Feeling Past Politics: Affection, Settlement, And The Disciplines Of Civil Society In Early Anglo-America, 1620-1682

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Abstract
This dissertation argues that emotional experience consisted in diligent effort on the part of the seventeenth century setters of the New England colonies and that this care for fellow-feeling comprised one of the key civic disciplines complementing early Anglo-American settler political life. Literary historians of the early republic and antebellum periods have argued that sentimental literary production manifested and reproduced the ideal political dispositions of the new nation. Earlier colonial literary historians have in turn revealed the precedents of those practices and ideals in the prescriptions for emotional life in the English colonies, particularly within those self-consciously civic-minded settlements of New England. Neither of those discourses, however, have described the phenomenological aspect of sentiment and affection; nor how those were transformed and renewed by the exigencies of the new American continent; nor, finally, how such experience participated in the transformation of emergent power described by historians and anthropologists as modern settler colonialism—a form of power qualified by the ability to make an indigenous population appear to disappear, both materially and discursively. Emotional discipline, I argue, facilitated power’s reformation, and did so with particular intensity in the paradigmatic settler colonial context, the Massachusetts Bay Colony and its nearest colonial neighbors—Plymouth, New Haven, Connecticut and Rhode Island. This study draws on methods of close reading and historically-informed literary analysis to reveal how prescriptions and descriptions of feeling in writing and in speech shaped normative and intimate knowledge of recognizable social bonds. This dissertation reveals furthermore that hostility and aggression characterized all forms of fellow feeling prescribed by the New England settlers—in fact, maintaining these emotionally fortified distinctions between individuals and between groups was one of the most useful conditions reproduced by New England settlement’s self-consciously political revolution in sentimentality and affection. My study concludes that these techniques of prescribing more earnest social feeling endure, inflecting exhortations in the present to “sympathize” with those who seem less fortunate, exhortations amplified in the discourse by which literary analysis tends to justify its existence today.

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Ajay Kumar Batra’s presence, and all it has comprised, merits, among these, a discrete sentence.
ABSTRACT

FEELING PAST POLITICS: AFFECTION, SETTLEMENT, AND THE DISCIPLINES OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN EARLY ANGLO-AMERICA, 1620-1682.

Ana Schwartz
David Kazanjian
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This dissertation argues that emotional experience consisted in diligent effort on the part of the seventeenth century setters of the New England colonies and that this care for fellow-feeling comprised one of the key civic disciplines complementing early Anglo-American settler political life. Literary historians of the early republic and antebellum periods have argued that sentimental literary production manifested and reproduced the ideal political dispositions of the new nation. Earlier colonial literary historians have in turn revealed the precedents of those practices and ideals in the prescriptions for emotional life in the English colonies, particularly within those self-consciously civic-minded settlements of New England. Neither of those discourses, however, have described the phenomenological aspect of sentiment and affection; nor how those were transformed and renewed by the exigencies of the new American continent; nor, finally, how such experience participated in the transformation of emergent power described by historians and anthropologists as modern settler colonialism—a form of power qualified by the ability to make an indigenous population appear to disappear, both materially and discursively. Emotional discipline, I argue, facilitated power’s reformation, and did so with particular intensity in the paradigmatic settler colonial context, the Massachusetts Bay Colony and its nearest colonial neighbors—Plymouth, New Haven, Connecticut and Rhode Island. This study draws on methods of close reading and historically-informed literary analysis to reveal how prescriptions and descriptions of feeling in writing and in speech shaped normative and intimate knowledge of recognizable social bonds. This dissertation reveals furthermore that hostility and aggression characterized all forms of fellow feeling prescribed by the New England settlers—in fact, maintaining these emotionally
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The dissertation to follow argues that emotional discourse constituted the most potent technique of settler colonial discipline in seventeenth century New England. A reductive summary of this thesis might simply invert the latest scholarship in colonial New England studies inside-out and thereby restore attention to its dialectical motion. At the conclusion of the final chapter of 2015’s *Sympathetic Puritans*, Abram van Engen, in a move endemic to recent literary histories of the colonial era, observes the vitality of affection among white English settlers: “sympathy both creates and blurs boundaries—each part of the process leading to the other” (197).¹ Sympathy, in other words, depends on the studious and iterative maintenance of a boundary. Here van Engen demonstrates that he ultimately knows this. Yet in his monograph, which examines the transcendent potency of sympathy, the memory of the first operation, the creating of boundaries, seems somehow unbearable—he stages it, here and throughout the text, rhetorically as a first movement, to be overcome by the dynamism of the latter, what he named here “blurring.” Van Engen, who is not alone among literary critics in this attention to affective force, repeats the compulsion to settle with the felicitous aspect of sympathy in his last chapter’s last sentence: “[Sympathy] not only built distinctions; it broke them down” (198). Sympathy emerges from his study as the ultimate victor and, and part of this victory consists in transcending, and to some degree forgetting, its prior and enduring role in oppression, too; and it is this desire to forget the material conditions that produce a seeming need for sympathy, I will argue in what follows, that unites much of early American literary historical scholarship with the agents of English settler colonialism in America, or at least, the first ones.

To make this argument, my introduction will begin by offering a brief critique of a foundational assumption in early modern political theory—the universality of fear—and then show how fear produced the desire to redefine social relationships as newly and more robustly consisting of positive affection. This process naturalized colonial English settlers’ sense of

emotional proprioception. My chapters will demonstrate this redefinition largely chronologically, according to a narrative arc. I begin by explaining how walls and fences shaped settlers’ understanding of justice and its restoration, and did so in response to a keenly felt sense of individual paranoia towards their responsibilities to justice between English and non-English neighbors. I follow that description by narrating the consequences of individuating hyper-vigilance on the relationship between men and women; how, within the walls of the household such fear was experienced as shame, one of the most inescapably and persuasively real affective experiences of colonial settlement. I follow that story with an account of how that shame was passed down across divisions between parent and child, and how that renewed category of the generation made self-evident the sense of fidelity through temporal progress that distinguished the English from their native neighbors. Finally, I show how sustained encounters with those neighbors in turn revised the perception of friendship possible between people and peoples, a deeply frightening experience that led to the desire to more narrowly qualify friendship as a matter of affection over and above its use as a form of pragmatic alliance. This dissertation tells a story that historically explains how feelings that can seem natural or self-evident in the present were forged as such in contexts of fearfully new alterity.

In what’s left of this introduction, I will describe the theoretical foundations for this argument, a specific understanding of fear as a social problem that modern political rationality promised to solve. This foundation will enable an understanding of the endurance of fear as the animating affect institutionalized by the emotional regimes of the first half century of colonial settlement in Anglo-America, and particular, in New England. First, I will review the place that fear holds in one of the early modern era’s most enduring articulations of political life, Hobbes’ *Leviathan*. I then explain how my primary archive, the texts documenting settlement in colonial New England, illustrates the practical and at times improvisational unfolding of Hobbes’ premises and their calcification in affectively charged relational structures. And before concluding with a survey of my dissertation’s chapters and the impact of my intervention, I will retell a story about one of the earliest such English settlements, the first nineteen houses at Plymouth. This retelling
has two goals. First it exemplifies the epistemological subtleties by which fear endures even after
its provocations have nominally been settled. Second, more specifically, it elucidates how the
events that took place at Plymouth in 1620-1621 informed the expectations and behavioral
prescriptions brought to American settlement by the Massachusetts Bay Colony.

The Place of Fear

Fear’s universality guaranteed the political stability of Hobbes’ theoretical commonwealth,
however humbly he staged its debut in his text. In his *Leviathan*, as with many of his treatises,
Hobbes tended to start small. He began by noting aspects of human behavior, such as particular
dispositions, affections and passions that might easily seem to be, in his treatment,
transcendently accessible, universal. Hobbes described these dispositions in order to make all
human actions more clearly legible to others. Out of this clarity, he hoped, civilized or civilly
inclined humans might willfully form useful and durable covenants and contracts, and thereby,
eventually, secure greater safety through the creation of a state, or commonwealth. “Fear”
appeared modestly in his early survey of these passions, in his sixth chapter, “Of the Interior
Beginnings of Voluntary Motions, Commonly Called the Passions; and the Speeches by which
They are Expressed” (27-35). Fear belonged to a secondary set of passions, after the primary,
simpler ones—appetites, desire, love, aversion, hate, joy, and grief. Of the various objects
aversion might take, aversion to hurt, Hobbes named “fear” (30). Hurt, he implied, might come in
different forms—or not come, since absence or presence of the aversive object was less
important than the imagination of that object. Hurt might consist of direct bodily violence. It might
consist in the diminishment of status that ensured certain safeties and securities. It might consist

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   (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996), pp. 157-174
in privation or dearth in a world of scarce resources.\(^5\) But fear consisted in all these things, since they were all possible outcomes to be strenuously avoided.\(^6\) Such vulnerability, Hobbes claimed, made all men equal, and equal not only in their fundamental aversions, but also equal in their dependable desire and striving to respond preemptively to that possible harm.

Fear acquired greater significance as Hobbes began to conclude the *Leviathan*’s foundational first book, “Of Human Nature.” In his twelfth, and probably most famous chapter, on the “Natural Condition of Mankind as Concerning Their Felicity,” Hobbes described fear not only as widely felt, but deeply and enduringly felt, too. In the course of that chapter, Hobbes suggested that fear was perhaps the most important and dynamic of those previously listed passions. If, as he claimed, nature had more or less “made men so equal in the faculties of body and mind” (74), then it would stand to reason that all men shared the ability and motivation to try to secure their own safety from hurt in a world that provided limited shares of necessary and desirable resources.\(^7\) Hobbes reasoned that every man’s claim to those resources would always be open to subsequent seizure from another, equally needful man. Securing necessary resources would require guaranteed invulnerability to future dispossession, a broad state of precarity that might denote the loss “not only of the fruit of his labor, but also of his life or liberty” (75) at the hands of someone in similar, if not sympathetic situation. Fear of these losses distinguished itself from the other natural affections in its primacy.\(^8\) For Hobbes, one’s own knowledge and certainty of fear emerged as they foundational rubric through which to understand the lengths to which others

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\(^8\) Though of course, as many of Hobbes’s critics have observed, fear itself contains multitudes. See, for example, Sokoloff, “Politics and Anxiety”; and with relation to canonical American literature, see Paul Hurh, *American Terror: The Thinking of Feeling in Edwards, Poe, and Melville* (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 2014).
might go to avoid their own desperation and need; this version of sympathetic feeling was a heuristic key to negotiate social life.

Fear consolidated. Though initially one of several passions, it now defined a specific and necessary condition for politics—that is, the organization of a people by means of coercive or potentially coercive uses of power. Ideal political life meant, or ought to have meant the banishment of fear, nevertheless the memory of fear, Hobbes implied, ought to endure, and his text sought to memorialize that fear by drawing it into a theoretical structure. He did so by consigning fear as the enduring affect of the “state of nature,” a place or a time in which every man must assume that all other men naturally desired to secure their own safety, and another’s man’s desire would stop at nothing to make him “master of other men’s persons, wives, children, and cattle” (76). Hobbes conveyed fear’s supremacy in his now famous list of social benefits that the state of nature lacked: industry, agriculture, navigation, architecture and transportation. In the state of nature, there would be no “knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts, no letters, no society; and, which is worst of all,” Hobbes paused, rallied, and then revealed, “continual fear of danger of violent death.” This possibility of the permanence of fear was the possibility of a life that was lonely, poverty-stricken, abject, violent, and brief. Fear, aversion to that version of multifarious hurt, ought to produce in every man the desire for peace, assured by justice, and guaranteed by the terms of contract that would underwrite collective life.

Hobbes turned now to draw fear into political rationality, to make sense of it as an ongoing principle on the part of the decision-makers of the commonwealth. Fear became not only the motive to contract into a civil society, but also the principle by which the commonwealth

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10 Conventional abbreviations of Hobbes’ phrase tend to disavow some aspect of that state of nature that endures within the social experience of modern political community. Is it possible to deny that loneliness and poverty are omnipresent, maybe even essential elements of civic life? Better to reassert with wit the fear of nastiness, brutishness, and early mortality that name the ongoing and seemingly ineluctable experience of emotional and economic diminishment. See Eric Slauter, “Being Alone in the Age of the Social Contract,” William and Mary Quarterly 62.1 (2005): 31-66.
would behave exogenously—though not without a curious elision of the parties beyond the walls of the city. Hobbes insisted that commonwealths owed nothing to each other—that they behaved to each other as individuals would in the state of nature.¹¹ In doing so, he extrapolated the given principles of individual experience to that of the collective social body. Intellectual historians have cautioned against a too-simple representation of the figurative movement by which individual experience explains collective ideology, and they have suggested that the model of state sovereignty did not straightforwardly follow the recognition of individual sovereignty, but rather produced it.¹² Yet Hobbes’ use of individual experience to explain and draw support for his justification of collective order worked because he had already installed fear as that most reliable of passions. The premise of fear became the promise of secure and confident social and political strategy. Yet three questions follow. First, given fear’s appearance as one of many widely-shared principles—and not even one of the primary ones—why should fear take on the epistemological burden of seeming to be the primal explanatory force? Second, in extrapolating the hostility among humans to justify the behavior between states or commonwealths, what of the difference that a commonwealth sustained in relationships, on one hand, to other commonwealths, and on the other, to those individuals unaffiliated with a commonwealth or seemingly stateless who may have happened to live nearby? How would a state’s policy respond to these differently? Finally, within societies, such as Hobbes’ seventeenth century England, societies wherein fear did claim such universality, how would a people collectively affirm and hierarchize which of many possible fears should organize their endogenous and exogenous activity?

Hobbes' reason reached an important limit in thinking the universality of fear when he described the state of nature’s privations, a limit implicit in that list’s global scale. Hobbes wrote about the state of nature from within the commonwealth, clearly, enjoying the benefit of arts,


letters, and society, at very least. Even though his own commonwealth faced a crisis of sovereignty when he was writing, the state of nature was still fundamentally different, but according to a historically specific principle. For Hobbes, the state of nature meant a peculiar global confinement and loss of mastery. In the state of nature, man lacked the ability to travel widely, lacking “navigation [and] the use of the commodities that may be imported by sea,” as well as the absence of the benefits of the “instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force.” Further in his list of fearsome privations was the lack of “knowledge of the face of the earth” (76). His attention to these spatial qualities of civilized life, and his intuition that civilized life quietly depended on the alterity of the places it sought to master, together suggest that the mere existence of territories beyond instrumental and cartographic control constituted one of the unspeakable fears of Hobbes’ time. To name, as he did, near the conclusion of this chapter, “the savage people in many places of America” (77) gratifyingly offered a swift and seemingly self-evident object to make global unknowability more knowable. These people stood in for all that might be feared in the state of nature, and they also stood on the face of the earth that one might desire to know and extract commodities from. These people lived in fear, according to Hobbes’ account, but they also lived as fear, making that possibly hypothetical state real, instantiating and personifying the theory of the wilderness by which civilization would know and love its own boundaries.

Inhabitable America appeared for Hobbes as evidence of the reality of the state of nature, and as a threshold that held at bay from the rational commonwealth its inchoate speculations on the possibility of other motivations that animated other humans. Hobbes’ development of these ideas during the second quarter of the seventeenth century took place exactly contemporaneous with the settlement of America, and the inauguration of an English colonial commonwealth. And though the matter of colonial settlement appears infrequently in his writing, for both him and the

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English settlers in America, contact with American natives people produced the desire for clearly identifiable principles by which to engage persons whose political affiliations did not or did not seem, as Hobbes would, to take ongoing fear of death as their primary strategic heuristic.\textsuperscript{15} For Hobbes, the status of indigenous Americans beyond the realm of justice and contract—even the implicit contract of mutually recognized self-interest—was clear. But the writings of the English who settled in America demonstrate little clarity on the matter. Their documents engage directly with the question Hobbes’s rhetoric in chapter twelve elided: how would a commonwealth engage with parties and coalitions of people who might not share similar presuppositions and theoretical elaborations for political cohesion? And what effect would their improvisational engagements have on their commonwealth’s sense of discrete identity?

In America, Hobbes’ contemporaries experienced a less distinct fear, a fear which included the enduring possibility of violent death, but was not limited to it. That English colonial settlers felt fear would be difficult to deny. Indeed, that premise has endured as one of early American history’s foundational givens since at least as early as the anonymously penned \textit{Mourt’s Relation}.\textsuperscript{16} Historians of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries have repeated that premise when they have acknowledged the courage of these settlers, implying in those encomiums, reasons to feel fear.\textsuperscript{17} Yet in part because of the exigencies of settler-colonial transfer, which tends to underemphasize the presence of people in the desired land, the specific proprioceptive consequences of the fear experienced by English settlers, its social circulation and

\textsuperscript{16} Nancy Lusignan Schultz, ed. \textit{Fear Itself: Enemies Real and Imagined in American Culture} (West Lafayette: Purdue Univ. Press, 1999).
\textsuperscript{17} See, for example Charles MacLean Andrews, \textit{The Colonial Period of American History}, who in his first volume's discussion of the differences between the Virginia Company and New England, frequently turns to indicate the courage proper to significant individuals of each group (New York: Holt, 1912). For a broader survey of the tendency to obliquely address the experience of fear and other affective responses to indigenous people, see James Merrell, “Some Thoughts on Colonial Historians and American Indians” \textit{William and Mary Quarterly} 46.1 (1989): 94-119; and Wendy Anne Warren, “More than Words: Language, Colonization, and History” \textit{William and Mary Quarterly} 69.3 (2012): 517-520.
its long-term effects, remains sorely under-explained. As they set up schemes for living in a place of unrelenting fear of violent death, what were specific fears that so animated English governance? And how might the affective consequences of contemplating those fearful futures have organized the actions and priorities of settlers in their present? Such questions turn us to history; they inform political philosophy; but for discovering the answers, the reading practices of literary historians are well suited.

Towards a better account of the manifold and subtle efficacy of fear, the documents written by New England’s settlers emerge as a particularly rich archive. These settlements were not exceptional among colonial projects, yet they demonstrate certain qualities of colonial, and specifically settler-colonial techniques with unusual vividness. Among the various Europeans whose global ventures qualified the early modern era, English were more likely to imagine enduring settlement as the ideal technique for claiming land. And among the various English settlements, those in New England were more likely to have plans for ensuring stability through reproducing and renewing the social units that had organized their lives in England. One reason that they have appeared to be exceptional is that, relative to other initial colonial ventures, so many of their primary documents have been preserved, and that so many of these primary documents recorded quotidian life. These documents reveal experiences that may very likely have been shared by other Europeans who sought to reproduce a mode of living and renew what was best about it there. These desires for normalcy would require ongoing reckoning with what

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they did not call the state of nature. They came to prefer that state to seem emptier, and so more often, they called it the wilderness.\textsuperscript{21}

Among other things, the wilderness offered the settlers of New England the opportunity to represent themselves as extraordinarily meek and sensitive, a disposition that complimented and helped make sense of their experience of perseverant terror.\textsuperscript{22} The consequences of this fear, a self-memorialization as a weak and vulnerable people, has been one of the enduringly rehearsed aspects in colonial New England studies. Most histories of colonial settlement in New England affirm this self-representation, even if that meekness is not the primary object of analysis, and they do so especially when that quality is sublated into a more caricaturish notion of repressed desires.\textsuperscript{23} At first, such sensitivity and meekness might not have been named explicitly, since it was understood according to the earliest critics to have been a matter of intellectual sophistication rather than the capacity for explicitly emotional richness. The earliest academic studies of colonial settlement, Perry Miller’s detailed and scrupulous elaboration of colonial ideology, represented these settlers as deeply intellectual. In Miller’s work, these people strove, as perhaps the first inheritors of a new and reforming Protestant tradition, to bind their beliefs to

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\textsuperscript{22} Kathleen Donegan, \textit{Seasons of Misery: Catastrophe and Colonial Settlement in Early America} (Philadelphia: Univ. Pennsylvania Press) makes a vivid argument for the uses of terror in emphasizing proprioceptive meekness.
\textsuperscript{23} The caricature, Breitwieser contended, as early as 1991, has underexamined symptomatic value: “The fact that we continue to find Mather’s hyperzealous vigilance, like his earnest extravagance in general, funny, suggests to me that it is for us either \textit{liberating}, freeing us from a certain bondage to putatively self-evident discriminations between the important and the trivial, or \textit{vicariously anxigenic}, staging in a distanced and embarrassingly unabashed form our abiding latent worry over what may lie beneath [!] the next stone we happen to kick over. \textit{Or both:} if the temperate reasonableness with which the age of Franklin replaces the age of Mather amounts to a modernization rather than an easing of constraint, then Mather’s ‘neurotically’ exuberant excessiveness explodes in advance Enlightenment protocols that lie historically between him and us, freeing us to romp about in a golden age of repression, of an \textit{innocent} unfreedom that did not know better than to say its name.” \textit{American Puritanism and the Defense of Mourning} (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1991), pp. 209, fn. 57. See Also, van Engen, \textit{Sympathetic Puritans}, p. 7.
\end{flushright}
their reason, and to desire all the more to do so in that wilderness state. Likewise, Sacvan Bercovitch’s description of the New England disposition highlighted its desire to sensitively mediate secular and divine domains, a sensitivity so great that an entire structure for social belonging, durable through time, might be condensed into the title of a short biographical fragment.

This sensitivity, primarily intellectual, was not antithetical to emotions, but rather drew strength from it. The critics that followed Miller and Bercovitch at the close of the twentieth century, more or less contemporaneous with the decline of the Cold War, have amply revealed this, composing studies well-attuned to the realm of feelings. In 1989, Andrew Delbanco wrote of the settlers’ ordeal, the emotional constitution of a sense of shared peoplehood through the internecine struggles of Congregationalist social injunctions. In 1990, Mitchell Breitwieser wrote about the dialectical attraction to and synthesis of an antagonistic feminine grief necessary within colonial New England’s Calvinist regime. In 1992, Amanda Porterfield wrote of the emergence of religious humanism out of women’s religious expression more broadly. Before that, in 1983, Patricia Caldwell argued that a coherent mode of American expression might be traced through the articulations of dejection and affective debasement that colonial settlement brought to the conversion narrative. And in 1984, Michael McGiffert re-introduced his edition of a set of conversion narratives delivered by colonial settlers at Cambridge by narrating how fraught and tense and “screwed painfully tight” (138) these settlers’ emotions could be, inclining them toward

28 Amanda Porterfield *Female Piety in Puritan New England: The Emergence of Religious Humanism.*
a greater understanding of the theory that undergirded their praxis.\textsuperscript{30} All of these studies affirm that the English who settled in New England were capable and eager to think about the experience of suffering and pain.

Such an intense literary historical focus on a specific period might indeed have the unintended effect of making this body of people and their body of literature appear to be exceptional and in that exceptionality and exemplarity, seem to have set a guiding, perhaps even determinant path for the Anglo-Americans who happened to also set the agenda for the nation-state in the centuries that followed. But their practice of sensitive sociality really was built on theories for better living, for political and civic renewal.\textsuperscript{31} These settlers aspired to produce a mode of quotidian life that would purify the political corruptions that had characterized their prior lives in the metropole. The social sensitivities of the settlers in New England were one of the most deliberate aspects of such a desire to reform and renew their sense of civic peoplehood. Their commitment to reform Protestantism, the religious ideology from which they derived the enthusiasm and stamina for such a transfer, encouraged, and in some accounts, required, scrupulous attention to the capacity for feeling and affection, even, and especially in conditions where affection was dampened, dulled or mute. The documents of the settlers in Massachusetts reveal an enduring attunement to matters of affection and emotion, a sensitivity with unusual political stakes. For this quality of their colonial settlement, their documents stand out with unusual relevance as texts in which to track the incipience of settler colonialism alongside theories of modern political sovereignty.

This dissertation, however, is somewhat less concerned with showing a causal relationship between Hobbes' theory and the fears of colonial settlement, in New England or elsewhere, than it is in demonstrating in one local situation how the absorption of fear as a motivating principle could be not only useful in helping make sense of the behavior of those

\textsuperscript{30} Michael McGiffert, \textit{God's Plot: Puritan Spirituality in Thomas Shepard's Cambridge}.

beyond the walls of the city who lack civil society, but also in making sense of the behavior of those within the city or settlement, guiding the shapes that affiliations took, and the performances of feeling required to mediate that lingering fear. Colonial settlement in New England responded to these varieties of fear by intensifying their attention to affective experience, but doing so in an aggressively narrow fashion. New England settlers insisted on the primacy of fellow-feeling among themselves, and occasionally extended that fellow feeling towards select others over whose qualitative differences they would eventually feel they had established some degree of control. The dissertation that follows traces the incremental steps by which feelings and emotions were imbued with the transcendent immanence formerly ascribed to the divine. These affections not only justified but came to organize the boundaries between those who merited recognition within the colonial commonwealth and those who did not. In this regard, the ideology of New England settlement has contributed to the shaping of a modernity that still operates today.

This intervention in the study of colonial America answers more recent renewals of critical interest in the profound emotional capacity of New England settlement. Some of this work takes place under the rubric of treating religion not as an object of analysis but as a method for understanding past worlds. These studies of American settler colonialism reveal the deep well-spring of socially organizing power upon which civil life in early Anglo-America drew. New England again tends to feature in these studies as a privileged site for analysis, as it does in more specific accounts of American sentimentalism in the pre-Republican decades and prior to that. These studies draw on that well-documented sensitivity on the part of New England settlers, revealing that affective discourse, widely shared, contagiously felt, circulated religious

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33 Stephanie Kirk and Sarah Rivett, “Religious Transformations in the Early Modern Americas,” specifically surveys continuity among and distinction from other modes of European colonial settlement. ibid., 69-91.

34 For a survey of these accounts, see van Engen, Sympathetic Puritans, pp. 227-228, notes 18 and 20.
immanence among settlers. Yet again, as with those studies of the early nineties, and in a different sense, as with Hobbes’s own theories, these accounts of settler colonial emotion rarely describe the intense epistemological rupture that encounter with other, extra-civic modes of relation and affection would have effected, nor the effect of that encounter on local disciplines relational feeling. These studies, however, have made it possible for us to take the next step to observe the ways in which fellow-feeling was dialectically constituted through acts of mastery but not dissolution; to see that that fellow-feeling, especially among those within the walls of a colonial setting, sought to preserve the boundaries of difference over which human affection was supposed to cross.

Good Fences Make Good Strangers

Sympathetic affection, in other words, necessarily preserved ambivalence, if not antipathy, towards other individuals and served as the most powerful force for organizing a society. As an example of this technique, consider the following story that narrates the institutionalization of Hobbesian self-interest ownership of labor in what would become the most cherished Anglo-American memory of early settlement. In 1623, the settlers at Plymouth decided no longer to practice collective ownership of agricultural labor. The account that William Bradford offered in his *History of Plymouth Plantation* has set the tone for most histories of the Plymouth settlement: in it, a group of little over one hundred Separatists arrived, incorrectly, at Plymouth, unprepared for the winter and survived only through a divine providence mediated by the naïve generosity of native inhabitants. Many fell ill and died. In 1623, conditions were so severe that Governor Bradford and his advisors reconsidered their commitment to the “common course,” assuming it to be unrealistic in saving settlers from starvation. Instead, their last recourse to ensure bare survival was to distribute that responsibility to individual households.

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This gamble, Bradford claimed, with a decade’s hindsight, worked. Likewise, many accounts of early American economic history point to this moment for its proleptic exemplification of free-market principles. Bradford’s self-consciously polemic logic in explaining that episode drew on a principle that Hobbes would have agreed with, the primacy of self-interest proper to each individual. Yet Bradford’s didactic narration is not the only account, nor even the most vivid, since he began writing nearly ten years after the fact. Contemporary accounts of the first years of settlement, such as the diurnalistic text probably coauthored by Bradford and Edward Winslow, *Mourt’s Relation*, and Edward Winslow’s more narratively comprehensive sequel, *Good Newes From New England* reveal fear’s more dynamic part in the 1623 decision. These texts show how the need for fellow-fellow feeling among English settlers followed a fortification of possessive boundaries, according to the terms of self-defense that the English brought to their initial encounters with native Americans.

Much good news there was to report from New England, Edward Winslow knew, but the best news may have been the promise of success and safety for the first and future English settlers, a promise represented by the completion of a fort at Plymouth during ten months between May 1622 and March 1623. Winslow’s *Good Newes* may profitably be read as the story of that fort’s coming into being, both as a desire, and then in concrete reality, much the way that Winslow and Bradford’s prequel to this text, *Mourt’s Relation*, narrated the affective and material exigencies that complicated the fulfillment of the goals put forward by the “Mayflower Compact” on the second page of that relation. In the earlier text, the intrusive presence of native people, more and more frequent, more and more proximate, repeatedly interrupted lawmaking deliberations. In the *Good Newes*, Winslow narrated, first, how the Pilgrims came to recognize the desirability of a palisade and a fort; then, the challenges involved in executing that goal; and later, the completion of that goal and first uses of the fort; and finally, though less directly, he

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narrated the consequences of that process for the Pilgrims after they achieved a desirable degree of safety. Fort-building required sensitive speculation on the part of the Pilgrims, and reflection on the movement of affection that their actions might provoke between the two parties, settler and native. This speculation required English to imaginatively fellow-feel beyond their limited perspective, what van Engen summarizes as the “imaginative transfer of oneself into the place of another” (15). Though van Engen’s account of the deep feeling of which English settlers were capable details its origins in European theological debates, it incompletely describes their strategic deployment and elaboration of such distanced and pragmatic sensitivity the new world. To reread Winslow’s account of Plymouth’s fortification reveals fellow-feeling was a technique useful not only in securing consensus among the English, but also for active defense and tacit aggression.

The best defense was a strong offense. This was the inclination of the Plymouth Separatists, later called Pilgrims, as Winslow described their early relationship with the native people of New England. These English understood their own offensive strategy to consist most importantly of performing the ability to strike offensively and lethally at will. This required control of their own visibility and of their perception in the eyes of their neighbors and potential antagonists. These settlers aspired to control an ongoing perception of potential violence, rather than explicit violence itself. This aspect of their strategy mattered so much to the English at Plymouth that it became a point of contention between themselves and the settlers who arrived two years later, the tense relationship with which Winslow inaugurated the Good Newes. The indentured servants who arrived on the Fortune, sent by Thomas Weston, settled at Wessagusset, thirty-five miles north of Plymouth, though in a distressingly less disciplined manner. The settlers at Plymouth understood better than their fellow countrymen how important it was to be able to manipulate their new neighbors in order to secure provisional pacts of mutual
nonaggression. Such pacts also secured more quotidian necessities, like food. With an eye for coercively securing their survival through pragmatic cooperation with native people, yet also aspiring to diminish their dependence on the native population, the Plymouth settlers drew on their capacity for emotional sensitivity, the affective delicacy about which Bradford would boast a decade later—though in his account, such sensitivity took place centripetally. Such sensitivity framed their deliberation on how to respond to rumors of a plot against them coordinated by their translator, Tisquantum, in the spring of 1622. Ought they to impale their town and surround it with a palisade? For the first year and a half of settlement, curiously, English settlers had not done this.

All actions, these settlers knew, could communicate, especially in a colonial setting. Signifying action included the action of obscuring the visibility of future actions. English settlers drew on their sensitivity to such meaning-making with great urgency in the early years of Plymouth settlement, and the Good Newes is one of the most intimate records of this tactical and speculative labor. Written with broader temporal scope and narrative comprehension than Mourt’s Relation, but with greater immediacy than Bradford’s History of Plymouth Plantation, Winslow’s Good Newes From New England demonstrates the ineffable collective disturbance that provoked these deliberations, and the consequences of those disturbances in a renewed disposition towards collective life. Later colonies, such as those at Massachusetts Bay, would experience a

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somewhat less intense state of worried vigilance in part because Winslow’s text, published in England in 1624, would have prepared them for these conditions. The elite leaders of those later settlements, men like John Winthrop or Thomas Dudley, would have read these texts before migration and discerned therein the ongoing necessary labor of imagining what affections one’s own actions might provoke among those whose neighborly norms were less than self-evident, yet whose neighborly presence would have been, at least for a time, ineluctable. Winslow documented, for example, Standish’s reflection on the hostility implied or the suspicions provoked by taking a party of more than eight men on an errand of preemptive aggression against the Massachusetts (91). Such reflections testify to an unrelenting uneasiness at the condition of visibility, a condition the English experienced as a liability. But they noticed that they might be able to transform that risky visibility into an asset if they performed dispositions that implied greater power than they materially possessed, and in provoking emotions in their neighbors such as fear or insult. Their ability to provoke such emotions would supplement the power of their material fortifications.

One reason to build the palisade, and later, the fort, indirectly followed the fact that self-consciousness about the effects of visibility could at times qualify, if not foreclose the settlers’ sense of freedom to move at will, a sense of freedom that often operates as a key modality of settler colonial projects. Such self-consciousness and second-guessing appeared very early in the Good Newes, when, after completing the palisade but not yet the fort, English settlers reconsidered the prudence of their first local trading mission. After rumor reached these hopeful traders of Tisquantum’s plot, William Bradford, Isaac Allerton and Miles Standish reassessed the

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projected gains of their travel, since it would mean dividing and becoming weaker. Would it be safer, they wondered, to “mew [them]selves up in [their] new-enclosed town” (62)? Or would such actions make easier a siege for which they were severely unprepared? They favored, ultimately, strategic boldness. Foregoing trade with the Massachusetts would mean, they knew, even greater hunger and risk for their much-diminished people. Such risk they admitted. But the most detailed rationale Winslow recorded for his English readership was a calculation of affective logic. The English feared that their proximate neighbors would see their regressive move toward greater self-enclosure, recognize their weakness, respond with violence. If the English stayed back, Winslow wrote, the natives “would see [them] dismayed, and be encouraged to prosecute their malicious purposes with more eagerness than ever they intended.” Settler reasoning attended to a possible surge of native peoples’ affection. They hoped that controlling and subduing their legible expressions of fear might ensure their survival, and perhaps offer them a way out of these disadvantageous conditions. Bluffing meant control of emotions, a desirable control attested to even in descriptions of its interruption, such as when Winslow, narrating the testimony of a Massachusett messenger, described the messenger’s assessment of Standish’s countenance, how that messenger saw, “by [Standish’s] eyes, that he was angry in his heart, and therefore began to suspect themselves discovered” (93-04).

Fortification would represent not only protection from material vulnerability by means of walls that were permanent and less permeable than human skin. According to the same logic as they signified more strategic calculation on the part of the English, these walls also represented the alleviation of constant visibility to the potential enemy. During the first year of settlement, visibility and vulnerability had interrupted the Plymouth Pilgrims’ attempts to settle on agreeable

laws, the goal that they had for themselves before debarking the *Mayflower*. The "Mayflower Compact" concluded with the promise to "frame such just and equal laws, ordinances, acts, constitutions, offices from time to time, as shall be thought most meet and convenient for the general good of the colony" (18). But the appearance of native neighbors every time the settlers convened to make those laws, according to the *Relation*, foreclosed that goal. Their proximity disturbed the English so keenly that the latter could only complete their task after settling on a treaty of neighborly peace between the English and Massasoit, who they understood to be the Abenaki leader. In both the *Relation* and the *Good Newes*, English appear to have understood the shared desirability of unfettered movement, marveling frequently at the ability of the natives to make encampments appear to vanish at will; expressing irritation that they did not know how to get in contact with nearby natives when so they desired. Yet English techniques for claiming land would require permanent and visible settlement, which meant incommensurate access to mobility. For English Pilgrims who knew they were under surveillance, and who, consequently labored constantly to speculatively assess the affective disposition of their surveillors, this was stressful. Such stress intensified their desire for the optical and martial shelter that the palisades and the fort would provide.

Material fortifications gratifyingly supplemented, and eventually eased the intense need for bold performances of aggressive potential, but fortification was not a perfectly ideal solution, at least not in the early years of settlement. Building was risky, and this was so not only because it could admit weakness and suggest fear to nearby natives. Building was risky because it required time and energy, and, more specifically, because it routed time and energy away from justifiably more profitable uses, such as tending crops. The Pilgrims recognized these resources, time and strength, to constitute a zero-sum game, particularly because of their few numbers, and because

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46 See *Mourt’s Relation*, pp. 49, 50, 54, 55, and 59.
48 *Mourt’s Relation*, pp. 60; Winslow, *Good Newes* pp. 71.
those few were so weak—Bradford wrote that at their weakest during the first Plymouth winter, there were only “six or seven sound persons” (77). The colony deliberated explicitly on these choices. Following the confrontation with Tisquantum in which the translator, with no great kindness of decorum, pointed to the miraculous power of the plague possessed by the English, stored in gunpowder barrels under their houses, Winslow wrote of the “further thoughts of fortification on the part of the English, and reflected on how, though there was “great eagerness” for such a collective project early in 1622, such labor would take “the greatest part of [their] strength from dressing [their] corn” (68). Upon the fort’s completion in March 1623, Winslow recognized some of the consequences of that difficult decision, but he did so in more oblique terms, searching for moral value, and with a tenacity that might bespeak lingering doubt regarding the labor’s prudence. Readers must not unjustly judge, he wrote, since “a little time cannot bring [so great a work] to perfection,” and “besides,” he went on, sometimes the “enemy of mankind,” —not the local enemy, but the enemy of all humans civilized enough to have recognized him— worked through deceit. It was quite possible that the enemy of mankind was present within the mind of the reader “blinding the judgment,” of English on both sides of the Atlantic who were perhaps too reliant on reason. Such an enemy might cause “reasonable men to reason against their own safety” (92). There was the enemy outside and the enemy within, Winslow implied—the latter all the more insidious for making the possibility of permeation by the former seem, despite reason, desirable.

One reason for uncertainty would be the intuition that building fortifications might have a third consequence. On one hand, the fort would relieve the English from visibility and vulnerability. On the other, it would divert energy from planting crops and it would imply fear and suspicion on the part of the English. In addition to these, fortification would also suggest preparation for more actively hostile relations with one’s neighbors, preparation for sustained aggression and animosity. Building a fort and a palisade would not only transform visibility from a liability to an asset, it would furthermore have an inverse effect in transforming native mobility from a tactical strength into a weakness insofar as a palisade and a fort could protect a group of
people and supplement their ability to see further and with less interruption.\textsuperscript{50} Winslow wrote that the English looked forward to a "continual guard kept" (68), the ability look beyond the walls that mewed them in. Given the constant speculation on how their actions would provoke energetic and affectively sustained aggression on the part of the neighbors, it is likely that the English understood their fort might be understood in this manner, as a message. Yet describing that intuition directly was difficult for these English. Winslow and Bradford both went on to describe the enduring caloric precarity endured by the Pilgrims, but a connection between that condition and the native response to their fortification hides itself in these texts, and with it, the conditions by which the English came to justify and affirm their sense of buffered, labor-possessing individual self-hood, the proprioception that would undergird all later practices of sympathetic fellow-feeling.

If the best news from New England was the news that the English had built a fort to preserve the safety of their weak bodies, which had "as yet (under God), no other defense than [their] arms" (61), the goodness of this news was not unqualified. The fortification changed the relationship between English settlers and native people, and among the English themselves. Winslow reflected on the efficacy of these English techniques of defense and offense immediately after narrating a firefight in which Captain Standish successfully defended the English from future native violence. Winslow's reflections focus on the feeling of fear among potential enemies, and the value of that fear for their safety. The experience of fear and terror permeates his description of the "judgment of God" that "terrified and amazed them."—that is, according to Winthrop, it terrified the natives, not the English.\textsuperscript{51} So shocked and awed were they that they kept their distance, extending the effect of the walls past their material substance: "none of them dare come amongst the English," Winslow wrote. Yet despite this distance, the English understood and shared at least part of their fear immediately. Specifically, this was the fear that prevented them


from “preser[ving] health and strength.” Perhaps recalling the debate among the English whether to plant or to build—or perhaps having forgotten it—Winslow observed that in their fear, the natives had “set little or no corn, which is the staff of life” (98). The effects of fear were sympathetically available for understanding, a shared experience briefly evident in his use of the gnomic present to invoke timeless truths. The settlers, recall, had neglected their crops too, and since they had depended on their neighbors for corn consistently since their arrival, terrified neglect affected them, too.\textsuperscript{52} Natives’ fear meant little to no ground for mutual trust, but furthermore, how there was little to no corn to be gained by risky trusting.

Fortification transformed the social foundation of English settlement at Plymouth. Realization of shared precarity produced the rhetorical naturalization of a self-interested colonial subject whose boundaries and motives necessitated settler sympathies.\textsuperscript{53} The Pilgrims now faced likely starvation, and though the parallel between native and settler hunger does not appear explicitly in the English texts, Winslow and others may have intuited this mutual misfortune. Almost a decade later, Bradford described the English experience of privation in terms that represented the English in a highly sympathetic condition, recalling the possibility of the Pilgrims “languishing in misery” (132). The notion of “misery” would admit to the experience of “distress caused by privation or poverty,” but also “great sorrow or mental distress…a feeling of extreme unhappiness.”\textsuperscript{54} Thus articulated, Bradford shaped the image of the Pilgrims away from the inhabitation of a condition perhaps worse than misery, substituting instead something less bitter, the meek emotionality that is the Pilgrims’ special preserve.\textsuperscript{55} It is in this mood that Bradford

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
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\item \textsuperscript{53} C.B. Macpherson. \textit{The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke} (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1962) offers a theory of the nearly contemporaneous origins of such naturalized autonomy through reading the work of English philosophers, primary among these Thomas Hobbes.
\end{thebibliography}
introduced what Samuel Eliot Morison would call the “End of the ‘Common Course and Condition’,” (120-21) and its replacement by the formalization of private ownership of labor, if not yet of land, among the heads of households in Anglo-America. This is an oft-told story.56

Bradford’s well-known narration documented the strategic decision “to assign every family a parcel of land,” renewed yearly, in order to incentivize survival. They cited a principle of self-interest that these elite understood to be self-evident, yet despite that obviousness, both Bradford and Winslow felt the urgency of pointing out such a principle explicitly. When Bradford reflected on the decision several years later, he made use of the Pilgrims’ survival as a success story, and directed that success toward a philosophical tradition, refuting Plato’s ideal for a communally possessed civic polity.57

Winslow, too, saw the opportunity to explicate a civic lesson therein. Winslow affirmed the certain “self-love wherewith every man in a measure more or less, loveth and preferreth his own good before his neighbors;,” and, as a consequence, he went on, the Plymouth governance decided that “every man should use the best diligence he could for his own preservation” (98-99).

Bradford’s account, for its explicit allusion to a philosophical tradition, has most attracted intellectual historians. They have found in this episode an attractive opportunity to make claims on the idealist intentions of the English who set the template for Anglo-American exceptionalism, according to the priorities of their respective historiographical moments.58 Yet recontextualizing Bradford’s history by placing it alongside Winslow’s more immediate relation reveals the local

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conditions that provoked such explicit abstractions on what they claimed were obvious truths
about human nature. Winslow’s account makes evident the causes of Pilgrim hunger and its
consequences for institutionalized atomization, articulated through that unit of representative
feeling, the household. Puritan hunger followed the well-deliberated decision to fortify and to
supplement that fortification with techniques of terror. Bradford’s later elision of the connection
between fortification and hunger—unintentional, probably—attests to the success of the rhetorical
naturalization of self-interest. That rhetoric mewed in the ongoing stress of vicariously extending
one’s own experience of fear and the sympathetic work of understanding how such fear might
have caused others to “reason against their own safety” and neglect their own sustenance.
Instead, Bradford’s elegiac tone produced an unassailable—because regretfully foreclosed—ideal
communal fellow-feeling at the moment of property’s formal installation as a settler colonial
technique.

By the time he wrote, Bradford may have forgotten what it was like to recognize how fear
could coerce a peoples’ decision not to plant, and instead to prepare for violence and war.
Winslow’s writing, on the other hand, preserved the uncanny and undesirable experience of
shared mutual fear. It also preserved evidence of the desire not to be experiencing mutual
affection. Consider, for example, Winslow’s narration of several episodes of direct and personal
interactions with individual native people, episodes that show the sympathetic capacities of an
English settler, as well as his desire for control over the movement of affection. Take the
remarkably vivid episode of homeopathy at the center of the Good Newes, in which Winslow
recognized an obligation to pass beyond any personal norms for disgust, and instead, in various

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59 Following Bradford, historiographers tend to overlook this condition for privatization of labor,
despite Winslow’s possibly unwitting association of the two, a tendency that endures, such that
even a 2011 monograph on war-making techniques in early New England can detail the
gendered aspects of the division of labor implied therein, but not settler-native hostilities. See
Romero, Making War, pp. 37-38.
60 On Bradford’s elegiac tone, see Donegan, “As Dying, Yet Behold,” and Burnham, Michelle,
Folded Selves: Colonial New England Writing in the World System (Dartmouth: Univ. Press of
61 On uncanniness and unsettlement in the early New England archive, see Bergland, National
Uncanny.
forms, to permeate several dense borders of native society—not, initially, in order to heal Massasoit, which he ended up doing anyway, but rather to celebrate his death. Winslow narrated a journey to Massasoit’s home, and how, once there, he passed through the thick threshold of the edifice, “a house so full of men as we could scarce get in” (82). Then he would have to penetrate the mouth of Massasoit and its parasitic pathogens—the mouth was “exceedingly furred; and his tongue swelled in such a manner as it was not possible for him to eat” (82). He brought Massasoit back from what he would, in another context, call “the pit’s brim” (98), by feeding him, and freeing stool from his body.\(^{62}\) Despite the intimacy and boundary-crossing that all of these acts implied, Winslow, in his recollection, would tend to cut short his descriptions of how these acts affected him personally. “Diverse other things were worth the noting,” he wrote, “but I fear I have been too tedious” (84). He again performed a control of his affections during such elaborations when he narrated his subsequent conversation with Conbatant, a conversation in which he, Winslow, promised that if he, Conbatant, were as ill as Massasoit, he, Winslow, would provide him with the same care, too. “Much profitable conference was occasioned thereby; which would be too tedious to relate” (87).

Massasoit’s illness in 1622 coincided with that of John Donne, an ocean away. In response to this illness, Donne wrote his *Devotions Upon Divergent Occasions*, for which he too is now aphoristically famous.\(^{63}\) Eminent among these meditations is the one representing an individual’s insularity as fictive. Donne’s seventeenth devotion aimed to recall to consciousness a shared humanity within the Christian church; it did so by presenting a sequence of metaphors—a bell, a body, a book, a sermon—to signify the unity that all men should feel, granted that they shared the same faith. But before he would famously denounce the island that each man metaphorically wasn’t, Donne elaborated the greatest difference between men as a difference of

translation. God’s ability to provoke affection and unity would be proven through a metaphor of movement or migration—either of the meaning of a notion from one language to another, or, in an equally robust a denotation in the seventeenth century, the “transference; removal, or conveyance from one person, place, or condition to another.”64 Geographic place and a peoples’ language were the metaphorical tenors for the power of fellow-feeling. Yet these were metaphors whose metonymic implications for the colonial English empire are difficult to overlook in light of the discovery of the strangest news from New England, news related to Winslow by one of the many anonymous messengers of the text. New England, like the old one, was an island.65 A neat formal analogy, the affinity may have, however, greater significance insofar as the news about New England reproduced in spatial terms the insular self-consciousness that now defined these people in their new environment. It naturalized what the settlers had created, the material and affective construction of the Plymouth settlement as an effective island.

The text that narrated that production and reproduction, Good Newes from New England, served at least in part, as a conventional guidebook advising the proper material preparation for settlement. Winslow’s text also justified its prescriptions from the start—Weston’s ill-prepared men arrived in the relation’s first sentence. Those men brought with them no provisions to supplement those of the already hungry settlers at Plymouth; they did not even bring enough for themselves to eat, and thus made worse New England’s conditions of dearth; and made them still worse because they were reluctant to work. Thus the importance of sufficient material planning. But in addition to these material prescriptions, the Good Newes often noted also the ideal dispositional qualities for English settlers. Weston’s men were poor planners, with an insufficient speculative faculty by which to strategically imagine fellow-feeling and then to manipulate it in their negotiations for securing safety and sustenance in the New World. The ideal planter, to

65 MacMillan, Sovereignty and Possession, warns of deliberate untruths in early modern cartography as an international strategy of misinformation among European colonial rivals (pp.148-177); it is not impossible, following Cohen’s analysis of communication in colonial New England, that the native people were engaging in their own disinformation strategy.
Winslow and to Bradford, was one capable of conceiving himself to be an island—this capacity undergirded all future exercises of collectivity. Such a planter would be able to venture forth willfully in a colonial settlement, reproduce English autonomy elsewhere, and affirm that autonomy through venturing forth emotionally too. Some of Winslow’s readers would later leave the British Isles in order to establish a robust civic community in Massachusetts. And though their stories of settlement would rarely convey such perplexity, provocation, and affection by indigenous neighbors so explicitly as Winslow’s did, they nevertheless gestured, as my chapters below will show towards the uptake of its lessons when they affirmed the necessity of emotional sensitivity in cohesive settling.

Relational Affections

The chapters to follow describe how a group of settlers who took up the self-conscious task of inaugurating a new form of collective coherence sought to organize and transmit a set of affective responses to fear. This description takes place in a sequential fashion. Organizing collective renewals of relational affection shows writ large the movement of fear among a people, and follows their own tendency to understand the individual through metonymic recourse to the collective. Each chapter’s description of emotional experience draws on those insights described in the chapter prior, from the initial demarcations of possessive property, to the reproduction of those boundaries as norms within the home; to the mediation of those norms among peers and to their children through time; and the consequent limit on any individual’s ability to look beyond the boundary of communal fellow-feeling and see valid personhood. Many of the English participants in the smaller stories I retell would have experienced this incremental development of affection within the span of an individual life. Sometimes a part of this sequence might help shape an individual’s experience of a discrete within a brief period of his or her person’s life. Sometimes, the archive reveals only partial glimpses of a chapter’s insights within a discrete event. But I organize the subtle and long-term effects of fear in a sequential manner in order to make visible the enduring effects of negative and antagonistic encounters tend to fall out of accounts of the
disciplinary development of fellow-feeling in and after the colonial period of Anglo-American history.

