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Shifting Landscapes, Policies, And Morals: A Topographically Driven Analysis Of The Roman Wars In Greece From 200 Bc To 168 Bc

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Abstract
This dissertation offers a new analysis of the activities of the Roman army in the Balkan peninsula between 200 BC, when the Romans declared war on Macedon and took a land army to Illyria, and 168 BC, when the Romans decisively defeated the Macedonians at the Battle of Pydna. This is derived from a close reading of ancient sources (primarily Livy, Polybius, and Plutarch) taken together with personal autopsy of the routes the Romans took in the modern countries of Greece, Albania, and FYROM. Chapter 1 covers the Roman campaign in the Myzeqeja plain during 200 BC. Chapter 2 focuses on the Roman campaign in the border areas between Illyria and Macedon during 199 BC. Chapter 3 covers the Battle of the River Aous, the first battle fought between the Romans and Macedonians, at the border of Epirus and Illyria in 198 BC. Chapter 4 covers Roman activities in Thessaly between 198-170 BC, including new reconstructions of the battles of Cynoscephalae in 197 BC and Thermopylae in 191 BC. Chapter 5 covers Rome's invasion of Macedon in 169-168 BC, culminating in the Battle of Pydna. The results of this dissertation point to a new way to interpret this period, organized around two different but related concepts: theater of war and Roman policy. During this period the Romans operated in three distinct theaters of war: the Myzeqeja plain and its surroundings, Thessaly, and Macedon. In turn, the transitions from one theater of war to the next coincided with the development of three distinct phases of Roman policy towards Greece: first to protect the Adriatic ports and gradually extend the buffer zone to the east, continuing the regional policy Rome had established and maintained since 229 BC; second to reduce the influence of each of the Hellenistic kingdoms while maintaining a balance of power in Greece; third to invade Macedon for the first time and permanently alter how it was administered. While the first two policies both acted to maintain some type of status quo in Greece, the third policy looked to actively change it.

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SHIFTING LANDSCAPES, POLICIES, AND MORALS:
A TOPOGRAPHICALLY DRIVEN ANALYSIS
OF THE ROMAN WARS IN GREECE FROM 200 BC TO 168 BC

Jacob Nathan Morton
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in
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At Penn they taught me to read and at the ASCSA they taught me the value of autopsy. I hope this dissertation reflects a marriage of those two approaches.
ABSTRACT

SHIFTING LANDSCAPES, POLICIES, AND MORALS: A TOPOGRAPHICALLY DRIVEN ANALYSIS OF THE ROMAN WARS IN GREECE FROM 200 BC TO 168 BC

Jacob Nathan Morton
Supervisor: Jeremy McInerney

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INTRODUCTION

This dissertation focuses on the activities of the Roman army in the Balkan peninsula during the period between 200 BC, when the Romans declared war on Macedon and took a land army to Illyria, and 168 BC, when the Romans decisively defeated the Macedonians at the Battle of Pydna and gained control of Greece. Those Roman military movements then become the basis for a new understanding of both short- and long-term goals and policies for the states involved in these conflicts, as well for as the individual actors. The analysis thus ranges from individual decisions made during campaigns, to how and why specific battles unfolded, to seasonal goals, and ultimately the development of long-term goals and policies. The results of this study lead us to a new understanding of Roman policy in Greece and how it developed.

Roman expansion during the second century BC has been the subject of much scholarly interest and study, starting with the contemporary historian Polybius himself. Traditionally, scholars divide this period into three wars Rome fought in Greece, each war distinguished by whom they were fighting against: the Second Macedonian War, the Syrian-Aetolian War, and the Third Macedonian War. However, in this dissertation I offer a new approach to elucidating the history of this period based on topographic analyses. Where the Romans were fighting was more important to the Romans than whom it was they were fighting against. A focus on where the events took place cuts across the previous divisions and gives new perspective into the development of Roman behaviors and policies during this period. Determining exactly where and how the people
involved moved through the landscape of Greece and its surroundings provides a solid foundation on which to build: where, when, and how the Romans moved through Greece points us to why they did so.

The chronological parameters of this study were chosen with topographic and policy-based criteria in mind. The campaign of 200 BC serves as the starting point because it is the first instance of Rome bringing an army across the Adriatic to wage war against Macedon. Rome had in fact been militarily involved in the Adriatic coast of Illyria since 229 BC, but had not acted to extend their sphere of control outside the Illyrian coast. Similarly, though Rome had been at war with Macedon between 214 and 205 BC, they had not waged a full-scale land campaign. In 200 BC, however, war against Macedon and the dispatch of a land army to the Balkan peninsula finally converged. The campaign of 168 BC serves as the endpoint of this study because after their victory at the Battle of Pydna, Rome took the unprecedented step of instituting administrative control over the peoples she defeated (Macedon and Illyria), and Rome's relationship to Greece fundamentally changed.

**Organization**

While the overall narrative arc of the dissertation follows the chronological series of events, the individual chapters each focus on a specific region. In each chapter I explore the routes the Roman army took through the landscape; the locations and reconstructions of battles and skirmishes; the locations of field camps, settlements, and natural toponyms; the calendar of events during each campaign; and the logistics of maintaining an army in the field. The scale of these logistical concerns indicates their
importance, as the Roman armies in the field in Greece at this time required almost 18 tons of grain daily. The Roman army dealt with its food requirements through lines of supply, pack trains taken on the march, and local foraging. Understanding how one could supply oneself in the field involves understanding the economic seasonality of regional harvests, transhumant shepherds, and methods of storage.

The conclusions drawn from these findings are then used to understand decisions, plans, and goals made during each campaign, and the relationships of different campaigns.

This dissertation is organized into five chapters, each focused on a specific region. This organization facilitates our understanding of how Roman involvement in Greece evolved better than traditional schemes of periodization, which subdivide this period into the Second and Third Macedonian Wars, punctuated by the Syrian-Aetolian War.

Chapter 1 focuses on the Myzeqeja plain in western Illyria. In 200 BC, Rome sent an army under the consul Gaius Sulpicius Galba to secure this plain in order to further guarantee the Illyrian ports under Rome's protection. These ports had great economic and strategic value for Rome, given their role in controlling trade in the Adriatic and the movement of ships from the Balkan peninsula to Italy. As a result of this campaign, Rome was able to maintain control of the Myzeqeja plain and the Illyrian ports and did not need to fight to protect them again throughout the period under study.

Chapter 2 focuses on the area extending east-west between Illyria and Macedon. In 199 BC, the Romans campaigned through this area under Sulpicius. The Romans did
not return to this region subsequently, however, as in the following year the Macedonian
king Philip V pulled the Romans attentions elsewhere.

Chapter 3 focuses on the first half of the 198 BC campaign season, from when
Philip encamped to the southeast of the Roman winter quarters at Apollonia through the
Roman victory under the consul Titus Quinctius Flamininus at the Battle of the River
Aous. This chapter demonstrates that Philip took the initiative to pull the theater of war
from the western boundaries of Macedon to the southern boundary of Illyria. The Battle
of the River Aous forms the centerpiece of this chapter for two reasons. First, it was the
crucial turning point in the topography of the conflict. Had Philip not taken steps to shift
the Romans' focus to this new region, the Romans might well have continued their
eastward advance from the coast towards Macedon. Instead, the Romans' responded to
Philip, moving south to attack his camp. Second, the Aous has been largely neglected in
scholarship on this period, and was thus ripe for a new and detailed study.

Chapters 1-3 can be seen as a cohesive unit in that they collectively cover the
theater of war of the Myzeqeja plain and its surroundings. However, at the end of chapter
three it is unclear what and where Rome's next steps would be, and thus this marks a shift
in the study as a whole.

Chapter 4 focuses on the Roman campaigns in the new theater of war of Thessaly,
covering Rome's military presence in Thessaly between 198 BC - 194 BC, 191 BC - 190
BC, and 172 BC - 168 BC. In 198 BC Flamininus first led the Roman army across the
Pindus to Thessaly and the senate voted to support his actions in winter 198/197 BC.
After this crossing, the Roman theater of war did not revert to Illyria, but rather stayed in
Thessaly for the next three decades. Throughout this chapter, the Aetolians and Athamanians play key roles as sometime allies and sometime enemies of the Romans. It will be seen that over the course of this 30-year period, Thessaly evolved from an area of key importance to many states to merely the gateway to Macedon.

Chapter 5 focuses on the Roman campaigns in Macedon, the third and final theater of war. In 169 BC, Rome took the unprecedented step of invading Macedon directly. Rome invaded again in 168 BC under the consul Lucius Aemilius Paullus and defeated the Macedonian king Perseus, son of Philip V.

The results of this dissertation point to a new way to interpret this period, organized around two different but related concepts: theater of war and Roman policy. During this period the Romans operated in three distinct theaters of war: the Myzeqeja plain and its surroundings, Thessaly, and Macedon. In turn, the transitions from one theater of war to the next coincided with the development of three distinct phases of Roman policy towards Greece: first to protect the Adriatic ports and gradually extend the buffer zone to the east, continuing the regional policy Rome had established and maintained since 229 BC; second to reduce the influence of each of the Hellenistic kingdoms while maintaining a balance of power in Greece; third to invade Macedon for the first time and permanently alter how it was administered. While the first two policies both acted to maintain some type of status quo in Greece, the third policy looked to actively change it.
Identifying these three distinct policies in this short time period differs from previous scholarship in that Rome's 200 BC campaign is often looked as the beginning of a slippery slope of Roman imperialism that led to Rome's takeover of the Mediterranean.

I approached this period originally intending to sidestep the "Roman Imperialism question" as the scholars who study it are locked in their positions and the debate is frozen. I just wanted to know actually how the Romans campaigned in Greece. However, my approach led to new conclusions that hopefully open a new window into the Roman Imperialism debate and reopen the dialogue concerning it.

**Methodology**

Our evidence for the routes taken by Roman armies is literary - primarily taken from Polybius, Livy, and Plutarch - and is not nearly as clear or defined as one might like. These sources report where the Roman armies went by naming locations along their routes. However, they do not tell us exactly how to get between these locations, and all too often we are not sure where these places were actually located in the landscape.

To determine an ancient military route, I started from fixed points where archaeology has confirmed the placement of a location mentioned in the texts. To get between these fixed points, I began by gleaning clues from the literary narratives, such as discussions of terrain, as well as logical inferences, such as the fact that an army camp requires a source of fresh water. I then studied maps of the area in question to better understand the topography. I also looked at more contemporary evidence, such as

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1 For recent reviews of the state of the debate on the development of Roman imperialism, see e.g. Rich 2004, Hoyos 2013, Edwell 2013.
documented Ottoman routes through mountain passes, the accounts of early modern travellers, and military accounts, including the works of English WWII veterans who operated in Greece and Albania and official Greek military accounts of the Balkan Wars and WWII. Then I traveled the route or routes in question, recording with a GPS unit, camera, and extensive notes. This personal autopsy refuted or confirmed my hypothesized route by revealing details I could not otherwise learn, such as lines of sight, details of terrain, difficulty of travel, relative time of travel, appearance of landmarks, and the effects of different weather conditions on specific landscapes, as well as offering the opportunity to talk to local people who are familiar with the region.

Topographic study rooted in autopsy of these regions of ancient Greece already has a strong scholarly history. W.M. Leake and N.G.L. Hammond are noteworthy predecessors for the regions covered in Chapters 1-3; Leake, Stählin, Bequignon, Hammond, and Pritchett for Chapter 4; and Leake, Hammond, and Pritchett for Chapter 5.

The bulk of my fieldwork was done by bicycle. Between September 23rd, 2013 and May 2nd, 2015, I conducted eight bike-touring research trips in the territories now divided between modern Greece, Albania, and FYROM.

Bike trip 1 lasted from September 23rd to October 5th, 2013. This trip's primary overarching goal was to investigate whether L. Aemilius Paullus travelled from Corcyra to Delphi by ship or by land in 168 BC, and to retrace Paullus' route in 168 BC from Delphi to the Battle of Pydna via Larisa and Tempe. Trip 1 started in Igoumenitsa, Epirus and went south through Aetolia to the Corinthian Gulf, continuing east along the Gulf. I
then turned north at Itea to Delphi and continued north through Phokis and Thessaly, and then through Tempe into Pieria, stopping where the Battle of Pydna was fought in 168 BC. While travelling along this route I also spent time on other avenues of research: e.g. visited Delphi to see Paullus' relief and inscription from 167 BC; explored Phokis for Flamininus' route in 198 BC; went through the Malian plain to Larissa tracing the Roman route from 191 BC in reverse, and part of Flamininus' route in 198 BC; researched the area of Thessaly where Cynoscephalae was fought in 197 BC; researched the area of Thessaly between Larisa and Tempe pertinent to Antiochus' campaign in 191 BC, and the Roman campaigns of 171 BC to 168 BC; explored Tempe relevant to the 169 BC Roman campaign; explored Pieria relevant to the 169 BC Roman campaigns; visited Dion for the 169 BC Roman campaign; passed through Pieria tracing the Roman campaigns of 169 BC and 168 BC; explored the potential courses of the Elpeus river in relation to the 168 BC Roman campaign; and explored where the Battle of Pydna was fought in 168 BC.

Bike trip 2 lasted from October 11, 2013 to October 18, 2013. This trip's overarching research goal was to trace the route the Roman legions walked when they left Greece in 194 BC. I started in Demetrias and went west across Thessaly to Gomphi before continuing north and taking the Zygos pass across the Pindus to Ioannina. This trip again allowed me to pursue additional research goals: visiting Demetrias, one of Philip's "three fetters of Greece" and a key location in the campaigns of 197 BC, 191 BC, 190 BC, and 169 BC; investigating the Pagasitic gulf, important to the Macedonian and then the Thessalian economies; the route between Demetrias and Farsala pertained also to Flamininus' movements in 197 BC; I was able to explore the area related to
Cynoscephalae in 197 BC in greater detail, along with the area of western Thessaly relevant to campaigns of 191 BC; I visited Gomphi for its role in the campaigns of 199 BC, 198 BC, 191 BC, and 171 BC; I biked the route between Gomphi and Kalambaka to trace Flamininus' route in 198 BC in reverse; I investigated the Thessalian side of the Zygos pass for its role in the campaigns of 198 BC and 191 BC; I looked at the northernmost pass over the Pindus between Thessaly and Epirus for its role in the campaigns in 198 BC and 191 BC; and visited Ioannina to explore its role as the possible location of ancient Passaron and to see its exceptional archaeological museum.

Bike trip 3 lasted from February 17th, 2014 to February 22nd, 2014. This trip's overarching research goals were to investigate the route Flamininus took in 198 BC to subdue Phokis and the route Flamininus took in 197 BC between Phokis and Pherae. I began this trip in Livadia and went south to Anticyra on the Corinthian Gulf before then going north and tracing Flamininus' route through Phokis in 198 BC; I then continued north to the Malian gulf and researched where the conference of Nikaia took place in the winter of 198/197 BC, and then continued west to where the Battle of Thermopylae occurred in 191 BC. The remainder of the trip was to trace Flamininus' route at the beginning of 197 BC, going from Elatia north to the coast, west past Thermopylae, and then north through the Malian plain and to Xyniae before I attempted to head northeast cross country to Phthiotic Thebes. However, this final part of the route turned out to be only a maze of small agricultural roads, not passable by bicycle, and instead I went over Mt. Othrys via Anavra to Phthiotic Thebes and then on to Demetrias.
Bike trip 4 lasted from February 26th, 2014 to March 3rd, 2014. This trip's overarching research question was to explore Flamininus' route across the Pindus between Thessaly and Ambracia in 198 BC and Flamininus' subsequent move on Atrax. Bike trip four started in Menidi in Aetolia, from where I travelled north to Arta before turning east into the Pindus and taking the southernmost route between Epirus and Thessaly. I then continued across Thessaly via Gomphi and Trikala to Larisa. This trip researched Flamininus' 198 route through the Pindus and then across Thessaly from Gomphi to Atrax; the remains of Ambracia and how they relate to the Ambracian Gulf; Tricca, where Philip first stopped after crossing the Pindus in 198 BC; Larisa, important to the campaigns of 197 BC, 191 BC, and 172 - 168 BC; and generally gave me more familiarity with Thessaly. This trip also highlighted just how cold it gets in the Pindus in the early spring.

Bike trip 5 lasted from April 4th, 2014 to April 15th, 2014. This trip went through the Peloponnese and focused on Flamininus' 196 campaign on Argos and Sparta and Paullus' 167 BC tourism trip around the Peloponnese. Ultimately, neither of these were included in my final study.

Bike trip 6 lasted from April 22nd to May 4th, 2014. This trip's overarching goal was to explore the location for the Battle of the River Aous in 198 BC and the supply routes associated with it, as well as Sulpicius route in 199 BC. This trip began in Ioannina; I went north into Albania, and continued up the Drin valley to Fier via Tepelenë. From here I turned north east and continued to Elbasan and on to Lake Ohrid and into FYROM, returning to Greece via the Monastir Gap, going through the Vevi pass.
and then entering Macedon via Edessa and finishing in Thessaloniki. This trip researched Philip's route from Passaron to the Stena in 198 BC; the location of the Battle of the River Aous in 198 BC during a three day stay at Tepelenë; the Roman supply route between Fier and Tepelenë in 198 BC; the remains of Apollonia; and then Sulpicius' route of 199 BC between Apollonia through the Genusus valley to Lake Ohrid; then the areas north of the lake pertinent to control of movement through the area and the Parthini and Atintanes; the site of Lynchnidus important to the Roman position in 169 BC; the site of Heraclea the area of southern FYROM that Sulpicius was on in 199 BC; the site of the skirmish at Vevei pass from 199 BC; the route between the Vevi pass and Edessa that Sulpicius did not take in 199 BC; allowed me to gain familiarity with central Macedon, and to visit Pella and Thessaloniki.

Bike trip 7 took place between October 15th and October 27th, 2014. The primary research goal of this trip was to explore the potential route through the Devoll valley relevant to the 200 BC and 199 BC campaigns, and other areas pertinent to Sulpicius' 199 BC campaign. This trip started at Tirana where I met Professor Iris Pojani about getting her support to direct an archaeological project to locate the Battle of the River Aous. From Tirana I went southeast to Elbasan before attempting to (unsuccessfully) take the Devoll valley between Elbasan and the Korce valley potentially used in the 200 BC and 199 BC campaigns. Returning to Elbasan, I instead retraced the route from Elbasan to Ohrid from Bike trip 6, before going south around the lake to the Korce valley, tracing Sulpicius 199 BC route and the skirmishes in the Korce plain. From the Korce plain I further traced Sulpicius' 199 BC route east out of the plain and northeast over the pass to
Florina before continuing northeast into FYROM past the site of Stuberra to Prilep. Continuing to tract Sulpicius' 199 BC route, I went south to again see the Vevi pass before continuing Sulpicius' route south to Kozani and then west and north to Kastoria. This trip was particularly enlightening for the first hand experience of regional rain in mid to late October.

Bike trip 8 lasted from April 23rd to May 2nd, 2015. The primary goal of this trip was to explore possible routes across the Pindus including between Kozani and Konitsa and the Grevena pass to determine routes and locations relevant to the 198 BC campaign. This trip researched a possible route for Philip to have taken in 198 BC between Kozani and Konitsa across the Pindus mountains. Then I went up the Aous valley from Konitsa to Permet and then south to Ioannina, to research Philip's supply lines in 198 BC as well as his route of retreat after the Battle of the River Aous, including visiting the most likely remains of Passaron near Ioannina. From Ioannina I went east into the Pindus to Metsovo where Philip stopped to determine what to do next in 198 BC. I then continued north via the Grevena pass, which was the route Philip had taken earlier in 198 BC in reverse. I then continued on to Veria to see how difficult this entrance into Macedon was compared to the one via Edessa.

Based on findings from Bike trip 6, I began a project to more intensively investigate the Aous river valley and the possible location of the battle in 198 BC. Between April 24th - 27th, 2014, I initially explored this valley on foot with Professor Nick Rauh and Taylor Rauh to see if the landscape aligned with Livy's description and Hammond's conclusions. I returned to show my findings to the local representative of the
Albanian Ministry of National Culture, Gjirokaster, on October 9, 2014 and again on April 7th 2015. I then served as project director for the Vjöse River Valley Archaeological Project (VRVAP) between July 22nd and August 16th, 2015, with the express goal of determining the location of Philip's camp and the location of the Battle of the River Aous.

Finally, I led three hiking-based research trips. The first two involved hiking around Thermopylae to explore how the different historical accounts accorded with the landscape. The third trip aimed to investigate the movements related to the 169 BC and 168 BC campaigns in Perrhaebia and Pieria and to find and investigate the Macedonian forts at Karya and around Tempe.

**Sources**

The texts used for Greek and Latin sources were as follows: for Livy Books 31-45, I used Briscoe's Teubner editions; for the remainder of the texts, I used the Loeb Library editions. My translations generally follow the Loeb translations as well as the Livy translations by Yardley (31-40) and Chaplin (41-45). 5), with some adaptations, except where otherwise noted.

Our ancient sources are narrative accounts each with their own agendas, overarching themes, and authorial biases. My close readings of these sources take these into account and pay particular attention to the relationships between the different authors' works. The topographic analyses work as a check on our written accounts to determine whether they depict reality or merely narrative devices. As a result, this
dissertation offers new insights into the ancient texts, including highlighting narrative goals that may not have been apparent previously.

For the topographical studies that underpin this dissertation, I used a variety of maps. For Greece, I used declassified maps issued by the Hellenic Military Geographical Service (HMGS), and road/hiking maps by brands Road and Anavasi. For Albania, I used maps by the brand Vector and Reise. For FYROM, I used maps by the company Trimaks. I also used Google Earth and Google Maps extensively.
CHAPTER 1: THE MYZEQEJA PLAIN

Introduction

In 200 BC Rome declared war on Macedon and sent an army across the Adriatic to the Illyrian city of Apollonia. Livy reports that this new war against Macedon, the Second Macedonian War, was actually a direct extension of the First Macedonian War (L.31.1.8). The Romans were able to restart their war against Macedon now that the Second Punic War had ended (L.31.1.9). The 200 BC Roman campaign was not only an extension of the First Macedonian War politically, but topographically as well, as it concerned the same Illyrian ports of Apollonia, Corcyra, and Oricum. However, Roman concern with these Illyrian ports had not begun with the First Macedonian War, but in fact had been a Roman military concern since the First Illyrian War in 229 BC. In 200 BC, the Roman army returned to Illyrian territory that Rome had been fighting to control and protect periodically for the past 30 years. However, the Romans now led a land army further inland than they ever had before.

[Figure 1.1] In 229 BC Rome first established in the region a group of cities and peoples under their direct protection: Corcyra, Apollonia, Dyrrachium, the Ardiaei, the Parthini, the Atintanes, and Issa (Plb.2.11.5-12). In 219 BC, Rome took control of Dimallum (Plb.3.18.3-7). In 215 BC, Rome was still in control of Corcyra, Apollonia, Dyrrachium, Dimallum, the Parthini, and Atintania, as Philip demanded that the Romans relinquish these in his treaty with Hannibal (Plb.7.9.13). By 208 BC, Atintania and the
Ardiaeans had fallen back under Macedonian control (L.27.30.13). By 205 BC, Philip controlled the Parthini, "other neighboring tribes", and Dimallum (L.29.12.3). In 205 BC, the Peace of Phoenice assigned the Romans control over the Parthini and Dimallum, and assigned the Macedonians control over Atintania (L.29.12.13.).

This chapter investigates the topography of the Roman land campaign of 200 BC to better understand the campaign, the motivations behind it, and the behaviors of the different peoples involved. The 200 BC campaign was the first major Roman land campaign in this region and set the stage for the ongoing Roman military presence in the east.

**The 200 BC Campaign**

The 200 BC campaign took place in the Mezeqeja plain. [Figure 1.2] The Myzeqeja is a fertile, roughly triangular shaped plain in modern Albania. It is bound to the west by the Adriatic coast; to the north by the Shkumbi river; to the south by the Aous river in the west, and then the mountains that extend east-west between the Semeni and Vjose rivers; and extends east to Berat. Mountains surround the plain in all directions except the west.
The campaign began in late autumn when the Roman consul Publius Sulpicius Galba sailed with his consular army from Brundisium to his allotted province of Macedon (L. 31.14.1-2; 31.22.4; Zon. 9.15; App. Mac.4). After depositing his land troops near Apollonia, Sulpicius promptly split the fleet, sending part to Athens and wintering the rest at Corcyra (L.31.22.4-5).

The military crossing from Brundisium to the Illyrian coastal cities was not novel. Roman military fleets had been making this journey during the First Illyrian war (229 BC), the Second Illyrian war (219 BC), and the First Macedonian war (214 BC - 205 BC). Additionally, Roman traders had been sailing in the Adriatic prior to 229 BC, as Illyrian depredations on Roman merchant ships had originally spurred the Roman military interest in the area (Plb.2.8.1-3). The port cities on the Illyrian coast had been under Roman protection since 229 BC and were thus safe harbors (Plb.2.11.5-10).

Livy provides the fullest narrative of this campaign:

(1) Consul Sulpicius eo tempore inter Apolloniam ac Dyrrachium ad Asum flumen habebat castra, quo arcessitum L. Apustium legatum cum parte copiarum ad depopulandos hostium fines mittit. (2) Apustius extrema Macedoniae populatus, Cor<r>hago et Gerrunio et Orgesso castellis primo impetu captis ad Antoniapream, in fauciibus angustis sitam urbem, uenit. (3) ac primo euocatos principes ad conloquium, ut fidei Romanorum se committerent, perlicere est conatus; deinde, ubi magnitudine ac moenibus situque urbis freti dicta aspernabantur, (4) vi atque armis adortus expugnauit puberibusque interfectis, praeda omni militibus concessa, diruit muros atque urbem incendit. (5) hic metus Codrionem, satis ualidum et munitum oppidum, sine certamine ut dederetur Romanis effecit. (6) praesidio ibi relictio Cnidus – nomen

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7 Illyrian port (Apollonia, Corcyra, Oricum, Epidamnus) usage references and crossings between Italy and the Illyrian coast: First Illyrian War (Pol.2.11.8; Second Illyrian War (Pol.3.18.); First Macedonian War: (L.24.40.2,5; 24.40.8; L.26.26.2).
8 For the crossing between Italy and Apollonia, see e.g. Pliny NH 3.100.
9 Orlie et al 1992, discuss how the natural currents of the Adriatic run between Brundisium and Apollonia facilitating the crossings across the Adriatic.
propter alteram in Asia urbem quam oppidum notius – ui capitur.

ruerentem legatum ad consulem cum satis magna praeda Athenagoras quidam, regius praefectus, in transitu fluminis a nouissimo agmine adortus postremos turbuit. (7) Ad quorum clamorem et trepidationem cum reuectus equo propere legatus signa conuertisset et coniectis in medium sarcinis aciem direxisset, non tulere impetum Romanorum militum regii: multi ex iis occisi, plures capti. (8) legatus, incolumi exercitu reducto ad consulem, remittitur inde extemplo ad classem.

(1) The consul Sulpicius was at that time encamped between Apollonia and Dyracchium along the river Apsus, to where he summoned the legate L. Apustius and sent him with part of the forces to pillage the territory of the enemy.

(2) Apustius pillaged the edges of Macedonia, seized the forts (castella) of Corrhagus and Gerrunius and Orgessus at first attack, and came to Antipatreia, a city located in a narrow pass.

(3) At first he tried to entice the leading men, called out to a conference, to formally surrender to the Romans; Then, when they, confident in the size of the force and of the walls and site of the city, scorned his words, (4) he attacked and captured it by force of arms, and with all the men of military age having been killed, and all the booty given to the soldiers, he destroyed the walls and burned the city.

(5) This fear caused Codrio, a sufficiently strong and fortified town (oppidum), to surrender without contest to the Romans. Having left a garrison there, he captured by force Cnidus - a name known on account of the other city (urbs) in Asia than for this town (oppidum).

(6) As the legate was returning to the consul with a sufficiently great amount of booty, Athenagoras, a prefect of the king, attacked the rearmost troops while crossing a river and threw the rearguard into confusion. (7) When the legate had promptly rode back to their clamor and alarm, he turned around the standards and drew up the battle line, with the baggage having been gathered in the center, and the royal troops did not endure the attack of the Roman soldiers: Many of these men were killed, more were captured.

(8) The legate, with the army having been returned unharmed to the consul, was sent from there immediately to the fleet.

(L. 31.27.1-8)

Appian's and Zonaras' more brief accounts accord with Livy's description of the campaign, but supply no topographical detail. Appian reports only that "a Roman army hastened to Greece, Publius commanding the land forces and Lucius the fleet"
(App. Mac. 4). Zonaras reports that "Apustius invaded Macedonia and was plundering the
country as well as subduing garrisons and cities" as well as that Sulpicius was ill upon
crossing the Adriatic, causing Apustius to lead the campaign, and Apustius ended the
campaign "when it was already winter." (Zon. 9.15).

Scholars understand that all three
authors had access to Polybius as a source, or to authors who had previously had access
to Polybius, although the portion of Polybius that covers this campaign is lost.

Sulpicius' 200 BC land campaign thus had six successive components: 1) Sulpicius
established the Roman camp on the Apsus; 2) From this camp, Apustius
ravaged territory under Macedonian control, 3) took by force three forts (castella), 4)
sacked the city (urbs) Antipatreia, 5) gained control of two towns (oppida), and 6) was
harassed by Macedonian troops while returning to Sulpicius' camp.

Livy reports that Sulpicius arrived in his province "near the end of autumn" - cum
autumno ferme exacto (L. 31.22.4). Livy is understood here to have been using Polybius
as his source. However, Polybius' year had only two seasons, summer and winter, while
Livy's year had four. The increase in the number of seasons resulted in Livy translating
Polybius' phrase "near the beginning of winter" into "near the end of autumn". However,
there is scholarly disagreement as to when exactly Polybius' beginning of
winter occurred, ranging from the fall equinox (roughly September 22nd) to the morning

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10 Badian 1970, p 35 follows Zonaras that Sulpicius was sick during the 200 BC campaign.
12 That Livy is using Polybius as his source for this passage, see Briscoe 1973 p115; Tränkle 1977, p27;
Briscoe 1977; Briscoe 2009 p462. For discussion of Livy's handling of Polybius' seasons in this passage,
and more generally, see Briscoe 1973, pp 115-6; Briscoe 1977.
setting of the Pleiades (roughly November 7th). Sulpicius thus marched east from Apollonia some time between late September and early November, and ended the campaign once winter had begun. It remains to determine just how much time that was in order to determine how much time Apustius had to operate.

Sulpicius had been in command of forces during the First Macedonian War for six continuous years (211 BC - 206 BC). He would have been familiar with the weather patterns in this area from personal experience, and thus would have known the best time to put troops into winter quarters at Apollonia (L.31.22.4).

The seasonal weather patterns in northwestern Greece and southern Albania are predictable, consisting of a dry summer followed by autumn rains that start in October and reach their maximum intensity in November, during which month they often turn to snow. The amount of rainfall increases and the temperature decreases further from the coast and at higher elevations.

The autumn rains begin in early October, but the weather dramatically worsens in late October and early November. For example, Lear's 1848 journal records rain, and often torrential rain, on ten of thirteen days between October 5th and 17th on a trip across the Myzeqeja plain from the coast to Berat and back. The increasing cold and unrelenting rain at the end of October compelled Lear to leave Albania entirely on

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13 For advocacy of the fall equinox, see Holleaux 1932, Etudes iv pp 338ff; Walbank 1940, pp 138, 317, 341; Briscoe 1973. For advocacy of the morning setting of the Pleiades, see Pédich 1964. For advocacy of the mid-point of the two, see Briscoe 1977.
15 For daily rains in this area to be understood to begin at the start of October, see Hobhouse 1817, p19; Walbank 1940, p317. The American School for Classical Studies at Athens completes the School research trip to Epirus by the end of September because of how regularly it rains in early October (Margaret M. Miles pers. comm.).
November 6th. 17 Between October 15th and October 27th, 2014 while traveling through Albania, FYROM, and northern Greece, I experienced cold, torrential rain on nine of the eleven days. The Albanians I spoke to all said that this was normal weather for late October, and would only increase in intensity in the days to come.

