these internal discussions over the present and future state of the monarchy, Iberian authors were also increasingly compelled to confront the challenges of outsiders. In response to northern European threats to Spanish and Portuguese maritime dominion beyond Europe, the Spanish jurist Juan de Hevia Bolaños, composed his Curia Filípica, which, although less known today, was reprinted numerous times in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Drawing on the theories of Vázquez de Menchaca, Bolaños acknowledged that “the use of the Sea is a natural right and is common to all the world, and as such everyone can use it, fishing, sailing, and making use in every other way.” For Bolaños, however, common use of the sea could be restricted by the first who occupies it. That first occupier, he wrote, is considered in quasi-possession of it, according to

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337 Ibid. 41v.
338 Solis, Alegación en favor de la Compañía de la India oriental, 59-59v.
339 Solis, Discursos sobre los Comercios de las dos Indias, 119; and Alegación en favor de la Compañía de la India oriental, 14r-14v.
341 Juan de Hevia Bolaños, Curia Filípica (Madrid: Imprenta de la Real Compañía, 1825 [1605]), vol. 2, book 3: Comercio Naval: S1, 471-478: Mar, no. 2. This work was originally published as, Curia Philippica (Valladolid: Andrés Merchán, 1605).
natural law and the law of nations. Moreover, “although navigation cannot be prohibited by any private person, it can be prohibited by the Prince.”\textsuperscript{342} In fact, “the Prince has the obligation to defend the Sea from corsairs that infest it, both within his district and on its edges, and outside it, by reason of the royal rights he holds.”\textsuperscript{343} Finally, in defense of Iberian claims to territorial sovereignty, Bolaños proclaimed that any land within that sea “belongs to the first who populates it.”\textsuperscript{344} And in reiterating the validity of the papal donation, the original justification of Iberian imperium beyond Europe, he explained that “the Catholic Kings of Spain” held “the dominion of that territory” since it was “included in the concession made by the high Pontiff Alexander VI.”\textsuperscript{345}

More famously, in 1625, the Portuguese jurist Seraphim de Freitas published his, \textit{De iusto imperio lusitanorum Asiatico}, in direct response to Hugo Grotius’ penetrating critique of Portugal’s monopoly on maritime trade and navigation in Asia.\textsuperscript{346} Grotius, in his famous, \textit{Mare Liberum}, made copious use of the theories of sixteenth century Spanish theologians, including Vitoria and Fernando Vázquez de Menchaca.\textsuperscript{347} Following Vázquez, Grotius argued that property rights are acquired by prescription, or in other words, by sustained occupation over time. But in a direct critique of Iberian claims to dominion over the sea, he contended that acts of navigation did not constitute occupation, writing famously that, “a ship sailing over the sea no more leaves behind itself a legal right than it leaves a permanent

\textsuperscript{342} Ibid. 471-478: Mar, no. 12.
\textsuperscript{343} Ibid. 471-478: Mar, no. 14.
\textsuperscript{344} Ibid. vol. 2, book 3: Comercio Naval: S1, 471-478: Mar, no. 5.
\textsuperscript{345} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{346} Seraphim de Freitas, \textit{De iusto imperio lusitanorum Asiatico} (Valladolid: Officina Hieronymi Morillo, 1625).
track.”\textsuperscript{348} Grotius also denied the validity of the Papal donation, arguing that the Pope was not temporal lord of the whole world. And he claimed, moreover, that even if the donation were valid, the Portuguese had failed to confirm that title through \textit{de facto} possession.

Countering Grotius point by point, Freitas too drew heavily on the arguments of Vitoria and Vázquez de Menchaca, as well as on those of Luis de Molina. Regardless of their fundamental disagreement over the validity of the papal donation, Freitas argued that Portugal had indeed fulfilled the requirements for exclusive dominion of the sea.\textsuperscript{349} Not only were the Portuguese the first to open the maritime route to Asia, he wrote, but they had maintained control of that route and its commerce for over a century, which is to say, through cumulative prescription.\textsuperscript{350} If the 1417 papal grant of Martin V marked the beginning of that process, wrote Freitas, the 1493 \textit{Inter cætera} bull and the voyages of “discovery” of Bartolomeu Dias and Vasco da Gama represented its confirmation and maturation.\textsuperscript{351}

While Freitas’ treatise represented the most forceful, sophisticated response to the legal-theoretical challenge to Iberian dominion of the sea, other authors, including Spanish ones, lent further support to his argument. For instance, just four years later, Juan de Solórzano Pereira completed a wide-ranging juridical treatise, which addressed, among other topics, Portugal’s claims to maritime dominion in Asia. Solórzano, in the first of his two-volume, \textit{De Indiarum Jure}, affirmed several points set out four years earlier by Freitas.\textsuperscript{352}

\textsuperscript{348} Quoted in Mónica Brito Vieira, “Mare Liberum vs. Mare Clausum: Grotius, Freitas, and Selden’s Debate on Dominion over the Seas,” \textit{Journal of the History of Ideas} 64, no. 3 (2003): 372.
\textsuperscript{350} Vieira, “Mare Liberum vs. Mare Clausum,” 367.
\textsuperscript{351} Vieira, “Mare Liberum vs. Mare Clausum,” 377.
\textsuperscript{352} Juan de Solórzano Pereira, \textit{De Indiarum Jure sive de justa Indiarum Occidentalium Inquisitione, Acquisitione, & Retentione}, 2 vols. (Madrid: Ex Typographia Francisci Martínez, 1629-1639). The second volume of this two-volume work was subsequently published in Spanish as \textit{Política Indiana} in 1647. Solórzano’s work provided the
Solórzano argued that, regardless of the validity of the *Inter cætera* bulls of donation, Portugal’s proven, long-term occupation of lands and seas in the East meant that, according to the legal requirements for prescription, it could claim legitimate territorial and maritime dominion across its Asian imperium.

If the issues of slavery and monopolies on trade and navigation dominated debates over Portuguese imperium, the Castilian crown’s rights to dominion in the Indies proved the most intense in the Spanish case. As for the question of maritime monopoly and dominion, although a range of Spanish theologians, jurists and humanists continued to discuss Spain’s American imperium, they came into increasing agreement about its basic legitimacy. By the late sixteenth and first half of the seventeenth century the monarchy and its advocates drew upon a diversified range of arguments in support of Spain’s empire, including the papal bulls, the voluntary vassalage of native peoples, the right of just conquest, and the right to occupy unclaimed or uncultivated lands.353

In his, *Monarquía de España* – completed in the early seventeenth century but circulating in manuscript only until its first publication 1770–71 – Pedro Salazar Mendoza began by extolling the power of the “Catholic King” as “the largest ever seen, that the world has ever had since its creation,” and proclaimed its “Empire” to be “more extended and large than all the Universal Monarchies” of antiquity, including that of the Assyrians, Chaldeans, Persians, Greeks and Romans.354 The sun “is always shining without losing sight

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of [the monarchy’s] Lordships,” he wrote, and he described its total dominion in more precise terms as “twenty times larger than was the Roman.” More than simply describing the unprecedented reach of Spanish imperium, Salazar also aimed to justify the bases of the titles by which both the Spanish and Portuguese held their overseas imperium. As for the Portuguese, he devoted a chapter precisely to the bases upon which “the King [of Portugal] titles himself ‘Lord of the Conquest, Navigation and Commerce of Ethiopia, Arabia, Persia and India’,” which was itself, Salazar notes, “an imitation of that which his predecessor, King John [the third] titled himself, ‘Lord of Guinea’.” The title of ‘Conquest’,” he wrote, corresponded to “the stone markers [padrões] and forts they had on the Coast; [and] that of ‘Navigation’ to the unknown Seas that they made known” and over which “He [the King] became such owner […] that neither the Gentiles nor the Moors dared to navigate them without his safe-conduct.” He further argued that the Common Law principle of the sea as common to everyone applied only to Europe, and that “the Gentiles and Moors for their infidelity cannot take advantage of it.” On the dominion over India itself, Salazar claimed that the Portuguese King held it undisputedly through the right of first occupation, since “neither by inheritance, nor by conquest, did the property of the Province belong to any one.” Portugal’s dominion in India must be respected not only by “Gentiles and Moors” but also by any persons who recognize the “Holy Catholic Church” or govern “themselves by its political laws.” Finally, the title of ‘Commerce,’ wrote Salazar, derived from the fact that Portuguese armadas returned “loaded from those parts of all the things the land produces,” mentioning “Goa, Ormuz, Malacca, and other [places],” where they treat “the

355 Ibid. xxvi.
356 Ibid. vol. 2, book 5, title 2, ch. 22, 186. In fact, the title “Lord of Guinea” dates back to the reign of the Portuguese king Manuel I, in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries.
357 Ibid.
358 Ibid.
359 Ibid.
360 Ibid.
natives as [...] vassals of a Lord; paying the King duties on the entry and exit from those ports,” on the merchandise traded, and on the contracts agreed upon with “the Kings and Lords” of those “provinces.”

“This way of doing business,” he noted, “is maintained with friendly and tributary Kings, like those of Cananor, Cochin, Ceylon, and others.”

On Spain’s right to sovereignty in the “West Indies” Salazar cited the arguments of a range of theologians, jurists, and other authors, including Francisco de Vitoria, Gregorio López Madera, Alonso de Castro, and Juan Mayor. He also cited the *Inter cætera* bull of Pope Alexander VI, which entrusted to the “Spaniards the reduction of the idolatry [of the Amerindians],” and prohibited it “to any other Nation,” this having come, Salazar Mendoza did not fail to note, “after the resistance of the Princes and Lords of this New World.”

Synthesizing these diverse arguments, he described the war against “rebellious Indians” in particular as “very just,” since Spaniards waged it “in favor of the oppressed Indians,” those “that were already members of the Church, friends and companions of the Spaniards.” For the injury that these “rebellious Indians” committed, Spaniards were fully justified in their efforts to “occupy those lands and Provinces, and make themselves Lords of them, altering the government; [...] maintaining in everything the laws and conditions of just war, as the Kings have always maintained.”

Placing particular emphasis on the arguments of Vitoria and citing various precepts of natural law and the law of nations, Salazar Mendoza justified the Spanish conquest of America based on the failure of certain Amerindian groups to reciprocate Spaniards’ overtures of companionship and friendship, to have commerce, trade, and communication with them, to allow them to pass freely through their lands, and to provide the Spaniards

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361 Ibid.
362 Ibid.
363 Ibid. vol. 1, book 3, title 7, ch. 12, 355-357.
364 Ibid.
“hospitality with good courtesy” as “messengers and ambassadors of Kings.”

Moreover, he cited the voluntary cession of sovereignty on the part of certain indigenous lords and caciques, the alleged cannibalism and general brutality of others, and explained that on these bases the Spanish “Kings could legitimately make themselves Lords of these Provinces, and they can enjoy and possess them with much security of conscience.”

Lastly, and most importantly of all, Salazar Mendoza cited St. Augustine, St. Isidro and St. Thomas in arguing that, having “no superior in the temporal,” and regardless of the numerous legitimating reasons listed above, “the Sovereign […] Kings of Castile” were under no obligation “to authorize war,” and could simply “have moved by their authority.”

Even more famously, the Jesuit ethnographer, José de Acosta, had first argued in the late 1580s that despite valid critiques of the conquest’s initial legitimacy, Spanish claims in the Indies had become legally prescribed through their long, continuous occupation of the land. In his, De procuranda indorum salute, Acosta melded the diverse, often explicitly opposed, theories and arguments of Las Casas and Vitoria with those of Sepúlveda and others in censuring the abuse and excessively violent tactics of the early settlers in the subjugation and conversion of Amerindians while at the same insisting on the Indians’ fundamental barbarity. He lamented that the “Christian religion” the Amerindians displayed was “pure appearance and varnish,” but blamed the Spaniards for this since they “attempted to persuade [the natives] more with the sword than with the word, not with the innocence and doctrine of the preachers, but with the cruelty and fear of the soldiers.” Nevertheless, he held that “it is not licit to make war on the barbarians for infidelity however obstinate” they may have

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365 Ibid.
366 Ibid. vol. 1, book 3, title 7, ch. 12, 357.
367 Ibid.
368 José de Acosta’s, De procuranda indorum salute (Madrid: CSIC, 1984 [1588]), book 1, ch. 13, 191-193.
been. But, in a subtle defense of the initial phase of conquest, he argued that all empires, beginning with Rome itself, had origins in violence. Most importantly, regardless of the violence through which the initial phase of conquest had been carried out, the Spanish had come to occupy the Indies in good faith, he argued. The Spaniards’ prescriptive right had the “confirmation of at least sixty years,” and any restitution of the territory “would lead necessarily to universal chaos.” Moreover, now that so many Indians had become Christians (even if just by name), the duty to protect the faith “and the eternal salvation of the Indians themselves provide[d] the Christian princes with the strict and just right to govern the [Indian] Christian community.” “This alone is enough,” proclaimed Acosta, “and more than enough,” to justify Spanish sovereignty over America and its native inhabitants.

The controversy culminated with the publication of the two-volume, *De Indiarum Jure* (1629 and 1639), by the jurist-bureaucrat Juan de Solórzano Pereira. In addition to his defense of Portuguese maritime dominion in Asia, Solórzano synthesized over a century of theological and juridical debate on the validity of Spain’s American imperium, recognizing all the above titles as legitimate, although acknowledging their varying degrees of force. More than simply an impartial jurist, Solórzano was also a royal official, and the monarchy’s objectives therefore were also his own. “With the approval and support of God,” he wrote, “I am going to speak of the justice and right of our […] Catholic monarchs of the Spains

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370 Hernando Sánchez, *Las indias en la monarquía católica*, 103.
372 Ibid.
373 Ibid.
374 Juan de Solórzano Pereira, *De Indiarum Jure sive de justa Indiarum Occidentalium Inquisitione, Acquisitione, & Retentione*, 2 vols. (Madrid: Ex Typographia Francisci Martínez, 1629-1639). The second book of this work was subsequently published in Spanish as *Política Indiana* (Madrid: Diego Díaz de la Carrera) in 1647. Solórzano’s work provided the foundation of the first comprehensive corpus of Spanish American law, the 1681 *Recollectión de Leys de los Reynos de las Indias*, which he co-wrote with Antonio de León Pinelo.
[...] to discover, [...] acquire and [...] retain the Western and Southern provinces of this so-called New World.”

Moreover, recognizing that while the debate was largely settled among Spaniards, it was his “obligation to take the plume, like the men of arms the lance and shield,” to dispel the arguments of the many foreign “Heretics and Authors ill-disposed to our Nation, [...] who spread their infesting treatises” and who attempted to degrade Spain’s moral and legal authority in the Indies. Solórzano reaffirmed the Pope’s supreme authority in the spiritual world, including over non-Christians. He cited the royal chronicler, Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, for proof that, from the beginning, Spaniards had carried out the conquest in good faith and with “loyalty and love [...] for their Kings.” He also referred to the arguments of Vitoria, Luis de Molina, and even the Portuguese Seraphim de Freitas on the sea, to demonstrate that “deserted, uncultured places” are considered in “natural liberty,” and belong to the first who occupy them.

Importantly, Solórzano assessed multiple perspectives in debates on specific points. He made implicit reference to Sepúlveda, Vargas Machuca and others of “the opinion of Aristotle,” who argued that as “brutish, and barbarous,” the Indians were “taken to be beasts,” regarded as servants, and therefore justly enslaved and warred against for refusing to “obey” and “submit to human customs.” But Solórzano himself explained that despite not possessing the same level of culture and civilization as Spaniards, in no part of the Indies “have there been found such brutes that do not have some use of natural and intellectual reason, and are capable of enjoying the right of nations.”

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376 Juan de Solórzano Pereira, Política Indiana (Madrid: Matheo Sacristan, 1736 [1647]), part 1, book 1, ch. 9, 33.
377 Ibid.
378 Ibid.
379 Ibid.
length in arguing for Native Americans’ true humanity. “Therefore,” he wrote, the Indians 
“cannot be warred against and have their land taken or possessed,” except by the series of 
legitimating titles Vitoria presented in his mid-sixteenth century Relecciones. He also drew 
on Giovanni Botero, a “foreign author,” who, “in his Relaciones Universales,” argued that “our 
Kings can not only retain the Indies, but can make open war on the Indians that rebel 
against them, or,” in a thinly veiled reference to northern Europeans, “against others that 
invade or perturb them.”

As for the Papal bulls of donation, Solórzano acknowledged that although some 
“authors say it only gave the Catholic Kings and their successors […] the right of the 
evangelization, conversion and General protection of the Indians,” the majority “are of the 
opinion that the dominion and jurisdiction that [the pope] wanted to give […] was general, 
absolute.” Solórzano opined that this latter “interpretation seems to conform to the very 
words of the bull itself.” And in his conclusions, he identified the whole debate of Vitoria 
and his pupils as of mere “antiquarian interest,” raised only by “certain heretics out of envy 
of our nation.” With that, Solórzano concluded the legal debate within Spain over the 
monarchy’s claim to sovereignty in the New World, but not before attempting to 
demonstrate for posterity what he saw as the global, indeed providential, character of Iberian 
imperium.

Solórzano saw the civilizing and evangelizing actions of the Iberians as the highest 
and purest legitimation of their overseas empires. In addition to the various missionary

381 Solórzano Pereira, Política Indiana, part 1, book 1, ch. 9, 33. Here Solórzano cites Vitoria’s Relecciones again
382 Ibid. part 1, book 1, ch. 11, 43.
383 Ibid.
384 Ibid.
385 Recopilación de leyes de los reynos de las Indias (1681). See Pagden, “Dispossessing the Barbarian,” in The Languages 
of Political Theory in Early Modern Europe, 97-98.
exploits of Spaniards in America, he also lauded those of the Portuguese in Asia.386 He asserted that “God Our Lord […] gave this New World to the Kings of Spain,” attributed God to inspiring both the Spanish and Portuguese to such expansionary endeavors, and placed their achievements on an equal plane.387 “Castilians, like Portuguese,” wrote Solórzano, “have surpassed Hercules, Bacho, Osiris, Alexander, Tírios, and Carthaginensis, and all others who were celebrated and venerated in antiquity.”388 Stressing the globality of joint Spanish-Portuguese imperium, he proclaimed that, “earlier having and enjoying the best of Europe, […] the great part they occupied of Africa, and even more of Asia with the domination of East India, now is added the fourth part of the World,” America.389 And echoing the mellifluous praise of Botero, Salazar Mendoza, and many others, Solórzano wrote that the Spanish monarchy, including Portugal’s multicontinental possessions, was “twenty times greater” than that of the Romans, was greater even than that of China, and “almost girdles the entire globe, extending from the Orient to the Occident. […] One can sail around the world without touching any lands other than those of Spain.”390

Conclusions

In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, defenders of Spanish and Portuguese imperium were confronted by heightened threats from abroad, including armed attacks and commercial competition, as well as legal challenges that disputed the fundamental bases by which the Iberian rulers claimed sovereignty beyond Europe.

387 Solórzano Pereira, Política Indiana (1736 [1647]), part 1, book 1, ch. 9, 33.
388 Ibid. part 1, book 1, ch. 8, 28.
389 Ibid.
390 Ibid.
Although debates over particular aspects of the moral and legal bases of Iberian imperium persisted, they arose increasingly in response to the critiques of foreigners, rather than from questions and qualms raised from within. If Spaniards and Portuguese continued to debate African and Amerindian slavery, they showed increasing accord over the issue of maritime monopolies on trade and navigation. Likewise, the “Controversy of the Indies,” over Spain’s right to dominion in the Americas, was finally resolved, at least within Iberia itself, with the sophisticated syntheses of José de Acosta and Juan de Solórzano Pereira. By the early seventeenth century, Iberian jurists, theologians, humanists, and bureaucrats, were largely in agreement on a range of issues including the necessary conditions for waging of just wars of conquest (or “pacification”), for the subjugation of native peoples, for exclusive rights to maritime monopoly, and for legitimate claims to territorial sovereignty beyond Europe. As a result, internal Iberian debates over the legal and moral foundations of overseas imperium began dissipating, especially amidst the celebratory frenzy surrounding peninsular union in 1580.

Despite receiving the fitting moniker “prudent,” in recognition of his pragmatism in matters of state, many contemporaries viewed the reign of Philip II in messianic terms. With the union of Portugal and the Spanish monarchy, Philip had achieved the ever elusive goal of uniting the entire Iberian peninsula under his singular sovereignty. Even more significant was that, with the aggregation of Portugal’s myriad possessions across Africa, Asia, and Brazil, he now laid claim to one of the largest, most extended monarchies the world had ever known. Philip’s composite monarchy constituted what was, according to several observers, the first truly global empire in history. A range of humanists and cartographers, engravers and sculptors, theologians and jurists, devoted themselves to substantiating and amplifying this point.
Importantly, however, the triumphalist vision of the breadth and depth of Iberian imperial power stood in sharp contrast to the reality of crown rule in many areas claimed by the monarchy. Despite globalized claims to dominium over seemingly endless territories throughout “the four parts of the world,” Iberian imperial sovereignty remained diffuse, contested, and uneven across space and time.391 This was true to a certain degree in the main centers of colonial authority, not to mention in the peninsula itself. It was even more so the case in remote regions on the distant edges of empire, including in places like Southeast Africa, the Philippines, and the Río de la Plata.

391 In the sixteenth century, “the four parts of the world” referred to Europe, Africa, Asia, and America.
Southeast Africa offers a prime regional case study for demonstrating the diffuse, fluid nature of Iberian imperial sovereignty, and for assessing the various strategies the Portuguese crown used to extend, justify, and maintain its influence in the region both directly and indirectly. The region was significant not only as home to one of the continent’s largest and most powerful African polities in the sixteenth century – the so-called “kingdom” or “empire” of Monomotapa – but also because it soon became a major – if often overlooked – center of gravity within Portugal’s vast extended empire. According to the terms agreed upon in the Treaty of Tordesillas, Southeast Africa lay squarely within the Portuguese-claimed hemisphere of conquest and jurisdiction. Yet, despite this, and despite the region’s key strategic and commercial value to the broader Portuguese empire, royal officials encountered great difficulty in establishing and maintaining effective authority there. In addition to the harshness of the climate and the susceptibility of the Portuguese to disease in the region, their frustrations were due in large part to the overwhelming power of local indigenous groups, as well as to the general military and political volatility of the interior, which saw constantly shifting relations of alliance and conflict between declining and

emerging polities. In this tumultuous context, the Portuguese crown represented but one of a range of forces vying for hegemony and survival.\(^{393}\)

In examining the strategies the crown mobilized to extend its direct control and indirect influence in the region, it is worth noting that beyond formal territorial sovereignty,
Lisbon also aimed to expand and consolidate various other forms of authority. For instance, Portuguese rulers throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries sought continuously to reinforce their claim to be “lord of the sea” and secure exclusive control over the navigation of the entire East African coast. Through the Padroado Real, the crown also claimed supreme power over the church in Africa and prime jurisdiction over all Christians within its dominions. In addition, it declared a monopoly on trade in the region to cover not only maritime commerce, but also that conducted on land. In fact, the effort to extend territorial sovereignty seems to have been driven as much by the king’s desire to control the region’s trade, in order to tax it, as by any direct interest in the land for its own sake, which, with the exception of the mine fields, held little intrinsic value in itself. In any case, unlike in other parts of its empire, in Southeast Africa the Portuguese crown did nonetheless develop a significant territorial footprint. The limits of that footprint were vague, however, in continuous flux, and contracted substantially by the close of the seventeenth century.

The fluid instability of Portuguese colonial authority in the region was in large part a consequence of the crown’s reliance on intermediaries. Aside from sponsoring a failed military expedition to the interior in the late sixteenth century and establishing a handful of forts and a small bureaucracy of colonial officials, the crown exerted its power for the most part indirectly. Many of the most influential intermediaries were either native-born Portuguese or mestiços – often referred to alternatively as “mistiços” or simply “sons of Portuguese” – engaged in the gold trade who had risen to positions of power in local society by adapting to indigenous forms of social, political, and economic organization.\(^\text{394}\) As a

\(^{394}\) Contemporary authors often referred to these people using the Mokaranga term, “muzungos,” although in many cases they used instead, “sons of Portuguese,” or “Portuguese,” the latter of which could refer either to settlers of full Portuguese extraction or to mixed-race persons who had at least some Portuguese blood. For examples of the use of the words “mestiço” or “mistiço,” see “Carta de P. João Baptista de Ribeira (de Goa) para Alfonso de Zárate, Reitor do collegio de Córdova, 27 de Outubro de 1565,” in Documenta Indica (DI
result, the legitimacy local peoples afforded them derived less from their status as representatives or subjects of the Portuguese crown than from the prestige they enjoyed as heirs to earlier ancestral chiefs. Likewise, despite having the advantage of European firearms, their military power derived not from any innate Portuguese strength or superiority. After all, although there did emerge a substantial “mestiço” population in the region, the total number of settlers of full Portuguese extraction seems not to have exceeded 300 at any point in sixteenth or seventeenth centuries. As a result, their most important assets were the massive armies of native soldiers on which they depended. 395 More than agents of an “informal” or “shadow” empire, these persons navigated deftly back and forth within and beyond the orbit of crown power. 396 At times they operated in the name of the crown as its direct representatives, often holding official positions in the colonial administration. At other times, however, when their interests diverged from those of Lisbon, they resisted the encroachment of imperial rule and demonstrated their own exclusive authority over both local indigenous peoples as well as less powerful Portuguese and mestiço settlers in their midst.

In an effort to establish its own exclusive sphere of sovereignty in the region, in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the crown fortified and garrisoned several of the main trade fairs. It also formally recognized the territorial domains of several prominent

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395 As in Southeast Africa, scholars of the so-called “New Conquest History,” have likewise highlighted the dependence Spanish conquistadors in America on the armies of indigenous allies and vassals. See, Restall, “The New Conquest History,” Restall, Maya Conquistador; and Restall, Seven Myths of the Spanish Conquest; Matthew and Oudijk, eds., Indian Conquistadors; and Altman, The War for Mexico’s West, among other works.

Portuguese and mestiço intermediaries who had initially received those lands in grant from local rulers. When a series of internecine dynastic disputes weakened the Monomotapa’s grip on power in the early seventeenth century, several of these settlers intervened on his behalf, defended him with their own private armies, and eventually subjugated him to a relationship of vassalage to the crown of Portugal.

Portuguese crown power in the region reached its apex in the early 1630s. Over the second half of that century, however, several indigenous groups emerged to challenge and undermine Portuguese hegemony. Ultimately, the crown’s effective sovereignty was confined to a handful of isolated enclaves along the coast and the lower reaches of the Zambezi River, in the area referred to broadly as the Rios de Cuama (“Rivers of Cuama”). Within the Portuguese population, power reverted in large part to the most prominent settlers, but by the mid 1690s, their authority was reduced as well. Local polities eclipsed the Portuguese as the preeminent force on the interior plateau, and much of the area formerly controlled by the Portuguese crown remained beyond its effective reach until well into the eighteenth century and beyond.

Portuguese interest in Southeast Africa first piqued in the early sixteenth century when colonial officials recognized its strategic value on the carreira da Índia shipping lane connecting Lisbon and Goa. They also noted its commercial promise given the bustling coastal trade that had long linked the East African hinterland to distant markets in the Middle East and South Asia. By the mid sixteenth century, Portuguese merchants had established themselves at coastal trade fairs running all the way from Malindi to Sofala.

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Through force, and the threat of force, they eventually eclipsed the long-dominant Swahili-speaking Muslim merchants as the leading importers of South Asian textiles, the primary commodity exchanged for Mocaranga gold, ivory, and slaves.398

Yet despite their naval power and success in wresting the bulk of that trade from local sheiks or fumos (literally meaning, “brother,” fumo was the Mocaranga term for a “chief” or “governor” whose legitimacy derived from his inheritance of an ancestral position of authority), Portuguese crown forces had substantially less success on land. This was partly a result of the harsh climate and disease that crippled Portuguese armies.399 The Dominican, João dos Santos, who spent several years in the region, reported in his *Ethiopia Oriental*, that, “the country is very hot, unhealthy, and prejudicial to foreigners, especially the Portuguese, who fall ill and die of fever.”400 Francisco de Monclaro, a Jesuit, made a similar attestation, noting with marked contempt for the indigenous peoples that the land and climate was so difficult that only “barbarians” like the *cafres* [ie. Africans] could live there.401 Despite his disdainful views of the region’s climate and inhabitants, Monclaro did nonetheless note the

398 “Relação da viagem que fizerão os Padres da companhia de Jesus com Francisco Barretto na conquistas de Monomotapa no anno de 1569, feita pello P. Monclaro da mesma companhia,” in *Documenta Indica (DI)* hereafter, edited by Joseph Wicki, vol. 8: 1569-1573 (Rome: Monumenta Historia Soc. Jesu, 1964), 698 and 702. Thanks to their overwhelming advantage at sea, the Portuguese supplanted their Muslim competitors with relative speed, becoming the preeminent traders on the Southeast African littoral. The Jesuit Francisco de Monclaro observed in 1569 that the headmen encountered along the coast, although “wealthy and powerful, [...] might better be labeled sheiks rather than kings,” and not simply because they were mostly Muslim. The implication was also that they lacked the power and station required for the title of “kings,” and that instead they were just sheiks or *fumo*, the local term for “chief or governor.”

399 “Carta de P. Stephanus Lopes a P. Everardo Mercuriano, Moçambique, 4 de Agosto de 1574,” *DI*, vol. 9: 1573-1575, 384. In his report from Mozambique Island in 1574, Estevão Lopes describes the difficult climatic conditions, how it was oppressively hot, except in June and July, and laments the lack of bread, wine and oil – “which the Portuguese are raised on,” and were accustomed to – except that which arrived by trade at very high prices. And he added, specifically, that the lack of fresh water and made people sick.


401 Monclaro, “Relação da viagem que fizerão os Padres da companhia de Jesus com Francisco Barretto na conquistas de Monomotapa no anno de 1569,” *DI*, vol. 8, 692. The term, *cafre*, which contemporary Portuguese used to refer to Africans, connoted infidelity, lack of civilization, and persons who were neither Christian nor Muslim. Therefore, following Newitt, even when citing translated works, I have preferred to maintain the original term, *cafre*, for its linguistic specificity, rather than using “Kaffir” as it is often translated into English, or the more general, less nuanced term, “African.” See Conceição, *Tratado dos Rios de Cuama*, 5.
sheer beauty of the mountains along the coast, which he believed to hold behind them a terrestrial paradise replete with some of the world’s richest deposits of gold and silver. But more than climate or disease, the most important factor impeding Portuguese expansion in the hinterland was the opposition posed by a multiplicity of local polities to Portugal’s attempts to expand its influence at the expense of their own.

Local Politics and Society

As Santos explained in the late sixteenth century, the indigenous inhabitants of the interior spoke Mocaranga. Contemporaries often referred to the region itself and its inhabitants using that same term: Mocaranga. The only the exceptions, wrote Santos, were areas on along the southern bank of the lower Zambezi and “along the seacoast, where other languages are spoken, particularly the Botonga [or Tonga] tongue, for which reason these lands are called Botonga and their inhabitants Botongas [or Tongas].”

As Gai Roufe recently demonstrated, Mocaranga was also the name of the region’s pre-eminent native polity, which throughout the sixteenth century and early years of the seventeenth consisted of four major constituent kingdoms united through relations of affinal and consanguineous kinship. Although several contemporaries used the term, “Mocaranga,” the majority erroneously conflated the ruler’s title with that of the political unit itself and referred to that larger polity as “the Monomotapa.” In addition, several contemporary Portuguese characterized it as an “empire,” or described its imperial qualities.

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402 According to Mudenge, the category, “Shona,” was not used to describe the people of this region until the nineteenth century. See Mudenge, *A Political History of Munhumutapa*, 21.
404 Roufe, “Local Perceptions of Political Entities along the Southern Bank of the Zambezi in the 16th and 17th Centuries.” Affinal relations refer to those established through “in-law” or through various forms of “marriage,” whereas consanguinity refers to common ancestry or descent, which is to say, to be related by blood. Roufe explains these relations in detail regarding the Mocaranga.
This reflected both their own Eurocentric paradigms of political organization as well as their desire to emphasize the vastness of that polity and its power in order to justify their subservience to it and place it on the same plane as the Aztecs and Incas. While the smaller constituent polities were in theory vassals of the Mocaranga ruler, as were the Portuguese, and paid him an annual tribute, he had relatively little influence in their internal affairs. It is perhaps most apt then to describe Mocaranga power over its constituent kingdoms as denoting a relation of suzerainty rather than full sovereignty, keeping in mind the limitations of these concepts in the African context given their origins in European legal and political theory.

Santos referred to the larger polity as “Monomotapa” and distinguished between its past status as an “empire” and its current one as a “kingdom.” For Santos, the distinction was meaningful, and he employed it to reflect the gradual weakening of that polity prior to Portuguese arrival. The “kingdom of Monomotapa is situated in the lands called Mocaranga,” he explained, all of which “formerly belonged to the empire of Monomotapa, and [is] at present, […] divided into four kingdoms.” These kingdoms, he wrote, were the Quiteve, the Sedanda, the Tshikanga [ie. Chicanga], and “the kingdom which at present belongs to Monomotapa.” According to Santos, at some unspecified moment, an earlier Mocaranga ruler appointed three of his sons as governors of Quiteve, Sedanda, Chicanga. “As soon as their father died,” however, “and another son who was at court succeeded to the empire,” the three “rose in arms” against their brother, and “were never again willing to obey the Monomotapa or his successors,” each one claiming sovereignty within his respective

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405 That tribute was called a curva. Local subjects typically paid curva in the form of labor and grain, whereas the Portuguese paid it in cloth.

406 In surveying a range of contemporary writings on the Monomotapa, however, we see authors vacillating frequently between the terms “empire,” “kingdom,” and “state,” reflecting a general lack of precision – and in some cases a lack of interest in precision – in defining its status.

domain. The kingdom of Monomotapa, he wrote, nonetheless remained “very much more extensive than the three others combined,” and he saw that earlier violent splintering as the cause of the seemingly perpetual conflict that characterized relations between them.

According to Santos, the “vast kingdom of Monomotapa is more than two hundred leagues in length and almost as much in breadth.” It was bounded in the east by the Zambezi, in the southeast by the Indian Ocean, “where it forms a tongue of land only ten or twelve leagues in breadth between the rivers Luabo and Tendanculo,” and in the west by “the lands of another very powerful” kingdom called “Abutua” (or Butua) whose reach was believed to extend all the way to the limits of the kingdom of Angola in the west. The kingdom of Quiteve extended from the coastal region around Sofala toward the interior along the Buzi River, eventually reaching the southeastern edge of the Monomotapa. That of Sedanda (which some authors referred to as Madanda) controlled “the lands traversed by the river Sabi,” farther south. And the last of the former Monomotapa vassal kingdoms, Chicanga (in the region of Manica), governed the lands lying roughly between those of Quiteve, Butua, and the Monomotapa heartlands. In Manica there were alleged to be “very extensive gold mines,” which, in addition to those reported in other parts of Southeast

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408 Monclaro, in one account, however, writing several decades earlier, claimed that both the ‘Butoa’ [Butua] and Manica were tribute-paying vassals of the Monomotapa. See, “Relação da Viagem que Fizerão os Padres da Companhia de Jesus com Francisco Barreto na Conquista de Monomotapa no Anno de 1569” (“Account of the journey made by Fathers of the Company of Jesus with Francisco Barreto in the conquest of Monomotapa in the Year 1569, by Father Monclaro, of the said Company”), in RSEA, vol. 3, 226-.

409 Malyn Newitt, however, has argued that even at its height the territory controlled by the Monomotapa was actually rather modest, measuring some one hundred and fifty miles by fifty miles. See Malyn Newitt, “Introduction,” in António da Conceição, Tratado dos Rios de Cuama, xxi. There is some dissension among scholars as to its actual size, however. Eric Axelson, for instance, described the Monomotapa’s “empire” as significantly larger, dominating a territory some four hundred miles long by two hundred miles wide. See, Axelson, Portuguese in South-East Africa, 1600-1700, 7. As to the nature of its political structure itself, Michael Pearson characterized it as “a greatly attenuated conglomery of loosely controlled tribal groupings.” See Pearson, Port Cities and Intruders, 23.

410 Santos located the kingdom of Butua northwest of the Monomotapa, but most modern historians locate it more directly west, if not southwest. See, Isaacman, Mozambique, 6.
Africa, proved a persistent if elusive obsession of the Portuguese throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.\(^{411}\)

Sixteenth century observers, like Santos, despite their condescending, denigrating portrayals of Mocaranga civilization nonetheless acknowledged the domineering power of several indigenous rulers even in their relations with Portuguese settlers and colonial officials. Santos noted that all three of the “rebel kings” (i.e. the Quiteve, Sedanda, and Chicanga) were “great lords,” but that the “Quiteve is the most powerful and richest.” The bulk of that wealth, he claimed, came from the “extensive commerce” the Quiteve conducted with the Portuguese, who brought him “great quantities of cloth and beads,” which “form the wealth of the cafres.”\(^{412}\) Diogo do Couto, the influential chronicler and author of several volumes of the well-known, _Décadas da Ásia_, remarked that such cloths were “much esteemed by the cafres, who divide them into pieces, […] wear them round their loins,” and “look upon them as the greatest finery in the world.”\(^{413}\)

In addition to the wealth the Quiteve acquired through trade with the Portuguese, he also enjoyed that which he amassed through tribute. Throughout most of the sixteenth century, Portugal was officially considered a vassal of both the Quiteve and the Monomotapa. The Portuguese captain at Sofala paid an annual tribute, or _curva_, of more than two hundred _cruzados_ worth of textiles to that native ruler in exchange for the right to reside and trade in his kingdom.\(^{414}\) Independent Portuguese merchants were likewise required to pay a duty of “one piece of cloth in twenty, and the same for beads” in order to pass “in safety” through the Quiteve’s lands “to the mountains of Manica, where the gold mines”

\(^{413}\) Diogo do Couto, _Década IX da Ásia [Decade IX of Asia]_, in RSEA, vol. 6, ch. 22, 366-369.
were thought to be located.\textsuperscript{415} The Quiteve also demonstrated his dominance by imposing strict diplomatic protocol on the envoys to which he gave audience. He required them, Portuguese envoys included, to enter his chamber barefoot and “throw themselves on the ground sideways […] and so speak without looking at him, clapping their hands after every four words, as is the custom.”\textsuperscript{416}

Similar to the Quiteve, the Monomotapa ruler required his own strict protocol in such meetings and demanded a tri-annual \textit{curva} from the Portuguese Captain of Mozambique of more than three thousand \textit{cruzados} worth of cloth and beads for the captain’s three-year term of office.\textsuperscript{417} Having paid this tribute, all Portuguese merchants and other Christian subjects of Portugal – including local converts and a substantial population of settlers from India – could, according to Santos, pass through the lands of the Monomotapa “with their bags of gold much more securely than if they were in Portugal.”\textsuperscript{418} If the Portuguese refused or delayed in paying the tribute, the Monomotapa could impose an \textit{empata}, which he did on occasion, sanctioning the seizure of all Portuguese merchandise within his dominions.\textsuperscript{419} Once the tribute was paid in full, the Monomotapa would reopen his lands to the Portuguese “and establish peace there” by royal decree.\textsuperscript{420}

Mocaranga power and wealth was not only represented by textiles and beads, however. Even more important, in fact, was the number of “wives” a ruler possessed. In addition to the women the Monomotapa married, the title of “wife” was used as a symbolic

\textsuperscript{417} Santos, \textit{Ethiopia Oriental [Eastern Ethiopia]}, 1609, in RSEA, vol. 7, book 2, ch. 9, p.270-273. For a more detailed description of this tribute arrangement, see Mudenge, \textit{A Political History of Mhunhumutapa}.
\textsuperscript{419} Captain Pedro Barreto de Rezende, \textit{Livro do Estado da India [Of the State of India]}, in RSEA, vol. 2, part 2, 413-419~. Writing in 1635, Rezende claimed that an \textit{empata} implied not only the seizure of Portuguese property, but also “that all Portuguese in his [ie. the Monomotapa’s] territory were to be killed.” Not all contemporary descriptions of the \textit{empata} included this important detail, however.
designation to refer other female relatives as well as to prominent male vassals, including several Portuguese “whom he esteems and holds in great respect.”⁴²¹ According to Santos, the title signified his “love” for those persons, and symbolized his desire “to show them as much love as he shows his wife.”⁴²² Thus, when in 1569 Monclaro relayed reports that the Monomotapa had some three thousand wives, he was referring – knowingly or not – to the many women and men which comprised the vast kinship-based polity of Mocaranga.⁴²³

**Portuguese and Mestiços at the Vanguard of Empire**

Despite the crown’s limited direct institutional presence, Portuguese merchants and adventurers spread throughout the region in the sixteenth century. This included a number of deserters from the Portuguese military and numerous *degredado* convicts sent to Southeast Africa to serve out their sentences. These persons existed for the most part beyond the reach of the Portuguese imperial bureaucracy, having integrated within local systems of political, cultural, and economic organization. Several amassed great landholdings, also engaging in trade and functioning as middlemen between local societies and agents of the Captain of Mozambique in the enclaves of crown power on the coast and main rivers.

Several of these settler-merchants held great power and influence in local society. The vast majority of these “Portuguese” married native women and had mixed-race mulatto children, which Portuguese officials and missionaries often referred to disparagingly as

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⁴²³ Monclaro, “Relação da viagem que fizerão os Padres da companhia de Jesus com Francisco Barretto na conquistas de Monomotapa no anno de 1569,” in *DI*, vol. 8, 714. Also, in highlighting that ruler’s barbaric despotism in order to justify war against him, Monclaro claimed that the Monomotapa once had hundred of these “wives” executed for allegedly practicing witchcraft.
“mestiços,” “mistiços,” or “sons of Portuguese.” Some had multiple wives in accordance with local custom, a practice which local missionaries looked upon with great disdain. And having embraced the social and cultural norms of local society, many became powerful fumos with all the customary privileges and duties that role entailed. This interracial mixing was not simply restricted to the hinterland. As the Jesuit João Baptista de Ribeira reported already in 1565, even the population of Mozambique Island, the official center of Portuguese authority in the region, was composed of both “Portuguese casados [married settlers] and others, mestiços.”

Given the autonomy of these persons from colonial authorities in Mozambique Island, not to mention in Goa or Lisbon, and since many were either illiterate or had little to no formal education, they left scant direct documentary evidence of their existence and activities. However, close readings of the notes and correspondence of missionaries and royal officials reveal the remarkable ubiquity of such people throughout the region, even well before the Portuguese crown extended its effective authority there in the first half of the seventeenth century. Importantly, however, although they enjoyed substantial autonomy from the Portuguese crown in many cases, they ought not be understood as existing independent of larger frameworks of power. As mentioned, most of these early settler-intermediaries derived their authority from indigenous groups and headmen, and were deeply enmeshed within preexisting, pre-European systems of political, cultural, and economic organization.

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425 “Carta de P. João Baptista de Ribeira (de Goa) para Alfonso de Zárate, Reitor do collegio de Córdova, 27 de Outubro de 1565,” DI, vol. 6, 1563-1566 (1960), 536. The term, casado, or “married man,” referred specifically to soldiers who had completed their military duties and received the right to marry. But the term was also commonly used as a synonym for morador, or resident, with all the municipal rights and duties that status entailed: see Conceição, Tratado dos Rios de Cuama, 7.
426 Newitt, Portuguese Settlement on the Zambezi, 57.
One example was Rodrigo Lobo, a Portuguese who by the late sixteenth century had established a personal fiefdom on the island of Maroupe, in the middle of the Buzi River. Santos described Lobo as “lord of the greater part of the island,” mentioning that he possessed many cafre slaves there, and that “all the other inhabitants were his vassals,” as well, meaning presumably that they either paid him tribute, could be called upon for military assistance, or both. The king of Quiteve, wrote Santos, granted the island to Lobo, “who was a great friend of his.” The Quiteve reportedly also conferred on Lobo the title of “wife,” which he and the Monomotapa alike bestowed “on the Captains of Mozambique and Sofala [and] upon all those Portuguese whom he greatly esteems.”

Another example was Antonio Caiado, an independent settler who had established himself in the very heart of Mocaranga, at the Monomotapa’s zimbabwe (his residence and court). When the Jesuit Gonçalo de Silveira reached that court in 1561 as an official envoy of the Portuguese crown, Caiado served as his interpreter. Caiado was reportedly a “great friend” of the Monomotapa, “on familiar terms” with him. We do not know the precise number of Portuguese living at the Monomotapa court in this early period, but Caiado was apparently not alone. The Jesuit Luis Fróis referred to some “Portuguese,” perhaps mestiços, alongside certain “Christians from this side of India” [ie. the west coast of India], and “slaves of the Portuguese,” who were most certainly indigenous. And although we have no direct evidence of it, Charles Boxer has suggested that in the early seventeenth century there may

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427 Santos describes this island, Maroupe, as “situated in the middle of the river of Sofala,” but he must have meant the Buzi River. See Santos, *Ethiopia Oriental [Eastern Ethiopia]*, 1609, in RSEA, vol. 7, book 1, ch. 20, 224.
have even been a few isolated settlers as far as the Kariba gorge on the present day border of Zambia and Zimbabwe.\footnote{C. R. Boxer, Race Relations in the Portuguese Colonial Empire: 1415-1825 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 49.}

Several of the region’s most powerful Portuguese came to rule over vast militaristic chiefdoms with control over large swathes of territory and groups of slaves and dependents. And beyond the symbolic prestige they enjoyed as heirs to earlier indigenous fumos, their authority derived principally from the hundreds and sometimes thousands of soldiers in their retinue, whose collective military power vastly exceeded that of the Portuguese and mestiço settlers alone. In 1613, Diogo Simões Madeira alluded explicitly to the importance (and loyalty) of his enslaved soldiers, “who always accompany me on these occasions,” and who set aside all their own concerns “in order to secure completely these lands and preserve the forts.”\footnote{“Carta de Diogo Simões Madeira para el-rei,” Sena, 11 July 1613, in DPMAC, vol. 9, 313. For original source, see Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino [AHU hereafter], Mozambique, caixa 1.} The settler-intermediaries depended on the “formal empire,” to borrow Malyn Newitt’s term, in order to secure access to cloth and firearms, which were central to their own wealth and power, as well as to that of local kings and headmen, and which were procured most easily through agents of the Captain of Mozambique, who administered the crown’s monopoly on trade in the region.\footnote{Newitt, “Formal and Informal Empire in the History of Portuguese Expansion,” 17.} But the relationship was mutual. In the late sixteenth century and first half of the seventeenth, the crown, in turn, also relied heavily on these people in extending its authority throughout the hinterland.

Beyond Mozambique Island – which after the 1560s had a population of roughly a hundred Portuguese in addition to another two hundred or so natives and Indians – other significant concentrations of Portuguese settlers could be found at Sena and Tete, on the
southern bank of the Zambezi, located 60 and 120 leagues [about 160 and 320 miles] respectively, from the mouth of that river, where it empties into the sea.  

Small numbers of Portugueses had settled in these two riverine enclaves in the decades prior to the first crown-sponsored expedition to conquer the interior in 1569. Earlier that decade, the Jesuit Luis Fróis estimated the Portuguese population at Sena to be some “ten or

433 “Relação da Viagem que Fizerão os Padres da Companhia de Jesus com Francisco Barreto na Conquista de Monomotapa no Anno de 1569” (“Account of the journey made by Fathers of the Company of Jesus with Francisco Barreto in the conquest of Monomotapa in the Year 1569, by Father Monclaro, of the said Company”), in RSEA, vol. 3, 202. In a separate letter, written in Mozambique Island in 1570, Monclaro says that the population of Mozambique, in addition to an unnamed number of native peoples, consisted of some seventy Portuguese casados, six hundred Indians, and seventy Muslims from Mucigate; see, “Carta de P. Francisco de Monclaro a P. Leoni Henriques,” Mozambique, 1 August 1570, in DI, vol. 8, 295. Michael N. Pearson cites the distances in kilometers, at about 260 and 515 kilometers, see Port Cities and Intruders, 39. One league translated to roughly four kilometers.
fifteen,” in addition to “some Christians” from western India.\textsuperscript{434} The Portuguese settlement at Tete, sixty leagues upriver, was no doubt even smaller.

Despite the occasional conflicts between Portuguese and Muslims in Southeast Africa, and despite the official position of the Portuguese crown and missionaries, which regarded Muslims as enemies of the kingdom who could be justly conquered and enslaved, the two groups seem to have lived for the most part in peace and symbiosis. In one early sixteenth century missive the king of Portugal even instructed his captain at Sofala that he “shall not interfere in the disputes and contentions that there may be between the Moors and cafres,” and that he should “leave them to follow their own customs” so that both “the cafres be well treated and the Moors be not offended.”\textsuperscript{435} Nearly four decades later, in 1569, Monclaro reported that along the Zambezi there were “in different places about twenty turbaned Moors, men of position and rich, who traded with our people at the station of Sena.”\textsuperscript{436} “Christians and Moors went about so much mixed together as if they belonged to the same sect,” he wrote, adding that, “Moors were not always evil.”\textsuperscript{437} And the famed chronicler Diogo do Couto wrote of a “village of friendly Moors” near Sena in 1571, where “those Moors, owing to their exchange with the Portuguese with whom they had, for the most part, grown up together, spoke and wrote our language very well.”\textsuperscript{438}

As Michael Pearson has argued, both Sena and Tete functioned as “inland port cities,” which is to say that they developed as points of purchase, sale, or barter of a variety of goods not only between the hinterlands immediately adjacent and Portuguese factories on

\textsuperscript{434} “Carta do Padre Luís Fróis,” Goa, 15 December 1561, in \textit{DPMAC}, vol. 8, 40.
\textsuperscript{435} Axelson, \textit{Portuguese in South-East Africa, 1488-1600}, 126.
\textsuperscript{436} “Relação da Viagem que Fizerão os Padres da Companhia de Jesus com Francisco Barreto na Conquista de Monomotapa no Anno de 1569” (“Account of the journey made by Fathers of the Company of Jesus with Francisco Barreto in the conquest of Monomotapa in the Year 1569, by Father Monclaro, of the said Company”), in \textit{RSEA}, vol. 3, 235-236.
\textsuperscript{437} Monclaro, “Relação feita pelo Padre Francisco de Monclaro, da Companhia de Jesus, da Expedição ao Monomotapa, Comandada por Francisco Barreto,” in \textit{DPMAC}, vol. 8, 393.
\textsuperscript{438} Couto, \textit{Da Ásia}, \textit{DPMAC}, vol. 8, 275.
the coast, but also with other smaller fairs farther inland in the direction of the
Monomotapa’s court and along the network of rivers that flowed into the Zambezi from the
west.\textsuperscript{439} Both Santos and Couto described this commercial system in detail. While Sena
functioned as a center of trade in itself, its primary function was as a staging point for goods
caluring to and from Tete and beyond.

From Tete, “[there are three market places where the Portuguese go to […] sell their
merchandise [mostly textiles and beads] or exchange it for gold.”\textsuperscript{440} The first of those inland
fares was Luanhe [Luanze], about thirty-five leagues southwest from Tete, along the river
Mazouvo.\textsuperscript{441} The second, which Couto called Bucoto (and which Santos called Manzovo,
since it was located on that river), was some thirteen leagues northwest from Luanze. The
third, Massapa, was located fifty leagues from Tete, roughly west of the fair at Bucoto. In all
three of the fairs, the Portuguese “residents of Sena and Tete have warehouses called \textit{churros},
where they store their merchandise, and from which they sell it and send it to be sold”
elsewhere.\textsuperscript{442} Massapa was the most important of the three since it was located at the edge of
the Monomotapa’s realms and since the majority of trade between the Portuguese and
Monomotapa had to pass through it. Beyond the presence of traders, wrote Couto, by the
late sixteenth century, the Dominicans had even established “churches at all these places,
where the sacraments are administered to the resident Christians” and to those itinerant
merchants and others who passed through there.\textsuperscript{443}

\textsuperscript{439} Pearson, \textit{Port Cities and Intruders}, 39.
\textsuperscript{440} Couto, \textit{Década IX da Ásia [Decade IX of Asia]}, in \textit{RSEA}, vol. 6, ch. 22, 366-367.
\textsuperscript{441} Couto says south, but it was in fact southwest. Couto, \textit{Década IX da Ásia [Decade IX of Asia]}, in \textit{RSEA}, vol. 6,
ch. 22, 366-367.
\textsuperscript{443} Couto, \textit{Década IX da Ásia [Decade IX of Asia]}, in \textit{RSEA}, vol. 6, ch. 22, 368-369.
Missionaries

In addition to settlers, missionaries also played a significant albeit less transformative role in extending Portuguese influence throughout Southeast Africa. Bereft of a robust ecclesiastical administration under the direct crown control of the Padroado Real, the regular clergy, in particular Jesuits and Dominicans, were at the forefront in this process. As Eugénia Rodrigues has shown, missionaries often served as interpreters and representatives of the Portuguese crown in its early dealings with local indigenous kingdoms. This was in part to convey Portugal’s supposedly benign intentions, its hope for peaceful coexistence, and to demonstrate its joint desire to bring local peoples “to the light of the true religion” and extend Portuguese political and economic interests in the region. But priests also accompanied armed expeditions to the interior, providing spiritual inspiration and protection to troops in battle, and solace at the side of the wounded and dying. In addition, they were tasked with ensuring that wars of conquest were conducted legally, and that the proper ceremonies and declarations accompanied the subjugation of defeated rulers and peoples.

Beyond the work they carried out as advisers, preachers, and confessors to Portuguese settlers and members of the civil administration, the Jesuits and Dominicans also endeavored to extend the spiritual and political influence of Christian Portugal throughout the various societies across Mocaranga. As the Spanish had done in America, the missionaries in Africa often focused their efforts on converting local rulers in the hopes that their conversion would facilitate the widespread conversion of their subjects. While by the

444 Rodrigues, “Embaixadas portuguesas à corte dos mutapa.”
445 In a letter to his superior, the priest Luis do Espirito Santo provided a firsthand account of the conversion of the Monomotapa Mavura, noting that he placed that newly installed ruler “in possession of the kingdom,” and “made him tributary to the Catholic king.” See, “Letter from Friar Louis of the Order of Preachers to his
early seventeenth century it became custom for newly crowned Monomotapa rulers to accept baptism in return for Portuguese military alliance, several contemporaries noted that their identity as Christians was essentially nominal since they continued to live more according to traditional social and spiritual norms and customs than European ones.

