Integration: The Cultural Politics Of Migration And Nation In The New German Public

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Integration: The Cultural Politics Of Migration And Nation In The New German Public

Abstract
This dissertation examines public discourse on culture and integration and asks how do mediated public discussions about integration reproduce norms of national culture and identity that operate to represent and manage “Other” (immigrant, minority, etc.) populations in the German context? Through a case study approach, this dissertation uses critical discourse theory to analyze public campaigns, media events, and mediated controversies since the mid-2000s that sought to define the qualifications for cultural citizenship. Although in recent years an increasing number of publications have addressed Germany’s diverse and transnational population, examinations of processes and policies of integration have tended to focus either on the level of the government or on the level of everyday life. Although ideas about integration and multiculturalism are predominantly forged through events and the surrounding representations in the media, the mid-level processes of the media sphere have been neglected in scholarship. Using Foucault’s theories on biopolitics, I argue that integration discourse divides the population into normative nationals and candidates for integration, consisting of individuals with apparent immigrant heritage. This division sets up a neoliberal framework of perpetual evaluation that separates the productive from the threatening integration candidates while reinforcing normative foundations of Germanness. This dissertation includes three sections. The first outlines two major foundations of German national ideas: The Romantic nation represented by the idea of Heimat and the rational, Enlightenment notion of Germany as a bastion of Western values. This section examines the historical and theoretical underpinnings of these schemas of identity and the place of “new Germans” within them. The second section examines the construction of “the new Germany” in the first decade of the new millennium through the media’s celebration of immigrant patriots and the emergence of “soccer patriotism.” The three chapters in this section examine three different cases in the media that illuminate the relationship between patriotism and productivity and the role of diversity in this new national formation. The third section analyzes media events that construct boundaries separating integration successes from failures. These cases expose the continuities linking celebrations and condemnations of immigrants and new Germans.

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To my parents, who got me to the door, and to Alex, who brought me home.
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This dissertation examines public discourse on culture and integration and asks how do mediated public discussions about integration reproduce norms of national culture and identity that operate to represent and manage “Other” (immigrant, minority, etc.) populations in the German context? Through a case study approach, this dissertation uses critical discourse theory to analyze public campaigns, media events, and mediated controversies since the mid-2000s that sought to define the qualifications for cultural citizenship. Although in recent years an increasing number of publications have addressed Germany’s diverse and transnational population, examinations of processes and policies of integration have tended to focus either on the level of the government or on the level of everyday life. Although ideas about integration and multiculturalism are predominantly forged through events and the surrounding representations in the media, the mid-level processes of the media sphere have been neglected in scholarship. Using Foucault’s theories on biopolitics, I argue that integration discourse divides the population into normative nationals and candidates for integration, consisting of individuals with apparent immigrant heritage. This division sets up a neoliberal framework of perpetual evaluation that separates the productive from the threatening
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INTRODUCTION

Since the turn of the millennium, “integration” has become a dominant concept in discussions about culture, politics and demographic development in Germany. Following a trend throughout Europe, German politicians since the turn of the millennium have condemned multiculturalism, claiming that it leads to social disintegration and parallel societies. This backlash rejects the legalistic and difference-oriented approach of multiculturalism, blaming it for harming social cohesion and preventing minority groups from becoming normal and productive members of society. At the same time, critics of multiculturalism also reject the assimilationist approach that was critiqued for repressing difference during the rise of multiculturalism at the end of the 20th century. Multiculturalism is framed as the opposite of assimilationism, which is portrayed as the pursuit of equality through the stripping away of cultural difference. Integration is proposed as the humane middle ground between multiculturalist segregation and oppressive assimilationist forms of equality (Geissler & Pöttker, 2006). However, what this middle ground looks like is almost never explicitly defined. Across the political spectrum, integration is an extremely flexible signifier. As a result, integration is easily instrumentalized for diverse political, social, and economic projects.

Integration is defined in the media using, on the one hand, “examples of successful integration” and, on the other, tales and statistics of masses of “integration-refusers” and socially deficient parallel societies. Representations of immigrants and “new Germans” within integration discourse have also been crucial in creating the conception of a new cosmopolitan period in German history: one defined by unity,
tolerance, and a renewed sense of national pride. At the same time, the celebration of “beneficial” forms of difference co-exists easily with condemnations of threatening forms of difference, often within the same discussion. Although integration has emerged as an explicit political priority and as the leitmotiv of public discussions on citizenship and the national character of Germany as in many parts of Europe, the term has attracted little critical attention in scholarship.

This dissertation critically examines patterns and themes of mediated public discourse on culture and integration and its role in constructing the normative national core and managing difference. Discourse is the communicative space where meaning is produced, reproduced, and modified (see Stuart Hall, 1997a). In this regard, integration projects, campaigns, and debates have provided the framework for new constructions of German identity. The selective inclusion and celebration of minority Germans and immigrants has contributed to a new cosmopolitan version of Germanness, while at the same time obscuring structures that support the reproduction of disproportionate social and economic disadvantage among non-normative populations. Integration discourse is part of a new iteration of citizenship in Germany guided by rules of utility and productivity. This approach rejects the legalistic, rights-based approach of multiculturalism, with its focus on the right to difference. Instead, it follows biopolitical criteria that place the body and life at the center of politics (Lemke, 2011, p. 116). One becomes part of the German population by contributing to the well-being of society.

From the beginning, citizenship was a mechanism of regulating populations (Hindess, 2000). In Germany, the stability of citizenship laws and norms has been a point of consistency in a nation-state that has undergone frequent, radical change. Through
Imperial Germany, the Weimar Republic, the Third Reich, and divided Germany, the citizenship laws established in 1913 remained largely the same.\(^1\) Recent changes break this stasis on two fronts: external pressure is introduced as freedom of movement for all European Union citizens opens the possibility of poorer populations seeking opportunity in the relatively wealthy Germany, and internal pressure results from the admission of new populations of “strangers” (Simmel, 1950) to the roles of German citizenry. The actual magnitude and empirical impact of these pressures is not as important as the perception that these changes raise fundamental questions about who “we” are. As a result of these changes, latent biopolitical underpinnings of citizenship have surfaced and been made explicit through public debates on migration, integration, and patriotism.

What before was taken for granted in terms of citizenship is now explicitly considered. While the question of the correct relationship between the nation (\(Volk\)) and the German state was a perennial concern after the defeat of the fascist model of the Third Reich, the descent-based definition of German citizenship was not contentious. Whereas the primary question used to be if and how Germans can be proud to be German (as opposed to having regional pride), the question is now, “Who are we?” In the shift from the first question to the second, concern shifted from the limitation of state power over subjectivity by emphasizing the distinction between nation and state (with the final power in the hands of “the people”), to the character of the nation itself. In the space

\(^1\) An exception was the revocation and subsequent reinstatement of citizenship from Jews and other “non-Aryan” Germans during the Third Reich.
created by this shift, the State has stepped in with a new set of answers: “we” are those who act for the good of the population. “You are Germany” (see Chapter 4) when you are a productive, positive, and helpful citizen, regardless of race, religion, or ability.

The dawn of the new millennium in Germany brought the culmination of historic changes related to several forms of integration. In the decade after the reunification of East and West Germany in 1990, the unified Federal Republic solidified an external shift toward supranational economic and political integration by adopting the new currency of the European Union and by accepting of member state citizens’ rights to move and work in Germany. At the same time, Germany addressed the internal integration of foreign-nationals by providing, for the first time since 1913, territory-based jus soli citizenship for the children of long-term immigrants born in Germany. Despite the rapid growth of the foreign-national population in the post-war period, especially through guest worker programs, until 2000 a child could only acquire German citizenship by descent from a German parent. Naturalization was technically possible as of 1989, but was complicated and rare (Abraham, 2008, p. 148). Since, with the exception of voting, permanent non-national residents had the same rights and access to the same public benefits as nationals, there was little motivation to pursue naturalization. With a few notable exceptions, the naturalization policies of authorities in state governments ranged from ambivalent to obstructionist.

The citizenship law that went into effect in 2000 broke new ground by acknowledging that individuals born and raised in Germany were not, after all, foreigners. However, the late acknowledgement of immigrants and their children as a durable part of German society has also led to terminological awkwardness that persists
to the present. The terms guest worker, foreigner, migrant, and the oxymoronic foreign co-citizen (ausländische Mitbürger) have been joined by the technocratic term “person with a migration background” (Mensch mit Migrationshintergrund). More recently, the terms “new German” and “post-migrant” have emerged as emic alternatives among transnational Germans. For the purposes of this dissertation, I will generally use the term immigrants for foreign-born individuals who have settled in Germany and minority as a broad term for people of color or those with otherwise apparent non-German ancestry. These terms are also problematic and hopelessly insufficient for capturing the diverse histories and experiences of people who are not automatically identified as normative Germans. In the United States and Great Britain, the use of the term minority has been productively criticized as obscuring crucial differences between groups, as disempowering, and as supporting the normativity of whiteness (Aspinall, 2002; Cross, 2009; Okolosie, Harker, Green, & Dabiri, 2015). These debates over preferred terminology for non-normative or minoritized groups are important opportunities to assess and critique current dynamics of language and power. At the same time, a definitive answer as to the “right” way to discuss white supremacy and racial categorizations is impossible, since discourses of normativity and difference are dynamic and must be constantly revisited in context. My preference for using the heuristic terms minority and normative is meant to draw attention to the process of distinction and fragmentation, rather than to describe actual groups of people. In this sense, they are meant as shorthand for the processual terms minoritized and normalized. The emphasis on the process of fragmentation makes space for considering commonalities across national and historical contexts without necessarily erasing the particularity of each case or the phenomenological experience of this process.
While the barriers to legal citizenship for long-term immigrants and German-born people of all backgrounds have fallen significantly, their representation in the public sphere reflects the precariousness of their position in the national social imaginary. Although access to citizenship brought this population into the legal framework of the nation, national discussions about immigrants and “new Germans” have produced a hierarchy of citizenship based on “efforts at integration” (*Integrationsleistungen*). In practice, integration is used as a metonym for economic success. At the same time, integration is framed as a choice, equally available to all. To refuse to integrate is to choose a life of economic insecurity at the margins of society. The predominance of Manichean models for the representation of minority Germans allows their co-optation for the promotion of a “new colorful Germany,” even while simultaneously mobilizing the image of the “bad migrant” to promote the normative legitimacy of the values of the German majority. As such, these discussions are as much about the definition and fortification of the German nation as they are about immigrants or new Germans themselves.

This dissertation investigates the promotion and negotiation of the German nation in a new age of supra- and transnational integration. It addresses questions including: Under what conditions are new Germans—that is, those that have only been entitled to citizenship since the introduction of *jus soli* citizenship and naturalization law—celebrated and placed at the center of the national public? How has the admission of new populations into the German social body, or demos, changed the categories of belonging? Why do sports play such a prominent role in integration policy and public discussion? What role do representations of new Germans play in processes of national narration?
How is integration implicated within projects to promote a “positive” and “healthy” relationship between the population and the idea of the German nation? Encompassing these concerns, the central research question for my dissertation is:

*How do mediated public discussions about integration reproduce norms of national culture and identity that operate to represent and manage Other (immigrant, minority, etc.) populations in the German context?*

Specifically, this dissertation analyzes public campaigns, events, and mediated controversies that define the meaning of Germanness and the qualifications for national belonging. In particular, it focuses on the function of mediated discourses of culture and integration for the management and regulation of populations within Europe and its most powerful member state: Germany.

The cases examined in this dissertation include the media campaigns that promulgated patriotism in preparation for hosting the FIFA 2006 World Cup and mediated discussions celebrating “soccer patriotism” during the tournament, the media coverage of a battle between anti-nationalist activists and German flag waving immigrants in Berlin, the dueling scandals following the release of an anti-Muslim book by politician Thilo Sarrazin, and the mobilization of minority celebrities in media industry programs in the name of integration. These cases, which I will outline in more detail at the end of this introduction, represent key moments in the definition of Germany’s approach to diversity and difference in the decade following the implementation of birthright citizenship. Through these cases, I argue that the recent development of integration policy and discourse can be best understood through
Foucault’s theories of biopolitics. Thomas Lemke consolidates the shifting notions of biopolitics developed by Michel Foucault into three major uses:

First, biopolitics stands for a historical rupture in political thinking and practice that is characterized by a rearticulation of sovereign power. Second, Foucault assigns to biopolitical mechanisms a central role in the rise of modern racism. A third meaning of the concept refers to a distinctive art of government that historically emerges with liberal forms of social regulation and individual self-governance (2011, p. 34).

In relation to the first usage, integration provides an alternative to the politics of rights and contestation proposed in multicultural and deliberative democratic approaches. Instead of raising new political questions and proposing new political structures, integration eschews deliberative political engagement in favor of goals derived from social and natural scientific knowledge relating to the optimization of the life of the population (Lemke, 2011, p. 33). Consequently, integration policy focuses more on the self-governance and social regulation inherent in sports participation than on developing better forums for political contestation and complex cultural dialogue (Benhabib, 2002).

Finally, the scientific and rationalist modes of evaluation used to determine a group’s level of integration contribute to a form of colorblind racism that fragments the population into the categories of the worthy and the unworthy.

Building on Foucault’s work, Agamben argues that biopolitics implies an ongoing process of reassessment. “It is as if every valorization and every ‘politicization’ of life…necessarily implies a new decision concerning the threshold beyond which life ceases to be politically relevant…and can be eliminated without punishment” (1998, p. 139). Although Sarrazin is not calling explicitly for the death of Muslim Germans—in fact, his policy recommendations are quite moderate—he argues that their existence and
proliferation in Germany poses a fundamental threat to the nation. The implication is that for the health of the nation, Muslims who fail to “integrate” must not be encouraged to thrive. Whether the context is celebratory or condemnatory, integration involves constant reassessment. The praise of the multicultural elements of the national team in a successful tournament does not exempt differentially marked players from heightened scrutiny of their dedication in the wake of a poor performance (see Chapter 2).

Sports in Germany have provided a forum for national self-construction since their mobilization in the effort to educate and mold patriotic national citizens in the Turner Movement beginning in the nineteenth century (Krüger, 1987). With the rise of international sporting spectacles in the twentieth century, German soccer and Olympic sports became emblems of national power on the world stage—as in the 1936 Berlin Olympics—and of the recovery of national pride on the domestic level—as with the legendary upset victory of the West German national team in the 1954 FIFA World Cup. With the emergence of integration discourse, sports have once again emerged as a key forum for reconstructing German national identity in response to contemporary political and social developments. With the help of familiar narrative forms in the field of sports, integration has become a “nodal point” (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001) at the center of discourses of nationalism and Otherness. This includes a complex of different chains of association in which migration is not an action or experience, but the trace of foreignness that remains identifiable by normative society. As this cases in this dissertation show, sports and celebrity athletes emerge time and again within integration discourse. The chapters in this dissertation examine why sports provide such an effective forum for
explicating discourses of integration as part of the larger process of policing borders of national identity and managing difference.

While sports provide a key forum, it is not enough to consider integration discourse only in the field of sports. Discourse around sports and integration reveals how particular forms of difference are rendered (temporarily) valuable and apolitical. At the same time, we also need to consider how articulations of integration made explicit in sports travel within a more dispersed field of public controversies and projects targeting integration. These complementary cases reveal hierarchies and contingencies within integration discourse. By viewing these cases together, we see that while integration discourse addresses all those with identifiable traces of foreignness, it also supports a distinction between minorities, with Muslims as the paradigmatic figure of difference. Islam functions here not as a religion but as a racial distinction couched in the discourse of cultural “differentialism” (Balibar & Wallerstein, 1991).

The dichotomy of good patriotic immigrants versus problem immigrants depends on an ongoing process of reassessment in the public sphere, one where the value of persons to the nation is constantly under evaluation, depending on how well these persons fit the ideals of integration. The key idea that sets the parameters for judgment, in both celebratory and condemnatory modes, are the metrics of productivity defined in integration discourse. As such it is possible to represent a segment of the population as a threat, while still holding up and celebrating those that break the mold of their cultural group to become fully integrated members of the healthy, productive national population. This dissertation examines these associations as they emerge and reproduce themselves in the context of media spectacles and controversies. These events, and related public
campaigns, have created new national narratives based on the renegotiation of German belonging to include civic nationalism and to take advantage of internal diversity. This introduction outlines the theoretical and methodological frameworks for this dissertation, concluding with an outline of the chapters.

**Theoretical Framework**

Across Europe, the past two decades have seen a concerted backlash against multiculturalism. At the same time, integration has arisen as the new leitmotif of discourse about immigration and religious and cultural diversity both in individual countries and at the level of the European Union. To understand this convergence in European discourse, I review the ideas about universalism and particularism to identify continuities in European thought with ideas developed at the dawn of the modern age. I also consider how these discourses contribute to an apparently paradoxical double notion of culture that explains away the contradictions of capitalism as an economic system, legitimating the disproportionate cultural and political influence of European and Euro-American states. But while discussions of the negotiation of universalism and particularism dominate debates about how to manage internal diversity, a subtler form of biopolitical rationality operates in parallel to justify the acceptance of some groups and the exclusion of others according to notions of fitness. This flexible process of categorization includes multiple forms of difference, but converges with, and is ultimately inseparable from, racist projects.

*Against Multiculturalism*
In October 2010, in a statement that echoed through the German media-sphere and beyond, Chancellor Angela Merkel declared multiculturalism to be a complete failure. Although this statement was widely discussed and repeated, it is hardly original—neither in Germany nor in Europe’s other increasingly diverse countries. On the contrary, one blogger outlined “the eternal death of multiculturalism,” linking to over a dozen such proclamations by German politicians since 2001 (American Viewer, 2011). As Vertovec and Wessendorf observe, “since the early 2000s across Europe, the rise, ubiquity, simultaneity and convergence of arguments condemning multiculturalism have been striking” (2010, p. 1). In these critiques, multiculturalism has been constructed as a cohesive and dogmatic concept that fosters segregation and social disintegration by catering to immigrants and allowing them to maintain their illiberal tendencies. The frequency and strength of the multiculturalism backlash has made the word itself into a political taboo.²

At the same time, despite the excision of the term from political and policymaking discourse, throughout Europe the backlash against multiculturalism has not appreciably changed the content of policies themselves (Vertovec & Wessendorf, 2010, p. 27). In most cases, policy changes have been moderate, even as public debates have grown increasingly hot. Although, as recent European Parliament elections and the UK vote to

² For example, whereas the German government’s inaugural “National Integration Plan” from 2006 used the word “integration” 1,215 times, “multicultural” appears only 3 times, and only in adjective form (“Bundesregierung | Nationaler Integrationsplan,” n.d.).
leave the European Union suggest, heated debates and rhetoric against immigrants and, in particular, Muslims may be eroding this moderation in policy. In these debates, multiculturalism is typically rejected in favor of “integration.” As integration has become a keyword in public discussions about internal difference throughout Europe (Joppke, 2007), it has remained a concept without a definition. Integration is a signifier that does not have or need a signified to function. It is a floating signifier that “absorbs rather than emits meaning” (Buchanan, 2010, p. 173), a vehicle onto which multiple, and even contradictory, meanings are projected. Thus, the meaning it carries from case to case is reflective of the social systems that created it rather than of any essential or real phenomenon. Accordingly, within the process of national reproduction in Europe, integration discourse provides a space for national self-reflection through and against differentially marked internal populations.

Because of its fundamentally amorphous nature, integration must be examined through its mobilization: through what it does as opposed to what it is (Lentin, 2014). The fluidity of integration as a signifier is one of its strongest rhetorical characteristics. Since the concrete impact of the public discourse against multiculturalism can be difficult, if not impossible, to determine, an examination of discourses around integration or against multiculturalism may be more productively considered in terms of their contribution to the construction of public logics. By analyzing how integration is deployed in German public discourse, this dissertation provides fresh insight into how differentially marked populations are defined and discursively managed in Germany.

As the formal barriers to citizenship have become more permeable, integration discourse has contributed to new forms of “exclusive inclusion” (Ong, 2003; Partridge,
Here I am not interested in integration as a process *per se*. Nor am I concerned with determining whether it is failing or succeeding. Rather than judging the success or failure of nation-states to integrate differentially marked populations, my concern is to unravel the political and economic rationalities supported by integration discourse. In short, this dissertation explores how integration talk functions to constantly reevaluate the worthiness and value of a group or individual member, as well as to reinstate and legitimatize the normative values of the nation.

*Universalism and the Politics of Difference*

From a theoretical perspective, questions around equality and difference have traditionally revolved around the relative importance of universal human capacities and needs versus the importance of the particular identity of the individual, and by extension, the cultural group (Taylor, 2005). Both positions focus on the development of individual capacity through the realization of a coherent subjectivity, but they differ in their conceptions of the source of this true subjectivity. The cosmopolitan, universalist position emphasizes a form of unifying inner rationality that can overcome differences between individuals and groups. The particularist position emphasizes the differences between peoples as the source of the unique abilities and capacities of group members. For the former, group-based pressure to conform threatens to overwhelm the internal voice of truth that is the source of subjectivity. For the latter, unique group-based modes of thought and action enrich the soil in which the authentic self grows.

Charles Taylor outlines how this arises from a tension in the relationship between two shifts in self-conception under modernity. The first change emerged from the
collapse of honor-based social hierarchies. Against honor, the modern notion of universal and egalitarian “dignity,” or eventually “citizen dignity” took hold (2005, p. 466). The honor-based system depended on exclusivity. For honor to hold meaning, it must be accorded only to the deserving few. Dignity, on the other hand, derived its meaning from its universality. Dignity arises from the belief in the innate capacities of all people. At the same time, the subjective turn of the 18th century bound the idea of “the good” to the idea of being true to oneself. Taylor identifies Rousseau as the most influential articulator of this shift. “Rousseau frequently presents the issue of morality as that of our following a voice of nature within us. This voice is often drowned out by the passions that are induced by our dependence on others... Salvation comes from recovering authentic moral contact with ourselves” (Taylor, 2005, p. 467). As God and divine right lost their place as the source of moral and social orders, the self became the source of the good. Morality became a matter of heeding the voice of nature within us.

In this line of thought, it is a person's calling to live in an original way, not in imitation of anyone else's life. “It accords moral importance to a kind of contact with myself, with my own inner nature” (Taylor, 2005, p. 468). However, there is a fundamental conflict within the ideal of inwardly generated selves, since the very frameworks on which they depend are externally generated and dialogically maintained. Since the identity of the individual is necessarily dialogical, this identity also involves group identities. The languages of self-determination are acquired through interaction with others and, I would add, in conversation with discourses circulating in the mediated public sphere. Taylor argues that ”we define our identity always in dialogue with, sometimes in struggle against the things our significant others want to see in us” (Taylor,
This mimetic mode of self formation (Taussig, 1992) also involves the reification of the categories of difference that are organized under the banner of culture.

Building on Rousseau’s liberal Enlightenment ideals of internal morality, Herder and other German Romantic thinkers reoriented ideals of individuality to apply to differences between groups, introducing a hermeneutic circle between the cultural group and the self as the source of morality and truth. The Romantics took over Rousseau’s concept of popular sovereignty, but added to it the conviction that the source of the authentic self springs from the distinct organic nation to which the individual belongs. As William Wilson summarizes, “Herder believed that humanity was something man could achieve only as a member of a nation and that nations could arrive at humanity only if they remained true to their national characters, or souls” (1973, p. 823). This notion of progress through national self-actualization requires each nation to develop its unique abilities to contribute to the larger progress of humanity. Thus, the ideal of authenticity framed the differences between human beings as a matter of moral significance since the failure to live an authentic, fully realized life is to betray one’s duty to the nation, and by extension, humankind. However, as Robert Young (1995) shows, this conceptualization of progress through the contributions of unique national cultures also produces a fundamental paradox.

While on the one hand colonization and racial mixture are regarded by Herder as introducing a fatal heterogeneity, on the other the very progress of mankind comes as a result of diffusionism, or cultural mixing and communication, whereby cultural achievements of one society are grafted onto another. (R. Young, 1995, p. 38)
In other words, for each culture’s unique talents to contribute to progress at the level of humanity, those contributions must be picked up and incorporated into other cultures. This diffusion and the necessary hybridization that results are both necessary and dangerous to the mission of humanity as Herder conceptualizes it. Young uses Herder's work to show how the idea of culture has always been fraught, ambivalent, and divided against itself. Moreover, hybridization has always been desired and feared, characterized both as the great hope and the potential downfall of Western “civilization.”

Whereas Rousseau’s universalistic and cosmopolitan conception of culture dominated in France, as German intellectuals sought to construct the historical and social legitimacy for the unification of German speaking states, they relied on Herder’s universal national particularism as a normative foundation. These two approaches to constructing modern nationalism involve divergent positions regarding questions of difference. The liberal French position, which was famously elaborated by Ernest Renan in the late 19th century, focused on the primacy of voluntaristic association. For Renan, linguistic, historical, religious or geographic difference was not essential for the foundation of the nation (1990). In this view, the difference is irrelevant for public issues; the cultural neutrality of the public sphere ensures the freedom and equality of all citizens. The nation necessarily includes difference within its borders. However, that difference is not a threat to the nation since it is subordinated to the “daily plebiscite” through which the people identify with national memory and grant their consent to be governed.

For the German Romantic approach, however, difference posed a more complicated challenge. As Young observes, Herder considers contact—the exchange of
ideas between distinct groups—as necessary for human progress. However, difference that was deemed “out of place” or improperly consolidated posed a threat to the full realization of a people’s potential. Individuals and groups who were separated from their nation geographically, and who acquired the languages and customs of other nations were a sign of the failure of their true nation to develop its own authentic virtues. “The stability of a nation,” said Herder,

> which does not forsake itself, but builds and continues to all build upon itself, gives a definite direction to the endeavors of its members. But other peoples, because they have not found themselves, must seek their salvation in foreign nations, serving them, thinking their thoughts; they forget even the times of their glory, of their own proven feats, always desiring, never succeeding, always lingering on the threshold.” (quoted in Wilson, 1973, p. 823)

It follows that the immigrant or national minority group is doomed to permanently inhabit a liminal space, separated from their authentic selves and prevented from reaching their full potential. Instead they must languish, longing for their true selves and subordinate to the more fully actualized members of the autochthonous nation. German speaking Romantic intellectuals saw this as defining the fractured, dispersed and stateless German nation in the late 18th and 19th centuries. Although the dangerous and even genocidal possibilities of this type of national ideology became clear during the age of European fascism, Romantic conceptions of authentic, organic nations remain influential. For example, while the essentialist and eugenicist implications of this type of nationalism were harshly critiqued in the aftermath of the defeat of National Socialism, the idea of the homeland as the source of the fully actualized, authentic self persist in the idea of Heimat, which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 1.
While the development of French and German approaches to nationalism emphasize different aspects, nationalist frameworks necessarily contain both voluntaristic and primordialist elements. Attempts to draw a hard distinction between them often end up reinforcing the familiar normative distinction between bad nationalism and good patriotism (Yack, 1996). However, the tensions between and within these two lines of thought still characterizes debates over how to conceptualize and respond to diversity within the nation-state. In states where national projects have been most successful, these debates emerge most frequently in relation to debates about how to respond to national minorities and newcomers or, in Georg Simmel’s terms, “strangers” (1950). In these cases, the existence of the nation as a meaningful category is taken for granted. What is up for discussion is if, and under what conditions, strangers should be allowed to participate in and even possibly alter the national project.

*Multiculturalism and the “Universalist Masquerade”*

Among both proponents and critics of multiculturalism, the emphasis on culture as a source of authenticity and social solidarity is burdened by a moralism and an essentialism that is difficult to escape. As important as it is to maintain the “right to be different” while still confirming the right to belong (Rosaldo, 1997), public talk about cultural politics must inevitably overdetermine the outlines of culture in order to make claims. Furthermore, the “right to be different” can just as easily be mobilized from the hegemonic position to argue for the right to exclude those whose difference threatens to enter and change its authentic national culture.
As Immanuel Wallerstein argued in his influential essay, *Culture as the Ideological Battleground of the Modern World-System* (1990), the apparent paradox of the universalist and particularist conceptions of culture is actually a symbiosis. Although in different conceptions one definition may predominate over the other, both uses of culture are at work wherever cultural politics are in play. The particularist usage (usage I) defines culture as "the set of characteristics which distinguish one group from another" (1990, p. 33). This usage, which Herder emphasizes, sees culture as based on the history of each group. Each group has its own equally legitimate and historically grounded culture. The second usage (usage II) is the evaluative and hierarchical type. This is the universalist, transcendental notion of culture, the Arnoldian “sweetness and light,” which holds that the products and values of cultures (in the particularist sense) can be compared by universal measures.

Across these definitions, echoes of both Rousseau and Herder reverberate, of Enlightenment and Romanticism. While different political philosophies prioritize different uses of “culture”, Wallerstein shows how the presence of both elements is necessary for the logics of the modern political, social and economic system. Here “culture” is the idea-system that has resulted from our “collective historical attempts to come to terms with the contradictions, the ambiguities, the complexities of the socio-political system” (1990, p. 38). Wallerstein writes that

we have done it in part by creating the concept of ‘culture’ (usage I) as the assertion of unchanging realities amidst a world that is in fact ceaselessly changing. And we have done it in part by creating the concept of ‘culture’ (usage II) as the justification of the inequities of the system, as the attempt to keep them unchanging in a world which is ceaselessly threatened by change. (1990, p. 39)
Cultural politics set the parameters for how social problems are assessed and sustain the logical framework for solving problems and assessing individual agency and responsibility. This symbiotic but contradictory use of culture smooths over the contradictions within the system, occluding the fact that inequality is not simply an unfortunate byproduct of progress that will be ameliorated as the system expands, but is rather at the very heart of the system.

Thus, a belief in universalism suggests that all people are equally able to achieve success according to transcendent measures, while culture in the evaluative sense is mobilized to explain the disproportionate success of some groups over others. But as Taylor points out and Wallerstein elaborates, the universalism of modern liberal democracy has thus far been a European Universalism. “It is not that there may not be global universal values. It is rather that we are far from yet knowing what these values are. Global universal values are not given to us; they are created by us. The human enterprise of creating such values is the great moral enterprise of humanity” (Wallerstein, 2006, p. 28). Cultural politics form the foundation upon which the contemporary world economic and political system is constructed as well as the tools for its maintenance and reproduction. The move towards a more universal form of universalism requires a critical approach toward claims made about culture and difference in the public sphere.

Moving Away from Culturalism in Public Discourse

From conflicts over the permissibility of certain forms of religious dress to the right of parents to deny potentially life-saving care for children, liberal democracies face increasing challenges in navigating the terrain between recognizing the claims of
individuals or groups to maintain cultural traditions and protecting the rights of individuals whose autonomy these practices threaten. To address these cross-cultural challenges, Seyla Benhabib (2002) proposes a deliberative democratic model based on contestation and justification in the public sphere. Benhabib’s conception of publics resists automatically assigning cultural definitions to individuals over other forms of identification that they may prefer. She also resists the idea of privileging a priori the claims of ethno-cultural groups over those of other publics. For Benhabib, all groups should have an equal right to contestation. This is particularly important since the recognition of cultural claims often conflicts with the rights of disempowered groups like women and children.

In this regard, I would propose that in thinking about deliberative democracy it might be helpful to move away from “cultures” in political discussions in favor of the term publics. This would help address Benhabib’s concern about the prioritization of one group’s cultural claims over the claims of other groups. Also inherent in the idea of publics is constituency not through birth but through action. To be a member of a public is to actively engage. This is also conducive to the principles Benhabib outlines to guide multicultural pluralist arrangements: egalitarian reciprocity, voluntary self-ascription, and freedom of exit and association (2002, p. 131). As Fraser (1990) argues, multiple publics are not only possible, but essential to deliberative democracy. Benhabib’s framework promotes the kinds of communications across lines of cultural difference that Fraser sees as both problematic and highly desirable, and it does so without requiring the “bracketing of differences” that Fraser rightly criticizes in the Habermasian model. Benhabib does not advocate ignoring or suppressing differences, but instead sees the struggle to understand
difference through complex cultural dialogue as holding the answers to multicultural dilemmas.

One area of concern that Benhabib does not sufficiently address, however, is the informal impediments to equal access to the public sphere posed by social inequality. This is another aspect of the Habermasian deliberative democratic approach most frequently highlighted by critics (Fraser, 1990). Even in the absence of formal exclusions, and in a system designed to encourage the participation of multiple publics, factors related to social status impact the likelihood of less powerful groups to participate.

Margaret Kohn addresses this in her critique of deliberative democracy. Kohn asks whose voice predominates in public discourse, and answers with statistics showing that the more intensive the form of participation, the greater the tendency to over represent high-status members of society. Holding speech as the predominant medium of deliberative democracy privileges parties with the greatest command of linguistic resources. Kohn asserts that a whole repertoire of tactics must be included to achieve a more egalitarian public sphere. To bring together and expand on Benhabib and Kohn’s theories, I would argue that the key aspect of deliberation is reflective communication. There is no reason the definition of deliberation must be limited to dialogic discussion. Deliberation can take the form of political satire, grassroots mobilization, protest, or political art. It can be

3 By “intensive” Kohn and those she cites are referring to the level of active, original participation involved in a political activity. Voting, which follows strict, uniform procedures, is one of the least intensive forms. Forms that require face-to-face speech and public debate are considered the most intensive.
enacted in films or on television, in the style of tragedy, comedy, or tragicomedy. The essential characteristic that allows it to serve the cause of deliberative democracy is reflective communication. Since many of these forms are broadly accessible, they are more likely to engage a variety of affected parties. Meeting around a table or in a town hall for verbal deliberation is no less important; however, to neglect to consider other modes of deliberative communication is to see only part of the picture.

This brings me to the limitations of the present investigation. By focusing on discourse in the mediated public sphere, this dissertation analyzes only part of the picture. For the most part, the sorts of flexible and creative spaces for contestation hinted at above will not be analyzed here. The justification for this critical omission is that my interest and focus here are the strategic logics of normative, or hegemonic, publics. The contribution of this type of analysis is to help clarify the evolution of predominant forms of common sense and to highlight the strategic, rather than natural, logics that support them. It is an attempt to follow Wallerstein’s call to historicize our intellectual analysis, and

To place the reality we are immediately studying within the larger context: the historical structure within which it fits and operates. We can never understand the detail if we do not understand the pertinent whole, since we can never otherwise appreciate exactly what is changing, how it is changing, and why it is changing. (2006, pp. 82–83)

While in the present project I will not pretend to capture the totality of “the pertinent whole,” I will attempt to follow the lines of thought and knowledge from their articulation in the immediate context of public events back to the historical and systematic discourses that make them make sense. At the same time, it is important to
remember what this focus omits. The spaces of contestation outside of hegemonic discourse are myriad. Counterpublics and alternative discursive logics exist alongside and make frequent incursions into the discursive space of the normative public sphere (Fraser, 1990; Michael Warner, 2002). The focus here on the flexibility of hegemony in incorporating and taming contestations is not meant to deny the possibility of resistance and even of fundamental systemic change. As Wallerstein reminds us, the current capitalist world system is historical (2006, p. 28). Like all such systems it has a life cycle and, thus, at some point must also come to an end.

**Difference as a Matter of Productivity**

As Taylor (1999) and Wallerstein (1990) argue, the strategic logics of universalism and particularism work in tandem to smooth out the contradictions of global capitalism and to justify the hegemony of certain systems of value and knowledge. Benhabib and Kohn provide two approaches to tackling the challenges of creating space for difference in the face of the hegemony of the public sphere in the singular. They move away from questions of cultural values to assert the need to support counter-hegemonic public spheres and complex cultural dialogue. However, there is a third, and perhaps more powerful perspective at work in the discourse of integration: the biopolitical approach to governing that subverts dialogue and contestation in favor of a rational and utilitarian approach to integration.

For the biopolitical approach, the question of difference itself is not the most important issue up for discussion in debates about integration and difference. Multiculturalism holds that the right juridical framework balancing the demands of
universal equality with the right to difference can solve the problems of tensions between
groups. The rejection of multiculturalism is not necessarily the rejection of difference,
*per se*, but rather the rejection of the agonistic framework for managing difference. In
focusing on the negotiation of rights and exceptions, multicultural and deliberative
democratic approaches center on juridico-legal frameworks, focusing on particular cases
of right and wrong, of permitted and prohibited, rather than on the larger and, from the
biopolitical perspective, more crucial questions of the health and happiness of the
population. Integration discourse is not about particular conflicts or claims, but rather
about ideas of the health and vitality of society as a whole. The issues of particularism
and universalism outlined above still circulate within discussions of difference. However,
those who reject multiculturalism in favor of integration seek to replace practices of
contestation valued by proponents of deliberative democracy with a biopolitical
framework that values harmony, homeostasis, and productivity. This section outlines the
development of the biopolitical techniques and forms of knowledge most fundamental for
understanding integration as opposed to multiculturalism and deliberative democratic
approaches to negotiating difference.

Integration discourse has developed in Germany since the turn of the millennium
in reaction to the inclusion of German-born Others into the citizenry at the legal level.
However, the idea of integration as an issue does not appear for the first time in this
period. In fact, the first call in the magazine *Der Spiegel* for Germany to develop an
“integration policy” to address guest workers who were becoming “permanent guests”
appeared in a special report on social inequality in 1970 (“KOMM, KOMM, KOMM -
GEH, GEH, GEH,” 1970). Nevertheless, the imagined impermanence of the migrant
population persisted well into the 1990s, enabling a politics of denial in regards to Germany’s status as an immigrant country (see Süssmuth, 2001). It was only after citizenship law was changed in 2000 that questions of integration became a persistent public topic. Despite never having instituted a national policy regarding immigrant membership in society—multicultural, deliberative or otherwise—Germany took up the politics of integration just in time to join the wave of multiculturalism backlash crossing Europe.

Despite its almost obsessive scrutiny of differentially marked groups, integration is not primarily a way to think about difference. Multiculturalism is myopically concerned with difference: the protection thereof, its representation and recognition, and the moderation of harms that can result from making exceptions to universal norms for this purpose. In contrast, integration is concerned with difference insofar as it relates to productivity and the welfare of national society. Above all, integration is a framework for thinking about the population, about the nation delimited by the territory of the state. Integration purports to be a route towards the construction of a better, more productive population. It is also a means of conceptualizing and managing threats to the population. Both tasks use difference as their axis, but the first treats difference as a source of life while the second revolves around difference as a threat to life that must managed or neutralized. In both cases, the subject of concern is the normative population, the nation.

In contrast to multiculturalism and deliberative democracy, integration politics do not stem from the legal discourse of public rights, but instead relate to a concept of right based on productivity and a biopolitical notion of social value. Foucault (2003) correlates the development of this concept of public right with the emergence of two new forms of
power, disciplinary and biopolitical, which complement and partially displace sovereign power. Sovereignty, which traditionally belonged to the king, was the right of life and death. More precisely, it was the right to kill or let live since “sovereign power’s effect on life is exercised only when the sovereign can kill” (Foucault, 2003, p. 240). In Europe during late 18th and 19th centuries, industrialization and demographic explosion meant that sovereign power was no longer sufficient to govern the economic and political body of society. Such was the extent and rate of change that too many things were escaping the old mechanisms of sovereign power, both at the level of detail and at the mass level (Foucault, 2003, p. 249). Disciplinary mechanisms were introduced to take care of the details, to surveil and train the population. Biopolitical mechanisms were introduced to manage populations. Over the course of the 18th and 19th centuries, mechanisms of regulatory and disciplinary power extended across the domain of life, aided by the circulation of related norms. In Chapter 2 of this dissertation, I outline Foucault’s (2008) work showing how biopolitics became even more central in Germany in the postwar period as leaders in the West German Federal Republic sought a source of legitimacy for the new state. I then argue that integration is an extension of these biopolitical and neoliberal ideals through policies evaluating and managing difference.

*Race as Discursive Fragmentation: Death in a Politics of Life*

Since antagonism, war, and death can never be eliminated from the field of life, Foucault poses the question, “How can the power of death, the function of death, be exercised in a political system centered upon biopower?” (2003, p. 254). It is here that Foucault argues that racism intervenes. Foucault defines racism as “a way of introducing
a break into the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die” (2003, p. 254). Although racism existed long before the modern state, under biopolitics it becomes a technology of power. Foucault defines race not by what it is, but by its function. He defines two major functions. As an analytic of history, in the approach to history as race war, race is the means of articulating antagonisms, historical injustices perpetrated by the sovereign against the nobility, understood as a race or nation. The second function arises when the discourse of race struggle is incorporated within the state rather than oriented against it (Foucault, 2003, p. 81). Within state discourse race provides a means of fragmenting the population, of determining which populations must be made to live while others are left to die.

It also transforms the older calculation of the relationship of war that “in order to live, you must take lives.” Racism makes it possible to establish a relationship between the life of the normative population and the death of the Other that is purely civil in nature. It is not the military or warlike relationship of confrontation, but rather the rational and civic calculation of the greater good (Foucault, 2003, p. 255). It eliminates antagonism from this relationship by substituting a biological-type rationality that converts the us-them conflict into a calculation whereby as the inferior species die out, the stronger I—as a species rather than an individual—will be and the better I can live (Foucault, 2003, p. 255). It is here, according to Foucault, that state racism appears: “a racism that society will direct against itself, against its own elements and its own products. This is the internal racism of permanent purification, and it will become one of
the basic dimensions of social normalization” (2003, p. 62). In this way, racism is a requirement for the state to exercise sovereignty, which is to say, its right to kill.⁴

Following this biopolitical version of race struggle, which is internal to state function, integration discourse eliminates conflict, since it denies the deliberative, agonistic rights and representation approach. Instead, it builds its approach around supposedly objective measures of population welfare. Integration itself becomes the marker of race, the means of fragmenting the population. The population is divided into two categories in relation to integration. First, there is the category of the nation, which stands in for the population. The integration status of the national does not need to be assessed. The national, the individual representative of the population, is the normative subject whose life is an indicator of the health and well-being of the population. The national is not evaluated in relation to integration since the national is the population.

However, nationals may lose their unqualified status if they betray the evolutionary project of increasing national well-being. Although this form is rare in the cases at issue in this dissertation, this category of the failed German national emerged in the Sarrazin debate as a way to defuse the critique that Sarrazin’s book unfairly targets Muslims (see Chapter 6). To show that Sarrazin’s work is not racist, reviewers on Amazon point out that Sarrazin is just as critical of unproductive, low-intelligence

⁴ Here Foucault clarifies that with “killing,” he is not talking only about murder, but also indirect forms of death, such as “the fact of exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death for some people, or, quite simply, political death, expulsion, rejection, and so on” (Foucault, 2003, p. 256).
Germans. However, this practice of separating the unproductive members from the valuable nationals is consistent with the population fragmentation Foucault outlines as part of state racism. The place of these unproductive nationals is illustrated by the trope of the *Asozialen*. The Duden dictionary defines *asozial* as 1) incapable of life in society, not fitting into society; living on the margins of society; 2) damaging to community, society; or 3) possessing a low intellectual, cultural level; uneducated and ill-bred (“asozial,” n.d.). A *Asozial*, or the slang version, *assi*, indicates a type of person who is harmful to society. Currently, it is primarily used in slang form as an insult.

This term emerged in politics and jurisprudence in the early 20th century. The category of the *asozial* emerged as inseparable from hereditary and eugenicist thought. Under National Socialism, it was used to describe and then deport to concentration camps a category of social undesirables that included the heterogeneous groups of vagrants, beggars, mentally ill, alcoholics, addicts, work-averse (*Arbeitsscheuen*), nutritionally deficient, and prostitutes. Sinti and Roma were also grouped within the category of “*Asozialen*” (Willing, 2003, p. 1). The term continues to be used today in relation to the same referents. The *Asozialer* is not only outside the norms of society, but actually threatens the well-being of society or the population at large. In addition, they are often blamed for other social ills, such as racism and xenophobia (see Conclusion), relieving normative society of the burden of answering for the violence of the fragmentation of integration discourse. This term shares much with the American derogatory term “white trash,” both in terms of its present day usage and its emergence in 20th century eugenicist thought (see Newitz & Wray, 2013). The tropes of the *asozial* and of white trash disqualify individuals or classes from belonging to the category of society or the national.
As such, their life is no longer an indicator of the health of the population, but rather exists as a threat to the health of the population.

Giorgio Agamben’s work on biopolitics helps to explain not only these continuities between contemporary liberal democratic social categories and those of early 20th century totalitarianism, but also the fundamental stakes involved in rights, political membership, and the construction and evaluation of social groups. Agamben argues that liberal democracy, using the juridical framework of rights, includes from its outset the possibility for totalitarianism. In the creation of the rights and protections of citizenship, the modern state created a new form of exception: the condition of statelessness. Through citizenship rights based in national membership, the nation-state separates bios—political life—from zoe—natural life. This separation creates a “zone of indistinction” and a form of life that lies beyond the protections of the political, but which, under conditions of modernity, cannot return to a natural form of life. This is what Agamben refers to as bare life—life that has been stripped of all other qualities except for life itself (1998, p. 171).

Furthermore, Agamben argues that it is not the qualified life of the citizen that modern democracy has situated as its referent. Instead, it has affirmed bare life (the right to life, health, happiness, satisfaction of needs) as the fundamental subject of politics. Politics under biopolitics is concerned with the determination of the value or nonvalue of life itself. This process of determination involves an ongoing process of boundary definition beyond the formal legal distinctions established in citizenship norms.

Citizenship is invested with the task of optimizing life. Citizenship, and the right to issue, withhold, or revoke it, “names the new status of life as origin and ground of sovereignty” (Agamben, 1998, p. 129). The importance of citizenship relates to what
Agamben sees as one of the essential characteristics of modern biopolitics: “its constant need to redefine the threshold in life that distinguishes and separates what is inside from what is outside” (1998, p. 131). The implications of this became clear when, after the start of WWI, many European states introduced juridical measures allowing for the mass denaturalization and denationalization of portions of their populations who were considered unworthy or as enemies of the nation. This reached its culmination with the Nuremberg laws of fascist Germany, which concretized “the principle according to which citizenship was something of which one had to prove oneself worthy and which could therefore always be called into question” (Agamben, 1998, p. 132). Here we can see that the fate of the racialized Other and the unworthy or asozial citizen converge as easily under democracy as within totalitarianism. In the process of ongoing evaluation, both can be reduced to bare life, that is, to life without political value. This process is so central, that Agamben situates the work of answering the question of what is national (German, French, American, etc.) as a critical political task of biopolitics. In fact, Agamben argues that under most radical manifestation of the biopolitical regime, the German Third Reich, the answer to the question “Who and what is German?” coincided directly with the highest political task (1998, p. 130). This illustrates starkly how the work of belonging, of defining and refining the essential nature of national life, cannot be separated from the definition of life without political value.

Generations after the defeat of the Third Reich and the return of liberal democracy to Germany, the question of who and what defines Germanness has continued as a fundamental political preoccupation. Through the inclusion of immigrants and their descendants within the political body of the nation in 2000, the question of what
constitutes Germany and Germans arose again with new urgency. This dissertation analyzes attempts to answer this question in the public sphere. Agamben argues that "in modern biopolitics, the sovereign is he who decides on the value or nonvalue of life as such" (1998, p. 142). Consequently, it is essential to focus on the institutions and individuals positioned to assume the role of the sovereign and define who and what the nation is, and the relative value of different forms of life for the national body. This work is done above all within the mediated public sphere. Integration has emerged as one of the fundamental tools in process of defining new norms for these “new Germans.” Lemke has argued that “biopolitics is essentially a political economy of life” that goes beyond the state and the juridical order (2011, p. 60). It is this political economy of life that motivates the ongoing process of evaluation that divides integrants from nationals and separates the worthy from the asozial.

Study Design and Data Corpus

Examinations of processes and policies of integration have tended to focus either on the level of the government (Guild, Groenendijk, & Carrera, 2009; Joppke, 2007; Penninx, 2005), or on the level of everyday life. Several ethnographic works on this topic move between the macro and interpersonal levels, analyzing not just integration but also the disjunctures between cultural policies aimed at managing difference and the lives and practices of the minority groups who are the focus of those policies (Hinze, 2013; Partridge, 2012). However, the mid-level processes of the public sphere have largely been ignored, or only considered in passing. At the same time, as a number of scholars have observed, ideas about integration and multiculturalism are largely forged through
events and the surrounding discussions in the mediated public sphere (Lentin & Titley, 2011; Vertovec & Wessendorf, 2010). This dissertation examines major events focused on defining German identity and the place of diversity within it that took over the mediated public in Germany since the turn of the millennium. It will also examine several smaller, splinter events connected to these larger instances of media attention.

The primary source of empirical data for this dissertation is press coverage in the print media, in addition to the content and documentation of public service campaigns and projects, policy documents, and entertainment programs. Although industry experts have recently announced the arrival of the global newspaper crisis in Germany (Doctor, 2013; Schnibben, 2013), print media remain at the center of the increasingly diverse German media sphere. Print holds a particularly influential place in the German mediated sphere based on two important indicators: First, journalists from across the field regularly consume print sources more frequently than other media; second, print sources are cited more frequently across the media sphere than other media.

The main criteria for selecting which periodicals to analyze for the print media portions of this dissertation were the sources’ influence among journalists and their influence on other media as indicated by the number of citations they generate. According to the most recent large-scale study on the state of journalism in Germany, the largest proportion of journalists are employed by newspapers (Weischenberg, Malik, & Scholl, 2006). The same study showed that media professionals regularly consume print media more frequently than other media. Among the representative sample of media professionals surveyed, 35% and 34% of journalists regularly read the SZ and Der Spiegel respectively. This compares to 19% who regularly watch the news program the
Tagesschau on the public broadcaster ARD (Weischenberg et al., 2006, p. 359). The list of periodicals most regularly read by journalists that appears in this survey was used to determine the primary periodicals of interest for this dissertation. In descending order, the top 11 periodicals read by journalists were the Süddeutsche Zeitung, Der Spiegel, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Die Zeit, the Bild, Die Tageszeitung, Stern, Focus, Die Welt, the Frankfurter Rundschau, and the Handelsblatt. The fact that media professionals who are producing content are consuming these print sources most frequently suggests that they are a critical site for analyzing public discourse in Germany.

Furthermore, in terms of overall citations within the media sphere, from July 2009 to December 2013 just two print sources, Bild and Der Spiegel, garnered over 40% of all citations in the media. The only non-print outlets to make the top ten cited sources were the public service broadcasters ARD and ZDF with 7% and 5% of citations (PMG Presse-Monitor, 2014). Together, in descending order, the online and print versions of the periodicals the Bild, Der Spiegel, the Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ), the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (F.A.Z), Die Welt, Focus, the Handelsblatt, and Stern garnered 87% of all media citations in 2013 (PMG Presse-Monitor, 2014). This suggests the strength of print’s influence as the medium of reference across the media sphere. Audience numbers

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5 These periodicals have different rules for capitalization. I have decided to adopt the common German rules for capitalizing titles. Where articles (die, der, das) are included as official part of the periodical’s title, I have included the German article as part of the title. For newspapers that do not use an article in their titles, I have used the English article. For magazines that do not include the article in their title, no article is used.
also back up the importance of print. The most popular television news show, the *Tagesschau* regularly reached 5.34 million viewers in 2010 (Schröder, 2010), while *Bild* had 12.31 million readers in 2012, according to the media research group Media-Analyse. While television news is also very popular, print is still the primary medium in Germany both in terms of audiences and resonance. Print media are the center of public deliberation and the primary space for the development of major arguments of national significance. In addition to print media, I examine institutional structures, policy documents, audio-visual and print publicity materials as well as examples from entertainment media.

**Search Methodology**

Access to the archives of the most important German print media is difficult outside Germany. The only periodical that maintains a fully accessible, comprehensive online archive is *Der Spiegel*, which includes facsimile versions of all print articles beginning with their first issue in 1947. Articles from *Spiegel Online*, which has been producing original content since 1996, are also available in the archives. There is no single newspaper database available that maintains a comprehensive electronic archive of the most important sources of German print news. The best online archive of German periodicals is maintained by GBI-Genios, which provides a university-oriented subscription service called Wiso. Wiso includes access to 180 German print news sources, not including the *Bild*, the F.A.Z., or the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*. The only available option for access to an electronic archive of the *Bild* is to search the newspaper’s website, which includes a limited electronic archive. The *Süddeutsche*
Zeitung and the F.A.Z. each provide subscription-based access through university libraries. I accessed Wiso and the full archives of the Süddeutsche Zeitung and the F.A.Z. by visiting the library at the Free University in Berlin.

Table 1: **Top Periodicals Read by Journalists and Description of Available Access**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Percentage of Journalists Who Are Regular Readers</th>
<th>Type of Access</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Süddeutsche Zeitung</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Full access (library)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Der Spiegel</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Full access (online)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (F.A.Z.)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Full access (library)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Die Zeit</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Full access (WISO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bild</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Partial access (online)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Die Tageszeitung</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Full access (online)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stern</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Full access (WISO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Full access (WISO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Die Welt</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Full access (WISO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frankfurter Rundschau</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Full access (WISO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Times Deutschland (ceased publication 2012)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Full access (WISO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handelsblatt</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Full access (WISO)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to capture a variety of content produced by periodicals with a cross-section of political orientations, I focused on the top newspapers regularly read by German media professionals (Weischenberg et al., 2006). This list also contains the highest circulating news and information periodicals and the most frequently cited sources across the media sphere (PMG Presse-Monitor, 2014). These sources include a wide range of political orientations. Rather than claiming to be apolitical or completely impartial, news periodicals in Germany acknowledge their political orientation. The selected periodicals represent a mix of perspectives, from center-right (Bild, Focus) and neoliberal, center-right (F.A.Z., Handelsblatt, Die Welt), to center-left (Süddeutsche Zeitung, Der Spiegel, Die Zeit, Stern, Frankfurter Rundschau). The Bild provides insight into the conservative, populist German public sphere, while the other sources form the backbone of Germany’s quality press. In addition, the cooperatively owned Tageszeitung, which has the smallest circulation of all the selected periodicals, represents one of the most critical and progressive perspectives among legacy media in Germany. The diversity of editorial orientations across these sources capture a broad range of mainstream perspectives on the issues under study. For cases that produced a corpus that was either too large to submit to detailed textual analysis or too small to get a full sense of the case, the list of periodicals searched was limited or expanded accordingly. The specific searches used and the rationale behind alterations of the periodical list are explained in each chapter.

Methodology: Discourse Theory and Analysis
As Ernest Renan argued in his seminal theory of nationalism, "the essence of a nation is that all individuals have many things in common, and also that they have forgotten many things" (1990, p. 11). But who decides on the form those commonalities should take? How is it determined which are the things to be discarded in the construction of social and political solidarity? As the age of authoritarianism waned in the late 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries and the democratic nation-state established itself as the most important level of political organization in the West, maintaining a minimal level of consent of the governed became the major problem of the national elite. As such, “the battle for nationhood” became “a battle for hegemony, by which a part claims to speak for the whole nation and to represent the national essence” (Billig, 1995, p. 27). This process entails the construction of a national identity, through which representatives, by virtue of shared nationhood, are anointed with legitimate social authority. However, as Laclau and Mouffe (2001) have shown, identity can only be constructed negatively through emphasizing the construction of frontiers built upon the distinction from others. Since these constructions are permanently contingent and perpetually vulnerable to the challenge of competing rearticulations, normative groups must constantly reproduce the “chains of equivalence” that support their attempts to establish their versions of “truth” as normal.

Consequently, the construction of Others, both within and beyond the boundaries of the nation-state, is intimately related to the construction and maintenance of the collective authority of a normative national group. What we are must regularly be defined by who we are not. Furthermore, the successful articulation of a hegemonic discourse leads to the naturalization, and therefore the disappearance, of the normalized
subject position. The analysis of these processes requires a theoretical and methodological approach that locates and unpacks operations of power at the level of their everyday reproduction. Discourse analysis, in its various forms, encompasses a variety of methods and analytical forms that relate a specific case or event to the larger structures that shape them. As Foucault pointed out, "in appearance, speech may well be of little account, but the prohibitions surrounding it soon reveal its links with desire and power" (1971, p. 9). In the next section, I outline some of these approaches to discourse analysis, from its origins in linguistics to its adaptation in service of macro-level social and political analysis.

Development of Discourse Analysis

Discourse Analysis, in its many forms, emerged from the union of poststructuralist literary theory with critical linguistics beginning in the 1970s. At the time, a divide had been growing between linguists interested in an increasingly abstract and mathematical notion of language and those primarily interested in how language shapes subjectivity and social reality. Debates on subjectivity in the analytic philosophy of language and in literary studies have continued to diverge, the former focusing on increasingly technical and abstract modeling and logical analyses of form which have little practical value for the hermeneutics of desire and difference that concerns the latter (Lee, 1997).

While critical linguistics increased the attention toward social and metalinguistic forms, that is, "linguistic forms used to talk about and represent discourse" (Lee, 1997, p. 11) including reported speech, quotation, and indirect discourse, the founders of Critical
Discourse Analysis (CDA) were concerned that sociolinguistics still paid too little attention to issues of power and social hierarchy. Coming from diverse disciplines, these scholars, including Norman Fairclough, Ruth Wodak, and Teun van Dijk, sought to further open textual and discourse analysis to take advantage of the methods and insights of multiple disciplines. According to Wodak (2001), most approaches to CDA have at their foundation the social semiotic approach of Michael Halliday’s systemic functional grammar.

Halliday distinguished three metafunctions of language that are continuously interconnected: Firstly, the ideational function through which language lends structure to experience (the ideational structure has a dialectical relationship with social structure, both reflecting and influencing it); secondly, the interpersonal function which constitutes relationships between the participants; and thirdly, the textual function which constitutes coherence and cohesion in texts (Wodak, 2001, p. 8). Halliday’s structural framework, while based in linguistics, leaves room to approach these problems from a number of perspectives. Developing these insights, Fairclough argues for a theoretical perspective on language and more generally semiosis (including ‘visual language’, ‘body language’, and so on) as one element or ‘moment’ of the material social process, which gives rise to ways of analysing language or semiosis within broader analyses of the social process. (2001b, p. 121)

CDA analyzes texts and interactions, but it does not start from texts and interactions. It starts, instead, from problems that people face in their social lives and social issues that are taken up within sociology, political science and/or cultural studies.

While practitioners of CDA make social hierarchy and power their central concern, some scholars in cultural and media studies argue that CDA maintains a
linguistic bias towards micro-level discourse. Bloomaert and Bulcaen argue that "CDA is still burdened by a very “linguistic” outlook, which prevents productive ways of incorporating linguistic and nonlinguistic dimensions of semiosis” (2000, p. 461). To move beyond narrow conceptions of textuality, they propose “a more ethnographically informed stance, in which linguistic practice is embedded in more general patterns of human meaningful action” (2000, p. 461). Furthermore, Threadgold (2003) holds that theory and method cannot be divorced, and thus, a sustained engagement with critical theory should be taken as fundamental for methods pertaining to critical discourse analysis.

In order to more effectively illuminate structural levels of power as they operate in media texts, Carpentier and De Cleen (2007) propose an approach they call Discourse Theory and Analysis (DTA). DTA has much in common with Critical Discourse Analysis, including a fundamental commitment to understanding power relations in society and working towards emancipation. However, whereas CDA is more concerned with micro-level linguistic analysis, DTA uses Laclau and Mouffe’s (2001) discourse theory to focus on a broader definition of text considering also non-linguistic forms. DTA also utilizes a macro-contextual approach which refers “to the social as the realm where the processes of the generation of meaning are situated” (2007, p. 277). While practitioners of various forms of discourse analysis often make divergent claims about the relative importance of the textual at the micro-level, and the intertextual at the meso- and macro-levels, approaches to discourse analysis utilize a hermeneutic approach, which seeks to understand structural elements of the formation of the social subject by focusing on concrete events, embodied, mediated or both. As Fairclough writes, "the reason for
centring the concept of ‘social practice’ is that it allows an oscillation between the perspective of social structure and the perspective of social action and agency” (2001a, p. 27). In this way, discourse analysis shares much with interpretive ethnographic approaches to culture and society, which conceive of culture as “webs of significance” (Geertz, 1977, p. 5).

Although not traditionally situated within methodologies of discourse analysis, some of the most productive approaches to the oscillation between structure and action can be found in interpretive ethnography. Although Fairclough does not reference him in relation to the idea of “social practice,” Bourdieu’s early ethnographic work was foundational in outlining the structure-practice nexus. Contrary to objectivist and structuralist approaches popular in mid 20th century anthropology, Bourdieu (1977) argues that in homogeneous societies it is not explicitly understood rules that govern practice, but rather “practical knowledge, based on the continuous decoding of the perceived—but not consciously noticed—indices of the welcome given to actions already accomplished” (1977, p. 10). This perpetual mechanism of checks and corrections ensure the adjustment of practices to meet the expectations of other social agents.

This mechanism functions implicitly, without the need for active reflection or theorization on the part of agents. It is a “discourse of familiarity that leaves unsaid all that goes without saying” (1977, p. 17). Bourdieu critiques anthropologists who, when asking informants to express what is implicit, take the explanations as reflective of the informant’s process. In actuality, by turning practical knowledge into semi-theoretical explanations in response to outsider questioning, informants reduce and unintentionally conceal the true depths of practical knowledge (1977, p. 19). Instead, Bourdieu proposes
that social analysts focus on the construction of “the principle which makes it possible to account for all the cases observed…This construction, and the generative operation of which it is the basis, are only the theoretical equivalent of the practical scheme which enables every correctly trained agent to produce all the practices and judgments of honour called for by the challenges of existence” (1977, p. 11). The implicit background principles guiding background practices, which are known to all and are reproduced and developed socially, provide both structure and space for strategic maneuvering. And yet, “the imposition and inculcation of the structures is never so perfect that all explicitness can be dispensed with” (1977, p. 19). In fact, inculcation through some form of objectification in discourse or through the symbolic support of emblems and rituals is “one of the privileged moments for formulating the practical schemes and constituting them as principles” (1977, p. 20). Thus, examining these instances of inculcation can reveal much about the otherwise largely implicit principles guiding practice.

Discourse and the Social: Analyzing Fixity and Dispersion

Laclau and Mouffe (2001) provide a set of tools to help apply these insights about social practice and the invented nature of any articulation of culture to the analysis of advanced capitalist societies. The apparently more complex and fragmented nature of these societies as compared to their traditional counterparts is the result of the fundamental asymmetry “between a growing proliferation of differences—a surplus meaning of ‘the social’—and the difficulties encountered by any discourse attempting to fix those differences as moments of a stable articulatory structure” (2001, p. 98). While in more homogenous societies the knowledge of practice, or “the social,” remains largely
implicit, in heterogeneous societies the multiplicity of forms of the social raises difficulty for those attempting to maintain their definition of the normal. It becomes more difficult for the hegemonic group to “conceal from itself its own truth” and inscribe in objectivity its representation thereof (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 22). Thus, increasing polysemy in heterogeneous societies puts pressure on discursive structures that “the social” attempts use to create the identity of society.

Laclau and Mouffe show that discourse is the ultimately futile attempt to tame and fix this surplus meaning of the social. Through the concept of overdetermination, they focus on every form of fixity as the object of critique. One possible conclusion from Althusser’s early mobilization of the idea of overdetermination—the one that Laclau and Mouffe aim to recover—is that every formulation of society is necessarily an overdetermination. Overdetermination is the means by which the social constitutes itself as a symbolic order. For Laclau and Mouffe, overdetermination is the process of creating symbolic order by fixing a privileged meaning from the manifold possible meanings. "Society and social agents lack any essence, and their regularities merely consist of the relative and precarious forms of fixation which accompany the establishment of a certain order" (2001, p. 98). The attempts at fixation will always remain partial since “the presence of some objects in others prevents any of their identities from being fixed” (2001, p. 104). Discourse is a battle against the surplus of meaning that can only ever partially succeed. This “surplus” is the terrain of every social practice - the field of discursivity (2001, p. 111). "Any discourse is constituted as an attempt to dominate the field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of differences, to construct a center” (2001, p. 112). They call the “privileged discursive point of this partial fixation, nodal points"
Thus, although Laclau and Mouffe argue for a critique of every form of fixity, they do not deny the existence of fixity absolutely. Fixity can succeed to greater or lesser extents, but can never succeed definitely. Thus, despite great efforts to hold onto a coherent idea of society,

society never manages to be identical to itself, as every nodal point is constituted within an intertextuality that overflows it. The practice of articulation, therefore, consists in the construction of nodal points which partially fix meaning; and the partial character of this fixation proceeds from the openness of the social, a result, in its turn, of the constant overflowing of every discourse by the infinitude of the field of discursivity. (2001, p. 113)

The partial successes of articulation provide an always incomplete, impermanent and imperfect, but still potent sense of society. Just as a complete form of fixity is impossible, it is also not possible to do away with fixity altogether. To do so would be to do away with the conditions of possibility of social practice and even the social altogether.

This notion of the discursive field complements Foucault’s archeo-genealogical approach to discourse. In The Archeology of Knowledge, which was originally published in 1969, Foucault instructs that the first step for analyzing discourse is to question familiar categories or groupings and other notions that provide continuity through ready-made syntheses. "All these syntheses that are accepted without question must remain in suspense" (2002, p. 28). Foucault seeks to unsettle the tranquility with which familiar nodal points are accepted. Like Laclau and Mouffe’s exhortation to critique every form of fixity, Foucault is not arguing that they should be definitively rejected. However, the first step to understanding the operations of hegemony is to question the forms of knowledge, the common sense that it supports.
According to Foucault, we must show that these categories and continuities “do not come about of themselves, but are always the result of a construction the rules of which must be known, and the justifications of which must be scrutinized” (2002, p. 28). The kinds of rules Foucault is talking about are not the juridical form imagined by traditional structuralists that sees practice as a form of obedience to the rules. It is “rule” in the polysemic sense, as Bourdieu also proposes (1977, p. 27). Beyond the explicitly stated and recognized form expressed in the idea of norms, Bourdieu reminds us to consider rules also in the form of theoretical models, or as a scheme immanent in practice. So, in summary, the first step in analyzing discourse is to unsettle and examine the foundations of its unity and continuity and ask under what conditions this unity is made legitimate. Once having taken it apart, we have to ask if it can be put back together again, or whether it could be reformed in another way.

Given their privileged position in formulating narratives, in selecting from the universe of events fragments to portray, analyze and publically disperse, the media are a prime site of analysis for discourse theory. Yet, according to Carpentier and De Cleen, relatively few studies of the media have used discourse theoretical analysis. Instead, studies of media discourse have been primarily undertaken under the more linguistically oriented Critical Discourse Analysis. Despite the common ground between these approaches, Carpentier and De Cleen argue that discourse theory allows analysis of the media to move beyond “talk and text in context,” to use Van Dijk’s formulation, to consider non-linguistic aspects of discursive formations.

Perhaps the most crucial allowance of discourse theory and analysis’s broader approach is the theoretical support it provides “for the in-depth analysis of the
construction of political identities, embedded in the sociology of conflict and antagonisms” (Carpentier & De Cleen, 2007, p. 278). Although CDA offers better tools for the analysis of the specificities of language and form, in their comparison of discursive approaches for analyzing subject formation Jørgensen and Phillips conclude that “critical discourse analysis has the least developed understanding of self and identity (2002, p. 146). Since my interest in this dissertation is focused more on how public representations create and reinforce ideas of society, a discourse theoretical approach provides the most focused framework for identifying points of fixity and pulling at their seams to examine their constituent parts and to ask how it might be otherwise.

**Chapter Outline**

**Part I: German National Ideas**

The first section of this dissertation outlines two frameworks of identity formation that inform basic assumptions about selfhood and belonging at various scales: the affective Romantic and the rational Universalist. As was argued above, the particular and the universal are both necessary to conceptualize and reproduce the particular disjunctive hyphen of the nation-state. In the German case, the “twin concepts of power state and romantic nation are constitutive but not fused” (Wæver, 2005, p. 39). The first chapter analyzes the conception of the nation through the German idea of *Heimat* (homeland). The second chapter traces the emergence of integration projects, relating them to the development of forms of national identity and state sovereignty based on rationalistic economic imperatives after World War II. Both sections consider the relationship
between normative and non-normative populations in each of these modes of collective subjectivity.

Chapter 1 examines how the concept of Heimat (homeland) has helped to stabilize the German sense of nationhood and national subjectivity across periods of political rupture. While changes in German citizenship law have gradually extended formal citizenship to those outside the imagined autochthonous population, informal mechanisms of normative citizenship reproduce the category of the stranger, or the candidate for integration, across generations. This chapter analyzes how the notion of Heimat has functioned in post-war Germany in conservative and leftist narratives of the past to separate the personal from the political in memory of past atrocity. It also looks at the subtle ways that Heimat excludes non-normative citizens from participation in collective memory and, thus, from full membership in the national citizenry.

Although Germany is traditionally seen as a paradigmatic example of particularistic forms of national identity, the implementation of birthright to citizenship in 2000 has required the renegotiation of national belonging. Chapter 2 explores the development of integration discourse as a means of including and simultaneously managing diversity within the German population. Sports, and above all soccer, have played an important role in the conceptualization of integration. I analyze documents from the Federal Government, the German Olympic Sports Confederation, and the German Soccer Association to explain the symbolic and practical value of sports in integration discourse. This chapter argues that integration discourse is an extension of biopolitical and disciplinary technologies for constituting and governing the national
population, which have been a fundamental part of the national project since the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949.

Part II: Integrants and the New Germany

This section examines the new forms of public relationships to the national that have emerged in Germany since 2000. Since the first German state was established in 1971, there have been many “new Germanys.” In fact, since its foundation as a state every generation has lived through the foundation of at least one new iteration of Germany, from the rise of the Third Reich to Reunification. However, the newest Germany, based on the inclusion of immigrants and their children, is the first to include “new Germans” (Bota, Özlem, & Pham, 2012; Ezli, 2014). This section examines how hosting one of the world’s greatest sporting spectacles contributed to a renaissance of German symbolic nationalism and how the participation of “new Germans” has been invoked by the media to create a break from the traumatic past. In this process, the media frames integration and national pride as fundamental to the health and wellbeing of the national population.

Global sporting spectacles provide an ideal forum for the “repatriation of difference” (Appadurai, 1990, p. 307) and construction of the symbolic power of the nation brand. This is particularly salient for the host nation. In 2006, Germany hosted its first FIFA men’s World Cup since reunification. The desire for a renewed German pride has long been stymied by the specters of German nationalisms of the past. Where past efforts had failed, Chapter 3 examines how the 2006 World Cup finally succeeded in breaking the perceived taboo against the public expression of overt national pride. At the
same time, in the period leading up to the tournament, integration reached an unprecedented level of importance in public policy and in the media. In 2004 the first law governing immigration went into effect (Zuwanderungsgesetz). For the first time, in this law “integration” became a matter of law. In both national self-reflection and integration discourse, sports emerge repeatedly as a source of narrative and symbolism. Mentions of the 2006 World Cup are often accompanied by passionate declarations about its personal and national significance, evoking themes such as pride, freedom, national cohesion, and the feeling of joining the world of “normal” nations. During the 2006 World Cup, football was proposed as a model for national engagement. The first case study analyzes how the features and expectations of this event were mobilized to legitimate a change in German practices of symbolic nationalism.

In preparation for the tournament, several national media campaigns were rolled out in a coordinated effort to use the wave of enthusiasm for one of the world’s largest and most popular sporting events to usher in a new era of patriotism. The largest and most successful of these projects was the social marketing campaign under the slogan, Du bist Deutschland (“You Are Germany”), which is the focus of Chapter 4. The initial campaign was one of several campaigns focused on promoting Germany developed in the year running up to the 2006 World Cup in Germany. A related campaign, “Germany—Land of Ideas” focused on promoting German innovation and industrial prowess to take advantage of the global attention that hosting the World Cup would attract. But unlike the international focus of the “Land of Ideas” campaign, Du bist Deutschland was focused entirely on creating a “positive mood” and stimulating national sentiments among the German population. This campaign illustrates the internal component of nation branding,
which follows from the imperative to secure the buy-in of citizens for the success of national projects of self-representation on a global stage. In the case of Germany, this required the neutralization or at least the suspension of complicated domestic politics of memory around national symbols and sentiments. By successfully executing this spectacle following the established script for global sporting events, Germany was fulfilling its duty as host. In this way, the global sporting spectacle of the World Cup provided both the means and the justification for remaking German national pride. Given the almost universal participation of German media companies in the campaign, as well as the indirect support of the government and industrialists through Partners for Innovation, Chapter 4 investigates the kind of idealized national construction imagined by leaders in German industry, media, and politics.

After the 2006 FIFA men’s World Cup hosted by Germany re-established the practice of public displays of national affiliation there, flag-waving became an almost obligatory national sports tradition in the 2008 Euro Cup and again in the 2010 World Cup. As commentators in the media enthused, the multi-ethnic German national team of the 2010 World Cup inspired transnational Germans and immigrants to join in the patriotic displays in greater numbers. Chapter 5 discusses a heavily mediated flag fight between immigrant patriots and anti-nationalist Germans during the 2010 World Cup, which exemplified the symbolic and pedagogical value of immigrant patriotism for the promotion of a civic form of nationalism. The story of the display and adamant defense of one of Germany’s largest flags by Lebanese immigrants in Berlin attracted national and international attention. The story was framed in the media as a surprising reversal of the expected: the flag’s attackers were ethnic Germans and its defenders were hyphenated
Germans. Yet, the story is framed not only as a surprising reversal, but also as a critique of many Germans’ distrust of symbolic patriotism. The fervor of the Lebanese-German patriots is projected as a lesson to normative Germans about patriotism as a healthy and natural form of social cohesion that is compatible with—and even necessary for—the functional development of diverse societies.