The effect of this weather pattern on military activity was evident in the campaign in northern Epirus during the First Balkan War in 1912. Between October 6th and 11th, "torrential rain" and "continuing inclement weather" adversely affected the Greek troops' morale and led to great confusion with the Greek pack transportation units. 18 The weather dramatically changed on October 25th, though, when "a sudden cold set in, and thick fog and continuous torrential rain made the operations of the Army of Epirus difficult," and by early November, "battlefield conditions had changed significantly due to adverse weather" causing the Greeks to suspend all offensive operations by November 13th. 19

Similarly, during World War II, it had already been raining for days when the Italian army crossed the Albanian border into Greece on October 28th, 1940 during a torrential thunderstorm. 20 The storms did not break until November 2nd, and were so severe that they prevented supply ships from sailing across the Adriatic from Italy and knocked out radio antennas. 21 By November 8th, temperatures had fallen and rain had turned to snow, and on November 10th the Italian mountain division was defeated - with the Italians blaming the defeat on lack of provisions due to the weather disrupting their lines of supply and the Greeks attributing the Italians’ defeat to "the excessive demands

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17 Lear 2008, p163.
18 Hellenic Army General Staff (HAGS) 1998, pp 151-6, map 15.
20 Carr 2013, pp 40-45.
of mountain combat in foul weather which eroded [Italian] divisional morale wholesale.\textsuperscript{22}

\textbf{[Figure 1.3]} The rains caused streams and rivers to swell and generated 'brown quagmires' of mud and mire that greatly slowed the movements of men and pack animals.\textsuperscript{23} This resulted in the problems seen in both 1912 and 1940 with maintaining supply lines, troop movements, and soldiers' morale. John Carr, a military historian of Greece, additionally points out that mud and rain are "immeasurably harder on an advancing army than on one in a defensive position,"\textsuperscript{24} and so in 200 BC would have affected the Romans more than the fortified hill settlements they were attacking.

As Sulpicius was familiar with the regional weather patterns as well as with commanding an army in the field, it seems unlikely that he would risk getting caught in this predictable weather. We read of no pressing goals that needed to be accomplished by the end of the season, and Sulpicius expected to lead the troops during the following campaign season so he was not compelled to act rashly because this was his only chance for military glory.\textsuperscript{25} Sulpicius would have wanted to winter his troops by the end of October at the latest, knowing that the weather reliably changed for the worse at that time. Therefore, to give Apustius as much time as possible to complete his campaign, we should understand that Sulpicius arrived in his province in late September, which gave Apustius a maximum of four weeks to campaign.

\textsuperscript{22} Carr 2013, pp 53-54. Similarly, World War II British commando David Smiley reports on the brutal cold in Albania in early November (Smiley 1984, p95).

\textsuperscript{23} Carr 2013, pp 40, 43, 47. See also Smiley 1984, p31 "In both Greece and Albania it was frequent for small streams, or even dried up river beds, to become deep and broad rivers in a very short time after heavy rainfall in the mountains."

\textsuperscript{24} Carr 2013, p40.

\textsuperscript{25} See discussion of this point in chapter 2.
Antipatreia is the only site in Livy's report of the 200 BC campaign with a description of its topographic setting, and was the largest settlement in the narrative, being the only urbs in contrast with the three castella and two oppida. Since the other toponyms in Livy's narrative are located in relation to Antipatreia, it follows that Antipatreia's location must be determined first.

Since the early 19th century, travellers and scholars have proposed that Antipatreia lay beneath the modern city of Berat at the southeastern corner of the Myzeqeja Plain for three reasons:²⁶ the first reason was that Berat fits Livy's description as "a city located in a narrow pass," as Berat sits inside the western entrance to the Osum valley extending to the southeast;²⁷ the second reason was that Berat was in Dassaretian territory (Plb.5.108.2), which extended from Berat eastward through the Korce plain,²⁸ and the third reason was that the walls of the Byzantine citadel at Berat contained large ancient, potentially Hellenistic, blocks in its 13th century walls, and Livy specifies that Antipatreia had significant walls.

Albanian archaeologist Gani Strazimiri's 1964 systematic study of the walls of the Byzantine citadel at Berat further demonstrated that there were 4th and 3rd century BC Illyrian phases to the walls and that these phases showed evidence of burning at the end of the third century.²⁹ Albanian archaeologist Hëna Spahiu followed up Strazimiri's work with excavations of the castle at Berat in the years 1973, 1974 and 1978. Spahiu's study

²⁶ Hughes 1820 p 257-260; Leake 1835 I, pp 361-2; Leake 1835 III, pp 325-7; Patsch 1904, p131; Kromayer 1907, p10 n4; Kiepert 1914; Fine 1936, p26; Walbank 1940, pp 11-12; Walbank 1957, p632.
²⁷ Hughes 1820, plate between pp 254 and 255 and Patsch 1904, Fig.102 show the strong position of Berat's castle looming over the valley.
²⁸ For the area associated with the Dassarettii, see TIR; Hammond 1972.
²⁹ Strazimiri 1964, esp. pp183-184, with photographs of the Hellenistic phases and a site plan. However, Strazimiri supplies no images of the "traces conservées de l'incendie". Hammond 1966, p42 n11 advocated for Strazimiri's conclusions and alerted English speakers to Strazimiri's research.
of the foundation levels of the walls together with the corresponding ceramic sequences led him to conclude that Antipatreia had been located at Berat and had been destroyed around the year 200 BC.\textsuperscript{30} Spahiu's work also pointed to the importance of this location through time, as the ceramic sequences suggest inhabitation of the site in the early Iron Age, and continuous settlement starting from the 7th century BC.\textsuperscript{31}

Albanian archaeologist Neritan Ceka, however, has proposed that Antipatreia was, instead, at the western edge of the Korce plain, located by either of the modern villages Symiza or Hija e Korbit at the eastern end of the Devoll valley.\textsuperscript{32} No archaeological evidence supports Ceka's claim, and neither Symiza nor Hija e Korbit lie in a valley, although both are near the Devoll valley.\textsuperscript{33} Ceka attributes the ancient blocks found at Berat to the ancient Illyrian city of Partha.\textsuperscript{34} Placing Antipatreia at the western edge of the Korce plain would shift Apustius' campaign significantly further east and through the rugged Devoll valley.\textsuperscript{35}

Due to the limited time available for the campaign and greater effect of seasonal weather on higher elevations and rugged terrain, Antipatreia was most likely located at Berat. I will analyze the campaign with that understanding, but return again to the claim of Symiza.

\textsuperscript{30} Spahiu 1983, esp. pp 133-5, with photos of the ancient courses of the walls and site plan.
\textsuperscript{31} Gilkes 2013 pp 67-87, briefly summarizes the archaeological evidence at Berat up through Spiahu's scholarship, however, Gilkes has no citations or proper bibliography.
\textsuperscript{32} Ceka 2005 p90; Ceka 2011, map 1; Ceka 2013, pp 110-111, 185. Ceka's argument gains authority from his extensive autopsy of the region, e.g. Hodges 2014 p45, "[Neritan Ceka] knows this Balkan country more intimately than any living soul."
\textsuperscript{33} Ceka 2013 has no footnotes and the bibliography cites nothing specifically on Antipatreia, Symiza, or Hija e Korbit. While Ceka calls this book "scientifically correct; without analysis or debate" (Ceka 2013, p9), one hopes he will fulfill his promise "to rework the book and put in references for every idea and place" (Hodges 2014, p45).
\textsuperscript{34} Ceka 2013 p110, passim.
\textsuperscript{35} Ceka 2013, p209.
Livy reports that Sulpicius led the army out from Apollonia and established camp along the Apsus river between Apollonia and Dyracchium. Apollonia was roughly 7.5 km due west from the city of Fier, just south of the village of Pojan.\textsuperscript{36} Dyrrachium, formerly the Greek city of Epidamnus (Strabo 7.5.8) lies beneath the modern city of Durres.\textsuperscript{37} The Apsus river, currently the Seman river, begins at the confluence of the Osum and Devoll rivers just north of the village of Kuçovë and flows southwest for roughly 27 km before turning northwest and emptying into the Adriatic approximately 13 km northwest of Apollonia.\textsuperscript{38}

We should expect that Sulpicius would encamp at the eastern edge of Roman controlled territory, with a secure supply line and access to a water source, as well as at a location elevated off the plain both to make it easier to defend and because the Myzeqeja plain had the potential to get swampy during the fall rains.\textsuperscript{39} The area in the foothills of Mt. Shpiragut roughly 29 km east-southeast from Apollonia, at 235 m elevation just south of the modern village Kutalli would have been an ideal place for Sulpicius' camp, and was less than 4 km from the Apsus river.

This encampment was roughly 5.5 km north of the Roman controlled settlement of Dimallum at the eastern edge of Roman influence in the Myzeqeja plain. Dimallum sat at an elevation of 404 m at the western edge of the foothills of Mt. Shpiragut.\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{37} Gilkes 2013, pp 157-168; Ceka 2013 \textit{passim}; Hammond 1972 \textit{passim}.
\textsuperscript{38} Hammond 1966, p42; Ceka 2013; Barringtons Map 49 citing Hammond 1974 p 191; Dr. Beqiraj \textit{pers. comm.}; Briscoe \textit{ad loc}, adds, "B has Hapsum, which is also the form in the Peutinger table". Alternative spellings for the river are Semen and Semeni (object case).
\textsuperscript{39} On the Myzeqeja plain getting swampy in the rains, see Hammond 1966 p42n10. Marmullaku 1975 pp 102-103.
\textsuperscript{40} Dimallum: Hammond 1968, pp 12-15.
Romans had been vying with Philip for control of Dimallum since 219 BC due to Dimallum's strategic role in controlling the central Myzeqeja plain: the Romans took control of Dimallum in 219 BC (Plb.3.18.3); Philip desired to gain control of Dimallum from the Romans in 217 BC (Plb.7.9.14); Philip gained control of Dimallum by 205 BC (L.29.12.3); the Romans regained Dimallum at the Peace of Phoenice in 205 BC (L.29.12.13). The camp's proximity to the permanent settlement of Dimallum, as well as the cluster of houses there today, indicate that there was access to fresh water at the encampment.

Sulpicius had a flat and secure supply line through Roman controlled territory between Apollonia and the encampment. Although he could have brought 30 days of food with him into the field, which would have covered the length of the campaign, Sulpicius would still have he wanted a secure supply line in case of unforeseen circumstances. Furthermore, Sulpicius might not have wanted to bring such a large pack train into the field and have depended on periodic resupply. Sulpicius left for campaign with two legions (L.31.8.5) consisting of freshly levied troops and volunteers from Scipio's veterans of the Second Punic War (L.31.8.6, 31.9.5, 31.14.2). Middle Republican Roman legions consisted of 4200-5000 infantry plus 300 cavalry with a roughly equal number of allies (Plb.6.21.8-9, 6.26.7). According to Roth's calculations, two legions plus allies would have required 2,640 modii of grain per day weighing 17.9 tons.42

41 For discussion of legion sizes in Polybius in Livy, see Dobson 2008, pp 47-58.
42 Roth 1999 pp16-24, esp. chart p22. Roth convincingly argues that the Roman army was divided into units of men into which the modius divided evenly, thus units that involved basic, fraction-less math to supply.
Sulpicius might have preferred a system of resupply than having to move so many carts of grain at once at the beginning of the campaign.

Hammond proposed that the most logical place for the Roman camp was just south of the village Kuç (now Ura e Kucit) in the foothills of Mt. Shpiragut. Indeed, this would be an ideal location from which to control the narrow east-west passage to the north of the Mt. Shpiragut foothills. So much so, however, that the Macedonians had time to recognize its strategic location during their 100 years of activity in the area, and would have taken the effort to control the best locations before the Roman arrival. As such, the Macedonians had already placed their castellum Corrhagus just south of Ura e Kucit and therefore this area was not available for a Roman campsite.

However, the question remains why Sulpicius' encampment does not appear to accord well with Livy's description. Livy uses the cities Apollonia and Dyrrachium as reference points with which to situate where the camp was located for the reader. The camp, though, would be much closer to Apollonia, and 'between Apollonia and Antipatreia, along the river Apsus' would have been a more precise description. However, the pairing of Apollonia and Dyrrachium has strong associations for Rome's military presence in the region for the reader of Livy - and of his source Polybius.

In 229 BC, Apollonia and Dyrrachium came under the direct protection of Rome, as part of a group of cities under Rome's protection in the region (Pol. 2.11.8-12). From 229 BC to 200 BC Rome militarily protected them in the face of attack four times. From the Illyrians in 229 BC (Pol. 2.11.8-10) and from Philip three times: in 216 BC (Pol.

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43 Hammond 1966 p 42; Walbank 1940 p 138n4.
44 Corrhago is discussed further below.
Later in 205 BC, the Romans reaffirmed their continuing protection of Apollonia and Epidamnus in the Peace of Phoenice with Philip V (L. 29.12.13). Throughout, Apollonia and Dyrrachium were safe and friendly harbors for the Romans. Thus, by using these toponyms, the Roman camp and campaign are from the beginning established as in direct relationship to cities in Illyria that Rome has already actively protected.

Because of this legacy, using these two cities to site the first Roman fort in the Second Macedonian War could serve to make the Second Macedonian War seem like a natural extension of Roman military activity in the area. Up to this point, this activity had been to keep Greek cities free from Macedonian control, and free to govern themselves as they saw fit. Thus, Livy’s narrative begins with topographic references that evoke a narrative of Roman protection of Greek cities from Macedonian aggression from the initial landing in Greece for the Second Macedonian War, with the liberation of all Greece by Rome being the direct end result of the end of the Second Macedonian War.

After encamping by the Apsus, Sulpicius divided the army between Apustius and himself, but we have no evidence for how Sulpicius made the division. Since both Apustius and Sulpicius required a significant amount of men - Apustius for his campaign to be successful and Sulpicius to safely encamp on the borders of hostile territory - it seems reasonable to assume that that Sulpicius divided his force in half, keeping one legion in camp with him and sending one out with Apustius.

Livy does not provide any topographical information concerning the castella of Corrhagus, Gerrunius, and Orgessus, and there are no definitive archaeological or
epigraphic finds to help locate them.⁴⁵ Livy does report, though, that these are castella, as opposed to the urbs Antipatriea, or the two oppida Codrio and Cnidus. What is in Livy's mind's-eye when he uses the term castellum? Furthermore, when Livy writes castellum in a passage for which he is using Polybius as a source, what was in Polybius' mind's eye?

To address this problem, I found all the passages in which Livy uses a form of the word castellum and then cross referenced these with all of the passages where Livy appears to have directly translated Polybius to see if there are any matches to determine what word Polybius used that Livy later translated as castellum.⁴⁶

Livy uses some form of the word castellum 113 times in his extant corpus, with the majority (79) in books 31-45, which are the books that cover the time period relevant to this dissertation. Of these usages, two are in passages considered to be direct translations from Polybius. Both passages of Polybius are reports of formal treaties and as such can be expected to use precise language.

The first example is found in the last clause of the terms Rome established after the Battle of Cynoscephalae in 197 BC:

Livy 33.34.11: *Amynandrum tenere iusserunt castella quae per belli tempus Philippo capta ademisset*

They directed Amynander to hold the castella which he had taken from Philip during the period of the war.

Polybius 18.47.13: Ἀμυνάνδρῳ δὲ συνεχώρησαν, ὅσα παρεσπάσατο κατὰ πόλεμον ἑρύματα τοῦ Φιλίππου, κρατεῖν τούτων

⁴⁵ cf. Briscoe 1972, ad loc. “The precise location of these forts is not known.”
⁴⁶ Packard 1968 assembled all of Livy's uses of castellum; Tränkle 1977 pp29-32 assembled all the passages Livy appears to have directly translated Polybius.
They allowed Amynander to hold all the **erymata** he had taken from Philip in war.

The second example is found in the last section of the Peace of Apamea in 188 BC:

Livy 38.39.14: *Regi Eumeni Chersonesum in Europa et Lysimachiam, castella vicos agrum quibus finibus tenuerat Antiochus, adiecerunt*

To King Eumenes they bestowed, in Europe, the Chersonesus and Lysimachia, the **castella**, villages, and lands within the boundaries of Antiochus.

Polybius 21.46.9: *περὶ δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως Εὐμένους . . . τότε τῆς μὲν Εὐρώπης αὐτῷ προσέθηκαν Χερρόνησον καὶ Λυσιμάχειαν καὶ τὰ προσορούντα τούτοις ἐρύματα καὶ χώραν, ἣς Ἀντίοχος ἐπήρξεν*

For King Eumenes ... they bestowed now in Europe the Chersonese, Lysimachia, and the adjacent **erymata** and territory which Antiochus held.

**Eryma** is the corresponding word to **castellum** in both passages. In both treaties, the preceding sections had to do with the legal status of peoples and settlements of different sizes, e.g. *poleis*. Thus, in both treaties a clear distinction is made between an **eryma** and other forms of settlement.

The LSJ defines **eryma** as "fence, guard" that can refer to the wall of a settlement, a stone breastwork for a military encampment, or a river or trench used as a military defense. All of the definitions have a military connotation. Sylvian Fachard, scholar of Classical and Hellenistic fortresses in Greece, adds that an **eryma** can be used as metonymy for a fort or guardpost. He has found through his study of the term that it most often refers to forts involved in border conflicts and that it would be "small and inexpensive to build, most probably in dry rubble."  

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47 Sylvian Fachard, *pers. comm.* August 9, 2016.
"eryma occurs eight times and in five of the cases it is coarse construction, quickly assembled - rubble walls."48

Since Polybius is using what is apparently a precise term, eryma, and Livy is in both these cases translating him and using the word castellum, we need to examine whether Livy is being equally precise and consistent in his distinction between settlement types. Three passages in Livy where castellum is contrasted with other settlements demonstrate that Livy's usage is consistent. The first two passages are again found in the formalized, precise context of treaties.

The first passage is the Senate's decision concerning the conditions of the peace with Antiochus III after the Battle of Magnesia. Conditions relating to 'agrum ... castella vicosque ... oppida' are discussed in one place (L.37.56.3), and conditions relating to 'oppida vici castella agrI' (L.37.56.6) in another. The treaty presents castella as distinct from other types of settlements.

The second passage also comes from the account of the Peace of Apamea.49 The conditions of the peace specify that Antiochus III must withdraw from certain "urbibus agris vicis castellis" (L.38.38.4), removing nothing from these certain "oppidis agris castellisque" (L.38.38.6) Again we see castella as distinct from other terms for settlements.

48 Sylvian Fachard, pers. comm. August 10, 2016. For more on erymata, see Fachard 2012, pp251, 252, 284.
49 The peace of Apamea is also the context of the second example of correspondence between Polybius and Livy discussed above. The corresponding passage of Polybius (Plb.21.42.6) to this passage of Livy has a lacuna that begins during the phrase, perhaps even at the word, that corresponds to castellis in Livy.
In the third passage (L.39.28.4), Philip complains that the Romans only allowed him to recover *quaedam castella magis quam urbes*. Here, *castella* are presented as distinctly different, and less desirable to possess, than *urbes*.

In the preceding three passages along with the two mentioned earlier which are direct translations from Polybius, the term *castellum* is presented as distinct from other types of settlements and having a military character.

The best comparanda for what I believe these *castella* to have been are located above the Vale of Tempe. Livy, in discussing the 169 BC campaign, reports that the Romans gained possession of the *castella ... quae super Tempe essent et circa Philan* (L.44.7.12). The archaeological remains of two Macedonian forts near Tempe, one by Karya and one by Rapsani, fit Fachard's description of what an *eryma* should look like. Both were situated along the border of Macedonian territory and utilized dry-rubble construction, exploiting the locally available stone. Despite the construction materials, it is clear that they were built with care, and were not merely temporary structures. Both were situated on a height that afforded the occupants maximum visibility of neighboring territories, while making them difficult to assault. The size of the remains suggested small forts, with the walls of the one above Karya roughly 270 m by 100 m and the walls of the one above Rapsani roughly 125 m by 125 m, appropriately sized for a garrison of a few hundred men. These forts were contemporary with the ones near Antipatreia, and, since they were also built by the Macedonians, similarity in their construction should be expected.

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50 Rizakis 1986; Pritchett 1991.
To be effective, these walled forts should have occupied the best strategic positions from which to control access to Antipatreia. Macedonia had been regularly in control of this region for over one hundred years by this point; we should expect that they had a strategic understanding of the landscape, and were defending it accordingly.

Placing these three forts relatively near to one another and to the west of Antipatreia would accord well with Livy's narrative. Livy would then be understood to be describing Apustius' movements as a logical progression from west to east, moving from Sulpicius' camp towards Berat, with the three castella somewhere between them.

This hypothesis makes good strategic sense as well, as the castella would then be a system of defense guarding the approaches to Antipatreia. McCredie, in his book on the forts on the Athenian-Boiotian border, states that the point of 'garrison-forts' was "not so much in the hope that then could themselves prevent the entry of an invading army or fleet, but more because they could force such an army to weaken itself. An invader could not afford to leave these strongholds unred; for, if they were left, their garrisons could at any moment emerge to disrupt the enemy's communications and, if faced with a with a superior force, retreat again into the strongholds."\(^{51}\)

McCredie's analysis of the function of a border fort accords with the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae's* (TLL) definition of a castellum. In the entry for castellum under heading I "*in re militari et aliis rebus publicis*" and subsection A "*propri: castri parvi genus ad castra vel res alias tutanda extrectum*" we find what appears to be a fitting

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definition: 'a kind of small military fort built for protecting camps or other things'. The TLL glosses *castellum* as equivalent to the Greek term *phrourion*, a fort or hill fort - a word that can be a synonym for *eryma*.52

Understanding that the function of these three *castella* was to protect Antipatreia from assaults both from the north and west, locating them at three points that control access to Antipatreia makes the most logical sense. As discussed above, the first of the three forts was above Ura e Kucit, not far from Sulpicius' camp. Following the west-east progress of the campaign, as reported by Livy, this would be the first *castellum* mentioned, Corrhagus. The fort would sit at the modern boundary of the division between the two administrative zones of Fier and Berat, controlling the pass and thus the route towards Antipatreia from the western part of the Myzeqeja plain and the coast. Sulpicius' camp was well positioned in relation to Corrhagus, and this placement would have allowed the Romans to be close enough to Corrhagus to attack it suddenly, but not so close that it would have been an impediment to establishing their camp.

Before assaulting Corrhagus, though, Apustius ravaged the territory of the Macedonians. This territory was most likely the areas on the north bank of the Apsus to the north and west of Corrhagus.

The second fort, Gerronius, was in the foothills above the modern village of Perondi. This fort would function both to help Corrhagus control access to Antipatreia from the west, and to control the pass that controls access from the north via the valley running north-south between the Osum and Devoll valleys.

52 Fachard *pers comm.* August 9, 2016.
The third fort, Orgessus, was in the foothills by the modern village of Mbreshtan. Located to the west-northwest of Berat, between Mt. Shpiragut and the foothills to the east, Orgessus would occupy a position that would be difficult to assault. Orgessus would effectively be the last line of defense should an army force its way past the other two castella. Apustius would have been forced to deal with these three castella before assaulting Antipateia, as Livy describes.

After seizing the three forts, Apustius proceeded to Antipatreia. After failed attempts at negotiating their surrender, Apustius sacked the city with a brutal display of force, including killing all the men and burning the city. The Roman pack train now carried an extensive amount of booty as well.

From Antipatreia, Apustius moved on the oppida of Codrio and Cnidus. There are neither positive archaeological remains identifying these sites nor additional literary or epigraphic references to them besides Livy's mention of them here.

Livy reports that Codrio was a walled oppidum that was in a strategic enough position to warrant a Roman garrison after its capture. After securing Antipatreia and the three forts protecting the approach to it across the Myzeqeja plain from the northwest, the next important strategic area was the valley running north-south between the eastern Myzeqeja plain and the western entrance to the Devoll valley. A Macedonian invasion from the west, whether it came through the Devoll or Shkumbi

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53 Hammond 1966, p42 proposed that all three forts were located on Mt. Shpiragut west and south of where I placed Orgessus. However, a castellum by the summit, which Hammond implies to be a prime location, would be too far south to offer optimal protection for Antipateia. Additionally, the total absence of any human habitation there today indicates that there is no fresh water on the mountain and unsuitable for a permanent fort. Finally, placing all three forts on the same north-south ridge that extends south of Berat does not seem very strategic for preventing attacks from the west and north.

54 Ceka does have an alternate theory for the placement of these castella, however it is tied to his mistaken placement of Antipateia and questionable etymology: Ceka 2013, pp 111, 132, 209, 210.
valleys, could enter the Myzeqeja plain only by continuing through the Shkumbi valley or had to pass through this north-south corridor. [Figure 1.4] From the location of the modern village of Dragot in the foothills north of the plain, Codrio was well placed to control the southern access to this north-south valley, and sitting at 150 m above the plain was difficult to assault as well. This location was roughly 19 km north-northwest of Antipatreia, which both allowed for quick communications between the two and made it a logical next place for Apustius to attack. The strategic value of the location for controlling access through both the passes to the west and to the north made Codrio worthy of a Roman garrison.

Livy reports that Cnidus was an oppidum which thought that it could withstand the Roman assault. As Apustius likely continued his campaign to secure the rest of the valley, Cnidus would logically lie further north up the valley towards the western entrance to the Devoll valley. The modern village of Grekan, roughly 10km northeast of Dragot, would have been a fitting location for Cnidus. Grekan is at a high point of the foothills before they start descending to the north, making it a strategic, defensible location, one from which the inhabitants could reasonably think they could resist a Roman assault. As the Romans had just successfully overcome Antipatreia's resistance, there were likely extenuating circumstances that led to Cnidus believing that they could prevail in the face of Roman attack where the larger Antipatreia had not. That the weather was either already becoming more severe, or that they knew it would shortly, could reasonably have led them to think that the Romans would not attempt a siege. Furthermore, as they were located near the entrance to the Macedonian controlled Devoll
valley, the Cnidians might have expected the Macedonians to come save them. This belief seems quite reasonable in light of the fact that a Macedonian attachment did arrive on the scene just after Cnidus was taken, in time only to harass the Romans on their way back to Sulpicius' camp. Thus, Cnidus' naturally defended location and proximity to Macedonian protection presumably led them to think they could withstand the Romans.

Hammond proposed that the archaeological remains of a fortified site at Kalaja e Irmajt are "probably to be identified with Codrion" based on the idea that these are the only walled remains found in the district and Codrio is the only settlement in the district to which Livy specifically assigns walls. However, Polybius' report of Scerdilaidas' raid in Dassaretia (Plb.5.108.2) in 217 BC and Philip's immediate reprisal raid (Plb.5.108.8) contains the names of two more poleis that were surely walled (Chrysondon and Gertus) in this district as well as two more settlements of unspecified size (Creonium and Gerus). As a result, we need not feel compelled to identify these archaeological remains as Codrio. Additionally, Kalaja e Irmajt sits high (nearly 1000m above the valley floor) in the mountains west of the Devoll valley, 20km west of Dragot. Storming this location would have been an intensive undertaking, especially at the end of the campaign season as the weather changed. Since Hammond believed this fortress "guards the entry into the district of Gramsh," it seems illogical that it would be a part of a limited campaign focused around Antipatreia. There was neither time in the season, nor sufficient strategic

55 Hammond 1966 p43n14, repeated at Hammond 1972 p100; for a more thorough description of the archaeological remains, see Hammond 1967 p586.
56 Walbank 1957, p632 and Hammond 1968 p16 n55 argue that Polybius' Gerus was the same settlement as Livy's Gerunium. I remain unconvinced.
57 Nothing in Livy's narrative suggests such effort here.
58 Hammond 1972 p100.
motivation, for the Romans to have assaulted an oppidum at Kalaja e Irmajt. The location, instead, seems more fit for controlling movement through the Devoll valley than the valley between Antipatreia and Elbasan, making it a suitable location for a Macedonian fort controlling the Devoll valley. This fort would be a likely candidate for where the Cnidians thought they would get Macedonian assistance against the Roman assault.

My placements for both the castella and oppida, however, beg the question, "why have no archaeological remains of them been found?" First of all, we should expect that the walls of these settlements were not as impressive or well-built as the walls of an urbs such as Antipatreia. It is likely that even the Hellenistic walls at Berat were only preserved because they were incorporated directly into a later phase of construction. Additionally, my experience in Albania taught me that Albanians are very resourceful about reusing stone in their own buildings and this culture of reuse could explain why no remains of these forts have been found. In Kelcyre, the stone remains of Old Kelcyre had been almost entirely removed and incorporated into the buildings of Kelcyre and other local villages in just the short period since Kelcyre was moved to its current location in the 1950s. If in 60 years the stone remains of houses were reused to such a degree, one can imagine what may have happened to the stone walls of these castella and oppida over 2200 years.

That does not preclude some degree of preservation of these structures. I am not aware of any systematic search for remains such as these in the area around Berat. Since

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59 I have not visited the site, but I looked at images freely available on the internet and the site looks more like a phrourion such as Eleutherai in Attica than a town. Additionally, Kalaja means fort, indicating that the Albanian archaeologists who named it thought it to be a fort and not a town as well.
the Albanian archaeological tradition has recently favored Ceka's interpretation that Apustius' campaign was located in the Korçe valley, archaeologists have not focused their attentions on this particular region with a view towards finding Hellenistic remains.60

After sacking Cnidus, Apustius turned around and began to head back to Sulpicius' camp. This supplies an opportunity to determine a calendar of events for the 200 BC campaign from when Sulpicius set out from Apollonia to when Sulpicius wanted Apustius to return to the Roman camp so they could winter the troops.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Approximate days the action took</th>
<th>Total days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sulpicius in Apollonia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To Apsus camp</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summons Apustius</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apustius arrives</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apustius ravages territory</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To Corrhagus + sack</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To Gerrunius + sack</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To Orgessus + sack</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To Antipatreia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failed negotiations</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antipatreia sack</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To Codrio + garrison</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To Cnidus + sack</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 2: Calendar of events for 200 BC campaign*

Assuming that Apustius moved efficiently from sack to sack and had no troubles or delays in his assaults, the Roman campaign had already taken three weeks before Apustius headed towards Sulpicius' camp, which would have taken at least two days due to Apustius' booty-laden pack train. Time would have been tight even if we suppose that

60 Unfortunately I have not yet had the opportunity for autopsy of the region around Berat to search for these remains, however I hope to conduct this work myself in the future.
Antipatreia were at Berat. However, if were to follow Ceka and place Antipatreia at Symiza, we would need to add to that itinerary two 110 km trips through the Devoll valley. These trips would have been slowed due to the fact that the Devoll valley was exceptionally rugged and steep terrain that went through hostile territory, and that the difficulty of travel would have been enhanced by the increased rainfall, lower temperatures, and earlier snows in the Devoll valley compared to the eastern Myzeqeja plain.\(^{61}\) This was a difficult military route in good weather, and in late October weather for an army with a pack train laden with booty could have been catastrophic. Given the most plausible time constraints, Ceka's placement seems most improbable. Additionally, it seems difficult to believe that an experienced consul would have sent his army under a legate through a hostile, rugged, unfamiliar valley under the threat of severe weather to wage the 200 BC campaign.

Finally, it is important to point out that there may be a modern political reason influencing Ceka's placement of Antipatreia in the Korçe valley. Placing Antipatreia in the Korçe valley realigns the ancient spheres of control within the territory that became Albania. If Antipatreia was at Symiza and Berat was instead the site of the ancient Illyrian city Partha, then the area that was historically under non-Illyrian administrative control and cultural influence is moved significantly further east.\(^{62}\) Ancient control of

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\(^{61}\) The Devoll valley starts in the west at about 100m elevation and climbs through rolling mountainous terrain to an end elevation of 800 m where it opens into the Korçe plain. To create a flat area to lay the modern road involved great public works projects. As of October 2014, landslides just south of the town of Gramsh had washed the road away. The workmen there told me that the damaged road had been closed for years and they did not expect it to open for many more.

land is an important factor in the arguments used for the creation and evolution of the borders of the Balkan states. Arguing for continuous Illyrian inhabitation and control of the eastern Myzeqeja plain, coupled with the idea that modern Albanians are direct descendants of the Illyrians, bolsters the Albanian claim on land that was later inhabited by other ethnic groups.