My first chapter, argues that justice between neighbors depended on a proper recognition of the value of borders. This chapter focuses on the social category of “neighbors,” as its key heuristic. It is a relationship whose ubiquity and flexibility both in the present and in the past can cause some loss in its historical specificity. Neighborliness has been an implicit concern for studies of colonial settlement, particularly Anglo-American colonial settlement, since the late twentieth century, when cultural historians began to seek more just and detailed approaches to telling the story of the encounter between two peoples with different aspirations and principles for life on the American continent. The heuristic has two important qualities. First, it names the minimal requirements for a relationship between two parties, recognition of proximate existence. Second, more specifically, it names a shared avowal of ideals required by the self-consciously settlement-minded English who arrived at Massachusetts in 1630. John Winthrop, the first governor of that colony, reminded his fellow-shipmates and future constituents that they were to love their neighbors, as their divine text had instructed them, as themselves. Much of the recent scholarship on these settler colonial subjects has elaborated the latent promise of this ideal social bond. These studies have expanded illuminated on Winthrop’s ambition that emotionally intense prosocial feeling would produce the compromise necessary for survival in the New World, a balance between justice and mercy. Yet these accounts assume a homogeneity of affective experience uninterrupted by the strange new exigencies of settlement life. Some of these conditions included: the proximity to life’s bareness and possible privation; the new contrast with other forms of affection visible among native people; and the uncertainty of how to include as objects of affection the new arrivants to the colonial settlement. Querying “neighborliness” and

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66 Jodi Byrd, *Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism* (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 2011) uses the term “arrivant” to describe third parties whose presence in a settler colony must take on the terms put forward by the settlers, often in opposition to the interest of natives.
its transformation in Anglo-America reveals that the ability to distinguish between justice and mercy comprised the greatest affective consequence of English borders.

When English settlers wrote about neighbors, they often did so in order to restore or to bring close an abrogated justice. To demonstrate this, my account turns to diurnalistic writing of early settlement, to show how persistently disturbing the experience of unjust behavior could be in a colonial setting where laws had not yet been re-established, and to show also how useful narrative could be in helping organize that disturbance. These texts, diaries and journals, circulated minimally, and their intimate status reveal patterns of attention and memory upon which individuals drew as they strove to realign themselves within the social body. I focus in particular on John Winthrop’s *Journal* to show the following pattern: the desire to conclude a story aptly and justly often required a revision of focus. After rereading John Winthrop’s “Modell of Christian Charitie” and showing that its prescription for a normative insulation would be the precondition for the practical disavowal of separation exemplified in Donne’s seventeenth meditation, I turn to a story Winthrop composed of a dispute between neighbors in which narration provided justice where juridical procedure could not. I read next a passage about Atlantic neighborliness, and show how in Winthrop’s hands, the injustice of losing global attention might be mitigated by a renewal of affection within domestic boundaries, a renewal that required some awkward degree of absorption of the New England island’s circum-Atlantic networks. Finally, I show that Winthrop prescription for centripetal affection followed experience of unpleasant proximity with those whose understanding of walls as a discipline of affection differed. These readings show that the affection for which the settlers at Massachusetts were famous, or are becoming famous again, has been always an exercise of affirming distinction among neighboring peoples.

My second chapter, “Houses of Shame,” argues that this sense of individual and bordered personhood was naturalized through the cultivation of shame. In doing so, it interrogates the uses and conditions of hospitality in a settler colony. This heuristic has been important in recent studies of colonial American settlement that take an Ibero-American or a
comparative approach. These studies have shown hospitality to have been a key concept by which, first, the native people of America were considered persons; and second, should they fail to understand their obligations as such a misunderstanding would justify the acts of war and conquest that the Spanish indeed went on to enact in the sixteenth century. Hospitality’s militarization constituted the corrupt model of sociable settlement against which English distinguished themselves. Among the English, practices of domesticity, which included hospitality, ascribed to the household patriarch the authority that elsewhere belonged to the sovereign. Hospitality thus figured as one aspect by which sovereignty was distributed among individuals, particularly in a colonial context. And women were necessary in this regard, not only as possessions within the household, property by which acts of hospitality would take place, but also necessary for reproducing persons and dispositions agreeable to these norms, agreeable, in other words, to the affectionate fellow feeling among English households. Yet studies of gender in colonial New England tend to overlook the psychological and ideological conditions necessary to draw from women the extra labor in a colonial context. The household was not a site free from fear, not by any means—fear no tonly of bringing shame upon oneself and one’s household among one’s neighbors. This chapter will demonstrate how the performance of shame was one that shame’s manifestation of allegiance to oppressive ideals could bring a woman closer to personhood.

My account begins by making the following observation: the prospect of ongoing self-disclosure required by the theological foundation many colonial New England settlers shared was a burdensome, perhaps loathsome prospect, and especially so for the women of the Massachusetts Bay Colony. My account turns to one of the only texts of the first half-century of New England settlement written by a woman, the oeuvre of Anne Bradstreet. These texts are valuable for a number of reasons. Not only do the late, unpublished poems reveal, as many critics have shown, the extent of theologically inflected emotion of which the settlers at New England were capable, but her poems, especially the earlier, published, and less personal verses more vividly disclose the desire to direct that affection toward intellectual pursuits, deliberately to not
talk about herself. I read these poems on less anachronistic terms than they tend to be read, bracketing desire or a lyric subject more robustly to be produced in the nineteenth century, and instead, read Bradstreet’s formalism as the desire to invoke emotion strategically in order to participate in an intellectual tradition. Read thus, these texts suggest that Anne Bradstreet did not like talking about her feelings; nor did she always enjoy writing poetry. Yet she intuited that this practice was the closest she could approach to personhood, and one technique for asserting personhood would be to assume for herself the status of the host and provoke speech by others. To note that she may have felt chronic shame, and that she at times drew on representations of shame to achieve some degree of recognition and self-determination recasts the transhistoric literary kinship that Bradstreet has for so long seemed to offer her own most vocal champions.

My third chapter, “All the Rage,” argues that the category of the generation organized the experience of disaffection and personal doubt regarding the viability and continuity of the New England social covenant. I focus on that seemingly indispensable, the generation, to reveal its effects in facilitating the endurance of seventeenth century settler colonialism, possibly into the present. That category has been important in the field since its founding: it has organized the studies of Anglo-American colonial character since at least Perry Miller. Miller, and most of his own followers, have understood that category intuitively, as a shared horizontal experience of descent. They never explicitly define or interrogate that category, despite using it to show how a social mission was collectively inherited for three centuries. For Miller, that social mission was the replacement of Calvinist predestination with a more secularized, melancholic resolution to industrious worldliness; for Bercovitch, his first major critic, the inheritance was the unending site of the renewal of a promise and its progressive optimism. Yet even the most trenchant critics of their historiographical aspirations have rarely engaged with the category by which they first intuited that continuity. None have explained the efficacy of feeling generationally, how it takes place, and what its consequences can be. How does a group of young people come to feel solidarity in their recollection, often antagonistic, of their fathers’ ideals?
My account begins with the following intuitive but not obvious problem: How do you get people who don’t share your experience to agree to your advice while you talk directly at them. This is the problem that the ministers of the second and third-generation faced, and that challenge helps illuminate how and why the jeremiad’s rhetoric was so popular and successful. The jeremiad sermon manifests, in a generically coherent manner, a discursive mode that long preceded its New England instantiation, and that mode likewise prolifically organizes another set of texts just following its flourishing in the 1660s in New England, the accounts of King Philip’s war of the 1670s. These texts show an attraction to evidence of apostasy and ideological infidelity, and in doing so perform the possibility of taking youthful disaffection seriously. Both texts, the sermons and the war narratives, stress the piety of the fathers as a loss, but the war narratives draw on the disciplined allegiance to that hierarchy and use it to explain the terrifying apostasy of many groups of natives from the treaties that their fathers had made. Outrageous evidence of native infidelity to the treaties of the fathers, however, forecloses an inquiry into native fidelity to their interests in the present; this is a choice that the New England settlers never had to make because even through trial—especially through trial—they understood themselves to be vindicating and proving their own forward-looking faithfulness. The dual contract and covenants passed down and measured by the generation thus gained distinction from the singular contract inherited by natives.

My fourth chapter argues that friendship in colonial New England was not essentially a matter of emotionally-saturated experience, but rather became that way as a consequence of resentment to fellow-English that followed close contact and dependence on native neighbors. “With Friends Like These” focuses on the relationship between friends, a relationship of potentially exceptional iconoclasm—one does not need proximity, a house, or paternity in order to have friends. For these reasons, friendship can often seem to transcend history, to be a characteristic that all humans possess. This extra-generic quality of friendship has been well noted by philosophers in general, and by recent early American historians in particular. They have noted its capacity to forge deeply personal alliances that evade, erode, or transcend the
explicit violence of collective institutions, such as the nation or the state. Friendship has thus been seen as the ideal mode of elective affiliation among Anglo-Americans and occasionally, between Anglo-Americans and their exceptionally privileged others. Yet can there be friendship without feelings? Is such friendship real? And what about feelings of obligation that are unrelentingly burdensome and unpleasant? About these potential aspects of friendship most scholars have said nothing, and this has the possible effect of excluding from affectively affirmed personhood those whose feelings are not easily intelligible, whose feelings do not often conform to regnant expressive scripts. I argue that the rhetoric of affectively robust friendship, in the early years, signaled a resentment toward dependence on those whom one did not particularly like, and that, once rhetorically severed from any material foundation, these settlers’ norms for friendly feeling become the threshold for recognition and participation in civic life.

My account begins with the following observation: unlike enmity, friendship at the scale of the collective tends to appear less “real” than personal friendship. This is so both for many contemporary persons as well as in the archive that these contemporary readers have encountered. This chapter’s archive focuses on three short texts: a letter, a language guide, and a long-suffering captivity narrative. To an unusual but not exceptional degree, these texts revise their formal conventions in representing a deeply troublesome experience of affective and material privation, when an individual, typically the writer, was circumstantially coerced into cultivating (or desiring) affectively satisfying experiences with people not of his or her own choosing. These texts strain to reconcile, on one hand, a fidelity to representing affective experience, with, on the other, a fidelity to the communicative norms shared by the ideal friendly community, and in this struggle, they reveal a desire to deeply feel out of an ongoing condition of often dull, but sometimes seething ambivalence. These texts all explicitly name friends and reflect on the qualities of friendship. In doing so they reveal affect to be an ideological remainder from the theological past into the secularity of modern, post-reformation, disenchanted, enlightenment. These readings suggest that the narrow vindication of friendship on the basis of feeling is one of settler colonialism’s most enduring disciplinary techniques.
Throughout these chapters, movements that I name “affect” and “emotion” and sometimes “feelings” signal temporary experiences of being impinged on and disturbed. These encounters call into question both the limits of discrete personhood as well as the assumptions of commonly shared modes of sensory perception. Sarah Ahmed’s insight that affects—in her account, primarily fear—produce the proprioceptive borders that a modern self takes for granted is useful here insofar as these readings emerge fundamentally from a dissatisfaction with the self-possessed and willful subject that earlier readings of colonial affection have taken for granted. Individuals in early modernity, already assemblages of not entirely knowable inward motion, unexpectedly moved—affected—by a variety of environmental factors, some of which were amply accounted for in early modern medical philosophy. Early modern Europeans, such as Hobbes himself, typically named those disturbances “passions;” within the discourse of reform Protestantism, these experiences, modified by reflection and otherworldly aspirations, often take the name “affections.” Yet I use the more modern terms affect and emotion not primarily to intervene in those critical discourses, but rather to position this work alongside them, and in doing so, to signal in advance the modern revision and reaffirmation of borders that American settlement produced.

These readings narrate the naturalization of “deep feeling,” showing how the disavowal of accreting antagonisms that produced desires for deeply felt allegiance and consensus. These chapters show the effects of fear as it conditioned those more local, intimate emotions, feelings whose personal quality lends credibility to their “natural” status or even their “reality.” The New England settlers themselves understood affective experience to be an effect of a reality beyond

their individual persons, though in their cosmology, these affections derived from a divine source. Yet these settlers understood their world have a shaping influence in their emotional range. Their explanations of the process by which divine affection moved them often drew on their observations of the world around them, a world that was not always, not even frequently, congenial or hospitable. It is beyond the scope of this project to determine whether the ultimate mover of their affections was indeed transcendent or material. Yet literary historical scholarship that has described the development of these affections thus far has tended to bring a less than satisfying critical eye to the desire that these actors explicitly expressed for the emotions they felt to be real. Such a desire was, I demonstrate, deeply implicated in the violence they enacted on their neighbors—a violence that included turning away from the presence of these new neighbors, as well as turning away from the process by which such desire for emotionality acquired a template for fulfillment, and then was, for the most part, naturally fulfilled.

Consider, as an indication of the success of that occlusion, one of the most pressing concerns of New England studies in 2017. During the discussion portion of the 2017 MLA panel on the futures of the study of colonial New England, one senior scholar queried the panelists on their method of conveying the relevance of this historical period to current and future students of American literary production.71 Her question implied a normative experience of the field of study as a historical space with abstract, at best analogic relevance for understanding certain contemporary conditions. The query, though urgent, assumed that students, the next generation of scholars in the field, exist distinct from the effects of settler governance. This is not true. It is untrue not only because the colonial Anglo-American archive has determined in advance the social value of the category of the generation, as my third chapter shows. The assumption that the experience of colonial settlers exist distinct from the political effects of normalized affections in the present depends on not taking into account the effect of the colonial English disposition in unmooring socially valid affective experience from material conditions. Rather, renewing attention

to the historical setting in which such affective sovereignty emerged suggests that Anglo-American subjects remain inflected by the colonial emotional disciplines herein described, and this, more enduring subjective constitution suggests that the discipline’s periodizing boundary may be, at least in this regard, a fallacy. Instead of arguing for the relevance of the colonial New England archive, this project aspires to reveal the often-unseen ways that the practices of this period may have endured, all the more oppressively relevant. Following Foucault’s description of critique as the ongoing and incremental movement towards “not being governed like that and at that cost” (45), this review of colonial New England society strives to historically qualify affective relationships that appear historically transcendent, and thereby suggest that these enduring disciplines can become not quite so relevant.72

The question of contemporary, typically analogic relevance between this period of the past and the present follows crucial late twentieth century critiques of the idea that seventeenth century New England settlement determined an American character. The most well-cited such critique of New England studies remains Amy Kaplan’s introduction to her coedited 1991 volume, The Cultures of United States Imperialism.73 In her introductory essay, “Left Alone with America: The Absence of Empire from the Study of American Culture,” Kaplan reread the founding text of colonial New England Studies, Perry Miller’s own introduction to Errand Into the Wilderness, showing how his autobiographical moment on the banks of the Congo, his work’s “paradigm drama,” symptomatized the mutual imbrecation of imperialism and the study of Anglo-American origins. Her account sensitively notes the disavowed memories of imperial violence in the history of the United States’ formation, disavowals necessary to negatively define American culture as exceptional—against slavery (the banks of the Congo); dispossession (the Wilmot Proviso), or civilizational decay (the Temple of Jupiter). Observing the enduring necessity of such contrasts to define Anglo-American identity, necessities that preexisted and determined Miller’s account,

Kaplan queries the value of “postcolonial studies” for an analysis of Anglo-American empire that aspires to account more justly for its organization and distribution of power in other imperial settings, both domestically and aborad.

Kaplan focused symptomatically on New England in that introduction, but her critique signaled a broader-literary historical turn in American Studies away from reading New England texts hegemonically for their manifestation of the early stages of a national disposition. Yet within the discipline, aspirations to avoid that hegemony turned still further inward, and as they sought to explain a local diffusion of subjectifying power, tended to turn away from the conditions of possibility that yoked the spread of empire presaged by Hobbes’ “knowledge of the face of the earth” (76). Informed by a first-world historical context marked by the decline of the Cold War’s bilateral antagonisms, historians and literary historians, drawing on insights of French social theory, such as those of Michel Foucault or Michel de Certeau, have demonstrated the diffusion of political power in quotidian colonial experience, diffusion at times dissonant or resistant to the hegemony of elite orthodoxy.  

This cohort of literary historians astutely revealed the ways that participants in New England settlement were not all in happy, or even unhappy agreement with Calvinist theory and practice. There was not a singular orthodoxy among these settlers, but rather, for example, but rather, the leaders of the colony in their vocational practice shaped the Calvinist between spiritual autonomy and social co-dependence, and they made it possible for settlers themselves to exercise greater authority in their own practice of subjection. The reconstructed behavior of the non-elite reveals that these English settlers actively negotiated their place within the ideology that they shared, and sought for themselves, through such quotidian


acts as talking, listening, building houses, telling jokes, more capacious terms for their experience while still—and this is crucial—upholding the terms of that shared disposition.\textsuperscript{76}

A similar shift in critical attention took place at the close of the twentieth century with respect to the histories of contact between settlers and indigenous people, based on a desire to understand power’s more diffuse exercise among a people in modernity. These historians of contact saw that the model of authority and coercion hierarchically exercised, as it had been assumed by the major historians of the field, did not fully account for the experiences of subjection in a colonial setting, particularly in a settler colony. Rather than a simple frontier in which European colonial agents unilaterally subdued indigenous people, the encounter between these two parties might be understood as a middle ground not wholly determined for conquest by colonial agents.\textsuperscript{77} It might also be understood as a “marchlands” or a “contact zone” characterized by a lack of clarity in which the imbalance of power produced new improvisatory techniques for survival, antagonism, and compromise on the part of parties unevenly pitted against each other.\textsuperscript{78} These studies have demonstrated that the exercise of power at close range was not a one-way movement. Instead, these studies show that native people found active modes of asserting willful and recognizable action in their own interest.\textsuperscript{79}


Yet in order to make more desirable and less epistemologically inhumane statements, such as "Pequot women proved resilient and resistant to their enslavement" (Cremer 295),\textsuperscript{80} an under-critiqued aspect of that shift in emphasis slipped by, a shift towards a seemingly pre-existing sub-altern subjectivity on whose behalf recent literary historians have been eager to speak while at the same time turning away from the psychic formation of allegiance and desire on the part of English, allegiance and desire that were the conditions for enslavement, oppression and, often, genocide, and that demanded of indigenous people a mastery of the skills of self-representation according to settler English norms.\textsuperscript{81} What recedes from visibility, and evades analysis by these more democratic scholars of colonial settlement remains the effect that these encounters and engagements had on the epistemology of colonial settlers, how such encounters reshaped the desires and sensibilities of collective and individual identity within settler communities such that the settler affectionate disposition would come to appear to be so normal as to not require explanation.\textsuperscript{82} Few, if any, of the most recent studies of affection in a settler colony understand affect or affection to be not transcendent, but rather a limited category for the experience of inwardness or emotions, one whose limits were troublingly on view in settlement’s documented negotiations. As with the earliest histories of settler courage, fear factored importantly in those negotiations, and the affected quotidian life within the palisades of settlement.

\textsuperscript{81} Glen Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks: The Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition (Minneapolis: Univ. or Minnesota Press, 2014); more specifically to the Pequot women, see Kathleen Bragdon, “Gender as a Social Category in Native Southern New England” Ethnohistory 43.4 (1996): 573-592; Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Three Women’s Texts and a Critique of Imperialism” Critical Inquiry 12.1 (1985): 243-261 points attention to the tendency of feminist criticism to almost inevitably reiterate “the axioms of imperialism” and in doing so illuminates the ongoing relevance, though in a different colonial context, of the conditions of power at play between scholar and object that she described in her more famous essay, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” in Can the Subaltern Speak? Reflections on the History of An Idea ed. Rosalind C. Morris (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2001).
Between the unsettlement of epistemological foundations on one hand, and the diffuse circulation of power among a settler community, on the other, it becomes possible to understand the endurance of settler colonial dispositions through their emphasis on the sovereignty of individual affections, an emphasis that distinguishes archive of the New England colonies. The power exercised by non-elite subjects within the colony depended fundamentally on the availability of land and the distance from centralized state power at the metropole. That distance empowered subjects according to the priorities necessary for the reproduction of a settler disposition, a disposition in which the individual was tasked with manifesting a national character through his or her everyday life. These diffuse exercises of power, in which subjects reproduced familiar but previously undefined or unclarified aspects of their English lifestyles, would have answered, in small but attractive ways, the ongoing condition of uncertainty and fear in colonial settlement. New England, of course, would not have been the only such setting in which quotidian exercises bore such social importance, but it was a site of unusually explicit reflection on the value of such discipline. New England settlement illustrates the normalization and naturalization of affection in response to the epistemological uncertainties of settlement, and in that normalization, the discourse of affection preserves as obvious and beyond criticism the assertions of power across relationships so easily perceived as transcendent.

To these histories, this dissertation contributes an understanding of how emotionally-understood relationships preserve an uneven distribution of power according to settler priorities. A concise summary of the structure of this affection appears, for example, in Hannah Arendt’s discussion of the feeling of pity in contrast to the activities of solidarity. In her study of revolutionary movements, Arendt observed that “without the presence of misfortune, pity would not exist, and therefore [pity] has just as much vested interest in the existence of the unhappy as a thirst for power has a vested interest in the existence of the weak” (79). Likewise, each of my chapters reveals how a specific experience of affection—the affection by which settlers ethically

justified and normalized fundamentally violent and unjust seizure and settlement—derived
strength and validity from crossing boundaries. Those boundaries of difference, difference
between types of neighbors; differences between men and women; between parents and
children; enemy and friend would therefore need ongoing fortification and renewal in order for
English settlers to understand and vindicate their moral and sentimental superiority. Take, for
example, Ivy Schweitzer’s sensitive discussion of the friendly affection that English people
sustained for each other—among men, across the rich and the poor, between men and women,
and even between settlers and native people. In order to recognize the power of such affection,
English sentimental subjects would need to have a strong sense, and later, a clear understanding
of the differences that separated them, and would have a keen interest in renewing those
boundaries. In this manner, even the affection that Schweitzer reads between, for example,
Catherine Maria Sedgwick’s eponymous Hope Leslie with the native Pequot Magewisca,
preserves for readers of Hope Leslie in the early nineteenth century and into to the early twenty-
first, an understanding of affection dependent on the boundaries it would appear to transcend.\footnote{Ivy Schweitzer, Perfecting Friendship, pp. 180-206.}

Affection, so seemingly potent in its evasion of normative coercions, reproduces settler-colonial
epistemology of difference and its implicit distribution of power.

Thus reframed as a technique of settler colonialism, emotions appear now to be a
discipline of power with unremarked subtlety and perseverance. When Patrick Wolfe described
settler colonialism as an enduring structure rather than a discretely bounded event, he aspired to
show the ways that the distribution of power in nineteenth century Europe generally, and Victorian
England specifically, inflected the terms that anthropologists brought to the study of native people
in Australia; the uptake of those terms among English settlers on that continent; the effect of
those terms in the perception of native neighbors; and eventually, the material and perceptual
erasure of those people as neighbors. Though the arrival of Europeans in Australia may have
qualified as an event, it was the structure of perception and relation that endured—that

\footnote{Ivy Schweitzer, Perfecting Friendship, pp. 180-206.}
endurance was conditioned by the seeming self-evidence of such putatively common sense European concepts as time, progress, descent, space, and territory. To that list of terms for experience, this study of New England colonial settlement contributes the experience of emotions, and argues that it was the naturalization of emotions that made and makes it possible for Anglo-American literary critics to imagine the continuous American character that Kaplan and her cohort critiqued.

Winslow’s account of Plymouth offers in miniature, a type for the chapters to follow, how the fear of the state of nature intensified the urgency of feeling sympathetically, of loving the neighbor you identified as much as you loved yourself. Thus fortified, fellow feeling would find institutional encouragement at Massachusetts, undergo secularization and dissemination in the eighteenth and nineteenth century by textual disciplines such as novels and lyric poems. These textual disciplines cherish the affirmation and control of difference, as Arendt’s analogy suggested when her rhetoric bound the exercises of pity with relations of power, and testify to the limitations of pity, which she had earlier associated with sympathy. Sympathy’s most dynamic site of experience is inward, and thus, with pity, it would seem to operate autonomously, insulated, or at least separated by a “blurred” boundary from the global context that made such feeling urgent. The rhetoric of almost every colonial New England text following Winslow’s thus turns away, sometimes visibly, from those global conditions, sometimes disturbingly near. The purpose of this dissertation, thus, is to reveal the ways that the desire for safety within a settler community reproduces within the walls of the city the seeming self-evidence of self-interest as well as

sympathy, its complement; and how small, critically neglected social disciplines go on to reproduce such individual fortification. From the earliest days of English settlement, these disciplines of feeling have been technologies of warfare. Through them, settlers in America have effectively terrified themselves and others, and, once seemingly safely insulated, these settlers would turn still further inward, draw out their stories, and celebrate their successful broaching of the boundaries over which they have sought always to remain in control.
This chapter argues that the stresses of engaging with neighbors of a new sort and with old neighbors in a new way produced in colonial New England settlers the desire, not yet entirely accessible, of defining justice as an abstraction, distinct from its variable and sometimes unpredictable instantiation in the immediate present. A settler colony would have an unusually strong need for a robust sense of justice among its enfranchised participants, since, distant from the metropoles’ authorization and enforcement of law, that shared sense of justice would facilitate cooperation and survival, perhaps even flourishing. Yet the challenges of early colonial settlement would also require frequent abrogation of an individual’s sense of justice in service of required compromise. In New England, such an impasse might be addressed by emphasizing the utility of mercy to complement justice, the ideal balance for neighborly love. Yet mercy, as my introduction suggested, exercised power, and most powerfully in colonial New England, its effect was to render justice an increasingly abstract principle as it was invoked beyond the limits of settlement. In what follows I will unpack how the decision to act justly or mercifully cleaved the understanding of justice such that under the sign of mercy would appear acts of individuating and sympathetic care; under justice, a fealty to rule and abstraction.

For an example of the relationship between exercises of elective neighborliness and assertions of justice, consider the following reflection on the part of colonial Massachusetts’ first chartered governor. John Winthrop has enjoyed historical fame for a number of reasons, but lately in early American studies he has returned to eminence for insisting that persuasively experienced affection would ensure the requisite compromise in the uncertain and new colonial setting.86 In his “Modell of Christian Charity,” Winthrop invoked a well-known and often-cited

narrative example of this love, the story of the good Samaritan. Winthrop did so in order to illustrate a transcendentally valuable principle for social cohesion, the injunction to “love your neighbor as yourself,” and he did so while he and his listeners, his future constituents, were still aboard the Arbella, a liminal space in which passengers were probably still experiencing a very compact version of neighborliness, and may not yet have thought to ask themselves the following very valid question, “But who is my neighbor?” It’s easy to assume that the Biblical prophet of Winthrop’s citation meant to imply that anyone could be my neighbor, and also easy to assume that this is what the prophet, to those who were present at his exhortation, and to those who read about it afterwards, has always been understood to have meant.

Consider, however, as evidence against so universal an interpretation of the neighbor’s own universality, the clear existence of non-neighbors that Winthrop theorized in a less public reflection less than a decade later. “By the royal law,” Winthrop wrote in his Journal, the notebooks in which he accounted for the attunement of the collective settlement to justice, “thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.” He then reviewed the Biblical prophet’s story of the Jew found by the Samaritan on the road to Jerusalem. But his reflection concluded with a strange clause, strange not only in its contradiction of seemingly obvious interpretations of the parable, but also strange in its positive recommendation of decisively unneighborly and unloving behavior towards this stranger: “but if such an one be not our neighbor, then we have no relation to him by any command of the second table [to love the neighbor as oneself], for that requires us to love our neighbor only…” Thus, freed from that obligation, Winthrop speculated on the sort of behavior in which one might now engage with an impunity that transcended positive law and entered the realm of sin and morality, the realm from which he derived his sense of justice. He went on: “and then we may deceive, beat, and otherwise damnify him, and not sin, etc” (448). How, this chapter asks, did it become possible to not be a neighbor?

Answering this question, this chapter proceeds in three parts. First, I will survey general definitions of justice and their problems, and show, more specifically, how justice, even
imperfectly asserted notions of justice, circulated as a shared sensibility in New England during the first decades of settlement. I will explain my chapter’s provisional redefinition of justice as alignment, something akin to notions of justice as harmony, and I will demonstrate how discursive exercises of narrative accounting facilitated a communion of just sensibilities in colonial life.\textsuperscript{87} Next, I will show how those exercises of narrative accounting could be useful not only in drawing an individual into that communion of sensibilities but also in restoring a sense of justice where civic administration’s compromises often, and perhaps inevitably failed. Understanding justice to comprise realignment of a sympathetic people could help determine just punishment, or, when just punishment seemed impossible, in restoring a sense of the possibility of justice. The examples offered invite a query into the definition of justice as a sensed alignment, and in particular a challenge to the seeming self-evidence of justice’s strong attachment to affect. These examples as of the New England archive: alignment of what persons or objects? Finally, I will show how this definition of justice affected attempts to compromise with those beyond the desirably aligned community. Individuals beyond that boundary would become objects by which nature elaborated its own justice, rather than subjects capable of desiring justice for themselves. From within this order of things, one would thus not need to sustain a relationship with those other parties, and might be able to exclude them from the scope of neighborly affection.

Justice and Justification

Justice, according to philosophers, is a fundamental social virtue. By this, the philosophers mean to say that justice and its recognition must be present for a group of people living together. Justice appears, and not only to the philosophers, as a condition for all other social and political desiderata, as well as the best goal for a society to deliberately approach through time.\textsuperscript{88} Justice can also measure the worthiness of acts and decisions along the way. Typically, Western societies have done so through the use of legal principles institutionally administered, such as


law-making, or courts—though as some philosophers have suggested, this perspective may indeed fundamentally qualify that category, “the West.” Such decisions are queried for their accordance with justice, and the institutions themselves likewise assessed, and a society’s priorities refined accordingly. On account of these ongoing qualities, justice is often understood by philosophers, and occasionally, political theorists, to be a transcendent political virtue, one applicable and perhaps even homogenously composed across space and through time. Justice, if it is to bear the weight of preeminent social principle, it must, it seems, endure such translation. Three observations qualify this ambition.

First, a minimum threshold distinguishes which parties can access justice. Typically, this threshold is that of reflective, often human sentience. But not always. Many early modern Europeans, for example, understood the relationship between God and humans to be governed by divine sense of justice, a coherence that existed beyond mortal understanding, and that could be synthesize all the imperfections that riddled attempts to affirm justice among humans. These imperfections will be the theme of the second section below; examples of divine justice, the first. Fidelity to a divine principle or agent embodying that principle was simultaneously a fidelity to justice, even if that justice might seem, in the present, not to exist. It is in part for this reason that it was perhaps more frightening for the early modern subjects who settled in America to imagine a person to profess fidelity to the demonic than to not believe in God at all.

Occasionally, a society of humans, those uniquely tasked to struggle with so delicate a concept as justice, might be challenged to extend their fidelity to a theory of justice into their behavior with parties who seemed to exist beyond the recognized qualities of humanity. A modern example, and a vexed analogy, might be the attempts to secure justice for members of the animal world, say, more specifically, those animals that undergo great suffering for the

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advancement and pleasure of human society. A commitment to justice on the part of humans in this regard would be undertaking action with the goal of extending to animals some degree of self-determination from their subjection to harm or violence. That these efforts often take up the vocabulary of “fairness” suggests that they see it to be a matter of justice, rather than, say, mercy. What troubles this analogy is, of course, the long history of Western thought’s limitations in the application of justice by qualifying and thus narrowing the category of the human, a historical limitation that was produced and reinforced by colonization. In the colonies, and especially in settler colonies, it became possible for humans to exist as objects by which colonial settlers would exercise their fidelity to a principle of justice. Those objects appeared, to settlers who exercised epistemological power, and who controlled the boundaries of justice, less capable of understanding justice and desiring it. They appeared, that is, not to exist on a just and equitable plane of encounter, what we might call neighborliness.

A second qualification to a historically transcendent, universal definition of justice follows the observation that justice tends to be named in its perceived absence. Many philosophers have noted this challenge in forging positively affirmed theories of justice, or in forging a theory of justice at all. Justice, as a named notion, appears to be a positive ideal, but attempts to define it circle repeatedly back to what it is not. Some philosophers have gone so far as to argue that, in opposition to the semantic sequence implied by the amendment of a prefix, injustice conceptually precedes justice, and that it is impossible to define justice positively without recourse to those

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91 See, for example, the summary of these critiques drawn together in Susanne Lüderman, *Politics of Deconstruction: A New Introduction to Jacques Derrida* (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 2014), drawing together and sorting the radical-liberals (Robert Nozick, Friedrich Hayek, James Buchanan), and the communitarians (Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel, Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Walzer), before explaining Derrida’s position that justice best inheres is the acts of deconstruction that aspire to put off as long as possible the foreclosure of the particulars for the sake of the universals (pp. 60-63); see also Amartya Sen, *The Idea of Justice* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 2011).
undesirable conditions. Less forcefully, other philosophers have suggested that justice’s doubly-negative condition demands for its materialization an ongoing, if very difficult commitment to valuing internal difference.

To define justice as a double-negative, as the absence or the movement away from injustice, requires vigilance towards what remains hidden or occluded from the present scope of justice. One under-noted implication of this definition is that justice might essentially resist comprehensive existence in abstraction. The notion of a theory of justice would be an oxymoron. Justice’s interminable oversights continue to frustrate and provoke theorists who would desire such abstract existence and a guarantee of durability across contexts for this fundamental social principle. The matter frustrates practitioners and fabricators of the law, those who acknowledge the non-correspondence of legal principles in ideal justice yet seek to bring justice’s ideality closer to realization by means of law and its guarantor, the force of violence implicit or explicit. Yet one of the fears latent in the legal pursuits of justice would be the unwitting enactment of violence on those currently positioned in the occlusive gap between law and justice, who might, on the margins of justice’s pursuit, experience not only exclusion from justice, but active and violent injustice. Thus, justice appears to be not only not easily transcendent, but also easily unjust in its aspiration to universality.

A third and final qualification to justice’s universality consists in its affective aspect. Some theorists of justice have noticed that not only does justice resist abstraction, but, still further, it also tends, in its negatively defined qualities, to appear to individuals primarily, if not overwhelmingly, in the domain of affect, or emotion. These theorists note that many individuals often identify a feeling of having been excluded from justice, or an intuition that they have

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received an injustice before they are able to indicate clearly and effectively the specific qualities of justice’s abrogation, as well as the process of its effect on them. Sometimes the gap between feeling and knowing is brief, other times great. In some cases, it is infinite, and some people will know, or feel that they know, that they have experienced injustice without ever being able to account for how. If, as I will suggest below, we knew why we were experiencing what we felt to be injustice, we would no longer feel it to be an injustice, or to feel it so keenly. In this process of reflection, we see at least one strong relationship between reason and injustice. Reflective reason can be tool for restoring justice, or restoring the perception of shared and affirmed meaning among a group of people justly organized.

Yet justice’s affective aspect is both a benefit and a liability for those seeking to perfect justice in the world. On one hand, the feeling of being injured energizes reflection on desirable principles of social coherence and alignment. On the other hand, as we will see in section two below, these intuitions and affections are, like all affective experience, historically shaped and not the product of a divinely implanted conscience or the stirrings of natural law. It becomes easy to misrecognize the value of injustice’s affective dimension, to reify the experience of injury and then to summon reason in support of repair. To do so without querying the sources of that affection and the existence of parties beyond the historical conditions that produced that affection, risks potentially reproducing injustice towards those other parties. Such rationalization is a difficult deployment to resist, despite our best and most conscientious intentions.

Colonial settlement, reassessed in light of these three qualifications, poses a unique challenge for perfecting justice insofar as the proximity of parties who do not necessarily share one’s affectively verified attachments to justice tends to disturb the assumptions of a naturally aligned and whole community, assumptions that were perhaps easier to notice before settlement in America. This aspect of settlement needs not be unique to any particular historical setting but its challenge in early modernity coincided with the epistemological upheaval that the expansion of
global knowledge posed for Western Europe.95 Many of those Western European settlers concerned themselves with justice in their encounters with other parties.96 Those in the English colonies who undertook such reassessments of shared principles were already prompted to reflect on the stakes of a shared commitment to justice by their loss of such seemingly durable concepts as a catholic and universal church, or of the divine right of kings. Among the English colonies, those in New England had a special opportunity and obligation to reflect on justice since those settlers were more explicitly interested in producing the Renewals of subjectivity that John Josselyn had observed when he offered, with respect to New England, the following definition, “A colony is a sort of people” (152).97 New England’s settlements were not unique in their desires for justice, only unusually reflective about the formation of a discrete group of people in pursuing that desire.

What then, was justice? What has justice been for these others, distinct, and often opaquely so, in time and place? Justice, for many early modern English, overlapped with positive law less clearly and directly than the norms for justice of the present may have led us to expect. In sixteenth century England, the principles and methods of Common Law guided legal authorities in their decisions to effect justice among English people.98 The Common Law tradition worked against a universalization of justice by offering the English people a sense of historically enduring and upright sense of peoplehood in distinction to the principles of ancient Roman law that reappeared to European legal practice during the late Middle Ages and the early modern

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The English liked to believe that they had inherited a set of traditions and precedents that uniquely guided them, but did not coercively prescribe the justice among nationally participant parties. Such a contrast with the rest of Europe, or perhaps the world, proved especially attractive in the years following the split between Rome and England, loosely informed by the Protestant Reformation. The Common Law tradition assured the English that justice was not yoked to continental European legal methods, and, furthermore, through alternate approaches to justice, English people might grow to see themselves more reliable and united as a people or nation.

In a colonial setting, nationally-resonant justice would be all the more vital in drawing individuals harmoniously together. Approval of laws in colony mattered, as the earliest examples of settlement at Jamestown showed, because without it, English colonies might easily and quickly degenerate into anarchy, starvation and misery. This was so not only because enforceable rules produced necessary action, but also, because those nationally-shared and revitalizing principles could animate settlers facing novel obstacles and their consequent discouragement; a shared sense of justice and nationhood could give them something to live for. This was the case not only at Jamestown but also, for example, at Plymouth, where the prospect of future laws was so important that every passenger aboard the Mayflower was required to affirm, either personally or through their representation by a head of household, that they would go on to make

99 Tomlins, Freedom Bound, pp. 93-132
new laws as soon as possible. Though they had landed at Plymouth in territory not yet legally covered by the jurisdiction of England, their affirmation of a compact was based on the anticipation of future justice and alignment with their authorizing state.

In the Massachusetts colony, founded a decade after Plymouth and learning from its example, legally-verified justice would turn out to be somewhat more desired by the populace, though less easily accessible by law. Law made the elites in New England nervous for at least two reasons. First, law was potentially idolatrous. This was the fear of the reform Protestant theorists of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, and one feature of the dogma that made their Protestantism hot. Positive law, a secular stand-in for divine rule, was necessarily imperfect, but in its tendency to naturalize the principles that gave it coherence, it leaned uncomfortably towards idolatrous reifications of human works of representation, creating what it had sought initially to describe. This was so structurally and to some degree inevitably. Thus, the system installed in New England, named by its historians as New England Congregationalism, favored the oversight and jurisdiction of local governance, the vigilance of civic elders and the town’s church, rather than of a central court, though that also had its uses.

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Complementing this persistent localism was an ongoing practical and ideological uncertainty regarding the sources of authority to wield force in a colony distant from the sovereign whose face appeared on both copies of the charter. Who would ensure adherence to those distant standards, particularly once the king had himself been seized by Cromwell’s army, later to be beheaded? Furthermore, and more particular to the New England colonies, what certainty was there that this king’s authority truly merited allegiance? This uncertainty was heightened by the position taken up by Separatists, forty miles away at Plymouth, who proceeded in their governance on the plausibility that the king had forsaken his side of the divine covenant with God. By what principle was law in these colonies to be legitimated without the king? If not him, then whom? To what embodiment of justice would settlers align their most important decisions? These problems riddled the Massachusetts governance, particularly during the first decade of settlement, a time during which no one seemed to know for sure to what degree they might legitimately invoke the authority of the crown to assert the justice properly.

One hopeful guarantee of justice among English settlers was the plausibility that all, or at least most residents of the colony shared a transformed and consensus-inclined religious Long Argument: English Puritanism and the Shaping of New England Culture, 1570-1700 (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1991).


Winship, Godly Republicanism pp. 39-67 and 111-133.

disposition. This religious disposition and its many qualifying components has been documented, perhaps exhaustively, by historians, social, political, literary and otherwise, over the course of the last century.\textsuperscript{113} Among the foundational aspects of this shared disposition was an attachment to divine justice, the widely shared personal hope that one had been, in the words of theologians such as Calvin and Luther, and in the English tradition, Perkins, Ames, and Sibbes, “justified.” Justification was a basic concept within reform Protestantism, and thus is often quickly glossed in the modern accounts.\textsuperscript{114} Justification followed the original premise of original sin. It named the process of being inexplicably pardoned by God for injuries ineluctable to human nature. To be justified, or to have undergone justification, was not something one could directly experience, nor further still, produce. One did not access justification through acts like baptism or communion, or good works such as charity and alms-giving, as one may have accessed saintliness in the prior religious regime. Instead, God had simply marked one for such realignment with his purity at some time beyond human reckoning. The signs of such ineffectable election were likewise uncertain, but in the New England colonies such signs bore very high stakes, for sufficient proof of justification could purchase entry into the exercises of justice practiced in the churches and towns.

The conversion narrative in colonial New England translated into civic, perhaps even political terms the pursuit of the benefits of spiritual justification, positively considered. This is what earlier historians meant when they named the people of New England as a community of “visible saints.”\textsuperscript{115} Several churches in colonial New England expected their congregants to testify to the individual experiences that had led any one of them to believe that God had chosen him or


\textsuperscript{114} Perry Miller’s \textit{New England Mind}, for instance, though it makes recourse to the concept throughout, only reflects on its definition in two pages, 26-27.

her for inclusion in a future heavenly community as well as the imminent theocracy that the American setting facilitated. These testimonies collated evidence that comprised primarily affections. This was so because affections were not easily induced by human efforts. One could not, according to early modern emotion theory, produce in oneself the feelings such as those described by Thomas Shepard’s congregants at Cambridge. An Edward Hall, for example reported feeling “misery” and an “undone condition” (149); and a Francis Moore, may have thought otherwise, until God revealed “to him that he was miserable” and produced in him still “farther humiliation and sorrow for sins past” (150-151). A George Willows, reflecting on his lack of explicit misery, “thought, oh, if I could but mourn under sin, then I should be happy” (154). A Joanna Sill “apprehended nothing but death and wrath” (15); while Nathaniel Eaton recalled being unrelentingly reminded of “the gall and bitterness” of his unreformed condition” (162). Only divine intervention could produce such intensities, but one could, if one studied, prepare oneself for seeing these conditions, and hope for admission into a just community.116

The American setting was ideal for this sort of exclusive sociality. For one, though settlers would have brought with them legal disciplines, what Tomlins calls “cultural baggage” (69), there was room and requirement to refine those disciplines, since most of their material foundations did not visibly exist and would need building. America seemed also to be emptier and lacking in the distractions that might attract the affections in unreformed Europe.117 Life in America was also difficult, and not always predictably so. Movement to America courted the intensification of high-stakes life experiences, and gave one narratively useful life events, typically unfortunate ones, through which to see the intervention of God. These events included the deep disturbance of

moving across the Atlantic, the loss of family and friends once there; or the difficulty of severe privation and survival in the colonial setting. According to the ever-pliable doctrine that God put those he favored through trial, such events would prove to individuals that God cared enough about them, individually and collectively, that he deemed it valuable to intervene. Such losses, their theology insisted, would remind them of the vanity of all human wills and aspirations, earthly or divine. This sort of theodicy never let an opportunity for despair go to waste.

Narrative mastery emerged as the preeminent skill that signaled justified status. It exercised individuals’ expectations of a likely, but not necessary causal relationship between events. Skillfully aligned, these events would point, hopefully, to the desired condition. Thus, so many of the preserved conversion narratives feature a concluding statement, sometimes provoked by the interrogation of a church elder, regarding the assurance of one’s justification. This was a trick question. The correct answer was never to claim assurance, but rather to signal hope by reviewing cited evidence. One’s mastery of this skill also be seen as evidence of divine favor and thus participation in these rituals required a persuasively performed account and not only accurately reproduced morphology. At Cambridge, for example, a member of Thomas Shepard’s congregation, after studious reflection, would share his or her fabricated account of emotional development, and his or her faith, if not thorough knowledge, that these endured hardships had had meaning. The entire congregation beheld the performance, the elders of the community would adjudicate that performance for its earnestness and sincerity, and then accordingly, grant or deny the applicant membership in the church. For men, this meant


121 Caldwell, Puritan Conversion Narrative.
enfranchisement in civic affairs.\textsuperscript{122} Thus, the conversion narrative, as it has conventionally been understood, drew on the fear of remaining spiritually unjustified and civically excluded. Through smaller acts of experiential justification, of seeking in daily disappointments evidence of divine intervention, one might achieve a socially affirmed realignment.

Not all communities required such performances. Recent scholarship has suggested that these relatively public practices of disclosing emotional inwardness took place in only four or five towns.\textsuperscript{123} But these revisionary literary histories continue to affirm, and indeed intensify, the centrality of the emotionally developmental conversion narrative as it qualified New England settler society. In these revisions, the conversion narrative would participate all the more robustly in drawing together a settler community. The plots would be told not only once in that high stakes and highly visible setting, but rather, all the time, in any context. They were to be iteratively reproduced and refined. The same principle would prevail—one was encouraged to provide causally coherent accounts of inward experience indicative of divine intervention and one did so because these repetitions offered the storyteller greater hope of deriving social affirmation of the likelihood of his or her own spiritual realignment. Significantly, these more frequently shared accounts differed from their more visible counterparts in the lack of a discrete moment of validation. And so, the work of justifying the ways of God among one’s fellow men might go on interminably, and perhaps also exhaustingly.

Both these types of narration disciplined the individual who testified; and as disciplines tend, this too was an experience of power and coercion. The literary histories that have described the conversion narrative’s dynamism in colonial New England society have tended to represent these rituals in a positive light, and scholarship on New England’s discursive norms since Michael McGiffert’s \textit{God’s Plot} tends to have followed his assessment that such talk was not only only necessary (“Stitching together a social network, they had to know who was who and…who was


worth what” (147)), but ontologically liberating (“The release, the sheer relief, the unimagined sense of freedom—in a word, the happiness”). Such historical retrieval has gratified these historians insofar as it countervails perceptions of a severe and repressive New England disposition that have been usefully reproduced by the civic pieties of subject formation in the United States, typically through secondary education. These critics seem to share an understanding that to express one’s emotions is something normatively and unilaterally gratifying. Though earlier scholars of the conversion narrative observed that the stakes of such disclosures might be felt very acutely and unpleasantly, they have understood the pious community to have offered encouragement and affirmation commensurate to the severe social pressure of the performance. These historians believe that the practitioners believed that it was worth it; and the historians seem to believe so, too. Thus, in these studies, the responsibility of Congregationalism in producing these unpleasant disciplinary norms has receded (as has the unpleasantness of the narrative labor), once these stories had been performed successfully. Likewise in recession has been the effect of this dialectic in shaping a peculiar sort of person who would frantically seek in social life to disclose an ontological realignment in order to make good on their accumulations of misfortune, their inchoate intuitions of injustice.

Theorists of modern subjectivity have pointed out how such seemingly elective disciplines can operate politically and coercively, even though they take place marginally to the state’s exercise of force. The belief that we have been repressed, they argue, has made modern normative regimes of social behavior seem to be exercises of freedom. The twenty-first century value, for example, of reproducing Nathaniel Hawthorne’s nineteenth-century caricature of colonial New England’s seventeenth-century repressiveness as a historical fact, however based

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125 van Engen, *Sympathetic Puritans*, p. 7

in archival evidence that caricature may be, is in making quieter normative regimes, especially the affective and discursive ones that emerged during this period, appear by comparison to be exercises in liberation. The liberatory quality of these exercises derives from the tendency to overlook the conditions of ongoing coercion that determined that particular free feeling. New England settlers’ exercises of affective self-disclosure drew, for example, on a historically specific understanding of individual responsibility in contrast with regimes of Catholic discipline based in rote corporeal practice, and from that contrast these iterative practice of less embodied self-revelation could appeared to be attractive, if not pleasurable.\footnote{127} It was not these regimes that produced the condition, in Michael McGiffert’s words, of being “screwed painfully tight” (138). It was, rather, the requirement of endless emotional accounting, which seems less and less, according to revisionist histories, not to have been optional, that comprised a significant part of such painful screwing.