This kind of instrumentalization of national sports teams and global sporting spectacles is by no means unique to Germany. As Laurent Dubois (2010) shows, the 1998 World Cup victory in a tournament hosted in France was celebrated as the victory of the “black, blanc, beur” (black, white, and Arab) team. The team represented the colonial history and postcolonial present and future of France. The team’s diversity was subjected to intense scrutiny, and was held as a symbol of the transformation of French society. Like the French case, the German team was converted into a symbol of positive change in German society. Moreover, the change in the makeup of the national team was used to symbolize a break with the past. In both cases, international sporting events provide a forum and a symbolic focal point for reckoning with the past and constructing an idealized national trajectory. Unsullied by associations with nationalist crimes of the past, immigrant patriotism authorizes and invites normative citizens to participate in normalized forms of nationalist expression.

Part III: “Failures” of Integration

The two chapters in this final section analyze the construction and fortification of divisions between citizens and integrants, between integration failures and successes. They demonstrate how divisions made using biopolitical logics fracture the population so
that the power to make live can be optimized by confining social ills to particular segments of the population. While national pride and sporting integration define the optimal forms of life for Germans and worthy integrants, this section investigates various means for the assessment and condemnation of unfit populations. The precariousness of the support of the new cosmopolitan Germany that was touted during the flag fight was thrown into sharp relief just months after the national soccer team returned from South Africa. In August of 2010, one of the most intense recent debates in Germany broke out around the publication and runaway popularity of Thilo Sarrazin’s book titled *Germany Does Away with Itself* (Deutschland schafft sich ab), which is the focus of Chapter 6. The arguments of the book are built on nativist pseudoscience bolstered by statistics that supposedly prove that while intelligent German women are not procreating, less intelligent populations, particularly Muslims, are proliferating and dumbing down German society.

Drawing on evidence from sources including Herrnstein and Murray (1996), Lynn and Vanhanen (2002), and Francis Galton (1869), Sarrazin’s book borrows from a long tradition of eugenicist social science. These authors combine pseudoscientific theories of the heritability of aptitude and intelligence with state-generated statistics describing the levels of education, criminality, and affluence to draw broad conclusions about the state of society and the culprits of social ills. In many ways, this debate echoed the American controversy around Herrnstein and Murray’s racially oriented book on the heritability of IQ, *The Bell Curve* in the 1990s. According to an analysis of press coverage, *The Bell Curve*, which “spent weeks at the top of the best-seller lists” (Schmidt, 2012), “was accorded attention totally disproportionate to the merits of the book or the novelty of its
thesis” (Naureckas, 1995). Like the media response to Sarrazin’s book, “media accounts showed a disturbing tendency to accept Murray and Herrnstein's premises and evidence even while debating their conclusions” (Naureckas, 1995). Similarly, although taking issue with his tone, Sarrazin was widely praised for bringing to light an important and “taboo” issue.

Finally, Chapter 7 examines two media projects that emerged around the time of the Sarrazin debate, which illustrate the depth of entanglements between processes of celebration and condemnation in integration discourse. According to his critics, Sarrazin’s book was the antithesis of productive integration work. However, several positively oriented integration campaigns and programs developed in the wake of the debate bear a strong resemblance to many of the arguments and assumptions of Sarrazin and his supporters. Although the projects analyzed in this chapter celebrate integrants using celebrity examples, they also depend on a binary conception of integrants as either willful failures or successes.

The first part of Chapter 7 examines the creation of a new prize category honoring “successful examples of integration” by Germany’s oldest media prize institution, the Bambi Awards. The Integration Bambi was first awarded in 2010, less than three months after the publication of Sarrazin’s book. The inaugural recipient was German national soccer player, Mesut Özil. The introduction of a prize category honoring integration was uncontroversial, particularly with the soft-spoken Turkish-German soccer star as the first recipient. However, the choice of successful Tunesian-German rap artist Bushido as the 2011 recipient became a national controversy. Bushido’s work draws on gangsta rap conventions, including violent, misogynistic, and homophobic lyrics. He is also actively
involved in youth charity work. The first part of this chapter compares the framing and responses to these two award recipients, considering the logics of social prizes. These recipients served to define the ideals of integration and the threat posed by its failure. Controversy around the award only heightened the importance of the award and strengthened the normative assumptions behind the category.

The second part of Chapter 7 examines another celebrity-oriented integration program, the *Raus mit der Sprache—Rein ins Leben* (Out with language—Into Life) campaign from Association of German Periodical Publishers with the support of the Federal Government. The campaign features photographs of well-known minority German athletes, artists, and politicians sticking out their tongues for the camera. Their tongues have been digitally altered to display the colors of the German flag, indicating their ability to speak German. In addition to the content of the campaign and its theme song, this section analyzes the statements of campaign creators and supporters to understand the goals and the logic of this campaign as it relates to integration, focusing on the conception of language within integration discourse. Judgments about what counts as valuable language reflect both the anxieties and the opportunism of broader approaches to social diversity in an increasingly diverse population. This campaign demonstrates how the frequent invocation of language within integration discourse and policy engages in the politics and political economy of life examined in previous chapters. Through the examples of the Integration Bambi and the *Out with It* campaign, this chapter examines how minority celebrities act as models of and threats to integration.

The conclusion of this dissertation contemplates the future of integration discourse, using reactions to the ongoing global refugee crisis to extend the implications
of a politics oriented towards the cultivation of life. Public discourse and policy in the European Union reacting to the crisis highlight again how biopolitics involves perpetual decision-making about which lives are of value for the life of the population, which is conceived in terms of the normative national. At the same time, the racist logics of this process of decision making have been taken up by the growing populist right, threatening to destabilize the moral balance of European Universalism (Wallerstein, 2006). In response, mainstream politicians and public figures have scrambled to isolate racism as a marginal social phenomenon, rather than an inherent part of integration discourse. The conclusion turns to the critical voices writing from a minoritarian perspective to challenge this move to confine conceptions of racism to the margins. These writers propose a new way forward that insists on confronting racism as a structural and institutional problem and that engages the complexity of cultural dialog in diverse societies.

\[1\) Unfähig zum Leben in der Gemeinschaft, sich nicht in die Gemeinschaft einfügend; am Rand der Gesellschaft lebend; 2) die Gemeinschaft, Gesellschaft schädigend; 3) ein niedriges geistiges, kulturelles Niveau aufweisend; ungebildet und ungehobelt.\]
PART I: GERMAN NATIONAL IDEAS
CHAPTER 1 – HEIMAT AND GERMAN NOTIONS OF SUBJECTIVITY

This chapter examines one of the foundations of German national subjectivity that has emerged from the critical analysis of German nationalism largely unscathed: the idea of Heimat, or homeland. Biopolitics, with its focus on “the population” as a biological corpus, imagines itself as operating above the social levels of national politics and law (Lemke, 2011). However, the idea of the population which is politically relevant continues to be cultivated through national discourses and norms. It is true that conceptions of the population can easily scale to encompass all of humanity, as in discussions of the geological impact of humanity through population growth and ensuing environmental degradation. However, the political and institutional mechanisms for implementing biopolitical policies and mechanisms still depend on nationally defined states and the uneven power of the international system of nation-states, such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, or NATO. Even in this global age, the hegemony of the nation-state persists in politics as it does in popular imaginations. What defines the nation as a social and political entity varies greatly, and that definition has implications for determining the legitimate place and expectations of denizens of a state. Recalling Foucault’s (2003) definition of biopolitical race war as a means of fragmenting the population into the normative and the potentially threatening, this chapter looks at the role of the affective concept of Heimat in defining German belonging through a shared conception of an imagined personal and familial past. Heimat defines those whose membership is assumed to be natural, emerging from a connection to an originary past that concords with the present. It is a foundational part of the distinction between the
grounded “national” and the dislocated “integrant,” who presumably suffers psychic fragmentation because of the separation from their own harmonious *Heimat*.

In contemporary liberal democracy, tolerance is promoted as a public virtue and racism is almost universally condemned (Brown, 2009). In this schema, *Heimat* serves as a seemingly benign means of dividing the population at the apparently pre-political level. However, the fact that this form of intimate division may cut deeper than overt acts of racism was conveyed in two anecdotes shared with me outside one of Berlin’s popular watering holes in the neighborhood of Kreuzberg. Since the early 1990s, if not before, Kreuzberg has been the jewel in Berlin’s crown of cutting edge alterity. Germany’s most famous Turkish neighborhood, Kreuzberg is a national symbol of both multicultural cool and the threat of parallel (immigrant) societies (*Parallelgesellschaften*). Berem is a university student from Dortmund, whom I had met while doing research in Istanbul two summers earlier. She had been doing an exchange year there through the Erasmus program, and I had interviewed her about her experience of living in Turkey as a German of Turkish descent. To be specific, Berem is not Turkish, but Kurdish, although her family, as she put it, was twice assimilated: her parents to Turkey and her to Germany. As a result, while her family’s traditions varied significantly from many of her Turkish-German compatriots, she shared with them both the Turkish language of her parents and

7 See, for example, *Berlin for Young People*, 1992 (qtd. in Soysal, 2004, p. 67)
the German language of her birth nation. One thing that has never been ambiguous to Berem was her subjectivity as German.

During our first conversation, Berem assumed that I planned to ask her about rupture and crisis, the modes of subjectivity that have long been assigned to first, second and third generation Germans or, as they are more commonly called, “migrants” or “people with a migration background” (*Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund*). Her assumptions, and the stories she told me when she realized that my conceptual frame did not fit the presumed mold, revealed how frequently Berem was faced with pushing back against narratives of deficiency, or fracturing and disintegration that others—primarily normative white Germans—projected onto her.

Our second meeting was purely social, but we ended up talking again about experiences of mismatched interpellation. One story she told me was of being on the train in Frankfurt an der Oder, where Berem attends university. Pass checkers boarded the train, and she handed them her semester ticket. The checker looked at it and, claiming that it was invalid, took it away. Berem protested, and the conductor responded, “This is how it’s done in Germany.” Berem was utterly confused, and only upon later reflection did she realize that it was a racist act: “I didn’t understand the comment. I see myself as a German, and it never crossed my mind at the time that others might not see it the same way.” The checker’s interpellation of Berem as a foreigner passed her by, and even when she put the pieces together, her anger was short-lived. This was just an individual whose racist aggression against Berem failed to hit its mark.

The other anecdote Berem offered was from the time of her preparations for the Erasmus year in Istanbul. When she was getting the paperwork necessary for her student
visa, the German official who was helping her exclaimed, “How nice! You’re going back to your homeland.” Berem responded curtly that she was born in Germany and that this was her homeland. The woman responded with a flustered apology. Of the two incidents, this misguided friendliness was the one that most upset Berem.

The most obvious explanation for the less disturbing nature of the direct form of exclusion is that the spontaneous malice of an individual is easily written off as a random act of aggression from the margins of society, despite the checker’s status as a public employee. The fare-checker’s act was so distant from Berem’s self-conception and her conception of her home nation of Germany that, in the end, it was almost risible. On the other hand, the sympathetic instantiation of exclusion came from the very center of German social and institutional space. The official had Berem’s German passport in hand as she simultaneously denied it as a signifier of true national affiliation. The fact that the comment was meant to be understanding and supportive galled Berem even more. Part of the depth of this affront also relates to the particular status of the *Heimat* in German notions of belonging. Berem’s contrasting anecdotes express the subtle corrosiveness of well-intentioned misapprehension and raise questions about how the local and personal notion of homeland reproduce the abstract political notion of the nation.

This chapter investigates the forms of social cohesion and exclusion expressed in the German idea of *Heimat*. Understanding *Heimat’s* role in the construction of a German national subjectivity is essential for understanding the durable distinction between the *national* and the *integrant*. Lentin and Titley (2011) borrow and elaborate on the term “integrant” from an empirical study by Hvenegård-Lassen (2005) based on interviews with bureaucrats involved in integration programs in Denmark and Sweden.
Lassen defines the category of the integrant as the imagined recipient of integration programming, the “subject for integration.” Focusing on the category of the integrant allows for a division between conceptualizations of the subject of integration programs and discourse and the actual people they refer to. Thus, discourse constructing the integrant tells us more about the people and institutions who contribute to it than it does about its referent. This chapter focuses on the category of the national which, as this dissertation argues, only has meaning in relation to its Others.

The rootedness and permanence of the imagined Heimat, as well as its conceptualization as the epitome of German harmony, reproduces the perception of citizens and residents without German descent as permanent foreigners. Furthermore, it does so within an affective framework that is difficult to criticize. The intimacy of Heimat resists analysis. As Peter Blickle observes, “the tacit assumption is that Heimat can only be understood from within. Therefore, true understanding can only come only out of a form of identification, not from a form of analysis” (2004, p. 12). Heimat is conceived as fundamentally constitutive of the self. It is the place of origin, the place of individual sovereignty. Through its association with the individual and particular, it also presents itself as apolitical and even anti-nationalist. At the same time, as we will see, Heimat constitutes the nexus between the individual world of the experiential and the abstract space of politics and, thus, forms the foundation of the German national imaginary.

*Heimat and Subjectivity: From the 19th Century to the Postwar Period*
The term *Heimat* combines a particular conception of the temporal and the spatial in the definition of the affective and political German nation. Notoriously difficult to translate, “homeland” is an insufficient, but tolerable approximation of *Heimat*. From the Old High German term *Heimoti*, which signified the right to be present at a certain place or locality (Schütz, 1996, p. 57), *Heimat* implies a deep affective bond of a person to an original home. The possession of a *Heimat* is a key part of individuals’ possession of their own person, their own interiority. Intimately linked to the possession of legitimate claims to space, *Heimat* exists primarily, and perhaps exclusively, in retrospect. *Heimat* is the imagined origin that is remembered in the process of the human becoming the individual. *Heimat* encapsulates a place-world wherein portions of the past are brought into being. It is the foundation of the German conception of indigeneity, a mode that—although itself formed through the defamiliarization induced by change over time—emphasizes rootedness and constructs temporal continuity. The intimate and individual possession of *Heimat* is conceived of as an apolitical form of affiliation, as opposed to communitarian and exclusionary forms of affiliation associated with nationalism.

Despite the wealth of popular and scholarly texts centered on the *Heimat* idea, very few authors have taken a critical approach to understanding the term and its social and political function. In her book, *A Nation of Provincials* (1990), historian Celia Applegate was the first to seriously investigate the genealogy of *Heimat*, which she traces to the foundation of the modern notion of Germany as nation-state. The primary distinguishing feature of the modern German notion of *Heimat* is its “mixture of practicality and sentimentality” (Applegate, 1990, p. 8). The idea emerged in the first half of the 19th century, in conjunction with terms like Nation, *Volk*, *Vaterland*,
and _Staat_ to create new political imaginaries in the diverse and unstable German states after the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806. As part of efforts to provide solid ground for a German nationalism, writers and civic leaders reinvented the term, which had long existed in the German language but was previously of little social or political importance. The term was at the heart of a new mode of language, one that was aware of its audience, which was imagined in national terms. As Applegate writes, _Heimat_ “is a term that dwelt in one world, that of the self-conscious centralizers, modernizers, and nationalists of the General Estate, while evoking another” (1990, p. 8). Emerging from the new bourgeois public sphere, it evoked an imagined, mythologized version of the hometown—the secure society of childhood memory.

While focusing on the private and local, this evocation was mobilized to establish the earliest membership policies of modern statehood in the German territories in the 19th century. In the 1820s in the independent kingdom of Bavaria, the _Heimatrecht_ (law of domicile) was enacted as part of an administrative effort to unify the definition of citizenship and extend it to the borders of the state (Applegate, 1990, p. 8). This law established the right of citizens to settle in any Bavarian town they chose, and imposed responsibilities such as self-sufficiency and adherence to laws. _Heimatrecht_ represented a new principle of state citizenship which superseded the right of local communities to determine who belonged and who did not. “_Heimat_ represented a thoroughly flexible concept by which the state could reproduce itself at the local level of civic experience characteristic of most people’s lives” (Applegate, 1990, p. 8). As urbanization and industrialization overtook the real hometown, the deceptive antiquity of the word increasingly obscured the administrative fiction of this reinscription of _Heimat_.

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The territorially grounded nature of this shared form of individual memory is essential for it to function as a constitutive part of the political-cultural union of the nation-state. As the example of early 19th century Bavaria shows, the foundation of modern political institutions requires particularity to establish a new universal form of liberal politics based on citizenship. Observing the growing hegemony of the modern nation-state, Marx recognized already in the mid-nineteenth century that the state requires particularity to justify its superiority,

Far from abolishing these factual distinctions, the state presupposes them in order to exist, it only experiences itself as political state and asserts its universality in opposition to these elements… it is only in this way, above the particular elements that the state constitutes itself as universality” (Marx, 2005, p. 219).

The person living within the political state thus lives in a double life of particularity and universality. As Marx observed in the case of the United States, the political emancipation of the individual through granting democratic sovereignty to the figure of the citizen does not require neutralizing difference. In order to construct the idea of the species-being in the form of the citizen, the living individual is divested of “his real individual life and filled with an unreal universality” (Marx, 2005, p. 220). The scalability of Heimat provides a sort of affective continuity within this double life.

Although the concept of Heimat is built on deeply localized notions, these notions were primarily a means of transferring the emotional and social attachments of the lived world to a broader, more abstract level than ever before. As Applegate observes, “the utility of Heimat lay in its capacity to obscure any chasms between small local worlds and the larger ones to which the locality belonged” (1990, p. 10). At the same time, the idea of provincial diversity of the German territory was maintained as a constitutive part
of the new German state after unification in 1871. In this way, *Heimat* acted—and continues to act—as a wedge that props up the uneven parts of the German nation to produce an illusion of cohesion and continuity. The emptiness of the gap creates the imaginary space necessary to generate a conception of community in the abstract. *Heimat* is the power of the imagined but never experienced past: the original homeland. Public invocations of *Heimat* involve the subordination of phenomenal experiences to collective memory—or perhaps more precisely, to the collective individualized experience of idealized memory. Reference to *Heimat* invokes idealized forms of personal memories and associations to cultivate a collective affect in service of a shared political imaginary.

During the Nazi period, *Heimat* was used by the regime as part of a raft of terms to express a highly-centralized form of Germanness, losing the provincial associations foundational to its meaning. For the Nazis, *Heimat* was just another way to talk about nation, race, and *Volk*. Thus, although it was a prominent part of nationalist discourses of the period, the term was easily rehabilitated after the war through the reintroduction of the local emphasis. “Pulled out of the rubble of the Nazi Reich as a victim, not a perpetrator” (Applegate, 1990, p. 229), *Heimat* was revived after the war and once again used to create a grounded and affective form of national cohesion. Since Nazism was seen as an excess of centralized national power, the provincialism of *Heimat* was seen as an antidote to “excessive Germanness” (Applegate, 1990, p. 18), while still providing a powerful form of national sentiment. This conception held even though, as discussed above, it was the very provincialism of *Heimat* that made it so crucial for creating the double life of particularity and universality necessary for establishing a centralized, modern German nationhood.
Faced with the unbearable trauma of accepting the broad participation of society necessary to commit National Socialist crimes, postwar Germans retreated to personal memories of the Nazi period (Confino, 1998). As part of this, the intimate, local, and experiential aspects of the Heimat concept were revived and its imperial deployment in building the abstract political community of the nation were forgotten or ignored. Heimat’s affective security and harmony became a refuge in postwar Germany, where the bucolic Heimat film genre took over the German cinema, peaking in the 1950s (Kaes, 1992; Ludewig, 2014). Cinema quickly became one of the most popular leisure-time activities after cinemas were reopened in the summer of 1945. The German public had little appetite for films depicting harsh postwar realities, a genre that became known as “rubble films” (Trümmerfilme). Almost immediately after the German film industry began releasing original films again in 1947, there were appeals from the press and German audiences to stop depicting politics and ruins and produce more positive, unblemished representations of German life (Ludewig, 2014). Postwar Heimat films largely reproduced the settings, narratives, and emotional arcs that defined Heimat films during the Nazi period.

Still, the escapist and apparently apolitical nature of Heimat films allowed this genre that had been an effective part of Nazi propaganda to succeed in West Germany’s economically-driven postwar culture industry (Ludewig, 2014). In a newly divided and occupied country, as Anton Kaes writes, “Heimat signified above all an experience of loss, a vacuum that Germans filled with nostalgic memories” (1992, p. 166). This was not only the personal loss of one’s original home and the imagined harmony it represents, it was also the loss of the uncontroversial, unthinking simplicity of banal nationalism.
This is not to suggest that nationalism disappeared in the German public after the defeat of National Socialism; nationalism continued, for example, in strict, descent-based citizenship laws and in policies of ethnic German “repatriation” discussed below. However, the idea that Germans denied themselves symbolic nationalism and self-confidence because of the Nazi past is essentially taken for granted in public discussions of German nationalism (see Chapter 3). In the postwar period, *Heimat* offered a simple and positive form of identification that public celebrations of symbolic nationalism could no longer provide.

**Coming Home?**

If the ideal Germany should be, as one writer in the postwar period put it, “outwardly as unified as necessary, inwardly as diversified as possible” (Schnath, 1958, p. 20), it would appear that the concept of *Heimat* should be well suited to provide a new pluralist form of identification in Germany as its population changes with immigration and demographic shifts. Yet, as Berem illustrated in our conversation, the forms of diversity compatible with claims to Germany as *Heimat* do not extend to those who are perceived as exogenous. A decisive boundary constructed by the German notion of *Heimat* is between those who live in the nation of their *Heimat* and those who are perceived to have been displaced from it. The counter-image of *Heimat* is embodied by the *Ausländer* (Räthzel, 1994, p. 89). *Ausländer*, which translates to foreigner, is composed of the preposition *aus*- meaning outside, and *Land*, meaning country. It means, consequently, a person who lives outside their country and, simultaneously, one who belongs outside the country where they reside. The disturbing associations of the
alienation from *Heimat* are also expressed in its antonym in adjective form *unheimlich*, generally translated as uncanny. The *Heimat* is where the subject makes sense, and the experience of the unheimlich is the suspension of that familiar regime of truth. Whereas *Heimat* represents the place where one unquestioningly belongs, the *Ausländer* is one who is deprived of that harmonious belonging in perpetuity.

The most dramatic illustration of the complex relationship between *Heimat* and ethnic or racial notions of belonging is evident in the case of ethnic German *Aussiedler* (resettler), whose ancestors had moved to parts of Eastern Europe and Russia from German territories decades or even centuries before. The definition of citizenship established in the 1949 Basic Law of the German Federal Republic included special consideration of *Aussiedler*, originally referred to as *Heimatvertriebene* (expellees from the homeland). To paraphrase the relevant statute, refugees or expellees of German descent who found refuge in the boundaries of the German Empire in 1937 were defined as German according to the Basic Law (Article 116, Paragraph 1). This designation was clarified in the Expellee and Refugee Law (BVFG) of 1953 to define ethnic German status through the verifiable self-designation as German as well as the ability to demonstrate characteristics such as descent and the maintenance of language or cultural norms. The inclusion of these ethnic German minorities in German citizenship was a reaction to the expulsion of these populations from the lands they had long occupied as a response to German invasions during the Second World War. In the first four years after the war, eight million expellees settled in West Germany (von Koppenfels, 2002). Numbers of *Aussiedler* entering Germany dropped to an average of 40,000 between 1950 and 1986 and then spiked with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, reaching nearly
400,000 in 1990. Aussiedler were provided significant resources to aid their resettlement, including housing aid, access to the pension system and free German language classes.

The laws and processes establishing the privileges of German Aussiedler further codified the juridical meaning of Germanness through ethnic descent, although this may have been an unintended consequence of a reactive policy responding to the ethnic definitions used to expel minority Germans from Eastern Europe (von Koppenfels, 2002). In addition to strengthening norms of jus sanguinis citizenship, the process of accepting Aussiedler also depended on shared conceptions of the meaning of Heimat, which includes descent but also depends on the demonstration of an active imagination of territorially and culturally grounded origins. The injustices of expulsion and the pain of the loss of one’s Heimat became part of a strong conservative narrative of German victimization in the Federal Republic that continues in contemporary reunited Germany in mainstream as well as extreme right circles (Brinks, 2000); it allowed postwar Germans to position themselves as victims of the Nazi period due to the suffering of “good Germans” expelled from their rightful homelands (Confino, 2005). Although it was widely acknowledged that after generations living far from Germany there was very little that could be clearly distinguished as “German” about the Aussiedler, with proof of descent and a cursory demonstration of the maintenance of cultural ties “returnees” were welcomed into Germany with citizenship and social benefits. But as Stefan Senders (2002) argues, this was not simply a policy affirming biological, blood-based belonging. More than that, the process of applying for Aussiedler status was an active mimetic construction of the nation. Senders writes that in the process of repatriation,
ethnic Germans are required to bring their life stories into conformation with prototypic plots; they must claim to have had the proper kinds of relationships, to have felt the appropriate pain, and to have experienced their own being in specific and predetermined forms. (2002, p. 90)

Through “testing” Aussiedler to see if they qualify for repatriation, German jurisprudence made the norms regulating the reproduction of normative German citizens transparent. These norms affirm that to be German implies genealogical descent, but that genealogical descent is not necessarily sufficient to be German. The peak in applications for Aussiedler status in the 1990s established affinity across time and space at a historical moment when the children and grandchildren of the postwar Gastarbeiter (guest worker) generation were coming of age as foreigners in the territory of their birth.

Updates to the Expellee and Refugee Law in 1992 added the expectation that Aussiedler demonstrate having suffered for being German as one key means of proving the authenticity of the claim to Germanness. In fact, current guidelines for applicants from outside the former Soviet Union must “demonstrate that they have experienced discrimination or the effects of earlier discrimination as a result of their German identification (Völkszugehörigkeit)” (Bundesverwaltungsamt, n.d.). Regardless of whether it was a reasonable reflection of their lived experience, Aussiedler are required to present documents and narratives demonstrating the endurance of their memory of their German Heimat abroad in their written petitions to German bureaucrats.

More than a recovery of original belonging, however, the petition procedure entails a narrative performance that produces the German citizen “in Germany’s own image”, thereby excluding other forms of difference from the narrative of national reproduction (Senders, 2002, p. 88). This process of claiming citizenship acknowledges
the possibility of transformation. As Senders’ study of legal cases from the 1990s shows, the children of individuals who qualify as ethnic German **Aussiedler** might not themselves qualify if they are determined to lack the necessary experiences and traits, from a grasp of basic German to the maintenance of religious rituals, such as celebrating Christmas in the German way following the Gregorian calendar. But by rearticulating and recounting these requisite experiences in written petitions for citizenship, the **Aussiedler** can become German again through the process of repatriation. At the same time, by emphasizing the link between suffering endured to maintain Germanness outside the ancestral homeland, it confirms the perception of the incompleteness of the lives of **Ausländer** living in Germany and deprived of access to the place where they truly belong. This might explain the sympathetic enthusiasm of the German official as she imagined Berem’s experience of “returning” to the place where she can finally belong.

The perception that those residents and citizens who do not qualify as ethnic Germans live suspended between their homelands and their host lands rearticulates the perpetual difference between the German self and the foreign other. For this reason, when writing about pervasive portrayals of immigrants and their descendants as internally torn or fragmented, Leslie Adelson argues that “the trope of ‘betweenness’ often functions literally like a reservation designed to contain, restrain, and impede new knowledge, not enable it” (2007, p. 266). The imaginary bridge “between two worlds” keeps apart that which it pretends to unify. Rather than a mode of transit to someplace new, the bridge keeps migrants suspended in a state of perpetual alterity. In this context, turning a critical eye to the deeply naturalized and also ambivalent notion of **Heimat** reveals how the emotional and affective requirements of modern citizenship cannot be separated from the
political. Left unexamined, the cultural and temporal assumptions that undergird the term uncritically reproduce the foreignness of those whose *Heimat* is presumed to be elsewhere.

**Heimat: The Making of German Nationals and Integrant “Strangers”**

As we have seen, the *Heimat* idea forms part of the daily reproduction of the modern nation by creating a link between the locality and the nation. However, the term’s flexibility does not necessarily encompass all forms of particularity. The term’s openness obscures its function in racializing groups who carry exogenous markers, from foreign names to physical features such as “*schwarze Haare*” (black hair). These traces of foreignness index individuals and groups as “strangers,” to use Georg Simmel’s term. Writing at the turn of the twentieth century, Simmel defined strangers as members of society whose relations are defined by the synthesis of “nearness and distance” (2011). The paradigmatic stranger for Simmel was the European Jew, who often settled in one place, but who nevertheless maintained a kind of mobility through business as well as familial and social connections across space.

Simmel emphasized that strangers are part of society, not truly outsiders. They share many commonalities with their indigenous neighbors, but those commonalities are universal and general in nature, as opposed to the particularities “organic members” share with each other that distinguish them from the universal. Strangers’ mobility and the general nature of their relations of commonality are the inverse of *Heimat*. Crucially, however, while the stranger and the *Heimat* are incongruous, their relation is not one of insiders as opposed to outsiders. Strangers are not the barbarians at the gates, but the
neighbors whose status lies in between, simultaneously near and distant. Their ambiguity, the complexity of their relations, opposes the simplicity, harmony, and clarity of the imagined Heimat.

In our universal system of nation-states, strangers become particularly problematic. States operate by abstracting the concepts of friends (insiders) and enemies (outsiders) to the level of national collectives (Bauman, 1990; Schmitt, 2007). But, as Bauman (1990) observes, strangers are others within whose status of friend or enemy is unclear, and therefore unsettling. Whereas oppositions between friend and enemy “enable knowledge and action; undecidables paralyze” (Bauman, 1990, p. 146). Strangers must always be watched, their behavior scrutinized to determine whether they are friends or enemies. Bauman writes that assimilation is a “war against ambivalence”8 (1990, p. 155). It is the attempt to either turn a stranger into friend, or clarify their status as an enemy. However, when strangers are part of a distinguishable group, the actions of some reflect on, and raise questions about, the whole class. So long as they are recognized as strangers, the determination can never be settled. The process becomes an infinite loop until it is forgotten that they are strange. By using the term integrant to refer to this stranger status in Germany, I emphasize this infinite loop that maintains scrutiny on those whose Heimat is assumed to lie elsewhere.

8Without discussing the arguments about the differences and similarities between integration and assimilation generally, in relation to the figure of the stranger, the two concepts play the same role.
So long as a person—a Migrant, Muslim, Ausländer, Mensch mit Migrationshintergrund (person with a migration background)—is caught up in the discourse of integration, their status as stranger remains active. Even in his pessimistic account, Bauman recognizes that a stranger’s status as strange may be forgotten. The definition of classes of strangers is socially grounded and subject to historical change. The Jewish stranger of Simmel’s time is no longer the paradigmatic stranger. Although there is significant discomfort among normative Germans around Jewishness in Germany, which manifests in part as Philosemitism, Ruth Mandel’s (2008) ethnographic work in Berlin during the 1980s and 1990s shows that Jews are no longer the primary internal Other. Mandel’s work draws parallels between the pre-war status of Germany’s Jews and the contemporary perception of Turkish-Germans as the primary example of “foreigners inside” (2008, p. 137). As new waves of refugees from Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Afghanistan, Iran and other majority Muslim countries continue to arrive, the Turk as paradigmatic stranger has been joined by the designation as Muslim. As relations change and new strangers are identified, the formerly strange may recede from notice within normative society. However, some features identifying strangers are more durable than others, phenotypical difference chief among them.

Heimat’s troubling continuity with the past lies not in the overt racism of the Nazi period, but rather in its status as a conventional discursive practice that continuously re-inscribes difference, even when the intent is integrative. Even at the heart of the term ‘integration,’ the assumption of the necessity of a social process to suture two or more distinct elements reifies the very existence of the difference it seeks to overcome. It denies the possibility that a person raised in Germany can become familiar with and take
ownership of the various cultural spheres they are immersed in, regardless of their heritage. This, I think, lies at the heart of Berem’s two stories of social exclusion. The government worker’s inadvertent friendly exclusion cut Berem more deeply than the overtly racist act of the ticket checker. This friendly exclusion marks her as a permanent stranger within.

Indeed, the unimpeachability of *Heimat* is based in its perceived individuality. For each person, the meaning and imagining of *Heimat* is unique. Often it is associated with the distinguishing features of the landscape of one’s childhood. It is safety and domesticity evacuated of conflict—that is to say—of other people (Räthzel, 1994). It is the state of harmony that can only be achieved in the imaginary. This internal nature of *Heimat* is what Isaiah Berlin calls “collective individuality” (1976, p. 200). This refers us back again to the particularity of German national collectivity. It is a collectivity that bases itself on collective individuality and views collective social formations—such as those projected onto patriarchal Eastern societies—as threatening the harmony of the internally constituted but shared possession of *Heimat*. Modernity, through the nation-state, has fused cultural and political subjectivities to the point that the betrayal of the nation is tantamount to the betrayal of self (Yack, 1996). *Heimat*, a thoroughly modern term dressed in primordial trappings, reveals that the tension between European universalism and romantic particularism is not a conflict at all, but rather a constitutive force of modern subjectivity.

Different national imaginaries combine these two frameworks of universalism and particularism in distinct and historically specific ways. The generalization necessary to sustain the imaginary of a national population is built on different conceptions of
specificity. Everyone must answer the question of what it means to be a member and what defines a nation as opposed to its neighbors, although the answers must always remain internally contested. National imaginaries also interact with regional and global divisions, such as the distinction between modern and developing nations, between the East and the West. It is quite common in the literature on nationalism to divide nations into categories according to the weight given to particularistic as opposed to political or constitutional forms. In one classic example, Kohn characterized the development of European nationalisms according to the battle between nationalisms based on claims of historical community as opposed to nations based on “the dream of brotherhood and equal peoples in a universal order of democratic justice” (1955, p. 51). German nationalism is often seen as a prototype of the particularist nation, defined by romanticism and Herderian notions of essential cultures and “communities of fate” (Schicksalsgemeinschaft). In contrast, French nationalism is defined as a civic community of consensus, where culture, religion, and other forms of individual or group-based differences are theoretically irrelevant in determining who belongs to the nation. While there is some truth in this characterization, it obscures as much as it illuminates. After all, what national ideology does not claim to pursue universalist aspirations of democratic justice and equality among its citizenry? What modern nation has been immune from nativist chauvinism that seeks to protect an essentialized notion of national culture from outside threat? Keeping these phenomena apart creates a normative distinction between good and bad forms of nationalism, creating the illusion that positive civic nationalism can fully displace the negative historical variety (Kuzio, 2002; Yack, 1996). The crucial point is to determine the relationship between these two tendencies as they emerge in
each context. As a concept, *Heimat* is one of the terms that facilitates the spatial and temporal movement between universalist national imaginaries and personal experience and affect. The shared conception of *Heimat* as a source of the self builds the national from the personal, while also maintaining the positive normative valence of universalism. After all, everyone can have their own version of what constitutes *Heimat*.

Although the deceptive naturalism and intimacy of *Heimat* makes it difficult to analyze, in doing so we may understand and critique the assumptions that reproduce everyday forms of exclusion that can sometimes cut deeper than a particular act of explicit racism. In part, this would involve acknowledging that in Germany “cultural contact today is not an ‘intercultural encounter’ that takes place between German culture and something outside it but something happening within German culture between the German past and the German present” (Adelson, 2007, p. 268). Even as citizenship rights have finally been expanded to include the second and third generations born of the immigrant “Guest Workers” of the postwar period, locating the source of subjectivity within the *Heimat* marks those who carry traces of other homelands as strangers or, borrowing from Partridge (2012), as “noncitizens.”

**The Desire for “Healthy Normality”**

*Heimat* is bound up with a discourse of longing for “normality” that establishes confident and unequivocal national self-identification as a prerequisite for the psychic health of the population. In this view, people and historical events that introduce complexity and unruly plurality or that evoke ambivalence pose a threat to the well-being of the national population. Along with the discourses examined in other chapters of this
dissertation, *Heimat* is one means of reducing this social complexity, assigning it to the individual level and managing the trauma of associations with the perpetrators of historical atrocities. This chapter concludes with examples that elucidate this relationship between the trauma of the perpetrators and notions of normality and national “self-confidence.” Also circulating within these discourses is the crucial question of who has the right to speak about the National Socialist past. My intention here is not to enter discussions about the relative validity of different representations of the past *per se*. What is important for this dissertation are the uses of these debates about the past as part of the construction of the national present and its legitimate citizenry. The first two examples come from discussions surrounding two of the most popular creative works of the 1980s and 90s: Edgar Reitz’s epic film series *Heimat* (1981-1984) and Martin Walser’s award-winning auto-biographical novel, *A Leaping Spring* (1998) (*Ein springender Brunnen*). From distinct political perspectives, these works model a collective national reclaiming of narratives of the Third Reich from outsiders as well as a move to privatize the past in a way that isolates personal experience from practices of state genocide.

The 1990s were defined both by Germany’s reunification and by a fresh outbreak of racist violence against immigrants and refugees. Even as reunification raised the possibility that Germany could once again be a “normal” nation in Europe, fatal fire bombings and riots broke out in the early 1990s, raising the specter of the racisms of Germany’s past. The 1990s also brought new revelations about the involvement of Wehrmacht soldiers and everyday Germans in the Holocaust (Caplan, Frei, Geyer, Nolan, & Stargardt, 2006). At the same time, frustration was building with the growing memorial culture and official efforts at “coming to terms with the past”
(Vergangenheitsbewältigung) (Assmann, 2003). However, despite complaints that the past casts a consistent and oppressive shadow over Germany, the breadth and depth of discussions and efforts at self-reflection and coming to terms with the past have been highly contested (Kansteiner, 2006b). To be clear, not only have the meaning of the past and the relevance of the past for the present been contested, the meaning and extent of that process of public self-reflection is itself a complex and contested issue. While the specter of the question of guilt and responsibility (the Schuldfrage) never fully left the collective consciousness, Dan Diner writes that over time the question has been “paradoxically most present in terms of denial” (2000, p. 221). While the crimes of the Nazi past would periodically break onto the scene, in the form of high-profile trials such as the Eichmann trial, as well as in controversial commemorations and debates, discussions of the Holocaust only gained broad traction in the 1980s (Caplan et al., 2006; Confino, 2004; Giesen, 2004; Maier, 1997). The myth of the good and chivalrous German Wehrmacht soldier, as opposed to the vicious Nazi, had been undermined in scholarship as early as the 1970s, but survived among the general public until the late 1990s (Kansteiner, 2006b). The history of public debate about the meaning of the Nazi past, its relevance for the present, and the role of everyday Germans in enabling and perpetrating atrocities, is complex and uneven. Regardless of the inconsistent and often limited nature of these discussions during much of postwar history, the claim that the past

9 See Wulf Kansteiner (2006b) for a detailed discussion of the various phases and protagonists of the struggles over memory culture from 1945 through the 1990s.
has been constantly used to create a “guilt complex” (*Schuldkomplex*) among Germans is widely accepted as valid. As this section will show, this guilt complex has been situated as a major stumbling block inhibiting the “normal” development of Germany as a strong, proud, and effective nation today.

As was discussed above, *Heimat* provided a refuge from the most troubled parts of the collective memory of Nazi crimes, starting with the escapism of the popular postwar *Heimat* films. With a few very powerful exceptions, in the first decades after the war, “West Germans emphasized their own suffering and largely ignored the suffering they had inflicted on others” (Kansteiner, 2006b, p. 111). Even when representations of the Nazi genocide began to appear with more frequency on television in the 1970s, stories were focused on a particular subset of victims—usually successful survivors—and good Germans who aided them, erasing perpetrators and bystanders or reducing them to elite leaders or to caricature (Kansteiner, 2006a). One turning point in media representation and public discussion was the 1979 telecast of the American television mini-series *Holocaust* (1978) in West Germany. The series, which attracted 20 million West German viewers or roughly half of the population, followed two families during the Third Reich, a family of German Jews and an ambitious couple that ascended the ranks of the SS. The entertaining and emotionally powerful series included both victims and perpetrators as complex subjects and brought the Nazi genocide into the center of the public sphere with unprecedented success. However, the success of *Holocaust* frustrated some on the German left, who saw the production as a hypocritical capitalist project, meant to profit from the pain of Nazi crimes (Herf, 1980).
Edgar Reitz explicitly framed his popular television series, *Heimat* (1984), as a German answer to the successful American mini-series, *Holocaust* (Confino, 1998). The epic, fifteen-hour film tells the story of a family in a small town near the Rhine from 1919 to 1982. As Alon Confino explains, beginning in the 1970s, the New Left embraced the *Heimat* idea as a symbol of "local roots and authentic German ways of life", and, thus, as the antithesis to nationalism, Americanization, and consumerism (1998, p. 193). This was at the heart of a new movement among German historians promoting oral history and the history of everyday life. Taking up this approach in television fiction, with *Heimat* Reitz aimed to portray genuine German relationships and experiences, as opposed to the supposedly kitschy and stereotypical Hollywood representations of *Holocaust*. Reitz unequivocally supported the commonly held view that *Heimat* cannot be scaled up to the nation or state, claiming in a 1984 article in *Die Zeit*, that "*Heimat* and nation... are contradictory terms" (quoted in Confino, 1998, p. 190). The nation is associated with conflict, abstraction, and diversity; *Heimat* is personal, embodied, harmonious and close-knit. As Confino summarizes, “the local meaning of the *Heimat* idea enables Reitz to disavow the notion of national history, and to fragment the larger processes of German history into numerous histories of local *Heimats*” (1998, p. 190). Reitz’s statements about *Heimat* reveal a slippage between the intimate personal experiences he foregrounds in the film, on the one hand, and on the other, a national consciousness constructed on collective but private ownership over the past.

This foregrounding of the legitimacy of local experiences also has implications for determining who has the right to narrate the past. In reaction to *Holocaust*, Reitz wrote that “the most profound expropriation that exists is the expropriation of people
from their own history” (quoted in Confino, 1998, p. 194). Reitz’s film is a reaction against expropriation both by foreign storytellers and by historians who attempt to, in his words, “generalize, to order events, to disclose cause and effect” (E. Reitz, 1988, p. 137). Although he positions himself against national history, Reitz proposes a nationalist version of history that equates embodied “German experience” with authenticity, excluding both those who do not have a personal connection to the German past and those who undertake a broader analysis of the past and situate the personal in relation to political events. This view gives authority to speak based only on the personal, assuming, of course, one is also a member of the nation.

This argument was taken even further by Martin Walser in his 1998 speech accepting the Friedenspreis des Deutschen Buchandels (Peace Prize of the German Books Trade) for his autobiographical novel, Ein springender Brunnen (1998). The award is one of Germany’s most prestigious, and the annual award ceremony is nationally televised and attended by the cultural, political, and intellectual elite. Walser’s novel depicts an idyllic childhood in southern Germany during the Nazi period, and of the loss of a father and brother during the war. As in Reitz’s film, National Socialism is presented unreflectively and its crimes are not presented at all. In Walser’s acceptance speech, which will be examined in more detail below, he spoke out against the "instrumentalization of Auschwitz" and the making of remembrance into a ritual (1998). He framed his critiques to provide plausible deniability against possible claims that he was promoting the forgetting of the past in that he purported to only be speaking for himself and his own experience. However, the language of the speech constantly slipped seamlessly between the personal “I” and the German “we”, belying this claim.
The speech received a near unanimous standing ovation from the exalted audience. Two days later Ignaz Bubis, the chair of the Zentralrats der Juden in Deutschland (Central Council of Jews in Germany) criticized the speech as intellectual arson (geistige Brandstiftung). Bubis repeated and elaborated his criticism a month later on the 60th anniversary of Kristallnacht, which unleashed a heated debate. Opinions expressed in the media generally sided with Walser, and cast Bubis’s concerns as a “failure to understand” Walser’s literary and artistic style in the speech (Assmann, 2003; Eshel, 2000). The debate ended up reinforcing Walser’s position and casting doubt on both the ability and the motives of “Others” who would speak out against closing off the past.

Walser shares a suspicion of abstraction and symbolism with the early architects of the notion of Heimat. He also shares their blind acceptance of the nation as a natural community. “Germany” as a collective of German individuals is utterly natural, to the extent that it supersedes the political—and therefore abstract—state. Walser demonstrates this by reiterating his long-standing opposition to the division of Germany. Contrary to the typical West German stance, Walser denied not only the legitimacy of the GDR, but also of the Federal Republic in its divided form. Walser compares the stance he took in 1977 to his current project. “Trembling as [he was] then” Walser insists that "Auschwitz is not suited to becoming a routine threat, a means of intimidation or a moral cudgel to be mobilized at any time, or simply a required practice. What comes to pass through ritualization has the character of lip service” (Walser, 1998). Here, the threat Auschwitz poses is not that it reveals humanity’s latent capacity for unspeakable brutality but rather, that it can be used for the “permanent presentation of our shame.” Walser’s deep
identification as a German above all means that he interprets any presentation of German crimes as a process of external shaming imposed by self-hating Germans and various outsiders.

Walser’s rejection of the representation of German crimes is not limited to the crimes of the National Socialist past, however. He feels the same suspicion in response to discussions of contemporary hate crimes. He presents a quotation from an unnamed “intellectual” (Habermas) about the festive atmosphere during the racist riots of the early 1990s. Framing his question as self-critical, Walser asks why he is “not galvanized by the same outrage” as this intellectual who writes of the “sympathetic population [that] sets up sausage stands in front of burning refugee hostels.” Here, Walser references an article that Habermas wrote for Die Zeit in 1992 criticizing the public reaction to the xenophobic violence. Habermas argues against the single-minded concern with the political implications of the violence for Germany’s international image. After quoting a number of top politicians who identified “the actual crime” as the harm to Germany’s international image, Habermas writes, “Neither the victims or the barbarization of our society rate as the first worries, rather it is the image of seat-of-industry Germany” (1992). Walser goes even further, by categorically refusing to believe the worst details of the riots themselves.

Walser sees the injustice of the supposed guilt complex (Schuldkomplex) as singular: in the past quarter century, there is “no other people (Volk), population, society” that could be so addressed. Although the unnamed intellectual refers to a specific and contemporary event, Walser rejects the presentation of racist violence that recalls Germany’s “eternal shame.” He blames the media’s “routine of accusation” for pushing
him to look away when faced with German “shame:” “when I am presented every day with this past in the media, I notice that something in me defends itself against the permanent presentation of our shame….I start to look away.” But lest the audience think that Walser is concerned about the ethics of this tendency, he reveals that in analyzing it he is “almost happy” to realize his reaction is not against remembrance itself, but against the “instrumentalization of our shame for present purposes.” Walser suspects that the media and self-hating German intellectuals have ulterior motives for representing the past in public. He suspects that it makes German critics feel closer to victims, relieving themselves of their burden by heaping it higher onto their compatriots. Walser, however, claims that he cannot shake the feeling of always standing on the side of the “accused.”

This section of Walser's speech raises several important issues. First, it shows how the over-identification with the national (German) converts all representations of crimes committed by group members into an accusation against the nation, and thus against all members. This identification is so strong that it holds together crimes past and present under the same agenda of shaming. Any use of the past as a tool for analysis is tantamount to “instrumentalization,” which, regardless of its purpose, is suspect and is a misuse of Auschwitz. Second, it reflects once again the structure of 19th century Heimat discourse, which defends the sovereignty of the individual and expresses suspicion of politics, abstraction, and symbolism. Under cover of this disavowal of politics, it reaffirms the unquestioned natural community of the people (Volk). This is a politics of the private nation, which holds the personal experience as primary and truly authentic. This nation is unaffected by the historical unfolding of the politics and actions of the
Finally, it draws a strong line between “we” Germans who are the target of hurtful representations and those who marshal those representations. Walser’s binary divides the world into victims and perpetrators, accusers and accused. The strength of Walser’s national identification makes a shared practice of remembrance impossible. Those who publically discuss German crimes are thus outsiders. The common experience of being constantly accused, threatened with the constant mobilization of Auschwitz as "a means of intimidation or moral cudgel" (Walser, 1998) unites Germans. The positive reception reflected in the standing ovation Walser received was carried over into the mediated debate that followed from Bubis’s critique. While a number of other prominent figures—most of them also Jews—shared Bubis’s reading of Walser’s speech, the responses published in the media largely supported Walser and dismissed the critique as an inability to understand Walser’s literary style (Eshel, 2001). The lightly veiled anti-Semitism underlying the claim that German Jewish critics were incapable of understanding literary German was expressed in a more extreme form when, at the height of the debate, a pig painted with a Star of David and labeled BUBIS was driven onto Berlin’s Alexanderplatz (Roll, 1998). The mostly positive reaction to Walser’s and against Bubis’s criticism of it shows that speaking out against the continued public analysis of Germany’s past to establish the “normality” of reunified Germany serves to unify and consolidate the idea of the German nation against domestic and international outsiders.

**New Germans and the German Past**

This national consolidation around the past has consequences for immigrants and new Germans, whose familial past does not include a connection to the perpetrator
generations of the Third Reich. This is not only a problem of the right, as represented by Walser. While many have called for an inclusive practice of memory since early in the postwar period, many of the critical leftist proponents of *Vergangenheitsbewältigung* (coming to terms with the past) have relied heavily on a genealogical connection to National Socialism to justify the depth of German responsibility to be critically self-reflective. For example, Habermas’s idea of “constitutional patriotism” is based on political attachment and the commitment to the norms, values and procedures of a liberal democratic constitution, relying also on “supplements of particularity” to become an effective form of political attachment (J.-W. Müller, 2008, p. 11); in the German case this meant the self-critical memory of the Nazi past.

Habermas and other leftist intellectuals proposed constitutional patriotism in reaction to the move by conservative historians to relativize the National Socialist past during the 1980s (see Chapter 3). However, in seeking to reaffirm the singularity of Nazi crimes, the national emphasis of early concepts of constitutional patriotism effectively excluded immigrants and new Germans from a key site of national community formation (J.-W. Müller, 2008, pp. 37–39; Rothberg & Yildiz, 2011, p. 38). Nevertheless, as Jan-Werner Müller argues, this ethnic-national emphasis is not critical to—or even sustainable within—the practice of constitutional patriotism (2008, p. 42). Although it may have been an expedient way to counter conservative drives for normalization, the construction of an exclusive form of memory culture is not necessary to preserve active engagement with the past. In fact, it is counterproductive. As Rothberg and Yildiz (2011) show in their excellent ethnographic work with immigrants and their descendants who engage with and explore Germany’s past and its lessons for politics and society across
time and space, there is no *a priori* reason that immigrants cannot access the collective memory of the receiving country. Taking on the question of whether the immigrating to Germany doesn't also mean immigrating into Germany's recent past (Senocak & Tulay, 2000), Rothberg and Yildiz discuss the example of a group of immigrant “activist citizens” (Isin & Nielsen, 2008). This group of Turkish immigrant women are engaging with and exploring Germany’s past and its lessons for politics and society across time and space, using the example of Nazi genocide to think through the Turkish history of Armenian genocide. Rothberg and Yildiz counter the assumption that immigrants are necessarily cut off from the collective memory of the receiving country. They expose the ways that the leftist politics of contrition, in the ways outlined above, have led to cordonning off immigrant citizens and minorities, supporting ethnicist notions of Germanness.

In the 1980s and 1990s, both sides of the polarized debate between conservative and critical leftist approaches to defining the place of the National Socialist past in the country’s contemporary self-conception depended on a descent-based definition of the national community. For conservatives like Walser, only Germans could understand the emotional and psychological toll of being faced with a ceaseless “routine of accusation” domestically and internationally. In contrast, pushing back against conservative attempts to relativize the past led many critical intellectuals to overemphasize the particularly German responsibility for remembering National Socialist crimes (Rothberg & Yildiz, 2011). However, after reunification, the self-reflexive critical form of identification called for by “constitutional patriotism” fell out of favor. Reunification ushered in a new wave of nationalist enthusiasm. With the “anomaly” of the national division gone, many
intellectuals from across the political spectrum thought that Germans could now form a “normal” national consciousness (J.-W. Müller, 2008, p. 44). In addition, after fiercely but vainly resisting citizenship law changes introducing limited birth right to citizenship around the turn of the millennium, conservative politicians gradually discovered the pedagogical power of immigrant patriots in the cause of establishing a “normalized” national consciousness (see Chapter 5). The enthusiasm of immigrant patriots for their new homeland serves as an example to Germans whose relationship to the nation is portrayed as neurotic and tense (verkrampft). In contrast, critical intellectuals from Adorno to Habermas see this tension as part of a productive community-building process of reflection on uncomfortable pasts (Jürgen Habermas, 1997, p. 17). From this perspective, engaging with this tension that conservatives view as pathological serves as a tool of empowerment and as the key to the formation of an ethical and active national community (Assmann, 2003; J.-W. Müller, 2008).

However, this rational and complex discursive version of national affiliation runs precisely contrary to the pre-political, affective, and harmonious notion of Heimat. Heimat discourse accepts the contributions that immigrants and transnational citizens can make in freeing German national sentiment from the friction and complexity of the past. Their participation is also rhetorically useful as evidence of the inclusiveness of new nationalism. However, since Heimat thinking is also incompatible with the complexity and rationality of plural and transnational affiliations, it also maintains a boundary between immigrant patriots and normative nationals. German “memory culture” (Esmer, 2014) thus stands as both a challenge and an opportunity for new Germans seeking to claim their place within national culture.
While those with identifiable immigrant heritage may continue to be frustrated in their attempts to claim their *Heimat* in Germany, their presumed lack of a German past gives them a privileged position in defining a new Germany free from the burdens of the National Socialist past. This is evident in minority cultural production from hip-hop to journalism (see for example Harris, 2010a; Samy Deluxe, 2009). In their 2012 book *Wir neuen Deutschen* (We New Germans), Polish-born Alice Bota, Turkish-German Topçu Özlem, and Vietnamese-German Khue Pham intertwine narratives from their personal lives as first and second generation immigrants from three distinct cultural and socio-economic backgrounds with broader analysis and critique of identity and exclusion in contemporary Germany. They use their biographies and their experience as journalists on the editorial staff of the prestigious weekly newspaper, *Die Zeit*, to analyze the logics and functions of limited notions of Germanness and to argue for the benefits of inclusiveness to the whole population of Germany. Throughout their work they criticize the hierarchical differentiation of “Germans” from “foreigners.” Germanness is defined first by the lack of foreign traces in language, religion, appearance, and name. However, they observe that Germanness may be attained (at least provisionally) despite these foreign traces based on a person’s level of achievement in society.

Although Bota et al. provide a nuanced and comprehensive critique of the differential valuation of the “foreign” and the “German,” they also uncritically accept several common assumptions relating to *Heimat* and the German past. The third chapter of their book, *Meine Heimat, keine Heimat* (My *Heimat*, No *Heimat*), addresses the question of where one comes from, delving into the affect of belonging. Bota et al. observe that those who ask this question of others can usually answer it easily for
themselves, but are not satisfied with a simple answer. For those whose origins are multiple this question is a trap, forcing them to declare loyalties to one at the expense of others. They write that Heimat is an extremely emotional and complicated concept, one that evokes the sacrifices their parents made by emigrating, and the desire for the security their German friends seem to derive from it. “Heimat,” they write, “is the origin of body and soul; it is the middle point of one’s own world”\textsuperscript{x} (2012, p. 50). The authors’ internalized conception of Heimat underscores their assimilation of German notions of self, even as it marks them as permanently alienated from it.

Even as they perceive that Germans enjoy security and harmony from inhabiting their own homeland, echoing Walser’s position, they see Germans as tormented by shame for the Nazi past. They write that, “being German still means: having to bear Nazi jokes abroad, keeping your head bowed, and only bringing out the flag during the World Cup”\textsuperscript{x} (2012, p. 53). They argue that the burden of the past has prevented Germans from having a robust national identity. Somehow, the authors do not interpret long persistence of exclusively descent-based citizenship, the primacy of singular notions of Heimat, and the resistance to accepting people of color as German as indications of a strong national identity. Despite the abundant evidence Bota et al. present of the resilient positive associations with Germanness, the authors still accept the Walserian notion that a persistent “guilt complex” makes positive German identity impossible. Bota et al. go so far as to borrow the axiom that “to love others, one must first love themselves” (2012, p. 53) to argue that German self-loathing is actually the root of xenophobia. They offer little justification for this claim, which appears to be based on the commonsensical idea that bullies—here xenophobes—only lash out at others out of a lack of self-confidence,
caused in this case by shame about the Nazi past. The authors consider themselves as absolved from this shame, since others do not see the German past as belonging to them. In this, they find an opportunity: by encouraging Germans to accept their immigrant and minority compatriots as part of the nation, they can build a new identity free from the fetters of past nationalist atrocities. In their acceptance of the view that the past has a pathological impact on the German national psyche, they view the incorporation of the transnational in Germany as a route to freedom from the past.

Bota et al.’s book musters a powerful critique of the cultural politics of contemporary social inequality, but it also demonstrates the taboo surrounding the concept of racism in Germany. The authors repeatedly address issues of appearance, religious stigma, and religious and cultural othering, but the words “race” and “racism” only appear on two pages in the book. Beyond that, it shows the even stronger taboo around examining continuities with National Socialist past. The only role the German past plays in the book is as a source of shame that prevents a relaxed and healthy contemporary German identity. Taking a different approach, Turkish-German journalist Mustafa Esmer (2014) rejects the ways the past is used by normative Germans in a commentary written for the online magazine, Migazin, which covers issues related to migration in Germany. Esmer uses stories from his life to demonstrate how the burden of the past functions to delegitimize criticism of racism by minorities in contemporary Germany. Esmer points to a pattern evident in episodes ranging from memories of his parents' attempts to criticize discriminatory treatment in the search for housing to contemporary discussions about his experiences of everyday racism with "bio-German" friends. Whenever his parents or Esmer spoke up against racialized inequality, they were
met with the defensive dismissal, “Yeah, yeah, we are all Nazis” (Esmer, 2014). He then asks,

Why, even though I have lived in Germany since my birth, I grew up here and I actively follow politics, am I not allowed to criticize the injustices that govern my life? Very simple: I am missing a crucial marker of bio-German identity, namely, the German original sin—the Holocaust. The exclusivity of the German original sin is the problem that leads to the lack of recognition of new Germans by the majority society.” (Esmer, 2014)

Esmer sympathetically observes the same “guilt complex” that Bota et al. blame for German self-hatred and, paradoxically, xenophobia, but comes to a different conclusion. Instead of seeing the inclusion of minorities as a means of breaking the curse of guilt, Esmer calls for an initiative involving representatives of the German population in all its diversity to devise a new, active, and inclusive approach to German memory culture.

Esmer’s account shows that, even among his liberal German friends, the past is not functioning as a tool to understand the logics and the significance of everyday forms of racism. On the contrary, it has been used to create an environment of what Robin DiAngelo (2011) in the United States has called “white fragility,” or the expectation among majority populations of being insulated from racial stress, leading to the inability to tolerate challenges to the hegemonic racial equilibrium.

This resistance among majority German society to a national “guilt complex” and its prevention of “normal” national sentiments reaches back to the early postwar years. Already in 1959, Adorno criticized pervasive complaints of a “guilt complex,” suggesting that this term portrays burdening of oneself with the past as pathological, “whereas the healthy and realistic person is fully absorbed in the present and its practical goals” (2012, p. 91). This quote reflects the extent to which biopolitical concepts of health and the productive, future-oriented population were already well-established and functioning to
construct national ideals less than 15 years after the war ended. Indeed, Adorno saw much behavior that is neurotic in relation to the past, including “defensive postures where one is not attacked, intense affects where they are hardly warranted by the situation, an absence of affect in the face of the gravest matters, not seldom simply a repression of what is known or half-known” (2012, p. 90), examples of all of which are readily apparent in Walser’s 1998 speech. Adorno was skeptical that this neurosis was the result of a collectively felt guilt, but rather suggests it was a defensive reaction against it. A key part of this defense is the denial of continuities from the Third Reich to postwar Germany—in particular as regards national identity and racism. Establishing a new national normality after the Third Reich has depended heavily on the intimate features of Heimat thinking, while denying its political functions in establishing the abstract nation-state and maintaining the notion of internal strangers.

**Conclusion**

By privileging an imaginary stability, simplicity, and harmony, Heimat excludes populations whose experiences of moving across cultures and switching cultural codes makes them acutely aware of the ambiguities and complexities of national cultures. Because new Germans must learn diverse sets of cultural codes, they can never forget that cultural assumptions are not simply natural, but are socially constructed. Heimat crystallizes this desire for continuity between the personal and the social, between local experience and the political abstraction. Although visible minorities are excluded from this German norm of Heimat, their perceived lack of a German past positions them to support another desired form of normality: a present- and future-oriented German nation.
that is free from the burdens of the past. Whereas this chapter has focused on an affective concept that distinguishes indigenous Germans from integrant strangers, the next chapter examines rational, biopolitical conceptions of the social body that mobilize immigrants and minorities in integration projects that aim to build a new Germany suited to the challenges of a global economy.

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1 So wird es en Deutschland gemacht
2 Wie schön! Sie fahren zurück in die Heimat.
4 Aufnahmeverbot aus anderen Staaten (einschließlich Estland, Lettland oder Litauen) als der ehemaligen Sowjetunion müssen zusätzlich nachweisen, dass sie auf Grund ihrer deutschen Volkszugehörigkeit Benachteiligungen oder Nachwirkungen früherer Benachteiligungen unterlagen.
5 Das fällt mir ein, weil ich jetzt wieder vor Kühnheit zittere, wenn ich sage: Auschwitz eignet sich nicht, dafür Drohroutine zu werden, jederzeit einsetzbare Einschüchterungsmittel oder Moralkeule oder auch nur Pflichtübung
6 Nicht den Opfern und der Entzivilisierung unserer Gesellschaft gilt die erste Sorge, sondern dem Ansehen des Industriestandortes Deutschland.
7 Wenn mir aber jeden Tag in den Medien diese Vergangenheit vorgehalten wird, merke ich, daß sich in mir etwas gegen diese Dauerpräsentation unserer Schande wehrt. Anstatt dankbar zu sein für die unaufhörliche Präsentation unserer Schande, fange ich an wegzuschauen.
8 Wenn ich merke, daß sich in mir etwas dagegen wehrt, versuche ich, die Vorhaltung unserer Schande auf Motive hin abzuhören und bin fast froh, wenn ich glaube, entdecken zu können, daß öfter nicht mehr das Gedenken, das Nichtvergessendüren das Motiv ist, sondern die Instrumentalisierung unserer Schande zu gegenwärtigen Zwecken.
9 Heimat ist der Ursprung von Körper und Seele, es ist der Mittelpunkt der eigenen Welt.
10 Deutschsein heißt immer noch: im Ausland Naziwitze ertragen, den Kopf gesenkt halten, die Fahne nur zur WM rausholen.
11 Warum darf ich trotz der Tatsache, dass ich seit Geburt in Deutschland lebe, hier aufgewachsen bin und die Politik aktiv verfolge, die Missstände, die meinen Alltag bestimmen, nicht kritisieren? Ganz einfach: Mir fehlt ein wesentliches Merkmal biodeutscher Identität, nämlich die deutsche Erbsünde—der Holocaust. Die Exklusivität der deutschen Erbschuld ist das Problem, das zu der fehlenden Anerkennung Neudeutscher vonseiten der Mehrheitsgesellschaft führt.
CHAPTER 2 – SPORTS INTEGRATION IN THE NEW GERMANY

In the early 2000s, after the introduction of territorial birthright to citizenship (jus solis), Germany quickly transformed itself from a paradigm of “segregationist” approaches to immigration into a strong supporter of new “integrationist” approaches (see Süßmuth 2001). German migration policy shifted from exclusion and repatriation to focus on management and socialization. Chapter 1 discussed the German notion of Heimat, or homeland, which is generally conceived as a paradigmatic example of particularism. Heimat evokes a personal, private and individual imagination of the place of true belonging outside the realm of politics. However, as Chapter 1 argued, it is precisely this sense of intimacy that made Heimat such an effective tool for the generalization of identity to formulate Germany as a national community in the modern sense. Heimat maintains its particularist and primordial underpinnings but, by conceiving of itself as an individualist concept, resists political analysis. However, as this chapter will argue, contemporary notions of national belonging and citizenship in Germany have also evolved to include universalizing imperatives under the paradigm of civic integration. As a complement to the past temporal orientation of Heimat, contemporary integration projects work to cultivate collective forms of subjectivity that aim to improve the future life of the population. Sports have emerged as one of the most prominent forms taken by these projects. This chapter looks at the prominent place of sports, and
particularly soccer, in integration policy to parse the logics underpinning the development of new techniques for managing diversity in German society.

Several of the earliest national institutions to initiate integration projects were the German Olympic Sports Confederation and the German Football Association (DFB, Deutscher Fußball Bund), which fields the national soccer team. Despite the long relationship of sports to war (Mangan, 2004; Pritchard, 2009), today sports are conceptualized as the ideal model for transcultural social cohesion and international cooperation. This chapter opens with an analysis of a 2014 cover story from Der Spiegel, which shows the extent to which sports facilitate discourses of national self-construction.

To further investigate the conceptualization of the relationship between sports and integration, this chapter examines the place of sports in the National Integration Plan of 2006 and in the integration programs of the German Football Association and the German Olympic Sports Confederation. The corpus for this chapter is as follows:

- German Football Association (DFB) and Mercedes Benz
  - Integration Prize
    - Brochures (2008-2015)

- German Football Association (DFB)
  - Integration Starts with Me! Practical Handbook (2011)

- German Olympic Sports Confederation (DOSB)
  - Integration through Sports Program
    - 20 Years of Integration Brochure (2009)
    - Integration through Sport: An Introduction (2012)

- The Federal Government (Die Bundesregierung)
  - National Integration Plan
    - Plan Introduction and Sections Related to Sports (2007)
I analyze the social policies and rhetoric around the participation of minority Germans in elite and amateur soccer, and in particular, the claim of DFB leaders—echoed by politicians—that “sport is the primary engine of integration in Germany,” and that elite athletes of color represent “lived integration” (gelebte Integration). As this chapter shows, discourses of sporting integration follow a biopolitical mode of governance aimed at managing diversity and cultivating it into a form that is beneficial for the German population. In doing so, those discourses strengthen the normative foundations of majority German society and justify the socio-economic inequality of those who choose not to or fail to meet those normative standards.

The chapter ends with an analysis of the seams of this sporting integration, the disjunctures where the easy transition from celebration to skepticism and condemnation reveal the dual nature of biopolitics: the power to “make live” involves deciding which life should be encouraged to thrive and which should not. The logics dictating that resources and energies be poured into disciplining non-normative bodies to transform them into valuable members of the population also dictate that those provisional members be surveilled for evidence of errancy. In particular, I examine a debate about requiring players to sing the national anthem that cropped up after the national team performed below expectations at the Euro Cup in 2012. This chapter asks, what connection do discourses of sports integration illustrate between life and integration? How does promoting “integration” through sports discipline unruly bodies and turn them into productive citizens? How are the minority affiliations of these athletes conceptualized as contributing to their ability and to the ability of the German national team, or in the case of amateur sports, to the German population at large? The central role of sports in
German policy on the socialization and management of those newly entitled to citizenship has emerged in concordance with economic theories of national life developed in Germany after World War II and, more recently, as part of the spread of a new form of integration discourse across Europe around the turn of the millennium. In both cases, economic logics have gained ascendance in the definition of deserving citizens.

Although it is still common to distinguish European policies on immigrant reception into national typologies defining them on a range between multiculturalist and assimilationist, as Christian Joppke (2007) has shown, policy across European states is converging around the ideal of “civic integration.” Typologies of nationalism often categorize nationalisms according to their relative reliance on ethnic or civic traits in defining the population (Canovan 2000, Yack 1996). “Mature,” “modern” and “Western” forms of nationalism—with all of the problematic superiority implied in these terms—are typically associated with civic nationalist conceptions that accommodate and incorporate diversity in the very idea of the nation (Canovan, 2000). This form contrasts with “exclusive” forms that depend on primordial and particularistic conceptions of the national population. The latter, “segregationist” form is often associated with Germany (Koopmans 2005), most dramatically expressed in the period of National Socialist rule. Even after National Socialism, Germany’s maintenance of a decent-based form of citizenship (jus sanguinis, or “blood right”) made it, until recently, “the pariah among immigrant-receiving states in the West” (Joppke, 2007, p. 2). In contrast, the Netherlands and France are held up as exemplars of two different forms of civic nationalism (Joppke, 2007). The Dutch version is characterized as a strong pluralist model of multiculturalism.
built on the traditional Dutch model of pillarization, which affirmed the right to self-organization in the interests of maintaining religious communities (Prins & Saharso, 2010). On the other hand, the French model of civic nationalism is often referenced as a paradigm of universalist or assimilationist models of incorporating cultural difference (Simon & Sala Pala, 2010). However, closer examination of the policy and discourse of these paradigmatic examples shows that they have actually converged in recent decades, moving towards new discourses of “integration,” while condemning the supposed “balkanization” of multiculturalism (Vertovec & Wessendorf, 2010). At the same time, assimilation is no longer considered a realistic or ethical approach. Even France condemned the idea of assimilation as early as the 1980s, calling for the utilization of “differences within a common project and not, like assimilation, their abolition” (quotation from the French High Council for Integration cited in Simon & Sala Pala, 2010, p. 93). Despite their many differences, recent scholarship has shown that clean typological distinctions among models of citizenship and belonging in Western immigrant-receiving countries are untenable.

Instead, Europe has broadly turned to “integration” as a supposed alternative to assimilation and multiculturalism, outlined in a policy document released by the Council of the European Union in 2004. This document reflected and advanced a convergence of policy on immigrant reception and incorporation. The Council outlined goals for the monitoring and evaluation of integration processes, as well as factors such as education, employment, language skills and majority society contact that they argued contribute to successful integration (Council of the European Union, 2004). While also including a point clarifying the need to pursue anti-discrimination policy, the document primarily
outlines immigrant obligations to become productive and autonomous. State and civil society measures are aimed at creating the conditions for immigrant self-reliance. Christian Joppke (2007) traces the development of the EU policy to the Netherlands, which took a strong turn away from multicultural policy over the course of the 1990s. The Dutch went from being pioneers of multiculturalism to become leaders in what Prins and Saharso (2010) call “new realism,” a social conservative discourse condemning the supposed hegemony of the “liberal elite” and its oppressive norms of “political correctness.” While the language of the 2004 policy document maintains broad language of inclusivity, Joppke shows that the implementation of “civic integration” policy across Europe demonstrates an increasingly obligatory tendency and has become a new tool for immigration restriction, particularly for the family members of low-skilled immigrants seeking reunification.

European states have moved to adopt a dualistic policy of immigration, which rolls out “a red carpet of relaxed entry and residence requirements” for highly skilled immigrants while “fending off” low-skilled immigrants with pre-entry integration requirements and other restrictions (Joppke, 2007, p. 8). After long denying the permanence of postwar labor migration and the settlement of asylum seekers, Germany followed the implementation of changes to citizenship law in 2000 with the enactment of
its first explicit policy on immigrant inclusion with the Immigration Act in 2004. This law introduced, in highly contradictory terms, the “entitlement” and the “obligation” of immigrants to attend integration courses. Without defining it, the law includes the term “integration” 61 times. The law requires integration education for long-term permanent residents who are deemed to have “special integration needs” and those who receive public benefits. This law grants broad discretion to authorities to determine the level and meaning of integration. The meaning of integration, however, has remained flexible, defined informally in public discourse and indirectly through the specific government measures to pursue it. While later chapters, and particularly Chapter 6, analyze the repressive side of integration discourse, this chapter analyzes the attractive and productive aspects of biopolitical mechanisms embodied in sporting integration.

**Being Somebody Again: National Self-Reflection and Optimization Through Sports**

After Germany’s 2014 victory during the men’s FIFA World Cup, *Der Spiegel* published an issue with a cover that asked *Wir sind wieder... wer?* (We are who... again?). This title used punctuation to convert the famous idiom *Wir sind wieder wer* (We are somebody again), which emerged from the jubilant collective response to West Germany’s 1954 World Cup victory, commonly known as the Miracle of Bern (“„Wir sind wieder wer“,” 1996). That event has taken on mythological proportions in national

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10 Act to Control and Restrict Immigration and to Regulate the Residence and Integration of EU Citizens and Foreigners (Immigration Act) of 30 June, 2004.
narration, with prominent politicians and historians referring to it as “the true birthday of the Federal Republic” (Joel & Schütt, 2008, p. 8). In a spontaneous display of national exuberance—one that provoked anxiety among many international observers—the audience in Bern broke into the original national anthem, complete with the excised section proclaiming “Deutschland über alles” (Germany above all). By referencing the return of collective public pride in 1954, Spiegel ties the current victory back to that postwar moment of “becoming someone.” At the same time, the ellipses and interrogative transform the statement into its opposite: a statement of doubt and anxiety about the makeup of the population and its meaning for national collectivity.

The issue was released with six different cover images of people draped in the German flag, who, according to the editor’s introduction, represent six German Archetypes, including a man in sandals and white socks with a German shepherd, a woman in business attire with a child on her hip, and a man pushing a shopping cart filled with reclaimed bottles and cans. These people represent six possible answers to the question of who represents the national “we”. The figures, the top halves of their bodies covered by the flag, are identifiable by their stances and clothing. On the cover for the digital edition (figure 1), Angela Merkel is suggested by her typical dress (black slacks and pink blazer) and her characteristic stance: straight-backed with feet placed close together, arms bent with her hands meeting in front of her torso, fingers lightly touching. To each side, you can see part of two other figures, suggesting that the series of covers forms a circle. These two figures are identifiable as a national soccer team member and a Muslim woman, fully veiled in black. Ironically, in order to show that the woman is veiled, she is the only figure whose face is not completely covered by the German flag.
The cover image suggests that the nation, embodied by its top politician, stands between two possibilities competing to define its future. The soccer player represents national unity and the glory of success on a global stage.
This is the Germany of lightness and positive national sentiment. The figure of the woman, on the other hand, represents the threat of a “parallel society” within Germany, defined by “traditional” Muslim values and gender norms. The veiled woman is both a figure of both pity and anxiety, symbolizing the supposed repression of women among a segment of the “we” in Germany that does not wish to adopt “Western” norms. As Joan Scott (2007) observed, in Western Europe the veil or the headscarf has taken on a disproportionate meaning, standing in for the threat posed to liberal democracy by Muslim minorities and symbolizing a “clash of cultures” between the West and the Muslim world. This cover image is Orientalist in Said’s (1979) most basic sense: it poses Western Europe’s quintessential image of Oriental difference beside the figure representing the liberal democratic state and asks whether these things are reconcilable.