In the 1560s, the Dominicans established a presence in Sena, Tete, and Mozambique Island, and in the following two decades, in the wake of the Barreto-Homem expedition, founded missionary outposts in the kingdoms of Quiteve and Chicanga, in Butua, Chicova, Massapa, Mashona, Macequeque, Zumbo, and along much of the coast including Sofala.  

By the 1630s, they had expended their presence to places like Amiza, Chipiriviri, Luanze, and Quebrabrasa, with twenty-five missionaries in a total of thirteen missions.

The Jesuits, although important as envoys to native rulers, arrived to the interior later and had a less substantial presence. By 1611, they had colleges in Sena, Tete, and Mozambique Island, as well as a residence in Quelimane. In theory, the colleges of Sena and Tete held spiritual jurisdiction over their own vast mission territory, which largely overlapped with that of the Dominicans and encompassed all of Baroe, Quiteve, Manica, and Mocaranga in general.

Yet, although the missionaries claimed a vast geographical footprint, their impact was evidently quite limited. Contemporaries throughout the seventeenth century reflected with general disappointment at their lack of progress. In 1605, Philip III himself lamented

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447 Hernández, “Proyección misionera de Goa en algunas regiones Africanas,” 27.
448 Ibid. 22.
reports of “a decrease in Christianity in […] Mozambique and the Rivers of Cuama.”

The king ascribed this decrease to the lack of “diligent ministers,” arguing that those there presently “occupy themselves with worldly matters rather than their duty,” and were more interested in “acquiring merchandise” than in carrying out their sacred duty. In the 1630s, one official urged the king to send Franciscans to supplement the largely ineffective Jesuits and Dominicans arguing that even those native peoples who had converted seemed still to live according to their ancestral cultural and spiritual conventions and traditions.

To the same effect, describing the area of Sofala, another official proclaimed flatly that, “there are no Christians, […] or at least they are very few.” “And if those who are our captives become Christians for that reason,” he continued, “their Christianity only lasts as long as their captivity.”

Justifying War and Conquest

When compared to Spanish conquests in the Americas, Portuguese expansion in Africa elicited far less controversy. Part of the reason was that, unlike in Spanish America, many Portuguese conquests in Africa and Asia were directed against local peoples that were either Muslim or which Europeans considered so barbarous that, as Gomes Eanes de Zurara first argued, their conquest and enslavement was easily justified in the name of conversion.

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449 “Carta régia para o vice-rei da Índia” (“Letter from the king to the viceroy of India”), Lisbon, 28 February 1605, in ANTT, Documentos Remetidos da Índia ou Livros dos Monções [DRILM hereafter], vol. 1, fols. 11-15. See also, DPMAC, vol. 9, 95-97.

450 “D. Andres de Vides y Albarado ao Rei; Sena, 22 de julho de 1633,” cited in Axelson, Portuguese in South-East Africa, 1600-1700, 99.

451 Rezende, Livro do Estado da Índia [Of the State of India], in RSEA, vol. 2, part 2, 404.

452 Ibid.
and civilization.\textsuperscript{453} A range of Portuguese authors, including several with firsthand experience in Southeast Africa itself, echoed Zurara and the aggressive discourses of Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, stressing the natives’ barbarity and animalistic nature in order to provide implicit justification of their subjugation and domination by the crown of Portugal.

In the mid 1560s, for example, frustrated by the lack of progress in converting local peoples, the Jesuit João Baptista de Ribeira described them as “extremely barbarous and bestial.”\textsuperscript{454} Monclaro likewise compared the “negros of this land” to animals and claimed that they lacked any “form of justice.” “They kill easily,” he wrote, “have no religious ceremonies, nor any interest in them, nor any mechanized production of any kind.”\textsuperscript{455} He concluded pessimistically that there was little hope for the spread of Christianity since the Mocaranga were “not interested in spiritual matters, only in pleasures of the flesh.” “They have many women,” he wrote, “are all thieves, and do not even trust their own children.”\textsuperscript{456} Estevão Lopes, another Jesuit, called the local inhabitants “brute animals” and “thieves,” and likewise surmised that it was not worth the effort of attempting to make them Christians or subjugate them to Portuguese colonial rule.\textsuperscript{457} Given their barbarism and thievery, he argued, their conversions were only superficial; they reverted to infidelity after a certain period of time or upon reaching a certain age.\textsuperscript{458} Displaying his view of the complementary roles of

\textsuperscript{453} Gomes Eanes de Zurara \textit{Chronica del Rei D. Joam I de boa memória. Terceira parte em que se contém a Tomada de Canta} (Lisbon: Antonio Álvares, 1644), available at the Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal (BNP). The manuscript was completed in 1450. See also Ponsen and Feros, “The Early Modern Iberian Empires.”

\textsuperscript{454} “Carta de P. João Baptista de Ribeira (de Goa) para Alfonso de Zárate, Reitor do collegio de Córdova, 27 de Outubro de 1565,” \textit{DI}, vol. 6, 1563-1566 (1960), 536.

\textsuperscript{455} Monclaro, “Relação da viagem que fizerão os Padres da companhia de Jesus com Francisco Barretto na conquistas de Monomotapa no anoo de 1569,” \textit{DI}, vol. 8, 701-702. Monclaro even reported a rumor, perhaps a myth, of the Monomotapa punishing people by making them walk through a crocodile infested river. See Monclaro, “Relação da viagem que fizerão os Padres da companhia de Jesus com Francisco Barretto na conquistas de Monomotapa no anoo de 1569,” \textit{DI}, vol. 8, 706.

\textsuperscript{456} Monclaro, “Relação da viagem que fizerão os Padres da companhia de Jesus com Francisco Barretto na conquistas de Monomotapa no anoo de 1569,” \textit{DI}, vol. 8, 709.

\textsuperscript{457} “Carta de P. Stephanus Lopes a P. Everardo Mercuriano,” Moçambique, 4 de Agosto de 1574,” \textit{DI}, vol. 9, 383.

\textsuperscript{458} Ibid. 384.
spiritual and political conquest, Lopes concluded that the natives of Southeast Africa were incapable of becoming good subjects and conquered peoples.459

Beyond the fact that most Europeans portrayed the cafres as barbarians unfit for the exercise of formal sovereignty and jurisdiction, however, the relative lack of controversy surrounding Portugal’s expansion was also due in part to the fact that, until the late sixteenth century, the Portuguese had not actually conquered much territory, nor attempted to for that matter. But when the empire’s maritime orientation took a “terrestrial turn” in the late sixteenth century, theologians and jurists across the Lusophone world, like their counterparts in Castilian realms, felt nonetheless compelled to justify that shift, and articulated sophisticated defenses of Portugal’s right to territorial conquest beyond Europe.460

In the late 1560s, Jesuits in Southeast Africa advanced perhaps the most striking example of such a defense. Their immediate objective was to justify a punitive conquest of Mocaranga for the murder of Gonçalo de Silveira, the Jesuit envoy of the Portuguese crown. As a fellow Jesuit attested from Goa in 1561, Silveira’s objective had been “the conversion of […] the king of Monomotapa,” believing “that the conversion of this kingdom would be easy after the [king] had been converted too.”461 Silveira was initially met with warmth and success. The Monomotapa showed him “the greatest honor […] he had ever done to any other living man: he took him to a room where no one ever enters,” and asked if he desired

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459 Ibid. In further denigration of the local indigenous peoples, Santos proclaimed that, “the cafre nation is the most barbarous and brutal in the world, for they adore no God and have neither idols, images, nor temples, nor do they make use of sacrifices, and have no ministers consecrated to the divine worship such as almost all heathen nations have.” “They can neither read nor write,” he continued, and they “have no books, and all ancient history and other things which they know they learn by tradition from their ancestors.” See Santos, *Ethiopia Oriental [Eastern Ethiopia]*, 1609, in RSEA, vol. 7, book 1, ch. 9, 199 and 201. Diogo do Couto too labeled the native subjects of Monomotapa “barbarians,” in part for their lack of written history, a true sign of civilization as he saw it. He admitted that through their oral history tradition the cafres “can tell us how many kings they have had,” but that they “cannot say for how many years they reigned nor what their origin was.” See Couto, *Década IX de Ásia [Decade IX of Asia]*, in RSEA, vol. 6, ch. 25, 390.

460 Sanjay Subrahmanyam described this “terrestrial turn” in his, “Holding the World in Balance,” 1372.

461 “Carta do Padre Luís Fróis, Goa,” 15 December 1561, in *DPMAC*, vol. 8, 38. Fróis, importantly, was not actually present to witness these events, but instead relied on, and distorted, information he received from Caiado’s report.
any women, gold, land, or cows. In less than a month, having learned more from Silveira about the “tenets of the faith,” the Monomotapa “revealed his willingness to become a Christian.” According to Fróis, however, in the following weeks, a group of influential Muslims convinced the Monomotapa that Silveira was “a great sorcerer and evil man,” that he had actually been sent by the Mongazes (with whom the Monomotapa was currently feuding), and that he represented not spiritual salvation but a threat to the kingdom’s very existence. As a result, the Mocaranga king ordered Silveira’s execution, a move he came almost immediately to regret, showing, “signs of sorrow for the priest’s death,” and casting “the blame on the instigation of the Moors,” whose own execution he ordered subsequently.

While the circumstances and motivations behind Silveira’s execution remain murky, its implications were clear. As the Portuguese saw it, the event provided sufficient justification for a full military invasion. In 1569, king Sebastian I convened his Mesa da Consciência to obtain their legal and moral endorsement of such the enterprise. Eager to avenge the death of their fellow Jesuit, the board members issued a detailed decision, outlining the necessary conditions for the waging of a just war to conquer Mocaranga.

The report cited “the great offences and injuries done to” the king of Portugal and “his subjects,” and “the violence shown to his delegates,” in particular with “the unjust death of Father Dom Gonçalo [de Silveira],” the “ambassador” of “our lord the king,” “sent by the viceroy of India to preach the faith of Christ, which he did peaceably and without offence.” In the same breath, the authors denounced “the shelter and favor bestowed by the

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463 Ibid. 47.
464 Ibid. 49.
465 For a study of the motives behind Silveira’s execution from a local perspective, see Roufe, “The Reasons for a Murder,” 467-487.
466 “Determinação dos Letrados: Com que Condições se podia fazer Guerra aos Reys da Conquista de Portugal, fala em especial do Monomotapa” (“Decision of the Lawyers: With the Conditions on which War may be made upon Kings the Conquests Portugal, especially upon the Monomotapa”), Almeyrim, 23 January 1569, in RSEA, vol. 3, 153-156.
said king in his ports and territories upon the Moors, the enemies of our holy faith and the instigators of all the evils and offences.” Beyond the execution of Silveira, the report decried “the death of other Portuguese [traders], and the robbery of their property.” Moreover, it also condemned the Monomotapa’s alleged despotism toward other indigenous peoples. Having supposedly “seen and examined [the] documents and reports of many persons,” the authors determined that “the emperors of Monomotapa frequently command their innocent subjects to be killed and robbed, and are guilty of many other wrongs and tyrannies for slight causes.”

Regarding the legality of Portugal’s presence in the region, the board cited the Papal bulls, which conceded “to our lord the king alone […] the commerce of all the kingdoms, islands, and provinces lying between the capes Não and Bojador and India, upon condition that the said king our Lord should cause the gospel to be preached in the said kingdoms and provinces.” According to the authors, Silveira’s mission intended precisely to satisfy that condition. In an implicit allusion to natural law and the law of nations, the authors also echoed the legitimate titles of Francisco de Vitoria, asserting that “in case the cafres or any other people of the conquest refuse to admit the said ministers, or to allow them to preach the gospel with the said caution, or obstruct with violence the hospitality and commerce which are the common right of nations,” the Portuguese may build fortresses and send soldiers there. “The captains and subjects of his Majesty [the king of Portugal] may justly stand upon the defensive; and should it be necessary for the safety of their persons and property,” the Portuguese “may make war, laying waste, making prisoners, taking places, and proceeding in all things according to the rights of lawful warfare.” “For all these reasons,” the report concluded, “our lord the king may command war to be made upon the said king of Monomotapa.” In order for that war to be considered lawful and “without sin,” however,
the authors qualified that its primary intention must not be “the increase of empire [imperio], or the personal glory and profit of the prince, or other private interests,” but “to spread the gospel.”

The Barreto-Homem Expedition and its Impact

Thus confident in the legal cover for intervention, Sebastian commissioned Francisco Barreto, his former viceroy of India, to lead an expedition in 1569 aimed at punishing the Monomotapa and seizing the mines in his territory. Barreto initially planned to disembark his forces at Sofala and then head overland conquering the kingdoms of Quiteve and Chicanga en route to the ultimate target, the Monomotapa. Vasco Fernandes Homem, Barreto’s deputy, explained that with the riches seized in those initial conquests, the expedition “would be able to bring together more people and horses” in order to “conquer the Monomotapa.” But Monclaro and the Jesuits in Mozambique were interested solely in punishing the Monomotapa and avenging their brother, Silveira. With this in mind, they persuaded Barreto to bypass the Quiteve and Chicanga, and instead to head straight for the Mocaranga zimbabwe approaching from the Zambezi via Sena.

467 According to Monclaro, Sebastian held broader dreams of conquering the entirety of Africa and spreading the faith across that vast continent. See Monclaro, “Relação da viagem que fizerão os Padres da companhia de Jesus com Francisco Barretto na conquistas de Monomotapa no anno de 1569,” DI, vol. 8, 684. There were also plans to conquer and fortify the Comoros Islands, whose population of Christians was being “converted to Islam by Arabian traders,” who, according to Monclaro, had killed many Portuguese. Francisco Barreto shelved this proposal, but did stop at Zanzibar, entering seven to eight leagues inland, expelling the locals with ease, and securing from the local king the official donation of Zanzibar to the crown of Portugal. See, “Carta de P. Francisco de Monclaro a P. Leoni Henriques, Mozambique, 1 de agosto de 1570, DI, vol. 8, 294; and Monclaro, “Relação da viagem que fizerão os Padres da companhia de Jesus com Francisco Barretto na conquistas de Monomotapa no anno de 1569,” DI, vol. 8, 694.
The decision proved a fatal mistake for the Portuguese. The harsh, humid climate of the rivers crippled Portuguese soldiers, many of whom perished or became so ill they could not continue beyond that point. When the already depleted army reached the territory of the Mongazes, just beyond Sena, those rebellious vassals of the Monomotapa, known for their martial prowess in war, fell upon the Portuguese and their Tonga allies, inflicting significant losses on them, and crippling their forces further still. Monclaro described in vivid detail the intensity of that battle, and how the “lack of wind in the valley” combined with the smoke from Portuguese firearms to “turn the day to night.”

Surveying the dire state of his army, Barreto decided to withdraw to Sena, where he became ill and died soon thereafter. Homem took over Barreto’s office and steeled himself for a second effort, this time following the original overland route through the Quiteve and Chicanga. Homem disembarked at Sofala later that summer with a force of five hundred men and several pieces of artillery. As he explained in his letter to Luis da Silva, before heading forth to the interior, he set “on fire the entire place where he had dwelt, and also the dhows,” the boats on which he and his army had arrived to Sofala. He did this “so that the soldiers might finally understand that God and their muskets alone would save them.”

Homem and his forces engaged those of the Quiteve in battle, ultimately defeating them and forcing their ruler to flee with his wives, children, and small armed guard to an

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469 The Mongazes eventually became part of the Tongas.
471 Ibid. 729-730.
472 Couto, Década IX da Ásia [Decade IX of Asia], in RSEA, vol. 6, ch. 24, 386-387.
473 “Dhows” are small lateen-rigged ships common to the Indian Ocean.
isolated, mountainous region where, because of its sacred significance, the Portuguese-allied soldiers would not pursue him. But the mines the Portuguese found in the lands of the both the Quiteve and Manica were a far cry from those of Potosí. Homem soon concluded that there was little left to conquer, that the potential resources garnered there, both in wealth and manpower, would be insufficient to proceed toward Mocaranga without refitting yet again, and thus he withdrew his men to Sofala. When two hundred of Homem’s men, sent to prospect for silver above the Zambezi’s Cabora Bassa rapids, were massacred by local forces, the dreams of conquering Mocaranga were shelved, at least for a time.

Monclaro reflected in defeat that, “there is much potential wealth in this region, but it is largely out of reach of the Portuguese.” To endeavor to conquer these territories is to waste money and Portuguese [lives],” he noted with resignation. “He who would have all, loses all.”

Overall, the Barreto-Homem expedition was a failure. Due to a combination of disease and the force of the Mongazes, the Portuguese fell well short of their ultimate objective of conquering the mines of the interior, expelling the Muslims, and punishing the Monomotapa for Silveira’s execution. Moreover, the mines that were found were far less rich than imagined, leading the settlers who remained there to revert from mining to “the trade in

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477 Monclaro, “Relação da viagem que fizerão os Padres da companhia de Jesus com Francisco Barreto na conquistas de Monomotapa no anno de 1569,” in *DI*, vol. 8, 709.

478 “Relação da Viagem que Fizerão os Padres da Companhia de Jesus com Francisco Barreto na Conquista de Monomotapa no Anno de 1569” (“Account of the journey made by Fathers of the Company of Jesus with Francisco Barreto in the conquest of Monomotapa in the Year 1569, by Father Monelaro, of the said Company”), in *RSEA*, vol. 3, 225.
cloth,” which, they ultimately deemed “more profitable” since local peoples valued cloth so highly.\(^{479}\)

The expedition did result in certain successes for the Portuguese, however. Barreto and Homem managed to fortify Sena and Tete with artillery and walls of stone and mortar.\(^ {480}\) The two fortresses now housed Portuguese crown-appointed captains with small garrisons of royal troops, and soon arose as the central nodes of Portuguese crown power on the rivers. In addition, the Monomotapa offered three concessions in order to avoid war with the Portuguese, laying the groundwork for their future alliance. First, he promised to expel the Muslims from his territory; second, to guarantee the unmolested activity of missionaries throughout his dominions; and third, to cede the gold mines in his territory as well.\(^ {481}\) In addition, the second phase of the expedition, under Homem’s leadership, impressed Portuguese power on the Quiteve, forced the royal family to flee, and secured Portuguese access to the gold mines of that kingdom as well as those of Manica.\(^ {482}\)

Although the Barreto-Homem expedition failed to achieve the crown’s overarching objective of extending formal sovereignty over the gold fields of the interior, in subsequent decades Portuguese traders and adventurers spread throughout the region. As the Mocaranga polity weakened in the late sixteenth century, it began ceding territories to competing groups, like the Quiteve and Chicanga, as well as to powerful Portuguese. As these figures rose in power, Lisbon sought to extend its official sovereignty over the region through a variety of means. The first means of doing so was by appointing captains at the

\(^{479}\) Ibid. 253.
\(^{481}\) Monclaro, “Relação da viagem que fizerão os Padres da companhia de Jesus com Francisco Barretto na conquistas de Monomotapa no anno de 1569,” in DI, vol. 8, 732-733.
\(^{482}\) In any event, the mines of both Quiteve and Manica were found to be less rich than the Portuguese had hoped.
main trade fairs. And since the fairs were so lightly guarded by royal soldiers, local settler-landholders were the only ones powerful enough to serve as captains and protect the forts.483

Sena and Tete emerged as the undisputed centers of Portuguese power on the Zambezi after their fortification and establishment as captaincies.484 The captain was almost always a prominent settler appointed by the Captain of Mozambique. In addition to the fort, Sena, the larger of the two towns, also had a church and “factory,” or warehouse, “to which are brought all the cloth, beads.”485 If in 1561 there were only ten to fifteen “Portuguese” resident in Sena, by the 1590s Santos estimated that total at around fifty, alongside several hundred converted local peoples and Indians, bringing the total population of Christians to around two thousand.486 Tete, slightly smaller, was home to some “six hundred Christians […], of whom about forty were Portuguese and the others Indians and cafres.”487 This meant that already by the second half of the sixteenth century, Tete had a population of Christians roughly comparable to that of Sofala.

The settlers had initially gained civil and criminal jurisdiction over the areas around Sena and Tete when the Monomotapa granted it to them in the mid-sixteenth century.488 As a result, the newly appointed Captain of Tete became lord over an area of two to three leagues around the town. The area encompassed eleven native villages each headed by “a cafre captain or governor, […] called an encosse. All these cafres are subjects and vassals of the Captain of Tete, to whom they refer their suits and quarrels, in which he judges and gives sentence when the encosse is unable to decide and settle them.”489 “The jurisdiction of the Captain of Tete over these cafres is so complete,” wrote Santos, “that he even has authority

483 Lobato, Colonização senhorial da Zambézia, 82.
484 Santos, *Ethiopia Oriental [Eastern Ethiopia]*, 1609, in *RSEA*, vol. 7, book 2, ch. 8, 267-.
485 Ibid.
486 Ibid. 267-268.
487 Ibid. 269.
over the chiefs themselves.”490 In times of war, or even simply when in need labor to
maintain the fort or for other public works, the captain could call on his eleven *encosses*, “who
come forthwith with their men armed with bows, arrows, spears, hoes, axes, and everything
else that is required, according to the service for which they are summoned.”491 In short
order, wrote Santos, the Captain of Tete could command some two thousand of the “most
valiant” “cafre warriors.”492

Of all the Portuguese fairs and settlements of the interior, Massapa was the most
important since it served as the official center for Portuguese trade with Mocaranga. Given
that Mocaranga power outstripped that of the Portuguese throughout most of the sixteenth
century, the captain there derived his authority and legitimacy first from the Monomotapa
and only second from the king of Portugal and his agents in Goa and Mozambique Island.
Local settlers elected the captain, who was then confirmed by the Monomotapa. According
to Santos, as in Tete, the Monomotapa gave the Captain of Massapa, “jurisdiction and
supreme judicial authority over all the *cafres* who come to [that fair] and those who live on his
lands or within his borders. He has power to give verbal sentence in all cases, and he can
even condemn the guilty to be hanged, without appeal against his sentence.”493

In turn, the Portuguese crown then confirmed the Captain of Massapa as well.
Beyond his authority over local Mocaranga peoples, “the viceroys of India” granted him
“power to act as judge and chief of all the Portuguese who frequent these kingdoms.” The
Captains of Sofala, Sena, Tete, and Massapa all had “similar jurisdiction and authority [...] to
pass sentence on the Christians in the country, and carry such sentences into execution”
without appeal. In addition, the Captain of Massapa served in effect as the ambassador of

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490 Ibid. 291-292~.
491 Ibid. 292~.
492 Ibid. 292~.
493 Ibid. 270~.
the crown of Portugal, and as “agent in all matters between the Portuguese and
Monomotapa; he acts here also as factor of Monomotapa to receive all the duties paid to
him by the merchants, both Christians and Moors, which are one piece of cloth in every
twenty brought into these lands to be sold.” In return, the Monomotapa guaranteed “the
secure passage of traders through” his land “to sell their merchandise,” ensuring that no one
would impede them.494 Perhaps most importantly, noted Santos, no person was allowed to
“enter the territory between Massapa and the residence of the king [ie. the Monomotapa]
without the license of the king or the captain, for which reason this place is called the Gates
of Massapa, and the captain the Captain of the Gates.”495 Moreover, the captaincy was a
lifetime post, and no captain could resign from it, or leave Massapa without the
Monomotapa’s permission.

From Vassals to Lords

While the Portuguese never forcibly “conquered” the Mocaranga polity or its mines,
the progressive splintering of that once dominant power created a unique opportunity for
the Portuguese crown to establish its supremacy in the region in the early seventeenth
century. Internecine conflicts of succession and threats from rebellious vassals and hostile
neighboring polities compelled the Monomotapa to appeal increasingly to powerful settler-
intermediaries for military assistance to defend his dominium. The first such example of this
partnership came in 1597, when the Monomotapa requested Portuguese aid in driving out
the forces of Chunzo, a neighboring kingdom that had invaded from the west.496

494 Ibid.
495 Ibid. 272~.
Portuguese agreed very willingly,” wrote the chronicler, António Bocarro, “because of the advantage they would derive from the land being free of robbers,” whose presence was known to suppress trade. The Portuguese “immediately set out to accompany the army of Monomotapa,” defeating one of Chunzo’s captains and securing the peaceful surrender and vassalage of another. Although the Monomotapa was spared defeat, the event marked a significant shift in the region’s balance of power. “From that time forth,” in gratitude for their aid, he “allowed the Portuguese to enter his country with guns, a thing which was strictly forbidden by him before.”

In addition to external threats like that of the Chunzo, the Monomotapa Gatsi Lusere, was increasingly faced with internal ones as well. When Matuzianhe, a pretender to the throne, rose in rebellion, and proclaimed himself “King of Mocaranga,” he divided the territory among four rebel headmen, each of which opened a separate front in the war, “wasting and ravaging the surrounding lands and obstructing the roads so that the Portuguese and their traders could not come or go in safety with their merchandise.” In this case, the settlers were spurred into action not at the Monomotapa’s request, but to protect their own interests. In 1607, the preeminent settler-headman, Diogo Simões Madeira, led a force out of Tete that “attacked and defeated the enemies” on three of the four fronts, and compelled the fourth rebel headman to offer peace and obedience to Madeira in order to avoid the slaughter of his men. With that, and with the Monomotapa’s confirmation, Madeira became lord of twenty-five villages around Tete and of another two thousand soldiers.

497 Ibid. 363~.
498 Ibid. 364~.
499 Ibid.
500 Newitt, Portuguese Settlement on the Zambesi, 59.
Recognizing that “the Portuguese were the principal cause of his success,” the
Monomotapa summoned Madeira, expressed profound gratitude, and promised to “give him
the silver mines in his kingdom.” Madeira subsequently “induced the emperor” to expand
that donation to include not only the silver mines, but also those “of gold and other metals
[…] in the whole of his kingdom” and to assign that grant to the Portuguese crown, rather
than to Madeira personally. In the donation, the Mocaranga ruler thanked Madeira for his
services, asked “his Majesty [of Portugal] to accept him as his brother in arms,” and pledged
“to give to his Majesty all the mines of gold, copper, iron, lead, and pewter which may be in
my empire.” He offered these grants, however, on the crucial condition that “the king of
Portugal […] shall maintain me in my position […] and shall give me forces with which to
go and take possession of my court and destroy [the] rebellious thief, […] Matuzianhe.”

A contemporary Jesuit report reflected on the impact of those events in which “one
Diogo Simões [Madeira], who is very rich and a friend of the King [of Monomotapa], […]
helped and assisted him greatly in the war against his rebels.” The report went on to
explain that the Monomotapa “so highly esteems the Portuguese for his safeguarding,” that
in addition to allowing them to go about armed throughout his territory, “he beseeches and
implores them to build their fortresses where they wish, […] even near his Court.”

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502 Ibid. 366-367.
503 Ibid.
504 Ibid. To demonstrate his sincerity and firmness of commitment, the Monomotapa declared “in the presence
of all” that he offered “his son, the prince, to be conducted to India,” and that two other of his sons as well as
two daughters would be entrusted in the personal care of Madeira to “teach and keep in his house” and make
Christians.
505 “Relaçam Annal das cousas que fizeram os Padres da Companhia de Jesus, nas partes da Índia Oriental, e
em algumas outras da conquista desta reyno nos annos de 607 e 608 e do processo da conversão e christianidade
daquellas partes, com mais huma adicãem à relaçam de Ethiopia, Tirado tudo das cartas dos mesmos padres
que de a vierão, e ordenado pello padre frei Bartolomeu Guerreiro da Companhia de Jesus, natural de
Almodovar de Portugal,” book 1, ch. 2, in *DPMAC*, vol. 9, 165. Original manuscript found in the Biblioteca
Pública de Évora [BPE hereafter], Res. 794, fols. 1-6.
506 “Relaçam Annal das cousas que fizeram os Padres da Companhia de Jesus,” book 1, ch. 2, in *DPMAC*, vol.
9, 165. Original manuscript found in the Biblioteca Pública de Évora, Res. 794, fls. 1-6.
Portuguese obliged, assigning a force consisting of Portuguese, “sons of Portuguese” [ie. mestiços], and Tonga soldiers, to serve as a permanent bodyguard of the Monomotapa accompanying him everywhere throughout the rest of the seventeenth century.\textsuperscript{507} As a result, the report continued, the Portuguese were “so feared and respected,” it was “as if they wielded much more power than they do.”\textsuperscript{508} Although accompanied by “slaves with bows and arrows, and a few guns for their protection,” the Portuguese “go peacefully throughout the interior of that great Empire and are given shelter and food as if they were born there and were lords of that land.”\textsuperscript{509}

Given the general freedom with which the Portuguese could now traverse Mocaranga, in 1608 King Philip II of Portugal [Philip III of Spain] issued instructions to his viceroy in Goa, João Frojas Pereira, for the comprehensive fortification of the Zambezi. Noting that the Monomotapa was “very weak at present because the neighboring kings are fighting him and his subjects have risen up against him,” Philip saw a prime opportunity to extend his influence – if not formal dominion – across the Zambezi Valley and beyond.\textsuperscript{510} He ordered that Sofala, Sena, and Tete all be provided additional garrisons and ammunition, both “for the continuation of the commerce and trade, and because they are necessary for the conquest of the silver mines.”\textsuperscript{511} In addition to those at Sena and Tete, he also ordered the construction of four other fortresses: at the Lupata Gorge, Massapa, Bucoto, and Luanze.

\textsuperscript{507} In 1696, the Augustinian administrator of the Church of Mozambique and the Rivers, António da Conceição, mentioned the existence of such a force in his, \textit{Tratado dos Rios de Cuama}. For a published version translated into English, see Conceição, \textit{Tratado dos Rios de Cuama}.


\textsuperscript{509} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{510} “Regimento dado ao Vice-Rei da Índia, D. João Forjaz Pereira, para a conquista do Monomotapa; Lisbon, 21 March 1608,” Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo [ANTT hereafter], \textit{Documentos Remetidos da Índia ou Livros das Moçagens [DRILM hereafter]}, vol. 2, fls. 14. See also, \textit{DPMAC}, vol. 9, 118-120.

Philip instructed his viceroy to proceed with tact, however, so as not to offend the Monomotapa, and if possible, to obtain his consent in constructing those forts so as to avoid any potential “waste and damage a war would bring.”\textsuperscript{512} The viceroy, through his local captains, was to send the Monomotapa “gifts of cloth and other goods which he values,” and to convey to him that in the construction of those forts, the Portuguese were not “taking his land from him, nor his government, nor are we fighting for possession of his pastures and cultivated lands, which are his means of subsistence and which he values above all.”\textsuperscript{513} Instead, Portuguese officials were to impress upon the Monomotapa that their “only interest is in the metals,” which, according to Philip, were “not important to him and do not constitute his wealth.”\textsuperscript{514}

In addition, in his official letter of acceptance of the Monomotapa’s donation of the mines the previous year, in 1608 Philip proclaimed that his Mocaranga counterpart “shall enjoy all the honors, blessings and privileges of my brother kings.”\textsuperscript{515} As a “brother-in-arms,” all Portuguese India officials, including the viceroy and various captains “shall assist, defend and support him with my fleets and soldiers, protecting him from any harm.”\textsuperscript{516} Finally, Philip reaffirmed that, above and beyond the search for gold and silver, his supreme objective remained to convert “the said Emperor and his vassals to our Holy Catholic

\begin{footnotes}
\item[	extsuperscript{513}] Ibid.
\item[	extsuperscript{514}] Ibid.
\item[	extsuperscript{515}] “‘Carta de Imãos em Armas’ do Rei de Portugal a favor do Imperador do Monomotapa, em resposta à carta desta de 4-8-1607; Lisboa, 27 Setembro 1608,” Biblioteca da Ajuda, SI-VII-44, fls.118v-120v. Also available in \textit{DPMAC}, vol. 9: 135.
\end{footnotes}
Faith,” and “bring about the spread and increase of [that] Faith in all the kingdoms, lands and provinces of trade and conquest belonging to the Crown of Portugal.”\textsuperscript{517} With that in mind, he enjoined the Monomotapa to “permit the Holy Gospel to be preached in all the lands and kingdoms” within his jurisdiction, and proclaimed that “churches and crosses may be set up in those parts and places ordained by the ministers of the Church, who shall not be harmed or troubled, neither shall those who have been converted to our Holy Faith.”\textsuperscript{518}

Even after the formalization of this brotherhood-in-arms with the Portuguese crown, the Monomotapa’s effective power continued to decline. According to Bocarro, when he launched a premature punitive expedition against his former vassals in the kingdom of Baroe, they “defended themselves valiantly, […] killed many of his Mocarangas, and reduced him to such extremity by warfare and hunger that he was exposed to total ruin.”\textsuperscript{519} At the same time, a weakened but not defeated Matuzianhe seized the opportunity to continue his conquest of Mocaranga dominions elsewhere. But Madeira, “who was then Captain of Tete,” attacked Matuzianhe with a force of “fifty guns and four thousand very valiant cafres, who are the vassals and friends of Tete, […] routed him, and dispossessed him” of his many lands and vassals.\textsuperscript{520} On the spot where the battle took place,” wrote Bocarro, Madeira “built a wooden fort, in which he placed twenty guns and three hundred cafres, thus rendering those lands secure.”\textsuperscript{521} Madeira then provided the Monomotapa with twenty guns and a thousand soldiers, vassals of Tete, who accompanied him to Chidima, where he remained for the rest of that year.\textsuperscript{522} The result of all this was to increase the Monomotapa’s

\textsuperscript{517} “Carta de Imãos em Armas” do Rei de Portugal a favor do Imperador do Monomotapa, em reposta à carta desta de 4-8-1607; Lisboa, 27 Setembro 1608,” Biblioteca da Ajudá (BA), SI-VII-44, fls.118v-120v. Also available in DPMAC, vol. 9: 135.

\textsuperscript{518} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{519} Bocarro, Década XIII da Ásia, in RSEA, vol. 3: ch. 129, 372-373.

\textsuperscript{520} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{521} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{522} Ibid.
dependence on the Portuguese further still and to strengthen Portuguese control over even more of Mocaranga.

Despite their official alliance as “brothers-in-arms,” and despite the rising power of the Portuguese, throughout the first quarter of the seventeenth century the Captain of Mozambique continued to pay the *curva* to the Monomotapa throne, in symbolic recognition of Portugal’s vassalage to the Mocaranga ruler. In 1627, however, the relationship was reversed. The event leading to this inversion was the execution of the Portuguese envoy, Jerónimo de Barros, by Caprasine, the then-reigning Monomotapa. The particular reasons behind Barros’ execution remain unclear. But whatever the cause, the event had profound repercussions.

In retribution, the powerful settler, Diogo de Sousa de Meneses, led a combined force of some two hundred and fifty Portuguese and thirty thousand of their vassals in war against Caprasine, defeated him, and “proclaimed as emperor” his brother, “a Christian whom the friars of St. Dominic had converted and baptized, calling him Dom Philip Mavura.” Marking the Portuguese crown’s official transition to lord of Mocaranga, Mavura “submitted himself and became a vassal of his Majesty, with all his empire, promising to pay every year as tribute three *pastos* [a measure of gold far smaller than which the Portuguese had previously paid to the Monomotapa] to the Captain of Mozambique.” By this act,

523 “Caprasine” is referred to in several texts as “Kaparidze.”
524 Pedro Barreto de Rezende – secretary to the Count of Linhares, the viceroy of India – asserted that Caprasine had simply ordered Barros’ execution “for no other reason than his wickedness,” although there were more complex reasons. Rezende, *Livro do Estado da India* [Of the State of India], in *RSEA*, vol. 2, part 2, 413-419~.
525 Rezende, *Livro do Estado da India* [Of the State of India], in *RSEA*, vol. 2, part 2, 413-419~. In one instance, Rezende refers to him as D. Philip Marcara, and in another, as D. Philip Mavura. The figure Rezende refers to as “Marcara,” appears in the official treaty he signed with the Portuguese as “Manuza.” See, “Treslado das Capitulações que fizeram os Portugueses com El Rey de Monomotapa,” Tete, 28 June 1629, in *RSEA*, vol. 5, 287-290. For an account of the battle, and of the troop numbers, see, “Letter from Friar Louis, of the Order of Preachers, to his Provincial; 3 February 1630,” in *RSEA*, vol. 2, 427-428.
526 Rezende, *Livro do Estado da India* [Of the State of India], in *RSEA*, vol. 2, part 2, 413-419~.
wrote Pedro Barreto de Rezende, the “great empire” of Mocaranga, including all of its “dependent kingdoms,” was “thus rightfully acquired and added to the crown of his Majesty.”

The 1629 treaty, in addition to formalizing the transfer of power to the crown of Portugal, stipulated a new diplomatic protocol in which, from then forward, on entering the Monomotapa’s *zimbabwe*, the Portuguese could remain “shod and covered, with their arms in their belts, as they speak to the king of Portugal, and he shall give them a chair on which to seat themselves without clapping their hands.” Highlighting the relations of power in which the Portuguese now held prominent position, from thence forward the Monomotapa was required to “consult” the Portuguese-crown appointed Captain of Massapa “concerning war and any other novel events which arise.”

To reinforce the crown’s monopoly on trade and mining in the region, the treaty stipulated that the Monomotapa “shall not give land containing gold to any person of whatever rank, this being very prejudicial to the barter and commerce [of the Captain] of Mozambique.” The conditions also formalized the Portuguese crown’s territorial dominion in and around the numerous trade fairs and settlements of the interior, including not only Massapa and Luanze, but also the lands surrounding Tete, which the Portuguese had conquered in the recent war, and which the agreement officially “annexed thereto.”

To placate the Monomotapa, the treaty ensured that in return for sending those “three *pastas* of Botonga” every three years to the newly arrived Captain of Mozambique, the

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527 Ibid. For another account of these events and the treaty that followed, see “Treslado da carta de Antonio Camello do sucesso da guerra contra o Manamotapa,” 1629, Real Academia de la Historia [RAH hereafter], Jesuítas, 9-3687/107, fols. 607-610.
529 Ibid.
530 Ibid.
531 Ibid.
Monomotapa would continue receiving the customary, albeit by now purely symbolic, satisfaction of his tri-annual “gift,” from the Portuguese crown.\textsuperscript{532} By the 1630s, however, as crown control in the region reached its apex, the Portuguese king was no longer comfortable providing such “gifts,” explaining that, as he saw it, “it is not proper that being my vassal the Captains of Mozambique should pay tribute” to the Monomotapa.\textsuperscript{533} As an alternative, the viceroy of India “should grant him license to trade with a certain number of pieces of cloth in the rivers of Cuama, in such quantity and in such manner as appeared fitting, that might satisfy him, and might not be prejudicial to the monopoly of the cloth.”\textsuperscript{534} In addition, he should send to the Monomotapa a compilation of the laws of Portugal, “for the government and good administration of his kingdoms, with the necessary declarations in accordance with his usages and customs.”\textsuperscript{535} This last point was crucial since it meant that local Mocaranga custom maintained a degree of power vis-à-vis royal law even after the subjugation of the Monomotapa to the Portuguese crown.

\textbf{Extending Crown Control}

Throughout most of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Portuguese crown headquarteried its Southeast African operations on Mozambique Island, which they had

\textsuperscript{532} A \textit{pasta} was a measure of gold worth eight hundred Portuguese cruzados. This “gift,” or \textit{sagoate}, was a synonym of \textit{curva}, or tribute.
\textsuperscript{533} “Carta régia para o vice-rei da Índia,” Lisbon, 5 March 1634, in \textit{RSEA}, vol. 4, 240.
\textsuperscript{534} “Carta régia para o vice-rei da Índia,” Lisbon, 5 March 1634, in \textit{RSEA}, vol. 4, 240.
\textsuperscript{535} Ibid. The king was mostly likely referring here to the so-called \textit{Ordenações Filipinas}, which were ratified in 1603. For further evidence of proposals to the same effect, see also “Carta sobre se mandar ao Rey de Monomotapa facultade para meter alguma roupa no Rio da Cuama em lugar da Curva que pedia,” 8 March 1634, ANTT, \textit{DRILM}, vol. 1, book 31, fols. 375-377; and “Carta sobre os Moradores de Mozambique, comerciarem com os Cafres Maraves, e impedir-lhe a comunicação com os Hollandezes, e estrangeiros da Europa,” 28 March 1635, ANTT, \textit{DRILM}, vol. 2, book 33, fol. 129, and the “Reposta a dita Carta, 19 Dezembro 1635,” fols. 129-131.
fortified in the early sixteenth century. As the king’s highest representative in the region, the Captain of Mozambique held wide-ranging authority with delegated jurisdiction over both civil and criminal cases. The captain also enjoyed a monopoly on all trade there. When in 1562 the queen regent Catherine appointed Fernão Martins Freire d’Andrade as Captain of the fortress of Sofala and Mozambique, she explained to her viceroy in Goa that she “thought fit to entrust to d’Andrade all the business, trade, and barter of the river of Cuama [i.e. the Zambezi] and of the other rivers of Sofala, on behalf of my treasury.”

In no “goods can anyone but the captain trade, and he makes himself quite rich from it in very little time,” wrote João Baptista de Ribeira three years later. According to Ribeira, the captaincy of Mozambique was “the most lucrative Fort in all of India, […] because in three years they [the captains] make 100,000 ducados.” As a result, for most of the sixteenth century, the captain focused primarily on controlling the region’s coastal trade and navigation for his own personal financial benefit, and largely eschewed expanding the Estado’s territorial footprint on the East African mainland.

In addition to the captain, a modest garrison of troops and a handful of administrative and treasury officers constituted the entire formal presence of the Portuguese crown on Mozambique Island. Other officials occasionally wintered there en route to Portuguese India stations further east, but their presence on the island was temporary, usually not lasting more than a few months at a time. Even at the height of Portuguese power in Southeast Africa, beyond Mozambique Island, the official Portuguese presence in


539 Ibid.
the region consisted of only a handful of captains and their ill-equipped garrisons at isolated, lightly fortified trade posts along the coast (in Sofala and Quelimane, for instance), the Zambezi (at Sena and Tete), and in the interior, at the trade fair at Massapa. The crown also appointed a series of “Captains of the Conquest of the Mines,” and “of the Rivers,” referring to the so-called rivers of Cuama. But these were not permanent posts, and their occupants often also functioned simultaneously as captains of Mozambique.

As the Monomotapa’s hegemony waned in the early seventeenth century, the Portuguese crown arose as the preeminent power in the region. Importantly, colonists and their private armies, rather than crown agents, were the primary actors responsible for affecting that rise. As a result, the Portuguese crown advanced a series of plans and proposals to consolidate its control and ensure that sovereignty remained in the hands of the king, rather than the settlers. These efforts, which reached their climax in the 1630s and 1640s, included the extension of royal land grants, continued calls for the construction and bolstering of fortifications, the dispatching of professional miners, and even comprehensive plans to further colonize the Zambezi and interior.

The first lands secured by Portuguese and mestiço settlers in the region had not been granted by the Portuguese crown, but by local kings and fumos who held sway over the region before Lisbon achieved any significant degree of territorial dominion there. It was early land grants like these that formed the foundation of what eventually became known as the prazo system in the eighteenth century. In 1612, for instance, Philip instructed his viceroy that although “the said lands have indeed been given to [Madeira] by the Monomotapa, you should send him grant in my name” as well.\(^5\) The king provided the two key caveats, however. First, in confirming that grant to Madeira, the king reserved for himself “the mines

of gold, silver, or other metals which there may be in the said lands.”\footnote{Ibid.} In addition, he required that Madeira subject himself to the “orders and commands of the generals of the conquest, or in default thereof, of the Captain of Mozambique.”\footnote{Ibid.} As such, the king sought to satisfy Madeira’s desire for formal authority and lordship, while at the same time reserving the mineral wealth for himself, and bringing Madeira more firmly under Portuguese crown control.

At around the same moment, as Portuguese power was on the rise in the region, the crown began also allocating its own original land grants directly. In 1618, Philip ordered his Captain of Mozambique, Nuno Álvares Pereira, to provide “the new settlers,” with lands and “to distribute them in such a manner that […] there shall be in each part the people necessary for the increase of the settlements and cultivation of the lands.”\footnote{Lobato, Coloniação senhorial da Zambézia, 99.} But the recipients of such grants were not free to do completely as they pleased. They also incurred certain obligations, at least in theory. They were expected “to live in the said lands themselves and with their families, […] to cultivate them,” to defend them, and to pay a small quit-rent to the crown.\footnote{“Parecer do procurador da Coroa de 28 de Novembro de 1625,” and the “Carta de aforamento da terra Inhaparapara, Sansa e Pangara, 3 de Outubro de 1634,” Historical Archive of Goa [HAG hereafter], cod. 2328, fols. 220-221v, cited in Rodrigues, “Mercadores, Conquistadores e Foreiros,” 453. See also, Manuel Barreto, “Informação do Estado e Conquista dos Rios de Cuama,” in RSEA, vol. 3, 467-468.} If in 1618 the king sought to facilitate the widespread occupation of the territory through land grants, in the following decade crown officials in Goa favored a more targeted approach. To facilitate “the conservation of the Rivers [of Cuama],” the lands were to be located “nearby our settlements” in order to subdue the local peoples who inhabited them.\footnote{“Parecer do procurador da Coroa de 28 de Novembro de 1625,” and the “Carta de aforamento da terra Inhaparapara, Sansa e Pangara, 3 de Outubro de 1634,” HAG, cod. 2328, fols. 196-197v; cited in Rodrigues, “Mercadores, Conquistadores e Foreiros,” 453.} And in places with few Portuguese settlers, like the island of

\[\text{\footnote{\text{\textcopyright} 2023 by the author.}}}\]
Luabo, the Captain of Mozambique began delegating authority over the land and its peoples to local *fumos*.\(^{546}\)

In addition to submitting local indigenous groups to Portuguese colonial rule, crown officials also used lands grants as a means of reining in settlers. In 1629, Gaspar Barbosa, the newly appointed *ouvidor-geral, provedor dos defuntos*, and *vedor da fazenda*, was tasked with “wresting the lands from the jurisdiction of the powerful [settlers],” and reapportioning them to other persons as he saw fit. This was intended to enhance the crown’s “jurisdiction, command, and power” so that all these “newly conquered” lands would be brought more firmly under the control of the royal “treasury of his Majesty.”\(^{547}\)

By the mid 1630s, the crown had apportioned grants throughout large swathes of territory south and west of the Zambezi. In 1635, Rezende explained that all the lands around Sena and Tete had been divided among Portuguese settlers, “some by gift of the Captains of Mozambique, others by grant from his Majesty.”\(^{548}\) In the following decade, after Portugal’s “restoration” of independence from the Spanish Monarchy, the crown continued granting lands with the aim of expanding its effective jurisdiction.\(^{549}\) In 1646, King John IV instructed his Captain of Mozambique to “distribute the lands of the Rivers of Cuama equally among the *cazados* who are sent there, so that they may sustain themselves from those same lands.”\(^{550}\) In addition to providing each settler their sustenance, the instruction to

\(^{546}\) Rezende, *Livro do Estado da India [Of the State of India]*, in *RSEA*, vol. 2, part 2, 407-408. Luabo was at the southern mouth of the Zambezi delta.


\(^{548}\) Rezende, *Livro do Estado da India [Of the State of India]*, in *RSEA*, vol. 2 (1898): part 2, 413-419. But, he lamented, despite the vast dimensions of those lands “they yield very little” either in terms of agricultural produce or precious metals.


\(^{550}\) “Carta Régia, Para o cap’am da fortaleza de Moçâbique o a sere partirem igualmente as terras dos Rios da Cuama pelos cazados q la se envore; Lisboa, 15 de dez’ro de 646,” Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino [AHU hereafter], códice 208, Cartas Régias, 1643-1678, fol. 95v.
distribute such lands “equally” was also a potential means of curbing the rise of excessively powerful settlers with disproportionate territorial domain. Moreover, in order to ensure the diffusion of such territorial dominium among an increasing number of settlers, the king decreed that, on the death of the grantee, only a third of their land “shall […] go to their heirs,” while the remaining “two thirds […] shall be divided among” newly arrived casados “sent to that conquest.”

The policy of apportioning lands to settlers coincided with roughly simultaneous efforts to fortify Portuguese territories in Southeast Africa while at the same promoting colonization to further populate the region with settlers loyal to the Portuguese crown. When a Dutch fleet attacked Mozambique Island in 1607 and again in 1608, destroying much of the town and pillaging the churches and warehouses, the Portuguese king and viceroy made the fortification of that island a priority. Sofala, although long since eclipsed by Mozambique as the official center of colonial administration and trade in the region, nonetheless remained of strategic concern for the Portuguese since it offered a potential disembarkation point for enemies to approach the mines overland from the south. As a result, throughout the 1630s and 1640s several contemporaries advanced plans to reinforce Sofala’s defense. Quelimane, Luabo, and other coastal points on the Zambezi delta were the focus of fortification efforts as well.

552 For a contemporary account of the August 1607 Dutch attack on Mozambique Island, see “Carta que a cidade de Goa escreveo a Sua Magestade o anno de 1607,” in RJEA, vol.5, fols. 284-285. On another plan a decade later to prevent another Dutch attack on Mozambique, see Biblioteca da Ajuda, Códice 51-VIII-8, 31 Janeiro 1612: “Carta régia de D. Filipe II, sobre se enviar a Moçambique munições para se defender, para o caso de os holandeses, que têm naus aparelhadas para Maluco e Pêrsia, atacarem a fortaleza.” For continued efforts in the 1630s, see “Carta sobre as prevencoes para a defensa de Mogambique, 27 Janeiro 1633,” ANTT, DRILM, vol. 1, fol. 30, fol. 254; and for the 1640s, see “Para o capitão da fortaleza de moçambique, 22 Fevereiro 1644,” AHB, Códice 208, Cartas Régias, 1643-1678, fol. 1v. 
553 For efforts to strengthen Sofala’s fortifications in 1633, see, “Carta sobre a conquista das Minas de Monomotapa, fortifiaçõens do Porto de Sofala, e Bocas do Rio de Cuama, Quelimane, Luabo; 3 Abril 1632,” in
The push to fortify the interior and formalize settlers’ possession of the territory was meant to benefit the royal treasury in three fundamental ways. On the one hand, the crown received a quit-rent (albeit a small one) from the settler-grantee for each land granted. More importantly, in expanding Portuguese occupation in the region and reinforcing that occupation with increased military power, the crown sought to more firmly control commerce and ensure that it channeled a larger portion of the profits of such commerce into the royal treasury. In addition, rather than continuing to suppress independent trade in the region, in the mid 1630s the king sent repeated instructions to his officials on the ground to

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ANTT, *DRILM*, vol. 1, book 30, fols. 154-156; the “Reposta a dita Carta, de 12 Janeiro 1633,” ANTT, *DRILM*, vol. 1, book 30, fols. 156-158; “Para o vRey da India, sobre se fortificarem as fortalezas de Moçambique e Sofalla, e se fazer hum forte na ilha de Luabo, na ponte de quiliame e sofala; Lisboa, 20 Janeiro 1646,” AHU, Códice 208, Cartas Régias, 1643-1678, fol. 62v; and “Para o mesmo vRey sobre se fazer hu forte em Quiliman, e outro em Sofalla, Lisboa a 18 de fev’ro de 649,” AHU, Códice 208, Cartas Régias, 1643-1678, fol. 122v.

554 “Carta sobre a conquista das Minas de Monomotapa, fortificaçõens do Porto de Sofala, e Bocas do Rio de Cuama; Quiliman, Luabo; 3 Abril 1632,” ANTT, *DRILM*, vol. 1, book 30, fols. 154-156; the “Reposta a dita Carta, de 12 Janeiro 1633,” ANTT, *DRILM*, vol. 1, book 30, fols. 156-158; “Carta sobre a fortificação das bocas dos Rios da Cuama, 10 Dezembro 1633,” ANTT, *DRILM*, vol. 1, book 31, fols. 87-89; “Carta sobre as Minas de Monomotapa, e fortificação das bocas dos Rios da Cuama,” ANTT, *DRILM*, vol. 1, book 31, fols. 428-430; “Carta sobre se mandar a Goa o Engenheiro Bartolomeu Cotão, e seus companheiros para obrarem as fortificações das bocas do Rio da Cuama, 17 Mar 1634,” ANTT, *DRILM*, vol. 1, book 31, fols. 434-436; “Termo, e Condições do Contrato, que Diogo de Souza de Menezes, fez quando entrou nas Fortalezas de Moçambique e Sofalla, sobre o estanco das roupas dos Rios de Sofalla e Cuama, de 16 de Janeiro de 1632,” ANTT, *DRILM*, vol. 2, book 35, fols.117-125; “Carta para que se lhe desse parte das fortificações que se obrarão nas bocas dos Rios da Cuama, 28 Marco 1636,” ANTT, *DRILM*, vol. 2, book 36, fols.176-179) and “Carta para que se lhe desse parte das fortificações que se obrarão na bocas dos Rios da Cuama, 28 Marco 1636,” ANTT, *DRILM*, vol. 2, book 36, fols.176-179. Unfortunately for the Portuguese, the fortifications of Mozambique, not to mention those of other less central Portuguese settlements in the region, were never considered sufficient. As late as 1666, the king relayed to his viceroy a report from the Captain of Mozambique attesting to the “miserable state” of the fortress of Mozambique, which was “in want of men, arms, powder, and other military stores which it requires to be able to withstand a siege, should the enemies wish to attack it.” The efforts at fortification focused not only on the coastal areas, but also at strategic points along the rivers, in the interior, and at the main trade fairs. And in his instructions to refortify the upriver settlement at Sena, the king ordered the establishment of a permanent garrison there of thirty men. This measure was a means not only of repelling any potential attacks from the Dutch or neighboring native indigenous polities. It was also, the king made clear, intended “limit the killings” and combat the general “oppression to which the powerful there submit the poor,” in reference to the leading independent settlers who often exercised their power violently over their slaves and dependents and all others who threatened their interests and hegemony in the Southeast African hinterland. See, “Letter from the King to the Viceroy of India, Joaõ Nunes da Cunha; Lisbon, 8 January 1666,” in *RSEA*, vol.4, 341; and “Carta R sobre ser conveniente fazer-se hum prezidio com trinta homens, e hum Capitão em Sena, para acutellar as mortes, e oppressão que ali fazião os poderozos aos pobres, e sobre executar o que ja lhe tinha determinado acerca da entrada de Quiliman, Porto dos Rios de Cuama. Feita 25 Janeiro 1647,” ANTT, *DRILM*, vol. 2, book 57, fols. 71-73; and “Sua reposta, de 15 Dezembro 1647,” ANTT, *DRILM*, vol. 2, book 57, fol. 388.
encourage all commerce between Portuguese settlers and local peoples, including with members of polities, like the Maravi, that were not subjected to Portuguese imperial rule. Noting that such trade was “of no damage to my service or treasury,” he argued that, “on the contrary, many evils might result from their not holding this commerce.”