Take, as evidence of the inescapability of those coercive conditions, the story of Ann Needham Hett, the wife of a man who made barrels in Hingham. Hett’s story is interesting for a number of reasons and she will reappear occasionally in the chapters that follow. Ann Needham Hett distinguished herself as a resident of the colony by strangely desiring certainty more than justification, and her violent pursuit of certainty troubled the leadership of the colony keenly enough to require a more sophisticate explanation of her actions than she herself had offered. One member of the Massachusetts Bay Colony’s General Court, John Winthrop, wrote about her in that account book of colonial justice that he was keeping. In his account of her testimony, Hett felt her uncertainty as an unbearable burden, materialized in her children. She attempted to relieve this burden by throwing her children away, and she did so several times. First, into a well; second, into a river. In these acts, she differed from others burdened with despair in the colony. Some narrated it and found in it a desirable experience of forsakenness. Others killed

\footnote{127 Porterfield, Female Piety.}
themselves— took place in early Massachusetts with surprising frequency. Unlike those, however, she could explain her active and rational, if perhaps excessive response to that oppressive condition: “She would give no other reason for it, but that she did it to save it from misery, and withal that she was assured, she had sinned against the Holy Ghost, and that she could not repent of any sin” (391). Her perverse justification offers an opportunity to critique the requirement of narrative in order to participate in the just alignment of a colonial people.

The event of Hett’s testimony reveals different approaches to justifying misfortune. First, Winthrop’s desire to explain such an anomalous and violent act, to give it a cause and a meaning that answered the question “why?” according to his version of proper social alignment, appears in his own act of storytelling. Winthrop drew on Hett’s personal statement and took it further to offer a superior diagnosis—she was not to be trusted because she had always been subject to “a melancholic temper near to phrensy” (391). Second, when she declared her reasons for pursuing certainty, she inverted the conversion narrative’s ordering of the spiritual and material: rather than fearfully confessing her faithful desire for unmeritable justification, she triumphantly declared the works by which she had probably secured her own damnation. And finally, her tendency to try to kill her children in water suggests that the dominant disalignment that produced colonial New England self-consciousness in the first migrants, being severed from their previous political community in England by the Atlantic crossing, had longer-term effects than its appearance as a motif in the narrative’s morphology contained.

Winthrop’s turn inward, his diagnosis of affection by melancholy rather than intellectual grappling restored justice where Hett had pointed out a refusal of divine justice and justification. Winthrop’s turn to reveal the more deeply inward motives that Hett herself did not realize was a

useful narrative strategy insofar as it acknowledged the experience of injustice on her part, the unfairness of the doctrine of predestination, but gave it a better and more rational explanation that left the necessary social and religious orthodoxy intact. Winthrop saw it to be his responsibility to make such interpretations, for in his ability to discern inner motive lay his qualification for the exercise of administrative justice in a colonial setting. To be able to know why someone had done something, the motives and exigencies that produced his or her unjust actions, was, his journal shows, a necessary prerequisite for just administrative leadership, if not justice itself, and in close reading some of these stories to follow, I will suggest the ways that this ideal for justice shored up the exclusivity not only of the settler community, but also the control over which neighbors one would love as oneself, and which one would “deceive, beat and damnify,” until they no longer existed as potential neighbors at all.

The Scale and Site of Justice

The relatively private stories under consideration here don’t do much. Unlike novels, poems, or political pamphlet, some of the more favored texts of literary criticism, these stories cannot be said to have acted on their readers, or any other sort of publics because they did not circulate widely enough to have readers, nor was there much of a public sphere in colonial New England, at least not yet. Nor, as with the more local performances of conversion narratives or sermonic polemics, did they strive to persuade local or intimate communities of anything in particular. Yet it is precisely because they lack great social aspiration that diaries and journals can reveal so vividly the patterns of attention and techniques for organization that are often intimate and intuitive, if not impulsive. Diaries and journals illustrate what seem to be the plainest and most simple of mnemonic acts, an especially vivid resource for reading the patterns of mind among a people whose desire for plainness of style was itself compromised by forces greater than their

130 Adam McKeown, “Light Apparitions and the Shaping of Community in Winthrop’s History of New England” Early American Literature 47.2 (2012):293-319, notes this, for example, yet struggles with the question of the social value of Winthrop’s compositional techniques.
These texts offer material by which to critique the constitution of common sense, and especially, the constitution of a commonly shared sense of justice.

Though a comprehensive survey of diaries and journals might yield rich insight on the broad compositional intuitions on the part of English settlers, this chapter is interested, more specifically, in the encounter between these common-sense aspirations to satisfying order on one hand, and on the other, the tension resulting from an individual’s experience of injustice and disalignment within a regnant order committed to the manifestation of divine justice among a people. The goal of this focus is to reveal how writing, and in particular, how basic narrative acts, grapple with the limitations of human justice. More specifically, I will be reading several passages from the journal of John Winthrop as he attempted to preserve an account of the covenant between God and his specially chosen people. At times, God’s fulfillment of his part of that covenant might be opaque, but Winthrop, who, as frequent governor of the colony, bore unusual responsibility for seeing to the fidelity of the human portion, believed it would be exceedingly important to track that progress anyway. Thus, his entries often treat precisely the seeming impossibility of reaching a just settlement in disputes among colonists, and in doing so strive to organize the known information in a manner that would at least align events into a satisfying account of what had gone wrong. Whereas the conversion narratives exercised by individuals sought to justify God’s direct and individuating work, these anecdotal and largely impersonal narratives sought to justify dissent among individuals, a trickier, more delicate task.

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This section will not offer a comprehensive survey of Winthrop’s diurnalistic practice. This is because his text is quite long and during the two decades he wrote it his style and priorities changed quite a bit. In the first months of Atlantic crossing, Winthrop began to write down his observations in a notebook. When he finished that one in 1637, he started another; when he finished that one, in 1642, he began another; and in 1649, he died. He initially wrote in the style of a mariner’s log, recording his observations, usually about the weather, sometimes about whales, and he made sure, as land approached, to rehearse the script of the smell of the land that, like a garden, reached out to greet him.\(^{134}\) Over the next several years, his observational style would dilate. As hassles increased and refused to stay settled, and as events took unexpected turns, he began to include addenda or rewrite stories he may previously have thought concluded. He began to wait on writing an event and later to recollect its plot in more satisfying completion. These more reliably conclusive stories would, at a later date, fit his expository, perhaps rhetorical purposes. Historians and theorists of history have of course observed that documenting the past often, if not always, comprises an epistemological argument. Given this, Winthrop’s texts demonstrate the variable approach to justice that a settler colony, in his mind, demanded.

This section in particular focuses on several stories that Winthrop wrote in and around 1641. During this time, a convergence of unsettling conditions for the Massachusetts Bay Colony prompted reflections on the relationship between justice and the law. The first condition as the waning of the arrival of large bodies of settlers, the decline of the “Great Migration” that had sustained colonial growth for the prior decade.\(^{135}\) In 1639, Winthrop noted a fear “of a stop in England” (298). In 1640, he noted how “few passengers (and those brought very little

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\(^{135}\) Perry Miller, “Errand Into the Wilderness,” has imagined this moment to be the decisive turn from English into American consciousness on the part of the settler Psyche. *Errand Into the Wilderness* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1956).
money)...so as now all our money was drained from us” (328). He had some sense of the cause, particularly the seeming success of Cromwell’s New Model Army in restoring a better government than that of King Charles I—those ships had “brought us news of the Scots entering into England, and the calling of the parliament, and the hope of a thorough reformation” (341).136

Winthrop had a strong sense of the undesirable effects, too, going on to note that “Others, despairing of any more supply from thence, and yet not knowing how to live there [England] if they should return, bent their minds wholly to removal to the south parts” (341). This upheaval aggravated a general sense of dissatisfaction with the difficulties of settlement endured in Massachusetts at this time, dissatisfaction manifest in a large number of defections from the colony. Some returned to England. “Many,” on the other hand, began to inquire after the Southern parts” (323), Virginia, and rival colonies in the Caribbean, particularly Providence Island, “the Other Puritan Colony”.137 All these posed for Winthrop and other elders of the colony doubts regarding the special favor in which God was assumed to hold New England. The second condition for Winthrop’s reassessment of the law’s relationship to justice was the approaching completion of a revised work of legislation, the “Body of Liberties” that would curb the authority the colonial magistrates generally, and of the governor more particularly.138 Winthrop was vocally opposed to this development, but after Isaac Stoughton had revealed the charter he had hidden

138 This desire for laws appeared with initial force in May 1635, following the first open election; the result was an unsatisfying document completed by John Cotton in 1636 titled “Moses His Judicinals”. In 1638, they revisited the task; in 1641, the text known as “The Body of Liberties” was brought forth. It curtailed the powers of the assistants in favor of more and more detailed legislation. Winthrop saw a stark challenge to his mode of governance; he noted at least two reasons in his journal; first was insufficient familiarity with “the nature and disposition of the people” and with “the condition of the country”; second, that to formalize their laws would coerce them declare, officially, rules that, contra their charter, were “repugnant to the laws of England” (314). In December of 1641, after noting the ratification of the Body of Liberties, Winthrop wrote an eight-point outline for a defense of the arbitrating wisdom of the judges. Among these, he reasons that to strive to systematize all decisions would nullify the necessary “parts and gifts” of the judge, what Samuel Willard would later popularize in a 1694 sermon called “The Character of a Good Ruler”. See Haskins, Law and Authority and T. H. Breen, The Character of the Good Ruler: A Study of Puritan Political Ideas in New England (New Haven: Yale, 1970).
from the freemen, and after the freemen's consequent enfranchisement, there was little he could do about their desire for clear legal procedure.  

In the election of 1640, Winthrop was voted out of the office of the governor, a post he had held for eight of the first ten years of settlement. In 1641, he was still out of office. This meant, at very least, more time to reflect and to write. Writing, Winthrop drew on his familiarity with the powerful effect of plotting in judicial action. Not only, of course, would he have been, a decade into settlement, familiar with the conversion narrative and its social value—he would write one himself in 1637, drawing on a private notebook of personal quotidian observations. Furthermore, in England, after training at Trinity College, Winthrop had served in the Inns of Court as an estates lawyer processing claims of property inheritance, and he would have been at least familiar with the crucial role of the “narrator” in presenting cases to magistrates and judges. And so during these years, many anecdotes that Winthrop composed reveal his desire to persuasively identify a common principle responsible for the disarray of the colony. Among the variety of conditions for this disarray, Winthrop sought to reframe these disorderly episodes with

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139 Winthrop had been voted out of office in 1634 by the initiative of a small but vocal party of colonists, led by Isaac Stoughton, had written a small pamphlet to publicize the fact that the charter no one had seen had indicated that these freemen were to participate in electing the Governor and Assistants. The justifiability and intensity of their disapproval remains a matter of dispute among historians. Most historians agree that John Winthrop had not only absconded with both copies of the Royal Charter, but also, once in the colony, kept the charter hidden from the freemen it was meant to enfranchise. They disagree regarding the merit of Winthrop’s intentions in these acts: some see it as an expression of lingering oligarchy on the part of the early magistrates, particularly Winthrop; others observe, based on the famous “missing clause” that the early magistrates had no obligation to extend the franchise and that they did so evidences their commitment to the terms of the egalitarian covenant. For a summary of these positions, see Michael P. Winship, who generally falls in the latter camp. “Godly Republicanism” pp. 444. On Isaac Stoughton, see Frances Rose-Troup, The Massachusetts Bay Company and its Predecessors (Clifton: Kelley, 1973), pp. 117-127 and Stoughton’s “letter” Proceedings of the Massachusetts Bay Historical Society LVIII, p. 446. On the “missing clause, see Ronald Dale Karr, “The Missing Clause: Myth and the Massachusetts Bay Charter of 1629” New England Quarterly 77.1 (2004): 89-107.

140 Bremer, in his biography of Winthrop, invites us to imagine that this ousted governor spent this time not only writing but also “discussing the new tests God had delivered” (301).

an eye to the place of personal affection within a just society, with an eye towards the consequences of the disalignment of settler’s feelings.

Winthrop’s attention found great attraction during this time to instances where desires for justice conflicted. Consider Winthrop’s account of the repeated rape of the Humphrey daughters at Salem, a clear crime unjustly unredressable because of the still vague condition of colonial penal codes. Though the trial concluded in a frustrating impasse, Winthrop’s record of it concluded with the consciences of the criminals. His story suggested thereby that satisfying justice was not to be found in the refined application of the law, but rather in the movement toward alignment of inward dispositions. There’s no easy way to begin telling the story, for the first statement in such anecdotes typically diagnosed the conditions of the event and set up blame. Winthrop began by noting the proximate residence of the Humphreys and the Fairfields, and the unfortunate neglect of the Humphrey parents: “One Daniel Fairfield…and his wife a lusty young woman, dwelling at Salem near a farm of Mr. Humfrey (one of the magistrates), who much neglected his children…” (370). Neighborliness without the properly pious care of property had caused this crime, he implied, at least in its first iteration—the repeated rape of the two younger daughters of the Humphrey household. The crime continued for over two years after the girls were sent to board at the household of Jenkin Davis at Lynn, victims to the head of that household, and also, at some unspecified time, by their own family’s servant, John Hudson. These girls, Sara and Dorcas were between the ages of six and nine during this time. Though more than usually vivid, these passages were not Winthrop’s most urgent concern—they take up six sentences. He recorded these crimes to note the effects of their discovery, the ten paragraphs of struggle to try to adjudicate them correctly, in light of the legal precedent they would set.

A conflict of implicit covenants unsettled the course of justice as Winthrop saw it. On one hand, English settlers understood themselves to be owed the guarantee of security for the bodies of the female members of their household’s property, a guarantee that the certainty of punishment for rapists would shore up. The “foul” quality of the crime, in Winthrop’s words,
followed the social value of a woman’s purity as a household possession, especially among the
dominant (Humphrey was one of the magistrates), and especially within a colonial setting.\textsuperscript{142} On
the other hand, the men who were charged with a crime understood themselves to be owed due
process, including the testimony of two witnesses; and they were owed this with heightened
urgency in matters of capital punishment, crimes that could result in a sentence of death or
banishment.\textsuperscript{143} The state owed security of property to its households, but also security of access
to just trial to its individuals. But given that these girls had been so young when the crimes had
taken place; and given that there had been no other witnesses; and given that the qualifications
for a capital crime had not yet definitively been set, how was the general court to administer
justice properly?

These questions proved troublesome in their potential to set precedents whose effect
would endure through time and across colonial space. Thus the Massachusetts General Court
proceeded by seeking a wider source of consensus, and solicited the advice of the religious and
civic elites in the neighboring New England colonies, Connecticut, New Haven and Plymouth.\textsuperscript{144}
Winthrop’s account of the proceedings was scrupulous, and he included within his account of the
deliberation a clear list of the questions by which these elites decided on the best course for
justice, and then later he followed up with the responses. First, they queried whether frothage
constituted sodomy (no); second “how far (so far as torture?) a magistrate might go to exact

\textsuperscript{142} Maria Mies, “Colonization and Housewifization” in Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World
Scale: Women in the International Division of Labor (London: Zed, 1986); Louis Montrose, “The
Work of Gender in the Discourse of Discovery” Representations 33.1 (1991): 1-41; and Silvia
Federici, Caliban and the Witch: Women, the Body and Primitive Accumulation (New York:
Autonomedia, 2004); and chapter two, below.
\textsuperscript{143} Haskins, Law and Authority, on the two-witness rule, see pp. 125, 130, 152-153; on torture,
see pp. 201-201; Jane Kamensky, Governing the Tongue: The Politics of Speech in Early New
England (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1997) discusses the social attitudes towards speech in
which the two-witness rule made sense. On banishment, see Nan Goodman, Banished: Common
Law and the Rhetoric of Social Exclusion in Early New England (Philadelphia: Univ. of
\textsuperscript{144} Robert Oakes, “Defining Sodomy in Seventeenth-Century Massachusetts” Journal of
Homosexuality 6.2 (1981): 79-83; Richard Godbeer, “‘The Cry of Sodom’: Discourse, Intercourse,
and Desire in Colonial New England” William and Mary Quarterly 52.2 (1995): 259-266; Edgar J.
McManus, Law and Liberty in Early New England: Criminal Justice and Due Process, 1620-1692
(Amherst: Univ. of Massachusetts Press, 1993).
confession (yes, sometimes); third, whether the “two-witness” rule was always necessary (most of the time); and fourth, whether “presumptuous sins,” such as the desire and the anticipation of committing a sin merited capital punishment (sometimes) (372). The Massachusetts General Court, possessing now a little more guidance regarding how to proceed in the future, sentenced Fairfield, Jenkins and Hudson not to execution or to banishment, but to fines and stocks. Yet Winthrop, and its likely not only Winthrop, seemed dissatisfied in this regard, so he noted, in his account’s last sentence, that a subtler collective sense of justice endured intact, that they “acknowledged their sins to be greater than their punishment” (374). More enduringly than the list of still vague guidelines regarding the administration of justice, Winthrop sought access to another individuals’ experience of conscience in signaling the avenues for realignment. 

Winthrop believed that the consciences of convicted sexual predators mattered in the realignment of a community’s sense of justice. But what if only a few people bothered to ask these men as they sat in the stocks whether they felt they had received justice or not? If the alignment of individual affections within a community was to matter, such alignments needed wider publication, and Winthrop’s intuition of this requirement animated the story he composed next, a story that magnified the visibility of guilty conscience and made its value for an entire colony clear. Like the prior story, this episode featured the difficulty of administering justice through law. And again, it featured the effects of proximity among English settlers in determining and circulating affectively verified knowledge of justice and it’s lack. Yet Winthrop saw that this episode might have even more value in encouraging the ongoing alignment, or desire for alignment, among English neighbors. His composition, though it drew on his unusual access to the interior affections of his constituents, endorsed a perspective shareable among settlers, a perspective attuned to the inner and often secret experience of one’s neighbors.

One Sunday morning, Winthrop began his narration, a young man in Boston named William Hackett decided to skip church. The requirement of practiced and willful alignment appears in Winthrop’s introduction of his composition of the crime by noting the boy’s errancy
from that crucial site for the gathering and sympathizing of neighbors. What was Hackett doing instead? Copulating with a cow. Animal-human intercourse was qualitatively different from the crime that had come before, but its trial and punishment foundered according to similar principles. Until the defendant admitted his crime, there were insufficient witnesses to prove the event had taken place. The cow could not testify, and only one person, Hackett’s next-door neighbor, had been present to observe the event. Unless Hackett admitted that he had engaged in a crime that almost certainly merited capital punishment, he could not, according to the court’s commitment to due process, justly sentence him. Thus, how fortunate it was, from Winthrop’s perspective, that Hackett eventually confessed.

In Winthrop’s telling, however, though the boy had skipped out on church, his occupation of another civic space, the jail, and his proximity with a “very godly man,” the jailer, produced important confessions that would have been valuable for the congregation and the town to witness. From this jailer, Winthrop secured evidence that, like the pedophiles at Salem and at Lynn, this young bugger really was sorry, and that, though he had been “very stiff in his denial” during the trial, later his “hard heart melted,” in earnest (374). Though Winthrop, always keen to discern a confessional fake, may have held suspicions toward the courtroom performance, as he was, for example, in the trial for the revocation of the banishment of John Underhill, it was precisely the limited circulation of Hackett’s jail cell testimony, its futility aspiring to do anything, that testified to its truth value. Such knowledge distinguished Winthrop from his frequent opponent in the court, Richard Bellingham, who was then governor and who had “doubtful of the evidence” even after the confession and thus, “refused to pronounce the sentence” (374). Earlier I noted that the memory of corporeal Catholic saintly discipline would have made the discursive disciplines of reform Protestantism appear, by contrast, to be exercises of freedom. Yet here, that sense of freedom drew for its persuasiveness on a more proximate

145 John Murrin, “‘Things Fearful to Name’: Bestiality in Colonial America” Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies 65 (1998): 8-43. Bradford too wrote about the episode, though much more tersely: “a very sad spectacle it was” (356), and he made a show of his reluctance towards writing about it.
contrast with coercion, the possibility that one might now justly, perhaps also legally, be subjected to torture in jail, and it was this fear that would have produced in Congregationalist settlers a deeply felt fealty to quotidian acts of alignment such as attendance at events like church meetings or public hangings.¹⁴⁶

Finally, Winthrop intuited, as he concluded his composition with the event of Hackett’s hanging, that such spectacles could have civic value in restoring the desirous alignment of settlers, in widely reproducing in them the desire to always be understood by one’s neighbors to be pious and upright. Consider the balance between the beginning of Winthrop’s story and its conclusion, how the public spectacle of the gallows matched the private spectacle of neighborly vigilance. Winthrop literally framed his description of the crime according to Hackett’s house’s window and his neighbor’s nosy gaze: “He was discovered by a woman, who, being detained from the public assembly by some infirmity that day and by occasion looking out her window, espied him in the very act” (374). Note that Winthrop felt obliged to justify this woman’s own truancy, an intuitively attentive explanation that implied a normative disapproval towards anyone who simply might not feel up to such collective settings. Those who recall Foucault’s retrieval of the newspaper accounts of the beheading of Damiens the regicide will recognize how Winthrop’s attention to public attendance at the gallows suggests the disciplinary value in such events, not

only as a public warning to those who might consider engaging in crimes they imagined to be private, but also, more unsettlingly, as a public warning to those present that ideal justice required the diminishment of privacy from the vigilant neighbors, an intensification of the stakes of the more general confessional Congregationalist mode.  

This mode of inwardly attuned justification could operate on the scale of the globe. Winthrop found the opportunity to exercise that capacity that same year when the Massachusetts Bay Colony lost one of its most valuable mariners, Capt. William Peirce. According to the story Winthrop later composed, reason for the loss could be traced to the eagerness of a group of defecting colonists to get to Providence Island, and to get there in such a hurry that they insisted their captain lead them directly into danger. Their eagerness for material comfort provoked an antagonism between two systems of governance, an antagonism that produced the death of Captain Peirce in a firefight with Spanish privateers. On one hand, were the norms of maritime law, in which the captain’s authority over his ship was sovereign. On the other, there was the persistence of the antithetical proto-democratic Congregationalist principle that a good shepherd take stock of the will of his flock.  

Torn between his better judgment and knowledge of the Spanish Caribbean on one hand, and on the other, the desire of these unhappy colonists to get to Providence despite warnings of Spanish ambush, Captain Peirce, according to reports that Winthrop synthesized, chose to listen to the people over whom he had been given charge.

Focusing with something like poignancy on the details like the “sail and shrouds,” like the captain, “shot through,” Winthrop, who was then facing a crisis of constituent confidence, found the story fascinating. Winthrop composed this story with detail rarely invoked in more local

148 Breen, *Character of the Good Ruler*.
149 Winthrop’s sense of the crises is implicit in the epistolary exchange between the respective governors of Massachusetts and Providence Island. In 1640, Winthrop received a letter from Lord Say and Sele, in which the latter harshly critiqued Winthrop’s mode of governance. He also cited the attractions of the Caribbean colony, which was doing quite well after experimenting with crops like tobacco and sugar cane. Both governors would have known that their ability to invoke authority through recourse to the royal charter would have been in jeopardy in the anti-
testimonies, detail that is all the more curious given that Winthrop was nowhere nearby when it took place. What, he may have wondered, was the justice that God had seen in so precise a death—Peirce was one of only two to die in that firefight. Winthrop sought justification for this death by turning away, to a different and more local story. Winthrop did not write about Captain Peirce immediately, and perhaps, given that the event had taken place so far away—Providence Island was further away from New England than England was—he planned on not writing about it at all. He reframed the vexing loss of the New England mariner, and probably his personal friend, as an opportunity for personal discipline.

Winthrop recollected the death of Captain Peirce in concluding a strange and more local story of neighborly desire the story of Bridget Peirce, the captain’s wife, and her preservation from a potentially disastrous house fire kindled by her fastidious love for a piece of fabric. At stake in the conflagration was a desire for worldly comforts and her memory of England—a former neighborhood, another island, a better life. At a time when the colony’s depopulation threatened its existence, Mrs. Peirce’s immoderate nostalgia, similar in its reprehensibility to the defection of an entire town, could now appear as a small but emblematic injustice and obstinate disalignment, exemplary of a colony-wide failure to live up to an agreement with God. Winthrop, like Hobbes, knew that God worked in mysterious ways. And though Hobbes, at least, would later conclude that one could not effectively contract with God, Winthrop understood the covenant with God to

monarchical, sympathetically reformist Cromwellian climate. Popularity, not only success in popular election, but a present and agreeable population meant more than it typically had for Congregationalist doctrine. Say and Sele criticized Winthrop’s theocratic mode more or less directly when he provoked him to “consyder seriously, and let our frendes thear be Judges betwene vs, wheather this be not a taking of godes name in vayne to misapply scriptures in this manner...by assuminge (for that must be granted you) that thear is the like cal fr om god for your goinge to that part of America and fixing thear, that thear was for the Israelites goinge to the land of promise and fixinge thear.” When Sele pointed to the horizontal, egalitarian sociability of “friends” to act as “judges between us,” he intimated that Winthrop would not be able to govern if the people did not want to be governed by him, if they would rather submit blank ballots or depart altogether, adding theological insult to injury by suggesting the heresy of “misapplying scripture.” Winthrop Papers IV:264; and Journal pp. 324-325.
undergird the possibility of justice in America. Yet a sense of enduring injustice permeated his telling, unfairness perhaps that those proto-democratic Congregationalist ideals should have demoted him from governorship, and should likewise have led to the death of so valuable a supporter of the colony as Captain Peirce. These similarly sourced sense of injustice inflected the moral of the story that united Captain and Mrs. Peirce across their discrete plot arcs, and it manifests itself in the severity with which he took the opportunity to reprimanded her in his writing, the harsh, perhaps vengeful spirit of his conclusion that it was good that her parcel of fabric burned, since such a loss would prepare her for the death of her husband not a long time afterward.

Winthrop would write many, many anecdotes in his journal. Among the many, these few from 1641 distinguish themselves for the vivid glimpses they offer into the struggles to restore justice alongside law’s limits, and the reparative value of recognizing the priorities at stake. In composing these anecdotes, Winthrop demonstrated one way of enacting his famous premise that deep affection would secure necessary compromise between justice and mercy. Thus, deep affection, the possibility of fellow-feeling, undergirded the conclusions of these stories in scenes of pathos and regret, scenes of touched consciences with widely-reaching value. Making patent those typically hidden conditions could restore the alignment of the people where civic and state institutions could not. Indeed, the requirement or obligation to have feeling bore the burden of the affective consequences of the state’s decision to prioritize property-holding individuals over those they possessed.

In doing so, these stories affirm the historians’ insights that perspective, even sympathetically inclined perspective, implies coercion. For Winthrop, history’s power was to assert knowledge claims, and in doing so to produce harmony, or, in Winthrop’s words, harmonious love. But love has been a dissembling word in these histories. Sarah Ahmed, in her


discussion of the cultural politics of hate and love, has observed that love—in this archive, neighborly love—claims universal solvency only after it has excluded certain subjects from its realm of recognition. That such exclusions might draw on reservoirs of hate to reinforce their boundaries will be the object of analysis briefly in the final section below and in more detail in my final chapter. For now, note simply that these stories provide closure and alignment by setting up a narrow sympathy available between particular subjects. These privileged subjects, historians have revealed, tended to be English, tended to be male, and when possible, tended to be better born, as with Winthrop’s demonstrated sympathy for Richard Bellingham after the then-governor refused to pronounce Hackett’s sentence. These stories represent as natural and intuitive sympathy that would enact the balance between justice and mercy. Meanwhile, justice for the sake of the Humphrey daughters rather than for the sake of preserving the integrity of women and children as property appears just as absurd as justice for the sake of Hackett’s cow, since their realignment into the community mattered significantly less than that of these men.

A global challenge to justice, however, troubled Winthrop’s accounting of the colonial conscience. Captain Peirce’s death seemed to some degree to resolve that disturbance. Winthrop recollected that story of Atlantic scope when he began to write a more local story about simple and straightforwardly English longing. Little disturbed his composition of substituted loss.

Little, however, but not nothing. Winthrop’s writing, in general, had been keen to preserve moments when divine intervention seemed too bizarre to deny (a cat that ate a baby; a mouse that ate heresy), but what was bizarre about this Bridget Peirce’s story, in Winthrop’s telling—that is, what required explanation and justification by recourse to divine plan—was not that the parcel of linen had burned, but that only the parcel of linen had burned, and not the entire house and everyone in it. Since that unlikely salvation had use, in Winthrop’s telling, to encourage reflection and realignment, Winthrop saw little need to justify or account for the cause or

153 Winthrop cited, in a later dispositional diagnosis, Bellingham’s “melancholic” disposition (376).
154 Michelle Burnham, *Folded Selves*.
155 On Winthrop’s cat and mouse, see *Journal*, pp. 341 & 72
motivation of the fire itself, which was started by a black slave in the Peirce household, an unnamed woman who had probably been purchased in exchange for natives captured by the New England settlers during the Pequot War, clearing space for neighboring English households and the systems of labor they comprised. One way to not be neighbor, in other words, and not to merit egalitarian love and sympathetic inquiry, was to be a household possession. Likewise, the "goods to buy cotton" on board Peirce’s ship, the Desire, are excluded from neighborly recognition. Because administrative justice cared deeply about the unit of the household; and because those households were to reconcile to one another according to the affective condition of the landowning head, Winthrop did not concern himself with the possibility that this slave’s actions might be justifiable, that she might be engaging deliberately in arson in pursuit of her own sense of justice.

These stories showcase the norms that administrators like Winthrop, even emotionally sensitive administrators like Winthrop, brought to the activities of negotiating with newer, stranger neighbors. And administrators like Winthrop, as will become evident in chapter three below, were among the more merciful of the settlers, since they knew that compromise, at least for the time, was highly useful for the health and prosperity of the early colony. The commitment to neighborly love, a balance of justice and mercy—among the English—depended on an attunement to particulars, especially openness to affective condition, yet when tasked to reflect and act on justice beyond the colony, however, the civic leaders of the New England colony tended to understand justice less as a matter of individual nuance, and more a matter of fidelity to an abstraction, more and more amenable to ideas of natural law rather than social relation. To turn

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away from particulars, as we will see, made it possible to refuse to acknowledge someone nearby as a neighbor.

Who Isn’t My Neighbor?

Justice as alignment circumvents the question of justice as vengeance, the redistribution of harm among obstinately uncompromising parties, and this justice would require recourse to abstraction, something like natural law. “Otherwise,” as William Bradford put it, “it” a divinely overseen order of things, “would raise war” (300).\textsuperscript{158} This is the exclusivity that quietly distinguished New England’s approach to local justice from their relationship to non-English in their vicinity, and it is what binds the New England settlers’ idea of justice to that of later settlers, such as those ideas composed by a later governor, of a former colony further south. In his \textit{Notes on the State of Virginia}, Thomas Jefferson, while aligning into catalogues all the known objects of what to his mind had the potential to be a utopian state, found the opportunity to assert the future, fearful realignment of one obstinately unjust condition—the derangement of the white disposition produced by their weakness for not working, an indolence and extremity that slavery enabled.\textsuperscript{159} Jefferson’s prose, however, remained agitated by a condition he knew to be unjust, yet he refused to identify justice, in his final account, as a relationship between human parties, and instead emphasized, through techniques of personification, a relationship between powerful whites on one hand, and on the other, an abstraction.

Jefferson’s abstraction, of course, was God. He qualified God by pointing to his best attribute, justice, but since Jefferson did not believe in God quite so desperately as, say, Winthrop’s Hett did, he went on to focus on white peoples’ relationship to justice, in which he

believed quite earnestly.\footnote{Julian S. Waterman, “Thomas Jefferson and Blackstone’s Commentaries” \textit{Illinois Law Review} 27.6 (1932): 629-659; Ari Helo and Peter Onuf, “Jefferson, Morality, and the Problem of Slavery” \textit{William and Mary Quarterly} 60.3 (2003):583-614; and Bernhard Fabian, “Jefferson’s Notes on Virginia: the Genesis of Query xvii, The different religions received into that State” \textit{William and Mary Quarterly} 12.1 (1955): 124-138; and Arthur Scherr, “Thomas Jefferson Versus the Historians: Christianity, Atheistic Morality, and the Afterlife,” \textit{Church History} 83.1 (2014):60-109.} It was this relationship that terrified Jefferson, and caused him to tremble. He observed that this divine personification was, for the moment, in 1782, asleep. That personification pushed further away the responsibility putatively borne by those in power to pursue justice actively, and through that personification, Jefferson speculated, for the thrills, perhaps, on what waking justice might look like.\footnote{Jonathan Elmer, “The Archive, The Native American, and Jefferson’s Convulsions” \textit{Diacritics} 28.4 (1998): 5-24; Matthew Cordova Frankel, “‘Nature’s Nation Revisited’: Citizenship and the Sublime in Thomas Jefferson’s Notes on the State of Virginia” \textit{American Literature} 73.4 (2001): 695-726.} This version of justice appears infrequently in accounts of first English settlement—and almost never in accounts of justice or injustice within the colony. Yet despite its minimal explicit presence, it was an aspect of justice perhaps most frightening to the English precisely because that too, the “reversal of fortune” pertained to the concept of justice—it was the exclusive relationship that undergirded exercises of harmony within the colony.

Justice as harmony and justice as reversal of harm, or vengeance, were not incompatible in New England in light of the fact that harmony and fellow-feeling required for those settlers an explicit drawing of boundaries (narratives of justification) that would determine eligibility for civic participation. Hobbes affirmed a similar premise when he observed that there could be no justice or injustice in the state of nature because in the state of nature there was no contract, no minimum threshold of civic binding.\footnote{Hobbes, \textit{Leviathan}, pp. 79-88, esp. pp.81.} Justice, negatively defined, was anything that did not violate contract. Most settlers in New England, especially those in the first decades, did not have the opportunity to read Hobbes, and at any rate, they would probably have disputed his position on the grounds of the universality of their God’s justice, applicable in any context. Yet that universality would be tested in the colonies, and a quiet difference in emphasis distinguished their
justice as it was practiced domestically from the way they exercised it across the walls of the colony. If there was to be a transcendent justice, it would not, they imagined, be possible to rely on the mercy or the lenity of the unjustified native people, or those insufficiently attuned to the search for divine justification. From these other parties, English settlers could expect nothing but a straightforward “reversal of fortune,” one likely enacted in what they called war. Potential for this reversal qualified their experience of neighborliness, and helps us understand how it is you might come to be excluded from that category.

The frightening potential for reversal appears spectrally throughout the colonial New England archive, and has prompted queries into the relationship between settlement and its psychic obverse, horror or uncanniness, that would later go on to take the form of haunting in the literary imagination.\(^{163}\) The New England colonists’ inwardness and sensitivity finds a dynamic complement in the proprioception of victimhood, grievance, and, more and more in the New England colonies, the prospect of being hunted. Such a disposition endures, if poets like Robert Frost are to be trusted, into modern acts of borderly-neighbor-making, which take as their first motive in his canonical poem, “Mending Wall,” not proper relationships among land-inheriting English speaking men, but rather, “the work of hunters,” which is “another thing” (33).\(^{164}\) The New England settlers tirelessly reflected on the experience of feeling hounded, either by consciences or by external parties, though only little explicit evidence of paranoia endures.\(^{165}\)

Take, for instance, Winthrop’s refusal to speculate on the potential arson of Mrs. Peirce’s slave, and his tendency rather to attend to the more recognizable persecution of Spanish


privateers because in that case, English reform Protestants knew, according to the script rehearsed by historians such as Bradford, that they were the justly aggrieved party. On the other hand, given that another black maid had recently been accepted into the church at Dorchester, having provided proof of her own likely justification by God, Winthrop would not have known precisely what the proper relationship was or was to be between white slave-owners and the human labor they had purchased and now thought they owned. What properly aligned place were they to have, not only in the households of New England, but in New England at all? Such presences quietly disturbed the harmoniousness of New England society. Winthrop noted the fact of Isaac Stoughton’s black slave’s “sound testimony”, but did not reproduce it, just as he avoided even approaching an explanation, sympathetic or otherwise, of the accidental act of the black maid of the Peirce household. The oversight seems not to be deliberate, but this is no exculpation of Winthrop or his slave-owning peers, since it testifies to a deeper-seated and intuitive exclusion of these parties from the English affective covenant.

To be fair, though, the English had cause to fear each other, too. This would appear with much less frequently in archives like Winthrop’s, in part because that fear that Hobbes described, fear of living in a place without laws and recourse to justice, would have reminded these settlers how urgent it was to work cooperatively past the reasons for suspicion or fear. Yet occasionally fear appears, as when, for example, Winthrop noted how William Hackett’s neighbor waited until nightfall to emerge from her house and to report her neighbor’s frightful behavior. Little asides, such as noting that “being affrighted at it, and dwelling alone, she durst not call to him, but at night made it known” (374) reveal brief glimpses of the implicit violence that was evidently possible to enact among so socially disciplined a polity. Neighborliness, in moments like these, was not certain guarantee against acts of violent obstruction of justice, retribution, or simply random harm. Sympathy emerges as a technique not only for future tattle-telling, but also as a technique for defense and fortification, for it was this woman’s ability to sympathize with the

166 Winthrop, Journal pp 347.
young man, to imagine his sense of the undesirable consequences of his discovery, perhaps even its unfairness, that led her to imagine, frightfully but fruitfully, the lengths to which he might go to act retributively or preemptively. The casualness of Winthrop’s aside suggests, too, that such paranoia was to some degree normal among these English.

A sense of extra-legal unfairness was most enduring in the relationship, tenuous though it was, sustained between English settlers and those beyond their colony. This unpleasant sensation of uncertain grounds for justice had troubled English since those at Plymouth had first debarked. As my introduction showed the experience of vulnerable visibility had disturbed the English Pilgrims, and that they may have experienced such vulnerability as an injustice is suggested by the level of detail, sometimes repetitive, that Mourt’s Relation brought to the descriptions of the bodies and the behaviors of Massasoit and his contingent at the first treaty between the English and “their next bordering neighbors” (52). Such a desire to maintain control and to prevent reversal produced in the English, first at Plymouth and later at Massachusetts, the inversion of ideal policy to be exercised within and without the walls and palisades. Winthrop would insist in 1630 that among settlers, a balance between justice and mercy be exercised as neighborly love. Seven years earlier, however, it was mercy and extremity that they had exercised among the native people—particularly when Captain Miles Standish tortured a messenger Massachsuett with the promise of violence like what he had administered to Wituwamat, threatening him as they kept him captive in New England’s first prison. Then Standish told the unnamed messenger to observe English mercy in letting him free, and to pass on to his people his knowledge of the “extremity” of English commitment to justice. The English rationalized this behavior in their uncertainty whether native people, their new potential neighbors, could understand justice. But it was also, as I will suggest in a brief digression, because their recourse to extremity with external neighbors followed an intuition that their claim to

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neighborliness proceeded on tenuous grounds, precisely because their favored template for neighborliness seemed to foreclose a claim to territory as the condition for divine and transcendentally loving care.

Though the Jeffersons and the Winthrops and the Bradfords of early American governance seem to have found the prospect of reversal deeply unsettling, the prospect of reversal is a foundational condition for one of the most persistently misread narratives of the Western tradition, the narrative that Winthrop invoked in his reflection on ideal neighborly behavior. When the student of the law followed up on the first question to the Biblical prophet regarding the attainment of eternal life, he asked a very valid question, “who is my neighbor?” He received a trick answer. The answer has often been misread because the misreading provides moral guidance that is much easier and more gratifyingly empowering than the prescribed relationship it overlooks. The prophet answered the lawyer’s query with a short narrative. The story began with an act of inexplicable violence: A man from Jerusalem walks to Jericho. On the way, a group of robbers rob him. Three passers-by pass by. The first is a Priest, a man occupying the highest office of religious leadership among the Jews to whom the episode was being shared. The second is a Levite, another office of legal and spiritual leadership, following that of the priest. The third passer-by on the road between Jerusalem and Jericho was a Samaritan, a man belonging to a different city and a different people, with no obligation to the victim. Meanwhile, most readers, including Winthrop, have understood the victim, given his starting point, to have been a Jew, the object of violence and mercy remains unidentified throughout. The goodness of the Samaritan consists in the pity, or fellow-feeling, that moves him to immediately address the wounds of the victim; to offer money to a local innkeeper for the injured man’s care; and to visit him later, to check in on his health and the innkeeper’s bill. The narrative exemplifies neighborliness as movement by interior feeling, and that movement’s translation into action. Who, the narrator asked the lawyer, did he think the neighbor was? The neighbor was not to be defined.

by geographic accident, but rather, to be defined by his ability to transgress that territory’s habits, and this behavior has emerged as the ideal path to merit eternal life.

The possibility that behavior (here, care) could achieve for an individual such an eternal reward ought to have tipped off the Calvinist predestined to the misplacement of interpretive attention, but for a people willing to deny agency to their will, such oversights as this gratifying empowerment might be rationalizable, if not, say justifiable. By the time that the story concludes with so clearly emulatable and undeniably prosocial action as that of the now beatified Samaritan, readers typically seem to forget that the way to eternal life consisted, before the story’s start, not in being a good neighbor, but rather in loving the neighbor as one might wish to be loved. This is to say, love the neighbor unconditionally, despite the prejudice one may have borne towards those of a different country, nation or people, and even after one had been stripped of everything including one’s national identity. If neighborliness is to be transcendent, it must first endure this violation of earthly attachments and bindings.

In a colonial setting, this sort of separation from a place and a people was both legally and affectively unbearable. Legally it was untenable according to those Common Law norms whereby one’s claim to land required “manning, planting, [and] keeping.”\textsuperscript{169} Required, that is, placing people stably and permanently on that land, reproducing their ways of life through institutions like the household, the magistracy and the church, and making sure that those people and their institutions endured. If the English engaged in such behavior, as theorists of colonial settlement such as John Cotton speculated, then they would flourish.\textsuperscript{170} To lose this, to lose territorial claims to personhood like the man on the way to Jerusalem did before his neighbor appeared for desperately needed love, was a frequent fear of early settlement. That loss was at stake collectively not only in the swift and elided mortality that the Plymouth settlers, like the

\textsuperscript{169} Tomlins, pp. 21-192.
Massachusett natives they first encountered, had endured.\textsuperscript{171} It was also at stake in the removal of settlers in 1640, back to England and away to Providence Island. Deterritorialization of the earlier inhabitants, foreclosed neighbors, was what had cleared the ground, so to speak, for the validity of later English claims, evident, for example, in the abandoned house of Sagamore John that Winthrop found on the six-hundred-acre plantation that he was granted in 1631.\textsuperscript{172} This edifice, like the many such abandoned homes that Winthrop and Bradford had witnessed in \textit{Mourt’s Relation}, were warnings to English about their own urgent foundational premise.

But territory is not only an epistemological tool, it is also a political discipline, affectively distributed.\textsuperscript{173} It has been so since at least the early modern era.\textsuperscript{174} And the prospect of reversal in their relationship to territory would have frightened these settlers very much. It is possible, for example, that such an ongoing fear produced their attraction to the impersonal separation from land that the conversion narrative would feature as its repeated motif. It is possible, also, that such a fear was on Winthrop’s mind when he posed so neighborless a threat as shipwreck to be the metaphorical consequence of not successfully and harmoniously sharing fellow-feeling among other English settlers (294).\textsuperscript{175} It is also the fear that animated Winthrop to compose a short story, one of the few personal anecdotes in his notebook about putatively impersonal colonial affairs. It suggests the necessity of producing and affirming an exogenous hostility, someone who was almost certainly, to English intuitions, not a neighbor, in order to ensure the attractiveness of a Christian charity that would bring settlers closer together emotionally so that their material distinctions might remain intact.

It is a story of nearly perfect narrative cohesion, save that Winthrop did not explain why, in the episode’s first sentence, he had gone out after supper one night. Perhaps the

\textsuperscript{173} Stuart Elden, \textit{Terror and Territory: The Spatial Extent of Sovereignty} (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 2009).
\textsuperscript{174} Stuart Elden \textit{The Birth of Territory} (Chicago: Chicago Univ. Press, 2013).
\textsuperscript{175} \textit{Winthrop Papers} II: 282-295.
burdensomeness of the discourse of self-disclosure was getting to him; perhaps he wanted exercise his limbs, or perhaps to exercise the gun skills that he had denied himself in England; or to exercise something like vengeance on the wolves or other creatures that were not neighbors because they did not realize what a fence was for, who “came dayly about the house, & killed swine & Calues, &c” (56). Whatever the reason, it got dark too quickly, and then began to rain, and Winthrop now found himself dependent on that remaining edifice, the “abandoned house of Sagamore John” (57), which may have reminded him uncannily what it must have been like to get waylaid on the road to Jericho, and require care and hospitality.

Thus briefly dependent on the assistance of unknown neighbors, Winthrop noted his personal experience of the condition of vulnerability and persecution that the English understood themselves always to have been enduring when an indigenous woman walked by, and insisted violently that she deserved access to the house, too. As she beat the walls of the little house, she revealed that she did not recognize commonly accessible laws of land claim and forfeiture, and, still worse, in her persistence, revealed that she did not understand what a door barred shut was for, either. Property emerged, affirmed, as the condition for neighborly love. The class-transcending brotherly affection that Winthrop had prescribed on his Arbella sermon appeared in the conclusion of the story. Both in her denial of the validity of walls, on one hand, and on the other, in the affectionate respect paid by Winthrop’s servants—who were at this point very likely still indentured laborers, and who anticipated someday to own their own land, and becoming neighbors in their own right—hallooing through the night for his arrival. The restoration and alignment of affection for such property emerges as the order of things that alleviated the fright of justice’s momentary reversal.

Averse to contemplating his temporary reversal, Winthrop understood the native woman as excluded from neighborly recognition because she herself did not recognize the proper

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boundaries and alignments that would produce, among a people, neighborly harmony. Towards those parties, one need not exercise neighborly love, but simply a commitment to abstract justice that was, with a little theorizing, self-evident in nature. This commitment to justice aligns with one of Hobbes’ first theses on the natural law, that in the state of nature, self-interest ruled, and towards those beyond the commonwealth’s founding contract, to “deceive, beat and damnify” was not an unjust course of action. And though the English commitment to that ideal might, as will be evident below, make at times make unpleasant demands on the colonial people and their governance, those sacrifices would make all the more desirable the claims to superior knowledge and exercise of transcendent justice.

Native people were not incapable of understanding English justice, of course. The potential for bringing to them Europe’s ideals for justice—natural justice, divine justice—was one justification for colonization. Often in his writings about making agreements and promises with those beyond the colonial commonwealth, Winthrop seemed open to the possibility of engaging with natives on shared ground. In his descriptions of Miantonomo, for example, an English ally and friend who will reappear in chapter four, Winthrop deemed him “very deliberate and [he] showed good understanding in the principles of justice and equity” (409). Though they were of a “cursed race,” as the magistrates of Connecticut, New Haven and Aquiday speculated, nevertheless an alliance with them was securable through “justice and kindness” (341). Such openness has been read as openness to alternate modes of understanding alignment among a people. Yet with respect to justice, these assessments bear a self-congratulatory tone in their assertion of success in naturalizing European norms for justice. Native treaty partners became evidence of the transcendence, or at least lossless translatability of those concepts. Yet a little bit of discomfort emerges when these white settlers were asked to practically trust in indigenous peoples’ grasp of justice. This is evident in their behavior towards legal disputes, especially with regards to capital crimes, that involved settlers and native people. English settlers were ready to

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177 Waswo, “The Formation of Natural Law.”
try native people in English courts, and sometimes they even granted these defendants what looks like mercy in their acquittal for being not as familiar as English were with the nuances of English law. But English seemed, on the other hand, averse to the prospect of a reversal—to the prospect, in other words, of indigenous people forcefully executing their vision of natural justice.

Such uneasiness intensified their claims that justice, if there was to be justice between two discrete political parties, was not to be tied to the specific qualities of their relationship, but rather, in nature itself. This justice was more American than its native inhabitants, and through their exercise of natural principles, English came to understand themselves to authoritatively command both populations. This is the yield of an unfortunate incident that took place beyond the boundaries of Massachusetts’ jurisdiction, and that should, therefore, have belonged to the Plymouth colony to adjudicate. After Thomas Peach and some of his companions, Thomas Jackson and Richard Stinnings, and one other who, in Bradford’s words, “scaped away and could not be found” (298) were charged and found guilty of killing a Narragansett for no reason, the people of Plymouth, “some of the rude and ignorant sort murmured that any English should be put to death for the Indians” (300). Yet the Plymouth government was loath to do so. Their reluctance intimated an at least nominal split between elites’ grasp on justice and that exercised by the masses. Though these common English have been vindicated by literary historians for adopting populist and grassroots relationships to power, negotiating and distributing it among themselves, it is also these parties, as we will see in chapter three below, that saw themselves to be privileged in deserving a distinct code of behavior.

Bradford himself seems not to have been immune to this centripetal sympathy. Like Winthrop, he cared deeply about the conscience and causal conditions of his sympathetic Pilgrims. Even after the sentence had been pronounced, a sense of regret and unfairness lingers...

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in the accounts written by both governors. Bradford took time to illuminate young Peach’s prior condition. He was a “lusty and desperate young man” who had run away out of idleness and also because he “had got a maid with child.” These were reprehensible misdeeds, but the rehearsal of Peach’s domestic dissension qualifies and lessens the gravity of the murder, places into a catalogue of other, somewhat less grave offenses. Both Winthrop and Bradford acknowledged that Peach had behaved with great fidelity for the English colonies, that he “had been one of the soldiers in the Pequot War and had done as good service as the most there, and one of the forwardest in any attempt” (299); Winthrop went one step further and noted a more personal loss that Peach’s execution constituted: “Two of them died” like Hackett, “very penitently, especially Arthur Peach, a young man of good parentage and fair conditioned, and who had done very good service against the Pequods” (261). Such attention, like the turn to the regretful moods of Hackett, Hudson, Davis, or Fairfield, would seek to realign the subject who committed the crime back into the fold of the elect.