Although there are many other visible cues that could signify Muslim difference, the headscarf or veil is the primary focus of attention in European cultural politics (J. W. Scott, 2007). By choosing a fully covered figure meant to represent the maximum possible difference, the cover’s designers set up an irreconcilable tension between Islam and key German institutions.

This symbol of illiberal traditionalism stands in contrast to, and as such defines, the liberal democratic values embodied by Chancellor Merkel. But this image also includes a third figure: the national soccer team player. As Chapter 5 will demonstrate, the unprecedented diversity of the German national team beginning in the 2000s
contributed to a new national imaginary that uses minority players and patriotic fans to authorize and “teach” the German public to be proud of their country. In public discussions about the changing German population, sports and sporting celebrity repeatedly emerge as a means of managing cultural difference and reasserting normative German values under the banner of integration. Sports not only provide a forum for national self-reflection, they have been mobilized as a technology for transforming immigrants and their descendants into valuable citizens.

The quintessential German values identified in these discussions are imbued with the kind of universalism that Wallerstein (1990) identifies in his analysis of the key relationship between universalism and racism-sexism. This symbiotic pair contains the contradictions of the world system under capitalism, explaining persistent inequalities in the face of capitalist promises of rising prosperity for all. Wallerstein’s idea of the universal and the racist-sexist tracks closely with the rationalities behind Foucault’s theories of biopolitics. Both identify a political economy of life that seeks to optimize the life of the population, while always also reproducing the division between life that is worthy and life that is unworthy, and thus a threat to the population. The population must be optimized for better life, which means that it must also be fragmented—a hierarchical mechanism that Foucault uses to define racism (2003, p. 255). This involves a constant process of self-definition, and identification of traits of universal value with the hegemonic or normative population. Wallerstein defines this form of universalism as “European universalism,” which holds that Western civilizations are superior because they are the only ones that have come to be based on universal values and truths.
The title article in the 2014 *Der Spiegel* issue is a wide-ranging rumination on who “we” are, defining the components of a national population and touching on pieces of the German past and present, from the Nazi past to Germany’s emergence and bright future as a global economic powerhouse and moral authority. The theme of the article is the trajectory away from “self-imposed gloominess” (*Selbstverdüsterung*) and shame over the past towards attaining “lightness” interpreted as the primary component of a new “Germany feeling” (*Deutschlandgefühl*). The article claims that “it is also German virtues that have led to the German lightness. Since prosperity makes life light and elevates the mood. As a consequence of diligence, discipline, and obedience this prosperity is currently growing” (Kurbjuweit et al., 2014, p. 61). These culturally defined traits are used to explain the prosperity of Germany, which, as the authors note, was enjoying something like a “small economic miracle” amidst the European economic crisis. They attribute this prosperity both to “German virtues” and to the economic reforms made in the early 2000s to “bring society and the economy into conformity.” This statement legitimates Germany’s economic gains at a time when its Southern European neighbors were mired in economic turmoil. The virtues claimed as culturally German serve to explain Germany’s success on the playing field as well as in the global economy.

Returning to the cover image of the three figures described above, German liberal democracy stands between its projection of illiberal traditionalism on the one side and on the other a national soccer team that has come to signify the possible benefits of a transnational and multiethnic society. This forked pathway of “benefits” and “challenges” has driven the underlying narrative in the battle for Germany’s future, encapsulated in integration discourse and its projects. It should not be surprising, then, that sports
emerged as a major focus of the earliest national projects for integration. One of the first institutions to take up the project of integration was the German Olympic Sports Confederation (DOSB). The DOSB conceptualized a program called “Sport for everyone—Sports with Aussiedlern” in 1989 that allocated federal funding to provide recreational sports activities to newly arrived ethnic German immigrants from the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc countries (see Chapter 1 for a discussion of Aussiedler). In its first iteration, only immigrants with German citizenship were included. The decision not to include refugees was harshly critiqued by some politicians, but it was justified by arguments that ethnic German Aussiedler were permanent immigrants and that they had a “greater willingness for integration” than other groups (Giebenhain, 1995, p. 172). In 2002, as part of a national shift sparked by the liberalization of German citizenship law, “Sports with Aussiedler” was renamed “Integration through Sports,” reflecting a new recognition of immigrants and their children as part of German society. However, this move towards new inclusiveness was accompanied by increasing majority anxieties about some groups’ “cultural compatibility” and “willingness to integrate,” or lack thereof.

The National Integration Plan of 2006 and the integration programs of Germany’s two most important sporting organizations reflect attempts by the State, in Gramsci’s generous sense of the term (1971, p. 244), to manage cultural and social difference by cultivating “docile bodies” (Foucault, 1978) at the individual level. At the level of the population, these programs contribute to discourses that normalize values that are portrayed as both inherent in German culture and universal in their utility for cultivating an economically independent and rational citizenry under global capitalism.
Germany’s Economic Rebirth: Foundations of Sovereignty in Economic Liberty and Enterprise

The concepts of neoliberal citizenship at the heart of integration discourse are not unique to Germany, but they have played a particularly important role in the Federal Republic since its establishment in 1949. Foucault uses the example of Germany’s reconstruction in his lectures from 1978-1979, collectively titled *The Birth of Biopolitics* (2008), to trace the emergence of one of the most influential strains of the neoliberal politics in globalized political economy. In the aftermath of Germany’s defeat in World War II and its subsequent occupation by Allied powers, German politicians faced an existential crisis of national legitimacy and national sovereignty. Under the guidance of prominent neoliberal economist, Ludwig Erhard, the state’s role was framed as the establishment of “economic freedom” and “responsibility” of its citizens (Foucault, 2008, p. 81). The purpose of this framing was not simply to establish good economic management for the purposes of universal prosperity; more importantly, “the economy produces legitimacy for the state that is its guarantor... this economic institution… produces a permanent consensus of all those who may appear as agents within these economic processes” (2008, p. 84). As Foucault puts it, “history had said no to the German state, but now the economy will allow it to assert itself” (2008, p. 86). This allowed Germany to establish “a new dimension of temporality” based not on the memory of a “malfunctioning history,” but rather on continuous economic growth. While this form of political economy subsequently spread across the globe, it played a foundational role in mitigating the memory of the past to reestablish a self-confident West German state.
In establishing the tenants of this new political-economic regime, German politicians drew on the tenants of the German and Austrian ordoliberal school of economics, which had been active since the 1930s. Their theories would also become the basis of American neoliberalism. Against the tenants of welfare economic theories, according to the ordoliberals, social policy should not aim to equalize economic differences restricting the access of consumer goods. Instead, inequality plays a vital role in maintaining the “price mechanism,” which is the basis of economic rationality: it can only produce regulatory effects if the fluctuations that are part of mechanisms of competition are allowed to function (Foucault, 2008, p. 142). The mechanism of this “social policy” must be privatization. Finally, economic growth is the only true and acceptable form of social policy; growth should not be followed by increased redistribution, which, according to neoliberal theory, would hinder further growth. As a liberal regime, the neoliberal government cannot intervene in the effects of the market, or correct its harmful effects on society. Instead, it is left to intervene on society itself.

The architects of the social and economic policy in the first decades of the Federal Republic called for a politics of society (Gesellschaftspolitik) that sees “society as the target and objective of governmental practice” (Foucault, 2008, p. 148), or what one key policymaker called “a politics of life” (Vitalpolitik). This involved generalizing economic rationality and the ideal of the citizen as entrepreneur and producer throughout the social body. At the same time, German neoliberals in the postwar period recognized that the economization of the entire social field, which prioritized competition as a principle order of life, would put stress on the social fabric of society. Vitalpolitik and what was also called the “social market economy” (Soziale Marktwirtschaft), maintained strong welfare
provisions and other measures to protect the population from the harshest impacts of a
generalized economistic approach to politics and life. To compensate for the “cold”
features of competition in society, the state must maintain a political and moral
framework that would ensure “a community which is not fragmented,” and foster
cooperation amongst people who are "naturally rooted and socially integrated" (Foucault,
2008, p. 243). Thus, the German form of neoliberalism also included social protections to
compensate for the ethical problems of neoliberalism, while also depending on a
homogeneous conception of society to justify this protection. This framing also
foreshadows a response to migration and cultural diversity as a threat to the viability of
the protections offered by the social market economy approach. However, this provision
of protection for a “naturally rooted” population divided German neoliberal policy
against itself by maintaining protections that worked against the conditions it held as
necessary for the full functioning of the regulatory mechanisms of the market.

While Germany was liberalizing its citizenship policy around the turn of the
millennium, German government and the business sector were also implementing
fundamental changes to liberalize Germany’s economy and eventually to severely reduce
its social safety net (see Chapter 4). As the Spiegel article cited above proudly stated,
Germans made changes aiming to “bring society and the economy into conformity,”
including massive cuts to its welfare provisions. These changes moved to do away with
the ambiguities of German neoliberalism as it had been implemented, bringing it closer to
the pure form imagined by the ordoliberals in the 1930s, a form which had been more
fully implemented in the United States. The liberalization of citizenship law at this time
also created the imperative to include immigrants and minority Germans in this political
and economic regime. This was an opportunity fully in line with many of the economic imperatives of neoliberalism. Critical Marxist theorists have long critiqued the logic of global capitalism as one of standardization, from Horkheimer and Adorno’s (1944) work on cultural industries through Herb Schiller’s (1976) theory of cultural imperialism and critics of globalization in the 1990s. However, Foucault argues that these theories have little to do with neoliberal governmental policy. On the contrary, the current art of government involves “obtaining a society that is not oriented towards the commodity and the uniformity of the commodity, but towards the multiplicity and differentiation of enterprises” (2008, p. 149). This explains why integration discourse so easily praises social and cultural difference as enriching, as sources of potential growth for the population at large.

On the other hand, when candidates for integration reject this order, it stands as a threat to the population. In his lectures from 1977-1978, titled Security, Territory, and Population, Foucault clarifies the distinction between the politically relevant population and its Others: “The people are those who, refusing to be the population, disrupt the system” (2009, p. 44). Agamben also observes this division in Western politics, arguing that

It is as if what we call “people” were in reality not a unitary subject but a dialectical oscillation between two opposite poles: on the one hand, the set of the People as a whole political body, and on the other, the subset of the people as a fragmentary multiplicity of needy and excluded bodies. (1998, p. 178)

For both Agamben and Foucault, this fracturing is only possible within a group that can be conceived in some way as a people or a population. Thus, when foreigners become a part of the citizenry in Germany, when they are finally included within the population,
they also become subject in a new way to processes of biopolitical fracture. It must always remain to be seen whether they will join the population as entrepreneurial members whose young bodies and “cultural difference” might even benefit the economic growth of the social body, or whether they will refuse the terms of engagement and become a threat to the system. This permanent ambiguity is heightened around immigrants and apparent minorities, representing in the starkest terms the biopolitical fracture that is an always active potential in the population: “it is what cannot be included in the whole of which it is a part and what cannot belong to the set in which it is always already included” (Agamben, 1998, p. 179). It is only when they became a potential part of the politically relevant population that immigrants and their children became the targets of integration.

To Support and Demand: The 2007 National Integration Plan

In 2007, the German Government released a National Integration Plan, in cooperation with representatives from the sectors of research, business, civil society, and the media. Before going into more depth on the parts of the plan dealing with sports, this section examines the broader conception of integration outlined in the introduction to the plan. In the introduction, then secretary of the Federal Ministry for Migration, Refugees, and Integration Maria Böhmer sketches Germany’s postwar migration history in a few short paragraphs. Starting in the 1950s, foreign guest workers were invited to work in Germany. “They wanted to stay—and should have only stayed—temporarily; then many of them chose a life in Germany” (Bundesregierung, 2007, p. 9). Then “people came for other reasons to Germany, and were often also allowed to stay,” she writes, referring
obliquely to the rise in asylum seekers in Germany in the late 1970s and 1980s. Finally, with the fall of the Iron Curtain, “many Germans returned to the land of their ancestors.”

The legitimacy gap between the refugees and guest workers who overstayed their welcome and the “Germans returning to the fatherland” is hardly veiled in Böhmer’s statement. The statement goes on to propose a new historiography of Germany, saying that although the postwar immigration has changed Germany, migration and cultural exchange has traditionally characterized Germany as a European “Kulturnation” (cultural nation). Böhmer addresses the long-delayed acceptance of “foreign” migration (as opposed to the “returned German” Aussiedler) as: “A reality, that opens up many opportunities but also contains the danger of social tension.”

Thus, only an active and comprehensive policy to pursue integration of “people with a migration background” can contain the risk they pose and convert them into a benefit for the Population.

In the following sections, I used descriptive coding (Glaser & Strauss, 2006) to identify the themes and discursive patterns that emerged in the documents from national sporting integration programs. I began with the introduction to the Federal Government’s 2007 National Integration Plan and the section of the plan dedicated to sports. I examined the brochures celebrating the winners of the annual “Integration Prize” awarded since 2007 by the German Football Association (DFB) and its corporate sponsor, Mercedes Benz. As of the time of writing, it is the most highly remunerated social prize in Germany. Winners earn money as well as vehicles from Mercedes Benz. The prize honors amateur sports programs in a variety of different institutions, including soccer teams, schools, and sports clubs. Soccer is their primary focus, although they also honor other sports programs. From the DFB, I also examined the 2013 “Practical Handbook”
for developing integration programs in amateur sports. In addition, I analyzed the German Olympic Sports Confederation’s (DOSB) 2014 “basic paper” (Grundlagenpapier) on the program “Integration through Sports.” The DOSB is the umbrella organization for local German sports clubs (Sportvereine) and claims to be the largest “citizens’ movement in Germany,” with over 27 million members in about 90,000 sports clubs across the country (Der Deutsche Olympische Sportbund, n.d.). Sports clubs in Germany are primarily financed through membership fees and depend heavily on volunteers for management and programming (Hovemann, Horch, & Schubert, 2006). In terms of membership numbers and cultural influence, the DFB and DOSB are two of the most important civic institutions in Germany. The materials examined here depict approaches to integration as a concept and a social agenda by key organizations from government, business, and civic sectors.

The first of the two most important guidelines proposed to optimize this risk-to-benefit ratio is that “Integration must be lived. It cannot be prescribed.” Secondly, it requires the practical and concrete engagement of institutions and individuals at all levels of the state and society. It is a universal social project within the nation that reinforces and protects national norms by managing potential dangers posed by immigrant difference. In setting the foundations for integration, the National Integration Plan emphasizes the importance of a strong conception of the particularity of German culture and normative values as well European universalist norms that form the basis of German constitutional law:

Integration is a task with national significance. The foundation is, besides our values and our cultural self-conception, the free and democratic order, as it has
developed from German and European history and which has its legal expression in the basic law.\textsuperscript{vi} (“Nationaler Integrationsplan,” 2007)

This statement sets the terms for the discussion on integration: it is a discussion that will be framed in terms of national interests. It also binds together, in no uncertain terms, the establishment of the German constitution with the presumably monolithic values and cultural self-conception of the hegemonic German “we.” To further emphasize the primordial underpinnings of the community claiming to set the foundations, the statement emphasizes the organic and historical development of the community and its norms. Throughout the National Integration Plan, the possessive language of the first-person plural underscores the stability of the normative German national category into which immigrants are to be integrated.

The Integration Plan and its accompanying brochures and press releases frequently reiterate that integration is a project and requires “effort” (\textit{Anstrengung}) from everyone: state, society, and immigrants. It is generally listed in this order, in an apparent attempt to dispel the concern that demands are being made on the immigrant alone. The directionality of these efforts, however, is not equal. As the statement above confirms, the process is built on the normative foundations of a historically defined culture and nation. The state and society has the responsibility to make efforts to educate and employ immigrants, while immigrants must make themselves employable, culturally acceptable, and intelligible by majority society through the German language. Change may be demanded of all, but the immigrant is required to change themselves whereas the majority society is only required to make changes to enable the immigrants’ transformation. Under the rubric of “support and demand” (\textit{fördern und fordern}), the plan
sets out the obligations to be placed on those I call integrants or candidates for integration:

Integration cannot be prescribed. It requires effort from everyone, from the state and society. Crucial, for a start, is the willingness of the immigrant to be open to a life within our society, to accept unconditionally our basic law and our whole legal system and, especially, to make a visible sign of their belonging to Germany by learning the German language. On the side of the receiving society, acceptance, tolerance, civil society engagement and the willingness to honestly welcome people who legitimately live with us are indispensable: Integration—an opportunity for our country! (“Nationaler Integrationsplan,” 2007)

The receiving society here, once again hailed in the flyer through the first-person plural, is required to be tolerant and accepting, at least of those whose residence is deemed legitimate. However, the since the flyer stipulates from the outset that “Germany is an open-minded country,” this does not require those in the majority society to make any fundamental changes. They need only act according to their tolerant and open nature.

On the other hand, very concrete demands are made of immigrants. The immigrant is asked to be open to a life within German society and to follow its rules. They are expected to accept these laws and the whole legal order “unconditionally,” which is to say, they have no right to challenge or question existing laws and norms. It is difficult to understand how a democratic system can also proscribe its people from challenging existing legal norms, unless those people are considered non-citizens. Finally, immigrants are assigned the burden of proving their affiliation and dedication to Germany by learning the standardized form of the German language. As this is something that immigrants must prove, normative German society does not have to presume belonging until it is visibly signified. The use of the modifier “visible” (sichtbar), which figuratively translates here to obvious or apparent, is curious for a capacity or trait that is
auditory, not visible. However, the first mode of determining whether immigrants must demonstrate their belonging as candidates for integration, or whether they are presumed already to belong to “society,” is inevitably somatic difference.

The expectations placed on German institutions and normative society generally focus on encouraging them to more effectively include, educate, and build the capacity of immigrants and their descendants. They are encouraged to see “diversity as an occupational resource” (Beschäftigungsressource). In terms of fighting discrimination against immigrants and minorities, the report does not go into detail. An analysis of the terms hate, racism, prejudice, xenophobia, stereotypes, and discrimination\(^\text{11}\) as they are used in the report shows that these issues arise only rarely. Where they do appear, it is often in the context of concerns about interethnic tension between immigrants. Concerns with discrimination are often related back to their harmful effect on creating a productive workspace or on Germany’s image, and thus its international competitiveness. For example, in a section dedicated to increasing Germany’s attractiveness to highly qualified researchers and workers, the plan states that “the prejudice of ‘xenophobia’ in Germany can give international researchers the impression that they will not be welcome”\(^\text{ix}\) (“Nationaler Integrationsplan,” 2007, p. 190). To be clear, the “prejudice” that is of concern in this statement is not bias against foreigners, but rather the preconception held by outsiders that xenophobia is a problem in Germany. It then goes on to affirm that

\(^{11}\) Hass, Rassismus, Vorurteile, Ausländerfeindlichkeit, Fremdenfeindlichkeit, Stereotypen, Diskriminierung
studies have shown that only a tiny number of foreign researchers experience xenophobia in Germany during their stay, dismissing it as a real concern. Only the “prejudices” or preconceptions of xenophobia are a concern, not its actual existence. Throughout the report, racism and discrimination among the majority society is addressed only in the vaguest of terms, and is often paired with a renewed declaration of the responsibilities of immigrants to be open to normative Germans. For example, “among the native (German) population prejudices and xenophobia must be dismantled. At the same time immigrants must also be willing to be open to society” (Bundesregierung, 2007, p. 140). Although the plan claims that integration is “a two-way process,” normative society’s role is to educate and train immigrants in majority norms while the immigrant’s role is to accept established norms and to contribute to optimizing the life of the social body.

Sports as “Lived Integration”: Cultivating Responsible Citizens and Managing Risk

In the 2007 Integration Plan, sports are institutional arenas that receive special attention. The plan points out that as a “motor of integration,” sports provide a wide range of possibilities for integration, from cultural and social exchange to involving immigrants in the “everyday politics” of running and supporting sporting clubs and teams. The “positive effects of sports involvement” are accepted as common knowledge:

Sports provide very diverse offerings and stand open to all people, regardless of their personalities or their cultural or financial situations. Fair play and equal opportunity are supported in every form of sports through worldwide standards of rules. Sports satisfy the human need for comparison and serves development of a movement- and body-oriented personality. In particular, the practice of team sports leads to a team spirit that does not emerge on its own in daily life.¹ (Bundesregierung, 2007, p. 139)
Despite these common-sense claims of the open, egalitarian, and socially constructive nature of sports, scholars have contested the basic claim that amateur sports inevitably lead to the kind of cooperative, intercultural solidarities described above (Giebenhain, 1995) as well as the claim that sports participation is equally available to all (Breuer, Hallmann, & Wicker, 2011). Halm (2006) even provides evidence indicating that, in general, amateur sports in Germany have contributed to social division between majority society and Turkish-German youth. However, this chapter is not concerned with the effectiveness of sporting integration in achieving its stated goals, but rather what sports integration reveals about the biopolitical foundations of cultural politics around nationalism and migration in Germany. My critical analysis here focuses on how major sporting institutions, the government, and business sponsors discuss and frame the integration projects they support.

The National Integration Plan, along with the integration programs of the DOSB and the DFB, represent an ambitious project to use the symbolism of elite national sports and the practical framework of amateur sports to discipline young “integrant” bodies and to normalize values that are portrayed both as universal and as already typically German. These values mirror ideals of economic citizenship and the imperative to cultivate human capital. While the programs all play lip service to the ideal of integration as a two-way process, the targets of integration programs show this process to be highly uneven. The
role of sports in communication and language learning is a clear example of the enforcement of German norms within a practice that is lauded as universal and egalitarian (presuming, of course, that one has the physical capacity to participate). Language is one of the most salient themes in the corpus.\textsuperscript{12} Sports are seen as ideally suited to bridge communication gaps because of their universal rules and the prioritization of physical communication over verbal forms. At the same time, sports are taken as an opportunity to enforce norms of monolingual communication in the national language.

Among their six fundamental rules, the DFB’s Handbook for sports integration lists the need to establish German as the sole “field language” (\textit{Platzsprache}). The rule of monolingualism is justified in terms of the need for fairness and equality. They write that “communication only functions in the language that all participants understand. It is a fault of respect and unfair to speak to someone in a language that he does not obviously understand. This leads to rejection and aggression” (Hink, 2011, p. 28). This statement contradicts the many statements lauding the value of sports in its transcendence of language. This statement goes so far as to legitimate German speakers who reject and react aggressively towards those who speak anything but the universal language. It shows that despite celebrations of diversity in the universalist framework of sports, sports are a means of entry to organize diversity and subordinate it to hegemonic norms. The unequal

\textsuperscript{12} See Chapter 7 for further discussion of language norms within integration discourse.
flow of these expectations of norm acquisition is even clearer in this statement advocating sports in the National Integration Plan:

Cultural integration is accomplished by the transmission of cultural techniques like, for example, language acquisition as well as the acquisition of culturally coded social “normative models” like behavioral models for everyday situations. Sports clubs offer not only places to play sports; they are also spaces of everyday communication that open access to two-way intercultural learning. xi (“Nationaler Integrationsplan,” 2007, p. 140)

The final nod to two-way processes of learning is belied by the fact that the norms and techniques to be acquired in the first part of the statement are German, starting with language. Encouraging bilingualism or the majority acquisition of minority languages is not promoted anywhere in the corpus. Programs are oriented towards attracting, accommodating and/or reforming people “with a migration background.” Majority Germans are involved as planners or, incidentally, as teammates and peers, but are not framed as targets. Majority norms are the foundation of the process tying together the social body. As the National Integration Plan puts it, the goal is “to tie more people with a migration background into established structures, and thereby improve understanding between people of different cultures” (“Nationaler Integrationsplan,” 2007, p. 142). The guidelines and narratives presented in the corpus call for changes at the institutional level to more effectively reach and reform minorities at the individual level.

If sports are—as is repeatedly claimed in the corpus—the ideal tool for integration, it is because sports serve the dual purposes underlying biopolitics: discipline and regulation. As I argue throughout this dissertation, biopolitics are the logical and technical modus operandi of integration. As Foucault shows, the modern era has been characterized by a turn away from negative, repressive forms of constraint and towards a
generalized system of discipline and surveillance that operates through desire (Foucault, 1977, 1978, 2009). Sports integration depends on the broad appeal of sports to attract young minorities and, once physically and affectively engaged, to recruit them into a system of liberal political and economic values. As I will demonstrate, the stories of successful integration selected for the DFB and Mercedes Benz Integration Prize characterize soccer as a technology for transforming dysfunctional multi-ethnic communities and spaces into optimized cosmopolitan communities. They do so by affirming the legitimacy of values and norms that are framed as German, and more broadly Western, as optimal for collective life while simultaneously celebrating beneficial and consumable forms of difference.

The Integration Prize highlights two kinds of contexts for this community transformation. One type of transformation exemplifies the disciplinary side of sports integration through the conversion of dangerous multiethnic neighborhoods into safe spaces by attracting and educating unruly young men. The other commonly featured narrative illustrates the regulatory side of sports integration, celebrating clubs that have managed to turn demographic shifts that could have posed existential threats into new sources of growth. The award honors clubs that lost membership due to the strong localized growth of immigrant communities, but which managed to turn this threat of demise into a productive new opportunity by attracting new immigrant members. They also promote the accommodation of a selection of divergent norms around consumption and modesty, by promoting respect for alcohol and food restrictions and affirming different practices around showering and nudity.
The disciplinary side of sports integration projects focuses on using the affective and playful character of sport to attract and teach minority youth values and norms such as punctuality, discipline, responsibility, and hard work. Coaches, educators, and program coordinators explain that soccer motivates young people, spurring them to discipline themselves:

That soccer plays a primary role in integration, is obvious to Heinz Bunzer: “We have it so much easier, since we are a playful community.”\textsuperscript{xii} (2010 Integrationspreis, 2011, p. 9)

In our opinion, endless prohibitions and reprimands don't go anywhere. We set ourselves the goal to do things from the inside out in a positive way and through that to reach different cultures.\textsuperscript{xiii} (Hink, 2011, p. 8)

I think that the boys and girls on a team notice quite quickly how much fun it is to pursue goals and to celebrate victories together—and everyone happily pitches in for that.\textsuperscript{xiv} (Hink, 2011, p. 48)

Once engaged in sport, young people are primed to incorporate other forms of behavior that elevate their human capital. Their performance in sport is secondary to other pedagogical goals. The body is a medium, a conduit for socialization:

Social capacity, a self-confident performance, team spirit—that is more important than lactic acid values and shooting techniques. “With soccer young people are intrinsically motivated, so they learn with greater motivation and in a playful way, to stick to the rules,” says Konermann. “The goal is to get as many of them to get a foothold in the job market as quickly as possible.”\textsuperscript{xv} (2013 Integrationspreis, 2014, p. 19)

"Soccer is a good means to realize positive developments, both for individual students, as a class and, also, for our entire school," says Jürgen Kuhlmann. Because the ball can do a lot—playing soccer teaches the Gelsenkirchen youth important values and strengthens their character. "Not to give up so easily when facing difficulties, to address conflicts but not to allow them to escalate, soccer facilitates this," reports the physical education teacher from his experiences in past years.\textsuperscript{xvi} (2010 Integrationspreis, 2011, p. 10)
In this schema, sports provide a point of entry to engage the individual in self-improvement for the good of the class, school, and beyond to the population at large. The logic of sports integration tracks closely with the techniques and aims of discipline, turning “confused, useless multitudes of bodies and forces into a multiplicity of individual elements” (Foucault, 1977, p. 170) whose forces are coordinated and made productive. The chaos of untrained bodies emerges particularly clearly in one prize narrative. Businessman Thomas Stoll decided to start a soccer program after had attending “a seminar on the transmission of values in Austria.”

Then I came home and picked up my son from school. The children were out of control; they were simply running across the street and were hurling around the wildest profanity. That was my key moment. It was clear that I had to do something. xvii (2010 Integrationspreis, 2011, p. 14)

The ethnic background of the children is not specified in the narrative of the program, but its status as an “integration” program communicates the minority status of its targets. Soccer, with its requirements of order, cellular dispersion and control of bodies also includes processes of “hierarchical observation” and “normalizing judgment” (Foucault, 1977, p. 170). Integration as a system of managing difference aims to normalize immigrants and their descendants and render them useful. At the same time, as it operates in service of liberalism, it must avoid the appearance of illiberal coercion. Sports are hailed as a “motor of integration” because they attract young, able-bodied people, enlisting them in their own normalization.

Targets of Discipline and Normalization: Unruly Boys and Oppressed Girls
Sports integration programs overwhelmingly focus on young people and their families. Since sports integration is heavily invested in sports as a pedagogical tool, families are targeted as the first locus of social reproduction. The targets of these programs are approached within a highly-gendered framework. While the pedagogy applied to girls and boys share some of the same goals—foremost among them, the cultivation of individual empowerment, confidence, and “good values”—they diverge on key points. Remedies proposed by sports integration programs point to perceived deficits in immigrant communities. In the corpus, young minority males are singled out for reform of deviant behaviors like violence and criminality, whereas women and girls are targeted to remedy gender inequality that is presumed to be a generalized problem in “traditional” minority communities. In both cases, integration projects are largely oriented towards problems located within immigrant communities. This deficit-orientation is particularly prominent in the narratives of the DFB and Mercedes Benz Integration Prize.

In the stories publicized by the Integration Prize, young men are often normalized by neglecting to mention gender as a focus when discussing boys’ teams, or stigmatized by making them the focus of programs targeting social deviance and neighborhoods classified as “social combustion points.” The celebrated Midnight Sports program in Berlin is a paradigmatic example of this type of gendering, targeting people characterized as potential delinquents and normalized as male. As the 2013 Integration Prize brochure avers, Midnight Sports organizers were invited to confer with Chancellor Merkel on the topic of integration and were awarded with the Bambi—Germany’s oldest and most important media prize (see Chapter 7)—for the category Integration. The project
mobilized the celebrity and symbolic power of its sponsor, the Ghanaian-German national soccer team member Jérôme Boateng, in a narrative of reforming urban minority youth through sports to “defend a Berlin neighborhood teetering on the brink.” The program’s founder Ismail Öner, a trained social pedagogue of Turkish heritage, described his motivation for starting the project,

The police designated the Heer Street in North Spandau a "criminally burdened place." A group of about 30 young people, mostly with a migration background, had practically crippled the neighborhood. For me it was clear: something had to change now. Midnight Sports was the result of a discussion I organized between the police and the young people. On December 8, 2007, we opened the gym for the first time. The effect was stupendous. The categorization of "criminally burdened place" place could soon be lifted.(2013 Integrationspreis, 2014, p. 22)

This story epitomizes transformative narrative of sports, which by transforming dangerous young people, defends and restores the social body to health. The category of a “criminally burdened place” is a local legal classification of space that the police may assign, which lowers the requirement of reasonable suspicion to justify police intervention. Cities and states across Germany have similar policies classifying “dangerous zones” to justify increased surveillance and police intervention. Local police have broad authority to designate these spaces of exception, and the limited research available on these policies suggests that designation is based as much or more on demographic features of a space than on actual risk of violence (Belina & Wehrheim, 2011; Ullrich & Tullney, 2012). Öner draws on this category to justify the claim that these mostly minority youths represented a serious threat to life in the neighborhood and to link his intervention to the neutralization of that threat.
Midnight Sports uses the attraction of organized sports to transform threatening young men into useful individuals through a variety of disciplinary techniques that coincide with the requirements of sport. In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault (1977) outlines a modern technology aimed at increasing the usefulness of individuals in the most efficient possible manner. Discipline seeks to produce “subjected and practiced” bodies, increasing the forces of the body in terms of utility while decreasing the political force of the body through obedience (1977, p. 138). This involves processes of enclosure and partitioning, which in this case is the removal of young men from the public spaces of the streets to the controlled space of the gym and the indoor soccer field where each player knows his place and his function within that space. By its very definition as a practice, sport produces “docile bodies,” which is Foucault’s term for the disciplined body that represents maximal utility and minimal cost. Beyond the direct practices of the game, however, sports open the possibility for further interventions, as the leader of Midnight Sports explains.

*DFB Interviewer:* And the baseball bats had to be left outside the gym?

*Ismail Öner:* Let's not exaggerate, it wasn't so bad. We created encounters. At our first tournament, the police played against the kids. They had previously only encountered each other during incidents. The young people come to the gym and they bring all their works and needs along. Then the social pedagogy work begins. We create networks with schools, families, soccer clubs, child welfare offices, and other people and institutions around the kids. There is often trouble. They are in danger of failing, they are under threat of expulsion, a young man can't find an internship, another has a court order. Sometimes it's just lovesickness.\(^ {\text{xix}} \) *(2013 Integrationspreis, 2014, p. 22)*

Here, the DFB interviewer picks up on the description of delinquency that Öner introduced in his previous statement by suggesting, half in jest, that these young men needed to be disarmed before participating. Öner initially pushes back against what he
classifies as an overstatement of their deviance. He then continues to outline the depth
and breadth of interventions necessary to reform these young men and make them
productive. Foucault writes that disciplinary space aims to “establish presences and
absences, to know where and how to locate individuals, to set up useful communications,
to interrupt others, to be able at each moment to supervise the conduct of each individual,
to assess it, to judge it, to calculate its qualities or merits” (2009, p. 143). The practice of
soccer in itself fulfills these aims, but Öner’s statement shows that, above all, it generates
the enticement to enter a disciplinary space that to acts as the nexus in a network of other
disciplinary spaces. The statement above concludes with an inventory of transgressions
against the standards and norms of schools, the job market, and the legal system. Öner
mitigates this description of deviance by adding an example of the “normal” travails of
youth learning to navigate amorous relationships.

There is a tension in the DFB literature between the masculine normativity of
soccer and the special gendered imperatives of integration discourse demanding the
inclusion and empowerment of women. While the above interview emphasizes that
Midnight Sports welcomes all national backgrounds, “including Germans,” Öner
expresses discomfort with female participants, explaining that he is unable to relate to the
problems of girls:

If they come into the gym they are permitted to play. But I know what I can do
and what I can’t. Pedagogy plays a major role. I don’t have the ability to
empathize in order to understand the problems of 14-year-old girls. Other female
colleagues (Kolleginnen) will have to take that on.\textsuperscript{xx} (2013 Integrationspreis,
2014, p. 23)

Before this question, the last of the interview, the neutral term “young people”
(Jugendliche) is generally used for the participants. Once Öner refers to “our boys”
(unsere Jungs), but until the last question gender otherwise unspecified, and consequently, presumed to be male.

Soccer in Germany and in most of Europe is deeply associated with masculinity (Pfister, 2003; Pfister, Fasting, Scraton, & Vázquez, 2002). While the men’s soccer was becoming a keystone of postwar national mythology, German women were barred from organized soccer by the German Football Association until 1970. In the development of recreational and professional soccer across most of Europe during the 20th century, soccer was coded as fundamentally masculine and women were long barred or discouraged from playing organized soccer.  

Although women’s soccer programs in Europe have become increasingly competitive at the elite level, amateur participation rates are heavily skewed in favor of men. In 2016, women’s teams made up only 7.7% of soccer teams in Germany (Deutscher Fussball-Bund, 2016). The drastic gender disparity in soccer participation nationwide does not rate as a central concern on the DFB website. It receives only passing mention and the lack of female players is described as a technical problem to be negotiated with, for example, an online team exchange where female teams can post openings for players or with “test training” sessions (Schnuppertraining) where girls can check out the game. In contrast, in the context of sports integration, girls’ participation is framed as a central problem with broader social implications, both as a

13 In contrast, in the U.S. participation rates across genders are approximately equal, and soccer has traditionally been considered a sport that is equally appropriate for males and females (Knoppers & Anthonissen, 2003; Markovits & Hellerman, 2003).
reflection of and as a means to change the presumed patriarchal norms of minority communities.

Girls and women receive special attention in the DFB Integration Prize, although their interest in soccer is sometimes observed with considerable surprise. As one prize winner stated, “we noticed—with total astonishment—that the girls also liked to play soccer during recess, and were good at it”\textsuperscript{xxi} (2009 Integrationspreis, 2010, p. 8). This statement underscores the strength of the male coding of soccer in majority German society. However, this realization of girls’ interest in soccer in the context of integration programs does not lead to reflection on the problematic gendered assumptions about soccer held by majority society. Instead, participation is viewed within the framework of assumptions about gender inequalities in minority communities. As program organizer Hans-Jürgen Daum stated,

I was very skeptical at the beginning. Girls from Moroccan or Turkish families playing soccer? I couldn’t really imagine that. Today I see the enthusiasm of fathers cheering on their daughters. Soccer has contributed to a convergence of cultures.\textsuperscript{xxii} (2009 Integrationspreis, 2010, p. 19)

The failure of imagination described in this statement relates to the intersection of gendered and religiously coded national categories. While there is much left unsaid in this statement, it only makes sense in relation to an underlying presumption of, on the one hand, a patriarchal traditionalism among Muslim minority families and, on the other, a normative culture that supports gender equality in sports participation. This statement is best understood by beginning at the end. Daum’s inability to imagine Muslim girls playing soccer was tied to the assumption that their fathers—who turned out to be enthusiastic fans—would prohibit their daughters’ participation in soccer. When he was
proven wrong, however, he does not question his initial assumptions about these (Muslim) families, but instead credits soccer with causing a change in their culture, causing them to converge with implicitly German norms. This proposed effect of soccer in transforming patriarchal norms is even clearer in another statement by the founder of the project, Social Integration of Girls through Soccer, which has been replicated nationwide. Founder, Dr. Ulf Gebken claimed that, “soccer can be a lever of emancipation. The older brother or father see the sister or daughter in a completely different milieu. It changes the role behavior”xxiii (2011 Integrationspreis, 2012, p. 18). In hegemonic sports culture, soccer is seen as a fundamentally masculine pastime, while in the context of sports integration it is as a means of empowering minority girls and combatting the particular gender inequalities in minority families. The concern with gender in integration discourse separates the actual and perceived gender inequalities in immigrant communities from those of the majority society.

Along with sports’ ability to teach rules and norms, targeting women and girls is one of the most frequently appearing themes across the corpus. Following the gendered focus of the National Integration Plan, minority women in sports integration programs are defined as a special target for integration. Using the female body as a symbolic site, these programs strongly target immigrant and minority girls and women to contest the gender inequalities presumed to be endemic in minority communities and to encourage women to transmit the values and norms of integration in their role as mothers. As the National Integration Plan states,

In their role as mothers, female migrants have a key place in the integration of the next generation. Many girls with migration backgrounds achieve good results in
school and dominate the German language. Nevertheless, they often lack the opportunity to put their potential to profitable use. (Bundesregierung, 2007, p. 18)

The Integration Plan and in the sports integration programs portray women as a crucial source of unutilized human capital. This focus on women as mothers also reflects the drive of biopolitics to push into every domain of human life. Integration programs focus heavily on empowering girls, in part to recover female productivity lost to traditional family structures and in part to prepare them to pass integrated values down to their future children. The reason for this loss of female human capital, implicit in the statement above, is sketched out in more detail through the examples of the problems to be solved, including need to protect immigrant women from domestic violence, forced marriage, and the impingement of their human rights. By framing these problems as particular to immigrant communities, this discourse characterizes immigrant communities as illiberal. Their illiberalism poses a threat to the ability of immigrant women to contribute to Germany’s future prosperity. In this way, the presumption of patriarchal dominance calls for disciplinary solutions to change the behavior of men and boys and regulatory solutions to change the norms that prevent women and girls from reaching their full economic capacity.

**Regulation: Immigrants and the Nation’s Future**

There is considerable overlap in the discourses driving sports integration programs examined in this chapter. They all include the goal of improving the inclusion and socialization of immigrants and minorities for the benefit of society at large. They also proclaim the ability of sport to reform or socialize the individual and impart the
idealized Western/universal values of equality, liberty, and individualism. The programs in this chapter operate at the micro-level of practice, but also draw on the national level symbolism of elite athletics, quoting national team members who explain how soccer or their Olympic careers have allowed them to integrate into normative society and convinced them of the equality of opportunity for immigrants and minorities in Germany. xxiv One quote that encapsulates the sports integration-meritocracy narrative is from women’s national soccer team member Cecilia Okoyino da Mbabi, who states, “Soccer helped me to easily integrate myself into German society, so that today I can study and play for the national soccer team. I learned through sports that there are opportunities in Germany, even for children with a migration background” (Hink, 2011, p. 12). Programs proclaim sports’ ability to create community through the shared experience of self-actualization around a common task with universal rules. These values and behaviors are framed as a stepping stone to success on the job market. These sports integration programs also share a lack of concern with structural inequality, racism, and social exclusion. Although sports can just as easily exacerbate stereotypes and racism (see Stuart Hall, 1997b; Hoberman, 1997), the idea of sports—both at the level of individual practice and the level of mediated representation—as a natural mechanism for positive transcultural exchange is persistent throughout the discourse on sports integration.

Although they share key foundations, the discourses of the DFB and DOSB can be distinguished in terms of emphasis and tone. The DFB literature has a more disciplinary and remedial emphasis, whereas the DOSB places a greater emphasis on creating interventions to achieve equal participation. In their 2014 paper, the DOSB
writes that “whereas before remedial integration was consistently the focus, today it is primarily about the equal participation of people with and without a migration background in all areas of life”\textsuperscript{xxv} (DOSB, 2014, p. 4). Subtle forms of othering persist in the DOSB’s integration discourse. However, recent publications by the DOSB also critically interrogate the classification of “having a migration background” and insist on the category’s fluid meaning. Furthermore, they define those with a migration background as an inextricable part of the German population. While both the DFB-Mercedes Benz and the DOSB programs use disciplinary and regulatory mechanisms, the DOSB discourse emphasizes the regulatory elements by conceptualizing integration primarily in terms of the population. The regulatory elements of sports integration center on the “social body,” which is to say, on the population as an aggregate. As opposed to the deficit-orientation of disciplinary discourse, regulatory discourse is oriented towards the potential benefits of immigration and cultural diversity for the future. This involves the quantification and projection of changing demographics that underscore the need to recruit immigrants and their children into the national project. In this mode, politicians, industrial elites, and sporting functionaries speak enthusiastically about the opportunities offered by candidates for integration.

Regulatory aspects of projects identify key target populations and optimize interventions for the greatest possible benefit to the broader population. This targeting focuses on families, the young, and the able-bodied based on their importance for sustaining national growth in the future. Integration projects all begin with the division of the population into normative nationals and candidates for integration, defined by the possession of a “migration background.” The DOSB project is no exception, but while it
accepts this basic premise of division, it seeks to mitigate the harm caused by this division by promoting an anti-essentialist definition of the category of “people with migration background” and challenging those who equate it with “foreigners.” Instead, they argue that this diverse category is an increasingly important part of the nation’s future:

The total number of new immigrants grew last year by 43,000 or 0.1%. According to projections, this tendency will continue at least until 2030, but not because that many new people will immigrate, but primarily because people of non-German heritage are younger on average than the majority population, and are therefore more often at an age to establish families.\textsuperscript{xxvi} (German Olympic Sports Confederation, 2012, p. 6)

Using statistical projections, the DOSB justifies the importance of interventions to increase the productivity of those with a migration background, who, they note in the following paragraph, are twice as likely to be unemployed as their normative German peers. This comment opens the door to discussions about structural inequality, but the solutions offered by sports integration programs invariably return to interventions targeting individual behavior and interpersonal contact.

Although the framing and top-level conceptualization of the DOSB program emphasizes the benefits of diverse populations, the programs featured often involve the same pedagogical and disciplinary approaches as those honored by the DFB and Mercedes Benz Integration Prize. Like the DFB, the DOSB uses sport as a gateway other pedagogical interventions, including language programs, social counseling, and school or job search assistance, an approach they call “Sports plus x” (German Olympic Sports Confederation, 2012, p. 30). The DOSB shares the commitment of the National
Integration Plan and the DFB framework to mobilizing sport as part of a comprehensive and interventionist program aimed at imparting idealized normative values and behaviors.

While the disciplinary mode includes more-or-less implicit threats posed by individual immigrants and immigrant communities, the regulatory mode focuses entirely on the potential benefits of managing the present population for future gains. The emphasis on the benefits represented by diversity fits into an economic system of value that sees difference as a potential source of innovation. In the words of Mercedes Benz’s Director of Global Diversity,

Diversity, whether in sports or in business, always broadens one's own perspective….diversity enriches our culture and thereby our lives. It is, therefore, the foundation for the future of enterprise and for the future of society. xxvii (2013 Integrationspreis, 2014, p. 3)

To achieve this benefit, however, integration must be carefully managed and “rehearsed” (geübt) through coordinated interventions from top level policies down to individual communities. In the 2009 Integration Prize brochure, the same Mercedes Benz representative underscores the importance of active interventions in order to make diversity beneficial, emphasizing that “integration must be fostered and supported in order to be really effective and lasting, and so that diversity of people and cultures will be an enrichment for everyone” xxviii (2009 Integrationspreis, 2010, p. 3). Ideally, programs should form a network. As the DOSB puts it, “integration work can start on islands. But sooner or later these islands must be connected, so that each one can reach its full effectiveness” xxix (German Olympic Sports Confederation, 2012, p. 32). To illustrate effective networking, they present the example of a “colorful Berlin network” that organizes “prevention weeks” for school children. This program involves schools, police,
the judiciary, and sports clubs to teach children the difference between “fighting and competition” (Kampf und Wettkampf). After lessons on drug abuse and weapon laws from German authorities, students can try a variety of new sports. In this combination of fun activities and stern lessons, sports are not simply a reward for disciplined attention; it demonstrates the continuity of these projects. This program perfectly blends the disciplinary imperatives to impart bodily control and knowledge of certain punishment for potential transgressions. It does so according to a biopolitical philosophy promoting preventative measures to manage the risk and increase the stability, health, and economic viability of the population. Even with the attempts at progressive reframing by the DOSB, their highlighted integration projects target immigrant and minority children as risks in need of management.

Although the regulatory mode enthusiastically proclaims the benefits of diversity, the implicit threat does not disappear, but rather shifts up to a higher scale: to the level of the population. The potential benefits are contingent on the successful management of difference through “integration work.” In a typical articulation of the task, Maria Böhmer states,

The integration of people from immigrant families is an enormous challenge. Let's make it into an opportunity for our country! Because here we are deciding, above all, the question of the future viability of our society—both on the national and the European level. (“Nationaler Integrationsplan,” 2007)

Here, “our society” is both national and European, implicating all European nations in the project of integrating non-European populations. This quote emphasizes the integration of minorities as a path to a better national and European future. However, by framing the stakes of integration projects as nothing less than “the future viability of our society,” the
threat posed by the supposed refusal to integrate operates at a greater order of magnitude. The threat of failure is framed as existential, making each unruly body symbolize the death of German and European society.

\textit{Cracks in the Veneer of Sports Integration}

Integration as a conceptual framework guides interventions attempting to bring immigrants and their children into the biopolitical order that Foucault calls the “normalizing society.” These interventions reflect their transition to being recognized as a permanent part of the population, a change which began with the implementation of a limited form of \textit{jus soli} citizenship rights in 2000. This increased inclusion has been accompanied by new interventions from the state level reaching down to local communities and even into the family sphere, seeking to discipline and regulate new Germans through their status as permanent candidates for integration. Power under a regime of biopolitics operates through the cultivation of life. Yet, biopolitics also involves a constant process of distinguishing between life that must be cultivated, and life that poses a threat to the People and must be weeded out. The discourses and programs of integration do not categorize all immigrant and minority people as unworthy life. Instead, they categorize these groups as carriers of both risks and benefits. The extraction of benefits calls for coordinated and comprehensive interventions and surveillance to assess progress. This process includes celebration, care, and attention with the goal of developing candidates for integration into enthusiastic supporters of the German national project. In this regard, sports are seen as an ideal and natural nexus connecting individual bodies to the life of the normative population.
This process of assessment and distinction of integration successes from failures is open-ended. Candidates for integration may be celebrated as exemplars of success one day, only to have their integration status questioned at the next opportunity. Elite athletes are repeatedly caught up in this process. As embodiments of the nation, the minority athletes of the men’s German national soccer team are a key focal point of this process of assessment, celebration, and criticism. This process is by no means confined to Germany. When the French men’s soccer team won its first World Cup title in 1998, the ethnic composition of its team reflected France’s history of empire. The diversity of the French team was hailed as a source of its success and as a sign of a new post-colonial era of racial equality and harmony (Dubois, 2010). Despite the team’s successes, any lackluster performance has consistently raised complaints from the right that the team might be “too black.” In the Netherlands, there has been a similar development as the number of national team players of color increased in the 1990s. While a number of minority players have achieved the status of national heroes, audience studies and studies of media coverage of the national team have shown familiar racialized patterns that distinguish (autochthonous) white players from their (foreign) teammates of color (Hermes, 2005; Floris Müller, Zoonen, & Roode, 2007; Sterkenburg, 2013). Historical legacies of colonialism and increasingly mobile transnational populations are reflected in the demographics of national sports teams, and media coverage frequently draws on difference as an explanatory tool for the successes and failures of national teams.

International competition turns athletes into embodied national symbols, and the carefully choreographed cameras and running commentary of mediated international sports reproduce common tropes and narratives of differentiation (Wenner, 2002).
German case, the vaunted “multikulti” team of the 2010 World Cup in South Africa came to symbolize the strength of a new inclusive Germany (see Chapters 5 and 7). The Turkish-German midfielder Mesut Özil became a breakout national star. Özil, along with his German-born national teammates Jerome Boateng, Sami Khedira, have been widely lauded as “examples of successful integration.” The Polish-born Miroslav Klose and Lukas Podolski are sometimes also added to the list of the “successfully integrated.” But while the national team was being celebrated for its unprecedented diversity in 2010, a new debate emerged reflecting the surveillance and assessment that has accompanied minorities’ entrance into the symbolic national core. Before the 2010 tournament, former national team member, trainer and DFB vice president, Franz Beckenbauer criticized the national players who chose not to sing along with the national anthem before games. Beckenbauer faced a temporary ban from FIFA in 2014 and is currently under investigation for corruption related to the successful bid to host the 2006 World Cup, but remains one of the most popular figures in German soccer. The popular tabloid, the Bild, stoked the debate by publishing Beckenbauer’s statement that all players should be required to sing along (Stevens, 2010). After the team exited the 2012 European Championship, the debate was kicked up again with new enthusiasm. Politicians and leaders in the DFB proposed a “singing requirement” (Singpflicht) for all national team players, while the team’s coach defended the free choices of this players (“Diskussion ums Halbfinal-Aus bei der EM,” 2012). These discussions were renewed again in anticipation of the World Cup in 2014 and the European Championship in 2016.
Winning “Integration Prizes” and even the World Cup in 2014 has not protected minority athletes from perpetual policing. In a country where nationalist celebrations around sports have, until recently, been relatively restrained (see Chapter 3), the scrutiny and critique of athletes who choose not to sing has been highly charged. Karen Spoerr, a commentator in the national newspaper *Die Welt*, addressed the players in an open letter. It is worth quoting substantial excerpts from the letter, since it provides a striking example of racialized and gendered discourses in soccer and narrates how the mediated experience of sports feeds expectations for affective satisfaction.

Dear Mesut Özil, Sami Khedira, Jerome Boateng,

I don’t understand much about soccer, but I understand a little…. I must say, the business of playing together works well on the German team. Something else does not work so well. You already know what I am talking about, right, about the
national anthem. All the players sing the national anthem—only you three don’t. You stay silent… I have to ask myself: What are you telling us with your silence? … I really like you three, because you look so good, because you can run so fast, and because you want to shoot goals so that the Germany can become the best soccer team in the world.

But then I see you standing there silently. The camera films the singing mouths. The singing players, the singing trainer, the singing reserve bench. Only you three pinch your lips together\(^\text{14}\) like teenagers who want to punish their parents for not being cool enough. You stand there and shun the millions of enthusiastic countrymen in front of their televisions, who are yearning nothing more deeply in that moment than to get goosebumps. Who wish to be allowed to melt into a singing German community of destiny, even people like me, who can’t tell the difference between a penalty and a free kick.

[…] You three stand there speechless and destroy the beautiful idea that by singing the national anthem we can become a whole. Or could it be that this is just a misunderstanding?

Dear Mesut, Sami, Jerome, every time that I see you stay silent, I ask myself what you must be thinking while Germany sings. I think I know: You aren’t thinking about Turkey, Tunisia and Ghana. You aren’t thinking about your national identity. You think: Einigkeit und Recht und Freiheit für das deutsche Vaterland (unity and justice and freedom for the German fatherland). Right? How about next time you think it you just open your mouths?\(^\text{15}\) (Spoerr, 2014)

This commentary arguing that all national players should be expected to sing is followed by a counterpoint by a (male) colleague arguing that performance on the field matters most and that not singing does not mean that the players are not patriotic. He also points out that during the 1974 final no one, not even Beckenbauer, sang along. In contrast to the female author of the first position who proclaims three times her ignorance of the

\(^{14}\) The originally used term kneifen means “to pinch,” but is also used in phrases indicating the shirking of duties or fleeing in cowardice.

\(^{15}\) For the original text, visit \url{http://www.welt.de/debatte/kommentare/article129454350/Sollten-alle-deutschen-Spieler-die-Hymne-singen.html}
sport and disinterest in anything but national team soccer, the second author is concerned with results, with substance over symbolism. This reinforces the expectation that women have little understanding of soccer and are only interested in the pageantry and emotion of international games, whereas men have a deeper, more technical interest. The World Cup is framed as an exceptional event, where “even women” become soccer fans and patriotic displays are increasingly not only safe and normal, they are almost obligatory. Spoerr drives this point home, writing, “The national anthem is just as interesting to me as soccer, which is to say normally not at all. But during the World Cup I am interested in both, soccer and the anthem.”

Chapter 3 will examine the beginnings of this new national sports orthodoxy in 2006. By 2014, Spoerr expresses her entitlement to demand that players satisfy her desire for the affective satisfaction of uncomplicated “collective effervescence,” to reference Durkheim’s (1995) classic theory.

Spoerr is angry that these three players of color have “destroyed the beautiful idea” of perfect national unity. Possibly recognizing a problem with explicitly singling out three minority players for rebuke, she attempts to show that she is not prejudiced against them personally, by complimenting their physical appearance, speed, and effectiveness in raising Germany to the top of the global (sports) hierarchy. This comment falls squarely in the terrain of positively framed racism that flourishes in sports, where minority athletes are valued for their almost preternatural physical prowess, and appreciated for their physicality rather than their tactical or intellectual abilities (see Hoberman, 1997). After sexually objectifying these players, the author further demeans Özil, Boateng, and Khedira by infantilizing them and accusing them of petulance and spite against their “uncool parents,” presumably here embodied by white German society.
To avoid accusing them of secret disloyalty by thinking instead of their fathers’ homelands (Boateng and Khedira have white German mothers) she presumes to fill their silence with her own wishful interpretation that they must be mentally singing along. Spoerr concludes with the demand that they should “just open their mouths” next time.

Özil, Boateng and Khedira had already been scrutinized and critiqued for their failure to properly perform patriotism in 2010 and 2012, and had already publicly accounted for and defended their actions during the anthem, explaining that they use that moment to focus and/or pray. In defense of his legitimate place as a national player, Khedira argued

> It is a good sign when one sings the national anthem, but that doesn’t make you a good German. You become a good German when you speak the language well and you live the values. And that is the case with all of us.\(^{\text{xxiii}}\) (“Debatte um Nationalhymne „überflüssig“,“ 2012)

Khedira accepts not only the positive value of performing patriotism, but also the basic notion that belonging as German is defined by speaking “good German” and adopting normative values (see Chapter 7 for and examination of the role of language in defining legitimate citizenship). Spoerr not only erases minority players’ speech on this specific topic, she takes the liberty of defining their thoughts and demanding they act according to her expectations. Spoerr’s commentary perfectly blends sexist and racist frameworks around soccer. Although her column is an extreme example in that it illustrates so many tropes in such an unvarnished manner, the assumptions and expectations underlying it run throughout the cases analyzed in this dissertation.

**Conclusion**
Elite sports, particularly at the national level, reflect and reconstruct national politics of culture, race, and citizenship. They symbolize the optimism of national communities and also reveal the fragility of support for celebrated figures of integration. This chapter examined the politics of sports integration as it has been conceptualized by stakeholders in the government, business, and civic sectors and implemented at the level of communities. These programs demonstrate how the idea of integration operates through intertwined processes of discipline and biopolitical reason, seeking to improve the life of the population by disciplining bodies that represent a particular risk to that population. The celebratory and optimistic tone of sports integration discourse and practice, which emphasizes the benefits of properly disciplined diversity for the national future, implies the existential threat represented by the “failure” of integration. Immigrants and their children will either be the source of Germany’s future growth or the cause of its demise.

The rise of integration discourse cannot be separated from the rise of renewed forms of symbolic nationalism. This is the case not only in Germany but throughout Europe as the unity of the European Union has faltered in the face of nationalist commitments to regulating the population through controls on migration. Germany provides a particularly valuable case, however, because its history of atrocities committed in the name of the nation makes symbolic nationalism a contentious topic, which is subject to considerable public debate. The following chapters in this dissertation analyze a number of these public debates and “critical incidents” (Zelizer, 1992). These mediated incidents mobilize celebrity athletes and entertainers as examples for celebration or scrutiny for their roles in the project of constructing the new “colorful” German nation.
The next three chapters analyze and contextualize press discourses legitimating patriotism beginning with the 2006 World Cup. Chapter 3 analyzes media coverage to trace the emergence of the idea of “soccer patriotism.” Chapter 4 examines the political economy and representational politics of a media campaign that paved the way for the successful normalization of soccer patriotism in 2006. Chapter 5 investigates the mobilization of immigrants as pedagogical figures in the case of a dispute between immigrant patriots and German anti-nationalists.

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1 Es sind auch deutsche Tugenden, die zur deutschen Leichtigkeit beitragen. Denn Wohlstand macht das Leben leicht und hebt die Laune. Als Folge von Fleiß, Disziplin und Folgsamkeit wächst dieser Wohlstand gerade.

2 Sie wollten und sollten auf Zeit bleiben, dann entschieden sich viele von ihnen für ein Leben in Deutschland.

3 In den späteren Jahrzehnten veränderte sich die Zuwanderung. Nun kamen Menschen aus anderen Gründen nach Deutschland – und konnten häufig auch bleiben.

4 Mit den politischen Veränderungen in Mittel- und Osteuropa kamen viele Deutsche in das Land ihrer Vorfahren zurück.

5 Dennoch hat es lange gedauert, bis diese Entwicklung als das verstanden wurde, was sie ist: Eine Wirklichkeit, die viele Chancen eröffnet, aber auch die Gefahr gesellschaftlicher Spannungen birgt.

6 Integration ist eine Aufgabe von nationaler Bedeutung. Grundlage ist neben unseren Wertvorstellungen und unserem kulturellen Selbstverständnis die freiheitliche und demokratische Ordnung, wie sie sich aus der deutschen und europäischen Geschichte entwickelt hat und im Grundgesetz ihre verfassungsrechtliche Ausprägung findet.

7 Integration kann nicht verordnet werden. Sie erfordert Anstrengungen von allen, vom Staat und der Gesellschaft. Maßgebend ist zum einen die Bereitschaft der Zuwanderer, sich auf ein Leben in unserer Gesellschaft einzulassen, unser Grundgesetz und unsere gesamte Rechtsordnung vorbehaltlos zu akzeptieren und insbesondere durch das Erlernen der deutschen Sprache ein sichtbares Zeichen der Zugehörigkeit zu Deutschland zu setzen. Auf Seiten der Aufnahmegesellschaft sind Akzeptanz, Toleranz, zivilgesellschaftliches Engagement und die Bereitschaft unverzichtbar, Menschen, die rechtmäßig bei uns leben, ehrlich willkommen zu heißen: Integration—eine Chance für unser Land!

8 Deutschland ist ein weltoffenes Land.

9 Das Vorurteil der „Ausländerfeindlichkeit“ in Deutschland kann dazu führen, dass Forscher aus dem Ausland den Eindruck gewinnen, nicht immer willkommen zu sein.

10 Der Sport bietet sehr vielseitige Angebote und steht allen Menschen—unabhängig von ihrer persönlichen, kulturellen oder finanziellen Situation—offen. Fairplay und Chancengleichheit werden in jeder Sportart durch weltweit einheitliche Regeln gefördert. Sport befriedigt das menschliche Bedürfnis nach Vergleich
und dient der bewegungs- und körperorientierten Entwicklung der Persönlichkeit. Insbesondere die Ausübung von Mannschaftssport führt zu Teamgeist, der im Alltag nicht von selbst entsteht. 


Dass der Fußball eine Vorreiterrolle bei der Integration spielt, liegt für Heinz Bunzer auf der Hand „Wir haben es soviel leichter, denn wir sind eine spielerische Gemeinschaft.“

Unserer Auffassung nach führen ewige Verbote und Maßregelungen zu nichts. Wir haben uns zum Ziel gesetzt, solche Dinge von innen heraus positiv zu gestalten und damit die unterschiedlichen Kulturen zu erreichen.

Ich denke die Jungs und Mädels in einer Mannschaft merken selbst ziemlich schnell, wie viel Spaß es macht, gemeinsam Ziele zu verfolgen und Siege zu feiern – und dafür packt auch jeder gerne mit an.

Soziale Fähigkeiten, ein selbstbewusster Auftritt, Teamfähigkeit das ist wichtiger als Laktatwert und Torschusstechnik. „Jugendliche beim Fußball sind intrinsisch motiviert, sie lernen also mit hoher Motivation und auf spielerische Weise, sich an Regeln zu halten“, sagt Konermann, „Das Ziel ist es, dass möglichst viele, möglichst rasch auf dem Arbeitsmarkt Fuß fassen.“

Der Fußball ist einfach ein sehr gutes Mittel, um sowohl beim einzelnen Schüler, im Klassenverband aber auch für unsere gesamte Schule positive Entwicklungen auf den Weg zu bringen“, sagt Jürgen Kuhlmann. Denn der Ball kann viel - Fußball spielen lehrt den Gelsenkirchener Jugendlichen wichtige Werte und stärkt den Charakter. „Bei Schwierigkeiten nicht so schnell aufzustecken, Konflikte anzusprechen aber nicht eskalieren zu lassen, das leistet der Fußball“, berichtet der Sportlehrer aus den Erfahrungen der vergangenen Jahre.


Wenn Mädchen in die Halle kommen, dürfen sie mitspielen. Aber ich weiß auch, was ich kann und was nicht. Pädagogik spielt eine große Rolle. Und mir fehlt die Fähigkeit und das Einfühlungsvermögen, die Probleme von 14-jährigen Mädchen zu verstehen. Da müssen andere Kolleginnen ran.

„Wir haben—durchaus mit Erstaunen—bemerkt, dass in den Pausenhöfen auch die Mädchen gern und gut Fußball spielen“, berichtet Städtler.

Fußball kann ein Hebel der Emanzipation sein. Der ältere Bruder oder der Vater sehen die Schwester oder Tochter in einem ganz anderen Umfeld. Das Rollenverhalten verändert sich.

Der Fußball hat mir sehr dabei geholfen, mich problemlos in die deutsche Gesellschaft zu integrieren, so dass ich heute studieren und für die deutsche Nationalmannschaft spielen kann. Ich habe durch den Sport gelernt, dass es auch für Kinder mit Migrationshintergrund in Deutschland Chancengleichheit gibt.

Wo vorher stets eine nachholende Integration im Blickpunkt stand, geht es heute um die gleichberechtigte Teilhabe und Teilnahme von Menschen mit und ohne Migrationshintergrund in allen Lebensbereichen im Sinne einer interkulturellen Öffnung.

Die Gesamtzahl der Zugewanderten ist im Vorjahr gewachsen, um 43.000 Menschen beziehungsweise 0,1 Prozentpunkte. Prognosen zufolge wird sich die steigende Tendenz bis mindestens 2030 fortsetzen. Aber nicht weil so viele Personen immigrieren würden, sondern vor allem weil Menschen nichtdeutschen Ursprungs im Durchschnitt viel jünger sind als die Mehrheitsbevölkerung. Und damit häufiger in einem Alter, in dem Familien gegründet werden.

Vielfalt, ganz egal ob im Sport oder im Unternehmen, ist immer eine Erweiterung der eigenen Perspektive und will geübt sein. Vielfalt bereichert unsere Kultur und damit unser Leben. Dadurch ist sie das Fundament für unternehmerische Zukunft und für die Zukunft der Gesellschaft.

Aber Integration muss gefördert und unterstützt werden, um wirklich erfolgreich und nachhaltig zu sein, und damit die Vielfalt der Menschen und Kulturen eine Bereicherung für alle wird.

Integrationsarbeit kann auf Inseln beginnen. Früher oder später aber müssen diese Inseln verbunden werden, damit jede einzelne voll zur Wirkung kommt.

Schweiger und Sänger: Die deutschen Spieler mit Migrationshintergrund lauschen der Nationalhymne mit geschlossenen Lippen, der Rest singt inbrünstig mit.

Die Nationalhymne interessiert mich ungefähr genauso wie der Fußball, nämlich normalerweise gar nicht. Aber wenn Fußballweltmeisterschaft ist, dann interessiert mich beides, der Fußball und die Hymne.

Es ist ein gutes Zeichen, wenn man die Nationalhymne singt. Aber man wird dadurch kein guter Deutscher. Ein guter Deutscher wird man, wenn man die Sprache gut spricht und die Werte lebt. Und das ist bei uns allen der Fall.
PART II: INTEGRANTS AND THE NEW GERMANY
Integration discourse is an exercise in national self-construction, focusing as much on defining and propping up the normativity and the positive value of the national category as on defining those whose candidature for belonging must be assessed. As the case studies in this dissertation show, discussions about integration are deeply interwoven with reflections on German identity—in relation both to the troubled national past and to its possible futures. However, in their construction of the categories of integrant and national, these discussions not only define through opposition, more importantly they depoliticize and naturalize these categories. This requires the minimization of conflicts and controversy around them, requiring both categorizations to appear necessary, benign, and even positive. In the German case, however, the positive value of the national category has been contested since Germany’s defeat in the World War II was followed on the global stage by the atrocities that may follow from nationalism being taken to its logical conclusion. Germany’s defeat and the demand for a public reckoning for atrocities committed in the name of the nation complicated public nationalism, even though the defeat had little impact on the continuity of banal forms of nationalism, in that, borrowing Billig’s framing (1995), Germans never forgot or doubted that they were German. Although postwar nationalism continued to thrive in the collective intimacy of *Heimat* (see Chapter 1), the spectacular and celebratory practices of nationalism favored by National Socialists became points of contention. The media prescribed immersion in national colors during the 2006 World Cup to alleviate this contentiousness, proclaiming
the tournament as “the best group therapy for Germans, who are tormented by identity complexes, even though they are the world leaders in exports and have a generous social welfare system” (“Deutschland in Schwarz-Rot-Gold,” 2006). In this Spiegel article, this quote from a Portuguese newspaper commentary was gathered along with quotes from five other international periodicals to affirm the value of uncontested national identity.

This chapter analyzes the process by which the media in Germany constructed new narratives of national identity and patriotism around the 2006 World Cup. While Chapter 2 outlines the function of sport in the biopolitical system of values that defines the conditions for the substantive citizenship of minorities, this chapter returns to the category of the normative national and its narrative association with a harmonious and happy population. To understand the discursive field in which the press coverage of the tournament operates, I first outline the history of debates over nationalism in Germany. In 2006, the return of symbolic nationalism was celebrated by the German media and approved by international observers. Discourses of soccer patriotism construct the positive value of the national category, affirming the necessity of national affiliation for the health and wellbeing of the population and removing it from the realm of political contention.

During the 2006 World Cup, soccer was proposed as an ideal model for national engagement. This case study analyzes how the features and expectations of this event were marshalled to legitimate a change in German practices of symbolic nationalism. The first section examines the history of the debates over remembering National Socialism, which was introduced in Chapter 1, to explain the tension that the coverage of celebration of “soccer patriotism” in 2006 sought to defuse. The second discusses the nature of
sporting nationalism to clarify the role of sport spectacles in the formation and legitimation of the category of the national. Finally, I look at the media coverage of the 2006 World Cup to examine how the German media constructed new narratives of salutary national identity and patriotism by using the event to create a break from the past.

Articles were gathered using the search terms *Fußball* (soccer) AND *Patriotismus* (patriotism) in two different newspaper archives. Because of the volume of coverage related to soccer patriotism is so large, I limited my search to one influential national periodical and one regional periodical. For the national periodical I chose *Der Spiegel* including its online sibling *Spiegel Online*, which are by far the most frequently cited quality periodicals in Germany (PMG Presse-Monitor, 2014). A *Spiegel* search for the above terms yielded 46 articles (14 in print and 33 online) written in 2006. To understand the circulation of discourses of soccer patriotism in regional public spheres, I examined the archive of the *Mitteldeutsche Zeitung* (MZ), which holds a near monopoly on regional coverage in the south of Saxony-Anhalt. The MZ archives returned 26 results for the above search terms in 2006. The regional daily newspaper is not known for holding a strong ideological position. Of these results, I selected and examined articles that focused primarily on patriotism and national sentiments in the context of the World Cup. This yielded a total of 49 articles across the three sources (see table 2).

Table 2: *Search Results for Fußball AND Patriotismus, Jan. 1-Dec. 31, 2006*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>All Results</th>
<th>Selected (Commentary)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Der Spiegel</em></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Using discourse theory and analysis, I examined the themes and narratives used in the German press to construct the event and define its meaning for the nation. In the process, media coverage created a break from the past by simultaneously omitting or dismissing critical discourse about the role of nationalism in Germany’s fascist past and creating collective narratives of a new, unimpeachable “soccer patriotism.” As one astute commentator observed regarding the difficulty in taking a logical or critical stance towards the flag issue, “the secret of the little flags is: any resistance immediately comes off as uptight, whereas now we are in such a super laid-back mood” (K. Schmidt, 2006).

The return of celebratory nationalism hinges on a binary between tension and relaxation—any discussion or reflection on it uncovers or raises tension. The object under scrutiny (the flag and national colors) is defined as fun itself, establishing a “chain of equivalence” (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001) between national symbolism, the popular “parsed flag” (Marvin & Ingle, 1999, p. 216), and happiness, unity, and the alleviation of identity-based tension. Politics and critique are situated as the opposite of this, and, thus, quickly become unsustainable. National symbols are situated in a narrative of transformation in which the nation, previously alienated from itself, celebrates a glorious reconciliation.

Current narratives framing national soccer as the foremost site of national symbolism focus on the World Cup tournament hosted by Germany in 2006. Merely mentioning “the summer fairytale” (Sommermärchen), as it came to be called, is enough to evoke images of exuberant, flag-waving crowds of Germans “finally” taking their
place among the “normal” nations. The strength of this association continues unabated, as was evident in media reports in late 2015, which revealed that Germany’s successful bid to host the 2006 World Cup was not won on its own merit, but was bought away from the front-runner, South Africa. *Spiegel*’s title story revealing the results of their investigation declares that,

The soccer World Cup in summer 2006 was a turning point in German history. The country of the Holocaust had already made other steps towards rehabilitation; it had matured into a stable democracy; it had peacefully reunited. But then German also became likeable. (Feldenkirchen, 2015)

The author then outlines Germany’s concurrent rise to become one of the world’s most admired countries, as global leaders acting against climate change and for a capitalist economy that is both robust and socially responsible. The 2006 World Cup, according to this article, was the point that marked Germany’s change in global position from repentant perpetrator to moral role model.

However, as the article points out, the possibility of high-level corruption behind the symbolically crucial 2006 tournament in Germany threatens to tarnish Germany’s reputation and self-conception as a moral beacon. Nevertheless, the *Spiegel* journalist concludes that this has led to a more realistic image of a nation that is no better and no worse than any other: “There is no cause for German arrogance, no reason for feelings of superiority, which in these days are again showing themselves in their most primitive form: hatred of foreigners” (Feldenkirchen, 2015). This quote reflects a recognition of the link between identitarian forms of self-love and suspicion and hatred of those perceived as exogenous. As this chapter shows, this kind of reflection had no place within press narratives that asserted the unmitigated social and psychological benefits of the flag-
draped sporting spectacle of 2006. Although the World Cup, and in particular the 2006 tournament hosted by Germany, has emerged as possibly the most visible platform for national self-reflection and nation branding, it has received remarkably little scholarly attention. This chapter examines the process by which hosting this sporting spectacle transformed the nation’s relationship to its national symbols, freeing them from their long-troubled relationship to the atrocities of National Socialism while cultivating new collective memories to define German national identity. The contentiousness of the German case, as well as the efforts to neutralize that contention, provide a particularly stark example of the often-unnoticed processes of national narration that are part of all global sporting spectacles.

*The History of Remembering: Conflicting Postwar Narratives*

German memory of National Socialist atrocities followed a tortuous path, bifurcating in divided Germany with each nation following its own pattern of remembrance and amnesia. In her piece *Between Memory and Oblivion*, Claudia Koonz traced these paths, arguing that beginning with the post-war “Zero Hour” (*Stunde Null*), “Germans constructed a new identity based on a fresh start or a clean break from the past” (1996, p. 262). East and West Germans differed, however, in their strategies for creating the break. East Germans railed against Nazi crimes, using them as an opportunity to celebrate Communist resistance to fascism and to proclaim that “German monopoly capital—they gave orders for murder… while in the West, memory was sealed off in post-traumatic oblivion” (Koonz, 1996, p. 265). What was forgotten on both sides, however, was the racial genocide and the complicity of everyday Germans in Nazism.
Not until the late 1960s did memory of the genocide return to public consciousness, albeit in very different ways in the East and West. In this period, East Germany began preserving and memorializing the concentration camps, continuing the state-organized project of focusing on the heroism of “anti-fascist resisters”, minimizing or omitting the central racial element of the genocide. In the West, the flood of commemoration begun by the student movements in the late 1960s—including the push to recognize the Jewish victims of genocide—was less uniform, and more loudly contested. This contestation reached a climax in the bitter 1985-86 “historians’ dispute” (Historikerstreit) between historians, philosophers, and intellectuals over the appropriate historical interpretation of the genocide.