While Philip was willing to recognize as licit the omnipresent trade between settlers and local peoples, he commanded his officials to “show great care and vigilance in preventing any communication or trade between the cafres of the coast and the Dutch and other European nations.” Such exchange, he warned, “would lead to very serious evil,” as “it might facilitate their designs on the mines of Monomotapa.” This effort to exclude European competitors from the Southeast Africa trade was consistent with broader efforts at establishing and maintaining Portugal’s mare clausum across the Indian Ocean world, but in this case, its specific inspiration highlighted the crown’s primary material objective in the region: to secure exclusive access to the region’s mineral wealth.

Despite never encountering mines anywhere near the magnitude of those the Spanish found in the New World, the Portuguese remained convinced that Southeast Africa might one day become their own Mexico or Peru. This was because local traders brought substantial quantities of precious metals to the various fairs for exchange, and because local

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557 Ibid.

558 Ibid.
rulers continually promised the existence of vast mineral deposits in the interior in order to gain or maintain Portuguese favor. The majority of locally sourced metals were procured through the labor-intensive process of sifting sediment in the rivers, or through the mining of superficial deposits. The mythical mountains of gold simply did not exist on the scale the Portuguese hoped.

Nevertheless, throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Portuguese continued to search. In 1632, Philip dispatched to the Zambezi two professional miners, Martim de Souto and Andrés de Vides y Albarado, with extensive experience in Spanish America. After interviewing several locals in the area of Sena, Albarado remained convinced that such mines existed after all, and promised the king that, if located, “Your Majesty can have more profit than from all the Indies of Castile.” Albarado outlined a comprehensive, three-part plan to facilitate the discovery and exploitation of those mines. First, the crown should open up trade to all settlers, not just the agents of the Captain of Mozambique. Second, he should expand the bureaucracy of local treasury offices and customs houses to ensure that settlers paid full duties on the metals they procured. Finally, he urged Philip to send at least a thousand Portuguese casados to the region, along with their families, and fifty or sixty missionaries in order to achieve the effective occupation of the

559 Expecting to find gold “in the streets and forests” of Manica, in 1570 the Portuguese were disappointed to find that “it was extracted only with great difficulty.” Ever hopeful, in 1608 king Philip II of Portugal mentioned to his viceroy the latest reports of “gold and silver mines [in] the kingdoms of Monomotapa.” See Documenta Malucensia, 9: 119-21; cited in Pearson Port Cities and Intruders, 144. And in 1635, the viceroy, Miguel de Noronha, relayed news he received from the region claiming that it contained “the greatest mines of all metals which have not yet been discovered in the world.” Quoted in Axelson, Portuguese in South-East Africa, 1600-1700, 101.

560 “Sobre os Mineiros que han de ir a Monomotapa, a fim de reconhecerem as minas; foram nomeados Martim de Souto, ensaidor de minas castelhano, e D. Andrés de Vides e Alvaro…, que já servia nas Indias com o mesmo ofício,” Biblioteca da Ajuda, Códice 51-X-4: 24 Dezembro 1632; and Rezende, Livro do Estado da India [Of the State of India], in RSEA, vol. 2, part 2, 413-419.

561 “D. Andres de Vides y Albarado to Rei; Sena, 22 de julho de 1633,” Arquivo Histórico do Estado da Índia (AHEI) 49, LM 41, fols. 13-14, quoted in Axelson, Portuguese in South-East Africa, 1600-1700, 99.

562 Axelson, Portuguese in South-East Africa, 1600-1700, 99.
region, and to cultivate a cohesive colonial society obedient to Portuguese crown rule.\textsuperscript{563}

“With this,” wrote Albarado, “your Majesty will be lord of the world as you deserve to be.”\textsuperscript{564}

No doubt thrilled at the prospect of such riches, beginning in 1635 Philip issued a series of decrees to bring Albarado’s proposals into effect. As mentioned, he instructed his viceroy to permit free trade between settlers and local peoples. And, in addition to commanding his viceroy to send “factors, collectors, and secretaries in the customs houses, for the security and good administration of the mines,” he decreed that, “all the gold and silver extracted from the mines shall be stamped with the royal seal of this crown, in the same manner as in the Spanish Indies, to prevent any misappropriation of it which might otherwise occur.”\textsuperscript{565} He ordered his viceroy to send “a chief judge and a guardian of the property of deceased persons” for “the administration of justice,” as well as additional troops and horses, “to be divided among each of the settlements.”\textsuperscript{566} Perhaps most importantly, he endorsed the plan to send “every year as many men and married couples as possible, and given that “there is a greater scarcity of women for the residents to marry,” he ordered “several women from the Casa-Pia” in Lisbon to be sent, along with “several young girls.”\textsuperscript{567}

But despite firm intentions, and despite repeated royal decrees to carry out such plans, the colonization schemes never materialized. Malyn Newitt has ascribed this to the

\textsuperscript{563} For another proposal, from the previous year, to create a colony in the rivers of Cuama, which gave as the underlying impetus behind such an enterprise to reverse the general “decline of the Estado da India,” see “Apresentaç\~{a}o do declínio do Estado da Índia, e do poder dos inimigos, e da conveniência, para se aumentar aquele Estado, em se fazer colônia nos rios de Cuama,” Biblioteca da Ajuda (BA), Manuscrito Avulso, códice 54-X-19, no. 38; 1632.

\textsuperscript{564} “D. Andres de Vides y Albarado to Rei; Sena, 22 de julho de 1633,” Arquivo Histórico do Estado da India [AHEI] 49, LM 41, fols. 13-14, quoted in Axelson, Portuguese in South-East Africa, 1600-1700, 99.

\textsuperscript{565} “Carta régia para o vice-rei da India,” Lisbon, 24 February 1635, RSEA, vol.4, 260-261.

\textsuperscript{566} Ibid. 257.

\textsuperscript{567} Ibid.
crown’s lack of resources during the ongoing struggle with the Dutch, as well as to “vested interests,” like the Captain of Mozambique, missionaries, and competing factions of settlers and merchants, who opposed potential encroachments on their power and prosperity.\textsuperscript{568} Additional colonization schemes were proposed in the 1670s and 1690s. But like their earlier iterations, they came into fruition.

**Decline**

The Portuguese crown’s effective jurisdiction in the interior of Southeast Africa reached its apex in the 1630s. By that point, it had formalized some eighty-one land grants in the Zambezi Valley, seventy-two of which were held by private settlers (fifty-nine by men and thirteen by women), seven by the Dominicans and Jesuits, and the remaining two by local *fumos* in the region of Tete subject to Portuguese colonial rule.\textsuperscript{569} Despite the failure to carry out the proposed colonization scheme, Portuguese dominium in the region had nonetheless reached such an extent that in 1634 the Portuguese chronicler, António Bocarro, stated quite plainly that, “the lands are all ours […] not only along the river but thirty or forty leagues back from it, and extending more than one hundred leagues in length from the mouth at the bar of Quelimane up the stream.” “All these lands are given to Portugal,” he continued, some “subject to the Captain of Sena and some to the Captain of Tete.”

However, even at the height of its hegemony, the crown’s effective authority remained fragile and dependent on the collaboration of local groups, including both mestiço

\textsuperscript{568} Newitt, *A History of Mozambique*, 221-222.
\textsuperscript{569} Rodrigues, “Mercadores, Conquistadores e Forcios,” 466. Rodrigues’s numbers are based on the 1634-1637 registry of Figueira de Almeida. We do not know the precise dimensions of most of these seventeenth century land grants, but Alexandre Lobato has argued that in the mid eighteenth century, *prazos* ranged in size from those which could be crossed in one day to those which it took eight days to cross on horseback. See Lobato, *Colonização senhorial da Zambézia*, 114.
settlers and indigenous vassals and allies. Remarkable on the current balance of power, Rezende admitted in 1635 that despite recent successes, “the power of the natives” remained “vastly greater than that of the few Portuguese who are found in the country.”570 Moreover, exposing the limits of crown control over the European settler population as well, António Bocarro argued at almost exactly the same moment that although the territories claimed by the crown of Portugal “are so extensive, they yield but little,” because the settlers and their retainers “do not render us obedience in all things.”571

After the 1630s, Portuguese crown power in the region began fading with the reconsolidation of several local polities. As a result, authority reverted primarily to the leading settlers and their private armies. Already in the mid 1640s, the recently crowned king, John IV, lamented to his viceroy “the lack of vassalage of the residents” of “the Rivers of Cuama,” and called for the re-establishment of “justice” in the region.572 Proposals throughout the 1640s and 1650s to ensure settlers’ obedience to Portuguese colonial authority consistently failed to materialize, however. These included plans to garrison royal troops at the strongholds of prominent settlers and to support those garrisons by imposing rents on settlers’ surrounding estates.573 But the crown simply did not have the leverage or resources to do so and was thus unable to reverse these centrifugal tendencies.

570 Captain Pedro Barreto de Rezende, *Livro do Estado da Índia* [Of the State of India], in *RSEA* vol. 2, part 2, 418-419. Beyond this military dependence, the Portuguese were likewise reliant on natives in conducting the very trade that had brought them such wealth. Noting their loyalty and valor, Rezende’s portrayal ran counter to the more derisive portrayals of native barbarity and moral corruption. “All the trade and merchandize of the Portuguese in these extensive territories passes through the hands of caffres,” he wrote, “either their captives or individuals known to them.” The Portuguese “entrust large quantities of the goods most esteemed and valuable among them, which they carry for many leagues into the interior and barter for gold and ivory, returning punctually with all the gain with so much truth and loyalty.”


572 See “Para o VRey da India, sobre o stado em q le achão as cousas dos Rios de Cuama e pouca obediencia de seus m’res, e lhe enviar algua g’te, Lisboa, 18 de fevereiro de 649,” AHU, Códice 208, fol. 124v; “Carta Régia sobre o provimento de Justica, que necessitavão os Rios de Cuama, pela falta de vassallage de seus moradores. Feita a 15 de Dezembro de 1646,” ANTT, *DRILM*, vol. 2, fol. 51; and “Sua Reposta,” 15 Dezembro 1647, fols. 387-387v.

In his 1667, Informação do Estado e Conquista dos Rios de Cuama, Vulgar e Verdadeiramente chamados Rios do Ouro, the Jesuit Manuel Barreto reflected at length and with remarkable frankness on the expansions and recessions of Portuguese power in the Southeast African hinterland. Barreto noted the presence of crown-appointed captains at Quelimane, Sofala, Sena, Tete, and the Monomotapa’s zimbabwe, and of several “minor captains” at Dambarare, Ongoe, Luazi, Chipiriviri, and Manica. However, despite the geographic reach of crown control, Barreto made quite clear his impression of the crown’s limited effective authority. In reality, “his Majesty only possesses a triangle” of territory, he wrote, between Quelimane, Chicova, and Sofala. Moreover, even in “those [Zambezi towns] which [he] saw,” and where a captain resided, Barreto “noticed nothing to represent a captaincy beyond a wooden stockade.” But, he wrote sardonically, he did observe, “several iron guns lying on the shore full of sand, in proof of which an ear of green millet was growing from the touch-hole of one of them, showing the great fertility of the soil and the great care which is taken of the king’s property.”

According to Barreto, true power was in the hands of leading settlers, rather than with the crown itself. All the lands within that triangle of Portuguese dominium, he explained, had “been gradually acquired” by the settlers through their own means and efforts, and through their relationships with local polities and rulers. He mentioned António Lobo da Silva, Manuel Foz de Abreu, and Manuel Paez de Pinho as among the leading settlers of the period, and marveled at their wide-ranging authority and effective jurisdiction:

“the holders of these lands have the same power and jurisdiction as the cafre fumos [traditional

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574 As Barreto wrote, that triangle extended from Quelimane, following one hundred and twenty six leagues to the northwest along the Zambezi to Chicova, from there along “an imaginary line drawn from Chicova to the port of Sofala,” a distance of roughly a hundred and leagues, and from there, along some sixty leagues of sea coast back to Quelimane.” See, the Manuel Barreto, “Informação do Estado e Conquista dos Rios de Cuama, Vulgar e Verdadeiramente chamados Rios do Ouro. Ao Conde V. Rey João Nunez da Cunha,” 11 December, 1667, in RSEA, vol. 3, 466.

chiefs] from whom they were conquered, for the deeds of lease were passed in that form, and therefore they are like the potentates of Germany, and can pronounce sentence in all cases, put to death, declare war, and impose tribute.”

In Tonga and Mocaranga culture, a headman’s power derived less from his material wealth than from his ability to wield social influence over dependents and competitors through violence or the threat of violence. In appointing a captain to guard the Monomotapa’s zimbabwe, royal officials always selected “one of the settlers of the Rivers who has his own cafre following, which makes him respected,” wrote another observer in the late seventeenth century. Barreto himself explained that in order to dominate, it was necessary that one have force and the willingness to apply it, “because the cafres will only fear and respect those who have […] power.” Moreover, in joining a fumo’s ranks as soldiers, local peoples were “much more interested in the spoils of war than in any payment.” In this way, the leading settlers derived their legitimacy among local peoples as heirs to traditional kings and chiefs, and adopted the local style of rule. This was crucial. The landholders, he wrote, “would not be duly respected by their vassals if they did not hold the same powers as the fumos whom they succeeded.”

As Portuguese crown power in the interior waned, so too did the Portuguese and mestiço population in general. In 1667, Barreto noted that whereas “about thirty years ago there were more than sixty married Portuguese” in Sena, there were currently “not more than thirty Portuguese houses, with […] others,” belonging to “mocoques [non-Portuguese Indians and Africans] and manumuzungos [mestiços].” Tete, he wrote, which “in times past

576 Ibid. 466-468.
577 Conceição, Tratado dos Rios de Cuama, 33.
579 Ibid. 468.
580 Ibid. 473.
was very rich and much frequented,” by then contained “not more than forty houses of Portuguese and mocaques” combined.\textsuperscript{581}

The Portuguese crown likewise saw great fluctuations in its control over local groups. Although the peoples of Botonga [ie. the land of the Tonga] had long been loyal vassals, Barreto noted that “a great part of Botonga […] has rebelled against us,” as well as much of Baroe and Manica, all of which once again pledged primary allegiance to the Monomotapa, rather than to the crown of Portugal.\textsuperscript{582} Barreto did not attribute these defections to Portuguese weakness, however. Instead, he argued that, “the principal cause [was] the bad conduct of the Portuguese, from whose violence the cafres flee to other lands.”\textsuperscript{583} In any case, despite the renewed support it received from certain local groups, Barreto still viewed the Monomotapa’s power as far outstripped by that of the leading settlers.\textsuperscript{584} These figures, like Madeira, Lobo da Silva, and Paez da Pinho, could call hundreds and sometimes thousands of enslaved soldiers into armed action on their behalf.\textsuperscript{585}

Around Mozambique Island, the crown’s effective authority had long remained limited to the island itself and to the farms lining the bay.\textsuperscript{586} “Old men,” wrote Barreto, “remember a time when the two chief villages of the mainland opposite supplied the island [with enough] meat and vegetables [to provision] whole fleets from the kingdom which put in to that port.”\textsuperscript{587} But he noted that in recent years it had become even more isolated and virtually cut off from the mainland. Although he ascribed this to “the plague of lions and elephants,” which had turned the adjacent mainland into “wild forests,” it might just as well

\textsuperscript{581} Ibid. 476.  
\textsuperscript{582} Ibid. 482.  
\textsuperscript{583} Ibid. 491.  
\textsuperscript{584} Ibid. 482.  
\textsuperscript{585} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{586} Axelson, Portuguese in South-East Africa, 1488-1600, 233.  
have resulted from the rise of the Maravi kingdom in that territory, which was fiercely independent of Portuguese power.  

In order to address this general recession of the crown’s effective authority, Barreto offered two main solutions. First, he proposed that any person who “penetrates into the interior to trade should be bound to remain there without remission.” “Many estates and conquests are weakened,” he continued, “when men of capital leave them, by whom [other settlers] were animated and under whose protection many lived and grew rich.” In addition, Barreto argued that the crown should continue to rely on the settlers in advancing its claims to sovereignty in the region, but warned that the current generation should not be given the same free rein as the previous. “In the present state of things,” he advised, “it is necessary to push forward by means of Manuel Paes de Pinho in the lands of Tete, and of Antonio Lobo da Silva in those of Sena, as being the most powerful in estates.” But, he warned, “it should be done with caution, that they may not conquer simply for themselves.” This was to prevent any one settler from getting “such power that his obedience [to the crown] becomes a matter of courtesy.”

Barreto’s proposal proved easier said than done, however. Beyond offering symbolic titles to prestigious military orders or the nobility, the crown had little leverage in curbing these tendencies or incentivizing settlers to respect royal law and recognize the supreme

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588 Ibid.
589 Ibid. 492-.
590 Ibid.
591 Ibid.
592 Ibid. In the full passage, Barreto cited the case of, “Lourenço de Mattos, or Maponda, who going to war against Sanapache, who infested the lands of Botonga, both those subject to and those exempt from our dominion, killed and defeated him, and got possession of all the lands of the said Sanapache, so that he would not even restore to the Portuguese what Sanapache had usurped from them, which was the cause of great differences between him and the Portuguese inhabitants who laid claim to them, and he retained them, saying he had won them with his bow. These lands at his death passed to his son-in-law Sisnando Dias Bayão, or Manuampaca, and from him to his son-in-law, who they say is Antonio Lobo da Silva, or Nhemba, who must possess more lands than the first conquerors.”
authority of the Portuguese crown, let alone that of the Monomotapa. Conflict and disorder persisted, and despite the apparent dominance of the Portuguese crown throughout much of the interior, divisions within the settler population and their general lack obedience to royal officials meant that its position was far more fragile than it appeared.

That fragility was made painfully clear in the following decades. In his, *Tratado dos Rios de Cuama*, the Augustinian António da Conceição described the diminishing power of the Portuguese there, and, like Manuel Barreto three decades prior, provided a detailed proposal for how best to reverse that trend. Conceição nonetheless viewed the King of Portugal and his proxy, the Monomotapa, as the region’s “rightful” rulers. And despite the dramatic setbacks of recent years, he maintained hope that the Portuguese might one day discover and conquer the fabled silver mines, which, he rhapsodized, would enable them to achieve an eventual political and spiritual conquest of the entire globe.

First, he argued that the Portuguese must re-establish their preeminence throughout the Zambezi, “so that the Cafres who reside there will not recognize any overlord nor be subject to anyone, except the governor and our lord the King of Portugal.” To achieve this, he advised the Captain of Mozambique to station himself in Sena or Tete and, with a force of around a hundred soldiers, reconquer the adjacent lands, which for years prior had been under firm Portuguese dominion but had recently broken away. Conceição also

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593 Conceição’s 1696, *Tratado dos Rios de Cuama*, is without doubt the most comprehensive contemporary account of the region in the late seventeenth century.
594 Conceição argued that the Monomotapa’s legitimacy derived from that fact that “his ancestors conquered them and ruled over” “all these lands of Cafraria.” The king of Portugal’s “dominion in those lands and especially over the silver mines,” he argued, stemmed “from treaties which the Portuguese made on 24 May 1629 with the emperor Mavura, which he accepted when they delivered the kingdom to him after they had conquered it with their arms.” See, Conceição, *Tratado dos Rios de Cuama*, 37.
595 Conceição fantasized that the windfall from such mines would, “be sufficient to restore India and subjugate the heathen, and indeed the whole world, bringing it all to the true law of Jesus Christ.” See, Conceição, *Tratado dos Rios de Cuama*, 49.
596 Conceição, *Tratado dos Rios de Cuama*, 43.
597 Ibid.
proposed a colonization scheme, in this case not of Portuguese *casados*, however, but instead of “clean and honorable Indian families who have the disposition for trade, as they usually have.” He also proposed specifically to send young girls, “less than ten years old, the orphans of honest parents, with the recommendation to whoever is governing that they should give them and their husbands preference in the award of Crown lands and government appointments.”

Yet despite maintaining an optimistic view to the future, Conceição was frank about the political instability of late, the general recession of Portuguese power, and the fierce rebelliousness of local groups both on the Zambezi and in the interior. Explaining how Portuguese power depended on violence, he opined that those local groups, which remained “friendly toward us,” like the kingdom of Baroe, did so more “through fear than good will.” But certain of them, especially those “upstream of Sena,” he continued, “are bellicose, and the further inland, the stronger they are and less obedient to Portuguese authority, still less to that of the emperor [ie. the Monomotapa].” He described them as “usually in a state of rebellion,” “not willing to pay the customary tribute.”

However, the most transformative event in Conceição’s day was without doubt the rise of Changamira Dombo, a sorcerer and guardian of the herds of the Monomotapa who gathered a large following of soldiers and rose up against his lord in 1692. In the offensive, Changamira and his forces stripped the Monomotapa of many of his remaining possessions and seized virtually all the Portuguese fairs and estates in the interior. After the assault, the only subjects of the Portuguese crown that remained in that region were “some natives of

598 Ibid. 47-49.
599 Ibid. 19.
600 Ibid. 23.
601 Ibid.
602 Changamira was the named of the ruler of what eventually became known as the Rozvi dynasty.
India.”603 Then, in 1695, “news reached Sena that Changamira had razed the fair of Masekesa and in consequence had taken over the lands of Manica,” thereby depriving the Portuguese and mestiço settlers of access to the coveted gold and silver trade.604 Conceição ascribed the recent losses to “our lack of peoples and arms and the superabundance of those of the natives.”605 And he reported that, in another of the main trade fairs, Dambarare, “the enemy eventually killed everyone without a single Portuguese or Indian being able to escape from the whole fair.”

But Changamira died shortly after Conceição completed his treatise, and subsequent rulers of that dynasty, the Rozvi, were less hostile to the Portuguese. Had Changamira survived, he may well have expelled the Portuguese from the Zambezi altogether. In any case, given the weakened position of the Portuguese, and the inability of Goa to send sufficient support, they never attempted the reconquest Conceição so longingly sought. As Mocaranga power diminished over the course of the seventeenth century, so too did that of the Portuguese. As a result, by 1700, few Portuguese remained on the interior plateau, their presence mostly confined to Sena, Tete, and narrow tracts along the lower Zambezi.

Conclusions

The initial arrival of the Portuguese to Southeast Africa in the early sixteenth century did not mark the beginning of a progressive, linear process of extension and imposition of Portuguese colonial rule. Portuguese sovereignty was fragile and imprecisely defined. During most of the period from 1500 to 1700, Portugal was not even the hegemonic power in the

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603 Conceição, Tratado dos Rios de Cuama, 25.
604 Ibid. 75.
605 Ibid. 65 and 37.
region. Throughout the sixteenth century and the early years of the seventeenth, the king of Portugal was a vassal of the Monomotapa and paid a tri-annual tribute for the right to trade in that kingdom. Despite eventually subjecting the Monomotapa to Portuguese lordship and exercising nominal sovereignty over most of his former territory in the mid 1630s, by the close of that century, Lisbon’s effective sovereignty in the region was greatly reduced. This resulted in large part from the rise of powerful indigenous groups, like the Rozvi dynasty of Changamira, as well as from the constant threat of the Dutch, which diverted Lisbon’s attention to the coast, to Brazil, and to elsewhere across Portuguese India.

Even at the height of Iberian power in the region, Lisbon’s sovereignty was limited to a handful of isolated fortresses at Mozambique Island, Sofala, and the main trade fairs of the Zambezi Valley and Mocaranga hinterland. Within the Portuguese population, which included a large number of mestiços, prominent settlers held the true balance of power. Their authority in turn depended on the military support they received from local Tonga and other native soldiers, many of whom were enslaved, as well as from the alliance of other neighboring groups whose interests occasionally converged with those of the Portuguese against competing indigenous polities.

Settlers often operated on behalf of the crown, and served at the vanguard in extending the Lisbon’s effective authority by subjecting local groups and polities to Portuguese colonial rule. But these persons also expressed their allegiance to local native rulers, and proved deft in adapting to shifts in the regional balance of power. As a result, the effective reach of Portuguese colonial authority depended in large part on Lisbon’s ability to ingratiate these settlers and secure their loyalty in order to enforce royal trade monopolies and check the power of indigenous groups. When the interests of prominent settlers like

606 Portugal also paid tribute to another powerful native ruler, the Quiteve, until the early 1570s.
Diogo Simões Madeira or Diogo de Sousa de Meneses aligned with those of the crown, Lisbon's effective authority was greatly expanded and enhanced. But when those interests diverged, the crown had little means of enforcing its claims.

The limits of imperial sovereignty in the region were vague and fluctuated constantly as alliances formed and faded away. Despite possessing European firearms, neither royal authorities nor the most powerful settlers were ever able to firmly or permanently subject the interior to Portuguese rule. The dominance Lisbon achieved over the Upper Zambezi and parts of Mocaranga proved cursory. Native peoples continued to be the prime determinants of power relations in the region throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
Champions of Iberian expansion waxed lyrical about the unprecedented power and scope of the Spanish and Portuguese empires at the turn of the seventeenth century. In addition to recounting the famous campaigns in Mexico, Peru, and across the Indian Ocean world, a number of chroniclers also turned their attention to East Asia. In his global history of Spanish expansion in the age of Philip II, for instance, Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas claimed that Spaniards in the Philippines had “pacifie[d] a million people” and “baptized 300,000” over a space of “more than 300 leagues.”607 Giovanni Botero likewise rhapsodized about Spanish achievements in the archipelago, claiming that, “until now, the Spanish have pacified more than forty islands,” including Mindanao, Negros, Panay, Gigantes, Cebu, Mindoro, Luzon, and some thirty-three others, large and small.608 Presenting the Spanish as heroes overcoming enormous odds, Botero wrote that, “the number of Spaniards that have conquered and defended these islands is not more than 1,200,” of which a mere 500 were soldiers.609

Although presented by Botero as a virtue, from the perspective of Spanish officials, the small number of Spaniards in the archipelago was in fact a major problem. Colonial authorities faced tremendous challenges in extending Spanish rule in the Philippines, despite the bombastic claims of influential authors back in Europe. After over a century in the

607 Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, *Historia general del mundo del tiempo del Rey Felipe II, el prudente, desde el año de 1554 hasta el de 1598* (Madrid, 1601-1612), vol. 2 of 3, ch. 20, 454. Herrera mentioned in particular the “Augustinian, Dominican, and Franciscan fathers,” as well as “the Fathers of the Company of Jesus.”
archipelago and countless expeditions of conquest, by the late seventeenth century the geographic scope of Spanish colonial rule remained limited mostly to Manila and its environs plus a few remote outposts, none of which included towns with populations of more than 2,000, including their indigenous inhabitants.

A variety of factors converged to circumscribe Spanish sovereignty in the Philippines. Some emerged from rifts within the resident European population, while others developed from without as a range of local groups leveraged their own unique positions to influence or oppose the extension of Spanish colonialism in a number of ways. Jurisdictional disputes between the municipal council and high court (*Audiencia*), for instance, represent one example, as did the protracted conflict between religious authorities and members of the Spanish settler community over the administration and treatment of Philippine *indios*. These internal tensions surrounding Spanish rule, and the challenges they provoked, undermined the cohesion of settler society and the capacity of Spanish authorities to reinforce colonial governance across the archipelago. They even generated intense debates that echoed those in the New World by exposing Spanish abuse of native peoples and calling into question the Castilian crown’s fundamental right to sovereignty in the islands.

The vast distances separating the Philippines from the centers of metropolitan and viceregal power, and the communication lags those distances entailed, endowed colonial officials with substantial authority. As a result, local contexts and concerns heavily mediated the Spanish colonial project in the Philippines. While the king, his Council of Indies, and his viceroy in New Spain issued frequent instructions to their subordinates in the

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610 Although mostly in vain, the king and viceroy in New Spain did nonetheless attempt to overcome the challenges posed by distance, by providing, for instance, detailed instructions on how the governor or captain-general’s duties should be delegated and executed in the event of his death before the arrival of a crown-appointed replacement. See, “Instrucción para la forma en que se deben usar los cargos de gobernador y capitán general remitidos a las islas Filipinas en caso de muerte de alguno de ellos,” Luis Enrique de Guzmán, Virrey, México, 12 February 1653, in Archivo General de la Nación, México [AGN-México hereafter], General de Parte, vol. 10, expediente 350.
islands, the crown-appointed governor enjoyed wide authority to execute those instructions as he saw fit. Such delegation of powers extended throughout Spain’s colonial administration in the Philippines as well, providing local and provincial officials broad authority in their own right, and occasionally leading to significant conflicts within the Spanish colonial population and administration.

To be sure, the numerous legal and political disputes that erupted among Spaniards in the Philippines were not unique to the archipelago. On the contrary, they were integral to the institutional culture that governed political relations across the early modern Iberian world, and ought not be viewed simply as symptomatic of a failure on the part of the Spanish crown to establish itself as the preeminent power among the resident European population.\footnote{Regarding the Spanish American context, Alejandro Cañeque explains this process well in his essay, “Governance,” 145-149 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2013). For a concise analysis of these dynamics in peninsular Spain, Antonio Feros’ short essay, also entitled, “Governance,” in the same volume, on pages 141-144. And for a comprehensive study of these questions regarding early modern Portugal, but with implications for the broader Iberian world see Hespanha, \textit{As Vésporas do Leviathan}.} However, such tensions did limit the efficacy of royal officials in advancing their own individual pretensions, or those of their factions and the offices they represented. In the process, they forged significant divisions between sectors of settler society, each of which espoused a distinct vision of how the Spanish colonial project in the islands should take shape.

Even more importantly, in addition to fueling moral and jurisdictional disputes between royal officials, settlers, and the local clergy, tensions surrounding Spanish colonialism also spurred many indigenous groups into direct action to oppose it. As in the Americas, while some created short- or long-term alliances with Spanish authorities in order to further their own specific objectives, others resented Spanish demands and
encroachments, and resisted Spanish rule, often quite successfully. Spanish hegemony even came under threat in areas like Pampanga, whose population was generally considered the most loyal to Spain. Manila too, the ostensible stronghold of Spanish power in the Philippines, was, by the seventeenth century, in many ways as much a Chinese city as a Spanish one. Disputes between Spaniards and Chinese produced numerous flare-ups in violence, often with devastating consequences, making even the seat of Spanish authority in the archipelago perpetually unstable. Beyond Manila, despite the periodic dispatching of Spanish expeditions of conquest or “pacification,” the vast majority of territory remained under the effective authority of native groups throughout the period in question. Whether migrating beyond the sphere of Spanish influence, opposing Spanish rule outright, or allying with the Spaniards to advance their own distinct interests, Philippine indios and other non-European groups played instrumental roles in shaping the scope and nature of Spanish colonialism in the archipelago throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Herrera himself, while impressing upon readers the prowess of “Spaniards, [who] protect this island [ie. Luzon],” nonetheless betrayed the broad range of opposition they faced from “Rebels, Moors, and Gentiles,” thereby lumping, in the language of the colonizer, myriad forms of resistance and a range of groups with vastly different and often conflicting aims. See Antonio de Herrera y Tordesillas, Historia general del mundo del tiempo del Rey Felipe II, el prudente, desde el año de 1554 hasta el de 1598 (Madrid, 1601-1612), vol. 2 of 3, ch. 20, 454.
Over 11,000 kilometers east of Madrid as the crow flies, and some 14,000 from Mexico City due west, the Philippines were among Spain’s most remote colonies. Spanish objectives in the islands were hardly static, and were the subject of continuous debate during the first century of colonial occupation. Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, however, trade remained first and foremost among those objectives. Spaniards were particularly interested in silks and spices, and saw the Philippines as an ideal station.

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from which to access the fabled markets of China, Southeast Asia, and the broader Indian Ocean world. But the colony was also significant for other reasons. In the seventeenth century it provided a strategic base from which to counter the rising Dutch threat in the region. And in the context of the struggle over the Moluccas specifically, the Philippines came to represent an additional front in Spain’s global war against Islam. Although observing from a distance, in 1603 Botero neatly summarized the diversity of Spain’s interests in the archipelago and its strategic value to the crown’s broader global ambitions:

> These states are much more important than anyone can imagine. Because beyond being extremely copious in victuals, and having gold there, they are in a very a good place to subject the neighboring islands, and to maintain the Moluccas, and to introduce trade between the peoples of the archipelago and New Spain, and to facilitate commerce between China and Mexico, things of extremely great consideration and esteem. But what is without doubt most important of all is to begin to put an end there to the sect of Mohamed.  

When the Spaniards arrived in the Philippines in the sixteenth century, they encountered a diversity of peoples spread across the archipelago’s roughly 7,000 islands. Although the precise population is unknown, Linda Newson, using rigorous standards of historical geography, has estimated the total number at around 1.5 million, excluding Mindanao. While there did exist certain semi-sedentary communities practicing sawah rice cultivation prior to Spanish arrival, most Philippine indios were non-sedentary, practicing slash-and-burn, or “swidden” agriculture, relocating every few years after their fields ran fallow. Spaniards generally lumped the islands’ non-European inhabitants into the single category of indios, thereby erasing the myriad distinctions between those groups and using

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614 Botero, Relaciones universales del mundo (1603), part 1, 100a-101a.
615 Linda A. Newson, Conquest and Pestilence in the Early Spanish Philippines (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2009). This makes Herrera y Tordesillas’ claim that, by the turn of the seventeenth century, the Spanish had “pacified a million people, and baptized 300,000,” all the more spurious. For this claim, see: Herrera y Tordesillas, Historia general del mundo (1601), vol. 2, ch. 20, 454.
the term in reference to all persons considered subjects of the crown, regardless of whether those persons themselves recognized that subjecthood. In addition, Spaniards referred to the Muslim inhabitants of Mindanao and elsewhere as moros, crudely. And in the occasional instances where they did use more specific terms, they often used pejoratives like Igorots and Negritos [literally, little black people], which were likewise catch-all terms that denied the ethnic diversity of the various groups in the upland regions of northern Luzon.617

Prior to the advent of Spanish rule, the Philippines’ inhabitants had organized themselves in relatively small, decentralized, and politically independent communities, called barangays, which usually consisted of less than five hundred individuals.618 Each barangay, in turn, was composed of what Spanish contemporaries and modern scholars alike have identified as three or four social classes. Atop local social pyramids were the datus, members of the ruling class, or maginoo, which the early Spaniards compared to the European nobility given its hereditary nature of succession. Below the datus were a second class of elites, consisting of the mabarlikas and timawas, which, according to historian William Henry Scott, were bound to their datu, not by debt or inheritance, but by patron-client contract.619 Like the datus, the mabarlikas formed part of the hereditary aristocracy and were free, but were nonetheless vassals of a given datu, albeit of their own choosing, and were obliged to render

618 Junker, Raiding, Trading and Feasting. John Leddy Phelan has claimed that some exceptionally large barangays in Manila, Vigan, and Cebu may have contained up to 2,000 people; see John Leddy Phelan, The Hispanization of the Philippines: Spanish Aims and Filipino Responses, 1565-1700 (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), 15. According to Spain’s first governor of the islands, Miguel López de Legazpi, the pre-Spanish Philippines possessed no cabeceras, or seats of government, “nor did any of its towns obey any others; instead each population group governed itself by its own account.” See, “Relación de los pueblos puestos en cabeza de S.M,” 9 January 1574, AGI Filipinas, leg. 29, no.14, fols. 50r-51v.
619 William Henry Scott, “Oripun and Alipin in the 16th-Century Philippines,” in Looking for the Pre-Hispanic Filipino and other essays in Philippine History, ed. William Henry Scott (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1992), 92. Phelan has suggested that dependents were linked to their masters not only by debt obligations, but also by relations of extended kinship, or consanguinity; see, Phelan, The Hispanization of the Philippines (1967), 22.
that datu military service, most often at sea. The timaws, on the other hand, rendered their service in a range of labor activities, and were likewise considered free. Finally, the alipins occupied the lowest rung and constituted the vast majority of the population of a given barangay. Not exactly slaves, as the Spaniards mistakenly identified them, the alipins were in fact debt servants, bonded to serve datus, maharlikas, timaws, and even, on occasion, to other alipins. They served their masters as laborers, and although subjected to obligatory, non-contractual servitude, their duties were generally part-time. In addition, there existed at least a degree of social mobility between the alipin, maharlika, and timawa classes.

When the first Spaniards arrived in the Philippines, Islam – although the religion of the ruling elite in certain areas and adopted by some powerful communities in places like the Sulus and Maguindanaos – had yet to take firm root in the rest of the archipelago, including in Mindanao. Due most likely to the influence of fellow Muslim communities in Brunei and beyond, Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago, in the south, were the only regions of the Philippines to develop political units, like the rajah, which united multiple communities into what John Leddy Phelan has referred to as “suprabarangays.” This higher degree of political consolidation may in part explain the success of Mindanao’s inhabitants in repelling Spanish invasions.


622 Called alipin in Tagalog, these occupants of the lowest rung of the social ladder were referred to in Visayan as oripun. See Scott, “Oripun and Alipin in the 16th-Century Philippines,” 86.


The first official Spanish expedition to reach the Philippines was that led by Ferdinand Magellan, who, after proclaiming the archipelago for the crown of Castile, met his death there in 1521 at the hands of Mactan soldiers defending their land. Although several expeditions followed in next three decades – including that of Ruy López de Villalobos, who in 1542 renamed the islands of Leyte and Samar, Las Islas Filipinas, in honor of the future king Philip II of Spain – it was not until the late 1560s that Spaniards began attempting the systematic conquest and occupation of the archipelago under the adelantado, Miguel López de Legazpi. Throughout the sixteenth century, many Spaniards maintained as their ultimate goal the political and spiritual conquest of China, regarding the Philippines as an antesala, or stepping-stone and remote base of operations from which to attempt a larger enterprise of territorial conquest. In addition to China, the Spanish crown also sought to conquer a range of other important polities in the region, to submit their existing rulers to Castilian lordship, and to control the maritime spice trade throughout that vast region. But as the

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625 The name, Las Islas Filipinas, was subsequently extended to encompass the entire archipelago.
626 Manel Ollé, “El Mediterráneo del Mar de la China: Las dinámicas históricas de Asia Oriental y la formación del modelo colonial Filipino,” in Imperios y naciones en el Pacífico, Vol. 1, La formación de una colonia: Filipinas, ed. María Dolores Elizalde Pérez-Grueso, Josep María Fradera, and Luis Alonso (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2001), 64; see also, Boxer, “Portuguese and Spanish Projects for the Conquest of Southeast Asia,” 118-136; and Carlos Vega, “Un proyecto utópico: La conquista de China por España,” Boletín de la Asociación de Orientalistas XIV-XVIII (1982). In fact, even one of the Philippines’ early Augustinian missionaries, Martín de Rada, argued in a letter to the king that, “Si su majestad pretende la china, ques tierra muy larga, rica y de gran policia, que tiene ciudades fuertes y muradas, muy mayores que las de Europa, tiene necesidad primero de azer asiento en estas islas [Filipinas]; lo vno, porque no sería azertado pasar por entre tantas yslas y baxíos, como ay a la costa della, con navíos de alto bordo sino con navíos de rremos; lo otro tambien, porque para conquistar vna tierra tan grande y de tanta gente, es necesario tener cerca el socorro y acogida para cualquier caso que sucediere, avnque según me é informado [...], la gente de china no es nada belicosa y toda su confiança está en la multitud de la gente y en la fortaleza de las murallas, lo qual sería su degolladero, si se les tomase alguna, y así creo que mediante dios fácilmente, y no con mucha gente, serán sujetados,” quoted in Luis Alonso Álvarez, “Don Quijote en el Pacífico: La construcción del proyecto español en Asia, 1591-1606,” Revista de Historia Económica - Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History 23, no. 1 (2005): 244-245.
627 See, for instance, “Carta de Andrés Cauchela sobre ataque a Borneo,” 12 June 1578, Manila, AGI Filipinas, leg. 29, no. 27. For the larger Spanish plan to control the spice trade, see “Capítulos de carta del factor Román sobre la especiería,” 10 April 1584, AGI Filipinas, leg. 29, no. 46, fols. 203r-204v. Román argued that the Portuguese had thus far failed to achieve due in large part to the attacks and interference of local corsairs, that the Spanish navy was better equipped than the Portuguese to protect that trade, and that given the costs and challenges of shipping spices west through the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean, it would be cheaper and more efficient to carry them east, via Panama, on their way back to Iberia.
sixteenth century drew to a close, Spaniards increasingly recognized the enormity of those
goals, and the limits of their own manpower and resources. As a result, they shifted their
primary focus to the conquest of the Philippine archipelago itself, resigning themselves to
indirect trade with China via the local population of Chinese merchants, called “Sangleys.”
These merchants soon flocked to Manila in the tens of thousands to exchange their
porcelain, silks, spices, and other wares in exchange, primarily, for Spanish American
silver.628

At the founding of Spanish colonial government in the Philippines, Philip II made
clear his intentions. Noticeably influenced by the theories and discourses of Francisco de
Vitoria and other early critics of Spanish colonialism in America, Philip enjoined his first
governor of the Philippines in 1568 to seek the submission of natives by peaceful means of
persuasion, “to treat them well,” and befriend them, and to introduce them to “our holy
Catholic faith.”629 Predating the 1572-73, “Ordinances for the discovery, settlement, and
pacification of the Indies,” these instructions nonetheless reflected the impact of Vitoria’s

628 As Manel Ollé has explained, the Chinese economy was becoming increasingly monetized in the sixteenth
century, placing the Spaniards in a unique position given their access to Spanish American silver, see: Ollé, “El
Mediterráneo del Mar de la China,” 62. Chinese demand for silver thus played an important role in determining
the nature of the Spanish presence in the Philippines, which, over the course of the seventeenth century in
particular, became increasingly oriented around the trans-Pacific galleon trade that linked Spanish America to
China, via Manila. For detailed studies of Manila’s position within global circuits of trade and exchange, see
Flynn and Giráldez, “Born with a ‘Silver Spoon’,” 201-221; Carlos Martínez Shaw and Marina Alfonso Mola,
“The Philippine Islands: a vital crossroads during the first globalization period,” Culture and History Digital
Journal 3, no. 1 (June 2014): 1-16; Birgit Tremml-Werner, Spain, China, and Japan in Manila, 1571-1644: Local
Comparisons and Global Connections (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2015); and Birgit Tremml, “The
Global and the Local: Problematic Dynamics of the Triangular Trade in Early Modern Manila,” Journal of World
History 23, no. 3 (2013): 555-586; and Andrew Christian Peterson, “Making the First Global Trade Route: The
Southeast Asian Foundations of the Acapulco-Manila Galleon Trade, 1519-1650” (PhD diss., University of Hawai‘i, 2014). A testament to the truly global circuits in which Manila formed part, Chinese laborers, including
slaves, could be found not only in the Philippines, but also in the New World. See, for instance, Tatiana Seijas,

629 “Instrucciones de gobierno a Miguel López de Legazpi,” 16 November 1568, El Escorial, AGI Filipinas, leg.
339, no. 1, fols. 1r-2v. In 1574, Philip reiterated his order to treat the natives well, evangelize among them, and
ensure that their tribute obligations not exceed the official rate; see: “Relación de los pueblos puestos en cabeza
de S.M.,” 9 January 1574, AGI Filipinas, leg. 29, no. 14, fols. 50r-51v; and Kevin Joseph Sheehan, Iberian Asia:
The Strategies of Spanish and Portuguese Empire Building, 1540-1700, Ph.D. Dissertation (University of California,
Berkeley, 2008), 162-163.
ideas – and those of the broader Salamanca school – and the king’s concern that further expeditions in his name be portrayed as legal and just. To this end, Philip instructed his agents to eschew the word “conquest,” and use instead the term, “pacification,” in order to frame Spanish colonial expansion in more favorable terms and lend credence to the ostensible claim that the Spaniards’ primary aim was to deliver Philippine indios from oppression and offer spiritual salvation by leading them to the light of God and Christianity, the one true religion.  

Hoping to avoid the violence and abuse that continued to characterize the process of colonial rule in the New World, Philip hesitated to sanction slavery in the Philippines, but nonetheless permitted the captivity of Muslims there who refused conversion. In addition, reflecting another lesson learned in the fraught process of colonization in the Americas, in an effort to prevent the rise of excessively autonomous landed settler aristocracy, Philip

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630 For an example of such attempts to subjugate Philippine indios through more benign forms of persuasion, see the Instructions then-governor Gómez Pérez Dasmariñas gave to his son, Luis, charged with leading an expedition of “pacification” to Tuy: “Granting that one of the reasons for the hatred and hostility of the Indians toward us is the collection of tributes, especially when it is not accomplished with suitable mildness and moderation, this question shall by no means be discussed with them in the beginning. Rather, if the Indians should be fearful of what should be collected from them, and should place obstacles in the way of their reduction and our principal end, that of their conversion, good hopes shall be offered them that all satisfaction shall be accorded them in this matter, and that the tribute shall be only what they choose to give. […] You shall under no consideration allow any soldier to seize any gold or any other article of value from any Indian, in case that any of the said Indians should flee through fear or any other reason, and abandon their gold or other property to the power of the soldiers. […] As soon as you shall have come in sight of the district that you are to seek, you shall send your message and protests, with show of great love and moderation, so that the natives will admit our trade and friendship, as above stated. You shall under no consideration permit any soldier to violate any woman, or to offer to either mother or daughter any uncivil or rough treatment. Rather you shall see that no ill-treatment, or offenses to God, occur. You shall give the natives some silks or gifts of slight value, which will be highly esteemed among the Indians, and which will be a partial way of making them understand that we do not go there only for their property, but in order to give them ours, so that they will admit our friendship and trade, which is beneficial to them,” see: “Expeditions to the province of Tuy, Juan Manuel de la Vega,” 3 July 1609, Passi, in The Philippine Islands, 1493-1803: Explorations by Early Navigators, Descriptions of the Islands and their People and Records of the Catholic Missions, as Related in Contemporaneous Books and Manuscripts, showing the Political, Economic, Commercial and Religious Conditions of those Islands from their Earliest Relations with European Nations to the Close of the Nineteenth Century [The Philippine Islands hereafter], eds. Emma Helen Blair and James Alexander Robertson, 55 vols. (Cleveland, OH: The Arthur H. Clark Co., 1903-1909), vol. 14, 311-313.

631 In 1574, Philip eventually placed a categorical prohibition on the enslavement of “indios filipinos,” which referred to the native inhabitants of the archipelago that had converted to Catholicism. He even demanded that all such “indios filipinos” currently enslaved be emancipated, regardless of the manner in which they had been procured or originally placed in bondage. See: “Prohibición de hacer esclavos entre los indios filipinos,” 7 November 1574, Madrid, AGI Filipinas, leg. 339, no. 1, fols. 57v-58r.
instructed Legazpi and his lieutenants not to apportion the main Philippine towns, ports, or Spanish settlements in encomienda or land grants to private settlers. Instead, he made clear that those places were to be placed under the direct jurisdiction “of our Royal crown as we command that they remain.”

Keen to legitimize the military campaign that led to the fall of Manila, the expedition’s leader, Martín de Goiti, framed the war as defensive, as resulting from the violation of an accord by the former ruling sultan. As Goiti contended, the Spanish response in counterattacking and seizing the city’s fortress was both lawful and just. In addition, since, “according to the said natives,” Manila was “the capital of all the towns of this said island,” by occupying that city “in his Majesty’s name,” the crown of Castile thereby gained “royal ownership and possession, actual and quasi,” over the entirety of Luzon and “all other ports, towns, and territories adjoining and belonging to it.” In a final, symbolic act of conquest and occupation, Goiti ordered a soldier “to raise the flag of his company on the fort built by the natives.”

In recognition of its position as the center of Spain’s political, religious, and economic power in the Philippines, in June 1574, Philip II bestowed upon Manila the title, Insigne y Siempre Leal Ciudad de Manila [“The Distinguished and Ever Loyal City of Manila”], raising it to the highest status a city could enjoy within the Spanish empire. At the same time, Philip delegated to his new governor, Francisco de Sande, the task of delimiting...
Manila’s territorial jurisdiction, which came to radiate outward five leagues from its center across the surrounding coast and hinterland.\footnote{Orden de señalar los terrenos de jurisdicción a Manila,” 21 June 1574, Madrid, AGI Filipinas, 339, leg. 1, fols. 52v-53r: “Real Cédula a Francisco de Sande, gobernador de Filipinas, para que señale a la ciudad de Manila los terrenos que estime conveniente para su jurisdicción.”}

Despite the king’s instructions to submit Philippine indios peacefully, and despite contemporary claims that the conquest had been achieved through minimal violence, the larger documentary record reveals that the process of extending Spanish rule in the Philippines was, from the outset, defined by violence and attempts at forceful coercion.\footnote{Philip seemed to accept the claims of his officials, applauding them for their “loyalty and goodness,” “having done very well” by largely eschewing violent wars of conquest; see: “Instrucciones de gobierno a Miguel López de Legazpi,” 16 November 1568, El Escorial, AGI Filipinas, leg. 339, no. 1, fol. 1r.} As early as 1572, the Augustinian, Francisco Ortega, wrote to the viceroy in New Spain to inform him of an early expedition to Ilocos, the coastal region of western Luzon, north of Manila. In “collecting tribute” from indios, Ortega noted that the Spaniards respected “neither the law of God nor the instruction of your Majesty.”\footnote{AGI Patronato, leg. 24, ramo 27, cfr. Rodríguez (1978), 137-138.} What they did, “on arriving to any town or province, is to send a naujatato [an interpreter], not with gifts or presents, nor to preach [to the natives] or tell them things of God,” but rather to seize their belongings.\footnote{Ibid.} According to Ortega, the Spaniards demanded their gold chains and bracelets. Those who refused to pay fled to the mountains, where the Spaniards followed them, firing their “arquebuses and killing as many as they could without mercy, returning to their towns and killing the hens and pigs they found, seizing all of the rice, […] and after taking all they could from the [indios’] poor houses, set them afire,” allegedly burning and destroying over 4,000 houses on the expedition to Ilocos alone.\footnote{Ibid. Nearly two decades later, the king himself acknowledged the violence and arbitrariness of tribute collection, writing that, “Asimismo he sido informado que en el cobramiento de los tributos de los indios ha habido por lo pasado, y hay al presente, mucha desorden a causa de que los gobernadores que han sido de las dichas Islas hicieron las tasas muy confusas; [de lo que] se tomó ocasión para la dicha desorden de cobrar cada}
By 1574, in addition to Manila and large parts of the rest of Luzon, Hernando Riquel, chief royal notary in the Philippines, also claimed broad swathes of Cebu, Panay, and even Mindanao on behalf of the Spanish crown. A closer examination of Riquel’s text, however, reveals the superficiality of these claims and the limits of Spain’s effective sovereignty there. Regarding Cebu, Riquel acknowledged how little Spaniards actually knew about that territory and that they had yet to establish any seats of government there. On Panay, he noted that the Spanish had thus far only established a single town. As for Mindanao, Riquel claimed Spanish sovereignty over the island’s main river, although even that was likely an exaggeration. In reality, the Spanish had achieved control over little more than a discontinuous series of enclaves in the Visayas and Luzon, including Manila and its environs, Pampanga, the shores of Laguna Bay southeast of Manila, and the coast of Ilocos.

In addition to armed expeditions of conquest, and often as part of them, the Spanish crown also enlisted the support of missionaries in extending the reach of Spanish influence across the archipelago. The Augustinians were the first to arrive to the islands, having accompanied Legazpi, and thus enjoyed an early start in expanding their operations across the islands. They were soon joined by substantial numbers of Franciscans, Jesuits, Dominicans, and the Augustinian Recollects. As in the Americas, competition arose...
between the orders, prompting colonial authorities to divide the archipelago into exclusive geographic zones of operation for each.\textsuperscript{647} In fact, in 1619, the Spanish attorney general in the Philippines, Fernando de los Ríos Coronel, forwarded a petition to the Council of Indies, which, while stressing the “much necessity” of more missionaries to join the efforts of evangelization, argued forcefully that any new friars should come only from the four “Orders that are [already] there,” so as not to further complicate these tensions.\textsuperscript{648}

Beyond the spiritual aspect of their work in spreading the Catholic faith, missionaries also played a key role in the larger process of colonization by helping forge and reinforce the allegiance of Philippine indios to the Spanish crown. On the one hand, missionaries sometimes achieved this by seeking to defend indios against abusive and exploitative conquistadors and settlers. At the same time, however, similar to soldiers, they often represented the sole Spanish presence in many areas, and were instrumental in “reducing” certain indigenous groups by gathering them into doctrinas, which eventually developed into centers of formal Spanish sovereignty, called poblaciones.\textsuperscript{649}

In general, however, missionaries had limited success, especially in the highlands. Few remained there for more than a couple of years, and many were either killed by local

\textsuperscript{647} “Petición del Cabildo secular de Manila sobre necesidades,” 22 September 1600 (Probable), AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 36, fols. 216r-224v; and “Petición de Ríos Coronel sobre necesidades de las Filipinas,” September 1619, AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 108, fols. 651r. For further evidence of the conflict and competition between the various orders, see “Carta de Francisco de las Misas denunciando desórdenes,” 16 June 1596 Manila, AGI Filipinas, leg. 29, no. 61, fols. 420r-424r.

\textsuperscript{648} “Petición de Ríos Coronel sobre necesidades de las Filipinas,” September 1619, AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 108, fols. 651r-652r.

\textsuperscript{649} Villiers, “Portuguese Malacca and Spanish Manila,” 48-49. Describing this process, one contemporary indio named, “Panpanga,” reportedly explained in a letter to his brother that, “the friars of St. Francis […] showed him such love […] that he came to town, and there, when he saw the holy life of the friars and there were no Spaniards to impede it, he became a Christian helped by the grace of God,” which was likewise “the cause of many other indios coming down” from the mountains and settling in the town of Guamaca; see: Scott, “The Conquerors as Seen by the Conquered,” 71-72; originally in \textit{Philippine Studies} 34 (1986), 493-506.
indios or died of disease. Nevertheless, Philip II himself recognized the importance of missionaries in consolidating Spanish rule on the peripheries of his empire. And as early as 1574, he enjoined his governor in the Philippines, alongside those in Florida, Tucumán, and the Río de la Plata, to discourage missionaries from leaving those remote areas, warning that if they did so, and came back to Spain or Portugal, they would be prohibited from ever returning to the Indies.