This practiced tribute to the universal principle elegized known particulars. These narrative remainders would be buried, for the time being in these narrative’s recourse to transcendent ideals of justice, which, like the territory, was universally accessible and universally demanding. Both Winthrop and Bradford insisted in their accounts that these decisions were being made for the sake of justice as an abstraction, unmoored from the experience of the offended agents. Winthrop wrote that “the whole country here were interested in the case, and would expect to have justice done” (260), and in his insistence on avoiding the knowledge that the natives themselves desired justice writes a sentence in which it is unclear who is actually desiring justice. Bradford would take up the same vagueness, though in his personification he came close to suggesting whose justice is at stake in these acts of historiography. Reporting on Massachusetts and Plymouth’s back-and-forth regarding responsibility for the crime’s jurisdiction, Bradford wrote that the Massachusetts “pressed by all means that justice might be done in it, or else the country must rise and see justice done; otherwise it would raise war” (300). Neither governor identified the Narragansett people desiring justice; they were, simply, the country. Both
men grieved the intuitive wrong of losing young Peach and his partners by diminishing the particulars of the situation, the natives’ desire for justice, into the universal that nature would ensure. As with Jefferson’s natural god, justice would take place, eventually, but not for the sake of the alignment of the offended parties, but for the sake of justice itself.

These passages illuminate how easily elided justice’s requisite boundaries might be, elided in order for justice to appear so transcendent as to not need naming. Scenes like these help historicize justice in its ongoing agon with the law, and they suggest a fuller understanding of the endurance of settler colonialism into the present. Colonial New England, so finely attuned to intuition and affection, need not be exceptional in this regard, only usefully exemplary of what Derrida, in his 1991 lecture, hoped to reveal as the obligation of deconstruction to praxis across the boundaries that separate the academy from the polis, and the polis the world. North America, Derrida suggested with unusually specificity, would be an unusually productive site for unbinding work. For deconstructive theory, then, North America names the blind spot that attracts theoretical activity to extra-theoretical life, or at least life that would seem to exist beyond theoretical reflection. And it upon this distinction, that a more just version of justice might depend.
CHAPTER 2: Houses of Shame

The following chapter argues that an experience of emotional ambivalence, an affective impasse most vividly visible as shame, defined and substantiated the experience of gender in an early modern settler colony. To do so, the following three sections will reread the oeuvre of Anglo-America’s first published poet, Anne Bradstreet. The first section will describe a general ambivalence toward self-expression evident in her work; the second will note evidence of an unease specific to the work of writing verse; and third, suggest that the shame that permeates both these helped define personhood in its full and limited varieties in colonial New England.

Bradstreet’s work, scholars have noted, vividly registers the challenges of thinking, writing and laboring as a woman in a patriarchal social order. In attending to Bradstreet’s recognition and publication by these men, recognition that was exceptional in its seemingly favorable outcome, these critics have underestimate the general condition of misery that her verse preserves, and the relationship between that misery and the emotional prescriptions of New England colonial settlement. It is true that Bradstreet possessed an unusual education and an unusual access to public visibility relative to other women of her time and place. But her quotidian experience as a woman in the English colony would not have been drastically different from that of other women, and thus her verse can illuminate some experiences of antagonism and hostility that were more widely shared by women of her time. This chapter shows how the themes that her oeuvre stresses—violence, pain, and shame—represent more broadly the techniques by which settler colonial discourse made use of women’s emotional labor in order to fortify the perception of affectionate emotions as natural phenomena. Such affective reification, particularly in moments of shame towards ineluctable failure, strengthened settler individualism. Shame, in other words, verified the potential of civic recognition.

Within the scope of the dissertation, this chapter clarifies the social value of emotional self-representation in the colonial context. This chapter demonstrates that in this setting,
emotional discipline functioned as a political technique and this discipline sometimes lay at odds with the aspects of expressive work that contemporary critics tend to see as liberating or progressive. In colonial New England, self-disclosure was a civic discipline; it took different forms contingent to the parties involved; these practices of relational disclosure shaped ideal subjects in a new political context. Settlers were encouraged to attend to their affections diligently, an attention to individual proprioception that was to be circulated and shared. Such attentiveness sought to discern divine intervention on the scale of the individual soul. Yet in that aspiration to immanence, English settler emotional discourse tended to move towards discarding or disavowing the antagonisms and hostilities that made such sensitivity to affection and fellow-feeling necessary. Most of these hostilities, as my introduction suggested, in some form or another followed the experience of fear. In some cases, as will become evident with Bradstreet, this fear was less immediately explicit. Yet Bradstreet’s sensitivity to the unpleasantness of emotional self-disclosure drew on the foundational love for walls explained in the first chapter. Recalling how those walls mediated and preserved the conditions for fellow-feeling will help clarify why and how shame affected New England settlers in general, and women in particular, and Bradstreet exemplarily; will clarify how shame could be useful in achieving a greater and more valid sense of personhood. Finally, shame reappears in the chapter to follow, where shame’s circulation between fathers and sons renewed the horizontal social feeling known as the “generation.”

Within the field of American studies, this chapter will clarify how normative prescriptions for emotional life drew on and intensified the experience of gender in the colonial setting. Few texts in this archive, particularly those of the first decades of settlement, were written by women. Thus, Bradstreet has become an easy exemplar for the experience of all women in the colony. Recognizing this tendency, the readings to follow will note when an experience that Bradstreet’s work represents would have been commonly shared, and when it may have pertained most to a woman in her position or relative eminence. I begin with a suggestion somewhat dissonant within existing historical accounts of New England civic life, and especially of women’s place therein. I
suggest that a woman in colonial New England may not have wanted to disclose her feelings as often as she was expected to do so. Second, I will take this historiographical iconoclasm one step further to suggest that for an educated woman in colonial New England, writing verse may often have felt more like a burden than a gratifying opportunity for expressive freedom. Finally, I'm going to suggest that Bradstreet's ambivalence toward emotional expression in general, and verse representation more specifically, derived from her intuitive recognition of a situation that was awkward at best, and cruel at worst, a cruelty exacerbated by the colonial context. She may have recognized that she drew pleasure and satisfaction from performing allegiance to a structure of feeling that limited her access to personhood. This intervention will cohere around a close reading of one of Anne Bradstreet's strangest couplets, the fifth and sixth lines of her "Verses Upon the Burning of Our House, 1666."

Before that reading, however, consider the following qualities of her verse's context, and the implication of the production of that verse into domestic politics. Anne Bradstreet was born in England in 1610. Her father, Thomas Dudley, served as a steward in the household of the Earl of Lincoln, the same household where the Bradstreet family met Anne's future husband, another laborer in the household, Simon Bradstreet. This was in 1622, when Anne was twelve years old. Six years later, in 1628, Anne married Simon, and two years later, in 1630, both households, the Dudleys and the Bradstreets boarded the Arbella to participate in the founding of an English settlement in America. Bradstreet began writing poetry, evidently, at some point within the first decade of that new life. Much of that poetry self-consciously drew on the education that she had taken advantage of in the household of the Earl of Lincoln. She often strove in that verse

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179 Lauren Berlant, Cruel Optimism (Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 2002) describes as cruel situations in which subjects find that the objects of their own desire actively obstruct their own flourishing.
182 White, Anne Bradstreet, pp. 54-56.
to place herself within a recognizable intellectual lineage. In one of her earliest poems, for example, she drew on elegiac conventions, mourning the death of Sir Philip Sidney, and therein taking the opportunity to highlight her families’ descent from so eminent a English literary personage. As these manuscripts circulated within a limited readership, they would have shown off and complemented the status of her household in the new colony.

Bradstreet’s exemplarily disciplined domesticity bore transatlantic value for the leadership of the Massachusetts Bay Colony. In 1649, Anne Bradstreet’s brother in law, Thomas Woodbridge, took her manuscript of poems to England and published it in London with the title, *The Tenth Muse Lately Sprung Up in America*. The early American canon tends to remember Bradstreet for her later, unpublished verse, the verse that is shorter and more directly personal. Yet the *Tenth Muse* poems, typically longer, and less intimately vivid, would, the settlers’ elders hoped, have well-represented the English colony to the metropole. In England, her verses would secure status for the colony as they had for her family among neighbors and friends. Through publishing her verses, New England’s settlers might prove that despite the possibility of becoming wilder and less civilized on the frontier of settlement, the English language and the intellectual erudition it could transmit were not being lost in the new world, a technique, as scholars have noted, useful in shoring up the superiority of English claims to nativity. After a preface, *The Tenth Muse* began with a long poem about natural history; a longer poem about ancient

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geopolitics followed; then a treatise about the relationship between colony and metropole, elegies to several renown European figures (Sir Philip Sidney, Queen Elizabeth and French Protestant poet Guillaume du Bartas) and, completing her knowledge of emotions, history, politics and theology, a devotional piece on the Hebrew King David.\(^{188}\) There were moments in the collection of awkward and explicitly avowed imperfections, but her thematic ambitions, her obvious erudition, and her ultimately pious ambition would have flatteringly represented the best of English character that settlers strove to renew in their removal to America. Because Bradstreet was a mother, her verses could also represent the transmission and reproduction of that character. If the event of Anne Hutchinson’s antinomianism was a phenomenon produced by early Atlantic print culture, so was Anne Bradstreet, only with more explicitly positive content.\(^{189}\)

Yet throughout her verse, she turned relentlessly to themes of antagonism and pain, often drawn together in scenes of violence. Her attention to those qualities, especially when they took place outside of explicitly political settings (the state, the monarch), and irrupted into quotidian experience, preserves the political relevance of her oeuvre, even the later verse. The bifurcation of her verse into “early” and “late” (or “published” and “unpublished”; “impersonal” and “personal”; even “long” and “short”) has a solid foundation—her later verse was not published within her lifetime; it avows explicitly personal content; and indeed, as a whole, is markedly shorter than the earlier verse.\(^{190}\) Yet certain continuities persist. Even though she would be explicit in her later verse regarding her own experience of bodily debility, pain, and corporeal humiliation, her early verse is remarkably sensitive to these experiences on the part of others, and suggests that these themes were enduringly a part of her perceptual frame. In her natural


\(^{190}\) For an example of this bifurcation, which most studies of Bradstreet understandably take up, see Agnieszka Salska, “Puritan Poetry: Its Public and Private Strain” *Early American Literature* 19.2 (1984): 107-121.
histories, for example, she personified the four elements and the four humors, which allowed her to frequently describe hostility and aggression among women who called each other “sisters.” She described the effects of offense and shame as they were experienced corporeally. In her political history of four ancient monarchies, she described, often in great detail, the suffering of violently wounded bodies, often drawing on the same vocabulary (“the rack”; “on his knees”) that she used metaphorically, to describe her own pain. Her later verses would describe the cause of pain much less directly, in part because her body, in her understanding, was not weak because of aggression, or warfare, or martial strategy. Yet her attraction to stories that narrate the causes of pain in the published verse, and her relentless desire to make her own pain useful, typically devotionally, suggest that she sustained an ongoing interest in what worldly conditions and factors might be responsible for individual domestic suffering. A broader frame for reading her may thus helpfully illuminate the degree to which Bradstreet understood the individualizing effects of larger social structures into which she had not elected to participate, yet whose consequences she suffered.¹⁹¹

The Politics of Truth

The poem at hand well exemplifies her subtle attentiveness to aggression and coercion. Initially, it seems to avoid those themes. In the “Verses Upon the Burning of Our House,” Bradstreet narrated the memory of watching her house burn. She described the struggle to overcome the grief of irreparable losses in an environment characterized by privation and dearth. Critics have often read this poem as an expression of resistance to the ideology of patient and humble endurance and affliction that was encouraged, exhorted, and at times mandated by the Congregationalist doctrine.¹⁹² These critics reveal how Bradstreet’s sustained invocation of grief

¹⁹¹ Carole Pateman The Sexual Contract (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1988) has broadly described the phenomenon that Bradstreet would have experienced.
dilates the emotionality whose control, and occasional suppression Calvinism's New England variety would encourage. This poem, however, and in particular, the fifth and sixth lines, work antithetically to both that ideology, and its straightforward resistance. Thematically and stylistically coy, these verses reveal the countervailing emotional disciplines latent in New England's settler pieties. These lines make a show of what they do not explicitly show. They hide in plain sight a recalcitrance to Congregationalist confessional culture, a culture whose political qualities revise common sense understandings of settler colonial feeling, especially as it took place in New England.

Early in the poem, a moment of confessional dissonance signals Bradstreet's perplexity and ambivalence. The moment concludes with the observation of the existence of desire. What is the object of this desire? Standing before her memory of standing before a burning house, Bradstreet wrote that “the fearfull sound of fire and fire / Let no man know is my Desire” (236). Several not entirely distinct experiences of desire appear here. Objectively first, yet compositionally last, is the possibility that the poet desired that the fire in front of which she recalled standing continue to burn. The possibility that she may have actually wanted this, and the significance of that possibility for accounts of settler colonial affective disciplines, will be the object of analysis in the last section below. The second desire is one that, in the poet's eyes, belonged to others, perhaps especially to men. This desire was the desire to know what her desires were. The third desire, which appears first in that second line, was possibly a two-part desire. The poet desired that her readers know that she knew they wanted to know her desire. Corollary to that, she wanted readers to know that she did not want them to know what her desires were. This is a more complex representation and making visible of desire than has

the Gendered Discourse of Affliction in Anne Bradstreet’s “Here Follow Some Verses Upon the Burning of Our House, July 10, 1666” Legacy 27.1 (2010): 1-22. Giffen draws on Scheick’s account of a “logonomic” structure in what is probably the most sophisticated account of Bradstreet's ambivalent subject-position in colonial New England. This account differs from Giffen's in two major ways: first, in focusing on effect of emotions in particular in producing subjectivity; second, in contextualizing that feeling in a broader account of Congregationalism's coercions and violence.
typically been understood, both in colonial New England studies in general, and in Bradstreet's verse in particular. Baroquely, she articulated a complex mode of human striving, and in doing so signaled ambivalence that she probably experienced more widely and persistently than the occasion of this past event's recollection. Her ambivalence comprised the knowledge that she earnestly desired affirmation from a patriarchal society that limited her access to full civic participation.

In the work of unpacking her representation of power and its effects on her desires, it seems prudent to refrain from too forceful a claim about the truth of Bradstreet's personal, individual desire, and more prudent instead to focus on her attempt to represent that desire satisfyingly within her social context. This goal seems prudent because Bradstreet's description of desire in that passage shows an intuition that the discovery and representation of desire in general, and of women's desire in particular, organized power in her society. In this passage, Bradstreet put forward a concise, and very dense aspiration that the fact of her attempt to represent desire might stand in for a detailed explanation of the desire itself, a desire that remains patently cryptic. Her use of the couplet form supports this: its first line offers a premise that depends on the second for completion, fulfillment, or synthesis.\(^{193}\) Thus, the explicitly named object of her desire ("the fearfull sound...") recedes in importance to the sophisticated mediation of the perception of desire. Furthermore, she concluded the couplet and the sentence by naming desire as desire, that is, as something that she may have wanted in the present, but something that was more interesting in its lack than in its consummation. As a witness to this desire, she pointed to "man." She may have meant men specifically, or humanity more generally, though

given her frequent attention to the condition of women throughout her verse, the former possibility remains active.\textsuperscript{194}

The Congregationalism that drew together the ideal habits of life for New England settlers took a special interest in the experience of desire, and this interest would have affected women acutely.\textsuperscript{195} Congregationalism names a civic structure through which reform Protestant communities in America gathered around their church, and there enacted their commitment to renewing piety and to distinguishing themselves from the corruptions of political life at the level of the state.\textsuperscript{196} Their civic discipline depended centrally on local rituals of consensus.\textsuperscript{197} These rituals guided their aspirations to make piety praxis. These rituals were administered by churches that claimed autonomy from those of nearby towns, though the elders of each town consulted deeply and often with those nearby.\textsuperscript{198} These rituals distinguished New England from old, and for most congregations, centered iterative practices of emotionally charged self-disclosure. These practices included legal testimony, bearing witness, and even execution day apologies.\textsuperscript{199} The best example of this was the conversion narrative.\textsuperscript{200} Though historical accounts debate the ubiquity of the practice as a threshold for participation, the fact of the practice in less formal

\textsuperscript{194} Alice Henton, ““Once Masculines...Now Feminines Awhile”: Gendered Imagery and the Significance of Anne Bradstreet's The Tenth Muse” New England Quarterly 85.2 (2012): 302-325.
This phrase belongs to Sacvan Bercovitch, The American Jeremiad (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1978). Though he describes, primarily, sermons, those made sense in a discursive context that included a wide variety of speech acts.
settings, across the towns, in quotidian life, seems to remain undisputed. These were practices required from everyone, but affected settler English differently, primarily across boundaries of gender.

Bradstreet understood this; she recognized that sympathetic discourse and emotionally-charged self-disclosure exemplified the “new” in “New England.” This distinction appears most explicitly in Bradstreet’s work in the poem she composed describing New England and Old as a daughter and a mother, coming together in a dialogue regarding the ailments that afflict the mother. New England’s half of the dialogue is energetically tasked with sympathetic fellow-feeling, and task is prosodically rendered. New England’s half of the dialogue not only expresses explicitly the desire to know more about her mothers’ ailments and their causes. This typically took place by asking questions. But Bradstreet’s New England took advantage of the form of the verse dialogue, cleaved in strophes, suggesting a desire to feel across the verse boundaries that distinguished them, and the Atlantic Ocean that these boundaries obviated. New England’s first set of lines concludes with the subjunctive possibility that “she may sympathize” (141); in her second set of lines, she represents herself as dependent for livelihood on England’s attention, not material but discursive, to England’s relief, New England insists, “she is bound” (142). My prior chapter demonstrated that such acts of fellow-feeling typically shored up the control of that boundary by at least one agent. Here, the fact that it is New England that seeks to sympathize suggests the ultimate desire for distinction from her progenitor.

The gender of this relationship is not a coincidence. The inclination to sensitive fellow-feeling exemplified here distinguished women from men, and this is one of the most important conditions that made the category of women so vital for the civic dimension of New England settlement. Women, because they were perceived to be more naturally permeable to affection,

emerged as examples for men to learn the vocabulary and the discourse of deep feeling.\textsuperscript{202} Medical discourse since at least as early as Aristotle or his critic Galen, had been fascinated by, and vibrantly disputed the best and most accurate causes for women’s enduring susceptibility to affective fluctuation and influence.\textsuperscript{203} Bradstreet would very likely have known these theories.\textsuperscript{204} And thus she may have understood the connections between these theories and the status she occupied, as they are now evident to contemporary literary historians.\textsuperscript{205} Women found themselves in American to be personas crucial to the disciplinary heart of New England’s success as a settlement.\textsuperscript{206} Women would have modeled what it was like to really experience affection. But while men, on one hand, learned feminine sensitivity as an exceptional accessory to normative personhood, women were expected to be affected always and only, naturally.

What’s more, because the experience of divine affection was one that would always produce a sense of self-loathing and shame on the part of individuals towards their ultimate helplessness to effect salvation in the afterlife; and because women were understood to be more affectable by the sinful obstacles to salvation in this life, women’s truths were expected to be more straightforwardly shameful than men’s. Speaking truth, of course, was never easy. Reform Protestants didn’t tire easily in searching for evidence of the illusory power of scripts and false performances.\textsuperscript{207} Confessional performances, across contexts, were collectively judged for the presences of mere formalism, and often the stakes were high, such as membership in a church,

\textsuperscript{204} Lutes, “Negotiating Theology.”
permission to live within a settlement and for men, the ownership of property and suffrage.

Thus, shame was one of the most relevant affections that men learned to perform through watching it take place in women. And when women did not express shame, they appeared as most frightening to the secure order of things. Take, for example, the case of Ann Needham Hett, who intensified the insolence of infanticide by avowing, in explanation, a shameless perversion of Calvinist logic: if human existence were a period of supremely abject uncertainty about the state of one’s eternal existence, then the certainty of damnation she might achieve in her murder of her children could secure for her some degree of peace, and on her own terms. The case would have frightened fellow settlers furthermore because of the responsibility, spectacularly violated in this regard, for the moral and physical safety of children that would be, in the colony more and more normatively ascribed to women.

The most dynamic example, of course, remains the trial of Anne Hutchinson for the sin of antinomianism—for claiming access to a higher law, for spreading that sin through acts of unsupervised hospitality, and still further, for responding to the representatives of law and legitimacy, during her trial, with insolence manifested in the selective refusal to speak. The story has been retold vividly elsewhere; historians have uncovered its manifold aspects, such as its threat to a nascent theo-political order, for its threat to the civic community, understood to be

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comparable, perhaps even indistinct from an epidemic;\textsuperscript{213} how her performances of intellect made strategic use of silence and speech.\textsuperscript{214} Furthermore, because of the similarity of their first names, and because they are virtually the only women to appear substantially in the early New England archive, these two women have been amply compared.\textsuperscript{215} The publicity both received as print phenomena, however interests me here in its value for the New England leaders.\textsuperscript{216} Publishing Bradstreet, less than a decade after the \textit{Story of the Rise and Ruine}... would have represented settler womanhood in a redemptive light. In this sense, the Anne Hutchinson phenomenon would have helped produce the conditions that made desirable the Anne Bradstreet phenomenon. But not only in this sense. For the publicity of Anne Hutchinson would have had effects among the men and women of the colonies, too. Her trial and her banishment would have produced a fear among women in the Massachusetts Bay Colony, that they too might overstep social boundaries in what their own use of logic told them to be the proper exercises of piety, that what they thought was rational and useful for spiritual edification would turn out to be not only incorrect, but criminally so.

Shame would have been the proper disposition for women such as Anne Hutchinson and Ann Needham Hett. And men were particularly drawn to manifestations of such shame as a template for their private performances of piety, such as the shame studiously cultivated and famously preserved by Michael Wiggleseworth in his diary. In that document, he elaborated in great detail the sinful quality of his desires and actions; he described often the consequent feeling


\textsuperscript{214} Kamensky, \textit{Governing the Tongue}; Gustafson, \textit{Eloquence is Power}.


\textsuperscript{216} Field, “The Antinomian Controversy.”
of abjection and self-loathing, and he drew on rich figurative language to represent his desire for divine intervention. Like John Donne had in his meditational verse, Wigglesworth iteratively posed his desire for God’s spirit to violently penetrate him and replace more immediate corporeal desires. Such desire represents in miniature the caricature of repressiveness often attributed to this community of settlers. The point of shame, his text shows, was not to destroy desire, but to preserve it, and to use the memory and vocabulary of unacceptable desires as vehicles to understand the proper desires that ought to replace them. It would be bad enough to live in sin, still worse to desire it. But worst of all was not to want—that is not to believe in—the power of sin and divine purity at all. Historians have for some time debated on whether Wigglesworth’s abjection was an anomaly or exemplary of the New England disposition posing as antithetical a culture of self-expression with a culture of disciplined repression. Yet what Bradstreet’s verse will show us is that these two movements are not mutually exclusive, but help shape each other, as Foucault suggested in his History of Sexuality. Shame powerfully shaped the robust culture of expressive affection in this colony, and affirmed the ideal and necessary allegiance to the new settler regime.

Bradstreet’s relationship to her writing represents the more general double bind that women experienced in Congregational New England. Women were expected to always be shamefully desirous of something—either to desire something sinful or to desire correction from that sin. And, in confessing that desire, that is, in confessing their affection by objects in the

world, they publicized the ineluctable sinfulness that men expected from them. Furthermore, they
would not be able to achieve full recognition of personhood in their towns, qualified by suffrage, or
ownership of the land. Yet they were nevertheless expected to participate exemplarily in this
emotional self-disclosure. This is the political double-bind that Bradstreet seems to have been
negotiating in those lines, the unwilled position outside of political recognition, yet informing the
access that others had to it. In these lines, Bradstreet insisted that she was disclosing desire, but
insisted also that desire was complicated, objectively and contextually. One way to paraphrase
the line would be as follows: “I minimally want you to know that I have at least one desire, but
more importantly, I desire that you didn’t know what my desires were.” Of course, that’s clumsy
and might cause, potentially, some offense were she to say so directly to the men in her life.
Verse could mitigate these risks. Verse offered Bradstreet the opportunity to reveal such desires
more decorously, although such labor could like likewise, as the next section will show, be a
source of enduring ambivalence.

Bradstreet’s Misery

Despite the social challenges that she understood to attach to her position as a female poet, she
persisted in writing, and its persistence suggests Bradstreet probably found composing verse to
be a worthwhile experience, at times. Her recognition of disadvantage is amply evident in her
work, as is her aspiration to thematize those challenges, and make them part of her
representative labor. 222 Take, for example, her prologue to the Tenth Muse manuscript, in which
she gently mocked the gendered conventions that would have diminished her work’s reception—
she knew, she wrote, that if her verse proved any good, “They’l say its stolne, or else, it was by
chance” (7). Critics have noted her mastery of litotic performances, and her awareness of the
challenges that she faced. In her prefatory remarks, for example, she alluded to the querelles de
femmes tradition, a mocking enactment of a “war of the sexes.” She drew intellectual credibility

222 Eileen Margerum, “Anne Bradstreet’s Public Poetry and the Tradition of Humility” Early
from her familiarity with that mode, despite the fact that it placed the dispute between the genders on terrain over which men claimed ultimate power. More subtly, she seems to have taken pleasure in occasionally mocking the discursive grandiosity of which men were capable, as when, for example, she juxtaposed the long and drawn-out dying speech of the last Persian king Darius with that of his accidental audience, a lost and thirsty Greek soldier (104-105). After suffering a mortal wound, Darius held forth on his desire that the new Greek king Alexander enjoy health, and a long rule, and a happy family, and reliable counsellors, and expressed his disappointed desire that no one would hear his dying words as his blood soaked purple the hid of his fallen steed. And then the footman asked if the king had any water he might share.

These are moments of quietly evident gratification. They sit distinct from the conventional ambitions of Bradstreet’s literary critics, who have labored to prove, somewhat anachronistically, that Bradstreet was drawn to lyric verse for the opportunity offered for emotional expression. This seems to be a much less simple claim, though, than most accounts tend to acknowledge. Its complexity derives not only form the likelihood, explained above, that a woman like Bradstreet would have engaged in emotional expressiveness in a much less enthusiastic manner than simple models of expressive freedom comprehend. Furthermore, the lyric subjectivity upon which these critics have built their arguments did not, in 1651, exist. What seems more likely was that Bradstreet understood verse to be a useful genre through which to represent her disciplined erudition and labor, and useful precisely in evading the expressive trap of sentimental performance ubiquitous in quotidian Congregationalist social life. Verse composition allowed her

to participate in an intellectual and historiographical tradition, and if Bradstreet had to be saddled with the burden of ineluctable emotionality, it was in verse that she could make such over-determination useful, as is evident in her complex treatment of the Greek monarchy, as we shall see below. In this regard, Bradstreet’s formalism, particularly her use of heroic couplets, an established verse tradition, fortified her claim to intellectual participation at English letters’ transatlantic frontier.

But if verse empowered her, the labor of writing it often wore her down. Americanist critics, and the early American pedagogical canon more generally, have tended to undervalue Bradstreet’s early verse for her fidelity to formalism, for her apparently uninspired commitment to prosodic conventions, particularly that couplet form.226 This too is a double-bind that women’s expression and in particular, women’s verse production, would have encountered.227 In Bradstreet’s case, it is a double-bind with its own disciplinary history. Bradstreet’s first major champions in the middle of the twentieth century sought for her a place in the early American canon according to the literary hermeneutical priorities of the moment. This was the New Criticism that valorized the lyric, expressive mode, what Northrop Frye would describe as the “utterance overheard” that expressed the individual subject’s hidden depths of feeling.228 Thus, they emphasized her representation, especially in the late poems, of her capacity to represent deep and identifiable, sympathetic emotion. Scholars since these midcentury theorizations have critiqued the gendered norms built into Frye’s approach, and these critiques would suggest that Bradstreet’s publication and republication has taken place, since at least the seventeenth century,

226 Lousia Hall, “Anne Bradstreet’s Innovative Errors” summarizes the literary historical devaluation of Anne Bradstreet later verse, but her own vindication of Bradstreet’s later verse extends this rubric in another guise, arguing for the latter verse’s value according to its failures, what it does not do well.
on an essentially disadvantageous terrain. Even such a late and putatively expressive poem such as the "Verses upon the burning of our house," doesn't easily fit into the model of "utterance overheard."

Bradstreet's commitment to form in her early poems tends to disappoint literary critics searching for a robust expressive subject. Yet their disappointment bears value, exactly because it points out what they read as an unsprightly, labored quality in those early long poems. Their disappointment usefully points out precisely that writing verse is intellectual labor, or at least, that it has been since at least John Milton, Bradstreet's near exact contemporary. During and after the English interregnum, an anticipated revolution that that precipitated John Woodbridge's ambassadorial return to England, the labor of thinking and writing about the experience of personhood would have taken on greater significance. The colonies, and in particular, the value of virtuous womanhood in those colonies was a dynamic factor in bringing together a sense of nationhood out of those intellectual exercises. Such exercises depended also more fundamentally on women's labor insofar as women often were tasked with the responsibility of maintaining the household of men such as Edward Taylor, John Fiske, Benjamin Thomson, and, in England, John Milton—and in his case, the actual work of writing the verse down. Literary historians who critique the "laboriousness" of Bradstreet's lines inadvertently remind us of her unremunerated and typically unacknowledged household labor—labor that included teaching morals, language, and natural and political history, the content of her education and her verse to her husband's children.

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233 Robert Hilliker, "Engendering Identity: The Discourse of Familial Education in Anne Bradstreet and Marie de l'Incarnation" *Early American Literature* 42.3 (2007): 435-70; Pattie Cowell comes close to signaling recognition of labor, though the term hse gives to such labor on the part of...
Can it be any surprise then, that Bradstreet often felt weak and exhausted? Weariness and the depletion of strength emerges as one of the most repetitive themes of her work, and scholars who seek to vindicate her errors as a signal for her status as a feminist pioneer lose the opportunity to query the conditions with which she struggled.\(^{234}\) The content of the trauma of the house fire was, recall, the night-time’s restorative sleep. Rest is the sixth syllable of the poem, and rest was what the fire interrupted so unpleasantly. Likewise, almost all of the late poems describe human life’s vulnerability. Often the vulnerability she observed was her own. But it also frequently was that of her children and grandchildren, specifically the several who died in infancy, “Elizabeth Bradstreet, who deceased August, 1665, being a year and a half old” (186) or her namesake, “Anne Bradstreet. Who deceased June 20. 1669. being three years and seven Moneths old” (187) or “Simon Bradstreet, Who dyed on 16 Novemb. 1669. being but a moneth, and one day old” (188); or even her “Daughter in Law, Mrs. Mercy Bradstreet, who deceased Sept. 6. 1669. in the 28 year of her Age” (188). As with the poems describing her own weakness, the logic of the poem follows a pattern that aspired to make sense of seemingly senseless suffering.\(^{235}\) In almost all of these poems, she sought to transform suffering, loss, and the underlying recognition of human mortality into a more robust understanding of the effects of the divine on the human.\(^{236}\) But if these poems truly represent her depth of feeling rather than simply rote performances of sadness, as her elegies for public figures had, then it stands to reason that

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\(^{234}\) Louisa Hall, “The Influence of Anne Bradstreet’s Innovative Errors” \textit{Early American Literature} 48.1 (2013): 1-27. As late as 2013, the appearance of such vocabulary as “pioneer” in the first sentence of a Bradstreet article testifies to the endurance of settler colonialism as the foundation through which to champion a woman’s writing. See, on this habit, James Merrell, “Some Thoughts on Colonial Historians and American Indians” \textit{William and Mary Quarterly} 46.1 (1989): 94-119.


the attempt to reach that personally affirmed theodicy would have been tiresome affective labor indeed.

Elsewhere, the debilitating effects of the intellectual labor of making sense of disorder would appear in her verse as the irruption of the context in which she wrote it. This is best visible in her conclusion to the third of the four monarchies, the Greek. After nearly twenty thousand lines surveying nearly a thousand years of history she described the difficulty of completing that ambitious work by pointing to her bodily suffering, and explained it as a woman’s unfitness for the task.237 She wrote that she planned on quitting (135-36). This she reneged on. She returned to the verse later and completed the history of Rome, the last section of the four-part history. But that section appears significantly abbreviated—no single strophe lasting more than sixteen lines. When she gave up on that monarchy, too, she also pointed to her suffering body, “my pains” (140) and explained her weakness, again, as one implicitly following her weaker intellectual capacities, “the subject large my mind and body weak” (139). From the standpoint of the present, the idea that a woman might be unfit for intellectual labor because of her gender can seem hardly worth taking seriously. But what of the possibility that a woman might earnestly feel, at least some of the time, unfit for intellectual labor because of her experience of sexual difference. It is quite likely that, given her small and conservative society, that she would have understood her experience of gender as a limitation and a disadvantage.238 In other words, that these passages drew on tropes of women’s incapacity for intellectual labor does not meant that intellectual labor was not actually a struggle, and that living as a woman actually did make her work writing verse difficult.239

239 Though Abram van Engen’s optimistic account of the Bradstreet’s use of sentimentality to “engage in cultural politics” sensitively documents the emotionality that Bradstreet is could rarely afford to be shy about, it relies too much, I think, on an unreliable overlap between feeling and being, understands Bradstreet to be interesting only if she is always in control of the uses of her
It was not only the work of writing verse that exhausted her, but the resonance between the content and the context that wore her out. The places in which she interrupted the course of the verse to point to her debility often were places where women’s labor was either violently taken advantage of, or where the consequences of that appropriation and its affinity with her own experience made narrating that history difficult. This is particularly evident in the break between the Greek monarchy and the Roman monarchy. Throughout this poem, she had casually noted the conditions of women in a world ancient and bygone. In the past, women could, as the Bayblonian queen Semiramis had, take up exceptional leadership positions, and in her eyes, they were important as leaders because they knew the value of strong walls. Semiramis built the impressive city of Babylon, the city that became the object of envy for later monarchies. Less anomalously, women were also crucial in assuring the transmission of monarchical sovereignty and control over territory. Control over their reproduction was so important for men to possess that several monarchs turned to acts of incest, Bradstreet observed, especially in the Persian monarchy when a perceived distinction from the prior Babylonian monarchical line was highly desirable. Women’s reproductive labor became the condition for a prosodic wall or border insofar as Bradstreet measured time according to the filial unit. These long monarchies comprised smaller strophes under the heading of each monarch’s name, and featured the filial bond in a declaration of paternity early in the narration. Bradstreet was sometimes explicit that these social and poetic structures depended on controlling women, but her affective response to that condition would become evident in the Greek monarchy.

The Greek monarchy differed from the two that came before, however. Alexander assumed sovereignty not directly through inheritance, but by his means of controlling the martial power that he had inherited from his father Philip. He substantiated this claim by territorial
conquest and by the reproduction of certain characteristics of a people—particularly their language and their uses of language, like literature. Alexander fascinated Bradstreet; her attention to his reign exceeds almost anything else in the *Tenth Muse*. Bradstreet thus thought a great deal about this specific king’s rule, and in such thinking probably noticed that his mode of legitimation drew on women’s labor with less explicit coercion than those that came before. But it now posed a two-fold problem to her measurement of time. First, how would she organize the struggle to secure a legitimate ruler after Alexander’s death? Second, how would she transition in the Roman monarchy that, for once, did not begin with the conquest of a major city and control of its inhabitants. Rather, the founding of Rome began in a mode familiar to students of settler colonialism. Romulus built his city in what seemed to be vacant land, distant from the civilizations that seemed to precede it.

Both scenes, the legitimation of Alexander and the foundation of Rome, depended on women’s labor, but not according to the model that Bradstreet had used to organize time earlier. Women would still be responsible for reproducing a peoples’ defining characteristics, what she called, for example, Greece’s “mother tongue.” Women would also be responsible for the genetic reproduction of a monarch as well as the reproduction of an entire people—a broadening of the definition of the monarchy from what it had been prior. Yet for the Romans, this required capturing and raping the daughters of the Sabines. These problems differed in the immediacy of their relevance to Bradstreet’s life—it’s likely that she felt the work of educating English children, but unlikely that she witnessed the systematic rape of a neighboring population. Yet she was aware that they both required a different attitude toward women than that of the monarchs prior,

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an expansion of the demands made on women’s bodies, and it seems quite plausible that these themes produced the exhaustion that made it difficult for her to complete her ambitious project.

Finally, the arduousness of her obligation to finish what she had started was a consequence not only of the content, but also the context, her obligation to the men in her life. She described her experience of agonizing incapacity through reference to her relationships with men, from the duty she bore to her husband and his children, to the duties that preceded those, the ones she bore to her father as his daughter. Her most explicit attention to those duties tends to appear in the later, more personal verses. In some form, most of her later verse answered these duties, complementing them with a theologically desirable sheen of affection. In poems like “To my Dear and Loving Husband,” “A Letter to Her Husband, absent upon Publick employment” and “Another” (180-81); or “Another” (182) “Vpon my dear & loving husband his going into England. Jan 16 1661” and “In my Solitary houres in my dear husband his Absence” (233); or in her “thankfull acknowledgement for yª Irs rec’d. from my husband ovt of England” or even “in her “thankfull Remb” for my dear husbands safe Arrivall. Sept 1662” (235), she elaborated on the feeling of love for her husband, love which would not, unlike him, ever die (180). Also, she sometimes wrote of her enthusiasm to guide and direct his children in moral uprightness. The now-canonical expressions of love in these passages vindicated her status as an investment and as a token of alliance between her husband’s family as they established new lineages out of the possession and transmission of property in America; and her commitment to teaching them these principles would ensure the fidelity of those children to that system of possessing property, and prevent the sort of youth whom the Jeremiad would so enthusiastically castigate.

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This is not to say, of course, that she did not love her husband or her father. Her experience of what she calls love is all the more likely given that she had known Simon since she was twelve years old.²⁴⁶ Nor is it to say that the act of writing poetry was forced from her, and though she expressed embarrassment at the publication of her imperfections she kept writing for most of the rest of her life. That she turned precisely to the familial trappings of that patriarchy in her later verse suggests that she found gratification in fulfilling these duties to the men in her life, especially those to her father, who, after all, had written verses of his own. Occasionally, Bradstreet wrote verse directly to and about her father, such as in her “To her Father with some verses” (183). But more absorbingly, Bradstreet wrote her long poems, the “Quaternions” and “The Four Monarchies” as a sequel and rejoinder to Thomas Dudley’s lost long poem, “On the Four Part of the World,” and she claimed such filiation in the first lines of her manuscript. But by that same movement of filiopiety, when she described the possibility of failure, she explicitly named the potential agony of disappointing those men, of failing to live up to her duties within these relationships into which she was unwillingly bound.

Ambivalence thus marks and qualifies any experience of liberation or solace from patriarchy that Bradstreet may have achieved through writing verse. Paired to that that satisfaction, and intensifying her desire for it, for Bradstreet, was shame. She indicated as much in those passages of admitted failure, though she often evaded circumscribed direct admission of shame, and instead pointed to the evidence that she was probably feeling shame. Take, for example, her explanation for not finishing the section on Greece in the Four Monarchies: “For what is past I blush, excuse to make / But humbly stand, some grave reproof to take” (136). She foregrounded here the act of blushing, the manifestation of humility and recognition of grounds for

reproof. Yet she did not affirm that she actually blushed, nor that she thoroughly felt shame. She suggested, rather, that she would deserve such publicly visible shame were she to try to make excuses—which she may in fact have been doing by claiming in the preceding line that “the taske befits not women, like to men” (135). Yet her syntax held out the possibility that she wasn’t doing that (making excuses), nor feeling that (shame). Though she acknowledged the reprimand she would have deserved, she at least knew better than to claim immunity from censure that she amply provided herself. Showing shame showed she knew the rules.

Theorists of shame, such as Sarah Ahmed, have observed the individual and individualizing effects of shame, that it intensifies the experience of singular personhood in its contingency to ineluctable and often harmful social imperatives. Shame’s enduring popularity among affect theorists testifies to its dynamism through time, its ability to draw individuals into the rules, written, and often unwritten, that define their social environments. Furthermore, in aggregate, these studies suggest one of shame’s most dynamic properties to be its amenability to yet reaching beyond an individual’s reason. Shame endures at least in part because such suggestions imply that there is a way to not be so individually and unwillingly entangled, and if there is a way, should one not have achieved it? Finally, these studies have shown that performances of shame can strive to transform that hyper-individuating effect into a resource from which to affirm a modified form of personhood, a performance that can demonstrate, minimally, a redemptive knowledge of the rules that bind the subject. Bradstreet’s canny description of the hypothetical blush, and her disavowal of the excuses that she may in fact be making evinces this: though she acknowledged embarrassment at having aspired to write verse as if she were a man,

she at least knew, and performed her knowledge of the rules that she was breaking. And her blush complemented this movement, acceding the gendered conventions for feeling shame. That shame might signal another affective experience, pride, in addition to this already complex movement, appears in her earlier thoughts on the blush itself. Consider, in the "Quaternions," Bradstreet’s description of Flegm, the most ideally feminine of the four humors, the emblematic figure whose triumphant meekness scored points against her more irate sisters by taking a quiet position listening, avoiding visibility and attention. Flegm vindicated her eminence by pointing to her symbolic and translucent beauty. That beauty, she claimed, citing Helen at Troy, had the power to draw kings into war. The best testament to that beauty was, she claimed, a woman's blush. The blush, often taken as evidence of women's unreliability, the blush at least signaled knowledge of the rules by which social order, and the production of womanhood within that social order, were effected. Yet in Bradstreet’s treatment of the blush, it also suggested the enduring presence of another affection, an emotional disposition rarely ever noted by Bradstreet’s critics. Blushing required collaboration with Flegm’s livid, ardent, outraged sister, and it did so especially for women with “ivory faces” and “Lilly white” skin.

To blush signaled the presence or proximity of rage. That women were capable of such violent ardor appears intermittently in the colonial New England archive, though rarely do its documenters name it as such. John Winthrop, in describing Ann Needham Hett’s distress, for


example, sought a theological explanation and used Hett’s doctrinally-informed confession to diagnose a condition of enduring melancholy. In doing so, Winthrop redirecting responsibility for her aggression to a different humor, one less violent and threatening to the legitimate ordering of authority and violence. Yet it is easy to see how that humor, which, in Bradstreet’s account, loved her sword, and loved “the blade more then the hilt” (24-25) might equally have energized Hett’s actions. Such enthusiasm for violence on the part of English women would appear more vividly in the attack on native captives brought to Marblehead by English ships in 1677, during King Philip’s War. At first, “the whole town flocked about them” (672), but soon it was the women, specifically, who “laid violent hands upon the captives, some seizing us [the English captors] in the meantime, because we would protect them, others seizing them by the hair, got full possession of them,” according to an eyewitness. “Then with stones, billets of wood, and what else they might, they made an end of these Indians. We were kept at such distance that we could not see them till they were dead, and then we found them with their heads off and gone, and their flesh in a manner pulled from their bones” (652). Though my next chapter will illuminate some of the contextually specific objects, the “new World and new manners” of this anti-native rage, I want to suggest that rage, and not simply “rebellion” or “resistance” was what Bradstreet had in mind when, likewise approaching the American coastline, as she would put it several decades later, her “heart rose” (216). To bring us closer to closing, then, and to return to this chapter’s opening question: regarding what might a woman in an early modern settlement be angry? And why would Anne Bradstreet have wanted her house to burn?

253 Max Weber, of course, has defined legitimate violence as what the state uniquely possesses in “Politics as a Vocation” trans, Rodney Livingstone, The Vocation Lectures ed. David Owen and Tracy B. Strong (Indianapolis, Hackett, 2004); see also Walter Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” trans. Edmund Jephcott, Collected Writings, vol. I. ed. Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge: Belknap, 1996), pp. 236-262. Benjamin, following Weber, observed that such violence might be fearfully exerted by workers in a condition of general strike, and his interpretation makes it possible to read Hett’s attempted infanticide as one sort of strike critiquing the monopoly that the patriarchal state asserts in distinguishing which sorts of harm count as violence.

The Foundations of Hospitality

Did Anne Bradstreet want her house to burn? No, mostly. The answer seems simple enough from several perspectives. First, where else would she and her family live? It is difficult to overestimate the importance of houses for colonial New England settlers, particularly those who, as Anne Bradstreet had, survived the struggles of the first decade of settlement in America. Fires consumed many houses during those years. Even in 1666, after remarkable infrastructure had been installed on the North Atlantic littoral, much of the damage in this fire, such as the Bradstreet-Dudley library of over 800 volumes, would be irremediable. Furthermore, the construction and inhabitation of domestic edifices constituted the praxis of rightful territorial claims for the English. Given her education, and her proximity to the leadership of the colony, many of whom were familiar with English common law, Bradstreet may likely have known this, though she did not explicitly attend to those concerns here. Complementing this knowledge was the ongoing tense relations between English colonists and their native neighbors that had, as my first chapter has shown, manifested itself in the discomfort of too much visibility. The house represented potent norms for proving Englishness and civilized personhood, and it did so more intimately than the palisades and the forts could, though according to a complementary

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principle.\textsuperscript{260} Moreover, such walls and borders, especially those of the household, may have been more keenly desirable for women than for men since they would have offered a sense of protection from the hypervigilant witness culture of colonial Congregationalism.\textsuperscript{261} These all, material safety, accumulation of status and property, and the habituations for English personhood, were what was being consumed by the sights and sounds of fire and fire, and Bradstreet, an eminent English woman in the Massachusetts Colony, would have felt those losses keenly.

Yet the line suggests that Bradstreet was not totally averse to the destruction of her home. The house represented boundaries and obligations that gave shape to her poetic work, but these walls also manifested her confinement to a particular place, since she was, prior to her expressions of love, a part of that household, and comprised one of the patriarch’s possessions. Bradstreet knew this and to declare it was not especially controversial. She began the “Four Monarchies,” the centerpiece of \textit{The Tenth Muse}, with a similar observation. “When Time was young and World in infancy,” she wrote, “Man did not strive for Soveraignty, / But each one thought his petty rule was high, / If of his house he held the Monarchy” (53). Bradstreet used the house as a metonymy to represent the people and objects within it, drawing together these possessions under the father’s rule. She also understood that set of relationships as a precedent and a precondition for political development. Rather than simply analogize the relationship between the state and the household, as John Winthrop would in 1637, defending a court order fortifying residency requirements for the colony, Bradstreet put them into a sequential, negatively causal relationship.\textsuperscript{262} In the absence of formal state leadership, men exercised the same power

\textsuperscript{261} Kamensky, \textit{Governing the Tongue}, pp. 3-16.
within their homes. Yet the subjunctive mood that takes the same verb as the past tense suggests that domestic rule might not have been left in the past.

That rule would have been typical. And Bradstreet, at least nominally, endorsed it. She understood it as her duty to pass on an intellectual and moral education that would define an ideal household, distinguish it from other, less upright ones. In one of her later “Meditations,” for example, the aphorisms she composed in order to pass on and continue her life through her children, she wrote of distinctions among men in terms similar to what John Winthrop had declared. In his Arbella sermon he defined the richer sort from the poorer; valorizing, as we have seen in the first chapter, a buffered independence from which one could practice sympathy and kindness. In Bradstreet’s hands, however, the distinction between the richer and the meaner sort had moral value. Though she certainly extolled generosity as a virtue, when she described the “various dispensations” among the “sons of men,” she did so in order to frighten her readers, her children, into desiring moral goodness—some men were, she advised “so base that they are Viler then the earth…some againe, so ignorant and sotish that they are more like beasts than men” (202). It’s unclear whether Bradstreet meant to suggest that the qualities of these “sons of men” were heritable, according to the anxieties about inherited piety that structured the Halfway Compromise of the generation to follow. Yet it is especially clear in this passage that she understood her role as a didact to help reproduce these distinctions, and to do so not widely, but narrowly, among the persons within that household who also comprised patriarch’s possessions.263

Of course, her value as a possession differed qualitatively from that of other objects whose loss she recalled in the 1666 poem. But when she described the loss of her house, and her ambiguous feelings towards that loss, she began to intimate some degree of recognition of her status within tit. Her detailed, or rather studious lack of detail in describing these objects reveals the motifs (surface and depth; possession and accumulation) as they also organized her

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personal experience of the world, an experience whose troublesome aspects might be difficult, in their quotidian normalcy, to name or diagnose. Take, for example, her famed list of cherished objects, such as the trunk, the chest, and the store of things that she counted best. In this phrase, she alluded to the Biblical injunction to not accumulate earthly possessions, since those material objects might fall apart, wear out, or, as here burn up. The words she uses, “trunk” and “chest” point implicitly to an embodied inwardness conventionally attributed to women, easily understood as containers for feeling.

To that degree, however, they would also have implied a certain terror towards the violation of that inwardness or private property, as, for example, the wording of a 1646 raid on the houses of two Hingham residents reveals. Two men, after querying the sources for the Court’s Authority, were not only imprisoned and “in danger of their lives” but also “had their Trunks and Studies broke up, and their Papers taken away” (16). A copy of a petition to the English government, carried back to England on a boat, was still not safe after a one woman, distressed during a storm and recollected a sermon of John Cotton’s on the story of Jonas in which he exhorted any ship masters that “if any storms did arise, to search if they had not in any chest or trunk any such Jonas aboard, which if you find (said he), I do not advise you to throw the Persons over-board, but the writings, or words to that effect” (19). The woman, so deeply affected by fear, remembered the gist of Cotton’s sermons in general, but doubled her attention to naming the secret receptacles that she sought to expose.264

Bradstreet, too, recalled the “chest” and “trunk” in her former household. Yet her enumeration of objects, despite all that critics have observed about recalcitrant mourning for irreparable losses, named almost nothing specifically. Instead, her attention tended to remember receptacles for holding and hoarding things. Such a passage, certainly drew on the conventions for understanding women as receptacles and containers for things, especially for feelings. In a colony, when hoarding was linked so closely, in the early years, to survival, and furthermore, in a

global context where such settlement was linked, so closely, to infrastructures for extracting or
exporting commodities to and from the metropole, these objects signal something else,
something new. They allude to her intimate proximity to the structure of European accumulation
and possession rather than simply the objects accumulated, owned, and hidden. Given its toll on
her time, attention, strength, health, and will, this was a structure that she had ample reason to
critique.