This debate arose from a quest by conservative intellectuals to distance Germany from the fascist past and establish “a new, proud, ‘normal’ national identity” (Nolan, 1988, p. 62). The public battle began with an article by Ernst Nolte published in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung entitled, “The past that won’t go away” (Nolte, 1986). In arguing that many aspects of the Third Reich and the Holocaust were not unique, Nolte and other conservative historians sought to normalize National Socialism. As Mary Nolan (1988) argued, the Historikerstreit was one of a series of controversies sparked by actions from Germany’s political right throughout the 1980s that reflected the growing desire of conservatives for a “usable past.” In order to accomplish this, the political right needed to “emancipate nationalism from its discrediting by fascism. A reinterpretation of history…above all of the Third Reich, is integral to this construction of a conservative national identity” (Nolan, 1988, p. 62). Leftist intellectuals, led by Jürgen Habermas, fought back against this attempt to whitewash the German past and, in particular, the
Holocaust. Nolan argued that “whereas the right wants a uniform and emotionally felt national identity, [the left strives] for a calm and reasoned acceptance of constitutional democracy, built on a critical understanding of Germany's recent past” (1988, p. 65). Although they did begin to chip away at the “mourning work” (Trauerarbeit) that was gaining momentum in the 1980s, the right was not entirely successful in overcoming the pervasive hold of the past on German identity in West Germany at the time of reunification in 1990.

The gap in Eastern and Western conceptions of the past were a significant stumbling block to the establishment of a shared national identity after unification. As Koonz observes,

Like a common currency and culture, the public memory of historical events structures a sense of civil society across generations, classes, and regions… While tensions and out-right hostility repolarized East and West Germans, the public memory of their shared Nazi past also became a site of dispute. (1996, p. 269)

While East Germans had constructed narratives around the continuity of German fascism in the capitalist West, West Germany had nurtured an opposing position, likening the authoritarian GDR to the totalitarian Nazi state. Not surprisingly, East Germans balked at accepting the West German brand of mourning work, which included both implicit and explicit disparagement of the GDR and did not properly reflect East German experiences. In particular, residents of the towns near the concentration camps in the former East resisted the re-branding of the camps from heroic anti-fascist memorials into monuments of admonishment.

In fact, even in the West where they had originated, the official chastisements of mourning work, which inspired respect abroad and among liberal Germans, had not
caught on among the public at large. Koonz writes that “even before unification, the
depiction of Nazism in West German television specials, best-sellers, and films
contradicted political leaders’ rhetoric of mourning (1996, p. 274).” Many of them
focused on the lives of average Germans during the Nazi time, omitting or sanitizing the
unpleasant or morally challenging aspects (see also Chapter 1). Beginning with the
*Historikerstreit*, conservative intellectuals sought to exploit the gap between popular
memory and official invocations of the genocide. After unification, their message also
found an attentive audience among East Germans irritated by *Wessie* forms of memory.

Indeed, the desire to cast off the fetters of the past complicating the public
expression of national pride was one of the few sentiments that had popular appeal across
the newly reunited nation. The process of reunification facilitated this goal on two fronts.
First, reunification provided a functional justification for patriotism and the cultivation of
a united German identity. And second, it marked the end of a historical period.
“Sometime between November 9, 1989, and October 3, 1990, twentieth-century Germany
became history” (Confino 2004, 389). The dissolution of the post-war divide created a
new distance from the World War II—a “symbolic rupture” (Nora, 1998, p. 503) —
paving the way for a new German generation even further removed from the troubling
past.

Although the symbolic potential of the break with the past offered by
reunification held great potential for the foundation of a new national narrative, this
potential was mired in the conflicting Eastern and Western conceptions of that past. As
Michael Geisler (2005) argues in his work on German national symbols and public
memory after 1989, the process of forming a consensus around the meaning of past
events is a necessary—and in the German case, extraordinarily difficult—part of establishing the symbols of national identity. The significance of this failed consensus is illustrated by Ernest Renan’s famous claim that a nation is defined by its collective memory, by the fact that it shares, “in the past, a glorious heritage and regrets.” It is thus

A large scale solidarity, constituted by the feeling of the sacrifices one has made in the past and of those that one is prepared to make in the future. It presupposes a past; it is summarized, however, in the present by a tangible fact, namely, consent, the clearly expressed desire to continue a common life. A nation's existence is, if you will pardon the metaphor, a daily plebiscite. (Renan, 1990, p. 19)

Although Germany’s national symbols are arguably effective at accomplishing the official tasks of representing and identifying the state, Geisler argues that they have failed at their ideological tasks of “sustaining the collective identity of the nation, bookmarking public memory, and integrating diverse subgroups” (2005, p. 64). This results from that fact that large segments of the population—mostly among liberal Germans—feel discomforted by the symbols that are meant to inspire feeling of affiliation. However, it is important to note that while national symbols remained a point of contention, official forms of nationalism remained deeply rooted, for example, in German citizenship laws and immigration and asylum policies of the 1980s and 1990s (see Göktürk, Gramling, & Kaes, 2007). Despite the focus among both public observers and scholars of nationalism on public celebrations of nationalism, Michael Billig (1995) rightly points out that a more profound accomplishment of nationalism is its pervasiveness and durability in everyday life, even—and especially—as it disappears from notice.

**Sporting Nationalism**
Global sports spectacles are uniquely positioned to facilitate the renewal of nationalism under the pretext of a cooperative international event. Since their foundation, the Olympics and the FIFA World Cup were steeped in the idealist rhetoric of global peace and harmony. Tomlinson and Young (2006) traced these origins in the statements of the founding fathers of these events, Baron Pierre de Coubertin and FIFA president Jules Rimet. For de Coubertin, “the Olympic project had philosophical, historical, and educational dimensions and goals,” and he insisted that “internationalism was a bulwark against ignorance, chauvinism, and war” (A. Tomlinson & Young, 2006, p. 4). Rimet’s goals for the World Cup were no less lofty.

Seeing in sport a means of building good character, Christian and patriotic, his love of God and France was combined in his passion for football. He believed in the universality of the church and saw in football the chance to create a worldwide ‘football family’ welded to Christian principles (A. Tomlinson & Young, 2006, p. 5).

This conception of international sporting events as a source of healthy pleasure and fun and as promoting global friendship across social, racial, and cultural difference has endured as the justification for these events, even as particularistic elements of religion and nation thrive under the surface.

As this case study shows, the idealist rationale for the World Cup inoculated it against concerns about the nationalistic displays it encourages. After all, the logic goes, how can celebrations associated with an event explicitly designed to encourage universal peace be conduits of national chauvinism? But this is not so contradictory after all. As Gellner demonstrated,

The nationalist principle can be asserted in an ethical, ‘universalistic’ spirit. There could be, and on occasion there have been, nationalists-in-the-abstract, unbiased in favour of any special nationality of their own, and generously preaching the
doctrine for all nations alike: let all nations have their own political roofs, and let all of them also refrain from including non-nationals under it (2006, p. 2).

In this way, nationalism and universalism need not be mutually exclusive. The World Cup celebrates a universalized form of particularism regulated by nation-states. Even as international sports spectacles unite the people of the world under the banner of universal peace, they provide the opportunity to cement more “united” and fixed conceptions of national identity. And at the same time, the pervasive acceptance of these events as fundamentally benign makes any critique of the activities associated with them very difficult to sustain publicly.

The connections between global sports events and nationalism have been well documented (Bairner, 2001; A. Tomlinson & Young, 2006). One of the key tools of this connection is the ability to abolish the divisions between the national and the private through sports and the media. As Eric Hobsbawm writes, for the standardization, homogenization and transfer of popular ideologies, “deliberate propaganda was almost certainly less significant than the ability of the mass media to make what were in effect national symbols part of the life of every individual” (1992, p. 142). Sports as a mass media spectacle are a potent force for bridging the gap between private and public worlds. Hobsbawm continues to argue that

What has made sport so uniquely effective a medium for inculcating national feelings, is the ease with which even the least political or public individuals can identify with the nation as symbolized by young persons excelling at what practically every man wants, or at one time in life has wanted, to be good at. The imagined community of millions seems more real as a team of eleven named people. The individual, even the one who only cheers, becomes a symbol of his nation himself. (1992, p. 143)
Thus, sports are a key locus for transference of national identity to the individual through the shared pleasure of admiring the physical abilities of the nation’s most talented athletes. The process of the individual becoming the symbol of the nation is so seamless that it is easily naturalized, and therefore tends to remain unquestioned and difficult to interrogate.

For the nation hosting the event this process is intensified, since, as the nation becomes the host, the burden of hosting must be met by all those identified as belonging to the nation. This is an opportunity for national leaders to mobilize citizens for a united and idealistic cause. Acting as good hosts through enthusiastic support “is presented as a patriotic duty, whereby internal differences need to be set aside, if only for the duration, in the greater national interest. In this sense, host Olympic discourse resembles the galvanizing rhetoric of war” (Rowe & Stevenson, 2006, p. 199). With the enormous international media attention focused on the event, global sporting spectacles provide unparalleled opportunities for accruing symbolic capital if the event is well executed. The success or failure of the event is seen as a direct reflection of the capabilities of the host nation.

This is true even when unforeseeable events intervene, as was the case in the 1972 Munich Olympics, when the Black September terrorist group kidnapped and murdered eleven Israeli athletes from the Olympic Village. Like the 2006 World Cup, the Munich Olympics were seen as an opportunity for (West) Germany to “showcase its rehabilitation as a peace-loving, democratic state where the past was a foreign country” (C. Young, 2006, p. 118). Referring to the massacre in his memoirs, then Chancellor Willy Brandt wrote:
My disappointment at the time was intense, first because the Olympics on which we had expended so much loving care would not go down in history as a happy occasion—indeed, I was afraid that our international reputation would be blighted for many years—and secondly because our counter-measures had proved so abortive. (C. Young, 2006, p. 118)

As Young notes, this statement is striking due both to the order in which Brandt’s lists his regrets—the self is placed before others and the harm to the nation is prioritized over the suffering of the individual—and to the list of key words he employs: history, international reputation, loving care, and happiness. This emphasis on positive emotions, affective connections, and historical and international significance endures in the conception of the role of hosting that Germany brought to the 2006 World Cup.

Reclaiming a Collective Identity: Establishing and Redressing the Lack

As outlined earlier in this chapter, since reunification and even before, there has been a strong popular and conservative intellectual desire to reclaim German national pride from the clutches of the past. Despite the enduring “wall of the mind” (Mauer im Kopf) separating former citizens of East and West Germany, citizens of the newly united Germany shared a longing for a “normal” national identity. In the context of the modern nation-state, John Gillis writes that

> Individuals, subgroups, and nations all demand identity as if it were a necessity of life itself. Identity has taken on the status of the sacred object, an “ultimate concern,” worth fighting and even dying for. To those who believe they do not have it, identity appears even more scarce and precious” (1994, p. 4).

Popular German sentiment after unification arose from this sense of identity lost through occupation and national division. At the same time, it is important to note that Gillis
discusses not the empirical existence of identity, but rather the collective belief in the possession of identity and the ability to ritually celebrate it.

This also raises the question, with the contemporary proliferation of forms of identity, whether the national form still matters, and if so, why. Even as globalization makes borders increasingly porous, the nation-state still stands as the primary arbiter of legitimacy holding the power to determine what Hannah Arendt calls, “the right to have rights” (1973, p. 296). The physical capacity to cross borders may be more generalized than ever, but one’s ability to be fully human is still tied to the accident of birth that determines belonging to a nation-(state). This belonging to a political community is legally established by rules of citizenship, but it also requires social and affective scaffolding to perpetuate its legitimacy. Addressing the affective realm, Carolyn Marvin and David Ingle (1999) argue that the ability to govern is built on the willingness of citizens to sacrifice themselves and their children. One area that Marvin and Ingle do not address is the determination of whose death may act as a group-constituting sacrifice, an ability that Giorgio Agamben (1998) has recognized as a key function in modern politics. This distinction between life that has political value and can thus be sacrificed and life that may be killed but not sacrificed is the biopolitical basis of both modern democracy and modern totalitarianism. It is the foundation of integration discourse and reveals the continuities between past and present forms of exclusion. In modern democracies, the civic religion of nationalism is the only domain of identity that inspires this scale of collective devotion. This willingness to sacrifice is not only necessary in a straightforward military sense of national security and conquest. It is the sacrifice of group
members that creates the group, creating a form of unity that trumps—though never completely or without contestation—other affiliative domains.

Marvin and Ingle argue that only the process of the willing sacrifice of group members is powerful enough to forge the affective bonds holding a group together. For this reason, they define the nation as “the memory of the last sacrifice” (1999, p. 5). However, the idea that sacrificial violence is the source of national cohesion is contrary to the values of modern nation-states, which hold violence to be immoral or barbaric, a failure of politics rather than its necessary precursor. “To protect themselves from recognizing the source of group unity, citizens render totem violence and its symbols sacred” (Marvin & Ingle, 1999, p. 12) which is to say taboo, unknowable and unspeakable.

But what happens when the last great sacrifice revealed the totem secret before the whole world? Germans felt unable to construct their identity out of shared past not tainted by shameful revelation of the bloodthirsty foundations of nationalism. The revelation of the bloodthirsty nationalism of the Third Reich before the international community inhibited the proper function of the taboo against acknowledging that violent sacrifice generates the sentimental power of national cohesion. This broken taboo manifested in discomfort with the totemic symbols of national identity (flags, colors, anthems, etc.). In the late 1980s, the Historikerstreit began the movement to revive explicit symbolic nationalism, and reunification provided the sense of a legitimate need for active displays of patriotism, but official ambivalence around direct appeals to national pride still endured. To chip away at this lingering ambivalence, an event was needed that would strengthen national affect and symbolism while offering an illusion of
separation from explicit national pride. To create distance between the violence of past nationalism and current forms, nationalism had to be retrieved from the realm of contention and restored as a neutral given. Hosting the World Cup provided the perfect opportunity to create a uniform and emotionally felt national identity, while also dismissing the pursuit of a critical discourse on Germany's past.

**Mediatized Plebiscite: Fan Fests and Renewed National Narratives**

The soccer patriotism narratives of 2006 typically begin with descriptions of cities being taken over by a “sea of flags” (*Fahnenmeer*). These accounts revolve around a key new feature of the sporting spectacle; organizers introduced public viewings, or Fan Fests, throughout the country in the 2006 tournament. This element has become standard practice for World Cups ever since, taking place not only in the host country but also internationally. These viewings provided places for people to gather together and celebrate, and consequently they also provided an excellent opportunity to capture the revelry in the media and broadcast it to the world. This offered unprecedented opportunities for multiplying the impact of the celebrations. Not only could Germans across the nation participate in the experience of watching the event as a group regardless of whether they had tickets to the matches or even lived near the stadiums, but their celebration became the object of media attention, conferring an even greater status on their participation.

The most famous of these viewings was the Berlin “Fan Mile,” which stretched between the between two significant memorials of German identity and history: the nearly 70-meter-high Victory Column (*Siegessäule*) and the Brandenburg Gate. An
official city website publicizing the revival of the Fan Fast for the 2010 World Cup proclaimed that

With the Fan Fest during the 2006 FIFA World Cup Berlin created a worldwide acknowledged wave of enthusiasm, furor and friendliness for the German capital and for Germany. The incomparable pictures taken of the Fan Fest 2006 stood and stand for enthusiasm for sport, hospitality and the new found confidence of the Berliners and Germans. (‘International FIFA Fan Fest Berlin,’’ 2010)

The website celebrates the “breathtaking atmosphere” created by the over one million people that came every day during the 2006 tournament. This shows the value of the public viewings both for the mass sharing of positive sentiments and for simultaneously memorializing the unique experience by capturing and circulating it in images. It is also significant that this website, written in English and targeted towards visitors of Berlin, emphasized the newfound confidence of Berliners and Germans. This event allowed Germans to reclaim their nationalism from its shameful past not only for themselves, but to proudly affirm this fact in front of the whole world. With the 2006 World Cup Germans declared to the world their national pride, and through the success of the event they were validated by nearly universal international praise.

The German organizers of the World Cup recognized the value of the lived experience of the event. Although the media are a key component of constructing “imagined communities” (Anderson, 2006), there is still a power implicit in an embodied experience that gets lost in the mediated experience of an event. Paul Connerton explains that

There is a world of difference between typography as a rhetoric that is known about, and topography as a rhetoric that is known… For there is a type of experience recognizable only to those who have walked through a particular building or street or district. Only they have lived it. To ‘live’ an artifact is to appropriate it, to make it one’s own. (2009, p. 32)
Experiencing the World Cup on television from the comfort of one’s home is thus qualitatively different from the experience of the public viewing, which mimics more closely the scale and sensations of the experience of viewing the game from the stadium. In their literature publicizing the benefits of hosting a “Fan Fest”, FIFA wrote that in 2006, the official Fan Fests in twelve cities attracted approximately 18 million viewers, allowing six times as many people as were accommodated in the stadiums to experience the “unique FIFA World Cup feeling” (FIFA, 2010). Although the mediated experience of the events provides a sense of simultaneity to viewers, the experience pales in comparison to the power of physically experiencing the events in the same time and space. Together with the media, the public viewings created a feedback loop in which audiences enjoyed the embodied experience of collective emotions of fandom and the media wrote about those experiences, legitimating them and making them meaningful.

Indeed, the World Cup offers this experience of simultaneity on a level unlike any other event, even the Olympics, in which the simultaneity of different events divides the attention of spectators. In contrast, the World Cup offers only one event at a time, concentrating spectator attention at the global scale. There are reminders of the simultaneous spectator experience everywhere soccer is appreciated, from the quiet streets to the outbursts of sound that unite a city in celebration (or mourning). The public viewing experience heightens this experience even further, allowing spectators to participate bodily in a multi-sensory experience orchestrated by the action of the sporting event. The media captures and disseminates this experience, creating a virtuous circle further multiplying the impact, through photos and allusions to jubilant flag bedecked crowds.
As the FIFA literature affirmed, the public viewings were “very important platforms,” providing “80 percent of the non-action related stories” in the media about the World Cup (FIFA, 2010). The 2006 World Cup combined the nationally-oriented, mediated...
experience of watching on television with the massive embodied experience of the public viewings, all of which resonated and was amplified by the media coverage of the spectatorship.

**Rescuing the Flag from the Past: Young, Safe, Healthy**

Scholarship on journalism has challenged the common assumption that journalism’s role in presenting the news means that in terms of memory work it is only involved in writing “the first draft of history” and not the last (Edy, 1999; Lang & Lang, 1989; Zelizer, 2008). In fact, a great deal of journalism’s work consists of looking back, even—and perhaps especially—when reporting on the newest breaking stories. As is shown below, in covering the 2006 World Cup, the German media worked on making the new soccer patriotism the definitive end of Germany’s long struggle with its identity. Subsequent public reflections, particularly around the World Cup tournaments in 2010 and 2014, demonstrate the success of this narrative. To achieve this, media coverage employed a combination of memory and amnesia, of the present and the past. Stories emphasized the bounded and idealistic features of sports spectacles, creating a safe space for patriotism. Within this safe space, the media rehabilitated national symbols by portraying them in association with the positive and universal experience of the sporting event, reaffirming their interpretations through the expert opinion of German cultural elites. These narratives—which established and remaining uncontested—were then used as symbols to recall and create nostalgia for the event over the following months and years, establishing in collective memory a basis for “soccer patriotism” as a new normal mode of German national identity.
One of the methods they used to accomplish this was to focus on the bounded nature of “soccer patriotism,” which, the argument goes, is bound to sports and not to politics and more dangerous forms of nationalism. The fact that people are swathing themselves in the national colors is ascribed solely to the desire to support the national team, which happens to be represented by those colors.

There’s no need to worry about soccer enthusiasm playing into the hands of right-wing extremists. On the contrary: carnival costumed soccer fans send the message to the world: “Look here, we invite you to the international soccer festival.” Tricolored wigs instead of Nazi skinheads” (Biallas, 2006).

“Not every flag-waver is directly made into a patriot or nationalist,” says Klaus Boehnke, Sociologist at the International University of Bremen. The masses do not reflect at all on the historical meaning of national symbols. Above all, they are carried by momentary euphoria.iv (“Schwarz-Rot-Gold, wo man hinschaut,” 2006)

We remember: It was the soccer World Cup and Germany transformed itself for a few weeks into a euphoric nation.v (Hoch & Main, 2006)

Journalists and the experts they cite also assure readers that there is no need to be concerned about the long-term effects of soccer patriotism since it is tied to this singular event in which Germans are the hosts. Germany will not be able to host again for at least 25 years. This perspective ignores, however, the fact that these temporary experiences of what Durkheim (1995) calls “collective effervescence” serve to transfer these transformative emotions to the symbols around which the event evolves. While the event is temporary, its impact continues in the revitalization of the normalized significance of national membership. In this way, the World Cup provides the aura of neutrality even while exercising distinctly partisan behavior.

The central tool of this quasi-religious connection between the individual and national identity is the ubiquitous reference to national symbols, above all “black-red-
gold,” which achieves the status of fixed phrase. As Geisler writes, “a symbol reduces the enormous complexity of communication by using a concrete sign as a kind of shorthand for—in our case—a complex of interrelated concepts, ideals, and value systems” (Geisler, 2005, p. xxvii). As shown above, the media invoked national symbols in conjunction with hyperbolic, quasi-religious ecstasy. In Durkheim’s words, “it is, in fact, a well-known law that the feelings a thing arouses in us are spontaneously transmitted to the symbol that represents it” (2003, p. 112). Through the experience of participating as a spectator in the World Cup—particularly at mass public viewings—the intense positive emotions of the experience are fused to the symbols representing the national team being supported. The experience of Germans soccer fans temporarily losing their individual selves in the totality of the nation through interaction with national symbols was described in the German media in hyperbolic terms like “euphoria”, “exultation” or “jubilance.”

Although black-red-gold was never sullied in history, Germans have had a hard time with national symbols in the past decades. Now the whole country has been baptized in German colors. (“WM-Euphorie,” 2006)

In a civic religious experience, the German people were said to have been restored, made whole again through their embrace of the national colors. The whole nation is portrayed as participating in the ritual of renewal and rebirth into a shared national identity, all-the-while being reassured that these symbols have nothing to do with the shameful past. After the fact, the media provided Germans with the shared experience of imagining reliving the event, solidifying these symbolic associations and erasing any troubling links to the past they might have previously evoked.
The World Cup is delimited in time and space, and its patriotic displays are characterized as temporary. Journalists affirm that, “like a holiday”, after its passing the decorations will disappear back into the closet (Bock, 2006b). This characterization resonates with the idea that, in established nations, when nationalism “does irrupt in fever pitch, it is often seen as being confined to special occasions, the irruption soon dies down; the temperature passes; the flags are rolled up; and, then, it is business as usual” (Billig, 1995, p. 5) This language is repeatedly mirrored in World Cup coverage to prove that this display of nationalism is contained and is, therefore, safe.

For the Bielefeld historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler, the newly discovered self-awareness of the German fans is no sign of burgeoning nationalism. Rather, sports call forth an “Ersatz nationalism… since it operates with national colors and a national team.” For Wehler, the rediscovery of the German flag is an “extraordinarily ephemeral phenomenon,” a dangerous nationalism will not be called forth by it. (Todt, 2006).

Using expert voices, journalists draw stark boundaries around “soccer patriotism,” protecting it from the critique it might attract if taken seriously as an issue of cultural and social politics. However, the same articles that emphasize the temporary nature of soccer patriotism, often characterize it as a fundamental social transformation. Just before providing reassurances of its ephemerality, the above article states that “on the streets and in the stadiums, the inhibiting shame in dealing with national symbols has apparently given way to a relaxed relationship.” The reassurances of boundedness are belied by articles praising and exhorting the spread of the new national sentiments to other areas of life. This spread is repeatedly characterized as evidence of a normal and relaxed relationship to national symbols.
This event is made particularly exceptional by the duty of Germans as hosts, which implies the expectation of creating an appropriate atmosphere through shows of enthusiasm. To begin with, citizens are called upon to participate as a matter of their patriotic duty to represent the hospitality and enthusiasm of the nation (see also Chapter 4). Participating in the act of supporting one’s national team provides a site of large-scale solidarity, accentuated by the extra expectations of the role of host country. This expectation—evident in the association of flagged celebration with the liveliness and fun expected of a party’s host—was emphasized repeatedly in the German media to justify and legitimate nationalistic displays, seeking to eliminate the contentiousness of public symbolic nationalism in Germany.

“All of Germany rejoices black-red-gold—and friends from the whole world celebrate cheerfully along,” writes [Green Party Faction leader Renate] Künast in a guest column for the Bild am Sonntag. The soccer World Cup is a “festival of colors, of nations, of people, and black-red-gold is our ID card as guests: come here, we’ll show you, how beautiful Germany can be.”viii (“Deutschland in Schwarz-Rot-Gold,” 2006)

The World Cup hysteria is undiminished. And patriotism appears just as strongly pronounced in these weeks. Above all, the Germans as hosts of the soccer spectacle are showing their flags.ix (Pfeifer, 2006)

[Young Germans] are already globalized party-goers, and now they are the hosts. In this role, they don’t want to be grumpy. During a World Cup, globalization also means: the battle of merriment cultures. The Germans are participating in force.x (Kurbjuweit et al., 2006, p. 76)

Many journalists enthusiastically declared that the 2006 World Cup finally broke the taboo on nationalist celebration. In fact, it may be more accurate to say that, borrowing from Marvin and Ingle (1999), hosts used the simulated violence of global sporting spectacle to finally restore the taboo obscuring the real violence that constitutes the totem secret.
The national narrative that developed around the 2006 World Cup began from the premise that Germans have long been suffering under the burdens of the national past. This burden, the narrative goes, has led to collective self-doubt and a tense relationship between citizens and their national identity.

In Germany, there is always a big “but” when it has to do with Germany. Isn’t there too much black-red-gold in the seats and on the screens? Is one allowed to sing the German national anthem from the heart? (Kurbjuweit et al., 2006, p. 70) Citizens of the Federal Republic have always had a hard time with flag waving, with painted faces, with singing. (Schnibben, 2006, p. 84)

In the discussions of “soccer patriotism” in 2006, journalists frequently hint at a generalized feeling of disconnectedness and discontent that was alleviated by the tournament, suggesting that Germans had been denied something essential to their existence. Most often, the previous lack is indicated by claiming the newness of the “relaxed” mobilization of national symbols. Other examples are more explicit:

International studies confirm that in comparison to other countries, Germans still have a poor sense of self-esteem…. A big event like the World Cup, however, stokes up community sentiments and is a chance, particularly for young people, to identify with the country. (“Schwarz-Rot-Gold, wo man hinschaut,” 2006)

I find the ease new and highly pleasant… you notice how tensely you’ve been seeing things for such a long time. (Reif & Drecker, 2006)

Patriotism is not a luxury, but rather a necessity for survival. (Matussek, 2006)

German identity and German pride are described as being laden with contention and discontinuity. At the same time, strength of national identification is equated with good self-esteem, and—echoing Arendt’s and Agamben’s observations about the equivalence between affiliation with a political community and one’s right to life—is even construed as vital for existence.
Discussions of the German nation in the corpus are frequently ambivalent, oscillating between concrete description of national characteristics or patriotic displays and the denial of their coherence or significance. One article, in particular, demonstrates the simultaneous claim and denial of national coherence. Describing one of the many museum exhibits examining the meaning of German nationhood that appeared around the time of the World Cup, this *Spiegel* feature article lists several national exemplars featured in one exhibit:

There are the German thinkers and poets, the German forest, the German *Gemütlichkeit* (atmosphere of comfort, good cheer), German efficiency, the German longing for Italy, and there is Winnetou.\(^{xvi}\) (Kurbjuweit, 2006, p. 24)

Referencing a beloved German character from Karl May’s eighteenth century Western novels, the “Apache” Winnetou is a perfect example of the Noble Savage trope—a product of the distant European imagination of a prelapsarian human uncorrupted by civilization. The figure of Winnetou usurps an idea of Nativeness as a canvas on which to project German ideals.

Winnetou is hands-down the Federal German hero, a paragon of virtue, a nature freak, a Romantic, a pacifist in his heart but in a bellicose world, the best warrior, agile, trenchantly accurate. Eleven Winnetous, and we would be world champions on July 9\(^{th}\).\(^{xvii}\) (Kurbjuweit, 2006, p. 24)

Appropriating the figure of the Noble Savage as a vessel, the author delivers notions of self-evident and unimpeachable German ideals. If each member of the team could live up to the German ideals embodied in the figure of Winnetou, no nation could defeat them. Yet, after declaring these identity concepts, he denies the possibility of a coherent German identity. Citing an irresolvable tension, endemic to Germanness, the author asserts the necessity of continuous efforts of self-construction:
Identity and Germany are contradictory terms. After all, what Germanness meant was too long flush with unclear or constantly changing borders and populations. After all, the Holocaust is too unwieldy. With [the Holocaust] one cannot construct an identity, and without it even less…. in truth, the search is the goal. To search for the self, without being able to find oneself—that is German, that is also a German form of amusement. (Kurbjuweit, 2006, p. 24)

The uncertainty about the nature of German national affiliation is an invitation to perpetual reflection on the meaning of the nation—a practice that occurs throughout the soccer patriotism archive. These examples show how national redefinition discourse proceeds by 1) claiming that there is (and perhaps always has been) a crisis of identification, 2) defining the national/citizen, and 3) denying the boundaries created by the previous redefinition and, thus, defending against critiques of exclusion. Definition must take place, just as that definition must be denied to impede the introduction of agonistic politics. Its ambiguity maintains the nation at the center of attention. Departing from the claim of Germany’s particularly tense relationship to national identity, journalists affirm that the soccer patriotism of the World Cup nullifies these tensions—at least temporarily. At the same time, they argue that the exceptional nature of the event ensures that this release of tension will not turn into a politically dangerous form of national excess.

**Stigmatizing Critique**

Although the coherence, unity, and true patriotism of the soccer revelry were often questioned, the normative value of the World Cup and its nationally oriented performativity was framed as irreproachable. After all, commentators argued, gloomy
and serious deliberations have no obvious place in a sporting event, and thus critical discussions were rejected outright as knee-jerk, pessimistic, and generally absurd:

To reframe the dance in black-red-gold as an expression of the return of strengthened national feeling is absurd.\textsuperscript{xix} (Biallas, 2006)

Professionals consider the critique to be knee-jerk and typical German defeatism. “I don’t take it seriously” says Heinz Grüne, executive at Reingold (Cologne), an institute for market and media analysis.\textsuperscript{xx} (Bock, 2006a)

There will not be threatening national pride in Germany anymore, said [Bundestag President] Lammert. As such, he rejected criticism of the World Cup Euphoria: “The attempt, to declare such healthy patriotism as objectionable encourages the activities of deranged rightwing extremists.”\textsuperscript{xxi} (“WM-Euphorie,” 2006)

One has long asked himself: “Are we allowed to do this?” Of course, we are allowed. We have asked ourselves questions that should not be asked, since this is all without question normal. It is really good. Furthermore, the external perception is much more relaxed than our own. This all doesn’t mean that now Germany is marching again. Whoever interprets what is happening that way is crazy.\textsuperscript{xxii} (Reif & Drecker, 2006)

These last two comments, in particular, reveal the strength of associations of nationalism with normality and critique with political extremism of the right and left. The logic of this argument claims that by complicating symbolic nationalism, critics alienate “normal” citizens and drive them into the arms of the extreme right. Instead, it holds that positive feelings of uncomplicated national belonging should be generated at the center of society.

Nearly half of the selected articles refer to the existence of a “debate” around national identity and soccer patriotism, although few of them present actual criticisms of soccer patriotism. After alluding to debates, journalists and their sources condemn “bad” forms of nationalism sometimes alluding to the need to remember the Nazi past, while building up arguments of the positive value of soccer patriotism. Some commentators accept the inevitable presence of the national past, without engaging with the historical
connections between sporting spectacle and the symbolic politics of nationalism. In
discussing concerns about possible xenophobic violence against World Cup visitors, one
commentator reflects that for the potential victims

> It may not matter whether their health is threatened by a German or by someone else, but for Germans the shame and disgrace is incomparable. In this history has, and must have, a lasting effect. It need not ruin one’s cheerfulness, but in this country one cannot completely get away without consciousness of the Nazi years. (Kurbjuweit, 2006, p. 24)

Recalling Brandt’s characterization of the tragedy of the Munich Olympics, the harm to
the reputation and self-esteem of the national population is more significant than the
impact on the individual. This journalist recognizes the injustice of this, but cannot quite
bring himself to dig into its more problematic implications for the value of life and death.
One kind of death has symbolic significance, in that it can harm the national reputation,
whereas the other would have the same result for the victim but no relevance for the
national population. The Nazi years, here, stand as a constant threat to the national
population’s legitimacy and happiness. They are less important for the lessons they offer,
than for the shadow they cast on the nationally defined realm of politically significant
life.

The one clear example of the active vestiges of the leftist political critique from
the era of the Historikerstreit emerged when leaders of Germany’s largest teachers’
union, the Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Wissenschaft (GEW), republished an excerpt
from Benjamin Ortmeyer’s 1991 critical analysis of the history of Germany’s national
anthem. This action was mentioned as evidence of resistance in five articles in the
archive. Their stated goal was to emphasize the continued “need for a deep discussion of
the history and present of nationalism in Germany” in order to avoid “whitewashing the
ever increasing social cleavages in this country and conflating integration with assimilation” (Ortmeyer, 2006). According to the one article in the corpus that specifically examined the state of leftwing criticism in the context of the World Cup, the public backlash against the excerpt’s circulation was so harsh that the GEW was forced to apologize, stating that the “GEW did not want to spoil the World Cup for fans,” and acquiescing that “when young soccer fans sing the national anthem today, they do so out of joie de vivre and to support the German team” (Bilger, Langenau, & Stolzenberg, 2006). Although the GEW framed their action not as outright condemnation but simply as a call to keep discussion of nationalist symbolism alive, the threat it posed to fans’ “joy” was cast as egregious. In this schema of biopolitical values, the agonism promoted by leftist critique threatens the pleasure of frictionless unity, and must therefore be delegitimized. As one journalist observed with bemused approval, even among the cultural elite there was hardly a critic left to be found:

Suddenly, even late returnees (Spätheimkehrer) to patriotism in culture and politics discovered their hearts converted to the nation and fought loudly and with full physical strength against all forms of politically correct German self-hatred. (Mohr, 2006)

The original term used for these converted critics is Spätheimkehrer, which refers to German late returnees from prisoner of war camps after the World War II. The use of this term, underscores that critics are prisoners of the past and characterizes their turn to embracing symbolic nationalism as finally coming home to a normal relationship with the nation. The discussion surrounding the World Cup not only excluded critical leftist perspectives on the past and present of nationalism, it offered the opportunity to exile them to the political margins.
The Integrated: Immigrants in the Sea of Flags

In 2006, the version of the German nation that was established primarily focused on the unity, health, and happiness of normative Germans, which is to say, those without apparent foreign heritage. In the corpus examined in this chapter, transnational Germans were given little explicit consideration within the schema of this “new German feeling.” While the 2006 national team already included several first- and second-generation German players, the increasing diversity of the team only became a focus of broader attention in 2010 (see Chapter 5). Most often in these commentaries, immigrants appear as taxi drivers or merchants who tell journalists that they proudly wave the German flag next to their other national flag and express their approval of the new German pride. Writing of a conversation about game day preparations with his taxi driver from Ghana, one journalist relays,

His worst fear for this day: that he wouldn’t be able to get a hold of a German flag for the big party that evening. He wants to put it up on the roof next to the Ghanaian flag.\(^{xxvi}\) (Mohr, 2006)

In another article, the journalist talks to an immigrant flag salesman about his feelings on regarding the flag-draped celebrations:

Salim Hadij stands before a stall on the Fan Mile and takes a flag out of its holder. He is happy that the relationship of Germans to national symbols is becoming less uptight. With his praise, the German-Algerian is not entirely disinterested. He runs a wholesale business in Charlottenburg with fan items and is pleased with torrential sales. “Germans want to be proud of their country too,” says Hadij, “as they must be.”\(^{xxvii}\) (Todt, 2006)

Transnational and non-normative Germans’ approval of World Cup flag celebrations supports the idea that soccer patriotism is universally acceptable and not exclusionary. This universal approval removes the nation and its symbolism from the realm of politics.
and recasts it as a source of happiness and unity—temporarily transforming even integrant strangers who worship the flag into unambiguous friends, to use Baumann’s terms (1990).

It was a festival of youth—without a heavy ideological superstructure. Germany had the world as its guest and the Germans recognized that they were far more multicultural and international than they and others realized. That’s why it was so easy to hang a German flag from the balcony: for the first time in the history of the Federal Republic black-red-gold did not represent any political claims—like it still did in 1989—rather it was the national symbolic colors of good humor. If there is going to be patriotism, then let it be this kind! And if the German flag is being hung all over the country in Turkish and Arab shops and businesses, then integration is perhaps not in such bad shape, as many politicians wanted us to believe before the World Cup..xxviii (Malzahn, 2006)

Even temporarily, this transformation of stranger into member threatens more radical nationalists who hold more explicitly racist criteria for belonging. This fact also serves to bolster the credentials of soccer patriotism as a force for good. The irritation of the far-right National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD: Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands) with the soccer patriotism and the participation of non-white players on the national team was raised as proof that the World Cup nationalism runs contrary to exclusionary and violent forms.

The NPD ideologue Gansel, deeply disappointed with his people, concludes in a disgustedly racist but otherwise exactly correct way:

“Soccer patriotism integrates, in fact, everyone whose knowledge of German makes him capable of acquiring black-red-gold cloth from some migrant merchant. What the parade of blacks in the white [jerseys] of the national eleven demonstrates, works equally on the dancing streets. Here even negroes become German patriots.”

We have come so far. Nazis hate a cheerful, cosmopolitan patriotism like the devil hates holy water.xxix (Mohr, 2006)
German patriotism, which is equated in the last quote to a Christian sacrament, is portrayed as acceptable to and accepting of difference, unlike xenophobic right-wing nationalism that despises party patriotism because of its inclusivity. Although immigrants and minorities play a smaller part in 2006 than they come to play in 2010 and beyond, they appear already here at the constitutive margins of German soccer patriotism.

The conditionality of the kinds of belonging granted by soccer patriotism is erased through comparison with the staunch ethnic nationalism of the NPD and the far-right generally. However, the provisional nature of belonging appears amid the multicultural national celebration as well. One *Spiegel* feature article, titled “The Integrated” (*Die Integrierten*) (Supp, 2006), that was published mid-way through the tournament, assesses the progress of Muslim Germans towards integration (figure 5). The appraisal situates itself in the context of immigrant participation in soccer patriotism, observing that—“Berlin Turks in Black-Red-Gold, Germany flags on migrant cars—after five decades of immigration the gaze focuses on those new citizens who have found a *Heimat* in this country and who have not remained foreigners” (Supp, 2006, p. 58). Although the article claims to examine those who have “successfully integrated,” it is at least as much about providing examples of those who had the possibility to integrate, but chose not to. The article also presents the postwar history of migration and the myth, shared by Germans and Turkish guest workers alike, that the invited workers would someday return “home.”
Figure 4: This photo is placed above the article’s title, juxtaposing women wearing headscarves—a symbol of Muslim difference fetishized in the German public sphere—with the unifying symbolism of the German flag, implicitly asking whether these two symbols may function coherently together. (Supp, 2006)

The stories of four immigrants of different generations are interwoven with the history of German migration policy. Two of those featured made their living portraying the dysfunction of Turkish-German society. The Turkish-born author Saliha Scheinhardt,

Wrote about things that were true; she knew about the tradition of violence, the archaic-patriarchal power structures in parts of immigrant society; she knew about forced marriage, domestic violence, about the oppression of Turkish women. She was one of the first to tell about it.\textsuperscript{xxxi} (Supp, 2006, p. 60)

The article holds up Scheinhardt as an example of “integration” through her choice to leave the violence of the anti-modern Turkish society behind to embrace, in Scheinhardt’s words, the “freedom” of the “heavenly” German society. Similarly, Oktay Özdemir, an actor who debuted in the role of violent young gangster in the 2006 film, “Tough Enough” (\textit{Knallhart}), affirms that “there is too little integration” among Turkish-
German youth. He tells of his own difficult childhood on the streets. The article claims that this is not the exception, but normality.

The adolescents, who experience violence as normality, at home in the gang. The 13-year-old with drugs in his pocket, who looks for his role models in the tough scene, and naturally these role models exist in the neighborhood. Ghetto-German, that is their language. Ghetto-pride—that is the attitude on the street, at school. (Supp, 2006, p. 62).

In this article, Turkishness is defined as violent, patriarchal, and anti-modern. This statement casts the values and even the speech of these internal Others as fundamentally different, incomprehensible and antithetical to German social norms. As anthropologist Ghassan Hage observes (Hage, 2003), in a post-9/11 world, sociological explanations of problems ranging from criminality to terrorism have been displaced by the demand for unqualified condemnation. This is particularly true when the transgressions are considered endemic to non-Western or minoritized groups. In this “war-mentality” the ambiguous, humanized subject that emerges from a grounded and rigorous attempt to understand the Other presents a constant threat to order.

Here, Turkish-Germans have a choice to either condemn this litany of anti-modern traits and “choose the way into German society” or they can choose “another way,” as the final example of (refused) integration shows. The last example is Hülya Kandemir, who “was a musician with dreadlocks and a guitar and led a Western life, but [her brother] Mesut admonished her and she listened” (Supp, 2006, p. 62). She gave up her dreadlocks, which here stand as a sign of her adoption of a Western youth culture that borrows freely from other global counter-cultures, and chose the illiberal subservience of the headscarf and marriage to a strictly religious man. This parable illustrates the German fear of social disintegration through multiculturalism. It also affirms the impermanence of
integration. Integration is not the freedom to choose, with full knowledge and experience of one's options, between different styles of life, but is instead the choice of the correct liberal German values. This article, which is not about the World Cup or soccer nationalism, appears in the middle of the tournament and is introduced by the implicit question of what it means when “Turks” wave German flags. It fits within the project of national narration that ran through coverage of the 2006 World Cup, affirming the boundaries of Germanness while entertaining the possibility of transnational difference within it. The role of transnational citizens in legitimating symbolic nationalism is hinted at in 2006, as the media campaign examined in Chapter 4 shows. However, as the case study in Chapter 5 demonstrates, by 2010 this role took center stage.

**Conclusion**

Of the articles in the “soccer patriotism” corpus, one stands out as encapsulating the process of constructing patriotism above reproach, not because of its distinctiveness, but instead by its use of so many of the techniques and arguments leveraged throughout the corpus for this chapter. “Man, Woman, and Child Wear Black-Red-Gold” (Bock & Reuther, 2006) opens by enumerating some of the many consumer items that have been branded by the national colors: from bratwurst packages to thong underwear. The German national colors are ubiquitous like never before as “the national hosts display their flags.” How could a symbol attached to things as ridiculous as skimpy underwear and sausages pose any sort of threat? The article continues by listing examples from the many books being published to “teach Germans somewhat more self-love,” suggesting that lack of patriotism is a disorder that calls for an intervention.
In case the reader is wary of national symbols and their connection to the past, the authors explain the history of the national colors dating back to the supposed colors of uniforms of the Prussian Free Corps that fought the French in 1813. This story reminds readers of the liberal origins of the colors and of their freedom from implication in the “Nazi reign of terror.” The implication of this historical account is that since today’s German colors were not involved in past nationalist crimes, they should no longer be subject to critical interrogation based on the memory of nationalist excesses. The article evokes a memory of the past centered on the expulsion of the hereditary enemy and the desire for the union of the nation expressed in the failed 1948 revolution. Finally, it evokes the continuation of the legacy of shared German history reflected in the common characteristic of Prussian virtue. The article concludes with a tongue-in-cheek assurance for those who wonder, “in the style of Wilhelmenic obedience,” if it is even permitted to hang a flag from one’s balcony, that it is fine so long as it is not so large as to obstruct the view of others.

Just as pointed as the article’s words, the images accompanying the piece drive home the message of the positive impacts of the public expression of national pride. The photographs are powerfully affective: a heterosexual couple clothed in the national colors kissing beneath a flag unfurling in the breeze (figure 6), a sleeping baby with a tiny flag on her tiny shirt (figure 7), and a young man asleep on a bench with a large flag clutched loosely in his hand—he is all tuckered out since, as the caption explains, “national pride can be tiring” (Bock & Reuther, 2006).
Figure 5: Representing the reproductive power of the national flag. The caption reads: “one German flag, two bottles of beer—and then the man comes closer to the woman” (Bock & Reuther, 2006)

The images represent the paradigm of peaceful normality, all courtesy of the comfort of a “natural” relationship to national pride. This article provides a historical trajectory for the flag that is free from tension while establishing the roots of present day Germany in a shared past. It also centers the flag within the reproduction of Germany, in this case quite literally. The flag provides cover and the affective spark for the couple’s intercourse and adorns the baby that results from its successful completion.
The World Cup provided journalists with the opportunity to craft new narratives around national symbols. Through repetitive language and imagery, journalists created collective memory of the World Cup even as they reported on the events as they unfolded. By the end of the World Cup, journalists had firmly established a recognizable narrative signified by terms like “soccer patriotism” that are invoked to recall the “Summer Fairytale” (Sommermärchen)\textsuperscript{16} that was the 2006 World Cup. The World Cup offered the ultimate public plebiscite on a massive level, affirming the desire of the

\textsuperscript{16} This term, heavily used by journalists, was coined as the title of a documentary film portraying the German national team’s preparations for the World Cup and following them through to their third-place finish and the following celebrations. The title, Deutschland. Ein Sommermärchen refers to Heinrich Heine’s work Deutschland. Ein Wintemärchen, a satirical and critical piece that also includes naturalized patriotic elements.
nation to unite as a collective. Two features are important here: the event created the opportunity to collect a vast public archive—visual, textual, and auditory—of public consent through media coverage, photos, and even a documentary film. In addition, the commitment to the new practices of national pride are built around a reoccurring event; the World Cup every four years, interspersed with the smaller scale Euro Cup, offers a new opportunity every two years to remember the 2006 tournament and keep the new traditions alive. During the 2006 World Cup, the media re-wrote German national identity around the practices of “soccer patriotism,” using it to restore the collective amnesia that obscures the brutality at the foundations of national cohesion.

The forms of public nationalism embraced in Germany during the 2006 World Cup are by no means unique to Germany. As was repeatedly noted in the articles I examined, the practice of banal nationalism is widespread and generally unquestioned outside of Germany. Furthermore, the individual interpretation of the experience of joining in the collective practice of acting as a fan of one’s national team may diverge sharply from the most common mediated interpretations. This is illustrated by one *Spiegel Online* article published following Germany’s 2014 World Cup win. It featured the responses of ten young people to a popular question in the German media: “are you proud to be German?” (“Deutschland ist Weltmeister,” 2014). The responses varied greatly, from those who identified fully with the national team and felt personal ownership for the German win to those who supported the team but disavowed generalized national pride. Unlike many of the articles in the 2006 corpus, this article does not build up skepticism of generalized national pride as a straw man or as
depressive, self-loathing. Skeptical respondents push back against external interpretations of the excitement and jubilation of fans. Of the World Cup, one fan responded,

I joined in the fever too, watched every game, sweated, screamed, laughed. But I do that at concerts too. I’m not proud there either, I don’t feel responsible there either if a band’s album lands at the top of the charts. xxxiii (“Deutschland ist Weltmeister,” 2014)

This analogy uses two collective events that inspire similar actions and feelings among fans to caution outside observers who seek to interpret the national meaning of World Cup celebration. At the same time, this response points to the fallacy of nationalist interpretations that extend the successes of exceptional individuals to the entire national population. For other respondents, this symbolic extension was meaningful, and they felt varying degrees of personal ownership over the German team’s victory. Contrary to the media framing that suggests that skepticism or ambivalence around nationalism emerges from oppressive guilt over the past, Germany’s national past does not appear as a factor in these responses. Instead, responses emerge from distinct political positions on the constitution and symbolism defining a national collective, positions that echo those proposed in the Historikerstreit, only without specific reference to the past. For some, the investment in symbolic nationalism is a meaningful and positive form of collective engagement; for others, collectivity emerges from specific institutions and forms of engagement. This unusual article suggests that the politics of fandom are far more complicated than the media portrayal generally suggests. The next chapter addresses the investment of the German media in the symbolic nationalism of the World Cup, and asks what kind of Germany it sought to produce.
In 2006, journalists argued for the right to establish a public form of patriotism unburdened by reflexivity as is practiced in other established nation-states. As can be seen in the United States, however, in elevating the celebration of national symbols, the work of democracy can fall by the wayside. In the United States, Lauren Berlant argued that “the national knowledge industry has produced a specific modality of paramnesia, an incitement to forgetting that leaves simply the patriotic trace, for real and metaphorically infantilized citizens, that confirms that the nation exists and we are in it” (1997, p. 50). This substitution of the symbol (national colors) for the thing (democratic processes) inhibits critical processes. During the 2006 World Cup, Germans could relegate to a distant past the lessons of the Berlin Olympics, which show how no patriotism, and certainly not sports patriotism should be exempt from scrutiny.

Soccer patriotism and other forms of banal nationalism are a normalized part of contemporary life in countries worldwide. However, to explicitly deny the connection between sports and nationalism requires Germans to forget the symbolic significance of the 1936 Olympics as the international coming out party of National Socialism. Awareness of this memory is sometimes evident in traces of defensive discomfort in the coverage of the 2006 World Cup, but substantive engagement with the traumatizing past is explicitly avoided. This amnesia indicates the demise of the collective memory of the Berlin Olympics, and a relegation of the event into the annals of a history lived by “others.” The 2006 World Cup allowed Germans to reorient the collective memory of public displays of national enthusiasm away from the displays of the traumatic past and to build them instead around the purportedly apolitical, inclusive, and heroic global sporting spectacle. As the media made clear, “our” German patriotism has nothing to do
with “their” German nationalism. During the 2006 World Cup, the past “went away,” emancipating national symbols and placing patriotism in Germany above reproach. The next chapter analyzes efforts by politicians and the media industry to lay the groundwork for the patriotic revival of the 2006 tournament. It examines a massive marketing campaign organized by the major players in the German media industry with the stated goal of improving the national mood and stimulating a new national feeling in advance of the 2006 World Cup.

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i Das Geheimnis des Fänchenerfolgs ist: Jede Gegenwehr wirkte schnell unentspannt, wo wir jetzt so super locker drauf sind.

ii Fahnenmeer: Torjubel auf Norddeutschlands größter Fanparty in Hamburg

iii Schwatz-Rot-Gold: Fanparty auf dem “Heiligengeistfeld” in Hamburg


v Wir erinnern uns: Es war Fußball-Weltmeisterschaft und Deutschland verwandelte sich für ein paar Wochen in eine euphorische Nation.


vii Auf der Straße und in den Stadien ist die verdruckste Scham im Umgang mit nationalen Symbolen offenbar einem unverkrampften Verhältnis gewichen.

viii „Ganz Deutschland jubelt schwarzrotgold—und Freunde aus aller Welt feiern fröhlich mit“, schreibt [Grünen Fraktionschefin Renate] Künast in einem Gastbeitrag für „Bild am Sonntag“. Die Fußball-WM sei ein „Fest der Farben, der Nationen, der Menschen, und Schwarzrotgold ist unser Ausweis als Gastgeber: Kommt her, wir zeigen euch, wie schön Deutschland sein kann“.


xi In Deutschland gibt es immer ein großes „aber“, wenn es um Deutschland geht. Ist das nicht schon zu viel Schwarzrotgold auf den Plätzen und Bildschirmen? Darf man das Deutschlandlied inbrünstig singen?
Die Bundesdeutschen haben sich immer schwergetan mit dem Fahnenschwenken, mit dem Schminken, mit dem Singen.

Internationale Studien bescheinigen den Deutschen im Vergleich zu anderen Ländern immer noch ein schlechtes Selbstwertgefühl.... Ein Großereignis wie die Weltmeisterschaft schüre aber das Gemeinschaftsgefühl und sei gerade für junge Menschen eine Chance, sich mit dem Land zu identifizieren.

Die Unverkrampftheit finde ich neu und höchst erfreulich.... Man merkt, wie verkrampft man selber die Dinge lange Zeit gesehen hat.

Patriotismus ist kein Luxus, sondern eine Überlebens-Notwendigkeit.

Da gibt es die deutschen Dichter und Denker, den deutschen Wald, die deutsche Gemütlichkeit, die deutsche Effizienz, die deutsche Sehnsucht nach Italien, und es gibt Winnetou.


Identität und Deutschland sind Widersprüche. Dafür war das, was Deutsch hieß, zu lange Reich mit unbestimmten oder ständig veränderten Grenzen und Bevölkerungen. Dafür ist der Holocaust zu sperrig. Man kann sich mit ihm nicht in einer Identität einrichten, schon gar nicht ohne ihn.... In Wahrheit ist die Suche das Ziel. Sich suchen, ohne sich finden zu können — das ist deutsch, das ist auch ein deutsches Vergnügen.

Von dem Reigen in Schwarz-Rot-Gold den Ausdruck eines wieder erstarkten Nationalgefühls abzuleiten, ist absurd.

Fachleute halten die Kritik für typisch deutsche Miesmacherei und reflexhaft. «Das nehme ich nicht ernst», sagt beispielsweise Heinz Grüne, Geschäftsführer von Rheingold (Köln), einem Institut für Markt- und Medienanalysen.

Dröhnden Nationalstolz werde es in Deutschland nicht mehr geben, sagte Lammert. Deshalb wies er Kritik an der WM-Euphorie zurück: «Der Versuch, einen solchen gesunden Patriotismus für anstößig zu erklären, begünstigt die Aktivitäten der rechtsextrem Verwirrten».

Lange hat man sich gefragt: "Dürfen wir das?" Natürlich dürfen wir. Wir haben uns Fragen gestellt, die nicht zu stellen sind. Nun ist das alles fraglos normal. Das ist richtig gut. Zudem ist die Außenwahrnehmung sehr viel entspannter als unsere eigene. Das alles bedeutet ja nicht: Jetzt marschiert Deutschland wieder. Wer das, was geschieht, dennoch so empfindet, der hat einen Vogel.

"Die Notwendigkeit einer tiefgehenden Auseinandersetzung mit der Geschichte und Gegenwart des Nationalismus in Deutschland.... Nationalismus, der die immer größer werdende soziale Kluft in diesem Land übertünchen soll und Integration mit Assimilation verwechselt."

Die GEW wolle nicht „den Fans die Fußball-WM vermiesen… Wenn heute junge Fußballfans die Nationalhymne singen, tun sie das aus Lebensfreude und zur Unterstützung der deutschen Mannschaft."

Plötzlich entdecken auch patriotische Spätheimkehrer aus Kultur und Politik ihr Konvertitenherz für die Nation und kämpfen lautstark und mit vollem Körpereinsatz gegen jede Spielart des politisch korrekten deutschen Selbsthasses.

Seine schlimmste Befürchtung für diesen Tag: Dass er für die große Party heute Abend keine Deutschland-Fahne mehr auftreiben kann. Die will er sich neben der von Ghana ans Dach stecken.

Salim Hadij steht vor einem Verkaufstand auf der Fanmeile und nimmt eine Fahne aus der Halterung. Er freut sich darüber, dass das Verhältnis der Deutschen zu nationalen Symbolen unverkrampfter wird. Der Deutsch-Algerier ist mit seinem Lob allerdings nicht ganz uneigennützig. Er betreibt in Charlottenburg einen Großhandel mit Fanartikeln und freut sich überreißende Absätze. "Auch die Deutschen wollen stolz sein auf ihr Land", so Hadij, "das muss doch auch so sein."
Es war ein Festival der Jugend—ohne bleieren ideologischen Überbau. Deutschland hatte die Welt zu Gast und die Deutschen erkannten, dass sie selbst längst viel multikultureller und internationaler sind, als sie von sich und andere über sie annahmen. Deswegen fiel es so leicht, eine deutsche Flagge am Balkon zu hissen: Schwarz-rot-gold repräsentierte zum ersten Mal in der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik keinen politischen Anspruch—wie auch noch 1989—sondern war das nationale Farbensymbol guter Stimmung. Wenn schon Patriotismus, dann diesen! Und wenn die deutsche Flagge inzwischen auch landauf landab in türkischen und arabischen Lokalen und Geschäften gehisst wird, dann kann es um die Integration vielleicht doch nicht so schlecht bestellt sein, wie so manche Politiker vor der WM noch glauben machen wollten.


Berliner Türken in Schwarz-Rot-Gold, an Autos von Migranten Deutschland-Fähnchen—nach fünf Jahrzehnten Einwanderung richtet sich der Blick auf diejenigen Neubürger, die in diesem Land eine Heimat gefunden haben und nicht Fremde geblieben sind.

Schrieb über Dinge, die Wirklichkeit waren, sie wusste um die Gewalttradition, die archaisch-patriarchalischen Machtstrukturen in Teilen der Einwanderergesellschaft, wusste um Zwangsehen, Familiengewalt, um die Unterdrückung türkischer Frauen.

Eine Deutsche Fahne, zwei Flaschen Bier—and schon kommt Mann der Frau näher.

CHAPTER 4 – SELLING THE NATION ON ITSELF: THE MEDIA, SYMBOLIC POWER, AND GLOBAL SPORTS SPECTACLE

If you were watching television in Germany on the evening of Tuesday, September 26, 2005 you most likely saw, nearly simultaneously with 17 million others, a two-minute commercial featuring in quick succession over 30 prominent Germans interspersed with “everyday citizens.” The uncommonly long ad is a whirlwind of faces, places and phrases, moving at a brisk pace. The message of the ad is that “You Are Germany” (*Du bist Deutschland*). Breaking the third wall, this ad crossed into the private sphere and invited citizens into the collective fold via an empowering narrative of national identification. The campaign juxtaposes the grandiose with the infinitesimal, the obviously significant with the seemingly insignificant, the celebrity with the unnamed citizen, Germany with “you.” It collapses the categories of individual and society, arguing that although no one knows who “you” are, you are equally responsible for the success of the nation as its most prominent members. This, the campaign claims, will cut through the pessimism that is preventing Germany from reaching its fullest potential as a nation and motivate citizens to “take their foot off the break” and fuel the nation’s growth. The campaign confirms that with this identity comes the responsibility to be a productive part of the national economy. Serving as the keystone of the effort to prepare Germany and Germans to host the men’s 2006 FIFA World Cup, this campaign reveals essential aspects of the assemblage of political and economic interests mobilized by global sports spectacles. It serves, thus, as a locus through which to examine the dialectical relationship between the nation-making and global-marketing capacity of sport
as well as broader developments in political and economic approaches to national identification.

Building on the analysis of the new forms of nationalist practice outlined in Chapter 3, this chapter investigates the investment of media industries in promoting an affectively charged and uniform nationalism. To do so, it traces the form and function of the unprecedented social marketing and nation branding campaigns leading up to the 2006 World Cup in Germany. The examples in this chapter further elucidate the connections between the personal and affective politics outlined in Chapter 1 and the pragmatic and utilitarian metrics of social citizenship outlined in Chapter 2. The social marketing campaigns that began in 2005 demonstrate a new approach to nation building that accommodates and even promotes visible forms of difference within the population while constructing new qualifications for citizenship according to the individual’s contribution to the wellbeing and life of the national population. Specifically, this chapter focuses on the Du bist Deutschland (DbD) campaign, the centerpiece of the marketing effort, which had the stated goal of empowering and lifting the moods of Germans. The investment of media institutions in these marketing campaigns cannot be explained in terms of the usual quid pro quo relationship cultivated by the promoter of a product and the consumer. Even in the realm of social marketing campaigns, which focus on raising awareness of and support for issues such as environmental protection and public health, the “mood-boosting” German campaign is an outlier. Although the campaign raised lively discussions in the German press, with a few exceptions it garnered remarkably little attention from scholars, generally receiving little more than anecdotal treatment.
This chapter examines how political and industrial stakeholders leveraged the liminality of the mega sports event to normalize banal nationalism and promote a new form of national identity more suited to a globalized economy. Understanding the purpose and function of the campaign requires an examination of the political, social and historical framework within which it operates. After outlining the historical context, the second section consists of a textual and critical discourse analysis of the two-minute advertisement that formed the core of the first iteration of the campaign in 2005. The campaign denounces a critical stance towards public affairs and towards the nation. Instead, it promotes national membership based on the productivity of citizens and their willingness to support the nation. This allows for the inclusion of migrants and Germans of color so long as they are productive members of society. At the same time, by making belonging a result of personal engagement, the campaign suppresses questions of hierarchies and power relations between different groups, both cultural and socio-economic. In addition to the campaign’s advertisements, this chapter concludes with an analysis of press articles written on the campaign in the top national periodicals (see Introduction). A search for the terms “Du bist Deutschland” AND “Kampagne” (campaign) returned 124 relevant results. After examining these articles, I noticed that a distinct subsection of articles focused on the campaign creators and stakeholders, clearly

\[\text{17 This corpus does not include articles from the Bild, which does not maintain comprehensive electronic archives. The archive search on the Bild website did not return any relevant results for the search terms used in this chapter.}\]
articulating their public explanation of the campaign’s intended purpose and meaning. These carefully crafted messages convey a distinct ethic and set of ideals for German society. To focus more deeply on this perspective, I selected the articles that focused on the campaign’s creators and industry supporters. The resulting corpus of 29 articles includes media industry analysis and interviews with campaign creators to provide insight into the campaign’s stated goals as well as a range of journalistic perspectives on the campaign’s political and social implications. I coded these articles using grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 2006) to determine the predominant themes and their relationships.

Table 3: Search Results from “Du bist Deutschland” AND Kampagne

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources</th>
<th>All Results</th>
<th>Selected (Stakeholder- Focused)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Focus</em></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung</em></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Der Spiegel</em></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Spiegel Online (SPON)</em></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Die Süddeutsche Zeitung</em></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Stern</em></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Die Tageszeitung</em></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Die Welt</em></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Die Zeit</em></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>124</strong></td>
<td><strong>29</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This analysis focuses on the advertisements themselves as the primary texts, and considers the paratextual role of journalistic coverage. This campaign reveals the strategy and motivations that undergird the media industry’s investment in national pride and its role in the economics of global sports spectacles.

“World Champions of the Heart”\textsuperscript{18}: Branding the Host

In the fall of 2005, the \textit{Du bist Deutschland} campaign seemed to come out of nowhere; its development and the actors who created it were largely unknown (Speth, 2006). The partnership that produced the campaign included nearly all major German media companies, and yet there was very little advanced discussion of the campaign in the press. In the larger corpus of 124 articles, only 6 were written before the campaign’s debut. These and subsequent articles and provide very little insight into the material motivations of the campaign’s creators and stakeholders. Instead, they cite the affective goal of improving the national “mood” (\textit{Stimmung}). Understanding the strategies that motivated the campaign requires looking back to broader political and economic developments in Germany around the turn of the millennium. During a period of economic deregulation and labor market liberalization, social marketing campaigns like

\begin{small}
\textsuperscript{18} This slogan appeared in 2004, but it gained traction in the media and among the public during the tournament, both to celebrate the goodwill generated by the successful tournament and to cushion the disappointment of not taking home the World Cup trophy. It is still referenced today.
\end{small}
DbD communicated a new social vision for Germany that values self-reliance and an optimistic and agreeable stance toward the nation-state.

Although the postwar German economy has traditionally been regarded as a paradigm of socially conscious and constrained capitalism based on the idea of the social market economy (sozialer Marktwirtschaft), since reunification in the 1990s, the German economy has become increasingly liberal (Menz, 2010). The most radical of recent liberal reforms, collectively called Agenda 2010, were implemented under the leadership of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder of the Social Democrats beginning in 2003. These reforms were enacted to address the period of slow economic growth and rising unemployment that followed German reunification in the 1990s. In the first two years after reunification, the GDP in the Eastern states collapsed by a third (Hunt, 2006, p. 2). Restructuring and incorporating the “new states” from the former GDR involved the largest transfer of wealth in economic history (Streeck, 1997). In order to finance the costs of reunification, the government raised taxes in the 1990s and, even with new tax income, debt increased from 41.8% of GDP in 1989 to 64.2% in 2003 (Hunt, 2006, p. 9). Even before reunification, the high-wage West German economy had been suffering from growing unemployment and concerns about the capacity of German industry to develop innovation and maintain control in the high-end markets (Streeck, 1997). By the early 2000s Germany’s financial outlook was grim enough that the liberal periodical The Economist dubbed it “the sick man of Europe” (Minton Beddoes, 2013). Strong protections for workers, high wages, and generous welfare provisions made the German labor market more expensive than in neighboring countries in Eastern Europe. Slow
growth and rising unemployment supported arguments by industry leaders to enact reforms to lessen the labor market protections of the social market economy approach.

As part of the effort to convince political leaders to enact reforms to liberalize Germany’s economy, industrial groups began to develop new communicative approaches to influence policy and public discourse. Rudolf Speth (2004, 2006) followed the development of these new lobbying strategies during the Schröder government, tying them to a fundamental shift in the German political and industrial organization. Whereas West German industry had long been characterized by high levels of coordinated “organization, concentration, and centralization,” with the government playing an active role in making sure the markets addressed social imperatives (Zysman, 1983, p. 252), the established means of coordination and communication between government and industry began to shift in the 1990s. While traditional trade unions weakened, businesses became more independent. At the same time, the public relations sector was also becoming more professionalized (Speth, 2006). Public relations agencies saw opportunities in working with industry groups to influence public and political communication using modern marketing techniques to establish “discursive sovereignty using economic research expertise in conjunction with the media” (Speth, 2006, p. 9). Speth shows that campaigns and initiatives developed by industry groups proliferated in the first years of the new millennium, successfully winning political advocates for economic reform. However, the abandonment of the social contract that had long governed German capitalism was not popular among the public.

Halfway through his second term as chancellor, Schröder’s attempts at implementing reforms through consensus between business and labor interests had
yielded paltry results (Camerra-Rowe, 2004). As unemployment spiked and their electoral advantage began to slip away in 2002, political leaders of the ruling Social Democrats came under increasing pressure to implement reforms to address the long-term economic slump and to sell those reforms to an economically distressed population. In 2003, Schröder announced the Agenda 2010 reforms as well as plans to initiate an “innovation offensive” the following year (“Sick man walking,” 2003). In January 2004, Chancellor Schröder convened an “Innovation Conference,” bringing together leaders of industry and research to forge a plan to promote German industry and research (“Innovationsgipfel,” 2004). At the January meeting, Schröder announced his intention to form a “Partnership for Innovation” between leaders in the private and public sectors (“Innovationsgipfel,” 2004, “Innovationsgipfel,” 2004). Six months after this initial meeting, the “Partners for Innovation” agreed upon a mission statement committing to “work together for a new culture of innovation in Germany” (“Partner für Innovation - Mission,” n.d.). The initiative included industrial giants such as BASF, Deutsche Telekom, and Siemens as well as think tanks and lobbying groups such as the German Industry Association (BDI: Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie) and the German Trade Union Federation (DGB: Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund). At the same time, another government-supported initiative involving many of the same industry partners formed under the campaign that eventually became known by the slogan, “Germany—Land of Ideas.” This first campaign, which debuted under the soccer-club-inspired name “FC Deutschland 2006,” garnered bad press due to its poor organization. It also provoked the ire of the leading opposition party, the center-right Christian Democratic Union (CDU) for using public money as well as industry donations to fund what they
characterized as a campaign for the Social Democrats for the 2006 elections (Hammerstein et al., 2004). The Land of Ideas campaign was plagued by suspicions of political motivations, drawing unwanted attention to the campaign’s founders and eroding trust in its message.

While the Land of Ideas campaign was publicly struggling, a more abstract social marketing campaign was quietly in development to fuse the individual and the nation under the slogan, *Du bist Deutschland*. Media reports on the DbD campaign traced it to the Partners for Innovation initiative, but the campaign emphasized its independence from other groups and, above all, from the government and politics (von Petersdorff, 2005). According to one of the initiators of the DbD campaign, Bernd Bauer, the projects of the Partners for Innovation had been successful as a collaboration to create a reform friendly atmosphere in Germany; however, “the problem with the project was, that we did indeed reach the opinion leaders… We had the feeling, though, [that] now is the time to address all Germans. To motivate them to surprise themselves” (Moring, 2005).

Among the Partners for Innovation was the Bertelsmann AG, Germany’s largest media corporation and one of the top five media corporations in the world. Under Bertelsmann’s leadership, the social marketing campaign was developed independently from the Partners initiative, and assembled the country’s biggest media players from television and publishing to cinemas all participating *pro bono*. The strong division between the government- and the industry-led projects created a bulwark for the DbD campaign against the accusations of political propaganda that plagued the Land of Ideas initiative. Although this safeguard was not impervious to critique, it worked as part of a strategy to diffuse suspicion and enervate criticism, enhancing the plausibility of the claim of purely
philanthropic motivation. Altruistic claims aside, an analysis of the mechanisms of this nation branding effort—and particularly the role of the domestically focused component—reveals the strong economic logic driving this instance of corporate philanthropy.

*The Economics of Global Sport Spectacle and the Corporate Value of National Identity*

The wilting German economy and the unpopular reforms developed to “modernize” it provided one major impetus for the emergence of several new high-profile promotional campaigns. The other push came from hosting the 2006 World Cup, which was seen as both an opportunity and a justification for these new campaigns (Hammerstein et al., 2004). During the World Cup, the eyes of the world would be focused on Germany. In general, despite the highly visible economic activity spurred by hosting a global sporting spectacle, the activities directly related to the event have little economic value to host communities. The benefits of hosting, from the political and industrial perspective, have everything to do with their ability to create audiences or publics. As Wolfgang Maenning and Andrew Zimbalist’s comprehensive collection, *International Handbook on the Economics of Mega Sporting Events* (2012) demonstrates, the direct economic benefit to nations and cities of hosting sports mega-events are minimal at best. In fact, events usually result in a legacy of increased tax burden on citizens and superfluous “white elephant” facilities not suited to local use (Feddersen, Grötzinger, & Maennig, 2009; Maennig & Feddersen, 2010; Zimbalist & Maennig, 2012). In the case of less developed countries the economic impact can be particularly dismal. The hosts of the 2006 World Cup in Germany were at a significant advantage
compared to less developed countries. Germany’s infrastructure as well as its professional sports infrastructure, was already strong. The German Football Association (DFB) worked with private stakeholders to arrange for the costs of stadium development to be predominantly borne by soccer clubs and other forms of private investment.

Even under these auspicious conditions, the regional economic benefit from the World Cup to regional hosts was difficult to discern (Feddersen et al., 2009). Although it is well-known that sports mega events almost always result in a public deficit, competition to host these events is growing (Dowse, 2011). Scholars writing on sports economics agree that the motivation of national leadership to host sports mega-events cannot be explained by aspirations of direct economic benefit to the country. Instead, motivations are driven by a complex political economy consisting of a range of actors with set agendas, including transnational corporations, domestic sport associations and politicians and policymakers from different levels of governance. As Scarlett Cornelissen points out, “the manner in which the interests of these actors overlap or diverge determines the processes by which tournaments take shape, and the longer-term consequences such events bear for the wider host society” (2007, p. 248). Each tournament emerges from a different and contextually dependent set of interests.

In the case of the 2006 World Cup, a point of consensus between domestic corporate and political stakeholders was the priority of the promotion of the nation, the remaking of brand Germany. Consistently generating audiences unparalleled by other types of media events, global sports spectacles offer ideal opportunities to exploit focused attention to shape narratives of the nation for domestic and international purposes. Since the first expos and world fairs of the nineteenth century, global spectacle has played this
role as both a product of and a contributor to modern nationalism (E. Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1992; Roche, 2000). Maurice Roche observes that from their advent,

international and supernational cultural events helped to create a fragile space, something of an “international public culture,” in which “official” versions of collective identities, particularly but not exclusively national identities, were asserted and recognised in a (usually, at best, hierarchic and exclusionary; at worst hate-filled and warring) international “world of nations.” (2000, p. 22)

These events created an international consciousness at a global level, and gave governments a tool for creating and assigning meaning to collective national consciousness. Although these functions of global spectacle have a long history, they have recently undergone a subtle but important transformation that is reflected in the rise of the theory and practices of “nation branding.”

Nation branding, or “competitive identity,” as one of its major proponents, Simon Anholt has come to call it, essentially refers to approaching the nation as a product. Anholt, an independent policy advisor, argues that “governments now find themselves competing in ways that they are scarcely prepared to deal with, and inhabiting a world of global competition and mobile consumers where few of their traditional approaches work” (2007, p. 16). However, managing this type of competition is what businesses have perfected. According to Nadia Kaneva’s review of the literature, nation branding supporters share the assumptions that “nation-states operate in a global competitive context” and that “by managing their reputations strategically, nations can advance their interests in the international arena,” whether political or economic (2011, p. 125). This blending of economic and market rationalities into political communication distinguishes nation branding from traditional forms of strategic messaging and propaganda. Proponents of nation branding generally see it as the natural development of these earlier
forms to respond to the new demands of governance from a globalized economy (Kaneva, 2011). The market fundamentalism that underlies much of the work on nation branding sees it as more peaceful form of collective identity than traditional nationalism.