Debating Spanish Sovereignty

Despite the vast distances that separated Manila from Mexico City, Madrid, and Salamanca, Spaniards in the Philippines were hardly removed from the larger controversies surrounding the legality and morality of Spanish imperium. On the contrary, they were keenly attuned to debates gripping the broader Iberian imperial world, and sought to devise a new colonial policy for the islands that would facilitate the successful subjugation of new subjects while at the same time shielding themselves from critiques of the legitimacy of Spanish sovereignty there. In addition to seeking the willful submission of native peoples, Spanish authorities also sought to reinforce the legitimacy of Spanish rule in the eyes of Philippine indios through indirect means by co-opting traditional elites, preserving their position atop the local political hierarchy, and formalizing their role within the emerging colonial administration. Nevertheless, a number of early theorists continued to doubt the

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651 “Orden sobre la vuelta de Indias de religiosos,” 21 April 1574, Madrid, AGI Indiferente, leg. 427, no. 29, fols. 98v-99v.
legitimacy of Spanish sovereignty in the islands, based on the exploitative behavior of colonists.

As a result, a series of controversies quickly engulfed the Philippines, centering on the issues of slavery, tribute and just war, the rights of indigenous peoples, the competing jurisdictions of civil versus ecclesiastical authorities, and the Castilian crown’s basic title to sovereignty in the islands. Although distinct in their chronology and geographic focus, the essential themes of these debates echoed those of America, and tended to pit local settlers and civil authorities against the clergy, who were led initially by the Augustinian priest Martín de Rada and later by the first bishop of the Philippines, the Dominican, Domingo de Salazar.\(^6\)

The first major issue of contention to emerge regarded the institution of slavery. On the one hand, the debate over slavery revolved around the colonists’ right to take slaves (largely in the case of just war in Mindanao, Joló and against the Zambales). But they were also concerned with determining whether indigenous elites, including those incorporated within the Spanish colonial administration, should be allowed to continue to practice the pre-existing institution of debt-servitude, which the Spanish dubbed “slavery,” but which was actually quite different. Notwithstanding the protests of several early priests, however, the Spanish ultimately had no effective authority to eradicate the institution. Moreover, local colonial authorities proved hesitant even to attempt such a prohibition since it risked undercutting the crucial yet tenuous support they received indigenous headmen.

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\(^6\) In general, the religious establishment in the Philippines was more united than its counterpart in the Americas in its opposition to settler abuse, although there were certain exceptions. The arrival of the Dominican bishop in 1582, for instance, sparked concerns from the Augustinians over the jurisdictional control they exercised over their own doctrinas. Nor was there always unity among civil authorities. The municipal council of Manila, in that same year, likewise expressed their own concerns that the maestro de campo, captains, and other royal officials respect their own jurisdictions. For evidence of both, see “Carta del Cabildo secular de Manila sobre llegada de Salazar,” 20 May 1582, Manila, AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 13, fols. 100r-101v.
The first decree from Madrid on the issue was promulgated in 1570, when Philip informed his officials that neither gentiles nor Muslims in the islands should be enslaved unless they had explicitly rejected Christianity and refused to convert. The decree likewise allowed for certain exceptions in the case of just war. This latter qualification set a standard of justification that would be mobilized by countless colonists in succeeding decades seeking legal cover for the continuation of slavery.

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653 Patricio Hidalgo Nuchera, *La Recta Administración. Primeros Tiempos de la Colonización Española en Filipinas: La Situación de la Población Nativa,* (Madrid: Ediciones Polifemo, 2001), 90-91. This decree proclaiming the general freedom of Philippine indios was followed up by others in 1574 and 1583 (see “Expediente sobre gobierno islas Filipinas, 1583,” AGI Patronato, leg. 25, ramo 2), as well as by a 1591 Papal bull from Gregory XIV, “Liberty of the Indians in the Philipinas,” 8 April 1591, Rome, in *The Philippine Islands,* ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 8, 70-73, which stated: “we have learned that our very dear son in Christ, Philip, the Catholic king of the Spains, has ordered that in view of the many deceits usually practiced therein, no Spaniard in the aforesaid Philippine Islands shall, even by the right of war, whether just or unjust, or of purchase, or any other pretext whatsoever, take or hold or keep slaves or serfs; and yet that in contravention of this edict or command of King Philip, some still keep slaves in their service.”

654 Hidalgo Nuchera, *La Recta Administración,* 90, citing the Royal Cédula of 4 July 1570, which was revalidated on 29 May 1620. Both were collected in Law 12, Title II, Book 6, of the *Recolección de 1680.* Although a 1574 decree prohibited the enslavement of indios regardless of whether they had been captured in “good war,” subsequent decrees and practices suggest that slavery was indeed permitted of indios captured in wars deemed just. Philip II, in his 1574 decree on the issue, exclaimed that “mi voluntad es que no su puedan hazer esclavos los dhos yndios yo vos mando que proveays como ningun espanol pueda tener yndio alguno, por esclavo en manera alguna aunq’ el tal yndio y esclavo lo aya sido de los yndias y abido en buena guerra, y si algunos esclavos tubieren desta o otra manera los dhos espanoles les hagais dar livertad que nos por la presente los livertamos y damos por libres,” see “Prohibición de hacer esclavos entre los indios Filipinos,” 7 November 1574, Madrid, AGI Filipinas, leg. 339, no. 1, fols. 57v-58r. In 1580, the king further specified that no Indians could be taken into personal service as a payment of tribute. See, “Orden de guardar las instrucciones sobre descubrimientos,” 24 April 1580, Logrosán, AGI Filipinas, leg. 339, no. 1, fols. 181v-184v.

655 In 1592, for instance, in response to a request from the king for their opinion on whether war against the Zambales was licit, the Augustinians in the Philippines replied in the affirmative; see: “Parecer de los P. Augustinos sobre el hazer guerra a los Zambales,” (anonymous), 19 January 1592, Manila, in *Historia de la Provincia Agustiniana del Santísimo Nombre de Jesús de Filipinas (HPAF),* ed. Isacio Rodríguez Rodríguez (Manila: Monumenta Provinciae Philippinarum, 1981), 498-514, original source: AGI Filipinas, leg. 18B. Citing the theories of St. Augustine and Gratian, they began outlining the conditions for just war, “According to all of the doctors and theologians, canonists and jurists, three conditions are required for a war to be just […] The 1st condition is that there be authority to wage war; the 2nd, just cause to wage it; the 3rd, right intention” (p.499). Then, based on these conditions, they drew on specific examples from Luzon to explain precisely why war against (and by extension the enslavement of) the Zambales was indeed licit: “These Zambales impede the general movement of those that go by sea and land to Pangasinan, Ilocos, and Cagayan. And the endangered passages are not theirs nor of their lands, but rather are public routes, upon which they kill and rob those who pass. It fulfills the second condition because the Zambales offend and kill without being bothered by ours [Spaniards and Spanish-allied indios]. Beyond this, having promised obedience to the King our Lord and to the Governor, in his name, they have rebelled and risen up. Finally, it is justified since [the Zambales] have broken their word [many times] and the friendships they made [with us]” (p.508). See also the “Petición de informe sobre ataques de indios enemigos,” 30 August 1608, Valladolid, AGI Filipinas, leg. 340, no. 3, fols. 51r-52r, which refers to a proposal of the attorney general of the Philippines, Rios Coronel, to enslave a range of natives for their attacks on Spaniards, including the “Indian enemies” of Mindanao, Jolo, Burney (Borneo), and other
Beyond representing the first issue of moral and legal contention in the early colonial Philippines, the debate over slavery also contributed to polarizing the colonial administration, forging a fundamental rift between the clergy on the one hand, and civil officials and settlers on the other. The rift sharpened in subsequent decades and soon transcended the issue of slavery to encompass a range of other related aspects of Spanish colonialism in the Philippines. The Augustinian priest, Martín de Rada, who had arrived with Legazpi in 1565, emerged as an early critic of slavery in the islands and a staunch advocate for the protection of Philippine indios. Already in July of 1574, however, under pressure

nearby lands because, he claimed, they constantly attacked Spanish possessions, killing, robbing, and burning churches; as well as the Zambales and Negritos, “who live in the montes as assaulters.” As late as 1655, Spaniards still debated the question of whether Muslims from Mindanao could be held as slaves or emancipated: see “Pleitos del Consejo,” 1655-1656, AGI Escribanía, leg. 1027C, pieza 7, 1655 “Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera, gobernador y capitán general de las islas Filipinas sobre declaración de si dos esclavos que trajo de la isla de Mindanao, debían ser tales esclavos o libres. Pendiente en 1655,” (2 folios). In 1620, in the context of war with the Dutch and the continued resistance of Philippine indios, especially Muslims, to Spanish rule, the crown adjusted its policy. While the enslavement of Philippine “gentiles” remained prohibited, “in order not to prejudice their evangelization,” colonists were from there forward permitted to make war on and enslave “the indios of the islands of Mindanao and other adjacent [islands] that had rebelled;” see: “Orden sobre hacer esclavos a los mindanaos mahometanos,” 29 May 1620, Madrid, AGI Filipinas, leg. 340, no. 3, fols. 67r-68r.

656 P. Hernández, “El Padre Martín de Rada, O.S.A. y la pacificación de Filipinas,” Archivo Agustiniano 62, no. 180 (1974): 79-103. For early evidence of Rada’s protests to viceroy in New Spain about colonists’ abuse of Philippine indios, see: “Carta del P. Martín de Rada al Virrey de la Nueva España dando cuenta de la gran miseria y destrucción a que ha venido aquella tierra por los daños y robos que se hacen a los naturales,” 21 July 1570, Panay, AGI Patronato, leg. 24, ramo 9; cited in HPAF, 41-42. The protests of Rada and his Augustinian brother succeeding in eliciting from the crown a further prohibition of slavery in 1574, this one even more categorical, stating that no Philippine indio could be held as a slave in any manner whatsoever. In any case, Legazpi’s successor as governor, Guido de Lavezaris, lodged a protest against the 1574 decree, citing the capture of slaves in just war and refusing to enforce it, and in the early 1580s, then-governor Gonzalo Ronquillo de Peñalosa sought to placate the church by promulgating the earlier decree, only to subsequently suspend it pending further clarification from the king and his Council of Indies. The suspension of the decree by both Lavezaris and Ronquillo, pending clarification, represents a clear example of the exercise of the legal principle, **obedezco pero no cumplo**, in which Spanish officials on the ground recognized the reception of the decree and affirmed their obedience to the king, but delayed its implementation on the grounds that the king had been ill-informed by the ecclesiastics about the origins of slavery and its suitability in the Philippine context. And in any case, the remoteness of the archipelago, and the perpetual state of war that characterized many areas, like Mindanao, meant that, as Antonio de Morga himself, the historian and then-lieutenant governor, noted, Spaniards continued to hold slaves in the Philippines as late as 1598. We also see evidence that Spaniards continued to benefit from the coerced labor of converted indios into the seventeenth century. In 1605, for instance, the attorney general of the Philippines, Hernando de los Ríos Coronel, decried “the exploitation of the indios in the cutting wood [the timber industry]” through the polo, and “domestic services” [los tanores], had been expressly abolished on several occasions; see: “Peticion del procurador Rios Coronel sobre varios asuntos,” July 1605 (Probable), AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 51, fols. 310r-322r. Ríos Coronel, however, continued to support the movement to enslave indios of the Muslim faith, in particular those from “Minadanao and Joló, and other neighboring Mohammedan kingdoms,” since enemigos de los españoles y de la fé católica,
from early ecclesiastics like Rada who decried Spanish violence and abuse of natives, Lavezaris and twelve other local officials penned a declaration defending what they claimed were their just wars of conquest in the islands and their exaction of tribute from native communities. “War has not been waged against the natives except when necessary and in cases of defense,” they wrote, claiming that ever since the very beginning, they had “always sought peace.”657 While framing their own actions as defensive, the officials portrayed the indios themselves according to the now classical trope as “bellicose and traitors,” in a perpetual state of war even “before the arrival of Spaniards.”658 In addition, according to prevailing European theories of just war, if one polity entered into a treaty of alliance and subsequently broke that treaty, the other polity would be justified in taking retribution through war. Independent of whether the terms and implications of such agreements were fully and mutually comprehensible to both parties across the cultural and linguistic divide, this argument was mobilized frequently to justify military actions against indigenous populations across many of the vast territories claimed by the early modern Iberian empires.

Beyond the simple argument of self-defense in justifying the Spanish military action, Spanish officials also emphasized their role as liberators, there to free indio commoners from the tyranny of local indigenous headmen, from their spiritual enslavement by the devil, and from the alleged continuous depredation of internecine war and foreign invasion.659 Purporting to speak on behalf of indios, one Spanish official asserted that, “now they feel protected by the Castilians, who spare their towns from being assaulted by enemy indios and

que roban la tierra, matan y capturan vasallos, profanando templos y ornamentos sagrados […]” in “Petición de Ríos Coronel sobre esclavizar indios mahometanos,” 30 June 1607 (Probable), AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 63, fols. 423r-424v.
657 AGI Filipinas, leg. 34, no. 11.
658 Ibid.
659 Phelan, The Hispanization of the Philippines, 25. For evidence as late as 1632 of the attempt of Spaniards to justify their activities by acting as liberators or protectors of Philippine indios against the abuses of their own traditional headmen, see “Orden a Távora sobre trato a los indios,” 26 March 1632, Madrid, AGI Filipinas, leg. 329, no. 3, fols. 222r-222v.
corsairs.” On the issue of tribute in particular, they claimed that “the indios” pay it “with pleasure in exchange for this protection.” Spanish authorities did not stop there, however, also asserting that their presence brought vast economic benefits to natives while at the same time emphasizing the relative penury of Spaniards themselves. “The indios do not feel aggravated in paying tribute, since it is little and they pay it with ease, and even more so now that they are enriched with the commerce that the Spaniards have generated.” On the other hand, for Spaniards themselves, “life is very expensive there because of the lack of the things of the Castile.”

In response to these claims, in June of 1574 Rada issued his so-called Parecer, which, while focused specifically on the issue of tribute, presented a comprehensive critique of the broader bases of Spanish claims to sovereignty in the Philippines. According to Rada, Spanish authorities in the Philippines had violated the king’s order to persuade indios by peaceful means to submit to Spanish rule and engaged instead in unsanctioned, illegitimate wars of conquest. By extension, he argued, the encomiendas awarded in the wake of the Spaniards’ initial entradas were illegal since the king, on confirming them, was unaware of the true manner in which the natives that comprised those grants had been subjugated. Moreover, beyond challenging the legal bases of such grants at their founding, Rada censured encomenderos for exacting tributes without fulfilling their duties of protection and evangelization. This critique had deeper ramifications that exceeded the rights of

660 AGI Filipinas, leg. 34, no. 11.
661 Ibid.
662 Ibid.
663 Ibid.
664 “Parecer del provincial fray Martín de Rada agustino sobre las cosas destas islas,” 21 June 1574, San Pablo de Manila. AGI Patronato, leg. 24, ramo 29. For the response from Governor Lavezaris and the encomenderos, see, AGI Patronato, leg. 24, ramo 29.
666 Ibid. 91-94.
encounter to collect tribute. By exposing the lack of religious instruction in native communities, Rada called into question the basic legitimacy of Spanish dominium in the islands, based as it was on the obligation, made clear in the *Patronato Real*, to provide for the spiritual wellbeing of the king’s indigenous subjects. He concluded that, from a theoretical perspective, neither the king nor his Spanish subjects held legitimate title over the archipelago given that they had submitted its native population by force and neglected to provide sufficient religious instruction. However, anticipating José de Acosta’s arguments for prescription by over a decade, Rada nonetheless accepted that since the conquest had been affected and Spaniards had occupied the land (itself a questionable claim), they should be permitted to exact tribute, although only the minimal amount necessary to sustain themselves.  

On Rada’s death in 1578, the Dominican Domingo de Salazar arose as the primary defender of native rights in the Philippines. That same year, Philip appointed him as Manila’s first bishop. Salazar, a follower of both Vitoria and Las Casas, had, like Las Casas, gone to Madrid personally to lobby on behalf of indigenous peoples, emphasizing his personal experience in the Indies to bolster his credibility. As Horacio de la Costa has shown, Salazar’s two overarching objectives were to defend the rights of *indios* against abuse at the hands of *encamenderos* and the Spanish colonial administration, and to expand the influence of the church in the Philippines and protect its authority vis-à-vis the civil administration.  

According to Salazar, Spaniards had failed in their collective duty to safeguard the indigenous population from degradation and exploitation. His deep frustrations about the

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667 Ibid. 95-96. In this way, arguing for the effective prescription of Spanish rule in the Philippines, Rada foreshadowed José de Acosta, who advanced a similar argument regarding Spanish possession of the Americas, which, he contended, represented a demonstrated fact for over forty years.  
desperate state of affairs among many indio communities under Spanish rule compelled him to convoke a meeting of the Philippine church to formulate a united position on the morality and legality of Spanish colonial rule in the Philippines. In the so-called Synod of Manila of 1582, local ecclesiastics debated a range of issues including slavery, tributes, the titles of Spain to sovereignty in the Philippines, the administration of justice, the duties of encomenderos, and the consequences encomenderos should face for their abuse of natives during the conquest and thereafter.669

During Salazar’s tenure as bishop, relations between civil and ecclesiastical power strained further still. Just as the religious accused the colonists and civil authorities of exploiting Philippine indios, so too did the latter accuse the former.670 In 1598, for instance, Morga sent to the king a detailed list of some thirty-four alleged infractions committed by the doctrineros, including abusing and exploiting their indio charges. Morga accused the local clergy of a range of vices including dishonesty; trading goods and merchandise, which were supposed to be channeled through the official galleon trade; and usurping “Royal Jurisdiction, [by] hearing all kings of lawsuits from Indians.”671 He went on to accuse the priests of overstepping their authority by sentencing and imprisoning Philippine indios and imposing “on them [the idea] that they do not have to obey the justices of the King, but

669 Hidalgo Nuchera, La Recta Administración, 55-56.
670 For an example of an individual critical of virtually every faction of colonial society for their complicity in exploiting the Philippine indio population, see the “Relación de Diego de Zárate sobre Filipinas,” 1581-06-10, AGI Filipinas, 34, no. 38, fols. 280r-282v. Zárate censured encomenderos for demanding extra tribute and personal service, the missionaries for their abuses, arguing that this was why the natives did not follow the faith, and royal officials, for the bandala, which saw alcaldes mayores purchase goods from the Indians below the true market rate. On the king’s efforts to punish certain “religiosos doctrineros” for their “excesses,” see “Respuesta a Juan de Silva sobre asuntos de gobierno,” 1613-12-02 El Pardo, AGI Filipinas, leg. 329, no. 2, fols. 172v-175r.
671 “Relación hecha por el Dr. Antonio de Morga para S.M. de lo que se le ofrece sobre el estado de las Islas Filipinas, tanto en lo secular como en lo eclesiástico,” Manila, 8 June 1598, AGI Filipinas, leg. 18B, ramo 7; see the transcription in Antonio de Morga, Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas (Madrid: Ediciones Polifemo, 1997): 517-519. On the galleon trade, see: Marina Alfonso Mola and Carlos Martínez-Shaw, eds. El Galeón de Manila. Madrid: Ediciones Aldeasa, 2003.
rather that which the religious command.” Morga also accused the clergy of afflicting, “the Indians with bandalas and repartimientos of rice, wine, hens, and other things, without paying them, or paying them very little.” Most grave of all was his accusation of slavery. The priests, he claimed, held many as, “indios de servicio, without paying them” at all.

Salazar built upon the efforts of Rada, and in several respects exceeded his predecessor, and even Vitoria, in his arguments in favor of indios’ liberty. First of all, beyond protesting the enslavement of Philippine indios, Salazar contended that they should never be coerced into labor – without their willful consent – even if paid. Spaniards should likewise never impose Christianity by force, nor should soldiers accompany missionaries

\[\text{\footnotesize 672 “Relación hecha por el Dr. Antonio de Morga para S.M. de lo que se le ofrece sobre el estado de las Islas Filipinas, tanto en lo secular como en lo eclesiástico,” Manila, 8 June 1598, AGI Filipinas, leg. 18B, ramo 7; see the transcription in Antonio de Morga, Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas (Madrid: Ediciones Polifemo, 1997): 517-519.}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize 673 Ibid.}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize 674 Ibid.}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize 675 Beyond these theoretical, juridical protests, Salazar also led the church in practical efforts to alleviate the suffering of indios at the hands of rapacious settlers. While on a trip to Spain in 1593, Salazar outlined for the king what he saw as the major challenges facing Philippines, which, he argued, impeded both the spread of the Gospel and the consolidation of crown rule. Salazar identified three main problems. First, the abuse committed by Spanish settlers on the native population was perhaps the prime obstacle. “Spaniards,” he alleged, “commit so many injuries, aggravations, and harm to the natives, subjecting them to death and capturing them, their children, and women, with robberies of the dwellings, burning and desolation of their towns, houses, palm groves, and gardens, […] making tributaries […] of those of much poverty and misery. […] And if they don’t have money to pay [the tribute, the Spaniards] make them slaves to serve them or make them pay ransom.” Salazar likewise implicated royal officials in this abuse, claiming that, “all those who have governed or govern those lands in the name of Your Majesty orient their government toward this end.” Moreover, despite commitments to return indigenous headmen control over their local communities, “No native nor hombre principal has maintained his position, […] the government which they previously had has been stripped.”}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize According to Salazar, the second major factor inhibiting the success of Spain’s colonial project in the Philippines was the lack of religious instruction, “in many small islands […] where the [native] residents of those islands cannot receive the doctrine.” Related to this was a third factor Salazar identified: “the lack of ministers in those [islands].” In order to address these problems and set the Spanish colonial project in the Philippines on a more righteous, prosperous, and sustainable path, Salazar likewise proposed three main solutions, all of which, in one way or another, aimed to improve the condition of the native population. First, he urged the king to once again “declare the native Filipinos in liberty, which neither had they enjoyed in the past nor do they have now.” Second, he proposed a fundamental reform of the encomienda system across the islands, including small ones, to ensure that encomenderos were able to provide both food and doctrine to the Indians under their care. Finally, in reparation for past abuses and as a symbol of goodwill toward natives, he implored the king to command the encomenderos to return the tributes to indios that have been extracted unjustly.}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize See, Fray Domingo de Salazar, O.P., “Tratado del título que los reyes de España tienen para ser señores de la Indias,” 1593, Madrid, in Cuerpo de documentos del siglo XVI, sobre los derechos de España en las Indias y las Filipinas, ed. Lewis Hanke, 185-193 (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1977), original document held in the Archivo de la Provincia del Santísimo Rosario (Manila), vol. 420.}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize 676 De la Costa, “Church and state in the Philippines during the administration of Bishop Salazar, 1581-1594,” Hispanic American Historical Review 30 (1950): 330-333.}\]
since, even if they did not engage in violence, their very presence might strike fear among natives and encourage submissions to Catholicism and Spanish political rule that were not purely voluntary. Underlying Salazar’s arguments was the fundamental belief that Spain’s legitimate rule in the Philippines could only be based on the indios’ free and willful transfer of sovereignty, or on their defeat and submission in a truly just war. However, given that, in his view, neither scenario reflected the past or current reality, Salazar expressed grave doubts about the fundamental title of Spain to sovereignty in the Philippines.

Despite the persistence of Rada, Salazar, and their allies, and despite a series of royal decrees that supported their critiques and proposals in theory, colonial authorities did little to reign in abusive encomenderos. As a result, indigenous suffering intensified, compelling one governor, Santiago de Vera, to attempt to bring together the various sectors of Spanish society and administration in the Philippines in an effort to build consensus on how best to tackle the problem. In recognition of Salazar’s broad influence in the colony, in 1586 Vera appointed him head of a council that included representatives of the secular church and missionary orders, the high court, the municipal council and commercial elite, the military, and the local judicial administration from several prominent towns.

These collective efforts toward improving the condition of Philippines indios, while achieving the illusion or potential of progress, failed to result in substantive change. For

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677 Ibid.
678 Ibid.
679 Ibid.
680 Ibid. 325.
681 Visitas a la tierra, which consisted of expeditions of royal officials sent from Manila to inspect and ensure the operation of good governance in distant territories, were few and far between, and those few that did materialize, failed to result in any substantive change. In addition, despite succeeding in eliciting from the crown the creation of the office of protector de indios in 1589, a post first held by Salazar, within a decade, according one leading historian, that official’s effective authority had been severely undermined in particular by the exigencies of war with the Dutch, a circumstance which convinced Spaniards across the archipelago of the necessity of Indian exploitation as a means of strengthening and replenishing the colony’s defenses. See: Patricio Hidalgo Nuchera, “Visitas a la tierra durante los primeros tiempos de la colonización de las Filipinas, 1565-1608,” in Imperios y naciones en el Pacífico, ed. Maria Dolores Elizalde, Josep Fradera, and Luis Alonso, vol.
instance, although the representative council issued a *Memorial* that decried the exaction of tribute from infidels, citing encomenderos’ obligation to evangelize, such practices persisted, as did slavery and pre-existing forms of debt-servitude, particularly in remote regions where colonial authorities had little to no effective authority in everyday affairs.\(^{682}\) At the same time, however, the pro-indio lobby did see certain cases of limited success in the Philippines, in particular regarding the principle that the Castilian crown’s legitimate claim to sovereignty in the islands was based on the natives’ willful submission.\(^{683}\) As a consequence, in 1594 Philip issued a decree that returned *indio* headmen to the government of their towns, affirming the notion, articulated most forcefully by Salazar, that the natives maintained certain political rights of self-government.\(^{684}\) This compromise sought not only to placate the more critical voices in opposition to Spain’s presence in the Philippines. It also aimed to provide a more cost-effective means of governing Philippine *indios*, while simultaneously bestowing an air of

\(^{682}\) De la Costa, “Church and state in the Philippines during the administration of Bishop Salazar, 1581-1594,” 325.

\(^{683}\) Debates between ecclesiastical authorities on the one hand, led by Salazar until his death in 1594, and civil officials on the other, including the governor, persisted well into the 1590s and beyond. In large part, these disputes continued to focus on the rights of indigenous peoples, tribute, and the question of Spain’s just title to sovereignty over the islands. In 1591, reflecting on the deliberations of various councils on the issue, and in particular on the contents of another *Memorial* submitted by Salazar the previous month, then-governor Gómez Pérez Dasmariñas issued a set of new rules for the archipelago dictating the relative extent to which tributes should be collected from three different types of *encomiendas*. According to these rules, full tribute could be extracted from both Christians and non-Christians in *encomiendas* where religious instruction was provided and royal authority established. In *encomiendas* that had submitted to Spanish rule but which had no religious instruction, tribute could be collected except that normally set aside for the missionaries. No tribute could be collected in *encomiendas* in which neither Spanish law nor religious instruction had been established. Finally, in the many *encomiendas* formerly subjected to Spanish rule but that had since rebelled, encomenderos were permitted to extract as much tribute as possible. See: De la Costa, “Church and state in the Philippines during the administration of Bishop Salazar, 1581-1594,” 330-333, citing “Memorial of the Junta of Manila,” in Colín I, 612-613.

\(^{684}\) Hidalgo Nuchera, *La Recta Administración*, 55-57, citing “Real Cédula,” 11 June 1594, Madrid, AGI Filipinas, leg. 339, no. 2, 64. According to Hidalgo Nuchera, this was included as Law 16, Title VII, Book VI in the 1680 *Recopilación*.
legitimacy on Spanish colonial rule in the islands through the co-option and collaboration of indigenous elites.  

**Manila: Stronghold of Spanish Power?**

While questions continued to swirl regarding the legitimacy of Spanish colonialism in the Philippines, by the 1580s, Manila had emerged as the colony’s undisputed center of Spanish settlement and administration. This was reflected primarily in the city’s position as the seat of the main institutions of colonial government for the region, including the high court, or *Audiencia*. At the same time, however, even in Manila, the crown’s capacity exercise its effective authority was far from absolute. Prominent officials of government, including the high court justices and municipal councilmen, each held wide autonomy and jurisdiction, which often overlapped.

Beyond these internal dynamics of colonial administration that dispersed political authority, external forces also converged to challenge Spanish sovereignty in Manila in more overt, existential terms. In opposition to Spanish abuse and persecution, the city’s massive Chinese merchant community arose on several occasions in armed opposition to Spanish abuse and persecution. The scale of these uprisings, and their frequency, reflect the reality that Manila was, in many ways, just as much a Chinese city as a Spanish one. Beyond the impact of their various uprisings and revolts, Chinese power in the city was likewise evident in their control over commerce (including the silver trade within the domestic economy),


over the skilled labor force, as well as over the basic supply of food. As a result, the Spanish presence in Manila depended on a fragile, unstable coexistence with the city’s Sangleys, which erupted periodically into brutal explosions of violence.

After bestowing Manila with the title, “Distinguished and Ever Loyal City,” in 1574, raising it to the highest status a city could enjoy within the empire, the next significant step in cementing its prominence was the creation of a high court there in 1583. The foundation of the Audiencia resulted in part from the joint request of the governor, Gonzalo Ronquillo de Peñalosa, and Domingo de Salazar, the first bishop, who sought an impartial institution to mediate disputes between the church and civil authority. From the king’s perspective, the Audiencia would also serve to diffuse the power of both the governor and bishop by placing a third institution of government to temper the power of the latter two, all while enhancing royal authority in the islands by expanding the crown’s institutional footprint.

In theory, the Spanish monarchy laid claim to the entire Philippine archipelago. Its ambition was even greater, however. In discussing the foundation of the high court, Juan de la Plaza wrote that, “the King wishes to assign to the government of the Philippines everything from point of Malacca forward, all the way to China, Japan, and Maluco.”

Pending the successful conquest and incorporation of new territories in the region,

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687 Although a royal cédula decreed the establishment of the Audiencia in 1583, it was not actually instituted until the following year, after the cédula has reached Manila from Spain.

688 The Audiencia likewise soon came into conflict with both competing civil and religious sources of authority. Yet while the king sought to limit the intensity of such conflict, a certain degree was welcomed was a sign of the limits of the power of each. For an example of such a conflict between the bishop and Audiencia regarding the dispersal of royal treasury funds, see 13 July 1589, Letter of the Audiencia of Filipinas about the rebellion of the Indios in 1588 in Tondo, Cebu, and Cagayan; and the dispute between the bishop and the Audiencia, see: The Philippines Under Spain, ed. Virginia Benítez Licuaran and José Llavador Mira (1991): vol. 4, 547. In this case, the bishop accused the Audiencia of not releasing certain funds owed to the bishopric.

therefore, the court’s jurisdiction could have potentially expanded to cover all Spanish subjects across East Asia. As Antonio de Morga described it, by the early seventeenth century Manila had clearly emerged as “the capital of the kingdom and the head of the government of all the islands. It is the metropolis of the other cities and settlements of the islands.”

As in other parts of the Indies, conflict soon erupted between the Audiencia judges and other royal officials including the governor himself, who sat atop the Audiencia as its president. Already in 1585, less than two years after its formal establishment, two officials, at least one of which was a treasury officer, proclaimed that all the Audiencia judges did was meddle in military affairs and complicate the exercise of government of the relatively small settlement of Spaniards. At roughly the same moment, the newly appointed governor, Santiago de Vera, called for the dissolution of the Audiencia, frustrated by the limits it placed on his own power. By meddling “with the administration of the government and military matters,” the Audiencia proved a counterproductive impediment to the development of the

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690 Antonio de Morga, Sucesos de las islas Filipinas (Mexico, 1609), in The Philippine Islands, ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 16, 137.
691 “It seems proper at this time that the Audiencia be abolished and that these Islands be governed by a Christian person whom Your Majesty might choose; or by anyone whose qualifications are certified to Your Majesty as faithful servants and vassals,” they wrote. The audiencia judges, “have developed such a mortal hatred for us and maltreat us by word and deed so that we live oppressed and deprived of the freedom to use our positions.” The letter was written by Andrés Cauchela and Domingo Mendiola. See “Letters of the Officials of Filipinas about interesting points for the welfare of those Islands and about the importance of removing the Audiencia,” 20 June 1585, in The Philippines Under Spain, vol. 4, 309-315, original document found in AGI Patronato, leg. 25, ramo 2. While Domingo Mendiola’s specific position is unknown, his co-author, Andrés Cauchela, was a veteran bureaucrat and accountant in the royal treasury of the Philippines. For an account of Cauchela’s career and his request for retirement, see “Petición de jubilación del contador Andrés Cauchela,” 23 September 1592 (Probable) Manila, AGI Filipinas, leg. 29, no. 55.
692 Warning of the great expense the audiencia incurred in its operation and the rise in tensions between judges and military officials, Vera explained that, “Your Majesty has very little revenue in this Treasury, barely reaching 35,000 pesos. […] As the President and Magistrates have to be provided for, it is expected that nothing is left for other things that are required. The soldiers and the military go without shirts.” Beyond this, the proliferation of superfluous, drawn-out lawsuits between Spaniards and Indians, he argued, drained the resources of each. “All of this can be avoided,” Vera suggested, “by removing the audiencia and so their differences with the Governor can be avoided,” see Santiago de Vera, “President of the Audiencia of Manila, proposing the removal of the Audiencia,” 20 June 1585, in The Philippines Under Spain, vol. 4, 307-309, original document found in AGI Patronato, leg. 25, ramo 2.
Given that “the land is so newly discovered and has such a small Spanish population,” he proposed that simply, “a Christian person with judicial experience,” was all that was needed “to govern the [settlers] and mete out justice” among them, “considering they are mostly soldiers and military men.” Near the close of his six-year tenure, Vera successfully eliminated the Audiencia in 1590 after protracted debate, much to the pleasure of the municipal council, which presumably opposed the court’s efforts to curb the autonomy of the local settler elite.

Just five years later, however, Philip II equipped his newly appointed governor and captain-general of the Philippines, Francisco de Tello de Guzmán, with clear instructions to re-establish the high court. Providing a detailed explanation of the ceremonial process by which the Audiencia should be formally re-inaugurated, Philip likewise articulated an argument for how that body would not simply serve as a check on the governor’s power, but also enhance the governor’s effectiveness by allowing him to focus on political and military affairs, and providing him with competent counsel. “If you are disengaged from matters pertaining to justice, you will have more time for matters of government and war,” wrote Philip; “or in important and arduous cases you may find it advisable to have those with whom to take counsel, that matters may be considered with the requisite continuity and by a sufficiently large body of advisers.” “For these reasons,” the king concluded, “I have decided to reestablish an Audiencia in that city of Manila, as in former years.”

In addition to tensions at the highest level of colonial government in the Philippines between the governor, bishop, and judges of the high court, another persistent source of

694 Ibid.
695 “Carta y peticiones del Cabildo secular de Manila,” 24 June 1590, Manila, AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 21, fols. 126r-129v.
jurisdictional conflict concerned the autonomy and authority of Manila’s municipal council. As the local governing body of the center of political, economic, and religious power in the Philippines, Manila’s municipal council held significant sway, was fiercely protective of its exclusive jurisdiction, and often sought to expand that jurisdiction at the expense of competing institutions. Highlighting its own prominence, in 1638 the council noted that, “as head of the Islands, it dealt with affairs of importance and gravity,” and that, as a result, “its Councilmen […] should enjoy the same privileges and preeminencias as those enjoyed by [the councilmen] of other cities of the same quality, particularly those of the cities of Mexico and Lima, which in greatness, population, and authority do not equal Manila, which is neither inferior nor of less importance than any other [city] in the Indies.”

Noting the myriad conflicts between the municipal councilmen of Manila and royal officials in the city, the councilmen expressed particular frustration at the governor’s alleged overreach. Such overreach, they alleged, encompassed the forceful appointment of a number of personal friends and relatives within the council body itself in order to ensure personal loyalty through patronage, demands that the municipal council to meet in the governor’s residence, and the illicit practice of opening the councilmen’s letters to the king when they sought nothing but “to inform him [ie. the king] what was best for the royal service, and its conservation.” Regarding the first of these allegations, the authors argued that the governor’s appointees served essentially as spies, meaning that, “nothing happened in the Cavildo of which he [the governor] was not aware, and as such things did not proceed with

697 “Petición del Cabildo secular de Manila sobre necesidades de Filipinas,” 9 August 1638, Madrid (Probable), AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 235, pts. 37-38, fols. 1269v-1270r.
698 Ibid. fol. 1269v. For the governors’ appointment of relatives and friends, see “Petición de Ríos Coronel sobre necesidades de las Filipinas,” September 1619 (Probable), AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 108, pt. 32.1, fol.651v. Regarding the governor’s forcing the cabildo to meet on occasion in his residence, see “Petición del procurador Ríos Coronel sobre varios asuntos,” July 1605 (Probable), AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 51, fols. 310r-322r.
any liberty, nor did anyone dare to speak with Christian liberty.”

As a result, the council appealed to the king to command the governor not to appoint his allies as “Councilmen [Regidores], nor Alcaldes, nor even as secretary/scribe [escrivano].” In addition, further evidence of the governor’s wide-ranging power in the city, the councilmen lamented to the king that when cédulas prejudicial to the governor’s authority arrived to the municipal council, no member wished to be the one to inform the governor, out of fear of reprisal. In response, in a separate decree of 1638, the king explicitly prohibited governor from taking punitive action against any councilman that informs him of the contents a royal decree.

Perhaps the most salient aspect of this debate concerned the geographical reach of the council’s territorial jurisdiction. The same year the city was formally founded, Philip II explicitly defined Manila’s geographical limits as radiating outward five leagues from the city center. While the Audiencia served as the high court of appeals for all Spanish subjects across East Asia, it also exercised jurisdiction over a variety of criminal cases within that five-league radius. Municipal council magistrates [juízes ordinarios] held jurisdiction over most civil matters within that area, and likewise enjoyed effective authority over a range of other aspects of local Spanish legal, political, and economic life.

699 “Petición de Ríos Coronel sobre necesidades de las Filipinas,” September 1619 (Probable), AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 108, pt. 32.1, fol.651v.

700 Ibid.

701 8 December 1638, Cédulario de Manila, 22-23. Beyond this, the council also made reference as well to the governor’s illicit manipulation and alteration of tribute requirements, not only from the subjected Philippine indio population, but also from the sangleyes, Japanese, blacks, and slaves,” see: “Petición del Cabildo secular de Manila sobre necesidades de Filipinas,” 9 August 1638, Madrid (Probable), AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 235, pt. 58, fols. 1274r.

702 Cédulario de Manila, 14-17. There is some inconsistency in the early documentation. A copy of another cédula, purportedly from the previous day, 21 June 1574, contained a provision from Philip instructing his new governor and captain general, Francisco de Sande, “to assign twenty leagues of territory and jurisdiction given that the natives within [those 20 leagues] are settled and held in encomiendas by the residents of the said city.” See “Royal Cedula, indicating the jurisdiction of the city of Manila,” 21 June 1574, AGI Escribanía, leg. 403B, fols. 62v-63r. This appears to have been either an exception or a mistake, as the vast majority of documentation from the period refers to a 5-league radius. Although folios 69r-70r of the same document (AGI Escribanía, leg. 403B) refer to a painting that shows the true and precise boundaries of jurisdictions, such a painting has, to my knowledge, thus far not been located or identified by historians. For reference to the earlier cédula of 8 May 1596, which established Manila’s five-league jurisdiction, see “Petición del Cabildo secular de Manila sobre necesidades de Filipinas,” 9 August 1638, Madrid (Probable), AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 235, fols. 1260r-1354r.
Conflicts over the council’s jurisdiction in and around Manila intensified in particular after the turn of the seventeenth century as the city expanded and Spanish influence spread through parts of the surrounding region. In one instance, in response to repeated appeals from Manila’s municipal council to correct the governor’s overreach, in 1614, the king ordered the governor to respect the municipal council magistrates’ right to hear cases within the five leagues, while at the same time protecting the rights of crown-appointed indigenous alcaldes mayores to primary jurisdiction over indio towns beyond the five-league limit. He proclaimed clearly that, “the municipal council magistrates [alcaldes ordinarios] may hear without hindrance any cases [negocios] in any Indian towns within the five leagues as well as in any settlement of Spaniards within the said district.”703 “Regarding the towns of Indians” beyond the city’s jurisdiction, he continued, “I remind you that they have their own alcaldes mayores to govern and administer them, and that this should not change.”704 “You should be very careful to seek peace and quietude and see that the Indians are protected,” he concluded.705

The rise of the port of Cavite as the main shipbuilding center and harbor serving the greater Manila Bay also sparked tensions between the governor and municipal council. While the former sought to expand his own influence in the port by exempting Cavite from the authority of the municipal council, the latter protested repeatedly, appealing directly to the king and his Council of Indies on several occasions to defend its jurisdiction. In separate petitions from 1633 and 1638, the municipal council and its attorney general [procurador general], Juan Grau y Monfalcón, decried what they framed as the governor’s usurpation of its power by illegally placing Cavite under the jurisdiction of the alcaldes mayores of Tondo and

703 “Pleitos de la Audiencia de Filipinas,” AGI Escribanía, leg. 403B, for this particular matter from 23 June 1614, see fols. 175v-177r.
704 Ibid.
705 Ibid.
Bulacán, thereby depriving the Manila council of its rightful authority to set provision prices in the local market and generate revenue through taxation. The council explicitly requested from the king, “a cédula to conserve its jurisdiction in the manner it always had.”

After over a decade of seeking redress from the king to curtail the governor’s authority and buttress their own, in 1638 Philip IV dispatched a new cédula to, “Sebastian Hurtado de Corcuera, […] my governor and captain general of the Philippine Islands and president of the my royal Audiencia, or to the person or persons then in government,” “to respect the five league jurisdiction of the city of Manila, […] and not to perturb it.” This represented a significant victory for municipal power in its effort to curb that of even the highest crown official, the governor.

Beyond its status as the seat of colonial government, Manila’s centrality was likewise based, perhaps foremost, on its existence as an increasingly bustling entrepôt for the China trade. The association with commerce became so tightly linked that contemporaries commonly referred to it by the phrase, *Manila, Ciudad y Comercio* (“Manila, City and Commerce”). Despite the crown’s early intention to make the Philippines a self-sufficient, agricultural colony and apportion it into *encomiendas*, the rising profits of the Manila trade

706 “Peticiones del Cabildo secular de Manila sobre su jurisdicción,” 15 July 1633 (Probable), AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 173, fols. 960r-975v, and “Petición del Cabildo secular de Manila sobre necesidades de Filipinas,” 9 August 1638, Madrid (Probable), AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 235, fols. 1260r-1354r.
707 “Peticiones del Cabildo secular de Manila sobre su jurisdicción,” 15 July 1633 (Probable), AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 173, fols. 960r-975v.
708 “Orden sobre la jurisdicción de la ciudad de Manila,” 21 June 1641, Madrid, AGI Filipinas, leg. 340, no. 5, fols. 71r-73r. See also “Copia de Real Cédula de 21 de junio de 1641 sobre respetar la jurisdicción de cinco leguas de la ciudad de Manila,” AGI Filipinas, leg. 28, no. 51, fols. 205r-208r. This document, although from 1641, references an earlier 1638 document containing another cedula of similar effect. Likewise, a few short years later, the king issued another decree addressed to his governor, Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera, “not to create new governorships in the Port of Cavite or in the Parián of the Sangleyes,” but rather to maintain the existing officials there, “la justicia mayor del puerto de Cavite and the alcaldía de la Alcaicería del Parián.” This was a way of ensuring the superior status of Manila over these two neighboring jurisdictions. See, “Orden sobre nombrar gobernadores en Cavite y Parián,” 24 October 1642, Zaragoza, AGI Filipinas, leg. 340, no. 5, fols. 192v-193v.
709 Villiers, “Portuguese Malacca and Spanish Manila,” 53.
drove many encomenderos to abandon their grants in the countryside and flock to the city to pursue their fortunes in the China trade and its ancillary industries.

While Chinese merchants had long visited the Philippines for trade, their numbers, and the commerce they brought, expanded dramatically after the Spanish had established their base at Manila. In the 1520s, an early Spanish fleet in the archipelago recorded that just two Chinese merchant ships came “each year for the purpose of trade.”\(^{710}\) But as Manila’s trade grew, so too did its population, particularly the number of Chinese residents. The Sangleys came to form a major portion of the city’s population, only slightly smaller than the community of Philippine indios, and dwarfing the population of Spaniards. If in 1570 Manila was home to just forty Chinese heads of households, in 1589 the total number stood at some 4,000, and just six years later around 12,000.\(^{711}\) At around the same, at the turn of the seventeenth century, there were a total of roughly 20,000 Philippine indios in Manila, 3,000 Japanese, and a minority of 2,400 Spaniards, according to one estimate.\(^{712}\)

From the very beginning of the Spanish presence in the Philippines, the Chinese proved critical to the survival of the colony’s economic development.\(^{713}\) As the governor


\(^{711}\) “Santiago de Vera to Philip II, July 13, 1589,” in *The Philippine Islands*, ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 7, 89; and “Carta de Francisco de las Misas sobre varios asuntos,” 31 May 1595, Manila, AGI Filipinas, leg. 29, no. 57, fols. 382r-404v. Then, in 1603, a reported 24,000 Chinese were killed in the first of a series of large-scale massacres of the Sangleys, meaning that the total population had multiplied by at least six times in the short space of fourteen years; see: Bartolome Leonardo de Argensola, *Conquista de las Islas de Molucas* (Madrid, 1609), trans. in *The Philippine Islands*, ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 16, p295. The Chinese population of Manila fluctuated dramatically as a result of such outbreaks of revolt and repression. Despite such large-scale decimation, however, the Chinese population continuously regenerated itself with the influx of new migrants from the mainland. In 1639, in another brutal repression, the Spanish, by their own estimate, killed another 23,000 Sangleys, for instance, but by 1649 the Chinese population in the city had already recovered to some 15,000. See, Bartolome de Letona, “Description of the Philippine Islands,” 1662, in *The Philippine Islands*, ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 36, 200.

\(^{712}\) Villiers, “Portuguese Malacca and Spanish Manila,” 53.

\(^{713}\) One of the unexpected, negative by-products of the dominance of Chinese commerce in Manila was that the cheap, easy access to goods imported from China discouraged the development of Philippine manufactures and agriculture, including the vital production of rice and cotton. As governor Dasmariñas observed in 1591, given the affordability of Chinese products, even *indios* could afford to “pay for them,” and as a result, to the general detriment of the colony, to “abandon work and the cultivation of their fields.” Beyond providing much
Guido de Lavezares reported to the king in 1574, “the Chinese continue to increase their trade each year, and supply us with many articles, like sugar, wheat and barley flour, nuts, raisins, pears and oranges, silks, choice porcelain and iron, and other small things which we lacked in this land before their arrival.” In addition to importing the majority of foodstuffs and manufactures, Sangleys also represented the vast majority of the artisan class, providing a range of skilled labor in both urban trades and agricultural production.

Relations between Spaniards and Sangleys were tense and occasionally violent. At the same time, however, the two groups were dependent on each other for their livelihood and survival. The chafing of Sangleys under attempted impositions of Spanish rule, and the periodic violence that resulted, gave rise to a series of proposals to expel the Chinese altogether. Short of expelling the Sangleys, which was proposed on several occasions yet never carried out, Spanish authorities did attempt to implement a policy of supervision and social exclusion.


715 As John Leddy Phelan points out, the Chinese were generally more skilled and efficient farmers than Philippine indios, and that the Jesuits, for instance, largely preferred them as laborers on their agrarian estates. See Phelan, “Free Versus Compulsory Labor: Mexico and the Philippines 1540-1648,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 1, no. 2 (1959): 196. As the Jesuit priest Pedro Chirino noted in 1604, “from China come many persons able and willing to engage in all sorts of trades and they are skillful, quick and economical. They are physicians and barber and even stevedores,” he continued. “They are the tailors, the shoemakers, the silversmiths, the sculptors, the locksmiths, the masons, painters and weavers and finally they take over all classes of work in the city;” Pedro Chirino, S.J. Relación de las Islas Filipinas (Rome, 1604), quoted and translated in Rafael Bernal, “The Chinese Colony in Manila, 1570-1770,” in The Chinese in the Philippines: 1570-1770, ed. Felix, Alfonso (Manila: Historical Conservation Society, 1966), 61-62.

716 Relations were likewise tense between the Chinese and indios, the latter of which viewed the former with contempt for depriving them of economic opportunity, causing the decline in their own productive industries through competition, and exploiting them by charging excessively high prices for basic commodities, including food. See, Bernal, “The Chinese Colony in Manila,” 65.

717 For evidence of the deep-seated fear the Spaniards felt from the Chinese, see “Salazar to King,” Manila, 24 June 1590, in The Philippine Islands, ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 7, 220-224. In addition to cyclical outbreaks of violence, there were several proposals from leading officials in the Spanish administration to expel the Chinese altogether. But given the Spaniards’ utter dependence on the Chinese, few saw their expulsion as a desirable or
inhabit a compact, defined area, known as the Parián, which lay adjacent to but just beyond the walls of the Spanish Intramuros, within reach of its cannons. Several decades later, in the wake of a fresh wave of violence between Spaniards and Chinese, the king himself endorsed the arrangement, expressing his conviction that the Chinese should live “enclosed by a wall, just as is done with the Jews in Rome, Alexandria, and other places, in order to control them more easily.”

Beyond Spanish attempts to ghettoize the Chinese community, the crown also established a series of policies and institutions aimed at regulating the Sangleys’ social, political, and economic life, while at the same time seeking to shield them from abuse and exploitation. As in other aspects of imperial administration, some of these policies and institutions functioned more in the realm of aspiration than reality. In 1593, for instance, the Spanish attempted to regulate trade with the Sangleys through the so-called pancada through which the colonial administration would purchase Chinese goods wholesale at pre-arranged prices. In theory, the administration would then distribute those goods among Spanish merchants in proportion to their initial investment. The scheme aimed to ensure that both commodity prices and Chinese immigration in general would remain low since Chinese merchant activity would be restricted to the docks. The pancada was a failure from its viable alternative. As Antonio de Morga noted in 1609, without the Chinese, “there were no men to practice the various trades or to supply the City, so that food could not be found nor shoes be bought even at exorbitant prices.” Morga, Sucesos de Filipinas (1609). Bernal provides no specific page number in Morga for this quote.

718 Domingo de Salazar, “The Chinese and the Parian at Manila,” June 24, 1590, in The Philippine Islands, ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 7, 220. Parian’s exited in Cebu, Panay, and Jolo as well, but the Parian of Manila was by the far the busiest and most populous. See Alberto Santamaría O.P., “The Chinese Parian (El Parian de los Sangleyes),” The Chinese in the Philippines: 1570-1770, ed. Felix, Alfonso (Manila: Historical Conservation Society, 1966), 67-118; and Manel Ollé, “La formación del Parián de Manila: La construcción de un equilibrio inestable,” in La investigación sobre Asia pacífico en España, ed. Pedro San Ginés Aguilar (Granada: Editorial Universidad de Granada, 2007), 27-49. In its early years, the Parian was moved several times after fires, but always remained just beyond the walled Spanish quarter of Intramuros.

719 “Petición de informe sobre reducción de sangleyes en Manila,” 4 August 1643, Zaragoza, AGI Filipinas, leg. 330, no. 4, fols. 155v-156r.
inception, however, since both Spaniards and Sangleys readily circumvented it, seeking higher individual profits through an illicit yet hardly clandestine contraband trade.\footnote{From 1620, in a move that further centralized the China trade in Manila, the crown also began requiring all inbound China ships to dock there and pay official customs duties before proceeding on to their final destinations across the archipelago. In addition, the between 1591 and 1614, the royal treasury introduced a series taxes on the Chinese, including a residence tax, as well as two other which together amounted to a 16-percent tax on goods imported from China. See, Bernal, “The Chinese Colony in Manila,” 43.}

The Spanish colonial administration also pursued other, supposedly more benevolent policies aimed at currying the favor of the Chinese, in particular those recently converted to Christianity, and at encouraging their successful integration within the Spanish social and cultural world. In 1627, for instance, the Spanish authorities decided that, “the Sangleys converted to our holy Catholic faith shall not pay tribute for the first ten years after their conversion.”\footnote{“Orden sobre tributos de sangleyes cristianos,” 14 June 1627, Madrid, AGI Filipinas, leg. 340, no. 3, fols. 397r-398r. See also, “Laws regarding the Sangleys” [from Recopilación de leyes de las Indias], in The Philippine Islands, ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 22, 151-160, law 7.}

Likewise, a few years earlier, Spain’s attorney general in the Philippines, Ríos Coronel, proposed the creation of separate towns in the countryside for recently converted Chinese that had married Philippine women.\footnote{“Petición de Ríos Coronel sobre necesidades de las Filipinas,” September 1619 (Probable), AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 108, pt. 31, fol. 651v.} The plan sought to reward those individuals for their conversion by exempting them from the obligation to reside in the Parián, while at the same time helping buttress the colony’s agricultural production.

Exploitation and abuse persisted, however, despite the efforts of certain sectors within the colonial administration to foster coexistence. As a result, tensions between the two communities, as well as between the Sangleys and Philippine indios continued to smolder, breaking out periodically in intense eruptions of violence.\footnote{For relatively recent, nuanced analyses of Hispano-Chinese relations in the early modern Philippines, see Jonathan Gebhardt, “Microhistory and Microcosm: Chinese Migrants, Spanish Empire, and Globalization in Early Modern Manila,” Journal Of Medieval & Early Modern Studies 47, no. 1 (January 2017): 167-192; and Lucille Chia, “The Butcher, the Baker, and the Carpenter: Chinese Sojourners in the Spanish Philippines and their Impact on Southern Fujian,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 49 (2006): 509-534.} In May 1603, for instance, a Chinese Imperial fleet arrived in Manila Bay on the pretext of inquiring into
reports of gold mines in Cavite. Suspicious that the fleet had actually come to survey Spanish defenses in preparation for a full-scale invasion, both the Spanish and Chinese began arming themselves. Although a second Chinese fleet never arrived, Manila’s resident Sangleys nonetheless took matters into their own hands. Numbering some 30,000 compared to less than 1,000 Spaniards, and chafing under the yoke of Spanish oppression, the Sangleys commenced the conflict with an attack on the Spanish quarter, setting a number of houses alight and defeating the first Spanish squadron sent to retaliate. The Spanish then regrouped, gathered Pampangan, Tagalog, and Japanese reinforcements, and, over the course of several days, eventually turned the tide. The Pampangan troops, numbering some 4,000, were crucial to that effort. In the wake of this violence, the Spanish, deprived of the necessary foods and manufactures brought from China, reluctantly allowed the Sangleys to re-enter the city. Despite demanding that the total population of Chinese in the colony be capped at 6,000, the Spanish had little power to curb Chinese immigration. The following wave of Chinese immigration swiftly exceeded that number.