Though the concept of primitive accumulation appears in historical and economic thought
over two centuries after Bradstreet remembered these storage containers mournfully, it was
coined in order to describe the process of global expansion and material exploitation in which
English colonial settlement participated.²⁶⁵ In the Spanish colonies, such material exploitation
meant most visibly the extraction of resources, precious metals, as well as the coerced use of
indigenous labor to that end.²⁶⁶ The English colonies in the Americas tended to derive less from
extractive labor than from agricultural labor. More deliberately and earlier in their settlement,
English engaged in agricultural industry by using slave labor, tending to import slaves from Africa
rather than enslave indigenous people.²⁶⁷ Bradstreet very likely knew such slaves; perhaps her
household included some, too. Across the colonies, the condition for such systematic
organization of labor, and the condition for accreting, accumulating value, was the division of
labor within the household such that men were less burdened with the task of domestic care, less
burdened, too, with the work of reproducing the ideology that made accumulation desirable.²⁶⁸
This division of labor was also coercive, yet it tended not to appear that way to its agents and its

²⁶⁵ Michelle Burnham, *Folded Selves: Colonial New England Writing in the World System*
²⁶⁶ Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, *Puritan Conquistadors: Iberianizing the Atlantic1550-1700*
²⁶⁷ Jean M. O’Brien, *Firsting and Lasting: Writing Indians out of Existence in New England*
(Minneapolis: Minnesota Univ. Press, 2010); Margaret Ellen Newell, *Brethren By Nature: New
2015); and Wendy Warren, *New England Bound: Slavery and Colonization in Early America*
²⁶⁸ Maria Mies, *Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale: Women in the International
pp. 74-100.
objects, given the ideological power of the feeling of familial love that would bind together its agents not into a little tyranny, as Bradstreet characterized the Roman monarchy, pronouncing the final verdict. Instead, love, and shared pieties that came together under the sign of meek whiteness, produced the effect of that “little commonwealth.” It would be imperative for the household matriarch to perform this affection convincingly, and to reproduce it in her children, particularly in a colony. Bradstreet’s ability to remember, and to mourn for simple chests and trunks both participates in that reproduction and it signals the possibility of critiquing her role in it.

Let’s follow this line of reasoning one step further. We have seen how Bradstreet’s ambivalent attraction to the destruction of her house drew energy from her intuitive critique of her status as property within a patriarchal household. The possibility for a critique appeared in her objective detail describing the consumed contents of her house. Yet there was another object whose loss in the fire she felt with unusual soreness. This loss clarifies Bradstreet’s understanding of herself as a poet, and as a female poet in particular. Bradstreet missed, finally, the capacity that the house offered her to host guests. She missed the authority to participate in acts of hospitality, and in this poem, she described that activity with unsurpassed detail. Hospitality, and its components, take up several couplets. Here she described some of the actions that required delicate balances of power and submission, relationships whose negotiation constituted politics in early modern Europe. These were acts that retained for the master of the household some of the authority elsewhere consolidated in the sovereign. In quotidian experience, Bradstreet would have been not the host but the necessary labor on which the host drew in his assertions of authority and lordship. Yet here, strangely, she wrote of the loss as if she had been the formerly empowered sovereign.

American colonial settlement might have shifted Bradstreet’s understanding of the power choreographed in the practice of hospitality. She had spent her early childhood and youth in the household of an earl, but her adulthood was defined by labor within a much smaller household, a

shift in the scale of hospitality’s scope and requirements. In America, that sovereignty was
exercised by the patriarch, who often lacked title and clear link to nobility. Bradstreet at least was
related to Sir Philip Sidney, and at least her children would emulate the nobility of the angels. In
the American colonies, however, there was the more widely accessible promise of land, and this
land would have afforded him some of the hierarchical authority exercised by the monarch.
American sovereignty would have taken place on a much smaller and less populous scale, and
Bradstreet’s coming into maturity, her coming into motherhood, too, overlapped directly with her
witness to that atomization. She would have experienced clearly and intimately the intensified
responsibility that these colonial household conditions put on her, directly correlated to the
intensified authority that the patriarch could claim to the walls of his own home. In this
light, her
attention to hospitality as the greatest and dearest loss in the house-fire makes more sense. She
understood that the vehicle of individual sovereignty in the New World—land and the control over
the coming and going of bodies on that land—go up, so to speak, in flames.

Here, however, the directness with which Bradstreet lamented the loss of potential guests
bypassed the role of the household host almost entirely, foregrounding her relationship to the
guest and his or her actions as if she were the host herself. Elsewhere, Bradstreet similarly
fantasized about the authority of the host. Take, for example, her descriptions of her love for her
husband in “To Her Dear And Loving Husband,” where Bradstreet’s resolution reversed the
control over boundaries of the household as it was distributed between husband and wife. Here
she figured her husband as her heart’s only guest. In so doing, she drew on those social
conventions of hospitality and the authority they afforded. Furthermore, as with her attention to
the containers for accumulation, she suggested an opportunity to critique the unclear role of
women in the guest-host relation. Assuming the authority of the host in her relationship to her
husband shows the impossibility of the reverse—the woman could never be a guest, since that would accord to her rights inherent in personhood and rights that she did not fully possess.  

Instead, here, when she lost those provisions for even limited personhood, she articulated a less fantastic, more realistic description of her status as an object by means a master might exercise hospitality. Consider the object of her vocative case as the poem approached conclusion. Though she alluded to hospitality in her attention to the guest and the functions of hosting, she spoke, somewhat strangely, not to the past hosts or guests, but to the house itself, in an apostrophe. Her limited experience of personhood found its closest fellow-feeling with a burnt-up house. If the house that no longer existed could be understood to have feelings despite its immaterial existence, then she too could claim a similar experience of emotional personhood through the sympathetic lament that she performed here. Part of the misery represented here was that the house, which had been her constant companion during her husband’s many absences—some of which she versified—would not now nor ever have been able to answer that apostrophe.

Ultimately, what Bradstreet cherished in her memory as the most desirable vector of authority, however, was not simply the control over the coming and going of bodies, but rather the ability to encourage or induce discourse in others. And when she could no longer do that, she turned inward, and produced discourse herself. Bradstreet’s description of desirable hospitality focused on conversation as hospitality’s best feature—across three couplets that describe that loss, the distinction between discourse and silence takes up four lines. When she described that distinction, her composition placed her back in the moment of the fire, speculating on what she was about to lose, and the future after the loss. As she recollected the sounds of “fire and fire” she also recalled her anticipation of the general absence of pleasant talk; then she recollected her anticipation of the absence of narrative discourse; then anticipation of the loss of the intimate

talk of the bridegroom, and finally, recalled looking ahead to the silence in which the memory of the house would remain. Though she represented these all in the future tense, in her last couplet of the series, she quickly answered and negated that silence by substituting her own inward conversation—first, in the line that completes the couplet, in which her apostrophe to the house becomes more directly immanent in the present tense; and second, as she progressed to conclude the poem, in a moment of self-censure that proved that she knew the disciplines of emotional control, disciplines that she would have been expected to exercise for most of her adult life. Here, she could at least in this lonely and destitute self-reprimand, experience pride.

The performance of proud allegiance to shared norms appeared in a moment of greatest debasement, dependence and vulnerability. Bradstreet’s representation of fealty here explicitly featured acts of speech. Her imaginative exercise of hospitality straddled the desire for security and relative autonomy from the people in her world and the movement towards demanding such potentially unpleasant acts of self-disclosure form others. These two aspects suggest that even in her home she may not have felt complete liberty to speak frankly, to tell pleasant tales or recount things of old (237); suggest that she experienced the home in a manner not totally severed from the memory of the colony’s treatment of other women, for say, Anne Hutchinson. This passage suggests the coercive remainder of modern domestic hospitality, though barely evident because cloaked in the mode of mourning. If Bradstreet felt hesitation speaking frankly, she nevertheless represented the ability to make others speak as something longed for and desired. And so, as this poem recollected her prior two-part desire (desire for relative safety on one hand; desire to produce speech from others on the other), the lines also reproduced in miniature the strategic situation that all men in a state of nature found themselves, according to a political philosopher like Hobbes or Machiavelli, in which one ought to behave in a manner that provoked fear in others in order to preempt their mastery by provoking fear in you. For Hobbes, any state in which the fear of harm was present, if not the harm itself, was a state of war; in this light, Bradstreet, who had studied the history of warfare—she wrote the colonial book on it—would have been living in an ongoing state of war, as would most of the women of her town.
Shame was a technique of domestic warfare, too. Bradstreet’s verses show how useful she found it. In the face of violence over which she had minimal control, and into which she did not contract—at very least, the gendered violence of Puritan confessional culture, and the various, quotidian, unarchived techniques by which her household labor was exploited—she could at least assert explicit knowledge of the rules that bound her. Bradstreet’s fire-side verses show her access to power or authority to depend on the structures that also confined her, and how she turned, in order to reconcile or synthesize these ambivalent feelings, to a representation of even more self-disclosure. This discourse doubled back and redeemed her very fist and strange desire; it replaced her confusing resentments with the possibility of demonstrating her knowledge of perfection and purification. In this passage, and not only in this passage, Bradstreet drew on her familiarity with techniques of representing shame and did so in order to fortify her sense of willful personhood. She would be, in these passages, a person who knew her own abjection, and knew how to make that abjection seem to be the ultimately desired object. Her performance of feminine affections (grief, recalcitrance, shame) if not her avowal of the feminine ideal, was essential here, insofar as readers of this poem, including, perhaps, Anne Bradstreet herself, could uniquely believe that she believed in her abjection.

This poem illustrates a more widely enacted trajectory in which the desire for perfection and purity replaced the more hostile and antagonistic desires produced by Congregational discursive norms, and in particular, how that replacement drew on and clarified women’s ideal performances. To be shamed, or at very least to demonstrate shame, was necessary as the individual absorbed mastery of those fences across which Congregationalist fellow-feeling would ideally have passed. This experience of shame, writ large, Bradstreet implied in her narration of the beginning of the Roman Monarchy. Her the Romans depended as a nation for identity on the willful decision of enfranchised patres to move within the walls of the city. But it depended as a nation for reproduction on the unwilled capture and rape of the women who would then, though nominally naturalized into Roman civilization, would remain, at very least semantically, distinct: Bradstreet suggested the endurance of resentment, the memory of the offense as a diminished
but distinguishing characteristic when she wrote that the Sabines “as one people dwelt in Rome” (139), A mother’s exemplification of such shame would teach children, especially male heirs, how to understand the obligations to their parents, particularly to their fathers through which they would achieve command of patriarchy in their own right. The chapter to follow will reveal the partial transmission of resentment as an endogenous collective identity through the category of the “generation.”

This substitution reframes the Anne Bradstreet cherished by feminist literary histories of colonial New England. Bradstreet’s own experience of structurally-conditioned misery and abjection recasts the relationship sustained with her through time. When critics have sensitively read her verse, particularly her later verse, for its vivid representation of direct emotion, indirect affection, and inchoate desire, they assume the easy and natural accessibility of those feelings by readers in the present. The critics tend to draw on Bradstreet’s own vocabulary for an affectively homogenous community by imputing to her a familial, maternal camaraderie. The project of reading her poems reproduces, in the present, the structure of feeling Bradstreet composed in her description of the relationship between Old England and New, in which the daughter renews and perfects the instruction passed down by the mother through a more perfect exercise of feeling. Yet Bradstreet’s verse retains its value in demonstrating the way that emotional and discursive norms shamed and shaped women disadvantageously, revealing a broader movement in which naturalized emotion became a technique of colonial settlement. Bradstreet’s verse helps de-essentialize that experience, and historicize the natural appearance of emotional expressivity. Such reframing preserves her value for those of us who can elected no particular national kinship with this poet, or at least, if we have it, we don’t always find ourselves feeling it.

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CHAPTER 3: All the Rage

This chapter argues, first, that a requirement of intergenerational affection, in addition to mutual respect, distinguished New England’s social contract; second, that this requirement produced resentments that the concept of the generation organized neatly and productively, but not comprehensively; and third, that diffuse lingering resentments, the rest of the rage, shaped the satisfaction English demanded from indigenous neighbors, particularly allies. Reform Protestant English saw themselves to be owed fidelity guaranteed by gratitude, a debt owed by children and also by native people. The debt of native people in particular gratified the English because the fidelity comprising these debts would never completely be satisfied. Native fidelity to contracts, covenants, treaties and promises with the English was always also proof of their propensity to betray their fellow-countrymen, shoring up English perceptions of native perfidy. The desire for practical gratitude thus appears as the condition requisite for both the experience of generational affiliation and popularly shared anti-native aggression.

This chapter’s argument takes place in three sections. The first section, a review of the popular genre of the jeremiad sermon of the third and fourth decades of settlement, reveals an ineluctable position of affective coercion in which all children of Congregationalist setters found themselves: young people, and not only young people, were expected to desire reformation for the sake of upholding the collective covenant with God. This expectation was a debt that they had not elected to bear. My second section, a review of the narratives of King Philip’s War, reveal a similar movement towards affective coercion, now between English and native neighbors, a movement animated by English desire for stability and control. Natives were expected to feel gratitude to English for safety from conditions of vulnerability that the English themselves had produced. My last section brings these two insights together and reveals a largely unremarked complicity between two familiar phenomena: first, an endogenous settler logic of emotional coercion, best visible in jeremiad rhetoric; second, an endogenous settler rhetoric of purity and
fidelity required from native people. Drawing on the insights of the first two chapters on justice and shame, this chapter demonstrates New England Congregationalism’s nearly intrinsic settler logic, and lays the foundation for my final chapter, on the feeling of friendship in America.

Irony, Inheritance, Increase Mather

The section to follow will review the jeremiad sermon, one of the most popular genres of New England settlement, perhaps even of Anglo-American expression. I approach the form not from a standpoint conventional to literary historians, a standpoint of enfranchisement and freedom ("repent, reform, and prosper") but rather from a standpoint of coercion, of predestinatory and unwilled contract ("the future of our people depends on you"), and I do so in order to more fully account for the social effects of the contradictions latent in a semi-inheritable Calvinist orthodoxy. I will review this genre by symptomatically close reading a curious passage from Increase Mather’s 1678 election sermon, “A Call from Heaven to the Present and Succeeding Generations.” In this sermon, one of the most popular and politically influential spiritual teachers of the colony pushed the formal conventions of his genre to their limits when he argued against the reliable sincerity of the Ecclesiastical teacher. Rereading some of the familiar textual features of this performance will show, first, how Congregationalist doctrine and its practical unfolding might be expected to generate resentment, anger, and dangerous faction among the English. Next, I will demonstrate how the jeremiad’s formal conventions organized these dissatisfactions according to the seemingly natural social category of the generation. Finally, I will show how the filial relationship could pacify resentment toward the unpleasant condition of being obliged by an unelected covenant, a condition shared by nearly every English settler born on the American continent.

The settler priorities transmitted within the form of the generation emerge in a brief reflection on the name that Richard Mather gave to his sixth and final son, the author of the primary text to be read here. Before settlement in America, and assumption of the pastorship at Dorchester in 1635, Richard Mather and his wife Katherine produced four sons: Samuel, Timothy, Nathaniel and Joseph. In 1637, Eleazar was born. In 1639 came a sixth son, to whom they gave a different sort of name, Increase. In doing so, they hoped to memorialize a peoples’ ambition to populate a new, better, and more pure community of people in America. To increase in a colony would mean not primarily the gratification of personal desires to produce a dynasty—the achievement for which the Mathers were later be recognized anyway. Although the enthusiasm for such procreation was probably not distinct from such a desire, to increase in this colony meant, most importantly, to increase its population of potentially elect people and to thus fulfill a legitimizing covenant. This is what John Cotton had meant when, in 1630, he had exhorted his congregation to “be implanted into the Ordinances” and to “have a tender care that you look well to the plants that spring from you, that is, to your children.” Increase would go on to marry John Cotton’s daughter; and, in doing so, would inherit Cotton’s household, his vocation, and his pulpit; and he rarely tired of reminding his congregation of these inheritances. It is highly likely that Increase imagined himself to be the privileged example of his eponymous mandate.

That “increase” is a synonym for one usage of the word “generation” can elucidate the latter’s biopolitical qualities. By the seventeenth century, the word “generation” had acquired the meaning it continues to hold today, a category of people plausibly distinct from those who

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came before. In colonial New England, such distinctions had important political and demographic value insofar as they could sort people according to their likelihood to have willed, or at least wanted, a fulfillment of the terms of the covenant between God and man, particularly those men who had moved to New England. Yet two conditions qualify the uptake of this category as an organizing force in colonial New England. First, a basic, but important observation about the divinely predestined election that qualified civic participation in New England. To the great frustration of Congregationalism’s most prominent social theorists and pious parents, such election could not, by definition, be inherited! Second, the category of generation was, and remains artificial and occasionally clumsy. Because reproduction of a people takes place diffusely and not directly across bracketed cultural thresholds, the substantive qualities that distinguish a generation may, of course, be shared across that imagined boundary. Together, these qualities suggest that the relationships of obligation and affection that the generation organizes operated horizontally and vertically; and that these relationships were achieved through discipline; and finally, that such discipline had political effects. And though the civic and political utility of the jeremiad that re-popularized that category has been well documented, the political effects of the category of the “generation” that it naturalized itself have yet to be satisfyingly described.

Since the dawn of the discipline of early American studies, historians have read the jeremiad as an expression of shared anxieties towards the possibility of vertical faction between groups of younger and groups of older settlers. I will argue that these cleavages were not dominantly vertical, but rather diffusely distributed, often horizontally. To do so, I will review the emergence of a renewed emphasis on the vertical aspect of the generation during the middle and later half of the seventeenth century in New England. My ambition is not to suggest that the generation did not exist as a category of relation prior to the settlement of America by the English,

279 For a documentary survey of these social theorists’ positions, see Williston Walker, “The Creeds and Platforms of Congregationalism” (New York: Scribner, 1893).
nor that fathers and sons existed in peaceable harmony and satisfaction prior to 1660 or even 1630. Instead, perhaps more simply, I hope to suggest that the generation acquired unprecedented social value during the third and fourth decades of settlement in Massachusetts and its neighboring colonies. It did so because it neatly organized anti-social affections, such as hostility, rage and resentment among English, affections that followed the recognition, particularly keen for those born in the colonies, of uncontracted obligation to a community of peers, elders, and younger people. This was not only the obligation to behave uprightly—such obligation, of course, is one of the paradoxes of the social contract, a paradox whose justification would be a matter of great importance to philosophers like Hobbes and his inheritors. More frustratingly, the rage and resentment followed a recognition of obligation to believe in a shared ideology, and to feel affectionately, or at least (but perhaps more agonizingly), the obligation to want to believe and to feel. Increase Mather's 1678 sermon, "A Call from Heaven" answered the ambivalence that followed the recognition of coercion and it did so most delicately and most forcefully when, in his third sentence, Mather, the teacher of the Boston congregation, told his listeners that the Ecclesiastical teacher he cited did not mean what he wrote, but rather, that he was being ironic.

The 1678 sermon's premise is familiar. Its source text exemplifies the relations conventionally at stake in the jeremiad's application. All humans, according to Christian doctrine, generally owed gratitude to God for their existence. Good Christians were to enact that gratitude in the respect paid by sons to their fathers. The text from which Mather drew this lesson, Ecclesiastes 7:1, was short and simple: "Remember now thy Creator in the days of thy youth." The passage foregrounded the divine capacity for creation, but the matter of fidelity to earthly fathers was, for Mather, easily interpretable. Implicit in the identification "creator" was the divine

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281 Increase Mather, "A Call from Heaven to the Present and Succeeding Generation" (Boston: John Foster, 1679).
282 Eccles. 7:1 Geneva
power to bring humans into existence, a power on which fathers drew in their work of procreation, increase and biological regeneration. Implicit in the identification of “the days of thy youth” was a state of individual development characterized by immaturity, and by progress towards greater responsibility to one’s community. Finally, implicit in the command to “remember” was an action of respect, of acknowledging credit where credit was due, and acknowledging such dues not only abstractly, but materially. Creators (fathers, but also, God) could make demands of their creations (children, young and old), and this was especially so for the chosen children of God, the settlers of the New England colonies. According to the jeremiad’s logic, this instruction was not a metaphor, but rather a metonymy insofar as the responsibility for fidelity, for remembrance, and for payment of the debt of being created in the first place, came to rest, at least temporarily, on the literal children, on the “present and succeeding generations” of Mather’s title, who were understood to always be capable of freshly disappointing the ideals and lived example of those who had come before.

The potential for disappointment, in Perry Miller’s discipline-inaugurating account, defined the Anglo-American character that he understood the first settlers to have passed down to their children, along with more tangible property. But the matter of ideological fidelity, generationally defined or not, to an always-tenuously applicable social vision fascinated Miller, perhaps for his entire career. Most famously, the category of the generation framed his introduction to Errand into the Wilderness, the 1956 collection of essays that brought together his oeuvre’s most important work. In his eponymous introduction, the only discrete new piece of writing in the book, Miller signaled an emergent continuity in Anglo-American discourse from out of the disappointment visited on the memory of the first generation by the second and the third, and probably the fourth

and fifth, too. For Miller, that disappointment followed Congregationalism’s practical conundrum regarding the uncertainty of merited political enfranchisement. And that disappointment produced the melancholy yet idealist pragmatism passed on to Edwards, Emerson, Fuller and Melville. For Miller, the category of the generation could help make sense of the inbuilt illogic of a state founded on the uncertainties of Calvinist election. His introduction elaborated on the jeremiad’s psychologically complex gratifications, and helped naturalize that form of transmission.

The problem of merited civic recognition and inclusion exceeded that essay, however; it reappeared throughout his entire career. His second article, published in 1933 and titled simply “The Halfway Covenant,” was excluded from the later collection perhaps because of its thematic similarity to his new and streamlined introduction. But that earlier essay treated the matter of generational declension and its political frustrations at length. In that essay, he noted the paradox of a social doctrine that insisted that one’s merit for inclusion could never be truly known—why behave agreeably, why respect the memory of one’s fathers, and why teach one’s children to behave agreeably and respect one’s fathers if these acts did not ultimately testify to the requisite divine election? The highly-debated solution revoked immanent sovereignty’s defining role as the arbiter of church membership; and, what was perhaps worse, it did not resolve, but highlighted the temporal and logical loophole in the covenant. If, as the Cambridge Platform affirmed, individuals might merit enfranchisement through their performance of good works on the premise that the manifestation of those good works testified to the likelihood of

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287 In a later essay, Miller called it a state, and though he didn’t define it as such, the stakes of such an identification, the legitimate exercise or threat of exercise of violence, will, I hope, be clear by the end of this chapter.
divine election, why bother with earnestly desiring belief at all? One may profitably read the rest of Miller’s career, texts like Orthodoxy in Massachusetts, and the two New England Minds as an attempt to minutely document the ideological sophistication produced in response to a simple social problem: that according to the doctrine of always uncertain election, one could never know whether one’s neighbors were working, affectively speaking, quite so strenuously for mere evidence of salvation as oneself. Miller’s first essay emphasized that this mystical distinction preexisted the founders’ first children, it preexisted the increase and generation that his late-career summary leaned so heavily on. And so did its antagonistic effects.

The fact that the innovators and popularizers of the jeremiad in colonial Anglo-America were themselves of the second generation—that is, the first to be born or to come into maturity in America—tends to fall away from recollections of Miller’s analysis, even though he is clear and direct in his writing. Increase Mather, exhorting his congregation to remember their creators in the days of their youths, was himself born in the Massachusetts Bay Colony, as was Solomon Stoddard, one of the most vocal theorists in the controversy that was tentatively resolved by the Halfway Covenant. Certainly, there were some practitioners of the jeremiad’s generational invective who had been born in England, such as Samuel Danforth, or William Hubbard, but these men were children when they came over, with a less personal sense of the stakes of forming and keeping the divine covenant than their fathers had. Miller noted that relationship between a father and a son, characterized by a self-evident ideal that the latter should emulate the former, structure the ideal that sons emulate the colony’s first “fathers,” who appeared, in retrospect, ideologically unassailable and unified. But Miller’s logic privileges a pre-existing and

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widely shared experience of filial ambivalence that may not have been primarily at issue here. Mather’s sermon helps illustrate the way that the jeremiad sermon’s signal features—not only its repeated articulation of the filial relationship, but also its tonal variation and its interest in socially defining behavior—made the filial relationship the primary vector for experiencing resentment productively among a people.

The relationship foregrounded by the sermon—the debt to the elders borne by the youth—might seem straightforward—it was, after all, a common theme. But Mather decided in this sermon to shake things up, and in doing so, revealed the stakes of fabricating the natural feeling of a natal relationships. According to the conventions of the genre, congregants could expect to hear a source text first, followed by commentary and textual observations, which revealed latent or perhaps easily forgotten moral principles, and led, finally, to a widely useful application.293 Mather took up the first of these, citation and observation, swiftly. After sharing the source-text, Mather asserted that Solomon, the biblical teacher, had two goals, to dehort and to exhort. In the second sentence, Mather expanded the parameters of the text to include what had just preceded the source-text, the last verse of the prior chapter. The message of the first cited verse would have seemed straightforward enough, as surveyed above, and would have seemed so especially for congregants who had been listening to such invectives for several years now, if not their entire lives.294 But expanding the scope of his attention to include the context of the cited verse allowed Mather to do something not typically noticed in literary treatments of the genre, especially in America. Mather’s Ecclesiastical teacher had just finished telling his students to “Go and prosper,” but in Mather’s retelling, that advice was really of a contrary disposition. The pair of verses in sequence (first: prosper; second, remember) suggested that the youth might be


294 Bercovitch, American Jeremiad, reminds readers that the jeremiad mode had a robust life in England before the departure of reform Protestants; before, even, the reformation itself.
enjoying themselves before the necessary acts of remembrance, and thus, Mather believed that such an exhortation could not be positive, but rather negative, a dehortation. Mather could see that, unlike the typical sermonic mode, the teacher had not then been in earnest, but was being ironic.

The passage works, even today, in estranging from readers and listeners the foundational assumption of a sermon's sincere tone. Ideally, listeners must believe that their teacher actively and earnestly desires their reformation, and that so much is truly at stake in their reformation as to foreclose the intentional risks of miscommunication latent in ironic speech.295 Almost all of the seventeenth century colonial sermons bear this out, and the jeremiad in particular derived a great deal of authority from its persuasiveness in invoking the intimately felt threat of calamity and cataclysm as a manifestation of divine favor, temporarily frustrated. In the American colonies, such threats were shored up by the ongoing paranoia of unrest between English settlers and native neighbors—“the Armies of the aliens” whom they saw it as their duty to extirpate, to put to flight (29).296 This paranoia did not cease, for reasons to be described, even after the hostilities of King Philip’s War of 1675-76 ended. Irony towards the necessity of reform, and towards the hope of future prosperity seems less than likely to have been well-received, given the war’s high mortality rate and its subsequent effects on relations between New England and Old.297 To point out irony on the part of the source text, as Mather’s “Call” did; to suggest insincerity in Biblical teachings, seems not only unconventional, but insulting, too, as well as confusing and counterproductive.298 Yet there Mather went, squandering time and attention in temporary misdirection. In doing so, his sermon reveals an irreconcilable tension within the metonymical structure of authority in the colony, between the vehicle of representation (the

296 Increase Mather, The Day of Trouble is Near (Cambridge: Marmaduke Johnson, 1674).
honest, natural relationship of paternity) and the tenor (the forceful, artifice in a relationship of creation). Irony’s parabasis reveals that unwilled subjectivity that many settler youth may have noticed, if not named.

The assumption of sincerity remains one of the under-examined premises of the New England sermon, and overlooks tonal complexity in accord with understandings of the reform Protestant commitment to the plain style.\textsuperscript{299} Certainly, many seventeenth-century English religious teachers, such as John Donne or George Herbert made style serve their purpose. Donne, especially, is remembered for the humor and sophistry evident across his sermons, poems, and less public meditations.\textsuperscript{300} And certainly, the matter of rhetorical sophistication on the part of the New England sermon has not passed the attention of the form’s most astute critics. Sacvan Bercovitch, for example, noted a sense of self-awareness in the American settlers’ turn to the form, from the first arrivants and into the centuries that followed.\textsuperscript{301} Miller, for his part, recognized that the form may be have been energized less by a desire for true and effective reformation than by a desire for an expiatory manifestation of knowledge of sins committed, a performance of collective shame similar to Bradstreet’s confessions of imperfections at the conclusion of the Greek and Roman monarchies.\textsuperscript{302} But the sermon has seemed not to be the place for ostentations formal tricks—Miller turned, near the conclusion of his collected essays,


\textsuperscript{301} Bercovitch, \textit{American Jeremiad}. Following Derrida, via Jodi Byrd I use the term \textit{arrivant} to signal those residents of a settler colony or state whose presence as migrants was unwilled. \textit{Of Hospitality} trans Rachel Bowlby (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 2000); and Jodi Byrd, \textit{Transit of Empire: Indegenous Critiques of Colonialism} (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 2011).

away from the sermon and toward a different genre, Michael Wigglesworth’s enthusiastically apocalyptic poem, “The Day of Doom,” to suggest that the jeremiad’s conventional threats, at least in 1662, offered settlers an experience of pleasure.³⁰³

Ironic efficacy makes a little more sense when considered alongside a more readily identified convention, the litany of youthful misbehavior. This technique suggests some of the unexamined and more diffuse relational tensions that the jeremiad’s rhetoric sought to consolidate. For Miller, the most interesting formal aspect of the sermons was the energetic lists of various sordid misbehaviors on the part of the unregenerate, most visibly the youth; “because they were not only works of necessity, but of excitement, they proved irresistible” (9). The relationships that most explicitly emerged from that ordering, the filial relationship, fascinatingly unfulfilled, was by no means the only relevant relationship of antagonism and hostility. Such litanies might, and perhaps more energetically, respond to the dissatisfactions and resentments of the young towards the old. It is possible to imagine individuals who undertook sins such willfully and deliberately, perhaps in response to the frustrations of not being able to induce sincere feeling. Perhaps they did so because they held on dearly to the notion of a divine sovereignty and were reluctant to fake allegiance to it.³⁰⁴ Such litanies may have gratified the desires of young, or not yet mature, chronically infantilized persons, such as Ann Needham Hett, to be taken seriously. This too was a vertical relationship, though reversed in direction.

These lists might also gratify the ears of the well-behaved among the younger generations. Individuals like Increase Mather, who, though not able to identify biographically with the struggles and achievements of those fathers who had moved and settled of their own volition, could now, in their acts of condemnation, associate themselves morally with their progenitors, and credentialize themselves through condescension, through depicting their unregenerate peers as underdeveloped and immature. This was a horizontal relationship, mediated by the vertical.

And it followed a more generally applicable representation of the degenerate as youthful, a representation that empowered any morally self-regarding person, which is to say, almost any person, to look out and assess as immature any person who was not trying as earnestly or as visibly to achieve or to perform achievement of special election, which is to say, almost any other person. These relationships are only some of the dissatisfactions and resentments that the jeremiad’s rhetoric answered. These antagonisms may not have aligned necessarily with the filial obligation between fathers and sons, but the clarity of that relationship, and its seemingly self-evident debt would have drawn together and explained such resentments in a neat and attractive fashion.

Irony takes the ambitions of the litany one step farther, and then another. First step: where the litany of immature and unregenerate acts worked in a mostly static manner to align ideal standpoints within the congregation, irony aligned argumentative positions through time. Listeners shared a practical performance in which their will to piety was shaped not only by their actions, but also by hierarchical leadership. When Mather called out the ecclesiastical teacher for his use of irony in his “Call,” his turn to a prior verse activated a not entirely willful collective mnemonic practice. Much of the congregation would have known the cited preceding verse, and shared a mental experience of recollection along with the teacher. 305 Second step: Mather’s attention to the formal qualities of the preceding verse began to enact the source text’s command, which his turn to precedent aspired to justify the command to remember. And in order to understand the explication of the irony in the passage prior, listeners had to complete at least the smallest step of the advice given to recall, to remember. By careful movement through rhetorical sequence, a movement that required aligning perspectives as the collective progeny of a divine father, the congregation together came to understand and synthesize the potentially insulting

provocation on the part of the teacher. The explicit rhetorical movement of collective memory began to enact the exhortation initially offered, and in doing so encouraged, perhaps coerced, all listeners to align themselves in that implicitly filial relationship.

Litany and irony, particularly the irony that Mather invoked in the “Call” thus made similar rhetorical demands of listeners, demands that enacted the recommended perspectival alignment. The litany justified and circulated patriarchally-oriented condescension as an avenue for experiencing resentment and the possibility of irony likewise narrowed for the congregation the possible standpoints for reflection. This laid the foundation for the sermon’s consequent thematization of memory. Memory, memory of God and of the fathers’ fealty to him, was a duty and responsibility for all children—and everyone in the colony had been at some point someone’s child. Theoretically everyone around the globe owed that remembrance to God, but in particular, the inhabitants of the New England colony, according to the fathers’ first covenant, owed a desire to enact that remembrance in their behavior. Further still, Mather insisted that it was not “every kind of Remembrance of God, but that which is affectionate and practical that is intended”—not only must it take place in action, but it must also, and perhaps more stressfully, be deeply felt. Such ideal acts of memory, of course, would exceed the primary acts provoked by the performance of Mather’s sermon. Yet Mather’s relentless emphasis on the word underscores the subtle force of his rhetoric: it is nearly impossible to not recall something when someone commands you to remember it.

Remembering, represented by Mather as a semi-willful act, signaled more generally the limited freedom to choose good behavior, starting with pious reflection. These were limitations that all New England settlers, and particularly the children, would have felt according to the prescriptions of Congregationalist orthodoxy. Irony opens up some space to understand such exhortations critically, to wonder about the earnestness of an utterance or the possibility for different interpretations. Yet Mather’s placement of such an observation so early would have produced a narrowly elaborated set of mental actions, and thus in turn narrowed the seemingly
self-evident avenues for filiation he later prescribed, filiation of patriarchal inheritance. In doing so he drew on the rhetorical and affective potential of the sermon form, and particularly as it was used in the Anglo-American context, which had from its earliest days sought to provoke in its listeners some experience of divine immanence that would always remain inaccessible to logic. Most famously, this would be the theory of the form’s efficacy as elaborated by the next century’s most successful practitioners, celebrities of the Great Awakening such as Jonathan Edwards and George Whitfield. As the valorization of universal reason later to be remembered as the Enlightenment dawned, those preachers attempted to manifest in their sermons the desirability of affection, what reason might not be able to provide.

Yet the power of sermons as practiced in the high-stakes colonial setting had, from the first days of settlement, exceeded the straightforward content of the words uttered, with significant consequences for the administration of political authority. As Anne Kibbey has shown in the sermons of John Cotton, these performances could manipulate their listeners beyond their consciousness or reason, and that manipulation, as it transformed the self-understanding of the congregation, could effect violent consequences in the material world, typically against women and native people. A similar desire for submission to a power beyond reason appears in sermons like Mather’s “Call.” Or at least, such a sermon makes visible and attractive the desire


for such a submission, the desire to participate before volition in a collective recollection of scripture, and to do so as the first step in presently still difficult acts of earnest and respectful—“affectionate and practical”—remembrance. These were the vital first steps for persuading individuals of the attractiveness of the desire to believe, particularly vital for individuals, not always youth, who may have intuited the ideological paradox that they had little choice in their inheritance of filial debt.

Mather’s rhetoric made payment of that debt seem easier, and in doing so, began to pacify the possible rage that would lead, at best, to undesirable faction at a time when the colony required solidarity—first, in response to native hostility; and second, in response to the possibility of losing civic autonomy during the early years of the Stuart Restoration. This was not a debt, however, that any civic participant could control, given that good works were, at best, a signal of the passing on of a regenerate spirit to the next generation, but were nevertheless required, according to the jeremiad’s logic, for the salvation of the entire colony. Thus, as I hope to have suggested persuasively, participation in what Bercovitch called “rituals of consensus” was not primarily aimed at spiritual regeneration, and not totally, or even ultimately, aimed at the civic practice of regeneration—of faking it, so to speak, till you made it. Rather, participation in these collective acts of memory would ideally organize and align the affections of an individual toward the desire for such regeneration, a desire for fidelity to that ineluctable collective debt, and towards the enduring and faithful dependence on the memory of the fathers as a guide to civic flourishing. Or at least, it aimed to sustain the desire for such regeneration until one one day achieved sufficiently credentialed maturity, and might, in turn, invoke such a litany of disappointments on the new and freshly debt-bearing youth.

Irony, for Mather, destabilized interpretive practice in order to uphold as unshakeable the figure of the “creator,” metonymically represented in the person of the father. Yet the metonymy

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derived efficacy from a causal similarity, but not complete identity between tenor and vehicle, and thus the instability of father themselves appears, hidden in plain sight. Fathers were responsible for creating children biologically. But the desire for salvation could only be valid of some remainder existed between, on one hand, the creation and instillation of the desire for piety by the natal father; and on the other hand, that same action by the spiritual creator. If one (and thus, both) of these were missing, where, then, to place the blame? And how might blame be affectively experienced when the storied fathers of the first generation, were, more and more like God, placed beyond blame? These negative affections, the frustration intensified by an inability to attribute responsibility, I suggest, appears in moments of resentment and rage.

Rage, I want to suggest, emerges from experiences of unwilled responsibility, though the subtle manifestations of rage—its rhetoric, its desire for objects—might often pass unnoticed. Rage skulks in the vicinity of generational resentments, but to exercise our sensitivity towards its conditions and its contexts, consider the expression of similar rage in a contemporaneous account of the debt owed by a creature to its creator. As Increase composed his reading of the Ecclesiastical exhortation to “remember now thy Creator in the days of thy youth,” he may have remembered his own youth, perhaps the first five years of his twenties spent in Cromwell’s service in the colony of Ireland, and then, in London, during which time he may perhaps have come into contact with the works of John Milton, if not Milton himself. He may perhaps, between the 1667 publication of Paradise Lost and his composition of the “Call” eleven years later, have encountered Milton’s version of fury towards the condition not of damnation, but of being created in the first place:

Did I request thee, Maker, from my Clay,
To mould me Man, did I solicit thee

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Almost two centuries later, Mary Shelley’s fascination with this debt memorialized the furious futility of feeling in a state of unelected subjectivity, particularly as that feeling inflected the experience of gender and race in a post-Enlightenment Europe. Yet in the seventeenth century, the contrast between the felicities of Edenic life, and the miseries of an indebted subjectivity derive even greater resonance for Congregationalism in a colony, a condition imaginable, though indirectly, in the lines to follow, as they represent ambiguity regarding the object that bound the subject to this unwilled debt:

As my Will
Concur’d not to my being, it were but right
And equal to reduce me to my dust,
Desirous to resign and render back
All I receave’d, unable to performe
Thy terms too hard, by which I was to hold
The good I sought not. (746-52)

Satan had received existence from God, but the English in America, like Adam, understood themselves to have been granted something else too, something perhaps more difficult to return —possession of that “delicious Garden” that John Winthrop had smelled while still on the boat.

Dependency Theory

The making, keeping, and breaking of treaties with indigenous neighbors obsessed the English almost as much as did their own intergenerational fidelity to their covenant with God. The following section, noting this similarity, argues that narratives of King Philip’s War more clearly reveal the often-deliberate attempt to coerce native peoples’ fidelity to English interests by an

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intensification of the semblance of willed choice, not only through deploying settler colonial
treaties’ falsely simple choices, but also by an emphasis on positive affections, particularly
gratitude, in contrast to conditions of fear. I will show this through a similarly representative close
reading of a passage symptomatic of the more widely recognized stakes of peace-keeping and
war-time political techniques. In retelling the story of Benjamin Church’s council with
Awashunkes, the leader of the Saconet people who neighbored his plantation, I will demonstrate
how the logic of concern for natives drew on the model for peaceable cooperation based on the
affection prescribed for the English almost half a century prior, but also drew on a selective
authority to prescribe behavioral distinctions within large groups. I will review why such singling-
out was necessary, and do that through surveying the history of alliances with which English
people negotiated, shifting across space, but also through time. Finally, I will show how the
contrast between native infidelity and English filiopiety, which appears in all the English narratives
of the war, reveals these treaties’ lingering familiarity covenantal resentment and rage.

Perspectival intimacy makes up for temporal immediacy forgone in the three decades
that passed between the events about which Benjamin Church wrote, and when he wrote them.
Among the many accounts of that war, Church’s distinguishes itself for its protagonist’s familiarity
and proximity with the enemy.315 It can thus offer an unusually vivid account of the uses of
affection in strategies of latent and manifest violence. Short of actual captivity among the enemy,
the condition for which Mary Rowlandson has become famous, Benjamin Church, in writing his
Entertaining Passages Relating to King Philip’s War (1716), could draw on his frequent direct
contact and engagement with native people, and, in turn, document blossoming antagonistic
feelings, such as suspicion, fear, resentment and elation.316 Many of the more immediately written
narratives, such as William Hubbard’s Narrative of the Troubles with the Indians (1677), or,
before that, Thomas Wheeler’s Thankful Remembrance of God’s Mercy (1676), Increase

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315 Philip Gould, “Benjamin Church: Citizenship and the History of King Philip’s War in Early
316 Mary Rowlandson, The Sovereignty and Goodness of God in Slotkin, So Dreadfull a
Judgment, pp. 301-69.
Mather’s own *Brief History of the Warr with the Indians in New England* (1676), or the anonymously published epistolary serial, *The Present State of New England, with Respect to the Indian War* (1676), often describe the attempts to secure peace with native people by means other than explicit violence, though rarely, if ever, do they give firsthand accounts of such attempts. And Benjamin Church himself did not pen the text attributed to him, but rather delivered his memories to his son, who compiled them in third person prose after the turn of the century. Yet even mediated thus, Church’s memories remain unparalleled in their intimacy—Mary Rowlandson only comes close to matching Church’s detailed memory of, for example, the “great dance” of Awashunkes, leader of the Saconet who resided near his Pocasset settlement, and the closeness that allowed him to see and to remember, as she was dancing, the “foaming Sweat” on her body (398). None of the other war narratives would be able so vividly to document the juxtaposition of personal and collective interests at stake in the meeting that opened the *Entertaining Passages*, a meeting between Church and Awashunkes, in which he tried to convince her of the wisdom of persisting in fealty to and reliance on the English.

Church could identify the start of the war, and three decades’ retrospect gave him great confidence regarding the interests at stake. The war took place between 1675-76, but the conditions that brought it about preceded that threshold by several decades, and the explicit violence endured in settlement further from Boston into 1678. For Benjamin Church, as for most historians since, the war was brought into reality by King Philip’s consolidation of several

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318 Richard Slotkin, “Benjamin Church: King of the Wild Frontier” *So Dreadful a Judgment*, pp. 370-90; and Gould “Reinventing”

leagues of dissatisfied and alarmed native people in and around Mount Hope. This was the effective cause. But more infuriatingly to the English, and the provocation that almost all narratives cite, King Philip was, in his strategic rallying, reneging on a promise between his native people, the Wampanoag, and English settlers—not only the treaty he had signed with the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1662 and would renew in 1671, but a far earlier treaty, the 1620 agreement between his father, Massasoit, and the settlers at Plymouth. Such treaties would, at least from the perspective of English participants, implicitly bind native people through time, inter-generationally. Yet as the English recognized that these treaties might be reneged on, they also made use of a condition of coexistence more difficult to countervail, coexistence based on inequality and an affectively recognized (and therefore putatively more secure) condition of reliance on English protection. This emerges generally from a survey of war narratives, but that it should desirably complement explicit treaty making appears most clearly in the fact that Church concluded his narrative of peacetime negotiations by recollecting his desire that Awashunkes place herself and her people “steady in [their] dependence on the English” (400).

In the early spring of 1675, a “rumor of war between English and Natives” interrupted Benjamin Church’s plans to fill his plantation at Pocasset with “good Men”—English—to be his neighbors. He already had neighbors, a fact that becomes clear in the second paragraph of the text. In response to the rumor, Church sent messengers to Awashunkes, the leader of the Saconet people who lived on adjacent land, in an attempt to “engage her in his interests” (397), to persuade her to participate cooperatively on the side of Church and his planation in the likely

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event of war. Awashunkes sent a counter-invitation to Church to come and consult with her. He arrived in the middle of a meeting between the Saconet and a smaller delegation from Mount-Hope, the latter of whom he considered, after looking them up and down, to be “in the posture and figure of preparedness for War” (398). Though his assessment of their belligerence might leave room for skepticism, and though Plymouth, too, was fortifying its defenses, this passage reveals, nevertheless, how Church’s attention to native belligerence produced, through contrast, the opportunity for Awashunkes and the Saconet people to redeem themselves, in the eyes of suspicious English, through willed, peaceful cooperation and submission.323

King Philip had, Church learned from Awashunkes, solicited an alliance with her, and then complemented that invitation with a threat. Were she to refuse, according to Church’s recollection of her account, Philip would attack her English neighbors (Church and his plantation, though he did not name himself). Philip claimed, she reported, that the English (Church and his newer neighbors) would “without a doubt suppose [her] the author of the Mischief” (399). Philip’s threat cited, as a guarantee, historical precedent, since, in their history of conflict with native people, English had generally not been eager to distinguish among political affiliations when they stood to profit from retaliatory violence.324 And Philip narrated the terms of that threat to other native allies, too.325 Church’s account reveals, if a little obliquely, the difficult position in which

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323 Drake, King Philip’s War, pp. 96-98; Plane, 146-47.
324 On the English disinclination to distinguish among friendly and hostile natives during the Pequot War, “an act of terrorism intended to break the Pequot morale” (151), see Alfred Cave, The Pequot War (Amherst: Univ. of Massachusetts Press, 1996), pp. 122-167; and below, Chapter Four.
325 Jenny Hale Pulispher cites Daniel Gookin’s report of a similar encounter between to some of the Mount Hope Indians and the Christian Indians of Hassanamesit, Chabanakongkomun, and Magunkaquaog: “if we do not kill you, and...you go to the English again, they will...force you all to some Island as the Natick Indians are, where you will be in danger to be starved with cold and hunger, and most probably in the end be all sent out to the country for slaves.” Daniel Gookin, “An Historical Account of the Doings and Sufferings of the Christian Indians in New England, in the Years 1675,1676, 1677” (1677), Archaeologia Americana, Transactions and Collections of the American Antiquarian Society2 (1836), pp. 476, quoted in “Massacre at Hurtleberry Hill: Christian
Awashunkes found herself when both parties, Philip’s increasingly large alliance, and the United Federation of English settlers, demanded her cooperation and fealty. Through his twice-framed survey of her predicament, it is possible to also see the more profound effect of informal English war policy on her situation. How, Awashunkes asked, did Church suggest she proceed?

In Awashunkes’ experience of coercion and distress, Church saw an opportunity to peddle the English promise of security. His enthusiasm for what he had, at least nominally, to offer, appears in the fact that he repeated his answer to her almost three times in the two paragraphs with which he concluded the episode. He told her to “shelter herself under the Protection of the English,” to “send to the Governour of Plymouth and shelter her self, and People under his Protection,” and, more generally, he did “at parting advise her what ever she did, not to desert the English interest” (399, italics original). Following these repetitions, it may seem curious that, after Awashunkes sent Church back to his plantation with two of her guards for his protection, Church repeated to these guards a summary of his ambitions for the Saconet people: “He took his leave of his guard, and bid them tell their Mistress, if she continued steady in her dependence on the English and kept within her own limits of Sogkonate [Saconet], he would see her soon” (400). This fourth exhortation differs from those that preceded it on at least three counts: first he did not primarily address Awashunkes, but her messengers; second, he framed his advice as a conditional in which the apodosis ill-fit the protasis; and finally, in that advice, he subtly and somewhat strangely reinvoked the ideal of neighborly affection put forward as the guarantee for cooperation in the earliest declarations of a settler social covenant. These textual details, and the historical conditions they symptomatize, reveal how important it was for the English settlers to make not only their sons, but also their possible enemies, feel dependence as debt.