On the way back to Sulpicius' camp from Cnidus, Apustius was attacked by a Macedonian force while crossing a river. Apustius had been fording the river Apsus due east of Corrhagus, as this was the best place to ford the river before proceeding to Sulpicius' camp. Crossing here would have left the entrance of the valley towards Elbasan obscured, allowing the Macedonians to approach unseen and take the Romans by surprise from the rear. This Macedonian force came out from the Gramsh valley, from the garrison stationed at Kalaja e Irmajt or another near it. The Macedonians briefly threw the Roman rearguard into confusion, but the Romans drew up into military formation and repelled the Macedonians. Apustius then continued on to rejoin Sulpicius' camp and Sulpicius led the army back to winter quarters at Apollonia.

Scholars since Leake have associated Apustius' campaign with Polybius' discussion of the 217 BC campaign season (Plb. 1.108. 1-8). In this passage, Scerdilaïdas, the king of Illyrian Arideia, seized multiple towns of the Dassaretii.

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63 On the creation and development of Albania's borders, see e.g. Marmullaku 1975 pp30-35; Abrahams 2013; Mazower 2000. Tensions over Albania's borders still run hot: e.g. the October 14th, 2014 brawl between the Serbian and Albanian soccer teams over a map of "Greater Albania", and the immediate political fallout. I was in Tirana at the time and all were convinced that the Third Balkan War would actually begin at any moment.

64 e.g. Leake 1835 NG III pp326-328; Bekker 1844; Walbank 1957, p 632; Hammond 1968, pp 15-16, 16n55; Bricoe 1972 ad loc.
including Antipatreia, from Macedonian control, before Philip promptly took them back, along with additional settlements in the vicinity.

Polybius reports Philip hearing about Scerdilaidas' raid:

τῇς δὲ Δασσαρήτιδος προσηγμένον πόλεις, τὰς μὲν φόβῳ, τὰς δὲ ἐπαγγελίαις, Ἀντιπάτρειαν, Χρυσονδύωνα, Γερτούντα, πολλὴν δὲ καὶ τῆς συνορούσης τούτοις Μακεδονίας ἐπιδεδραμηκότα.

[Scerdilaidas] had got into his hands by menaces or by promises several cities of the Dassaretae, namely Antipatreia, Chrysondyon, and Gertus, and had made extensive inroads on (overran) the neighboring parts of Macedonia.

(Plb. 5.108.2; trans. Loeb, adapted)

Polybius then reports Philip's reprisal raid:

πλὴν ὁ γε Φίλιππος στρατεύσας ἀνεκτήσατο μὲν τὰς προειρημένας πόλεις, κατελάβετο δὲ τῆς μὲν Δασσαρήτιδος Κρεώνιον καὶ Γερούντα ...

Philip, then, advancing with his army recovered the cities I mentioned, took Creonium and Gerus in the Dassaretis ... [Philip heads east taking more places]

(Plb. 5.108.8; trans. Loeb)

We see here a precedent for the Roman military movements in 200 BC centered on Antipatreia. The maximum extent of Macedonian control to the west in both 217 BC and in 200 BC was western Dasseretis, and Antipatreia was the key city in this area. This account reveals that this area around Antipatreia was so important to Philip that he felt compelled to immediately retake it personally, even though it was at the far edge of his territory.

The eastern Myzeqeja plain was understandably important to Philip as it functioned as a distinct entity from the western Myzeqeja plain with its own key economic and strategic strengths. From the fifteenth century through to today, the
Myzeqeja plain has not been viewed as a homogenous entity but rather two administrative and economic units.\textsuperscript{65} This comparative evidence helps us understand the likely patterns of economic use and administration of the ancient landscape.

[Figure 1.6] The Albanian government currently divides the Myzeqeja into two administrative zones, with the western Myzeqeja up to the western edge of the foothills of Mt. Shpiragut within the administrative zone of Fier, and the continuation of the plain to the east within the administrative zone of Berat. The Ottomans likewise divided the plain administratively. In 1466, they made the Myzeqeja plain into the administrative Sandjak of Avlona with Berat as its capital. This effectively divided the plain into two administrative zones with the western administrative center at the Sandjak's eponymous city of Avlona and the eastern administrative center at the Sandjak's capital city of Berat. Avlona, ancient Oricum and modern Vlorë, is 25km south of Apollonia, which in turn sits 7km west of Fier. There has been continuity in the placement of the two administrative centers between the 15th century and today, with the major coastal city in the west (Apollonia, then Avlona, then Fier), and Berat in the east holding the administrative seats. Berat was always the most important administrative seat in the eastern Myzeqeja plain, and often for the central plain as well.\textsuperscript{66}

Berat was a wise choice for administrative control of the plain because of how the pastoral economy of the plain worked. Throughout time, this plain has been pasturage

\textsuperscript{65} contra Hammond 1968, p1 who argued that the Myzeqeja was a singular entity controlled by the port cities of Apollonia and Dyrrachium.

\textsuperscript{66} Leake FO Nov 1805 reports that there were only three vizirs in charge of all Albania and Berat was one of them (the other two were Scutari and Ioannina). The importance of Berat to the administration of the plain is further indicated by the fact even though the Sandjak was originally called the Sandjak of Avlona, the capital city was Berat, and then over time the Sandjak came to be called the Sandjak of Berat. Sandjak of Avlona: e.g. Karaczay 1842, p69 - seat of the pasha at Berat. Sandjak of Berat: Patsch 1904.
used by transhumant shepherds. The shepherds live in the mountains to the east and south in summer and move with their flocks into the Myzeqeja plain for the winter. Located at the boundary of the mountains and the plains, Berat is well positioned for administrative control of these people and their flocks at each season of transhumance. This plain is pastureland controlled from the edge of the mountains, not from the ports. Apollonia and Dyrrachium were foreign controlled (Greek, then Roman) cities focused on the larger world of international trade centered on the Adriatic, not the control over transhumant shepherds.

Caesar, in his *Bellum Civile*, gives us valuable evidence for the economic use of the plain in antiquity. When Caesar was encamped at Dyrrachium, he was unable to get provisions brought by ship because Pompey was camping nearby and controlling the ports (Caes. *BC* 3.42.1-3). Caesar was unable to requisition grain from nearby, as the surrounding regions "generally need imported grain" (Caes. *BC* 3.42.5). This is supported by the fact that Pompey was importing grain for his own troops. That the land was used primarily for pasturage and less for growing cereals is shown in that Caesar was not able to get enough grain for his men, but makes up for this caloric deficiency though meat and milk (Caes. *BC* 3.47.4 - 3.48.2). Milk and meat are the products of a pastoral economy, and having enough of them to feed an army indicates their abundance. Later in the season, the hope of the grain crops beginning to ripen raised the spirits of Caesar's men (Caes. *BC* 3.49.1), indicating that there was some agricultural activity in the region, but

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67 See e.g Campbell 1964.
68 Meat for the men: *Pecus vero, cuius rei summa erat ex Epiro copia, magno in honore habeant*. Milk for the men: *chara, quod admixtum lacte multam inopiam levebat*. 
not enough to support an army for an extended period of time. Pompey's troops later in the season have trouble even foraging fodder in this area (Caes. BC 3.58; 3.76.3).

Varro also supplies us with key economic information about the region. Each of the three books of *Rerum Rusticarum* consists of a dialogue devoted to a different component of farming: Book I to agriculture, Book II to pasturage of flocks, and Book III to pasturage of small animals. Tellingly, for our purposes, Varro places the dialogue of Book II in Epirus (Varro *RR* 2.int.6). It is reasonable to infer that Varro placed the dialogue here because it was expected to resonate with the reader as an ideal setting for a discussion of pasturage due to the prevailing landuse in northern Epirus at the time being pastoral.\(^69\) Reinforcing the idea of there being large-scale pasturage in northern Epirus, within the dialogue Varro's characters speak casually of very large herds of hundreds of sheep (Varro *RR* 2.2.20, 2.10.11). Varro's characters also speak of Illyrians being transhumant shepherds so skilled and so plentiful that even their women are exemplary at the job (Varro *RR* 2.10.6-9).

During the majority of its recorded history, most of the Myzeqeja plain was swampland not fit for large-scale agriculture.\(^70\) This only changed when the large public works projects and agricultural collectives established in the 1960s under the communist regime drained the swamps and turned the area into productive agricultural land for growing cereals.\(^71\) However, without the goad of communist collectives, land all over

\(^69\) Presumably the conversation takes place just north of Butrint, as Atticus, who is included as a participant in the dialogue, had an estate there.

\(^70\) Keefe et al.; Marmallaku, esp. pp102-103 for a harrowing account of the ubiquity of malaria here in the early 20th century.

\(^71\) Marmallaku; Keefe et al.
Albania is today again reverting from agricultural use to pasturage.\textsuperscript{72} Both Hughes, in the early 19th century, and Hammond, in the 1930s, observed the eastern part of the Myzeqeja plain near Berat being full of flocks and herds and the western part being swampland, and Leake reported that The Bishop of Koritsa told him that "an army landing at Avlona, and advancing as far as Berat, would be unable to proceed from a want of provisions, Albania producing nothing but men, and this fine looking plain returning very little to the cultivator."\textsuperscript{73} The land use of the Myzeqeja plain in antiquity would have been similar to the pastoral land use seen from Caesar to the pre-communist modern era.

Berat held a position of administrative importance in the region due to its key economic and strategic location for the movement of transhumant shepherds in and out of the plain. Destroying Antipatreia removed the Macedonian infrastructure for controlling the economic and strategically valuable eastern Myzeqeja plain. [Figure 1.7] Rome pushed their control eastward and now controlled the western Myzeqeja plain from Apollonia, the central Myzeqeja plain from Dimallum, and the eastern Myzeqeja plain from the garrison at Codrio. Sulpicius used the 200 BC campaign to push Roman control eastward to the next natural barrier. This served to extend the buffer zone around Apollonia and to control a key economic area.

\textsuperscript{72} When I biked across the plain from Fier to Lushnjë and then up to Rrogozhinë on April 29, 2014, I was astonished at how this landscape was used today predominately for pasturage rather than agriculture. Looking at a map, one would assume the limited plains in Albania would be used for agriculture, as are Thessaly and Boiotia in Greece. The predominance of pastoralism is reflected in the modern diet, which is viewed as deeply traditional. Bread is not a standard part of the meal, as it is in Greece, but meat, cheese, and milk always are. A typical breakfast includes both cheese and milk for drinking.

\textsuperscript{73} Leake 1835 I, p341; Hughes 1820 II, p262f; Hammond 1968, p1; Hammond 1972, p6.
Politically, this show of force served to pull allies away from the Macedonians, as during the winter of 200/199 BC, the Illyrian king Pleuratus (the extent of whose lands is unclear but appears traditionally based around the Ardiaeans\textsuperscript{74}), Athamanians, and Dardanians offered allegiance to the Romans against the Macedonians\textsuperscript{75} (L.31.28.1-2). Rome would have already learned during their previous actions in the region that the political factions in the area would align themselves with whoever appeared to be strongest at the moment: In 229 BC, the Romans defeated the Aridaeans in a single campaign, after which many local tribes offered their allegiance and asked to be under Rome's protection (Plb.2.11.5-17); in 219 BC the Roman campaign in the region consisted solely of sacking the best defended settlement in the region, Dimallum, after which Demetrious of Pharos surrendered and all the neighboring tribes asked to be Roman allies (Plb.3.18.3-6); In 211 BC, the Romans pointed to their recent success in battle to convince the Aetolians to ally with them (L.26.24.1-3); and, in 205 BC, Roman military presence at Dyrrachium inspired the neighboring tribes with hope to revolt from distant Macedonian control and for Roman alliance (L.29.12.3). The Romans knew that a show of force, such as burning Antipatreia, would likely pull local tribes out of Macedonian control and into their own sphere of alliances. As Antipatreia was far from the main Macedonian forces, which limited their potential to come to her aid, especially so close to the end of the campaign season, it was an effective and low risk way for Rome to demonstrate her military power.

\textsuperscript{74} L.27.30.14: The Aetolians demand Philip return the Aridaeans to Pleuratus and his father; On Scerdilaidas and Pleuratus being part of the Ardiaean dynasty, Wilkes 1992, pp167-171; Hammond 1966, p243
\textsuperscript{75} Aetolians are as yet undecided.
Hammond argued that this campaign was only intended to create a bridgehead in order to attack further east the next season. However, the eastern Myzeqeja plain is not the only route one might have used to campaign eastward the following year, and thus focusing the campaign here would have done little to facilitate an eastward push in 199 BC. To campaign further east, the Romans would take the Shkumbi valley, which they already controlled due to their alliance with the Parthini. Instead, we should view the 200 BC campaign as primarily aimed to enlarge the buffer zone around Apollonia. Although the eastern Myzeqeja plain is small, since there is a major mountain range at the eastern end of the plain, pushing Macedonian control out of this area pushes the Macedonians all the way to the other side of the mountains to the Korçe valley. The Romans could have maintained this extended buffer zone in Illyria and waged the war against Macedon with the navy in the east. Such a naval focus would have been consistent with Roman activity in the First Macedonian War. While preparation for the 199 BC campaign was a factor, the 200 BC campaign also served distinct functions of its own and extended Roman control into a new vital area.

From the end of the 200 BC campaign through the Battle of Pydna in 168 BC, the Romans never fought over the Myzeqeja plain again and were repeatedly able to ferry troops between Italy and Apollonia, Oricum, and Dyrrachium as well as move troops through the Myzeqeja plain without incident. The Romans used these ports to pull all of the Roman troops from Greece in 194 BC (L.34.50.10, 34.52.1-2) and 188 BC

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76 Hammond 1966, p43.
77 For Roman naval campaigns in the First Macedonian War, see Thiel 1946, pp 55-199.
(L.38.41.15), as well as to deliver troops to Greece from Italy in 192 BC (L.35.20.11, L.35.24.7), 191 BC (L.37.6.1-2), and 189 BC (L.38.3.9-10).

In 172 BC, after fifteen years without a military presence in the east, Rome's first step in preparing for the Third Macedonian War was to establish garrisons in Apollonia and other coastal cities, and this was accomplished without a fight (L.42.18.2-3). Then in 171 BC, the Romans transferred troops to Apollonia, from where the consul "sent tribunes with two thousand soldiers to hold castella of the Dassareti and of the Illyrians" (L.42.36.8-9). These actions seem strikingly reminiscent of the 200 BC campaign, and were similarly successful in securing the area as Rome had no problem using the coastal ports or moving through the plain in 171 BC (L.42.48.7 (Dyrrachium), 42.49.10 (Apollonia)), in 170 BC (L.43.9.6 (Illyrian Coast west of Dassaretia)), and Paullus' arrival on the Illyrian coast in 168 BC.78

In 200 BC, Rome sacked Antipatreia to extend the buffer zone around the Illyrian ports under Roman protection as well as to gain regional allies. The Illyrian ports had come under Roman protection in 229 BC and Rome had previously extended the buffer zone in a similar manner by sacking Dimallum in 219 BC. Thus, in location and conduct the first step of the Second Macedonian War was a direct extension of the first two Illyrian Wars. The 200 BC campaign was successful in that Rome never needed to fight to secure this strategically vital area.

78 The Third Illyrian War (L.44.30-31) (App. Ill. 9) = (L.42.36) takes place too far north to be covered in this chapter. The sacking of Epirus takes place after the time parameters of this dissertation.
CHAPTER 2: BETWEEN ILLYRIA AND MACEDONIA

Introduction

After the 200 BC campaign season, the Romans gained key allies including the Dardani and elected a new consul to replace Sulpicius in the consular province of Macedonia. However, Sulpicius still led out the army in the 199 BC campaign.

This chapter focuses on the 199 BC campaign and an investigation into the topography of the area between Illyria and Macedonia in which it took place, continuing through the subsequent events in this area through 168 BC. The Roman campaign of 199 covered the most territory and spent the most time in the field of any Roman campaign in the east to date. This campaign also featured the first clashes between a Roman army and a Macedonian army led by Philip V.

The landscape in which the 199 BC campaign took place is crucial for the control of east-west travel between Illyria and Macedonia and acts as a buffer zone protecting against attacks from each direction.

Once we understand the topography of the campaign we are able to understand better both Sulpicius' goals for the campaign as well as certain of Sulpicius' and Philip's actions which otherwise would seem confusing or even foolish.

Sources of evidence for the 199 BC Campaign

Livy (L.31.33.4 - 31.40.6), Cassius Dio (Cass. Dio 18.1-4), and Dio's epitomizor Zonaras (Zon. 9.15) discuss the 199 BC land campaign. Livy's account is our most
detailed and full, but differs significantly from that of Dio and Zonaras. The most crucial difference is that the accounts of Dio and Zonaras recount a much shorter Roman campaign; the Romans return to winter quarters at Apollonia at a point in the narrative when Livy reports that they continued east with the campaign. Livy is understood to be using Polybius as a source for his narrative of the 199 BC land campaign, although the corresponding passage of Polybius is lost.\(^79\) Dio often differs from Polybius in his account of events, but also claims acquaintance with Livy (Dio 67.12.4).\(^80\) The differences between Livy's and Dio's accounts indicate that Dio was employing additional source materials.

Both Livy's account and the Dio/Zonaras account of the 199 BC campaign begin with the Romans already engaged in military action, having omitted the details concerning Roman troop movements from winter quarters to this moment. In Livy's more detailed account, military action begins with Roman assaults on settlements in the eastern Genusus valley; in the more abrupt Dio/Zonaras account, military action begins with skirmishes with Philip's forces in the Korçe valley.

In an effort to identify the potential routes and understand the topography of this campaign, I conducted three separate research trips through the region which today spans portions of Greece, Albania, and FYROM.

Understanding the topography is crucial for understanding the trajectory of the 199 BC campaign. Once the topography is defined, it becomes clear that the restrictions

\(^{79}\) Briscoe 2009, p462. Tränkle

\(^{80}\) On differences between Dio's and Polybius' accounts of the same historical events, see Beck 2013. For the difficulties in Quellenforschung for Dio, see Millar 1964, pp34-38; Beck 2013, esp. p141n69 "Dio's sources are a notorious problem."
on movement imposed by the landscape at several points in the campaign forced the Roman consul to make crucial decisions. These decisions reveal larger goals and priorities, and suggest how they aimed to achieve them.

**Circumstances at the beginning of 199 BC campaign**

Sulpicius would have expected his imperium to be prorogued for 199 BC based both on his own experiences during the First Macedonian War, as well as the recent appointments of magistrates in Spain and Africa.

In the First Macedonian War, the praetor M. Valerius Laevinus was granted imperium in 215 BC, which was then extended annually through 211 BC, in which year Sulpicius was elected consul and sent to replace Laevinus in Macedonia (L.26.26.4).  

Sulpicius command was subsequently extended yearly through 206 BC. Extended campaigns were thus standard in the Macedonian theater.

This practice was not limited to Macedonia nor did it stop in 205 BC with Sulpicius' recall. Six magistrates with foreign appointments had their imperium prorogued in 205 BC; nine in 204 BC; eight in 203 BC; and eight in 202 BC. In 201 BC five magistrates were prorogued, and Laevinus was again granted imperium with relation to activities in Macedonia, suggesting that perhaps the magistrates in command of the First Macedonian War would again be in charge of the Second. In 200 BC, Sulpicius goes to his consular province of Macedonia. Four other magistrates are prorogued during that year, and L. Cornelius Lentulus returned to Rome after a six-year command in Spain;

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81 See Broughton 1951 for full citation of primary sources for magistrates.
82 Sulpicius was replaced by P. Sempronius Tuditanus in 205 BC (L.29.12), the year in which the Peace of Phoenice ended the war.
his successor was subsequently prorogued for a second year. Furthermore, in 203 BC the Senate took the extreme step of extending Scipio Africanus' imperium indefinitely until the end of the Second Punic War (L.30.1.10). Importantly, Sulpicius himself was appointed dictator to prevent anyone from interfering with Scipio's special appointment (L.30.24.1-3). Recent precedent thus indicated that foreign commands were going to get extended terms, and Sulpicius could reasonably have expected such treatment.

It is clear that Sulpicius desired such an outcome. During the winter of 200/199 BC, Sulpicius sent letters to the Senate "in which, among other things, it was said that a laurel had grown out of the stern of a warship" (L.32.1.12). The laurel was both a symbol of victory and the 'ornament of generals enjoying a triumph' (Lewis-Short); in fact, Sulpicius's contemporary Plautus even used the term 'laurel' as metonymy for a triumph (Plaut. Cist. 201). Sulpicius thus was signaling to the Senate that a prodigy had appeared that foretold a military victory for Sulpicius in Macedonia, and that a triumph would be forthcoming.

In the same year, there was a parallel case to Sulpicius' reporting an omen to the senate to get his imperium prorogued. In 200 BC, when Quintus Minucius Rufus was the praetor in charge of the province of Bruttium, the Temple of Proserpina at Locri was robbed and the Senate ordered Minucius to make right this sacrilege (L31.12.1-4). Importantly, Livy tells us that "the concern to atone for the violation of this temple was increased by the prodigies which were reported in numerous parts of the country at the

83 The consul Servilius Caepio had announced his intention to interfere with Scipio's extended command.
84 Africanus' influence at Rome was strong in 199 BC, as he was elected consul and chosen Princeps Senatus in that year, and Sulpicius might have thought that Africanus would support Sulpicius' extended command as Sulpicius had supported his.
85 "in quibus inter cetera scriptum erat lauream in puppi navis longae enatam"
same time", prodigies which included "dread forms of animals reported in several places" (L.31.12.5-6). Minucius successfully investigated the sacrilege and replaced the money (L.31.13.1), and so his work there seemed to be complete. However, he then sent a report to the senate that in his province a colt and three chicks were each born with one too many legs (L.32.1.7-11), apparently indicating continued divine displeasure. As a result, the senate extends Minucius' command to continue dealing with conspiracies in Bruttium (L.32.1.7-8). Magistrates were claiming indications of divine pleasure or displeasure in order to influence the Senate's decisions about prorogation.

According to Livy's account, there is further precedent for Sulpicius making use of religion to gain military command. Sulpicius was a strong advocate for declaring war on Macedonia and used evidence of divine approval to get the war vote passed. At the time Sulpicius is elected consul in 200 BC, the Roman senate and people were debating whether to declare war on Macedonia, but the people had not yet voted. On the day he was inaugurated as consul, Sulpicius offered a motion that the consuls perform sacrifice and conduct a short prayer he composed that "whatever the senate and people shall resolve for the common good and with reference to beginning a new war" turns out well (L.31.5.3-4). Sulpicius then reported back to the senate that the gods approved this prayer and sacrifice and that the haruspices said that the "entrails were propitious and portended an extension of territory, victory, and a triumph" (L.31.5.7). Nonetheless, the people voted against the war (L.31.6.3).

In response, Sulpicius explained his earlier actions and the meaning of the divine response, saying that "the immortal gods themselves favor [voting for war], for when I
offered sacrifice and prayer that this war should turn out successfully for me, for the senate and for you, for the allies and the Latin confederacy, and for our fleets and armies, they all gave favorable and propitious signs" (L.31.7.14-15). As a result, the people then voted for war (L.31.7.15). Because Sulpicius had previously been assigned Macedon, this vote was in effect a vote for Sulpicius to have military command in Macedon.\textsuperscript{86}

However in 199 BC, contrary to expectation, Sulpicius's imperium was not extended and he was replaced for the upcoming campaign. On the Ides of March 199 BC, the province of Macedonia was assigned to the incoming consul P. Villius Tappulus. Sulpicius knew this well before the campaign season began. In 199 BC, the Ides of March fell on either January 4th (Gregorian) or January 26th (Gregorian).\textsuperscript{87} Either possible date leaves more than enough time for Sulpicius to have learned that he was replaced before Villius would have come to replace him.

It appears then that Sulpicius decided to go on campaign anyway even though he knew he was not intended to. To do this, Sulpicius left his his winter quarters with his army before Villius showed up to relieve him, and therefore set out earlier than the normal start of campaign season.

The other reason that Sulpicius wanted to leave earlier than usual was that he needed to start harassing the Dassaretii as soon as possible if he wanted to engage with Philip during the 199 campaign season. Philip might have otherwise chosen to direct his energies towards a different theater, as the Macedonians were engaged in conflicts

\textsuperscript{86} After obtaining the war vote, Sulpicius successfully challenged the normal actions of the fetials (L.31.8.3) and the pontifex maximus (L.31.9.7-8) to get what he wanted, furthering the idea that he is unafraid to manipulate religion for his own ends.
\textsuperscript{87} Marchetti 1973; Derow 1976. Briscoe 1981, pp 17-26 summarizes and critiques their debates and supplies a helpful chart.
elsewhere during this period. Sulpicius wanted to engage with Philip in order to win a major battle and get a triumph. The need for this was even greater since he was defying the senate and knew this could be his last chance to hold imperium.

**Topographical Analysis of the 199 BC Campaign**

For the purposes of this analysis, I have divided the Roman campaign of 199 BC into three sections, on the basis of geography. Furthermore, there are Roman military victories over Macedonian forces at the end of each of these three sections. The Romans had to make a decision about what to do next after each of these victories; these were not inevitable choices. Important information can thus be extrapolated from the choices made at these key moments.

Section one focuses on the events in the Korče valley through to their victory over the Macedonians near Otolobus (L.31.33.4 - 31.39.3). Section two focuses on the plain extending from the Kleidi pass (Greece) north to the modern city of Prilep (FYROM) culminating in the Roman victory over the Macedonians at the Kleidi pass (L.31.39.4 - 31.39.15; Dio 18.1-4; Zon.9.15). Section three focuses on the area from the Kleidi pass south to the modern city of Kozani, continuing west and northwest to the Tsangon pass where the Romans take the Macedonian controlled city of Pelium (L.31.40.1-6).

**Topographic Analysis of Section I**

Livy reports that the Romans left their winter quarters at Apollonia (L.31.18.9, 31.40.6) and headed east:

per Dassaretiorum fines exercitum ducebat, frumentum quod ex hibernis extulerat integrum uehens, quod in usum militi sati esset praebentibus agris. oppida uicique partim uoluntate, partim metu se tradebant; quaedam
Sulpicius was leading the army through the territory of the Dassaretii, carrying with him untouched the grain he had brought from winter quarters, since the country supplied adequately the needs of the soldiers. The oppida and vici surrendered, some voluntarily, others through fear; some were carried by assault, some were found abandoned as the barbarians fled to the neighboring mountains. He established a base near Lyncus on the river Bevus; from there he sent troops to forage among the granaries of the Dassaretii.

(Livy 31.33.4-6)

It will be useful to first determine the location of Roman camp, and then to establish how he traveled between Apollonia and this location.88

In this passage, Livy supplies us with five topographic clues for locating the Roman camp:

1) It is near 'Lyncus'
2) Territory of the Dassaretii had to be passed through to get there
3) It is close enough to (or in) an area controlled by the Dassaretii that would allow for granary raiding.
4) This area controlled by the Dassaretii generates (or trades for) enough grain to have all these granaries for the Romans to raid.
5) It is on a river named Bevus.

Scholars agree that Livy's use of the toponym Lyncus here does not refer to the city Lynchnidos (located at modern Ohrid) but rather "the name of the canton occupied by the Lyncestae,"89 a people who occupied the mountainous area east of and

88 See chapter one for discussion of location of Apollonia just west of the modern city of Fier, Albania.
89 Hammond 1966a, p43n19
surrounding Lake Prespa.\textsuperscript{90} [Figure 2.1] It follows that Sulpicius established his camp at the western edge of this territory, as Livy makes no mention of Sulpicius having passed through it.

Topographic clues 2, 3, and 4 above all refer to an area of land under control of the Dassaretii. The Dassaretii appear to have controlled an area centered around the Korče valley and the mountainous zone between the Korče valley and Berat (Antipatreia) including the Devoll valley, but the extent "varied with political conditions".\textsuperscript{91} At times it extended as far as the western shore of Lake Ohrid,\textsuperscript{92} the southern shore of Lake Ohrid,\textsuperscript{93} beyond the Tsangon pass at the eastern edge of the Korče valley,\textsuperscript{94} and the easternmost part of the Genusus valley by Lake Ohrid.\textsuperscript{95} In 199 BC it would appear that all of this territory was under Dassaretian control due to their relationship with Macedonia; Macedonia's military interventions in this area since 217 BC kept the Dassaretian borders at their greatest extent.\textsuperscript{96} Territory controlled by the Dassaretii thus lies between the Roman winter quarters at Apollonia and the western edge of Lyncus.\textsuperscript{97}

\begin{itemize}
\item [90] e.g. Leake 1835, 3.310-311; Kromayer 1907, map 199 BC; Hammond 1967, p614-616; Hammond 1972, pp58ff; TIR; Hammond & Walbank 1988, p 153; BA; Ceka 2013, p381. Notice that Kromayer, Hammond, and Ceka all agree on this placement - a rare occurrence of scholarly consensus.
\item [91] Hammond 1972, p95.
\item [92] Hammond: 1968, Fig 1;1966a, Fig 3; 1966b, Fig 1;1989, Fig 1; Hammond & Walbank 1988, Fig 8.
\item [93] Ceka 2013, p421; Badian 1952, p74; Hammond 1967, Map 15.
\item [94] Wilkes 1992, map 4; Ceka 2013, p421; Hammond 1972, p96; Badian 1952, p74; BA.
\item [95] Hammond: 1968, Fig 1; 1966a, Fig 3; 1966b, Fig 1; 1989, Fig 1; 1988, Fig 8.
\item [96] Macedonian military takeover of the Dassaretii in 217 BC (Plb. 5.108.8). Macedonian actions that led to potential expansion of Dassaretian territory: Macedonian military control of Ardiaeans and Atintanes on north shore of Lake Ohrid and extending west by 208 BC (L.27.30.13). Macedonian intervention in Dassaretii and takeover of Lynchnidos on eastern shore of Lake Ohrid in 208 BC (L.27.32.9). Macedonian military control of Parthini by 205 BC (L.29.12.3). Macedonian insistence on control of Atintanes in 205 BC (L.29.12.13). Repeated attacks by Philip on Apollonia and Dyrrachium that involved moving land forces via Lake Ohrid indicating Macedonian/Dassaretian control of areas south and west of Lake Ohrid in 216 BC (Pol. 5.110), 214 BC (L. 24.40), and 205 BC (L. 29.12.5-7).
\item [97] Walbank 1940, p142 and Kromayer 1907 both believe Sulpicius went north of Lake Ohrid, but Hammond has since convincingly demonstrated that the Atintani, not the Dassaretii, controlled the area north of the lake (most thoroughly, Hammond 1989), which helps explain the Macedonian interest in the
Livy states that the Romans raided the granaries of the Dassaretii. The Romans need to raid granaries because the grain in the fields is not yet ripe at this point in the campaign; in fact Livy reports when it does become ripe later in the season (L.31.36.6).

**[Figure 2.2]** The only major agricultural zone in Dassaretian territory is the Korçe valley. This is the only area that could produce enough surplus grain that the Romans could still successfully raid storehouses containing the previous year's harvest just before the new harvest is to begin. The Korçe valley borders the western boundary of Lyncus. Thus a location in the Korçe valley accords with the first four of Livy's topographic clues.

What remains is identifying the River Bevus. This is difficult as the only other mention of a river Βεύος is in Stephanus of Byzantium who states only that a Macedonian polis named Βεύη was near it. Though poorly attested, it is possible to identify the river Bevus on the basis of other evidence; we should look for a river that accords with Livy's other topographic clues, supplies a strategic location for the camp, and aligns with the rest of Livy's narrative. The Çërravë river fits these requirements: it is located at the edge of the Korçe plain near the mountains of Lyncus, and offers a strategic location for a camp. The Çërravë river flows into Lake Ohrid from the south, originating in the ridge of hills that divide the Pogradec plain on the southern shore and the Korçe plain.