Anholt concisely expresses this view that

the market-based view of the world, on which the theory of place branding is largely predicated, is an inherently peaceful and humanistic model for the relationships between nations. It is based on competition, consumer choice and consumer power; and these concepts are intimately linked to the freedom and power of the individual. For this reason, it seems far more likely to result in lasting world peace than a statecraft based on territory, economic power, ideologies, politics or religion. (Anholt, 2006, p. 2; quoted in Kaneva, 2011, p. 126)

This view is based on a politics and morality that uses market metaphors and extends them beyond the realm of material exchange into all realms of life. In this way, even something as intangible as happiness can be “registered” and “recognized” as “having negotiable value” (Anholt, 2006, p. 2).

The significance of the role of cultural identity in economic competition is only recently starting to become clear. Less than three decades ago, corporations enthusiastically embraced Theodore Levitt’s prediction of the disappearance of cultural difference in the face of the proliferation of “global corporation” (1983, p. 3). However, local cultures were not as easily penetrated as Levitt imagined. Levitt’s global corporations faced unexpected resistance in the form of local competition and backlash against the overexposure of global brands (Silk, Andrews, & Cole, 2005, p. 1). Corporations were forced to reformulate global strategies to take local cultural difference into account.
The value of negotiating identity for corporations seeking to capture broader markets is clear. But as globalization has involved national governments in new unaccustomed forms of competition, nation-states have taken a new look at the value of the symbolic capital of the “national brand.” The increasing mobility of capital has undermined many of the traditional prerogatives which nation-states were founded to maintain. “The modern nation-state emerged as a cohesive political, economic, and cultural entity designed to consolidate and regulate capital accumulation within the boundaries of a specific geographic location” (Silk et al., 2005, p. 2). As the boundaries dividing national and global markets have largely dissolved, the globalized conditions of late capitalism have undermined traditional national sovereignty in crucial ways. The conditions that have unsettled the traditional jurisdiction of the nation-state are the same that have given rise to global corporatism. Silk et al. argue that “while human civilization is being increasingly corporatized, the nation and national culture have become principal accomplices within this process, as global capitalism seeks to—quite literally—capitalize upon the nation as a source of collective identification and differentiation” (2005, p. 7). Rather than making the nation obsolete, under advanced globalization the nation-state and global corporations have grown together, sharing an interest in the symbolic capital and affective power of “imagined communities” (Anderson, 2006) as well as of imagined Others.

In the case of the 2006 World Cup, this opportunity came with a particular set of political and historical challenges. As was discussed in Chapters 1 and 3, even though the call for generalized national pride gained strength through reunification, resistance against abstract symbolic national pride persisted among segments of the leftist political
and intellectual establishment. However, a comprehensive marketing approach to the nation requires the cultivation of an abstract form of nationalism. According to Anholt, “the first and most important component of any national C ompetitive I dentity strategy is creating a spirit of benign nationalism amongst the populace, notwithstanding its cultural, social, ethnic, linguistic, economic, political, territorial and historical divisions” (2007, p. 16). The perception of the national brand among the internal population, Anholt argues, is a driver of the external perception of the brand. However, Anholt sees this as a long-term, comprehensive project. In an article in Die Zeit about Germany’s major pre-World Cup campaigns, Anholt expressed skepticism about the effectiveness of the DbD campaign, calling it an “absolutely laudable effort that, I am certain will do absolutely nothing” (Hoff, 2005). From Anholt’s perspective, much longer term and more targeted programs are necessary to create appreciable change in a Nation Brand. However, while the concrete impact of such campaigns may be hard to measure and may even be indiscernible despite campaign creators’ references to survey data showing that ten million people were “motivated to take things on” by the campaign (Bauchmüller, 2006), they are significant for what they reveal about industrial and political concepts of society.

The Power to Define Reality: The Media and the National Symbolic

Recognizing the symbolic potential of the World Cup, German politicians, industry and the media sought to harness its full potential by creating a broad-ranging marketing strategy including campaigns to initiate the German people in their upcoming role as national hosts. These “social marketing” campaigns were facilitated and justified by the upcoming World Cup, but their symbolic utility was not limited to this event.
While other campaigns, like the Land of Ideas, made soccer a central point of reference, DbD was more general, utilizing sports, and above all national-level soccer, as one point of reference among many nationally charged symbolic scenes. Under the auspices of benign corporate citizenship, the domestically-focused DbD campaign proposed a new relationship between Germans and the nation-state characterized by American-style meritocracy and patriotism. In her classic work *Decoding Advertisements*, Judith Williamson outlines the construction of systems of meaning through advertising. She writes that “advertisements are selling us something else besides consumer goods: in providing us with a structure in which we, and those goods are interchangeable, they are selling us ourselves” (Williamson, 1978, p. 13). In a very literal application, when the nation is the good being sold, advertising is thus selling the unification of nation and self, the *you* becomes *Germany*.

Although most my analysis deals with the 2005 television spot, the print branch of the first campaign merits consideration as well. This branch consisted of print advertisements featuring a variety of famous Germans from the past and present. These ads appropriated the prestige of successful individuals such as Ferdinand Porsche and Albert Einstein and bestowed it on the audience, promising that if they try hard enough, they too can become as important as these figures. The mode of transference is through the nation. Germany is the connection between the aspirant and the prominent person. It is thereby implied that as the national culture cultivated past success, by your association with it you too will be successful. However, in their choice of figures the campaign was again caught up in a historical trap that opened it to critiques of callous opportunism. As one critic pointed out, in his lifetime Albert Einstein was emphatically told, “*Du bist*
(Böss, 2009) Another critic pointed out that the campaign proved Einstein right when he said, “If my theory of relativity is proven successful, Germany will claim me as a German and France will declare that I am a citizen of the world. Should my theory prove untrue, France will say that I am a German and Germany will declare that I am a Jew.” The choice of Ferdinand Porsche similarly inspired critique over the role Porsche played in the war effort during the Second World War. The unsuccessful dehistoricization of historical figures in the print ads also made them popular fodder for internet satirization and critique.

The television spot stayed on safer ground by largely maintaining a present and future orientation. The opening shot, fading in from black, is of the sun peeking through the foliage of the trees lining a field. The quality of the light and the misty air suggests the sunrise. The sky deepens toward the edge of the frame to a clear blue. The camera tracks to the left and the sound of birds chirping accompanies opening notes of Alan Silvestri’s theme for the film *Forrest Gump*. In the choice of theme music, the campaign evokes the values promoted in the American film, which—according to Lauren Berlant’s reading—is “one of the most popular vehicles celebrating citizenship’s extraction from public life…which uses spectacles of the nation in crisis to express a nostalgic desire for official national culture” (1997, p. 180). Forrest is incapable of being corrupted by national crisis because of his limited ability to conceptualize. Even being the namesake of the founder of the Ku Klux Klan cannot besmirch his innocence. “He encounters history without becoming historical” (L. G. Berlant, 1997, p. 180). In this way, the connection with the film expresses a desire to be liberated from personal association with history, like Forrest. In its condemnation of the political movements of the 1960s, the film also
mirrors the attacks by conservative Germans on the value of the debates forced upon the 
public sphere by the protests of the postwar generation that famously turned a critical eye 
to their parents’ activities under Nazi rule.

By moving from darkness to the dawn, the viewer is reborn in the opening shot. The shot divorces what will follow from that which came before. As in Berlant’s allegory 
of infantile citizenship, the nation is conflated with the natural. “The nation’s priceless 
essence is located in what transcends the world of practical citizenship, with its history of 
nationally sanctioned racial, sexual, and economic exploitation” (L. G. Berlant, 1997, p. 
40). Although Berlant is writing about the United States, the fact that her theories 
correspond with many of the key points of the campaign reflects the desire to adopt forms 
of privatized citizenship like those being promoted in the US. This form of citizenship is 
built on the normalization of the national symbolic. In becoming normal, “hardly anyone 
asks critical questions about its representativeness” (L. G. Berlant, 1997, p. 36). Although 
the symbolic body of the national flag was not yet “normal” enough to be utilized without 
raising critical questions, the ad’s creators accessed the symbolic national body in the 
form of nature.

The second shot reveals a beautiful older woman with flaxen hair standing with 
er her back to a tree and the sun illuminating her face. Like a loving grandmother, she 
smiles into the camera ad she says, “you are the miracle of Germany.” As she pronounces 
the final word, the camera pulls back to a medium long shot, emphasizing the move from 
the particular to the general. Her statement refers to the unexpected 1954 World Cup 
victory of the West German team, commonly known as “the miracle of Bern” (Das 
Wunder von Bern). Here, the “miracle” also evokes Germany’s rapid postwar economic
recovery, commonly called the “economic miracle” (*Wirtschaftswunder*). Immediately, the audience is immersed the system of meaning of the sporting spectacle, and more specifically, the meanings and sensations of victorious competition. The particular victory referenced was also the spiritual rebirth of the nation from the ashes of the World War II. The reference to this victory also prepares viewers to associate the campaign slogan with the slogan “*Wir sind Weltmeister*” (we are world champions), which is the chant that corresponds to the celebration of World Cup victory. This associate did not escape notice in the press (see Corinth, 2005).

Germans would have made these connections with ease, especially with the debut of the film “The Miracle of Bern” in 2003. The film tells the fictional story of a prisoner of war returning to his family from internment in Siberia. It chronicles the difficult reunion of the family shattered by war. Ultimately, the victory of the national team finally succeeds in reuniting the estranged father and son. The allegory is brought full circle, as it is the son’s special relationship with one of the national players that inspires the player to score the winning goal in the final game. Thus, the “infantile citizen” delivers the national victory that unites his family and his nation. By reframing the memory of the war around the suffering of the postwar period and the intimate relationships intertwined with the symbolic national victory, the traumatic past is contained and the present is freed from its burdens.

After the ad’s symbolically laden first three shots, the next shot is a simple close-up of a woman resting her face on her right hand. The background is out of focus, but appears to be a cobbled street which is again lit by the angled light of a bright morning sun. Referencing a popular interpretation of the mathematical chaos theory, she informs
us that “a butterfly can unleash a typhoon.” The next shot presents a young woman, frame left, in a yellow shirt cradling a baby swaddled in blue. The swaddling reflects the color of the sky. On the right side of the frame the Berlin TV tower stands tall. The woman, who appears to be of East-Asian descent, looks up from her baby and continues that “the gust produced by its wings may uproot trees kilometers away.” In the middle of the pronouncement the shot cuts to a winged stage performer creating a translucent arch with a bubble blown with a wand.

The next shot is a tracking shot from an extremely low angle that shows young people peeling off and dropping yellow flyers from what is appears to be a balcony in an official building. The man speaking is one of the protestors and as the shot moves to him, a fragment of a protest sign becomes visible behind him. The next shot is from below shooting directly upwards. The illuminated dome is visible above as fliers flutter down toward the camera. The next shot is a long shot from a low angle in which the protestors are visible on the balcony of the rotunda. It is now clear that the signs contain crossed out swastikas. The anti-Nazi association of this scene is driven home by the shot of the falling fliers, which mirrors almost exactly a shot from the 2005 film Sophie Scholl: The Final Days, which chronicles the interrogation and execution of White Rose activists Sophie and Hans Scholl when they were found guilty of high treason after being caught distributing anti-war leaflets. Closer inspection reveals that the scene is shot in the atrium of Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, the location of the Scholl siblings’ apprehension in real life and in the film. This scene associates the messages promoted by the campaign with heroic activism and thereby positions the patriotism promoted in the
campaign in opposition to past nationalisms. In fact, this scene suggests that it is through a strong identification with the nation that nationalism is best resisted.

All of this has been presented in the first 17 seconds of the two-minute spot. In total, the ad is composed of 66 shots, none of them longer than three seconds long, most of them less than two. These shots feature 43 different speakers, over 30 of them celebrities of differing calibers. The themes expressed in the campaign’s text—which creators dubbed a “manifesto”—emphasize the power of the seemingly insignificant (the individual citizen) and the obligation of the individual to the collective embodied in the nation. Individuals are not positioned as important in themselves, but rather in their relation to the national symbolic. “Why do you wave flags while [Michael] Schumacher makes his rounds?” asks a man standing by the side of a pool as a swim team practices. “You know the answer,” suggests a man emerging from between the grey pillars of Berlin’s Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe. “Unrealistic, you say? Then why do you cheer on your team if your voice is so unimportant?” The many (individually insignificant) all contribute to support the national symbolic, embodied in its most successful members.

Another prominent theme is the need for self-sufficiency. In a reformulated version of JFK’s famous speech, a male surgeon instructs the audience to “ask not what others can do for you.” German national team member Gerald Asamoah picks up this point, saying “You are the others. You are Germany.” To drive this point home, the ad features people in humble positions, including a bathroom cleaning lady, sitting alone in a bathroom with a plate for tips on a table beside her, or an impeccably dressed and coiffed—yet presumably homeless—man selling copies of BISS, a street magazine
designed to “help the homeless help themselves.”¹¹⁹ Two harbor workers in the familiar overalls of manual laborers emphasize that “it doesn’t matter where you work, or what position you hold. You keep the store running.” A waitress in a Japanese restaurant says in accented German, “You are the store.” Tied up with these themes is an injunction against criticizing or demanding anything from the government, as in the line “treat your nation like a good friend. Don’t complain about him, offer him your help.” The alignment of these values with those of neo-liberalism was not lost on critics (see for example Jessen, 2005; Wulf, 2005).

Although the liberal economic philosophy of the “manifesto” was decoded and soundly critiqued by a handful of journalists and commentators in the German public sphere, the politics of its images and characters received less attention. In particular, what is the connection with the demographic characteristics of the figures and the roles in which they are cast? One fact stands out in this analysis: white men are the norm. The ad carefully includes individuals representing other demographics—a fact that rarely escaped explicit mention in the press. Ghanaian-born German national team member Gerald Asamoah’s inclusion sparked particular interest. Other visible minorities include a man with Down Syndrome, the waitress of East-Asian heritage, as well as R&B singer Xavier Naido and Vietnamese-German television moderator and actress Minh-Khai

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¹¹⁹ BISS—Bürger in sozialen Schwierigkeiten (Citizens in Social Difficulties)—is a Munich-based monthly street magazine published by a non-profit group to offer homeless people a means to support themselves through its sale. Different versions of this program can be found in major cities across Germany.
Phan-Thi. Although commentators are right to celebrate the inclusion of disabled and non-white individuals in the campaign’s construction of the German nation, it is not clear that these representations challenge the expected roles of Germans of color, and particularly those recognizable as Turkish- or Muslim Germans. Turkish-Germans are represented by rapper Kool Savas, who is shown with his characteristically urban style and distinctive style of German common among transnational urban youth. An interior shot of a group of five dark-haired young men riding in a car and flashing hand-signals also suggests a typical conception of “urban” Turkish or Arab young men.

The portrayal of gender in the campaign is even more starkly normative. Of the 41 adult speakers, only 13 of them are women. This disparity is masked by the positioning of more women at the beginning and end of the advertisement. The ratio among prominent figures portrayed is even worse, with three times more famous men than women. Only four of the women are portrayed in the context of a non-domestic profession. Two of those professions are bathroom attendant and waitress. Another, fashion designer Gabriele Strehle, is accompanied in her studio by her industrialist husband. Only champion cyclist Judith Arndt is portrayed actively participating in a non-traditional profession. Of the women not portrayed in active roles, three of them are portrayed inside the home, while not even one of the men appears in a private setting. The men, on the other hand, are portrayed in a wide variety of settings and professional roles, from academic and symphony conductor to mechanic.

Finally, one of the most salient features of the campaign is the prominence of the media itself. Twelve of the featured celebrities are either journalists or actors or both. In the content and the structure of the campaign, media’s authority to represent the nation is
repeatedly reinforced. The resonance of this impact was increased through the media coverage of the campaign. A campaign press release cited a study showing that in its five-month duration, the campaign had reached 98% of the population in Germany, with every German over age 16 having been exposed on average 21 times. Despite lively criticism on the web, 54% of respondents liked the campaign and 41% felt personally invested in the topic (Diel, 2006). According to the same press release, the campaign was mentioned in more than 2,500 press articles. As will be discussed in the remainder of this chapter, this not only increased exposure for the campaign itself but also provided the opportunity for campaign leadership to build narratives around the creation of the campaign emphasizing the charitable intentions that drove it. Even the criticism of the campaign by some journalists was spun by campaign leaders to prove that the power of media institutions does not undermine the diversity of journalistic opinions and the free press. DbD served to legitimate the media as the framer of national reality by reinforcing the importance of media personalities. The juxtaposition of known and unknown persons suggests that it is through the media—and the national symbolic as expressed in the media—that unknown citizens become connected to the mythical national center.

**Intimacy, Politics, and National Reproduction**

Multiple “social marketing” campaigns that emerged in advance of the 2006 World Cup targeted ambitious goals of renewing Germany’s image and generating excitement about Germany both domestically and abroad. DbD is distinguished by its primary focus on abstract idea of “mood” (*Stimmung*). While the concurrent Land of Ideas campaign also targeted sentiments of excitement and fun using enthusiasm for
World Cup soccer, it was more pragmatically legible, promoting specific German industries and knowledge sectors and encouraging specific actions like inviting international investment (see figure 9). In contrast, the original DbD campaign addressed abstract sentiments and values. Even the more specific second incarnation of the campaign in 2007, which focused on encouraging “child-friendliness,” maintained a carefully broad message, skirting clear exhortations while promoting the adoption of a generalized public disposition. In the second campaign “you” refers to children, and the narrator speaks as a parent. The audience watches the children on screen from the position of parents while the soothing female voice claims that “there is no bad time to have you.”iii The creators’ statements to the press show that Du bist Deutschland is not only a project to evoke emotional reactions in audiences; it is a much more ambitious project to cultivate a system of values prioritizing a neoliberal politics of private responsibility and biopolitical values of production and reproduction.

![Image of Claudia Schiffer with text: "Come on over to my place. Invest in Germany Land of Ideas."

Figure 7: After over a year of negative press coverage of internal disputes and flagging support, the Land of Ideas campaign had its first major public success with internationally-placed ads that invited (male) investors to couple with Germany as embodied by supermodel, Claudia Schiffer, promising full satisfaction including “breakfast in the morning.”

This final section draws on the text and images of the 2005 and 2007 DbD campaigns along with media coverage of their creators to identify three overlapping aspects of this political project. First, the campaigns promote an intimate and affective
form of citizenship that prioritizes the cultivation of an optimistic predisposition and casts it as the precursor to economic well-being. The definition and function of affect is a matter of significant discussion among theorists. One point of tension is its distinction from and relationship to emotion. Both affect and emotion related to aspects of feeling. Lawrence Grossberg proposes that "emotion is the articulation of affect and ideology" (2010, p. 316). Affect can be understood as feeling before its articulation in a particular instance, as the feelings and associations that circulate in public and "stick" - in Sara Ahmed's words - to reproduce the associations between "ideas, values, and objects" (2010, p. 29). As with the concept of Heimat discussed in Chapter 1, affect is both a public form of feeling and the basis of apparently intimate lives, giving "circuits and flows the forms of a life" (Stewart, 2007, p. 2). In this case, I connect the emotions expressed in this case to the affective politics of the economic vision of life they support.

Instead of seeing happiness as resulting from material security, the first DbD campaign proposes that a positive attitude is the necessary precursor to economic growth. The second DbD campaign in 2007 ties happiness to literal—not just symbolic or economic—reproduction. This affective orientation also extends to politics and the relation to the nation. The next and closely related aspect of this project is a new framing of the responsibility of individuals to the nation. Instead of viewing the nation-state as responsible for creating the conditions enabling citizens to be productive, this framing removes the state and makes the individual responsible for creating the nation with their productive action and positive disposition. Once this relationship was established in the first campaign, the second DbD campaign’s apparent leap to encouraging literal reproduction as a national project is revealed instead to be a seamless continuation.
Finally, DbD campaign proposes a new identitarian schema for Germany that de-emphasizes ethnic and cultural forms of identification in favor of citizenship based on individual, private (re)productivity. This is accomplished through a narrative of a color-blind and classless society, in which the self-conscious placement of a handful of visible minorities among normative citizens smoothes over economic and racial inequalities. DbD promotes an explicitly nationalist framework, but does so—and perhaps is only able to do so—by altering the vision of the nation, moving away from the explicitly culturalist and genealogical definitions of the German people. Instead, it offers a new cosmopolitan meritocracy that fiercely promotes the nation even as it alters the qualifications for national citizenship. This alteration is, in one sense, a broadening in that it offers equality to all regardless of race or class. However, as observers of American fantasies of meritocracy well know, by privatizing risk this apparent opening also introduces new forms of precarious citizenship.

These campaigns may be best understood through comparison with another national context: the cultural politics of right-wing America. Although the social or “coordinated market economy” of postwar Germany and the liberal anarcho-capitalism of the United States are often considered as oppositional varieties of capitalism (Crouch & Streeck, 1997; Menz, 2010), their theoretical origins are actually the same. Foucault argues that the foundation of this form of government or governmentality is the idea that the only acceptable form of social policy is economic growth. In order to achieve this growth, government must intervene to create the conditions for optimal functioning of the market, so that competitive mechanisms can play their proper regulatory role in all areas of life (Foucault, 2008, p. 144). They key difference between the German “social market
“economy” and American neoliberalism is the belief among German theorists that the market mechanisms are so fragile that they must be carefully managed by a socially interventionist policy (Foucault, 2008, p. 323). In this sense, the “enterprise society imagined by [German] ordoliberals is... a society for the market and a society against the market” (Foucault, 2008, p. 242). The American version eliminates this ambiguity, generalizing the economic form of the market “throughout the social body and including the whole of the social system not usually conducted through or sanctioned by monetary exchanges” (Foucault, 2008, p. 243). However, the Du bist Deutschland campaign and the concurrent economic reforms passed by the German government suggest an erosion of this ambivalent stance in favor of a purer commitment to the generalization of market mechanisms, proposing a fundamental change in the role of the state in mediating between markets and the population. This shift is also accompanied by a more expansive role for industry in social affairs. In responding to the question of what constitutes the campaign’s deeper message, advertising executive and DbD creator Fischer-Appelt summarized it as an affirmation “that the industry is ready to take over responsibility for this country” (Ax, 2005). In place of state support, industry aspires to assume social responsibility by propagating the personal embrace of market rationalities.

Lauren Berlant’s (1997, 2011) work on American cultural politics demonstrates the consequences of this generalization of market rationality, which reached new levels through what she calls the “Reagan revolution” beginning in the 1980s. Central to this process is the simultaneous expansion of the nation idea and contraction of the idea of the state. The state’s role is to support the generalization of market logics rather than to provide public services. In this increasingly “intimate” public sphere, private values and
practices are the basis of citizenship. Here, citizenship practice is, above all, oriented
towards or emerging from the family sphere. “No longer valuing personhood as
something directed toward public life, contemporary nationalist ideology recognizes a
public good only in a particularly constricted nation of simultaneously lived private
worlds” (L. G. Berlant, 1997, p. 5). In this privatized, intimate national sphere, the
“public” in the traditional modernist sense of deliberative democracy ceases to be the
central ideal of the body politic. Central aspects of this public life, from the protests of
social movements—at least those not concerned with family politics—to the professional
practice of politicians have “been made to seem ridiculous and even dangerous to the
nation” (L. G. Berlant, 1997, p. 5). Instead of looking to the public sphere to formulate
political solutions to problems, responsibility is placed on the individual and risk is
shifted to the personal sphere.

Berlant’s concept of intimate publics is complex and varied. Introducing a
discussion with Berlant, Jay Prosser proposed that intimate publics “are both the
strangers formed into communities by affective ties; and the assumptions of shared
emotions and worldviews that precede, create, and then often render anxious and
ambivalent such publics” (L. Berlant & Prosser, 2011, p. 180). Intimate publics can
function at the small scale of specialized communities of interest on the internet or at the
large scale of national or transnational communities. They are both actual people bound
by shared experiences or concerns and assemblages of norms that organize, mobilize, and
interpret collective sentiments. What makes them so effective is their ability to connect
with people through a sense of “authenticity.” Their relationship to politics is also
complex. In the same discussion, Berlant clarifies that
Intimate publics usually flourish to one side of politics, referring to historical subordinations without mobilizing a fundamental activism with respect to them ….in times of crisis, though, such as the present, their relation can become newly fraught and dynamic. Political publics in struggle often take on the logics of intimate ones, deploying sentimental models of affective recognition to establish political grounds for imagining survival according to their own interest. Indeed, they often try to co-opt or affiliate with existing intimate publics, for good or ill, as when they claim that their own politics is really about realizing a world for affective community, and not about power as such. (2011, p. 184)

This is the function of intimate publics that most clearly applies to the campaigns analyzed in this chapter. As with the dramatic appearance of the intimate public that Berlant observes at the heart of the new conservatism of the late twentieth century, the campaigns of the coalition of German industries and politicians in the Partners for Innovation and the Land of Ideas initiatives address the nation as an affective community to support specific political and economic agendas. While the American form focused primarily on social conservatism and rigid norms of reproductive bodies, the German version focuses less on regulating the particulars of sex—although it is at least as concerned with reproduction, as is abundantly clear in the second DbD campaign and the Sarrazin debate (see Chapter 6). The German form concentrates more on economic liberalism and personal responsibility for creating what Berlant calls “the good life” (2011). In both contexts, the abstract sentimental nation takes center stage. The first DbD campaign centers on deploying sentimental images and ideas to create the idea of a better life through affective national bonds.

**Affective Economy**

“You are Germany. So how about you celebrate yourself again?”—Du bist Deutschland Manifesto
The most important motivation cited by campaign creators in the press was the desire to change and brighten the national “mood” (Stimmung). From the first discussions at Chancellor Schröder’s “Innovation Conference” in January 2004, a link emerged between the “right” disposition and the continuation of the good life in Germany. Schröder criticized cautious and conservative approaches in German business and research and exhorted the assembled industrial, political, and academic elite to “speak first about opportunities and only then about risks” (“Innovationsgipfel,” 2004, “Schröder zu Innovation,” 2004). The chancellor framed this as an existential matter for the nation, arguing that Germany’s prosperity depends on its ability to outcompete its rivals in global markets. To do so, Schröder emphasized again the importance of attitude: “The goal is to strengthen renewal in Germany, to deconstruct barriers and to awaken new confidence in the productive capacity of this country” (Schröder zu Innovation,” 2004). Besides committing the government to increasing funding for research universities, the Innovation Conference had few clear goals beyond uniting important national players to clarify shared interests and underscore the need for attitudinal change. As was outlined at the start of this chapter, this meeting lead to the foundation of the Partners for Innovation who went on to create the DbD campaign. As the story was narrated in the press, leaders of one of the world’s top media conglomerates, Bertelsmann, were inspired to attack the disordered national affect that had developed from the economic malaise:

Germany in autumn. Gray skies, veil of mist, bad humor. Many people have resigned themselves to unemployment, bankrupt companies, lost prosperity. As trees lose their leaves in the autumn, they lose their courage, cast off responsibility. In Germany in autumn 2004, Bertelsmann CEO Gunther Thielen and his friend Bernd Bauer refused to come to terms with it. Optimism and responsibility were needed, not self-pity. Everyone should know this. The idea: 82 million people identify again with Germany. (Moring, 2005)
In this narrative, the campaign came from the spontaneous inspiration of titans of industry who had become frustrated with the passivity of the economically depressed population. The use of the seasonal metaphor sets up a curious relationship between the economy and individuals. Changing seasons usually indicate that which is outside of individual control or social influence. The dropping of leaves in autumn is not something that a tree could be expected to change or take responsibility for. However, even this extreme example of a situation governed by inexorable structure does not justify complaint or the abdication of individual responsibility. The prospect of economic winter demands “optimism and responsibility, not self-pity.” Yet, it is telling that the metaphor for the economy is a force of nature. The message is not that people should mobilize to find political solutions to change economic conditions. It would be foolish to try to prevent seasons from changing. To weather harsh economic conditions, individuals must muster their own reserves and take care of themselves. The source of affective fortitude, stated as if it were self-evident, is the collective identification with the nation.

The primary target of the DbD campaign, in both its 2005 and 2007 iterations, was to alter the sentimental climate of Germany. One of the most common words to appear in the corpus of stakeholder-focused articles is Stimmung, which translates to collective mood, sentiment, or morale. In the press corpus for this chapter, coded segments related to emotions outnumbered all other themes. More specifically, campaign creators claim that Germany’s most pressing problem is a collective bad attitude:

The aspirations with which organizers have set out are not exactly modest: they want to fight whiners, defeatists, and self-doubters. No longer should every other German have to report that he is afraid of the future. “We want to reach an awakening in Germany” says campaign leader, Bernd Bauer.\textsuperscript{viii} (A. Kaiser, 2005)
This framing of Germany’s problems as primarily attitudinal goes back at least as far as the first campaign proposed by Chancellor Schröder, FC Deutschland, which became the Land of Ideas. This early campaign was described in a *Spiegel* article from 2004:

> Enough with despondency, self-doubt, and fear of the future, so speaks a melodious voice to the audience. We can do it. We are somebody. We are, above all, a great community, capable of getting fired up.\(^9\) (Hammerstein et al., 2004, p. 23)

The authors of this article observe that this kind of emotional politics represents a stark departure from the traditional position of the Social Democratic Party:

> Officially, it is about a brightened mood in the country organized by the modern advertising industry. Schröder wants to impart a new we-feeling to Germans tormented by fear of social decline. Highly emotional PR has thus arrived among those who had always fought against such efforts to smooth over reality. They once wanted to be “the voices of critique” or even to organize a “counter public;” they no longer recoil from targeted mass influence.\(^8\) (Hammerstein et al., 2004, p. 22)

These campaign ideas indicate the rightward shift of the center-left Social Democrats, moving from an agonistic politics of deliberation to an emotional, intimate politics more commonly associated with the political right. Although FC Deutschland never took off in the specific form proposed in 2004, the political and economic rationality of the Schröder government was readily adopted in the media industry’s DbD campaign. In a reversal of the philosophy of the German social market economy, here the emotional life of the population is not to be supported by the markets guaranteed by the state, instead the markets are to be supported by the appropriately buoyant emotions of the population. The people must be optimistic, because it is what the market/nation requires.

*The Productive Citizen*
The purpose of cultivating a positive disposition is to improve the individual potential for productivity and to stimulate “courage” to take personal responsibility for the prosperity of the nation. You are Germany when you have a positive attitude and you use your energies for entrepreneurial and productive purposes. In interviews and press statements, campaign creators emphasize the goal of catalyzing individual action, framing passivity as a core contributor to German economic problems:

“That is the goal: to finally drag Germans out of a standstill, to give the starting shot so that they want to get moving,” says [campaign] initiator Bernd Bauer.\textsuperscript{xi} (Moring, 2005)

The [campaign] initiators hope that many citizens become active. “Do something,” they want to call out: “Make something, you can do it”\textsuperscript{xii} (“Wir in Deutschland,” 2005).

The [slogan] fits, because we want to tell people: it depends on you, what happens in Germany. It has to do with you! … We wanted to seize people. So that every person does what they can. That is why we have the passage: “Germany has enough hands, to reach out to each other and grab hold. We are 82 million.”\textsuperscript{xiii}

(Oliver Voss quoted in A. Kaiser, 2005)

This national inertia is framed as a result the failure of personal responsibility or, framed euphemistically, the failure to believe in oneself. As advertising executive Holger Jung stated in an interview,

We concentrated on a characteristic tendency that is currently obvious in this country: to push the responsibility for all the problems of this world away from oneself and to say, “It’s not my fault, it is theirs.” The intelligentsia finds this formulation too simple for a problem that is certainly very complexly interwoven. But a campaign can’t solve that; it has to concentrate on a key problem that lies with every individual.\textsuperscript{xiv} (Grimberg, 2006)

Jung’s statement acknowledges the complexity of social and economic problems, but absolves his branch from the responsibility to do justice to this complexity, citing the inherent limitations of the format of advertising. It is portrayed simply as a matter of
expedience that they have chosen to focus on individual responsibility and to ignore complex, structural causes.

The creators acknowledge, however, that it would not be effective to show a completely positive picture. They make a concession to reality by admitting the difficulty of the task they propose, as in the 2005 DbD “manifesto” with the line “our time does not taste like cotton candy. No one wants to claim that it does. It may be that you have your back to the wall….Yet once we tore a wall down together”\textsuperscript{xxv} (“Das Manifest: ‘Du bist Deutschland’ im Wortlaut,” 2005). By including low-wage workers and even a presumably homeless—albeit well-dressed—man, campaign creators lend plausibility to their claim to represent a reasonable assessment of the contemporary situation in Germany. As the creator of the campaign slogan, Oliver Voss, puts it, “if we had just shown happy people, that would have been a lie. Through the direct address, in which we pointed a finger out through the television, people are almost forced to react”\textsuperscript{xvi} (A. Kaiser, 2005). But the purpose of this concession is not to focus attention on understanding the problems themselves, but to acknowledge them so that they can be put aside to make way for the call to action.

The statements of campaign creators underscore a contradictory stance towards politics, conflating productive activity with civic or political action. When confronted with the question of what authorizes industry to take on “such a massive political initiative” (Ax, 2005), Michael Trautmann, one of the advertising executives engaged in the campaign, affirmed first the formal right of any interested party to engage in building political will and shaping public opinion. At the same time, Trautmann emphatically denied that the campaign has any political content:
This advertisement is not propaganda….it does not aim to convince anyone of a political opinion. It only aims to remind every citizen of his responsibility and to push him to take part in the political debate. There can be no doubt that this goal is legitimate.\(^{xvii}\) (Ax, 2005)

This statement is a poor fit with the content of the campaign, which directly discourages critical politics through its exhortation to “treat your nation like a friend,” and to stop complaining and take responsibility for yourself. In the campaign, responsibility does not refer to political engagement, unless all productive activity is equated with civic or political engagement. Trautmann’s denial of a political agenda cloaks the campaign’s promotion of a politics of the apolitical, a politics of personal productivity and collective identification with the nation. This statement is even more disingenuous when paired with the acknowledgement by campaign co-founder Bernd Bauer, quoted above, that the motivation for the campaign was to extend support for economic reform policies beyond the political elite to the general population (Moring, 2005). As one cultural critic writing in the typically reform- and campaign-friendly \textit{Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung} summarized,

\begin{quote}
Economic problems appear in this perspective as psychosomatic suffering, unemployment is seen as a consequence of a nationwide depression and no longer as the result of decisions that have created particular structural conditions. Because they have apparently given up on believing in the ability to change them, they logically seize on a rhetoric of revitalization, which reduces the nebulous realm of struggle to the question of solely personal commitments: “You are Germany. Your will is like fire under your behind. You hold the store together. You are the store. You are Germany.”\(^{xviii}\) (Reents, 2006)
\end{quote}

In short, the campaign seeks to reshape the field of public engagement, locating it in the terrain of the “intimate public” and foreclosing a systemic or structural approach to solving political problems.
The biopolitical logics of productivity underlying these qualifications for fully “being Germany,” which is to say, for being a full citizen took on an even stronger role in the second part of the DbD campaign that debuted in 2007. The second iteration replicated the format of the first and boasted an even bigger budget, saturating Germany’s media-sphere. In the first campaign the addressee is the potentially productive person who is exhorted to be Germany by taking productive action, through some form of labor or philanthropy. The speaker is the national collectivity embodied in celebrities and media personalities and unknown Germans including visible minorities. In the second iteration, the addressee is a child—all children—and the speaker is the parent figure. The ad reflects long-standing anxieties about Germany’s aging and insufficiently fertile population (T. Kaiser, 2007). In interviews, campaign creators frame Germany’s demographic decline—its failure to achieve optimal reproduction—once again as an affective problem. They seek to create an atmosphere of child-friendliness, which they carefully distinguish from directly arguing that people have more children (Iken & Gerlach, 2008). Again, the ad’s “manifesto” addresses the difficult and unpleasant parts of parenting, providing dramatic tension that is overcome by the full wash of emotions, love and purpose that children represent. “You make us crazy” the warm female voice says, pausing before adding, “with happiness.” The adult, in reproducing, has reproduced the nation in its ideal, infantile form, still unsullied by history and existing as pure potentiality.

Integration and the Equal Inequality of Neoliberal Citizenship
For DbD, full German citizens must be productive, optimistic, and independent in the face of adversity. One requirement that the campaign sets aside, however, had until recently been a formal requirement under the law: decent from German parents. Among the dozens of children pictured in the second DbD television advertisement, a handful of non-white children appear. While white children clearly represent the norm, as in the first iteration, this version consciously includes children of color as well as several children with Down Syndrome to show that the nation it invokes is not defined in the ethnic primordialist sense.

The campaign creators position themselves against old ways of defining Germanness. In fact, when a historical photograph surfaced showing the slogan “Denn Du bist Deutschland” (Because you are Germany) on a large banner at a Nazi demonstration in the mid-1930s, campaign leaders dismissed any connection between the campaign and past nationalism as absurd. According to ad executive Holger Jung, the revelation of the photo caused a serious internal discussion among the creators, but when they determined that it was a call to join a local event, and was “in no way a Nazi slogan at the level of Arbeit macht frei,20 or the like, [they] were relieved” (Grimberg, 2006). When historians confirmed the insignificance of the slogan for National Socialist messaging, they felt they could “move forward with the slogan in good conscience.”

Jung then pointed to the content of the campaign as clear evidence disproving nationalist

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20 “Work sets you free.” This slogan was famously displayed over the entrance to Auschwitz and other Nazi concentration camps.
goals: “Just look at the campaign and the advertisement: the very last thing that we want is to slip off into a nationalist direction. That would be practically exactly the opposite of the campaign” (Grimberg, 2006). Holger’s statement here, and the relative ease with which campaign creators and historians (see for example Meyer-Gatermann, 2005) dismissed any meaningful parallel in the historical example, reveal a very narrow conception of nationalism. Nationalism is never defined but is understood to be negative, chauvinistic, and archaic. Cultivating a “national feeling” or an identification with the nation is frequently cited by the media and creators as a principal goal of the campaign, yet this is somehow unquestionably distinct from, or even contrary to, nationalism.

The supposedly stark distinction between the desired national feeling and identification and chauvinist nationalism is so self-evident that they do not elaborate on it. Holger’s statement implies that one only need look at the campaign’s inclusion of visible minorities to see the inclusiveness of the campaign’s vision of Germany. What this narrow conception of nationalism fails to consider, however, is that nationalism’s categories of belonging may change, but it always fundamentally involves decisions about who qualifies as a member and who does not. The parallel in the slogans old and new is defined not by the specific qualifications it makes, but rather by the fact that it serves as a system of qualification. Furthermore, nationalist systems of affiliation function at multiple levels, from formal juridical qualifications to cultural, moral and substantive forms. The value of this parallel then, is not to show that DbD shares National Socialism’s brand of exclusion, but rather to draw attention to the importance of interrogating every nationalist discursive framework to understand its logics of inclusion and exclusion.
While DbD includes visible minorities within its schema of Germanness, it does so alongside new qualifications, namely, that all may “be Germany” who 1) embrace a positive disposition towards growth and reproduction, 2) do not complain or protest, and 3) who contribute to national prosperity. The fairness of these dictates is built on the presumption of equality—of equal opportunity in a fair and unbiased system. The campaign accepts the existence of economic inequality by featuring menial workers and a newspaper-selling homeless person along with Germany’s wealthy industrialists and celebrities. It argues that these differences do not matter, because, as Michael Trautmann put it, “anyone who does something is a role model, like Einstein or Ludwig Erhard”\textsuperscript{xxxi} (Moring, 2005). Trautmann erases the differences between Germany’s most famous and successful citizens and its humblest by elevating productive action to the status of moral virtue. The campaign’s choice of Ludwig Erhard is particularly meaningful (see figure 10). Erhard served as the first Minister of Economics after the war and is widely credited for West Germany’s postwar economic boom, known as the Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle). As Foucault observes, he was also instrumental in establishing economic freedom and prosperity as a basis of the legitimacy of the new Federal Republic of Germany, which had lost its legitimacy through the Nazi defeat and foreign occupation. Erhard helped establish a framework in which “economic development and economic growth produces sovereignty….the economy produces legitimacy for the state that is its guarantor” (Foucault, 2008, p. 84). The state guarantees free economic activity and,
Figure 8: This 2005 print advertisement depicting a woman with an unusually large cabbage refers to former Chancellor Ludwig Erhard who was one of the principle architects of postwar economic policy, and is widely credited for Germany’s “Economic Miracle.” The text reads in part, “Do you believe that a miracle is the result of hard work? Then you have something in common with Ludwig Erhard…. You too can work for your miracle. You decide whether you reach your goal. Not fate.”

Consequently, those who participate in that activity legitimate the state through their participation. This produces a permanent consensus of all those who may appear as agents within these economic processes, as investors, workers, employers, and trade unions. All these economic partners produce a consensus, which is a political consensus, inasmuch as they accept this economic game of freedom. (Foucault, 2008, p. 84)

This economic philosophy that legitimizes the state is easily extended to legitimate the citizenship of minorities who appear as agents within economic processes. All those who participate in economic activity contribute to the legitimate sovereignty of the state. As Chapter 6 shows, however, this act of inclusion does not inhibit racialized forms of
exclusion. In fact, when some groups are conceived as congenitally deficient economic actors, it becomes very easy to condemn the group while denying racism with the claim that any economically contributing individual, regardless of race, is a valid citizen. Furthermore, the focus on the relatively high rates of reproduction among minority groups defined as undesirable shows that not all children or “child-friendly” communities “are Germany.” Instead, they may be defined as the source of Germany’s eminent demise.

**Conclusion**

The social marketing campaigns inspired by hosting the 2006 World Cup attempted to create consensus around increasingly neoliberal economic and political policies. To do so, they mobilized an intimate version of the public, which is tied together as an affective community through affiliation with an abstract, imagined Nation. Although the direct appeal to mass emotion used in this campaign was a significant departure from postwar political communication in West Germany, the idea of economic activity as a force constituting national legitimacy, as “a circuit going from the economic institution to the state” (Foucault, 2008, p. 84) goes back to the foundation of the Federal Republic. In Ludwig Erhard’s deceptively simple words, “only a state that establishes both the freedom and responsibility of the citizens can legitimately speak in the name of the people” (quoted in Foucault, 2008, p. 81). As Foucault shows, freedom here refers primarily to economic freedom, to the ability to act as an agent in economic processes. Responsibility refers to the state’s obligation to create the proper conditions for market rationalities, or incentives, to function. In this way, the discourse of DbD is connected to
a well-established German political economy. At the same time, its expansion into intimate and affective realms and the reduction of the role of the state signals a move toward more all-encompassing forms of neoliberalism. As the state’s direct social role is diminished, the idea of the nation moves to the fore.

DbD also marks an important change in the place of visible minorities in the German identitarian schema. Their inclusion can be seen in pragmatic terms as a means of diffusing critiques that the campaign represents a “bad” kind of nationalism. Yet, this move also signals something more profound. It signals the introduction of colorblind norms of citizenship that propose to unite the population under a moral framework of economic “freedom and responsibility.” This is a fundamental aspect of integration discourse, which holds that the path to full citizenship is equally available to all who formally qualify. The advertisement proposes that in today’s Germany, all who follow this moral framework belong to the nation. Those who fail, do so of their own choosing. However, as we will see in the final three chapters, the question of visible minorities’ qualifications is never fully settled. Instead, integration discourse holds integrant candidates in a separate space of evaluation, where they may be celebrated as a success and a credit to the nation or classified as threatening to its continued existence. The next chapter examines the case of an immigrant family whose defense of an oversized German flag against anti-nationalist attacks during the 2010 World Cup attracted the attention of the media and the praise of experts and politicians. As in the DbD campaign, the patriotism of these “new Germans” serves as a pedagogical example for normative Germans, authorizing and even demanding the generalized practice of public patriotism.
Das Problem bei dem Projekt war, daß wir zwar die Meinungsführer erreicht haben… Wir hatten aber das Gefühl: Jetzt ist die Zeit, alle Deutschen anzusprechen. Sie zu animieren, von sich selbst wieder überrascht zu sein.

Hier soll wohl „Du bist Deutschland“ Abhilfe schaffen—„Ein löbliches Unterfangen“, meint Anholt, „das, da bin ich sicher, absolut nichts bewirken wird.“

Du zeigst uns, dass es nie den falschen, sondern eigentlich nur den richtigen Zeitpunkt gibt dich zu bekommen.

Du bist Deutschland. Also, wie wäre es wenn du dich mal wieder selbst anfeuerst?

Ziel ist es, die Erneuerung in Deutschland zu stärken, Hemmnisse abzubauen und neues Vertrauen in die Leistungsfähigkeit des Landes zu wecken.


Der Anspruch, mit dem die Organisatoren daherkommen, ist nicht gerade bescheiden: Sie wollen gegen Nörgler, Schlechtredner und Selbstzweifler angehen. Nicht mehr lange soll jeder zweite Deutsche bekunden müssen, er habe Angst vor der Zukunft. „Wir wollen einen Aufbruch in Deutschland erreichen“, sagt der Leiter der Kampagne, Bernd Bauer.

Schluss mit Verzagtheit, Selbstzweifel und Zukunftsangst, so spricht da eine wohlklingende Stimme auf den Zuhörer ein. Wir können was. Wir sind wer. Wir sind vor allem eine große Gemeinschaft, die sich zu begeistern vermag.


"Das ist das Ziel: Die Deutschen endlich aus dem Stillstand zu holen, den Startschuß zu geben, damit sie sich bewegen wollen", sagt Initiator Bernd Bauer.

Die Initiatoren hoffen, daß so viele Bürger aktiv werden. „Tu was“, wollen sie ihnen zurufen: „Mach was, Du kannst das“.

Der Satz paßt, weil wir den Leuten damit sagen: Es hängt an Dir, was in Deutschland passiert. Es geht um Dich! … Wir wollten die Leute packen. Damit jeder tut, was er kann. Deshalb die Passage: "Deutschland hat genug Hände, um sie einander zu reichen und anzupacken. Wir sind 82 Millionen."

Worauf wir uns konzentriert haben, ist eine Eigenart, die hierzulande derzeit ganz offensichtlich ist: Bei allen Problemen dieser Welt die Verantwortung von sich wegzuschieben und zu sagen: "Ich bin nicht schuld, das sind ja die anderen." Das findet die Intelligenzija dann zu eindimensional für ein Problem, das sicherlich hochkomplex verstrickt ist. Aber das kann eine Kampagne nicht lösen, sie muss sich auf ein Schlüsselproblem konzentrieren, das bei jedem Einzelnen liegt.

Wenn wir nur glückliche Leute gezeigt hätten, wäre das doch verlogen gewesen. Durch die direkte Ansprache, indem ein Finger aus dem Fernseher hinauszeigt, ist man zum Reagieren geradezu gezwungen.

Diese Werbung ist ja keine Propaganda…. Sie will niemanden von einer bestimmten politischen Meinung überzeugen. Sie will nur jeden Bürger an seine Verantwortung erinnern und ihn anregen, sich an der politischen Debatte zu beteiligen. Es kann keinen Zweifel daran geben, daß diese Absicht legitim ist.


Denn sehen Sie sich die Kampagne und den Spot an: Das Allerletzte, was wir wollen, ist, in eine nationalistische Richtung abzuleiten. Das wäre praktisch genau das Gegenteil der Kampagne.

CHAPTER 5 – IMMIGRANT PATRIOTISM: TEACHING GERMANS TO CHEER

After the 2006 FIFA men’s World Cup hosted by Germany re-established the practice of public celebrations of national affiliation there, flag-waving became an almost obligatory national sports tradition in the 2008 Euro Cup and again in the 2010 World Cup. As commentators in the media enthused, the multi-ethnic German national team of the 2010 World Cup inspired minority Germans and immigrants to join in the patriotic displays in greater numbers. Even second and third generation migrants who inhabit the physical space of the German nation have only recently been allowed to lay claim to the metaphysical, abstract space of national citizenship. In this context, performances of patriotism including the marking of physical space controlled by immigrants with German national symbols can serve as a challenge to exclusionary ethnic ideas of national identity. At the same time, the promotion of civic forms of national identification as a challenge to ethnic nationalism reinforces the legitimacy of the nation-state as the paramount form of social identification. In Germany, ethnic norms of citizenship continue to operate alongside new conceptions of citizenship that emphasize liberal democratic norms of economic and social citizenship; these norms of equality, human rights, and freedom are framed as universal in their validity, but also endemic to Germany and “the West” (see Introduction and Chapter 2). Thus, while to be German without qualification still depends on apparent German descent, affective civic nationalist performances have emerged as a new route for visible minorities to claim citizenship as a “new German.” By moving between the arguments and rhetorical frames within the
media coverage and the political and social contexts they are in conversation with, this chapter aims to untangle these tensions as well as the political strategies and stakes of immigrant patriotism in Germany.

To understand these dynamics, this chapter examines the media spectacle generated by a flag fight between German flag hoisting immigrants and left-wing anti-nationalists in the Berlin neighborhood of Neukölln during the 2010 World Cup. As Youssef Bassal, a protagonist of the flag fight, argued, “we belong here, no matter if the leftists or extreme right does not like us. In the end we’re even going to teach the Germans how to cheer for Germany again” (Grieshaber, 2010). In this conception, marking space in an immigrant neighborhood with the national flag of the adopted nation allows non-ethnic Germans to claim full access to both abstract and physical national space through civic national displays. In exchange for the right to identify with the national core, immigrants provide a model of “infantile citizenship” (L. G. Berlant, 1997). Unsullied by associations with nationalist crimes of the past, immigrant patriotism authorizes and invites ethnic Germans to participate in quotidian forms of nationalist expression. The harmless depictions of the Bassals and their neighbors celebrating in over-the-top costumes bearing the national colors infantilizes the immigrant patriots and attests to the benign nature of symbolic celebration (figure 11). At the same time, it serves as a pedagogical performance aimed at teaching the diverse constituencies of the German nation-state how to practice civic nationalism.
The coverage of the case examined here demonstrates how global sporting spectacles provide an apparently apolitical space of mediated national self-reflection. These popular events are focal points of national attention and frequently provide the stage on which debates of national significance play out. At the same time, as Maurice Roche observes, sports mega events reveal connections between the cultural, the political and the economic in modern societies and the contemporary world order (2000, p. xi). Moreover, the (trans)national appeal of these events invokes a powerful articulation of popular communication: it embodies at once the structural forces of transnational capital, cultural globalization, and the political dynamics at the juncture of local histories, representations and nationalisms in globalized contexts. Studying these dynamics, as occasioned by the incidents and discourses under discussion in this chapter, reveals the powerful structural, affective, and textual articulations of popular communication.
The relatively small scale of the incident required a broader search methodology than was used in other chapters. I used the surname of the family, *Bassal*, in an expanded Google Custom search set to search 234 German periodicals. I also searched international coverage of the incident using LexisNexis and the terms *Bassal AND Germany*. These searches returned 66 unique articles (table 2). Sources included regional papers from across Germany but mostly concentrated in Berlin, national prestige publications, as well as several international sources including the *Wall Street Journal* (US) and *The Independent* (UK). To contextualize this case, this paper builds on the discourses analyzed within the press coverage of the 2006 World Cup in Chapter 3. These sources represent a broad cross-section of the German media-scape in terms of geographical scale and political orientation. The national and international reach of the coverage indicates the broad scope of the story’s media appeal.

**Table 4: Combined Search Results for Bassal (German Periodicals) and Bassal AND Germany (LexisNexis)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Periodical Type</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local/Regional</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>66</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This case illustrates the attempt by some immigrants to contest their exclusion from the German citizenry from the peripheral space of a frequently-maligned immigrant neighborhood. Through the case we can also see glimpses of how the recent broadening of Germany’s legal definition of citizenship is already beginning to impact the inclusion
of immigrants and new Germans in German national life and in the abstract space of national identity. At the same time, the case shows how the opening of national identification on civic lines may coexist with the continued privileging of ethnic norms. Furthermore, the discourse of civic nationalism in the flag battle also posits the necessity of normalized displays of nationalism, discrediting critiques of casual forms of nationalism.

The tension between the boundaries of the state and the ethnic categories of the people included and excluded by those boundaries is a hallmark of the modern nation-state. Under Gellner’s famous definition, “nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent” (2006, p. 1). To legitimate the claim of sovereignty, the liberal democratic state must foster the belief in, and dedication to a common culture defined in some combination of ethnic, religious, linguistic, philosophical or juridical terms. This form of common identification is essential in liberal democracy since, as Carolyn Marvin and David Ingle write, “only nationalism motivates the sacrificial devotion of citizens without which there can be no effective governance” (1996, p. 10). The affective requirements of modern nationalism are thus a far more important part of the function of the modern state than the rational Enlightenment values of liberal democracy would acknowledge.

George de Vos offers three basic temporal orientations for group identification: “past-oriented (familial-cultural), present-oriented (functional), and future-oriented (ideological)” (1995, p. 27). The first category correlates with ethnic nationalism and is rooted in the perceived common territorial origins of a social group. The second category, which correlates with civic nationalism, focuses on the space of experience and
emphasizes present participation (de Vos, 1995, p. 26). The final orientation emerges out of dissatisfaction with past- and present-oriented forms of national identification. Although some forms of this movement- or cause-orientated identity may seek to operate within the nation-state system, I will refer to this form as *post-nationalist*. In reaction to the nationalist atrocities of the past, post-nationalism in Germany can be seen in the traditional—though currently faltering—support for the supranational political project of the European Union as well as in the far-left politics of antifascist groups. As de Vos notes, these categories are by no means mutually exclusive. Still, they provide a useful framework for analyzing the priorities and strategies of a nation-state in defining the requisites for belonging to the dominant social category. They can also be used to understand the struggles of the members of subordinated groups to access a more favorable standing in society.

These struggles can be observed in neighborhoods of multicultural cities that exemplify the dynamism and complexity of spaces of identity not easily accounted for by the homogenizing category of national citizenship. In particular, immigrant neighborhoods represent the permeable boundaries between the hegemonic identities of the majority and the competing and complementing identities of immigrant minorities. In nations that impose civic nationalism as the norm, de Vos writes that “some members of subordinate groups may seek to change their assigned or ascribed lower-status positions to more congenial past or future designations of self and group” (1995, p. 28). This form of resistance can be seen among some transnational Americans who use the flag of the ancestral homeland to protest American structural inequality, which often hides behind the symbolic equality of universal national allegiance to the stars and stripes (Flores-
Gonzalez, 2001, p. 14). In other cases, groups marginalized by ethno-nationalist norms may seek to claim access to national identity through civic nationalism.

**Territory, Ethnicity and Citizenship in the Modern German Nation-State**

In Germany, the union of nation and state has been particularly strong. Although old regional identities—along with their differentiated languages and customs—remain, the conception of Germany as a territory occupied by and ruled by and for Germans (in Geller’s *national* sense) remained strong even through the cataclysmic changes of the last century. Although at the time of Germany’s foundation as a modern nation in 1871 it adopted a territory-based rule of citizenship (*jus soli*), “blood” (*jus sanguinis*) has been a key concept in German citizenship since 1895 after a rightward populist turn of German conservatives that eventually led to the fully descent-based citizenship laws of 1913.\(^\text{21}\)

These rules remained in effect, with the addition and later removal of Nazi policies of exclusion and racial expulsion, through the end of the millennium. Despite the rapid growth of the foreigner population, until 2000 a child acquired German citizenship only by descent from a German parent. Although naturalization was contemplated in law, even for highly qualified candidates, the process was ambiguous, arbitrary and prohibitive (Göktürk et al., 2007, p. 151). When the revision of the Nationality Act\(^\text{22}\) was enacted establishing *jus soli* citizenship in 2000, there were approximately 7.5 million

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\(^{21}\) 1913 Reichs- und Staatangehörigkeitsgesetz

\(^{22}\) Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz, StAG
foreign nationals living in Germany, which represented nearly 10 percent of the country’s population. Nearly 1.5 million of these “foreigners” were born in Germany. In fact, one-third of all foreigners had been in Germany for over twenty years (Abraham, 2008, p. 149). The new citizenship laws opened membership to German society to millions of residents, at least legally.

The introduction of *jus soli* citizenship rights through the revision of the Nationality Act in the late 1990s was highly contentious (Göktürk et al., 2007). It was passed with varying degrees of resignation, even among many leaders in the governing coalition of the center-left Social Democratic (SPD) and the center-right Free Democratic parties (FDP) that proposed the reforms (Nathans, 2004, p. 252). This is clear in the remarks of then Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, who introduced and concluded the section of his speech to the Bundestag addressing the law by focusing on the need to face what he called “reality,” that is, that recent immigrants were unlikely to leave. The lack of enthusiasm for the changes is even clearer in the statements of one of the Social Democratic Party experts on citizenship law, Dieter Wiefelspütz, who said in a 1997 debate that “we aren’t going to be rid of the people here now” (quoted in Nathans, 2004, p. 255). Territorial rights to citizenship introduced new forms of uncertainty into the definition of society and the population. Under the sole rule of “blood” rights to citizenship, the biopolitical metaphor of the social body functioned with seeming transparency. The blood connection limited the types of birth that were relevant in biopolitical terms. Territorial birthright introduced new concerns about disparate fertility rates among various groups for the national future (see also Chapter 6). With the
expansion of the definition of the population to include territorial rights, the increased complexity of defining the population has spurred new forms of surveillance and control.

This expansion of access to citizenship has been accompanied by new restrictions on immigration. Liberalizing the laws governing citizenship was easier when the government seemed better able to control who might come to live in the country (Nathans, 2004, p. 252). Before 2000, restrictions on immigrants from European countries and on ethnic German Spätaussiedler were much looser than on immigrants from countries perceived as less “culturally compatible.” In practice, this cultural incompatibility was primarily ascribed to Turks and immigrants from other predominantly Muslim countries. This process has continued in the 2000s with the new immigration act (Zuwanderungsgesetz), that, as Markus Schmitz writes, “unmistakably opted for the Europeanization of the national immigrant labour market and for centralized control over non-EU immigrants” (Schmitz, 2011, p. 262). This law includes new requirements for residency that “specifically [regulate] the national (re-) socialization of immigrants from non-European countries who are required to attend so-called ‘integration courses’”. These laws are applicable to new immigrants as well as those who already reside in the country but are determined to be “in particular need of integration measures.”

23 In 1993, the ‘Right of Return’ was extended to individuals of German ethnicity living in the former communist countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.
In Germany, where the connection of ethnic nationalism to the crimes of the Nazi period lingers despite efforts to relativize and historicize it, the persistence of ethnic conceptions of Germanness have made celebrating national pride contentious. Leftist anti-fascist (Antifa) and anarchist groups attempt to maintain the awareness of this connection through attacks on banal nationalist discourse and symbolism. However, in the battle between critical and celebratory approaches to national symbolism, the latter have made significant gains in recent years. The “soccer patriotism” of men’s World Cup soccer has opened a new path in Germany for mitigating the negative associations of ethnic nationalism without following the post-nationalists in abandoning nationalism altogether (see Chapter 3). That the 2006 World Cup provided the setting for the renewal of German nationalism concords with scholarship on mega-events and the symbolic cultivation of the modern nation-state. According to Maurice Roche, since their invention in the late 19th century, modern states have used international and supranational cultural events to create a space of transitory uniqueness. They offer concrete, if transitory, versions of symbolic and participatory community (2000, p. 7). Since the establishment of broadcast media, sporting spectacles have consistently provided the largest audiences ever assembled (Wenner, 2002). The symbolic power of these events is amplified by the fact that more than any other popular genre, sports has demonstrated the capacity to assemble publics that approach the totality of the public. The pretext of hosting an international sporting event gave the German public license to worship national symbols while still maintaining that the celebration had nothing to do with the nation, but was
merely an expression of enthusiasm for the game. Given their role as hosts, many in the media even portrayed patriotic displays as the duty of the host nation.

As we saw in Chapter 3, during the 2006 World Cup, the German press heralded the birth of a new civic religion. The language in the press characterized new patriotism in religious terms. The experience of thus losing the individual self in the totality of the whole, through communication with the national symbolic is described in the media as a hyperbolic experience of “euphoria”, “exultation” or “jubilance”. To use the terminology of Marvin and Ingle, through devotion to the “totem god” made tangible in the vernacular flag (1996), the German people are said to have been restored, made whole again. In 2010, immigrants and minority Germans joined ethnic Germans in civic nationalist displays in unprecedented numbers, according to the German and international media. Cheering for the national team was made more attractive by the teams unprecedented diversity. In fact, 11 of the 23 national players in 2010 had a transnational background. A significant proportion of the team would not have legally qualified to wear the German jersey just 10 years prior. The black, red, and gold-draped celebrations of soccer fans including many immigrants, and the backlash they provoked among left-wing post-nationalists, provided an opportunity to establish a new nationalist pedagogy designed to reorient German national identity. In the Neukölln flag fight in particular, the media used the immigrant example to “teach the Germans how to cheer for Germany again.”

**Broadcasting New Nationalism**

In the immigrant neighborhood of Neukölln, which, as journalists emphasized, is home to 300,000 in habitants from more than 160 nations, owners of a small family-run
electronics shop on the Sonnenallee gained national attention for the struggle surrounding their enormous German flag. The family—alternately described as “Arab”, “Lebanese”, “Lebanese living in Germany,” “German-Lebanese,” “Lebanese-German”, “German of Lebanese descent,” “German of Lebanese background,” “German,” “shopkeepers with Arab roots”—ordered a German flag measuring 22 meters tall and 5 meters wide specially made to cover the façade of their five-story building at a cost of 500 EU. They had hung small German flags outside for years without incident. The cousins, Youssef and Ibrahim Bassal, and Badr Mohammed told journalists that immediately upon hanging their flag they were approached by leftist individuals who criticized them, demanded they take the flag down, and accused them of nationalism. The encounters escalated and the flag was attacked, set on fire, and cut down by an unidentified party that accessed it by climbing onto the roof. According to an article published on June 25, one cousin, Badr Mohammed, stated that if the flag antagonists were successful in destroying the flag, they would not order a second one due to the prohibitive cost (Anker, 2010a). Despite organizing a neighborhood watch the flag was successfully damaged or stolen on three occasions (“Bassal verteidigt Flagge,” 2010). But, as the coverage asserts, the attacks only steeled the family’s resolve to display their national devotion to Germany, leading them to purchase two more identical replacement flags.

Their explanations for their devotion to German symbols emphasize their right, based on their affective devotion and their lived experience, to identify with their adopted nation. The Bassals shared pieces of their migration narratives to illustrate their process of becoming German.
“When I came to Berlin in the middle of the 1980s, I couldn’t speak a word of German. It annoyed me so much that I couldn’t understand anything, that I wanted to learn the language quickly. Today Berlin is my home; I am German, have a German passport, my kids were born here. I live and work here, pay taxes. Why shouldn’t I also support the German soccer team,” asks Ibrahim.1 (Nachtsheim, 2010)

This narrative begins with learning the German language as the first point of entry into German society. Language learning, and the supposed inability and unwillingness of immigrants and their children to learn German, is one of the primary objects of scrutiny in German debates on integration (Ersanilli & Koopmans, 2010; Gramling, 2009; Wiese, 2015; see also Chapter 7). I. Bassal starts with his journey to linguistic competence and then lists a series of other qualifications, from the official state sanctioning of the passport and contributions to government coffers, to the lived experiences of raising children and working. Bassal shows that he is a fully active and competent citizen. In other articles the cousins mention their relatives in the police and the army, emphasizing the ultimate sacrifice they, as a community, are willing to make for the nation.

[I. Bassal] has spent most of his life here. His family as truly arrived in Germany. His nephews serve in the military, and one is now even training with the Berlin police, in the “higher levels of the civil service,” as Ibrahim stresses.2 (Klatt, 2010)

Ibrahim Bassal: “I say: We feel like Germans. I was born here. My two children were born here, and one of my friends fights with the army in Afghanistan. We identify with Germany and, naturally, with the German flag.”3 (Schupelius, 2010)

This last statement, which was repeated in several articles, claims territorial birthright to citizenship, whereas in most of the statements the Bassal cousins state that they immigrated decades earlier. In other articles, the cousins’ claim to German belonging—and to self-determination generally—is even more assertive, almost a provocation.
“We won’t let anyone tell us, that we can’t hang the flag.” And furthermore: “We live here, we have our existence here, and also our roots—little by little.”\textsuperscript{iv} (Grabitz, 2010)

“‘I am a German,’ he declared in between customers, many of whom he spoke with in Arabic. ‘It’s that simple’” (Angelos, 2010).

Moving between German and Arabic, while claiming the legitimacy of his citizenship affirms that pluralism and transnationalism should now be considered part of what defines the German population. Other quotes from non-ethnic German Neuköllners echoed these sentiments (see “Trommeln für Deutschland,” 2006). The family’s claims to legitimate citizenship using the evidence of their devotion to national symbols were celebrated in the press, presented as a model for minorities and immigrants as well as for normative nationals.

\textit{Nationalism as Normality}

This case reveals a persistent tension in the German relationship to the flag and nationalist celebration. Even while there is a belief that Germans are prevented from celebrating freely because of past nationalist excesses, press discourse in this case affirms that nationalist celebration is normal, natural, and salutary. Frustration with this tension is revealed in the ascription of normality and abnormality to the actions of the event’s players. To alleviate the tension and situate national celebration as normal and good, moral reservations about it need to be discredited and inhibitions dismissed as illegitimate or abnormal. The first assumption of normality that the articles affirm is that citizens should venerate their national symbols. As Butler writes about the instantiation of the sexed position, through the assumption of the national position and its appropriate
performances in this instance, the media creates the fiction of the preexisting positions and behaviors it assumes (2011, p. 71). Journalists (re)iterate the assumption that national subjects should naturally venerate the national flag. The actions of the white German flag antagonists violate this assumption.

So [Badr Mohammed] fights against Germans and for the German flag. Sonnenallee 36 stands for the contradictory relationship of many Germans to their country.⁷ (Stawski, 2010)

The leftist scene in Berlin has started a campaign against German flags. The juicy part: most German flags hang from the apartments of foreigners—they don’t understand the world anymore.⁶ (“Linksradikale reißen Deutschlandflaggen ab,” 2010)

In Neukölln the world stands on its head. Turks and Arabs hoist the German flag—on their cars, their shops, their houses and apartments. They rejoice over our national eleven. At night radical German leftists come [and] tear the flags down or light them on fire.⁷ (Schupelius, 2010)

While the coverage assumes that normative Germans should celebrate the flag, the articles frequently frame it as counterintuitive that immigrants would venerate the flag of their adopted nation, assuming, at the very least, that they should be less ardent devotees than autochthonous Germans.

The flag fight, which is described as “bizarre” and “grotesque,” transgresses this expectation by emphasizing the sacrifices of the immigrant protagonists and their neighbors, their flag devotion described as “a minor miracle” (Scally, 2010). The flag-defending cousins are frequently quoted emphasizing this transgression of normality.

The two [cousins] cannot comprehend that Neuköllners of Arab heritage [have to] defend the German flag against those of German heritage.⁸ (“Linke bekämpfen vermeintlich zu deutsche Araber,” 2010)

Almost bemused, they state that the Neuköllners of Arab heritage from the Sonnenallee are defending the German flag against those of German heritage. Upside-down world, they find.⁹ (Anker, 2010a)
Bassal simply cannot understand that the protest is coming from the German side.\textsuperscript{x} (Hagen, 2010a)

Bassal is baffled. He finds it strange—and also irritating—that Germans want to forbid a Lebanese from hanging up a black-red-gold flag.\textsuperscript{xi} (“Fahnen-Streit,” 2010)

Why are Germans tearing down their flag, while people of all nations celebrate the black-red-gold?\textsuperscript{xii} (Nachtsheim, 2010)

The cousins’ statements are used to affirm that not only is it natural for normative citizens to celebrate the flag, the fact that immigrants and foreign-nationals would do so proves that it cannot involve the taint of exclusionary forms of German nationalism. In this case, the blurring of the boundaries of the national subject to include immigrant patriotism reconciles nationalist norms with liberal democratic expectations of tolerance and, thus, secures the foundations of contemporary German nationalism. The last question posed above, by a German commentator, characterizes the flag fight as a transgression of the benign order of a German patriotism in the naturalized world of nations. This rhetorical question set the grounds for the reaffirmation of patriotic practice as distinct from, and opposed to, chauvinism in order to invalidate the post-nationalist critique of symbolic nationalism.

**Invalidating the post-nationalist critique**

“Flag fighters mistake patriotism for nationalism”

The corollary of the immigrant’s unexpected German patriotism is the aberrant anti-nationalism of the German activists. Their rejection of the flag is characterized as unnatural but not entirely unexpected. It is framed as evidence of a pathology in German
national self-conception that results in the misconception of all national symbolism and sentiment as tantamount to Nazism. The flag thieves’ critique of nationalism as a political system was simplified to the point of absurdity, characterized as illogical and incoherent.

A question posed by the flag protagonists across the body of articles is, “Why shouldn’t we cheer for Germany?” The articles identify and invalidate two possible answers to this question. The first possible answer is that the brutality of past crimes of German nationalism is so exceptional as to make German national celebration immoral in perpetuity. As one 58 year-old woman is quoted as saying, "Germany did too many horrible things during the Third Reich to be able to cheer out loud for this country" (Grieshaber, 2010). The press coverage of this case shows almost universal skepticism of this view. To this point, Youssef Bassal is quoted as saying, "It's not like there is still a swastika on Germany's flag" (Grieshaber, 2010). Because immigrants are not implicated in the Nazi atrocities, they are taken as having the authority to absolve the present generation for past German crimes. This portrayal characterizes anti-fascist flag fighters as foolish and their critique as preposterous.

The flag is not hanging there “because of the Second World War, but rather for the German team: because the German team is no longer really German; it’s multi-kulti and we belong to that” explains Bassal.xiii (“„Wir werden die deutsche Fahne verteidigen”,” 2010)

Here they have made a point of destroying and removing Germany flags hanging outside shops and vehicles because they believe the proud patriotism hearkens back to the ugly nationalism of the Third Reich. (“Leftists Harass Immigrants for Supporting Germany,” 2010)

As soon as [Bassal hung the flag], young people aggressively came into his store and accused him of supporting nationalism and waking Nazi feelings in the German population once again.xiv (T. Reitz, 2010)
In Berlin-Neukölln, the multikulti neighborhood *par excellence*... above all German-Turks and German-Arabs adorn their shops in black-red-gold. The “Autonomous” scene from the black block—“Never again Germany!”—naturally cannot tolerate this. The antifascist fight knows no mercy, and even the shopkeeper from Lebanon can be a menacing flag-Nazi (Mohr, 2010).

To associate immigrants waving the German flag with National Socialism is intuitively ludicrous. Pointing this out invalidates critiques of “event-dependent nationalism,” as one anti-fascist group called it, and places it above accusations of chauvinism. In addition, it invalidates any argument that seeks to make comparisons between present and past forms of nationalism, enshrining the Nazi past as exceptional and aberrant. As one article puts it, “the Bassal cousins say their patriotism has nothing to do with the evils that transpired long before they immigrated to Germany. Rather, they say, the flag is an expression of the good life they've built here” (Angelos, 2010). This narrative emphasizes a present- and future-oriented nationalism—or “patriotism” as it is invariably called—based on the economic prosperity of post-war Germany, while marginalizing arguments referencing the Nazi past.

The flag fight narrative naturalizes and solidifies the distinction between the “good” patriotism of the immigrant flag protagonists and the “bad” nationalism of the National Socialist past and the xenophobic racism of the present. Today’s German flag is characterized as anathema to nationalism, which belongs to despotism. As one editorial put it, “Not for nothing was the flag of German Democracy forbidden during the Third Reich” (“Schwarz-rot-bunt,” 2010). As in the coverage of the “soccer patriotism” of the 2006 World Cup (see Chapter 3), the disapproval of the openly xenophobic far-right is used to show the morality of the object under discussion. It is as if the democratic
pedigree of the national colors prevents them from falling in the realm of nationalism, which is presumed to be anti-democratic.

However, as Michael Billig’s work on banal nationalism shows, even on the far-right, nationalists rarely characterize themselves as such. Instead, in-groups tend to describe their motivations as patriotic (Billig, 1995, p. 57). Popular and scholarly claims of an obvious distinction between aggressive nationalism and defensive patriotism fall apart under examination. To illustrate, Billig references writings on nationalism from the Nazi period observing that “fascists will protest that they are defenders, not attackers, only taking against foreigners when the latter are a danger to the beloved homeland” (1995, p. 57). Even the most ardent nationalists conceptualize their actions as domestically oriented, defensive and motivated by the love of the homeland and its people. While the specific projects carried out following nationalist assumptions may vary radically, encompassing projects of solidarity and of violent exclusion, distinguishing negative and positive form as distinct psychological phenomena does not hold up to scrutiny. In deconstructing this distinction, Billig is not making a normative argument demonizing patriotism; instead he strips away the normative distinction that uses the nationalism of “others” to place “our” patriotism above reproach, naturalizing the world of nations with its “universal code of particularity” (1995, pp. 72–72). Billig argues for critically examining the construction of the globalized “habitus” (Bourdieu, 1994) of nationalism, a phenomenon that has been so successful that it is rarely noticed and very difficult to imagine elsewise. Billig examines the relationship between the waved and the unwaved, forgettable flag. Both modes of flagging make up banal nationalism, although Billig’s primary intervention is focusing attention on the ignored
unwaved form. Billig proposes that in the stable nation-state, the unnoticed form overtakes the actively symbolic and communicative form of flagging that accompanies disputes over territory and national identity. In the German case, the desire to erase contention around the flag played out most strongly in the 2006 World Cup (see Chapter 3). While the 2010 flag fight was a contentious episode, the press used it to discredit the flag antagonists and establish the propriety of banal nationalism, which includes both unnoticed everyday flagging and organized, sanctioned episodes of exuberant flag waving.