That Church should have addressed himself to these messengers in addition to his consultation with Awashunkes reveals, at very least, an attempt to reconcile English modes of Indians and English Authority in Metacom’s War” William and Mary Quarterly 53.3 (1996): 459-486.
political planning and strategizing with those of his native neighbors, and to find a ground for mutually beneficial action by widely distributing the experience of fear. Church, among all the major war narrators, probably best understood, at least in general terms, some of the major differences between English political organization and that of native people, differences that made attribution of responsibility for injury between parties less clear.\textsuperscript{326} Perhaps he knew, for example, that strategic alliances were made in a more collective and participatory process than they were in the English colonies.\textsuperscript{327} Even if he did not know it well, the participatory quality of native political strategizing was on view at the conference Awashunkes had hosted. She had invited Church, as well as delegates from King Philip at Mount Hope, with whom Church had directly argued during the meeting. Perhaps, in leaving his messengers, Church hoped that they would relay not only the message, but also lobby in his favor, and in favor of all English, against an obstacle that he never named, the fact that English shelter demanded several dear renunciations: leadership of the Saconet people, their way of life, and their land, too.\textsuperscript{328}

To be clear, this form of deliberation was not completely alien to the English. Within the pale of Congregationalist settlement, at plantations like Massachusetts, Plymouth, New Haven, Connecticut and Rhode Island, collective participation mattered. There, republicanism, qualified by godliness, to dilate Michael Winship’s phrase, had been exemplarily institutionalized.\textsuperscript{329} The collective will of the people was the legitimation and the substance of self-governance for colonial English, so long as those enfranchised people were of God’s specially chosen—or, according to those controversial debates on church and civic membership, so long as they demonstrated plausible likelihood of divine election. Somewhat unlike Awashunkes’ deliberation, these leaders,

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the pastors at the church, and the magistrates and assistants who comprised the general court, could call on a mandate during their tenure rather than ongoingly solicit the insight and agreement of their people. Every now and then, such as in the episode of the women at Marblehead noted in the prior chapter, or as in the uprising against John Eliot’s praying Indians read in the concluding section below, collective action superseded the institutionally decided policy.330

Perhaps Church reiterated his meaning to these messengers a fourth time in order to respond to and underscore the particular weakness and vulnerability of the Saconet people that a female leader, in his mind, signified. His hope that these messengers would influence their mistress seized on his likely assumption that as a woman, Awashunkes representatively embodied a greater vulnerability to attack, as well as greater susceptibility to influence by persuasion.331 Church probably understood that authority among native societies was not always, or even often, inherited in a clear or direct patrilineal manner. Yet that knowledge may not have offered commensurate clarity regarding the limits of Awashunkes’ leadership. A contemporary text, the anonymous Present State of New-England, narrates such an alliance, that between Philip and Weetamoo, from a less intimate perspective than Church’s.332 There, the alliance between Philip and Weetamoo appeared in more conventional relations of marriage, and though marriage would subordinate Weetamoo’s power to Philip’s, her desire for evil was commensurate. The Present State drew explicitly on Biblical templates, here that of the ambitious queen Jezebel and her uxorious husband Ahab; and it drew, perhaps as well on a less clear knowledge of alliances among natives that shifted more often than the English could keep track. Written in the

332 Gina Martino-Trutor, ““As Potent a Prince as Any Round About Her”: Rethinking Weetamoo of the Pocasset and Native Female Leadership in Early America” Journal of Women’s History 27.3 (2015):37-60.
The immediate fright and rage of war, *The Present State* represented such alliances as monolithically evil, and according to frequently imprecise terms. Church, with greater familiarity, if not thorough understanding, and with the calm of several decades’ retrospect, described the alliance in a less overdetermined manner, one that complemented his representation of Awashunkes’ capacity to choose.

The broader inclusiveness of Church’s last advice shows his desire to democratize the experience of fear in support of English claims to provide the best security for native people. In the memories that he shared with his son, Church recollected his own broad-mindedness regarding the deserving participants of civilized peace and security. He had, his story insists, amply warmed Awashunkes, and earnestly made himself available as a liaison between English settlers and native neighbors. Church also explained to her how her decision would benefit her people, and as his concluding memory of the event makes clear, he made sure to note his attention to ensuring that the other natives were informed and thus capable of taking self-interested action, at very minimum, to act to persuade their leader. Though it was possible that these guards had heard his advice during the meeting, it is also possible, given the “hundreds of Indians gathered together from all Parts of her Dominion” (398, italics original), that they had not. His last exhortation might strive to encourage their persuasive intervention, and it might also work to secure their own defection and pursuit of safety at Plymouth.

If Benjamin Church’s advice democratized fear, it did so along with heightening the individual responsibility of native people for the feared outcome. The matter of personal responsibility quietly framed the last shared advice, which tasked the messengers with the work of transmitting the message and also perhaps persuading Awashunkes to respond agreeably. More intensely than this, however, Church posed the matter of Saconet safety as one over which Awashunkes was in control. As if frustrated that the first statements of advice may have reached her too bluntly, Church now, about to part ways with the Saconet, posed it as a conditional sentence, (“if she continued steady…then he would see…”) in which decision would have both
grammatical and material effects. Rather than a simple discrete and singular decision, in this articulation, her decision would take place in time. This sense of time, represented by the transition between the if/then statement’s two sequential halves, was structurally identical to the jeremiad’s covenantal rhetoric, which intensified the perception of individual will, limited though it may be. Church’s adoption of the rhetoric suggests that settlers learned to understand the experience of ideal personhood in this manner, and thereby learned to structure the stories they told about themselves and the people around them. In their favored sermons, such explicit ultimatums usually appeared at the conclusion of the performance of advice: “If we shall neglect the observation of these articles…the Lord will surely break out in wrath against us” (Winthrop, 295); “If the people cleave to the Lord, to his Prophets, and to his Ordinances, it will strike such a fear into the hearts of enemies…” (Danforth, 24).333

As with those explicitly delivered exhortations, Church insisted that Awashunkes had options, and a great deal hinged on her choice between them. To some degree, Church’s offer was like Philip’s solicitation, which also had asked her to make a decision. But Philip’s solicitation of Awashunkes’ alliance, according to what Church reported being told, made more explicit threats, and by different means. Philip’s hypothetical scenarios suggested that Awashunkes’ choice was not ultimately very relevant, since indiscriminating violence from the English would be an inevitable factor in her relations with her neighbors. On one hand, an alliance with Philip would mean going to war with him against the English. On the other hand, Philip implied, an alliance with the English would, ultimately, not be more safe, for it would result in English violence eventually. English indiscrimination, Philip suggested, was more reliable, in the long run, than their contingent favor, and certainly more reliable than the reputation that natives held in the eyes of the English. Unlike Philip, Benjamin Church imagined that his offer would be attractive to Awashunkes because in it, she appeared to possess effective responsibility.

Historians of settler colonialism in general, and of colonial settlement in America in particular, have revealed the illusory agency offered by ultimatums such as those of Benjamin Church. In response to those historians, their successors have aspired to reveal the many ways in which native people were not simply and passively dying off as victims. These historians have surveyed the techniques by which native people actively negotiated with English power. Their historical method, which points out the capacity of actors to subvert or resist, would, ideally, restore to students of history a respect for those actors as people rather than as passive objects of inevitable violence. Following these accounts, political theorists and some historians have, in their turn, critiqued a model of political relation in which resistance tends to follow a foundational possession of a fully formed and deliberate will. Such a model, these theorists observe, would require in the oppressed an understanding and a cultivated mastery of an abstract, modern political will, but the problem with such a foundation is its model for abstract human personhood severs that individual from the historical conditions that determine the behavior and dispositions required for recognition as a full person. That model reproduces, in Gayatri Spivak’s phrase,

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the “axioms of imperialism” (243), and it does so particularly when recognition of women’s self-
determination is at stake.338

Awashunkes’ reflective capacities, her ability to make informed and effective decisions, as well as her interest in negotiating with power were clearly visible in her counter-invitation, and her control over the event of the council. Yet significant epistemological space exists between these forms of political assertion and the mode of deliberation in which Church expected her to engage, space mapped by the discourse of reform Protestantism, and especially its emphasis on proprioceptively constituting individual will.339 The primary difference is not tethered essentially to the fact that Church asked her to make a decision, but rather to Church’s implication, in his invocation of the sermonic ultimatum, that she should feel burdened by a feeling of personal responsibility and obligation to him in that decision.

The decision had high stakes, and the burden was not irrational to expect. Awashunkes probably understood that to agree to Church’s terms would mean that she and her people would leave their land, land that Church clearly had stated that he had actively working towards making available for other English to purchase and settle.340 Agreeing to Church’s terms would mean moving into a settlement such as that at Plymouth, or being removed to a less favorable site, such as the praying towns that had been reserved for other native communities, such as those at Natick, just outside of Dedham.341 Agreeing to Church’s terms would mean, moreover, ceding to further agreement to a residence and way of life organized more and more according to English norms, an intensification of exposure to missionizing agents such as John Eliot—English

convinced of the efficacy of affectively understood subjectivity, and the personal responsibility to choose.\textsuperscript{342} These were all aspects of the agreement that Church saw as beneficial for the Saconet people. He called such a condition “dependence.”

Awashunkes’ agreement, perhaps we might call it assimilation, would not produce greater safety.\textsuperscript{343} At best, what it promised was survival of bare life along with the death of all the qualities that distinguished that mode of life from the English.\textsuperscript{344} Her enduring vulnerability receded from the explicit ultimatum along with Church’s own participation in the structure of colonial power that produced it. It is perhaps possible that Church remained unaware of the patterns of native removal that may seem obvious to scholars of settler colonialism. It is also possible that despite the intensified calls for a renewal of English solidarity as the war loomed, that nevertheless Church truly saw himself as a unique ally and friend to Awashunkes, an advocate distinct from the predatory English against whom Philip and his cohort would soon wage war. All these are possibilities. But it is difficult, given Church’s own backstory in his relation’s first and second paragraphs (“hoping that his good success would be inviting unto other good Men to become his Neighbors” (397)) that he remained completely ignorant to the advantages to be gained by placing such a decision into Awashunkes’ hands. Among these advantages, wanted widely in English memorials of the war, was a proprioceptive innocence. Increase Mather’s people of “innocent blood” (History 131) insisted that they “have not got the Land in possession by our own Sword” (143). The English desired, their texts repeatedly reveal, a clear conscience.\textsuperscript{345}

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{342} Bailey, Race and Redemption, pp. 15-38.
\textsuperscript{343} “Such assimilation,” writes Neal Salisbury, “was never considered as even a remote possibility” by the English in the New England colonies. “Red Puritans: The ‘Praying Indians’ of Massachusetts Bay and John Eliot” William and Mary Quarterly 31.3 (1974): 27-54.
\textsuperscript{345} Kathleen Donegan, “As Dying, Yet Behold, We Live: Catastrophe and Interiority in Bradford’s “Of Plymouth Plantation” Early American Literature 37.1 (2002): 9-37; Eve Tuck and K. Wayne
\end{footnotes}
Complementing this moral advantage, the apodosis to Church’s conditional sentence disavowed responsibility for what might happen to her. Curiously, in his recollection, Church did not actually promise her safety in exchange for her dependence. It might sound like he had, since safety would be logical counterpart to the renunciations he required. But he had not. Instead, Church promised her the prospect of ongoing conversation regarding her safety: “he would see her again quickly” (400). What he meant by this, most likely, was that, after liaising with the English at Plymouth regarding protection for her and her people, he would return to communicate to her what the English plans at Plymouth were. Yet such communication would bear little consequent relation to the fact of her “continuing steady in dependence” or “keeping within her own limits at Sogkonate.” Instead, the matter of his good will, manifest in his amenability to talk with her at all, would stand in for his more likely condition of limited authority to contract: in accord with Philip’s threatening assessment of English indifference, Church himself, or any single individual, could not actually do much to ensure the enduring the safety of Awashunkes or her people. Nor, according to the principle of self-interest that characterized the earliest settlements at Plymouth, did he have much incentive to try.

Benjamin Church’s parting exhortation, his entreaty that Awashunkes remain grateful for his assistance and that she prove her gratitude through steady dependence, has value here not primarily in proving deceit or hypocrisy, or even motivation by self-interest on the part of Church in particular, or English settlers in general. On that last account, at very least, the English

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346 Carl Schmitt identifies “everlasting conversation” (53) as the trait modern liberalism inherited from German Romanticism; though his texts postdate New England’s colonial settlement, the political tradition to which Novalis and Müller responded, early modern Spanish political philosophy, would not have been foreign to the hostilities of English reform Protestantism out of which Congregationalism emerged. Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty trans George Schwab (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1985).
themselves, especially at Plymouth, already avowed a shared constitutive character. Instead, Church’s story testifies to an intensification of personal responsibility as it was imputed to native people, responsibility that contracts and treaties formally depended on, but that also, less formally, warranted the making of promises and personal agreements, the compromises that implicitly followed mutual recognition of dependence, shared history, and intimate contact. This personal responsibility brought with it the expectation that native people experience these opportunities for compromise as generosities and boons on the part of the English, and the expectation, or at least hope, that gratitude for such generosity would energize compromise’s difficult work, work that entailed for native people greater and greater losses; for English, greater and greater gains.

Church’s conditional exhortation expanded the logic of John Winthrop’s sermon on Christian love into a new context, but it did so along a slightly different distribution of power. Winthrop, recall, on the brink of settlement and its challenges, had observed that compromise would be difficult, but argued, to preempt despair or discouragement in the face of those challenges, that love would “answer all things,” as Mary Rowlandson would write almost half a century later (364). This love had to be felt personally, and in that regard, it would be the most efficient safeguard against the debilitations of dispute, resentment, or faction in a high-stakes colonial setting. Church seems to have observed the value of such affectionate feeling between settlers and natives, in his insistence that he truly was a reliable ally, and that he cared not only for Awashunkes and her people, but also for the principle of peace. Nevertheless, not despite these desires, but for their sake, Church was also involved, actively and implicitly, in the reproduction of conditions of dependence that would make it easier, he imagined, to secure the experience of gratitude on the part of the native neighbors. For Church, reproduction of these conditions involved active, willful, and grateful participation in the conditions that disadvantaged

Awashunkes, the Saconet, and all cooperative native people more generally. But more importantly for this account of the affective manipulation that yokes the jeremiad with the war treaty, it involved his representation of the tenor of the encounter, of his desire to assert an interminable affective debt.

We have seen in this section that the rhetoric of personal responsibility shaped the avenues of negotiation English sought with those beyond their society. That these avenues and scripts might also bear with them specific affective intensities will be the argument of this chapter’s final section, which reveals the conditions in which steady dependence was framed, conditions of erratic and terror-inducing violence. Steady dependence, for settlers, required control of the conditions, material and rhetorical, that these English hoped would produce in their native neighbors a usefully emotional relationship. Unsteady dependence, on the other hand, suggests what may have been at stake in creating conditions of limited effectiveness on the part of leaders like Awashunkes and Philip. Dependence that was not steady was a dependence capable of reflection on those limitations to decision and action, yet likely, as the example of Philip showed, of responding to those limitations erratically, unpredictably, and with violence animated by resentment. As Church elaborated the conditions that had led him to war, he implied, in his sensitivity to Awashunkes’ closeness and vulnerability, that she had an obligation to reciprocity. Such intimacy should, implicitly, shore up the covenant that Church hoped to produce in this encounter, an agreement whose burden of fulfillment—a fidelity that could only ever be disproven—would never be on the party setting the terms. This implicit covenant was the setting for Church’s account of the war, and it explains a quiet but persistent tone that is rarely explicit in the war narratives, yet quietly present in all of them. It is a tone complementary to the disposition of the jeremiad. Colonial English understood themselves to be owed gratitude and affectionate allegiance to their safety. The reneging on that debt produced, as we will see, these peoples’ rage.

The People’s Rage
Perhaps it is because we have never been thoroughly convinced that the colonial settlers of New England sought for the hearts and bodies of their native neighbors the same sort of safety and salvation that they desired for themselves, that we have never taken seriously, nor perhaps even noticed the isomorphism between the ultimate abstract uncertainty of true conversion among English settlers, on one hand, and on the other, the ultimate practical uncertainty of true conversion among native people. Conversion was not a singular event for New England settlers, though its signal symptom, the conversion narrative, would among some Congregationalists, be meaningfully performed at a unique time and place. Quotidian conversion, and particularly its process of manifesting itself in a reformed way of living, had been a general goal of migration to and settlement in America, and to the degree that native people might be allowed to participate in that civic and spiritual renewal, their conversion might matter, too. At least two major obstacles impaired the pursuit of this general reformative goal. First, settlers faced resistance from native people to the strategic and ideological persuasions of English culture, as my second section above has explained. And second, as my first section above explained, even settlers in civic isolation from native people had to make sense of Calvinism’s essential knot—not ever knowing for certain who had been marked for salvation, even oneself. This second problem preceded settlement, but colonial Congregationalist procedure kindled that aporia as a socially dynamic problem. Drawing together the insights of my first and second sections, I will argue now that the sense of frustration toward an ideologically inescapable uncertainty manifested itself as rage, and that this experience of rage unified a group of English of mixed spiritual maturity in America.

This last section features close readings drawn out of the anonymously printed set of war-narratives attributed to Nathaniel Saltonstall, and particularly the first of the collection of five, the *Present State of New-England, with Respect to the Indian War*. First, I will show how the jeremiad’s rhetoric of filiopiety structured the ways that war narratives would make sense of and derive social value from initially shocking violence. War became an opportunity for prescribed memorialization, not only the memory of war leaders in general, but for lineages of familial fidelity that the war made visible. War narratives thus gratified English settlers’ desires to understand themselves as specially elect according to the terms put forward by the jeremiad that had flourished a decade prior. Next, I will show how the jeremiad’s rhetoric of filiopiety created value out of shocking violence in a second way, in justifying the heightened violence against native people. War, in these accounts, was necessary because native people could not be trusted to keep their covenants—neither the universal and implicit respect owed to all fathers by all sons, nor to the particular and explicit respect that, according to present and former treaties, the English understood themselves to be owed. And native fidelity to the former constituted, in some cases, reneging on the latter. For these reasons, the likelihood of faithfulness and thus the certainty of conversion among native people was nearly impossible. In the eyes of English settlers, it was largely undesired. My last section, culminating in a close reading of a scene of near vigilante violence against native converts, reveals how the unanswered dissatisfactions of the community of English elect inflamed the internecine aggression that, expressed centripetally, made them a “commonality.” This was the “Peoples Rage.”

In the outbreak of war, English found an opportunity for mnemonic acts of filial piety that the sermons of the previous decade had prescribed, acts that were not only discursive, but also, conveniently, affectionate and practical. Samuel Nowell, the eldest son of another Increase, and

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who had eyewitness knowledge of the war, explained this in a sermon clearly. In his 1678 sermon, “Abraham in Arms,” Nowell’s first synthetic observation on his chosen source-text, Genesis 14:14, was the perfect alignment between preparation for war and ideal fatherhood.

He was forthright about this doctrine: “the highest practice of Piety and practice of War may agree well in one person” (274). Abraham had fulfilled his responsibility to God, Nowell claimed, by teaching his household to be always ready for war. Attentive and mnemonically prepared congregants would, of course, recognize that Nowell’s passage referenced Abraham’s preparation for war against an alliance of kings in the valley of Siddim, a battle that took place before Abraham sired either of his sons, Ishmael or Isaac. Yet it had not taken place before God’s covenant with Abraham, in which the former had promised those sons in exchange for the latter’s promise of enduring obedience. Thus, as he taught his household, which consisted primarily then of servants, to be ready for war, Abraham prepared himself for his role as a father to an entire people. Such preparation also offered to his servants provisional status as family through acts of emulation, obedience and violence, acts that signaled in advance the prescriptions for unregenerate offspring in the seventeenth century. Given the novel absence in New England of a distinct military class, such exhortations as Nowell’s underscored the importance of sustaining the martial preparedness that the recently concluded War had necessitated. Such ongoing preparation for war, Nowell argued, could practically fulfill the requirement for active memory that sermons like Mather’s prescribed.

The writing of war narratives also participated in such memorialization. Many of these narratives, especially those of Increase Mather, feature exemplary acts of fidelity between fathers

and sons, and on the part of father-like generals for the soldiers in their charge, and on the part of the soldiers for their leaders. Mather, wrote, for example, of the "dutiful Son" of Captain Thomas Wheeler, also named Thomas Wheeler, who found himself "sorely wounded" in his attempt to save his father after the latter was shot in the arm in battle. Captain Thomas Wheeler, in his own narrative, "A Thankful Remembrance," affirmed the anecdote and elaborated on his son's risk. As the younger Wheeler "endeavoured to Rescue me" he proved "himself therein a loving and dutiful son" (245, italics original). Thomas Wheeler also commended the bravery of the "Son of Serjeant Pritchard" who did not survive such a risk on behalf of his contingent. Fathers, as Mather’s Joseph Rowlandson exemplarily did, mourned the losses of the "Children of [their] Bowels" (111); sons ought, therefore to lament and fear the "loss of Candlesticks" (109) of paternal guidance. Saltonstall, too, insisted on the enduring memory of the names of those who had fought for English safety, such as the name of Captain Samuel Moseley, “an excellent Souldier, and of an undaunted Spirit, one whose Memory will be Honourable in New-England (B). Such memorials answered directly the pulpit’s castigations, which tended to cite the fifth commandment as the most flagrantly disobeyed of them all. Mather inveighed at length in his history about the “rebellious breaches of the fifth Commandment, as may cause horror when we think of it” (181, italics original). According to the logic of the infinitely emulatable fathers, any acts or failures to act could be intensified as sins by the paired infraction of the commandment to "honor thy father and thy mother.” Episodes such as that of Wheeler or Pritchard signaled the best avenue for proving the redemptive merit of the English people.

Such bravery might, in some cases, even redeem the sins of the fathers, or mothers, as in the case of Edward Hutchinson, who died of wounds sustained during an ambush at Quabaog by natives with whom he was to make a treaty. Most histories do not point out explicitly that Edward Hutchinson’s mother was Anne Hutchinson, the domestic heretic condemned in 1637 for

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356 Exod. 20:12 Geneva.
357 Mather, Brief History 89.
corrupting the teachings of John Cotton and spreading that corruption among her English neighbors.\textsuperscript{358} The court banished her from the Massachusetts Bay Colony; with her family she moved to Rhode Island to reside near Williams and his Narragansett Neighbors who, in 1645, killed her.\textsuperscript{359} Only six children remained with her at the time; Edward had by then moved back to Boston where he inherited the old family home.\textsuperscript{360} Winthrop, in his \textit{Journal}, barely commented on her fate, much less mourned it, but his revelation that one of Anne’s daughters, Susanna, had been taken captive by these natives, and lived among them from the age of 8 to 12, and, further, that she was “loth to have come from the Indians” after she was restored by Dutch soldiers, recasts the urgency of Edward Hutchinson’s pious martial leadership. Both Anne and Susanna are missing from Mather and Saltonstall’s stories, but these narratives do point out the intensified grievance that so valuable an Englishman should also have lost his mother to native violence. His Abrahamic martial performance effectively redeemed his lineage’s less illustrious memory.

By contrast, native people appeared more and more in these narratives as incapable of faithfulness—perhaps, these narratives claim, essentially so. Though Mather saw among native fathers and sons and intense familial affection, such affection did not in his eyes translate into action. Mather signaled his skepticism when he wrote in his history that “the breach of the fifth Commandment is one of the greatest National sins, which the Indians are guilty of” (181). His use of “Nation” here, I want to suggest, is ironic. Earlier in that same text Mather had named natives as “those which are not a people” and thus the indication of a nation here, more potently if read insincerely, signals Mather’s desire to argue not only that a shared lineage was necessary for a


nation, but also affection and respect along those lines. Such skepticism was inscribed in these narratives both specifically and generally, and in its specific instantiation, fortified English theories and generalities.

English had given their native neighbors many opportunities to prove their fidelity to the settlers’ ideology—they had been offering native people such opportunities since they first debarked at Plymouth. Furthermore, as colonial settlement flourished, the English remembered to make good on those promises that they had earlier made to their English investors, to evangelize the native people in addition to reforming their own ways. John Eliot was perhaps the most actively committed to that promise; he founded several camps, later towns, where those who demonstrated sufficient evidence of the will to reform might find safety, and guidance towards reform under Eliot’s biblically-sourced rules, from the seemingly minute, such as the prohibition of the custom of some native people to kill lice with one’s teeth on pain of a fine, to the more severe, such as fining any native person found idle. Eliot energetically lobbied the English and New England colonial governments for the land and authority to realize his elaborate plans for conversion. Yet though the government in the metropole readily endorsed his actions, the colonial government maintained active hostility and suspicion towards the sincerity of the people in the “praying towns” that bordered and limited their own land claims.

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361 James Drake affirms that “the Puritans saw groups of Indians not as foreign nations but as inhabitants and subjects of colonial polities” (37); “Restraining Atrocity: The Conduct of King Philip’s War” New England Quarterly 70.1 (1997): 33-56

362 The question of English evangelizers’ sincerity in their desires to convert Indians has fascinated historians almost as much as the question of native converts’ sincerity fascinated the evangelizers. For a summary of the historiographical debates in the last decades of the twentieth century, see Richard Cogley, “Idealism vs. Materialism in the Study of Puritan Missions to the Indians” Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 3.2 (1991): 165-82; as well as Pulsipher’s selected bibliography in “Massacre,” p. 465, fn. 20.


English reasons for suspicion towards the people Mather called the “perfect Children of the Devill” (116) seized on the specific figure of King Philip, for his actions were, according to the war historians, not only threatening to the safety of the English, but they were also evidence of a general disposition of infidelity to native-settler contracts. Philip’s story, too, was a lesson in filiopety, but a negative one; and one that sheds light on the pull of horizontal commitments that are often at stake in vertical allegiance. Philip was the son of Massasoit, the sachem of the Wampanoag who had first made a treaty with the Mayflower’s English settlers at Plymouth in 1620. The war narratives of 1675-76 often turned to the treaty between Massasoit and the English as knowledge that was necessary for a full understanding of Philip’s infidelity in consolidating several polities of native people. These narratives point to the treaty in order to insist that Philip’s revolt was all the more outrageous in its unfaithfulness to the memory of his father. In these explanations, the war narratives signal a quiet knowledge of the anxious experience of intergenerational covenanting, of the unelected inheritance that had so troubled the second and third generation of English settlers as it bound them to a preexisting covenant.

The position of Philip’s native allies may not have been as unfamiliar to English settlers as their narratives often seem to want to claim. This is clearest in the verse history of the war that Benjamin Tompson composed, wherein he ironically ventriloquized specific knowledge of English strategies of power and usurpation. Like many narratives, Tompson’s would include dialogue attributable directly to King Philip. Whereas most other prose narratives of the war quote native speech with condescending, if not mocking dialect to approximate poor native grasp of the English language, Tompson could represent Philip’s speech with precision and subtlety structured by the heroic couplet form. He imagined Philip beginning a speech to his followers thus: “My friends, our fathers were not half so wise / As we ourselves who see with younger eyes”

366 Mourt’s Relation, or, a Journall of the Pilgrims at Plymouth ed. Dwight B. Heath (Boston: Applewood, 1986); see also James Drake, King Philip’s War, pp. 16-34.
(218). Church’s use of alliteration emphasizes the apposition between friends and fathers, and represents Philip, in the first words of his speech, overreaching the formality that filial respect required by suggesting, even if only briefly, that he, their son, was their friend, too, and a poor friend, one that was enabled in his betrayal of a vertical covenant because he undervalued like one of his horizontal ones. All of the narratives that cite Philip’s infidelity to his father also cite his more recent 1671 treaty with the English at Boston—some, like Mather’s, even quote it (151). In so doing, they insist on Philip’s responsibility—to his father, to the English, to everyone except his own countrymen and constituents in the present. Yet Tompson’s account of Philip’s acts of infidelity to English and to his ancestors, in order to make sense of his political method of persuasion, goes on to represent in surprisingly frank detail many of the grievances that these native people would have endured. Tompson’s prosopopoeia of someone so untrustworthy as Philip ironically interrupts the logic of the native people, and yet signals, in doing so, what one theorist of modern rhetoric sees as a “temporary identification” and, provisionally, “participation in the cultural politics under attack” (266).³⁶⁸

King Philip objectively personified a general English skepticism toward the possibility of fidelity. And because English success during the war depended on each and every “Indian that deserted his Fellows” (Mather, History, 137), these narratives occasionally feature examples of broader filial perfidy among unnamed and unspecial natives, such as the Nipmuc father and son captured and killed by the English near the end of Saltonstall’s first missive (B2 verso). This story inverts the filial piety of stories such as those of Wheeler or Pritchard or even of Edward Hutchinson, and it does so not only formally but consequentially, since the English had seized this father and son as suspects in the search for justice for the death of Hutchinson a few days prior. Their lives, should they be found directly guilty, would presumably settle that score. Yet not only must they die in exchange for Hutchinson’s life, but they must also serve as a thematic counterpart to exemplify the negative of what Hutchinson had signified, a faithlessness

commensurate with English fidelity. Thus, the thematic, as well as narrative gratification the English must have felt, not only when they read of the individual interrogation of father and son, in which any discrepancy between their stories would prove that at least one of them were lying; but more specifically, when they read how this unnamed father claimed to be one of the praying Indians, and insisted that his son was not. Still worse, he testified that his had been part of the ambush that had killed Hutchinson. Regardless of the specific truth-content of the father’s confession, such an episode would have testified more fundamentally to an underlying capacity to betray the care that might be expected of a father for his own rising and future generation. After the interrogation, the English killed them both.

The Present State synthesized the contrast between English fidelity and native infidelity, and the effects of that articulation come most forcefully together in a scene of English unification through a shared experience of what he named “the Peoples Rage.” Their rage would manifest itself in the dissemination of the feeling unjust victimhood that rose to violent expression in popular anti-native riots. This rage in part drew on the experience of a fear that was, to the minds of English, undeserved, an enduring experience of injustice elaborated in my first chapter above. The Present State rehearsed some of those symptoms of the effect of stressful surveillance by those on the margins of the pious community. Now, fifty years later, the conversion of natives and their residence in neighboring praying towns—sometimes on highly coveted land—did little to ease that fear, and in fact, intensified its more general persistence.369 Rage, at least in part, named the English reaction to the unfairness of ongoing, now decades-long fear. But now it would draw additionally on an English resentment that preceded the encounter between English and native, and the treaties that these encounters produced.

Saltonstall did not explain the rage that he cited in his narrative’s most graphic and violent episode, the formation of a mob that tried and eventually succeeded in hanging an unnamed native seized from one of the praying towns, an execution that he likened to the killing

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369 Jean M. O’Brien, Dispossession by Degrees; and Bross, “The Epithet of Praying.”
of a dog. But he did document an affective enthusiasm that the English brought to this violence, and in doing so, the *Present State* reveals a connection between anti-native violence, and prior dissatisfactions with English settlement. The peoples’ rage followed loss of control over a shared and ideologically valid principle for civic and political recognition.

As I showed in my first section, the jeremiad drew on a relationally indistinct displeasure towards the limits of Calvinism’s applicability to civic life, and a more explicit dissatisfaction with the social compromise that this limit produced. This compromise resulted in the appearance, if not the actuality, of spiritual free-riding among the English, what might have looked like attempts to sneak one’s family into the city of God through the back door, as, for example, some of the women of Cambridge were observed to have done. These women, not affiliated with the elect by birth or marriage, and who had hitherto not shown any archivally enduring sings that they had wanted to join that community in the first place, had waited until they were pregnant or recently delivered in order to be baptized along with their offspring. These children would have access, now, to greater social status in the congregational polity, greater access to land, and to enfranchisement and participation in colonial governance. To observe the inclusion of these undeserving children may likely have resulted in not a little exasperation, at best, on the part of those who had worked at very least a little bit more anxiously for signs of their own salvation’s assurance than had these very ignorant and very young youth. Though such robust preparation was never promised to natives at the praying towns, the ideological grounds on which such towns were built—the premise that God might choose any body as his elect, and that this election would any rate exceed any human certainty—would have inflamed the ire of those English settlers all the more.

As these resentful people strove toward greater reconciliation and cooperation, native people appeared now as a useful foil against which the unregenerate might work to prove their

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merit, if not election.\textsuperscript{371} Consider, as an example of such triangulation, Saltonstall’s account of the exploits of Cornellis, a Dutchman condemned and pardoned for acts of piracy. “To shew his Gratitude,” this Cornellis “went out and did several good Services abroad against the Enemy” (B). In early July 1675, for example, Cornellis nearly caught King Philip, bringing back and wearing proudly Philips’ own cap. He was then tasked with a special scouting errand, though, perhaps not having yet earned fully the trust of the English, he was told to return within three hours, “on pain of death.” Puritan historians since Perry Miller ought to be thoroughly grounded in grammar and rhetoric, and thus, knowing that the concept of the errand bears at least two meanings, may not be surprised to find that Cornellis substituted his own errand for the one he had been tasked with. Cornellis returned, reporting that he had destroyed forty canoes, that he had killed thirteen natives, and to substantiate these claims, he brought back eight natives alive. But Cornellis had returned five hours late. The War Council, proving fidelity to their word, sentenced him to death, again. Then they again immediately pardoned him, and then they gave him some thanks. If, as my first chapter argues, the balance of mercy and justice within the commonwealth depended on the balance between mercy and extremity beyond it, Cornellis’ legitimated impunity reveals extremity’s use in earning a sort of mercy, and it also reveals, even before that, the calculated use of mercy to secure that prized vehicle of social control, debt, affectively verified by gratitude.

English extremity, able to make finer and finer distinctions among European settlers, now became an instrument in controlling distinctions among natives, and in asserting greater control over English security. Here we see how the anticipatory tenor of the Jeremiad produced the violent settler codes by which natives had more and more to live by should they want to remain alive—and this summary of a desire to live is more than a glib formulation. Such an experience of willful wanting, like that demanded of Awashunkes by Benjamin Church, took an even more intensely contingent form in the formal decree that Saltonstall’s relation reproduced. Recall first,

\textsuperscript{371} To exemplify the “degrees of otherness” that the settler recognized, James Drake cites the English Puritan selective violence and against Irish Catholics during the 1640s. “Restraining Atrocity” 49-50.

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however, how Increase Mather, in his sermon, *The Day of Trouble is Near*, had elaborated on the various meanings of the word “near.” It signified many things, Mather claimed: spatial nearness; nearness as probability; and finally, temporal imminence. If, according to the rhetoric of the jeremiad, such nearby trouble was proof that God still violently cared about the English, then it’s probable that such techniques as Mathers’ quantitative speculation on these troubles’ temporal approach, particularly in 1673, gave specificity to the more and more desirable and spectacular catastrophe, and gave terms, also, to the enduring suspicions toward native people that Philip’s 1662 and 1671 treaties did little to quell.

These jitters appear in the order ratified on 30 August 1675, and that Saltonstall reproduced in full in his *Present State*, and which he introduced to point to fear’s productive anticipation: “the English, not thinking themselves yet secure enough” (B2) decided to make more laws. Insecurity, like a war on terror, responds to fears that are potentially infinite. Yet unlike later wars on an affective state, Saltonstall’s insecurities had clear connections to prior anxieties and antagonisms among the English. Why were they insecure? No one asked him this question, but Saltonstall offered an answer anyway, and he did so, tellingly, in the present tense, signaling reformed Christianity's perhaps timeless problem. The English thought themselves insecure “because they cannot know a Heathen from a Christian by his Visage, nor Apparel.”

The order began, like Church’s narrative did, with the matter of willful wanting, and of making that will evident in behavior: “Those Indians that are desirous to approve themselves faithful to the English,” were the object of the order, identified in the its first sentence. They were directed, in what followed, to a series of significant changes in quotidian life. They were ordered to move to certain designated “residencies…Natick, Punquapaog, Nashoba, Wamesit, and Hassanmeesit” (B2, verso); ordered never to entertain “any strange Indians” once there; ordered...

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to confine their movement within a one-mile radius; ordered to always have English chaperones with them when they did move; and finally, the order warned that were they to reject such terms for their protection, were they to forego such hospitality, to offer unauthorized hospitality, to move beyond their boundaries, or to move at all without English accompaniment, then they would be subject to the violence of any English person, who could now, according to the terms of this document, “account themselves wholly Innocent, and their Blood or other Damage (by them sustained) will be upon their own heads.”

To the degree that every English settler might feel this fear, it would produce a shareable rage that unified English in acts of affectively charged violence, and into what Saltonstall would call a “Commonality” of the people. It is out of this fear that the English learned the lesson that the Present State made clear in its last sentence: populist rage was the only reasonable reaction to the discovery that there was no reliable difference between preying Indians and praying Indians—in other words, that divine election was unpredictable. After narrating the execution of the anonymous native father and son for participating in the killing of Edward Hutchinson, Saltonstall told the story of what happened when Captain Moseley captured eight of Eliot’s praying Indians. The narrative does not justify their seizure, but it need not have been anything more nefarious than taking a walk without a chaperone. Along with several other native captives who would be sentenced and shipped to Calais, these eight were brought to trial. These eight however, the English court condemned to die. Eliot and his colleague, Major Daniel Gookin, who was more reviled for his defense of the natives from a position of lesser political standing than Eliot, together lobbied earnestly for clemency for these captives.373 Apparently, this took some time, and the executions were stayed. Before any punishment could take place, several of the eight were snuck out the back door, “let loose by night, which so Exasperated the Commonality” that, around 9PM on the night of September 10th, probably just after dark, the English at Boston formed a mob, and sought the leadership of a hopefully sympathetic and evidently key-carrying

373 J. Patrick Cesarini, “‘What Has Become of Your Praying to God?’: Daniel Gookin’s Troubled History of King Philip’s War” Early American Literature 44.3 (2009): 489-515.
Captain Oliver, to “break open the Prison, and take one Indian out thence and Hang him” (D). Oliver declined. In the morning, he notified Mr. Ting (Tyng), one of Boston’s justices of the peace, who also happened to be his neighbor, and who, within the week, issued an order for one especially notorious of the prisoners, to be hanged. Saltonstall described his violence with unusual enthusiasm.

In Saltonstall’s composition, the actions of this mob, desirous of violence beyond legal procedure, qualified the collective he called a “Commonality,” and this episode clarified and nominally introduced the affect that these people shared, their rage. “Thus,” he wrote after the death of this praying Indian, “thus was the Peoples Rage laid in some measure but in a short time it began to work (not without Cause enough)” (D). The pages to follow narrate the flourishing of such collective will, a fearsome expression of democracy. In what one historian calls a “mutiny,” the soldiers at Roxbury invoked their possession of the force of their weapons, which decades prior, John Winthrop had hoped not to make widely available for precisely this reason. The mutiny rejected their insufficiently democratically selected leader, Captain Daniel Henchman, who was also, like Gookin, of the earlier generation, and seen to be too lenient with the praying Indians. Against this militia’s uprising, the Massachusetts General Court could do nothing. The people at Charlestown fasted. Some Quakers at Boston were publicly beat and humiliated. The entire colony now turned to fast. Now there was a mysterious fire at Chelmsford, less mysterious to the English when they looked to the Wamesit people next-door. A fire at Springfield, presumed to have been started by a nearby encampment of praying Indians, provoked the towns nearby, like the mob at Boston, to rise “without any Command or Leader, and [slay] all of them they could find” (E verso). In Saltonstall’s telling, these were signs for hope—

hope for the unification of English settlers despite the antagonisms that may have earlier prevented such community. It was a hope based on a common-sense paranoia that made Hezekiah Usher’s pun on prayer and predation so gratifying.378 Realizing they were prey and now wiser for it, “care is now taken,” Saltonstall concluded, “to satisfie the (Reasonable) desires of the Commonality” (E2). Reason’s restoration would provide the present state with closure, though yet the war wore on. Reason, lest their rage seem to occlude their justice.

This rage preexisted its objects of violence, as did the necessity for an affective verified “Commonality.” Saltonstall’s term invokes the idea of the Commonwealth, a word rich with significance in the discourse of seventeenth century political theory, as well as in the discourse of New England’s colonial administration. A commonwealth legitimated sovereignty, the right to kill or let live. Such a commonwealth, for thinkers like Thomas Hobbes or John Winthrop, signaled a body of people united by a contract or covenant, implicit or explicit, but one that in either case entailed ongoing fidelity to a rule of law and law’s procedure.379 Such fidelity drew as a resource on a shared experience of nationhood or religious piety, or even, as episodes like that of Cornelis’ errand show, practiced violence against non-European neighbors. But Saltonstall’s version of community did not overlap precisely with the law-abiding commonwealth, as his narrated episodes of near-anarchy suggest. Saltonstall’s Commonality, in the assessment of at least one historian, exemplified an “unconscious” struggle to define democracy, and in doing so, that body attested to a condition of shared debt that and resentment that, I have argued, qualified a community defined by the unbequethability of belief—the unbequethability, in other words, of an efficacious individual will. This form of generational debt, some political theorists speculate, lies at the heart of community, and not only etymologically.380 Commonality, like community, signaled no

378 Mark Rifkin, Settler Common Sense: Queerness and Everyday Colonialism in the American Renaissance (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 2014).
shared possession, no identity or common plot of land, but instead, a shared state of being
unidentifiably possessed, obligated, and ineffably affected by this unelected debt. The
restlessness of the rage, its relational foreclosures will become visible in my final chapter, which,
out of this general climate of dynamic resentment, alights its critical foot on that slender, brittle
branch named friendship.

CHAPTER 4: With Friends Like These

This chapter argues that colonial friendship perfected rather than subverted, the aspirationally
transcendent ideology of settler colonialism in New England. This chapter’s argument on the
consistency of friendship holds perhaps the highest stakes of the dissertation’s incremental arc.
This is because it’s object of analysis, friendly affection, has the capacity to appear most powerful
in opposition to the historical condition from which it nevertheless emerges. I argue here that the
intimate experience of terror and grief can provoke the desire for a category of social feeling
distinct form the conditions of political life. As we have seen, most affective experience was not
distinct, though it may seem to have been from the present. Each chapter has focused on
representations of the practical unfolding of the emotional prescriptions circulated by the colony’s
civic and theological leaders. Yet in times of extraordinary intimate distress, as the stories of
Anthony Thacher, Roger Williams and Mary Rowlandson will show, a settler individual might
desire reprieve from these stressful injunctions. The mode of relief sought—more sincere, more
heartfelt affection; affection unmoored from productive social bonds—cedes ultimately to the
ideologically dominant process of settler subjectivity. “If a full heart then asks, what can we love
fervently, answers are ready, and the process attains to ideological allegiance” (117).381

I have cited Mitchell Breitwieser’s account of Rowlandson’s social context in order to
signal in advance how densely violence appears to be embedded in received modes for

381 Mitchell Breitwieser, American Puritanism and the Defense of Mourning: Religion, Grief and
Ethnology in Mary White Rowlandson’s Captivity Narrative. (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press,
1990).
understanding affective life. Breitwieser, in the monograph that secured Mary Rowlandson’s place in the early American archive, is describing here the latter days of New England’s Congregationalist theocracy, describes its mobile and vigilant synthesis of familial love into a more comprehensive political fealty. For Breitwieser, as for many contemporary readers, the heart speaks for the individual whose intensity of will or striving defines the early modern subject. The image of the heart richly conveys and circulates the perpetual, life-sustaining flow of blood, and it speaks on behalf of the energies of the entire body, as well as of a group of individuals—here the individuals who were so often collectively described as one corpus. Here, the heart is an interior metonym, an object within the whole that acts as the spokesperson for the whole. Its hidden, well-buffered location means that the heart, the essence of the human, will never touch, nor attain immediate access to the ready objects of affection, the answers which may very likely overlap with their speaker or vehicle. Unless, that is, the contents of the heart be exposed by bloodletting or violence. For this reason, the leap from loving catechism—from the apostrophic search for a steady and constant end to that striving—the leap from there to ideological allegiance, requires cleavage through politically unifying violence, an often terrifying leap by which by which ideology is perfected and faith, as that of Kierkegaard’s Abraham, made complete. An enemy antagonizes and mediates blood’s work; the closer the foe the better.

What then of love’s passage and momentary habitation in the house of the enemy?

Love, as we have seen, loves the neighbor and the fences. Pious Christians strove to do likewise: acts of love defined the self alongside proximate others, and, depending on the genres

for its expression—friendship, for example—love could retard the fearful approach of the stranger, or whatever it was that “doesn’t love a wall,” as Robert Frost put it. English settlers found in their New World neighbors an opportunity to exercise their works of love. Thus far, most of the exercise I have read moved endogenously, close-heartedly. This chapter turns outward, and shows how that centrifugal turn provoked a transformation in inward expectations for the heart’s fulfillment. More specifically, this chapter reveals how the desire for deep feeling emerged for colonial New England settlers out of their frustrations and dissatisfactions with colonial prescriptions for sharing feeling; frustrations and dissatisfactions that became evident to settlers when they were able to look a little more clearly beyond their fences and walls. Love began to look stranger, as it should for us, too.

In order to briefly indicate the gulf between so seemingly similar usages, consider the currency of love in a neighboring colonial settlement, Roger Williams’ Rhode Island. Among the more open-hearted English, preceding Mary Rowlandson by a generation, Roger Williams stands out for his unusually high degree of commitment to a belief in the power of love to surpass old fences—prejudice and fear—and newly reinstall others—conscience, and perhaps nation. Williams could measure love’s power. It was stronger than money. It could, as the Biblical philosopher-king Solomon observed, “answer all things,” even the demands of the sometime-enemy, antecedents to Frost’s “old-stone savage armed.” Love was a currency more widely accepted: “It was not price nor money that could have purchased Rhode Island,” Williams wrote in a testimony twenty-three years after the fact. “Rhode Island,” he insisted, “was purchased by love; by the love and favor which that honorable gentleman Sir Henry Vane and myself had,” with an exceptional Narragansett, a man in whom Williams described the “sparks of true Friendship,” that “great Sachem, Miantonomo” (306). Roger Williams had had “ocular knowledge of

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persons, places and transactions," of the Narragansett, and he probably understood that it was no simple "love" exchanged between native people and the English in 1636, but a more complicated negotiation of martial alliance and territorial use. ³⁸⁵ "Love" however, and "friendship" are the terms that Williams used to condense that complexity and to translate it into the New England settlers’ vernacular. ³⁸⁶ The ability to identify friendly love between settlers and native people depended on looking—and feeling—past the material conditions that distinguished them; eminent among these conditions were territory, nation and religion.

Defined as loving feeling, friendship does not banish the aggression assumed by fences, but more quietly preserves it. Aggression persists in several early American texts of love, as well as more modern representations—though to find it requires, within contemporary norms for affectionate affiliation, maybe a little more work. Modern descriptions of friendship typically assume the vocabulary of affection and sentiment, and with reason: feelings can measure important affective properties of friendship; feelings are invisible and, presumably, more personal than the social and therefore historically contingent practices that often characterize public life. For these reasons, feelings appear to be the most flexible and universally valid solvent for the stuff of friendship. Feelings preserve and circulate the social category of friendship across social boundaries such as gender, race, or class—even time: as the intense affiliation one experiences upon reading a sympathetic text from a distant time or place. Because it can, in theory, cross all such boundaries, philosophers and practitioners of friendship imagine that a capacity for friendship is essential to humanity, or the human quality in other creaturely life. Those boundaries

³⁸⁶ These terms, "love," "friendship," and "one body," were shorthand that John Winthrop used to exhort his fellow shipmates aboard the Arabella in his canonical address to them on departing. They invoked the solemnity of contracts and covenants among a people still negotiating, sometimes explicitly, a theologically sound degree of fealty to written laws. Hugh Dawson, "John Winthrop’s Rite of Passage: The Origins of the ‘Christian Charitie’ Discourse" Early American Literature 26.3 (1991): 219-231; and Dawson, "Christian Charite as Colonial Discourse: Rereading Winthrop’s Sermon in its English Context" Early American Literature 33.2 (1998): 117-148, as well as above, chapter one.
and whatever lies beyond, can, still, have a profound effect on how friendship is experienced, how it’s felt. These extrinsic factors shape feeling as well as the ability to recognize feeling in others. When the literature on friendship ignores material differences by foregrounding feeling as its foundation, it closes its eyes to its own exclusions.

Storytelling reveals the historical modes for cultivating fellow-feeling. Typological storytelling, in particular, offered the most dynamic template for sharing experience in Early America, generating one of the strongest foundations for similarity among citizens. Take the following example, which generates friendly feeling by making the enemy, for a moment—a long blink, perhaps—disappear: Here, experience recounted through recourse to typological precedent evokes emotions—sad ones—to establish friendly feeling, but the story does so on at least two interpretive levels, one more exclusive than the other. In the winter of 1675/6, Mary Rowlandson paused at the banks of a river, probably the Ashuelot River where it met the Connecticut River—today, the borders of present-day Massachusetts, Vermont and New Hampshire meet a few miles away. Rowlandson wrote about the moment only two or three years later, after crossing and returning to her English community in Boston. From that temporal remove, she described the emotions that she felt then through a story still further in the past. “By the rivers of Babylon,” she quoted the words of the prophet Isaiah, “there we sat down, yea we wept, when we remembered Zion” (42).387 Her implicit comparison between the river at hand and the rivers of Babylon makes sense to readers not only, and not even primarily, through the evident typological pattern, the technique by which the settlers of New England collectively affirmed divine Providence that shaped life’s course and shone ahead of them as its fulfillment. Even when readers do not or did not feel particular sympathy for Rowlandson’s predicament, it is easy to acknowledge that these images—the inability or refusal to stand; the topographical impediment that ought also to bring life and refreshment; and the similarly fluid tears that it evokes—also function as a metaphor or, in a

more modern idiom, an “objective correlative” for the feelings of weariness and grief that Rowlandson, and that other Biblical group of weeping people must have felt. Rowlandson’s first usage of the first-person plural now expands. In dilates to include those who remember Zion, and perhaps also includes those for whom such an assembly of images successfully evokes emotion. Rowlandson’s tears sought a commensurate sympathetic reaction, quite possibly even from the hearts of contemporary readers. As we will see below, the move through and past typology, a movement effected by sympathetic feeling, was a historically crucial rhetorical technique that Mary Rowlandson’s text exemplarily invoked and continues to deploy.