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Atintani at the Peace of Phoenice (L.29.12.13). There is an agricultural area at the north of the lake, but its proximity to Macedonian controlled Lynchnidus (L.27.32.9) would lead one to expect Lynchnidus to play a role in the narrative if the Romans went by it, especially as Lynchidus does play a role in the Roman preparations for the Third Macedonian War.

98 In disagreement: Ceka 2013, p210 places the river Bevos [sic] "in the upper flow of the river Devoll" without supporting argument.

99 Hammond (1968, p16n55; 1967 p616 n1; 1966a, p43; 1972, p94) previously argued for this river being the Bevus, but his reasoning was based on unconvincing linguistics (namely that Polybius' Boioi (Plb.5.108.8) should be related to, and live by, this Bevus) paired with an unconvincing placement for the
Establishing a camp on the ridge by the site of the modern village of Cërrave along the Çërravë river would be a strategic choice for multiple reasons: it sits roughly 100m above the Pogradec plain to the north, but 100m below the top of the ridge; this area is thus effectively hidden from the Korçë plain while still being within easy raiding distance. From the top of this ridge, Roman scouts would have a commanding view of the entire Korçë plain, including the Tsangon pass and the pass south of Korçë. Positioning their camp by Cërrave would also give the Romans the advantage of high ground in the event of an attack from the Korçë valley to the south, as an attacking army would have to climb 150 m of elevation.

Scholars have proposed three possible routes that could take the Roman army through the territory of the Dassaretii between Apollonia and the Korçë valley.

[Figure 2.3] The first is a relatively direct route as the crow flies between Berat and Korçë, described in detail by Leake on the basis of personal autopsy. In his *Travels in Northern Greece*, Leake describes his own journey via this route; scholars have since interpreted this to mean that it was a viable route for the Roman army. However, in Leake's foreign office correspondence, there is a letter dated November 7th, 1805 addressed to Lord Mulgrave, concerning his mission to identify potential military routes through the landscape. Leake writes that this route cannot be called "a practicable passage". Leake could travel it with a horse but declares it not passable for an army.

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Boioi, themselves, (namely that Polybius is listing toponyms following Philip's route east, but acknowledging that at least one location does not follow this logic). There is no evidence to locate where on the lake the Boioi were.

100 Leake 1835, I p337-354 covering September 10-13, 1805.
101 Hammond 1972, pp97-99 argues for this route, citing Leake, and is followed by TIR and BA.
Even today there is no road along this route and very few villages; this rough landscape does not lend itself to travel by ancient or modern means.

This leaves two viable routes that must be considered. The first goes southeast through the Devoll valley via Gramsh and enters the central Korče plain by Maliq. The other passes through the Genusus valley to the western bank of lake Ohrid, before heading south along the lake to the northern edge of the Korče plain.

The route through the Genusus valley is most likely to have been the one Sulpicius chose, due to the comparative difficulty of the terrain of the Devoll valley. This difficult terrain would have been amplified by seasonal weather, logistical concerns, and the fact that it was hostile territory.

The route through the Devoll valley travels through significantly more rugged terrain than the route through the Genusus valley. The hills rise steeply from both sides of the river resulting in more limited areas at the same level for troops to march together, and route itself is comprised of a series of steep hills. It took a modern public works project to level enough space to first build a major road through this valley. However, this road was washed out so severely that as of October 2014 it had not been operational in years and the road workers I spoke to did not expect it to be operational for many more years due to both the work involved and the propensity of this valley for further washouts. The hills to the west of the road are so steep that there is no route around the washout. In contrast, the via Egnatia was built in the Genusus valley in the 130s BC

103 Supports this route: Hammond 1972; Ceka 2013, p210.
104 The Albanian road workers explained this to me with my map. The only roads in those hills are "too difficult even for a pick up truck".
and was maintained throughout the Byzantine, Ottoman, and modern periods in part due to this valley's gradual grade and wide areas for troops to march together.

The difficulty of the terrain would have been amplified by the season in which the Roman army was traveling, due to the fact that inclement weather, snow, flooded streams, and mud would make movement through rough terrain even more difficult.

Livy gives us two major temporal markers over the course of the narrative related to the grain harvest in this region, and the relationship of the harvest season to the events of the campaign. Based on our understanding of the traditional time for the harvest season in this area, it is possible to work backwards and determine the point at which Sulpicius set out from Apollonia.

Later in the campaign, when the Romans arrive at Stuberra, they foraged the grain that was in the fields of Pelagonia (L.31.39.4). The period of time in which cereals are reaped in the field is limited because cereals need to be within a certain window of ripeness to be reaped and ripe cereals are especially susceptible to loss due to adverse weather, e.g. wind, hail, and rain. The entire cereal harvest of oats, barley, and wheat lasts only four to six weeks, with the wheat harvest focused in the last two weeks. Wheat can be harvested "green" at the beginning of this period, and although riskier for storage purposes, can be immediately eaten. Comparative studies with lowland and mountain crops in northern Greece as well as mountain villages in Euboia indicate that the wheat harvest in Pelagonia and the Korçe valley traditionally fell in end of June and beginning of July, but wheat could be "green harvested" before it was fully ripe from the

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107 Halstead 2014, pp73-75, 104.
beginning of June. From this information, it can be deduced that the Romans must have begun foraging in Pelagonia in early July to have been able to gather significant quantities of grain in the fields, as it would have been in the local farmers' best interest to have gotten their crops out of the fields as soon as possible to avoid loss. The sooner the Romans arrive, the less the locals have already harvested. Additionally, it can be deduced that the Romans could not have begun foraging in the fields in the Korče valley before the beginning of June, as the wheat would not yet have been edible.

The following is a conservative estimate of days of the 199 BC campaign, using the harvest dates discussed above as fixed points to determine when Sulpicius left his winter quarters. All of the time periods are estimated cautiously, even using the bare minimum number of days when such information is available, and each time estimate could reasonably be extended. Although I have not discussed Philip's movements yet, I include them in the timeline and will discuss them in detail below.

**Starting date: Mid April (Approximately 48 days before beginning harvest in Korče valley)**

Roman march from Apollonia to camp at Çërravë, including raiding of settlements and pillaging foodstores: (~184km) 14 days

Time from Roman arrival at Çërravë before Philip leaves Bitola area: 7 days

Philip marches from Bitola area to east of Tsangon pass: (~85 km Bitola to Bilisht via Florina pass) 3 days

Cavalry searching/skirmish/corps recall: 4 days

Philip recalls Perseus; Perseus marches to Philip: (~100 km Bitola to Gradsko) 8 days

Philip marches to Athacus: (~40km Bilisht to Blace) 1 day

Time before Romans to Ottolubum: 10 days

Romans to Ottolobus: 1 day

**Beginning of harvesting date for Korče valley: June 1 (approximate)**

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108 Halstead 2014, p72; DuBoulay 1994, p276. In 195 BC, Roman foragers harvested ripe grain and trampled the unripe grain (L.34.26.8); the presence of both in the field indicates that they were foraging at the earliest part of the harvest. I have not been able to find comparative data on pre-modern harvest times in Albania. When anthropological interest in Greece in the 20th century was strong, the communist regime in Albania kept their borders closed and information secret.
Romans forage/get careless: 7 days
Skirmish: 1 day
End Section I
Romans stay in Korče valley after Philip leaves: 7 days
Roman march to Stuberra: (~150km Çërravë to Chepígovo) 5 days
**Period of harvest in Pelagonia: Late June/early July**
Romans start harvesting in Pelagonia roughly 20 days after beginning harvesting in the Korče valley.

According to this estimate, for the Romans to have been able to forage in the fields in the Korče valley and Pelagonia as Livy says they did, the Romans had to have left winter quarters at mid-April at the latest. Since all of these time estimates are low estimates, Sulpicius could have reasonably set out as early the beginning of April or even late March. April is a cold and wet period for travel through the mountainous terrain between Apollonia and the Korče valley. The harsh spring weather of April would have increased the relative difficulty of travel through the Devoll valley compared to the Genusus valley.

In further support of this timetable, we know that Sulpicius would have been motivated to begin his campaign as early in the season as possible, since he needed to set out before the new consul arrived, and because of his desire to engage with Philip, as discussed above.

Logistical concerns would also impact Sulpicius' choice of route. Livy notes that the Romans set out from winter quarters carrying grain with them (L.31.33.4). Later in the account of this campaign, Livy mentions that they were traveling with a *grave agmen* that did not allow them to pursue Philip when he escaped via a mountainous route.

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109 I was in Tepelene in early April 2015 and it was freezing cold. The mountains seen to the north and east from Permet at the end of April 2015 were all covered in snow. The Metsovo pass was closed due to heavy snowfall through April in 2015.
Based on his use of the same term in his description of the Roman troop movements in Asia in 189 BC, a *grave agmen* is a wagon train. Livy tells us that their movement is slowed to a mere five miles per day because they were "dragging a train heavy now with booty" (*praeda iam grave agmen trahens*) (L.38.15.14). The *grave agmen* clearly refers to carts rather than heavy infantry. In both these situations, the *grave agmen* restricts Roman troop movements.

While a Roman military expedition always had a large number of mules and the soldiers carried great weights on their persons, not all campaigns had trains, and for the ones that did, the size of the train could vary considerably. Having carts as part of the baggage train would be consistent, however, with later examples of Roman military action in Greece. For example, in 171 BC the Roman army in northeast Thessaly was foraging with at least 1000 wagons (L.42.65.3). Livy's mention of the *grave agmen* thus shows that the 199 BC campaign had a wagon train and that the train was of sufficient size that rough terrain would slow and/or impede its travel.

Furthermore, the Romans were bringing elephants on this campaign and this was, in fact, the first campaign in which they had done so (L.31.36.4). In 169 BC, a full 30 years later, the Romans still have serious problems maneuvering elephants through rugged terrain (L.44.5.2-12). Since this is the first time the Romans included elephants in

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110 Roth 2012, p 297 takes it as self-evident that *grave agmine* (L.31.29.2) means a wagon train.
111 Then on the Roman return to Greece in 188 BC, Livy tells us that their baggage train (*impedimenta*) contained, or possibly consisted of, loaded carts (*plaustra*) (L.38.40.6). Presumably this is the same train this same army had in the earlier part of their campaign.
112 For further discussion concerning military movement without a train being faster and easier than with the train, see Roth 2012, pp 79-90.
their campaign, they were likely considerably less skilled at maneuvering them than they were in 169 BC, and as a result should be expected to choose a more conservative route.

The final issue is whether the Romans had to pass through hostile territory, since there is a greater potential for getting ambushed and generally harried as opposed to traveling in allied territory. One should assume that Sulpicius took this into consideration. The route through the Devoll valley via Gramsh was controlled by the Dassaretii. The route through the Genusus valley was controlled in part by the Parthini and in part by the Dassaretii.

[Figure 2.1] The Parthini occupied the area north of the Genusus valley extending east from Dyrrachium, controlling movement through the lower Genusus valley that runs northeast between the modern city of Elbesan and the modern village of Librazhd. At Librazhd, the valley turns to the southeast and gradually climbs to the modern village of Qukes before turning east through the Prrenjas plain and quickly climbing up the ridge and then quickly down to Lake Ohrid. Control of the valley between Librazhd and the lake appears to have shifted through time between the Parthini and the Dassaretii.

The Parthini were Roman allies in 199 BC. They had surrendered to the Romans without a fight in 229 BC and were taken under Roman protection (Plb.2.11.11). Rome was still in control of them in 215 BC (Plb.7.9.13), but by 205 BC the Parthini had come under Macedonian control (L.29.12.3). Apparently, though, the Parthini found the Romans more agreeable masters, as the Roman arrival at Dyrrachium in 205 BC aroused

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114 See Hammond 1968, p8 for bibliography of ancient sources on the Parthini. As Mt Shpatit and Mt Polisit rise up from the area directly south of the valley in this area, this part of the Genusus valley is logically easier to control from the north.
115 The Parthini controlled the entire Genusus valley by the Third Macedonian War due to Roman patronage (Pliny NH 3.145; L.43.9.7).
the Parthini "to the hope of revolution". The Parthini were then restored to Roman control at the Peace of Phoenice in 205 BC (L.29.12.13).

On the other hand, the Macedonians controlled the Dassaretii in 199 BC, and during the 200 BC campaign there appears to have been at least one active Macedonian garrison in the Devoll valley.\textsuperscript{116}

\textbf{[Figure 2.3]} All of this evidence points to the idea that Sulpicius would have chosen the Genusus valley. Sulpicius was an experienced general with many years in the field and many previous years of command in this theater of war. He should be expected to have taken all of these considerations into account when he chose his route inland and chosen the least difficult route.

\textbf{Location of Philip and the Macedonian army}

Having established the Roman route and the location of their camp at Çërravë, it will be useful to determine the Macedonian army's location at this point in the campaign.

The Macedonian army is not all in one place as Philip has split his forces. Philip began the season by sending his son Perseus with troops to guard the pass \textit{ad Pelagoniam} to prevent Dardanian invasion (L.31.33.3). \textbf{[Figure 2.4]} To invade Macedonia or Pelagonia the Dardanians would travel south along the Axius river to the confluence of the Erigon and Axius rivers, where the ancient city of Stobi was located (L.39.53.16). At this juncture, the Dardanians could continue southeast and south along the Axius valley into Macedonia or head southwest along the Erigon valley to Pelagonia. The confluence

\textsuperscript{116} Discussed in chapter one.
of the Erigon and Axius rivers is thus a key point to control to prevent Dardanian
invasions into Macedonian controlled territory.¹¹⁷

Controlling this pass had been a focus of Philip's.¹¹⁸ In 217 BC, "Philip occupied
Bylazora, the largest town in Paeonia and very favorably situated as regards the pass
from Dardania to Macedonia. So that by this conquest he very nearly freed himself from
the fear of the Dardani, it being no longer easy for them to invade Macedonia, now that
Philip commanded the passes by holding this city" (Plb.5.97.1-2). Bylazora was located
in the Axius valley roughly 22km northwest of Stobi at the modern village of Veles in
FYROM. Bylazora thus also controlled access to the Axius and Erigon valleys.¹¹⁹

Then in 211 BC, "Philip captured a city of the Dardanians, Sintia, as likely to
afford a passage for the Dardanians into Macedonia (L.26.25.3). While the location of
Sintia is not secure, it is reasonable to assume that it was within the territory controlled
by the Sinti, which extended from the Roupel pass into Macedonia between Mt Kerkini
and Mt Sintiki north along the Strymon river valley almost 40km to the Kresnenska
pass.¹²⁰ A city in the Strymon valley due east of Veles would control access through the
valley. Presumably this more eastern route into Macedonia became an issue once the
Axius and Erigon valleys were shut off in 217 BC.

¹¹⁷ The Macedonian controlled territory further west than Pelagonia is protected by the Macedonian
controlled/allied buffer zone of the Atintani in 199 BC. However, from a period beginning sometime
between 215 BC and 208 BC (211 BC is the most likely date) to the Peace of Phoenice in late 205 BC, this
buffer zone included the Parthini and the Ardiaeans as well as the Atintani.
¹¹⁸ And understandably so, as the Dardanians had been a thorn in the Macedonian side for some time,
including conflicts in 229 BC both before and after Demetrius' death (before: L.31.28.1-1; After: Justin
28.3.14), as well as Philip's first campaign as king, in 220 BC (Justin 29.1.10). See Greenwalt 2010, pp301-
302.
Controlling these passes needed to be a repeated undertaking by the Macedonians because the Dardanians were persistent in their efforts to raid them. In 208 BC the Dardanians invade Macedonia and hold Orestis and advance west into the Argestaean plain\(^{121}\) (L.27.28.1). This Dardanian campaign would have taken the Erigon valley pass into Pelagonia and then continued south through the Monastir gap. In 207 BC Philip waged war with these Dardanians, presumably to regain control of this pass. (L.28.8.14).

After Philip pulled Perseus from the pass in 199 BC, the Dardanii invaded Macedonia through the Axius valley.\(^{122}\) Then, in 183 BC Philip, as part of the process of shoring up his eastern and northern borders (L.39.53.12-14), founded a new city (Perseis) on the Erigon near Stobi (L.39.53.14-16) to control more directly Dardanian access through the Erigon valley.

Between the 200 BC and 199 BC campaign seasons, the Dardanians allied themselves to the Romans in order to join them in attacking the Macedonians (L.31.28.1-2). This recent alliance provides extra reason for Philip to have suspected that there would be a Dardanian attack this campaign season.

That Philip split his forces at the beginning of the 199 BC campaign shows that he was not sure what the Romans would do in this campaign season. Sending Perseus to guard the pass shows that Philip suspects one of two actions: The Romans could stay put on the western coast and send the newly allied Dardanians and Illyrians to attack the Macedonians for them, or they could attack on two fronts with the Dardanians/Illyrians from the north and the Romans from the west. Since Philip does not send all his troops to

\(^{121}\) For the Argestaean plain as a part of Orestis, see Leake 1835, IV p122; Hammond 1972, p 100.

\(^{122}\) This is discussed later in this chapter.
guard against the Dardanians, or leave the vicinity to resume his recent military activities in Asia, Thrace, or Attica, we must assume that Philip suspects a Roman land assault from the west. However, there are two different routes by which Philip could expect the Romans to make this attack.

**[Figure 2.3]** The first route goes north of Lake Ohrid past Pylon, Lynchnidos, and Herakleia. The Via Egnatia later followed this route (Strabo 7.7.4). This was the most common route taken, and the easiest route for an army to travel, which argues for this being the expected route for the Romans. The second route is the route Sulpicius actually chose, namely to go south around Lake Ohrid to the Korče valley.

**[Figure 2.4]** If one were mounting an invasion of Macedonia from the west by either of these routes, one would emerge in the southern Pelagonia valley, an area called the Monastir Gap by scholars of World War II. The northern route would enter the valley at Heracleia Lyncestis, located at the modern city of Bitola (formerly Monastir), while the southern route would enter the valley less than 30km south of Heracleia by the modern city of Florina. If Philip tried try to block or ambush the Roman army on the march on either the northern or southern route, and guessed wrong, the Roman army would end up behind him with a clear path into the heart of Macedonia via Edessa. Knowing this, the best strategy would be to wait in the area between Florina and Heracleia. Heracleia was a major Macedonian city in a grain-growing region and

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123 For the route of the via Egnatia, see Hammond 1974; Romiopoulou 1974; Collart 1976; Fasolo 2003; Lolos 2008; Via Egnatia Foundation 2010.
124 Philip had left winter quarters before the Romans sent out their scouts to look for his camp (L.31.33.7), indicating that he was not waiting at Pella, but had already moved west.
would have had the provisions to supply the Macedonian army. Philip thus camped here and waited to hear if and how the Romans were invading.

While the Romans were pillaging the horrea of the settlements in the Korče valley, Livy tells us that "Philip saw that everything round about was in confusion and that the people were greatly terrified" (L.31.33.6). However, Philip did not know where the Roman army was encamped and sent out a squadron (ala) of cavalry as a scouting party into the Korče valley (L.31.33.6-8).

From his camp by Heracleia, Philip's options for entering the Korče valley were few. He could travel the very round-about route north of the lakes and then circle around Lake Ohrid and enter the Korče valley from the north, or he could travel north of Lake Prespa and cut south between the lakes through rugged territory and enter the Korče valley from the north. The most direct option was to enter the Korče valley from the east via the Tsangon Pass. While this third option is more direct, if the Romans held the Tsangon pass, Philip could end up in a disadvantageous situation. Philip needed to proceed with caution until he understood how the Romans occupied the Korče valley.

If Philip sent out his cavalry from where he was encamped by Heracleia, it would have involved the cavalry traveling roughly 85km each way, a multiple day journey. This seems unlikely. Rather, once Philip knew that the Romans were in the Korče valley, he moved his camp through the Florina pass and established a new camp in the Bilisht plain southeast of the Tsangon pass. From here he sent out his cavalry scouting party to investigate the situation, including the Tsangon pass.
At the same time, the Romans knew that the Macedonian army had left winter quarters and were in the land of the Dassaretii, but did not know exactly where they were (L.31.33.7). The Romans sent out cavalry to scout for Philip's camp, simultaneously with Philip's scouting party (L.31.33.7).

The Macedonian and Roman cavalry scouting parties met and had an inconclusive skirmish in the Korçe plain (L.31.33.8-10), and neither army learned the location of the other's camp from their scouts (L.31.33.10). However, deserters furnished information to each army on each other's campsite (L.31.33.11).

Philip now acted decisively, having learned where the Romans were encamped and that they were not holding the Tsangon pass. He recalled Perseus and the soldiers with him (L.31.33.6), indicating that the imminent Roman threat was his primary concern. Once Philip had gathered both forces together, he had 20,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry (L.31.34.7) - equivalent numbers of men to the Romans. Since Philip learned of the Roman location from deserters, it is reasonable to assume that he also learned how many men Sulpicius had and the state of their provisions.

Philip used deserters as guides (L.31.33.7), who would have had foreknowledge of the landscape, and been able to have led Philip to a strategic location in relation to the Roman camp at Çërravë. [Figure 2.5] Philip advanced and "fortifies with a wall and ditch a hill near Athaeus, a little more than a mile from the Roman camp" (L.31.33.7). The location of Athaeus is unknown, as is its proper spelling, as different manuscripts

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125 As the ridge south of the Roman camp by Çërravë blocked the view of the Roman camp from the plain, this skirmish could have taken place anywhere in the Korçe valley.

126 Sulpicius, on the other hand, would have learned from deserters that Philip had significantly fewer men than Philip later showed up with.
and editors supply *Athaeo, Ataeo, Athaco, Achaco, and Achaeo* and we have no other attestation to help us determine the correct name.\textsuperscript{127}

Despite this, it is possible to determine the location of the Macedonian camp. Following Livy, we know that the camp was on a hill, and a little more than a mile from the Roman camp located by Çërravë. There is a ridge of hills that runs from south of Çërravë towards the northeast, with a small gap southeast of Çërravë. This ridge runs roughly one mile from Çërravë. The modern village of Blace is less than 1.5 km southeast from here, and is a reasonable location for where ancient Athaeus was. The area on the hill east-northeast of Çërravë is large enough to have held a Macedonian camp. Therefore this is the most logical place for Philip's camp to have been.

Additionally, from this hill one has a clear view of Çërravë and the surrounding plain. Livy relates an anecdote about Philip looking down on the Roman camp from his own camp. Livy states that Philip "seeing the Roman camp stretched out below him, it is said that he admired its whole arrangement and each section allotted its own place, with the rows of tents and also the well-spaced streets between, and that he remarked that no one could believe that that camp belonged to barbarians" (L.31.34.8).

[Figure 2.2] To get to this new camp site on the ridge above Blace, Philip went west through the Tsangon pass and proceeded north along the eastern edge of the Korçë valley to the northeast corner of the plain by the modern village of Padgorie before heading cross-country north to Blacë.

\textsuperscript{127} Briscoe 1972, p140 "The place is unknown and the correct spelling therefore unascertainable." Briscoe 1991, ad loc. *nomen incertum.*
At this time, when the Romans are camped by Çërravë and the Macedonians are camped on the ridge to the east above Blace, Dio's and Zonaras' more limited narratives come into play alongside Livy's.

**[Figure 2.5]** Livy reports that both armies stayed in their camp for two days, then had an inconclusive skirmish with only 1000 men fighting per side (L.31.34.9 - 31.34.7). Although the Romans led out all their forces to the battlefield, the Macedonians were only willing to engage in a limited skirmish. Logically, this skirmish occurred in the plain between the two camps.

Livy continues that after another day in their respective camps there is another skirmish (L.31.36.1-3). For this skirmish, Philip "concealed his caettratos whom they call peltasts in ambush in a suitable place between the two camps" (L.31.36.1). Then, Philip ordered his cavalry to engage the Romans and that if things went badly, "they should by retiring gradually draw the enemy towards the place of ambush" (L.31.36.2). The ridge on which the Macedonians were encamped has a small gap just southwest of their camp. Behind the hill to the southwest of the gap would be an ideal place for the Macedonians to hide and from which to ambush the Romans if they approached the Macedonian camp. However, the Romans did not fall for the ruse. Livy notes that Romans were victors in both skirmishes, however neither skirmish was significant to have had losses worthy of note.

Dio and Zonaras both support Livy's account, albeit with less detail. Dio's account begins after a lacuna: "and they delayed for several days, not meeting in battle array, but engaging in skirmishes and encounters with light armed troops and the cavalry" (Dio
18.1). Dio's account notes that a period of time passed, although he is less precise than Livy. Zonaras gives a similar account to Dio that "when the two leaders drew near together they pitched camp opposite each other and engaged in skirmishes with the cavalry and light-armed troops," (Zon.9.15). Zonaras omits the waiting period, but supplies the detail that the camps were closely placed - a detail seen in Livy but absent from Dio as preserved.

Livy reports that the next day, Sulpicius sent out his entire army including his elephants "to the hills and even against the wall itself" of the Macedonian camp, but the Macedonians would not leave their camp (L.31.36.4-5). The Romans decide to move their camp because the Macedonians would not engage in battle, and the proximity of their camp made foraging unsafe (L.31.36.5-6). That the Romans need to forage gives us important temporal information.

Heretofore, Livy has said that the Romans were foraging from the horrea of the Dassaretii, but now they will forage grain from the fields. As discussed above, this indicates that it is now the season in which one can harvest grain, which begins in this area in early June. It also indicates that the Romans have already consumed their provisions, both the grain they brought from winter quarters and that which they pillaged from the Dassaretiand settlements. Dio, in fact, gives a slightly different account of this episode in which he stresses the Roman lack of provisions. Dio states that the Romans repeatedly advanced to the Macedonian palisade to try to draw out the Macedonians to fight, as opposed to the single occasion Livy reports, and that they did this because they had few provisions (Dio 18.1).
We now have a strategic reason for why Philip would not engage with the Roman army. It is otherwise confusing why Philip would gather all his troops together, leaving open the northern border to Dardanian invasion, as well as ignoring the recently troubled areas of Thessaly, Ionia, Thrace, and Euboia, to march to a mile from the Roman army, and then refuse to engage with them. However, Dio says that "Philip's supply of provisions was better than the Romans because his own country was close by; so he waited, expecting to wear them out without a conflict" (Dio 18.2). Philip clearly knew that the Romans were out of provisions, perhaps through information supplied by the deserters he had been employing. By not engaging militarily, Philip employed an active strategy of starving out the Romans in order to make them leave or compel them to make a mistake, such as commit to battle in disadvantageous territory. Philip's delay is presented as strategic in Dio, but as potentially cowardly in Livy.

Dio, Zonaras, and Livy are in agreement that the Romans moved their camp to a location that allowed them to forage more safely (Dio 18.2; Zon.9.15; L.31.36.6), but only Livy supplies topographic details. Livy says that "Sulpicius moved his camp about eight miles from there to Ottolobum - so they call the place" (L.31.36.6).

To locate this new Roman camp we need a place that fulfills the following requirements: it is about eight miles from the previous Roman camp by Çërravë; it is in or near an area with enough arable land to generate enough grain for this move to have been strategically sound; and it has to be near swampland, as a swamp plays a role later in Livy's narrative (L.31.37.8).
[Figure 2.6] Just south of the ridge on which the Romans and Macedonians are encamped lies the Korçe valley. This is a large highland plain of arable land extending roughly 30km north-south and roughly 11km east-west at its widest point. This was the only area that had the potential to have generated sufficient grain to feed the Roman army. Additionally, in the center of this plain towards the west, lies the area of Maliq, formerly known as the Swamp of Maliq (Keneta e Maliqit) before it was drained as part of a public works project under the Communists in the 1960s. Before this draining, the swamp of Maliq covered an extensive area in the west of the plain between the modern villages of Sovjan and Maliq - sometimes even turning into Lake Maliq during especially wet periods - and extending to the northeast across the plain.\textsuperscript{128}

Livy places this new Roman camp by a settlement whose name has five manuscript and editorial variants for its spelling: Otolobum, Attalobum, Octolophum, Ortholophum, and Ottolobum\textsuperscript{129}. Briscoe uses Otolobum, citing Pritchett's analysis of the word Otolobus as used in Livy.\textsuperscript{130} Pritchett here argues that "the word must be equivalent to the Greek \textit{otos lobos} and mean the "lobe of the ear."\textsuperscript{131} Pritchett then argues that certain mountains "can be identified without question as having a profile suggesting the name."\textsuperscript{132} While it is implausible to think that we can identify exactly which mountain or hill looks most like an ear lobe, Pritchett's argument that the ancient Greeks assigned the name 'ear lobe' to mountains or hills is valid.

\textsuperscript{128} For the size of the swamp, see Fouache et al. 2010, p526.
\textsuperscript{129} The Loeb opts for Ottolobum.
\textsuperscript{130} Pritchett 1969, p171. The context for Pritchett's discussion is the Otolobus in Livy's narrative of Q. Marciius Philippus' route of 169 BC.
\textsuperscript{131} Pritchett 1969, p171.
\textsuperscript{132} Pritchett 1969, p171.
Briscoe gives support to the variant spelling Octolophum in his apparatus criticus. This name would mean eight hills, or perhaps "Eighth Hill". What matters here is that the concept of a hill or hills is inherent in this name as well. Similarly, all the other readings have in the second half of their name a root of 'lobom' or 'lophum', indicating a name designating a hill or mountain. The name Otolobum should then indicate a settlement in hill country. Along the western edge of the Korçe plain rise up the foothills of the mountains extending to the west.

The Roman camp by Otolobum thus sat eight miles south of the Roman camp by Çërravë, west of the Swamp of Maliq, at the western edge of the Korçe plain. In the hills to the west and above the modern village of Symiza is a strategic location for the Roman camp that corresponds to the elements of the description in Livy. There are the archaeological remains of a castle or fortress here, indicating that this area was considered a strategic location at some point in the past. Placing the camp in the hills here would have provided defense against attack and allowed access to the expansive Korçe plain to the east and south.

Livy supplies details on the Roman foraging operation and Philip's response:

Cum in propinquo agro frumentarentur Romani, primo rex intra vallum suos tenuit, ut cresceret simul neglentia cum audacia hosti.

While the Romans were gathering grain in the neighboring fields, the king at first kept his men within the camp, that carelessness might increase in the enemy along with rashness. (L.31.36.7)

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133 This use of the name 'Eight Hill' brings to mind the common use in Montana of the name Nine Mile for a specific area outside of town, the memory of from just what it is nine miles distant being long gone.
134 Especially Ortholophum - 'Straight Hill'.
Foraging on this scale was a major undertaking. Feeding two Roman legions plus an equivalent number of allies would require roughly 17,900 kg of grain a day.

Two examples in Livy give us a sense of what such a foraging operation looked like. In 201 BC, while campaigning in the territory of the Boi in northern Italy, the Roman army "chose a campsite near the fortified town of Mutilim that was suitable for reaping crops as the grain was now ripe" (L.31.2.7). The Gauls made a surprise attack and "killed about seven thousand men scattered through the grain fields," killing both unarmed men focused on reaping and their armed guards (L.31.2.8-9). The Roman army sending out these foragers was no larger than Sulpicius' army in 199 BC (L.31.2.6), and although composed of allies was under direct command of a Roman military praefect (L.31.2.6,9) and should be expected to have behaved no differently than a Roman legion. Livy gives no indication that this was an unusually large foraging operation, only commenting that the praefect did not assign enough armed men to protect the unarmed foragers.

An example from 171 BC in northeast Thessaly also highlights the scale of these Roman foraging operations. As in 199 BC, the Romans were encamped in the same general area as the Macedonian army, but far enough away to feel that foraging was safe; nevertheless they were attacked by the Macedonians while reaping grain in the fields (L.42.45.1-4.) The Macedonians captured 1000 wagons, many of which were already full

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136 Foraging in the fields was a key tactic of all ancient armies (Engels, 1978) including the Roman army (Roth 1999, esp. pp117-155). See Trajan's column scene 109 for the classic image of Romans reaping in the fields on campaign.

137 For the number of Sulpicius's troops, see chapter 1 discussion as well as Briscoe 1973, p166. For quantities of food required, see chapter 1 discussion and Roth 1999, esp. pp. 18-24.

138 Livy comments that the Romans did not have as many armed guards as they should have.

139 Livy blames their slaughter on the commander's decision to not have enough armed guards and to put the men in a position where they could get ambushed, not on any rash action of the allied troops.
of grain. Livy gives no indication that this number of wagons was out of the ordinary, but does say that the men reaping had no armed guard.