The media’s characterization of normality in the flag fight suggests that despite the friction that regularly manifests around nationalism in Germany, assumptions of the proper behavior of nationals—that they should celebrate and defend the national flag—were already well established in the mediated public sphere at the time. The participation of the immigrant protagonists is posed as proof of the inclusive, democratic nature of contemporary German nationalism. The flag’s defense by immigrant patriots nullifies any association with nationalism, as with Y. Bassal’s rhetorical question “What, pray tell, have I got to do with the Nazis?” (Lau, 2010). Both the flag skeptics and enthusiasts of national celebrations share the assumption that the Nazi past is exceptional, and therefore incomparable. For the skeptics of nationalism, this means that Germans have an exceptional moral obligation to abstain from the nationalist celebration that is a global norm. For national celebrants, the exceptionalism of the Nazi past means that any reference to it as a comparative tool is illegitimate. Furthermore, national celebrants consider the moral obligations advocated by the skeptics to be unfair and discriminatory.
However, if we do not accept the exceptionalism of the discourses of nationalism from the Nazi period, both of these positions are destabilized. This is not to deny the importance of ethical and normative discussions examining the extent of the evils of the period. Instead, it clears the ground for important discussions about the extent to which banal nationalism may provide a basis of continuity that has made it possible to maintain the idea of a coherent nation through successive transformations of the state. It also enables the crucial consideration of the continuities in conceptions of “the people” and the ways threats to the population are conceptualized. After all, the most valuable understandings to be gained from the Nazi period are not simply the recognition of the human capacity for brutality but rather how, as Agamben puts it, a nation can transition so easily from modern parliamentary democracy to totalitarianism and back to democracy (1998, p. 122). Agamben argues that the ease of this transition points to the extent to which politics has become biopolitics. The banality of nationalism—with its assumptions about citizenship and about which life has political value—is deeply implicated in this process. This question has relevance far beyond German borders. Events like the flag fight provide opportunities to modify and affirm consensus around these assumptions and to discuss nationalist norms in order to forget them (Billig, 1995).

In waging war against what the anti-fascist representatives on the internet called “event-dependent nationalism,” flag antagonists sought to underscore the repressive and racist authority of the nation-state. In a statement made on the internet calling for a national World Cup flag battle, a person identified as Ines Müller wrote, "It seems as though the Germans are yearning for a basis for their identity that would allow them to push the German state and its past in the background, but neither the present nor the past
can be repressed” (Angelos, 2010). Post-nationalist statements regarding the flag fight raise reasoned arguments linking soccer nationalism to everyday discourses delineating and excluding “those who do not fit the image of the ‘good German’” (Autonome Neuköllner Antifa, 2010). More fundamentally, they raised objections to the hegemony of nationalism as a mode of governmentality. In a statement regarding the media interpretations of the flag fight, one Neukölln-based antifascist group, which did not claim to participate in flag-stealing activities, characterized the nation as “an obligatory collective in which societal contradictions—such as the permanent competitive relationship between individuals—must be obscured and individual happiness must defer to the supposedly superior interests of the national collective” (Autonome Neuköllner Antifa, 2010). In choosing to wage their battle against the private property of individuals, however, the broader post-nationalist political agenda was ignored or villainized in the press. Instead, the illegal anti-fascist actions are used to portray the flag-wavers as courageous heroes (“Fahnen-Streit,” 2010). The clear immorality of the attack on personal property bestows moral authority on the victim who resists the attackers.

“Flag fighters are anti-immigrant”

Once the activist critique of nationalism is ruled unreasonable, the remaining answer proposed in the articles to the question of why the Bassal’s flag was targeted is that activists must believe immigrants do not have the right to affiliate themselves with the German nation. In several statements, the cousins recognize the distinction between the xenophobia that motivates right-wing extremists and the motivations of the leftists. A typical example of this reads, “For the fascists we are foreigners, and for the anarchists…
actually, I have no idea what we are to them" (Hagen, 2010a, 2010b). However, in most of the coverage, about the nature of the identitarian politics motivating leftists’ actions gives way to statements that directly conflate leftist positions with xenophobia and hatred.

From their perspective, we are migrants. They don’t understand Germans who defend Germany who are not of German descent. (I. Bassal quoted in Anker, 2010a)

Youssef Bassal doesn’t understand the world anymore: “We have relatives who serve in the military and with the police. Germany took us in when we had to flee war in Lebanon. We know how much we owe to our new Heimat. And this hatred…” (“Deutschland-Hasser terrorisieren Fußball-Fans,” 2010)

In this way, the leftists’ actions are attributed to ethno-nationalist rather than post-nationalist ideologies. Left-wing radical groups may practice their own forms of ethnic essentialization (see Chapter 3 for discussion of the leftist form of German exceptionalism). In fact, the statement about the fear of waking “Nazi feelings” in normative Germans attributed to flag-critics in the article by Reitz quoted above shows a kind of exceptionalism regarding Germans’ relation to nationalism. If this second-hand repetition is accurate, this statement implies that Germans are particularly susceptible to dangerous forms of nationalism. While this form of essentialism merits critical deconstruction, the articles in the archive tended to skirt this more complex question, simply characterizing the flag-thieves as anti-immigrant and their anti-nationalist politics as facile and absurd.

For German post-nationalists, the cultivation of a national identity at the state level is necessarily dependent on the definition of Others, which leads to racism and group-based hatred. In a photograph taken during the flag fight, the masked members of
the group Anti-Racist Alliance Neukölln (*Antirassistische Bündnis Neukölln*) stand over a mound of flags with a banner that reads, “German flags can’t help against racism” (see figure 13). The picture, which was posted on the website Indymedia linksunten, was accompanied by a letter claiming responsibility for the theft of 5,000 flags, including “one of the internationally known giant Sonnenallee flags” (AntiraBündnis44, 2010).

Post-nationalists do not believe in a benign, egalitarian form of nationalism. The flag thieves position themselves against all forms of flag celebration, whether by immigrants or by established Germans, stating, “We oppose the media discourse that accuses us of making our neighbors into ‘foreigners.’ The debate around the ‘Neukölln flag fight’ only serves one thing: the image of a ‘cosmopolitan’ German nation!”xx This goal of promoting Germany as cosmopolitan, or open to the world (*weltöffnen*), using national symbolism runs contrary to the post-nationalist conviction that flags are necessarily tools that divide populations.
Figure 10: This was published on the website linksunten.indymedia.org along with a letter claiming responsibility for the theft of 5000 flags. The banner reads: “German flags can’t help against racism! Attack nationalism! Stop deportations!” (AntiraBündnis44, 2010)

The flag thieves argue that integration is an idea that is used to dictate that immigrants undertake one-sided adaptation even while they are denied full societal participation (AntiraBündnis44, 2010). However, as they protested in their statement, the narrative that developed in the press framed the anti-flag campaign as an anti-immigrant action, suggesting that they took particular issue with immigrant patriotism. In all the articles examined for this chapter, only one, from the progressive independent *Die Tageszeitung*, challenged this narrative, pointing out that it makes more sense to see the attacks on immigrants’ German flags as evidence that the leftists see anyone waving a
(German) flag as an equal antagonist; “They do not pay attention to origins, for them every flag waver is a nationalist and, therefore, the enemy”\textsuperscript{xixi} (Alke, 2010). Without necessarily agreeing with their politics, this journalist was the only one to question the logic of framing the flag vandals’ actions as anti-immigrant.

\textit{Teaching civic nationalism}

Then a small boy enters the store. He reaches for one of the small flags meant for mounting on cars.
"What sort of flag do you have there?" Bassal asks the child.
"Germany," the child, who also appears to be of immigrant descent, replies quickly.
"And what do you love?" Bassal asks.
"Germany," the child calls out.
Bassal smiles, satisfied. (Hagen, 2010b)

After resolving the question of the legitimacy of German patriotic displays by minority Germans and immigrants, the media turn to the task of broadcasting the Bassal cousins’ lessons on civic nationalist comportment. Media coverage of the flag fight portrays immigrants as natural teachers, “leading the way in teaching Germans how to feel good about themselves” (Grieshaber, 2010). Journalists observed that in 2010 the immigrant neighborhoods of Kreuzberg and Neukölln seemed to be even more heavily bedecked with the German flags than the “traditionally German” neighborhoods in Berlin (Stollowsky, 2010b). “Former immigrants” are showing “bio-Germans,” with their inhibited relationship with the flag, how to be more relaxed showing the flag (Anker, 2010b). The use of the term “bio-German” here reinforces the normativity of ethnic or blood-based citizenship. The use of “former” as a qualifier for immigrants suggests that,
although the family members had undertaken immigration, in this context they have overcome their immigrant status.

Journalists describe the Bassal’s electronics shop as the center of World Cup activity in Neukölln. The oversized flag outside the store calls to wayward patriots, and invites them to enter the church of civic religion. “Now the little shop is almost full of people,” states one article, “all curious to hear the story of the giant flag” (Hagen, 2010b). The flag even draws pilgrims, as another article shows: “an older woman enters the store. She isn’t interested in a cell phone card or a TV cable, instead she says, ‘I’ve come all the way from Wilmersdorf. I absolutely had to see the flag.’”xxii (“Bassal verteidigt Flagge,” 2010). Ibrahim Bassal, who jokes that he has a dry tongue from so much storytelling, is always willing to tell the story one more time, and so are journalists.

According to Bassal family statements, what started as an idea to do “a little something extra” in celebrating the World Cup that year became something more. The conflict and the public attention it generated solidified their defense of the flag into a mission to promote patriotic performance. Articles show that hanging the flag was carefully orchestrated to make a statement and teach a lesson to fellow immigrants and ethnic Germans alike, breaking through the boundaries of the “parallel society” (Parallelgesellschaft) supposedly exemplified by the neighborhood.

It is often said of the Germans, that their relationship to their own flag is sometimes tense. But as during the Summer Fairytale four years ago or the European Championship two years ago, former immigrants showed the “bio-Germans,” according to [Green Party politician Özcan] Mutlut [sic], how to be more relaxed with showing the flag.xxiii (Anker, 2010b)

The flag represented a conscious effort to demonstrate and claim belonging, and to reach out to ethnic Germans. Ibrahim Bassal went so far as to say that the five-story flag was “a
small gift to this country.” In explaining their decision to order the flag, Badr Mohammed was quoted as saying, “we considered amongst ourselves what we could do to show everyone: ‘we belong together’” (“Fahnen-Streit,” 2010). Mohammed is a politician in the ruling center-right Christian Democratic Party, and is consequently well versed in the perceptions and interpretations of immigrant actions (“Flagge zeigen,” 2010). After 18 years with the center-left Social Democrats, Mohammed switched to the Christian Democrats in 2009 after dissatisfaction with the social democratic approach to the politics of integration. In a statement made at the time of his decision, Mohammed emphasized the need to “build the unity of Germans of diverse backgrounds and religions” (Schulz, 2009). Mohammed emphasized the need for immigrants to be productive and loyal German citizens, a position which he said was not sufficiently supported by the center-left party. The statements of the flag defending family self-consciously wield their particular patriotic authority to position themselves at the center of the new diverse Germany they are seeking to promote. This immigrant patriotism resonates with the desire of German conservatives to popularize a new form of banal nationalism that cannot be associated with past nationalist atrocities (Geisler, 2005; see also Chapters 1 and 3). Aware of the political implications of the flag spectacle, the cousins’ enactment of multicultural patriotism must be read as a political and pedagogical act directed at both ethnic Germans and new Germans.

The news stories show that the lesson was enthusiastically received by German politicians as well as by the wo/man on the street. “Integration expert” Burkard Dregger, also of the center-right Christian Democratic Party, is quoted opining that the flag was exemplary in showing that those who hung it were ready to “identify with our nation.
Many long-time Berliners could take a lesson from them” (Fahnen-Streit,” 2010). Ethnic Germans quoted on the scene all approve of the flag and its owners’ fight to defend it. Still, the divisions separating the categories of native and migrant run deep. Although the ethnic Germans quoted are enthusiastic about the family’s message of unity, their statements maintain the normative notion of Germanness, constructing “integration” as unidirectional process. “We have to get away from calling these people foreigners,” 19-year-old customer, Manuel Hornauer, is quoted as saying. “It is super when they are so integrated” (Hagen, 2010b). Similarly, an elderly woman in the company of two friends who made the pilgrimage to see the flag commented, “When the Turks feel like Germans, I find that beautiful,” wrongly assuming the cousins to be Turks. “It’s good that they feel like us” (Angelos, 2010). Others have even more trouble internalizing the pluralist identifications possible under civic nationalism. On another occasion a woman stopped by the store to ask why the Bassals didn’t put up a Palestinian flag (Angelos, 2010). The flag fight revealed the normative ethnic nationalist assumptions of majority Germans, while providing an opportunity to supplement them through the affirmation of a broader form of civic nationalism.

**Soccer Patriotism and Sports Integration**

The flag fight was widely hailed in the media as a “sign of integration” (Anker, 2010a). The term “integration,” along with its adjective and verb forms, appears 93 times in the corpus in 40 different articles. The patriotic performance of the Bassal family from the heart of one of Germany’s most stigmatized neighborhoods is so powerful and unexpected that many journalists claim it has made them reconsider common portrayals
of the neighborhood. Neukölln is described as a foreign space and its enthusiasm for German national symbols is, therefore, portrayed as unexpected.

This alone is remarkable: an Arab family has rolled out likely one of the biggest German flags in the country here of all places, in Neukölln where every fifth person is a foreigner. xxvii (Stawski, 2010)

Terms used to describe Neukölln include “social problem area” (Bein, 2010), “problem neighborhood” (Grabitz, 2010; Zehrt, 2010), and “social combustion point” (Anker, 2010b). It is described as being “like an oriental bazar” (Stollowsky, 2010a) boasting “the busiest police station,” “the largest unemployment office in Germany” and “at least one suspicious mosque” (Keseling, 2006).24 The “Sonnenallee is a man’s street” (Keseling, 2006) in a neighborhood that is plagued by “language deficits,” “criminality and poverty” (Anker, 2010a) that also “brings many children into the world” (Keseling, 2006). Journalists exoticize the neighborhood, emphasizing its difference in classically Orientalist terms and associating that difference with social deficits. It is masculine, dangerous, and highly fertile. One article lists a litany of commonly known critiques of the neighborhood, claiming that the flag fight does not fit with this picture.

Neukölln has for years earned a rather ignominious fame as a social combustion point. Unemployment, low level of education, high percentage of foreigners, criminality, and poverty are more pronounced here than in other neighborhoods. More than 300,000 inhabitants from more than 160 nations live in Neukölln... The flag fight does not fit in this image of Neukölln. xxviii (Anker, 2010a)

24 This article, which appeared four years before the flag fight, was a feature piece on Neukölln that included a short portrait of Youssef Bassal. Although it predates the flag fight, it sheds light on long-standing perceptions of the neighborhood. Since it also includes one of the central flag fight protagonists, I decided to include it in the corpus.
More neutral characterizations of the neighborhood refer to it as “multi-kulti,” but most often its diversity is associated with other social deficits. English language articles describe the neighborhood in less negative terms, such as “working-class district” (Hagen, 2010b) and “multicultural neighborhood” (Scally, 2010). Journalists repeated familiar tropes of the neighborhood’s marginality, foreignness, and deficiency, and then proposed that the patriotic performance of the flag fight could be cause to reconsider this image.

Throughout the corpus, the patriotic performance of the Bassal family is directly equated with integration. The fierceness of their loyalty to Germany was increasingly emphasized as the flag battle progressed, as evidenced by the financial and even physical sacrifices made to the flag. The willingness to sacrifice to the national totem (Marvin & Ingle, 1999) provides proof of their integration. As discussed above, the Bassals provide other arguments and evidence supporting the legitimacy of their claim to German citizenship, but, in the end, the flag and its defense provide the key evidence.

A few streets away is the notorious Rollberg quarter, where gangs of youth, mostly Lebanese multiple offenders, make trouble.... Failed integration? The Bassal cousins have their own perspective on things. They defend the German flag. (Grabitz, 2010)

With three plush soccer balls atop his oversized Germany hat, Ibrahim Bassal does not exactly look fearsome, but he is very serious. “We will defend our flag even with our blood. No one will tear it down again,” says the 39-year-old Bassal] full of passion, pointing with his index finger to the giant black-red-golden flag above his electronics shop… “From now on we will keep watch around the clock” (“Bassal verteidigt Flagge,” 2010)

Youssef Bassal’s face color has turned somewhat grey-green. He has not slept much in the recent days—since “these strange Germans” turned up at his shop wanting to tear down his flag. He smiles, tired but satisfied like someone who is fighting the good fight. Bassal is fighting for the honor of the German flag: “I will defend this flag—[even] if I don’t get to sleep at all!” (Lau, 2010)
“We sit here every night with two or three men and keep night watch,” [I.] Bassal explains. “The flag will be defended until the last breath.” (Zehrt, 2010)

Kahled Hossen, who fastened the flag to the roof, risked his life to do so. Even if autonomists keep tearing and igniting it: “We will keep on repairing it.” (“Flagge zeigen,” 2010)

The militaristic language and sacrificial zeal of these statements belie the apolitical harmlessness projected by the plush soccer ball hat. The coverage glorifies the sacrificial offerings for the “honor” of the flag. Offering their blood, breath, and lives for the protection of the symbol points to the transformation of bodies into worthy lives through their association with the national (Agamben, 1998).

If integration is equated here with displays of loyalty to national symbols, then to criticize or question the legitimacy of national symbols is to actively block integration. Bassal and the journalists covering this story impugned Germans who are not holding up their end of the integration bargain. For immigrants to “integrate,” they must be allowed to belong as full members of the nation. These proponents of civic nationalism argued that minority integration and essentialist conceptions of national identity are mutually exclusive. Instead, this essentialist ideology was ascribed to the post-national flag opponents, letting ethno-nationalists off the hook and placing blame for the inability of visible minorities to achieve equal status in German society onto post-nationalists. After sharing quotes from international newspapers praising Germany’s diverse national team as evidence of Germany’s success in embracing its multi-ethnic society, one article uses the flag fight as evidence that there are still “problems with the co-existence of demographic groups in Germany” (“Fans froh,” 2010). The flag vandals are cast as antagonists against the immigrants as such rather than against the hegemony of
nationalism in Germany and beyond. Here, post-nationalist politics, rather than structural and everyday forms of social exclusion, are identified as the cause of social conflicts. Statements by politicians go even further in situating post-nationalist ideology as a threat to an inclusive Germany:

For Green [Party politician] Özcan Mutlu, the bizarre fight represents an “upside-down world.” “It is expected that immigrants integrate, but when the identify with the colors of democracy, they are attacked,” said Mutlu.\textsuperscript{xxxiv} (Anker, 2010b).

In this statement, the Turkish-born Mutlu supports the normality of nationalist celebration and conflates national symbolism with politics itself. The actions of the integrants in protecting the flag proves their commitment to democracy. In attacking the flag, the activist vandals are not merely transgressing the law, they are attacking democracy itself. Mutlu’s statement creates a complex “chain of equivalence” (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001), equating nationalist with democratic performance and using nationalist celebration as the anchoring point to define integration.

The dependence on self-contemplation through examination of the margin is demonstrated by some articles that even suggest that the lack of German national pride has contributed to Germany’s inability to integrate immigrants. An article quoting sociologist Klaus Bade, the head of Germany's Expert Council of Foundations for Integration and Migration (SVR) suggests that the causes of two of the key problems Germany faces, low standards of education in immigrant communities and the growth of an ethnically defined underclass,

stem from Germany's difficult history and a resulting lack of national pride, after the atrocities of two world wars. Unlike France or the US, Bade said, Germany lacked a sense of confidence and greatness for immigrants to identify with and aspire to. In contrast, he pointed out that Germany’s large Turkish population respected and honoured the "great country and tradition" of their homeland.
"We're proud of being Turkish, are you proud of being German? No, you're somehow embarrassed to be German," Bade paraphrased their attitude. (Maguire, 2010)

Although Bade’s concerns with the impact of persistent discrimination are briefly mentioned later, this quote promotes the idea that that the lack of civic national pride on the German side discourages immigrants from claiming German identity as their own. This argument assumes that German identity is freely available for the taking by non-ethnic Germans. On the contrary, the history of German debates on citizenship and immigration shows that the norms of Germanness still exclude non-white and Muslim Germans. Even with legal liberalization, those who claim belonging but who do not meet the ethnic criteria can still expect to be met with incredulity.

Still, the protagonists of the Neukölln flag fight frame their actions in part as a model of empowerment for fellow immigrants and minority Germans. In this arena, at least, it is the immigrants who have access to a lesson that Germans desire to learn: how to openly demonstrate pride in one’s country. The Bassal family sees this knowledge as a gift they can bestow—demonstrating an uninhibited and unburdened relationship to national symbols, free from the past. As Youssef Bassal was quoted as saying, “we can teach the Germans a little national pride, regardless of history”xxxv (“Fans froh,” 2010). Unfortunately, however, although the lesson of the moral authority of civic religion was easily assimilated, their effort to dismantle the boundaries reproducing the idea of a “parallel society” of dangerous internal others did not have such an enduring impact.

Understanding the importance of boundary maintenance for the stability of dominant identities reveals the precariousness of societal integration through soccer patriotism: while minority patriotism offers a potent tool for strengthened nationalist
discourses, truly acknowledging the permeability of boundaries separating the national majority from the foreign subaltern would require relinquishing a fundamental tool for majority self-conception. The Bassal cousins were seeking to open the abstract space of German identity to include those with experiential and affective ties to German national space. In doing so, they aligned themselves with the symbolic nationalist politics of the German center-right.

While this might theoretically pose a threat to conservative ideology, the centrist conservative politics that dominate German governance recognizes the pedagogical value of this parable of civic nationalism. Furthermore, enshrining the example of the Bassal family’s loyalty to Germany does not necessarily preclude politicians from reverting to the condemnation of the supposed “parallel societies” as soon as the Bassals’ lesson has served its purpose. Thus, diversity can be acknowledged, and even celebrated within the context of the unifying force of broader civic national identity. While this national allegiance remains unchallenged, the majority can feel free to emphasize the diversity of those united under the flag. This can even serve to underscore the power of the totem: the greater the diversity of its worshipers, the greater its unifying power must be.

Indeed, the news coverage shows that the media and politicians capitalized on the story to push for more open nationalism and use this case to impugn the morality of those who critique nationalism. They also used it to showcase the “good” migrant who is playing by the rules, thereby conflating nationalist expression with socially desirable integration. In this vein, Dregger was quoted as saying, “Burning and tearing our flag is abhorrent enough. But to reproach well integrated immigrants for their integration is downright perfidious” (“Fahnen-Streit,” 2010). Chancellor Angela Merkel, also a
Christian Democrat, is cited numerous times in the articles championing Germany’s “international team” (Maguire, 2010) and celebrating displays of patriotic enthusiasm in immigrant neighborhoods “as a sign of long-awaited positive integration” (Paterson, 2010). The precariousness of this support for pluralism was demonstrated only three months later when Merkel again declared “the absolute failure” (“Der Tag, als Multikulti für tot erklärt wurde,” 2010) of the multicultural society in the wake of the runaway success of Thilo Sarrazin’s statistical condemnation of “undesirable” immigrants (see Chapter 6).

**Legible Space and Ethnic Discrimination**

As the debates and legislation on immigration suggest, despite the opening of ethnic citizenship laws in Germany since the 2000, the ethnic idea of national affiliation in Germany continues as the norm. This has been most evident in the backlash against multiculturalism and in the efforts of conservative politicians to legally enshrine the hegemony of the German *Leitkultur*. As a proposal released by the ruling Christian Democratic leadership several months after the flag fight states, “our cultural values, formed through a Judeo-Christian tradition to which the Christian Democratic Party feels particularly bound, and historical experiences are the basis for the societal cohesion that constitutes our *Leitkultur*. We expect those who come to us to respect this” (Wittrock, 2010). This proposal assumes a clear delineation of German (Judeo-Christian) culture from the culture of unassimilated (Muslim) Others. It also establishes the hierarchy of this binary within German territory.
These religious and cultural Others are at their most dangerous when they are perceived as being organized into a “Muslim parallel society” (*muslimische Parallelgesellschaft*) (Schmitz, 2011). These parallel societies are epitomized by the Berlin neighborhoods of Kreuzberg and Neukölln, as was evident in the coverage of the World Cup flag fight. The availability of low-cost housing in these formerly neglected West-Berlin neighborhoods made them essentially obligatory destinations for guest workers in the post-war reconstruction period. Workers’ hostels offered substandard housing for migrant workers who were eventually able to afford lodgings of their own in the inexpensive neighborhoods. These communities grew in the following decades and remain well-established today.

A key technique for maintaining state control in complex and heterogeneous systems, is the narrowing of vision and simplification (J. C. Scott, 1999). One of the most successful simplification strategies is the state-administered gathering of census information. By increasing the legibility of the nation’s population, the census provides important tools for the state’s power to define demographics and spaces as valuable or as liabilities. In Germany, local police precincts administer a comprehensive population registration system. According to the law, all residents of Germany must report to a local police precinct within a week of changing their domicile. Registration is difficult to avoid since it is necessary to open bank accounts and for a wide array of official business. As part of this registration, demographic information is gathered. This information is processed by regional statistical offices that produce regular demographic reports. The series of biannual registered population reports produced by the Berlin Brandenburg statistical office focuses primarily on two metrics: ethnicity and age—two metrics that
are at the root of anxieties about the future of the aging and dwindling German nation (Amt für Statistik Berlin-Brandenburg, 2011).

Despite the new citizenship rules, the statistical reports of the state maintain the German/migrant binary by dividing the population into the categories of those with or without a “migration background”—a category introduced by the State and Federal Statistical Offices in 2005 to describe any person who has at least one parent who immigrated to Germany after 1949 (Statistisches Bundesamt, n.d.)—before breaking it down by citizenship status. In Berlin, these reports are broken down by neighborhood. They thus render the spaces of ethnic minorities visible and legible. Focusing on the ethno-nationality of residents and their ages in the reports suggests that these are the most meaningful metrics for interpreting the social space of the city. Whether because the reports suggest this, or because the writers share the basic anxieties of the state, writers critiquing German social space focus heavily on ethno-nationality and fertility in their assessments, raising fears that the least culturally “fit” among the population will outbreed the country’s more “intelligent” and successful members (see Chapter 6). These treatments use statistics and pseudoscience to reify the boundaries separating ethnic Germans from immigrants and their progeny. The most well-known of this genre is Thilo Sarrazin’s popular Deutschland schafft sich ab (“Germany Does Away with Itself”) (see also Heisig, 2010; Hug, 2010; Ulfkotte, 2010), which debuted just two months after the peak of the multicultural “party patriotism” of the 2010 World Cup.

Sarrazin’s work, which will be the subject of Chapter 6, uses suggestive statistics to draw boundaries creating the internal Other to stabilize and promote a stronger sense of Germanness tied to ethnicity. Sarrazin does not reject immigration out of hand, but
rather argues that “good” immigration from “culturally compatible” nations needs to be encouraged and undesirable immigration curbed. Above all, Sarrazin distinguishes the bad immigrants from the good by their Muslim background. Sarrazin portrays Muslim immigrants as an existential threat to European society. Mehdi Semati defines Islamophobia as “a cultural-ideological outlook that seeks to explain ills of the (global) social order by attributing them to Islam” (2010, p. 266). The extraordinary success of Sarrazin’s book brought Islamophobia into the open in the center of society. In Sarrazin’s book and others like it, the dangers of “Muslim parallel societies” are embodied within immigrant neighborhoods. Kreuzberg and Neukölln in Berlin, as the quintessential national exemplar, are the focus of intense scrutiny (see for example Buschkowsky, 2012).

Portrayals of the area are characterized by the “ambivalent interplay between celebrating and stigmatizing cultural difference” (Schmitz, 2011, p. 269). These neighborhoods are alternately characterized as dangerous, poor, and culturally desolate or as edgy, hip, and shabby-chic. Drawing on the work of Edward Said (1979), Schmitz writes that the idea of the parallel society functions as a spatial reference for the Muslim’s refusal to integrate; “at the same time, it represents all that is not compatible with Germany’s imagined cultural homogeneity” (2011, p. 269). In the context of supposedly parallel societies, the display of allegiance to German national symbols (not the least of which is the national soccer team) by minority Germans and immigrants defied the expectations of the normative population.

**Conclusion: Persistent hierarchy**
The compelling characters of the Neukölln flag fight were mobilized by the German media to 1) sever the link with the past using the de-historicized, present-focused nationalism of the immigrant and to discredit those who would maintain the link between nationalism and racism, to 2) spread the gospel of the new civic religion, again, by using the example of devout immigrants who demonstrate the proper relationship between worshippers and its most powerful symbol: the national flag, and 3) to secure the morality of the new nationalism by emphasizing its egalitarianism and tolerance of difference. This serves to allay fears of the bloodthirsty, violent nature of the new nationalism (Marvin & Ingle, 1999) by substituting purportedly peaceful international sporting competitions for war. This benefits the media and the political elite by restoring nationalism to the toolkit for governance and national narration. The desire of immigrants to wave the flag is a powerful ally in the battle to bolster and legitimate the power of the totem. Because the immigrant chooses their new flag rather than simply accepting its assignation by birth, immigrant patriotism demonstrates the desirability of identification with Germany. Furthermore, the immigrant’s love of their host nation is present-based and untainted by the stain of past abuses of national power. At the same time, the immigrant and new German protagonists of the Neukölln flag fight used the event to claim their place in the nation and to challenge their exclusion from the privileged space of national belonging.

In the flag fight, the Bassal cousins used civic nationalist norms to attack the cultural differentialism that closes German citizenship to Muslim immigrants, in particular. In doing so, however, the Bassals and the German media strengthened the hegemony of nationalism in Germany, bringing it one step closer to achieving unnoticed
banality. In contrast, in their fight against nationalist symbols, German anti-fascists proclaimed the inevitable racializing functions of nationalism as a system for managing difference. However, their attacks on the flag in Neukölln ended up providing a compelling narrative on which to base a powerful civic nationalist pedagogy affirming the moral superiority of civic nationalism. Anti-fascist forms of post-nationalism, then, became the nationalist’s straw man. The coverage of the flag fight was a useful space for the re-negotiation of national identity, but a surface reading of that coverage and of the event can miss underlying problems that such a conception of identity glosses over. The celebration of immigrant patriotism shores up the universalist and egalitarian credentials of the nation (see also Chapter 2), but, as the following chapter shows their contribution to the legitimacy of civic nationalist celebration does not necessarily undermine the particularism that disrupts the inclusion of immigrants and minorities as part of the national category.

The next chapter examines the consequences of this persistent particularism in an event that occurred several months after the flag fight: the debate that followed the publication of a book that predicted the destruction of the German people through the dual threat of proliferating Muslim immigrants and declining birthrates among educated white Germans. This case also demonstrates the difficulties in discussing race and racism in the German context. Intolerance stoked by cultural, religious, and linguistic difference is more easily portrayed as benign and justifiable than racial intolerance. Perhaps this is because, as Stuart Hall (2000) notes, the biological referent of ethnic differentiation is less direct. In conceptions of ethnicity, the biological articulation of difference is present but is indirect, operating through kinship. As civic nationalism establishes itself as a new
norm in Germany, its relative inclusivity should not be allowed to render it invisible and, thus, above critique. As the book debate shows, civic nationalism does not necessarily mitigate pseudo-scientifically legitimated models of social and cultural deficiency that plague representations of immigrants. Although it opens new possibilities for legitimating minority identification with the nation, it also supports a binary of the “successfully integrated” versus the “unassimilable and intractable” immigrant.

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4 "Wir lassen uns nicht sagen, dass man die Fahne nicht aufhängen darf." Und weiter: "Wir leben hier, wir haben unsere Existenz hier, auch unsere Wurzeln - schon langsam."

5 [Badr Mohammed] kämpft also gegen Deutsche und für die deutsche Fahne. Die Sonnenallee 36 steht längst für das widersprüchliche Verhältnis vieler Deutscher zu ihrem Land.


8 Die beiden können gar nicht fassen, dass die arabischstämmigen Neuköllner die Deutschlandfahne gegen die Deutschstämmigen verteidigen.

9 Fast belustigt stellen sie fest, dass die arabischstämmigen Neuköllner aus der Sonnenallee die Deutschlandfahne gegen die Deutschstämmigen verteidigen. Verdrehte Welt, finden sie.

10 Dass die Proteste gerade von deutscher Seite kommen, kann er einfach nicht verstehen.

11 Bassal ist verständnislos. Dass Deutsche einem Libanesen verbieten wollen, eine schwarz-rot-goldene Fahne aufzuhängen, findet er „komisch“. Und ärgerlich auch.

12 Warum reißen Deutsche ihre Fahne herunter, während Menschen aller Nationen Schwarz-Rot-Gold feiern?

13 Die Flagge hänge dort „nicht wegen des Zweiten Weltkriegs, sondern wegen der deutschen Mannschaft: Weil die deutsche Mannschaft ja nicht mehr richtig deutsch ist; das ist ja Multikulti, wir gehören dazu“, erläuterte Bassal gegenüber der JF.
Kaum geschehen, seien junge Leute aggressiv in seinen Laden gekommen und hätten ihm vorgeworfen, er fördere den Nationalismus und wecke wieder Nazigefühle in den Deutschen.

In Berlin-Neukölln, dem Multikulti-Kiez par excellence. Vor allem Deutschtürken und Deutscharaber staffieren ihre Läden schwarzrotgold aus. Das konnten die Szene-"Autonomen" vom schwarzen Block - "Nie wieder Deutschland!" - natürlich nicht dulden. Der antifaschistische Kampf kennt keine Gnade, und auch ein Kleinhandl aus dem Libanon kann ein gemeingefährlicher Flaggen-Nazi sein.

Nicht umsonst war im Dritten Reich die Fahne der deutschen Demokratie verboten.

Nicht habe ich denn bitte mit den Nazis zu tun?

"Für die Faschisten sind wir Ausländer und für die Autonomen…" - Bassal hält inne und denkt nach - "keene Ahnung watt". (In this statement, the journalist transcribed Bassal’s switch to the Berlin dialect in the second part of the sentence. This shows Bassal to be both fluent in standard German, but also in the regional dialects of his German hometown.)

Youssuf Bassal versteht die Welt nicht mehr: "Wir haben Verwandte, die dienen bei der Bundeswehr und bei der Polizei. Deutschland hat uns aufgenommen, als wir aus dem Krieg im Libanon flüchten mussten. Wir wissen, was wir unserer neuen Heimat zu verdanken haben. Und dann dieser Hass ...."

Wir wenden uns gegen den medialen Diskurs, der uns beschuldigt, unsere Nachbar_innen zu "Ausländern" zu machen. Nur einem dien die Debatte um den "Neuköllner Fahnenstreit": Dem Image einer "weltoffenen" deutschen Nation!

Sie achten nicht auf Herkunft. Ihnen ist jeder Fahnenträger Nationalist und damit Feind.

Eine ältere Frau betritt den Elektroladen. Sie interessiert sich nicht wirklich für eine Handykarte oder ein Fernsehkabel, sondern sie sagt: „Ich komme extra aus Wilmersdorf und wollte unbedingt diese Fahne sehen.

Allein das ist bemerkenswert: Eine arabische Familie hat ausgerechnet hier, in Neukölln, wo jeder Fünfte ein Ausländer ist, wohl eine der größten Deutschlandfahnen im Land ausgerollt.
die scharz-rot-goldene Riesenfahne über seinem Elektroladen in der Sonnenallee des Berliner Bezirks Neukölln: „Ab jetzt halten wir rund um die Uhr Wache.“


„Wir sitzen hier jeden Abend mit zwei, drei Mann und schieben Nachtwache“, erklärt [I.] Bassal. „Die Fahne wird verteidigt bis zum letzten Atemzug.“

Kahled Hossen, der die Flagge auf dem Dach befestigte, hat dafür sein Leben riskiert. Auch wenn Autonome immer wieder an der Fahne zerren oder zündeln: „Wir werden sie auch immer wieder reparieren.“

Für den Grünen-Bildungspolitiker Özcan Mutlu stellt der bizarre Streit eine "verkehrte Welt" dar. "Es wird erwartet, dass sich die Zuwanderer integrieren, aber wenn sie sich zu den Farben der Demokratie bekennen, werden sie angegriffen", sagt Mutlu.

Cousin Yussuf will helfen: «Wir können den Deutschen ein wenig Nationalstolz beibringen, Geschichte hin oder her.»
PART III: “FAILURES” OF INTEGRATION
CHAPTER 6 – DESTRUCTIVE PRODUCTIVITY: THE SARRAZIN DEBATE AND THE THREAT OF PROLIFERATING NON-CITIZENS

Just weeks after the national celebration of Germany’s immigrant patriots and multi-ethnic national team emerged as a major theme of the 2010 FIFA World Cup, the release of politician and Bundesbank board member Thilo Sarrazin’s book positing the demographic demise of Germany triggered a nationwide debate on racism, immigration, political correctness, and the effectiveness of German social policy. In the media sphere, Sarrazin’s polemical book incited impassioned denunciations, cautious interest, and the heralding of a brave harbinger of inconvenient truths even before its publication. The firestorm of public responses peaked national interest and contributed to the book selling out on the first day of its public release (Stein, 2012, p. 1). Over the following six weeks of intensive public debate, the “Sarrazin debate” quickly morphed into an “integration debate.” What began as a debate about the problematic nature of Sarrazin’s racially charged arguments developed into a debate about migration policy and the integration status of Muslim populations. The book, and the public debate it triggered, constituted a contentious public event through which the boundaries and values of the nation were discussed and consolidated. Whereas previous chapters focus on the celebration of immigrants and “new Germans” in social marketing campaigns, sports integration programs, and sporting nationalism, this chapter examines one of the most visible public debates of the past decade in Germany to analyze the exclusionary side of integration discourse. But while the emphasis in this chapter’s case shifts from celebration to condemnation, both modes of integration discourse depend on the same theories defining
the ideal political and economic conditions to secure the future of the German national population.

This chapter critically examines patterns and themes of public discourse on culture and integration and its role in constructing the normative national core and managing difference. In particular, it analyzes the construction and fortification of divisions between normative citizens and racialized groups including immigrants and Muslim Germans—between integration failures and successes. The Sarrazin debate demonstrates how divisions made using biopolitical logics fracture the population so that the power to “make live” (Foucault, 2003) can be optimized by confining social ills to particular segments of the population. To determine which rhetorical structures resonated most strongly among his readership, I analyzed the reader reviews posted in response to the book on Amazon.de. Of the 227 reviews posted during the first 8 weeks of the debate, I selected for close textual analysis the 45 reviews that received over 100 votes from other users as either “helpful” or “unhelpful.” Reviews were analyzed using the iterative descriptive coding process outlined by Glaser and Straus (2006).

In addition, I examined articles discussing the book and the surrounding debate published in Spiegel and the Bild. Sections from Sarrazin’s book were pre-circulated in these two periodicals, placing them at the center of the debate. I conducted searches in the online archives of Spiegel and Bild for the term “Sarrazin” from August 23, 2010, including the print Der Spiegel and Spiegel Online.

25 Including the print Der Spiegel and Spiegel Online.
when book excerpts were published in *Spiegel* and *Bild*, until October 31, 2010. Although the discussions of the Sarrazin debate continue today, I consider the last major event of the debate to be Angela Merkel’s declaration of the failure of multiculturalism on October 16th, 2010. I included Amazon.de reviews posted until two days after Merkel’s speech. To include reactions to Merkel’s speech, I followed news coverage until the end of October. The initial periodical search returned 191 results on Bild.de and 243 results from the *Spiegel* archives. I eliminated news stories that primarily summarized events and public statements and I focused on features, commentaries, interviews, and letters-to-the-editor analyzing and debating Sarrazin’s book and the subsequent fallout from its publication. This resulted in a collection of 46 items from the *Bild* and 36 items from *Der Spiegel*. Press articles were studied to determine the overall development of the mediated debate.

Table 5: Results for Sarrazin in Bild and Der Spiegel, Aug. 23—Oct. 31, 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Periodical</th>
<th>Article type</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bild</td>
<td>Feature</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commentary/Analysis</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Letter to the editor</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interview</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Der Spiegel</td>
<td>Feature</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commentary/Analysis</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Letter to the editor</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interview</td>
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The book, *Germany Does Away with Itself: How We Are Putting Our Country on the Line* (Deutschland schafft sich ab: wie wir unser Land aufs Spiel setzen), opens with a laudatory statement on the success of the German people in rebuilding their nation from the ashes of World War II and the “pride and faith in the solidity of its economic and social models” that carried Germany through four global economic crises (Sarrazin, 2010a, p. 7). According to Sarrazin, the strong values and optimism of the German people have allowed the nation to prosper and withstand the pressures of globalization. Unfortunately, he claims, this optimism and success has “clouded the vision of Germans,” preventing them from seeing the “hazards and putrefaction in the core of society” (2010a, p. 7). He attributes this putrefaction to the “quantitative and qualitative” decline of the German population. The “quantitative decline” is due to the low birthrates among ethnic Germans. The “qualitative decline” is related to the “ongoing proliferation of the less stable, the less intelligent, and the less competent” (2010a, p. 11). This latter problem is related, first, to the failure of the social system to properly incentivize hard work and, second, to the “quality, structure, and cultural background of the migrants in Germany,” (Sarrazin, 2010a, p. 17). This, argues Sarrazin, has led to the overall decline in values and abilities, or “human capital” (Foucault, 2008), that a society needs to be successful.
This argument illustrates the link between life and death in biopolitical governmentality. Sarrazin posits that the excessive success in producing life, in the form of economic, political, and social rebirth after the World War II, has lead Germans to become complacent and to allow death to enter in the form of proliferating social undesirables. As Sarrazin’s arguments show, the focus of biopower on life does not mean that the function of sovereign power to wield death is eliminated. The flourishing of some forms of national life (economic) has led to a neglect of other forms (reproductive). In the introduction to his book, Sarrazin ventriloquizes an imagined “good German,” who protests that quantitative decline of a national population need not be fatal. A small nation can have advantages, this person might say. Sarrazin counters his imaginary “good German” interlocutor, arguing that reproductive decline would not be fatal per se if not for the simultaneous proliferation of the “wrong sort” of people—especially Muslim minorities and immigrants. By establishing the wrong types of incentives through the welfare system, the German state is held responsible for enabling these degenerate populations to thrive.

Utilizing strategic aggregation and individuation of minority populations, Sarrazin’s rhetoric facilitates the construction and subsequent condemnation of congenitally degenerate demographics under the banner of individual responsibility. Sarrazin reasons that if racism or xenophobia impeded the socioeconomic stability and success of immigrants and minorities, then all people of color would be affected equally.

Indians and Vietnamese seem at least as foreign as Turks and Arabs and yet demonstrate far greater success in our society. Causes for difficulties in school, the job market and in society generally must, thus, be sought out within the groups themselves; it must have something to do with their own behavior.\textsuperscript{iv} (Sarrazin, 2010a, p. 60)
This false logic presumes that all difference from the norm is viewed equally by normative society, that Germans view all traces of foreignness in the same light. Here, the success and relatively positive preconceptions garnered by some minority groups contest the existence of racism rather than representing racism’s other face. Sarrazin develops this thread in another section of his book that praises European Jews for their outstanding intelligence and socio-economic success. Sarrazin outlines the Jewish involvement in the development of intelligence research, and the dismay of National Socialists in the face of the superior average results of Jews as compared to German gentiles. Sarrazin explains that he has “gone into detail on the Jewish-German origins of intelligence research because the discussion of the genetic components of intelligence often run into strong emotional resistance” (Sarrazin, 2010a, p. 97). Raising the involvement of Jewish researchers in answer to this “emotional resistance” only makes sense if that resistance is a euphemism for anti-racist criticism. Sarrazin argues that the participation of Jews in this research, as well as Nazi frustration with it, disproves criticism of eugenics as racist. He bases this on the spurious assumption that minorities are incapable of supporting racism. Sarrazin allays the emotional discomfort of readers whose exposure to liberal ideals of tolerance may have sensitized them to react to claims such as his. By the same stroke, he characterizes any criticism of his work as racist as anti-rational.

By invoking positive assessments of Jews within Sarrazin's framework, he intends to prove that it cannot be racist because it favors Jews, based on their supposedly heightened intelligence. This evocation of Jews in Sarrazin’s book demonstrates the narrowness of his view of racism. In the German context, the antisemitic past is taboo to
the extent that even the word *Jude* often evokes discomfort (Mandel, 2008). Putting aside for the moment the fact that Sarrazin’s essentialist philosemitism is not the opposite of antisemitism but its twin, as Anne Norton (2013) argues, the history of the Jewish Question in Europe was never simply a matter of the superiority or inferiority of Jews *per se*. It was always a question of the nature and future of Europe and its nations. From Spinoza to Marx, the Jewish question was “the axis on which” modern struggles over politics, progress, secularism and faith turned (Norton, 2013, p. 2). Beginning with the Enlightenment, Jews became a means of defining Europe, either as a tolerant place where even non-Christians might flourish, or as a place under siege and threatened by outsiders within.

Norton observes that the contemporary clash of civilizations narratives and their liberal democratic detractors have followed much the same course with the figure of the Muslim. Today, Norton writes, “Islam is marked as the preeminent danger to politics; to Christians, Jews, and secular humanists; to women, sex, and sexuality; to the values and institutions of the Enlightenment” (2013, pp. 2–3). For conservatives, they are a potentially disloyal and incompatible threat, and for liberals they are an object of tolerance—to be endured or saved—that reinforces the superiority of "Judeo-Christian" liberalism. Sarrazin’s book does not mince words in singling out Muslims as his primary target.

When I speak here about migrants, I am referring exclusively to migrants from Muslim countries (Turkey, Africa, the Near and Middle East). They are the only ones who, in large part, have language problems; at the same time, they make up a considerable part of the lower classes and welfare population of Germany, and their children have the biggest problems in the German education system." (2010a, p. 235)
Sarrazin equates Muslims with “migrants,” and migrants here are synonymous with social deficiency and the threat of the decline of Germany. Sarrazin’s use of Jews as a shield against anti-racist critique only underscores the parallel with the past. As the figure of the Jew defined the existential questions of Europe's past, so Muslims are mobilized today. The past shows, however, that this role has potentially lethal consequences.

Sarrazin’s book draws on the legitimating force of scientific objectivity to present a picture of reality, which he claims is kept secret by the soft-hearted liberals of the political establishment in Germany. By focusing his analysis at the level of the population, Sarrazin defines aggregate threats to the nation, while maintaining that, since he is not speaking about the individual, his claims about the relative intelligence and productivity of different demographic groups do not constitute a racial project. The runaway success of Sarrazin’s book derives from its presentation of an “objectively verified” account of reality that resonates with the intuitive theories of a large part of the public, combined with a defensive scaffolding built on post-WWII color blindness and resentment toward the processes of Vergangenheitsbewältigung 26, which became part of official politics in the Federal Republic during the late 1970s and 1980s.

Although Sarrazin’s book is by no means the first to focus on the threat posed by the “failed integration” of Muslim immigrants and their children (see: Ates, 2008; Heisig, 2010; Hug, 2010; Kelek, 2006; Ulfkotte, 2003, 2010), the relatively quiet reception of

26 Lit. “coming to terms with the past”
other such works fueled the perception of the book as groundbreaking. Even though other recent books from a similar perspective have achieved considerable success, none received the kind of advanced circulation afforded Sarrazin. The high-visibility pre-circulation of book segments unleashed a heated debate in the media developed into a full-scale media-hype. The debate triggered by the publication of Sarrazin’s book took over the German media sphere in the last months of 2010. Years later, Sarrazin’s book and the subsequent debate continue to symbolize struggles in Germany over ideals of integration and the future of Germany as a multiethnic nation.

The first section of this chapter outlines the role of contentious public debate in constructing and re-constructing social norms and regimes of knowledge. Using print sources, it examines the trajectory of the debate in the mediated public sphere. The second section analyzes the reader responses to the book and the debate on Amazon.de. Responses to the book demonstrate the appeal of Sarrazin’s claims of rationality and scientism in critiquing Muslims in Germany. They also reveal the strength of economic logics of social value that hold that government interventions must prioritize free market mechanisms for the regulation and optimization of the population. This reflects a biopolitical approach to politics and governance, which uses neoliberal logics and technologies to selectively cultivate the life of the population (Lemke, 2011, p. 60). The Sarrazin debate revealed biopolitical social logics that divide the population according to their supposed potential for integration, which is to say, their potential for productivity within German society. According to this discourse, productivity is a universal social good, and thus, apolitical. Meanwhile, anti-racist critiques of Sarrazin are characterized
as politically motivated, irrational attempts to subvert hard facts by exploiting German
guilt about the past.

_The Scandal is a Scandal_

The Sarrazin debate does not fit neatly into the categories of media events or
media scandal. While the Sarrazin debate is certainly about the adjudication of social
norms and morality, it is not a scandal in the traditional sense which implies the making
public of morally transgressive private acts (Lull & Hinerman, 1997, p. 8). These acts are
often of a sexual or criminal nature and typically involve celebrities and politicians,
although they may also involve corporations or public institutions. They are highly
personalized and often focus a magnifying attention on the implicated public figures,
turning them into characters. The Sarrazin debate is a scandal composed entirely of ideas
in circulation, revolving around the hero-martyr character embodied by Sarrazin. The
scope of the debate was centripetal, expanding from the figure of Sarrazin to encompass
the German nation and even the “Western World.” What exactly constituted the
fundamental transgression of the Sarrazin debate was contested. In the initial wave of
public reaction, the transgression was the defamatory and racist nature of Sarrazin’s
claims. The backlash against this initial scandal, however, held that the true transgression
was the characterization of Sarrazin’s arguments as defamatory and racist. In short, in the
backlash created by Sarrazin supporters, the scandal itself was the true scandal.

Although the most commonly theorized media scandals are sparked by a material
or embodied occurrence—whether an accident with an uncertain cause, or the revelation
of an ethical transgression by a public figure or institution—the event of the scandal itself
is always fundamentally a phenomenon of communication. Following Deleuze, Paul Patton writes that there are "two realms of being, a material realm of bodies and states of affairs and an incorporeal realm of events. Events are expressed by means of language, in statements, but they are attributes of bodies and physical states of affairs" (1997b, p. 3). The corporeal is implicated here, but it is in communication that the corporeal is made meaningful, and where the potential for change resides. Patton continues to explain that events are the secondary effect of “corporeal causal interactions: they do not affect bodies and states of affairs but they do affect other events, such as the responses and actions of agents. Pure events are both the expressed of statements and the ‘sense’ of what happens” (1997b, p. 3). The material occurrences of mediated scandals are only made meaningful in description. Action as embodied occurrence only becomes social, and thus political, through communication.

While this is true in a strict sense, it is important not to limit the conception of communication to the verbal. Gesture, the aural and the visual are no less potent forms of communication than the verbal, although their semantic openness may be more apparent. However, this chapter, as well as most of this dissertation, is limited to written forms of communication. Although this encompasses only a fraction of what contributed to the “sense” of what the Sarrazin debate meant, this fraction was intentionally constructed to communicate. In written communication, the strategic logics of the affair as it unfolded
are still available, often in their original form. This is particularly appropriate in the case of the Sarrazin debate, since, from the outset the scandal consisted of a struggle over the moral implications of social critiques depending on cultural and racial differentialism. This type of communication event is located in the social imaginary, but not in the sense of the imaginary that is opposed to the real. These “collective assemblages of enunciation might be regarded as a materialist concept of the social imaginary” (Patton, 1997a, p. 30). This study focuses on a portion of this assemblage of enunciation which remains accessible in an inscribed form.

Peter Vasterman broadens the focus of literature on visibility and on concentrations of media attention to offer a theoretical framework for what he calls “media-hype” (2005). Vasterman centers his framework on the multiplying effects of the media to account for their impact on common knowledge and political opinion through a process of social amplification (2005, p. 513). “Media-hype can…be defined as a media-generated, wall-to-wall news wave, triggered by one specific event and enlarged by the self-reinforcing processes within the news production of the media” (Vasterman, 2005, p. 515). The chain reaction of media-hype begins with a “key event” that triggers more attention than usual for a variety of reasons. The broadness of this definition is intentional, since the trigger of increased attention is often unpredictable. In the case of

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27 Amazon.de reviews may be edited by reviewers after they are posted. These changes cannot be tracked by other users. The earliest reviews will often acknowledge that they updated and expanded their original reviews after finishing to read the book.
the Sarrazin debate, the kinds of statements and claims about Muslim immigrants that triggered the hype were not uncommon in the public sphere. Yet, its supporters hailed Sarrazin’s book as fresh, brave and unprecedented. While, as some critics pointed out, the theses themselves were far from unprecedented (Al-Wazir, 2010), the wave of media hype unleashed by the pre-circulation of book excerpts in the media supported the impression that there was something particularly shocking or unexpected about Sarrazin’s claims.

The key event in the Sarrazin affair was the pre-circulation of sections from the book in Germany’s most popular newspaper and magazine, the Bild and Der Spiegel, the week before its general publication. The ability of Sarrazin’s agents to arrange this high-profile debut was likely predicated on Sarrazin’s demonstrated ability to generate media-hype. An unapologetic polemicist, Sarrazin caused a smaller-scale scandal in 2009 that foreshadowed the arguments he would make in his book. In an interview with the magazine Lettre International, Sarrazin stated, “I do not have to recognize anyone who lives off the state, rejects this state, does not properly provide for the education of their children and constantly produces new little headscarf girls” (Berberich & Sarrazin, 2009, p. 197). This earlier scandal paved the way for Sarrazin’s 2010 debut, since, as Vasterman observes, even after the decline of a news wave, media-hype facilitates the generation of subsequent news waves because of the public’s heightened sensitivity

28 See, for example, the Ich denke an Deutschland conference inaugurated in 2009, which posed the question, “When will we have finally gone too far?” http://www.denkichandeutschland.net/24.htm.
regarding the topic (2005, p. 515). Bild is a tabloid that has a daily circulation of over 3.5 million as of 2010, making it the highest circulating periodical not only in Germany, but also in all of Europe. From its establishment in 1952, Bild has taken a strong conservative and nationalist editorial stance. It has long been the target of criticism for its unmatched influence on politics and the German social imaginary. Bild takes unambiguous stands on issues and encourages readers to act. One of the paper’s slogans, “Bild dir deine Meinung” is a play on words meaning “form your own opinion.” In addition to boasting the highest readership, Bild received more reprimands than any other paper from the Deutscher Pressrat, Germany’s independent press watch group.\(^{29}\) Although publishing in Bild provided the maximum quantitative audience for Sarrazin’s work, the paper’s well-known rightwing populist stance might have allowed the book to be dismissed as merely another populist provocation.

In contrast to Bild, Der Spiegel distinguishes itself as a national standard of investigative journalism. Der Spiegel has employed fact checkers since its establishment in 1947 and currently maintains one of the world’s largest fact checking departments (Silverman, 2010). Although Der Spiegel has its own history of muckraking and political maneuvering, it remains one of Germany’s periodicals of reference. Der Spiegel is one of two sources that is most widely read by German journalists, making it is one of the most important “orientation media” nationwide (Weischenberg, Malik, & Scholl, 2006, p. 29).

\(^{29}\) Since 2006, Bild has been reprimanded over 50 times (”Deutscher Presserat : 2006-2013,” n.d.)
In addition, *Spiegel Online*, which operates independently from the magazine counterpart and does not overlap in terms of content, is the second most visited news site in the German media sphere behind *BILD.de* (Stein, 2012, p. 36). Publishing in *Der Spiegel* lent legitimacy and seriousness to Sarrazin’s claims, making them difficult to dismiss out of hand. By pre-circulating excerpts in *Bild* and *Der Spiegel*, Sarrazin was guaranteed maximum visibility. Both publications debuted different excerpts on August 23, 2010, and *Bild* continued to publish a new excerpt every day for a week.

The published sections in *Bild* and *Der Spiegel* set the terms for the debate, and by hitting on a number of hot-button issues unleashed a critical reaction which was anticipated in the book, and thus strengthened the rhetorical position of the work rather than undermined it. The “news theme” (Vasterman, 2005) framing the discussion accepted Sarrazin’s claim—stated in the first section published in *Bild* and repeated elsewhere—that the facts and ideas he presented were taboo and that political correctness prevented their discussion in the public sphere. The rhetorical terms set by Sarrazin that became the news theme and ensured that any criticism could be construed as confirming his basic premise. Sarrazin’s leadership position and the hyper-visibility of the text with its transparent racial provocations demanded responses from public figures, which contributed to a “positive feedback loop” (Vasterman, 2005, p. 513) generating new events on which to base stories.

The media sought and published responses from the institutions associated with Sarrazin, building “interactive media momentum” (Vasterman, 2005). As is typical in media-hype, the “huge news hunt generates all kinds of responses in society, varying from individuals reporting similar experiences to statements from official sources and
interest groups, using the opportunity to promote their views or to announce actions” (Vasterman, 2005, p. 515). The initial reaction from politicians and public figures was strongly critical. Indeed, chancellor Angela Merkel made a statement just two days after the first segments were published, calling them “highly offensive, defamatory, and polemical” (“Umstrittene Thesen zu Migration,” 2010). Criticism of Sarrazin grew stronger after an interview with Berliner Morgenpost in which he responded to a question about the existence of a “genetic identity” that, “all Jews share a particular gene, Basques have particular genes, that distinguish them from others” (“Thilo Sarrazin—‘Ich bin kein Rassist,’” 2010). The claim of the existence of a “Jewish gene” sparked immediate condemnation across the political spectrum (Friedrich, 2011, p. 11). It is important to note, however, that almost without exception even Sarrazin’s harshest critics affirmed the value of debating “problems of integration.”

The comment asserting the existence of a Jewish gene, although relatively neutral compared to Sarrazin’s statements about the inherited intelligence deficits of Muslims, ignited a new controversy that ensured Sarrazin’s dominance in news coverage across the media sphere. Although the plausible deniability of the racist theories informing Sarrazin’s work was maintained by his supporters, Sarrazin’s remark about a “Jewish gene” crossed the line of deniability for a German public particularly sensitive to antisemitism after what one journalist euphemistically called, “those murderous twelve years” (Baum, 2010). While holding firm to the claims of his book, he expressed regret for broaching the topic of the Jewish gene and the comment was considered a mere gaffe by Sarrazin’s supporters (Broder, 2010). Reacting to the controversy, the Bundesbank board and Bundespresident Wulff asked for and received Sarrazin’s resignation from his
seat on the board of the Bundesbank. The progress of these public reactions and calls to action provided new opportunities for news outlets to publish on the story as breaking news.

With the initial backlash keeping the story at the top of the news agenda, Sarrazin’s book sold faster than it could be printed for the first several weeks after its publication. Just as importantly, the public condemnation affirmed Sarrazin’s self-positioning as a teller of “uncomfortable truths,” since, intuitively, if his arguments were already part of public discussions on the social issues they would not have raised such a strong backlash. In confirming this assertion, the counter-arguments of Sarrazin’s critics gained little purchase and the terms of the debate were set as those he had proposed. Furthermore, this feedback loop provided the counter-opinion necessary to create uncertainty as to the meaning of Sarrazin’s statements. This uncertainty is necessary for a story to sustain interest and instigate a public conversation. As Bird writes, “the scandal story… is not clear and closed, but ‘open’ allowing for many competing versions and interpretations. As people speculate, they tend to look for answers in their own experience” (1997, p. 109). Without the condemnation from public figures, Sarrazin’s statements probably would have faded from public attention.

In the wake of the stark criticism followed a backlash and growing support for Sarrazin’s arguments and for “freedom of opinion.” This development began already in the early days of outrage, as media outlets repeatedly reported on the unprecedented responses from their audiences, mostly in support of Sarrazin (Friedrich, 2011, p. 12). As the reports of public support for Sarrazin’s work piled up and the book sold out even before it could hit the shelves, opinions among the elite shifted and discourse refocused
on the need to respect the feelings of “the people”—referring to the normative German public. Merkel significantly softened her position less than two weeks after the initial pre-circulation, saying that although she still maintained that Sarrazin’s work was not helpful for the integration debate, acknowledgement of the statistically proven elevated tendency toward violence among devout Muslim youths should not be taboo: “It is a big problem, and we can talk openly about it without raising the suspicion of xenophobia” (“Integrationsdebatte ohne Tabus,” 2010). In this interview in Bild’s Sunday edition, Merkel confirmed the existence of a “taboo” against the discussion of the social deficiencies of a given group. She went on to warn against the association of violence with any specific religion, saying that,

> Violence by young people is often a sign that they don't see any prospects for themselves. Only education, education, education can help with that. Our government is making a lot of offerings in that regard, but the first responsibility lies with the parents, from which school and society can't relieve them.\(^{vii}\) (Merkel, 2010)

Although Merkel attempted to soften and reframe the links that the Bild’s questions repeatedly proposed between criminality and unemployment and people with a Turkish and Arab or Muslim background, her reframing did not challenge Bild’s conclusions, including claims that minorities are threatening and intimidating the police. Her responses supported an interventionist approach by the government to regulate immigrant and minority compliance with integration demands, while denying the existence of social and structural inequality as causes of the poor prospects for minority youth. While affirming that the state needs to and does provide appropriate education, Merkel located ultimate responsibility in the private sphere of the family.
While continuing to deny the value of Sarrazin’s contribution, Merkel adopted the language and assumptions that framed Sarrazin’s text, implicitly sanctioning the fundamental validity of his claims about the dangers of failed integration and political correctness. Without explicitly singling out any group, Merkel mirrored the deficit narratives proposed in Bild’s questions.

We can expect from those who come here that they integrate into our society, that they learn our language. That men make it possible for their wives to take part in societal life, that girls be allowed to go on class trips and take part in physical education classes. Violence in schools and other deplorable situations must be openly discussed. Concealment only strengthens prejudice. (Merkel, 2010)

Merkel’s comments frame integration as a problem of minority values and behaviors clashing with German norms of gender equality, female empowerment, and adherence to the law. Merkel reproduces Orientalist tropes of the despotic and patriarchal Muslim (Said, 1979), strengthening the distinction between “our” peaceful and egalitarian Western norms and “their” Oriental culture. By condemning the most obviously egregious parts of Sarrazin’s discourse, the racialized assumptions underlying Merkel’s framing of the enforcement of integration are normalized. Although she resists naming any particular group, the centuries old familiarity of European publics with latent Orientalist tropes upholding the fundamental cultural distinction and incompatibility of East and West is such that no group need be explicitly named. Merkel went a step further in October, attracting international attention with her claim that “multiculturalism is a failure” (“Integration,” 2010, “Lob und Empörung,” 2010), a claim she and her fellow party leaders have made repeatedly over the years. The speed of this rhetorical shift, from outright condemnation to implicit validation, shows the power of the public backlash against the initial public condemnation of Sarrazin’s work. This rapid convergence also
suggests that the forms of knowledge held by Sarrazin’s supporters and his critics were not as distinct as a polarized understanding of the debate suggests.

The one premise that neither critics nor supporters of Sarrazin disputed in the media coverage was the idea that “integration problems” were a serious concern in Germany that needed to be openly and aggressively addressed in policy. In the articles examined, only one person denied the fundamental premise of “integration” as a social issue. In an interview with Spiegel Online, white German actor Peter Lohmeyer was interviewed about the role of soccer in personal and national identity. When asked about the meaning of the German-Turkish Euro-Cup soccer qualifying match for “integration debate,” Lohmeyer responded, “Integration discussions really get on my nerves. You don’t have to talk about it, integration just happens. Period” (“EM-Qualifikation Deutschland,” 2010). With this exception, “integration” was broadly accepted as an issue demanding serious scrutiny and debate. In the corpus of articles, integration is never directly defined, but is outlined by certain associations and indicators: educational achievement, employment status, and language proficiency are chief among them. Integration is conceptualized as a personal choice to value education and take responsibility for economic productivity. In other words, integration is the choice to dedicate one’s scarce resources to the development of one’s human capital, to be an effective “entrepreneur of the self” (Foucault, 2008, p. 226). Like the notion of integration itself, the subject of integration is poorly defined but implicitly understood. The figure of the integrant is referenced by terms such as migrant, immigrant, Muslim, Turk, Arab, foreigner, and foreign co-citizen. Little or no distinction is made between the immigrant generations and their German-born descendants, or between foreign nationals
and German citizens. Supporters and detractors of Sarrazin proposed different sources of the presumed failure of Muslim populations to achieve integration. While all agreed that the state should invest in special educational measures for migrants, Sarrazin’s detractors focused almost entirely on education while supporters demanded that the government intervene and enforce integration.

The difference between detractors and supporters can be interpreted in terms of two approaches to neoliberal social politics that Foucault identifies in his 1978 lectures entitled, The Birth of Biopolitics (2008). Sarrazin’s critics emphasize the need for maintaining the social protections present in notions of Vitalpolitik (vital politics) that originated in the German and Austrian “ordoliberal” school of economics. Developed starting in the 1930s, ordoliberal economists developed a new theory of liberalism which was later implemented as the basis of the post-war political and economic system in West Germany. Like other forms of neoliberalism, Vitalpolitik accepts and promotes the extension of the economy to the entire social field, but in addition it maintains the need for compensating for what is cold, calculating, and mechanical in the economic field of competition. Philosopher and public intellectual, Richard David Precht (2010) most clearly encapsulates this approach in his commentary in Der Spiegel identifying a “social war”—not in terms of a Huntington-style “clash of civilizations,” but in terms of either a “social” or “dissocial” approach to the economy. Precht calls for a morally sensitive “new

30 The concept of neoliberalism was coined by the German Ordoliberal school (Foucault, 2008).
idea of growth” centered on measures of happiness. This view resonates with the German neoliberal version of enterprise society that is “a society for the market and a society against the market” in that it is oriented towards the market while compensating for the market’s effects on social values (Foucault, 2008, p. 242). The approach of Sarrazin’s critics maintains ordoliberalism’s concern for the socially corrosive effects of market rationality without questioning the economic premises underlying Sarrazin’s work.

In contrast, Sarrazin’s supporters did not accept the ambivalence towards market rationality inherent in German ordoliberal social politics. As I examine in more detail below, they saw the social protections it proposes as a hindrance to the proper function of economic rationality at all levels of the social body. Yet, the call among Sarrazin supporters was not merely against political intervention in migration and integration, but rather for interventions that support economic rationality in every aspect of social life, and most intimately and most urgently, in choices about reproduction. Across the spectrum of opinion in Der Spiegel and Bild, the question is not whether the state should intervene to compel the “integration” of transnational populations, but how it should do so.

**Scandal and Online Review Forums**

In addition to direct communication with traditional media in the form of letters to the editor, calls, and comments on online versions of stories, members of the public registered their reactions on the internet on book review forums. The book review forums of the internet provided a neutral ground for public response. The first reviews of the book were posted on Amazon.de within 24 hours of the publication of the first book.
Amazon provided a public space for rejoinder moderated primarily by readers themselves. Unlike the comment sections of online news articles in which the content of the article guides comments, book review sites allow readers and members of the public more latitude in the topic and length of their responses. Amazon.de also includes mechanisms for the public to weigh in on whether the reviews are “helpful” and to respond directly to reviews.

Internet-based communication allows individual users to achieve a level of visibility that approaches and sometimes exceeds that of the traditional media. Castells argues that politics is primarily media politics and that, although “the media are not the holders of power… they constitute by and large the space where power is decided” (2007, p. 242). As such, mediated communication plays a fundamental role in the formation of “the public mind.” For this reason, Castells sees the establishment of internet-based communication, or what he calls “mass self-communication,” as the basis of a historical change in the terrain of politics and “counter-power” (2007). The overwhelming majority of the reviewers of Sarrazin’s book on Amazon.de position themselves, like the book itself, against what they portray as the German political establishment.

The Sarrazin debate was so successful because, for supportive reviewers, it replayed a narrative of beleaguered truth-teller, risking condemnation to speak truth to power. Sarrazin prepared the ground for this narrative and his credibly was, thus, increased by his critics. Sarrazin’s critics undermined his theories and analysis, but failed to provide an equally compelling narrative. As Tomlinson (1997) observes, media scandals are “middle-order moral events” that function to regulate the unspoken moral
foundations of a community, providing “contexts for ‘communal’ moral reflection and debate in modern secular societies” (1997, p. 68). Major moral issues, from starvation and genocide to climate change are difficult to personalize. They are not easily connected to or instantiated in the behavior of symbolic individuals. Instead, these high-order events are so unwieldy that they tend to produce a retreat from moral engagement. In contrast, scandal attracts and requires the active engagement of people to materialize as an event. The success of scandal as a middle-order moral event depends in part on the narratability of scandal, that is, the potential of scandal to be converted into a story with symbolically significant characters.

In the case at hand, the most significant character was Sarrazin himself. Sarrazin strategically placed himself as a champion of truth beginning with the epigraph of his book, which was also opened the first excerpt published in Bild. The epigraph is a quote from one of the founders of the German Social Democratic Party, Ferdinand Lassalle, that states, “all political small-mindedness consists of the silencing and concealment of that which is.”31 This quote sets up the antagonism that Sarrazin expands in the following text between the champions of truth and reality and the well-intentioned but cowardly apologists for the true causes of social denigration. Sarrazin’s acquiescence to calls for his resignation from the Bundesbank completed his transformation into a “martyr” of political correctness (“Sarrazin-Rücktritt,” 2010).

31 “Alle politische Kleingesterei besteht in dem Verschweigen und Bemänteln dessen, was ist.”
If scandal’s particular enduring appeal as a narrative form lies in its ability to help “people structure their view of what the world is and how it should be” (Bird, 1997, p. 102), the next question is what view of the world a given scandal produces. One of the most salient features of the Sarrazin affair evident in the Amazon.de reviews is the personal investment of reviewers in defending the core arguments raised by Sarrazin’s work. As Tomlinson writes, “what claims priority in our selective attention… is those experiences that speak most directly to the way in which we continuously narrate our ‘selves’ to ourselves” (1997, p. 73). The Sarrazin debate reveals a clash between political discourses of tolerance and multiculturalism and the self-narration of many Germans, which, as reader responses indicated, found its expression in Sarrazin’s portrayal of Germany’s problems. The magnitude and content of the response suggests that the backlash against Sarrazin’s perspective piqued the ire of Germans who were weary of the perceived taboos around cultural differentialism that are seen as a lingering punishment for the crimes of the Nazi period.

**Biopolitical Truth in Reader Responses**

Of the 840 reviews published on Amazon.de as of December 28, 2015, more than a quarter were written within the first two months of the initial pre-circulation of book excerpts. After five years, new reviews and discussions continue to be added regularly, although much less frequently than in the early months. This analysis focuses on reviews published during the critical first two months. Of the 227 reviews posted in the period August 23-October 18, 2010, the highest impact reviews (those with over 100 votes registered in response to the question, “Was this review helpful to you?”) were selected
for close textual analysis assisted by descriptive coding. The great majority of all reviews posted as of the end of 2015 gave the book the maximum possible score of 5 stars; 82% of reviews assigned the book four or five stars. Mirroring the opinions expressed in the review scores, positive reviews were much more likely to earn positive user feedback in terms of the votes for the review’s helpfulness. Most voters rated negative reviews as unhelpful. Because negative reviews were more likely to attract high numbers of (negative) votes, one-star reviews were heavily over-represented in the selected corpus (table 6). A representative sample of 45 reviews would have included 31 five-star reviews, 7 four-star reviews, 3 three-star reviews, 1.5 two-star reviews, and 3 one-star reviews. The overrepresentation of negative reviews in my sample amplified oppositional opinions that would have been lost in a representative sample.

Table 6: Reviews on Amazon.de that Received Over 100 Votes, Aug. 23-Oct. 18, 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Number of Reviews</th>
<th>Helpful Votes</th>
<th>Unhelpful Votes</th>
<th>Percentage Voted Helpful</th>
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<tr>
<td>5 Stars</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>11,021</td>
<td>2,332</td>
<td>83</td>
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<td>4 Stars</td>
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<td>1,368</td>
<td>2,766</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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While a diversity of opinion is expressed across the body of texts, several themes predominate. These themes relate to the politics of truth, economics and the dysfunction of the state’s welfare policies, and the need to exercise and protect the democratic values of German society. Although the importance of Sarrazin’s most racially charged claims
was frequently minimized, reviews often defended the validity of such claims using economic and statistical facts. The reviews, as a corpus, represent an impassioned defense of society based on a purportedly dispassionate rationality of facts and figures. The threat to society, as it is constructed here, is not just integration-refusing immigrants, but more fundamentally, the welfare state that perpetuates this failure to integrate. The reviewers assert the democratic sovereignty of the people, as represented by the outpouring of public support for Sarrazin, to check the over-reach of the government.

One of the most common themes repeated in reviews was the strength of the book’s truth-value, which was based on logic and statistical fact. Reviewers frequently stated that these statistics and facts are widely known and accepted, yet they also claimed that they are “swept under the rug” (CyberCynic, 2010) by the liberal elite.

The data presented in the book shows a sad truth, that is well supported by statistics. Namely, the rejection by some immigrants of the simplest basic rules: the learning of a foreign language as well as the observance of the laws and rules of the host society. (Olli R., 2010)

In his book, Sarrazin draws on broadly recognized investigations, studies, scientists and, without exception, on serious sources. He collects statistics, evaluates them and draws his conclusions in a dispassionate, objective way. As such, it has less to do with “opinions,” but rather with conclusions about things that are already known. (CyberCynic, 2010)

People accuse Sarrazin that his numerical data are all wrong. As a board member of the Bundesbank, Sarrazin has access to the best available statistical material. He would hardly leave himself open, with false data on the birth rates of Turkish migrant women in relation to German academics. (Chartleser, 2010)

Sarrazin was described as a disinterested and rational professional, characteristics that lend legitimacy to his interpretation of the data. In fact, reviewers used the abundance of data to marginalize Sarrazin’s interpretive role. As one reviewer assessed, “the author has brought together many facts, that speak a clear language” (Naoko, 2010). The
mechanisms of knowledge invoked to validate Sarrazin’s thesis involve tools of quantification to analyze and diagnose society. In Foucault’s 1978-79 lectures on the birth of biopolitics, Foucault emphasizes the need to determine “under what conditions and with what effects a veridiction is exercised, that is to say... a type of formulation falling under particular rules of verification and falsification” (2008, p. 36). Foucault is not interested in empirical truth per se, but rather in the regimes of veridiction that enable truth claims to be made and widely accepted regardless of their empirical validity. While the debate often focused on proving or disproving Sarrazin’s data, the most important part of the debate was its function, not the validity of the science itself. The debate was and is important because of how it established biopolitics as the relevant mode of knowledge about society and its Others.