At this point, the eighth “Remove” of her narrative of captivity, Rowlandson was traveling with a large group of people, and most of these people did not remember Zion. Even if they were descended from the ten lost tribes of Israel, as some reform Protestant theologians had speculated, many had rejected the gospel brought to them by the English, and through engaging in war with God’s true chosen people, made themselves the embodiment of the enemy. They were, from Rowlandson’s standpoint in captivity, analogous to “Babylon”. But because they were not geographically fixed like the ancient and impressive city, and because they were the enemy, their own experience of territorial dispossession and sojourn receded from sight. Rowlandson’s rhetorical turn to a Biblical past, a move so common in her culture as to hardly be worth remarking on, ensured that the vector of emotion remained narrow. She focused single-mindedly on one sympathetic experience, and thus the fulfillment of pattern from narrative symbol in a text to its iconic enactment in the flesh aggressively sealed off Rowlandson’s recollection of perception from the possibility of observing in the gestures of her captors even the most basic embodied feelings—being tired, for example, or hungry—to say nothing of those feelings’ historical or cultural associations. Her allusive style, which pushes just past conventional use, framed the visibility of immediate fellow-feeling in order to extend a certain sort of friendship

through time, and render other forms of community emotionally invisible. The enemy, which had
and still surrounded her, disappeared.

Some Versions of Friendship

Friendship limits itself when it turns away from the enemy. This is so both abstractly, and it is so
with respect to the individual animosities that provoke the turn to theory in the first place. Before
attending to some of the historically specific conditions that help produce this aversive tendency,
let me survey the history of theorizing about friendly feeling. The openness of friendship, writes
Derrida, “to think friendship with an open heart,” means, among other things, “to think it as close
as possible to its opposite” (39), to imagine perhaps being wrong about the boundaries
separating enemy from ally, and ally from friend. War opposes friendship in its scale—it is
collective rather than individual—and in quality—antagonism rather than amity. War unifies a
community around its animosity for a collective antagonist, since, striving for consensus, the state
encourages individuals to absorb its perspective on the values that determine the visible qualities
of what Aristotle described as “another self.” It also shapes the feelings perceived towards that
other individual—for example, by fostering national identification within the jurisdiction of a state
that will condition fear towards non-state actors, such as pirates, say, or those who insufficiently
recognize Protestantism’s cleavage of religion from civil society. Once naturalized through
feelings, these characteristics consolidate political fealty against the threat of bare life beyond.
Often this naturalization of feeling takes place unreflectively, but the writings on friendship in early
American wartime illuminate those qualities in the negative, like shadows around a fire. Thus,
after this brief review of the philosophies of friendship, three stories will reveal how an intimate
experience with the enemy elicited sustained thought about friendship’s identifying qualities, as
well as the modes and motivations for representing those friends in writing. These texts—a letter,
a prescriptive guide and a descriptive memoir—display the desire to affirm an affective foundation
for friendship, as well as the limits to that desire, limits shaped by the colonial experience.

Friendship’s strength remains its idiosyncratic dynamism, its ability to adapt according to its participating individuals over and in spite of their historical situation. For this reason, friendship has offered philosophers and intellectuals the possibility of thinking beyond historicism as well as definitions of genre. How, therefore, to describe it? A.C. Grayling, in the most recent popular attempt, correctly begins with this descriptive difficulty. And of the many possible genealogies, Grayling’s is exemplary not exceptional when he understands friendship as an abstraction that exists before its complicated unfolding in practice. He begins in the jeremiad mode, soliciting authority by means of a lament: In the contemporary age, friendship has lost an originary, Platonic integrity. “Indeed,” he writes,

the words “friend” and “friendship” have become so stretched and extended as to have lost a good deal of their meaning and this even before we ask in what sense there can be friends across sexes and ages, cultures and ethnicities, divides of experience and oppositions of attitude. (3)

Grayling discourages separating theories of friendship from practice; assuming, first, that it is possible to do so. In his perspective, the qualities that distinguish individuals are secondary and external obstacles, rather than active factors that shape inward life. Grayling yields that friendship proves itself across differences between people, but that friendship originates within certain boundaries, within the emotionally robust and reflective individual, to be extended outward at will.

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when it encounters sympathetic likeness in someone else. He begins with a causal philology:

With philoi, amicus, and friend, he plots three points on a straight line that he then follows through their consequent elaborations in the literature of Europe and Anglo-America. It appeared variously as a personal end and means, as with Plato’s Socrates; as an ethical and political value, as with Aristotle; and as a problem for theologians such as Aristotle and Aquinas. In the early modern era, friendship acquired its recognizable emotional intensity: Montaigne and Bacon wrote of their passionate feelings for specific friends rather than for friends in the abstract, as Socrates had desired. Smith, Hume and Kant tempered that intensity, describing ideal friendship as a cool and rational affinity between liberal subjects. Perhaps because they saw it as a matter of private life, it has, mostly disappeared from philosophical discourse until recently.  

In order to establish continuity with modern descriptions of friendship, Grayling deemphasizes the military or martial aspects of friendship in the ancient Greek context, the hataeries cultivated between men for stronger cohesion among those who protected the polity; and elaborated in Roman culture in service of smoother governance and commerce. Christian theology reactivated the porousness between friendly thought and militant thought—the infiltration of Christian love’s possibly infinite reach, a reach that militated against the human manifestations of evil in the world. Who, they asked, can’t the heart love? Christianity’s founding prophet had demanded that his followers erode the boundary between individual affinities and political commitments when he instructed them to love their neighbors as their own selves, to love

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393 Horst Hutter, Politics as Friendship: The Origins of Classical Notions of Politics in the Theory and Practice of Friendship (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier, 1978). More recently, Foucault’s description of “Friendship as a Way of Life” reactivates that tradition when he writes of the unique history of men’s friendships alongside martial experience. He cites, for example, the close intimacy of men during World War I, for whom constantly “death was present and finally the devotion to one another and the services rendered were sanctioned by the play of life and death” (139). Foucault, Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth trans. Paul Rabinow (New York: New Press, 1978).
neighbors who might be anyone, including the enemy. Indeed, Jesus, and his most important 
exegete, Paul, exhorted Christians to love even their enemies. Could friendship exist in 
Christianity if enemies merited equal treatment as friends? For Augustine, friendship merited 
comparable scrutiny as enmity, since insufficient vigilance towards the personal qualities of the 
friend might cause the Christian to overlook potentially harmful, even treacherous tendencies and 
thereby cause Christians to err in their goals of using the world and its inhabitants as means 
towards the only acceptable end of loving God. Aquinas, following Augustine, considered how it 
would be possible to love the enemy as the enemy. He recommended loving the enemy as if he 
were the neighbor; but to love the enemy as an enemy required a special sort of love that was 
beyond human understanding. Therefore one could only try to prepare herself for the possibility 
of loving the enemy as enemy, an anticipatory mode familiar to the New England settlers in their 
pursuit of assurance of divine election. Christian love, absorbed into the genealogy of friendship 
Grayling described, moves counter-historically, away from specific qualities of hostile strangers. 

European colonization of the New World, an intra- and inter-continental antagonism, 
brought forth some of the finer political philosophical details of enemy status, in progressively 
more detailed definitions for waging just war. The rivalry between European states—other 
Christian states—was not the same as the enmity Europeans perceived when they encountered 
or anticipated the encounter with the indigenous American population. In his comparison of 
Vitoria and Gentili’s theories of just war, Chris Tomlins observes that, for Vitoria’s Relectio (1539), 
war implied the mutual sovereignty of states, and therefore only Christians could declare just war. 
Vittoria allowed that defense or resistance against aggressors might theoretically allow non-
Christians to wage just war, but that there would most likely never be a just reason to resist the 
arrival of Christian planters. Following him, Alberto Gentili, in his De iure Belli (1552) argued that 
war might be justly waged by non-Christian states, yet the participants in war had to be 
identifiable as states—pirates, for example, could not wage “war,” since they acted on behalf of 

2003), pp. 3-39.
extra-state interests. Violent parties had to possess such institutions as senates, treasuries and legislatures, since these were necessary conditions “for a treaty of peace, should matters so shape themselves” (25), but in that case, the enemy would have to appear to have such elements of civilization.395 The enemy appeared first, in relationship with the European, and in terms of religious affiliation; then he appeared independently, and in terms of civic infrastructure. Both discourses, as tacit contrasts, informed the intense and deeply-felt fusion of civic and religious life, the similis simili gaudet of a body “knit together” that the first ideologues of the New England colonies, such as Winthrop and Bradford, encouraged in their visions for ideal social life.396 Fellow-feeling, a shared emotional orthodoxy, facilitated rightful, righteous claims to possession of the land against disorganized passions of earlier inhabitants.397

Long Distance Relationship

At times, descriptions of early American friendship go beyond the terms of cultivated passions and reveal animating oppositional energies that can be easy to overlook. These descriptions bring to light some additional factors that shape feelings, some of the possible antagonisms against which friendship guarded itself, and some of the consequences of that exclusion on

396 The vocabulary of intimate manly affection animated the sermon as well as the fascinating letter Winthrop wrote to his friend Sir William Springe that is cited by Michael Warner and Ivy Schweitzer to show the depth and intensity of feeling that Puritans could perform when it suited them. See Winthrop to Sir William Springe 8 Feb 1630 Winthrop Papers (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1929-1947) 2:203-206. Ivy Schweitzer, “John Winthrop’s ‘Modell’ of American Affiliation” Early American Literature 40.3 (2005): 441-469; and Michael Warner “New English Sodom.” American Quarterly 64.1 (1992):19-47
397 The complementary political philosophy on friends and enemies has rarely been remarked by early American literary historians, who tend to overlook the militancy of early modern Christian piety. Ivy Schweitzer’s Perfecting Friendship (Durham: UNC, 2011) offers the most detailed account of friendship in Early America, and to some degree addresses this oversight. She condenses the Aristotelian model of friendship-in-similitude and shows how it could be used for political ends, as when the friendships between women could tap into masculine rhetoric to represent their disenfranchised situation. Yet she is limited by the subject-centric model of friendship, and as one symptom of that limitation, like Grayling, she can only put forward a version of friendship based on affection, on a cultivated experience of the passions. On the tacit contrast, see Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, Puritan Conquistadors: Iberianizing the Atlantic, 1550-1700 (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 2006).
literary form. Narrative logic, as we have seen in earlier chapters, has provided gratifying consolations in response to the inscrutability of providence, aligning an individual’s experience with a sometimes inscrutable system beyond his or her control. At times, that form of accounting might be interrupted by a different mode, one resistant to narrative’s justifying logic—such as, for example, the list. Observe, for instance, the narrative of Anthony Thacher and its culmination, how he memorialized his friendship he made with John Avery on their passage across the Atlantic in 1635, and how he strove to forget it after Avery’s death.

“The story,” he wrote, “is thus. First there was a league of perennial friendship solemnly made between my cousin Avary and myself made in Mr. Graves his ship never to forsake each other to the death but to be partaker each of other’s misery or welfare as also of habitation in one place” (168). This friendship did not originate in spontaneous affective enthusiasm towards the other. Its animating affect was fear, maybe terror in anticipation of the sort of place where man might be or, worse, might become wolf to man. Fear, something like Hobbes’ speculation’s in his 

Leviathan, existed before the story began, beyond its narrative scope and beyond explanation. Thacher instead emphasized the deliberately forged alliance, a “made” quality repeated twice in the sentence. Both men acknowledged their mutual vulnerability to death or misery or worse. Desirous of greater immunity, they formed a “league” that they hoped would last through the years; a league entered into “solemnly,” without frivolity. Therefore, the punning word for maritime measurements ought not to be read frivolously but rather to allude to transactions in spheres of human activity that were decidedly impersonal, that were “military, political or commercial”, as the OED elaborates. A league, in most early modern cases, was made for “mutual protection and assurance against a common enemy.”

399 “league, n.1” and “league, n.2” OED Online. Oxford University Press. June 2015. Web. 22 July 2015. Later, Emerson would imply such enmity as the threat of improperly “struck” friendships when he advises readers to “be admonished by what you already see, not to strike leagues of
Whatever the enemy they feared, it would be the hand of God that put that league to the test. Or, given the unrelenting losses to follow, losses that were reminiscent of Job’s misfortune, it was perhaps the withdrawal of God’s hand and the intervention of Satan’s. Thacher and Avery and their families arrived in New England safely, but Thacher’s thinly-veiled foreshadowing nevertheless would come to pass very soon: “immediately,” in fact, “on our arrival unto New England there was an offer made unto us, and my cousin Avary was invited to Marblehead.” Thither they went, with their families, “all and every one of our families, with all our goods and substance for Marblehead, we being in all twenty-three souls, to wit” (168–69, emphasis added). Within two days, they found themselves caught in a storm “as the like was never felt in England since the English came there nor in the memory of any of the Indians.”

Thacher and Avery had tacitly speculated that their friendship would be tested and proven by a confrontation with an enemy. The storm preempted this; as an element of nature, it forced Thacher to consider their status as new inhabitants of the territory, new relative to other parties. Everyone died but Mrs. Thacher, all but two of the twenty-three. They died in waves, successively, and swiftly, like Job’s kin. Yet Thacher passed on the opportunity to cast himself typologically. He held in reserve his active synthesis into divine Providence, and chose other rhetorical forms to emphasize the persistence of horror. He was most effective in his pathos when he described the faces of family members just before their separation.

But a face was not just a face. Thacher implied early in his letter that he intended, in composing these descriptions, to find providential import in these surfaces, too; he hoped to use this providential perspective to share his experience of confrontation with his reader, and this is evident in the way that his text oscillates, in verb tense, between the gnomic present of the writing friendship with cheap persons, where no friendship can be” (122). “Friendship” Essays: First Series ed. Douglas Crase. New York: Library of America, 1991), pp. 111-124.

400 Winthrop wrote about the storm in his Journal. Perhaps because the native people were less novel foils for his descriptive aims in 1635, Winthrop did not use them to help index the strength of the storm, favoring instead a more objective, quantitative approach—the winds were strongest between 8 and 9 in the evening, during which time the tides rose and then fell 2-3 feet. See Journal Ed Richard S. Dunn, Janes Savage and Laetitia Yeandle (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1994), pp. 151-3.
and the still-present intensity of the past. He recalled the sight of his kin comforting each other “against ghastly death, which every moment stares us in the face and sat triumphingly on each other’s forehead” (169). He had been, in the storm, “perceiving the danger” and the likelihood of his own death, and although he later enjoined his reader to “look with me upon our distress” (that is, his family’s), the first encounter with death, anthropomorphized, looks back, in the time of writing at the “us” created by the text. More recent historians of emotion have observed how the face holds privileged status as a bearer of affective meaning, and Thacher’s insistence that death have a face attributes sentience to the danger, over and against nature’s impersonal force. Rather than direct theodicy through conventional scripts, Thacher’s personification preserves his own humanity in his ability to recognize something like subjectivity in nonhuman agents, instead of the hidden face or lifted hand of God at this moment of great distress. Death’s faciality helped Thacher preserve his own humanity, but, thus personified, it did not stop looking back.  

Thacher wrote to his brother three months after the storm. He wrote, he wrote, because he needed alleviation from his heavy heart. Biblical proverbs insist that there is a friend that sticketh closer than a brother. Thacher once hoped that this friend would have been Avery, but “now, having no friend to whom I can freely impart myself,” where might Thacher turn? With whom could Thacher be free? What does “freedom” mean in speaking of matters of the heart? Perhaps he anticipated Emerson’s insight about the intimate eroticism of friendly and sincere sharing: in such sharing, “you drop even those undermost garments” of conversational habit (120). Who then, within only a few months of arrival, would host such intimacy? Having lost so much, remembered in almost uncountable plentiude (“all and every”; “all our goods,” etc.), Thacher now tried, in a list, to count his blessings. “Now having no friend to whom I can freely impart myself, Mr. Cotton is now my chiefest friend to whom I have free welcome and access, as

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401 Rei Terada turns to Deleuze and Guattari to describe the face’s value to Western emotionology. Such personification insulates the perceptive self from “other zones infinitely muter and more imperceptible where subterranean becomings-animal [lupine?] occur” (115). A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1987) in Terada, Feeling in Theory.
also Mr. Mavericke, Mr. Warde, Mr. Hocker, Mr. Weles, Mr. Warhad, and Mr. Parker also, Mr. Noyes, who use me friendly” (173). To relatively qualify this “friend” or any friend, diminishes his singularity, and to list so many friends would imply a limit to the satisfactions that Thacher found in any one of them.

There may be a friend who sticks closer than a brother, but for Thacher, a distant brother appeared to have been a more satisfying companion. For Thacher, friendly freedom meant intimate access and unlimited welcome, a hospitality of both household and heart that he had anticipated sharing with Avery in their future mutual partaking of “habitation in one place.” Such hospitality might be extended formally among equals—all of these listed men were ministers—but not so easily claimed without the formal league made between family members, a formal league fortified from within by close kinship, and from without, by the fear of non-Christian enemies. For Thacher, satisfying friendship did not begin with affection, but rather with the anticipated exigencies of colonial settlement. Friendship was or would have been proved by access to hospitality of home and mind. His report to his brother of the storm and its consequences suggests that the experience of colonial settlement, its visible and invisible risks, whetted and intensified the emotional gratification sought from the “other self.”

The heart found it fervently could love the distant brother, an intensity encouraged by the epistolary form. In the letter, he directly addressed his interlocutor; he described his expectations for friendship in a person of similar class and vocation, of shared religious sensibilities, who offered reliably free and easy access to companionship. The medium of the written letter satisfied some of those yearnings. The blank page invited habitation, and it would be sent to someone who could experience it with less coercion than the appearance of a neighbor who stands at the door, and must, according to decorum that might be as historically mobile as the door itself, and knocks.402 Later, Benjamin Franklin would jest about how written narrative alleviated the

402 Even vampires, according to late nineteenth century English fiction, must observe hospitality’s rules. According to late twenty-first century Argentinean literary critic, Cesar Aira, one must first
unpleasant effects of direct expression, the shameful possibility of “being tiresome to others” who “might conceive themselves obliged to give me a hearing, since [the text] may be read or not as anyone pleases” (44). The letter differs from Franklin’s autobiographical narrative insofar as it responded primarily to spatial, rather than temporal distance. In its smallest increments—say, from house to house—the transatlantic letter gave a material form to the emotional distance produced by colonial settlement’s foundational promise of private property. The letter loved the neighbor and here, too, the watery fence—a loving missive that could confront the agent of trauma in the writer’s past. In the form, Thacher found the opportunity to commensurately express dissatisfactions with his current existence—the catastrophe and the new norms of colonial life. These dissatisfactions were possibly immoderate and almost certainly unprecedented, but writing a letter to distant kin offered the familiar and unreprehensible gratifications of loving with a full heart, and renewing that heart’s fullness with words.

Drama-Free

In the same year as Thacher’s hurricane, only a few months following, Roger Williams left Boston and entered the howling wilderness to make friends with its native inhabitants, an endeavor for which he is now famous. His commitment to a radical version of reform Protestantism continues to separate him from the other founders—Hooker in Connecticut, Winthrop in Massachusetts, Bradford at Plymouth. He faithfully insisted on the primacy of conscience over and against any forms of institutionalized piety, even those of the utopian Massachusetts experiment. He vocally opposed the legitimacy of the New England patents. The king did not have authority to give rights to earthly land, Williams insisted, at least not divine authority. His recalcitrance made him unpopular in Boston, then in Salem, and then even in the Separatist Plymouth colony, which


404 Mid-twentieth century scholars of Early American History tended to see in Roger Williams a precursor to liberal toleration. Later scholars insist that Williams cared less for the integrity of the state’s claims than he did the purity of the church from the state.
found his theology too extreme even to their standpoint. For this, in 1635, the Massachusetts
General Court exiled him. Yet along with his doctrinal opponents, Williams valorized the social
efficacy of affection. This is evident not only in his retrospective testimony of his acquisition of the
Rhode Island land, but also in the texts—the letters and the guidebook—that he wrote about his
new neighbors. These texts reveal some of the struggles of trying to mediate political
antagonisms by means of the disciplines of affection.

Friendship, for Williams, was always complemented by implicit leagues and alliances. On
the advice of his enduring ally, John Winthrop, Williams preempted extradition to England. He left
Boston in the middle of winter with some thirty followers, and sought habitation among the
Narragansett, also on Winthrop’s advice. He acquired the land around Moshausick, later
Providence, formally from Canonicus, the Narragansett sachem, in 1636; he drafted a written
treaty between them in 1638; he acquired an English patent in 1643, and a Royal patent in
1663.405 During the seven years between arrival and acquiring the patents, seven years that
included the Pequot War of 1636-37, Williams served as a frequent liaison between his hosts and
his countrymen.406 His experience acting as a Janus-faced middleman—mediating alliances and
rebellions, making sure his Indian friends did not turn into English enemies—led to a keen interest
in the qualities by which friendship might be recognized, and his more acutely territorial
experience of political life gave a spatial dimension to the experience of friendship, and its place
at the threshold of politics.

At the hilt of modern American Protestantism’s inherited liberalism, his book, the Key Into
the Languages of America remains a cherished, if deeply strange gem. It preserves Williams’
place in the Early American literary canon. His enthusiasm to separate the affairs of the church

405 Anne Keary, “Retelling the History of the Settlement of Providence: Speech, Writing, and
Jeffrey Glover, “Wunnaumwáyean: Roger Williams, English Credibility, and the Colonial Land
406 Nan Goodman, “Banishment, Jurisdiction and Identity in Seventeenth-Century New England:
The Case of Roger Williams” in Early American Studies 7.1 (2009): 109-139 and Goodman,
Banished: Common Law and the Rhetoric of Social Exclusion in Early New England
from the affairs of the state—the affairs of the world—made him a pariah among his fellow English, and a recognizable antecedent for the latent truths and essential goodness of the liberty of individual conscience. The Key’s formal idiosyncrasies, its combination of poetry, description, didacticism and glossary, an admixture without literary equivalent or precedent, reanimates the bold strangeness of the personality of its author. Because of the apparent omission of events pertaining to English settlement during the momentous first decade, this text might seem to readers to be outside colonial history and politics—truly to be about a spiritually pure alliance, earnest, if misguided in attempting to represent a people as lacking in historical consciousness. Williams wrote to showcase his unparalleled expertise of the Narragansett language and way life, his exceptional mastery, and his struggle to rhetorically control these elements—his precise divisions into thirty-two tripartite and thematically organizes chapters—seem to banish a plot, if not narrative. Yet in a culture where the desired split between secular and spiritual domains had not yet definitively occurred, politics and history did intrude into his account of a seemingly timeless people. Though Williams aspired to compose a mostly impersonal instruction manual, an experience of grief and grievance, and the social conditions that produced and intensified these antagonisms, appears obliquely. The story he quietly inscribed is one of hospitality, betrayal, grief, and then guilt. It is a story in which the qualities of friendship—and the enemy—appeared briefly, and then receded behind a stronger commitment to nation and religion.

Williams’s contribution to the philosophy of friendship, from the Key and its contemporaneous letters, appears to have been a relationship founded in service and utility. For Williams, friendship was not a fundamental human capacity or a transcendent ideal for social life. Like Aristotle, Williams cherished skepticism that evil people could be friends with each other, and

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like Aquinas, he cautiously approached cooperative relationships with pagans.\textsuperscript{410} The friendships he named directly in the Key were either between English and native people, specifically the Narragansett, or, when they were between native people, Narragansett and their neighbors, these were usually utilitarian alliances. Williams famously began the Key with the word for Narragansett “friend,” but he used it primarily to translate the practice of English hailing, a self-conscious performance that he encouraged:

\textit{What cheare Nétop? is the general salutation of all English toward them. Nétop is friend.}

Netompaug. \textit{Friends.}

They are exceedingly delighted with Salutations in their own Language. (93)

But in his chapter on vocabulary for war, he introduced several supplementary words for favorable sociality among Indians: Nowetompátipimmin (\textit{We are Friends}); Wetompachick (\textit{Friends}); Nowepinnachick (\textit{My Companions in War, or Associats}); Nowechusettíminmin (\textit{We are Confederates}) (236). And in his letters to John Winthrop, he elaborated that “Of the Narragnasetts generally, all the Cords that ever bound the Barbarian to the Foreigner were made out of Selfe and Covetousness” (45). Williams translated those affections, and explained that they were more like what the English understood as “confederations” rather than “friendships.”

Given this political strategy, Williams often explained those friendships and alliances through terms of territory, and he did so from the very start of his text. To elaborate on what relationships between English and Indian look like, Williams added vocabulary for wandering, sojourn, exile and hospitality. He noted the size of the towns and their distance, and that the emblematic act of friendship was to offer hospitality to a grieving neighbor. He would elaborate still further in his next chapters on “Eating and Entertainment” and “Sleepe and Lodging,” chapters that, as Glover observes, were themselves composed with an eye toward proving the worth of his claim to a patent on the Rhode Island colony in the English court. Even in his most

sentimental descriptions of friendship, a concern for territory was never distant. In letters to
Winthrop, he admitted that one Narraganett in particular, Miantonomoh indeed was special to
him, but that he was an exception. In Miantonomoh, he did notice “some sparks of true
Friendship,” and at the end of his life Williams reflected that Canonicus, Miantonomoh’s uncle,
had treated him as a son. Yet his relationships with these sachems were quantifiable and
political in ways that exceeded military strategies and aspired to national identity: “I probably
conjecture,” he mused to Winthrop, that Miantonomoh’s “friendship would appeare in attending of
us with 500 men (in case) against any foreign enemy.” Friendship with Miantonomoh and his
people would add the strength of numbers, and then some: through an extension of alliance,
friendship would naturalize English settlers to the land in opposition to some unnamed enemy
who arrived from beyond the territory.

The Key originated in friendship, Williams noted from the start—it was a form of “present
absence.” Friendship, famously, is the first formally introduced word in the Narragansett
language. But friendly attachments appeared even earlier in the text, in his preface explaining the
origin of the book:

I drew the Materialls in a rude lumpe at Sea, as a private helpe to my owne memory, that
I might not by my present absence lightly lose what I had so dearly bought in some few
yeares hardship, and charges among the Barbarians; yet being reminded by some, what
a pite it were to bury those Materialls in my Grave at land or Sea; and withall,
remembering how oft I have been importun’d by worthy friends, of all sorts, to afford them
some helps this way. (83)

Williams addressed these preliminary observations “To my Deare and Welbeloved Friends and
Countrey-men, in old and new England.” Having begun, while on a Dutch ship returning to
England, to organize his knowledge, as a “private helpe to my owne memory,” he was soon,
possibly even before arrival in England, “reminded by some, what a pite it were to bury those
Materialls in my Grave at land or sea.” Williams conceded that those earthly materials had value,

411 Williams reflected at length on his first encounters with the Narragansett in letters and
testimonies he wrote to his fellow country-men, specifically the political leaders at Boston and
within the United Federation, the league among the four New England colonies, Plymouth,
Connecticut, New Haven and Massachusetts, from which Rhode Island was excluded. See
Complete Writings, VI: 407-408.
but he remained vague as to how valuable they were, and kept silent regarding the dear rate at which he bought them; nor did he mention what the material of those materials was; nor the identity of his friends. What he did describe was the nature of the risk. He worried that the spatial distance he felt at that particular moment in time (surrounded by water), a condition that he called "present absence"; and that this condition would lead him to "lightly lose what I had so dearely bought in some few yeares hardship, and charges among the Barbarians."

"Present absence" is a many-meaninged phrase, rich in ambiguity and possible contradiction as it confuses space and time. "Present absence" is Williams' phrase to for a condition of belonging to others, in excess of one's own control, a condition inverse to Winthrop's notion of active, willful sympathizing. Here one depends on the lenitude of others over and against their reason or self-interest. "Present absence" animated his texts as the ambivalence and unexpressed resentment of having to represent two parties to each other in political situations with high stakes. War exacerbated the acute risks of present absence, for the context of socially imperative hostility, intensified the value of personal ties upon which an individual might depend. Williams experienced this unrelentingly—to be present to one party meant to be absent to another, while simultaneously attempting to represent the other in settings of mediation and interpretation.

Though Williams introduced the concept with respect to his friends in England—themselves on the brink of a civil war—he wrote with a more recent conflict in mind, as we shall see. In both the colonial and Atlantic context, writing could bridge this aporia, and give him a "palpable presence …even though physically he was absent" (633).412 Williams called this piece of writing an "Implicite Dialogue" (90), and many readers have observed the conversation that stalks through those columns.413 Through these minimally-contextualized words, he prescribed.

412 Felker makes this observation with regards to Williams' correspondence with Winthrop, a point whose implications are magnified when the writing circulated publicly, as the Key did.
413 See, for example, Christopher Felker, "Roger Williams' Uses of Legal Discourse," p. 637. Jonathan Beecher Field agrees, and observes that Williams had long favored the dialogue form.
conversation of all sorts, not only those relating to Indian evangelism. He also presented a critique to English hypocrisies in the poems with which he concluded every chapter. “Present absence” denotes his vocation balancing allegiances to two inimical parties.

“Present absence” can productively describe any number of representative forms, not limited by the historically transient qualifications of the literary or aesthetic. There is perhaps no genre that does this so vividly and materially, though, as stage plays, in which the audience member lives in the present alongside the actors she watches, while at the same time remaining necessarily absent to the story being enacted. This genre appears to have implicitly shaped the story of the Key and that story’s exposition. The Key’s glossary lists and its poems have been the focus of most critical attention for their captivating use of the elements of a page, yet few readers have connected the text with the conditioning influence of stage plays, which had been very popular in the London of Roger Williams’ early years. The reasons for the later English Puritan ban on stage plays (a ban passed in 1642, two years before the publication of the Key) would have held special meaning for so enthusiastic a reform Protestant like Williams. Plays, these English Puritans reasoned, were doubly-deceitful. They showcased, and even seemed to

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414 This is an observation borrowed from Simon Critchley’s reading and reviewing of Hamlet in Stay Illusion!: The Hamlet Doctrine (New York: Vintage, 2013).

415 Nan Goodman, in her work on banishment, shows that Williams was capable of representing narrative in unconventional means: her study of his religious tracts, the Bloudy Tenent... and the Bloudy Tenent Yet More Bloudy...along with other documents written by English who had been banned from their communities, identifies continuities in form across these, continuities that, in her reading, shapes a “new form of modern identity” (110). See Goodman, “Banishment, Jurisdiction and Identity.”

416 That Williams found himself attracted to Puritanism at a young age does not diminish the genre’s relevance but makes its disagreeable presence in his early environment all the more interesting for he would have had to think critically about its representational effects. In addition to the implicit narrative of the vocabulary lists, here are some scholars who have read the poems: Ivy Schweitzer, for example, shows that Williams used the poems to “spiritually empower” anyone outside of reform Protestant orthodoxy. Anne Myles shows how the poetry is not only explicitly didactic, but prosodically as well, teaching better spiritual syntax to the English. See Schweitzer, World of Self-Representation: Lyric Poetry in Colonial New England (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina, 1991) and Anne Myles, “Dissent and the Frontier of Translation: Roger Williams’ A Key Into the Language of America” Possible Pasts: Becoming Colonial in Early America Ed. Robert Blair St. George (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 2000), pp. 88-108.
encourage immoral behavior. They also professionalized the double-selves of actors.\footnote{David Leverenz, \textit{The Language of Puritan Feeling} (New Brunswick: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1996), explains these reasons at length. His chapter, plainly, is styled as a catechistic question, "Why Did the Puritans Hate Stage Plays?" pp. 23-40.} Protestantism’s reformist antipathy was, to some degree, similar to its complaint about merchant self-hood, the frustration that had drawn them to the “plain style.”\footnote{Michelle Burnham, \textit{Folded Selves: Colonial New England Writing in the World System} (Hanover: Univ. Press of New England, 2007) pp. 46-67} Williams’ style seems anything but plain, certainly. Yet its affinities to the dramatic form—its presentation of plotted scenes in dialogue more immediate than narration, and its attention to specific phrases, and its description of the settings in which action takes place—suggest a desire on Williams’ part to purify scripts for behavior and performance that plays had corrupted, a desire to proactively take up scripted dialogue for purer living rather than let description falsely have its way.\footnote{In addition to the possibility that the eyes of the world were attentively focused on the New England experimental field, Williams was keenly aware of the evangelism of action. In a letter to Winthrop from early in his exile, he noted that the uses of gestures such as hat-doffing and kneeling were especially delicate in evangelical contexts; he would rather “sin against mine own persuasions and resolutions” than set a bad example for the Indians he hoped to save. See his letter to John Winthrop, 14 June 1638 \textit{Correspondence} I: 164-6.} Thus, Williams’s \textit{Key} clearly distinguished dialogue from observation; general observations from particular; generalizations about abstract native behavior from specific scenes to which he wanted to identify himself as a witness.

Williams’ presence and occasional action in such scenes signal an implicit drama. His presence typically becomes visible in the prose rather than the dialogue passages, like actors embedded in a crowd who stand forward to deliver their lines when the time comes. The story that appeared in these passages is story about political treachery, in which the enemy could be anywhere. Williams concluded not with anger or resentment but with sadness, and he signaled that sadness through familial figures. As occasionally is the case with an early modern play, a poem provides closure to each scene, and there are five major acts. Here, in the first, a father learns to discipline his son through the friendly advice of an English guest. The father learns the appropriate use of violence in a domestic context, and the necessity of “tough love.” Here, in the
next scene, an unnamed native who knows where his true loyalties lie, feigns defection to the unnamed enemy in a time of war. He uses his position to defeat the “chief Leader and Captaine,” and, “in a trice, fetcht off his head” (131). Here, now, in the third scene, is “Canounicus, the old high Sachim of the Nariganset Bay (a wise and peacable Prince)” (136), who had learned, possibly from the English, to be vigilant—suspicious, even—of all sorts of treachery. He picks up a prop: “He took a sticke, and broke it into ten pieces, and related ten instances (laying downe a sticke to every instance) which gave him cause thus to feare” (137). The poem that concluded this scene is nervously overstuffed: its lines expanded to dactylic tetrameter as a momentary distraction from the familiar ten steady beats that Williams had earlier introduced. Here, in the next scene, is the translator, a guest again in the home of “the chiefe Sachim or Prince of the Countrey,” Miantunnómu (198). The translator is not talking, but feigning sleep, listening to the host and a Quinnihicut guest as they debate the journey of the soul after death. Audiences or readers can see that the translator is acting; even though he is “wearied with travel and discourse” he nevertheless secretly clings to wakefulness for the better intimacy that such present absence afforded him. He would choose to lie to his host, lying as though dead, to get a truer version of the thoughts of his host’s inner mind, a truer version than they might give him, he implies, were he awake. This play seems to have been composed with great pessimism regarding the possibilities for trust between two people, even friends. Now, in the very last scene, here is the translator, about to leave the territory, witnessing the “the chiefe and most aged peacable Father of the Countrey, Caunoúnicus,” mourning the death of his son. He “burn’d his own Palace, and all his goods in it, (amongst them to a great value) in a sollemne remembrance of his sonne, and in a kind of humble Expiation to the Gods, who (as they believe) had taken his sonne from him” (24). Unlike Thacher’s “ghastly Death,” Williams did not give the “King of Terrors” a face, but he did give the Narragansett king a face, and described it covered in tears and ashes of mourning. This terror, the unsightliness of a face contorted in tears and covered in dust must have evoked uncanny fright, staging immoderate grieving as something both familiar and proscribed to seventeenth-century English readers. The king evoked pity and also fear,
cathartically fusing the two into a representation of “what was once well-known and had been long familiar” (124).

Departure, deceit, death: theatergoers would have recognized the play as a tragedy, perhaps also as a historical play, given the repetitive concern for who the chief sachim was in any given scene. Williams had tried to keep colonial politics out of the Key—at least nominally English politics. The historical silence ought to seem strange, given the recent violent raid at Mystic, in which nearly seven hundred Pequot perished in flames within the span of an hour. In Chapter XXIX, “Of their Warre, &c.”, Williams provided ample vocabulary for anger and fear, weaponry and defense, and a detailed conjugation for the verb “kill”—for indeed, “their Language is exceedingly copious, and they have five or six words sometimes for one thing” (90-91). Yet Williams mentioned specifics of colonial war only glancingly: “Pequttoog paúquanan | The Pequots are slain” (237). When he mentioned Europe and England, he focused on their internal political upheavals rather than their relationship to the American colonies. Never would the twain meet as outright and confirmed antagonists in the Key. Yet in his alternation between chief sachims whose hospitality he enjoyed and in the text’s conclusion with a cathartic, possibly “expiative” conflagration, Williams conveyed a series of historical events of great importance in New England’s settlement and Narragansett dispossession, yet a series of events that did not achieve historical designation as “war.” These were events that might make anyone skeptical of the possibility of maintaining “personal” friends that transcended the political boundaries of territory, nation and, even, perhaps, religion.

If the event of the Pequot War functions as the intimately present absence in the memory of the author of the Key, the Narragnasett-Mohegan animosity, a relationship that lacked specific

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421 Margareta de Grazia, Hamlet Without Hamlet (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2007), observes that two subgenres were not so clearly distinct in the seventeenth century as they are now (57-61).
422 Following the Hartford Treaty’s ban on identifying Pequot by name after their defeat, one wonders about the identity of the Quinnihticut guest whose hospitality Williams had shared. For an account of the post-Pequot War animosity, see Michael Oberg, Uncas, First of the Mohegans (Ithaca: Cornell, 2003).
designation in the New England colonial archive, is its absent absence.\footnote{This is Jill Lepore’s insight on the historiography of King Phillip’s War, though she observes English utilizing such techniques during and after the Pequot War, too. The Name of War: King Phillip’s War and the Origins of American Identity. (New York: Knopf, 1998).} English settlers had sought to maintain strategic control over the visibility of the enemy and the conditions of his appearance. Less visible in its specific qualities as enemy, the enemy became more vague, and more phantasmically present as an agent of terror. Response to such terror required vigilance, the cultivation of family values, and biopolitical care for English bodies. And this meant reframing the nature of Indian politics, and reducing political grievances, such as those that between the Narragnasett and Mohegan—they would now be personal ones. Earlier, the English made the vanquished Pequot recede from memory by manipulating local indigenous customs and forbidding the use of their name, “Pequot.”\footnote{The Hartford treaty of 21 Sept 1638 determined that the wrongs of the Pequot would be “remitted and buried and never to be renenwed any more from henceforth” and that “after they the Pequots shall be divided as aforesaid shall no more be called Pequots but Narragansetts and Mohegan” (2). Yet initially, it was a treaty of peace not between English and Pequot but between Miantonomoh and Uncas and their respective Narragansett and Mohegan. On the conclusion of the Pequot War and its memorialization, see Alfred Cave The Pequot War (Amherst: Univ. of Massachusetts Press, 1996). See also Anne Kibbey, The Interpretation of Material Shapes in Puritanism: A Study of Rhetoric, Prejudice and Violence. (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996), pp.92-120.} They then fortified their control of the territory by strategically reshuffling alliances in the years that followed, favoring treaties with the Mohegan to increase their control over fur trade routes. Miantonomoh had become more and more unsatisfied with how the English treated the Narragansett following the war, particularly with respect to promised land to the west that had been given over to the new English settlement at Connecticut. In 1642, Miantonomoh attempted to raise a rebellion against the English, but was preempted by the more recent alliance that the English had made with Uncas of the Mohegan. The English responded by identifying the rebellion as an animosity between enmitous natives, possibly more personal than political, yet one with important political consequences for the English control of the territory, and then decided it would be wise to put Miantonomoh to death.

The English handed Miantonomoh over to Uncas, and Uncas to his brother, Sassacus. Winthrop wrote in August of 1643 that Sassacus “clave his head with an hatchet, some English
being present” (473). Williams was absent from this scene. He had left New England in June that year, and would not have discovered Miantonomoh’s death until he returned a year later. The pathos of the Key’s concluding scene is all the stronger a testament to a sense of burden in the affections between Indian and English that Williams felt. Williams perceived sadness as an expression of an individual father for his singular son; but through representing that king as the “father of his people,” he admitted to knowledge of and concern for greater losses, such as, for example, the deaths of Narragansett during the raid at Mystic, due to insufficient sartorial markers distributed among the Narragansett by the English so that they, the English, might distinguish friend (Narragansett) from foe (Pequot). Miantonomoh, Williams observed in his letters to Winthrop, had insisted on these markers, but without great success. “Chenock eiuse wetompatimucks?” Williams quoted Miantonomoh to Winthrop in a letter of August of 1637. He used the vocabulary word not of salutation but of alliance, and then translated: “Did friends ever deal so with friends?” (489).

Miantonomoh is not the successor who Canonicus mourned at the end of the Key, yet it is difficult to imagine that Miantonomoh was not, in a different way, present for Williams when he composed his text, a presence reminding William of the struggle to maintain fealties that were simultaneously personal and political. Separating the two, after all, does not banish the other.

For Thacher, friendship was an alliance, forged in anticipation of foreign encounter and fortified by the familiarity of kinship. Williams’ comprehension of friendship more pragmatically aligned with the Gospels’ description of true and false prophets: “Wherefore by their fruits ye shall know them” (Matthew 7:20). Williams had hoped that friendship with potential enemies would make it easier for him to fulfill the often competing demands of his countrymen and his conscience, yet his attempt to reconcile these has the effect of hollowing out the meaning of word

as it appears in his writing, much the way Thacher’s list of potential friends appears, ultimately, less than satisfying. While Thacher wrote a letter back across the Atlantic, Williams himself seems to have found in the passage reprieve from these inimical obligations. But no matter how sentimental their descriptions, both Williams and Thacher understood friendship to have a foundation in the material exigencies of settlement, and the unsettling feelings of encountering a stranger as a neighbor who might turn out to be the enemy. The possibility exists that Williams indeed experienced deep feelings when he learned about the death of Miantonomoh at the hands of Uncas, probably at the time of his return in 1644. But Miantonomoh seems to have been the exceptional figure in Williams’ feelings, and the contingencies of decorum and discipline that kept him from representing such sympathetic friendship explicitly, either during Miantonomoh’s life or after his death, were elective on Williams’ part, and probably not, for someone so committed to conscience, coerced. Given the stress of so many years of doubly dealing, which he enumerated in his later testimonies to the Massachusetts General Court, it is worth observing that in his letters to Winthrop, Williams rarely described their relationship with the vocabulary of friendship. After Winthrop’s death, he would describe him as a dear and true friend, but in missive after missive to Winthrop, he would sign off by reminding his ally of his “unfeigned” self.428

Williams’ “implicite dialogue” found a new mode, if not genre, for organizing and managing the diverse and easily intractable avenues for the heart’s renewed fullness—The Key hosted conversation, conversion, cohabitation and the concreteness of language in the sounds of poetry. As a “private aid to memory,” certain aspects were to remain more or less opaque—he prioritized clarity of things to say rather than narration of the scenes in which they were said. Insulated from each other by the strictly organized sections, these scenes do not achieve explicit unity as a plot, although implicitly, and loosely, they do intimate one. By separating these scenes, Williams avoided the famed deceptiveness of the early modern stage drama, prescribing what it would seem to describe; he also revised his role as a double-actor—if not double-agent—

between two enemies and transformed it into research; and, in his conclusion, he disowned, and then atoned vicariously for the deceits that had been unavoidable. They were not his deceptions, but rather his countrymen’s—a distinction that he emphasized through his exile, a distinction well championed by his famous commitment to the purity of conscience from corruption by the state. Friendship, at the close of the text, appeared to be a matter of vicarious feeling: if, upon arrival, one greeted the Narragansett proleptically as “friends,” one bid them farewell as friends through silent and presumably shared grief. The feeling of Canonicus’ grief that Williams described and carried with him as he crossed the Atlantic would substitute for the sachim’s presence during their absence from each other, a representation that affectively foreshadows the tenor of so many English representations of dying, deeply feeling native people to come.429

Roger Williams’ situation between antagonistic parties signals an experience of affection and emotional obligation that does not easily fit in with the Aristotelian tradition of friendship. But there are others. Leela Gandhi, writing a manifesto in the form of literary history, critiques the tradition traced from Aristotle, and points to alternatives. She first looks to the legacy of Aristotle’s ideal, and the limits it has long sustained within the tradition of Western philosophy, particularly the limitations of its tradition for hermetic self-sufficiency.430 Williams’ readers might have understood this self-sufficiency as his “unfeigned” honesty, as a smooth elimination of contradicting desires and impulses, which characterized ideal personhood and animated their inward search for assurance of election. Postmodern critics have pointed out the lineage of self-disciplined subjectivity, inherited by Marx from Kant, evidenced by their visions for ideal social life, if not friendship. Gandhi’s postmodernists offer instead a model of hybridity, or an excess of subjectivity that she critiques for their tendency toward imagining the world as if it were, in her

words, “simply a source of enjoyment” (22). In both models, Aristotle’s idea of “another self” appears as a solipsistic double-bind, one that inevitably finds its own image in its desires for companionable society. This is the image of sameness, the *similis simili gaudet* that animated John Winthrop’s *Modell of Christian Charity*, one that complemented the deeply-felt desirability of political uniformity. Williams saw, perhaps felt, beyond such uniformity, though his encounters with difference produced an intensified fealty to those with whom he shared fundamental pieties. Rowlandson, as we shall very soon see, saw beyond, and felt beyond, too, though unlike Williams, she lacked the option of installing herself as a settler even more deeply in those native neighborhoods. Returned to a settlement founded on those same English pieties, her reflection on friendship reveals and meditates on the distress towards affective coercion that Thacher had only intimated.

As we transition from Williams to Rowlandson, I want to suggest that Rowlandson’s experience aligns with an apposite model of friendship, and I want to show in what follows how the Epicurean emphasis on the singularity of the friend might easily collapse back into the model posed by Aristotle’s successors when affections—those inwardly guaranteed experiences—appear as the best, if not the only way to measure a relationship. Friendship, as practiced and described by Epicurus and his followers, corrects Aristotle’s foundational premise that friendship and the polis be mutually complementary. For Epicurus, the tendency of the polis towards greater abstraction and away from singularity—the paradox of justice stressed in chapter one—as well as its tendency towards relationships based on instrumentality, together impede the flourishing and fulfillment possible in collective social life. Epicurus turned his attention away from the polis, towards the margins of the city-state, advocating a model of sociability that largely overlapped with the practice of hospitality, even when it put the individual at risk of obstructing or even antagonizing the polis and its goals.

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431 Emerson might observe that “these uneasy pleasures and fine pains are for curiosity and not for life” (115), and insist that such an experience of the other failed to seek out the friend properly, “sacredly”.

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Williams experienced a version of this Epicurean model while in exile, but these friends they eventually would serve to complement a utilitarian model for friendship as a tool for political alliance. This version of friendship-as-opportunity appeared marginally in earlier texts, whether it be in the form of the indigenous enemy-friends “in the state of innocence,” that Winthrop described in his Arabella sermon; or the often-treacherous allies in Anne Bradstreet's monarchical poems; or the “perpetual alliance of friendship” vowed between Avery and Thacher—all these expressions of friendship strove toward a provisional, pragmatic structure for relating to strangers. Given that the approach of the stranger often evoked terror, such descriptions of desirable relationships often developed from safe-seeming norms regarding intimacy and immunity. These norms were the fences that define territory; defined national similarity; and prescribed practices of pious religion. Mary Rowlandson’s autobiographical narrative synthesized these three to safeguard the proper objects of heartfelt Christian love: friends—like brothers, but closer. Yet in captivity, she had experienced different degrees of hospitality and closeness, intensifying as her removes went on. Individual difference existed within collectively distinct parties, and now, those who had once been abstract and indistinguishable enemies, appeared to have singular and distinct qualities. They appeared in between blinks, to be possible friends.

**Neither a Borrower Nor a Lender Be**

Like Anthony Thacher, Mary Rowlandson could count and name her many “Christian friends.” They were fewer than Williams’ alliance of Miantonomoh’s five hundred:

> some in this town, and some in that, and others; and some from England; that in a little time, we might look, and see the house furnished with love. The Lord hath been exceeding good to us in our low estate, in that when we had neither house nor home, nor other necessaries, the Lord so moved the hearts of these and those towards us, that we wanted neither food, nor raiment for ourselves or ours, Proverbs xviii.24. There is a friend that sticketh closer than a Brother. And how many such friends have we found, and now living amongst? And truly such a friend have we found him to be unto us, in whose house we lived, viz. Mr. James Whitcomb, a friend unto us near hand, and afar off. (64)
As with Thacher, the urge to list friends followed a detailed retelling of unexpected and devastating events, in which most of the members of their families perished. And like Thacher’s letter, something of the stubbornly dissatisfied lurked in between listed names. Yet unlike Thacher, who tightly packed together his named friends into an unqualified list, Mary Rowlandson digressed more expansively on the quality and quantity of her friends, giving more descriptive outline on how to recognize one. Friendship was more than an affective bond. For Rowlandson, it was, among other things, troublesomely financial. These friends were people to whom she owed money, and still worse, they left her unsatisfied because they left her alone.

Not much information exists to illuminate the early life of perhaps the most familiar author of the early Anglo-American canon. Mary Rowlandson was born in the late 1630s, in England. In 1639, she crossed the Atlantic and settled in Wenham. Her father, John White, a reasonably well-off groomsman in England, became one of the wealthiest landowners in Lancaster, where they later settled. In 1656, she married Joseph Rowlandson, a minister whose parents were, most likely, illiterate. Her book describes a little more about her life in America: she had four children; her great vice was temptation to use tobacco and to abuse the Sabbath. She maintained friends in other New England towns as well as back in old England. She probably slept normally for much of her life. Her trauma—the destruction of her family, her house, her town, followed by her prolonged captivity as a prisoner of war among the Indian enemy—might have happened to anyone. The captivity lasted eighty-three days and spanned about 150 miles. The Algonquian party proceeded fitfully, moving and stopping in segments that she would, in retrospect, call “removes”—a term that invokes both increasing distance, as well as potentially interminable.

iterations of movement. During these months, from necessity, she moved past at least some of the prejudices cultivated by the Congregationalist settlers’ good fences. She watched, she observed and she absorbed many native life practices. Committed to a disavowal of affective experience that tends to seem, to modern readers, like narrative realism, she preferred to show, not tell. Here she is, exchanging her labor for currency, now for food, now for a place to sleep. Here she is tasting bear meat, and in her hunger, savoring it, and becoming a stranger to her own self. So close to dying, yet behold, she lived.