Using these roughly contemporaneous accounts of similar foraging activities, it can be inferred that Sulpicius' foraging operation in 199 BC involved similar numbers of men and wagons.

When Philip waited in his camp in the hope that "carelessness might increase in the enemy along with boldness", he was in fact waiting for the Romans to do two things: to reduce the number of armed guards for the foragers, as occurred in the 201 BC and 171 BC examples, and for the Romans to travel further from their camp while foraging.

Livy tells us that "when Philip saw them scattered he set out with all his cavalry and the Cretan mercenaries"\(^{140}\) and established his position between the Roman camp and the scattered foragers, (L.31.36.8-10). Philip then divided his forces, sending one part to chase down foragers and the other to catch foragers trying to return to their camp, and "there was slaughter and flight everywhere" (L.31.36.9-11). Dio's and Zonaras' briefer, and nearly identical, accounts corroborate Livy's narrative: Philip unexpectedly attacked the Romans while foraging and killed a few men (Dio 18.2; Zon.9.15).

The Romans and Macedonians were positioned in the following manner: the Roman camp was in the hills directly above Symiza at the western edge of the plain; the Roman foragers were scattered to the east all the way to the edge of the plain and to the south past Korçe; the Macedonians were positioned through the center of the plain to the south and east of the Swamp of Maliq between the Roman camp and foragers, roughly 8km from the Roman camp.

\(^{140}\) Philip has 2000 cavalry (L.31.34.7) and at least 300 Cretan auxiliaries (L.31.35.1).
After an indeterminate period of time, some foragers made it through the Macedonian blockade back to the Roman camp. In response, Sulpicius sent out the cavalry to aid the foragers and personally led out the legions (L.31.36.11 - 31.37.1). According to Livy, the Macedonians were winning the cavalry skirmish but over-zealously pursued the retreating Romans and "following too incautiously, they met the Roman cohorts advancing under command of the tribunes" (L.31.37.3-6) with the result that "the tide of the battle was turned and the pursuers became the pursued" (L.31.37.7). At 8km away, the Macedonian blockade would be far enough from the Roman camp that the Roman cavalry could engage the Macedonians significantly before the infantry arrived.

Dio and Zonaras again provide briefer, and nearly identical, accounts that support Livy's narrative: "on perceiving Philip's attack on the foragers, Galba made a sortie from the camp, attacked him unexpectedly, and slew many more in his turn" (Dio 18.3; Zon.9.15).

In describing the Macedonian flight, Livy introduces a swamp into the narrative:

The Macedonians died not by the sword alone, but thrown into the swamps they were swallowed up by the deep mud, horses and all. Even the king was in danger .... The king, riding around the marshes over roads and impassable places in panicked flight, came at length to his camp, when nearly all had given up hope of his safe escape.

nec ferro tantum periere, sed in paludes quidam coniecti profundo limo cum ipsis equis hausti sunt. Rex quoque in periculo fuit .... rex circumuectus paludes per uias inuiaque trepida fuga in castra tandem, iam desperantibus plerisque incolunem euasurum, peruenit. L. 31.37.8-9,11; 9-10 on Philip getting on a new horse omitted)

141 Livy specifies that Sulpicius acted in response to the foragers report, however Supicius likely had lookouts posted who alerted him to what was happening as well.
This is the swamp of Maliq discussed above. The Macedonians advanced into the swamp to their north and northeast during their disordered flight.

During the night, Philip secretly fled the area (L.31.38.9-10; Dio 18.3; Zon.9.15), and the Romans now controlled the Korçe plain.

**Topographic Analysis of Section II**

Before discussing Sulpicius' next move, it is necessary to first determine where Philip went when he left the Korçe plain, and why he did so.

Livy supplies two reasons why Philip left the area after the defeat at Otobulum. The first is the more obvious reason, namely that Philip thought it unsafe to remain in the same camp after two skirmish defeats (L.31.38.9). The second reason, however, was that Philip heard that "Pleuratus and the Dardani had already left home with great forces and had invaded Macedonia; and if he were surrounded by these encircling forces, it might well be believed that the Romans could end the war by sitting still" (L.31.38.7-8).

As discussed above, when Philip pulled Perseus from the pass by Stobi, he opened up two potential routes for the Dardani to invade: via the Erigon valley into Pelagonia or via the Axius valley into central Macedonia. If Philip feared being encircled, then he feared the Dardani coming via the Erigon valley, as they had in 208 BC, as then they could continue south past Herakleia and then cut west through the Florina pass and the Tsangon pass and enter the Korçe valley from the east.

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142 Fouache et al 2010 discuss the presence of the swamp from 2000 BC through to the communist period in Albania.
143 Dio/Zonaras say only that Philip was "defeated and wounded" (Dio 18.3; Zon.9.15) when he withdrew.
144 In the Dardanian raid in 208 BC, the Dardanians took this same route south via the Erigon valley and past Herakleia through the Monastir Gap. This recent experience would have taught Philip to expect them to take this route again.
Livy says that "Philip made for the mountains, choosing a road which he knew the Roman, with his wagon train, would not take" "Montes, quam viam non ingressurum gravi agmine Romanum sciebat, petit" (L.31.39.2). [Figure 2.7] Philip set out north from his camp between Lakes Ohrid and Prespa. This is a rugged cross-country route through what is currently a national wildlife park.

While Livy supplies Philip's reasoning as to why the Romans would not follow him on this terrain, Dio on the other hand supplies Sulpicius' reasoning for not following Philip, namely that "being short of provisions, ignorant of the country, and in particular not knowing his adversary's strength, he feared that if he advanced incautiously anywhere he might come to grief" (Dio 18.4).

This route would have allowed Philip to emerge from between the lakes by the Macedonian controlled city of Lynchnidus, which could furnish provisions and supplies to Philip's men. It would avoid the Dardanian advance via Florina, and if the advance were instead to the north of the lakes on the route that became the Via Egnatia, Lynchnidus could offer refuge for the Macedonian army.

We learn later in Livy's narrative that Philip 'established a base near Bruanium' (L.31.39.5). [Figure 2.8] Concerning Bruanium, Strabo reports that "all the cities of the Deuriopes on the Erigon river were populous, among which were Bryanium, Alalcomenae, and Stubara" (Strabo 7.7.9). The remains of ancient Stuberra are located between the villages of Trojkrsti and Chepigovo roughly 17 km southwest of the modern city of Prilep in FYROM.145 When Strabo first introduces the Erigon river to the reader,

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145 I visited the unimpressive remains of Stuberra on October 22, 2014. I discussed the state of the excavations there in November, 2014 with Aleksandra Papzovska Sanev, a Macedonian archaeologist then
he mentions the peoples that live along the river in order of the flow of the river (Strabo 7.7.8); he appears to be listing these three cities along the Erigon river in the same order. Thus Alacomenae was west of Stuberra, and Bruanium was west of Alacomenae.

Papazoglou correctly places Alacomenae by the modern village of Buchin at the western edge of the plain on the Erigon river. The best location for Bruanium is at the modern village of Demir Hisar roughly 12 km southwest of Buchin on the Erigon. Any visitor to the area will immediately deduce that this is a naturally protected location due to it being nestled in the foothills of the mountains to the west and protected by hills and ridges in all directions except along the Erigon valley.

Later in Livy's narrative, we read that Philip marched from Bruanium cross-country (transversis limitibus) and "inspired sudden terror" in the Romans encamped on the Erigon somewhere just south of Stuberra (L.31.39.5). For Philip to have surprised the Romans like this, he needed to give the appearance that he came out of nowhere. A camp at Demir Hisar would have allowed for this as the hills between Demir Hisar and the plain rise up to 800m above the elevation of Stuberra, totally blocking the view from the plain. Further north along the Erigon, the valley climbs to higher elevations through more rugged country, making it less likely to be the site of a polis, as Strabo specifies Bruanium was.

[Figure 2.7] Sulpicius was now in control of the Korçe plain, Philip had disappeared into the mountains\textsuperscript{147}, and the Dardani were somewhere in the territory of Macedonia. Sulpicius spent a "few more days foraging" before leaving the Korçe valley (L.31.38.10).

Stuberram deinde petit atque ex Pelagonia frumentum quod in agris erat convexit. Inde ad Pluinnam est progressus, nondum comperto quam regionem hostes petissent. Thence Sulpicius marched to Stuberra and brought there from Pelagonia the grain which was in the fields. He then marched to Pluinna, still ignorant as to where the enemy had gone. (L.31.39.4)

[Figure 2.9] Sulpicius traveled from Otolobus to Stuberra via the Tsangon and Florina passes and then continued north through the Monastir plain to Stuberra. Sulpicius then foraged the grain in the fields in the large agricultural valley of Pelagonia, in which Stuberra lay. Sulpicius moved from pillaging one major grain-growing region controlled by Macedon to another.\textsuperscript{148} Sulpicius appears to have been attacking Macedonian allies that were economically valuable to force Philip to defend them. Since the grain was still in the fields, the harvest had not been completed by the locals, which supplies us with a fixed date, as discussed above.

Sulpicius then advanced to Pluinna, a toponym for which we have no other textual attestation and no archaeological evidence. Using the rest of this narrative, we can roughly place Pluinna in the Erigon valley between Stuberra and Heracleia.

At this point, Philip surprises the Romans from his camp near Bruanium:

\textsuperscript{147} We should understand that Sulpicius knew that Philip escaped via route 1, between the lakes. Sulpicius would have realized this when he saw no evidence of the Macedonian army having passed through when he passed through the Tsangon pass.

\textsuperscript{148} Philip II incorporated this region into Macedonia presumably for its agricultural potential. Alexander's speech at Opis (Arrian 7.9.2) indicates that Philip II turned this area from pastoralism to agriculture.
When Philip had established a camp near Bruanium, marching from there across country he inspired sudden terror in the enemy. On that account the Romans moved from Pluinna and encamped on the Ospagus river. The king also pitched camp not far away, throwing up a rampart along the bank of the river - the natives call it the Erigonus.

Philippus cum primo ad Bruanium statuia habuisse, profectus inde transuersis limitibus terrorem praebuit subitum hosti. mouere itaque ex Pluinna Romani et ad Ospagum flumen posuerunt castra. rex haud procul inde et ipse uallo super ripam amnis ducto – Erigonus incolae uocant – consedit. (L. 31.39.5-6)

Philip's sudden appearance from the mountains west of the plain, taken together with the distinct possibility that the Romans were again caught unawares while foraging, makes the Roman terror at his arrival understandable. In response, Sulpicius moved from Pluinna and encamped by the Ospagus river. The location of this river is unknown, but it was presumably a tributary of the Erigon river to the south towards the direction of escape from this valley for the Roman forces. Philip encamped nearby on the Erigon, presumably near the earlier Roman camp.149

Livy reports that Philip, instead of forcing a battle here, moves south to block the Romans' route: "Then, feeling certain that the Romans would move towards Eordaea, he hurried forward to gain the pass, that the Romans might not force the road, which was closed by the narrow entrance" (L.31.39.7).

Philip knew where the Romans would go next due to his familiarity with how armies could move through this landscape.150 Philip knew to block the Klidi pass.151 In

149 See Thompson, 1968 for whether Philip used the river as a bulwark or if Philip actually built a bulwark on the riverbank. Either way, Philip was on the opposite bank of the Erigon from the Roman camp on the Ospagus and the camps were close together.

150 I realized this when biking through the area - it was so clear that this was the choke point. Additionally, the name of the town is 'Key', a name designated for Greek villages that are at the ends of passes.
1912 and 1941, generals' knowledge of local topography similarly allowed them to predict that their enemies would have to go through the Klidi pass. As a result, each time they led their army there first and attempted to block the pass, as Philip did in in 199 BC.

In Autumn 1912, the Ottoman forces held the Klidi pass to prevent the Greek army from advancing north to Monastir (Bitola). The Greeks sent three divisions from the south and drove the Ottomans from the pass, and then held the pass with the significant force of five divisions to prevent Ottoman troops from advancing south from Monastir. The Greek army then moved its General Headquarters to the Klidi pass, indicating its strategic importance.¹⁵²

In Spring 1941, The Greek army held the Klidi pass to prevent the German advance through the Monastir Gap. When the German invasion began further east, the Greek army reinforced its position at the Klidi pass with additional Greek, Australian, and British units. Once the Germans had taken Bitola, the Greek army further strengthened their position at the pass, calling in as many units as possible. Nonetheless, the Germans successfully assaulted the Klidi pass in only two days.¹⁵³

In both these cases, all the armies involved knew that the Klidi pass was key for north-south movement in this area and as a result either blocked the pass in advance or gathered enough troops in order to make an attempt to break through the pass. The

¹⁵¹ Walbank 1940 first proposed this location for this battle of 199 BC. Impressively, he proposed this before the events of 1941 set into stark relief that this is the key spot to hold to prevent an enemy advance south of the Florina plain.
¹⁵³ Papagos 1949, pp363-372. There is more information on this small World War II battle, including publications and interviews from generals and enlisted men from all armies involved, than on any event in the ancient world.
attackers took no alternate route; the defenders concentrated their forces in this one location.

Livy reports that once Philip was at the pass, he quickly fortified it, taking advantage of the natural terrain and the materials at hand.

There he threw up hasty fortifications, using sometimes a rampart, sometimes a ditch, sometimes piles of stones to serve as a wall, sometimes cut-down trees, as the nature of the terrain and the material at hand permitted, and, as he thought, rendered a road which was already naturally difficult impassable by the obstacles with which he blocked every passage.

ibi alia uallo, alia fossa, alia lapidum congerie ut pro muro essent, alia arboribus objectis, ut aut locus postulabat aut materia suppeditabat, <pr>opere permuniit atque, ut ipse rebatur, uiam suapte natura difficilem objectis per omnes transitus operibus inexpugnabilem fecit. (L.31.39.8-9)

Using the twentieth century battles as comparanda, as well as personal auopsy of the area, the area Philip fortified between Vevi and Klidi can be reasonably identified.

Philip's defensive works were in vain, as Livy reports that the Romans promptly took the pass with a two-pronged attack.

Then, scorning these [thrown stones] also, part of the Romans, forming a testudo advanced in the face of the enemy, while others, gaining the saddle by a short detour, dislodged the terrified Macedonians from their strong points and outposts, and even killed some of them, since flight was slow in the difficult country. So the pass was won with less trouble that had been anticipated

deinde iis quoque spretis partim testudine facta per aduersos uadunt hostes, partim breui circitu cum in iugum collis euasissent, trepidos ex praesidiis stationibusque Macedonas deturbant et, ut in locis impeditis difficili fuga, plerosque etiam obtruncant. Ita angustiae minore certamine quam quod animis proposuerant superatae (L.31.39.14 - 31.40.1)
This encirclement tactic is the same tactic that Philip had feared that the arrival of the Dardani would have allowed the Romans to do earlier in the campaign in the Korçe valley.154

Similar to what we have seen from Philip previously this season, Philip loses control of the battlefield and retreats but suffers very few casualties. He seems to each time have an escape route prepared and have a focus on 'living to fight another day' than gambling all on a major pitched battle. Philip presumably retreated from the area to hold the Edessa pass to prevent the Romans from invading central Macedonia.

**Topographic Analysis of Section III**

At this point, Sulpicius has chased Philip back to Macedon and Sulpicius is in control of the Klidi pass, and the location of the invading Dardani is still unknown. Livy continues following Sulpicius' movements:

"The consul marched to Eordaea, and after laying waste the country in all directions, proceeded towards Elimia. Then he made an attack on Orestis and assaulted the town of Celetrum, which lay on a peninsula; a lake surrounds it walls; a narrow tongue of land offers the only approach from the mainland" (L.31.40.1-2).

[Figure 2.10] Eordaea was the area south of the Kleidi pass extending south almost to the modern town of Kozani.155 This region is predominantly arable land currently used for agriculture.

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154 How the Romans take the pass is the same strategic move that they will employ the next season at the Aous, i.e. a bullrush through the center of the enemy's defense combined with an encircling maneuver.
Once through the Kleidi pass, Sulpicius could have advanced on Macedonia and invaded via Edessa, but instead he continued south to Eordaea. He does not move quickly through the area, but stays to "lay waste the country in all directions." Sulpicius seems to be repeating the behavior he exhibited in both the Korçe plain and Pelagonia of ravaging the area until Philip arrived to stop him. However, in this case Philip did not appear and Sulpicius moved on after an unspecified period of time, but presumably long enough to realize that this time Philip was not going to come out to stop him.

Elimia consisted of the area to the south of Eordaea that extended west through the Siatista pass to Orestis.\textsuperscript{156} Orestis extended northwest from the Siatista pass to the area surrounding Celetrum, located at the modern town of Kastoria.\textsuperscript{157} This Roman route follows the contours of the landscape and is the route that the modern roadway takes and the route the Dardani took in 208 BC.

Livy reports that the Celetrians trust in their natural and man-made defenses, as the city sat on an impressive rock outcrop on a peninsula, until they see the Romans' advance - at which point they promptly surrender (L.31.40.2-3). Whereas the testudo helped the Romans take the Kleidi pass, the Celetrians surrender just seeing it advance towards them.

"From Celetrum he proceeded to the land of the Dassaretii and took the city of Pelium by storm" (L.31.40.4). Alexander the Great took a similar route in 335 BC, moving from Paeonia via the Erigon river to the Devoll river and the site of Pellium (Arr.1.5.1-5). This route would involve going through Pelagonia, Eordaea, Elimia, and

\textsuperscript{156} Hammond 1972, pp116-123, map 11.
\textsuperscript{157} Hammond 1972, pp110-116, map 11.
Orestis as Sulpicius did. Understanding Arrian's Pellium to be the same place as Livy's Pelium, scholars agree that this city sat in the immediate vicinity of the Tsangon pass and directly controlled it.\textsuperscript{158}

Alexander waged his campaign in at the Tsangon pass to control his western border before heading off on his extended eastern campaign. This makes sense as this pass controls one of the only two major east-west routes between Illyria and Macedonia, the other being the northern route that became the via Egnatia. Philip II's founding of Herakleia controlled Illyrian access west by the northern route; Alexander taking Pelium and the Tsangon pass controlled the southern route. The next possible route west from Illyria was the Metsovo pass far to the south in Epirus. Thus, by taking Pelium, Alexander could reasonably believe that he had protected Macedonia from Illyrian invasion and head off on his eastern campaign.

Similarly, Sulpicius took Pelium to secure the Tsangon pass and the southern route east-west between Macedonian and Illyria and his control of the Genusus valley (by the allied Parthini and the earlier part of his 199 BC campaign) controlled the northern route, again leaving the Metsovo pass as the next available option for the Macedonians to go west.\textsuperscript{159}

Livy says that Sulpicius installed a strong garrison (\textit{praesidio valido}) at Pelium "because the city was well suited as a base to launch attacks into Macedonia"

\textsuperscript{158} There is debate concerning exactly where in the immediate vicinity of the pass Pelium was located. Winnifrith 2002, pp143-149, 187, map 7 is the most recent discussion, with analysis and bibliography of previous scholarship. Ceka is the outlier in this debate (Ceka 1972, 2005, 2011, 2013), placing Pelium at Selçë, which lies roughly 9 km west of Lake Ohrid and 8 km south of the Genusus valley. No remains positively associate Selçë with Pelium; the location does not accord with the narratives of Arrian or Livy.

\textsuperscript{159} The hostile Dardani and Ardiaeans prevented the Macedonians from attempting a more northern passage.
However, the garrison at Pelium was not solely offensive, but should be understood to have been defensive like the garrison Alexander installed. The purpose of this Roman garrison was two-fold, like Polybius' stated aims for Philip's Asian campaign in 200 BC: to prevent a stepping-stone for a Roman attack and make a stepping-stone for his own future attack (Plb.16.29.1-2). The Romans did not use this base to launch future attacks, however this base did affect future Macedonian movements, as explored in the succeeding chapters. As such, although Livy says that this garrison was founded for offensive purposes, its solely defensive use suggests that it was intended, perhaps primarily, for defensive purposes as well.

[Figure 2.11] From Pelium, Sulpicius then returned to winter quarters at Apollonia, ending his 199 BC campaign (L.31.40.6). As Sulpicius spent significant time during this campaign harassing Dassarettian communities, including pillaging their stored grain and foraging their harvest, it seems likely that Sulpicius would avoid going back through the hostile Devoll valley and instead take the same route back that he took to the Korçe valley at the beginning of the campaign through the Genusus valley.

**Topographic Analysis Conclusions**

Analyzing Sulpicius' actions, especially his actions made at crucial moments when he had choices, helps us to draw some conclusions about the goals of the 199 BC campaign. These moments are when Sulpicius arrives in the Korçe valley, after the skirmish at Otolobus, and after the battle at Kleidi pass.

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160 This would then be a similar situation to in 169 BC when Antiochus IV installed a strong garrison (validum praesidium) at Pelusium "so that he could reinvade Egypt whenever he wished" (L.45.11.5), which Antiochus then did the next year (L.45.12.1).
At the end of this campaign, Sulpicius garrisoned Pelium and now effectively controlled both direct routes west (Tsangon Pass and Genusus valley) from Macedon to Apollonia and Dyracchium. This was a logical goal for the 199 BC campaign in that the Roman protected ports were then safer, which precludes Macedonian use of them to invade Italy.\textsuperscript{161} Alexander's securing of the Tsangon pass in 335 BC supplied historical precedent for such a move. Additionally, this goal would have made for apparent continuation of the 200 BC campaign that pushed the westernmost boundary of Macedonian military influence further east.

However, if this was Sulpicius' goal for the campaign, it begs the question why Sulpicius did not make an attempt to control the Tsangon pass earlier in the campaign when he had the opportunity. After he established camp by Çërravë, Sulpicius spent a period of time pillaging the storehouses of the Dassaretian settlements before Philip arrived. Sulpicius here had time to attempt to secure the Tsangon pass but chose not to.

Instead Sulpicius' actions appear to have been designed to disturb Macedonia's allies, and perhaps also disrupt Macedonian economic interests as the Korçe valley was a grain surplus generating region, in order to draw out Philip. Sulpicius could look to 217 BC when Demetrias' military actions in Dassaretia brought swift direct reprisal from Philip (Plb.5.108), or more recently to Philip's repeated military interventions in the area, including personally led raids on the Illyrian ports in 216 BC (Pol. 5.110), 214 BC (L. 24.40), and 205 BC (L. 29.12.5-7) which involved troop movements through Dassaretii controlled territory. Sulpicius appears to have wanted to goad Philip into battle and

\textsuperscript{161} Roman fears that Macedonian will launch a naval invasion of Italy: L.31.3.6, 31.7.2-14.
compel him to come to the Roman established position rather than bring the fight to Pella.

After Philip fled the Korçe valley, Sulpicius had a critical choice of actions to take which can help us understand his campaign goals. For example, Sulpicius could have returned to Apollonia, or secured the Tsangon pass, or pressed on into Macedonia, or stayed in the Korçe valley and established a strong beach head for the next year's campaign. Interestingly, Dio/Zonaras and Livy each report Sulpicius making a different choice. In Dio/Zonaras, Sulpicius's campaign ended here and he returned to Apollonia, indicating that Sulpicius' goal for the campaign was to continue the 200 BC campaign to push Macedonian military influence east as well as to control the two direct east-west routes between Macedon and Illyria. However, Livy's account has Sulpicius choosing to press on further east into Macedonian territory. This suggests that Sulpicius' goal was either to force Philip into a decisive battle or to invade Macedonia.

However, Sulpicius does not invade Macedonia two different times in this campaign when he had the opportunity. After the battle of Otolobus, when Sulpicius went east via the Florina pass, he could have continued east via the Klidi pass and entered central Macedonia at Edessa. Sulpicius knew that Philip had fled the Korçe valley to the north. Once he entered the Monastir plain and realized that Philip had not already passed through (as Philip was at Bruanium), Sulpicius would have known that he could have gotten to Edessa before Philip. Since the Dardani were supposed to be attacking Macedon via the Axius valley, as I will discuss below, this would have made for a potentially devastating two-pronged attack on a central Macedonia unprotected by its royal army.
But, instead, Sulpicius went into Pelagonia and, as in the Korče plain, ravaged land until Philip arrived to stop him.

Similarly, after breaking through the Klidi pass, Sulpicius could have continued east to central Macedonia via Edessa but chose instead to go south to Eordaea and ravage land. At this point, the Dardani were actually raiding in Macedonia and would have made for a two-fronted attack on the Macedonian central plain.

Sulpicius ravaged the Korče plain until Philip came to stop him, then ravaged Pelagonia until Philip came to stop him, and then ravaged Eordaea, recent evidence suggesting that he was trying to draw Philip out to try to stop him. This then would have made for Sulpicius employing the same strategy three times in one campaign season. As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, Sulpicius' pre-campaign behavior indicated that he wanted to fight a decisive battle with Philip; his actions in the campaign indicate this as well.

Understanding this to be Sulpicius' goal could help shed light on other issues. In 200 BC, Philip was at Abydus conducting a siege (L.31.14.4), which would have prevented Sulpicius from bringing him to battle. This lack of opportunity for achieving his goal could help explain why Sulpicius left so late on campaign that season after previously campaigning so hard for the war.

Perhaps there were in fact two not mutually exclusive goals for the beginning of the Second Macedonian War: Sulpicius' goal and a greater Roman goal. In this conjecture, the greater Roman goal was to establish control of the two direct east-west routes between Illyria and Macedon while Sulpicius' goal was to win a victory over
Philip; the Roman goal was defensive while Sulpicius' goal was offensive. Dio's account of the campaign would then be employing a Roman source that only recounted the greater Roman goal, omitting the exploits of a Roman general gone rogue.

Another key to understanding the 199 BC is the actions and movements of the Dardanians. Philip left the Korçe valley in part because he heard that the "Dardani had already left home with great forces and had invaded Macedonia" (L.31.38.7). There is no mention of the Dardani between this report of their Macedonian invasion until they are already withdrawing from Macedonia after the battle at the Kliidi pass (L.31.40.7-8).

[Figure 2.7] This indicates that the Dardani did not take the Erigon valley into Macedon but rather the Axius valley, because one of the two armies would have run into them in the Erigon valley. This means that the Dardani were never coming to attack the Macedonians in the Korçe valley from behind, as Philip feared. This also helps to explain what otherwise would have been confusing behavior by Sulpicius in the Korçe plain.

If the Dardani were coming to the Korçe valley via the Erigon valley and the Tsangon pass as Philip feared, then it would have been in Sulpicius' best interests to avoid a pitched battle with the Macedonians until their arrival. Instead, we read that Sulpicius repeatedly tried to get the Macedonians to engage in a full infantry battle, and Philip refused to engage. If, however, Sulpicius' plan with the Dardani for the invasion of Macedon (L.31.28.1-2) had always involved the Dardani invading through the Axius valley, then Sulpicius' attempt to force battle makes more sense. This sheds light on Sulpicius' movements into Pelagonia as well. If Sulpicius had expected the Dardani to have invaded through the Erigon valley, then he might have been going to Stuberra to try
to unite the allied forces. However, if he knew that the Dardani were taking the Axius valley, Sulpicius went to Stuberra only to ravage the area, presumably to draw out Philip.

Philip's consistent past behavior could have allowed Sulpicius to understand how to act to generate a predictable response from Philip. Philip had previously acted quickly and decisively in response to threats and acts of aggression, e.g. his lightning strike on Thermon in 218 BC in response to Aetolian aggression (Plb.5.6-16); his swift reprisal raid in Dassaretia in 217 BC in response to Illyrian aggression (Plb. 5.108.3-8); his lightning strike on Apollonia in 211 BC in response to Aetolian and Roman aggression (L.26.25.2); his immediate response to a Roman raid in 208 BC by Sicyon (L.27.31.1); his series of lightning strikes on multiple fronts in 207 BC (L.28.5-8); and his forced marches to, and attack on, Apollonia upon Roman arrival in 205 BC (L.29.12.5-7). These events would have taught Sulpicius that Philip was quick to react to an act of aggression, and Sulpicius had personal experience as well, as he was in charge of the 208 BC raid by Sicyon that drew Philip's immediate response. As a result, Sulpicius would have understood that taking Antipatreia in 200 BC and ravaging Dassareitan lands in 199 BC would have been an effective way to draw out Philip. As all of these actions by Philip were quick raids after which he left the area, Sulpicius should also have realized that Philip often avoided a single deciding battle, but instead took measure to limit casualties and risk.

Philip, in 199 BC, then did act consistently with his past conduct, justifying Sulpicius' behavior. Philip was consistently quick to act in response to aggression as well as quick to change strategy upon a setback: Philip moved into the Korçe valley to deal with the Roman disturbance, then left in the night after two minor setbacks; Philip
advanced from the mountains in Pelagonia to frighten the Romans, but then left the valley when they did not fluster enough; Philip built impromptu defense works to stop the Roman advance, yet promptly fled the scene when these defenses were breached.

Philip's actions after the battle at Klidi pass help make sense of certain unsuccessful Macedonian tactics against the Romans in the 200 BC and 199 BC campaigns. When Philip retreated from the Klidi pass, the Dardani were already withdrawing from Macedon and Philip sent Athenagoras to harass the Dardani returning home (L.31.40.8; 31.43.1-3). This action was very similar to when Athenagoras harassed the Romans returning to their winter quarters at the end of the 200 BC campaign (L.31.27.6-8), the difference being that against the Romans this raid was ineffectual, while against the Dardani it caused great confusion and delay.

Philip also made a surprise attack led by his cavalry on the Aetolian camp, and this was enough to make the Aetolians panic and flee the theater of war (L.31.41.10 - 31.42.9). This is similar to Philip's raid on the Romans by Pluinna, the difference again being that against the Romans this tactic was ineffectual.

Philip employed two tactics unsuccessfully against the Romans which later are demonstrated to work against Dardani and Aetolian troops. The later success of these tactics this helps explain why Philip employs them against the Romans.

**The area between Illyria and Macedon from 198 BC to 168 BC**

From after the 199 BC campaign season through 168 BC, control of this corridor between Macedon and Illyria stays relatively consistent: the Romans controlled the area
west of Lake Ohrid and the Macedonians control east of Lake Ohrid, and the Romans maintained control of the Parthini and the Genusus valley throughout (L.43.21.1).

In 191 BC, the Roman consul Marcius Baebius met Philip in the country of the Dassaretii to plan how to stop Antiochus' invasion (L.36.10.10), and Philip escorted two separate Roman contingents through Macedon in order to invade Thessaly (L.36.10.11, 36.13.1). Roman control of Pelium should indicate that the country of the Dassaretii was under Roman control, but the furthest east point of Roman control.

Philip continued his concern with protecting himself from Dardani invasion through the Erigon and Axius valleys by founding a new city (Perseis) in 183 BC on the Erigon near Stobi (L.39.53.14-16), and resettling Paeonia in 182 BC in the hope of added safety from a potential Roman invasion (L.40.3.3-4).¹⁶²

The Macedonians did not campaign west of the lake. Perseus traveled through Eordaea and Elimia in 171 BC as part of his invasion route into Thessaly (L.42.53.5), but nothing indicates these areas were in revolt, but rather that they have constantly been under Macedonian control. In 170 BC, Perseus still controlled Stuberra and Pelagonia, as he used this area to mount a campaign among the Penestae to the north (L.43.18-20).