Among the main issues of contention between Spaniards and the Sangleys was agricultural production and access to food. For example, to address the shortage in foodstuffs, then-governor, Corcuera, attempted the forcible displacement of Sangleys from

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724 For three more or less contemporary, pro-Spanish accounts of these events, see “The Sangley Insurrection, Letter from the Audiencia, Pedro de Acuña and others,” 12-23 December 1603, Manila, in *The Philippine Islands*, ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 12, 142-169; “Carta a S.M. de Juan de Bustamante sobre el alzamiento de los sangleyes de Manila y victoria que sobre ellos obtuvieron los españoles,” 18 December 1603, Manila, in *HPAF*, 419-436; and Rodríguez Maldonado, Miguel, *Relación verdadera del levantamiento de los Sangleyes en las Islas Filipinas y el milagroso castigo de su rebelión con otros sucesos de aquellas Islas* (Seville: Clemente Hidalgo, 1606).


726 In the years immediately following the massacre, the Spanish attorney general in the Philippines, Ríos Coronel, proposed, “to reward some of the principales of the environs of Manila, Laguna Bay, and Pampanga, whose indios assisted the Spaniards in the Sangley uprising,” see: “Petición del procurador Ríos Coronel sobre varios asuntos,” July 1605 (Probable), AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 51, fols. 310-322r.


728 For evidence of such abuse, and in particular that of the Spanish fiscal of Manila, Juan de Alvarado Bracamonte, see: “Sentencias del Consejo: Sentencias y autos dados en residencia, Juan de Alvarado Bracamonte fiscal en Manila,” 1630, AGI Escribanía, leg. 1188.
their urban, commercial lives to the countryside of Calamba, on the Laguna Bay just south of Manila, where he sought to force them into labor in the intense heat of the rice paddies. In response to that effort, however, the Sangleys arose in protest once more, resulting in a revolt that engulfed virtually the entire region around Manila. Despite such devastation, the cycle of violence continued to repeat itself. Each time, the Chinese immigrant population continued to surge, only to be diminished before replenishing itself yet again. Several more such broad scale clashes occurred, including in 1662, 1686, 1762, and 1819. Although none of these conflicts succeeded in permanently uprooting the Spanish from Manila’s Intramuros, their presence remained precarious throughout the first two centuries of Spanish occupation.\footnote{Compounding the challenges posed by uprisings and invasions, the city was also wracked by devastating earthquakes and fires, which required large, costly efforts of recovery and reconstruction. See, “Al Obispo virrey, dandole cuenta de un terremoto que arruinó la ciudad de Manila y del encuentro con la flota holandesa que intento invadir aquellas islas,” 24 December 1648, AGN-México, Reales Cedulas Originales, vol. 3, exp. 56.}

**Limits of Colonial Authority**

From within their walled city in Manila, Spanish authorities employed a range of strategies aimed at extending and consolidating colonial authority over the rest of the archipelago. Drawing on experience gained in America, these strategies included the apportionment of *encomiendas* and land grants to both Spaniards and *indios*, and attempts to “reduce” *indios* to Spanish-style urban living and subject them to tribute obligations. The crown had earlier attempted to suppress *encomienda* in the Americas in order to curb the abuses of native populations and prevent the rise of autonomous colonial aristocracies. The institution gained a new lease on life in the Philippines, however, and like in America, soon attracted a torrent of criticism from local clergy. The Philippine *encomienda* arose as its
American counterpart was in decline, but the institution shared the same fundamental characteristics. As in the New World, it was the primary means by which Spain sought to consolidate control over native populations and exploit them economically.\(^730\)

Although the king omitted mention of *encomienda* in his initial instructions to Legazpi, in an early missive to Madrid, prior to the conquest of Manila, Legazpi sought permission to introduce the institution. “It would be in Your Majesty’s interest,” he wrote, “to distribute the conquered Indians in this archipelago, given that they have no lord nor recognize any lordship, and for their tranquility [quietud] and pacification, which is in the service of God our Lord and Your Majesty […].”\(^731\) Convinced of the expedience of *encomienda* in extending Spanish sovereignty, colonial authorities soon assented.\(^732\)

By 1572, Legazpi had ostensibly apportioned *encomienda* all the native inhabitants of the regions under Spanish control.\(^733\) These included Manila and its environs, Pampanga, the area around Laguna Bay, and a series of enclaves in Ilocos and the Visayas. Then, in the following two decades, Spain’s purported control in the archipelago expanded dramatically. According to one contemporary source, there existed 267 *encomiendas* by 1591, representing a total of some 667,612 *indios* under Spanish colonial rule.\(^734\)

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\(^730\) One of the key obligations of *encomenderos* in the Philippines was to cultivate their lands. See, “Instrucciones de gobierno a Francisco Tello,” 25 May 1596, Toledo, AGI Filipinas, leg. 339, no. 2, fols. 146r-170v.


\(^732\) Legazpi apparently began apportioning such *encomiendas* as early as 1570. See [“Copia de carta que el general miguel lopez de legazpi scrive al virrey de la nueva españa, fecha en la ciudad de manila a XI de agosto de 1572,” AGI Patronato, leg. 24, ramo 23, in which he explains: “Por el mes de noviembre del dicho año de [15]70 fui de Panay a la isla de Cebu, donde se fundó en nombre de su Majestad una villa de españoles […], a los cuales se repartió los indios que en aquella comarca estaban hechos de paz, conforme a lo que su Majestad tiene mandado, aunque en los repartimientos hubo alguna confusión por no saberse los pueblos ni la cantidad de gente que había en aquellas islas comarcanas que estaban de paz, [por lo que] se señalaron tantos vecinos en cada isla para que pro indiviso gozasen de los aprovechamientos de ella.”]

\(^733\) Villiers, “Portuguese Malacca and Spanish Manila,” 44.

\(^734\) “Relación de las encomiendas de indios de Luzón,” 31 May 1591, Manila, AGI Patronato, leg. 25, ramo 38. See also, Newson, *Conquest and Pestilence in the Early Spanish Philippines* (2009); and, for an English translation of the report, see “Account of the encomiendas in the Philippinas Islands [G. P. Dasmariñas],” Manila, 31 May 1591, in *The Philippine Islands*, vol. 8, 96-142.
Beyond seeking to subject Philippine indios to Spanish political and religious domination, royal officials also saw the encomienda as a key means of integrating indigenous peoples within the emerging colonial economy and ensuring a steady supply of food through agricultural production. To do so, Spanish authorities experimented by introducing a variety of tribute obligations on Philippine indio encomendados in the hopes of efficiently exploiting the colony and making it self-sufficient. In its early stage, the Philippine encomienda tribute encompassed labor service as well as payment in a range of other forms including coin and foodstuffs. Eventually, however, Spanish authorities forbade personal service as a means of payment, concerned by the potential that such an arrangement could devolve, as it often did in practice, into conditions akin to slavery. This stance enabled the crown to claim the moral high ground despite rarely enforcing the prohibition in practice.

Although always an exploitative institution, the early years of encomienda in the Philippines were defined by particularly acute abuse. While some encomenderos extracted tribute from their charges, few fulfilled the obligation to protect them or facilitate their instruction in Spanish Catholic religion and civilization. In addition, many encomenderos tried demanding more than the official rate of one peso (or ten reales), some even requiring tribute in scarce or expensive products, making indios' work of procuring payment all the more taxing.

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735 Spaniards demanded tribute from all Philippine indios, including both Christian converts and infieles, although in reality only those under effective Spanish control could be made to pay. See “Instrucciones de gobierno a Francisco Tello,” 25 May 1596, Toledo, AGI Filipinas, leg. 339, no. 2, fols. 146r-170v.
736 “Orden sobre no cobrar los tributos en servicios personales,” 26 May 1609, Aranjuez, AGI Filipinas, leg. 329, no. 2, fols. 85v-86r.
737 In 1619, Spain’s attorney general in the Philippines, Hernando de los Ríos Coronel, even proposed that the wives of indio soldiers serving in the Spanish army, most of which were from Pampanga, be relieved of their tribute and poló labor obligations until their husbands returned home. See, “Petición de Ríos Coronel sobre necesidades de las Filipinas,” September 1619 (Probable), AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 108, fols. 644r-663r.
738 For a report on abusive encomenderos in Pampanga, see, “Relación de Diego de Zárate sobre Filipinas,” 10 June 1581, AGI Filipinas, leg. 34, no. 38, fols. 280r-282v.
739 Initially, Spanish authorities required Philippine indios to pay tribute in agricultural products, unlike in New Spain, where Indians were required to pay in precious metals. In an attempt to incorporate indios into the
Nevertheless, although in the early 1590s, the Spanish crown claimed over half a million Philippine *indios* under its dominion and Christian tutelage, a closer look at contemporary documents reveals the hollowness of such claims. Of all the encomiendas apportioned in the islands, the king himself (via his colonial authorities in the islands) directly administered just 31 of them, while another 236 were reportedly in the hands of “private individuals.” Importantly, however, and this detail was crucial, “from many of those in Cagayan and some in other districts no tribute can be collected, because they are not

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Philippines’ monetary economy, however, beginning in 1580, royal authorities permitted *indio* tributaries to pay their due either in agricultural products (especial) or in money (dinero). The decision backfired, however, driving many *indios* away from agricultural labor given the relative ease of obtaining money through trade, resulting in acute food shortages. In response, in 1595 the crown revised its policy, requiring *indios* to pay tribute half in money and half in foodstuffs, and in 1604 Spanish authorities further clarified the policy, requiring four *reales* in coin, one fowl, and six *reales* in other foodstuffs. See, “Orden de guardar las instrucciones sobre descubrimientos,” 24 April 1580, Logrosán, AGI Filipinas, leg. 339, no. 1, fols. 181v-184v; Phelan, *The Hispanization of the Philippines*, 95; and Luis Alonso Álvarez, “La inviabilidad de la hacienda asiática: Coacción y mercado en la formación del modelo colonial en las islas Filipinas, 1565-1595,” in *Impetus y naciones en el Pacífico, Vol. 1, La formación de una colonia: Filipinas*, ed. María Dolores Elizalde Pérez-Grueso, Josep Maria Fradera, and Luis Alonso (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2001), 204. Hidalgo puts the date at 1602: see, Patricio Hidalgo Nuchera, “Sistemas para la explotación de las islas: Encomiendas, tributos y comercio. La recta administración versus el mal comportamiento: La situación de la población nativa en el contexto del marco colonial temprano,” in *Las relaciones entre España y Filipinas, siglos XVI-XX*, ed. María Dolores Elizalde Pérez-Grueso (Madrid: CSIC, 2002), 77. Royal instructions to the current governor, Dasmarias, for instance, ordered that, “que no se pudiere forzar a los indios a pagarlos en cosa señalada [producto] sino en dinero si lo tuvieren o quisieren dar, o en cualquier otra cosa de sus frutos o granjerías,” see: AGI Filipinas, leg. 339, no. 1, fols. 365v-389r. For the perspective of a local official in Manila, Francisco de las Misas, who argued for the preference of tribute payments in foodstuffs (especial) rather than money (dinero), see “Carta de Francisco de las Misas sobre varios asuntos,” 31 May 1595, Manila, AGI Filipinas, leg. 29, no. 57, fols. 382r-404v. Debate over the issue of how tribute should be paid persisted into the early seventeenth century; see, “Petición de informe sobre tributos de los indios,” 6 March 1608, Madrid, AGI Filipinas, leg. 340, no. 3, fols. 26v-27r; and Phelan, *The Hispanization of the Philippines*, 96.

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740 Pedro Galende, “The Augustinians in the Philippines, 1565-1890,” *Boletín eclesiástico de Filipinas* 39 (1965): 41; and “Account of the encomiendas in the Philippines Islands,” 31 May 1591, Manila, in *The Philippine Islands*, ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 8, 96-142, which contains the following quote: “In the city of Manila, along its coast and the coast opposite, and in the provinces of Pampanga, Pangasinan, Ylocos, Cagayan, La Laguna, Camarines, Masbate, Zebu, Panay, Balayan, and Callayla, which is all of Luzon and the other Philippines Islands settled, there are 166,903 whole tributes. Each tribute includes husband, wife, and excepting the sons, the children. Therefere there are 667,612 souls in the said provinces, besides the religious of the convents of Manila.” Another interesting document, although from the second half of the seventeenth century, is the 1667 royal decree demanding a report from the viceregal authorities in New Spain, which reflected the crown’s suspicions that local officials in the Philippines were inflating the number of encomiendas that were actually occupied in order to increase the amount the royal *sitnado* subsidy that the Philippines received from México. See, “Oficiales reales de Mexico. Que informe si los oficiales reales de Filipinas mandan relación de las vacantes de encomiendas para su descuento de los situados remitidos de Mexico,” 6 March 1667, in AGN-México, Reales Cedulas Originales, vol. 9 exp. 88.

pacified,” implying that Spaniards exercised no control whatsoever in these particular communities over which they laid claim.\cite{742} In this case, the governor ascribed the situation simply to geographic distance: “In some of these districts it is impossible to go to administer justice, because of their distance from the capitals where the alcalde-mayor live.”\cite{743} It was painfully clear to Spanish authorities, however, that native resistance to encomienda, and to Spanish rule in general – not the geographic distance of colonial authorities or simply the commercial attraction of Manila – was the prime cause of the vast numbers of vacant encomiendas by the mid seventeenth century.\cite{744} The perpetual state of violence and insecurity throughout much of the Philippines contributed to a steady contraction of the geographic reach of encomienda across the islands.\cite{745} As Luis Alonso Álvarez has shown, by the mid 1590s, while encomiendas continued to exist in theory as legal entities, most had lost their productive economic function as suppliers of food and manufactures.\cite{746} Crown-subsidized military intervention was the only means of reversing this trend, but as events would attest,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{742} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{743} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{744} According to the historian, Eric A. Anderson: “Between 1636 and 1650, 65% of vacant private grants reverting to the crown were in areas in or near Luzon. A much smaller percentage (35%) reverted to the crown marginal regions.” See, Eric A. Anderson, “The Encomienda in Early Philippine Colonial History,” \textit{Asian Studies} 14 (1976): 33. While private settlers were in theory required to remain present within the lands of the encomienda, beginning in 1619, certain officials, like the governor and the regidores of the municipal council, were exempted, and permitted to appoint someone to manage the encomienda in their stead while they resided in Manila and tended to matters of government; see, “Petición de Ríos Coronel sobre necesidades de las Filipinas,” September 1619 (Probable), AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 108, pt. 28, fol. 650v. For record of a lawsuit from 1606 issued against one Gabriel de Ribeira, who had left his encomienda vacant and gone to Mexico, see: “Pleitos de la Audiencia de Filipinas,” AGI Escribanía, leg. 403B, part 3.
  \item \textsuperscript{745} Corruption also appears to have played a small yet certainly secondary role in this process. According to the attorney general, Juan Grau y Monfalcón, accused the then-governor, Sebastián Hurtado de Corcuera, in order to enrich himself, of intentionally awarding a number of encomiendas to individuals who never took charge of them, instead funneling the corresponding subsidies for those encomiendas into his own personal coffers. See: “Petición de Juan Grau sobre encomiendas con pensiones,” 13 June 1642 (Probable), AGI Filipinas, leg. 28, no. 23, fols. 101r-105v.
  \item \textsuperscript{746} “Alonso Álvarez, “La inviabilidad de la hacienda asiática,” 183.
\end{itemize}
Madrid possessed neither the resources nor the political will necessary to buttress the
*encomienda* and secure Spanish authority over the archipelago in the long-term.\(^{747}\)

Beyond seeking to extract tribute from the Philippine *indios* the *encomienda*, Spanish
authorities also tried forcing many to sell certain merchandise below market rates and
implementing heightened labor obligations upon certain communities, especially in the
timber and shipbuilding industry.\(^{748}\) Such labor service, which Spanish authorities were keen
distinguish from slavery, was akin to the *mita* and *repartimiento* systems in the New World.\(^{749}\)
The first of these two methods of exploitation was known as the *bandala*, and was intended
to exist alongside conventional forms of tribute.\(^{750}\) The *bandala* consisted in theory of
demands on the native population to offer Spaniards their textiles, food, and a range of
other agricultural goods, including timber, for artificially low prices, which the Spaniards
then consumed or resold for substantial profit.\(^{751}\) The second method, the *polo*, entailed the
coerced labor service of Philippine *indios* to benefit Spaniards.\(^{752}\) Whereas in the Americas
such laborers tended to engage in mining, in the Philippines most worked in the timber

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\(^{747}\) In 1590, the king also issued a royal cedula in which he ordered his authorities to send “50 settlers and 50
farmers to the Islas Filipinas who can settle and attend to the cultivation of the land.” See: “Royal cedula to
bring 50 settlers and 50 farmers to the Islas Filipinas who can settle and attend to the cultivation of the land.”
intentions like these to increase Spanish settlement of the archipelago, however, its distance and reputation for
violence, insecurity in the hinterland discouraged most Spaniards from ever making the journey. Moreover, the
few settlers that did eventually arrive increasingly flocked to Manila, leaving much of the territory uninhabited
by Spaniards.

\(^{748}\) Hidalgo Nuchera, *La Resta Administración*, 17-18.

\(^{749}\) Ibid.

\(^{750}\) For an example of protest against the exploitative nature of the *bandala* in forcing *indios* in Pampanga to sell
their goods to Spaniards at below-market rates, see, “Relación de Diego de Zárate sobre Filipinas,” 10 June
1581, AGI Filipinas, leg. 34, no. 38, fols. 280r-282v.

\(^{751}\) Luis Alonso Álvarez, “Financing the Empire: The Nature of the Tax System in the Philippines, 1565-1804,”
Hidalgo Nuchera, *La Resta Administración*, 47.

\(^{752}\) Josep Maria Fradera, “La formacion de una colonia: Objetivos metropolitanos y transacciones locales,” in
*Imperios y naciones en el Pacífico, Vol. 1, La formación de una colonia: Filipinas*, eds. María Dolores Elizalde Pérez-
Grueso, Josep Maria Fradera, and Luis Alonso (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2001),
88. The *repartimiento* of New Spain in turn derived from the Incan *mita* and the Aztec *cuaquetitl*. 
industry, in shipyards, as well as in domestic and military service, especially in the navy.\textsuperscript{753} Philippine polistas rarely received the token wages to which they were entitled, and were often subjected to intense physical abuse and appalling working conditions.\textsuperscript{754}

Importantly, however, the Spanish were not sufficiently powerful to impose their will on the native population unilaterally. Instead, they relied on the instrumental support of allied indigenous elites and soldiers in extending and defending Spanish imperial rule. It was no coincidence that in the small handful of regions successfully submitted to Spanish rule (Pampanga, Laguna de Bay, and parts of Pangasinan and Ilocos), colonial authorities depended heavily on the collaboration of native elites in extracting tribute and enforcing the bandala and polo. The Spanish co-opted native elites by offering certain economic and jurisdictional privileges, by respecting their positions atop traditional Philippine hierarchies, and by awarding them prestigious titles in the Spanish colonial administration. Indigenous headmen, called principales or cabezas de barangay, were key figures through which the crown extended its authority, albeit indirectly. Philip II himself made this last point a priority in 1594, demonstrating a surprising respect for the native elite and lamenting the suffering that many of them endured in the early days of conquest, in particular those that had allied with Spain and converted to Christianity. “It is not just,” wrote Philip, that the traditional elite “be in a worse condition after having converted.”\textsuperscript{755} As a result, he instructed his officials in the islands to “treat them well, and to grant them in my name the Government of the Indios over which they were [previously] lords.”\textsuperscript{756}

The strategy of reinstating the local authority of traditional headmen not only endowed the Spanish regime with an air of legitimacy by recognizing the station of local

\textsuperscript{753} Alonso Álvarez, “Financing the Empire,” 81-82.
\textsuperscript{755} AGI, Filipinas, leg. 339, no. 2, fols. 64r-64v.
\textsuperscript{756} Ibid.
indigenous leaders, but also provided a means of extending Spain’s sovereignty indirectly at minimal cost to the crown. In an effort to reinforce the allegiance of certain *principales*, Spanish authorities even granted *encomiendas* and land grants to many of them, particularly those in Pampanga who had assisted the Spanish in the early expeditions of conquest, or “pacification.” Many *principales* benefited from, and often abused, their position as collectors of tribute and enforcers of the *polo* and *bandala*, an arrangement which formalized the sovereignty of the Spanish crown in local Philippine *indio* communities indirectly, by ensuring a durable link between the indigenous elite and the Spanish colonial bureaucracy. Describing this arrangement, the Augustinian priest, Martin de Rada, explained in 1577 that Spanish authorities, “make the *principal* pay the tribute of all of his community [*parcialidad*], and that he,” in turn, “charges the rest,” referring to the *indio* commoners within his jurisdiction. While the greed of individual *principales* no doubt contributed to the frequent abuse of commoners, such exploitation was often heightened by the pressure of fines on those *principales* who, for a variety of complex reasons often beyond their control, failed to meet the strict annual quotas of rice and other foodstuffs demanded by colonial authorities.

Beyond enforcing the *bandala* and *polo*, *principales* also fulfilled the role of raising Philippine commoners for military service in support of the crown. As in the New World, in the Philippines native soldiers were crucial to the expansion and consolidation of Spanish

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758 Alonso Álvarez, “Financing the Empire,” 67-68. For an attempt by the Spanish crown to limit the abuse of *indios* by their own native *principales*, see “Orden a Távora sobre trato a los indios,” 26 March 1632, Madrid, AGI Filipinas, leg. 329, no. 3, fols. 222r-222v.  
rule, especially in the seventeenth century. As Stephanie Mawson has recently demonstrated, Philippine *indio* soldiers comprised an important portion of both special expeditionary forces and standing armies in the archipelago, including in Manila.\(^{761}\) For instance, in describing a mission to the mountains of northern Luzon in 1624, the Spanish captain Alonso Martín Quirante explained that his company included some, “seventy Spanish soldiers and officers, [...] two Japanese miners, [...] eleven of his Majesty’s negro slaves, [...] nine Indians imprisoned for crimes; 47 *sangley* carpenters, smiths, and sawyers; and 1,748 other Indians – 893 from the province of Ylocos, formed into twelve companies; and 855 from the province of Pangasinan, formed into ten other companies.”\(^{762}\) In addition to Ilocanos and Pangasinanes, natives of the Tagalog and Camarines regions of Luzon likewise formed part of Spanish armies, as did Pampangans, who represented the vast majority of native soldiers in the service of Spain.\(^{763}\) While it is generally estimated that some 40,000 *indio* soldiers served the Spanish crown in the period from 1575 to 1640, often outnumbering Spanish soldiers by five to one, Mawson suggests that the ratio was often even higher.\(^{764}\) Spaniards’ heavy reliance on indigenous elites and soldiers resulted from and in turn reflected the harsh reality that the handful of enclaves of Spanish authority in the Philippines were surrounded by vast seas of territory under indigenous control. If the crown’s effective control was somewhat circumscribed and unstable within Manila itself, it was even more so the case beyond the city’s walls and its broader five-league jurisdiction. Over the course of the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Castilian crown sent armed expeditions of conquest (or “pacification”) to numerous areas across the archipelago, garnering nominal

\(^{761}\) Mawson, “Philippine Indios in the Service of Empire,” 386-388.


\(^{763}\) Mawson, “Philippine Indios in the Service of Empire,” 386.

\(^{764}\) Ibid. 385.
pledges of submission from local indios communities.$^{765}$ When Spanish soldiers and their indigenous allies left, however, these areas rarely remained loyal to colonial authority for long. The inhabitants of many such areas fled, refused to pay tribute, and in several cases rose in open, violent revolt, ultimately re-establishing their own effective sovereignty free from Spanish imperial rule until well into the nineteenth century. In certain regions, like Mindanao, the Spanish secured little more than a series of temporary footholds and beachheads, the vast interior of that southern island remaining virtually beyond the reach of Spanish influence altogether.

In addition to the limits on imperial sovereignty placed by Philippine indios and Sangleys, a range of other external groups also arose frequently to challenge Spanish colonial rule in the islands. Throughout the late sixteenth century and the entirety of the seventeenth, the Spanish faced continuous challenges in the region from several foreign enemies, including Dutch, English, Japanese, Chinese, Malaysian, and Bruneian corsairs and privateers.$^{766}$ In certain cases, multiple of these groups collaborated against the Spanish.$^{767}$ In

$^{765}$ For an account of the service of one particular settler, which provides a detailed description of his participation in a range of early “pacification” campaigns across the Philippines, see “Petición de Francisco de Rivas de vara de alguacil de Fernandina,” 7 July 1583, AGI Filipinas, leg. 34, no. 54.

$^{766}$ While northern European corsairs had already begun challenging Spanish and Portuguese positions in the Far East in the latter sixteen century, such threats increased considerably soon after the turn of the seventeenth century with the formation of the Dutch and English East India Companies. For an example of an English attack on the Pintado islands of the Philippines as early as 1588, see “Letter from Santiago de Vera to His Majesty about the attack of the English pirate on the shipyard in the Pintados,” 26 June 1588, in The Philippines Under Spain, vol. 4, 492-499. For evidence of a Dutch corsair attack prior to the formal establishment of the Dutch East India Company, see “Oliver van Noort’s attack on Luzon, Francisco Tell, and others,” October-December 1600, Manila, in The Philippine Islands, ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 11, 140-173. In some cases, suspicious Spaniards even accused the Portuguese, during the period of Iberian Union no less, of allying with anti-Spanish enemies, as they were alleged to have done with the Japanese in 1597, when they sacked and pillaged the Spanish ship, San Felipe, having been incited by the Portuguese. See “Carta de oficiales reales sobre varios asuntos,” 29 June 1597, Manila, AGI Filipinas, leg. 29, no. 62, fols. 425r-426v. For recommendations from the king to the viceroy in New Spain to reinforce Manila’s defenses, see “Recomendación al Virrey de la Nueva España, para que por leva se formen infanterías para Manila y el cuidado del Socorro de Filipinas,” 14 July 1643, Madrid, AGN-México, Reales Cedulas Originales, vol. 2, exp. 9; “Al virrey de la Nueva España, mandandole envíe a Filipinas, municiones, artillería, polvora, y demás cosas necesarias para evitar la invasión que quieren hacer los holandeses en esas islas,” 23 January 1644, Madrid, AGN-México, Reales Cedulas Originales, vol. 2, exp. 29; and “Manifestando que la perdida de la Isla Hermosa es muy lamentable y que importa mucho al conservación de aquellas islas, recomendando se les asista en todo lo que necesitan,” 18
one such example, the Japanese in the archipelago reportedly provided key intelligence to the Dutch for their raid of Manila.\textsuperscript{768} In another, the Dutch allegedly supported the Muslim Maguindanao sultanate of Mindanao in its extended campaign to repel the Spanish invaders.\textsuperscript{769} Such anti-Spanish coalitions spurred important calls from Spaniards in the Philippines in particular to establish a more robust and effective military union with the Portuguese in East Asia to combat such threats.\textsuperscript{770}

The Spaniards’ prolonged campaign in Mindanao took on special significance since many of its inhabitants were Muslim and it thereby represented another front in Spain’s global holy war against Islam.\textsuperscript{771} Spanish authorities initially sought to secure the friendship January 1648, Madrid, AGN-México, Reales Cedulas Originales, vol. 3, exp. 3. For a report from 1618 on recent Dutch assaults and indigenous uprisings in various parts of the archipelago, see “Relacion de lo que ha sucedido en las islas filipinas desde el mes de junio de 617 hasta el presente de 618,” 1618, RAH, Jesuitas 9-3657/8, fols. 1r-41r. For another report, this one from 1621, listing Mozambique, Ormuz, and the Philippines as the three colonies most under threat by Dutch assaults, see “Relación de los sucessos, que ha auido en las islas Philipinas y otras Prouincias, y Reynos del Oriente desde el mes de julio de 620 hasta el presente de 621,” 2 July 1621, RAH, Jesuitas, tomo 84, fols.116r-123v.

\textsuperscript{767} For an example of Japan’s support for the Dutch, as well as of collaboration between the Dutch and English in East Asia, see “Respuesta a Alonso Fajardo sobre asuntos de gobierno,” 9 August 1621, Madrid, AGI Filipinas, leg. 329, no. 2, fols. 402v-424r. Two decades on, the king was so incensed by northern European threats on the archipelago that he ordered his viceroy in New Spain to fine a range of royal officials in the Philippines for not doing more to repel them; see: “Al virrey de la Nueva España, avisandole que haga multar a los oidores, gobernador, fiscal y oficiales reales de Filipinas, por haber permitido en esas islas, dos embarcaciones de ingleses y daneces,” 21 September 1643, Madrid, AGN-México, Reales Cedulas Originales, vol. 2, exp. 162.

\textsuperscript{768} “Petición de Ríos Coronel sobre necesidades de las Filipinas,” September 1619 (Probable), AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 108, pt. 38, fol. 652v.

\textsuperscript{769} Fradera, “La formación de una colonia,” 89. See also, “Petición del Cabildo secular de Manila sobre necesidades de Filipinas,” 9 August 1638, Madrid (Probable), AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 235, pt.77, fol. 1277v.

\textsuperscript{770} See “Instrucciones a Ruy González de Sequeira,” 6 March 1613, Madrid, AGI Filipinas, leg. 329, no. 2, fols. 163r-167r. González de Sequeira was captain-general of Spain’s naval armada; and “Petición del Cabildo secular de Manila sobre necesidades de Filipinas,” 9 August 1638, Madrid (Probable), AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 235, pt. 77, fol. 1277v. “The Dutch,” wrote the Manila cabildo in 1638, “have much force in [the] seas, which they increase by uniting and confederating with the Iaos (?), Japanese, Mindanaos, and other Moors and Gentiles, enemies of the Spanish in the Philippines.” “And in order to oppose them,” the cabildo proposed, “it would be very convenient to unite and join together the arms of Castile and Portugal […] in the said Islands and in India, as one saw in the restoration of Maluco,” which a joint-Iberian force had recovered from the Dutch. An Iberian military union in the East would be “in the service of His Majesty, and of both Crowns,” the cabildo concluded, see: “Petición del Cabildo secular de Manila sobre necesidades de Filipinas,” 9 August 1638, Madrid (Probable), AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 235, pt. 77, fol. 1277v.

\textsuperscript{771} To this end, in the 1591 capitulación made on king’s behalf between the Spanish governor of the Philippines, Gómez Pérez Dasmariñas, and Esteban Rodríguez de Figueroa, the newly-appointed adelantado tasked with “pacifying” Mindanao, Dasmariñas proclaimed as his “dignified [digno] and principal duty […] in these islands the propagation of our holy faith among the natives, […] converting and saving them,” introducing them to
and collaboration of local elites on that southern island. But their failure to do so soon compelled them to take violent action in successive raids on the island.\textsuperscript{772} They sought to establish fortified strongholds in Zamboanga and along the Mindanao River in an attempt to provide the Philippines broader protection from the seaborne raids by the Maguindanaos, Sulus, Camucones and Borneans.\textsuperscript{773} In this conflict, as in others, the Spanish relied heavily on support from allied indio groups, like the Pampangans, and thus proposed that their allies be permitted to enslave the “Mohammedans of Mindanao, Joló, Borneo and other neighboring islands” as a means of “animating those that go to fight against them.”\textsuperscript{774} Despite these efforts, however, Spanish attempts to “pacify” the island remained incomplete including well into the late seventeenth century.

As the documentary record suggests, a vast gap existed between Spain’s claims to sovereignty in the islands and its effective authority in practice. For instance, colonial authorities had apportioned the lion’s share of the physical territory of Mindanao and Joló in encomienda, thus projecting an expansive claim to sovereignty, which vastly exceeded their actual ability to exercise full, indivisible rule. Spaniards’ inability to “pacify” and evangelize in those regions, despite several attempts, was clear evidence of this.\textsuperscript{775} While the Spanish did

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\textsuperscript{772} “Royal decree to the Governor of Filipinas asking him earnestly to try to befriend the king of Borney and the chief of the Mindanao River,” 4 June 1576, in \textit{The Philippines Under Spain}, vol. 3, 177-179.
\textsuperscript{773} “Relación de la pelea, y victoria de los españoles contra la armada del Mindanao en su misma costa y en el cabo, que llaman punta de flechas,” 21 December 1636, RAH, Jesuítas 9-3657/39, fols. 285r-288r; and “Respuesta a Corcuera sobre asuntos de guerra,” 2 September 1638, Madrid, AGI Filipinas, leg. 330, no. 4, fols. 71v-73r.
\textsuperscript{774} “Petición de Ríos Coronel sobre defensa de las islas,” July 1605 (Probable), AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 52, fols. 337r-340v.
\textsuperscript{775} As Bishop Salazar lamented in 1588: “much of [Mindanao] is apportioned in encomienda to Spaniards, and some [natives] pay tribute; [but] preachers of Mohamed have entered this region, having come from Brunei and Ternate, and we have news that some Moors from Mecca are among them.” “Fifty leagues from the island of Mindanao is that of Joló,” Salazar continued, “which many years ago was apportioned in encomienda. […] Neither in this region nor in that of Mindanao has there been evangelization, nor can there be until they are pacified,” see “Informe del Obispo de Filipinas, Fr. Domingo de Salazar, O.P, sobre el censo de las Islas
manage to win a handful of battles in these islands in the seventeenth century, they were unable to hold and defend the positions they had previously won, and were ultimately expelled from the islands altogether by the early 1660s.\(^776\) Beginning in the late sixteenth century and lasting throughout the seventeenth, Luzon itself, where Manila was located, was wracked by continuous outbreaks of violence against Spanish rule. Combatants in these conflicts included not only Zambales, Negritos, and Igorots, well known for their effective armed resistance, but also traditional allies of the Spanish, including the Tagalogs and Pampangos.\(^777\) Although the so-called Tondo Conspiracy was discovered and suppressed before coming to fruition, it was nonetheless evidence of the groundswell of unrest, and of certain Philippine indios’ collaboration with foreign agitators like the Japanese, even near the heart of Spanish control in central Luzon.\(^778\)

Then, in the seventeenth century, at least seventeen major uprisings broke out across the archipelago, including in Luzon, but also in more distant locales such as Leyte (1622) and the Pintados (1640-1650).\(^779\) In the context of the revolt in the Pintados, one contemporary account noted that in the early 1660s, after "a number of raids by the indios" and the suppression of the Tondo Conspiracy, a "conspiracy against the Spaniards" started in the Pintados.\(^779\)

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\(^777\) The Spanish were especially alarmed by the revolt that gripped Pampanga and Pangasinan in 1660-61 given the close partnership that colonial authorities had long enjoyed with the inhabitants of those lands. “In the early days of October, 1660, the loyal population of Pampanga made their first rebellious movements - the people being exasperated against the overseers of the wood-cutting, who had been ill-treating them,” one observer remarked. “All the islands were imperiled by this war,” he continued, “since all the tribes were on the watch for its outcome.” On the insurrection in Pampanga and Pangasinan (1660-61), see “Insurrections by Filipinos in the seventeenth century [Accounts by various early writers covering the period 1621-1683],” in *The Philippine Islands*, ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 38, p139-161.


\(^779\) “Insurrections by Filipinos in the seventeenth century [Accounts by various early writers covering the period 1621-1683],” in *The Philippine Islands*, ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 38, 87-241. These included in Gadanés (1621), Bohol and Leyte (1622), Mandayas (1625), Caraga and Cagayan (1620), Nueva Segovia (1629), Pampanga (1645), Bulacán (1643), the Pintados (1640-50), Pampanga and Pangasinan (1660-61), Ilocos (1660-61), Otón (1663 and 1672), Playa Honda (1681), and in various Zambal villages (1683). See also, “Letter of the Audiencia of Filipinas about the rebellion of the Indios in 1588 in Tondo, Cebu, and Cagayan; and the dispute between the bishop and the Audiencia,” 13 July 1589, in *The Philippines Under Spain*, edited Benítez Licuaran and Llavador Mira, vol. 4, 544-551.
Spaniard insisted on the link between proximity, civility, and loyalty to Spanish rule, while portraying as barbarous those natives that lived at greater distances, especially those in the highlands. “As the Indians have grown up in their wretchedness and in the life of brutes in their remote mountains, it seems to them that they are maintaining their liberty. They resented greatly this political compulsion to citizenship and the formation of a village, [so that they would live] as men.” Those in the provinces that were most civilized and were nearest to Manila,” he continued, “had obeyed the decree without opposition, but these [remote] provinces immediately made such demonstrations of displeasure that all of us perceived the difficulty [of enforcing the demand].

The Valley of Cagayan presents yet another fascinating case for the study of the limits of Spanish sovereignty in Luzon. Given concerns of strategic defense against pirates and corsairs (Asian and European), reports from indigenous allies of immense natural wealth in the region including gold, crops, and fauna, and the Cagayan’s proximity to China, colonial authorities soon initiated a major effort to submit the region to Spanish rule. As

781 Ibid.
782 The Spanish province by that name encompassed a vast area of some 26,000 square kilometers along the Cagayan River whose headwaters originated in a mountain pass just above Pampanga and which flowed through a lush, fertile valley before emptying into the China Sea on the Philippines’ northern coast. A gauntlet of mountain chains that reach over 3,000 meters at their highest peaks bounded the province to the south, east, and west. Despite a handful of reconnaissance expeditions to the northern coast, the interior of Cagayan was mostly unknown to Spaniards throughout the sixteenth century. As the historian, Ed. C. de Jesus noted, “the physical contours of the Cagayan region contrasts with the vagueness of the term, ‘Cagayan,’ when used for an administrative area or to identify the region’s indigenous population. In theory, the Spanish province of Cagayan extended over the entire valley,” Ed. C. de Jesus, “Control and Compromise in the Cagayan Valley,” in Philippine Social History: Global Trade and Local Transformations, ed. Alfred W. McCoy and Ed. C. De Jesus (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1982), 21-22.
783 In fact, when a Spanish expedition reached the mouth of the Cagayan River in the early 1580s, it found a settlement of Japanese pirates there, which it expelled en route to establishing the first Spanish town in the region at Nueva Segovia. For a report on one Spanish attempt to forge an alliance with a specific native group in Cagayan, see “Testimony of the Expedition to Nueva Segovia, Province of Cagayan, made by Sargento Mayor Diego Chaves de Cañizares,” 15 October 1590, in The Philippines Under Spain, eds. Benítez Licuaran and Llavador Mira, vol. 5, 6-18.
one official wrote to Philip II just two years prior, Cagayan was, “a foothold and stepping stone by which to enter the realm of Great China.”

While the Spanish encountered serious difficulties subjugating large portions of the indigenous population, they did nonetheless see limited success in establishing small enclaves of European settlement, at least at the outset. The major center of colonial settlement and administration in the region, Nueva Segovia, was home to some 200 Spanish settlers in the early 1700s, alongside another 50 to 100 troops and officers. However, despite repeated attempts to expand settlement the region and compel its early encomenderos to remain, already by 1622, the total combined Spanish population had declined to just 70, a collective result of diminishing dreams of conquering China, the draw of the Manila trade, and the general effectiveness of local indigenous communities in subverting Spanish attempts to subjugate them.

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785 The region was home to range of distinct groups, including the Ibanags, Itaves, and Gaddanes, which the Spaniards often referred to using an overarching term of their invention, “Cagayanes,” and which, for the purposes of evangelization, Spaniards distinguished as either Christians or infieles; see: De Jesus, “Control and Compromise in the Cagayan Valley,” 22. For a description of the settler population and political and religious administration in Cagayan as of 1588, see, “Informe del Obispo de Filipinas, Fr. Domingo de Salazar, O.P, sobre el censo de las Islas Filipinas en los años 1587-1588,” 25 June 1588, Manila, in HPAF, 351-353. According to Salazar, “the city of Nueva Segovia, two leagues inland, has 40 encomendero vezinos, and there is a monastery of St. Augustine with two priests, one alcalde mayor, two alcaldes hordinarios, one alguazil mayor, six regidores [aldermen], which form the cabildo, a hospital of the king, […] there is a fort with seven wide pieces and several small ones, […] and some muskets and arquebuses, and pikes and cotas, which are weapons they use in these parts. For its repairs, this fort depends on the tribute worth 100 pesos from a [nearby] town, and in addition to its 40 vezinos, it has 40 soldiers, whose task is pacification and the collection of the encomiendas [tribute]. Ten of the residents are married, and the rest are single, and 33 of the vezinos hold encomiendas on the main river of Taxo/Tajo, and the rest nearby. There are 26,000 Indians in the region of which 7,000 are peaceful and pay tribute. On this river and its environs, your Majesty has 700 tributaries, and of these 1,000 are peaceful and pay the tribute.”
786 De Jesus, “Control and Compromise in the Cagayan Valley,” 24.
787 “Petición del procurador Ríos Coronel sobre varios asuntos,” July 1605 (Probable), AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 51, fols. 310r-322r. For the population estimate, see De Jesus, “Control and Compromise in the Cagayan Valley,” 24, although my interpretation seems to diverge somewhat with that of De Jesus regarding the relative power of Spaniards and the natives of Cagayan.
The first major Spanish expedition to the region disembarked at the mouth of the Cagayan River in 1582. Supported by Pampangan, Tagalog, and Visayan troops, the joint force quickly expelled a settlement of Japanese “pirates” before establishing the first Spanish town in the region at Nueva Segovia. As in Pampanga and elsewhere, in Cagayan the Spanish sought to co-opt native elites by integrating them within the colonial administration, enshrining their position as *principales* atop the local social hierarchy, and entrusting them with the duties of tribute collection. With few resources in arms or personnel, however, the Spanish had little direct means of maintaining order there. In some cases, *principales* arose as local despots while many soon led their communities in rejecting Spanish rule.

In response to these frustrations, in 1591 the Spanish governor in Manila dispatched another major expedition, this one overland and led by his son, Luis, who depended on the instrumental support of two native guides: Dionosio Kapolong and an unnamed woman.

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788 “Carta de Juan Pacheco Maldonado al virrey sobre Maluco, China y Filipinas,” 1582-06-06 Manila, AGI Filipinas, leg. 34, no. 47, fols. 305r-313v.
790 De Jesus, “Control and Compromise in the Cagayan Valley,” 24-27. For a detailed analysis, based on the 1657 account by an audiencia judge, Gómez de Espinosa, entitled, *Discurso Paranético*, of how native *principales* exploited their own commoners, see James S. Cummins and Nicholas P. Cushner, S.J., “Labor in the Colonial Philippines: The *Discurso Paranético* of Gómez de Espinosa,” *Philippine Studies* 22 (1974): 190-191. As the justices of the Manila audiencia reported in July 1589, alongside a range of other rebellions throughout the archipelago, “the Indians of Cagayan have likewise revolted. The uprising has been going on for two years now. They go against the Spaniards in that province killing many of them and their indio allies.” Highlighting the Spaniards’ immense frustration at their inability to establish colonial rule and order, the *audiencia* explained how, “Last year Your Captain general sent an armada with all that is necessary to punish and pacify those indios. [But] the rebels fled to the mountains. Seeing that they got away with the affront and refused to make peace, another armada was sent which was also as ineffective as the first one for the same reason.” Highlighting the fragility of Spanish power throughout the region, the authors noted that, even beyond Cagayan, “there have been many other uprisings of Indios in many parts and provinces, killing many Spaniards and the pacified indios. The rebel Indios are emboldened because they see how few the men are and how difficult it is to impose the punishment because the Royal Treasury is very poor,” see: 13 July 1589, Letter of the Audiencia of Filipinas about the rebellion of the Indios in 1588 in Tondo, Cebu, and Cagayan; and the dispute between the bishop and the Audiencia, in *The Philippines Under Spain*, eds. Benítez Licuanan and Llavadó Mira, vol. 4, 545-546.
791 Its goal was “to discover, pacify and clean” the area along the river of Cagayan all the way from its origin to the city of Segovia. Alongside the relatively modest column of 70 Spanish soldiers marched a native auxiliary force some 1,400 strong. On approaching the town of Tuy, in the mountain pass near the origin of the Cagayan River, the Spanish captain, accompanied by two Augustinian priests there to ensure that any conquests were conducted according to the customs and precepts of Spanish law, “carved a cross in the bark of a tree there,
Although successful in securing pledges of obedience – albeit coerced – from numerous *principales* all along the Cagayan Valley in the short-term, as after earlier attempts, such promises soon proved hollow. After the withdrawal of the expedition, much of the region slid back into a state of open rebellion against Spanish rule. By the late seventeenth century, Spanish-led forces had managed to erect a string of isolated forts along the Cagayan Valley, but exercised little military power in much of the rest of the region. After the early 1620s, in fact, missionaries, who faced a range of challenges and frustrations themselves, represented the sole Spanish presence in much of Cagayan, including in the towns and villages most loyal to Spanish authority. While many natives took up armed opposition against the Spanish, others chose to flee into the mountains, hoping to avoid war or exactions of tribute, where they encountered a range of other groups, including the so-called thereby taking possession of the land and surrounding provinces in the name of the his majesty.” Upon entering Tuy, they reportedly met with some 50 *principales* from the surrounding region, whom, no doubt fearful of the Spaniards' vast force, agreed on behalf of their communities to submit to Spanish rule and to begin an annual tribute payment after one year had elapsed. See: 7 July 1591, Anon. “Relación de la jornada que hizo don Luys Dasmariñas … al descubrimiento de la Nueva Tuy y sus provincias,” in *HPAF*, 447-497; and “Información del descubrimiento y pacificación de Ituy (…y rrio de cagayan),” 15 February 1593, Manila (Probable), AGI Filipinas, leg. 193, no. 1, fols. 2r-2v. See also, Scott, *Barangay*, 263-264. The unnamed native woman was reportedly from Tuy, in the present-day Philippine province of Nueva Vizcaya.

792 In fact, just three years after his 1591 expedition to Tuy, Dasmariñas sent a second expedition farther into the mountains. However, assaulted by more than 1,000 natives, the expedition was forced to turn back, unable to extend Spanish sovereignty any further in the region; see: “Expeditions to the province of Tuy, Juan Manuel de la Vega,” 3 July 1609, Passi, in *The Philippine Islands*, ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 14, 292. Also, for an additional report, likely from 1594, containing a list of the villages throughout the Philippines at least nominally subjected to Spanish rule, see “List of Philippine villages reduced by the Spaniards,” in *The Philippine Islands*, ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 9, 81-86. In the 1620s, the even the supposed Spanish stronghold of Nueva Segovia was vulnerable, desperately undermanned, and surrounded by vast stretches of countryside in open revolt against Spanish authority. According to Alonso Martín Quirante in 1624, “[Various royal officials, and] the president [of the Audiencia, Alvaro de Mesa y Lugo] declared that the infantry stationed in the city of Nueva Segovia are very needy and destitute, as it is many days since any aid has been sent to them from this city; and, as the greater part of that province has revolted, his Majesty does not possess in it any royal revenues with which to be able to sustain the soldiers. [Accordingly, it should be considered] whether it would be advisable that the infantry established in the presidio at the mines be assigned to the province of Nueva Segovia, so that, with greater forces, our purpose to subdue the natives who have revolted there might be attained, since the said mines are in the middle of the path,” see: “Expedition to the mines of the Igorrotes, Alonso Martin Quirante, captain and Sargento-Mayor,” 5 June 1624, Alingayen, in *The Philippine Islands*, ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 20, 302.

793 Mawson, “Philippine Indios in the Service of Empire,” 397.

Negritos [or Negrillos]. These highlands remained beyond the influence of Spanish political and religious rule for virtually the entirety of the Spanish colonial era in the Philippines.

Throughout the Philippines, the highlands were universally represented as uncharted, hostile territory beyond Spanish control. Philippine highlanders were fiercely independent and resistant to Spanish encroachments, used their expert knowledge of the terrain to foil Spanish attempts to subjugate them, and proved a perpetual scourge both to the Spanish and to Spanish-allied indio groups like the Pampangos. With few exceptions, despite numerous attempts to subjugate them, the majority of these peoples remained independent of Spanish authority throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

The Spanish divided the native highlanders of Luzon into three general overarching groups: the Negritos, Zambales, and Igorots. Spaniards used the term, Negrito, to refer to a

795 “Carta a S.M. dando cuenta del estado de las Islas Filipinas,” 1 November 1587, Manila, Audiencia de Manila, in HPAF, 312-319. Page 318 contains a paragraph describing that Indians buried their gold and fled to the mountains to avoid paying tribute: “que an querido dexar sus tierras y poblazones e yrse a los montes, y otros an enterrado las joyuelas de oro que para su uso tenían…” Domingo Fernandez Navarrete, O.P., Tratados historicos, politicos, etnicos, y religiosos de la monarquia de China (Madrid, 1676), 304, 318; and Mawson, “Philippine Indios in the Service of Empire,” 400.

796 In an effort to consolidate control over the valley’s lowland population at the very least, in 1642 Spanish authorities expressly prohibited, “all intercourse, communication or trade with the heathen, apostate, and fugitive Indians, negroes and Zambals, who inhabit the mountains and hills, and are not reduced to the royal obedience, under penalty of 100 lashes and two years’ service in the harbor of Cavite,” see: “Ordinances of Good Government,” 1642, 1696, 1768, in The Philippine Islands, ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 50, 214. But such laws proved ultimately academic and largely ineffectual. Throughout the seventeenth century, lowland and highland indios maintained a vigorous system of exchange profitable to individuals and communities on both sides, including in particular local principales, see: Julian Malumbres, Historia de Isabela (Manila: Santo Tomas, 1918), 70; William Henry Scott, The Discovery of the Igorots: Spanish contacts with the Pagans of Northern Luzon (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1974), 65; and The Philippine Islands, ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 50, 248-249. According to De Jesus, this consisted principally of trade in goods such as salt, cotton, cloth, and metal tools and tobacco for mountain bees-wax and gold.

797 In Luzon and elsewhere, the Spanish drew a sharp distinction between inhabitants of the lowland and highland, whose relations were often defined by mutual enmity and warfare. On the island of Panay, for example, the Miguel Loarca explained that, “There are two kinds of men in this land [Panay] who, though they are all one, behave somewhat differently and are almost always enemies—the one, those who live on the coast, and the other, those who live in the mountains, and if they have some peace between them it is because of the necessity that they have of one another to sustain [themselves], because those of the mountains cannot live without the fish and salt and other […] jars and plates which come form other parts, nor can those on the coast without the rice and cotton which the mountaineers have,” see: Miguel Loarca, Relación, 120.

798 “Petición de informe sobre ataques de indios zambales,” 8 August 1609, Segovia, AGI Filipinas, leg. 329, no. 2, fol. 104v.
range of sub-groups throughout the archipelago, which, in addition to having a dark
complexion, likewise all seemed to have inhabited the mountains. Some early observers
even called them, “black Chichimecos,” in reference to their martial ferocity and the
independent spirit they shared with the Chichimecos of Mexico. Noting the inability to
subdue these highlanders, Ríos Coronel noted in 1605 that, “although many times the
governors send soldiers to punish them, they [the soldiers] are only able to kill a few, because
the [Negritos and Zambales] they run like deer and because they have neither towns nor
houses, nor do they plant, but sustain themselves with wild fruits and hunting.”

In addition to Negritos and Zambales, the mountains of the Cordillera Central – the
imposing range of towering peaks that separated the Cagayan Valley from Ilocos on Luzon’s
western coast – were likewise home to another important group. The Igorots, whose name
translates literally as, “people of the mountains,” were also known for their intractability
against Spanish encroachment. Beyond the desire to Christianize them and stem their

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799 Scott, Barangay, 252-253. Spaniards reported seeing “Negritos” (or “Negrillos”) in Mindanao, Palawan, Calamianes, Pangao, Negros, Panay, Mindoro, Pampanga, Zambales, Pangasinan, and the Cagayan Valley. In Luzon, however, Spaniards referred to Negritos and Zambales of the central mountains almost interchangeably, in one instance describing them collectively as, “an inhuman and savage people,” that “live in the hills naked; they are bandits and desire nothing other than to hunt head [cortar las caveças] in order to suck on their brains.” The Spaniards described headhunting as so central to these peoples’ society, that “no woman wishes to marry [a man] who has not cutoff heads,” and that those that had “cut the most heads” were considered “the most valiant.” See: “Petición de Ríos Coronel sobre defensa de las islas,” July 1605 (Probable), AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 52, fol. 337v.

800 Scott, Barangay, 253-256.

801 “Petición de Ríos Coronel sobre defensa de las islas,” July 1605 (Probable), AGI Filipinas, leg. 27, no. 52, fol. 337v.

802 Given the inaccessibility of Igorot territory, and their successful resistance to Spanish encroachment, the Spanish had little knowledge of political and social organization, relying largely on what little sketchy information about them trickled down to Cagayan or Ilocos through their indigenous allies who, much to Spanish chagrin, continued to trade with the Igorots. Noting that, “is not very easy to ascertain the number of those people, who are scattered, for they are so intractable, and do not let themselves be seen, moving from one place to another on slight pretext, without any hindrance,” Quirante nonetheless suspected their overall number not to be large. “If those called Ygolotes reach one thousand men, that is a great number,” he conjectured. See: “Expedition to the mines of the Igorrolas, Alonso Martin Quirante, captain and Sargento-Mayor,” 5 June 1624, Alingayen, in The Philippine Islands, ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 20, 266. See also, William Henry Scott, “The Word Igorot,” in On the Cordillera: A Look at the Peoples and Cultures of the Mountain Province (Manila: MCS Enterprises, 1969), 155. Similar to the Negritos and Zambales, early Spanish reports described the Igorots as living in small, decentralized political units consisting of around ten households, as beastly headhunters, and as ferocious in battle. In a report on the Spaniards first attempt to subjugate the Igorots in
attacks against Spaniards and Spanish-allied indios, colonial authorities also desperately sought access to their famous gold mines. This goal proved a continuous challenge, however.

At least two major expeditions reached the supposed location of the mines in the seventeenth century, but given the ruggedness of the terrain and the low quality of the ore uncovered, both expeditions soon withdrew in disappointment.