The text she wrote about that time, *A True History of the Captivity and Restoration of Mrs. Mary Rowlandson* has relevance that exceeds its placement in early American literary histories; it has informed English literature on both sides of the Atlantic. It yokes the Anglo-American colonial experience context with the emergence of the novel, that enduringly familiar literary form. It does so, in no small part, through Rowlandson’s ability to invoke in a surprisingly familiar idiom her experience of deep feeling—not in spite of the ideological exhortations of her place and time, but precisely because of them. Such a familiar expression of feeling goes a long way. First encounters with her text, a document that vociferously denounces the indigenous Americans with which it is peopled—are often unpleasant, if not difficult. Her hostility to her Algonquian captors and hosts makes her repulsive and unfriendly to the modern liberal sensibility. But her narrative fascinates precisely because of its descriptions of strangers, descriptions whose degree of detail is, with the possible exception of Williams’ *Key*, unsurpassed for her time, and because she pairs this detail with commensurate accounts of her interiority.

433 “Forceable initiation into Indian civilization showed the captives that the hardships their captors endured were often the result of English inroads on their land and subsequent depletion of their food supplies,” Susan Howe points out, as many other readers of the *Captivity* have. *My Emily Dickinson* (New York: New Directions, 1987) pp.43 On the place and time of the captivity, see Douglas Leach, “The ‘Whens’ of Mary Rowlandson’s Captivity” in *New England Quarterly* 34.3 (1961): 352-363.

434 Mitchell Breitweiser calls it realism for its ability to represent both what lay beyond familiar ideological pictures, as well as the irruption of that outer world; her disavowals are an essential part of that synthetic work. *American Puritanism*, p. 10.


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Rowlandson often mediated her expressions of disgust, revulsion, and anger through typology, but just as often she did not. These expressions reach a clear, if not perfected, translation into emotional discourse by the text’s conclusion, when she described a sticking insomnia that she tried to make the best of by meditating on providential design. She used to sleep without interruption, but now she found herself stricken awake. Everyone else could sleep. She, meditating on her past, could only weep. The modernity of her expression evokes great pathos in readers to this day, particularly readers whose capacities for fellow-feeling have been shaped by practices and disciplines of novel-reading. Yet the moment’s affective force began accruing sympathetic momentum much earlier. Affect is, perhaps, the stamp that guarantees the circulation of modernity that Bryce Traister has noticed reading her book: “Enveloped in the secular,” he writes, “is a letter written in the language of the sacred, and it is this thoroughly modern package that, somewhat paradoxically, carries religion into the episteme of an eighteenth-century modernity” (326). For Traister, her book invoked typology for a wider range of meanings in this later stage of theocratic rule in America. But if the plurality of interpretive meanings signals the arrival of secularism, it does so because already it was no longer necessary to invoke typology in order to affirm the exclusively pious community. Her text’s sympathetic fellow-feeling, introduced by, but not conterminous with, typological hermeneutics, replaces typology and it does so in direct response to Hobbes’ inaugural political affection, fear.

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437 Bryce Traister, “Mary Rowlandson and the Invention of the Secular” in Early American Literature 42.2 (2007):323-354. For Traister, sleeplessness is the modern truth universally acknowledged: “One of modernity’s truths is that few of us cannot understand the psychological extremis experienced in the condition of insomnia.” Jonathan Crary, in 24/7: Late Capitalism and the Ends of Sleep (New York: Verso, 2014), would agree with him, but might differ on the “whens.” On the Protestant disposition to make waking time valuable, see Matthew Wolf-Meyer, The Slumbering Masses: Sleep, Medicine and the Modern American Life (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 2012), pp. 51-78. On the “pathos” evoked for early readers, see Derounian, “Publication and Distribution”, pp. 251. Her article’s valuable insights on the material qualities of the text can’t speculate on whether or not her description of sleeplessness was as powerful for seventeenth century readers at is for those in the twenty-first.
Mary Rowlandson began with terror, and horror. Terror in the political experience of
topography and the appearance of the enemy within her own house, horror in the newly and
surprisingly attractive abjection of the visible content of one’s own body. To establish that the
Algonquian raid on Lancaster was a calamity of Biblical proportions, Rowlandson included an
unusually graphic scene that had both affective and theological consequences, and a third
consequence of binding those two. To revise Traister’s metaphor: she wrote the letter in the
language of the sacred onto the envelope itself, and not in ink. Notice in the following chapter, the
objects on which they eye composes itself, and the person or persons to whom that object
belongs:

“Thus were we butchered by those merciless heathen, standing amazed, with the blood
running down to our heels. My eldest sister being yet in the house, and seeing those
woeful sights, the infidels hauling mothers one way, and children another, and some
wallowing in their blood: and her elder son telling her that her son William was dead, and
myself was wounded, she said, “And Lord, let me die with them” (32).

God’s response was swift. Some people get queasy at the sight of pus; others gag at the sight of
clustered holes on surfaces like skin. Among the many possible representations of somatic
distress with the power to evoke such affectively charged responses, consider the strength of
blood, and the possibility that this description of blood is unique for its context. It does something
that virtually no other seventeenth century English eyewitness narratives of colonial war do: it
coerces the reader to visualize literal blood—as literal as blood can be. Assuming that a
narrative about war will include graphic violence, readers have tended overlook this passage,
though in its claims on the sympathy of the reader, it is arguably the most efficient series of

438 Stuart Elden, *The Birth of Territory* (Chicago: Chicago Univ. Press, 2013). On abjection, see
439 It might seem, initially, impossible that earlier war narratives don’t write about blood. It is and it
isn’t. The eyewitness narratives frequently describe the “bloodiness” of battles, and the
“bloodiness” or “bloodthirstiness” of the Indians, but this is always a modifier that rarely presents
blood as a visible substance, circulating within or emerging from bodies. See Richard Slotkin, *So
Dreadful a Judgment: Puritan Responses to King Philip’s War, 1676-1677* (Middletown:
Wesleyan Univ. Press, 1978). See also Charles Orr, *The History of the Pequot War: The
Contemporary Accounts of Mason, Underhill, Vincent and Gardener* (New York: AMS, 1980). For
the story of how blood manages to be both literal and figurative, and never quite either alone, see
sentences in the book.\textsuperscript{440} Her description of the fluid, in Brian Massumi’s vocabulary, “qualifies the intensity” of the enemy’s violence, but it is very specific blood that does so: it is the blood that belongs to Rowlandson and her close kin—her sister and her sister’s children.\textsuperscript{441} She guaranteed, too, that it was Christian blood, since her sister’s sincere piety had been the ideal to which Mary herself vowed that she aspired, earlier in the same paragraph. Because it was Christian blood, it could efficiently unify the living and the dead, the “we” that are butchered but can also stand amazed in witness.

Watch typology transubstantiate the solid stuff of kinship and melt it into air: The scene of the attack evoked meekness, messianic self-sacrifice, and lambs led to slaughter. But the terror of the memory, even three years later, overwhelmed the formerly reliable strategies for fitting life to form—and implied more than the type would seem to initially intend: “Of thirty seven Persons who were in this one House, none escaped either present Death or bitter Captivity…” Like Thacher, Rowlandson counted her losses, but she went a little bit further to contrast their deaths to her survival: “save only one, who might say as he, Job i. 15, And I only am escaped alone to tell the news.” The story she cited was Job’s. This is not very strange. Like hers, Job’s too featured sudden and sense-violating destruction of family and property. Job owned these, so the story seems, therefore, his. It was not, however, Job’s story to tell. The first-person storyteller, the messenger whose role Rowlandson brought to perfection as an antitype, was not Job, nor was the messenger related to Job by blood or bone, nor was he a proper member of the household staff. All of these had died.\textsuperscript{442} He is, instead, a stranger. This is no simple misfire of the

\textsuperscript{440} Indeed, that the strangeness of the scene has evaded critical attention attests to that great efficiency. Bridget Bennett calls it the self-evidently “primal scene” of the captivity narrative though does not take advantage of the opportunity to explain how such a primal scene frames the “Home” as a site for national as well as nativist identity at the same time. “The Crisis of Restoration: Mary Rowlandson’s Lost Home” in \textit{Early American Literature} 49.2 (2014): 327-356.


\textsuperscript{442} Nor is he, strictly speaking, the \textit{only} one left: there are three more, four total, whose conclusion is almost identical, save that the first three are interrupted by the arrival of the next. Such scripts are rarely \textit{sui generis}; one suspects that, for the first readers of the book of Job, if
typological impulse, though many such moments have productively illuminated the imperfections of this theocracy’s hold, and in far from simple ways. This particular misfire, though, uniquely signals a larger transformation in the ends and means of narratively evoked fellow-feeling. Her vivid narration of a baptism in blood at the conclusion of the paragraph just prior concentrated the valuable Christian piety that had been so cherished in her household, and preserved its survival in—and on—her person. Then she aligned herself with a figure who could claim no possible obligation from his addressee, on behalf of people who might have been able to, but could not now, because they were dead. These details of the Biblical story, easily accessible to members of pious households, are not and were not necessary for the analogy to work and for the story to evoke a feeling of sympathy, much like the tears by the rivers of Babylon. Yet by feeling something for the messenger—and only the heartless could fail to feel after so bloody a narration—the reader finds herself implicated into a network where sympathy circulates instead of Christian blood. Sympathy replaced blood, but preserved its efficacy.

What is the value of that feeling of sympathy? What sort of external actions manifest its presence? When emotions are the currency for succor, and when an experience of blood is the standard that underwrites their value, how pervasively will debt and obligation animate friendly association? These are not rhetorical questions, but real and difficult ones with which Mary Rowlandson struggled for long nights after her restoration, returning to them as psychic obverse to a material debt: On 2 May 1676, after her winter in in captivity, she returned to Boston, having been purchased “for twenty pounds, the price of my Redemption…raised by some Boston Gentlewomen, and Mr. Usher” (62). First debt. Second debt: “Then Mr Thomas Shepherd of Charlestown received us into his House, where we continued eleven weeks; and a father and Mother they were unto us.” As during her captivity, she depended on others directly for the necessities of life. But this dependence became less and less intimate as she began to conclude not for the messengers therein, the witnesses’ declaration of a mandate was already a rhetorical motif to invoke authority and make demands of its audience.

443 Traister, “Mary Rowlandson and the Invention of the Secular,” summarizes these misreadings and sees them as evidence of Puritanism’s long slouch toward secular individualism.
her narrative. She and Joseph moved to Boston; she called it “a remove”, and it was like a
captivity because it intensified her condition of debt. This was the third debt: Her benevolent
Christian friends, in England and America, “some in this Town and some in that,” had sent
money to “hire an house for us”—most likely through the paper bills of sale involving several
middle-parties to certifiably and conveniently transfer sums of money over great distances.⁴⁴⁴ The
house they hired seems to have been empty when Joseph and Mary and their more recently
redeemed son arrived, and it would probably not have thirty-seven inhabitants like their old home
at Lancaster had. These qualities of redeemed life brought to her mind thoughts of company and
closeness—and this is evident in the frequent return to vocabulary of distance and proximity in
her description of all her friends. To return:

…the we had, through the benevolence of good Christian friends, some in this town, and
some in that, and others; and some from England; that in a little time, we might look, and
see the house furnished with love. The Lord hath been exceeding good to us in our low
estate, in that when we had neither house nor home, nor other necessaries, the Lord so
moved the hearts of these and those towards us, that we wanted neither food, nor
raiment for ourselves or ours, Proverbs xviii.24 There is a friend that sticketh closer than
a Brother. And how many such friends have we found, and now living amongst? And truly
such a friend have we found him to be unto us, in whose house we lived, viz. Mr. James
Whitcomb, a friend unto us near hand, and afar off. (64)

Given her attention here to the spatial dimension English of social life, it is not difficult to note
some recalcitrance in response to all this generosity. Fourth debt: “I thought it somewhat strange
to set up house-keeping with bare walls,” she mused, but as ever, she turned to scripture.
Skipping typology altogether, she invoked the mordant pessimism of the Ecclesiastical teacher:
“but as Solomon says, Money answers all things” (italics original).⁴⁴⁵ Through friendly

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on New England settlers, see Michelle Burnham, *Folded Selves.*
⁴⁴⁵ In 1692, “money” would mean something more specific than it had in the prior sixty years of
Boston’s settlement. During Stuart repossession of the its colonial territories, and the
consequently more involved policies of governance enacted in the American colonies, Boston
was given a currency in accordance with the standard at the metropole. This took place about a
decade after Rowlandson’s *Captivity* was published, but it’s likely that, at least some of the
colonial English, probably the more pious, were wary of this possibility, not just because of any
lingering iconophobia towards systems of representation inherent in financial capital, but also
benevolence, very quickly, she found “the house furnished with love.” The fourth debt: 
everything in the house.

More urgent than making a definitive claim about the origins of her dissatisfaction is the 
task of observing the structures that determined her loneliness in English life. Rowlandson 
experienced different forms for social belonging in captivity, much like Williams did in exile, 
differences that changed the way she experienced settler sentimentality when she returned. 
Williams wrote in his chapter “Of Debts and Trusting” that the Narragansett were “very desirus to 
come into debt” (168); he saw, relative to English custom, a greater openness to ongoing 
obligation, although, at least in The Key, he could not make out how his new neighbors determined commensurability, especially through time. Something of that incommensurability now 
appeared for Rowlandson in English life; in the last paragraphs of the Captivity she described 
pursuing close attachments with her neighbors, perhaps to learn again to recognize English 
exchange, but she had limited success. Among her captors, closeness had meant, eventually, 
being able to differentiate among individuals within the community of enemies—some were more 
friendly than others.

There is little explicit emotional content in Rowlandson’s description of affiliation, though: 
among the Algonquian, friendship was as friendship did. At its most explicit, friendship was the 
experience of reliable hospitality, the more “free access” that Thacher longed for in his letter to his 
brother. Rowlandson noted this in her nineteenth remove, when the circumstances of flight 
brought her to request shelter from a neighbor rather than her “Master”, shelter that she was

446 The word “furnished” appears in English half a century before the word “furniture” and 
although both were well used before the late seventeenth century, it is only at the turn of the 
eighteenth that the verb form “furnished” describes presence of the movable articles of bodily 
accommodation within a house. See “furnished, adj.” and “furniture, n.” Oxford English Dictionary 

447 And even then, Adorno suggests, “it is not open to the individual to transcend a collectively 
determined loneliness through his own decision and determination” (165). See “Reconciliation 

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refused, and rudely. She reflected then on her relationship with her master, who was, or “seemed to me the best Friend that I had....” then she qualified, “of an Indian” (46). That closeness may have been on her mind during her famous description of wakeful alienation from the world of the sleeping, when she observed that there should have been a friend that stuck closer than a brother, a friend more valuable than Christian blood, maybe. The closest friendships involved intimate hospitality; Williams and Thacher would agree. Yet English life in urban Boston was a life of greater propriety and insulation. Rowlandson’s return to it was marked by unpleasant and growing debt for the very abstractions—bills of sale and bare walls—that separated her from the English with whom she shared blood and, presumably, sympathy. Her dissatisfaction towards her conditions led her to meditate on her enclosure and separation—an inverted exile or domestic captivity—with enduring pathos.

What Christian reader could fail to be moved by Rowlandson’s closing descriptions of the long-term psychic effects of trauma? The version of eloquently lonely self-hood she represented seems innate and familiar; its familiarity supports Nancy Armstrong and Leonard Tenenhouse’s claim that the Captivity brought back to England a disposition of affectively charged and nationally representative interiority, and that this disposition flourished in the manner of expression and affective discipline now enjoyed as the novel. The mostly absent presence of indigenous Americans in her ideal of affective gratification, as well as the near-impossibility of representing that experience, determined the intensity of her description of utter loneliness so that it appears to be as total as, say, the loneliness of outer space as conveyed in a contemporary captivity narrative like the 2013 film Gravity. Introspective loneliness is a foundational quality

448 Many of the article-length studies on Mary Rowlandson of the past several decades take the opportunity to imaginatively feel with her in this moment, to rescue and redeem her loneliness, since they cannot not rescue her from it.
449 Armstrong and Tenenhouse, The Imaginary Puritan, pp. 196-216.
450 Who has begun to write the story about theemptiness of outer space as anything more than what Harold Simonson calls a “safety valve” for the westward conquest that Frederick Jackson articulated in his “frontier hypothesis”? (Carl Sagan’s screenplay for his novel Contact, for example, depicts at least three characters who fear that the vastness of the universe might be an “awful waste of space”). See “Frederick Jackson Turner: Frontier History as Art” in Antioch
for the modern novel’s discipline; Rowlandson’s singularity innovatively focused on the “heart” rather than the gendered body. She was innovative, in other words, for drawing attention to the emotional life of the subject by distinguishing her blood from that of the enemy. Yet in accounting for the conditions under which emotion can have such power, we see that the objects towards which her modern heart strove, as well as the boundaries or obstacles separating her from that goal, emerged from the territory through a historically specific context, the deep and violent roots of Christian modes of relation.

To understand friendship primarily through feeling is an act of exclusion, but it’s also an act that seals off the feeling subject against the risks and coercions that undergird social flourishing, as Rowlandson’s conclusion so memorably conveyed. Friendship concluded her captivity, in part out of necessity—so many of her family members had died. But to overlook the material conditions of her friendly relations—her quantifiable debts to her neighbors—as well as the contrasting conditions that made her debt so uncomfortable—her prior intimacy with strangers and enemies—to overlook these and thus to understand her dissatisfaction as immaterial occludes other features of friendly and sociable life. Rowlandson may not have wanted to pay off those debts—to finish those obligations so may have been intensely alienating—but once those debts had been abstracted into financial terms, they controlled the avenues for expressing social obligation. In response, she insisted in her writing that the house was furnished with "love," for any specific objects, anything hanging on the walls or sitting in the cupboards might be counted into a sum.

To owe friendship to another person seems, to the modern, autonomous will at the center the buffered self, abhorrent, yet in early modernity, and particularly in the New England colonies, friendship was nothing if not obligation animated by love, typically obligation to an individual that was mediated by shared, collective pieties. The most visible site to fulfill such obligations of friendship, as Leela Gandhi has observed for another colonial context, was, and had long been in

acts of hospitality, but at times, invitation and inhabitation might not be accessible, or if accessible, not representable in a straightforward way. In these cases, practices of writing could go beyond geographical and cultural limitations to provide a vicarious habitation for fellow-feeling. In doing so, these three texts, the letter, the key and the captivity, tried to synthesize the feeling of abrogated affection that they more or less explicitly describe; and then, direct that desire outwards to their readers.

But when these settlers tried to represent friendship in writing, in their recourse to words left an unsatisfiable affective remainder. This affective remainder animated a comradeship, a Christian comradeship, to fill in that gap. Such comradeship drew energy from narrative storytelling to reach out, like Whitman’s noiseless patient spider, beyond that difference. In this view, writing about friends is substantially apostrophic: writing about friends is writing to a friend, perhaps a lost friend, but also, perhaps, one that is not yet known and still to come: “a friend,” writes Emerson, “is Janus-faced. He is the child of all my foregoing hours, the prophet of those to come, and a harbinger of a greater friend” (122). This description resonates in form with Williams’ experience of double-faced friendship, but Emerson transposes a social antagonism from the differences of nation or race into the development of the subject through personal time, towards greater alignment with himself, perfecting a synthesis of contradicting desires and impulses.

If writing about friendship entails writing to a potential friend; and if the specificity of friendship depends on the specificity of the other, then the apostrophic quality of writing about friendship also entails prosopopoeia, a specific sort of animation of the speaking voice that juxtaposes in affective competition intimate allegiances and collective ones, and in so doing forges a fiction of autonomous authority as the discourse-producing will that feels itself to have chosen its objects of intimate love, objects who share heart-feeling. Terror, like grief, may not feel like a choice, but love, especially for those following Christ’s injunction—love was a choice. These early American texts show this feeling of love to be an illusive replacement: Thacher’s affection and attention returned, ultimately, to the brother whose distance offered him freer access.
Williams, who strove diligently to love his enemies, singularly succeeded in loving them while preserving their inimical qualities—indeed, his subjective will to love emerged at its strongest when he accepted respite in the house of his enemy alongside his enemy’s enemy, and when he performed the deceptive role of present absence faithfully. The third, most rhetorically subtle and performatively complex of these texts, staged a plea for affective hospitality, but in so doing, expanded the vectors for sympathetic yet kept them within ultimately narrow bounds. Rowlandson’s rhetoric of subjectivity is deponent—like certain Latin verbs, she makes a show of laying aside her weapons, if not her hostility. Consequently, her narrative shows a double-motion, a counter-exposition in the fugue that concludes with one of the most robust expressions of early American personhood. Mary Rowlandson is a real English woman with many friends, and in the Atlantic world, friendship is the stuff of fiction.
CHAPTER 5: Feeling’s Future

Emotional sensitivity, I have argued, complemented the power and the violence of European settlement in America. Fellow-feeling was an active and dynamic force in this process and did not exist distinct from it, nor did it temper its coercions. This conclusion will reflect on these findings, signal their intervention in the most recent literary historical scholarship in the field, and speculate on the endurance of these methods in literary historical practice in the present. I conclude by returning to the model of seemingly non-utilitarian friendship that represents the apogee of Congregationalist fellow-feeling, trace its reappearance in the nineteenth century and into the novelistic practices of sympathetic camaraderie of the twenty-first century.

Hoping to make New England new again, recent literary histories have sensitively and studiously read the archive of seventeenth century settlement. They have aspired to prove that deep feeling was indeed a desirable part of the colonial affective repertoire. They have demonstrated, furthermore, that these colonists understood feeling to be not simply a matter of providence or grace, although its essence was divinely granted. Finally, these studies have demonstrated how important the faculty of imagination was in this labor. My dissertation has complemented these insights in turn. First, I have shown who the repertoire of colonial feeling, even socially shared feeling, included dispositions in excess of harmonious commiseration. Indeed, that pro-social feeling depended on the latent preservation of less archivally celebrated feelings, such as fear, revulsion, suspicion and hatred. I have shown, furthermore, that the labor of emotional discipline does not simply stop once fellow-feeling has been achieved (however that achievement gets measured). Rather, I have acknowledged that fellow-feeling had significant power in the colonial setting, and that this power would go on to have effects beyond those prescribed and desired by New England’s social theorists—they reproduced a tendency toward violence in the centrifugal and centripetal dispositions of the New England settlers. Finally, I have affirmed the value of imaginative labor in giving reason and logic to inchoate affective experience.
yet have looked beyond the evidentiary realm of the textual. I have done so in order to include, as
an object of my analysis, the process by which certain forms and ends of feeling appear
recognizable to readers, and amenable to representation in the first place. I have done so, as the
second half of this conclusion will demonstrate, in order to argue that certain forms of literary
discipline, exemplary among them the novel, preserve settler colonialism through naturalizing
certain forms of fellow-feeling at the cost of excluding, by ignoring, others.

To recap this process of preserving exclusive boundaries, consider the premise of John
Winthrop’s “Modell of Christian Charitie,” read briefly in the preface and in the first chapter,
above. The foundational premise—the preservation of social injustice—endures throughout the
document’s existence. Few, if any readers of this text have read as relevant the fact that the most
frequently-cited manifest of affection’s empowering capacity was issued from an exceptionally
elite colonial position, nor have literary historians observed with skepticism that the empowerment
outlined therein was an empowerment based on the will of an individual to understand himself as
an abstraction with formally equivalent value to any other individual. This formal equivalence, to
be codified into law by the successors of the colonial elites a century and a half later, encouraged
less elite individuals to abandon attention to the structures that produced their dependence on
others.

Winthrop’s “Modell” named and organized the subtleties of sociable feeling of which New
England settlers were eminently capable. Recent readings have stressed this capacity,
countering the vivid caricatures, present and past, of the New England colonist’s strictness and
severity. These scholars have continued a long tradition of scholarship keenly invested in the
project of refreshing memories of settler sentimentality. Perhaps the enemies, antagonists, and
skeptics of colonial settlement would have regarded Winthrop’s shipboard injunction with
disbelief; yet the exhortation’s initial audience, the future settlers aboard the Arbella in 1630,
would not have been surprised to learn, or be reminded of their capability and obligation to feel
love and affection toward each other, and then to behave accordingly. What changed, as several
scholars have shown, was not the possibility of not loving each other, but the possibility of the seizure of putatively unutilized resources, among them land, in the service of an equality among English materially constituted.

In my chapters’ readings I have affirmed the prosocial capability of these setters’ emotions. I have sought also to expand our breadth of attention, to bring to light a broader repertoire of affections that would allow us to more robustly understand what the inverse of Winthrop’s prescribed fellow-feeling was. I have demonstrated that fellow-feeling was prescribed, by Winthrop and others, not in opposition to repression or unfeeling legalism, but rather in dynamic dialectical engagement with averse, but intense affective experiences, such as fear (Preface); afflicted vigilance (Chapter One); shame (Chapter Two); rage (Chapter Three) and resentment (Chapter Four). Before all these exercises of fellow feeling, the English had to possess a strong capacity to recognize potential harm, even in oblique perceptions or representations. In Winthrop’s “Modell” for example, the injunction to practical fellow-feeling appeared urgent because Winthrop’s metaphorical description of the consequences of failure. He described divine retribution as a shipwreck. The threat rehearsed a common metaphor for the commonwealth as a maritime vessel. But in this colonial context, and especially in the event’s shipboard delivery, the power of Winthrop’s rhetoric signals some of the less clear and more terrifying fears of English settlement. A shipwreck is a paradigmatically isolated way to die collectively—surrounded by no humans from which to request assistance. This nameable insulation suggests the intensity of their fear of present humans upon which they might depend; the intensity of their desire that their sympathetic community not include, or even acknowledge, those who did not desire for their pure-soil plantation.

In addition to affirming and expanding the scope and utility of these exercises in affection, my research had aspired to affirm that these exercises were just that—deliberate cultivations rather than simply understanding them as the sort of immanent infusion of intensity valorized, for example, by the Romantic imagination. Literary historians have noted how complex and delicate
these exercises could be, and noted, too, that they often produced enduring and deliberate habits of reflection on the part of their practitioners. Thus, they could draw on principles and ideals that circulated through their religious doctrine, and make such principles useful in vernacular, quotidian, if not yet secular settings. The scholarship on these settlers has found for them a place in an intellectual community that includes well-known philosophers such as Aristotle and Plato; Augustine and Aquinas; Rousseau and Smith. Research has shown, too, that this intellectual labor exceeded the boundaries of what appears to the present as philosophical production. Many individuals, not just elite writers, deliberately engaged with the struggle between religious ideology and more practical politics.

I have hoped to show, however, that the emotional reflections of colonial New England settlers had value not only for a philosophical tradition, but a political one, too. Recent historians of New England settlement have shown their complicated negotiations on the best and most efficient mode for distributing authority and power that they understood to have been divinely lent them. This dissertation’s readings have shown that such emotional reflection was not distinct nor accidentally supplementary from and corrective to the political goals, but rather essential to them. Such an account might be quickly, if ungracefully summarized by observing the under-noted obverse of the Foucauldian principle of power that recent literary histories have invoked. Foucault has taught scholars of the past to understand power in a new way, distinct from a premodern episteme of royal sovereignty. Power, in this account, would circulate broadly. This means that everyday, non-elite individuals might have access to it and appear to wield it in response to vestigial representations of the earlier mode of sovereign power.

My research has aimed to offer a reminder and a corrective to these recent literary histories. I position myself alongside, but hoping to intervene in recent studies that tend to represent sympathetic fellow-feeling as a sort of positive populist power; that understand such power as different in kind from the exigencies of settler politics—different from, and thus implicitly, opposed to it. This opposition is possible only if settler politics names a realm of visible, typically
centrifugal, descending violence, a realm in which exercises of fellow-feeling can be a meliorative complement enacted by well-meaning, sincere individuals. Emotional experience, always represented in these accounts as willed experience, stands to redeem the violence engaged in by these same parties. Winthrop’s “Modell” signals a broader domain of political coercion when we recall, as so few scholars have done, that the governor, the most politically powerful man the colony was telling the subjects he governed that they were obliged to have and to cultivate feelings for each other—that in their endeavors to feel socially, collectively, they would fortify the individual who so earnestly willed.

Such an observation reminds us how Foucault insisted that power’s circulation was not an object that individuals accessed, but rather that power’s circulation shaped the perception of individual subjectivity, the apparent possession of an individual will. Misunderstanding and overestimating the a priori robustness of the willful individual in this archive ultimately misunderstands how the settlers’ emotional sensitivity actively participated in the violence it has been seen thus far to oppose. When these settlers engaged in reflective and deliberate fellow-feeling; when they acted in accord with a colonial governor’s exhortation to bind themselves together in affection; when they told their stories of intensely desiring to have divinely sourced feelings of piety, they took part in a reformation of power, and a reformation of violence, rather than a subversion and a triumph over it.

Finally, my research affirms the value of literary studies in the composition of more robust historical accounts of the composition of a people. The practice of close reading provides unique resources in telling the story of how fellow-feeling could come to be so powerful. The literary historians of colonial affection would affirm these techniques—the attention to how a text reveals concerns in excess of, and sometimes in tension with, its stated themes. One example of these methods and their yields has been the foundational observation of this dissertation, my introduction’s argument that the self-evidence of self-interest in the early ears of Plymouth settlement followed a strategic negotiation of emotional speculation. Literary analysis, an
attention to the motifs and formal qualities of a text (here, the tendency to repeat justifications for the decision to build a fort), strongly suggests an unresolved hesitation toward what the text described confidently as natural.

Literary analysis, I hope to show, can do more than this. It can reveal the limits and the under-noted consequences of the imaginative methods that we invoke when understanding the experiences of others. Literary analysis can show how these methods of isomorphic speculation have the capacity to fortify unjust structures within and external to a given community. Recall, for example, the fact that for Winslow, Bradford, and Standish, fellow-feeling, the act of speculating what another party might be feeling, was an explicit technique of martial strategy, the act that produced the necessity of the local, internal borders across which families and households were to exercise their affection. Recall, furthermore, that such household autonomy was the desired outcome of the “Modell of Christian Charity.” In that text, the work of sympathetic fellow-feeling would normalize the standpoint of autonomous generosity that only certain individuals would in reality be able to access—yet because the operation that Winthrop prescribed depended first not on another person on which to bestow material generosity, but rather, first, the imagination of individual autonomy required for generosity, this autonomy appears now to be not only universally accessible, but also ethically desirable.

Recall that Winthrop’s opening claim was the uncontestable goodness of maintaining social distinctions between the rich and the poor. Winthrop went on to define the rich and poor and he did so in a specific and rhetorically durable manner. Rather than qualify these categories empirically or quantitatively, Winthrop defined them as a matter of relation—and non-relation. The rich, he claimed, were those who were able to “live comfortably by their own means” (283). The rich, in other words, were those whose comfort and commodiousness might be acquired autonomously rather than contingently. Those rich, he had insisted at the start, were to remain that way. The poor, meanwhile, were everyone else. The difference between the two, translated into the figurative language of walls and fortifications, was the difference in being able to control
the boundaries between oneself and another person. It was imperative for the social and theological vision of the elite in the colony that these boundaries remain in place, and thus, Winthrop’s greatest achievement, testified to in the Anglo-American prosperity doctrine that some argue endures to this day, is by articulating the imaginative accessibility of the position of insulated autonomy.

Although the first statement in Winthrop’s sermon might appear to aspire to be a value-neutral description of the seemingly inevitable existence of economic inequality (akin to the book of Deuteronomy’s observation that “there will always be poor people in the land” or its Christic update, “the poor you will always have with you”), Winthrop’s later rhetoric went on to insist on the practical and perhaps ethical desirability of the insulated standpoint. In his description of the practical unfolding of a love that could cross those divinely ordained boundaries, Winthrop emphasized the value of imagining what the other individual might be undergoing. This is a relatively familiar description of how sympathy works, easily intelligible to readers of the twenty-first century educated by the received pedagogies of novel reading and interpretation. But notice, however, that when Winthrop described this operation in its more minute unfolding, he typically did so from a standpoint in which the sympathizing subject was already capable of material generosity. That is, Winthrop’s rhetoric assumed the ethical necessity of fabricating or self-fashioning a standpoint of material independence, of a buffered, fortified and autonomous self.

The imaginative praxis of sympathy depended, first, on the disavowal of dependence (an implicit disavowal of the conditions that produced that dependence); and second, on an act of self-imagination—imagining not only that one is in a position of extending sympathy, but also that there is a bounded entity indexed by the “self” that acquires the appearance of autonomy through such acts of centrifugal imagination.

I point out this inaugural self-fashioning, and its urgency in a colonial context, because it articulates in a condensed manner the salience of my work in a longer literary history. This literary history, the disciplines of sentimental feeling promoted in subsequent centuries of Anglo-
American development, depends, I hope to have convincingly suggested, on the endurance of an intrinsically settler-colonial self-conception. The relationship between the early American archive and the eighteenth-century emergence of narrative prose fiction—named, now, as the novel—has for some decades been an object of interest in literary histories of both sides of the Atlantic. The novel’s signature technique of revealing interiority through engaged contrast with an exterior world provokes in readers a desire that is often understood to be self-evident—the desire to surpass boundaries of self (and implicitly the boundaries that distinguish one sort of person from another), while leaving those boundaries and distinctions intact. Just as the mournfully valorized self-interest of the Plymouth pilgrims was not natural or self-evident, this desire for emotional transcendence is not natural or self-evident either, but takes place and acquires value in a colonial settler setting, according with the historically specific exigencies of that setting.

As I have reviewed above, the text that signaled the colonial emergence of the novel form, Mary Rowlandson’s captivity narrative, made sense within a very particular historical setting, though would go on to circulate and thus discipline a wide variety of readers in its sense-making practices. My contribution to this literary history suggests that the novel’s emergence and its enduring extraordinary popularity as a vehicle for sentimental exercise bears with it as a condition of its possibility a desire to maintain control of the boundaries between individuals, not simply the desire to surpass or transcend those boundaries. Novels, in other words, reaffirm the buffering of the modern individual self that has been narrated by Charles Taylor and others—they make this boundary appear to be self-evident and universal. One indication of their success is the perception that the affective disposition and relationship encoded in the novel—not simply the sort of individual narrated therein, but more foundationally, the mode of individual disclosure that the novel uniquely reproduces—is not only natural, but an ethically triumphant practice, worthy of disciplining less politically mature individuals as a precondition for civic participation. This is another way of explaining process in which Mary Rowlandson’s love makes sense.
This fiction—the feeling of the heart’s choosing to love—animates modern Anglo-American personhood, and has, since at least as early as the end of the seventeenth-century, and such a fiction was anticipated from the earliest recorded experiences of New England settlement. The shared fellow-feeling that circulated within the new national community found a strong elaboration in the writings of eighteenth-century writers, mostly men, though they absorbed from women’s discourse the rhetoric of deeply-felt sentiment and directed it towards a model of purposeful citizenship.\footnote{White Americans have long had a lot of feelings—evidently with special abundance in the pre-republican eighteenth-century through the antebellum era. See, first Abram van Engen, \textit{Sympathetic Puritans: Calvinist Fellow-Feeling in Early New England} (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2015); and Schweitzer, \textit{Perfecting Friendship}. See also Peter Coviello, “Agonizing Affection: Affect and Nation in Early America” \textit{Early American Literature} 37.3 (2002): 439-468; Caleb Crain, \textit{American Sympathy: Men, Friendship, and Literature in the New Nation} (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 2001); Julie Ellison, \textit{Cato’s Tears and the Making of Anglo-American Emotion} (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1999); Elizabeth Barnes, \textit{States of Sympathy: Seduction and Democracy in the American Novel} (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1997); Julia Stern, \textit{The Plight of Feeling: Sympathy and Dissent in the Early American Novel} (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1997).} Ralph Waldo Emerson, in the middle of the nineteenth century, composed one of the strongest responses to this version of sociable affection, as part of a larger project in articulating an essential, distinctly American character for white society.\footnote{On Emerson’s specifically American literary ambitions, see his own “The American Scholar” in \textit{Essays: First Series}; for a story of his life’s dedication to this work, see Robert Richardson, \textit{The Mind on Fire} (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1995).} In his essay “Friendship,” published first in 1841, he described the matter as one of pious, American diligence. Friendship "demands religious treatment" (120). To elaborate, he directly drew on the vocabulary of reform Protestant piety: “We talk of choosing our friends,” he observed, noting an inconsistency between the discourse of friendship and its experience. He continued with what seems, initially, and without an understanding of his religious development, to be a paradox: “We talk of choosing our friends, but friends are self-elected.” By this, Emerson did not mean that the self chooses friends; more likely, considering his turn to the Calvinist language of predestination, he meant to describe how the affinity that attracts men, ideally in pairs, works mysteriously, like an infusion of salvific grace. Friendship is less a matter of active pursuit and more one of discernment and reflection, introspection from which the elected self more strongly emerges. Through sharing
thoughts, Emerson implied, friends consummate and perfect the mandate of American settlement: “We shall stand by and by in a new world of our own creation, in which the earlier categories of “stranger” and “pilgrim” no longer apply as they had in the traditionary globe” (112). For Emerson, the ideal completion of the New England errand would align completely with the end of the otherness that distinguishes the approaching stranger from the self.

Yet Emerson remained wary of the rationality that a Protestant perspective might predispose in the experience of friendship, the calculated vigilance and dedicated labor that Weber would observe, especially in the United States, sixty years later. Emerson stated this suspicion explicitly in the essay: He hated the idea that love should be reduced to only manifest in exchange, “which makes love a commodity. It is an exchange of gifts, of useful loans; it is a good neighborhood; it watches with the sick; it holds the pall at the funeral; and quite loses sight of the nobility of the relation” (118). Measuring it thus deprived friendship of what he claimed were its essential satisfactions, truth and tenderness—the latter being his refined term for the feeling and expression of “love.” Emerson thus post-spiritualized friendship: he transposed the devotion and ardor of the heart, formally declaring its migration from the territory of religious practice and into the realm of deeply felt sociality. These feelings included not only tenderness but also fear.

Initially, Emerson acknowledged fear in response to the approach of the other as “an uneasiness betwixt pleasure and pain” (111). Yet, after the apotropaic essay past a church in his piece’s introductory vignettes, this fear seems to be something more like nervous excitement about the self that emerges in the encounter with the other. An interesting and valid intuition, only one that remains obstinately ignorant of the specific otherness of the other. By the conclusion of the essay, fear looks upward to the heavens, hoping to dismiss the qualities of the material world: “It is foolish to be afraid of making our ties too spiritual” (123), Emerson advised, and went on nearly to encourage the what he had earlier summarized as the “absolute insulation of man” (122). This is hardly a surprise coming from the author of essays such as “Self-Reliance,” or “Experience,” where he insisted, for example, that “souls never touch their objects” (243). But this
essay has specific insight on the best practical medium or genre for friendship. Conversation may have been ideal, but as an ideal, might be too much. "I cannot afford to speak much with my friend" (123, emphasis added), he noted, articulating his will to attention in the vocabulary of monetary exchange. And so he accorded greatest value to the letter. He imagined a letter as an early overture for friendship, inserting an imaginary letter from one imaginary friend to another; and over and above his skepticism toward the quantifiable exchanges of friendship, he made an exception for the gratification of letters: “To my friend I write a letter, and from him I receive a letter. That seems to you a little. It suffices me” (121). The letter was an exception and it did exceptional work: it could begin to transform the essay into a conversation, using the form of apostrophe that Rowlandson articulated through typological scripts.

For Emerson, Anglo-American piety, Calvinist and conversational, mended the walls that divided self and other, walls that might erode with time and negligence. His version of coolly expressed friendship went further than his closest philosophical precedents, those of Smith and Hume. Like Adam Ferguson, their contemporary and interlocutor, Emerson believed that unity with the mind of the deity was the end of all human relationships, especially friendship. Furthermore, his version of praxis, in which ideals and action were synthesized as the work of self-electing conversation, persists today, as the two final readings below will show. Emerson called these words “troops”—meaning to militarize against, presumably, loneliness or inarticulateness. Yet Mary Rowlandson’s eloquent description and deeply sympathetic, even friendly expression of loneliness and debt, ought to inspire suspicion towards the occlusion or receding of the material qualities of loneliness, a diminishing from sight that has, for so long, bestowed on Protestant America its very Christian feeling of emptiness.

For Emerson, friendship was spiritual, not religious. He made it so as a flight from the possibly fractious encounters with earthly, temporal otherness that he could only partially

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contained in his writing. He wrote, like Grayling, that friendship could overcome great differences, that it “cancels the thick walls of individual character, relation, age, sex, circumstance…and now makes many one” (113). The same blood-feeling can circulate as affective currency among these differences, and indeed, Emerson’s investment in the heart and in blood in this essay is contained and dignified. He turned to science, for example, to describe the regularity of the heart’s beating, its systole and its diastole; he rarely brought blood to the surface. In light of his ongoing interest in clarifying the white lineage of Americans from the English Saxons, perhaps what this heart-feeling could not cancel was the walls of human skin.\(^{455}\) Emerson’s studied silence on race in America; his advocacy of a friendship so spiritual that it would need little actual contact with the friend; his preference for such modes of communication as conversation, and especially letters; and his preference too for friendship to be measured by the transcendent movement of the heart—all these qualities of friendship that he described sound much more like contemporary experiences of friendship than those described in early American texts. Yet having considered the generic precedents and influences of those earlier texts, we are ready to see what articulations of friendship in contemporary America might be missing, and what some of the possible consequences are for that oversight.

Consider, as one example, Hanya Yanagihara’s novel in the sociological mode, describing the twenty-first century emotional life of urban professionals. In *A Little Life*, Yanagihara highlights friendship as the site of the most important care and tenderness.\(^{456}\)

\(^{455}\) On Emerson’s contributions to American race theory, see Nell Irvine Painter’s five chapters dedicated specifically to his thinking in *The History of White People* (New York: Norton, 2010): 151-200.

\(^{456}\) Alongside novels like Ben Lerner’s *10:04* (New York: Macmillian, 2014), and *Leaving the Atocha Station* (Minneapolis: Coffee house, 2011); Sheila Heti’s own *How Should a Person Be* (New York: Picador, 2013); Lars Iyers’ *Dogma* trilogy (New York: Meville House, 2009); Benjamin Kunkel’s *Indecision* (New York: Random House, 2006); Tao Lin’s *Tai Pei* (New York: Vintage, 2010) and Emily Gould’s bluntly titled *Friendship* (New York: Picador, 2014), the contemporary *kuntslerroman*, in describing the development of the artist in her world of necessity describes the environment of friends in great detail. Yanagihara’s *Little Life* (New York: Little, Brown, 2015) is just more self-conscious about these in its attention to the difficult task of defining what exactly friendship, the otherness of the other self, looks like, or whether it can be seen at all.
Influenced by recent narrative expositions of what Sheila Heti calls the “new American artist,”
Yanagihara qualitatively explores conditions that make these important relationships possible.
She features four friends: an actor, an architect, a painter and a lawyer in New York City. Her
exposition of the conditions for these urban migrants’ professional flourishing in a strange and
hostile environment draws on the novel’s unique technique of realist exposition—narration of
speech and thought—to represent some of the tense speculation and observation of the captivity
narrative. To return to Breitwieser’s observations on the genre, “like Mary White Rowlandson, [the
captive] suspects that his survival may depend on his ability to parse his hosts’ odd ways” (4).

What captivates Yanagihara’s interest among this group of friends is the competition
between two models for friendship: Jude, the lawyer, believes that friendship does not depend on
intimately sharing feeling, the way that Thacher and Rowlandson longed to do, but rather, it
flourishes in practices of attentiveness and hospitality, conversational and literal. His closest
friend Willem, the avid novel-reader and the only white man of the group, believes otherwise. As
with Emerson, conversation between two men, following the “law of one to one, is the practice
and consummation of friendship” (119). Willem’s insistence on talk, and his threat of withholding
his friendship, ultimately coerces Jude to share his unpleasant past. The story Jude tells
ostensibly explains his obsession with the feeling of purity, and justifies his compulsive self-harm,
the graphic and bloody scenes of cutting described using the genre’s characteristic technique of
represented speech and thought.

Jude’s strangeness fascinates Willem. His strangeness is introduced first as a matter of
race, and later through the caricature of the swift and swiftly vanishing native American that
Williams observed. In passages of narrated recollection, Jude remembers being told by his hosts

457 “I hadn’t even seen the Alhambra” in London Review of Books 34.16 (30 August 2012), pp. 31-2.
and captors—a monastery-orphanage of Jesuit brothers in the unspecified Midwest, and the one, in particular, who kidnaps him—that his performance in cross-country was so superior that he might pass for an Iroquois; Jude is given souvenir clothing from the native American tourist stops they pass as they flee. The priest is the most explicit enemy of the novel, yet not the only one. The discursive aggression inhering in Willem's style of friendship directly preserves Emerson's eloquent, Christian ideals, and Willem's first description of Jude in the novel, (“Jude’s not white”) suggests that those ideals of sociable behavior recycle and reanimate race discourse in order to prove the triumph of feeling. Race seems to be the surface against which emerging, visible blood guarantees friendship. In a novel so detached from historical events as Yanagihara’s—an insulation, or isolation reminiscent of Williams’ Key—friendship can float abstractly, like a shipwrecked sailor who has a story, but has not yet asked you to call him Ishmael.

A more robust captivity narrative appeared in American theaters on Columbus Day 2013: Tom Hanks, reenacting the captivity of a real life Captain Richard Phillips by a small band of Somali pirates in April 2009. The movie preserves the sequence of removes that Rowlandson innovated: Here is Captain Philips driving to the dock with his wife, chatting about their college-age son; here he is departing on the Maersk ship Alabama; here he is passing over the control of the ship to the pirate Muse; here are Muse and his accomplice, Belal, taking Captain Philips hostage in a life-boat;459 here are the tense, terse conversations, in which the possibility of shared humanity is extended for the gratification of American intersubjective understanding; and here is the bullet of the Navy SEALS, that enters through the porthole of the life-raft, like “an arrow or a rock coming through a window” (192), that kills Belal and splatters his blood all over the face of the Captain. The film does not make friendship as an explicit theme—Tom Hanks represents the

459 In Paradise Lost, Milton’s Belial, prince among the demons—a community of evil in which no friendship is nor can be. He urges against war and instead counsels “ignoble ease and peaceful sloth / not peace” (226-7) in an argument that complement’s Milton’s position on the persistence of evil in God’s creation. Belial acknowledges that even they, the demons, still all exist at the mercy of God, like Edwards’ spider, among the flames. Paradise Lost in Collected Poems ed. John Leonard. (New York: Penguin, 1999). The movie’s allusion may not even be an allusion, but the coincidence is rich to let pass by unnoted.
family and the mercantile commerce of the nation. As a representation of these two elements, he cannot find the vocabulary to articulate the specific qualities of his trauma at the conclusion of the film: when the nurse begins to undress him in the rescue ship’s infirmary, asking him where the pain is, the final frame centers Tom Hanks’ face, unable to speak and blubbery like a barbarian.

As the guarantor of property rights, the state sustains investments in nationality and race that make the difference between Phillips and Muse especially difficult to overcome, and this captivity narrative concludes by showing the effects of that struggle. As when, in the contemporary film Gravity, astronaut Ryan Stone’s return capsule begins to sink after crashing into unidentified waters, the conclusion of the captivity narrative suggests that the redeemed captive is never safe, and that she or he continues to live in a state of terror. Read in this light, the captivity narrative can only conclude with a split between bodily restoration and emotional estrangement, a remainder that testifies in the register of affect, to the state’s control over the boundary between bios and zoe; and to the state’s control over the avenues for returning from “bare life” that Agamben understands as the foundation of the “sacred.”

Rowlandson experienced these avenues as friendship’s mediation by financial debt; Hanks’ Phillips, in the difficulty, as an agent of nationalized commerce, to recognize within the experience of captivity by the enemy, the capacity for friendship that is supposed to be constitutive of the other’s humanity. The closing shot centers Captain Philip’s face, covered no longer with blood, but rather, now, with tears and trying to speak, but unable to do much else but babble.

Captain Phillips’ response to such a stark version of humanity has no genre or mode for expression given his national identifications and allegiances to the state. To respond to the humanity of the pirate, the extra-state actor, and to consider the possibility of friendship with him might, in the twenty-first century, require or result in a text that, in the words of Roger Williams, “[we] have not heard of the like, yet framed” (83). Emerson glancingly acknowledged the international stakes that such friendly recognition might have. His vision of the world was limited,

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and possibly a hyperbole; and it was stubborn in its preferences for text as the ideal mediation for sociability. Yet he believed that peace between two spirits, the most profound peace and respect could appear when each party “stands in for the whole world” (122). When he described the power of the letter to convey these feelings, it was a military power: writing to a friend brought forward “troops of gentle spirits” which “invest themselves, on every hand, with chosen words” (111). There is an enemy here, somewhere. Emerson, at least, was at his most vulnerable to the enemy when facing the loneliness of intellectual work. “The scholar sits down to write, and all his years of meditation do not furnish him with one good thought or happy expression.” What familiar dissatisfaction. Here, then, comes my list of debts:
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