In examining the rise of biopolitics, Foucault identifies the rise of a regime of truth based on political economy. In his lectures from 1975-1976, Foucault (2003) defines biopolitics as the massifying mode of power, aimed at the level of the population, as opposed to disciplinary forms that regulate at the level of the individual. The goal of biopower is to achieve equilibrium, regularity, and homeostasis across the social body. It involves a set of processes such as the ratio of birth to death, the rate of reproduction, the fertility of the population, and it introduces new mechanisms including forecasts, statistical estimates, and overall measures (Foucault, 2003, p. 246). The goal of these mechanisms is to cultivate “the power to make live” to optimize the state of life (Foucault, 2003, p. 247). In seeking to trace the development of biopower in his later lectures, Foucault turns to the strategic logics of the market and political economy (see also Chapter 2). With the rise of capitalism in the 18th and 19th centuries, the market
moved from being the domain of jurisdiction (justice) to the site of the formation of truth. In this, the government shifted away from being the arbiter of justice in the market. Instead, the market took over the determination of what qualifies as good governance. “The market determines that a good government is no longer quite simply one that is just...The market must tell the truth (dire le vrai); it must tell the truth in relation to governmental practice” (Foucault, 2008, p. 32). Foucault calls these two heterogeneous systems the revolutionary axiomatic, which operates according to public law and the rights of man, and the empirical and utilitarian, “which defines the sphere of independence of the governed on the basis of the necessary limitation of government” (2008, p. 43). Although these regimes of truth are heterogeneous, between them exists “a ceaseless connection and a whole series of bridges, transits, and joints” (Foucault, 2008, p. 43). As with universalist and particularist approaches to culture (see Introduction), while there are clear distinctions between the logic of each, they often work together to maintain hegemonic norms.

Both systems of truth with their attendant moral schemata are present in the tensions of the Sarrazin debate. However, it is the empirical and utilitarian approach that supportive reviewers focus on most heavily. The axiomatic approach does emerge, however, in the form of the defense of German democratic values that are under threat from demographic changes favoring the Muslim population. In explaining why Sarrazin should not be compared to the extreme right, one reviewer wrote:

The NPD [German National Party] is an undemocratic party; Sarrazin, however, speaks precisely to the point that with migrants from Turkish and Arab countries undemocratic and anti-human rights tides are infiltrating Germany. Sarrazin has absolutely nothing against a Turkish migrant who respects German laws, learns the German language, and feeds his own family.\textsuperscript{xii} (Müller-Güldemeister, 2010)
When the axiomatic paradigm appears in these reviews, it is often in the context of defending German moral and demographic values from “incompatible” cultures, which are epitomized by Turks, Arabs, and Muslims generally. This mode of governance and social distinction aligns with what Wallerstein (2006) calls “European universalism,” which, building on a clash of civilizations narrative, holds that Western civilizations are superior to their Others because they are the only ones based on universal values of equality and human rights. This comment also shows that the perceived anti-democratic ideology of Muslim immigrants can be construed as aligning them with the German far right. Finally, the reviewer upholds the fairness of critiquing the inferior values of Turks and Arabs by claiming that individuals may act independently and distance themselves from the statistically proven tendencies of their group. By adhering to the legal, cultural-linguistic, and economic norms of German society a Turkish immigrant does not pose a threat.

Sarrazin supporters also frame anti-racist criticism an existential threat to German society.

Leaving aside Thilo Sarrazin's sometimes rather coarse articulations, the book delivers above all verifiable facts that should serve as the basis for a discussion on necessary changes in our integration politics….in no way do I see his writing as an inflammatory smear that could serve to threaten the social peace in Germany. On the contrary: a man writes here, who talks not of assimilation but of integration, who is primary driven by worries about the future of our country, and who wants to dissolve the unspeakability of the clash of cultures by clearly naming the existing conflicts. xiii (Ulrich Groh, 2010)

Topics that are of true existential significance for our society—and not to forget—for our children are covered with thought and speech bans. Transgressions are very effectively punished by the racism cudgel or by banishment to the dirty brown corner.”xiv (W. F. Schmidt, 2010)
There have been many attempts to reduce Sarrazin’s very thoroughly presented self-evident [arguments] to xenophobia. Whoever argues this has not read the book. Whoever gets drawn into such an argument is squandering our historical last chance to turn things around and prevent irreparable changes that mean an uncertain future for us and our children.\textsuperscript{xv} (P. Schmitz, 2010)

Anti-racist discourses here are construed as posing a threat to life and democracy by silencing the truth necessary to protect German society into the future. In complementary ways, these reviews deny the racial project of Sarrazin’s work. Here, it is not racism that threatens German democracy, but rather anti-racist discourses that prevent the acknowledgement of the real threats to democracy.

The tensions and contradictions inherent in these logics follow, in part, from the economic and political logics that developed in the Federal Republic after the World War II. As Foucault demonstrates, the “ordoliberal” (German neo-liberal) economic philosophy that formed the basis of West German post-war economic policies was based on the rejection of Nazi economic policy, which was conceived as the consolidation of four economic policies that had operated before the war: a protected economy, state socialism, economic planning, and Keynesian interventionism. “Faced with the Nazi system, the theoretical, speculative coup de force of the German neo-liberals was not to say, as most people did at the time, and especially the Keynesians: The economic system the Nazis are setting up is a monstrosity” (Foucault, 2008, p. 109). Instead, ordoliberals posited that Nazism demonstrated the culmination of the economic logics of these four economic approaches. The thread that links these approaches is the state’s control over economic processes. “Since Nazism shows that the defects and destructive effects traditionally attributed to the market economy should instead be attributed to the state and its intrinsic defects and specific rationality, then the analyses must be completely
The resulting ideal is an inversion: a state supervised by the market as opposed to a market supervised by the state. Sarrazin aligns himself with these postwar ideals of a state that directs its interventions according to the market, and those postwar ideals are firmly associated with Germany’s post-fascist reconstruction as an exemplary democratic nation.

In Sarrazin’s book and in reviewers’ responses, the misdirected interventions of the state are the fundamental social and economic barrier preventing democracy—in the form of the sovereign will of the people—and market rationality from working to solve the nation’s problems. Reviewers do not denounce government intervention at large, but only intervention that limits liberty and inhibits the regulatory effects of the market. They call instead for more active interventions to enforce market rationality, which, in this view, necessitates integration. One reviewer praised *Germany Does Away with Itself* as

A long-overdue, rousing book that underpins with numbers where our government’s *laissez-faire* [policies] and especially the one-sided media reporting with its multicultural glorification and prescribed bleeding heart idealism (*Gutmenschentum*) has gotten Germany.\(^{xvi}\) (Franziska G., 2010)

The unwillingness of government to make active interventions to ensure the future life of the German population is interpreted as resulting from German guilt over the Nazi past. Not only are comparisons of Sarrazin’s theories with the eugenics of the Nazi period dismissed as invalid, guilt about the Nazi period actually threatens the German population:

> We live here in an absolute suck-up society. We stand in the middle of absolute chaos and our dear politicians silence what is going on here to death. Why? Because they want to play the nice Germans, the perfect Germans for the whole world, but don’t have things under control in any way. And why should we and our children still held responsible for things that someone hatched decades ago.\(^{xvii}\) (S. Staufen-Breisach “Halleluja,” 2010)
Here, the government’s excess is evident, on the one hand, in the anti-racist political correctness that seeks to limit the free speech of citizens who speak out against immigrants and minorities and, on the other, in the welfare state’s meddling with the proper functioning of the market system. In this view, “social policy cannot have equality as its objective. On the contrary, it must let inequality function” (Foucault, 2008, p. 143). This vision of equality is that inequality is the same for all. In this regard, the United States is invoked as a more appropriate model. In the U.S., social benefits are more limited and unavailable to newly arrived immigrants. “Therefore,” writes another reviewer, “integration there is enforced through the necessity of participation in the labor process” (Falk Müller, 2010). By focusing on the role of the state in producing this social dysfunction, reviewers humanize Sarrazin’s critique:

Contrary to what is claimed over and over, Sarrazin does not blame either Hartz-IV (welfare) recipients or migrants across-the-board, neither does he attack them. On the contrary, he determines that they behave, like any entrepreneur or employee, and in fact any economic person, according to the rules of economics, in that they optimize the relationship between input and output. Whoever can get something for free would be stupid to pay for it, and whoever earns more without working in Germany than they would with hard work in their homeland, would be badly advised not to come here if he could. (Müller-Güldemeister, 2010)

By inhibiting the salutary inequality of the market, this quote argues that the state incentivizes less industrious people to leave their homelands in search of the easy life provided by Germany’s welfare system. Here the reviewer argues that, not only does Sarrazin not condemn immigrants who take advantage of the system, he respects their rational decision to pursue a piece of the German dole. Thus, the only logical conclusion is to change the incentives driving that decision.
Along the same lines, reviewers condemn state interventions that support low-income families with children for encouraging the “wrong sorts” of populations to proliferate. Incentives governing the rationality of reproduction are among of the most frequently mentioned concerns in reviews. As another reviewer writes, the welfare system

Encourages families from the social stratum that cannot or will not survive through their own impetus to have large numbers of children. Thus, the taxpayer finances the intellectual thinning [of society], ever more welfare recipients are coming with ever fewer gainful workers. (P. Schmitz, 2010)

This line of argumentation underscores the death that is always implicit in biopower. Here the life of the intellectually inferior represents the weakening and death of the population. The implication is that for the German population to live, power must be exercised to curb the growth of sub-populations that pose a threat to that life. This illustrates the connection that Mbembe observes between “the generalized instrumentalization of human existence and the material destruction of human bodies and populations (2003, p. 14). In biopolitics, the destruction of human bodies and populations is ideally carried out through the optimization of policies aimed at controlling life and death at the aggregate level. The interventionist state—or, more precisely, the improperly intervening state—is singled out as the primary enabler of undesirable immigrants. Political intervention, here, needs to follow and support the logics of the market, creating the proper incentives to discourage the reproduction of undesirable populations. Reviewers support the extension of economic rationality into the most intimate private spheres of life. The market, properly supported by state institutions, would act as a guide and educator, rooting out the indolent and cultivating the entrepreneurial.
Although the immigrant underclasses are portrayed here as being all but helpless in the face of the poorly managed incentive system, the moral critique of Muslim immigrant indolence usually returns once the discussion turns to individual responsibility. As the above reviewer continues,

58% of people with Turkish roots do not feel welcome in Germany. But what better way to achieve recognition in a country than through successful self-integration of which one can be proud? And those who only want social support, without integration or without rendering any service at all in return—to them one has to say: you are really not welcome!†† (Falk Müller, 2010)

In this remark, integration is framed as a tangible accomplishment in which one can take pride. What exactly this integration entails is not explicit, but it implies the achievement of social success. In the first case it connotes entrepreneurship, whether social or economic. Integration is also framed as a possible form of reciprocation for those receiving public benefits. Either way, integration serves as short hand for the achievement of social worth.

With the focus on fertility and the political economy of the welfare state, Sarrazin and his supporters advocate changes that would limit the intervention of the government in supporting the salutary function of the economy. In biopolitics, “the multiplicity of individuals is no longer pertinent, the population is” (Foucault, 2009, p. 42). The discourses and mechanisms of security in biopolitics function, “without prohibiting or prescribing, but possibly making use of some instruments of prescription and prohibition, to respond to a reality in such a way that this response cancels out the reality to which it responds--nullifies it, or limits, checks, or regulates it” (Foucault, 2009, p. 47). By eliminating the welfare state, the market would be permitted to operate freely, and would correct the problems of undesirable immigration. At the same time, public resources
could be spent modifying conditions to encourage the procreation of “the more competent” (*die Tüchtigeren*) (Sarrazin, 2010a, p. 174).

**Conclusion: Consolidating the People**

The book excerpt published in *Der Spiegel* opened with the sovereign claim that “it is the right of every society to determine for itself who it will admit. Every country has the right, thereby, to protect its culture and its traditions” (Sarrazin, 2010b). The social, political, and economic are all brought together in the Sarrazin’s statistically legitimated portrayal of the decline of German society. The above statement invokes the sovereign right of the nation-state to define its borders and decide who within them has the right to have rights. As Agamben shows, modern biopolitics is characterized by the constant need to redefine the boundaries of life that define and separate the inside from the outside, which is to say, to perpetually distinguish between politically relevant and bare life (1998, p. 131). Given the central role of biopolitics in the eugenicist projects of the Nazi regime, it is surprising that Sarrazin largely overcame anti-racist critiques of his work. This may be related to the fact that Sarrazin’s underlying political-economic framework is taken directly from the post-war ordoliberal economic philosophy, which is associated with Germany’s return to democracy and economic prosperity. In fact, as was discussed above, the ordoliberals defined themselves precisely in contrast to their characterization of Nazi political economy.

However, as Agamben (1998) points out, the ease of transformation of modern parliamentary democracies to totalitarian states and then back again is only made possible because of the extent to which politics has become biopolitics. The trajectories of Italy
and Germany show that their political transformations were primarily a matter of determining a new form of organization suited to the task of the “care, control, and use of bare life” (Agamben, 1998, p. 122). As the troubling binary between the capable and the incapable in the Sarrazin debate showed, the shadow of biopower’s imperative to “make live” represents a continuity between modern totalitarian and democratic states. In a system that operates under the impetus to make live, racism “is primarily a way of introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power’s control: the break between what must live and what must die” (Foucault, 2003, p. 254). These implications of the cultural binaries drawn in the debate were not lost on all reviewers. One critical reviewer summarized the central point of Sarrazin’s book as follows: “there is worthy and there is unworthy life” (Steuber, 2010).

Despite the initial outrage over the genetic elements of Sarrazin’s arguments, the framing of integration as a cultural, economic, and political problem was generally accepted on the terms set forth by Sarrazin. In particular, integration is conceived as an individual process undertaken by non-Germans acting according to economic rationalities that can be measured by the socio-economic performance of an individual or group. This is demonstrated by the fact that the Sarrazin debate progressively became an integration debate, which focused on why some groups were socially deficient. This debate developed into calls by the leading center-right Christian Democrats for policies to reform and restrict immigration. Following similar statements from the party’s leader, Horst Seehofer, chairman of the Christian Social Union argued that, “no additional immigration should be allowed in the future from cultural groups that reject our German Leitkultur (leading culture). Integration refusal and the rejection of our German Leitkultur
are two sides of the same coinxxxiii (Weiland, 2010). Commentators that argued against the characterization of certain groups as “integration refusers” (Integrationsverweigerer) tended to rely on individual model immigrants (see El-Sharif, 2010). As the comments posted below these articles confirm, these sorts of individualized accounts were easily rejected as irrelevant to broader social trends that confirmed the existence of problem groups. This view holds that through their supposed rejection of German values, problem immigrants are condemned to—and deserving of—the social inequality that characterizes their situation. Thus, if they would only choose to integrate, the success that results from the superiority of the German canon of values (Wertekanon)32 could also be theirs.

The Sarrazin debate also opened new space for rightwing politics in the German mainstream, sparking speculation about the foundation of a new rightwing political party lead by Sarrazin. Although Sarrazin had no interest in founding a party, or even in leaving his center-left Social Democratic Party, the call for a rightwing alternative was answered with the establishment of the Euro-skeptic Alternative for Germany (AfD) party in 2013. The party platform closely follows many of the ideas promoted by Sarrazin, from a purist approach to economic liberalism to a desire to restrict Muslim immigration. While the party was founded with a primary focus on economic liberalism, the anti-immigration and ethnic nationalist elements of their platform have become increasingly prominent. The AfD has been making consistent gains in the polls since their

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32 For a typical example of the formulation of the role of these canonic values, see (Sarrazin, 2010a, p. 19)
founding, and has overtaken in the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats to become the second party in several states. The Sarrazin debate set the objectives and galvanized the public for a new political movement on the right in Germany.

The previous chapters have examined distinct occurrences of celebration and condemnation of immigrants and their descendants, while also drawing them into relation through their common foundation in biopolitical discourses that seek to manage difference in the government of life. The next chapter examines where these two modes of integration discourse overlap and collide in cases where minority celebrities serve as models of integration or its failure. It will also address the role of ideas about the German language that emerge repeatedly throughout integration discourse. The creation of prizes honoring “examples of successful integration” and campaigns that mobilize exceptional minority individuals celebrates an ideal of diversity that supports normative German values. Successful individuals prove the cosmopolitan and meritocratic character of German society and, at the same time, gloss over the myriad differences that distinguish the experiences of first generation immigrants from those of their children and grandchildren. Minority celebrities play several different roles in this form of integration narrative, from “migrant” strawman to minority hegemonic enforcer. The cases in the next chapter underscore the never-resolved status of the candidate for integration by tracing examples that cross back and forth between celebrating success and reifying failure.
Dieser Grundoptimismus und die Jahrzehnte des fas ungebrüten Erfolgs haben aber die Sehschärfe der Deutschen getrübt für die Gefährdungen und Fäulnisprozesse im Innern der Gesellschaft.

"Über die schiere Abnahme der Bevölkerung hinaus gefährdet vor allem die kontinuierliche Zunahme der weniger Stabilen, weniger Intelligenzigen und weniger Tüchtigen die Zukunft Deutschlands,"

"…um die Qualität, die Struktur und den kulturellen Hintergrund der Migranten in Deutschland."

Inder und Vietnamesen wirken in Deutschland mindestens so fremdartig wie Türken und Araber und haben doch viel größere Erfolge in unserer Gesellschaft vorzuweisen. Ursachen für die Schwierigkeiten in der Schule, am Arbeitsmarkt und generell in der Gesellschaft müssen daher wohl auch in den Gruppen selbst gesucht werden; sie dürften also durchaus etwas mit deren eigenem Verhalten zu tun haben.

Im Kern ist das deutsche Bildungsproblem vor allem auch ein Problem der muslimischen Migranten. Wenn hier von Migranten gesprochen wird, sind ausschließlich Migranten aus den muslimischen Ländern gemeint (Türkei, Afrika, Naher und Mittlerer Osten). Sie haben als Einzige zu großen Teilen Sprachprobleme, sie bilden zugleich einen wesentlichen Teil der Unterschicht und Transfer bevölkerung in Deutschland, und ihre Kinder haben die größten Schwierigkeiten im deutschen Bildungssystem.

"Alle Juden teilen ein bestimmtes Gen, Basken haben bestimmte Gene, die sie von anderen unterscheiden."


Die im Buch vorgestellte Datenlage zeigt eine traurige Wahrheit, die statistisch gut unterlegt wurde. Namentlich die Weigerungshaltung einiger Immigranten die einfachsten Grundregeln zu beachten: das Erlernen der fremden Sprache sowie die Beachtung der Gesetze und Regeln des Aufnahmelandes.

Sarrazin bezieht sich in seinem Buch auf allgemein anerkannte Untersuchungen, Studien, Wissenschaftler und durchweg seriöse Quellen. Er erfasst Statistiken, wertet diese aus und zieht seine Schlüsse in einer unaufgeregten sachlichen Weise. Es handelt sich also weniger um "Meinungen", sondern um Konclusionen dessen, was bereits bekannt ist.

Man wirft Sarrazin vor das seine Zahlenangaben alle falsch sind. Sarrazin hat als Bundesbankvorsitzender Zugang zu dem besten verfügbaren statistischen Material. Er wird sich kaum die Blöße geben, dass seine Zahlenangaben zu den Geburtenraten türkischer Migrantinnen bzw. deutscher Akademikerinnen falsch sind.

Der Autor hat viele Zahlen zusammengetragen, die eine deutliche Sprache sprechen.

Die NPD ist eine undemokratische Partei; Sarrazin wendet sich aber gerade dagegen, dass mit Migranten aus türkischen und arabischen Ländern demokratie- und menschenrechtsfeindliche Strömungen nach Deutschland eindringen. Gegen einen türkischen Migranten, der die deutschen Gesetze achtet, die deutsche Sprache lernt und sich und seine Familie selbst ernährt, hat Sarrazin rein gar nichts.

Sieht man einmal von der zuweilen etwas deftigen Artikulation des Thilo Sarrazin ab, so liefert das Buch in erster Linie verifizierbare Fakten, die als Diskussionsgrundlage für notwendige Änderungen in unserer Integrationspolitik herhalten sollen und diesen Anspruch auch erfüllen. Keineswegs hingegen verstehe ich seine Schrift als aufwieglerische Hetze, die dazu geeignet sein könnte, den sozialen Frieden in Deutschland zu gefährden. Im Gegenteil: Hier schreibt ein Mann, der nicht der Assimilation, sondern der Integration das Wort redet, den primär die Sorge um die Zukunft dieses Landes umtreibt und der die

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Sprachlosigkeit der aufeinanderprallenden Kulturen auflösen will, indem er die bestehenden Konflikte klar benennt.


xv Es wird vielfach versucht, die von Sarrazin sehr ausführlich dargestellten Selbstverständlichkeiten auf angebliche Ausländerfeindlichkeit zu reduzieren. Wer so argumentiert, hat dieses Buch nicht gelesen. Wer sich auf so eine Argumentation einlässt, verspielt die historische letzte Chance, das Ruder noch herumzureißen und unumkehrbare Veränderungen zu verhindern, die eine ungewisse Zukunft für uns und unsere Kinder bedeuten.

xvi Ein längst überfälliges, aufrüttelndes Buch, das mit Zahlen untermauert, wohin das Laissez-faire unserer Regierungen und besonders die einseitige Medienberichterstattung mit ihrer Multikultiglorifizierung und verordnetem Gutmenschentum Deutschland gebracht haben


xviii “Dort hat man erst nach mehreren Jahren Aufenthalt Anspruch auf Sozialhilfe, die relativ gering und zu dem auf 5 Jahre begrenzt ist. Dadurch wird Integration dort schon durch die notwendige Teilnahme am Arbeitsprozess erzwungen.”

xix Im Gegensatz zu dem, was immer wieder behauptet wird, beschuldigt Sarrazin weder Hartz-IV-Empfänger noch Migranten pauschal, noch greift er sie an. Im Gegenteil, er stellt fest, dass sie sich, wie jeder Unternehmer oder Arbeitnehmer, überhaupt jeder wirtschaftende Mensch, nach den Grundsätzen der Ökonomie verhalten, indem sie das Verhältnis zwischen Input und Output optimieren. Wer etwas umsonst kriegen kann, wäre dumm, etwas dafür zu bezahlen, und wer in Deutschland ohne Arbeit mehr verdient als in seinem Heimatland mit harter Arbeit, wäre schlecht beraten, nicht hierher zu kommen, wenn er es könnte.

xx 58% der Menschen türkischer Abstammung fühlen sich in Deutschland nicht willkommen. Aber wie kann man Anerkennung in einem Land besser erreichen, als durch ihre Integrationsleistung, auf die man selbst auch stolz sein kann? Und wer nur Sozialleistungen will, ohne Integration oder überhaupt Gegenleistung—dem muss man sagen: du bist wirklich nicht willkommen!

xxi “Es ist das Recht einer jeden Gesellschaft, selbst zu entscheiden, wen sie aufnehmen will, und jedes Land hat das Recht, dabei auf die Wahrung seiner Kultur und seiner Traditionen zu achten”

xxii “Die Kernaussage dieses Buches ist: Es gibt wertes und es gibt unwertes Leben.”

xxiii ”Es darf in Deutschland künftig keine zusätzliche Zuwanderung aus Kulturkreisen geben, die unsere deutsche Leitkultur ablehnen. Integrationsverweigerung und Ablehnung unserer deutschen Leitkultur sind zwei Seiten einer Medaille.”
CHAPTER 7 – MODELS AND MISCREANTS: INTEGRATION BY CELEBRITY EXAMPLE

Over the course of the first decade of the new millennium, the oxymoronic category of “foreign co-citizens” (ausländische Mitbürger) that arose in the 1980s began to give way to the cumbersome “people with a migration background” (Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund). This new term maintains an emphasis on the foreign, conflating the crucial differences in the experiences of immigrants and their German-born children and grandchildren. Those whose foreignness remains visible through somatic characteristics, or through names and dress, are categorized apart from the German national collective. More precisely, the category turns them into perpetual candidates for integration, who may be approved as a valuable member of the national population one day and classified as a threat the next. This chapter further examines the construction of qualifications for integration success and failure that surfaced in the 2010 Sarrazin affair using two celebrity-focused media projects broadcast during the same year. The first project is the creation of a new prize category honoring “integration” by one of Germany’s most important media award programs. The second is a print media campaign that displayed pictures of successful immigrants and people of color ostensibly to encourage German language learning.

Unlike the Sarrazin affair, which began from a place of condemnation, these two media projects purport to celebrate and support integration success. However, closer analysis reveals the shared underlying assumptions about the positive value of normative Germanness and the social and intellectual deficits of immigrants and minority
Germans—groups that are conflated under the umbrella term “migrant.” The famous entertainers at the center of these projects used the platforms they provided to stake a claim to full citizenship as “new Germans” (see also Chapter 5). In doing so, however, they often supported the same discourses of integration that perpetuate the divide between normative citizens and those who must perpetually prove their value.

The first example this chapter examines is the debut of the category of the “Integration Bambi,” created in 2010 for Herbert Burda Media’s annual Bambi Awards, one of Germany’s most important media awards. The inaugural Integration Bambi was presented to national soccer team member, Mesut Özil. The son of Turkish immigrants, Özil has been widely celebrated and heavily scrutinized in the German public since his successful debut on the national team in the 2010 World Cup in South Africa. The creation of the new award and the celebration of Özil as an “example of successful integration” were received with little comment by the media. Evidently, the award and its recipient fit with generally accepted narratives and, thus, remained soft news of only passing interest. The 2011 recipient, on the other hand, attracted significant attention. The selection of then 33-year-old rapper Bushido, born Anis Mohamed Youssef Ferchichi, for an integration award was considered scandalous and sparked a series of protests by former Bambi recipients and activist groups representing LGBT and feminist interests. Although Bushido has received numerous awards for his music without raising controversy, his acknowledgement in the context of integration was treated differently. In rejecting Bushido as an example of successful integration, evidence was marshaled to show how he is in fact an example of failed integration. In criticizing Bushido’s selection, critics reified the value of the prize and consolidated a portrait of its inverse. The corpus
for this section is the website for the Bambi awards as well as a recording of the speeches presenting the award to Mesut Özil in 2010 and to Bushido in 2011. The news coverage of the inaugural award for Özil was sparse; it was mentioned in most of the news pieces summarizing the event, but it did not inspire significant commentary. In contrast, Bushido’s receipt of the award inspired heavy coverage and commentary. Since the corpus of press coverage of the Bushido award is too large for close textual analysis, I limited my search to articles written from the day of the ceremony and the following two days (November 10-12, 2011), which I determined was the period of most intensive coverage. In this period, 24 articles were returned from Google Custom Searches of the top German periodicals (see Introduction for source selection methodology) using the search terms *Bambi AND Bushido AND integration* (see table 7). My analysis asks how the contrast between these two award recipients defined and entrenched the discourse of integration.

Table 7: Top Periodical Results for *Bambi AND Bushido AND Integration*, Nov. 10-12, 2011

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<td><em>Focus</em></td>
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<td><em>Frankfurter Rundschau</em></td>
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The second example I analyze is a self-described “integration campaign” that debuted in early 2010, which was created through the cooperation of the German Federal Government and the Association of German Periodical Publishers (Verband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger). Analysis of this example reveals an important theme in integration discourse: the inadequacy of minority usage of the German language. The campaign, titled “Raus mit der Sprache. Rein ins Leben”\(^{33}\)(henceforth Out with It), featured photographs of prominent individuals “with immigration backgrounds” sticking out their black, red, and gold striped tongues to indicate their ability to speak German. The campaign, which claims to “to encourage immigrants to learn German,” argues that speaking the language is the key to a successful life in Germany. What is not clear is how someone without fluency in German and significant knowledge of German popular culture would understand the ads. This logical gap notwithstanding, the campaign was honored with the prestigious Cultural Prize for the German Language (Kulturpreis Deutsche Sprache). This section will analyze the assumptions about immigrant and

\[^{33}\text{Lit. “Out with language, into life.” Raus mit der Sprache is an idiom, which loosely translates to “speak up” or “out with it.” In this chapter, I will refer to this as the Out with It campaign.}\]
minority Germans that motivate the campaign as well as the kind of citizenship performed by exceptional bodies of color in the campaign. Furthermore, it will address the how ideas about the German language play into the construction of the category of “integran.”

After an outline of the institutional and logical scaffolding of the Out with It campaign, I analyze the song that was selected as the theme for the second iteration of the campaign in late 2010 in the wake of the Sarrazin debate. The song, Nur ein Augenblick by rapper Harris, was used in a music video showing the making of the campaign. The original video for the song debuted on October 3, 2010, on German Unity Day. The video shows washed out images of the German flag waving masses on the Berlin “Fan Mile”, the stretch of road between the Brandenburg Gate and the Victory Column that has been set up for public viewings of national soccer matches during the men’s FIFA World Cup (see Chapter 3). The song’s text calls out integration refusers (Integrationsverweigerer), condemning them for their criminal tendencies and their complaints about Germany while denying the significance of racism. The sources for this section are the advertisements featuring 27 minority and immigrant models and the two videos for the campaign theme song, Nur ein Augenblick. I also examine press coverage of the campaign and its theme song to understand how they were interpreted in the mainstream media. While this campaign attracted considerable praise from across the press sphere, it

34 Lit. “Just a Blink of an Eye”
was generally considered uncontroversial and, thus, did not spur a large volume of coverage. As such, I expanded my search to include results from the German press archive, WISO\textsuperscript{35} in addition to Google Custom Searches of the top German periodicals. The searches for the campaign slogan, “\textit{Raus mit der Sprache. Rein ins Leben},” returned 33 articles discussing the campaign. Searches for \textit{Harris AND Integration AND rapper} returned 20 articles, 18 of which appeared in late 2010 when the campaign chose his song as its theme. Table 8 shows the combined results of both searches, which totaled 35 unique articles.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Periodical Type</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Top Periodicals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local/Regional</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>335</strong></td>
<td><strong>22</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As with the \textit{Du bist Deutschland} campaigns from 2005 and 2007 (see Chapter 4), this campaign and the new Bambi award category tout the diversity of German society, while also reaffirming the normativity of whiteness. These projects, which are all primarily led by the German media industry, mobilize minority bodies to affirm the cosmopolitan, tolerant, and meritocratic character of contemporary Germany. However, as the projects

\textsuperscript{35} WISO-net.de is an academic archive that includes 188 local, regional, and national periodicals.
in this chapter show, defining integration success through celebrity example also constructs integration failure as a matter of individual choice.

**Prize Logic in the Public Sphere: The Bambi and German Social Cohesion**

In 2010, Germany’s oldest media prize, the Bambi, added a new category; the jury awarded the first Bambi prize for “Integration” to the national soccer team midfielder Mesut Özil. With the German team’s third place finish at the 2010 FIFA World Cup the previous summer, soccer played a prominent part in the Bambi ceremony, reflecting its impact in the media sphere for the year. The creation of the Integration Bambi is also a reflection of anxieties over a changing Germany, which erupted three months earlier with the publication of Thilo Sarrazin’s anti-Islam polemic, *Deutschland schafft sich ab (Germany Does Away with Itself)* (see Chapter 6). What came to be known as the Sarrazin Debate stirred up national sentiments and surprised many public figures by revealing the popularity of Sarrazin’s stance against Muslim minorities (see Follath, 2010). By selecting a prominent, widely popular figure to stand as an “outstanding example of successful integration,” the Bambi jury provided a counter-example to Sarrazin’s disparaging pseudo-scientific analysis of Muslims in Germany.

However, while the Bambi for Integration ostensibly celebrates the presence of minority identities as part of Germany, it simultaneously circumscribes those identities, supporting notions of distinct cultural sources. Successful integration is defined as the acquisition of distinctly German cultural traits and traditions, while maintaining a pure connection to what is described as one’s “cultural roots.” The Integration Bambi is emblematic of attempts by the media to define an acceptable place in the nation for
minority identities, while still maintaining a normative core concept of a German culture independent of and distinct from that of minority cultures. Despite the problematics raised by the proscriptive qualifications for belonging inherent in a cultural prize for integration, the German press generally failed to question the category itself. In part, this failure can be traced to the logic and structure of the cultural prize itself. The critical and deliberative press essential for complex cultural dialogue in the mediated public sphere is short circuited by the cultural prize which, as James English (2008) shows, is not only resistant to critique, but requires critique to thrive.

This section investigates the nature of the public sphere created by this prize. This case illuminates the German media’s investment in the definition of national identity as well as the role and definition of the concept of culture in this national project. Entertainment-focused cultural prizes mobilize the symbolic value of celebrity for political, social, and economic purposes. Although this is also true of cultural prizes in general, pop culture prizes such as the Bambi are built explicitly on the logic of celebrity, which consists of a virtuous circle in which media presence creates celebrity and celebrity, in turn, legitimates the media.

The Bambi has claimed the space of adjudicator in the German media sphere. Although it embraces the populism of the most commercial media offerings, the Bambi does not hesitate to arbitrate the weightiest public issues. It has positioned itself as a hub of circulation in the public sphere. The Bambi selects from and amplifies images, events, and discourses circulated in the media in each year. As Michael Warner put it, “a public is the social space created by the reflexive circulation of discourse” (2002, p. 62). The Bambi presumes to create a space for the appraisal and appreciation of everything that
ostensibly matters in the mediated German public sphere, including well-known international figures like Jane Goodall (Our Earth Bambi 2010), international celebrities like Justin Bieber (Entertainment Bambi 2014), and national soccer players Miroslav Klose and Phillip Lahm (Jury Prize 2014).

The 2010 Bambi awards were in conversation with a variety of issues of public interest at the time. This is particularly clear in the case of the creation of the new category: The Bambi for “Integration.” The introduction of this award category reflects the preoccupation with identity and the evolving ethnic makeup of Germany. As I suggested above, it responds to a recent flair-up of social tension national self-reflection surrounding the publishing of Sarrazin’s controversial but extremely popular anti-Islam book (see Chapter 6). It also mobilizes the relatively uncomplicated and presumably apolitical sentiments of national cohesion formed around the German national soccer team and the FIFA World Cup (see Chapters 3-5). These events, too, are part of a larger process of national reflection on the meaning of Germanness. As the 2010 Sarrazin debate from Chapter 6 shows, although citizenship law changes at the turn of the millennium were an essential step in opening conceptions of Germanness to include ethnic and religious minorities, the threat posed by minorities to national normativity continues to be a source of considerable societal anxiety among majority Germans. Although politicians were generally united in their immediate condemnation of Sarrazin’s book, the popularity of his ideas among the majority population caused almost immediate backsliding, culminating in Chancellor Merkel’s statement declaring that multiculturalism had “failed utterly” (Smee, 2010).
Since the international soccer spectacle was a major focus of media attention in 2010, the Bambi organizers had planned to relive some of the World Cup enthusiasm with a performance by Shakira of the official World Cup song, “Waka Waka (This Time for Africa).” In a long tradition of Bambi awards for the national soccer establishment, the national team coach and training team received a jury’s choice Bambi. In creating the category of Bambi for “integration” and awarding it to Mesut Özil, the jury weighed in on the public debate, projecting onto the athlete their conception of “successful integration.” Composed of players from a wide variety of ethnic backgrounds, 2010 national team was celebrated in the press as a representation of, in Özil’s words, “a colorful new Germany” (Bambi 2010, 2010). Özil, whose talent and Turkish heritage has made him the subject of intense interest in the press, emerged in 2010 as one of the team’s strongest players.

The Bambi awards mobilized Özil’s celebrity to conceptualize and celebrate a notion of social cohesion, in which minorities “hold onto their roots” without publically challenging or changing the norms of German society. As David Marshall argues, celebrity is a powerful and malleable sign at the media’s disposal with its “capacity to house conceptions of individuality and simultaneously to employ or help embody ‘collective configurations of the social world’” (1997, p. xi). To understand what it means to be a celebrity, or Prominente, in Germany, we can look to the highest-circulating German periodical, the daily tabloid Bild. The Bild website includes a “theme page” dedicated to “Deutsche Promis” (German Celebs) that outlines a political economy of attention, in which individuals give up their privacy and submit to public scrutiny because “they live from regularly being in the media, since it increases their fame and
with it their market value”i (“Deutsche Promis - Stars aus Musik, Fernsehen, Kunst und Kultur,” n.d.). The examples of celebrities in the article include television moderators, actors, musicians, and athletes. In answer to the question of “why we need celebs,” Bild theorizes that “most people need role models. Not only to imitate them, but also to distance themselves, following the motto, ‘That is totally not okay!’”

Mediations of celebrity lives, thus, create a symbolic space for drawing connections and boundaries in the public adjudication of norms governing the body politic.

The Integration Bambi, like many of the other “social” Bambis that celebrate celebrity charity, separates the celebrity from the ostensible source of their fame—their work as professionals—and uses the social capital of their pure renown to make a statement about society. Particularly for socially-oriented prizes, that which is being honored is often as much about defining that which is unacceptable. As such, the definition of Mesut Özil as an “outstanding example of successful integration” creates a discursive framework by which minorities can be judged as successes or failures of integration.

The discourses of the award, particularly as exemplified by author and television moderator Nazan Eckes’s introductory speech, are constructed to soothe majority German anxieties around Muslim minorities. Eckes, through her dress as much as her words, presents herself as a model of non-threatening diversity. In her dress, which was the object of great interest in the press for having the lowest cut décolleté of the evening, she literally revealed herself to the German public. Her dress stands in opposition to the veiled femininity of the Muslim “parallel society,” assuring the audience that she does not represent the disturbing closure of Muslim modesty. In another conciliatory gesture to
the presumed values of her audience, Eckes opens with a story of transformation from her childhood:

I was born in Cologne, or Köln, as they say in Turkey. My parents are Turks. When I was six years old, I asked my mother about Saint Nicholas. She said to me, Nazan, kisim - my daughter—there is no Saint Nicholas. And I was the only one in my class who didn’t have sweets in their boots on the sixth of December. And today, almost thirty years later, Saint Nicholas comes to my house too. That is proof. I have arrived, arrived in my home, Germany.iii (Bambi 2010, 2010)

Eckes’s inclusion of Turkish words establishes her cultural authority to speak as a Turkish-German minority. The story of her disappointment at being excluded from the Christian German tradition of Saint Nicolas Day ended with the redemptive claim of her choice as an adult to partake in German cultural—and religious—traditions. Her anecdote acknowledges and accepts the Christian core of German traditions, modeling a form of integration that leaves the majoritarian foundations of the nation unchanged. Like the statement Eckes makes with her dress, her story is a counter-example to prevailing discourses of Muslim fundamentalism. She communicates that her religious beliefs—whatever they may be—are not a hindrance to her participation in Germany’s “Judeo-Christian Leitkultur” (Wittrock, 2010). The presentation celebrates Özil’s universal popularity across distinct lines of cultural difference. Both Germans and Turks celebrate Özil, and, in Eckes’s words, “his relaxed association with his Turkish roots and the German national jersey is an example to us all” (Bambi 2010, 2010). The 2010 integration award congratulates Germans for their meritocratic and cosmopolitan country, which, as Eckes claims, “opened opportunities that [she] would never have had elsewhere.” As one journalist swooned, the Eckes’s words on integration were powerful enough to make you forget the Sarrazin debate (Albers, 2010). With sweeping emotions
and glittering celebrities, the issue of the problematics inherent in creating a categorical award adjudicating the qualifications for “successful integration” was never seriously engaged in the press coverage of the award.

Those problematics were thrown into sharp relief by the debate around the 2011 Bambi for Integration recipient, Tunisian-German rapper Bushido. As Özil served to outline the qualities of the desirable minority—defined by his success and his agreeable, uncontroversial personality—Bushido functioned as a counter-example. With his lyrics composed for maximum shock value, in addition to being Germany’s most successful rapper he has long been a controversial figure on the German cultural scene. His selection for the integration Bambi was based, according to the jury, on his success despite his difficult upbringing and on his transformation into an interlocutor for politicians and the media on behalf of many Germans with a “migration background.” They also honored him for his charity work in recent years supporting the integration of young people from “migration backgrounds.”

Bushido’s Bambi had two main consequences of significance for this analysis: first, it caused a national scandal, drawing enormous attention to the award and, second, it evoked well-worn stereotypes of the criminal and intolerant Muslim Other. The press coverage of the Bushido Bambi scandal dominated the coverage of the awards, and generated far more original commentary than the years surrounding it. Whereas most of the other years’ coverage consisted largely of boilerplate wire service stories and press releases, Bushido’s Bambi inspired commentary and debate across the mediated and the public sphere. Following the intensified discourse around Bushido’s award, the Bambi’s ratings spiked in 2011 drawing six million viewers, or over 20% of the television
audience. The uncontentious 2012 awards only managed to draw in 2.6 million viewers ("Zuschauerzahlen: Bambi im Rekordtief," 2012). A handful of journalists remarked on this spike in attention, speculating that the controversial selection of Bushido might have been a calculated move to generate publicity and increase the perception of the Bambi’s cultural relevance (Buß, 2011; Frank, 2011). Most of the coverage, however, centered on the critiques of Bushido as an unworthy recipient of the award.

Following the logic of cultural prizes (English, 2008), in offering a Bambi award for Integration, the recipient may be critiqued as undeserving, but that critique only further reifies the category. Critics ended up enumerating the ways that Bushido fails to be a good example for integration without questioning the basic premise of the award. Most critics made it clear that their outrage was not inspired by Bushido being honored per se but by the fact that that honor was being bestowed in a social category of which he was unworthy.

Bushido can win all the prizes in the world—from Kreuzberg to Hollywood, just NOT ONE for “integration.” (Gensing & Varro, 2011)

Bushido calls for violence against gays and lesbians in his texts and statements. I understand “successful integration” to be something different. (Green Party state representative Claudia Stamm quoted in Gottschild, 2011)

Whoever propagates contempt for women and gay people has not earned a prize for successful integration. (Green Party politician Völker Beck quoted in Gottschild, 2011)

In the opinion of [Green Party Leader Claudia Roth], he is certainly not an example for successful integration, but “rather an extremely successful cultural figure who makes big bucks off the backs of minorities.” (Entscheidung stößt auf heftige Kritik,” 2011)

Far from harming the institution of the Bambi, the critics generally accepted the category of integration proposed by the institution, but merely critiqued the jury’s judgment in this
particular choice. The debate brought Bambi coverage into more prominent spaces in the German media sphere, with prestige publications like *Der Spiegel, Die Welt, Die Tageszeitung*, and *Die Süddeutsche Zeitung* devoting attention to the award and the protest it unleashed among activist groups. This follows James English’s assertion that scandal is the lifeblood of the prize. He writes that prize scandals function to “clarify and disseminate, as well as at times to assist in modifying, the contemporary rules governing the behaviors and dispositions of ‘artists’ or other authorities in matters of art” (2008, p. 196). In this case, however, the prize claims authority to characterize the behavior of immigrants and minorities as represented by celebrities. The criticism of prizes reinforces the value hierarchies critics seek to adjudicate. By criticizing Bushido as unworthy of the honor, even observers on the left—such as the Green party politicians quoted above—who might in other cases be critical of integration discourse ended up supporting the legitimacy of the integration prize.

The second consequence of the award was to provide fodder for the reification of the idea of the unassimilable Other. The discussion around the prize left little room for reflexivity around the notion of an integration prize. It focused almost exclusively on the question whether the winner was worthy of the prize, whether he lived up to the values it is designed to reward. The arguments in favor of the award—which in my investigation were primarily voiced by Bambi affiliates—were based on the idea of the prize symbolizing a “second chance.”

It is clear to [Hessian Minister for Integration Jörg-Uwe] Hahn: “He now has the duty to distinguish himself as a bridge builder” (“Bambi-Gala,” 2011)

Bushido was not honored with the Bambi for his earlier texts, said Peter Maffay. “On the contrary: Bushido has very clearly distanced himself from his statements
of ten years ago. He has long admitted his mistakes openly. My intention was, with all respect for those [Bushido] discriminated against, to build a bridge.\textsuperscript{ix} (\textquotedblleft Nach Wirbel um Bambi für Bushido,	extquotedblright 2011)

The gift the prize conferred was the possibility of Bushido turning over a new leaf and leaving behind undesirable behavior of the past, behavior that—everyone agreed—was contrary to the ideals of the prize. It was framed as a pedagogical tool, an incentive for the winner to follow the “right path.” This was particularly clear in the speech by aging rock artist, Peter Maffay, who presented Bushido with the Bambi for Integration. Although Maffay was collaborating with Bushido on a project entitled “Growing Up,” his speech was half-hearted. He distanced himself, saying that he knew Bushido “too little,” but felt that what they had in common was their willingness to “row toward unknown shores.” He concluded by expressing his confidence that Bushido “would live up to” the ideals of the prize. When Maffay announced weeks later that he was dissolving his partnership with Bushido, it was interpreted as confirmation of what all the critics knew all along: Bushido was irredeemable—a veritable counter-example for “integration.”

Most of the criticism of Bushido’s receipt of the award came from the political left and from activists for social justice. Bushido’s critics accused him of exploiting inflammatory texts for financial gain, as when Green Party leader Claudia Roth condemned Bushido for making “big bucks off the backs of minorities” (quoted above). This left-wing critique was met by a reaction from several conservative commentators who celebrated Bushido for his bold “political incorrectness” and for his material success.

Bushido is a perfect example of successful integration. The scandal around his award shows the phoniness of the self-proposed heralds of migrants…. The friends and devotees of migrants are outraged that, of all people, a rapper who is
To me, this whole do-gooder fuss stinks. What happened, after all? Bushido is a superstar. He’s no pantywaist, but rappers never are. Not everyone can sing about love and tra-la-la. (Gensing & Varro, 2011)

The conservative distain for identity-based political activism emerges here as support for Bushido’s “taboo breaking rap style” (Miklis, 2011). Debate about Bushido’s award disrupts minoritarian identity politics by pitting gender- and sexuality-based minorities and their supporters against integrants, typically conceptualized as Muslim immigrants and minorities. For conservatives, this reveals the hypocrisy of all identity-based social justice projects. The conservative commentators quoted above double down on a definition of integration based on meritocratic economic success (see also Chapter 6). Bushido’s self-presentation as a hyper-masculine outlaw appealed to some conservative sensibilities. However, it simultaneously played into conservative discourses of immigrants and minorities as a potential security threat. Crucially, both conservative and liberal partisans in this debate tended to validate the categorization of minorities as either integration successes or failures.

Even if Bushido had succeeded in making good on his “second chance,” his story is constructed as a quintessential example of the binaries dividing Muslim immigrant cultures from native Christian German culture. The Integration Bambi demonstrates how easily strong multiculturalist conceptions of culture can shift to nativist ones; when a strong conception of cultural difference remains, it is a simple matter to switch focus from celebrating the “color” and “diversity” of immigrant cultures to condemning those same cultures as reactionary and illiberal. Even if the Integration Bambi holds that
minorities can—and should—acquire traits of the majority society, the constituent parts of their identities are seen as distinct: one should be integrated in the majority culture without losing contact with their “roots.” The result of the Bushido scandal was both to boost the presence of the Bambi on the national stage and to rehash arguments about undesirable qualities of immigrants. Bushido became a “migrant” straw man.

In the end, Bushido was turned into an anti-hero, a counter-example that further ingrained discourses of the intractable immigrant who stands against the enlightened values of liberal German society. Although most of the press coverage avoided explicitly labeling Bushido as a typical undesirable immigrant, one journalist in the liberal prestige newspaper *Süddeutsche Zeitung* was more direct, writing that “Bushido embodies the young man with a migration background and thug-attitude, who acts out violently against minorities and won’t be confined by the rules of society” (Grill, 2011). This construction draws a distinction between the angry young (Muslim) men of the undesirable immigrant class and the minorities that must be protected from their violence.

This construction of masculine Muslim violence was repeated with the selection of the 2012 Integration Bambi recipient. Rabbi Daniel Alter was awarded in the integration category after being assaulted by a group of young men who were “presumed to be Arab.” In addition, during the 2012 Bambis, the sister of a young Thai-German man who was murdered by young Turkish-Germans in Berlin’s Alexanderplatz was honored in the category “Courage.” The choice to honor victims in two cases that were framed as acts of Muslim intolerance against other minorities reinforces the idea of the threats posed by dangerous Arab and Turkish “migrants” to the purportedly liberal-cosmopolitan ideals of the new Germany. While the fight against race and identity-based violence is
valuable regardless of the identities of the perpetrator, the choice of which perpetrators and victims are represented and which are ignored demands scrutiny.

The choice to highlight two cases of Muslim intolerance with Bambi awards in 2012 is particularly notable given the revelation that year about a famous series of previously unsolved murders committed by a right-wing extremist group, the National Socialist Underground (NSU). After two of the group leaders were found dead in a burning trailer home in November 2011, the authorities discovered that the group had been responsible for the murders of 9 small business owners of Turkish and Greek descent from 2000 to 2006. This series of murders, committed across Germany with the same weapon, had been a long-standing subject of media speculation. Police investigations and media speculation focused in entirely the wrong direction: the victims were assumed to have been killed by Turkish perpetrators as part of a transnational organized crime ring. The victims’ families were accused of hindering the investigation by keeping a code of silence, following the “characteristic hierarchical Turkish family structure” (Denso, 2006). As late as August 2011, the case was described in Der Spiegel as evidence of the threat of Turkish organized crime:

Since [the murder series from 2000 to 2006], dozens of police officers and state attorneys have hunted perpetrators and weapons; officers from the domestic security and intelligence service are attempting to penetrate the mafia-style organization of Turkish nationalists in Germany, responsible for the blood-letting. The murders, this much investigators know, are the reckoning for debts from criminal businesses or revenge on deserters.\textsuperscript{xii} (Neumann & Ulrich, 2011)

Investigators in the so-called “Bosporus” special commission ignored clues assembled by profilers in 2006 pointing to right-wing perpetrators, in part because the commission’s preference for a theory linking victims to Turkish organized crime (“Falsche Annahme
des Profilers bei den NSU-Morden,” 2013). After over a decade of criminalizing the victims of xenophobic hate and their families, the revelations in late 2011 and 2012 revealed the deadly consequences of widely-held criminal stereotypes of Turkish and Arab immigrants and minority Germans. Throughout the investigation, the victims of the flippantly named “kebab murders” (Döner-Morde) were characterized in the media and by investigators as criminals, as deserving of their fate.

In discourses reminiscent of American stereotypes of ethicized criminality, from the tropes of the Italian Mafia to discussions of “black-on-black” crime, the victims symbolized Others who introduce organized crime into Germany. Even in their deaths they represented a danger to the normative population. When it was discovered that the murders were hate crimes committed by German neo-Nazis, the case raised profound questions about the unwillingness of authorities and the media to see and take seriously the threat of racist violence by the German right. During 2012, one of the most important stories in the German media showed the influence of racism at both the margins and in the core institutions of German society, but this story was absent from consideration during the Bambi prizes that year. This absence would not necessarily be significant had the Bambi not chosen to highlight the victims of Muslim violence in two separate awards that year, including the Integration Bambi.

The celebrity and prize logics that support cultural awards cannot avoid having putatively normative consequences when applied to a social category of identity and belonging. The prize inhibits the expression of individual subjectivities and instead imposes its evaluative criteria to define valuable examples of diversity. The celebrity in Burda’s Bambi awards is rendered significant according to the categories of the prize,
which is to say, as candidates for integration. The celebrity within the construction of the cultural prize is rendered a mobile sign whose significance is articulated through the values embodied in the prize. The prize forecloses the notion of the “subject-in-process” (S. Hall, 1996) since the award functions as a conclusion. By awarding a cultural prize for integration to individuals born and raised in Germany, the prize maintains a division between those who qualify categorically as Germans and those who must strive to be considered integrated in German society. It does so under the guise of liberal cosmopolitanism.

Even with the problem posed by the subjectification between normative national and “migrant” candidates for integration inherent in the Integration Bambi, social critics in the media sphere failed to analyze the underlying problem with the award category. The logic of the prize undercuts the function of a critically reflexive public media sphere. Critics of the prize cannot help but participate in the discourses constructed by it; critique of cultural prizes, no matter how appropriate, tends to bolster their circulation in the public sphere. Since representation and circulation is tantamount to importance, heated debate and criticism only raise the profile of cultural prizes. After all, “the direction of our glance can constitute our social world” (Michael Warner, 2002, p. 62). The Bambi demonstrates the resilience of the cultural prize format, which, when wedded to the celebrity power of the popular entertainment media, forms a unique stage for the articulation of identities.

“Out with It”: Language Politics and Celebrity Enforcers
The introduction of the Integration Bambi in 2010 coincided with the debut of another celebrity-oriented integration project. The *Raus mit der Sprache. Rein ins Leben* campaign was a pro-bono social marketing campaign created by the newly minted German Foundation for Integration (*Deutschlandstiftung Integration*), an organization founded by the Association of German Periodical Publishers (*Verband Deutscher Zeitschriftenverleger*) and supported by the German government. The foundation’s board of trustees is chaired by Hubert Burda, owner of Hubert Burda Media and the Bambi awards, and Maria Böhmer, the first German Commissioner for Integration. Chancellor Angela Merkel is the organization’s honorary patron. This organization reflects the private and public institutionalization that has accompanied the rise in integration discourse.

According to its website, the Foundation for Integration aims to support the achievement of “equality of opportunity for people with a background of migration in Germany” (“Deutschlandstiftung Integration: Deutschlandstiftung,” n.d.). This framing of their mission suggests a focus on structural issues, on creating the conditions for equal opportunity. Although, the foundation’s activities, as listed on its website, include a scholarship fund for talented young people, they primarily focus on so-called “information campaigns” such as their inaugural *Out with It* campaign from 2010. Both the scholarship project and the media campaigns select highly successful individuals and, like the Bambi award, display them as examples of successful integration. In fact, the foundation recently inaugurated its own integration award, the Golden Victoria, which Angela Merkel personally awarded to Polish-born national soccer team member Miroslav Klose in 2014 (“Sie sind Sympathieträger und wunderbares Vorbild,” 2014). Instead of
acknowledging the conditions that contribute to “equality of opportunity” or its lack, the foundation’s actions focus on minority individuals who have already achieved success. These “information campaigns” single out successful individuals and then divine the characteristics or skills that contributed to their success.

The Foundation for Integration’s projects raise several important issues in relation to discourses of integration. First, they offer a chance to investigate minority participation in hegemonic projects regulating minorities and immigrants. Second, they highlight the strength of discourses of language in defining valid citizenship and a life worth living. This section examines the first question through a textual analysis of the Out with It campaign’s theme song, “Just a Blink of the Eye” (Nur ein Augenblick) by the Black German rapper Harris. Then, it analyzes the politics of discourse around language using press coverage of the Out with It campaign and its theme song. Reflecting and elaborating issues raised in other chapters, analysis of this campaign reveals blind spots in critical thinking about racism, nationalism, and the perpetuation of second-class citizenship.

The Foundation for Integration’s first project, the Out with It campaign, gathered elite athletes, politicians, and entertainers with transnational backgrounds to, as the Bild put it, “motivate migrants living in Germany to learn our language” (“Kampagne für Integration,” 2010). This motivation took the form of print ads featuring celebrities sticking out their tongues, which were digitally altered to display the colors of the German flag. The ads included prominent politicians Aygül Özkan, Christian Democratic minister in Lower Saxony and Green Party politician Özcan Mutlu (see figure 11) displaying their painted tongues. While the outstretched tongue could be read as a defiant
gesture through which visible minorities break rules of decorum to claim the German language as their own, press descriptions show that it was interpreted primarily as an exhortation to other minorities to speak “good” German (for example “Kampagne für Integration,” 2010).

Figure 11: Green Party politician Özcan Mutlu sticks out his tongue for the Out with It campaign. This is one of over two dozen campaign ads displaying the digitally altered tongues of minority German celebrities.
The most common term used to describe the gesture in the corpus analyzed here is *frech*, which translates to impudent, cheeky, or saucy. The infantile associations of this term and the depicted gesture problematize a straightforward interpretation of the gesture as empowering. It is difficult to imagine normative German politicians, such as the campaign’s official patron Angela Merkel, consenting to publically perform this intimate and childish gesture. In the only scholarly critique of the campaign I was able to locate, Mita Banerjee (2011) considers this question of agency and defiance. She uses the relatively recent German academic field of “xenology” (*Fremdverstehen*, which literally translates to “understanding the foreign”) to position the campaign within broader changes in German society beginning in the 1990s. When the third generation of Turkish-Germans did not generally shed all vestiges of foreignness, Banerjee writes that German politicians and intellectuals shifted their focus to a well-meaning effort to understand foreigners and, through this understanding, to solve the “immigrant problem.” Turkish-Germans were the “pivot point” of this effort; their supposed failure to assimilate served as the standard by which to compare other immigrant groups (Banerjee, 2011, p. 197). The xenologist acts as an ethnographer with a crucial difference; although ethnographers long understood their work as a project of understanding the Other, even in its earliest forms the observer sought to participate and to learn the language and the ways of their subjects. The xenologist, on the other hand, asks their participants to explain themselves “in the fieldworker’s terms” (Banerjee, 2011, p. 198). Banerjee observes that while the depicted gesture is meant to be shocking and perhaps defiant, the politics of its framing is to domesticate the subjects’ foreignness, pushing them to justify themselves in state-sanctioned language. Banerjee claims that the ad’s photographs “could only have been
taken by a xenologist” (2011, p. 199). This is only partially true, since, in a campaign such as this, there are many creators. The concept was developed by Patricia Scheder of the advertising agency DDB for the Integration Foundation and the photographer was Murat Aslan, a Berlin-based photographer of Turkish descent. The minority participants all joined voluntarily and expressed enthusiasm for the project in the occasional quote printed in the media. These minority celebrities are co-authors of the photographs alongside the normative German xenologists.

The interest of minority and transnational Germans in participating in this project, and others like the Integration Bambi, suggests that participation may be a means of taking on, however temporarily, a position as normative citizen. It is important to ask, however, if the significance of their status as apparent minorities—which is the reason for their participation—will be changed by the campaign or action. More concretely, do projects like the Integration Bambi or the Out with It campaign challenge common narratives of cultural or intellectual deficiency? The following analysis argues that examples of minority celebrity success may serve more to support the idea of Germany as a just and meritocratic society than to undermine widespread negative stereotypes of transnational minority communities. The Out with It campaign also shows that essentialist notions of culture and race allow some minority celebrities to take staunchly xenophobic positions without provoking serious reproach. In its choice of an aggressive song condemning intransigent immigrants as its theme song, this government and media industry supported campaign shows examples of exceptional minority citizens as proof of the potential for minorities to succeed under the current hegemonic system while
simultaneously condemning those who fail for their lack of loyalty and commitment to the German nation.

_Ungrateful Immigrants in Good-Hearted Germany_

The title of the campaign’s theme song, “Just a Blink of the Eye,” by rapper Harris (see figure 12), refers to racism in Germany. The song opens with Harris’s claim to understand the experiences of minorities who have endured open prejudice and antagonism from white German society.

You are young, black hair, brown eyes, dark skin.  
Believe me, I know that shitty look too
That particular “You, fucking Kanacke³⁶ look”
But that’s not Germany, that is just a blink of the eye

[Du bist jung, schwarze Haare, braune Augen, dunkle Haut
Glaube mir, ich kenn diese schieß Blicke auch
Dieser bestimmte „Du schieß Kanacke-Blick“
Aber das ist nicht Deutschland, das ist nur ein Augenblick]

This opening strophe establishes Harris’s minority credentials, airing the fact that racism exists as a part of everyday life in Germany. At the same time, he invalidates the significance of these experiences of racism, arguing that they are an aberration that does not represent the German nation. Racism, here, is ephemeral and insignificant. It is not an inevitable byproduct of the global political system of nation-states that divides the

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³⁶ Kanake is a strongly pejorative term for foreigners that was originally used against immigrants from southern Europe but which has come to be associated with Turkish and Arab minorities. The term was “reclaimed” in the 1990s as part of the Kanak Attak movement (see Göktürk, Gramling, & Kaes, 2007).
population into normative nationals and foreign strangers, nor is it a reason to criticize majority society.

*Figure 12:* Rapper Harris displays his body, prominently tattooed in old German Fraktur script with the word, *Deutschland.*

Having invalidated a minority position critiquing systematic racism, Harris opens an attack on intransigent, intolerant, and ungrateful immigrants:

How is it that you’ve lived in this country for over 10 years? Maybe longer, and you still don’t speak the German language? You say Germans are shit, German women are trash. Please do Germany a favor and get out!
Harris’s imagined interlocutor is the stereotypical nightmare of failed integration. He is young and presumably male, based on the alleged intolerance of emancipated German women. The first sign of the immigrants’ failure is his lack of German language ability. It both symbolizes his rejection of German society and further invalidates any criticism he raises of conditions in Germany. After all, if he does not speak German, it is assumed that he cannot possibly understand German society. Such a person holds no value to the nation, and Harris exhorts them to “get out.” Harris even offers, “If you don’t know where the airport is, I’ll bring you. I’ll pay for your ticket and souvenirs,” claiming that they would soon miss Germany and that they “don’t know how good [they] have it here.”

The text is primarily aimed at immigrants, but the critique also applies the whole population of visible minorities who act as though they “do not want to be here” and who do not properly perform their respect and appreciation for their place in Germany. Harris, foregrounding his status as a visible minority, condemns fellow minorities who do not share pride in their Germanness.

In addition to their lack of appropriate appreciation for Germany, Harris condemns his interlocutor as infantile and self-segregating, suggesting that a poor attitude and work ethic are responsible for immigrants’ problems, not racism, economic inequality or systemic disadvantage. The projected interlocutor’s audacity to critique Germany without fulfilling the affective performance of loyal citizenship incites Harris, who places himself in the role of pedagogue.
But when I see and hear how they speak about Germany…
If they can’t go back to a war, that I can understand

But you’ve got to behave yourself, that’s just how it is!
If you don’t look German, that’s just the way it is.
Be proud of your roots, stick your chest out and walk tall
But you can’t live here and talk shit about everything
And think that everyone should be nice to you too
Above all, if you don’t respect the Germans.

[Aber ich sehe und höre doch wie sie über Deutschland reden
Wenn man nicht in den Krieg zurück kann, kann ich das verstehen

Aber man muss sich benehmen, es ist einfach so!
Wenn du dich nicht als deutsch siehst, ist das einfach so
Sei stolz auf deine Wurzeln, Brust raus und gerade gehen
Du kannst hier aber nicht leben und alles schlecht reden
Und denken, dass man dann auch noch nett ist zu dir
Vor allen dingen, wenn du die Deutschen nicht respektierst]

The immigrant’s demand for respect is invalidated by his criticisms of Germany, according to Harris. This passage starts with Harris’s frustration with negative talk about Germany, building on the familiar trope that if majority society is so bad, if it is “all Nazis,” then immigrants should simply leave. While conceding that some people do not have the choice to go back to their war-torn homelands, Harris claims that they have the responsibility to “behave themselves.” The stance advocated by Harris resonates closely with American “respectability politics.” In the words of Michelle Smith (2014), this approach proposes that “marginalized classes will receive their share of political influence and social standing not because democratic values and law require it, but because they demonstrate their compatibility” with mainstream society. Respectability politics are “the first resort of marginalized classes.” They circulate within marginalized communities and are reinforced by mainstream discourses that locate the source of social inequality in personal and cultural deficits, disavowing the legitimacy of anger stoked by
inequality. Harris acknowledges that carrying visible difference can have negative consequences, “but that’s just the way it is.” This passage, in a subtler way than the main chorus, delegitimizes critiques of social exclusion based on visible difference, claiming that a respectful attitude towards majority society and appropriate pride in one’s “roots” is the solution to exclusion.

The demand for gratitude to Germany returns throughout the text. Harris’s text personifies Germany, giving the nation a body with organs and affect; “Germany is generous and has a big heart.” Harris is offended by the interlocutor’s lack of appreciation for the safety, stability, and opportunity Germany provides, and his laziness and “ignorance.” Harris rebukes, chides, and infantilizes his interlocutor. “You’re lucky, you’re here now,” Harris proclaims. “So behave yourself, do your work, grow up, and don’t be childish…You should be ashamed to speak so badly of Germany!” Although Harris appears to hear all of the negative things that his interlocutor says about Germany, he claims to be unable to understand his interlocutor’s explanation of his position. In the manner of xenologist, Harris demands explanation from the foreign Other, only to ignore it when it does not come in a normative form.

What is this shit all about? How ignorant do you have to be?
You don’t want to learn German, but you want to stay in Germany
That is too much for me, I can’t understand that
Can you please explain it to me? Oops, I don’t understand you
And that’s why you stay among yourselves, you can’t speak any German!

[Was soll der Scheiß? Wie Ignorant muss man sein?
Du willst kein Deutsch lernen, aber in Deutschland bleiben
Das ist mir zu viel, ich verstehe das nicht
Kannst mein das bitte erklären? Ups, ich verstehe dich nicht
Und darum bleibt ihr unter euch, ihr könnt kein Deutsch!]
The supposed inability to communicate in German invalidates the claim to full political personhood including the right to participate in social critique. Harris classifies language deficits as a result of intellectual deficits as well as a lack of will; he ties segregation to these deficits as opposed to broader questions of class or to decades of policy choices on guest worker housing, city planning decisions, and everyday racism in housing (see Mandel, 2008). Harris’s song is an unveiled attack defining and maligning socially undesirable immigrants and minorities. He gleefully acknowledges the potential interpretation of his text as racist, rapping, “If I were blond with blue eyes, you would say that I am a Nazi,” a sentiment he repeats in interviews (Harris, 2010b). For Harris—and apparently also for the government officials, and marketing and nonprofit agents who chose this song as the theme for the campaign—his status as a visible minority makes it impossible for him to promote racism. The selection of this song reveals a serious misapprehension of the nature and function of racism in the most influential echelons of the public. If racism is a materially significant discourse that uses demographic features to fracture the population into Life that must be protected and life that is a threat to the politically relevant population (see Introduction), it is the logic of the discourse itself that matters, not the demographic characteristics of its promoter. Harris uses his minority status to undermine anti-racist critiques of discourses like his, which claim that immigrants’ purported disdain for the majority population and their supposed lack of motivation or ability are harmful to the nation. From these firmly essentialist foundations, Harris uses his position to become the ideal enforcer of normative national hegemony.

Language and Life
The *Out with It* campaign positions itself as a helping hand to “migrants” to encourage them to learn German and, thereby, become full citizens. Instead, its theme song and the campaign’s content suggest that it is an internal discussion among normative German society and its minority elite defining the requirements for national membership and the responsibility for social inequality. To understand the campaign, audiences must also be familiar enough with the German public sphere to recognize the campaign models as nationally known politicians, athletes, and entertainers. Furthermore, to understand the campaign’s theme song, audiences must have a strong command of the German language. The campaign requires cultural and linguistic knowledge that would not be available to the purportedly isolated population it claims to target. The relationship in Harris’s song between language and politically legitimate personhood is also expressed in the more benignly framed discussions around the *Out with It* campaign. This final section analyzes discussions of the campaign in the press to understand the role of ideas of language in integration discourse.

The idea of language as both a means for and a measure of integration is one central themes in integration discourse that earlier chapters addressed only in passing. Arguments foregrounding the importance of speaking German appear frequently, whether in common experiences of German-born minorities who are regularly praised for their “good German” (see for example Bota et al., 2012) or in complaints about the purported refusal of immigrants in “parallel societies” to learn German. This issue also arose in discussions surrounding Bushido’s Bambi for Integration as a possible justification for the award:

If he sees to it that his friends and fans maybe learn German better, then that is a
He makes use of nasty clichés, but he also uses his popularity to spread good messages, like: Foreigners who live here must learn the German language. (Actress Uschi Glas quoted in Gottschild, 2011)

(Hessian Integration Minister Jörg-Uwe Hahn quoted in Gottschild, 2011)

These quotes argue that Bushido’s utility in convincing “foreigners who live here”—a descriptor that presumably refers to his friends and fans—to speak (better) German is more valuable than the potential harms posed by his clichéd gangsta-rap texts. Using press discussion around the *Out with It* campaign, this section examines how discourse about language supports and validates processes dividing the population into normative nationals and integrants. Although German language acquisition by first generation immigrants differs greatly from language acquisition by children raised in the German school system, these distinctions are erased in integration discourse. All integrants may be scrutinized and praised or condemned for their use of the German language. Focusing on the purported unwillingness or inability of integrants to speak “proper German” places responsibility for social exclusion on integrants themselves, protecting the idea of a meritocratic German society in the face of persistent education and opportunity gaps for immigrants and their descendants.

The discussions of the *Out with It* campaign in the press were not generally contentious. With a few exceptions, press accounts described the campaign in positive terms, uncritically conveying the stated meanings and motivations of its creators and participants. What emerges in the articles describing the campaign is a concept of integration that uses a symbolic notion of the German language use as a metonym for full citizenship and, thus, full political personhood. This notion of language is portrayed as equally accessible to all who are willing to work for it, opening a putatively egalitarian
space of citizenship. However, by using examples of minority celebrities who were raised in Germany, the campaign sets minority German speakers apart from their ethnic German counterparts. Regardless of the fact the featured celebrities they have been exposed to German since childhood, their dominance of standardized German is portrayed as particularly relevant for German language learners, or candidates for integration. The following excerpts characterize the imagined targets and motivation for the campaign.

With this campaign, the [Integration Foundation] seeks to make it clear how important it is for people with a migration background living in Germany to dominate the German language.\textsuperscript{xviii} (Rausch, 2010)

The campaign titled \textit{Out with It}, should motivate migrants living in Germany to learn our language.\textsuperscript{xx} (\textit{Kampagne für Integration},” 2010)

Celebrities want to be role models for migrant children.\textsuperscript{xx} (Fröhlich, 2010)

In order to get, in particular, children and young adults to increase their willingness to learn German, celebrities with foreign roots have made themselves available for the second series of the Integration Foundation campaign.\textsuperscript{xxi} (Fietz, 2010)

A poster campaign aims to move migrants to learn German…. The campaign primarily targets migrants and their children, who hardly speak German despite having been born in Germany.\textsuperscript{xxii} (Lachmann, 2010)

These five quotes target the broad range of individuals under the category of “people with a migration background,” explicitly including those born and raised in Germany. All, here, are equally candidates for integration. Successful examples, embodied here by celebrities, have been mobilized to “motivate” those whose failure to integrate is signified by their supposed inability or unwillingness to “speak German.” By focusing on children and young people, these quotes position unqualified, normative German language against youth vernacular forms. The existence of a correct, standard, and normal German language is taken for granted in these quotes. This is framed as “our”
language, the language that normative Germans speak. Non-standardized forms of German spoken by the children of immigrants are deemed invalid. The final section of this paper will contextualize this determination within a long tradition of language standardization as the basis for constructing the nation state. First, I will discuss examples from the press coverage that situate language-as-integration as the prerequisite for legitimate political and economic personhood.

Crucially, German and “language” in this corpus refers not to actual speech or communication practice, but to a symbolic ideal of “correct” standardized German. This point is driven home by the campaign’s mode of representation. Celebrities are mobilized as bodies; their language is not heard, but is symbolized through the display of their tongues, branded with the national colors. The campaign empties the representatives’ speech of all content, rendering their bodies as symbolic nodes for integration discourse.

In a distortion of the deliberative democratic model (J. Habermas, 1974), the communication of ideas as the ideal basis for active citizenship is displaced by the tongue itself as an instrument for producing a standardized national form of language. Language is valuable as a symbolic performance rather than as a means of communication and contestation in an agonistic public sphere. As Harris’s song demonstrates, ideas communicated outside the proper register can be dismissed as incomprehensible and illegitimate. The final quote above comes from a scathing opinion piece from the nationally circulating Die Welt titled with the question, Are Germans ashamed of their language? The column takes the campaign as an opportunity to air grievances about poor appreciation for the national language among minorities and normative Germans alike. The extended quote reads,
The campaign primarily targets migrants and their children, who hardly speak German despite having been born in Germany. [Integration Commissioner Maria] Böhmer says to them, “Language is more than communication—it is a tie that binds us.” It should be anyway.

But since that is still not the case today, we have this good and important poster campaign. After all, after five decades of immigration, young people in social combustion points [soziale Brennpunkte] in big cities stammer out a so-called “Kanak-Sprak” and are not capable of formulating grammatically correct sentences in German.”xxxiii (Lachmann, 2010)

This piece not only stigmatizes and delegitimizes minority German spaces and vernaculars, it interprets the supposedly lax attitude among majority Germans towards policing and correcting minority language as a failure of national pride. The myth of German (or any standardized national language) as a discrete, transparent, and concrete linguistic entity invites all those hailed as the national “we” to judge if speech meets the standard of qualifying as “German.” Although Harris recognizes that he is not perceived as part of the normative national collective because of his appearance, he asserts his national legitimacy, in part, by passing judgement on the linguistic deficits of his fellow minorities.