1576, the expedition leader reported that: “I was sent with 40 soldiers and 200 indios to discover the gold mines of the Ygolot province from which it is understood that all of the wealth comes which is known throughout the land, and I do not know by what chance it was that after such great fame and expectations, not even one grain of gold was obtained after discovering more than 200 mines, but only a lot of hardship and spear-thrusts, and the land was most rugged and almost uninhabitable for want of provisions and being 80 leagues from Manila,” see Ceballos (1576). The Igorots, however, long familiar with Spanish tactics of deception, were highly suspicious and avoided contact with Spaniards wherever possible. In a fascinating passage providing a rare glimpse of indigenous perspectives on the Spaniards, the Spanish captain, Alonso Martín Quirante noted that even when Spaniards ventured into Igorot villages accompanied by an interpreter, for example, if unable to physically expel them, “they flee from the Spaniards. Then, if perchance they hear some arguments that are shouted out to them, they laugh, and answer that we are deceiving them, and that they will not trust us; that they know us for people of bad faith.” See: Scott, Barangay, 259. According to the Spanish captain, Alonso Martín Quirante, in 1624, “There are more chiefs than in other nations, for there is one in every ten or twelve houses, who is head of his kinsfolk,” see, “Expedition to the mines of the Igorrotes, Alonso Martin Quirante, captain and Sargento-Mayor,” 5 June 1624, Alingayen, in The Philippine Islands, ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 20, 270. See also: “Expedition to the mines of the Igorrotes, Alonso Martin Quirante, captain and Sargento-Mayor,” 5 June 1624, Alingayen, in The Philippine Islands, ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 20, 276. In another interesting passage, reflecting indigenous critiques of Spanish behavior, the principales of Tuy, when asked if they had enemies, they answered: “Yes, we would have them if we would leave our land to commit depredations. But we are not like you Castilians, who rob everywhere,” see: “Expedition to Tuy [Luis Perez Dasmariñas],” 1 June 1592, Manila, in The Philippine Islands, ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 8, 250-252.

In describing the richness of the province of Pangasinan and Ilocos, for example, the priest Gaspar de San Agustin referred not to the natural resources of those provinces in themselves, but rather to “the commerce which they have with the mountaineer Indians, called Sambales and Igolotes; who possess the richest mines in the whole island,” in Gaspar de San Agustin, Conquistas de las Islas Filipinas, vol. 2 (Madrid, 1698), xv.

Spaniards continuously lamented their inability to subdue the Igorots, and frequently both the natives’ bellicosity and expertise in warfare, as well as the ruggedness of the terrain, of which the Igorots were well capable of turning to their advantage. Describing early resistance his army faced in a 1624 expedition to the territory, the Spanish captain, Alonso Martín Quirante, wrote that, at one point, “all three divisions had halted because the Ygolote Indians had occupied the road; and they were building forts at a narrow passage on it, with a stockade, where, when the said adjutant tried to pass ahead, they wounded him and some of the other Spaniards, and some Indians who accompanied him.” On the general ruggedness of the mountains, Quirante explained that, “wherever one looks from the height, very many mountains are to be seen, so jagged, steep, and near together that it seems impossible for men or any other living thing to exist on them.” And on the impenetrability of Igorot defenses within those ranges, he described how, “their settlements are established on the peaks of the mountains, and on the roughest of them, whence afar off they can see all the paths, so that no one can approach them without being seen by their sentinels, who always guard their posts day and night.” “If there is any danger,” Quirante continued, “they can easily retire without being seen, leaving behind nothing more than their miserable huts; and, not fearing whether any go to seek them, they defend themselves as they may by hurling down huge rocks which they have suitably placed, sharp-pointed reeds, and stones.” See, “Expedition to the mines of the Igorrotes, Alonso Martin Quirante, captain and Sargento-Mayor,” 5 June 1624, Alingayen, in The Philippine Islands, ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 20: 275-276.

Scott, “The Word Igorot,” 157-158. Other contemporaries, including Morga, believed that the Igorots periodically ceased or suppressed their own mining activities so as so avoid being discovered by the covetous...
Spaniards continuously lamented their inability to subjugate the Igorots. In describing the expedition he led to their territory in 1624, the Spanish captain, Alonso Martín Quirante, wrote that, at one point, “all three divisions had halted because the Ygolote Indians had occupied the road; and they were building forts at a narrow passage on it, with a stockade, where, when the said adjutant tried to pass ahead, they wounded him and some of the other Spaniards, and some Indians who accompanied him.” On the terrain, Quirante explained that, “wherever one looks from the height, very many mountains are to be seen, so jagged, steep, and near together that it seems impossible for men or any other living thing to exist on them.” And on the impenetrability of Igorot defenses within those ranges, he described how, “their settlements are established on the peaks of the mountains, and on the roughest of them, whence afar off they can see all the paths, so that no one can approach them without being seen by their sentinels, who always guard their posts day and night.” “If there is any danger,” Quirante continued, “they can easily retire without being seen, leaving behind nothing more than their miserable huts; and, not fearing whether any go to seek them, they defend themselves as they may by hurling down huge rocks which they have suitably placed, sharp-pointed reeds, and stones.”

In 1630, a Spanish priest remarked on their continued intractability, explaining that, “When peaceful they would bring down gold which they extract there from their mines […] but when the Igorots are on the warpath […] then these mountaineers come down to hunt heads, which they take with great pleasure.”

Spaniards; see: Antonio de Morga, Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas (Mexico, 1609), transcribed in The Philippine Islands, ed. Blair and Robertson, vol. 16, 102.
807 Ibid.
808 Ibid.
809 Ibid. 275-276.
810 Medina (1630), 150.
to the area in 1654. This latest expedition was likewise forced to retreat, however, after an outbreak of disease crippled the Spanish-led army before it was able to make any significant progress. In the end, after over half a century and several more attempts to subjugate the region, the Igorots, like many other groups throughout the archipelago, remained effectively independent from Spanish colonial rule.

Conclusions

A variety of factors converged to diffuse Spanish imperial sovereignty in the Philippines. Some were integral to the political and institutional culture of the Spanish monarchy, including in Spain itself, and actually served to buttress the ultimate authority of the king by limiting the sphere of jurisdiction of any one individual, faction, or institution. The competing jurisdictions of the governor, bishop, and high court justices, for instance, brought those figures into frequent conflict with one another. At the local level, the municipal council represented yet another key component in the constellation of colonial authority. While professing loyalty to the crown, each of these officials and the institutions they represented, continuously defended, and often sought to expand, their own exclusive jurisdiction against the pretensions of other colonial officials and institutions. Such conflicts were generally manifest in routine political squabbles over jurisdictional overreach, but also arose on occasion to sophisticated yet acrimonious arguments over the morality and legality of specific colonial policies, or even over the fundamental legitimacy of Castilian sovereignty in the islands.

811 “Carta de Sabiniano Manrique de Lara sobre materias de guerra,” 19 July 1654, Cavite, AGI Filipinas, leg. 285, no. 1, fols. 30r-41v.
Even more significant than internal struggles among Spaniards was the effectiveness of Philippine *indios* and other non-European groups in defining the limits of Spanish colonial rule at the local level. On the one hand, certain communities or individuals, especially native elites, allied with Spain or collaborated in official capacities within the Spanish colonial administration. They did this either to limit the violence and exploitation they might face, enrich themselves and preserve their social status, or to advance their own interests against traditional enemies. On the other hand, many indigenous polities and communities actively opposed the expansion of Spanish rule, often violently, including certain groups that had initially submitted to the Castilian crown, either willfully or at the barrel of a gun.

In any case, despite persistent efforts to extend colonial rule across the archipelago and to subject local populations to the authority of the crown of Castile, by the 1650s, nearly a century into the Spanish colonial project in the Philippines, Spain’s territorial sovereignty in the archipelago had diminished considerably. After reaching a high point in the first two decades of the seventeenth century, Spanish authority began three-decades of decline after the series of uprisings that wracked the Visayas in the 1620s, hastened by a combination of local conflicts both among Spaniards themselves in Luzon as well as between Spaniards and a range of external groups.\(^{812}\) Rebellions in Cagayan even predated these, beginning in 1575 and lasting well through the 1630s, representing one long continuous rejection of Spanish colonialism in that key region. While many Philippine *indios* rose in open revolt, others fled to mountains beyond Spanish control, leaving vast stretches of land, formerly apportioned in

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\(^{812}\) Mawson, “Convicts or Conquistadores?” 121; and Phelan, “Free Versus Compulsory Labor,” 194.
encomienda, depopulated and uncultivated. As Spain’s territorial sovereignty contracted, so too did its population of indio subjects.

Local factors were fundamental in shaping Spanish colonial policy in the Philippines. The commercial draw of Manila, factional disputes among Spaniards, and the threat of European rivals (especially following the separation of Portugal from the Spanish Monarchy in 1640) all combined to limit the crown’s capacity to exercise its effective authority over much of the archipelago. Equally if not more important, as this chapter helps demonstrate, non-European individuals and groups were likewise fundamental in determining the pace and contours of Iberian imperial expansion, including at the height of Spanish and Portuguese power in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.

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813 Domingo Fernández Navarrete, O.P., *Tratados históricos, políticos, éticos, y religiosos de la monarquía de China* (Madrid, 1676), 304, 318. The author was in the Philippines around the year 1650; see also Phelan, “Free Versus Compulsory Labor,” 194.

814 According to Phelan, the total number of Philippine indios under Spanish rule likely never exceeded 600,000 at any point in the seventeenth century. See Phelan, “Free Versus Compulsory Labor,” 195.

815 “Carta de Diego Fajardo sobre distintos puntos,” 15 August 1645, Manila, AGI Filipinas, leg. 22, ramo 1, no. 1, fols. 70r-78r. For integrated analyses of the Iberian empires in East Asia, see various works by Rafael Valladares, including, Valladares, *Castilla y Portugal en Asia*; Valladares “Dominio y Mercado: Sobre la contratación luso-española en Asia en el siglo XVII;” Valladares, “Olivares y Oriente: La Unión de Armas en Asia;” and Valladares, “Soberanías y Conveniencias.”
The acclaimed Hollywood film, *The Mission*, immortalized the struggle for sovereignty over the peoples and territories straddling the contested region of eastern Paraguay and the interior of São Vicente, Brazil’s southernmost captaincy, on the lush upper reaches of the Río de la Plata watershed. Like the film, historiography has focused on the culmination of the conflict in the mid eighteenth century or tended toward a dichotomous narrative of a clash between the Jesuits of Spanish Paraguay and slave raiding colonists from Portuguese Brazil. In this chapter, however, I analyze the origins of that conflict in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the variety of factions involved, and the methods and instruments the Iberian crowns used to extend their influence in the region, often indirectly. Analyzing local municipal council records, royal laws and decrees, chronicles and treatises, and reports from missionaries and imperial officials both in South America and Europe, I reveal the fluid range of interests within the supposedly unified groups of “Spaniards” and “Portuguese.” I demonstrate the central role of numerous Tupi, Guaraní, and mestizo groups in shaping European expansion in the region and defining its limits, especially in the early phase. Finally, I highlight how the Iberian crowns’ effective jurisdiction and authority there remained indirect, circumscribed, and constantly unstable even at the height of Iberian global hegemony during the dynastic union of Portugal and the Spanish Monarchy in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.

In places like São Paulo and Guairá, on the margins of the Iberian empires in southern Brazil and eastern Paraguay, the diffusion of sovereignty was a reality both *de facto*...
and, to a large degree, *de jure*. Physical distance from centers of both metropolitan and colonial power combined with jurisdictional layering to limit the crown’s effective control. The crown was forced to cede wide autonomy to missionaries, colonists, and local officials in the region in its effort to maintain a semblance of sovereignty from afar. Nevertheless, although missionaries and colonists were always protective of their autonomy, they also sought to demonstrate their obedience to the king’s ultimate authority, and, from the 1620s, even came to serve at the vanguard in extending and validating the sovereign claims of their respective empires.

Figure 15
Map of the Río de la Plata Region
The Early Iberian Presence in Paraguay and São Vicente

Prior to the late sixteenth century, Europeans had little knowledge of the vast hinterland separating the coastal enclaves of Portuguese Brazil from Spain’s isolated outposts in Paraguay and the Río de la Plata. As late as 1574, the famous Spanish geographer, Juan López de Velasco, wrote that, “the provinces of the Río de la Plata have a diverse situation.” The Portuguese, in their descriptions, put the provinces […] almost all within their demarcation,” he noted. “But according to the descriptions of Castile, not only the Río de la Plata […], but also a large part of that which the Portuguese have populated is within the demarcation of Castile.” Although it was agreed that the boundary line separating each of the Iberian-claimed hemispheres of imperial jurisdiction cut somewhere through the Río de la Plata watershed, its precise location remained a matter of dispute, as Velasco’s quote makes clear. As a result, the vast region slowly emerged as a center of conflict for sovereignty not only between Iberians and indigenous peoples, but also between the two Iberian empires themselves.

Although there did exist some mostly nomadic groups in the region, the majority of the Amerindian societies the Iberians encountered there organized themselves into semi-permanent villages and engaged in small-scale subsistence agriculture, which they typically supplemented with hunting, gathering, and occasional raiding of rival communities.

816 In the 1520s, Aleixo García, a Portuguese explorer in the service of Spain, became the first European to traverse the hinterland region that today encompasses parts of southern Brazil, Paraguay, and southern Bolivia. Thanks to the instrumental support of his Guaraní guides and guards, García reached the Andean foothills at the eastern limits of the Inca empire. But García’s Guaraní entourage soon rebelled and killed him, before he made it back to the coast.
817 López de Velasco, Geografía y descripción universal de las Indias, 549.
818 Ibid.
819 For excellent studies on the region’s indigenous history, which analyze how indigenous peoples conceived of ways of alliances, space, political structures, cultural forms of resistance, and material culture, see John Monteiro, Negros da terra: Índios e bandeirantes nas origens de São Paulo (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1994);
Despite the prevalence of war, capturing, and sacrificing of prisoners that characterized intra-Amerindian politics in the region, intermarriage was common among the myriad indigenous groups. As a result of this complex social and political fluidity, contemporary European observers showed considerable confusion in reporting on the state of Amerindian politics and even in simply distinguishing the various indigenous groups from one another.

Spaniards encountered a multiplicity of Amerindian societies in the southeastern viceroyalty of Peru, including the Guaraní, Guaycurú, Payaguá, and Charrúa, among many others. Although certain Guaraní groups did occasionally raid Spanish settlements, for the most part Hispano-Guaraní relations were peaceful, and the Guaraní eventually came to constitute the vast majority of Amerindians under Jesuit missionary administration in the region.820 The latter three groups, on the other hand, remained more hostile to Spanish expansion and managed to limit Spaniards’ encroachments into their ancestral lands for much of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

In Brazil, the Portuguese encountered a diversity of Amerindian groups as well, and classified them as belonging to one of three general linguistic categories: Tupi, Tapuia, or Guaraní.821 Adding to this complexity, within the Tupi population, there were two major subgroups: the Tupiniquim, which inhabited the interior plateau around São Paulo, and the Tupinambá, which generally clustered around areas adjacent to the coast and, like the

Maria Regina Celestino Almeida, Os índios na história do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: Editora FGV, 2010); and, although focused on a slightly later period, Guillermo Wilde, Religión y poder en las misiones de guaraníes (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sb, 2009); and Elisa Frühauf Garcia, “As diversas formas de ser índio: Políticas indígenas e políticas indigenistas no extremo sul da América portuguesa” (PhD diss., Universidade Federal Fluminense, 2007).


821 The Tupis were, for the most part, friendlier to the Portuguese and intermarried with them, whereas the Portuguese had more hostile relations with the Tapuia, and portrayed them negatively as more barbarous as a result. See, Monteiro, Negros da terra, 19. Some authors have emphasized the shared origin of the Tupi and Guaraní in central Amazonia, and have described them collectively as Tupi-Guaraní. See Barbara Ganson, The Guaraní under Spanish Rule in the Río de la Plata (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 17.
Tapuias, were less amenable to Portuguese encroachment. Beyond the various Tupi and Tapuia groups, there was also the Carijó, a sub-group of Guaraní, which inhabited the southern reaches of captaincy of São Vicente.822

Compared to the larger, more unified polities of central Mexico and Peru, the Amerindian communities of both the Spanish- and Portuguese-claimed territories in the Río de la Plata were relatively small and decentralized. In describing the Amerindians of the Brazilian coast, in 1576, the Portuguese chronicler, Pero Magalhães de Gândavo, wrote that the native peoples, “have no king among them, nor any other government of justice, but rather a principal [headman] in each village, who is like a captain, whom they obey voluntarily, and not by force.”823 Their villages, he explained, consisted of “seven or eight houses, which are very long […] made only of wood and covered with palm or other similar herbs made from the jungle.”824 Although we know that in certain cases villages would unite, often against a common enemy, for the most part they lacked larger, centralized polities.825

To the extent that both the Portuguese and Spanish were able to maintain an early presence even in coastal Brazil and the immediate environs of Asunción, they depended largely on alliances or integration with local indigenous societies. Indigenous groups were powerful, and the Iberians were simply unable to impose their own legal and political regimes upon them unilaterally. In fact, the early Spanish settlers of Paraguay were utterly dependent on the goodwill and support of local indigenous peoples for their very survival.826

822 Carijós and other Guaraní communities further west in Paraguay became the target of devastating raids by the residents of São Paulo in the early seventeenth century.
823 Pero de Magalhães Gândavo’s, *História da província Santa Cruz* (1576) and *Tratado da terra do Brasil, no qual se contém a informacao das cousas que ha nestas partes feito por P’o de magalhães* (1576 mss.). For the quote, see the 1858 edition, Pero de Magalhães Gândavo, *História da Provincia Santa Cruz* (Lisbon: Academica Real das Ciências, 1858), ch. 10, 43.
824 Ibid. 46.
When desperate Spaniards fled indigenous attacks in Buenos Aires and arrived at what would become the Spanish city of Asunción, the local Guaraní welcomed them, giving them food and other basic supplies. In addition, the Spaniards, at least in the early days, also depended on the Guaraní for protection against the hostile Payaguás, Charrúas, and Gauycurús, and later depended on Guaraní auxiliaries in expanding the reach of Spanish power in the second half of the sixteenth century.

Recent scholarship in the so-called New Conquest History has significantly enhanced our understanding of the fundamental role of Amerindian and mixed-race soldiers in virtually every major “Spanish” and “Portuguese” victory over other indigenous polities throughout the region and beyond in the early colonial period. Consistent with this view, on the Spanish side, Guaraní allies were absolutely crucial not only to Aleixo García’s early expedition in the 1520s, but also to those led by Domingo Martínez de Irala and Álvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca into the Paraguayan hinterland in the 1530s and 1540s. These expeditions included some 200-300 Spanish soldiers, buttressed by another 1,500-2,000 or so Guaranís. The Portuguese in southern Brazil were equally reliant on allied indigenous groups. Alongside the European residents of São Vicente and their mixed-race Luso-Brazilian offspring, Tupi soldiers were absolutely critical to each and every military expedition into thesertão, or backlands. One contemporary Spanish source reported that in

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827 This phenomenon is central to the so-called, “New Conquest History,” discussed in the Introduction. This was true throughout the rest of the American mainland as well. In Mexico, for instance, hundreds of thousands of Tlaxcalans, longtime enemies of the Aztecs, seized the opportunity to ally with the Spanish and were instrumental in the series of battles which led to the fall of Tenochtitlan in 1521. From there, many more thousands of indigenous allies, including but not limited to Tlaxcalans, Cholulans and even defeated Nahua groups from central Mexico joined the Spanish in their expeditions south and east into Yucatán, Guatemala and Honduras, northwest against the Cazcanes and Zacatecas, and later against a diverse confederation of Chichimeca peoples in the region of Bajío, in which Cazcanes fought alongside Spaniards. Likewise, in their various campaigns in South America the Spanish relied on support from Nahuas, Mayas, Nicaraguans of various groups, as well as Cañaris and other local South American societies who had long resented and resisted Inca domination.

his famous attack on the Jesuit missions of Guairá in 1628, António Raposo Tavares, who went on to become one of the fiercest and most infamous entrada leaders in São Paulo’s history, enjoyed the support of 900 Portuguese and mixed-race mameluks alongside another 2,000 Tupis.\textsuperscript{829}

Relations between Iberians and Amerindians were defined not simply by opposition or alliance, but also by exchange and intermixture. In Paraguay, Spaniards began sleeping in Guaraní-style hammocks, cultivating corn and manioc, and consuming those and other indigenous staples, including yerba mate, which soon emerged as a major force for social, cultural, and economic cohesion across the region.\textsuperscript{830} The Guaraní in turn adopted European tools and clothing.\textsuperscript{831} Beyond the simple exchange of goods and customs, immediately upon the arrival of the first Spaniards in Paraguay, local Guaraní peoples entered into relations of real and fictive kinship in order to cement their political alliance.\textsuperscript{832} They did so by offering their daughters in marriage to early Spanish settlers and to the growing population of mixed-race mestizos. Likely lost in cultural translation, the process of becoming kin, from the Guaraní perspective at least, signified their status as relatives of the Spaniards and thereby equals.\textsuperscript{833}

In early colonial São Vicente, Portuguese colonial authorities relied on indigenous, mestizo, and European intermediaries, or “go-betweens,” who had integrated within local indigenous communities.\textsuperscript{834} The Tupiniquim chief, Tibiricá was perhaps the earliest example of this. Tibiricá had offered his daughter in marriage to the early Portuguese settler, João

\textsuperscript{829} Monteiro, \textit{Negros da terra}, 71. The historian Jaime Cortesão argued that a typical bandeira consisted of 5-10 percent “whites,” and 90-95 percent Indians, primarily, Tupi; see, Jaime Cortesão, \textit{Raposo Tavares e a formação territorial do Brasil} (Brasília: Ministério da Educação e Cultura, 1958), 179.
\textsuperscript{830} Juan Carlos Garavaglia, \textit{Mercado interno y economía colonial: Tres siglos de historia de la yerba mate} (Rosario, Argentina: Prohistoria, 1983); and Ganson, \textit{The Guaraní under Spanish Rule in the Río de la Plata}, 29.
\textsuperscript{831} Ganson, \textit{The Guaraní under Spanish Rule in the Río de la Plata}, 29.
\textsuperscript{832} Susnik, “Contact, Servitude, and Resistance.”
\textsuperscript{833} Susnik, “Contact, Servitude, and Resistance.”
\textsuperscript{834} Metcalf, \textit{Go-betweens and the Colonization of Brazil}. 
Ramalho, who became his successor. As a result of large-scale intermarriage – often polygamous – between Iberian men and indigenous women, within the short space of three to four decades, the vast majority of early colonial society in both São Paulo and Asunción was mestizo. In some cases, contemporary authors referred to these individuals explicitly as “mestizos,” or as “children of Portuguese” or “children of Spaniards.” In general, however, as in the Zambezi Valley, the lion’s share of persons referred to as “Spaniards” or “Portuguese” were not in fact individuals of full European extraction, but were mixed-race peoples who retained many of the social and cultural conventions of their Amerindian relatives and ancestors.

Relations with local Amerindians were integral to virtually every aspect of the early European presence in São Paulo. The lack of European women meant that, from the colony’s inception, the Paulistas (residents of São Paulo) intermarried with local Amerindian women, giving rise to a predominantly mixed-race population. In fact, Spaniards increasingly referred to the Paulistas as *mamelucos*, alluding to the Mamelukes of Egypt, in denigrating reference to their mixed-race and skin tone, as well as to their alleged religious infidelity.

Even Gândavo, a Portuguese, wrote in his 1576 manuscript, *Tratado da terra do Brasil*, that,

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835 Monteiro, *Negros da terra*; and Metcalf, *Go-betweens and the Colonization of Brazil*.
838 On the *mamelucos* specifically and their significance in the history of early colonial Brazil, see Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, *Caminhos e fronteiras* (São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1994).
“the majority [of the residents of São Paulo] are *mamelucos*, children of Portuguese men and of Indian mothers of the land.” In 1585, the Jesuit P. Cardim counted some 120 Portuguese (referring to both European and mixed-race individuals) alongside many indigenous slaves (*com muita escravaria da terra*). The population became even further mixed in subsequent decades. As another observer noted in 1610, “the residents are the majority *mamelucos*, and rarely Portuguese. There is only one [Portuguese] woman, called Maria Castanha [Castanho].” “These [people] are in a terrible condition,” the observer continued, “and go about […] barefoot [with] bows and arrows, which are their ordinary weapons.”

Mestizos dominated colonial society in Paraguay as well. If in 1545 there were some 500-600 mestizos in Asunción, by 1575 there were several thousand. By that same year, one contemporary reported to the king that there were less than 300 Spaniards in the entire province of Paraguay. This imbalance only increased with the passage of time and provoked a series of conflicts between colonists and civil authorities recently arrived from the Iberian Peninsula. Like the inhabitants of São Vicente, the mestizo residents of Asunción were also the targets of scorn for their perceived impurity of lineage. Given that, in keeping with local indigenous traditions, the residents of Asunción, like their counterparts in São Paulo, often kept multiple indigenous women as wives or concubines, the city soon became infamous throughout the rest of the viceroyalty as, “Mohamed’s Paradise.” Although an exaggeration, in 1545, less than a decade after the city’s founding, the priest Francisco

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839 Gândavo, *Tratado da terra do Brasil* (1576 mss.), fol. 17r.
844 Ibid. 9-10.
González Paniagua reported to the king that some Spaniards in Asunción had up to seventy women, “most having fifteen, twenty, thirty, and forty,” while even the poor had five or six.\(^845\)

Even more so than in much of the rest of Spanish America, the tension that developed between peninsular-born Spaniards (\textit{peninsulares}) and the colonial settler population with longstanding roots in the local community was defined increasingly along such lines. The majority of colonists had married indigenous or mestizo women and had mixed-race children who were then incorporated into the local colonial population and the \textit{República de españoles}. From a relatively early date, king Charles V recognized the rights of mestizos to formal authority in Paraguay by possessing grants over Amerindian labor. Mestizos likewise held official positions in the local civil and ecclesiastical administration, and although in the early years they competed with \textit{peninsulares} for these positions, by the mid-seventeenth century mestizos dominated local colonial politics in both Paraguay and São Vicente.

\textbf{Incorporating Territories and Subjects}

Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Iberian presence in the region consisted of islands of European and mestizo settlement surrounded by seas of indigenous land. Amerindian headmen remained \textit{de facto} sovereigns over the lion’s share of territory there. However, highlighting the gap between theory and practice, between ambition and effective rule, the Iberian crowns nonetheless claimed sovereignty over the

\(^{845}\) Ibid. 16.
entirety of America, citing the authority they derived from the *Inter cætera* bulls of donation and the Treaty of Tordesillas in the late fifteenth century.

Interestingly, tensions between Portugal and the Spanish Monarchy for imperium in South America peaked during the latter part of the period of Iberian union, when the two polities shared a common monarch, these tensions emerging most clearly beginning in the 1620s. According to the terms agreed upon at the *Cortes de Tomar*, which cemented that union, although the Portuguese were afforded certain privileges to travel and trade in Spain’s imperial possessions, the two empires, like their peninsular realms, were in theory to remain separate and governed by their own respective laws and institutions. The reality, however, was more complex. Although this continued to be true throughout most of the first four decades of union, by the second quarter of the seventeenth century, a range of conflicts and pressures in both the colonial and metropolitan contexts converged to degrade that separation, in turn provoking further tensions on both sides of the Iberian peninsular and imperial divide.

Spanish American legal codes were relatively uniform regarding the incorporation of territories and subjects in the New World. The Castilian crown and its colonial agents claimed exclusive rights to the discovery and conquest of all American territory west of the ill-defined line agreed upon at Tordesillas in 1494. According to some Spaniards, the Castilian crown’s claim extended east all the way to Cananéia, at the southern boundary of the Portuguese captaincy of São Vicente and cut north from there through the continent’s interior. In theory, although by no means in fact, the jurisdiction of the viceroyalty of Peru

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846 Bouza, *Portugal en la Monarquía Hispánica*.
847 Enrique de Gandía, *Las misiones jesuiticas y los bandeirantes paulistas* (Bernabé: Editorial “La Facultad,” 1936), which located Cananéia, in the present-day State of São Paulo, as the southern original of the “ray of division
ran all the way from Panama to Patagonia, encompassing nearly the whole of Spanish South America. By the early seventeenth century, the viceroyalty had been divided into six administrative sub-jurisdictions each home to a high court, or audiencia, subject to the direct authority of king and his Council of Indies in Spain. The high court at Charcas held jurisdiction over the crown province of Paraguay (sometimes referred to alternatively as Guairá) and the Río de la Plata. In 1617, in an effort to ameliorate the challenge of governing such a vast territory, the crown divided the crown province of Paraguay in two, the northern part of which maintained its name (Paraguay), with Asunción as its administrative center, while the southern part was renamed the Río de la Plata and was centered at Buenos Aires.

Adding to this complexity, there also existed the Jesuit mission province of Paraguay, which, although overlapping with the crown province by that name, was distinct from it. The territorial reach of the Jesuit province encompassed all of present-day Paraguay, Uruguay, and Argentina, plus parts of Bolivia and Brazil. In 1609, the Jesuits created the mission sub-province of Guairá, which formed part of the larger Jesuit province of Paraguay. The crown of Castile always claimed ultimate territorial sovereignty over the missions, but the missions themselves and the territories in which they were clustered, enjoyed substantial jurisdictional autonomy from local civil authorities in Asunción and

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848 The sole exception was coastal Venezuela.
849 In the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the crown established six audiencias in the viceroyalty of Peru, which were located in Lima (1544), Santa Fé de Bogotá (1549), La Plata de los Charcas (1559), Quito (1563), Panamá (1567), and Santiago de Chile (1609).
850 Boxer, Salvador de Sá and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola, 70.
851 Boxer, Salvador de Sá and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola, 70.
852 In theory, the Jesuit province of Guairá was bounded by the Paranapanema River to the north, the Iguazú River to the south, the Paraná to the west, and the Atlantic coast to the east. See, Boxer, Salvador de Sá and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola, 25, citing Ramon I. Cardozo, La Antigua provincial de Guayrá y la Villa Rica del Espíritu Santo (Buenos Aires, 1938). The Portuguese likewise claimed sovereignty over much of this territory, leading to a major conflict in the late 1620s.
Buenos Aires. The Jesuits fiercely defended their autonomy and strove, to the extent possible, to restrict colonists’ contact with the Guaraní converts in order to shield the Indians from exploitation and ensure their own access to Amerindian labor in the missions. As a result, they were frequently at odds with the local settler community and its representatives in the municipal council of Asunción. This tension persisted throughout the Jesuits’ presence in South America, and pitted them not only against the local colonists of the Spanish viceroyalty of Peru, but also against the Luso-Brazilian colonists of São Vicente.

Exacerbating this tension with civil authorities was the fact that the Jesuits maintained a simultaneous allegiance to two separate sovereigns. On the one hand, they obeyed the king of Spain and his official representatives in America, which provided a large part of their funding and licensed their very presence in the New World through the Patronato Real. At the same time, the Jesuits also looked to the pope – and the central Curia in Rome – as the prime arbiter in spiritual matters, in governing appointments and assignments within the order, and in mandating strategies of organization, expansion, and catechismal instruction.853

Although São Vicente represented the southern and western limit of Portugal’s effective occupation in the sixteenth century South America, Portuguese claims to territorial jurisdiction on the continent were far greater. Like the Spanish, the Portuguese also claimed broad swathes of land the vast majority of which remained under indigenous control and much of which was subject to competing claims by the crown of Castile. The lack of accurate geographic knowledge of the continent’s interior is reflected in the fact that,

853 Despite the Jesuits’ autonomy from civil authority and their maintenance of a dual allegiance to king and pope, the fact that they were under direct crown control through the Patronato Real belies the characterization common in the historiography that the Jesuits functioned as a separate “state within a state” in Paraguay and the Río de la Plata. For one such characterization of the Paraguayan Jesuits as representing a state within a state, see Cortesão, Raposo Tavares e a formação territorial do Brasil, 201-202; and Boxer, Salvador de Sá and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola, 71 and 143.
throughout the first century and a half since the arrival of Pedro Álvares Cabral to the Brazilian coast in 1500, most Portuguese believed Brazil to be bound by natural frontiers. Although eventually proven to be myth, until the mid seventeenth century, the Portuguese Jesuits that educated many early colonial elites argued that Brazil was an island. Its territorial limits, they claimed, were the Amazon River in the north and the Río de la Plata in the south, both of which flowed from a common source, a lake in the center of the continent, called the Dourada, Eupana, or Paraupaba, located well into the continent’s hinterland to the west. In fact, despite their opposition to the activities of Portuguese slave-raiders in the region, many Portuguese Jesuit proponents of the Ilha Brasil theory, including António de Araújo and Simão de Vasconcelos, claimed that the Spanish Jesuit mission territory of Guairá [as well as those of Tape and Itatin] actually fell within the territorial dominium of the crown of Portugal, not Castile. Araújo wrote from São Paulo that, “all of this State of Brazil is closed with two limits, as with two keys, one of which is named the Río da Prata, and the other, Amazonas.”

The legal and political aspects of territorial jurisdiction in Portuguese Brazil were equally complex as those in the Spanish viceroyalty of Peru. In an effort to colonize and defend Brazil at minimal cost to the crown, the Portuguese king initially divided the territory into fifteen “donatory captaincies,” each headed by a lord proprietor with wide seigniorial dominium and jurisdiction. São Vicente, Brazil’s southernmost captaincy, was one of only

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854 Boxer, Salvador de Sá and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola, 14, citing the map of Brazil by João Teixeira Albernas, dated 1667 and reproduced in História da expansão portuguesa no mundo, vol. 3, 137; see also Cortesão, Raposa Tavares e a formação territorial do Brasil, 56.
855 Quoted in Cortesão, Raposa Tavares e a formação territorial do Brasil, 157.
two that had relative economic success and as a result was allowed to maintain its
jurisdictional autonomy when king John III converted the rest into royal captaincies under
the direct authority of the crown in 1549. As such, the Portuguese residents of the hinterland
town of São Paulo, for instance, in the captaincy of São Vicente, were subject to two
separate authorities: the king of Portugal and their lord proprietor, Martim Afonso de Sousa,
and his descendants. 858 Like local Spanish civil authorities in the Jesuit mission province of
Guairá, beyond the presence of itinerant representatives and visitadores, neither Lisbon nor
Bahia had any substantial direct institutional presence in the town of São Paulo until arrival
of Francisco de Souza in 1599, then-governor-general of Brazil, and even then, his stay was
only temporary.

In both Iberian empires, the extension of European rule came slowly, advanced
through the establishment of towns as nuclei of Iberian imperial jurisdiction and civilization
within vast territories the majority of which remained under indigenous control. Fleeing the
raids of indigenous peoples on the nascent outpost at Buenos Aires, in 1537 the Spanish
settlers founded Asunción, on the Paraguay River just above its confluence with the
Pilcomayo. In the following decades, Asunción arose as the base of Spanish forays into
adjacent areas, and soon became the seat of the Spanish governorship of Paraguay. 859 It was
from Asunción that Spaniards radiated outward, establishing smaller satellite towns at
Ciudad Real (1557), Santa Cruz de la Sierra (1561), Villa Rica (1570), Santa Fe (1573),
Corrientes (1588), and Buenos Aires (which they re-founded in 1580). 860

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If by the mid-sixteenth century the Spanish presence in the Río de la Plata region was restricted to a discontinuous series of isolated enclave towns along that river’s various tributaries, the Portuguese footprint was even more circumscribed. In 1574, the Spanish geographer, Juan López de Velasco, explained that, “the entire population of Christians in [Brazil] is … along the coast, the interior of which is not populated, because the Indians do not consent to it.” Over a half-century later, in 1627, the Portuguese Franciscan friar, Vicente de Salvador, echoed López de Velasco’s description of the colony’s maritime orientation. In his, *História do Brasil*, Salvador wrote that he could not even discuss the “sertão” [the hinterland], because it remained beyond the reach and knowledge of Europeans. “The Portuguese,” he explained, “being great conquerors of territories, do not take advantage of them, but content themselves with scurrying along the coast like crabs.”

Although in the late sixteenth century the Portuguese footprint in South America was significantly smaller than that of Spain, towns were equally fundamental to Portuguese colonization. Martim Afonso de Sousa founded the town of São Vicente on the southern coast in 1532. When the crown formalized his grant as lord proprietor of that captaincy two years later, Sousa’s jurisdiction also came to include several towns and settlements occupied by indigenous Tupis and the mestiço offspring of João Ramalho, a Portuguese explorer who had shipwrecked off the coast in 1513 and settled in amongst the local Guaianases, a Tupi subgroup. Within three decades the Portuguese had founded several more settlements along the coast including Itanhaém, Iguape, Cananéia, and Santos, the last of which was just a league and a half from São Vicente and became the seat of the

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861 López de Velasco, *Geografía y descripción universal de las Indias*, 566.
captaincy’s government. In addition, the town of São Paulo, which the Jesuits founded as a mission outpost in 1554, soon became home to a growing number of European and mestiço settlers as well. Throughout the first century and half of the Portuguese presence in Brazil, São Paulo, twelve leagues inland from the coast, was the only major exception to the colony’s otherwise maritime profile. In expanding the reach of Spanish and Portuguese authority, provincial officials or local municipal councils granted the lands around those towns to prominent colonists, many of which had participated in the initial conquest of the territory or had ties to the local elite. However, since land was abundant throughout the early colonial period, for individual colonists, control over Amerindian labor was arguably even more important than control over the soil itself since, as they saw it, land had little value if they lacked the land to exploit it.

In Spanish America, early colonial authorities introduced the *encomienda* as a means to address that problem, while prohibiting Amerindian slavery. Rather than land grants, *encomiendas* were grants of subjugated indigenous groups, which the crown, through its local colonial authorities, bestowed to individual settler-grantees, called *encomenderos*. Encomenderos

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866 *Actas da Câmara da Cidade de São Paulo* (São Paulo: Publicação da Divisão do Arquivo Histórico; Divisão do Arquivo Histórico do Departamento de Cultura) for those years are full of references to such local land grants.

were permitted to extract tribute from the Amerindians entrusted to them, usually in the form of seasonal labor, and in return incurred the obligation to instruct them in the Catholic faith and Spanish civilization, and to defend them and the territory within their jurisdiction. As a result of missionaries’ outcry against abusive encomenderos, in 1542 the Spanish crown abolished the institution, as it had slavery several decades prior. Nevertheless, the encomienda persisted into the seventeenth century in remote regions, like Paraguay, where the crown had less capacity to enforce its decrees. 868 Local municipal officials were hardly in favor of enforcing the royal prohibition since many were encomenderos themselves. 869

Luso-Brazilian colonists were equally interested in exploiting Amerindian labor. Colonial officials never formally introduced encomienda in Brazil, however, in part because indigenous slavery remained legal there until well into the second half of the sixteenth century. And even as the crown began restricting the Amerindian slavery, it maintained several legal loopholes, which Luso-Brazilian slavers exploited to perpetuate the institution. Although Brazil’s first missionaries were initially ambivalent about Amerindian slavery, by the late 1560s they increasingly opposed it, and succeeded in lobbying the crown to issue its first prohibition of the practice in 1570, which declared the general liberty of the “gentios,” as they called them, and appealed “to the consciences of those people who capture them.” 870

868 “Encomiendas de indios del Paraguay. Medidas tomadas para reprimir abusos cumpliendo lo ordenado en Reales Cédulas de 2 de octubre de 1605 y 27 de mayo de 1606,” Archivo General de la Nación-Argentina (AGNA hereafter), sala 9, doc. 23. 869 According to Barbara Ganson, in 1556, for instance, some 20,000 Carijó-Guarani were divided among 320 Spaniards in encomienda. Ganson, The Guaraní under Spanish Rule in the Río de la Plata, 26. 870 Georg Thomas, Política indigenista dos portugueses no Brasil, 1500-1640 (São Paulo: Ediçoes Loyola, 1982), 221-222. Regarding the early Jesuits’ ambivalence toward the institution, in 1559, for instance, P. Manuel da Nóbrega described the condition of servitude as an advance for Amerindians toward “gentility.” Drawing on the Spanish American examples of “Peru and the Antilles,” Nóbrega claimed that Amerindians should be “subjected and placed under the yoke of obedience to Christians,” since, “being tamed,” it was easier to firmly “inscribe” within them “the faith of Christ,” see: “Do P. Manoel da Nóbrega a D. João III Rei de Portugal,” 14 September 1551, Olinda, Pernambuco, in Monumenta Brasiliae, ed. Serafim Leite, vol. 1 (Rome: Monumenta Historica Societatis Jesu, 1956), 291; and “Do P. Manoel da Nóbrega a Tomé de Sousa Antigo Governador do Brasil,” 5 July 1559, Bahia, in Monumenta Brasiliae, vol. 3, 72. Frustrated at early efforts to subjugate the Tupiniquim of São Vicente, four years earlier, P. José de Anchieta, Nóbrega’s co-founder of the Jesuit order in
The law contained two key exceptions, however. The first allowed the enslavement of Amerindians “taken in just war, […] with my license and authority, or that of my governor.”\textsuperscript{871} It also permitted the enslavement of groups known for cannibalism, those which “customarily assaulted the Portuguese and other gentios in order to eat them,” including the Aymures, in particular.\textsuperscript{872}

Concerned by the ubiquity and abuses of the Amerindian slavery, the Portuguese crown issued a series of subsequent laws and decrees that reinforced the basic sentiment of the first, but added specific provisions. A second law, for instance, issued in 1587, included several regulations on settler activity and authority.\textsuperscript{873} It specified that colonists, no matter their status or influence, were prohibited from entering the sertão to make war on indigenous groups without express license from the governor.\textsuperscript{874} It also stipulated that two or three Jesuits must accompany each expedition since, “because of the good faith they have among the Indians, [they] can persuade [Amerindians] more easily to come and serve my vassals on their mills and plantations without force or deceit.”\textsuperscript{875} Importantly, the law placed the Amerindians under the direct administration of the colonists, not the Jesuits, although it decreed that the governor, a royal magistrate, and the local Jesuits must collectively oversee the distribution of indigenous captives among colonists to ensure that the process was

\textsuperscript{871} Thomas, \textit{Política indigenista dos portugueses no Brasil}, 221-222.
\textsuperscript{872} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{873} Metcalfe, \textit{Go-betweens and the Colonization of Brazil}, 191-192.
\textsuperscript{874} “Lei que SM passou sobre os Indios do Brasil que nao podem ser captivos e declara o que o podem ser,” in Thomas, \textit{Política indigenista dos portugueses no Brasil} (1982): 222-224.
\textsuperscript{875} Ibid.
conducted licitly.\textsuperscript{876} Finally, the 1587 law legalized the practice of \textit{resgate}, the buying of slaves from Amerindian groups known for cannibalism in order to save them from that practice.\textsuperscript{877}

A series of royal laws and decrees followed in the late sixteenth and first half of the seventeenth century, all of which upheld the dictates of previous ones, but added specific clarifications.\textsuperscript{878} For instance, the 1596 version first prioritized the role of “the religious,” mostly the Jesuits, in “reducing” and administering indigenous communities, and decreed that Amerindians should be paid for their work.\textsuperscript{879} Philip III issued a further series of laws and decrees in 1609, 1611, 1621, and 1628, which continued to reaffirm the general liberty of Amerindians, except those taken in “just” or defensive war.

Despite the series of laws and decrees restricting the practice, and despite the shift to African slavery across much of coastal Brazil in the late sixteenth century, Amerindian slavery continued to flourish in the hinterland region around São Paulo, in particular. This was due in large part to the fact that it was prohibitively expensive to import African slaves there given the arduous uphill trek required to reach the town from the ports on the coast.\textsuperscript{880}

\textsuperscript{876} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{877} Monteiro, \textit{Negros da terra}, 33. \textit{Resgate} remained difficult since many Indians continued their ritual sacrifice and even cannibalism.
\textsuperscript{878} The 1621 iteration, for instance, referred back to the original 1570 law of “the Lord King Sebastian, my cousin,” in which “God had informed us of the illicit ways in Brasil that gentiles were captured and of the great inconveniences that resulted from this,” in Registo Geral da Câmara da Cidade de São Paulo (RGCCSP), vol. 1, 1621 (São Paulo: Typographia Piratininga, 1917-1919), 326-335.
At the same time, São Paulo’s prime position at the entrance to the continental plateau, on the river Anhembi (now called the Tietê), also gave it unique access to the myriad Amerindian societies of the interior, in particular, the Guaraní, their relatives, the Carijó, and several Tupi groups as well, which had fled from the coast as the Portuguese encroached.

Local royal and municipal officials frequently awarded land grants on the outskirts of town to extend the towns’ own jurisdiction as well as to serve as a buffer between European and mestiço settlements and the mass of unconquered hinterland inhabited by hostile Amerindian groups. In November of 1587, São Paulo’s municipal council recommended that the Tupi and Carijó [Guaraní] peoples be brought down, or “descended,” from the sertão and either “distributed among the residents of the towns of this captaincy,” or settled into “an aldeia on the outskirts of this town, which needs it, since it is on the frontier of [the territory of] gentio Guanonimis and many other [hostile] Hybiribabaca nations.” In fact, according to the council members, it was precisely “because they [the Hybiribabaca nations] were so daring and risen up,” that the Tupi and Guaraní had begun coming voluntarily and taking refuge in the environs of São Paulo. By the early seventeenth century, Carijó were reportedly arriving voluntarily as well.

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883 3 April 1609, ACSP, vol. 2, 239.
Unlike in Spanish America, Portuguese law did not formally establish a separate, legally defined “Republic of Indians” as distinct from the “Republic of Portuguese,” comprised of the European, African, and mixed-race population. However, the formalization of indigenous aldeias (or aldeiamentos) did nonetheless reflect certain similarities to the system in Spanish America, in aiming to ensure the jurisdictional autonomy of indigenous peoples from European settlers. Like their Spanish American counterparts, rather than incorporating indigenous peoples within European settlements, royal officials in Brazil sought to settle Amerindian groups into separate towns, and expressly prohibited Portuguese and mestizo colonists from residing within the limits of those lands or cultivating them. As a result, although there existed no similar, official use of the system of two republics, there did exist parallel, non-overlapping exclusive jurisdictions, one of which encompassed indigenous aldeiamentos and the other the European and mestizo settlements.

In addition to lay settlers, local authorities often awarded land grants to mendicant orders as well, which established missions there housing local Amerindians. Beyond serving as buffers, local officials argued that many of those Amerindians came to the aldeiamentos voluntarily, seeking peace and protection. As such, colonial officials saw aldeiamentos (or missiones or reducciones in the Spanish case) as an expedient means of bringing Amerindians within the general orbit of Iberian influence and political administration. They directly served

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885 By the late sixteenth century, the average aldeia contained a multiplicity of indigenous ethnicities, due in part to the forces of disease, which meant that aldeias experienced an almost continuous process of de- and re-population. This also resulted from the fact that the Jesuits sought conscientiously to erase social distinctions among indigenous groups in order to homogenize them. See: Monteiro, Negros da terra, 47. On one occasion, São Paulo’s municipal council recommended separating “the Christian Indians,” meaning the Tupi, from the Carijós, since they were historical enemies and “used to warring.” See, 15 August 1611, ACSP, vol. 2, 293-295. For an introductory work on the history of the formation of the aldeiamentos around São Paulo, see Pasquale Petrone, Aldeamentos paulistas (São Paulo: Edusp, 1995).

886 8 July 1604, RGCCSP, vol. 1, 357-359.

the interests of both the crown and local Iberian colonists since they enhanced towns’
security, provided them a pool of subdued, concentrated labor, and also, in theory if not in
fact, served to “conserve” the local Amerindian population by providing for their spiritual
and material wellbeing. The king himself, for instance, instructed his first governor-general
of Brazil, Tomé de Sousa, to gather the Amerindians “near the settlements in the said
captaincies so that they may come into contact with Christians and not with heathens.”

In order to facilitate the process of conversion in their aldeiamentos or reducciones, the
Jesuits on both sides of the imperial divide maintained certain aspects of Amerindian social
organization, including the maintenance of indigenous headmen, which the Jesuits mobilized
as intermediaries in extending their own authority over indigenous commoners. One of
the Jesuits’ main strategies was to focus on converting headmen first in order to ease and
expedite the conversion of the rest of the community. Lamenting the lack of large
centralized polities, the priest, Pedro Correia, noted in 1551 that although “they have no
King, in each Aldeia there was a Headman.” Describing the situation in São Paulo, another
Jesuit reported in 1583 that, “they live in aldeias, under our administration, communally,” and
that in those aldeias they continued to live “in very large houses with a headman of their
nation whom they obey,” as they had prior to the Europeans’ arrival. Beyond converting
headmen, the Jesuits also placed particular emphasis on converting the youth, on learning

888 In reality, however, it could be argued that gathering Amerindians into aldeias had the opposite effect since
their proximity to European settlements made them more vulnerable to the outbreak of disease, which
frequently ravaged aldeia populations.
889 Boxer, Salvador de Sá and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola, 124.
890 By the second quarter of the seventeenth century the Jesuits represented the major missionary presence in
Guairá, but the Franciscans had also had a substantial number of reducciones, particularly in central Paraguay and
the immediate environs of Asunción. These included the Franciscan reducciones of Altos, Atrá, Caázapá,
Guarambaré, Itá, Tobati, Yaguaron, Yuti, Ytapé, Ypame, Perico, Jejuy, and Itati, all of which, according Barbara
Ganson, The Guaraní under Spanish Rule in the Río de la Plata, were founded between 1580 and 1615. All the
Guaraní inhabitants of these reducciones were subject to encomienda, Ganson, The Guaraní under Spanish Rule in the
Río de la Plata.
1, 231.
892 Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro [IHGB], Ar. 1.2.31, CU, fol. 207r-228r.
indigenous languages, and, to the extent possible, on eradicating shamans and other manifestations of traditional spiritual beliefs and practices.\textsuperscript{893}

The Jesuits, it is worth noting, were not the first or only forces shaping the development of the vast hinterland region between São Paulo and Asunción. The area was not simply an empty space or \textit{tabula rasa}, which the Jesuits (and Paulistas for that matter) entered and transformed according to will and design. The Castilian towns mentioned earlier, for instance, were already there, and established close commercial ties with the Jesuits missions, especially through the \textit{yerba mate} trade. Myriad indigenous groups also continued to shape the region’s development throughout the period in question, not simply those that settled within the missions themselves, but also those existed on the missions’ fringes, at times in conflict with European and mestizo settlements and at other times in coexistence.

Nevertheless, the Jesuits did represent a significant force for change, and their arrival contributed to a series fundamental shifts in the region’s social, political, and economic organization. As a result, the presence of Jesuit mission towns soon became a major focus of contention. While they offered the benefits mentioned above, the Jesuits’ efforts to protect Amerindians from settler abuse brought them increasingly into direct conflict with local settlers. The main reason was that, in their power as administrators of the Amerindians within their missions, the Jesuits controlled the distribution (\textit{repartimiento} in Spanish and \textit{repartimento} in Portuguese) of Amerindians for temporary – in theory paid – labor on settlers’ estates. As Amerindian populations began dropping precipitously from the combined force of disease and settler abuse, the Jesuits restricted their \textit{repartimentos}. In addition, by the early seventeenth century, the Jesuits began establishing missions farther from centers of colonial settlement in order to minimize their converts’ contact with exploitative colonists. The

\textsuperscript{893} Monteiro, \textit{Negros da terra}, 47.
process drove an increasingly sharp wedge between Jesuits, settlers, and their Amerindian allies in both Spanish and Portuguese America. That conflict eventually developed into the central dynamic of historical change defining political, legal, and military developments in the region throughout the first half of the seventeenth century.

Native Sovereignty and the Persistence of Amerindian Power

Despite the gradual expansion of Iberian power, Guaraní, Guaycurú, Tupi, Tapuía, and a range of other Amerindian groups maintained their effective sovereignty over the vast majority of the region throughout much of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Although the indigenous peoples in the environs of São Paulo and Asunción soon became the targets of slave raids and were subjected to widespread oppression and various forms of coerced labor, including slavery, in many interactions with Europeans, Amerindians held the balance of power. They frequently repelled European encroachments into their territory, entered into willful alliances with them to exploit divisions among Europeans to their benefit or to advance their own interests against those of Amerindian rivals, and even developed real and fictive kinship bonds in order to cement those alliances and integrate Europeans within indigenous lineages of social and political organization. Far from passive subjects of Iberian domination, Amerindian groups across the region played an active, central role in shaping the political, social, and economic development of the region throughout the colonial period.

Amerindians asserted their power almost immediately upon the arrival of Europeans in their territory, and continued to do so throughout the early colonial era. In response to slave raids on their communities by the early settlers of São Paulo, neighboring Tupi and Tapuía groups launched frequent assaults on the town throughout the first three decades
since its foundation, frequently threatening the town’s very existence. The first Spanish settlement at Buenos Aires faced similar assaults and reprisals, and as a result was abandoned soon after its original settlement, only to be re-founded four decades later. As contemporary reports attest, the Amerindian threat to the Spanish settlement of Buenos Aires remained substantial even well into the mid seventeenth century. In 1613, Francisco de Quiñones, the procurador [attorney general] of Asunción, lamented Spaniards’ inability to subjugate the Payaguás and Guaycurús, who persisted in raiding and robbing local haciendas and neighboring “towns of royal patrimony,” ensuring “that others are not repopulated, to the great detriment of the health and haciendas of the Spaniards, who are continually in alarm for their own defense as well as that of the Indians” under Spanish protection. In the midst of a major Amerindian revolt in 1630-31, the governor of Paraguay, Luis de Céspedes y Xería, condemned the Payaguás and Guaycurús as “indomitable rebels who deny His Majesty’s sovereignty and defy his Royal Justice, inflicting widespread damage and robbery, murdering Spaniards and domesticated Indians.” In 1643, over a century after the foundation of Spanish Paraguay, the Jesuit provincial, Antonio Ruiz de Montoya, described the Payaguás in particular as “cruel enemies of the Spaniards, on whom they inflict atrocious deaths.” “They terrorized that whole region,” Montoya continued, “without it being possible to subdue them by force of arms.”

894 Municipal council records point to numerous such indigenous assaults and uprisings, see ACSP, 1:332, 1:388-390, 1:393-394, 1:417-418, 1:423-424, 1:446-447. Even the Tupiniquim, allies of the early Paulista residents in the area, rebelled against the Portuguese and their mameluco kin from 1590 to 1595. See ACSP, 1:404.

895 In 1610, the Governor of the Rio de la Plata penned two reports on punitive expeditions carried out to punish the Indians who had risen up in the environs of Buenos Aires. See, Pablo Pastells, ed., Historia de la Compañía de Jesús en la provincia del Paraguay (Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Perú, Bolivia y Brasil) según los documentos originales del Archivo General de Indias, vol. 1 (Madrid: V. Suárez, 1912), 177, 179.