The Romans did not campaign in this area again until preparing for the Third Macedonian War. In 172 BC, Romans took forts of the Dassaretii presumably in advance of a land campaign into Macedonia (L.42.36.9). In 171 BC, the Romans made one inconsequential raid into Illyria (L.43.1.1-3) followed by the consul illegally taking his army ineffectually through Illyria towards Macedonia (L.43.1.4-5, 43.5.1). In 170 BC, the Romans mounted an offensive, marching their army from the coast and taking

¹⁶² Philip repelled a Dardanian invasion at Stobi in 197 BC (L.33.19.1-5).
Lynchnidus, which they still held in 169 BC (L.43.21.1). In 168 BC, though, Roman envoys reported to the senate that the army at Lynchnidus was not safe there (L.44.20.5), indicating that the areas east of lake Ohrid were still under Macedonian control. The senate promptly recalled the army from Lynchnidus to campaign on the Adriatic coast instead (L.44.21.4-11). The boundaries established in the 199 BC campaign held until the Battle of Pydna in 168 BC.
CHAPTER 3: THE BATTLE OF THE RIVER AOUS

Introduction

Rome had spent the 200 BC and 199 BC campaign seasons expanding the buffer zone that protected the Illyrian ports, while waging concurrent naval campaigns focused around Attica and Demetrias. In these two years, Rome extended this buffer zone east, first from the area around Dimallum in the central Myzeqeja plain to include the entire Myzeqeja plain through control of the area around Antipatreia, and then further east to include the entire Korçe plain through their control of Pelium. Rome gained control of other regional routes, including the Genusus valley - a major east-west corridor, through alliances with the Parthini, Athamanians, Dardanians, and Illyrians. One could reasonably expect that the consul for the 198 BC campaign would have continued this policy of gradual eastward expansion and aim to campaign in, and then secure with garrisons, either the northeastern shore of Lake Ohrid, Pelagonia, the Orestis-Elimia corridor, or a combination of the above. Continuing the gradual eastern advance, paired with an active naval campaign, would have been consistent with 200 and 199 BC Roman actions. However, Philip disrupted this progression of events by seizing the initiative at the beginning of the 198 BC campaign and forcing the Romans to react to him. Philip pulled the Romans' attention south by going around the east-west routes that Rome controlled.

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163 While beyond the scope of this dissertation, the naval campaigns of 200 BC and 199 BC had been waged by a combined Rhodian, Pergamene, and Roman navy that focused on disrupting the Macedonian economy by targeting the Saronic Gulf, Demetrias' shipping lanes, and Macedon's raw materials exports and ship building capabilities on the Chalkidike. See Thiel 1946, pp 202-238.
164 See chapters 1 and 2.
between Macedon and Illyria and encamping at the Aous before the Romans had left their winter quarters at Apollonia.

This chapter covers the first half of the 198 BC campaign, from the beginning of the campaign season through Philip's flight after the Battle of the River Aous. The Battle of the River Aous was the first major battle between the Romans and the Macedonians, and also the last time Rome fought in southern Illyria during the time period covered by this dissertation, as after this battle Roman shifted focus in Greece to Thessaly and Macedon. The Battle of the River Aous thus acted as a turning point as to where Rome waged war in Greece, with the focus between 229 BC and the Battle of the River Aous being southern Illyria and the Adriatic ports, and the focus between the Battle of the River Aous and the Battle of Pydna being Thessaly and Macedon.

The Battle of the River Aous deserves renewed attention due to the fact that it has been understudied compared to Rome's other campaigns in the east. The history of scholarship on the topography of the Battle of the River Aous began with Colonel Leake's 1835 work referencing his autopsy in 1804 and 1805. In 1907, Johannes Kromayer mapped and analyzed the battle working from maps alone. In 1966, N.G.L. Hammond published his own new interpretation, relying heavily on his personal autopsy. However, this autopsy consisted of a single three and a half hour visit to the valley that took place in 1931, 35 years earlier. Since Hammond, no scholar walked through this valley for the purpose of locating and analyzing this battle for more than 80 years.
years. This was due in large part to the political situation in Albania.\footnote{There is a direct relationship between ancient places that have been given thorough topographic analysis in the Balkans and their ease of access from Athens.} In the early 20th century, Albania experienced Ottoman rule, the Balkan Wars, independence, tumultuous internal politics, and Italian occupation.\footnote{See e.g. Winnifrith 2002; Marmullaku 1975; Jacques 1995; Mazower 2000; Winnifrith 1992; Falaschi 1992; Hutchings 1992.} After World War II, Albania sealed her borders until 1991, and there was subsequently a revolution in 1997.\footnote{See e.g. Bland 1992; Abrahams 2016; Jarvis 1999. The fictional works of Ismail Kadare are invaluable for attempting to understand this period.} \[Figure 3.1\] The lack of opportunity for foreign scholars to study in Albania led to a lack of interest in ancient events that took place in modern Albania by foreign scholars.

Albanian scholars have tended to focus on what they consider to be the ancient antecedents of the independent nation state in the geographical area of modern Albania, namely, the Illyrians and their Bronze Age precursors.\footnote{Hodges 2006; Hammond 1989; Ceka 2013; my personal communications with Albanian archaeologists.} One can see this focus in the large-scale mosaic on the National Museum of Albania, which faces the main square of Tirana \[Figure 3.2\]. Starting from the back left we see a Bronze Age warrior and then a 4th-2nd century BC Illyrian warrior, clearly identified by his shield. From here, we immediately leap to the 14th century AD with a warrior identified by Skanderbeg's coat of arms on his shield, and then jump ahead through time to the Balkan Wars and the Communist period. Notably, only periods of independence for the geographical region of Albania are represented.
As a result of this scholarly focus, the battle of the River Aous between Rome and Macedon, two competing foreign imperialist powers, has been all but ignored. To date, there has been no Albanian scholarship on the location of the Battle of the River Aous.¹⁷³

Livy and Plutarch each give narrative accounts of the first half of the 198 BC campaign, with Livy additionally supplying an alternate account attributed to Valerias Antias. Both Livy and Plutarch are understood to have derived their accounts from Polybius. Although we do not have the relevant Polybian passage, Polybius does refer to the Battle of the River Aous elsewhere in his narrative.

**Part I: Philip's movement from Macedon until encampment by the Aous**

Livy reports that Philip spent the winter of 200/199 BC in Macedon (L.32.4.7) preparing and drilling his Macedonian and mercenary troops (L.32.5.8), after which:

In the beginning of spring, Philip sent all the foreign auxiliaries and what light armed troops he had with Athenagoras into Chaonia via Epirus to occupy the narrows near Antigonea - the Greeks call it the Stena. Philip followed after a few days with the heavy troops.

principioque ueris cum Athenagora omnia externa auxilia quodque leuis armaturae erat in Chaoniam per Epirum ad occupandas quae ad Antigoneam fauces sunt – Stena uocant Graeci – misit. ipse post paucis diebus grauiore secutus agmine;

(Livy 32.5.9-10)

For the 197 BC campaign, Livy uses terms similar to *principioque veris - initio veris* (L.33.1.1) and *primo vere* (L.33.3.1) - to mean a time just before the spring equinox, which occurs between March 19th-21st in the Gregorian calendar.¹⁷⁴ Philip then sent out

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¹⁷³ Taulant Rama (regional representative for Tepelenë for the Ministry of National Culture), pers. comm.; Albert Kasi (Regional Director of Culture, Gjirokaster) pers. comm.

¹⁷⁴ See Briscoe 1977 on the narrative issues that result from Livy turning Polybius' two season year into a Roman four season year.
Athenagoras to the Stena sometime in mid-March, and followed about a week later. This would have given Athenagoras time to secure the mountain pass through the Pindus before Philip began his mountain crossing, as well as establish a presence at the Stena before Philip moved north through Epirus. Philip did not have the intelligence network to know if the Romans had secured the pass or the Stena during the winter, and sending Athenagoras ahead showed due caution.

[Figure 3.3] Antigonea was located in the hills on the east side of the Drin valley [Figure 3.4], roughly due east of the modern city of Gjirokaster.\footnote{Hammond 1971, reporting the 1970 findings of Albanian archaeologists; Ceka 2013, pp151-4. Before the archaeological finds of 1970 settled the matter, Walbank 1957, p156 had argued Antigonea was at Tepelenë and Hammond 1966, p 46 had argued that Antigonea was at Lekel, just south of Tepelenë. Antigonea's extensive archaeological remains are today designated an Archaeological Park and well maintained. See Antigonea Archaeological Park Guide 2010.} [Figure 3.5] The Drin valley was, and is, the main route north-south between Epirus and Illyria.\footnote{See Dalakoglou 2017 \textit{forthcoming} on the history of this route.} It is surrounded on both sides by high and rugged mountains which greatly restrict east-west movement.

[Figure 3.6] The Drin valley narrows as it extends north of Antigonea, culminating in the Stena by Antigonea, before it widens again where the Aous river joins the Drin river.\footnote{In contrast, the Drin valley gets wider as it extends south of Antigonea.} The Stena is a roughly 3.25 km long (as the crow flies) extremely narrow section with its southern boundary just north of the modern day border between the administrative districts of Komuna e Qendrës Tepelenës and Kommuna e Odries, approximately at the modern bridge that leads east from the roadway to the village of
Hormova, and its northern boundary approximately at the modern bridge that leads east from the roadway towards Lekel and into the Aous valley.\textsuperscript{178}

\textbf{[Figure 3.3]} The Stena near Antigonea were such a key chokepoint for controlling movement through the Drin valley that in 230 BC an Epirote army encamped at Phoenice divided their forces to hold the Stena to stop an Illyrian advance from the north, even though this division of forces directly contributed to their immediate defeat by the Illyrians already at Phoenice (Plb 2.5.6-8).\textsuperscript{179}

Philip's potential movements between Macedon and the Stena were limited due to the Roman consul Sulpicius' military and diplomatic maneuvers in 200 and 199 BC.\textsuperscript{180}

\textbf{[Figure 3.7]} As was discussed in chapters 1 and 2, Sulpicius had closed off the most direct routes between Macedon and Epirus: the garrison at Pelium controlled movements through the Korce valley, the Roman-allied Parthini controlled movement through the Genusus valley, and the Roman garrisons by where Berat had been controlled access to the Myzeqeja plain.

\textbf{[Figure 3.8]} Rather than force his passage, Philip instead took the Grevena pass route to the south, part of the long established road network in the Pindus that Ali Pasha rebuilt in the early 19th century.\textsuperscript{181} This route involved Philip exiting Macedon via Edessa and then continuing south for roughly 85 km through Eordaia and Elimeia.\textsuperscript{181}

\textsuperscript{178} Hammond 1967, p212 and 1971, p114 argued for this same stretch of the Drin valley to be the Stena, but accorded great value to the location of the village of Lekel in the hills directly to the east. However, the topography alone is enough to make this the key location to control movement through the valley.

\textsuperscript{179} The Illyrians then marched home from Phoenice through the Stena (Plb.2.6.6).

\textsuperscript{180} Makres and Papageorgiou 1990: for history of the route, pp 159-194 with maps; for Ali Pasha's rebuilding of long-established road networks through the Pindus, pp 13-133. Additionally, on this route see Hammond 1967, p 281.

\textsuperscript{181} This route through Eordeia and Elimeia was similar to Sulpicius' return route in 199 BC, as discussed in chapter 2.
Once Philip was by the modern town of Kozani in Elimeia, he turned west-southwest and went roughly 25 km to the modern village of Siatista. From here he turned south-southwest and entered the foothills of the Pindus, gradually climbing roughly 30 km to the modern village of Grevena. From here Philip climbed 61.3 km to the modern town of Metsovo, ascending from a height of 542.5m to a maximum height of 1512.6m, but ascending a total of 1648m due to the ruggedness of the terrain. The area by Metsovo, referred to as Tria Chania during the Ottoman period, was where the Grevena pass route intersected the east-west pass from Thessaly to Epirus. From here, Philip descended west 58.9 km to Passaron in Epirus, located near the modern city of Ioannina, at an elevation of 484.3m. This march of roughly 260 km with one significant mountain pass would have taken two weeks at an average rate of 20 km per day.

Kromayer and Hammond have argued that Philip took a different route across the Pindus. Kromayer argued that from the modern village of Siatista Philip turned west into the Pindus rather than south, crossed the mountains and entered Epirus at the modern town of Konitsa. Hammond argued that Philip marched from the modern town of Kastoria southwest into the Pindus to the modern village of Eptachori, at which point Hammond's route joins Kromayer's route and continues west to enter Epirus at

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182 Passaron is generally accepted to be the hilltop archaeological remains by the modern village of Gardiki, roughly 8km northwest of Ioannina (Dakaris 1987; French 1993-4, p 41; Blackman 1998-9, p 67). However, when I visited the site, the archaeologists working there said that there were four hilltop sites in the immediate vicinity that all had equal possibility of being Passaron. Additionally, Robin Waterfield reported to me that archaeologists working at the Ioannina museum told him that they believed Passaron to have been at Ioannina. All do agree that Passaron was close to, or at, Ioannina.

183 Kromayer 1907, map "Übersichtskarte für die römisch-makedonischen Feldzüge der Jahre 198 u. 197 v.Chr."
However, their proposed routes would not have been as viable for an army to march through, especially during an early season march.\textsuperscript{185}

While the Siatista-Konitsa route is shorter in length than the Siatista-Passaron route (118.9 km vs. 150.2 km), and ascends to a lower maximum elevation (1363 m vs. 1512 m), the Siatista-Konitsa route is more rugged. As a result, the Siatista-Konitsa route actually climbs a greater total elevation (2075 m vs. 2048 m) over a shorter distance. Most importantly though, the western part of the Siatista-Konitsa route, the part where Kromayer's and Hammond's routes overlap, passes through certain exceptionally narrow sections that have no parallel on the Siatista-Passaron route. These narrow sections would have made this route much more difficult for an army to travel. In multiple places, as seen in Figure 3.9, a two-lane road has had to have been cut into the steep mountainside which would have otherwise gone down directly to the river. In many places, as seen in Figure 3.10, the steep mountainsides descend directly to the edges of the flood plain. The comparative difficulty of this route would have been increased by late winter snows; if the snow were already melting the flash-floods and mud would have made the difficulties even worse. The floods from the melting winter snows can be so severe that they even wash out modern roads, as seen in Figure 3.11 where the guard rail has been knocked out and the asphalt has cracked and is collapsing into the river bed due to damage from spring floods.

\textsuperscript{184} Hammond 1966, p46; Hammond 1967, pp 275-7, 280; Hammond and Walbank, 1988,
\textsuperscript{185} Makres and Papageorgiou 1990 assign this proposed route very minor status in their history of the roads of the region. Ali Pasha did not deem the route important enough to build it up or install a system of khans along it, as he did the Grevena pass route.
The presence of a much greater number of active year-round villages on the Siatista-Passaron route, especially from Metsovo to Passaron, also points to this being the easier route in difficult weather.\textsuperscript{186} Finally, the Siatista-Konitsa route goes through areas important to the Greek campaigns of 1940-1 and to the Greek Partisans in 1945-1949 precisely because they were difficult areas for large armies to march through.\textsuperscript{187} In fact, the resupply operations by "The Women of the Pindus," namely carrying large packs through the landscape to the armies in this area, were viewed as so heroic that statues to them stand today in many of the villages on the Siatista-Konitsa route, as seen in this statue from Pendalofos [Figure 3.12].

Additionally, entering Epirus at Passaron gave Philip political and logistical benefits.\textsuperscript{188} Passaron was a historically important Molossian administrative center.\textsuperscript{189} While the capital of Molossia had been moved by Pyrrhus to Ambracia, Passaron's continued role as an important central location in Epirus can be seen in the events of 167 BC: Passaron was the center of Epirote resistance to the Romans (L.45.26.5-9), then the center of operations for the Roman propraetor Anicius Gallus' Epirus campaign (L.45.26.5, 15), and, finally, the base of operations for the Roman proconsul Lucius Aemilius Paullus single day sack of 70 Epirote communities (L.45.33.8 - 45.34.6).

Passaron's central location and regional administrative role made it an ideal place for

\textsuperscript{186} Hammond 1967, p 276 points out that there are year round villages on his proposed route. However, he clearly did not travel the Grevena pass route, as in Hammond 1966, p46 he advocates that his proposed route was the only possible route.

\textsuperscript{187} Papagos 1949; Woodhouse 1976; Carr 2013.

\textsuperscript{188} Epirus was allied to Macedon in 198 BC (L.32.14.5-6). The Epirotes had brokered the Peace of Phoenice in 205 BC and allied with Philip in the treaty (L.29.12).

\textsuperscript{189} See Plut. Pyr. 5.2 on Passaron being where the king and the people customarily exchange oaths. On this practice and how it relates to the importance of Passaron, see Hammond 1991, p189; Meyer 2013, pp 58, 72-3, 110-3, 126-7. On Passaron as important regional and administrative center of Molossia, see Douzougli and Papadopoulos pp 2, passim; Meyer 2015, p300.
Philip to establish his network of supply for the upcoming campaign immediately upon his arrival in Epirus. Since Philip now planned to campaign in territory new to him, establishing his network of supply at this point in the campaign was especially important.

[Figure 3.8] From Passaron, Philip continued "into Chaonia via Epirus," marching northwest from Passaron roughly 34 km before turning west and going roughly 27 km across the foothills to the Drin valley, where the Kakavia border crossing to Albania is today. From here, Philip marched north up the Drin valley 57 km to the Stena. This 118 km route from Passaron to the Stena is remarkably flat for being in the midst of such mountainous terrain.190

Livy reports that once Philip and his army were at the Stena by Antigonea,

When Philip had looked at every site of the region, he believed that the place most suited to being fortified was along the river Aous. The river flows in a narrow valley between mountains, of which the natives call one the Meropus and other the Asnaus, offering a narrow path on the bank.

cum situm omnem regionis adspexisset, maxime idoneum ad muniendum locum creditit esse praeter annem Aoum. Is inter montes, quorum alterum Meropum, alterum Asnaum incolae uocant, angusta ualle fluit, iter exiguum super ripam praebens.
(Livy 32.5.10)

[Figure 3.6] Philip abandoned his strategic position at the Stena that controlled the Drin valley north-south for a new location by the river Aous.191 Livy specifies that

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190 The surprising lack of elevation changes on this route between Passaron and the Stena attests to the ease of use of this corridor and its resultant key role in the landscape. For the history of this route, see Makres and Papageorgiou 1990, pp 134, 215-234; Dalakoglou 2017 forthcoming.

191 The Aous is called the river Vjose in Albania today. It begins in Greece from the Pindos mountains by the Vikos gorge and flows northwest by Konitsa and into Albania by Përmet and continues in this direction until it turns west by the village of Këlcyrë and continues west roughly 16 km until it joins with the Drin by Tepelenë. See Hammond 1967, p699; TIR; Ceka 2013, p212, passim.
Philip's motivation for choosing a campsite was his desire for the best place to fortify, rather than, for instance, the best place from which to control the Drin valley.

[Figure 3.13] The narrowest section of the Aous valley, as well as the section in which the mountains rise up most strikingly on either side, is the section that runs east-west roughly 15 km between the modern villages of Këlcyre and Tepelenë.\(^{192}\) From the northern end of the Stena to the western opening of this section of the valley is less than 3 km; Philip did not have to move his army far for his improved position.

Plutarch's description of the location of Philip's camp at the Aous fits this location as well:

This area has no less natural strength than the Vale of Tempe, but is without the beautiful trees, green woods, agreeable haunts, and pleasant meadows that there abound. Great and lofty mountains on either side slope down and form a single very large and deep ravine, and through this the Aous\(^ {193}\) dashes with a volume and speed which make it the equal of the Peneius. Its water covers all the rest of the ground at the foot of the mountains, but leaves a cut, precipitous and narrow, for a path along past its current; this path would not be easy for an army to traverse at any time, and when guarded, it would be utterly impassible.

\begin{quote}
eis\delta\'\ όχυροι μὲν οὐχ ἤτον τὸν περὶ τὰ Τέμπη, κάλλη δὲ δένδρων ὡς ἔκεινοι καὶ χλωρότητας ὕλης καὶ διατριβάς καὶ λειμῶνας ἡδές οὐκ ἔχουσιν· ὅρων δὲ μεγάλων καὶ ὑψηλῶν, ἐκατέρωθεν εἰς μίαν φάραγγα μεγάστην καὶ βαθεῖαν συμφερομένων, διεκκόπτων ὁ Ἀψος καὶ σχῆμα καὶ τάχος ἐξομοιοῦται πρὸς τὸν Πηνείον, τὴν μὲν ἄλλην ἄπασαν ἀποκρύπτων ὑπόρειαν, ἐκτομὴν δὲ κρημνώδη καὶ στενὴν παρὰ τὸ ρέθρον ἀπολείπτων ἀτραπόν, οὐδ' ἄλλως ραδίαν στρατεύματι διελθεῖν, εἰ δὲ καὶ φυλάττοιτο, παντελῶς ἀπορον.

(Plut. Flam.3.4-5)
\end{quote}

\(^{192}\) Leake 1835 I, pp 383-5; Kromayer 1907, Karte 3; Hammond 1966, pp 47-8; and Ceka 2013, p212 also all sited Philip's camp just north of the Stena somewhere in the valley between Tepelenë and Këlcyre.

\(^{193}\) For corruption, scribal error, or mistake resulting in Ἀους being transmitted as Ἀψος in the text of Plutarch, see Hammond 1966, p47; Leake 1835 I, p390.
Tempe is an apt comparison, as both narrow valleys extend for similar distances and offer similar opportunities to control movement through mountainous terrain.

Plutarch is correct that the Aous valley is not as lush or overgrown as Tempe, yet the Aous valley is quite beautiful today. The area where the Aous joins the Drin fits Plutarch's description of where the "water covers all the rest of the ground at the foot of the mountains" and Philip's camp is then somewhere deeper in the "precipitous and narrow" cut of the valley.194

East of where the Aous joins the Drin, the course of the Aous through the valley is the same today as it was in antiquity; the current course of the river Aous is the same as the ancient course of the river Aous.195

**Part II: Philip's encampment at the Aous**

Livy reports that once Philip chose the new location for the encampment, he set to fortifying it:

Philip ordered Athenagoras to hold and to fortify Asnaus with the light troops; he himself placed camp on Meropus. Where the cliffs were steep, a post of a few men were holding them; where they were less naturally safe, Philip was fortifying them in some places with ditches, some places with a palisade (vallo), and in some places with towers. Also a great quantity of catapults was placed in suitable places in order to stop the enemy with missiles at a distance. The king's tent was placed in front of the palisade (vallo) on a maximally conspicuous hill, in order to generate terror for the enemy and hope from confidence for his own men.

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194 Leake 1835 I, pp 388-9; Kromayer 1907, Karte 3; and Ceka 2013, p213 proposed that Philip's camp was in this section where the Aous joins the Drin.

195 Goga Beqiraj & Beqiraj 2015. University of Tirana Geology professors Dr. Arjan Beqiraj and Dr. Enkeleida Goga Beqiraj studied this valley as part of the 2015 VRVAP season and determined that the Aous cut its course through the bedrock of the valley in the Jurassic. I greatly thank them for extensive discussions on the geology of the valley. Hammond 1966, p41 had surmised that the bed for the river Aous in this valley was cut "aeons before the Battle."
Asnaum Athenagoram cum leui armatura tenere et communire iubet; ipse in Meropo posuit castra. qua abscisae rupes erant, statio paucorum armatorum tenebat; qua minus tuta erant, alia fossis, alia uallo, alia turribus muniebat. magna tormentorum etiam uis ut missilibus procul arcerent hostem idoneis locis disposita est. tabernaculum regium pro uallo in conspecto maxime tumulo, ut terrorem hostibus suisque spem ex fiducia faceret, positum. (Livy 32.5.11-13)

The location of Philip's encampment thus needs 1) sufficient space for troops on both sides of the river Aous, 2) cliffs or steep rocks abutting the camp in some places but not in others, 3) suitable places for catapults, and 4) a conspicuous hill for Philip's tent.

[Figure 3.14] The area that best fits Livy's description is in the section of the Aous valley bounded to the west by the Neck of Mezhgoran, where the river turns from northeast to north and the banks are especially narrow, and to the east where the Zagori River joins the Aous from the south.

To determine the amount of space Philip's men required, we need to know how many men Philip had. However, neither Livy nor Plutarch specify this number. To make as accurate an estimate as possible, we can look to relative troop values in other Macedonian campaigns.

Philip had a larger army at Cynoscephalae in 197 BC than he had at the Aous, due to the fact that he held a major levy during spring 197 BC, by which he was able to get his army to a strength it had not been at in years (Livy 33.3.2-5).196 Livy's report of Philip's 16,000 heavy infantry troops, 2,000 cavalry, and 7500 combined light-armed troops, foreign allies, and mercenaries (Livy 33.4.4-5) at Cynoscephalae should then give us a ceiling for the number of Philip's troops at the Aous.

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196 This levy included troops previously considered too young or too old (L.33.3.4). For epigraphic support for this levy, see Hatzopoulos 2001; Sekunda 2010, p460; Sekunda 2013, pp 88-89.
Antiochus had a smaller army at Thermopylae in 191 BC that Philip had at the Aous, as Livy reports that Roman consul Glabrio pointed out that the Romans faced more enemy soldiers at the Battle of the River Aous than were at Thermopylae (Livy 36.17.4). Livy's report of Antiochus' nearly (fere) 10,000 heavy infantry, 500 cavalry (Livy 36.15.3), 2000 allied Aetolians (Livy 36.16.11), as well as unspecified numbers of light-armed troops, dart-throwers, archers, slingers, and elephants (Livy 36.18.2-4) should then give us a floor for the number of Philip's troops at the Aous.\(^\text{197}\)

First, Philip then had between 10,000 and 16,000 heavy infantry. Scholars have debated whether the organizational component of the Macedonian heavy infantry was of 1000 men or of 4000 men, i.e. whether Macedonian heavy infantries were divisible by 1000 or only by 4000.\(^\text{198}\) The Macedonian armies at Cynoscephalae (16,000 heavy infantry) and Pydna (21,000 heavy infantry) could indicate, respectively, 4 \textit{strategia} and 5 \textit{strategia}.\(^\text{199}\) However, Antigonus Doson had 10,000 heavy infantry at the Battle of Sellasia in 222 BC (Plb. 2.65.2), and Philip V, himself, had 10,000 heavy infantry for the Social War in 219 BC (Plb. 4.37.7).\(^\text{200}\) Philip at the Aous then had a number of heavy

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\(^{197}\) We know that Antiochus is leading a Macedonian-style phalanx as Livy calls Antiochus' heavy infantry "Macedonians" (Livy 36.18.2, 4), and can only be referring to their phalanx fighting style - as Macedon was hostile to Antiochus at this time and not supplying him soldiers. There were 2000 additional Aetolians who chose to not fight with Antiochus but to stay in Heraclea instead (L.36.16.11).

\(^{198}\) Sekunda 2013, pp88-92; Sekunda 2010, pp460-1; Matthew 2015 pp276-296; Hatzopoulos 2001. The Macedonian phalanx was organized in units of four, based off the 16-man file of the phalanx, the \textit{lochos}: 4 \textit{lochoi} made a 64-man \textit{tetrarchia}, 4 \textit{tetrachiai} made a 256-man \textit{speira} or \textit{syntagma} (a 16x16 square), 4 \textit{speirai} made a 1024-man \textit{chiliarchia}, and 4 \textit{chiliarchiai} made a 4096-man \textit{strategia}; what matters here is which of these units was the organizational component of the phalanx.

\(^{199}\) For how to derive that there were 21,000 heavy infantry at Pydna, and how that is four \textit{strategia}, see Sekunda 2013, p92.

\(^{200}\) Livy's 10,000 heavy infantry at Thermopylae is potentially troublesome: Livy' report that Antiochus arrived in Greece with 10,000 infantry (L.35.43.6, L.36.19.11 citing Polybius as his source) and still had 10,000 infantry at Thermopylae due to specific reinforcements (L.36.15.3) could be read as an intertext to Herodotus' account of the Immortals at Thermopylae in 480 BC (Hdt.7.215-218, 223-4), whose number was similarly maintained at 10,000 (Hdt.7.83). This numerical connection would serve to align Antiochus'
infantry more than 10,000 but less than 16,000 and possibly divisible by four: 12,000 infantry fits these requirements.

For light-armed troops, we have less evidence to work with, as the number of light-armed troops is not always specified, as at Thermopylae discussed above. However, if we look to Livy's accounts of the numbers of Macedonian soldiers at Cynoscephalae and Pydna, we see similar ratios of heavy-armed troops to light-armed infantry and allies: 2.13 to 1 at Cynoscephalae and 2.16 to 1 at Pydna. Following this ratio, for 12,000 heavy infantry we should expect roughly 6,000 light-infantry and allies.

Philip brought no cavalry or elephants to the Aous (L.32.12.7). This was a strategic move for a defensive campaign, as horses and elephants require great quantities of food and water to maintain.

It remains to determine how much space these 12,000 heavy-infantry troops and 6,000 light-infantry and allied troops required. There are no detailed literary descriptions or archaeological remains of Macedonian field camps. However, by using Polybius' detailed description of a Roman field camp alongside Dobson's recent analysis of the roughly contemporaneous Roman field camps by Numantia, we can get a rough idea of how much space armies required in the first half of the second century BC.

Polybius describes a Roman field camp designed to hold between 19,200 and 22,400 troops (Plb.6.27-32). Polybius specifies that this camp was 2150 feet by 2150

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201 See Sekunda 2013, p114 for the breakdown of troops at Pydna, following L.42.51.3-9.
202 Roth 2012, pp 61-5, 78-9, 125-9; Engels 1978, pp 144-5, passim.
203 Polybius reports that the camp held two legions of 4200 to 5000 infantry and 300 cavalry each (Plb.6.20.8-9), and an equal number of allied infantry and three times as many cavalry (Plb.6.26.7). The
feet. Dobson demonstrated that the Polybian foot was .355m, which then results in a camp 763.25m by 763.25m with an area of 582,550.6 m\(^2\). However, one cannot just divide the area of the Roman camp by the number of men it was designed to hold to come up with an average amount of space needed per man, as there were significant aspects of Polybius' description that were particular to a Roman camp and not necessarily relevant to a Macedonian camp.\(^{204}\)

First of all, Philip divided his camp into three component parts - heavy-infantry barracks, light-infantry and allies' barracks, and Philip's tent - in three separate places, whereas the Roman camp contained all three within one palisade. Second, the archaeological evidence from the Roman camps at Numantia shows that both the roads within the camp and the area between the tents and the palisade (intervallum) could be significantly smaller in practice than Polybius prescribed: Polybian camp roads were 50 ft (17.75m) wide, but in the Numantine camps were as narrow as 5m;\(^{205}\) the Polybian intervallum was 200 feet (71m) from the tents on all sides, but in the Numantine camps were much smaller, ranging from as little as 3m to a maximum of only 29m.\(^{206}\) Finally, the market and supply storage areas (the forum and quaestorium in the Roman camp) need not have been within the same palisade as the soldier's barracks.\(^{207}\)

\(^{204}\) For the record, 582,550.6 m\(^2\) divided by 19,500 men makes for 30.3 m\(^2\) per man.
\(^{205}\) Dobson 2008, pp104-5.
\(^{207}\) See Dobson 2008, pp75-9 for it being a distinctly Roman practice to place the forum, quaestorium, and praetorium inside a field camp, and that there were distinct spatial and religious relationships between these three Roman camp components. Additionally, Polybius reports that the forum and quaestorium were the camp components which could be reduced in size, if need be (Plb.6.32.4-5).
What remains are the measured areas demarcated for the barracks for the soldiers. Polybius reports that each tent unit was 100 feet by 100 feet, which Dobson demonstrated was equal to 120 Roman feet by 120 Roman feet. The measuring unit of 120 Roman feet is also the unit of Roman centuriation, which led Dobson to conclude that "the camp's grid system seems not to have been a military invention, but was simply transferred from a civilian to a military context. If the army had introduced the concept, it would be expected that the theoretical dimensions of each area would have been selected with a closer regard to the ideal required for a unit's tents, which would not necessarily correspond to a square of 120 feet or convenient multiples or fractions of this .... The actus quadratus as a basic unit of area nevertheless clearly could not have been unsuitable in either cramping or providing an unnecessary amount of space for units; otherwise an alternative would have had to have been found." The Roman tent unit was thus a reasonable size for the number of men assigned to it.

A Roman foot was 0.296 m, so each tent unit had an area of 1260.25 m². Each 1260.25 m² unit housed 120 infantry plus 48 velites for a total of 168 men. Dividing the total area of the tent (1260.25 m²) by the number of men it held (168) results in the barracks supplying 7.5 m² per man for a 4200 man legion. Taking this area per man as a reasonable estimate, Philip's camp at the Aous would have required a space of 90,000 m² for the heavy infantry barracks for 12,000 men.