Although the campaign’s provocation is broadly presented and interpreted as a positive, cheerful, and lighthearted call to encourage “migrants” to follow the successful example of minority celebrities, the descriptions of a generalized migrants figure that appear in the corpus are most often negative. The campaign’s inclusion of minority hegemonic enforcers, like Harris, facilitates explicit discourses of blame and condemnation of “integration refusers” (Integrationsverweigerer). Discussions of the campaign define the trope of the “enemy of integration,” typically described as a young urban male of Arab or Turkish descent. Harris condemns people that he describes as his
own friends, with whom he grew up in Berlin’s Kreuzberg neighborhood. He uses his own experience as a troubled young man who saw the error of his ways and achieved success to invalidate his friends who felt marginalized:

The excuse was always: Germany doesn’t give us a chance. But that’s not true. I myself was at a school for the “difficult to educate” (Schwererziehbare). There were remedial classes, there were extra remedial classes and remedial classes for remedial classes. No one can say that Germany doesn’t do anything for these teens. They refuse!\textsuperscript{xiv} (Harris, 2010b)

Of course: When Sarrazin says that young criminals are often “black-heads,” he is unfortunately right. At least in Berlin. Now all the black-heads say: Fucking Sarrazin. I say: What do you mean, fucking Sarrazin, man? These criminal Alis\textsuperscript{37} screw up the reputation of well-integrated Arabs and Turks.\textsuperscript{xxv} (Harris, 2010b)

An article from the same author who exalted in Nazan Eckes’s speech for the integration Bambi, wrote an article praising Harris, claiming that “soccer and music have done more for integration than all the politicians combined” (Albers, 2010). In it, she quotes self-identifying minority fans of Harris who support his critique of minorities who refuse to take responsibility for their problems:

“You get straight to the point, man”; “Yes, we are also at fault that things are the way they are”; fans who write “I am young. I am a Turk. I passed my A-levels and I’m completely integrated. And I hate these Kanake, who can’t behave themselves here.”\textsuperscript{xxvi} (Albers, 2010)

The aggressively pejorative language in this quote is presented as acceptable, since it comes from self-identified minorities. Harris’s anger and disgust with enemies of integration overflows in another article in response to the topic of “honor killings.”

\textsuperscript{37} The common Arabic name Ali is used here as a racialized slur associating Arab men with criminality.
“Fucking parallel society!” Harris spits out his contempt with the words. “And we are supposed to handle these people with kid gloves? They should be deported.”xxvii (Pham, 2010)

Harris’s impassioned denunciations of the “parallel society” and his casual use of designations like “black-head” and “criminal Ali” are accepted without challenge, since, as a self-designated in-group member, Harris claims to be incapable of supporting racist projects. He expresses irritation with anti-racist critique, claiming that essentially the only thing about the Sarrazin debate that concerns him is the accusation that Sarrazin is racist. In response, he posed the question, “why must the cudgels be brought out anytime anyone says anything about foreigners?”38 (Pham, 2010). This comment points to idea, common in integration “debates” (see Chapter 6), that anti-racist critique abuses and victimizes normative Germans.

The national symbolic meaning of language in this corpus resonates with the political and economic discourses of integration and citizenship explored throughout this dissertation. The campaign creators saw their campaign as perfectly timed to meet intensified scrutiny of minorities and their integration status, as the second series debuted at the peak of the “integration debate” unleashed by Sarrazin (Fröhlich, 2010). The campaign supports the tautological associations in the Sarrazin debate that define integration as the achievement of social and economic success. Language-as-integration defines the difference between success and failure, and more fundamentally, between life
and existence. As one of the campaign’s models, DJ Chino, explained,

The German language is the BEST! Only when you understand and are understood can you begin to live and not merely to exist.\textsuperscript{38} (“Integrations-Kampagne,” n.d.)

This quote situates language at the base of the distinction between the politically qualified, valuable version of life (\textit{zoe}) and bare life (\textit{bios}) (Agamben, 1998). There is a persistent tension in the corpus that emerges from the intentional ambiguity surrounding language and communication. In this quote, DJ Chino discusses the basic ability to communicate, to understand and be understood. However, the press coverage of this campaign explicitly denies language as a simply, or even primarily, a matter of communication. As the quote above from politician Maria Böhmer states, “language is about more than communication—it is the tie that binds us.” The ambiguity around language and communication only serves to consolidate a normative notion of proper German.

Proper language is legitimated as a fundamental requirement for valid and active citizenship. It is frequently linked to the achievement of a “good” and politically meaningful life.

Whoever wants to become someone in Germany, and doesn’t speak the language, has no chance…. The Integration Commissioner of the Federal Government, Maria Böhmer said, “Good language knowledge opens the doors for a successful life in our country.”\textsuperscript{39} (“Integrations-Kampagne startet,” 2010)

[Maria Böhmer] said, in essence, whoever does not speak German can never become anything in Germany. In contrast, whoever speaks good German can make a contribution to society.\textsuperscript{39} (Lachmann, 2010)

“Only those who speak the German language have a chance,” warns [CDU minister Aygül] Özkan, promising, “In this country anyone can become anything.”\textsuperscript{39} (Fröhlich, 2010)
The message is clear: NO FUTURE WITHOUT A COMMON LANGUAGE!\(^{xxxii}\) (Herrmann, 2010)

Speaking the right form of German is required for the successful life of any individual person. Furthermore, the normalization of language is the prerequisite for the future of society itself, as the last quote emphasizes in capitalized text. Language-as-integration posits that the success associated with normative belonging is equally accessible to all, since language learning is flexible and technically available to all people. Those who refuse to learn German or speak properly cannot expect “to become anything” or even participate in society. In Maria Böhmer’s words, “whoever can’t speak German is only an onlooker in our country”\(^{xxxiii}\) (Ehrenstein, 2010). Language-as-integration discourse erases discrimination and structural inequality, asserting that the solution to social and economic inequality among minority populations lies with the individual. At a more fundamental level, it affirms that those without proper speech cannot have active, politically relevant lives.

**Shifting Definition of Citizenship: Cosmopolitan Monolingualism**

On its face, enabling immigrants to learn the German language poses clear benefits to immigrants as well as society at large. However, discussions about language deficits among “migrants” are built on a fuzzy concept of language. These discussions ignore the diversity of immigrant and minority experiences as well as the contextual factors that contribute to different levels of fluency and speech style. Furthermore, while campaigns like *Out with It* publicize the idea of language deficiency among minorities and immigrants, they do not include concrete plans to address the chronically insufficient
resources dedicated to instruction of German as a foreign language offered as part of “integration classes” (“Haushaltsplan,” 2014; Kocaman, 2010).

In one of the only critical articles written about the campaign, freelance writer Mely Kiyak (2010) investigated the language course offerings aggregated on the website ich-spreche-deutsche.de, the only concrete service offered by the initiative. She framed the article as an open letter to the politician Aygül Özkan, the first female Turkish-German minister who also posed for the Out with It campaign. Kiyak attempted to find a language course that would serve her imaginary retired 55-year-old mother with limited German skills. She called 10 of the 36 programs listed on the site and found that their offerings all targeted foreign students and business people or new immigrants. She also called local and national government ministries dedicated to assisting immigrants. She could not find a single German course that was appropriate—either in terms of cost or content—for her hypothetical mother. Kiyak concludes that “the market has not reacted to the political demand on migrants to learn better German. Likewise, politicians have no solutions. And you, [Aygül Özkan]? You model for a PR campaign by an industry group and stick your tongue out at migrants”xxxiv (Kiyak, 2010). While four other articles in the corpus included skepticism about the campaign’s purpose and effectiveness, Kiyak’s column was the only example that seriously addressed the lack of resources available for immigrants to meet language standards demanded in the German public sphere.

This focus on German language acquisition coalesced around the turn of the millennium at the same time as the introduction of jus soli citizenship. Like the concept of integration, the multilingualism introduced by foreign labor had been a topic of political debate since the mid-1970s (Gramling, 2009). However, they only became a
major political and public focus after citizenship laws were changed to acknowledge the reality of Germany’s status as an immigrant country. Previously, the priority of linguistic policy for labor migrants and their children had been to foster the “readiness-to-return” (Rückkehrbereitschaft) by funding instruction in heritage languages. German language instruction for first generation immigrants was neglected by the government. Only after pluralism was legally acknowledged as a German reality did linguistic pluralism become a target of state control. David Gramling (2009, 2016) identifies this “linguistic turn” as a new model of civic belonging based on the idea of jus linguarum (right of languages), or “cosmopolitan monolingualism.” Gramling argues that, unlike the previous models based on “blood” or “soil,” jus linguarum does not seek to establish a uniform “civic essence,” but rather reacts to the existence of linguistic plurality by introducing “segregative strategies” to reduce its impact on public life (2009, p. 131). Cosmopolitan monolingualism upholds the idea of “cultural diversity while discouraging the public use of multiple heritage languages.” In the early to mid-2000s, the “salutary neglect” of the Kohl government in the 1980s and 1990s gave way to a rapid proliferation of new laws and policies tying social assistance and visa renewal to the demonstration of progress in German language courses. Lest they be considered coercive, these policies were justified in terms of civil rights, arguing the immigrants had the “right” to learn German as a means of achieving autonomy and equality in Germany. In a remarkably fast turnaround, the center-right political coalition effectively resignified the German language “not as an inherited ethnic possession but as a pan-ethnic lingua franca” that represented the solution to the specter of cultural relativism and parallel societies ascribed to multiculturalism.
In the politics of integration of the early to mid-2000s, cosmopolitan monolingualism emerged as a panacea for problems of social cohesion and became the key symbolic performance of civic unification. However, as German language competency became an increasingly important symbolic tool, public debates about civic belonging only served to obscure the complexity of language practices among multilingual people, including the fact that for those raised in the German school system German may not be their “mother tongue” but it is certainly one of their native languages. The norm of monolingualism is so strong in Germany, as in most other European countries and their settler-colonialist offshoots (Auer & Wei, 2007), that multilingualism is seen as a problem that interferes with the proper acquisition of the majority language. In a proposal that inspired national ridicule, the Christian Social Union (CSU) party of Bavaria went so far as to propose that immigrants and asylum seekers speak German not only in public but also in the home, arguing at their party convention in 2014 that “whoever wants to live here permanently should be urged to speak German in the public sphere and at home” (Sprachregeln für Zuwanderer,” 2014). This proposal inspired near universal opposition, as the incursion into the private sphere was deemed invasive and impractical.

However, many critical responses to the CSU’s German-everywhere proposal actually revealed the strength of underlying monolingual language ideologies. Robert Moore (2015) recently compared EU policy documents on language pluralism in the European Union with early language standardization projects at the dawn of the modern European nation-state. In Moore’s analysis, the ideal multilingual Europe consists of a collection of monolingual states, each with its own mother tongue. Each of these
monolingual Europeans should then be encouraged to learn one language of choice and one language for international and practical use. Moore relates this policy to fears, on the one hand, of the dominance and threat of contamination posed by the *lingua franca* English and, on the other, fears of social disintegration through linguistic diversity of non-EU immigrants. In contemporary Europe, diversity is hailed as a “benefit,” a cultural advantage in a global age. At the same time, persistent anxieties circulate about the potential for chaos and miscommunication resulting from “poorly managed” diversity. Like the integration discourses examined throughout this dissertation (see, in particular, Chapter 2), linguistic difference is understood through a political economy of life that sees it as both a means of future growth through innovation and a potential threat in the form of those who “opt out” (Wiese, 2015), refusing to participate in the national project. With little to no interest in actual linguistic practices, symbolic language politics are a means of consolidating European norms in the face of changes brought by the new mobility within the European Union and by global political and economic projects.

There has been substantial research on new youth vernaculars in Western European countries showing similar constructions of these vernaculars as inferior and threatening to national language and majority culture (see Wiese, 2014). In research from across Europe, vernaculars associated with minority youth are associated with negative behavior such as violence and sexism even while they are sometimes seen as fashionable or “cool.” This simultaneous devaluation and appropriation of minority sociolects will sound familiar to those acquainted with debates around “Ebonics” (African American Vernacular English) in the United States. Despite scholarly research to the contrary, public reactions frequently equate deviations from standard German in minority
vernaculars with mistakes made by learners of German as a foreign language (Wiese, 2015). Furthermore, this use of “flawed” German is perceived as a willful attack on German norms, as “opting out” of majority society and, thus, as an act of aggression and a threat to social cohesion (Wiese, 2015, p. 356). This minoritized form of speech is also associated with laziness, with the unwillingness to expend the effort to speak “properly.” High German, in contrast, is a skill to be cultivated with care and, thus, is worthy of its elevated cultural capital. Whereas regional dialects are considered part of national history and local folk culture and are seen as compatible with learning High German, minority German vernaculars are commonly seen as an outside imposition (Wiese, 2014, 2015).

The CSU’s German-only proposal mentioned above comes into conflict with cosmopolitan monolingualism because it threatens the integrity of pure language transmission. In their zeal to eliminate all language diversity, the CSU proposal introduced the possibility of parents transmitting “faulty” or “broken” language to their children. The CSU violates the modern ideals of plural monolingualism by encouraging the possibility of corrupting a pure language. This commitment to language purity is illustrated by the leader of the Green Party, Cem Özdemir, who responded to the CSU proposal, arguing,

One reason why I can speak reasonably good High German, and not only Swabian chatter or broken German is because my parents didn’t speak German with me. If my parents had tried to speak mangled German with me, I certainly would not have become the chair of Alliance ‘90/The Greens, or a member of the German parliament, instead I would have ended up a car mechanic or some such thing. Which is to say, thank God my parents didn’t listen to the CSU, because when parents teach their children a language badly, the best teacher in the world can’t counteract it.\xxxvi (D. Müller & Özdemir, 2014)
Özdemir, who is one of the most consistent and outspoken advocates for immigrants, asylum seekers, and minorities in the German government, bases his condemnation of the CSU proposal on the value of language purity. In this view, learning anything but the standard dialect of a language makes it impossible to acquire the standard dialect, even with “the best teachers in the world.” High German, which was originally a geographic distinction, is now a qualitative distinction. The only road to upward mobility and the top echelons of society, here, is through the standard dialect. Although Wiese’s research shows that regional dialects are considered authentically German and, thus, valuable, speaking only regional dialect is a sign of poor education. Özdemir’s comment reflects well-established European monolingual narratives, which hold that regional dialects and “mangled” forms of standard language spoken by foreigners threaten standard language learning (Moore, 2015). Ignoring the realities of linguistic flexibility and the prevalence of code-switching, this “language decay” narrative (Moore, 2015) is a foundational topos of monolingual ideology that persists from the early days of the European nation-state (Gramling, 2009; Wiese, 2015). Özdemir’s statement promotes an orderly and managed multilingualism, that minimizes linguistic decay through provincial and “flawed” speech. And while Özdemir’s leftist politics would typically align him with those who would be critical of classist structures that denigrate local knowledge, this statement uncritically accepts that competence in High German is a reasonable prerequisite for socio-economic success.

The CSU proposal was almost universally rejected not because its monolingualism was too extreme, but instead because it violated the kind of cosmopolitan monolingualism and managed multilingualism that have emerged as ideals
in German and the European Union. In contrast, language bans that impose monolingual speech in official and public spaces, such as the schoolyard, have been widely celebrated. One school in Berlin, where 90 percent of students grew up multilingual, was even awarded the prestigious “German National Prize” in 2006 for their implementation of a German-only policy (Gramling, 2009). Although the policy evoked a heated national debate—including condemnation from Özdemir’s Green Party colleague, Özcan Mutlu, who appeared in the Out with It campaign (see figure 2) (Ohlert, 2014, p. 550)—the students affected by the policy did not find it problematic (Gramling, 2009). In interviews about the policy, students, as competent code-switchers, were not overly concerned with the policy, nor did they see it as particularly burdensome. Instead, students used the opportunity to raise other concrete issues of concern to them, such as reducing class size and improving opportunities after graduation. These concerns were largely ignored in the press.

What these discourses overlook is that speaking German is already a normal part of everyday life for multilingual students. Although they may have grown up speaking another language at home, the overwhelming monolingualism of the media sphere and public life makes it almost impossible for young people to avoid significant exposure to German even before they begin formal education. Still, young multilingual citizens, for whom code-switching is the norm, are subjected to scrutiny for their German language skills under the same rubric as those who learn German as a foreign language. They are congratulated when they speak with ease in formal registers or criticized for their “bad German” when they use informal youth sociolects. The Out with It campaign is an excellent example of the congratulatory mode, since the minority celebrities featured all
grew up multilingual with German as one of their native languages. They are held up as examples not for their fluency in multiple languages, but solely for their ability to speak “proper” German.

However, the everyday minority Germans—actual or hypothetical—who appear in the articles do not emerge from scrutiny as well as the celebrity role models. In the Out with It corpus, the characterizations of non-celebrity integrants was overwhelmingly negative. The positive descriptions of immigrants and minorities generally revolve around the role model celebrities as examples of the achievements possible through successful integration. One typical example paraphrases a statement by one of the advertising executives responsible for the campaign, explaining that “the prominent ambassadors are living proof that in Germany everything is possible when you integrate yourself. And when you are good” (Fröhlich, 2010). Although “being good” is often implied within integration, this example shows that, in this campaign, language takes center stage in defining integration.

The negative assessments of everyday minorities are concentrated in seven of the 39 articles examined, most of which speak about “migrants” in the abstract or through anecdotes told by Harris. One article from Stern, titled “The Sad Reality of Integration: The Germans, They Are the Others” (Albers, 2010) claims to break this pattern of “speaking about integration” without speaking with “migrant children.” It follows Harris as he visits a majority minority school in Berlin’s Wedding neighborhood at the invitation of their German teacher. Harris faces off with a boy who wants to know about Harris’s origins. Harris insists that he is German, despite the student’s continued questioning. The journalist describes the scene: “A boy and a man. Both born and raised
in Germany. Both marked as foreign by their dark hair, eyes, and skin. But only the boy feels foreign (Albers, 2010). This assessment casts social exclusion as a matter of individual choice, erasing the power differential between the celebrity man and the unknown boy. The students are said to identify with Harris, because of his status as a visible minority.

They tell him stories from their lives as migrant children, of everyday racism, prescribed social roles, hateful Germans, of life in their own world and of the fear of life in the other world. Harris tries to destroy the clichés that a generation grew up with, that also serve a defensive function. However, he had to ask for clarification, since even though these children grew up in Germany, none of them speaks the national language perfectly. The author does not specify which clichés Harris was attempting to clear up, but the context suggests that Harris answered their accounts of discrimination and social exclusion by telling students that their impressions of Germans are stereotypical and that they are using racism as an excuse for their problems. By characterizing students’ speech as incomprehensible, the author underscores the idea of students’ isolation from normative society and plays into common deficit narratives associated with the descendants of immigrants.

The author goes on to say that students are aware of the problem of inadequate speech in their community, paraphrasing their comments:

It is “ungood” that the soccer star Mesut Özil was awarded the Bambi for Integration, since he couldn’t speak correct German, says one boy. “My dad thinks that he can speak super good German, but when I hear him on the telephone, I think, what kind of talk is that,” admits another. Encouraged, a pair of girls finally told of parents who can’t speak German. “I am ashamed sometimes,” said one quietly. The author reminds us again of students’ language deficits, transcribing the error in the boy’s unfavorable assessment of Mesut Özil’s speech capacity, a deficit that he deems significant enough to disqualify Özil from consideration for an Integration award. The
students’ internalization of the national language ideology is so deep that it elicits shame for themselves, their families, and even the most celebrated members of their community. The article concludes with a quote from a boy who resigns himself to the reasonable expectation of social and economic failure if he cannot perform properly in the hegemonic linguistic register, saying “if I can’t hack it—with the language and everything—that I won’t make it here in Germany.” This recognition is presented as the desired conclusion of Harris’s visit, as a positive step towards pushing young minority students to put aside complaints of social exclusion and accept the narrative of personal responsibility and language normativity as the road to success.

**Conclusion**

The celebrities and successful individuals celebrated in the Out with It campaign act as minority enforcers of the hegemonic norms of cosmopolitan monolingualism. Their success is attributed to their competence in standardized German, implying—and in the case of Harris’s song explicitly stating—that individuals not fluent in standard German are responsible for any social and economic problems they face in Germany. In Harris’s terms, racism “is just the blink of an eye,” insignificant in comparison to the individual’s rejection of German society evidenced by their inability to communicate in the sanctioned standard vernacular. The celebration of minority role models in the Bambi for Integration and the Out with It campaign were accompanied in equal or greater measure by condemnations of minority straw men and tropes of young Muslim males’ antagonism towards Germans and their liberal democratic national project.
Celebrities are presented as examples of successful integration, proof that, as campaign model and women’s national soccer team player Celia Okoyino da Mbabi put it, “there is equality of opportunity in Germany for children with a migration background too” (Fietz, 2010). Celebrities are portrayed as successful because they are integrated, and their success proves their integration. Forms of diversity that fit neatly into an imagined ideal of German and “Western” values—summarized in one article as “respect for civil society, democratic rules, the defense of human rights, the freedom to think differently” (Malzahn, 2010)—are positioned as a threat to the nation and to the “good immigrant.” Only with a “German foreground” can candidates for integration hope to live. “If we are not successful in defending this [German] foreground, we will lose entire city sections forever—and with them the people” (Malzahn, 2010). In other words, threatening forms of difference embodied by enemies of integration must be eliminated to enable the life of successful candidates for integration as well as normative nationals.

In popular public narratives, diversity is valuable when it is well-managed and contributes to national political and economic projects. Diversity is proof that “Western values” are tolerant and permit “the freedom to think differently.” Difference is valuable when it adds “color” and inspires innovation, spurring growth. However, diversity that overflows or challenges hegemonic projects, that puts spaces and populations beyond the reach of the state, threatens the power of the nation-state to make live. In the conclusion, I will consider how these narratives of celebration and of the threat of uncontrolled diversity are playing out in the German reaction to the global refugee crisis.
i Deutsche Promis leben davon, regelmäßig in den Medien zu sein, denn es steigert ihre Bekanntheit und damit ihren Marktwert leben davon, regelmäßig in den Medien zu sein, denn es steigert ihre Bekanntheit und damit ihren Marktwert.

ii Die meisten Menschen brauchen Vorbilder. Nicht nur zum Nachmachen, sondern auch, um sich abzugrenzen, nach dem Motto: „Das geht ja gar nicht!“


v „Bushido ruft in seinen Texten und Statements zu Gewalt gegen Schwule und Lesben auf. Unter „gelungen Integration“ verstehe ich etwas anderes.“

vi „Wer Frauen- und Schwulenverachtung propagiert, hat keinen Preis für gelungene Integration verdient“

vii Er sei ihrer Meinung nach sicher kein Beispiel für gelungene Integration, „sondern eine äußerst erfolgreiche Kunstfigur, die auf dem Rücken von Minderheiten große Kasse macht“

viii Für Hahn ist klar: „Er hat jetzt den Auftrag, sich als Brückenbauer zu profilieren.“

ix Bushido sei nicht für seine frühen Texte mit dem Bambi ausgezeichnet worden, sagte Peter Maffay. „Im Gegenteil: Bushido hat sich ganz klar von seinen Aussagen von vor zehn Jahren distanziert. Er hat sich schon lange öffentlich zu seinen Fehlern bekannt. Meine Absicht war, bei allem Respekt gegenüber den Diskriminierten, eine Brücke zu bauen.“

x Bushido ist ein Musterbeispiel gelungener Integration. Der Skandal um seine Auszeichnung zeigt auch die Verlogenheit der selbsternannten Herolde der Migranten… Die Freunde und Verehrer der Migration sind nun empört, dass ausgerechnet ein im Kapitalismus erfolgreicher und im Diskurs politisch unkorrekter Rapper einen Integrations-Preis bekommt


xii Seither jagen Dutzende Polizisten und Staatsanwälte Täter und Waffen, Verfassungsschützer versuchen, die mafiöse Organisation türkischer Nationalisten in Deutschland zu durchdringen, die für das Blutvergießen verantwortlich sein soll. Die Morde, so viel wissen die Ermittler, sind die Rechnung für Schulden aus kriminellen Geschäften oder die Rache an Abtrünnigen.

xiii Deutschland ist großzügig und hat ‘n großes Herz

xiv Du hast Glück, bist jetzt hier, also benimm dich. Mach deine Arbeit, werd erwachsen, sein nicht kindisch! […] Schäm dich über Deutschland so schlecht zu reden!

xv Wär ich blond mit blauen Augen, würdest du sagen, dass ich ein Nazi bin.

xvi Wenn er sich jetzt darum kümmert, dass seine Freunde und Fans vielleicht besser Deutsch lernen, ist das schon in guter Ansatz.

xvii Er bedient üble Klischees, aber er nutzt auch seine Popularität, um gute Botschaften zu verbreiten, etwa: Ausländer, die hier leben, müssen die deutsche Sprache lernen.

xviii Die 2008 vom Verband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger (VDZ) gegründete Stiftung will mit der Werbekampagne deutlich machen, wie wichtig es für in Deutschland lebende Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund ist, die deutsche Sprache zu beherrschen.

xix „Raus mit der Sprache. Rein ins Leben“, heißt die Kampagne mit der in Deutschland lebende Migranten animiert werden sollen, unsere Sprache zu lernen.

xx Promis wollen Migrantenkindern Vorbilder sein.
Um gerade bei Jugendlichen und jungen Erwachsenen die Bereitschaft zu erhöhen, Deutsch zu lernen, haben sich nun Prominente mit ausländischen Wurzeln für eine zweite Staffel der Kampagne der „Deutschlandstiftung Integration“ zur Verfügung gestellt.

Eine Plakataktion soll Migranten zum Deutschlernen bewegen. Die Aktion richtet sich vornehmlich an Migranten und deren Kinder, die kaum Deutsch sprechen, obwohl sie in Deutschland geboren wurden.


Der Markt reagiert nicht auf die politischen Forderungen an Migranten, besseres Deutsch zu lernen. Die Politik findet ebenfalls keine Lösungen. Und Sie? Modeln für die Imagekampagne einer Wirtschaftsvereinigung und strecken den Migranten die Zunge heraus!

Wer in Deutschland was werden will und die Sprache nicht spricht, hat keine Chance. Die Integrationsbeauftragte der Bundesregierung Maria Böhmer, sagte: „Gute Sprachkenntnisse öffnen die Türen für ein erfolgreiches Leben in unserem Land.“

Dabei sagte [Maria Böhmer (CDU)] sinngemäß, wer nicht Deutsch spreche, könne in Deutschland nichts werden. Wer hingegen gut Deutsch spreche, könne sich in die Gesellschaft einbringen.

"Nur, wer die deutsche Sprache spricht, hat eine Chance", mahnt Özkan und verspricht: "In diesem Land kann jeder alles werden."

Die Botschaft ist klar: KEINE ZUKUNFT OHNE EINE GEMEINSAME SPRACHE!

Wer dauerhaft hier leben will, soll dazu angehalten werden, im öffentlichen Raum und in der Familie Deutsch zu sprechen.

Die prominenten Botschafter seien der lebende Beweis dafür, dass in Deutschland alles möglich sei, wenn man sich integriert. Und wenn man gut ist, ergänzt Schoeffler.

Die traurige Realität der Integration: Die Deutschen, das sind die anderen


Wenn ich es nicht packe - mit der Sprache und so -, dann schaffe ich es nicht hier in Deutschland.

Ich habe durch den Sport gelernt, dass es auch für Kinder mit Migrationshintergrund in Deutschland Chancengleichheit gibt.

Dieser deutsche Vordergrund besteht in der Achtung zivilgesellschaftlicher, demokratischer Regeln, der Verteidigung von Menschenrechten, der Freiheit von Andersdenken.

Wenn es uns nicht gelingt, diesen Vordergrund zu verteidigen, werden wir auf Dauer ganze Stadtteile verlieren - und mit ihnen die Menschen.
CONCLUSION

This dissertation assembles case studies from the past decade to investigate how discourses of integration have emerged as a tool for managing Germany’s internal Others, modifying and strengthening the category of the normative national in the process. The cases in this dissertation show how nativist logics form the foundation of integration, helping to explain the ease with which the xenophobic extreme right is entering mainstream politics in Germany and across the continent. Conceptions of integration are not monolithic; in fact, they are most often decidedly vague and malleable. However, this dissertation demonstrates how discourses of integration facilitate the racialized division of society from a platform justified by the promise of improving the life of the German population, including willing candidates for integration. The perception of the propensity of some groups to integrate has come to distinguish the deserving from the undeserving, the beneficial from the threatening; these processes have become increasingly important and fraught as the global refugee crises began to impact Europe in recent years.

This dissertation asked how mediated discourses of integration reproduce norms of national culture and identity that operate to manage minority and immigrant populations in the German context. The discourse of integration has become a norm across Europe, and in Germany it has guided the first attempts by the government to implement policy dealing with the long-term inclusion of transnational populations in the German body politic. To understand integration discourse it is necessary to situate it in relation to broader discourses of culture and the meaning of national belonging. The first
two chapters in this dissertation outlined the contemporary development of two major foundations of German national ideas: The Romantic nation represented by the idea of *Heimat* (homeland) and the rational, European universalist Germany founded on constitutional patriotism and pride through productivity. The two chapters in this section examined the theoretical underpinnings of these schemas of identity as well as the place of “new Germans” within them. The second section examined the construction of “the new Germany” in the first decade of the new millennium through the development of “soccer patriotism” and the celebration of immigrant patriots. The three chapters in this section analyzed three cases that illuminate the relationship between patriotism and productivity and the role of diversity in this new national formation. The third section investigated the idea of integration failures and the threat they pose to the future of the German population. The cases examined in these final two chapters each entail a process of dividing the valuable from the unproductive and threatening integrants, showing the relation between processes of celebration and condemnation. Integrants are both a valuable resource for the renewal of the German population and a potentially mortal threat to the fabric of German society. The cases in this section trace the process of evaluation that separates the productive from the harmful, and seeks to manage the threats posed by harmful difference to re-establish the stability of the population.

In Germany, sports have emerged as a key mechanism and narrative tool in integration policy and media discourse, wherein elite national sports and amateur youth sports play different but complementary goals. At the amateur level, sports integration supports the practical goals of providing regulated spaces of contact, as well as symbolic goals of reinforcing the superiority of normative German values. As was discussed in
Chapter 2, the embodied practice of sport is conceived as a means of instilling discipline among multiethnic youth to render them as docile bodies. It is an attractive form of governmentality that paves the way for other lessons on becoming an entrepreneurial and productive subject. In teams that include a mix of normative nationals and immigrants, youth sports can also provide opportunities for contact and solidarity across categories of difference. Literature produced by youth sports institutions invested in sporting integration praise this potential for contact, while providing normative guidelines to manage difference by prioritizing universal rules and German monolingualism.

At the elite national level, minority athletes become symbols of the German nation. As the cases in this dissertation show, as the bodies of visible minorities have come to symbolize the nation, they allow the nation to celebrate its own conversion into a cosmopolitan space. Permitting minorities to symbolize the nation is evidence that the national category is capacious and tolerant. However, the structure of broadcast sports also functions as a panopticon (Foucault, 1977), in which the audience and announcers frame, zoom in, scrutinize and interpret the meaning of players’ gestures as artifacts of integration. While players know that they are being viewed, they cannot know or control the lens’s movement, focus, or length. Others have the power to interpret and semantically fix their bodily expression. Of course, this power to affix meaning is not complete, and players may recover some of this power by breaking the script, by speaking out of place or refusing to follow the norms and expectations of the field. Nevertheless, the athlete is there first and foremost as a physical performer. In the context of integration discourse, athletes provide a performance waiting to be captured by cameras and interpreted by the media.
Two key media events inspired this dissertation: the men’s FIFA World Cup of 2006, which was hosted in Germany, and the 2010 debate unleashed by the publication and popular success of a eugenicist book by politician and Bundesbank board member, Thilo Sarrazin. The extensive national self-reflection catalyzed by these seemingly unrelated events contributed to intertwining discourses defining the characteristics and practices of a healthy German population as well as the threats to that population. In the first case, pride in Germany through sporting spectacle is defined as a salutary practice that is open to the whole population. It is a means for Others to show their commitment to national well-being. At the same time, the participation of Others is highlighted to demonstrate the constructive nature of “soccer patriotism,” distinguishing it from harmful, exclusionary forms of nationalism.

The case of the Sarrazin debate exemplifies the flip side of integration discourse. While sporting integration is about national renewal, the Sarrazin debate outlines the fear of the imminent collapse of the normative German nation under pressure from Muslim immigrants and their descendants who ostensibly refuse to integrate. The Sarrazin debate makes the hierarchy within the category of the integrant explicit. Integration discourse may attach itself to any identifiable traces of the transnational or the foreign, but the Sarrazin debate reveals the racialized category of the Muslim as paradigmatic figure of problematic difference at the center of integration discourse. At the same time, Sarrazin praises East and South Asians, Jews, and other minorities to obscure the fundamentally racializing aims of his project. The etic category of the Muslim organizes the large population of Arab and Turkish immigrants and their descendents into an essentialized religio-cultural group, in much the same way as historical Antisemitism (Mandel, 2008;
Norton, 2013). This “negative essentialism” converts Islam into an explanatory framework for all manner of social ills, without the need or even the possibility of empirical evidence connecting it to an actual group of people (Semati, 2011). In reality, the religious practices and cultural norms of Muslims in Germany reflect the diversity of practices of the many national and sub-national populations that make up Germany’s transnational population. Contemporary representations of Muslim peril implicit and sometimes explicit in integration debates, recall the tradition of Orientalist discourses (Said, 1979) situating the East and, more precisely, Islam as the “constitutive outside,” thus stabilizing the self-definition of Europe.

The Sarrazin debate shows how biopolitical logics divide the population into categories of the worthy and the unworthy, those who must live and those who pose a threat to life. Still, a strong distinction between the constructive and destructive modes of integration discourse is not tenable. As the cases in this dissertation show, integration discourse moves easily between celebration and condemnation, supported by the neoliberal strategic logics at the core of biopolitics. Biopolitics refers to a historical process by which “life” emerged as the center of political strategies (Lemke, 2011, p. 33). As it was developed by Foucault, biopolitics refers to an assemblage of strategies of governance, forms of political legitimacy, and technologies of security and population management. Binding Sarrazin’s anti-Muslim arguments and the promotion of sporting patriotism and integration are underlying values of social well-being through productivity. In tandem with common sense thinking about migration and difference at the level of the population, integration discourse operates at the individual level through
initiatives oriented towards cultivating disciplined, docile bodies, for example, through the kinds of sports integration programs analyzed in Chapter 2.

Whereas most of the contemporary research on migration and cultural difference in Germany and Europe focus on immigrants themselves, examining their levels of educational or economic attainment or investigating their experiences of exclusion and accommodation, this dissertation focuses attention on the function of integration discourse for the construction of the normative population. This conclusion extends the findings of this dissertation to the reactions to the ongoing refugee crisis. The cases in this dissertation elucidate the continuities between the outpouring of enthusiastic public support for refugees in the summer of 2015 and the simultaneous implementation of new policies that further restrict asylum laws. The development of integration discourse in the mediated public sets up a logical framework for the selective and always provisional inclusion of immigrant and minority populations as part of the new “colorful” Germany.

Asylum and the Future of Integration

The mediated public discourse in Germany around new peaks in demand for asylum during 2015 dramatically exemplifies how integration discourse strengthens national norms. As I will briefly outline below, the responses to the refugee crisis in 2015 followed many of the patterns established in other cases examined in this dissertation. Representations reflected Germany’s recent rise as one of the most admired countries in
the world, as reflected in the GfK Roper Nation Brands Index\textsuperscript{39} surveys measuring the “soft power” of nation branding, as discussed in Chapter 4. As during the World Cups in 2006 and 2010, Germans were praised for their welcoming and open culture, showing that they had learned from the lessons of the past to become a global moral leader. Domestically, journalists and commentators marveled at “how deeply our country has changed since those macro-crimes, that one could only slowly begin to speak of decades after the war” (Liebsch, 2015). Unfortunately, the celebratory discourse and action in this case was accompanied from the beginning by the other tools of securitization and responsibilization that characterize integration discourse. Finally, I turn to critical voices outside the mainstream public sphere, who critique the triumphalism of the response to the refugee crisis. They relate these responses to Germany’s recent history of self-congratulatory national spectacle, which denies structural and institutional racism in mainstream Germany. Against dualistic conception of Germany (as voluntary helpers or the racist fringe) and of immigrants and minorities (as productive and colorful or threatening and strange) these writers advocate an agonistic and critical transcultural approach to politics and representation in Germany.

\textit{Good Germany, Bad Germany}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{39} See: http://nation-brands.gfk.com/
\end{footnotesize}
During a visit to Berlin in June 2014, I was waiting for the S-Bahn when I noticed a sticker on the sign indicating the name of the stop (figure 13). The sticker showed a colorful cartoon of a panicked eagle in a boat, scrambling to pull a life preserver labeled “right to asylum” out of a sea of grasping discolored hands. At the bow of the boat, behind the eagle, the German flag waves. The boat’s rudder is painted with the German national colors and topped with the European Union flag. The top of the sticker proclaims that “the boat is full.” The bottom portion of the sticker was partially ripped up, obscuring the letters in the bottom right corner. The complete image, shown in the right panel of figure 20, displays the initials of the far-right National Democratic Party that produced it. The sticker showed some weathering, suggesting it had been there for some time.

![Figure 13: Left and center: Photos of NPD sticker from a train platform (by author); Right: Full image found with Google Image search](image)

This sticker and its partial removal symbolize several the key discourses and political tensions explored in this dissertation around nationalism and the control of
difference in Germany. The slogan at the top of the sticker is a well-established nativist metaphor, which proposes that immigration threatens to swamp the nation that is at capacity. This resembles the “wave” metaphor for migration, which is common across languages and national contexts. This depiction takes the metaphor to its logical extreme, making explicit the biopolitical logics suggested by the boat. In this image, refugees are completely stripped of their humanity. They are rendered as the living dead. The shred of life they possess, in the form of the reanimated hands grasping towards the safety in the Europe-boat, is only relevant insofar as it poses a threat to the national population, represented by the petrified eagle. Because of its limited capacity, the small asylum life preserver cannot possibly serve as an aid. Instead, it functions as a lure that pulls undead hands towards the boat.

The sticker clearly demonstrates the position of its neo-Nazi authors. In short, the valuable life of the national population is under threat from refugees, whose lives represent the death of the national population. As this dissertation demonstrates, this discourse also operates in the center of the popular mediated public sphere, most obviously in the Sarrazin debate but also in positively framed discussions about the value of properly managed and curated diversity. The choice of passersby to remove the letters indicating the sticker's authorship while leaving the message fully intact represents the acceptability of the discourses of the right, while denying their connections to racism in German society.

Reactions to the refugee crisis in Germany involved both the kinds of euphoric celebration that characterized the 2006 World Cup and new regulations restricting asylum rights based on biopolitical criteria of value under the imperative of integration. These
criteria amplify the threat posed by failed candidates for integration from “incompatible” cultures. These associations are supported by well-meaning programs, such as the sports integration programs explored in Chapter 2, as well by the anti-Muslim polemics of Thilo Sarrazin (Chapter 6) and the denials of racism by rapper Harris (Chapter 7). Although these discourses circulate freely in the mainstream public sphere, their mobilization and intensification as part of a growing xenophobic populist politics has raised alarm among many politicians and prominent Germans. Like the alteration of the NPD sticker, public responses to rising anti-refugee violence sought to exile open racism without attacking the roots of racist discourse in the mainstream. As the critics at the end of this conclusion argue, the refugee crisis became another spectacle, offering the opportunity to show the world the welcoming and tolerant new Germany while characterizing racism as a marginal phenomenon outside the boundaries of the normative nation.

**Introducing the World to Willkommenskultur**

As the international press observed with great approval (Kämper, 2015), Germany sent a message of support for refugees at a time when many other European countries were building fences. However, even as Germany gave the world the neologism Willkommenskultur (welcoming culture) (Akrap, 2015), the domestic reality was much more complicated: In 2015 lawmakers aggressively passed laws restricting asylum law and the movement of “concerned citizens” (besorgte Bürger) coalesced behind the new rightwing party, Alternatives for Germany (AfD). Indeed, a similar electoral shift to the right has been building across Europe, gaining strength from the political and economic instability in the Euro Zone and anxieties induced by record numbers of people forcibly
displaced by war and economic desolation, primarily from Syria, Somalia, and Afghanistan. While the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2016) determined that the overwhelming majority of refugees and displaced people are living in low- and middle-income countries, in the late summer of 2015 stories of a “European migrant crisis” dominated international news cycles. Images of crowds moving along train tracks and overloaded boats on the Mediterranean flooded the media. Still, of the 65.3 million people forcibly displaced in 2015, only 6% of them were hosted in Europe (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2016). Both in terms of pure numbers and as a percentage of the total population in European countries, European and other high-income countries have provided refuge for relatively few forcibly displaced people.

Whereas only months before Germany had played role of cold hardliners by proposing harsh austerity measures for Greece as its economy collapsed, in the late summer of 2015, Germans enjoyed international admiration for publicly welcoming refugees on train platforms and for Merkel’s statement that, “We can do it” (wir schaffen das) in regards to accommodating refugees. International news outlets praised Germany, while explaining that Germans’ welcoming response to refugees was due to their rational recognition that, with their rapidly aging population, Germany needed to welcome foreigners. The Washington Post published an article proclaiming that a demographic

Unfortunately, these narratives did not play out as expected; a survey of Germany’s top firms revealed that by September 2016, the 30 companies in Germany’s DAX stock exchange had only hired 63 refugees, 50 of whom were employed by the Deutsche Post (DHL) (Prodhan, 2016).
map of fertility rates shows “why some European countries reject refugees and others love them” (Noack, 2015), confirming that Germany’s embrace was solidly based in the statistically supported recognition of national interests in a time of population decline. A *Globe and Mail* headline from earlier that year dubbed Germany as “the place where the refugee flood is a solution, not a problem” (Saunders, 2015). In addition to the narrative of pragmatic self-interest, an article in *The Washington Post* also draws on the popular narrative of the “good-hearted German,” doing penance for the crimes of the Nazi period:

> Empathy and the country's Nazi-past — which turned Europe into a battlefield and later forced many Germans themselves to flee the war — might explain the country's enthusiasm for helping today's refugees. But there is another factor that few would openly acknowledge right away: Germany really needs them. (Noack, 2015)

This combination of rational self-interest and moral fortitude established a narrative in which Germans were the European heroes of the refugee crisis. Although this narrative functioned well internationally as a counterpoint to the outright hostility against refugees by many European leaders, it does not hold up under closer scrutiny of domestic politics. Without diminishing the substantial work of activists and concerned citizens in Germany, it is misleading to characterize the German response to the increased demand for asylum as enthusiastic in a durable sense or as responding to a rational desire to counteract the demographic decline of the German population.

The narratives of good Germans amongst duty-shirking European neighbors was partly based on valid foundations, but it is an oversimplification of Germany’s
complicated and ambivalent stance towards asylum seekers (see figure 14\textsuperscript{41}). On the one hand, Germany made the exceptional move to temporarily suspend the Dublin rules requiring refugees to apply for asylum in the EU country of first arrival in August 2015 (Holehouse, 2015). Furthermore, despite pressure from within her party, Merkel expressed her commitment to upholding the German constitution and the obligations of the Geneva Convention by refusing to put a limit on the number of asylum cases Germany would hear (“Merkel’s Conservative Allies,” 2015). On the other hand, by the end of September the German federal government had drafted and approved new restrictions reducing benefits and making asylum in Germany less accessible (“Neues Asylrecht,” 2015). Still, in the second half of 2015, images of refugees holding up pictures of Angela Merkel or handmade signs expressing their love and appreciation of Germany contrasted sharply with images of crowds of people caged or fleeing armed guards in Hungary. Although Germany’s exceptionally welcoming position was short-lived, it made a strong international impression.

**Responses to Refugee Crisis**

July 2015-March 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8/21/2015</td>
<td>Violent anti-refugee riots begin in Heidenau</td>
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<tr>
<td>8/21/2015</td>
<td>German government suspends enforcement of Dublin rule for Syrians requiring asylum</td>
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<td>requests be made in first EU country of entry</td>
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<td>8/28/2015</td>
<td>President Gauck speech divides “Dark” and “Light” Germany</td>
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<td>9/12/2015</td>
<td>Germany establishes border controls</td>
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<td>9/30/2015</td>
<td>New Asylum Laws (Asylpaket I) go into effect tightening asylum rights and</td>
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<td>reducing refugee benefits while providing access for refugees to integration</td>
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<td>courses</td>
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<td>10/31/2015</td>
<td>Germany reinstates Dublin rules for all and announces plans to increase</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>deportations</td>
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<tr>
<td>10/31/2015</td>
<td>In 2015, over 475,000 applications for asylum registered in Germany. Germany</td>
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<td></td>
<td>accepts highest number in EU, but is 6th in relation to population size.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11/2/2015</td>
<td>Second asylum package (Asylpaket II) passed, further restricting asylum rights,</td>
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<td>including for family reconciliation</td>
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<tr>
<td>11/2/2015</td>
<td>Integration Law passed increasing job market access and sanctions based on</td>
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<td></td>
<td>integration efforts</td>
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2015

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2016

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- In 2015, 1.3 million new asylum applications in EU countries
- In 2015, over 1 million cross Mediterranean, 3,771 reported deaths in the attempt. In 2016, fatality rate grows to 1 death in 88 crossings.
- EU-Turkey deal signed allowing new refugees to be sent to Turkey

**Figure 14: Timeline of Responses to Refugee Crisis**

Source: BBC 9/6/2015

Photography of Aylan Kurdi’s lifeless body circulates worldwide 9/2/2015

71 Asylum seekers found suffocated in a truck in Austria 8/27/2015

Integration Law passed increasing job market access and sanctions based on integration efforts

In 2015, over 475,000 applications for asylum registered in Germany. Germany accepts highest number in EU, but is 6th in relation to population size.
While international stories focused on the felicitous confluence of German pragmatism and moral commitments to human rights, domestically Germany struggled with a surge in arson attacks on refugee hostels in 2015. As concerns about “waves” of migrants “flooding” into Europe intensified, so did the violence against refugees and the hostels that housed them. An investigation by Die Zeit (Paul Blickle et al., 2015) determined that 222 serious violent attacks against refugees hostels had taken place in the first 11 months of 2015. In 169 of those cases no suspects were identified and only four cases resulted in convictions. In August, a multiday riot rocked the small town of Heidenau near Dresden. Groups of people, mostly men, greeted newly arrived refugees with flying bottles, rocks and racist slurs. A video posted on YouTube by one of the rioters shows smoke filled streets as people aim fireworks at police in riot gear (Hannes Kling, 2015). Dozens of people stand in and along the sides of the streets, pulling down police barriers, smashing concrete blocks, and throwing the resulting rubble at the police. At several points, they chant “Wir sind das Volk” (we are the people). None of the rioters were arrested. Although Minister of the Interior, Thomas de Maizière promised that the rioters would come to feel “the full severity of the state” (Zeit wieder rechte ausschreitungen in Heidenau), it took three months for investigations of suspects to begin and, as of the time of this writing, there have been no convictions (“Heidenau,” 2016).

As shocking as the events in Heidenau were, for the purposes of this dissertation, the most interesting part about them is not the actions of these extremist youth but the way their actions and statements were taken up in public discourse. The violent riots of Heidenau provided an undeniable and unambiguous incidence of racist hate against which mainstream society could unite in condemnation. Against the acts of Heidenau,
President Joachim Gauck made a statement praising the actions of ad hoc volunteer networks that had gathered to support the incoming asylum seekers. Gauck framed these actions, in Manichean terms, as the helper-citizens against the malicious extremist minority, claiming that volunteers “show that there is a light German, that is represented here shining against the dark Germany that we sense when we hear about attacks against asylum seeker housing or any xenophobic actions against people”\(^i\) ("Fremdenfeindlichkeit,” 2015). Gauck goes on to say,

> These lovely examples, that is the Germany we are building and that we depend on. And that this is a crystal-clear answer to the malicious agitators and arsonists, who spoil the image of our country. We will tell them, “You don’t represent us.” And we will absolutely not tolerate that lawbreakers—either abroad or domestically—stand for this Germany, which has shown itself to be open and willing to help.\(^ii\) ("Fremdenfeindlichkeit,” 2015)

Gauck’s statement came as part of a wave of enthusiasm for volunteering and demonstrating the welcoming character of Germany. The day after Gauck’s speech, Germany’s most popular periodical, Bild, rolled out a new public campaign under the slogan “We Help #refugeeswelcome” (Wir Helfen #refugeeswelcome). The campaign was introduced by Bild with the statement,

> “With the campaign, WE HELP, BILD wants to set an example of humanitarianism. We want to show that the noisy troublemakers and foreigner-haters do NOT bellow in our name! That Germany has a heart for people who need help!”\(^iii\) ("Große Hilfs-Aktion von BILD für Flüchtlinge,” 2015)

The Bild campaign gathered stories of companies, celebrities, and professional soccer teams who signed on to wear and proclaim the slogan “We help,” soliciting stories from their readers of their actions to help refugees. Gauck’s statement and the framing of the Bild campaign share a preoccupation with demonstrating to Germans themselves and to
the international community that Germany is a good and ethical nation. The asylum seekers provide the opportunity to showcase this goodness, framed as a national trait.

At the same time, as with soccer patriotism, the celebration of the helper nation is portrayed as incompatible with—and even antithetical to—nationalism. Professor of philosophy, Burkhard Liebsch made this argument three weeks after Gauck’s speech in an article in Die Zeit titled, *Our Country Surprises Itself* iv (2015). Liebsch points to the growth of volunteer movements in Germany to help refugees and argues that “hospitality does not lend itself to national pride and narcissism.”v Liebsch points out that the domestic and international press “surprised us with the discovery that we are a hospitable people. Apparently, no one had predicted this. And yet, the truly lovely pictures from train stations in Munich, Frankfurt, and Dortmund appear to unambiguously confirm this image.”vi According to Liebsch, these images of people holding signs welcoming the refugees who had been subjected to such brutal treatment on their way to Germany are a sign of the establishment of a post-ethnic conception of collective identity.

Liebsch’s text makes the enthusiastic reaction to refugees the center of a new national identity, while denying the political utility of this move. First, he sketches a new German historiography of an original Germanic hospitality that was lost during the rise of nationalism, culminating in the ultimate transgression of hospitality: The Holocaust. In its zeal for eliminating difference, Liebsch proposes that the National Socialist mission would have eventually reached all people including, presumably, normative Germans. After all, “don’t we all arrive as foreigners in this world?” Having learned from the Nazi era that the community of ethnicity (*Volksgemeinschaft*) “can only be a totalitarian fiction,” Liebsch claims that only the extremist fringe wants “to belong unconditionally,
to lose oneself in a political community” anymore. Second, Liebsch proposes that the refugee crisis offers the opportunity to recover the soul of the country, which since the end of the war, has been on the road to “freedom, not to pursue shameless and antisocial wealth covered over with a positive self-image, but in the sense of the freedom to answer others worldwide who need a place to dwell.” Here Liebsch critiques the economic rationality that provided a primary foundation of the Federal Republic (see Chapter 2).

Liebsch sees the crisis as a “historically singular opportunity” to freely choose hospitality in the Derridian sense (Derrida & Dufourmantelle, 2000) — unbound from the unitary norms, customs, and religious dictates requiring hospitality in “supposedly backward countries and cultures” (2015). This ideal form of hospitality belongs to no one, “least of all those who would write it on their flag” in order “to show who they are or what they would like to be.” In this, Liebsch contrasts true “hospitality” with the “welcome culture” that “was propagated during that special sporting mega event,” referring to the 2006 men’s soccer World Cup. The latter was predicated on the limited stay of the foreign guests “after leaving their money here.” Self-interest, calculation, and conditionality is the antithesis of Liebsch’s ideal of hospitality.

While Liebsch’s laudable ideal may well describe the disposition of the ranks of volunteers dedicating their time and resources to answer the call for shelter, Liebsch’s claim that the public statements and images of hospitality run contrary to strengthening symbolic nationalism is spurious. So long as national borders and citizenship regimes determine “the right to have rights,” the kind of hospitality desired by Liebsch is bound to the rule of law. Citizens may mobilize to offer shelter and care, but the law determines who may enjoy the sanction and protection of legal residency. The progression of
increasing restrictions on the right to asylum during 2015 and 2016 contradicts the claim that Germany’s response to refugees represents a new era of disinterested hospitality. Without a legal commitment to relinquish sovereignty as part of the pledge to asylum (Bosswick, 2000), the heavily mediatized welcome provided by citizens and volunteers risks becoming little more than a part of a symbolic narrative of national virtue.

Liebsch was not alone in making the connection to the enthusiasm for playing host to the world during 2006 World Cup. For Liebsch, the economic motivations of the 2006 World Cup make it a counterexample to the welcoming images from train stations in 2015. However, as the discussions of soccer patriotism and the World Cup throughout this dissertation show, whatever economic benefits there may be to the country hosting a sports mega event, the symbolic and affective significance of hosting is paramount. The symbolic political value of these events is such that, despite increasing research showing the likelihood of public debt and economic harm to host countries and cities, countries still compete heavily for the opportunity to host. The media coverage of these events also belies the claim that the desire to lose oneself in a national community has disappeared except among the extremist fringe. In Liebsch’s account, the asylum seekers themselves disappear except as a call that “our country” might answer, making itself whole again as a community of individuals constituted through moral action rather than ethnicity. By denying the significance and even the utility of national self-celebration of Germany’s welcoming culture (*Willkommenskultur*) for symbolic politics, Liebsch reinforces the binary dividing self-interested and chauvinistic nationalism from good forms of collective solidarity. As with the discourses of patriotism and integration examined throughout this
dissertation, this discourse denies nationalism while taking for granted the nation as the primary definition of that community.

**Beyond the Binary: Voices for a Critical Transnational Public**

The delight of rediscovering Germany’s hospitable national character was observed with skepticism by a handful of commentators writing outside the mainstream press, most of them self-identified as the children of guest workers, refugees, or immigrants. This dissertation analyzes the mediated public discourse of mainstream publications, the government, and private sector foundations. These cases demonstrate the frequently limited and curated participation of minority voices: athletes and celebrities invited to speak as role models of integration or immigrant patriots whose choice to promote a more inclusive civic nationalism matches journalistic interest in surprising stories that validate national values and create distance from shameful pasts. In this conclusion, I would like to turn to some of the critical voices that have been too rare in the archives examined in this dissertation. In their criticism of reactions to the refugee crisis, they raise concerns of the individualization of the problem of racism, the depoliticization of inequality, and the ephemerality of solidarity built on self-congratulatory national spectacles—issues that reverberate throughout cases assembled here.

This dissertation argues that, in a political, economic, and social system governed by biopolitical norms and logics, integration discourse performs the function of racism in Foucault’s sense (2003). It divides the population into normative nationals and candidates for integration. The cases in this dissertation have dealt primarily with the valuation of
the national category, in part through the process of assessing the achievement of integration by immigrants and minorities. The reactions to the refugee crisis include politics and discourses of integration, but they also protect the category of the national on another front, by assigning blame for racism to the antisocial (asoziale) fringe.

As critical commentators point out, the public enthusiasm for volunteering and the reaction to rightwing violence create a “simplified binary dividing society into ‘good white Germans’ and ‘bad white Germans’” (Kücük & Varatharajah, 2015). This is exemplified by Gauck’s division of society into “light” and “dark,” fragmenting and isolating undesirable elements by categorizing them as social pathology. The problematic association of light with good and dark with bad in a discussion of white nationalist violence went largely unnoticed in the mainstream public sphere. The kinds of pathologies typically associated with “integration refusers” are associated here with “dark Germany.” Bloggers Ellen Kollender and Janne Grote write critical commentary from the self-conscious position as Germans “without an apparent migration background.” In an article for the alternative online periodical Migazin, Kollender and Grote assemble many examples of prominent citizens that have attempted to marginalize racism through ridicule by characterizing those who express rightwing views as useless and intellectually
deficient people. As a key example, they point to a celebrated quote by the popular musician Farin Urlaub, stating that

As long as there are people who can't do anything, who don't know anything, and have never achieved anything, there will also be racism. Since these people want to feel good about themselves and to be proud of something. So, they look for someone who is different from them and they consider themselves superior. Or they are crazily proud to be “German,” something for which no effort was necessary on their side. (Kollender & Grote, 2015)

Kollender and Grote observe that this formulation projects racism onto the “losers” of society, those who have failed because of their “self-imposed lack of work and prospects” (2015). Likewise, in an article posted on the platform Medium, graduate students and former asylum seekers Elif Kücük and Sinthujan Varatharajah see in this binarism a familiar discriminatory schema in which “low secondary school qualifications, lacking intelligence, poor spelling or welfare (Hartz IV) are shortsightedly and arrogantly declared as reasons for racism” (2015). The useless human described in the Farin Urlaub quote above bears a striking resemblance to descriptions of “problem migrants.” Theirs is characterized as a worthless form of life, a form that is harmful to the growth of a healthy population.

As part of this process of drawing divisions, the “helper nation” joined in public displays of generosity and kindness towards refugees. Critical commentators expressed discomfort and skepticism about this sudden outpouring of enthusiasm, even as they

42 See, for example, the satirical version of a popular Sarah Conner’s song by comedian Carolin Kebekus “How Stupid You Are” (Wie Blöd Du Bist).
admitted feeling a spark of hope that this time the support would be more durable than the anti-racism concerts and demonstrations of “upstanding citizens” following the anti-refugee violence of the 1990s. In the 1990s, these symbolic public acts against racism did nothing to stop the laws undoing the strong protections for refugee rights in the constitution. Liebsch and critical commentators draw a common parallel between the representations of the response to refugees and the spectacle of heroism and hospitality celebrated during the men’s World Cup—a tradition that firmly took hold in 2006. As Doris Akrap writes in the Guardian, “it’s as if a year after the World Cup triumph in Rio, Germans desperately want to be world champions again—this time as the globe’s most welcoming country for refugees” (Akrap, 2015). Bahareh Sharifi echoes this sentiment in an article written for Migazin, writing that it is not the political protests of refugee activists over the past several years at have brought people onto the streets, but instead—referring to the 2006 World Cup, known as the Summer Fairytale—the “spreading drive to have been part of the Germany Summer Fairytale Part 2” in which everyone seeks to outdo each other in the “mediated presentation as world champions of welcoming culture (Willkommenskultur)” (Sharifi, 2015). Sharifi’s use of the past perfect progressive here emphasizes the self-consciousness of the actions by participants imagining their future selves looking back on the historical narrative they are creating. Writing in late September 2015, Kücük and Varatharajah elaborate this idea, imagining how “the past several months will remain in memory as the ‘summer of refugees and great solidarity.’ A supposedly well-earned nostalgia” (2015). Following the script of the World Cup mobilizations and victories, these commentators observe in the mediated outpouring of support for refugees the preparation of narratives in the present as the basis of future
collective memory. The pattern is so well known, that nostalgia is already present while events are in process.

Writing in mid-August, blogger Nadia Shehadeh observed the formation of this narrative.

About a week and a half ago the German Summer Fairytale took off, a wonderful story of solidarity, harmony, and Occidental diligence that unfolded through volunteer action and the generosity on the part of all kinds of ascetics. Selfies in front of masses of donations were shot and uploaded onto the networks, because do good and talk about it! The talk was of the victory of civil society and of evil and of “goosebump moments.”xi (2015)

In this description, the refugee crisis provided a moment of collective self-affirmation that picked up and even exceeded the breadth and power of the World Cup due to the seriousness of the task of saving lives and the “evil” antagonist of rightwing violence. Shehadeh goes on to vent her frustration as she watches her Facebook feed fill up with stories and images that could serve as archetypes of the white savior complex. Shehadeh wryly notes that “this is the summer of the heroes, this summer 2015, above all the German heroes, and it didn't even require a soccer team”xii (2015). Shehadeh also focuses attention on the ways that social media has created an echo chamber amplifying the spectacle of the good. In an even more pointed commentary in the weekly business news magazine, Wirtschaftswoche, famous Turkish-German comedian and cabaret artist, Serdar Somuncu, expressed his frustration with the mediatized helper-ism in unambiguous terms: “The sympathy with refugees is degenerating into a spectacle of self-representation.... the common sense of welcoming culture is starting to make me sick.... last year it was the Ice Bucket Challenge, now it is refugees”xiii (Somuncu, 2015). Somuncu sees in the social media virality of refugee boosterism a competitive spectacle and predicts that the cause célèbre—in this case the mortal plight of refugees—
will evaporate from public concern once the rash of excitement has passed. What will be left is the self-satisfaction and the security of the conviction that your community is on the side of the good.

Beyond the simple frustration with the self-congratulation of majority Germans, commentators argue that the spectacle of the good poses several problems for addressing the needs and rights of refugees—problems that are intertwined with broader struggles to validate the political claims of minority Germans. As in integration discourse aimed at immigrants and minority Germans, the process of division separating the bad nationals from the good personalizes and, thus, depoliticizes issues of racism, inequity, and the place of diversity in German society. Both the condemnation of the bad and the celebration of the good draw attention away from cultural, structural, and institutional politics that materially impact the lives of refugees and minorities. Volunteerism risks setting up a paternalistic relationship between majority society and refugee supplicants (Kollender & Grote, 2015), rather than a relationship based on political commitments to human rights in which refugees themselves are recognized as legitimate political actors (Sharifi, 2015).

Volunteerism also sets up a relationship based on the “symbolic violence” (Bourdieu, 1994) of the gift that must be met with appreciation and comes with the expectation of reciprocation. This prepares the way for the kinds of economic rationalities that have come to govern integration discourse since the beginning of the millennium, as the cases in this dissertation have shown. Kücük and Varatharajah see in Angela Merkel's asylum policy a desire to bind asylum policy and economic utility. This can be seen in the approving discussions of Germany's pragmatic approach to admitting
refugees as a solution for German labor shortages mentioned above. They write that, “refugees are welcome then, so long as they are useful, not least of all as apprentices, skilled workers and tax payers. But what about the illiterate, the aged and the psychologically and physically ill? Are the then less ‘worthy of saving,’ less welcome?” (Kücük & Varatharajah, 2015). Here, through the question of economic utility, the biopolitical line dividing worthy from unworthy life emerges again. As Agamben argues, the refugee, who has lost all other claims but that of humanity, should be the ultimate embodiment of human rights, but “signals instead the concept’s radical crisis” (1998, p. 126). Kücük and Varatharajah observe, even in the heady days of “welcome fever” (Kollender & Grote, 2015), the continuity of economic utilitarian discourse mobilized to assess those with nothing left but the claim to human rights. The poverty of those claims concerns Doris Akrap, who in listening to “good Germans” often asks herself,

What is going to happen, when the new refugees demand more than a tent, a bottle of water and a slice of bread? How will German society deal with this next turning point? What if it turns out that not every refugee has the skills to equip them for the “made in Germany” brand? When the asylum comes in the form of a personal gift, the political demands a refugee might make appear as an affront to the host-guest relationship. The limits of this arrangement materialize the moment refugee political claims condemn the inhumane conditions of detention, the “camp as a form of violence” (Kücük & Varatharajah, 2015). The limits have also emerged in the year since the “summer of heroes,” as two new revisions of asylum law have further restricted mobility and the forms of resources available to asylum seekers.

In a development that in retrospect appears almost inevitable, the state has also responded to the crisis by implementing the first federal “Integration Law”
(Integrationsgesetz) in July 2016, which makes access to benefits dependent on attendance of “integration courses” and allows authorities to place restrictions on place of residence. The law also ties the continued permission to stay in Germany to successful participation in occupational training and employment. Picking up on the now well-developed theme of integration discourse, the motivation for the law is summarized as “demand and support” (fordern und fordern). The law facilitates access to the job market for those with a strong likelihood of being granted asylum (guter Bleibeperspektive) and sanctions those who are unable or unwilling to participate. While the law commits to increasing resources for critical programs, including language classes, the emphasis on requirements and sanctions suggests that the problem with “integration” lies with the refusal on the part of asylum seekers to participate. As Pro Asyl’s (2016) position paper on a draft of the new law points out, in reality the problem is that the demand for language courses far outpaces the supply. The emphasis on penalties supports the prejudicial and counterfactual position that problems with “integration” lie solely in the refusal of refugees and immigrants to participate.

In the actions of public volunteerism and legal restriction over the past year, the critical commentators introduced above point to a crucial missing piece: the voices of those impacted—both contemporary and former refugees as well as guest workers, their descendants, and all those whose “migration background” is apparent, making them perpetual candidates for integration. Sharifi argues that “legal protection and political participation” are necessary, but must also be accompanied by the possibility of “active co-determination of societal and cultural self-conception” (2015). Reactions to the refugee situation underscore the importance of this kind of interpretational
enfranchisement. As the electoral success of the new rightwing political party, Alternatives for Germany (AfD), shows, a clear division between “dark” and “light” Germany—between the good normative national and the bad racist failed national—is a myth. Reactions to the increased demand for asylum in Germany demonstrate how biopolitical fragmentation operates as part of the acceptance of a new “colorful” Germany. In Serdar Somuncu’s words, “The most important task that we in this thankfully ever more diverse nation have is not to unthinkingly allocate affection and rejection, but rather to learn to weigh things and to allow argumentation in”\textsuperscript{xiv} (2015). To achieve this, minority narratives must be part of mediated public discourse even when they contest majority norms and point to the uncomfortable issues of the structural and racialized components of poverty and inequality.

The apparent polarization and division of the society into the “helper nation” (\textit{Helfer-nation}) and “dark Germany” (\textit{dunkeles Deutschland}) obscures the intertwining of the celebration and condemnation of integration discourse. Narratives of integration facilitate the easy swing from one stance to the other, maintaining the positive self-conception of the normative national as tolerant and pragmatic while cordonning off the non-normative into the ambiguous category of the integrant. The conception of Germany as a paragon of \textit{Willkommenskultur} was cemented by images of Germans celebrating refugees. The narrative that German support emerged from individual moral and empathetic commitments (based on having learned from the Nazi past) and out of pragmatic and thus durable economic self-interest established this welcoming reputation domestically and abroad. As the same time, the policy changes implemented in 2015 and 2016 represent a continuation of the restrictions of the 1990s,
when the “asylum compromise” abolished the sacrifice of sovereignty contained in the constitution's original commitment to asylum rights. The voices of refugees, along with their political organizing and their contestation of disappearing rights and inhumane conditions, remain marginal.

Integration and the Citizen

Less than two decades after the introduction of *jus solis* citizenship, integration discourse has become a cultural and a juridical norm, deepening political and cultural commitments to biopolitical rationalities for the cultivation of valued forms of life. The two major revisions of asylum law since 2015 were followed by the implementation of Germany’s first Integration Law in 2016, building on and significantly expanding the integration mandates of the Germany's first Immigration Law from a decade before. This dissertation argues that the positive and apolitical nature of concepts and mandates associated with integration should not be taken for granted. Instead, we need to carefully consider what function the idea of integration plays wherever it is mobilized to define the rules for belonging and citizenship. Integration discourse depends on an evaluative framework that classifies the population first by their status as national or integrant, and second according to the threats and benefits they represent for the population at large. The category of the integrant must constantly be evaluated and managed to determine, both at the individual level and at the level of the group, whether integrants fall into the subcategory of successes or failures of integration. This evaluation determines whether non-nationals are beneficial or deleterious to the national population. Crucially, it is a perpetual evaluation that can never be definitively settled. As several of the cases studied
in this dissertation show, an integrant who is celebrated as a “successful example” in one situation may later be judged a failure or traitor to the cause of integration based on another situation.

The topic of integration emerges where difference is seen as most insurmountable, and the paradigmatic Other is now the figure of the Muslim. While new generations of European-born Muslims are increasingly visible as national sports heroes, pop artists, and politicians, their success is too often mobilized to support the conviction that through integration success is equally accessible to all. This meritocratic myth perpetuates cultural deficiency models for explaining achievement and economic gaps, and erases the history of structural and interpersonal discrimination faced by immigrants and, especially, Turkish labor immigrants and refugees from predominantly Muslim countries. The cases in this dissertation focus on high-profile mobilizations of integration since it arose as a major national concern at the turn of the millennium. These cases also all involve the definition of Germanness, the proper performance of national affiliation, and the projection of Germany’s future. Putting these cases in conversation with each other reveals the development of more inclusive social imaginaries as well as the entrenchment of racial narratives in an economic guise. Across Europe, the rejection of multiculturalism and its associated deliberative approaches in favor of integration has shifted the focus of public discussions on difference from a paradigm of action based on negotiation, contestation, and self-narration to a paradigm based on the management of life itself.
Die zeigen es gibt ein helles Deutschland, das hier sich leuchtend darstellt gegenüber dem Dünkeldeutschland, das wir empfinden, wenn wir von Attacken auf Asylbewerber Unterkünfte oder gar Fremdenfeindliche Aktionen gegen Menschen hören.

Das ist dies schöne Beispiele, das ist das Deutschland, das wir bauen und auf das wir uns stützen. Und das ist diese überdeutliche Antwort an Hetzer und Brandstifter, die das Angesicht unseres Landes verunzieren…. wir werden den sagen, Ihr repräsentiert uns nicht, und wir werden schon gar nicht dulden, dass Rechtsbrecher, im Grunde im Ausland und im Inland für dieses Deutschland stehen, das sich heute als offenes und hilfsbereites darstellt.

Mit der Aktion WIR HELFEN will BILD ein Zeichen der Menschlichkeit setzen. Wir wollen zeigen, dass Schreihälse und Fremdenhasser NICHT in unserem Namen grölen! Dass Deutschland ein Herz hat für Menschen, die Hilfe brauchen!

Unser Land überrascht sich selbst

Gastfreundschaft eignet sich nicht für nationalen Stolz und Narzissmus.

In- und ausländische Presse überrascht uns mit dem Befund, dass wir ein gastfreundliches Volk sein sollen. Das hat offenbar niemand vorausgesehen. Und doch scheinen die in der ganzen Welt verbreiteten, wirklich sehenswerten Aufnahmen von den Münchener, Frankfurter und Dortmunder Bahnhöfen dieses Bild eindeutig zu bestätigen.

Aber nicht im Sinne der Befreiung zu schamlosem und asozialem Reichtum, den man durch ein positives Selbstbild bemäntelt, sondern im Sinne der Freiheit, weltweit anderen, die auf eine Bleibe angewiesen sind, zu antworten.

Solange es Leute gibt, die nichts können, nichts wissen und nichts geleistet haben, wird es auch Rassismus geben. Denn auch diese Leute wollen sich gut fühlen und auf irgendetwas stolz sein. Also suchen sie sich jemanden aus, der anders ist als sie und halten sich für besser. Oder sie sind bekloppterweise stolz darauf, ‘Deutsch’ zu sein, wozu keinerlei Leistung ihrerseits nötig war.

So waren es auch nicht die politischen Kämpfe der Geflüchteten-Aktivist*innen am Rindermarkt 2013, die die Menschen in München auf die Straße brachten, sondern der derzeit um sich greifende Drang beim deutschen Sommermärchen Teil 2 dabei gewesen zu sein. Es scheint, als wollen sich alle bei ihrem Einsatz überbieten, gefolgt von dem sich gegenseitig auf die Schulter klopfen und der medialen Inszenierung als Weltmeister der Willkommenskultur.

Die vergangenen Monate werden wohl in Zukunft als “Sommer der Flüchtlinge und der großen Solidarität” in Erinnerung bleiben. Eine vermeintlich wohlverdiente Nostalgie.

Vor ungefähr anderthalb Wochen ging das doitsche Sommermärchen los, eine wundersame Fabel aus Zusammenhalt, Harmonie, abendländischem Fleiß der sich in ehrenamtlichem Engagement entfaltete und Großzügigkeit jenseits jeglicher Askese. Selfies vor Spendemassen wurden geschossen und in Netzwerken hochgeladen, denn tue Gutes und spreche darüber! Vom Sieg der Zivilgesellschaft über das Böse und von Gänsehautmomenten war die Rede.

Es ist ein Sommer der Held_innen, dieser Sommer 2015, vor allem der deutschen Held_innen, und es brauchte nicht mal eine Fußballmannschaft dafür.

Die Anteilnahme mit Flüchtlingen artet in ein Selbstdarstellungsspektakel aus. Was kotzt mich mittlerweile dieser Common Sense von Willkommenskultur an…. Letztes Jahr war’s noch die Icebucketchallenge, jetzt sind es die Flüchtlinge…. so unglaubwürdig ist die Anteilnahme, wenn sie Teil eines Spektakels wird, bei dem es vielmehr um das Image des engagiertesten Wohltäters zu gehen scheint, als um die Frage, wie man aus den Fehlern der Vergangenheit lernen kann.

Die wichtigste Aufgabe, die wir in den nächsten Jahren in dieser Gott sei Dank immer vielfältiger werdenden Nation haben, ist es, nicht blind Zuneigung und Ablehnung zu verteilen, sondern das Abwägen zu lernen und Argumentationen zuzulassen.
APPENDIX

Chapter 3 News Corpus

Search Results for Fußball AND Patriotismus, Jan. 1-Dec. 31, 2006 from Der Spiegel, Spiegel Online, and Mittledeutsche Zeitung


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**Chapter 4 News Corpus**

Results for Stakeholder-focused coverage, selected from search for “*Du bist Deutschland*” AND *Kampagne in Focus, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Der Spiegel, Die Süddeutsche Zeitung, Stern, Die Tageszeitung, Die Welt, and Die Zeit*


http://www.welt.de/regionales/hamburg/article1570933/Was-steckt-hinter-der-Kinderkampagne.html


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**Chapter 5 News Corpus**

Combined search Results for *Bassal* and *Germany* in LexisNexis and Google Custom Search of 234 German Periodicals


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*Chapter 6 News Corpus*

Search results for *Sarrazin* August 23, 2010-October 31, 2010 in *Der Spiegel and Bild*.

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Neun unbequeme Meinungen und die Fakten: Diese Sätze muss man sagen dürfen, weil... (2010, September 4). BILD.de. Retrieved from


Chapter 7 News Corpus

Results for Bambi AND Bushido AND Integration, Nov. 10-12, 2011, in Focus, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Frankfurter Rundschau, Handelsblatt, Der Spiegel, Die Süddeutsche Zeitung, Stern, Die Tageszeitung, Die Welt, and Die Zeit


Combined search results for “Raus mit der Sprache. Rein ins Leben” plus Harris AND Integration AND Rapper, in WISO and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Der Spiegel, Die Süddeutsche Zeitung, Stern, Die Tageszeitung, Die Welt, and Die Zeit


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