896 Quoted in Boxer, Salvador de Sá and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola, 90.


898 Boxer, Salvador de Sá and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola, 91, citing Montoya’s, Memorial, of 1643.

899 Boxer, Salvador de Sá and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola, 91, citing Montoya’s, Memorial, of 1643.
Although many of the Amerindians that Spaniards and Portuguese referred to as “friendly” or “allies” were actually either slaves or otherwise dependents of Iberian colonists, many indigenous Amerindian groups entered into voluntary alliances with Europeans or joined their expeditions to the interior. The Guarambarenses, a Guaraní sub-group in the province of Paraguay, saw the advantage of allying with Spaniards in order to raid the territory of their ancestral enemies (the Payaguás and Guaycurús), which they did on several occasions. Likewise, the Tupiniquim peoples in southern Brazil, allied quickly with the Portuguese and mestizo residents of São Paulo to advance their own intra-indigenous political interests. Together, Tupiniquim-Portuguese forces launched slave-raids and assaults on their rivals, the Tupinambás, on the Carijós (a Guaraní sub-group in São Vicente), and eventually on the Guaranís of Paraguay, as they moved farther west in the early seventeenth century. For their part, the Tupinambás deftly exploited inter-European rivalries by allying with the French in the War of the Tamoios to harass Portuguese settlements along the southern coast. Although the Tupiniquim-Portuguese allies eventually prevailed with the arrival of the new governor-general of Brazil, Mem de Sá, with reinforcements in 1567, the conflict seriously threatened Portugal’s early foothold on the southern Brazilian coast.

The frequency with which many Europeans integrated within native society provides further evidence to Amerindians’ influence in defining local social and political realities, especially in the early period of Iberian settlement. João Ramalho was a prime case in point.

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900 Moraes, Bases da formação territorial do Brasil, 321.
902 The French posed an early and significant threat to Portuguese colonies in Brazil. In 1548, for instance, Luiz de Góes wrote to the king from the coastal town of Santos, warning him of the threat and requesting assistance from Lisbon for the fortification of the coast. See IHGB, Arq. 1.3.10, 12 May 1548, Santos, CU, fols. 263r-264v. The king responded the following year by installing the first governor-general of Brazil, Tomé de Sousa, to remain in the colony, with overarching power for its defense and administration.
Although Portuguese by birth, Ramalho fully embraced many Tupiniquim social and cultural conventions. Manuel da Nóbrega, a Jesuit leader in early colonial Brazil, scorned Ramalho for this. In every aspect of his life, Nóbrega asserted, Ramalho “follows that of the Indians. […] He and his children have many women. […] His children go to war with the Indians […] and go about nude like the Indians themselves.” Ramalho was not the only Portuguese to practice polygamy in early colonial Brazil, and the practice, notwithstanding the denunciations it provoked from Jesuits and other religious, nonetheless served to enhance an individual’s power and prestige among the local indigenous population. Wives were symbols of power; having several not only served therefore to root an individual within the local Amerindian community, but also, according to Tupi custom, to expanded one’s political power through an extended network of kinship. Another early Jesuit, Pedro Correia, wrote that, “recently a mammelucu was asked who were the female Indians and slaves you brought with you. She replied that they were the women of her husband, who she always brought with her, and [she] looked upon them as an abbess with her nuns.”

At the same time, however, despite the ubiquity of intermarriage and miscegenation between Amerindians and Iberians, and despite the relations of alliance Spaniards and Portuguese developed with particular Amerindian groups, as Iberian and mestiço influence in the region slowly expanded, so too did the exploitation of Amerindian populations, both by newly arrived settlers from Europe as well as by the early generations of mestiços. Despite maintaining many of their indigenous customs and traditions, many mestiços nonetheless identified as European and became increasingly alienated from the local Amerindian population. In Paraguay, for instance, rapacious Spanish colonists [many of

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them mestizos] openly flouted royal laws and decrees prohibiting Amerindian slavery. Ulrich Schmidl, a German explorer who had come to Paraguay on Mendoza’s early expedition to the Río de la Plata, reported that on one such expedition, the Spaniards captured “nearly 12,000 persons, […] men, women, and children, who must become our slaves.”

As a result of the growing tendency of Spaniards and mestizos to regard the Guaraní less as kin and more as servants and to treat them with disdain, Asunción experienced its first indigenous uprising. In 1539, during the first governorship of Domingo Martínez de Irala, the city’s Guaraní residents rose up violently against abuse they suffered at the hands of local Spaniards. Asunción, the ostensible stronghold of Spanish power in Paraguay, in fact remained under sustained existential threat throughout much of the sixteenth century. Tensions re-erupted less than a decade later, in 1546. In that case, Irala and the Spaniards of Asunción made a temporary pact with their long-time enemies, the Guaycurús and Yaperus, to quell the second Guaraní uprising. But settler abuse persisted and, as a result, in 1559-1560, a third, even more widespread Guaraní revolt exploded, putting Spaniards on high alert across the entirety of the Province of Paraguay.

Contemporary records indicate that even six years on the city of Asunción remained in a state of “continuous war […] with the indios naturales of that locale [comarca]” and was forced to plead to the viceroy for assistance in its rescue.

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908 Rui Díaz de Guzmán, Historia argentina del descubrimiento, población y conquista del Río de la Plata, ed. Pedro de Angelis, ch.8 (Buenos Aires: Imprenta del Estado, 1835 [1612]).
909 “Pleitos de la Audiencia de la Plata: Probable 1606/1608,” AGI Escribanía, leg. 846C: [1606] “Juan Alonso de Vera y Zárate, adelantado de las provincias del Río de La Plata, y sus hijos, Francisco y Juan Alonso de Vera y Zárate, con el fiscal sobre las conquistas del Río de La Plata, Paraguay y Tucumán y ocho ciudades que fundaron en dichas provincias el general Juan Ortiz de Zárate y Juan de Torres Vera; asimismo sobre el cumplimiento de ciertas capitulaciones que Juan Ortiz de Zárate firmó con S. M. en 1571.”
A similar dynamic unfolded in São Vicente. Despite the early collaboration and integration between certain early settlers, like Ramalho, and Amerindian groups like the Tupiniquim, there was also substantial opposition among neighboring Tupi groups to the growth of São Paulo already by the early 1560s. In particular, the increasing Portuguese and Tupiniquim-allied raids on several indigenous groups in search of slaves led to numerous punitive attacks against the town threatening its very existence. In the early years, the Portuguese were far from the hegemonic force in the region, but rather became yet another among a variety of groups vying for hegemony and survival in the complex world of sixteenth century São Vicente. The forces of Amerindian politics were fundamental in shaping the fluid expansions and recessions of Iberian power in the region throughout the sixteenth century.

The increase in Portuguese-Tupiniquim-allied raids from São Paulo on neighboring Amerindian communities in search of slaves led to numerous punitive attacks of retribution against the town threatening its very existence. The first occurred in July of 1562, when a group of headmen from supposedly converted Amerindian communities coordinated a large-scale raid on São Paulo that threatened the settlement with the same fate as that suffered by Buenos Aires less than three decades prior. Tibiriçá and Ramalho were both decisive in the defense of the town, and in the wake of the attack the residents completed its fortification with walls and bastions encircling the town.\textsuperscript{910}

Tensions hardly subsided after this early flare-up in violence, however. As São Paulo’s population grew so too did its appetite for indigenous slaves to serve in the domestic and agricultural labor force. Amerindian punitive assaults on the town continued throughout the 1570s and 1580s. Tensions eventually came to a head in the early 1590s when an alliance

\textsuperscript{910} Vilardaga, \textit{São Paulo no Império dos Felipes}, 96-97.
of Guaianá and formerly-allied Tupiniquim groups initiated a systematic campaign of attacks on São Paulo. In April of 1590 the town's municipal council reported that, “each day come news from Christian Indians, our friends, who say that Indians of the *sertão* [backlands] are already marching toward us, and […] that their intent is to cut off the road to the sea so that people” and reinforcements would not be able to reach the town from the coast.

The early warnings were correct. Three months later, the council reported that “the *gentio* of the *sertão*” had come “against us in war.” “All of the *aldeias* of the *sertão* of the captaincy came together,” attacked a slaving expedition led by Antonio de Macedo and Domingos Luis Grou and killed all of its members, including fifty “white” men and an unmentioned number of “male and female slaves, Christians Indians,” and destroyed “many *fazendas* of both whites and Indians, burning Churches and destroying the image of Our Lady of the Rosary of Pinheiros.”

The council members also sought to notify royal authorities throughout Brazil, warning that such unrest could spread. Indicative of the Amerindians’ power, and the fear they instilled among Portuguese settlers, the councilors warned that such attacks “could expand and spread,” as these “enemies,” who were “barbarous people and experienced in war” had “gathered more people” and would no doubt “advance their assaults.” “Once finished with this captaincy,” the councilors, noting the Amerindians’ capacity in playing Europeans against each other, warned that they “would go on to Rio de Janeiro, offering peace and commerce to the captains and priests of the English.” Warning of the “much damage that could result to this captaincy, which was at risk of depopulating,” the council petitioned the *procurador*, Jerónimo Maciel, to authorize what they framed as a

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punitive war against the Amerindians for the crimes they committed “for which they deserve grave punishment.”

The following year, in February of 1591, the council members forwarded an exasperated demand to the captain of São Vicente to come to their aid “against the Indians who threatened the town.” And in the following entry, the council, appealing in vain to colonial authorities, warned the captain and council officials and São Vicente and Santos that “if your graces do not help us, God our Lord, His Majesty, and Lopo de Souza [the lord proprietor and donatory-captain of São Vicente] will take notice.” In addition, in July of that same year, the council members appealed yet again to Jerónimo Leitão to come to their assistance in war, citing the latest attacks by Indians of Pirapintingui that “had killed, taken some slaves, and waged pitched war against us.”

Jesuits at the Vanguard of Spanish Expansion

Given the remoteness of the Río de la Plata from the main centers of colonial authority in Brazil and Spanish America, local actors enjoyed wide autonomy in virtually every aspect of colonial life and administration. At the same time, however, the fact that the crown had such a limited direct presence in the region meant that, for the most part, the responsibility of expansion and defense fell to missionaries and settlers themselves. Although the Portuguese Jesuits of São Vicente played an important role in extending European influence into hinterland west of São Paulo, local Luso-Brazilian colonists were far more

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915 7 July 1590, ACSP, 1:403-405.
916 18 February 1591, ACSP, 1:417-418.
917 7 July 1591, ACSP, 1:423-424.
918 Despite the relative directness by which a ship could reach Buenos Aires from Seville, Spain’s impulse to control trade and migration within its empire meant that goods and people could only reach the Río de la Plata legally by way of a single official route from Seville to Panama, then on to Callao, and eventually by mule over the Andes and down to Asunción to Buenos Aires.
fundamental to that process. For the most part, the Portuguese Jesuits’ influence was restricted to the main centers of Portuguese settlement and their immediate environs. In Paraguay, however, the situation was the reverse. While Spanish and mestizo colonists did make occasional forays into the hinterland to the east of Asunción, establishing a handful of settlements there, the Jesuits emerged as the primary agents in extending Spanish influence in the region.\footnote{Herzog, Frontiers of Possession, 74. Also, for a report of a Jesuit attempt to find the route from the Río de la Plata to Brazil in 1585-1587, see Anais do Museu Paulista (AMP) (São Paulo: Museu Paulista, 1922-): 1:2:139.}

From the earliest days of royal government in Iberian America, the Spanish and Portuguese monarchs made clear the priority of evangelization. The “principal reason that moved me to order the settlement of Brazil,” claimed king João III in his instructions the first governor-general of Brazil, “was so that the people of that land would be converted to our holy Catholic faith.”\footnote{“Regimento de Tome de Sousa,” 17 December 1548, in HCJB, vol. 1, 347.} In order to facilitate this process, the Iberian crowns encouraged missionary orders to dispatch priests to America for the combined purpose of evangelizing among the Amerindian population and attending to the spiritual needs of local settler communities. But relations between Jesuits and settlers were by no means uniformly smooth. The central issues of contention between the two groups in both the Spanish and Portuguese realms were the settlers’ alleged lack of adherence to Christian norms and customs and their maltreatment of Amerindians. In his first letter from Brazil in 1549, the priest, Manuel da Nóbrega reported that, “the people here all live in mortal sin, and there is not one man who desists from having many Indian women, all of whom have many children.”\footnote{“Do P. Manuel da Nóbrega ao P. Simão Rodrigues, Lisboa,” 10? April 1549, Bahia, in Monumenta Brasiliæ, vol. 1, 110.}
Slavery and other slightly less exploitative forms of coerced labor, like *encomienda*, were deeply ingrained in the early colonial societies and economies of Paraguay and São Vicente. Certainly, slavery existed among the Amerindian population prior to European arrival. As settlers arrived in greater numbers, however, and as the mining and plantation industries took root, Amerindian slavery expanded on an unprecedented scale. As the residents of São Paulo frequently attested in particular, Amerindian slavery had been integral to their economy and way of life from the very beginning of that colony. The early Jesuits noted this too, although in great lamentation. “Nearly all the men who inhabit the coastal areas, particularly in this captaincy, possess slaves,” wrote Nóbrega in 1553. But, he noted, because of the pitched resistance of local settler-slaveholders, “we can do nothing for them, nor do we dare preach to them. This means that through lack of justice, they remain captives, and their masters remain in mortal sin.” Nóbrega noted that he had brought the issue to the governor-general, but asserted that the latter had refused to act because he believed Amerindian slavery was “in the interest of the king and for the greater good of the territory and its settlers.” Without the consistent support of local or central colonial civil authorities the Jesuits of Brazil were largely hamstrung, and failed to achieve the level of success and influence as their counterparts in Paraguay.

As in São Vicente, the violent tension that gripped Paraguay had arisen primarily as a result of the harsh exploitation of Amerindian communities, particularly the Guaraní, by Spanish and mestizo settlers. Unlike the governors of São Vicente, however, all of whom largely supported Amerindian slavery, Paraguay’s series of governors had differing opinions.

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923 Ibid.
924 Ibid. In addition, Nóbrega noted that several of the governor’s advisers held indigenous slaves and that, as a result, he was hesitant “because of the harm it could cause to many men [slaveholders], and that it is better for them [the Indians] to remain slaves and work on estates.”
Some governors, like Irala, for instance, sided with local settlers, and facilitated the expansion of 
*encomienda* under their respective regimes. While others, like Álvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca, Hernando Arias de Saavedra (Hernandarias), and Diego Martín de Negrón, provoked the ire of local settlers for relatively tolerant views of indigenous communities and efforts to protect them.

In the remote region of Paraguay and the Río de la Plata, provincial governors and local municipal officials, enjoyed wide autonomy from viceregal authority in Upper Peru. For instance, although the Council of Indies in Seville had supreme power to appoint governors, the municipal council of Asunción had the authority to appoint governors in interim periods – after one died, had been deposed, or vacated office for other reasons – before his replacement arrived or was confirmed by the crown. In this way, local elites, the majority of whom were mestizo *encomenderos*, held dominant sway over political life in Asunción. Given the relatively low priority of Paraguay as compared to the many other, more economically and strategically valuable possessions in the Americas, the settlers of Asunción operated with relatively little oversight from higher crown authorities. One result of this limited oversight was that Amerindian slavery and *encomienda* persisted in the region despite the repeated royal prohibitions of both.

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926 To a large degree, Irala’s power derived from his support among the local settler elite, which supported him in usurping Cabeza de Vaca of his governorship in 1544 after only two years in office. Beyond supporting the expansion of *encomienda*, in that same decade, Irala even permitted *ranchoadas*, the term used to describe the systematic raiding and enslavement of Guaraní in surrounding areas. See: Susnik, “Contact, Servitude, and Resistance,” 26.
929 Ibid.
In direct response to the exploitation of Paraguayan settlers, the Jesuits began increasing their sphere of influence with the combined goal of spreading the gospel and protecting the Guaranís from encomenderos and hostile Amerindians like the Guaycurús and Payaguás. The first such Jesuit evangelization around the immediate environs of Asunción came in 1575. Roughly two decades later, in the mid 1590s, Jesuit evangelization in the region expanded further thanks to the support of the newly appointed governor, Hernandarias. The support Hernandarias lent the Jesuits, in accordance with the directives he received from the king himself, was crucial since the local Paraguayan colonists had so strongly opposed their efforts, jealous as they were of the Jesuits’ wealth, access to indigenous labor, and the exemptions they and their Amerindian charges enjoyed from local taxes and encomienda.

Keen to curb the rapid decline of Paraguay’s indigenous population, a combined result of disease and the harsh treatment at the hands of rapacious encomenderos, in 1609 the crown formally and systematically began facilitating Jesuit evangelization. Philip III himself advocated for the “sword of the word” as the best means of subjugating indigenous Paraguayans, rather than military conquest. Philip enjoined Hernandarias not only to promote Jesuit evangelization as means of subjecting the Guaraní to Spanish colonial rule, but also to

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934 For evidence of encomendero abuse in early seventeenth century Paraguay and the official efforts to curb them, see, “Encomiendas de indios del Paraguay. Medidas tomadas para reprimir abusos cumpliendo lo ordenado en Reales Cédulas de 2 de octubre de 1605 y 27 de mayo de 1606,” Archivo General de la Nación-Argentina (AGNA), sala 9, doc. 23.
but also to ensure that no new *encomiendas* were to be awarded throughout the entirety of Paraguay.\textsuperscript{936} The following year, the newly arrived governor, Negrón, echoed the king’s sentiments, arguing for Jesuit evangelization as the most effective, not to mention humane, way of bringing Indians “to the service of his Majesty,” describing the Jesuits as “perfect soldiers for this war.”\textsuperscript{937} Even if the Amerindians in Jesuit missions enjoyed exemptions from certain taxes and labor obligations, their gathering by the Jesuits into *reducciones* served both the Spanish and Portuguese crowns’ interests in instructing those Amerindians in Iberian social, cultural, and political norms, and, eventually, in substantiating each crown’s claim to dominium in that territory thanks to its effective occupation by Jesuit proxy in the name of the crown.\textsuperscript{938}

In establishing the Jesuit province of Guairá in 1609, the crown, through its local representatives in Asunción, explicitly forbade Paraguayan colonists from venturing there without royal permission.\textsuperscript{939} That year, the captain Antonio de Añasco wrote to his fellow captain, Pedro García, relaying the orders to prevent *malocas* (*entradas*) from entering the areas of Parapane and Atibajiba [in Guairá] and to prohibit their access to any of the rivers that go through them.\textsuperscript{940} The prohibition was aimed precisely at preventing the slave-raiding settlers from disturbing the work of the Jesuits in their evangelization of the region’s indigenous Guaraní. According to one priest in the region, “the Indians loved the law of God, but not the Spaniards.”\textsuperscript{941} Among the most important aspects facilitating the large scale conversion and retention of Amerindians within Jesuit *reducciones* were the many parallels and continuities between Guaraní and Jesuit forms of social organization. Such parallels could

\textsuperscript{936} Caraman, *The Lost Paradise*, 34.
\textsuperscript{937} Pastells, ed. *Historia de la Compañía de Jesús en la provincia del Paraguay*, vol. 1, 177-178.
\textsuperscript{938} Herzog, *Frontiers of Possession*, 74.
\textsuperscript{939} *AMP*, 1:2:147.
\textsuperscript{940} *AMP*, 1:2:147.
\textsuperscript{941} Quoted in Caraman, *The Lost Paradise*, 34.
be seen in the Jesuits’ commitment to communal living, in the lack of private property, and in the systems of collective, ceremonio nal labor that was common both to Jesuit and pre-contact Amerindian settlements.\textsuperscript{942} Equally important was the fact that, even after their integration within a given reducción, the Guaraní maintained their traditional internal organization of governance through a cacique, or headman.\textsuperscript{943}

After the crown’s formal recognition of the Jesuit province of Guairá in 1609, Jesuit missions expanded dramatically across much of the hinterland region east of Asunción, in the direction of Portuguese São Vicente. The first such settlements in the region were established by two Italian priests, Simón Maceta and José Cataldino. Beyond these Italians and some Spaniards, Flemish priests were also important to the development of Guairá’s missions.\textsuperscript{944} In the province of Guairá, Amerindians were gathered into the Jesuit-run reducciones but came under the direct jurisdiction of the crown, rather than any encomendero or civil authority in the missions’ vicinity. A royal decree of 1631 affirmed this status, further alienating colonists and reinforcing Jesuit autonomy from provincial authorities in Asunción.\textsuperscript{945} The 1620s saw the most frenzied, and successful, Jesuit activity, with the establishment of some thirty new reductions in the region in that decade alone.\textsuperscript{946} If the combined total number of Amerindians in Jesuit missions stood at some 30,000-40,000 in the late 1620s, by the late 1640s that number had reached as many as 100,000 by one estimate, this despite the numerous devastating attacks from the colonists of São Paulo that

\textsuperscript{942} Reff, “The Mission Frontier in Comparative Perspective,” 27-29.
\textsuperscript{943} Reff, “The Mission Frontier in Comparative Perspective,” 28-29; and Lía Quarleri, Rebelión y guerra en las fronteras del Plata: Guaraníes, jesuitas e imperios coloniales (Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2009), 86.
\textsuperscript{944} Caraman, The Last Paradise, 56.
\textsuperscript{945} Quarleri, Rebelión y guerra en las fronteras del Plata, 86.
\textsuperscript{946} Ibid.
had massacred, enslaved, or put to flight many thousands of Amerindians, particularly in the late 1620s and early 1630s.  

Even from an early date, however, Jesuit expansion provoked intense repudiation from settler communities in both Paraguay and São Vicente. Settlers slandered one of Guairá’s leading priests, Torres, as a “turbulent and restless spirit.” Tensions arose to such an extent that, in the 1610s, on the heels of the crown’s formal endorsement of the Jesuit evangelization, angry colonists in Asunción forced the priests to temporarily abandon the town’s college, forcing them to take refuge in the hinterland of Guairá, at a safe distance from the colonists’ reach. The Spanish settlers of Asunción, wrote Torres, “despise us because we reprimand their abominable greed and defend the liberty of the Indians.” Yet despite the fierce challenge posed by the settlers of Asunción, however, by the late 1620s, the province of Guairá represented the densest mission territory in all of America.

“Corsairs of the Sertão”: Paulista *entradas* and the Expansion of Brazil

Originally founded as a Jesuit outpost for the conversion of local Amerindians, it is no small irony that São Paulo soon became a hotbed of anti-Jesuit sentiment and colonial Brazil’s major center of indigenous slavery. The Amerindian uprisings of the 1580s and 1590s, threatening as they were to the still-fledgling settlement of São Paulo, ultimately provoked a series of efforts on the part of its residents to increase their own security and

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947 For these various estimates, see Moraes, *Bases da formação territorial do Brasil*, 353-354; see also Caraman, *The Lost Paradise*, 46.
948 Caraman, *The Lost Paradise*, 34.
952 Noting the secure location of the Jesuit College of São Paulo of Piratininga, atop a hill, in 1560 the governor-general of Brazil, Mem de Sá, ordered the relocation of the inhabitants of Santo André da Borda do Campo (Ramalho’s village) to the Jesuits’ site at São Paulo.
pivot from a defensive to an offensive posture as they steadily extended control over the surrounding lands and peoples.\footnote{Vilardaga, \textit{São Paulo no Império dos Felipes}, 130-138.} One early strategy, begun in earnest in 1592, whilst the town was still described as “at war,” was to apportion land grants to settlers increasingly deep into the hinterland to expand the town’s jurisdiction and extend its defense.\footnote{1592, RGCCSP, 1:36-37.} In addition, the residents of São Paulo began organizing armed expeditions, which, although framed as defensive to provide legal cover, were, in reality, aimed at enslaving Amerindians and impressing Paulista power throughout the western interior.\footnote{Although most of these expeditions either included or were exclusively focused on the violent capture and enslavement of Amerindians, several other motivations impelled them as well; see, Vilardaga, \textit{São Paulo no Império dos Felipes}, 174. Some were framed as punitive expeditions against particular Amerindian groups for the raiding of a settler’s estate or for attacks on the Portuguese-allied Tupiniquim, for instance. Others had as their primary objective the discovery and extraction of precious metals. Several were commercial caravans seeking trade with the Spaniards and mestizos of Paraguay and Guairá. Finally, several were targeted attacks on Jesuit mission towns, particularly during the second quarter of the seventeenth century. And as contemporary documents attest, in the early years, enslaved and allied Amerindian guides were crucial to the success of the early \textit{entradas}. In one example, the governor of Buenos Aires [or of the Río de la Plata] explained that the success of “Portuguese” invasions of Guairá depended on the collaboration of Guarani \textit{caciques}, who “served them as guides on these \textit{entradas},” see, “Governador Diego Negron ao Rei,” in AMP, 1:2:156-157. Amerindians had the best knowledge of the territory, the rivers, and the narrowest, easiest stretches of terrain over which to carry canoes between waterways; see, Cortesão, \textit{Raposo Tavares e a formação territorial do Brasil}, 178. For another study on the early expansion of São Paulo in this period, see, Sérgio Buarque de Holanda, “Expansão Paulista em fins do século XVI e princípio do século XVII,” \textit{Publicações do Instituto de Administração} 29 (June 1948): 3-23.} By second quarter the seventeenth century, the mestiço residents of São Paulo had emerged as the primary force on the interior plateau.\footnote{The threat of hostile indigenous groups on the town took several decades to fully subside, however. In 1608 and 1612, the Kayapó peoples occupied a large territory to the northwest of São Paulo, and defeated two separate Portuguese expeditions to the interior before withdrawing deep into the hinterland, see, Monteiro, \textit{Negros da terra}, 64. In 1635, São Paulo’s municipal council passed another ordinance limiting this privilege to whites by expressly forbidding Indians and blacks [\textit{negros do gentio o do guinea}] from bringing “bows into this town or its surroundings since [with those bows and arrows] they cause much harm to each other and they kill many cattle,” (24 November 1635, ACSP, 4:271). As a result of the general violence of the region, in May of 1613 the municipal council passed an ordinance permitting “whites and blacks […] to come and go with the weapons in order to protect themselves beyond the town’s limits.” The council members noted that they saw such a measure as necessary, “because of the threat of Indian uprisings against whites, which has occurred all along the coast” (16 February 1613, RGCCSP, 2:329-330). When the town of Santos requested gunpowder in November of 1624, the municipal council of São Paulo refused, noting that, “in this town there is not more than four arrobas, which is necessary for the firearms,” claiming that “there are in this land many Indians [\textit{gentio da terra}] that go around spreading this news,” and that “the \textit{gentio} might rise up against us, who have no more defense than the [few] firearms,” 2 November 1624, ACSP, 3:137. Three weeks later, the council officials warned that, “the \textit{gentio} are rising up,” and that the gunpowder supply was down to three arrobas, “which is not enough for the forts to defend themselves,” 21 November 1624, ACSP, 3:142.}
Despite its isolation and early vulnerability to Indian attack, the town began attracting large numbers of settlers, especially after the turn of the seventeenth century. Located as it was in a donatory-captaincy, with all of the jurisdictional privileges that entailed, one of São Paulo’s primary draws was its exemption from most royal taxation.957 As a result, a multinational range of settlers began flocking to the town, despite official prohibitions, including in particular Castilians and Flemings, as well as at least some Frenchmen and Englishmen.958 The lack of censuses, plus the fact that the names of many immigrants were Lusophonized in contemporary municipal documents, makes it impossible to ascertain with precision the number of foreigners resident in the town at any given time. Nevertheless, the litany of references to foreigners in the contemporary documentary record suggests that their presence was indeed substantial.959

While the captaincy’s coastal settlements languished, São Paulo flourished as its center of growth, largely on the backs of Amerindian slaves. By the turn of the seventeenth century, the coastal towns of São Vicente and Santos had only 80 residents each, while

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957 Theodoro and Ruiz, “São Paulo, de Vila a Cidade,” 102. For a 1636 text, which asserted that settlers preferred São Paulo to other Portuguese settlements in Brazil since there they could avoid paying taxes, see the Informação, by Manuel Juan de Morales. Morales argued in particular that, for the most part, the independent-minded Paulistas chose indigenous slaving over mining since that way they would not have to pay the quinto tax to the crown.

958 For a partial list of the names of some Castilians and Flemings; see, Vilardaga, São Paulo no Império dosFelipes, 188. One Castilian had apparently even risen to become an alcalde in São Paulo. Subsequently, in order to ensure block foreigners from positions of power in the local community, in 1638 the municipal council called for adherence to “the laws of his majesty which mandated that no person that was not a natural of the kingdom of Portugal become an official of justice,” 5 June 1638, ACSP, 4:391.

959 Many of these references, in particular those from Spaniards, came in the form of insults, noting the infidelity of the residents given alleged presence of many Jews or crypto-Jews, and Protestants from northwest Europe. Municipal authorities did not always look so kindly on the presence of outsiders, however. In 1635, the council record stated that, “in this town there were many foreign loafers [vadios forasteros] who prejudiced this town and its people,” and noted demanded that if within four days these individuals had not opened a shop and made themselves productive, they would be expelled and fined 6,000 reis, see, 20 October 1635, ACSP, 4:267. The council likewise made clear that foreigners were prohibited from holding local office. The position of almotaçel, to name but one example, was reserved for the founding “brothers, fathers, and grandfathers of the republic, and lacking them it can be those who are married to the daughters and granddaughters of them so long as they are not of the Moorish race, or Jewish, and infamous in any other way,” see, 24 September 1633, ACSP, 4:180-182. The almotaçel was the official responsible for regulating weights, measures, and the price and distribution of foodstuffs.
Itanhaém had less than 50.\textsuperscript{960} The population of São Paulo, on the other hand, grew from around 170 in 1589 to 534 in 1610, an increase of over three hundred percent in just two decades.\textsuperscript{961} According to another estimate, by 1640 the number had grown to around 1500, meaning that in a half century São Paulo’s population had grown by nearly ten times.\textsuperscript{962}

As São Paulo’s population grew, so too did its number of factions and the complexity of its internal politics. As a result, the king and his central colonial officials took a series of incremental steps to enhance royal authority in the town, which saw varying degrees of success. In 1585, the secretary of the town’s municipal council noted that there existed no formal compilation of local laws and ordinances, “except for one old book,” whose pages were “unbound and missing.”\textsuperscript{963} This loose bundle of documents represented the basis on which the town’s judges and magistrates were expected to rule, and it was not until that year, over three decades since the town’s foundation, that the full collection of ordinances was read aloud in their entirety before the municipal council in order to apprise its members of their contents.\textsuperscript{964}

In an attempt to enhance the force of royal law and decree in São Paulo, in 1609 the king dispatched the former governor-general of Brazil, Francisco de Souza, to the town as “superintendent of the mines” and “governor” of the newly created, “Repartição do Sul,” an administrative unit largely independent of viceregal authority in Bahia, and comprised of the southern captaincies of Espírito Santo, Rio de Janeiro, and São Vicente.\textsuperscript{965} Keen to the realities of local politics, Souza understood well the resistance of certain factions within São

\textsuperscript{960} Theodoro and Ruiz, “São Paulo, de Vila a Cidade,” 98.
\textsuperscript{961} Vilardaga, São Paulo no Império dos Felipes, 168-169.
\textsuperscript{962} Theodoro and Ruiz, “São Paulo, de Vila a Cidade,” 98.
\textsuperscript{963} 14 September 1585, AC SP, 1:282-283.
\textsuperscript{964} 14 September 1585, AC SP, 1:282-283.
\textsuperscript{965} For a description of the powers the king invested in Souza during his tenure as governor-general, see, “Carta da governança,” IHGB, Arq. 1.2.15.
Paulo to the encroachment of royal power on local authority and jurisdiction, and showed an impressive capacity for negotiation, alliance building, and adaptation.

Despite strong local protest, Souza was firm in maintaining crown-appointed *juízes dos indios* in Amerindian *aldeiamentos*. In addition, he facilitated the official establishment of new towns beyond São Paulo, including São Felipe, Mogi das Cruzes, and Parnaíba. While serving to accommodate the growing numbers of settlers to the region and expand Portuguese occupation of the interior plateau, the scheme also had the effect of diffusing Paulista power since each new town enjoyed its own territorial jurisdiction, independent from that of São Paulo. The granting of lands, of Amerindian labor, of knighthood and other prestigious titles, and the various fiscal, administrative, political positions he created helped Souza govern effectively, cultivated loyalty, and minimized opposition by integrating local interests with those of the *forasteiros* [ie. “outsiders” or “foreigners,” several of whom were Castilian or Flemish] that had arrived in his retinue.

Throughout the first five decades of São Paulo’s early colonial history, the formal royal institutional presence in the town was limited to a small handful of crown-appointed officials, including representatives of the king’s treasury and administrators of the estates of missing and deceased persons. In addition, the king or his governor-general in Bahia also appointed a captain and superintendent of the mines, although (with the exception of Souza) this official tended to be itinerant and only resided in São Paulo on a temporary basis. Beyond these officials, the rest of the local political administration was comprised of the

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966 For an example of an appeal from São Paulo’s municipal council to transfer the administration of Amerindians from crown-appointed *juízes dos indios* to locally-elected *juízes ordinarios*, see, 16 January 1600, *ACSP*, 2:70.

967 Parnaíba (today referred to as Santana de Parnaíba) was on the site where the mixed-race granddaughter of Tibiriçá, Susanna Dias had founded an estate several decades prior, in 1580, together with her son, the captain André Fernandes; Vilardaga, *São Paulo no Império dos Felipes*, 172. See also, Alida Metcalf, *Family and Frontier in Colonial Brazil: Santana de Parnaíba, 1580-1822* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1992).

968 For a protest from the municipal council of Sao Paulo that Parnaiba had usurped its territorial jurisdiction, see, 18 August 1640, *ACSP*, 5:51-54.
juizes ordinarios and members of the municipal council, all of which were locally elected. Arriving in the midst of a heavy influx of settlers to São Paulo, Souza oversaw a major expansion of the local administrative bureaucracy to accommodate the town’s growing population and better channel its wealth toward the royal treasury. In his capacity as the highest crown representative in São Paulo, Souza creating a number of new offices – mamposteiro de cativos, avaliador, partidor, medidor, avaliador da fazenda, juiz dos orfãos, repartidor de terras, procurador e escrivão do campo, capitão da gente de cavalo, escrivão da ouvidoria, alferes etc. – which helped deepen the connection between the local settler community and Portugal’s colonial administration in Bahia and Lisbon. Moreover, the creation of these positions helped augment Souza’s own power in the town since most of the holders of these offices owed him personally for their appointment.

At the same time, however, despite Souza’s successes in introducing a degree of royal authority in São Paulo, the town, like many others throughout the Iberian world, maintained certain autonomous tendencies. In the face of stiff pressure, he acquiesced to a series of demands from the municipal council. First, he agreed to relieve local residents of the obligation to go all the way to Santos to register all “Indians of service” [a euphemism for slaves], newly acquired or “descended” from the sertão. Also, recognizing the validity of their arguments in citing the foral (a legal provision or jurisdictional protection) awarded to their lord proprietor, he assented that they be exempt from paying the ten percent royal dízimo tax on fish. In another example, when Souza (while still governor-general) nominated one Diogo Arias de Aguirre to be the new captain of São Vicente, local authorities resisted, arguing yet again that the appointment violated the jurisdictional rights of their lord

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969 Vilardaga, São Paulo no Império dos Felipes, 188.
970 Ibid. 189.
971 Ibid.
proprietor who, according to the original donation, maintained the exclusive right to appoint all new captains. In this instance, Souza ultimately backed down and acquiesced to the proprietor’s own preferred appointee, Roque Barreto.

With time, as Souza’s ties to the local community took root, his own interests increasingly converged with those of the Paulistas themselves. In his capacity as “superintendent of the mines,” he organized a series of expeditions to the _sertão_, which, while purportedly aimed at securing precious metals, in reality had the joint goal of procuring Amerindian captives. In fact, it was at Souza’s encouragement that Pedro Vaz de Barros led an expedition into the Spanish-claimed territory of Guairá. That expedition, undertaken in 1611, captured some five hundred Guaranís who were marched back in chains to enslavement in Brazil. Further evidence of this convergence of interests is Souza’s collusion with several of São Paulo’s most notorious slavers. In tightening his relationship with São Vicente’s new captain, Roque Barreto, Souza also sponsored an _entrada_ led by Barreto’s brother, Nicolau. In addition, in 1601, Souza made Sebastião de Freitas “a knight of the regiment of His Majesty,” for his service in the “discovery of silver,” in “waring against enemy gentios,” and for various other _entradas_, which “he himself conducted with his slaves,” and which were deemed as being “for the good of the captaincy.” That same year, Souza also approved a request for knighthood from one António Raposo – not the same person as António Raposo Tavares, who arrived in São Paulo in the 1620s and went on to

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972 Ibid. 192-193.
975 Monteiro, _Negros da terra_, 60-61.
976 16 March 1601, RGCCSP, 1:104-106.
become one of the fiercest and most infamous entrada leaders in São Paulo’s history. Souza praised Raposo’s service to the crown in “the discovery of mines of gold, silver, and other metals,” and for having gone to “the mountains of Birassoyaba and Cachatava and Betiruna in person and with his slaves and later to the gold mines of Jaraguá.” Although certainly somewhat exceptional, Souza’s tenure nonetheless serves to demonstrate that local interests in São Paulo were not categorically or unequivocally opposed to those of the crown and its direct colonial representatives. Instead, it reflects the negotiation and fluidity that characterized the relationship between local and central imperial government, while at the same time serving to highlight jurisdictional exclusivities and ambiguities.

Even before Souza’s arrival to the captaincy, already by the mid-1580s, Paulista slaving had become so widespread that, on several occasions, the town was left virtually empty as all the able-bodied men were away in the sertão. The emptying of the town, albeit temporary, posed a serious challenge for defense. Fearing attacks from Amerindian groups by land and competing Europeans from the coast, São Paulo’s municipal council issued repeated ordinances forbidding anyone from entering the sertão without the council’s express permission. Crucially, these ordinances represented less a desire to obstruct the enslavement of Amerindians for the immorality or illegality of that practice, than an attempt to ensure the presence of a sufficient quantity of men on hand to ensure the town’s defense.

The first major expedition beyond the immediate environs of São Paulo was directly west to the Paranapanema Valley in 1581. The next four decades saw the steady increase of

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977 18 June 1601, RGCCSP, 1:117-119.
978 In June 1586, to take just one example, the municipal council met to address the issue of the captaincy’s languishing bridges over its various streams and rivers, which were in much need of repair for the good of “the republic.” But, the council members lamented, “all the people are absent from the captaincy with the captain Jerónimo Leitão who had gone to war [in the sertão], and that no one stayed except women.” For that reason, they concluded, they could not fix the bridges. See, 14 June 1586, ACSP, 1:297.
979 In February of 1632, the procurador of the municipal council, reported that, “the residents of this town have gone to the sertão, leaving it helpless,” and demanded that the council officials penalize those who go to the sertão, see, 28 February 1632, ACSP, 4:115.
Paulista *entradas*. In 1592, Raposo led an early *entrada* against the Amerindian communities of Barueri, on the western outskirts of São Paulo.\(^980\) Six years later, Affonso Sardinha reportedly went to some unnamed part of “the *sertão*, taking in his company more than a hundred Christian Indians, with the [combined] intent of making war and assaults,” on Amerindians and “seizing gold and other metals.”\(^981\) Two groups from Paranapanema (the Tememinó and Tupinaé) became the primary victims of Paulista raiding, particularly in the first decade of the seventeenth century.\(^982\) But it was the Carijós who constituted the majority of captives in the early seventeenth century, at least until the beginning of large-scale invasions of the Guaraní *reducciones* in Guairá in the late 1620s.\(^983\)

A forty to sixty day march to the west, Guairá, and its Jesuit *reducciones* in particular, soon arose as the primary target of Paulista *entradas*.\(^984\) In 1611, Pedro Vaz de Barros led what was perhaps the first expedition from São Paulo to Guairá, capturing some five hundred Guaranís and marching them back in chains for enslavement in Brazil.\(^985\) The following year, the municipal council of Ciudad Real reported to the governor in Buenos Aires, Diego Matín Negrón, that the Paulistas had entered Guairá again, this time taking away some three thousand indigenous captives.\(^986\)

As the seventeenth century progressed, the conflict that played out in this remote hinterland region ultimately took on imperial significance and reverberated all the way from São Paulo and Asunción to Lima, Bahia, Madrid, Lisbon, and Rome. As early as 1614, the high court of Charcas in Upper Peru, which had jurisdiction over Guairá, wrote to the king

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\(^{981}\) 14 November 1598, *ACSP*, 2:46-47.


\(^{983}\) Monteiro, “From Indian to Slave,” 107-108.

\(^{984}\) Ibid.


\(^{986}\) Pastells, ed. *Historia de la Compañía de Jesús en la provincia del Paraguay*, vol. 1, 223.
to report the Paulistas’ *entradass* into Paraguay. That same year, and again in 1616, Hernandarias, the governor of the Río de la Plata, likewise wrote to the king, informing him of the *entradass*, and urged him to order the depopulation of São Paulo to put an end to the Paulistas’ abuses. More than simply conducting raids into territory claimed by Spain, several years later, Juan de Lizarazu, a royal official in La Plata, reported that in the wake of one such attack, four hundred residents from “the river of São Paulo in Brazil” had actually settled there, in Itatim, just thirty leagues from the Spanish American city of San Lorenzo la Vieja. The implication was that, in certain cases, Paulista *entradass* served not simply to destroy Spanish missions, but also, by the 1620s, to extend Portuguese dominium at the expense of that of Spain through the effective occupation of the region by Luso-Brazilian settlers.

In response, the Jesuit priest, Antonio Ruiz de Montoya, appealed to the king to take action to prevent further Paulista raids on the *reducciones* of Guairá. Importantly, Montoya noted that the Amerindian captives taken by the “*vezinos* of São Paulo” were trafficked not only in Brazil, but also in other Spanish jurisdictions, including in Buenos Aires, and that a busy, illicit commercial route had been opened, stretching “from São Paulo to the outskirts and environs of Potosí, where they have already taken Indian captives.” Montoya appealed to higher authorities in Europe to enforce the royal law proclaimed in Lisbon in September of that year, and the bulls of popes Paul III and Clemente VIII, that no Amerindian could be enslaved. He likewise implored the appropriate civil and religious authorities in the Americas, like bishops, commissaries, and governors, to impose the various punishments

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987 *AMP*, 2:2:5-8. Beyond reporting the Paulista *entradass*, the high court also noted that Spanish American settlers, like their Luso-Brazilian counterparts in São Paulo, wanted to make war on hostile Indians in the environs of Asunción.
988 *AMP*, 2:2:8-9; and Quarleri, *Rebelión y guerra en las fronteras del Plata*, 81-82.
989 Pastells, ed. *Historia de la Compañía de Jesús en la provincia del Paraguay*, vol. 2, 8.
990 IHGB, DL219, 10, doc. 9.
991 IHGB, DL219, 10, doc. 9, fols. 3-5.
according to the law, including, most seriously, excommunication and prosecution by the
Inquisition.\textsuperscript{992} In terms of more specific measures, Montoya suggested the creation of a
bishopric in the region, with the status of papal nuncio [ambassador].\textsuperscript{993} Aware of the fact
that Philip was sovereign of both Portugal and Castile, Montoya likewise suggested that the
king delegate expanded jurisdiction to the governor of Rio de Janeiro over the towns of São
Paulo and São Vicente in order to expedite the political and judicial process so that he no
longer have to refer such cases to the central colonial authorities in Bahia.\textsuperscript{994}

Montoya’s early protests failed to elicit the results he desired, however. Beyond
repeated royal and papal decrees outlawing indigenous slavery, and the São Paulo municipal
council’s own persistent prohibitions of individuals entering the \textit{sertão}, Paulista raids grew
pace in the period, reaching crescendo in particular from 1628 to 1632 and again from 1635
to 1637, when indigenous slavery and slave-raiding in the region reached its apex.\textsuperscript{995} In that
first conjuncture, from 1628 to 1632, Paulista expeditions destroyed thirteen of Guairá’s
fifteen Jesuit \textit{reducciones} and forced the other two to relocate.\textsuperscript{996}

\textsuperscript{992} IHGB, DL219, 10, doc. 9, fols. 1-3.
\textsuperscript{993} IHGB, DL219, 10, doc. 9, fol. 2.
\textsuperscript{994} IHGB, DL219, 10, doc. 9, fol. 2.
\textsuperscript{995} For an interesting collection of correspondence in 1628 between Spanish officials in Paraguay and
Portuguese officials in Brazil about the ravages of the Paulistas in Guairá, see: \textit{AMP}, 1:2:172-179. Spanish
officials requested prohibitions of Portuguese settlers from going to the “certon” \textit{[sertão]}, into lands claimed by
Spain. Brazilian officials, like the “oydor,” Amador Bueno in Santos, agreed, but evidently did not have the
power to do stop them.
\textsuperscript{996} Monteiro, “From Indian to Slave,” 109.
Testifying in 1631, one Jesuit, Simón Maceta, who had been present in Guairá at the time of the attack, condemned the Paulistas as “corsairs of the sertão” [corsarios del serton]. Maceta alleged that the total number of Indians in their missions had decreased by some “200,000 souls in the last three years,” some of whom were “robbed and killed by the Portuguese of São Pablo,” and others whom, “fleeing their furor, […] died of hunger in the mountains.”

The historian Luiz Filipe de Alencastro has suggested that between 1627 and 1640 the number of indigenous Brazilians enslaved equaled the total number of enslaved Africans.
introduced to both Portuguese and Dutch Brazil throughout the same period. According to Alencastro, the Paulistas captured total of 100,000 Amerindians from the interior regions of Guairá, Tape, and Itatim, 7,143 per year on average, constituting “one of the most rapacious enslavement operations in modern history.”

The issue of entradas was a complex one for the residents of São Paulo. On the one hand, the municipal council formally endorsed royal and papal prohibitions on entering the sertão and, in September 1627, even called for the arrest of António Raposo Tavares and Paulo Amaral, calling them “mutineers” [amotinadores] for organizing such expeditions. At the same time, however, the Paulistas, including several members of the municipal council, were alarmed by the rise of Spanish encroachments onto what they claimed was Portuguese territory. Less than two months later, the council alerted the governor and captain-major of São Vicente that the Spaniards and mestizo residents “of Villa Rica and other settlements are entering into the lands of the crown of Portugal, each time taking possession of more and more of them.” Beyond that, the council noted, the Paraguayan settlers were engaging in essentially the same activity as the Paulistas in their expeditions, “taking away all of the gentio of that land for their repartimientos and service.” The Paulistas saw these incursions as resulting “in great harm to this captaincy,” not simply because of the immorality and illegality of Amerindian slavery, but, more likely, because they further exacerbated São Paulo’s already depleting pool of indigenous labor. In this sense, even if certain factions within São Paulo opposed Paulista entradas, the entradas nonetheless served to extend

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1000 Luiz Felipe de Alencastro, “The Economic Network of Portugal’s Atlantic World,” in Portuguese Oceanic Expansion, 117. Guillerme Furlong estimated that during the first phase of Paulista invasions roughly 60,000 Guairá Indians were marched away to slavery in Brazil and beyond within the five-year period from 1627 to 1632. See, Guillerme Furlong, S. J., Misiones y sus Pueblos de Guaraníes (Buenos Aires, 1962), 384.
1001 25 September 1627, ACSP, 3:281.
1002 2 October 1627, ACSP, 3:282.
1003 2 October 1627, ACSP, 3:282.
Portuguese power, at the expense of that of the Spanish, throughout the greater Río de la Plata region.  

**Royal Law, Local Custom, and the Jurisdictional Politics of Amerindian Slavery**

Despite their administrative separation and a handful of isolated acts of internal dissension within Jesuit ranks, the conflict over Amerindian slavery in the region contributed to a general unification of Jesuit strategy and solidarity across the Iberian imperial divide aimed at restricting colonists’ access to Amerindian labor and eliminating Amerindian slavery altogether. The Society of Jesus was, of course, a supranational entity, which, while beholden to the dictates of the Iberian crowns through the *patronato/padroado real*, nonetheless maintained a distinct sacred allegiance to the pope, and ultimately to God. At the same time, the larger Jesuit effort to curb colonists’ control over Amerindians also meant that, despite the mutual animus that persisted between many Paraguayan and Paulista colonists and officials, the Jesuits emerged as the primary targets of their collective ire and aggression. In this sense, the conflict was not simply a dispute between “Spaniards” on one side and “Portuguese” on the other.

In addition to the tension that gripped Paraguay and Guairá, the conflict also played out on a local level within São Paulo itself. In 1632 and 1633, a group of restive settlers pressured the municipal council to expel the Jesuits from the *aldeiamento* of Marueri [Barueri].  

The settlers argued that the lands belonged to them, and that, led by a handful

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1004 For evidence of this factionalism, see the copy of a protest lodged by the *ouvidor*, Amador Bueno, in which he decried the elections the municipal council conducted in his absence and the permissions it granted to conduct *entradas* into the *sertão*, and commanded that “the said officials […] be dispossessed of their duties to give order to the laws and orders of his majesty,” see 3 March 1629, *A CSP*, 4:18.

“Castilian forasteiro clerics,” the Jesuits had “usurped” the “law of his majesty” and his “royal jurisdiction.”

Insisting on their obedience as loyal subjects to the crown, the council presented a petition for the Jesuits to vacate the *aldeamento*, “with a long list of names in support of this stance,” proclaiming themselves the true “protectors” and “defenders of the law and jurisdiction of his majesty.” When the Jesuits refused to leave, the settlers ultimately forced them out, took possession of Barueri, and established it as a “royal aldeia” ([aldeia d’El Rei]) under the direct authority of the crown, not the Jesuits, and administered locally by locally-elected *juizes ordinarios*.

Tensions also erupted within Paraguay between local civil officials and the secular clergy on the one hand, and the Jesuits of that province on the other. For instance, in 1631, the priest Simón Maceta condemned the crown-appointed governor of Paraguay, Luis de Céspedes y Xería, alleging that he had supported the Paulistas, and that on his return from Spain via Brazil, he had accompanied the caravan that ravaged Guairá before continuing on to Asunción. Mazeta further accused Céspedes y Xería, who had close familial and commercial ties in Brazil, of slave trading himself, and of colluding directly with the Paulistas in sending “to São Paulo many Indians from [Guairá].”

Reflecting back on the events of 1632 and 1633, the Jesuit, Nicolás del Techo, writing several years later, criticized Céspedes y Xería for inhibiting the Jesuit evangelization efforts by usurping their authority in the mission provinces, by unjustly imprisoning a

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1008 Monteiro, *Negros da terra*, 144; Georg Thomas seems to suggest here that the Jesuits were not expelled from Barueri until 1640, see, Thomas, *Política indigenista dos portugueses no Brasil*.

1009 BNE, Sala Cervantes, MSS/18667/22, testigo de Pe. Simon Mazeta fol. 5r. Céspedes y Xería’s lack of action in opposition to Paulista incursions raised widespread suspicions among Spanish Americans regarding his potential complicity with the Paulistas, especially given his various interests in Brazil and the large amount he spent there. Spanish colonial authorities tried and ultimately convicted him on these charges in 1633, and again in 1635.

1010 BNE, Sala Cervantes, MSS/18667/22, testigo de Pe. Simon Mazeta fol. 5v. In 1628, Céspedes y Xería had married Victoria de Sá, the Portuguese niece of the governor of Rio de Janeiro.
prominent cacique, and even by authorizing the enslavement of the “New Christian” Amerindians of Paraná, which, Techo noted, went against both royal and papal decree. Highlighting the persistence of conflict between the secular and regular clergy, Techo likewise accused the bishop, Cristóbal de Aresti, of the order of São Bento, of colluding with the governor and of falsely accusing them of not paying their taxes in an attempt to strip the Jesuits of their missions and place them under the direct administration of secular priests.

While jurisdictional disputes within Paraguay and São Paulo were fundamental in sharpening tensions at the local level, the primary focus of conflict remained the vast hinterland region of Guairá, Tape, and Itatim, in the contested borderlands between the Spanish- and Portuguese-claimed territories of imperial sovereignty in South America. The unprecedented scale and devastation of Paulista raids on Guaraní missions in those territories in the 1620s and 1630s provoked a multi-pronged reaction from the Jesuits, which took the form of a vigorous campaign of legal and political protest, and eventually of armed resistance.

1011 Projeto Resgate, Colonia do Sacramento e Rio da Prata, Cx.1, doc.3; and Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino (AHU), ACL, CU, 071, caixa 1, doc. 3.
1012 Techo noted, however, that the Jesuit superior, Pablo Romero, intervened, “showing [the governor] the papal bulls and royal decrees in favor of the Company [of Jesus]”, and eventually succeeded in persuading the governor to maintain the reducciones under Jesuit administration, see, AHU, ACL, CU, 071, caixa 1, doc. 3.
Seeking redress and relief from the king, the Jesuit Francisco Crespo sent a missive to the Council of Indies in 1628 reporting that “many of the Portuguese from the town of São Paulo, […] against all Christian piety, go each year to capture Indians and take them to sell in Brazil as if they were slaves.” Accenting the Paulistas’ barbarism and brutality, the report went to claim that, “they do this with such cruelty that those [Amerindians] that cannot walk are killed and fed to the dogs.” Alarmed at the devastation of this latest round of Paulista incursions, the council recommended that the king “order that they [ie. the Paulistas] cease

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1015 AMP, 1:2:179-180, Madrid, 31 August 1628

1016 AMP, 1:2:179-180, Madrid, 31 August 1628
and punish them accordingly.” The king, in turn, agreed and instructed his governor of the Río de la Plata, Francisco de Céspedes, to “rigorously punish the Portuguese that from São Paulo and Brazil went to capture Indians from the reducciones that the religious of the Company of Jesus had in Paraguay.”

Another priest, Luis de Ernote noted in 1631 that a number of local colonists from Guairá had aggravated the situation by harboring some Paulistas and had failed to defend the lands for the crown of Castile. Unconcerned with the “service of the two Majesties [ie. God and king], but rather with theft, like the Portuguese,” Ernote alleged that on two or three occasions these colonists had captured “many Indians that had escaped the fury the Portuguese,” and had left “the Portuguese as Lords of the land,” thereby enabling them to continue, “thieving according to their taste and will.”