208 Dobson 2008 demonstrates that the troop barracks in practice were equivalent to Polybius' precepts.
210 See Dobson 2008, p48-9, 82-90.
211 For a 5000 man legion, each tent would have held 208 men, making for 6 m² per man.
At the eastern end of the valley section are two fields with a dry river bed running between them: the larger western field measures roughly 350 meters by 200 meters for an area of 70,000 m$^2$, and the eastern field measures roughly 300 meters by 70 meters for an area of 21,000 m$^2$, making for a total of 91,000 m$^2$, which is enough room for Philip's heavy infantry barracks. Directly across the Aous from the heavy-infantry barracks is a large field with more than enough room for the 300m by 150m barracks for the 6,000 light infantry and allies.

For both barracks, the steep mountains form the defenses on one side while built defenses form the defense works on the other three sides, in accordance with Livy's description that "Where the cliffs were steep, a post of a few men was holding them; where they were less naturally safe, Philip was fortifying them in some places with ditches, some places with a palisade (vallo), and in some places with towers" (L.32.5.12).

The area for the heavy infantry camp was protected to the south by the cliffs and steep rocks from the base of Mt. Golikut. To the north is a series of flat river terraces leading to the banks of the Aous, where Philip would have had built defenses. The river terraces were formed 17,000 years ago and the valley had the same topographic appearance in 198 BC as today. The proposed campsite for the heavy infantry is well positioned, being centrally located, partially hidden from the enemy's view from the west behind the small hill, and with access to an escape route to the east should the need arise. Additionally, the large open space west of the heavy infantry barracks provided an area in which the heavy infantry could fight, with more than enough room for a 16 man wide and

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212 Goga Beqiraj & Beqiraj 2015.
16 man deep phalanx unit, the *speira*, with additional light armed troops on each side.\(^{213}\) This made for a situation in which, unlike e.g. Thermopylae, once an enemy had fought through the initial defensive works they then had to fight an infantry battle on terrain favorable to the phalanx (Plb.18.31.3-6) before mounting an attack on the Macedonian encampments.

Livy is unclear whether the "suitable places" Philip placed catapults were on the towers from the camp defenses, natural locations such as hillsides, or both. Hellenistic catapult platforms preserved in towers indicate that a catapult needed a 5 m by 5m area in which to operate.\(^{214}\) Suitable places would have included the towers specified as part of the defensive works, as well as the southern side of the Neck of Mezhgoran [Figure 3.16], and the gradually sloping hills on the southern bank of the Aous in the area just west of the Neck.

[Figure 3.15] Just to the west of the proposed location for the infantry camp is the "maximally conspicuous hill" on which Philip placed his tent in order to "generate terror for the enemy and hope from confidence for his own men."\(^{215}\) [Figure 3.17] A tent on this hill would have been immediately visible for anyone entering the valley from the west, as well as from the infantry camp and everywhere else in this section of valley. Additionally, the steep sides of this hill would have made Philip's tent difficult to assault. Polybius specifies the area designated for the Roman consul's tent (*praetorium*) to be a

\(^{213}\) On the Macedonian use of the *speira*, see Sekunda 2013; Matthew 2015.

\(^{214}\) The best work on ancient catapults remains Marsden 1969, see esp. pp 116-163 for tower platforms. Marsden, pp 166-7 uses Philip at the Aous as one of his four examples of "catapults in field campaigns." See also Campbell 2011; Ober 1987 argues that multiple arrow-throwing catapults could fit on a 5m by 5m platform. For comparison, I measured the towers at the fortified Ptolemaic camp at Koroni to be 6m x 6m.

\(^{215}\) Scipio had similarly encamped in view of Carthage in 203 BC in order to "strike the Carthaginians with terror and dismay" (Plb.14.10.3).
200 foot (71m) by 200 foot square of area 5,041 m$^2$, and this seems a safe estimate for the area Philip's tent required as well. The top of this hill has a flat summit measuring roughly 80 m by 80 m, making for an area of 6,400 m$^2$, more than enough for Philip's tent.

[Figure 3.15] After the heavy-infantry barracks and Philip's tent have been placed, it becomes apparent that there is something strange about Livy's description of the Macedonian camp: Livy reports that Philip chose a location for the camp due to its defensive location, indicating that Philip intended to hold this area against an attack. However, Philip then placed his tent on a hill outside the vallum, apparently exposing it to attack. As the Roman camp was centered entirely on the consul's tent (Plb.6.27), placing Philip's tent away from the infantry barracks and outside the camp's palisade is a jarring detail.

However, fragmentary inscription SEG 40.524 found near Amphipolis suggests that Philip's tent would indeed have been placed outside of the fortified infantry barracks [Figure 3.18]. This inscription deals with Philip's own military field regulations and is dated to approximately 200 BC, the same time period as this camp. The inscription reads:

Concerning the construction of the camp:
When they have completed the enclosure for the king

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217 The other sections of the inscription concern other military regulations, i.e. 'patrols', 'discipline over war booty', 'foraging', and 'watchwords.' Hatzopoulos 2001, p144 proposed that Philip felt compelled to post these regulations sometime after 218 BC, when the division of campaign booty nearly led to a mutiny. Sekunda 2013, p88 follows Hatzopoulos.
218 The term φραγμός is rare in Classical Greek. Herodotus, Xenophon, and Strabo all use φραγμός to mean more than a boundary but a built barrier of some significance: Herodotus uses φραγμός to mean a built barricade higher than a horse's head (Hdt.7.36) as well as the wooden palisade that surrounded the Acropolis (Hdt.7.142); Xenophon uses φραγμός to mean a fence built of wood higher than a lion or similar
and the rest of his quarters and an interval has been left, they shall straightaway build barracks for the infantry staff-officers...

περὶ στεγνοποίας: ὅταν δὲ τὸν φραγμόν συντελέσωσιν τὸ<ι> βασιλεῖ καὶ τὴν άλλην σκηνοποίαν καὶ γένηται διάστασις, εὐθέο τοῖς ὑπασπισταῖς ποιεῖτωσαν ἐκκοίτιον
(SEG 40.524: fragment A, Column 2, lines 5-8)

Philip was thus in the habit of camping in a separate fortified area away from the infantry barracks.219

The question remains, though, why Philip would camp outside his defensive works when the specified reason he was camping here was because it was a good place for defensive fortification. The layout of Philip's camp becomes more clear though, if we infer that Livy misunderstood his source material's description of the Macedonian camp, perhaps due to his only understanding the regularized Roman camp.220 Livy was dealing with a passage describing a fortified camp that had a palisade around the barracks for the infantry and then an additional set of defensive works in the direction of the expected Roman attack. Livy's two uses of vallo in the above passage would then refer to two

wild beast can see over and stronger than it could break through (Xen. Ἕλ. 11.4); Strabo uses φραγμὸς to mean a wall made of stone (Strabo 13.4.14). Polybius does not use the word φραγμὸς.

219 When building field camps, the Romans and Macedonians both built the commanding general's tent first before attending to the rest of the camp, but in contrasting manners: the Romans designated the central area within the infantry camp and the Macedonians designated a separate area surrounded by its own defensive wall. If Livy or Polybius intended to differentiate the difference between the Roman and Macedonian camps, marking the difference between the centrality of the consul's tent and the separateness of Philip's tent would have been a good way to do it.

220 Scholars understand that Livy was relying on Polybius as his source for this section: Briscoe 1973, p1-2; Trankle 1977; Briscoe 2009, p462. Words used for the description of camps and components of camps in Polybius can have different meanings in different situations and scenarios. For instance, Polybius uses charax and parembole both as metonymy for camp (e.g. charax as camp: 3.43.5, 3.67.2; parembole as camp: 6.26.10, 6.42.3-5), but also uses charax to mean palisade (e.g. 10.41.5, 1.42.8) and parembole to mean where troops sleep (repeatedly in Bk.6). Polybius presents armies fortifying or surrounding a parembole with a charax (Plb. 3.68.5-6, 18.18.9) and an army approaching an enemy parembole (3.102.2), and expects the reader to understand this to mean camp including palisade, as Polybius later says that they dismantle the charax (3.102.4) of this camp. While charax can mean camp in some Polybian usages, charax can also mean a component of defensive works built for a siege that are not part of a camp at all (Plb.1.42.8). For further discussion on terms related to Greek camps, see Pritchett 1974.
different palisade features in the original that Livy has conflated to one *vallum*. If Livy were only familiar with Roman camps, this fort design would have been understandably confusing as Roman camps always have only one palisade (Plb.6.31.10-14, 6.41.5).

[Figure 3.19] In other words, Polybius originally described a camp in which there was an infantry barracks that had a palisade around it except where it abuts the cliffs, and Philip's tent was on a hill outside of this palisade that surrounded the infantry barracks (*tabernaculum regium pro uallo in conspecto maxime tumulo*). However, Philip's tent was within an additional set of defensive works (*qua minus tuta erant, alia fossis, alia uallo, alia turribus muniebat*) to the west.

First of all, we know that Greek infantry barracks had palisades around them (e.g. Plb.18.18). Additionally, there is literary and archaeological evidence of non-Roman camps in this time period that built additional defensive works towards the direction of expected attack, beyond the palisade around the infantry barracks.

Polybius reports that in 217 BC Hannibal established a palisaded encampment as well as additional defensive works, including a ditch and a palisade, directly between his camp and the hostile Roman camp (Plb.3.105.11).

[Figure 3.20] The archaeological remains from the Ptolemaic camp (265 BC -261 BC) on the Koroni peninsula in southeastern Attica, and the Macedonian camps by the modern village of Karya in Perrhaebia and by the modern village of Rapsani in southern Macedon (both built before 169 BC) were similar to Philip's camp at the Aous: [Figure

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221 Livy does not use *vallum* in any passage for which the Polybian source material is extant, even though Livy uses the word *vallum* 87 times in books 30 to 45. See Thompson 1968 for two instances where Livy used the term *vallum* that indicate that Livy misinterpreted his Polybian source material.


223 See Pritchett 1974, p133-146 for discussion and additional examples.
each of these camps had an infantry barracks encircled by a defensive wall plus an additional stone wall that only faced the direction of presumed attack. These additional defensive works were thicker and more substantial at all three sites. All walls at these sites were built with local, readily available stone.

The archaeological remains found at Philip's camp at the Aous indicate where Philip's additional defensive works stood. [Figure 3.23] Looking at this photo taken from the hills along the north bank of the Aous, northwest from the hill on which Philip had his tent, one can see the Aous moving westward through the valley within it ancient banks. At the western end of the valley, south of the Aous, is an alluvial river terrace formed 17,000 years ago. Directly on the alluvial sediments of this terrace were found the remains of the fortification wall of Philip's camp. [Figure 3.24] This wall runs approximately 60 m and was carefully built in courses of undressed river stones with a clear leveling course in places and stands between 1 m to 1.5 m high.

While this wall is currently used as a terrace wall, its careful construction, including the leveling course, indicate greater care was used in building this wall than was needed to create an agricultural terrace wall; such careful construction is associated with military purposes. Building a palisade on this solid, alluvial sediment terrace takes advantage of the natural environment to make a wall higher and more difficult to

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225 Goga Beqiraj & Beqiraj 2015. I greatly thank Dr. Beqiraj for walking me around the terraces and carefully explaining their geologic formation.
226 That the wall sits directly upon the alluvial terrace indicates that it is an ancient wall (Dr. Beqiraj, pers. comm.).
227 Archaeological architects David Scahill and James Herbst both asserted independently that this wall was so well-built as to indicate it was for military purpose rather than agricultural. Dr. Beqiraj, who has worked all over Albania for his whole career, confidently asserted, "This is no peasant wall."
overcome. Hellenistic Greek palisades are understood to have often had stone socles with the wooden palisade above.\textsuperscript{228} All the stone in this wall is locally harvested river stone and there was ample wood around to build the palisade.\textsuperscript{229}

The local shepherds said that this wall used to be longer, running along the entire river terrace to the east, but agricultural collectives destroyed the eastern part of the wall during the Communist period. The part of the wall that survives was left standing apparently to support a concrete threshing floor on top of the terrace that this wall helps create.

[Figure 3.23] There are additional walls that were part of Philip's defensive strategy just to the east of the Neck on the southern bank. [Figure 3.25] This set of two carefully coursed walls was intended to prevent a Roman crossing just inside the Neck. These walls were built with stone harvested from adjacent Mt. Golikut, an easy to quarry and common source of stone in the region still.\textsuperscript{230}

Figure 3.26 was generated by aerial photography by James Herbst in 2015 and gives a good view of Philip's entire encampment. In Figure 3.27, I annotated it to make it appear as Philip's camp looked.\textsuperscript{231}

Finally, Livy's narrative of the events of the Battle of the River Aous indicates that Philip had an additional set of defensive works besides the palisade around the infantry barracks, as I will discuss in detail later in this chapter.

\textsuperscript{228} Pritchett 1974, p135, passim. Livy censors Perseus for not building a wall and towers out of the "abundance of stone and forest timber at hand" in Pieria in 169 BC (L.44.6.16).

\textsuperscript{229} On the provenance of the stones, see Goga Beqiraj & Beqiraj 2015. Dr. Beqiraj assured me that the Aous is too rough to have been used to transport building materials to the site; the Aous is, indeed, used for white water rafting trips today in the area south of Përmet.

\textsuperscript{230} I have seen men easily quarry this stone and then break it into flat building stones with just a long crowbar.

\textsuperscript{231} For future publications, David Seahill will render formal plans and reconstruction drawings.
Part of the reason Philip thought this location best for fortifying defensively was that it was well-suited for supplying Philip's army with water and food for an extended period of time. [Figure 3.28] There were four potential sources of fresh water for Philip's camp: First, the Aous river, itself, originates in the Pindos mountains to the southeast and would have thus been safe from potential interference from the Romans to the west. Second, the Zagoria river flows from the Zagoria mountains from the south and empties into the Aous at the eastern edge of this section of valley. This water source was regularized most recently in the early 19th century by means of a water channel rebuilt by Ali Pasha, of which the first phase of construction might be from the second century AD. This source was also not liable to Roman tampering. Third, were the freshwater springs in the valley. There are currently two active freshwater springs, one at the east end of the valley on the south bank of the Aous, the other at the west end of the valley on the north bank on the property of the restaurant Sajmola. Both of these have been flowing, and being used, since beyond the local shepherds' communal memory. While these springs may or may not have existed in 198 BC, they indicate that there might have been constantly flowing underwater springs of potable water in this valley for Philip's

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232 The Aous river runs clean and clear today, except for when muddied by the building of a power plant on the river at Përmet (as in August 2015), or by sewage issues from Përmet (as locals told me has happened). Even when those issues are in effect, the Aous between Këlçyrë and Tepelenë is still used to water animals and for swimming.

233 The riverbed is dry now, but local shepherds said that this is a relatively recent development due to human intervention, i.e. a failed attempt to redirect the river for private irrigation.

234 Potable water was brought in from approximately 5 km to the south and was used for irrigation, powering a mill, and drinking into the 20th century. I have only hearsay from local shepherds as to how far the water channel goes up the Zagori as the gang-run marijuana growing operations in the Zagori valley prevented me from following the extent of the water channel to the south.

235 David Scahill and I plan to continue work on the aqueduct bridge at the eastern end of the valley that, at first investigation, has a 2nd century phase.

236 This freshwater spring flows at a high enough rate that it currently supplies all the drinking and cooking water used at Samjola.
use. Fourth, there is a dry river bed running also from the south through the heavy infantry camp that might have held water in antiquity, especially during the spring snow melt. All four of these sources were not liable to Roman interference from the west.

[Figure 3.29] While there was not sufficient nearby agricultural land, Philip's camp was well-placed to take advantage of the flat and secure route to the southeast through the Aous valley to Passaron. This route was roughly 110 km through allied territory, and its relatively gentle topography made it good for cart traffic. Prior to state investment in the road through the Drin valley in the last quarter of the 20th century, this had been a major north-south route. 237 Philip had the opportunity to establish this supply line with the Epirotes when he passed through Passaron earlier in the season, and the allied Epirotes could be understood to want to support Philip, especially in light of their role in brokering the Peace of Phoenice in 205 BC to explicitly get the Romans out of Epirus (L.29.12). Additionally, Flamininus' ostentatious refusal to take Epirote foodstuffs to supply his campaign after the Battle of the River Aous (L.32.5.5) indicates that Philip was using Epirote foodstuffs to supply his camp at the Aous, and that Flamininus was trying to mark the contrast between himself and Philip. 238

[Figure 3.30] Hammond had, in contrast, placed the heavy infantry camp on the slopes of the north bank of the river "because only on that side is there room for the road or path which Plutarch describes." 239 However, on the south bank is an Ottoman road

[Figure 3.31] and this was the main route through the area through the Communist

238 Livy reports that in winter 169/168 BC the Romans bought 30,000 modii of grain from the Epirotes. This demonstrates the Epirote capacity to generate sufficient surplus grain, especially as this grain was supplied during the winter, well after the harvest (L.44.16.2).
239 Hammond 1966, p49, fig 5 map 4.
period. Most importantly, the slopes on the northern side of the river are far too steep and uneven to have supported a camp of Macedonian infantrymen until one has climbed 550 m of elevation gain above the valley floor to where the village of Mezhgoran sits high above the valley today. Besides being an impractical location for food and water supply, a camp at Mezhgoran would not accord with Livy's later narrative of the battle in which Philip employs an escape route to the east when attacked from both north and south.

Philip's placement of his camp components and additional defensive works in this section of valley demonstrate that this was, indeed, a "place most suited to being fortified." It would be extremely difficult to force a way through the Neck and through the valley to the barracks, and the reality behind the Roman consul's exhortation to his troops at Thermopylae that the defile at the Aous "was more difficult to traverse" than Thermopylae due to the fact that the "fortifications were then both more suitably situated and more strongly constructed" (L.36.17.3-4) becomes apparent.

By encamping at the Aous before the Romans have even left winter quarters, Philip has taken over the initiative, where the Romans had held it during the 200 BC and

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240 The importance of this Ottoman road is seen in the great effort taken to build and maintain over time the terrace walls that support the road. The shepherds of the area told me of the use and importance of this road in their lifetimes, however the Ottoman road has been superseded today by the paved road along the north bank of the Aous.

241 I hiked up to the village of Mezhgoran, also visiting the radio towers and remains of walls built with large ashlar blocks just above them. Hiking through this area confirmed that this area would be too steep to place a camp until one got to either Mezhgoran.

242 Additionally, placing the camp at Mezhgoran does not accord with Livy's description of some parts being less well naturally protected and some more protected. Hammond's reliance on a limited single autopsy 35 years before he wrote up the article caused him to use Plutarch and a topographic map to determine which bank Philip's camp was on, rather than analysis of the landscape.
199 BC campaign seasons. Philip was no longer reacting to Roman aggression but has turned the tables so that now the Romans had to react to his actions.

**Part III: Roman movements**

Livy reports that the Romans were still in winter quarters at Apollonia when they learned that Philip was encamped by the Aous:

> The consul Villius had learned through Charopus the Epirote what passes the king had occupied with his army, and after wintering in Corcyra he crossed to the mainland at the coming of spring and began to lead his army against the enemy. When he was about five miles from the king's camp, after fortifying the place and leaving behind the legions, he himself went forward to reconnoitre with some light troops ...

Consul per Charopum Epiroten certior factus quos saltus cum exercitu insedisset rex, et ipse, cum Coreyrae hibernasset, uere primo in continentem trauectus ad hostem ducere pergit. quinque milia ferme ab regis castris cum abesset, loco munito relictis legionibus ipse cum expeditis progressus ad speculanda loca ...

(Livy 32.6.1-2)

**[Figure 3.29]** After Philip was already encamped at the Aous, Villius learned of it and marched from the Roman winter quarters at Apollonia down the flat Drin valley 82 km southeast to where the Aous joins the Drin. Roughly five Roman miles to the west of Philip's camp is the modern town of Tepelenë. **[Figure 3.35]** This is the only location in the vicinity that has space to hold a Roman two-legion camp. Additionally, the strategic value of this location is demonstrated by the fact that Ali Pasha chose it for his fortress to control the region. **[Figure 3.36]** The fortress of Ali Pasha looms over the

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Following Dobson's conclusions from Numantia that the *intervallum* could be reduced from Polybius' 71 m to 3 m in practice, the streets could be reduced from Polybius' 17.75 m to 5 m in practice, and Polybius' injunction that the forum and *quaestiorium* could be reduced in size leaves plenty of room for the Roman camp on the plateau on which the modern town of Tepelenë sits.
valley today, attesting to the strong position of the Roman camp there.²⁴⁴ When looking at the photo of the fortress, keep in mind that the fortress extends along the bank to the south for less than half as far as the Roman camp did.

This location was well served for keeping the Roman army supplied: The Romans could have relied on the Drin or the freshwater springs in Tepelenë today as source of fresh water. [Figure 3.29] Villius had a reliable supply route, with Apollonia only three to four days away by wagon on a flat, established route through allied territory, and the grain from Apollonia was essentially unlimited, as Rome’s own supply fleet directly supplied it.²⁴⁵

Livy reports that after Villius scouted Philip's camp:

on the next day Villius held a council, whether he should try to force a passage through the ravine which was held by the enemy, although great labor and danger were involved, or should follow the same circuitous route by which Sulpicius had entered Macedonia the previous year.

postero die consilium habuit, utrum per insessum ab hoste saltum, quamquam labor ingens periculumque proponeretur, transitum temptaret, an eodem itinere quo priore anno Sulpicius Macedoniam intrauerat, circumuceret copias.
(Livy 32.6.2-3)

²⁴⁴ No excavations have ever been conducted at the site that could confirm whether a Roman camp lay under the fortress (Taulant Rama, pers. comm.), however its dimensions and shape are what we'd expect from a Roman campsite, and I strongly suspect that there was a Roman antecedent to this Ottoman era fortification. The importance of the location is also shown in Tepelenë's outsized role compared to its population in Albania's 1997 revolution (Abrahams 2015).
²⁴⁵ For laden Roman wagon trains traveling between 20 and 32 km/day, see Roth 2012, p 211.
Livy reports that while Villius was spending many days in debate (L.32.6.4), the incoming consul Titus Quinctius Flamininus arrived at the camp, took over command (Livy 32.9.8), and then faced the same dilemma:

Flamininus held a council, whether to attempt to force a passage straight through the enemy's camp or, without even trying so difficult and dangerous a feat, to proceed into Macedonia rather by the safe but longer route through the Dassareti and by way of Lyncus.

For both Villius and Flamininus, the choice is between forcing Philip's position at the Aous, or retracing Sulpicius' route from the previous year through the areas between Illyria and Macedon. For both consuls, the choice is presented as between a dangerous route and a safe route. [Figure 3.37] However, those two routes do not go to the same area or aim at the same result. The "safe" route involved either ravaging Macedon's western borderlands as Sulpicius had done, or invading Macedon; while the "dangerous" route involved a pitched battle with Philip. Philip's camp did not block the consul's movement by Sulpicius' route; going through Philip's camp did not open a route between Apollonia and Macedon.

Plutarch also reports that Flamininus faced this choice, but that fear of having a long lines of supply on Sulpicius' route convinced him to force Philip's position at the

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246 This means that Villius did not get a campaign year, as Sulpicius had campaigned during Villius' 199 BC consulship, as discussed in chapter 2.
247 Sulpicius' route is discussed in detail in chapter 2.
Aous (Plut. *Flam.* 4.1). While this was a legitimate fear, Sulpicius had been able to wage a long campaign by living off the produce from the plains of Dassaretia and Pelagonia.

Unmentioned potential factors in the consuls' decision-making process include that Rome was more concerned with protecting the coastal Illyrian cities under her protection (Apollonia, Oricum, Corcyra, and Dyrrachium) than actually invading Macedon, and that, given Philip's current position, heading into the interior via Sulpicius' route would have left these cities open to Philip's attack; and that withdrawing from their established encampment at the Aous would have demonstrated weakness that might have caused them to lose recent allies like the Aetolians and Athamanians.

Livy then reports the reason that effectively sways Flamininus' decision-making process:

This latter view [i.e. following Sulpicius' route] would have prevailed had there not been the fear that, when he had moved farther from the sea, he would have let the enemy slip from his grasp, if, as had happened before, the King preferred to safeguard himself in wilderness and forests, and the summer would be spent without any accomplishment.

uicissetque ea sententia ni timuisset ne, cum a mari longius recessisset emisso e manibus hoste, si, quod antea fecerat, solitudinibus siluisque se tutari rex uoluisset, sine ullo effectu aestas extraheretur.

(Livy 32.9.10)

The choice is no longer between degree of danger or whether to invade Macedon, the choice is now about how best to get Philip to commit to a decisive battle. Philip had fought Sulpicius twice during the 199 BC campaign, but not in a decisive battle.

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248 Hammond 1966, p47 accepts Plutarch's reasoning so fully that he argues that Philip's chose his camp placement solely in order to threaten the Roman lines of supply for Sulpicius' route.
Flamininus wanted the kind of battle that ends the war and leads to a triumph, or his consulship "would be spent without any accomplishment."

Livy reports that Flamininus only "delayed a few days" (L.32.9.8) before he decided to force Philip's position at the Aous (Livy 32.9.11; Plut. Flam.4.1), and that Philip took advantage of the change of Roman commanders to propose a council to discuss peace terms (L.32.10.1). Thus, both commanders moved to bring to an end a forty-day period in which neither army had taken any action (L.32.10.1).249

Rather than indecision, though, this 40-day standoff had been an active strategic choice by Villius and Philip. [Figure 3.29] As discussed above, both commanders had established secure supply lines on routes easily traversed by wagons, with sources of supply sufficient to last through the season. As such a supply line was a remarkable logistical achievement in such rugged and potentially hostile country, each commander could reasonably expect that the other one had not dealt with the logistics of a potentially season-long stationary campaign as impressively, especially when operating so far from their respective homes and with no opportunity for local foraging due to the lack of agricultural land near either camp.

These logistical issues were, without question, enormous. The Roman army required 2640 modii of grain, weighing 17.9 metric tons, per day for his two-legion army.250 A wagon could carry 500 kg, which means that over 1430 wagonloads were

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249 Hamond 1966, pp51-2 and Briscoe 1973, p185 convincingly argue that there were no skirmishes during this 40 day period contra Walbank 1940, p151 who assigns skirmishes mentioned in Plutarch to this 40 day period.
250 For Roman military food requirements, see Roth 2012, pp 14-23. For the weight of a modius of grain being 6.78 kg, see Roth 2012, p24.
required for the 40 days, averaging to 36 wagons per day. While indeed large, this number of wagons, and the draft animals needed to draw them, was not prohibitive, as the Roman army on campaign in Thessaly in 171 BC employed at least 1000 wagons for foraging (L.42.65.2-5).

Both commanders, then, each trusting in their own impressive system of supply and not realizing that the other army was equally well supplied, committed to inaction in order to try to starve the other army out, and thus force the opposite side to commit to battle in unfavorable conditions, or to retreat from the scene due to unwillingness to commit to battle in unfavorable conditions. For comparison, Polybius reports that if the Spartans in 222 BC holding the pass at Sellasia that controlled access to Sparta through the Eurotas valley had delayed "for merely a few days" longer before committing to battle, the invading Antigonid army would have been compelled to leave the area and would not have defeated the Spartans in battle (Plb.2.70.3).

After 40 days, both commanders presumably realized that both armies had secured supply lines that could have supported them through the season, and Livy reports that Philip set up a conference with Flamininus, mediated by the Epirotes, to discuss peace proposals (Livy 32.10.1). Livy reports that Epirote officials:

brought the consul and king together for a conference where the river Aous is confined within its narrowest course.

consulem et regem, ubi in artissimas ripas Aous cogitur amnis, in conloquium adduxerunt

(Livy 32.10.2).

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251 For the weight capacity of a Roman military wagon, see Roth 2012, pp 211-2.
252 Briscoe 1973, p186 on the men who led Philip and Flamininus together, Pausanius the praetor and Alexander the Master of the Horse, being officials of the Epirote league.
[Figure 3.38] This conference took place at the western edge of the large field directly to the west of the Neck. At this location, the Aous runs south-north, with a field on the east bank and a field on the west bank. Along the northern edge of the western field, the Aous runs east-west, and the mountains descend steeply here all the way to the north bank of the Aous and would have given no opportunity for anyone to walk along the northern bank. As a result, to walk east down the valley, Flamininus had to go along the southern bank of the Aous and through this western field. Where the Aous runs south-north, the river narrows to a width that would have allowed dialogue across it.

[Figure 39] Philip stood on the east bank and Flamininus on the west. The conference was held on neutral ground between the camps, as the area between the Roman camp to the modern village of Dragot was in view of the Roman camp and should be thought to have been in the Roman sphere of interest, while the field to the east of the conference point was in view of Philip's camp and should be understood to have been under the Macedonian sphere of interest. The conference was held in the no-man's land between the camps, from where neither commander could see the other's camp.

This conference failed so dramatically that Philip and Flamininus had to be restrained from trying to throw weapons at each other across the river (Livy 32.10.3-8).

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253 Today there is a narrow 'two-lane' road that has been cut into the mountain. Without this cut, there would have been no passage.

254 To verify that the river here would allow dialogue, on August 15th, 2015, Kyle Mahoney and I recreated the conference at this point. We could easily approach the banks cut into the ancient limestone, had clear views of each other, were able to converse in voices only slightly above conversational volume, and were able to easily understand each other.

255 Walbank 1940, p151 placed the conference by Tepelenë, due to mistaken placements of Antigonea and the two camps. Hammond 1966, p51 placed the conference by Dragot, but the riverbed is too wide here for a conference and the location too close to the Roman camp for Philip to have agreed to it.

256 What matters for the argument here is that the conference failed. I discuss the content of the conference and its relationship to the conference at Nicaia in chapter 4.
Part IV: The Battle of the River Aous

Livy reports that, with the conference having failed:

The next day, in consequences of sallies from the outposts, there were numerous slight skirmishes in the plain, which offered ample space for them;

postero die per excursiones ab stationibus primo in planitie satis ad id patenti multa leuia comissa proelia sunt;  
(Livy 32.10.9)

[Figure 3.40] These skirmishes took place in the field immediately to the west of the Neck of Mezhgoran. [Figure 3.41] Philip's camp at the Aous was too secure for him to have risked engagement anywhere west of Dragot, and this field is the only other area large enough to have held skirmishes.

Then, as the royal forces withdrew to narrow and rough places, the Romans too, carried away by their zest for combat, forced their way to the same places.

deinde recipientibus se regiis in arta et confragosa loca auiditate accensi certaminis eo quoque Romani penetrauere.  
(L.32.10.10)

[Figure 3.40] The Romans and Macedonians first skirmished in the center of the plain, before the Macedonian retreated towards the Neck, where the field does get significantly narrower towards the Neck, as Livy describes. The mountain descends to the plain at the neck at a very steep angle, too steep to climb from this side, forcing everyone into the bottleneck.²⁵⁷

On the Roman side were the advantages of order and discipline and armor adapted to affording protection to the wearer; on the enemy's, the terrain and the catapults and ballistae ranged on almost all the cliffs as along a wall.

²⁵⁷ Two VRVAP team members were unable to ascend the cliff face here.
pro his ordo et militaris disciplina et genus armorum erat, aptum tegendis corporibus; pro hoste loca et catapultae ballistaeque in omnibus prope rupibus quasi in muro dispositae. 
(L.32.10.11)

Philip employed the catapults and ballistae Livy had earlier reported were part of Philip's defensive works at the camp. As the Romans approached the Neck, they were exposed to fire from four potential locations: [Figure 3.42] from sufficiently sized flat platforms that are accessible from the east on the northern side of the Neck roughly 143 m in elevation above the valley floor, on the southern side of the Neck roughly 109 m in elevation above the valley floor - where there are remains of a stone watchtower or observation point -, and on the southern bank of the Aous just west of the Neck, as well as from the towers specified as part of Philip's defensive works built on the alluvial terrace. The hills to the north of the plain in which the skirmishes were are too steep to have held artillery.

When many had been wounded on both sides, and a certain number had fallen, as in a regular engagement, night put an end to the fighting.

multis hinc atque illinc uolneribus acceptis cum etiam, ut in proelio iusto, aliquot cecidissent, nox pugnae finem fecit. 
(Livy 32.10.12)

The day of light skirmishes, less than a battle, had no serious consequences, but did establish for Flamininus the difficulty of forcing Philip's position.