The priest, Antonio Ruiz de Montoya, traveled to Madrid personally to deliver an appeal to the king in which he echoed all of these reports of Paulista barbarity, noting that their entradas violated “royal decrees and orders, […] leaving three provinces of Indians [Guairá, Tape, and Itatin] and three cities of Spaniards, which were Jerez, Ciudad Real, and Villa Rica, completely desolate, debasing them hostilely, even taking away some of the Spaniards, [including] a Priest.” Attempting to spur the king into action, Montoya stressed the larger global geopolitical risk that the Paulista entradas posed vis-à-vis European competitors and hostile Amerindian groups. “In communication with the heretics from Holland,” Montoya warned, likely in exaggeration, the Paulistas “open the route toward the provinces of Peru,” a development he considered of “manifest danger, even more so since

1017 AMP, 1:2:180-182, Madrid, 12 September 1628; also in Thomas, Política indigenista dos portugueses no Brasil (1982), 235-236.
1018 BNE, Sala Cervantes, MSS/18667/22, testigo de Pe. Simon Mazeta fol. 6r-6v.
1019 BNE, Sala Cervantes, MSS/18667/22, testigo de Pe. Simon Mazeta fol. 6r-6v.
1020 “Representação de Antonio Roiz de Montoya,” IHGB, lata 219, doc. 18. Montoya explained that he had “traveled more than 1500 leagues to prostrate himself at the feet of His Majesty” and deliver the report.
the said rebels [the Dutch] have established a foothold in [northeast] Brazil." Montoya noted in addition that, “the residents of S. Pablo were [a mere] eighty leagues from the Chiriguana nation.” “If they entered into confederation” with those Indians, “it will be easy with their intervention to empower the Dutch in Brazil.” All of this, he concluded, “requires swift and effective remedy.”

In 1636, Manuel João Branco, a longtime resident of São Paulo – who the historian Jaime Cortesão described as a Spanish “spy” – wrote yet another scathing report to the king decrying the Paulistas’ and their activities. In it, Branco suggested the king (Philip, who was then king of both Portugal and Spain) should overthrow the Count of Monsanto, the captaincy’s lord-proprietor, and convert São Vicente into a royal captaincy under direct crown control. After all, according to Branco, the territory did not actually belong to Monsanto, but was in fact within the king’s dominion and had thus been awarded in error. Branco went on to claim that the residents of São Paulo expressed full allegiance to their lord proprietor (Monsanto) rather than to the king himself, and to allege that the Paulistas’ king “is not Your Majesty” but is rather he who “fosters injustice and masks evil,” a clear if implicit reference to the Count of Monsanto.

1021 “Representação de Antonio Roiz de Montoya,” IHGB, lata 219, doc. 18.
1022 “Representação de Antonio Roiz de Montoya,” IHGB, lata 219, doc. 18.
1023 “Representação de Antonio Roiz de Montoya,” IHGB, lata 219, doc. 18.
1024 Cortesão, Raposo Tavares e a formação territorial do Brasil, 249.
1025 “That which falls between [the rivers] Curparê and São Vicente (which are the towns of São Vicente, Santos, São Paulo, Parnaíba, and other aldeias of Indians) belong to Your Majesty.” Branco likewise criticized Monsanto’s captains, who, he noted, destroy Christianity and the world by painting injustices with a gold veneer, and declaring prohibitions against slavery in the municipal councils, but doing nothing to stop them, and occasionally even facilitating them, sometimes publicly; see, Cortesão, Raposo Tavares e a formação territorial do Brasil, 251.
1026 Branco was not the only contemporary to express this opinion, however. The Jesuit Diego de Boroa, for instance, who was in the reducción, Jesus María, in Tape, when the Jesuits attacked, also argued that the Paulistas’ loyalty was not to the king but to Monsanto. In a letter to the king informing him of the invasion of Tape led by Raposo Tavares and imploring him take action to protect the Amerindians and punish the Paulistas, in 1637, Boroa alleged that the Paulistas appealed “to the Count Lord of São Paulo as if he were not a vassal of Your Majesty, saying that by his order and mandate they went there [to Tape] to expel the priests.” Boroa went on to portray the Paulistas as criminals and barbarians, saying that the violence they committed against the Indians
In the midst of this heightened struggle in the late 1620s and early 1630s, the Jesuits and their allies succeeded in eliciting a series of royal and papal decrees, which, for the first time, explicitly singled out the Paulistas for their crimes and cruelty, accusing them of having “perturbed the peace and quietude of the republic.”\(^{1027}\) As a result, the king instructed his Council of Portugal to punish those individuals responsible in order to prevent further damage and disorder.\(^{1028}\) In addition, in a 1633 decree, he denied the Paulistas’ request to take over the administration of the *aldeiamentos* around São Paulo.\(^{1029}\) Basing his decision on information received from the Jesuits and his chief magistrate in Bahia, the king accused the Paulistas of extorting and harassing the Jesuits, of breaking down the gates of the *aldeiamentos*, and of profaning the church, all with the goal of “capturing” Amerindians, a practice prohibited by the series of royal laws and decrees stretching back over six decades.\(^{1030}\)

Five years later, the king convened a junta of five councilors to reflect on the conflict and offer recommendations on an appropriate course of action.\(^{1031}\) Importantly, the junta consisted of three Portuguese councilors, including Sebastião Zambrana, the bishop of Porto, alongside two of Spain’s leading jurists and theologians, Juan de Solórzano Pereira was worse than that committed by heretic Calvinists and Huguenots, an important linking of the conflict in South America to that in Europe and beyond. The Paulistas, he wrote, went about “killing with inhumanity a great number of Indians, men and women, children, beheading them, opening them up with knives, burning them, showing themselves to be more cruel than wild beasts and more inhumane than Arabs [alarbes], Calvinist heretics and Huguenots,” quoted in Cortesão, *Raposo Tavares e a formação territorial do Brasil*, 296.

\(^{1027}\) Thomas, *Política indigenista dos portugueses no Brasil*, doc. 9, 235-236; 12 Sep 1628 (Madrid): Royal decree “To the governor of the Provinces of the Rio de la Plata that seeks to vigorously punish the Portuguese that go from the town of Sao Paulo to capture Indians form the reductions of Paraguay to sell them.”

\(^{1028}\) Ibid.

\(^{1029}\) 1633, RGCCSP, 1:485-488.

\(^{1030}\) 1633, RGCCSP, 1:485-488.

\(^{1031}\) Pastells, ed. *Historia de la Compañía de Jesús en la provincia del Paraguay*, 2:18-19. Although registered on 29 March 1639, the junta likely presented its recommendations to the king sometime the previous year.
and Juan de Palafox y Mendoza.\textsuperscript{1032} Drawing on their recommendations, the king issued his most forceful order to date. The 1638 decree enjoined the viceroy of Peru, the Marquee of Mansera, to punish “the Portuguese of São Paulo” for their insolence and effrontery and for the harm they had done to the Indians.\textsuperscript{1033} Those Amerindians, he wrote, “were reduced and baptized” at “the cost of my royal treasury,” but are now “dead, or wounded,” many either in captivity or having either fled to the mountains beyond Iberian control.\textsuperscript{1034} Philip threatened that any individuals deemed in violation of his decree would be expelled from Brazil and subjected to the Council of Indies and the Inquisition for judgment.\textsuperscript{1035}

In his 1638 decree, Philip alluded to the 1611 law, which had passed through the Council of Portugal and was promulgated in Lisbon, but attempted to close some of its loopholes. In this latest version, he ordered “that no Indian of any quality, even [those that are] unfaithful, can be captured or put into slavery for any cause or reason, nor can they be deprived of the natural dominion that they possessed over their goods, children, or wife.”\textsuperscript{1036} Philip acknowledged that both Portuguese and Castilians participated in these expeditions, and, for the first time, explicitly forbid all “Portuguese of Brazil” from crossing “the line of demarcation between that crown and the crown of Castile,” or from entering into Spanish territory “to reduce or take away Indians, to trade in any good, or for any other reason, on penalty of death and confiscation of one’s goods [\textit{so pena de la vida, y predimento de vienes}].”

Philip also accused their expeditions of incorporating many “Dutch, French, and from other Europeans of the north,” and therefore of exposing Potosí and Santa Cruz de la Sierra to an

\textsuperscript{1032} Ibid. The other two Portuguese councilors were Cid de Almeida and Francisco Pereira Pinto. Although registered on 29 March 1639, the junta likely presented its recommendations to the king sometime the previous year.


\textsuperscript{1034} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{1035} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{1036} Ibid. Among the Paulistas’ other crimes, the king accused them of violating royal authority by appointing “captain-majors and ordinary captains and other officials of war” without permission.
eventual invasion by the arch enemies of Portugal and Spain. And he even demanded that any illicitly Amerindians sent as far away as Lisbon, Madeira, and Cabo Verde be returned to their native lands in Brazil.\footnote{Ibid.}

Although the Jesuits and other detractors portrayed the residents of São Paulo as barbarous heretics and brutes, the Paulistas, for their part, remained committed to vindicating themselves from the priests’ condemnation. Most Paulistas had little to no formal education beyond what basic instruction some may have received from the priests of the college of São Paulo. Nevertheless, they showed an impressive capacity for argument and rhetoric, even attempting to shift blame onto the Jesuits themselves. In addition, they and their supporters demonstrated a clear awareness of the jurisdictional autonomy they possessed as inhabitants of a seigniorial captaincy and even of the general principles of natural law, customary law, and the law of nations. Many if not most Paulistas were firmly convinced of both the legality and morality of their activities.

First of all, consistent with their understanding of the natural boundaries of the Ilha Brasil, they argued that Guairá and the Jesuits’ other mission territories were located within Portuguese jurisdiction and that the presence of Spaniards in the region – Jesuits or not – represented therefore a violation of the territorial sovereignty of the lord proprietor of São Vicente and of the king of Portugal, by extension. Despite calls from the municipal council for the opening of trade and communication with Spanish Peru in the late sixteenth century, by the 1620s, as tensions between the Jesuits and Paulistas hardened and the conflict took on imperial significance, São Paulo’s leading residents protested vociferously against the incursions of Castilians who, “took away all of the gentiles [i.e. Amerindians] of this
kingdom [coroa] for their repartimentos and service.”\(^\text{1038}\) Moreover, the Paulistas argued that the Jesuits were the true tyrants and enslavers, portraying themselves in contrast as just “administrators” of Indians, as treating them more humanely once gathered into aldeiamentos, and ultimately as providing “a great service to God, king, and the Indians themselves” in delivering Amerindians from barbarism to civilization.\(^\text{1039}\)

In addition, the Paulistas saw their activities as in no way illegal or in contravention of the series of royal prohibitions of Amerindian slavery. São Paulo’s municipal council registry displays how the officials of that body continuously reaffirmed their loyalty to the crown and acknowledged the receipt of royal laws and decrees prohibiting indigenous slavery and slave raiding.\(^\text{1040}\) However, reminiscent of the Spanish legal principle, obedezco pero no cumplo [I obey but do not comply], the actual acts of the council show that while claiming to honor the spirit of the laws and prohibitions, local authorities often asserted their right to grant special “licenses” and “permissions” to settlers to “enter the serião and make war on the gentiles.”\(^\text{1041}\)

One of the earliest of the Paulistas’ defenses of their practice was also one of the most comprehensive. In April of 1585, the municipal councils of São Paulo, São Vicente, and Santos presented a collective request for license from the crown-appointed captain, Jerónimo Leitão, to, among other things, make war on the Carijó Indians and distribute them as slaves among the residents.\(^\text{1042}\) Presenting their request as “on behalf of God and His Majesty,” the councilmen argued that it was thanks to Amerindian slaves that, “this land

\(^{1038}\) 2 October 1627, ACSP, 3:282-283.

\(^{1039}\) Monteiro, “From Indian to Slave,” 114. See also BNE, Sala Cervantes, MSS/18667/22, 1631. According to the Jesuit Simón Maceta, the Paulistas, “decían publicamente a los indios que nosotros éramos unos pobretones, y que los eclavamos […], y otras palabras, con que nos desacreditavan a nosotros y a nuestros ministerios sagrados.”

\(^{1040}\) RGCMSP, 1: 326-335 (1621); 1:419-420 (20 May 1623); 1:501-502 (28 May 1635); 1:514-515 (1 March 1636); 2:77-78 (19 March 1639); 2:115 (4 February 1640).

\(^{1041}\) 26 June 1563, ACSP, 1:25.

\(^{1042}\) 10 April 1585, ACSP, 1:275-279.
became ennobled” and that “the settlers sustained themselves and made their plantations which paid the dizimos [taxes] to God and to his Majesty and sustained them honorably.”

“Given the waning of the slave population [escraveria],” due to “the many diseases and illnesses in this land,” they continued, “now there is no resident that can make small farms to sustain themselves let alone raise sugarcane.” They requested permission to “make pitched war against the Carijó Indians,” and made a case for the justness of such a war as defensive by noting that in the past “forty years they have killed more than 150 white men, both Portuguese and Spaniards, and have even killed priests of the Company of Jesus, who had gone forth to indoctrinate and teach our Holy Catholic Faith.” The council noted that the Carijó were enemies both of “white men” and the “Tupiniquim Indians, our friends,” and alleged that they practiced cannibalism in order to provide further justification. The councilmen requested that the captives taken in that war not be, “placed into aldeias, […] where the residents of this land will not reap any benefit,” but rather that they be distributed among the residents since as servants [slaves], they claimed, “being here,” among the residents, “they will make themselves Christians, live in the service of God,” and be safe from other hostile indigenous that “eat human flesh.” In this case, the captain consented, replying two weeks later that, “I conformed to [the request] and am ready to do everything,” for the “service of our lord and the good of the land.”

As the demand for indigenous slaves increased in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, colonists grew increasingly impatient in awaiting the captain’s official license of expeditions into territories west. As a result, beginning in the 1590s the Paulistas

1043 10 April 1585, ACSP, 1:275-279.
1044 10 April 1585, ACSP, 1:275-279.
1045 10 April 1585, ACSP, 1:275-279.
1046 10 April 1585, ACSP, 1:275-279.
1047 10 April 1585, ACSP, 1:275-279.
1048 10 April 1585, ACSP, 1:275-279. In September of that year, Leitão and the members of the three councils finally met and formally approved, ratified, and signed the original request; see, 6 Sep 1585, ACSP, 1:281-282.
began articulating a range of alternative justifications, several which obscured the true nature of their *entradas*. One such justification was to portray those expeditions as commercial in nature. Seeking to gain the unfettered right of colonists to visit indigenous *aldeiamentos*, in 1598 São Paulo’s municipal council protested that “it is a great oppression to always have to await the permission of the captain since it was a custom of the land to not have so many licenses and since the Indians are our friends and neighbors.” Without doing so explicitly, the argument evoked principles from natural law and the law of nations advanced five decades prior by Francisco de Vitoria in regards to Spanish America regarding the right to free commerce and movement in foreign lands.

Five years later, in 1603, one Pero Coelho de Sousa sought to justify his own *entrada* by harmonizing his own private interest with that of the crown. According to Sousa, his primary objective in leading this expedition was “to become worthy of the graces [*mercês*] and honors of His Majesty.” It also sought to locate the large quantities of “amber and gold” said to exist in the captaincy, items of particular interest to royal authorities. That same decade, the municipal councilmen of São Paulo wrote another appeal directly to their lord proprietor, which likewise stressed the captaincy’s potential to become a “great kingdom.”

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1051 Sousa’s army consisted of two hundred Portuguese and mixed-race individuals of low social standing (*gente do sertão*, *mamelucos*, *tangos maus* [fugitives]) alongside another eight hundred or so Potiguar and Tabajara Indian bowsmen; see, Bonciani, “O domínio sobre os indígenas e africanos e a especificidade da soberania régia no Atlântico,” 231-232, citing the “Auto que mandou fazer o Senhor governador-geral Diogo Botelho,” 26 January 1603, in *Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro* (RIHGB) 73, no. 1 (1910): 42-43.
1053 Ibid. Also among Sousa’s goals was, “to make some licit ransoms [*resgates*], […] which the *gentio* place on cords in order to eat.” Sousa assented, in accordance with royal law regarding such ransoms, that those captives, “having come [to São Vicente], must be examined by religious priests, and if not, must be placed in liberty, and [those responsible for] the disorder that took place on the said expedition must be punished.” Soon after the expedition, in response to the governor’s threat to excommunicate any individuals caught “ransoming” the *gentio* “Guoararemi,” the councilmen, displaying a keen awareness of the rights they possessed according to royal law, claimed that he had violated the seigniorial rights and *forais* “that the king had bestowed on the residents of this captaincy” in its original donation to Martim Afonso de Sousa; see 24 December 1612, *ACSP*, 2:323-326.
given its abundant natural resources. In order to best exploit those resources, however, the councilmen stressed the need “to conserve” the Indians, given their diminution as a combined result of disease and abuse. The councilmen also pointed out their unjust treatment at the hands of Brazil’s highest civil authorities. In reference to a recent expedition led by Roque Barreto, the councilmen condemned the governor-general for demanding one third of the Amerindian captives procured in that expedition and for initiating “a large investigation” which saw a whopping 65 of the town’s less than 200 residents become “fugitives” for the participation in that expedition. As a result, the councilmen beseeched their lord proprietor to consider the “protection” he owed “to his own” – meaning the residents of his captaincy – and to lobby on their behalf at the royal court, arguing that “no one has suffered so much abuse” as they had.

The Paulistas frequently portrayed themselves as victims in order to justify their activities. Beyond the persecution they claimed at the hands of central colonial authority, however, they also emphasized their poverty and the material privations they endured, all while purporting to maintain unflagging obedience to both the king and their lord proprietor. In justifying their activities, roundly condemned by the governor-general, the Paulistas reminded their lord proprietor that despite their reputation, there was “no one who

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1054 ACSP, 2:497-500. Rather than precious stones and metals, in this case the councilmen emphasized the abundance of cotton and lumber for shipbuilding.
1055 Estimating that there remained some 200,000 Carijós in the sertão, the council beseeched their lord to finance the effort to “bring them down [descer]” from the sertão “and make them Christians” noting that the town itself could recruit the necessary manpower since there were already some 300 Portuguese men at ready, alongside some 1,500 Indian slaves all of whom were experienced in “the work of the sertão” and whom regularly went “to Peru by land,” see, ACSP, 2:497-500.
1056 ACSP, 2:497-500.
1057 Ibid.
1058 See, for example, 1 November 1632, ACSP, 4:101; 7 February 1632, ACSP, 4:113-114; and 21 February 1632, ACSP, 4:114-115, among other entries.
suffers more effrontery” than they, “and there are no people” in the entire “estado [of Brazil]” who “are more humble and obedient than us given what we suffer.”

Perhaps most notable was the Paulistas’ repeated reference to custom. Several council records were more transparent about the motives of Paulista entradas, but appealed to the power of customary law in stressing that the slaving expeditions were, since the town’s foundation, a “use and custom” of the settlers “of this land,” which, by 1600, they “had been in possession of for more than forty years.” In the early modern Iberian empires, local custom as defined by municipal councils was often as forceful as royal law, and in some cases even more so. As a result, when local custom contradicted royal law, individuals in the local context had powerful legal means of defending their practices and their refusal to adhere to royal law was not necessarily seen as illegal in a modern sense.

In one particularly relevant example, in the Apologia pro paulistis, examined in detail by historians Janice Theodoro and Rafael Ruiz, an anonymous Jesuit in Rome conceded during an internal investigation into the matter that the Paulistas’ appeals to customary law were fully valid. Basing his argument on Francisco Suárez, Graciano, and Tomás de Aquino, the author argued in defense of São Paulo that, “the Paulistas were never obliged by the law.” Their customs could legitimately supersede royal law because, according to Suárez, laws do

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1059 RGCCSP, 113.

1060 In 1609, for example, when Hilaria Luis petitioned the governor to maintain possession of the enslaved Indians that belonged to her recently deceased husband, he flatly refused, noting that Indians were free according to royal law. However, after having consulted the procurador dos indios and a local ouvidor, the governor agreed that, rather than setting them free, they be put under the care of the juiz dos orfãos of Sao Paulo, since, as that juiz had argued, “it was use and custom to give freed Indian pieces [peças forras] to the orphans for their sustenance and service and not to sell them,” see, Monteiro, Negros da terra, 140, citing the Petição de Hilaria Luis, 3 November 1609, in the “Inventario de Belchior Dias Carneiro,” 1607, Inventários e testamentos - IT (São Paulo: Departamento do Arquivo do Estado de São Paulo - DAESP, Typographia Piratininga, 1920-), vol. 2, 163-65. The 1633 will of Lourenço de Siqueira granted legal freedom to his slaves (which, according to royal law, should have already been their status), but also, paradoxically, requested that the crown permit his wife to keep them in servitude in order to provide her sustenance; see, Monteiro, Negros da terra, 139.

1061 ACSP, 1:501 (5 February 1595), 2:49 (13 December 1598), 2:70 (16 January 1600), 5:8 (7 January 1640). This reference to the Paulistas’ long-term possession of the land served the dual purpose of reinforcing their (or their proprietor’s) claim to dominium by prescription, as well as their claim to have developed such “custom” over a sufficiently long period of time (despite it being only forty years).
not take effect “if they are not [formally] received.” In other words, according to Graciano this time, “laws are instituted when they are promulgated and [only] gain force when they correspond to use and customs.” Basing these arguments on those of the three influential theologians, the author qualified that custom could only trump law if it did contradict natural and divine law. And in this case, he concluded, it did not. Moreover, he justified the Paulistas’ activities by saying that such entradas had been conducted since the town’s foundation. “Since the beginning of the foundation of the republic and of the kingdom,” referring in this case to the founding of the town of São Paulo in 1554, when the settlers “began to frequent the interior and submit the native Brazilians [os brasis] to the Paulistas’ way of life,” “such a custom did not seem senseless [insensato].”

Although the Paulistas’ defense of their activities failed to elicit any positive response from the king or his Council of Portugal back in the Peninsula, one of Brazil’s highest colonial authorities was more supportive, albeit for strategic reasons. Keen to enlist their support in the struggle against the Dutch in Pernambuco, in 1639, Salvador Correia de Sá, then the captain-major and governor of the “Repartição do Sul,” sought to placate the Paulistas and defend them in the face of Jesuit condemnation and papal excommunication. Already the previous year he had called on São Paulo, São Vicente, and Espírito Santo to prepare supplies and provisions, including “wheat, flour, rice, meats, and beans” to “sustain the infantry” in northeast Brazil in the war to uproot the “rebellious enemy,” the Dutch.

A few months later, in a clear example of Portuguese colonial authorities mobilizing indigenous and mestiço soldiers against European imperial competitors, Correia de Sá called on “Rio de Janeiro, São Vicente, and São Paulo to raise 300 soldiers […] native sons of the

1062 Theodoro and Ruiz, “São Paulo, de Vila a Cidade,” 123.
1063 Ibid. 103-104.
1064 Ibid. 104.
1065 9 October 1638, registered in São Vicente, RGCCSP, 2:70-75.
land,” noting that they were of great effectiveness, given the “use and experience” they gained “in entradas to the sertão.” In one example, Correia de Sá pardoned Francisco Sutil for his “crimes committed in entradas to the sertão,” because Sutil had sent his son “to serve in the fight against the Dutch,” and allowed him to maintain his slaves, by commanding that, “the Indians he has remain under his administration.” In 1639 and 1640, Correia de Sá then subsequently attempted to issue a defense of the Paulistas and an appeal for a blanket pardon to all those “fugitives” hiding “in the forests of São Paulo,” noting how useful they would be in the “Restoration” of northeast Brazil from Dutch occupation.

Although Correia de Sá’s appeal was ultimately denied, its contents reflect the persuasive weight of pro-Paulista arguments. In many ways, Correia de Sá’s longer, more comprehensive appeal represented a comprehensive synthesis of the Paulistas’ own arguments, and more. For instance, he argued that, “those who go to the sertão, where there are gentios, do not go” for the purpose of “extortion or tyranny, but with love and in order to bring Christianity, as do the Fathers of the Company [of Jesus],” and to rescue them.

1066 1639, RGCCSP, 2:79-82.
1067 1639, RGCCSP, 2:79-82.
1068 1639, RGCCSP, 2:101-102.
1069 3 August 1639, RGCCSP, 2:103-106.
1070 Stressing the legality and economic value of Paulista entradas, Correia de Sá asserted that their, “entradas into the sertão were always permitted by the governors-general of Brazil given the mortal tyranny of the Indians.” In addition, he added that, “it would and will be impossible for Brazil to sustain sugarcane plantations without” these Indians brought from the sertão since, “everyone from the richest to the poorest in Brazil depends on them.” “It is impossible to sustain Brazil […] without the service of these Indians.” “If they were not serving in the houses of whites or in their aldeia colonies under the administration of the white residents, Brazil would lose its sugar cane plantations completely as well as the décimo taxes that came from them. Brazil itself would come to an end without them,” see, “Registo da provisão digo de um pardão,” [to those from São Paulo who entered the sertão against the laws of his majesty],” points 8 and 14, 1640, RGCCSP, 7:187-198.
from cannibalism. Regarding the Amerindians’ own sovereignty, dominium, and property rights, Correia de Sá asserted that, “the entradas into the sertão do not result in the extortion or seizure of the Indians’ plantations or estates [fazendas],” since the Amerindians had none, “nor any other movable goods or possessions.” The Amerindians he continued, “deal with nothing more than the present, nor do they have their own lands nor houses nor any other things, and [simply] go about nude in the sertão.” Moreover, he claimed, the Amerindians “come from the sertão not by force, but by their [own free] will.” After all, he surmised, no doubt disingenuously, “if they had come against their will,” by now they would have returned “to their lands and forests.”

The residents of Brazil’s southern captaincies, Correia de Sá noted, “are the poorest, and in their penury they have necessity of the Indians, and as such it would be very difficult to protect and accept the said excommunication which the bull discusses given that there is no other remedy than the service of these pagan Indians.” In any case, he rightly observed, if the excommunications were to be published, it would be impossible to ensure “the liberty of the Indians, according to the laws of his Majesty” given the power of local opposition. Moreover, although eschewing the term “rebellion,” surely a conscious omission, Correia de Sá warned that the excommunications could provoke “great mutinies,

1071 “Registo da provisão digo de um pardão,” points 6 and 7, 1640, RGCCSP, 7:187-198. Echoing the appeals of the Paulistas themselves, however spurious they might have been, Correia de Sá stressed that “the information” the king received was “false in claiming that the whites impede the Indians from being Christians.” In reality, he argued, the Paulistas had gone to the sertão precisely in order “to bring them into the fold of the Church.” “His Majesty and his Board of Conscience should be aware of the great spiritual benefit” such entradas afforded the Indians “brought down [descidos] from the sertão” since previously they had been “arrested and tied along cords to be eaten or to suffer other punishments according to their barbarous rites and laws.” Having come into the power of the Christians they have been, he argued, “they have been removed from that risk and danger,” see, “Registo da provisão digo de um pardão,” points 10-12, 1640, RGCCSP, 7:187-198.


1073 Ibid.

1074 Ibid.

1075 Ibid.

1076 Ibid.

1077 Ibid.
uproar, and disobedience” from the white population as well, “and would lessen respect for the ecclesiastical ministers.”1078 That resistance had the potential to cause “many deaths and fights seeing that,” according to Correia de Sá, the bulls of excommunication lacked “the order or permission of his majesty and would usurp the jurisdiction of his secular judges.”1079 Moreover, noting the security such *entradas* ensured by placing the indigenous population under Luso-Brazilian control, Correia de Sá argued that “if they were not subjects and under the servitude of the [Portuguese] residents and living together, [...] they might rise up as they have many times” in southern Brazil and as was then happening northeast Brazil, “in Paraíba and Pernambuco, where the Indians are uniting with the Dutch, who likewise benefited from the support of the said Indians [...] when their ships and armada came to Bahia” in 1624.1080

Ultimately, neither the Paulistas nor their supporters were successful in persuading other higher authorities. In response to Correia de Sá’s appeal in particular, one official [the *promotor*], rebuked it as “unjust and against all truth,” and argued that, as such, it “should not be considered.”1081 After all, the official concluded, it was “public knowledge and notorious” that “many residents [of São Paulo] bring the Indians forcefully from the *sertão* and use them as slaves.”1082

Nevertheless, the Jesuits and their Amerindian allies and charges were the only group to take effective steps to oppose the Paulistas in practice. Beyond issuing laws and public condemnations, no Spanish or Portuguese civil authority proved willing or able to reinforce their words with meaningful action.1083 On the contrary, beginning in the 1640s, Portuguese

1078 Ibid.
1079 Ibid.
1080 Ibid.
1082 Ibid.
1083 Even São Paulo’s own municipal council consistently decried *entradas* and slaving, but, like the provincial, viceregal, and metropolitan authorities, never took effective action to curb such activity. For examples of municipal council’s the formalistic prohibitions on *entradas* to the *sertão*, see for example, 22 March 1603, *ACSP*,
authorities actually encouraged Paulista *entradas*, hoping to channel their efforts in support of the crown’s own direct objectives. Although professing consistent concern for the protection of Amerindians, the Iberian crowns were likewise concerned with the conquest, occupation, and economic development of their American colonies and therefore let Paulista slaving continue into the second half of the seventeenth century almost completely unfettered.

**The 1640s: Imperial Sovereignty in Flux**

The 1640s were momentous, tumultuous years in the Río de la Plata, as they were throughout the Iberian world. Among the decade’s most significant developments was Portugal’s self-fashioned “Restoration” of independence from the Spanish Monarchy in December of 1640. In a fascinating turn of events, when news of John IV’s coronation reached São Paulo in May of the following year, a pro-Castilian faction within the town urged the residents to reject the new dynasty, to proclaim São Paulo’s independence, and to declare as king Amador Bueno, one of the town’s leading residents. Bueno promptly – and prudently – declined the proposal, and quickly persuaded his partisans to recognize the new Braganza king as their rightful ruler.² Nevertheless, the episode shed light on the complex factionalism within São Paulo and highlighted the autonomous impulse of at least a portion of its residents.


²:1084 For an account of this episode written in the eighteenth century, see Gaspar da Madre de Deus’, “A Defense of the Paulistas,” in *The Bandeirantes: The Historical Role of the Brazilian Pathfinders*, ed. Richard Morse (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965). Boxer is dismissive of this episode’s larger significance, writing that, “an inordinate amount of ink has been expended in Brazil on this relatively insignificant affair,” see, Boxer, *Salvador de Sá and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola*, 148.
Another roughly contemporaneous event of particular significance, albeit from the previous year (1640), was the simultaneous expulsion of the Jesuits from São Paulo, Santos, São Vicente, and Rio de Janeiro when their representatives returned to the southern captaincies from Europe with a freshly minted papal bull in hand. Unmoved by Correia de Sá’s appeal, in June of that year, they publicly promulgated the bull, which called for the excommunication of all individuals who had gone to the *sertão* to make war on the Amerindians without the proper license and permission. Since the bull implicated virtually all of São Paulo’s residents either directly or indirectly, the colonists revolted and, in concert with the residents of the other towns, resolved to expel the Jesuits from the southern captaincies entirely. After a week of wrangling, on June 13 at two o’clock in the morning, a group of leading residents read aloud the order of expulsion as a group of 200 colonists stormed the convent, arrested the priests, and dispatched them to Santos. The following day, municipal officials transferred administration of the *aldeiamento* of Barueri to the secular clergy, who had supported the Jesuits’ expulsion. Despite the fact that all of their legal or political pressure had thus far come to naught, the Paulistas remained firm in their commitment to demonstrate the legality of their conduct and to combat their reputation as traitors or criminals in violation of royal law and decree. In a letter to the king, the municipal council argued that, in promulgating the bull of excommunication, the Jesuits had sought to “deprive and strip the residents of their immemorial and ancient possession,” a thinly veiled reference to indigenous slavery, “which they held from the foundation of this State to the present.” More specifically, the Paulistas’ primary strategy in presenting their case was to shift the debate from a focus on slavery, which favored the Jesuits’ position, to a focus on the Jesuits’ jurisdictional overreach.

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into temporal power. As the colonists noted, according to the terms of the padroado real, bulls of excommunication, despite bearing the authority of Rome, could not be legally promulgated in America without prior ratification in Lisbon [or Madrid] and the corresponding royal seal to make it official.

The Paulistas were steadfast. Even Brazil’s first viceroy, the Marque of Montalvão, was unable to dissuade them. When Montalvão intervened, appealing to the residents of “such remote parts,” to offer full obedience and accept the Jesuits’ return, the Paulistas refused, citing the arguments above, while continuing to profess their loyal obedience to the crown. It was only in 1653 that the Paulistas accepted the Jesuits’ return, and this on the clear condition that the latter not intervene in secular affairs, in particular those relating to Amerindians. In a major concession that completely shifted the course of political struggle and debate in the captaincy, the Jesuits agreed not to oppose indigenous slavery and even pledged to refuse sanctuary to runaways.

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1088 Ibid. The Franciscans, often rivals of the Jesuits throughout the Iberian world, had supported the colonists in the process of expulsion. Several years later, in 1649, they issued a list detailing the legal bases for that expulsion, which focused almost exclusively on jurisdictional overreach: the Jesuits had forced vast concessions from the heirs of various settlers, likely in lands and indios; they had stripped lands away from farmers through legal subterfuge; they traded and sold Indian lands and goods without the Indians’ permission; they abused the Indians worse than settlers did, often making Indians carry them on their backs. Finally, and most generally, the Franciscans argued that the Jesuits had become too rich and powerful; see, “Causas que os moradores de São Paulo apontam da expulsão dos padres da Companhia de Jesus,” 1649, Biblioteca Nacional de Brasil - Rio de Janeiro (BNRJ), II, 35.21.53, doc. 2.
1089 Vilardaga, São Paulo no Império dos Felipes, 383-384.
1091 Monteiro, Negros da terra, 146.
Despite the Jesuits’ dramatic setbacks in southern Brazil, at around that same moment their power in the hinterland began rebounding significantly. In response to the devastating Paulista raids on Guaraní reducciones throughout much of the 1630s, the Jesuits and their indigenous allies began fighting back. Although lacking formal permission to do so, the Jesuits started training and arming their converts. Already in the mid 1620s, mission Indians from St. Xavier and Encarnación managed what was perhaps the first Jesuit-Guaraní...
victory against the Paulistas in Guairá. Again, in 1637 and 1638, the Jesuits and their Guaraní allies managed to repel two more Paulista attacks, this time on reducciones in Tape.

As early as 1635 one Jesuit, P. Tomás de Urueña, petitioned to civil authorities in Buenos Aires to procure weapons and munitions to defend the Guaraní of Guairá. Although this initial request was denied, as Paulista raids intensified, the Jesuits heightened their appeals to civil authorities in Paraguay and Spain to supply their Amerindians with firearms. Many settlers in Spanish America remained staunchly opposed to the idea, worried that, if given firearms, the Indians might turn them against Spaniards once the Paulista threat had subsided. In 1639, for instance, the municipal council of Asunción petitioned to the city’s sergeant-major, Francisco de Rivas Gavilán, to forbid the arming of Amerindians in the missions, warning that such an act would threaten “the sovereignty of Spain in those vast regions.” That same year, however, Antonio Ruiz de Montoya, the Jesuit provincial of Paraguay, took the appeal to the royal court in Spain itself, presenting a sophisticated case for arming the Amerindians. Citing ecclesiastical law and the works of various influential canonical theologians, including Aquinas, the Jesuits proclaimed that, “defense is permitted

1093 In an annual report to their superiors in Rome, the local Jesuits described how Diego de Alfaro, the leader of all the region’s reducciones, raised a force of 1,200 lightly equipped indigenous allies to confront the Paulista army of 200 Portuguese and mameluco soldiers alongside some 500 Tupis, which was “very well armed and disciplined militarily.” “With great valor,” Alfaro’s force “attacked the enemy, and obliged them to flee,” killing “some of the Lusitanians and many more of their Indian allies, the Tupi.” On 11 February 1638, the Paulistas attacked yet again. This time, “their army had increased by a good number of combatants.” According to the Jesuits, their indigenous allies fought in the name of “Christ and liberty, in a very just war,” attacking their “powerful enemy […] valorously like lions.” “Both sides fought furiously for five hours,” the report continued, until the mission forces prevailed, putting the surviving Paulistas to flight; see, Ernesto J. A. Maeder, ed., Cartas anuales de la Provincia del Paraguay, 1637-1639 (Buenos Aires: FECIC, 1984), 71-76.


to any person according to natural and human law.” Linking theological and legal arguments with evidence from the local colonial context, Montoya cited the case of Chile, where even when the “rebelled Indians,” despite having “sacked seven cities and seized many muskets and arquebuses,” had “never used them against Spaniards.”

In May 1640, Montoya returned from Madrid with a royal order authorizing the viceroy to permit the arming of Amerindians if he deemed it prudent and necessary. Despite vocal opposition from Paraguay’s settler community and a number of local civil officials, the viceroy eventually consented. For the Jesuits and their Guaraní allies, the viceroy’s decision could not have arrived sooner. On 11 March 1641, the very same day that news of Portugal’s Restoration first reached São Paulo, a well armed and equipped Jesuit-Guaraní force repelled yet another a Paulista column, this time near the confluence of the Uruguay and Mbororé rivers. The Guaraní victory at Mbororé proved decisive and marked the true turning point in their struggle with the Paulistas. When the Paulistas launched another raid the following year, the well-armed Guaranís easily repulsed it. In the

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1097 “Informe e justificação jurídica do uso de armas de fogo pelos indios,” 1639, in MCA, vol. 3 (1969): 303-314. The same was true, Montoya continued, of “the Calchaquies Indians, because arquebuses without powder and ammunition are useless.”
1098 Caraman, The Last Paradise, 75. The following year, Gabriel de Ocaña y Alarcón wrote to the Peruvian viceroy, the Count of Chinchón, advocating Montoya’s proposal. Noting that despite the initial defeats of 1637-1638 and the recent “uprising of Portugal,” against Spanish rule in December 1640, the Luso-Brazilian residents of São Paulo continued their “entradas” into territory claimed by Spain, capturing “the few Indians that had remained.” Given the circumstances, Ocaña likewise urged the arming of those Indians, “of whose loyalty there is no doubt,” he stressed; see, Pastells, ed. Historia de la Compañía de Jesús en la provincia del Paraguay, vol. 2, 67-71, 14 October 1641, Madrid.
1099 Caraman, The Last Paradise, 77-78.
1100 For a detailed account of this battle, see, “Relação da derrota sofrida pelos bandeirantes em Mbororé, escrita pelo Padre Claudio Ruyer,” Reducción de S. Nicolás, 6 April 1641, in MCA, vol. 3 (1969), 345-368.
wake of this victory, the Jesuits began expanding their mission footprint yet again, although from the 1640s forward, they stayed west of the Uruguay River.\footnote{The Jesuits established an additional 22 reducciones in parts of present-day Paraguay and the Misiones province of northeast Argentina; see, Ernesto J. A. Maeder, ed. Cartas anuales de la Provincia Jesuítica del Paraguay, 1641 a 1643 (Chaco: Instituto de Investigaciones Geohistóricas-Conicet, 1996), 80-81. As late as 1646, the Jesuits were also considering plans to rebuild the northern mission of Itatín (Itatin in Portuguese): “Memoria de Reformas de la Misión de Itatín, Propuestas por el Padre Justo Mansilla al Padre Provincial del Paraguay de la Compañía de Jesús,” 10 October 1646, Archivo General de la Nación-Argentina (AGNA), Compañía de Jesús, sala 9, doc. 134.}

Beyond simply curbing Paulista incursions into territory claimed by Spain, Guaraní troops began serving other functions as well.\footnote{The Guaraní’s increasingly fearsome reputation discouraged the Paulistas, Spanish encomenderos, and other rival indigenous groups from raiding their reducciones, as they had in the past. In addition, in return for these services in these campaigns, and in recognition of the numerous displacements and depredations they had suffered over the years at the hands of Paulistas, in 1643 the king issued a decree relieving Indians in the region that had “reduced themselves to the faith and obedience of His Majesty” from paying tribute for a period of twenty years; see Pastells, ed. Historia de la Compañía de Jesús en la provincia del Paraguay, vol. 2, 77-78, 7 April 1643.} Perhaps the most important of these was to expand their own military autonomy. Unlike in New Spain, where Amerindian troops served mostly as auxiliaries to Spanish-led battalions, in Paraguay, the Guaraní militias arose as the pre-eminent military power in the region by the mid seventeenth century.\footnote{Ganson, The Guaraní under Spanish Rule in the Río de la Plata, 47.} By that period, they were largely able to protect the region’s missions from assaults by the Spanish and mestizo colonists of Paraguay and the Río de la Plata, who, like the Paulistas, coveted the missions as concentrated pools of Guaraní labor to be exploited for their benefit.\footnote{Reff, “The Mission Frontier in Comparative Perspective,” 20; and López, The Revolt of the Comuneros, 38.} At the same time, however, they also came to serve the interests of those colonists and their representatives in the municipal council. For instance, even before receiving official permission for their armament, in 1638 and 1639 the governor of Buenos Aires, Mendoza de la Cueva, mobilized units of hundreds of highly trained and equipped Guaranís from the missions in punitive expeditions on Amerindians that had attacked the Spanish settlements of Corrientes and Santa Fe.\footnote{Mörner, The Political and Economic Activities of the Jesuits in the Plata Region, 97; and López, The Revolt of the Comuneros, 45.} Likewise, throughout the second half of the seventeenth
century, divisions of Guaraní assisted on several occasions in defending Buenos Aires against the hostile Charrúa Indians of the pampas as well as against the French.\textsuperscript{1106} Stressing the centrality of indigenous troops to the defense of Spain’s American colonies, one Jesuit priest, writing in the early eighteenth century, proclaimed that: “In the space of one hundred years, there has been almost no victory in this province which has not been made possible by the bravery and loyalty of the [mission] Indians.”\textsuperscript{1107}

Just as Spanish authorities increasingly mobilized Guaraní units in support of Spanish colonialism, Portuguese colonial authorities in Bahia likewise began officially recruiting Paulistas to advance their own aims and objectives. The newly independent Portuguese crown was well aware of the impact of Paulista entradas in extending Luso-Brazilian hegemony in the hinterland of São Vicente at the expense of that of Spain. As a result, the crown looked increasingly to the Paulistas to ensure its sovereignty in other parts of Brazil as well, especially in the wake of Portugal’s “restoration” of independence from Spain in 1640. Although largely unsuccessful in eliciting Paulista assistance for campaigns against the Dutch in Angola and Pernambuco, throughout the second half of the seventeenth century the Paulistas agreed to conduct a series of campaigns against Amerindians and African maroon groups resistant to Portuguese colonial rule.\textsuperscript{1108}

The fiercely autonomous Paulistas likely participated in such actions more for their own self-interest than for an overarching duty or desire to defend Portuguese imperial sovereignty. According to the prominent Jesuit, António Vieira, the famous expedition of 1648-1651, led by an ageing António Raposo Tavares, had a singular motive: to take

\textsuperscript{1106} Caraman, \textit{The Lost Paradise}, 104. The historian Adalberto López has asserted that, “in a period of one hundred years the Jesuit mission troops were mobilized more than fifty times by the authorities of the Rio de la Plata and the Crown,” López, \textit{The Revolt of the Comuneros}, 44-45.

\textsuperscript{1107} P. Gaspar Rodero, \textit{Hechos de la verdad, [...] en defensa de las misiones del Paraguay} (c.1733): 11.

\textsuperscript{1108} Boxer, \textit{Salvador de Sá and the Struggle for Brazil and Angola}, 174 and 254: discusses de Sá’s largely fruitless efforts to recruit the Paulistas and the Amerindian auxiliaries for campaigns against the Dutch in Angola and Pernambuco.
Amerindians “from their lands, either by force or by will, and to bring them to São Paulo, and there to make use of them as they are accustomed.” Nevertheless, Vieira lauded that enormous entrada as “one of the most notable events undertaken in the world until today.” Departing from São Paulo, Tavares and company had skirted the eastern Andes before descending the Amazon all the way to Belém, at the mouth of that great river, tracing the rough edges of the vast territory that would eventually expand even further to encompass the borders of modern Brazil.

**Conclusions**

The priests of the Spanish Jesuit province of Guairá, the mestiço residents of São Paulo, and various Tupi, Tapuia, and Guaraní groups all contributed in critical ways to shaping early Iberian expansion in South America’s southern hinterland. Notably, the crown had a minimal direct role in this process, and not solely due to its limited or overstretched resources, or to the vast distances separating the region from the centers of colonial and metropolitan power. The Jesuits and the Paulistas, while acutely aware of their position within the broader Iberian imperial world, nonetheless enjoyed substantial autonomy from royal authority thanks also to their distinct jurisdictional privileges. The two groups asserted those privileges through physical acts of expansion as well as through juridical appeals in defense of certain broader natural rights or specific local customs. Despite their remoteness on the geographical fringes of empire, both the Jesuits and the Paulistas articulated sophisticated arguments deftly attuned to broader Iberian currents of juridical, political, and theological discourse. They did so to demonstrate their obedience to their respective

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1109 Quoted in Monteiro, *Negros da terra*, 7.
1110 Ibid.
sovereigns, as well as to protect their autonomy, to justify their conduct in the eyes of God, as well as to elicit the support of higher authorities both in Iberia and in the centers of colonial power in Lima and Salvador da Bahia.

Spaniards in the region did not unanimously support the Jesuits, nor did all Portuguese in Brazil endorse Paulista aims and methods. Yet despite the specificity of their aims and the opposition they received from particular factions in their midst, the two groups emerged as the primary agents in advancing the territorial claims of their respective empires. When conflict famously erupted between the two groups yet again in the second quarter of the eighteenth century, it was not a new phenomenon, but a rekindling of latent tensions. The border agreed upon at the 1750 Treaty of Madrid marked one point of culmination within a longer process of contention that stretched back nearly two centuries.
In less than a century after the initial landings of Columbus and Cabral in the New World, Portugal and Spain had transformed from internally divided, relatively isolated polities at the edge of Europe to possess two of the most extended empires the world had ever known. The process of expansion prompted an array of new moral and legal questions requiring fresh interpretations of natural and ecclesiastical law. These debates related not only to questions of just war and conquest, but also to issues like slavery and other forms of coerced labor, the legal rights and status of non-European peoples and polities, royal versus private property rights, royal law versus local customary law, rights to monopolies on commerce and navigation, and the lawful occupation and possession of overseas territories. Portuguese and Spanish authors read each other’s work and often drew upon each other’s styles and arguments in promoting or defending the claims of their respective sovereigns. Over time, the collective interventions of Vitoria, Las Casas, Oliveira, Freitas, and countless others, steadily developed into a recognizable set of norms and legal precepts that came collectively to regulate Spanish and Portuguese imperial practice.

Alongside these debates, there emerged a distinct yet not entirely separate tradition of Iberian imperial celebration in which authors from across Portugal and the Spanish Monarchy showered their sovereigns with praise and lauded the exploits of their countrymen in extending Spanish and Portuguese influence beyond Europe. This celebratory discourse reached its crescendo around 1580, when Philip II of Spain ascended the Portuguese throne, adding that kingdom and its colonies to his already sprawling possessions. The famous 1583 medallion emblazoned with the phrase, “The World is Not Enough,” was one of many
examples of this discourse. With the incorporation of Portugal and its empire, the monarchy now claimed sovereignty over even larger parts of Africa, Asia, and America, where, in the words of the eminent Spanish chronicler and jurist Gregorio López Madera, “Roman power never reached, and which not even Alexander attempted to subject.”

Like their Spanish counterparts, many prominent Portuguese also celebrated the union for its potential in expanding the territorial reach of their common monarchy. As far away as Malacca, in 1584 the Portuguese bishop there, João Ribeiro Gaio, stressed the ease with which a joint Iberian force could conquer all the lands from India to Japan, including China. And Jorge de Lemos, a Portuguese India official, claimed the following year that the conquest of Atjeh would give Philip II the economic resources for a war to recover all Christian territory lost to the Muslims and overthrow the Ottoman empire.

These visions of global imperium, however, contrasted sharply with the realities of crown rule in many parts of the empires, as the king himself was all too aware. Moving outward from the main cities and towns that served as islands of Iberian sovereignty beyond Europe, the monarchies’ effective authority grew increasingly circumscribed. This was not simply a question of success versus failure. Some of the factors diffusing political authority were integral to the political and institutional culture of the Spanish and Portuguese monarchies, including in Europe itself, and actually served to reinforce the ultimate sovereignty of the king by restricting the jurisdiction of any one individual, faction, or institution. But in remote regions like Southeast Africa, the Philippines, and the Río de la Plata, to name just three, isolated settlers or missionaries often represented the sole Iberian presence beyond fortified enclaves. Each of these individuals maintained unique

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1112 Boxer, “Portuguese and Spanish Projects for the Conquest of Southeast Asia,” 121.
1113 Ibid. 124.
relationships to the crown, and often served as intermediaries at the vanguard in extending Iberian cultural, political, and economic influence. On the edges of empire, official agents of the crown played relatively minor roles in this process. Moreover, the initial arrival of Europeans did not mark the beginning of progressive, uninterrupted expansions of Iberian imperial sovereignty across those regions. Local indigenous, mestizo, and other non-European peoples often resisted the encroachment of imperial rule, as did missionaries and independent settlers in certain instances.

The Portuguese presence in Southeast Africa is a case in point. In the region of Mozambique Island, despite efforts to extend Portuguese rule, the crown’s effective authority remained limited to the island itself and to the farms lining the bay throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Farther south, in the Zambezi Valley, after a century or so as a tribute-paying vassal to the African ruler of Mocaranga, the Portuguese crown did eventually emerge as an independent authority by exploiting conflicts within local indigenous polities and confirming Portuguese and mestizo colonists’ ownership of territorial holdings that those colonists had amassed in years prior. Colonial officials also incentivized several of the region’s most powerful colonists to come into the imperial fold by offering them titles, either in prestigious military orders or in the formal colonial bureaucracy itself.

A similar dynamic played out in the Río de la Plata. Throughout most of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries the leading residents of São Paulo resisted certain efforts of the crown and central colonial authorities to intervene in their internal municipal affairs. But in the 1620s, as tensions mounted between Portugal and Spanish Monarchy during the later phase of the union of the Iberian crowns, the Paulistas increasingly aligned themselves with broader Portuguese interests, and several even accepted high military posts to extend and defend Lisbon’s claims to sovereignty in the region at the expense of that of
Spain. In both Southeast Africa and the Río de la Plata, powerful colonists represented an important face of Iberian expansion, skillfully leveraging their influence as intermediaries between formal colonial authorities and local African and Amerindian polities.

In all three cases, the Iberians were forced to accept the persistence of certain indigenous systems of social, political, and economic organization, despite attempts to replace them with European ones. In the Philippines, the Spanish crown sought to urbanize indigenous groups on the Spanish model. Local communities, however, including those most successfully subjugated to Spanish rule, resisted such reorganization and continued to live in their traditional barangays. The vast majority of the archipelago’s inhabitants, in fact, remained effectively beyond the reach of Spanish power altogether. In Southern Brazil, the leading settlers of São Paulo had risen to power precisely by allying with neighboring indigenous groups, intermixing with them, and integrating large numbers of indigenous soldiers within their own private armies, often by force. By the early seventeenth century, the majority of prominent Paulistas were mestiços themselves, or had entered into marriages of alliance with the daughters of powerful indigenous headmen. Their power depended not simply on the number of European settlers they commanded, but even more so on the indigenous and mestiço soldiers they could mobilize. This was especially true of the Portuguese and mestiços residents of the Zambezi Valley. Throughout the period in question, they based their power primarily on the loyalty they garnered from local indigenous allies as well as those within their ranks, most of whom were enslaved and comprised the overwhelming majority of the settlers’ total forces. In cultural terms as well, for most of the sixteenth century, their legitimacy derived first and foremost from the authority they inherited from their indigenous predecessors, and only second from their relation to the Portuguese crown.
In all three regions, the effective geographic reach of Spanish or Portuguese crown rule was imprecisely defined, in a state of continuous flux, and in some cases saw substantial contraction. Despite extending deep into the interior in the mid seventeenth century, by the 1690s the Portuguese presence in Southeast Africa had receded dramatically as the Changamire dynasty rose to eclipse the Portuguese-allied Monomotapa and expel the Portuguese from the Upper Zambezi plateau. The recession, or concentration, of Spanish rule in the Philippines was in some ways even more pronounced. Although the early phase of conquest – or “pacification” – had seemed to succeed in subjugating many Philippine indio communities with relative speed and efficiency, within decades several of those groups had thrown off Spanish rule, or relocated to the highlands beyond the sphere of Spanish authority. In the Río de la Plata too, indigenous groups forcefully opposed Iberian encroachments on their territory throughout the sixteenth century. And as late as the 1640s, despite the impressive power of both the Jesuits and the Paulistas, the conflict between these two groups left much of the interior largely unsettled and beyond the firm grasp of both Lisbon and Madrid.

In 1601, the Calabrian theologian and political philosopher Tomasso Campanella proclaimed triumphantly that given events of the past century the world now marveled at “the Spanish Monarchy for its audacity and power because it conquered so many seas and girdled the entire globe.” Campanella’s portrayal of the monarchy’s global reach was accurate in a sense. By then, having incorporated Portugal’s empire as well, the monarchy possessed colonies in Europe, Africa, Asia, and America – all “four parts of the world.”

What's more, the Iberians had linked those colonies through truly global circuits of navigation, exchange, and migration. Yet despite the mellifluous discourse of Campanella and so many other champions of Iberian imperium, the monarchy's sovereignty over and within many of its possessions was far from absolute, even at the height of Iberian global hegemony.

Beyond simply highlighting the disparity between discourse and practice, or ambition and effective rule, a focus on the limitations of empire places in sharper relief the true reach and depth of Iberian colonial authority. It illuminates the relative efficacy of strategies of imperial domination, including both institutional and discursive, ideological ones, and displays how imperial sovereignty was by nature layered, fluctuating, and uneven across space and time. It lends further nuance to scholarly understandings of how local actors navigated these invariably complex and fluid relations of power, and of how, in different moments, local actors on the peripheries of empire rearticulated concepts and discourses of Iberian and broader European law and political theory, either to affirm their obedience and belonging within the larger imperial body, or to claim authority as sources of law in their own right and defend their autonomy against the extension of crown power. It helps reveal the power of indigenous and mixed-race peoples in engaging and shaping colonial legal and political frameworks, patterns of conquest, and relations of vassalage and alliance. And it exposes the extension and maintenance of imperial rule as a continuous process of negotiation and adaptation, not only between various European actors, but also between Europeans and indigenous peoples, as a range of diverse individuals and groups balanced tendencies toward autonomy with more centripetal forces of inclusion and obedience within the larger framework of empire.
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