Livy reports that Charopus the Epirote then returned to the Roman camp (L.32.11.1). Charopus had reported to Villius earlier in this campaign that Philip was encamped at the Aous, and now came again to the Romans to give them more information about Philip's camp. Charopus brought a shepherd to Flamininus, and likely
acted as interpreter between the shepherd and Flamininus, as shepherds in this valley on the border of Epirus and Illyria did not speak Latin and probably did not speak Greek:

The shepherd said that he had been accustomed to pasture his flocks in the valley which the king's camp then occupied, and knew all the tracks and paths of those hills. If the consul wished to send some men with him, he would guide them by a road, not dangerous and not very difficult, to a place above the head of the enemy.

is se in eo saltu qui regis tum teneretur castris armentum pascere solitum ait omnes montium eorum anfractus callesque nosse: si secum aliquos consul mittere uelit, se non iniquo nec perdifficili aditu super caput hostium eos educturum.

(Livy 32.11.2-3; cp. Plut. Flam.4.2-3\(^{258}\))

This area is understood to have always had shepherds working in it, and multiple shepherds today pasture their flocks in this valley using traditional methods.\(^{259}\)

Traditional shepherds, including the ones in this valley today, cover surprisingly large amounts of ground every day, and vary their routes within the territory they cover, indicating that Charopus' shepherd would indeed have known all the tracks and paths of the area.\(^{260}\) 74-year-old active local shepherd Uncle Thoma told me that he had been at one time a 'path finder' in this region for the Communist government. The communists had wanted to understand the details of the regional topography and had turned to the

\(^{258}\) Plutarch's version has multiple shepherds who brought Charopus, rather than one shepherd whom Charopus sent.

\(^{259}\) Greater numbers of shepherds used to work in this area under communism, and even more so in the pre-modern era. The local villages of Peshtan, Mezhgoran, and Dragot that served as summer residences for the shepherds used to be significantly bigger than they are now. Archaeological evidence indicates that the only times this valley was devoted to agriculture was during the three times that there was strong centralized government: under the Antonines, Ali Pasha, and the Communists (Morton 2015). This is consistent with Alexander's speech to his men at the Opis about how the centralized government of his father turned them from shepherds to agriculturalists (Arr.7.7.9).

\(^{260}\) We would sometimes drive or hike to areas that we thought far from the site and would stumble upon one of the shepherds we knew from the site during his daily wanderings.
local shepherds for instruction, including for routes around and over Mt. Golikut - the same area through which Charopus' shepherd led the Romans.  

This valley is traditional summer pasture for the shepherds, which is the part of the year they consider themselves at home. Traditionally, shepherds in this region arrive in their summer pastures sometime in late April or early May. The shepherds in 198 BC would have been surprised to find Philip encamped in the middle of both their pasturage and their community. Philip's camp would have greatly disrupted the shepherds' economic lives, disrupting the crucial milking period of the year as well as possibly consuming their flock, as well as their social existence, as this is the part of the year in which all weddings and festivals are traditionally celebrated.

Taking these factors into consideration, the shepherds would have understandably wanted Philip out of the valley and been willing to help whoever would make that happen. That the shepherds went to Charopus to intervene with the Romans on their behalf indicates that Charopus must have been some kind of regional chieftain who protected the welfare of the people in his territory, and large shepherd communities traditionally have a single leader, the tselingas, who operates in this fashion for his community. This was likely a hereditary leadership position as Charopus' grandson also held a position of regional importance and conducted negotiations with the Romans.

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261 The degree to which local shepherds can be understood to have profound knowledge of the local topography was revealed to me when two of them individually told me not to use the shepherd Vini as a guide because he had not spent enough time in the area to understand the regional topography well enough to be a good enough guide; Vini had only been a shepherd there for 18 years, not nearly long enough to be considered knowledgeable of the area by the local shepherd community.
262 Campbell 1964; VRVAP 2015 interview project with local shepherds; Taulant Rama pers. comm.
263 Campbell 1964, p7-9, 23, passim.
264 Campbell 1964, p8, passim.
on the locals' behalf in 167 BC. This area centered on the part of the Aous valley in which Philip had his camp was a fitting place for a local leader to carve out a territory of his own as it sat in a middle zone between Epirus to the south and Illyria to the north.

Livy reports that Flamininus verified the shepherd's trustworthiness with Charopus and resolved to take the shepherd up on his offer (L.32.11.4-6). Flamininus demonstrated the same penchant for quick and decisive action in putting the shepherd's suggested plan into action as he had on his arrival at the Aous, when he committed to action in only a few days when his predecessor had been inactive for weeks. Flamininus also displayed a willingness to take risks and to put a dangerous level of trust in newfound allies, behaviors we will see him consistently display during his time in command.

Flamininus gave a tribune 4,000 infantry and 300 cavalry (L.32.11.7):

Flamininus ordered the tribune to take the cavalry as far as the ground permitted; when the road became impassable for cavalry, he should leave them on some level spot and go with the infantry wherever the guide conducted them. When he reached, as the guide promised, the place above the enemy, the tribune should send up a smoke-signal but raise no shout until, after the after the answering signal had been received by him, he could judge that the battle had begun. He instructed the tribune to march by night - and the moon happened to be full - and by day to take time for food and rest.

equites quoad loca patiantur ducere iubet: ubi ad inuia equiti uentum sit, in planitie aliquae locari equitatum, pedites qua dux monstraret uiam ire. ubi, ut polliceatur, super caput hostium peruentum sit, fumo dare signum nec

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266 The younger Charopus' betrayal of the Epirotes to the Romans in 167 BC led to Polybius' famous condemnation, "I believe there never was and never will be a man more brutal and more unprincipled than Charops" (Plb.30.12). On this younger Charops, see Plb.27.15; Diod. 30.5; Scullard 1945.
267 Ali Pasha started out as a regional warlord in this exact valley.
268 As the regional leader, Charopus would have been in charge of all the area's shepherds, meaning that he was both responsible for their welfare, and also responsible for their behavior. As such, checking on the shepherds with Charopus was the correct thing for Flamininus to do, in part because doing so let Charopus know that Flamininus was holding Charopus responsible should the shepherds betray the Romans.
antea clamorem tollere quam ab se signo recepto pugnam coeptam 
arbitrari posset. nocte itinera fieri iubet – et pernox forte luna erat – : 
terdiu cibi quietisque sumeret tempus 
(Livy 32.11.7-9)

First of all, smoke signals were a well-established and standard way for sending 
military messages by 198 BC. Second, the full moon gives us an opportunity for a 
secure date as the only full moon in 198 BC that fits into the narrative was on June 
24th.

This fixed date gives us an opportunity to establish a rough calendar of events for 
the 198 BC campaign:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Narrative Event</th>
<th>Estimated Time involved</th>
<th>Gregorian Calendar Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philip sends out light armed troops to the Stena</td>
<td>At the beginning of spring</td>
<td>March 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philip follows a few days later to the Stena with heavy troops</td>
<td>2 weeks</td>
<td>March 28 - April 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philip looks for a place to encamp</td>
<td>7 days</td>
<td>April 12-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philip establishes camp</td>
<td>7 days</td>
<td>April 19-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charops goes to Villius</td>
<td>4 days</td>
<td>April 28 - May 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villius hears that Philip is encamped and moves to Tepelenë</td>
<td>7 days</td>
<td>May 2-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villius in council per multos dies</td>
<td>35 days</td>
<td>May 9 - June 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flamininus replaces Villius</td>
<td>1 day</td>
<td>June 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flamininus waits a few days</td>
<td>3 days</td>
<td>June 14-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flamininus holds a council</td>
<td>1 day</td>
<td>June 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The forty day delay</td>
<td>40 days</td>
<td>May 9 - June 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting at Aous</td>
<td>1 day</td>
<td>June 18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

269 For the history of fire signals in Roman and Greek warfare, see Woolliscroft 2001, passim, incl. Appendix 1: References to signaling in ancient writers. Polybius has a lengthy digression on fire signaling and his singular contribution to the science in his Bk. 10.

270 Goldstine 1973. That Livy specifies that the similar night mission at Thermopylae in 191 BC occurred when there was a new moon, and makes no mention of the phase of the moon during night missions in Spain (L.34.13.3, 34.14.1) inclines one to believe that there was a full moon and that full moons on night missions is not a literary trope of Livy's.
Table 3: Calendar of events for 198 BC campaign

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Skirmish day</td>
<td>1 day</td>
<td>June 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrival of shepherd</td>
<td>1 day</td>
<td>June 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Message to/from Charopus</td>
<td>2 days</td>
<td>June 21-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 days of skirmishes/ 2 days of surrounding</td>
<td>2 days</td>
<td>June 23-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle of the River Aous</td>
<td>1 day</td>
<td>June 25 (fixed date)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One thing this calendar shows is that Charopus went to Villius to alert him to Philip's presence at the Aous right when the shepherds would have returned to the valley at the end of April and found Philip there. After the Roman army showed up at Tepelenë, Charopus then waited six weeks to send the shepherd to alert Flamininus to the surrounding route.

Flamininus told the tribune to move at night, but this would have been no problem for their guide as shepherds traditionally take their sheep out to graze each night from midnight for three hours during much of the year. Moving through these mountains at night would have been everyday behavior for Charopus' shepherd.

Livy reports that for this mission, Flamininus "loaded the shepherd down with huge promises, if he kept faith, nevertheless in chains" (Livy 32.11.9). We should see this, in part, as a contrast to Livy's narratives of Hannibal twice getting misled by local guides - once on purpose and once by a misunderstanding - whom he had comparatively trusted too much (L.21.35, 22.13).

Flamininus then attacked the Macedonians for two days, presumably on the same plain as the earlier skirmish, to distract Philip from thinking that he might attempt a new

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271 Campbell 1964, p27.
strategy (Livy 32.11.6). This was the third set of skirmishes in the field just west of the Neck.

Meanwhile, on the third day, when the Romans had sent up the smoke-signal that they had reached and were holding the height which they had sought,

interim die tertio cum uerticem quem petierant Romani cepisse ac tenere se fumo significarent,
(Livy 32.12.1)

The shepherd thus took two nights to make this trip from the Roman camp at Tepelenë to the spot above the Macedonian camp from which he made the fire signal. This full moon was right around the summer solstice, the shortest night of the year, meaning that the Romans had just less than 8 hours of darkness per night in which to travel.

[Figure 3.43] On the first night, the shepherd led them south down the Drin valley for roughly 12 km before turning east and climbing roughly 13 km at an 8% average grade past the modern village Labovë e Madhe to a small plain at the pass called Fusha e Cajupit at 1219 m elevation.\footnote{272 Using Naismith's Rule to estimate the time involved, this route would have taken just under seven hours.\footnote{273 For comparison, Professor Thomas Rose and I, when climbing Mt. Olympus, ascended 9 km at an average 19% grade in 4.5 hours, where Naismith's rule would estimate 4.74 hours of travel. The Romans could have completed this night's hike before light. The 300 cavalry escorted the

\footnote{272 The local shepherd guide should assure that they walked the most efficient route, and these are picked men and should be understood to have been fit.\footnote{273 Naismith's rule is one hour for every 5km traveled plus 1 hour for every 600 meters climbed, see e.g. Scarf 2008. 25 km traveled plus 1036 m climbed makes for 6.83 hours of travel.}
force down the Drin valley, acting as an advance force in case this were a Macedonian trap, particularly when moving through the Stena near Antigoneia.

Fusha e Cajupit is not visible from the Drin valley, nor is any pass over this mountain range apparent from the Drin valley. Although Philip had travelled north through this valley to the Stena and then spent multiple days scouting the area, it is easily understandable that he would not have seen this pass, as the mountain looks like a continuous, sheer wall. Since Philip passed through this area before the local shepherds had returned from their winter pastures, and the regional leader Charopus was inclined to help the Romans, it is reasonable to infer that no one told him about a pass over the mountain.

The next night, the shepherd led them northeast roughly 5km down the wash from Fusha e Cajupit toward the valley floor, descending at an average grade of 17%. They then continued northwest along the valley for roughly 8.5 km to where the modern village of Peshtan is today, at 365 m elevation. While Naismith's rule only adds 10 minutes per 300 m of steep descent, I prefer to add the same estimate for steep descent that applies to steep ascent. By this method of estimation, it would have taken the Romans about 4.5 hours to get to Peshtan (13.5 km with 844 m steep descent and 200 m ascent). For comparison, Professor Thomas Rose and I at Mt. Olympus descended 9km at an average grade of 19% in just under 4.5 hours. The local workmen on VRVAP, Klaert Shehu and Bashkim Lika, have used this route from Fusha e Cajupit down into the valley and back to Peshtan for hunting. The local shepherds also attested to this being a
commonly used and viable route. Additionally, the shepherds said that there is an Ottoman road network that connects the villages of Leskaj, Limar, and Peshtan, further attesting to the viability of this route. Both the workmen and the shepherds agreed that from the pass to Peshtan should take no more than six hours, and this time estimate was given after they had witnessed our slow American hiking speeds on an attempt on Mt. Golikut.

The smoke signal needs to have been visible from the Roman camp at Tepelenë, but did not need to be sent from the top of Mt. Golikut. Instead, from the area on Figure 3.44 marked with a blue thumbtack, only 400 m of elevation above Peshtan, one can clearly see where the Roman camp was at Tepelenë, and a smoke signal sent from this point would have been visible at the Roman camp. I was able to walk from Peshtan to this point in 50 minutes, making for a total time of travel on the second night of roughly 5.5 hours. The Romans were able to complete this route during the night, and then put up the smoke signal at first light.

The majority of the Roman force would have stayed around the area of Peshtan, a location above and hidden from Philip's camp, and only the required personnel would have gone up to make the smoke signal.

Livy reports that once Flamininus saw the smoke signal:

Then in earnest the consul formed the army into three parts and marched with the flower of his troops up the middle of the valley and hurled his

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274 I was unable to hike this route because it is too dangerous due to the massive marijuana growing operations in the valley. Early August is some kind of sensitive time for these growers, and the increased police activity at Lazarat was making the situation sensitive, and these gangsters had apparently gained a reputation as willing to shoot on sight. It appears that while the press and the Albanian government focus on the illicit marijuana-growing operations based just south of Gjirokaster in Lazarat, there is another operation in the Zagori valley.
right and left wings against the camp; the enemy came to meet him with no less vigor.

tum uero trifariam\textsuperscript{275} diuisis copiis consul ualle media cum militum robore succedit, cornua dextra laeuaque admuet castris; nec segnius hostes obuiam eunt.

(L.32.12.1)

[Figure 3.45] Flamininus saw the smoke from the Roman camp at Tepelenë just after sunrise at 6 am, and then drew up the army in formation and marched down the valley towards Philip's camp [Figure 3.35], covering the roughly 9 km to the field just west of the Neck where the skirmishes had previously been held by about 9 am. For the first time, Flamininus attacked in full force, as the previous attacks had been only skirmishes.\textsuperscript{276}

In contrast, Plutarch reports that Flamininus attacked Philip's camp in full force and only then, when already in the midst of battle, saw the smoke that led to the arrival of the surrounding Roman force saving the day (Plut.\textit{Flam.} 4.4-6). This account makes less sense for two reasons: First, there would be no need to send a smoke signal to tell an

\textsuperscript{275} Livy's use of \textit{trifariam} here indicates dividing the army into three parts which then all marched together to the same place. In contrast, Livy's twelve other uses of \textit{trifariam} refer to three distinctly separate military actions in separate places: Livy refers to dividing an army \textit{trifariam} with the three parts then acting in separate locations ten times (L.5.26.7, 6.2.7, 8.24.7, 26.41.20, 33.15.2, 34.38.5, 36.16.11, 38.20.6, 38.20.9, 38.46.8) - including all six examples in Livy's fourth decade -, as well as to three nations being divided into three armies (L.3.22.7), and three wars in three places (L.2.31.7). At the Aous, though, the three parts all do the exact same thing at the same time, namely attack Philip's camp. Polybius elsewhere discusses that the Romans had a special three-part marching order for dangerous situations (Plb.6.40.10-11). Plutarch 's narrative uses a similar phrase to Livy's at this same point in the narrative, "τριχῇ νείµας τὴν δύναµιν" (Plut. \textit{Flam.} 4.4). As Plutarch and Livy are both understood to have had access to Polybius' account, this could reflect Polybius' original language which Livy then translated directly. This would mean that Livy uses \textit{trifariam} to mean a military-related division into three parts and that the limited sample size has skewed it to seem to mean that the three parts have to act in separate places.

\textsuperscript{276} Livy's report that Flamininus sent both wings at once could appear strange in light of the narrow constraints of the topography. However, we should view this as paired with the following clause about the Macedonians matching their vigor in attack as Livy indicating that this was a full battle with Flamininus committing all soldiers in contrast to a skirmish, rather than Livy commenting on Flamininus' specific tactics.
army that was already engaged in battle that you were going to enter the battle; one could just enter the battle. Second, the plan of the surrounding force sending a signal to set the main army into motion and then waiting to attack until the main army was within the defensive works assures that the surrounding force did not attack too soon, which would leave them liable to slaughter against the larger Macedonian army, or that the main army did not attack before the surrounding force was in position to help them. Plutarch's account makes for a more dramatic turn of events in the battle, but implies a distinct lack of functional planning on Flamininus part.

Livy reports:

And while, carried forward by their desire to fight, they were struggling outside the defensive works, the Roman army enjoyed no small advantage in courage and skill and character of weapons; but after the king's troops, when many had been wounded or killed, retired to positions strengthened by art or strong by nature

et dum auiditate certaminis proyecti extra munitiones pugnant, haud paulo superior est Romanus miles et uirtute et scientia et genere armorum: postquam multis uolneratis interfectisque recepere se regii in loca aut munimento aut natura tuta
(L.32.12.2-3)

The battle began in the same field in which the previous skirmishes had occurred, but this time the Romans took control of the field.\textsuperscript{277} The Macedonians retreated within the Neck, across the river, and behind their additional defensive works built on the alluvial terrace, and were now protected by natural and man-made

\textsuperscript{277} At the skirmish, Livy assigns the Roman advantages as 'ordo, disciplina militaris, and genus armorum', and at the Aous as 'virtute, scientia, and genere armorum', and that the Macedonians' advantage is the landscape in both cases. Perhaps Livy is engaging here with Polybius' book 18 description of the comparative merits of the phalanx and maniple fighting styles, in which Polybius attributes the Macedonians with the advantage in arms but the Romans with the advantage in using the landscape.
defenses. As seen in Figure 3.46, the river here is not wide, and it is not deep either and could have been easily crossed by the Roman army.

then danger recoiled upon the Romans, who pushed forward impetuously over hostile ground and cramped spaces that hindered easy withdrawal.

uerterat periculum in Romanos temere in loca iniqua nec faciles ad receptum angustias progressos.
(Livy 32.12.3)

The Romans advanced through the neck and across the river and breached the Macedonians outer defensive works. However, now they were trapped with the Macedonian defensive works and the Neck obstructing their retreat and the palisaded Macedonian infantry barracks in front of them.

Nor would the Romans have escaped with unpunished rashness, if first a shout heard from the rear and then fighting as well had not made the royal troops insane with sudden terror.

neque impunita temeritate inde recepissent sese, ni clamor primum ab tergo auditus, dein pugna etiam coepta amentes repentina terrore regios fecisset.
(Livy 32.12.4)

Just as laid out in the initial plan, the Roman force with the shepherd waited to engage until the battle had fully begun. [Figure 3.47] From Peshtan, the Romans rushed down into the valley in under 20 minutes, and so would have waited until the Romans had breached the outer defensive works before attacking. Livy had reported that Philip did not fortify the parts of his camp adjacent to these southern hills, so there would have been nothing stopping this Roman charge. As such, the Macedonians' terror is understandable.

278 The river crossing just inside the Neck is a common swimming area today and would not have been a forbidding obstacle to cross or bridge.
Part of the Macedonians broke in a rout; others, when they had made a stand, more because they had no place to flee than because they had sufficient will to fight, were cut off by the enemy pressing on from both front and rear. The whole army could have been destroyed, if the victors had pursued the fleeing men; but the narrows and the rough country hindered the cavalry, the weight of their arms the infantry.

Pars in fugam effusi sunt; pars magis quia locus fugae deerat quam quod animi satis esset ad pugnam cum substitissent, ab hoste et fronte et ab tergo urgeente circumuenti sunt. deleri totus exercitus potuit si fugientes persecuti uictores essent; sed equitem angustiae locorumque asperitas, peditem armorum grauitas impediit (Livy 32.12.5-7)

The Macedonians fled east down the Aous valley and the Romans declined to pursue [Figure 3.48]. After the high-risk tactics of the battle, Flamininus now played it safe.  

**Part V: Aftermath**

The king at first fled in disorder and without looking back; then, having progressed an interval of five miles, when he surmised, which was true, that the enemy was not able to follow on account of the dangerousness of the terrain, he stopped on a certain hill and he sent his men through all the ridges and valleys in order to collect all the men roaming about into one place.

rex primo effuse ac sine respectu fugit; dein quinque milium spatium progressus cum ex iniquitate locorum, id quod erat, suspicatus esset sequi non posse hostem, substitit in tumulo quodam dimisitque suos per omnia iuga uallesque qui palatos in unum colligerent. (Livy 32.12.8)

Roughly five Roman miles east of Philip's camp, in the hills above the modern village of Këlcyrë, sit the remains of Old Këlcyrë. This location gave Philip a great

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279 Notice that Livy presents both the landscape and the Roman arms as aiding the Macedonian retreat. When it comes to retreating, the Macedonians have the advantage over the Romans in all ways.
vantage point to view [Figure 3.49] the Aous valley and [Figure 3.50] the general region, to both keep track of the potential Roman pursuit as well as find his scattered men.

Philip's retreat down the Aous valley was indeed unfavorable ground for the Romans: the Romans had no opportunity to have seen this ground previously, and the narrow path and steep wooded mountainsides could have made this a great place for an ambush. Flamininus could have reasonably feared that the Macedonians' quick retreat was part of a trap designed to draw the Romans down the valley into an ambush.

With not more than 2,000 men lost, the entire rest of the multitude, as if having followed some signal, gathered into one place and sought Thessaly with a regular military formation.

non plus duobus milibus hominum amissis cetera omnis multitudo, uelut signum aliquod secuta, in unum cum conuenisset, frequenti agmine petunt Thessaliam.
(L.32.12.9)

With the Romans pressing on both sides, having breached all the Macedonian natural and man-made defenses, one could have expected the total slaughter and capture of the entire Macedonian army at the Aous. Instead the Macedonians only lost 2000 men and all the rest escaped. The organized behavior of Philip's men after their defeat indicates that their retreat had been previously planned. They knew the route south down the Aous valley towards Thessaly well, as it had been their supply route. Philip had been

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283 The inhabitants were moved from Old Këlçyrê to Këlçyrê in the 1960s by the communist government. When Hammond 1966 refers to Këlçyrê, he means Old Këlçyrê as he was referring to the situation in 1931 when he had been there. The ruins of Ali Pasha's fort at Old Këlçyrê might have incorporated ancient blocks (Leake 1835 I, p 385 says he saw them, Hammond 1966 says he did not.) David Scahill saw my photos and thought that they might be Trajanic blocks; we plan on returning to investigate further.
prepared to abandon his position by the Aous should his defenses get breached; Philip was not making his final stand at the Aous.

However, in direct contrast to his own report of the events of the Battle of the River Aous, Livy also provides Valerius Antias' alternate account:

Valerius Antias writes that Villius, because he could not use the direct road, since the whole country was held by the king, entered the defile, followed the valley through the midst of which the river Aous flows, and, hastily throwing a bridge over the river to the bank on which the king's camp lay, crossed and engaged the enemy; that he defeated the king and put him to flight and expelled him from his camp; that he killed twelve thousand of the enemy in that battle and captured two thousand two hundred, together with one hundred thirty-two standards and two hundred thirty horses; and that he vowed a temple to Jupiter in this battle, if success attended him. The other Greek and Latin writers, at least those whose annals I consulted, report that Villius did nothing of remark, but handed over to the next consul, Titus Quinctius, the war in the same state that he had received it.

Livy's report of Antias' account works as counterpoint to his own version of events. Compared to the account that Livy endorses, not only did Antias get which Roman consul fought the battle wrong, he got certain other key details wrong as well: while Livy makes clear, by going through it twice, that both consuls had a choice between a safe option that avoided Philip's camp at the Aous and a dangerous option that
went through Philip's camp at the Aous (L.32.6.2-3, 32.9.8-9), in Antias' account the consul's only route was through Philip's camp; in Livy's account the Romans overcame many difficulties in storming Philip's camp, but crossing the Aous was not enough of an obstacle to warrant mention, while in Antias' account it is the only obstacle worthy of mention; and, in Livy's account Philip escaped with minimal casualties, while Villius' account reports so many casualties as to have made this a major Roman victory.  

My own research and analysis also suggests that Antias' version of events lacks validity as Livy's account aligns better with the landscape: Philip's camp did not block the main east-west corridor, and crossing the Aous would not have been a serious obstacle. Additionally, a major Roman victory on the scale of Antias' account would make Philip's subsequent military actions in 198 BC after his retreat from the Aous difficult, if not altogether impossible, to have carried out.  

Returning to Philip's retreat after the battle:

The king on the first day reached the Camp of Pyrrhus; the place called by this name is in Triphylia and belongs to the territory of Molottis. The next day - a huge march for an army, but fear drove them on - they reached thence the Lyncus Mountains. This range is in Epirus, lying between Macedonian and Thessaly; the side which overlooks Thessaly faces east, the northern Macedonia. It is clothed with abundant forests; the summits of the ridges offer open fields and ever-flowing springs. There Philip remained in camp for several days, uncertain in mind whether he should straightaway return to his kingdom or try to beat the enemy into Thessaly.

281 Antias' account also reports Villius' vowing of a temple, if he was victorious. While we do not have enough evidence to know for sure, if this temple did not exist in Livy's day, Livy could have been using that absence as evidence that Villius had not been victorious at the Aous.  

282 See discussion of Philip's actions in the remainder of the 198 BC campaign in chapter 4.
spectat, septentrio a Macedonia obicitur. uestiti frequentibus siluis sunt; iuga summa campos patentes aquasque perennes habent. ibi statuuis rex per aliquot dies fluctuatus animo est utrum protinus in regnum se reciperet an praeverti in Thessaliam posset. (L.32.13.2-4)

We do not know what the Camp of Pyrrhus was. [Figure 3.51] However, understanding that Philip left Old Këlcyrë about 12pm gave him roughly 10 hours of daylight in which his fear-driven men could have covered just over 50 km, which would have put them in the Konitsa plain. This well watered area would have been a fitting place for them to camp. The next day's march ended in the area between Metsovo and the modern village of Kranea. This is the one area from which one can go north to Macedon or east to Thessaly, via, respectively, the Grevena and Zygos passes.

Additionally, the high mountain plateau landscape in this area during the summer matches Livy's description. From the Konitsa plain to this area, though, would have been an impressive march. Whether Philip retraced his steps from earlier in the campaign and went south to Passaron before heading east into the Pindus to Metsovo, or if he headed east into the mountains from the Konitsa plain to Kranea, would have entailed a 100 km day. Although Livy specifies this as one long day, it makes more sense if this route took Philip two days. Three days to get from Old Këlcyrë to near Metsovo was still an impressive amount of ground to have covered in a limited time.

The same strategic and logistical planning skills that Philip had displayed in taking the early-season initiative and establishing a camp with secure supply routes, he again displayed in his efficient and orderly retreat from the Aous with limited casualties.

283 Kranea sits roughly 25 km north-northwest of Metsovo.
Livy reports while the Macedonians fled:

The Romans followed as far as it was safe, killing and despoiling the slain, and plundered the king's tent, which, even when undefended was difficult to approach; and spent that night in their own camp. The next day the consul followed the enemy along the defile through which the river makes its way down the valley.

Romani quoad tutum fuit insecuti caedentes spoliantesque caesos castra regia, etiam sine defensoribus difficili aditu, diripiunt; atque ea nocte in suis castris manserunt. postero die consul per ipsas angustias quas inter ualle se flumen insinuat hostem sequitur.
(Livy 32.12.10 - 32.13.1)

After the battle, the Romans only pursued as far as the Zagori river at the eastern edge the section of valley that held Philip's camp before returning to their camp at Tepelenë. The next day the Romans went as far as Modern Këlcyrë before returning to their camp at Tepelenë. Flamininus continued to play it safe after the battle. The Battle of the River Aous was over.

Conclusions

After Philip retreated into the Pindus, the Romans controlled all the east-west routes between Macedon and Illyria, as well as all the north-south routes between Illyria and Epirus. Rome had been periodically fighting to establish and maintain control of the Illyrian ports and their extended hinterland since 229 BC through the First Illyrian War, Second Illyrian War, First Macedonian War and Second Macedonian War. However, after the Battle of the River Aous, the Illyrian ports were protected, and the Adriatic was secure. Rome did not operate in this theater of war again over the time period covered in this dissertation.
After Philip retreated into the Pindus, however, it was in no way predetermined what Flamininus would do next. Flamininus had multiple choices that would all have been reasonable: Flamininus could have returned to Apollonia, having defeated Philip in battle and further secured Roman regional control, and set about petitioning for a triumph or ovation at Rome; Flamininus could have resumed the logical progression of events from the previous two years' campaigns and acted to push the boundary further eastward, extending Sulpicius' work; Flamininus could have continued south and shored up diplomatic relations and alliances with the Epirotes and Aetolians; or, Flamininus could pursue Philip into the Pindus. Flamininus' early season encampment at the Aous had disrupted the Romans' plans, and now that Philip had fled, Flamininus' path forward was unclear.

Colonel Leake wrote about the Battle of the River Aous that "It was on this singular field, in the year 198 BC, that the Romans obtained the first and therefore the most important of a series of victories, which extinguished forever the independence of Greece." However, this analysis was only apt after the battles of Cynoscephalae and Pydna had been fought. Immediately after the battle, there was no reason to think that this battle had been significantly more important than, say, the skirmish at Otolobum the previous year. It retrospect, the Battle of the River Aous can be looked at as a watershed moment when Rome and Macedon first clashed and thus the beginning of the end for Macedon. But at the time there was no reason to think that Flamininus had intended to

284 Sulpicius had chased Philip the previous season as well.
285 However, Flamininus had learned through his and Sulpicius' successive treatments of Viilus that it was easier for a consul to get replaced if he was in a location easier for his replacement to reach.
286 Leake 1835 I, p383.
greatly expand the scope of the war and to go to Thessaly. Much as Sulpicius had chased Philip into Pelagonia after the skirmish at Otolobum in 199 BC, seemingly changing his campaign program in direct response to Philip's flight, Flamininus would in fact chase Philip into Thessaly later in 198 BC. It was the events in the aftermath of the Aous that pulled Flamininus' attentions into Thessaly rather than east into the areas between Illyria and Macedon. When Flamininus returned to his encampment at Tepelenë on the evening of June 25th, 198 BC his choices were wide open and his actions not predetermined, and the history of Roman involvement in Greece could have gone any of a number of directions.
CHAPTER 4: THESSALY

Introduction

After the Battle of the River Aous midway through the 198 BC campaign season, Philip fled to Thessaly and Flamininus initially stayed in Illyria near the Adriatic coast. However, Flamininus soon made the momentous decision to cross the Pindus into Thessaly and opened a new Roman theater of war. From Flamininus' crossing into Thessaly through the Battle of Pydna in 168 BC, the Roman theater of war never returned to Illyria and Thessaly became the center of Roman activities in Greece.

This chapter is about the Roman military's presence in Thessaly from 198 BC through 168 BC. [Figure 4.1] Chapters 1-3 have focused on the Roman military in Illyria and the western edges of Macedon and how this related to Rome's concerns about sheltering the eastern Adriatic port cities under Rome's protection. This chapter, however, signals a shift in focus - both for the Romans and this dissertation - to a new region: Thessaly. Throughout this chapter, Thessaly serves as the battleground for control of Greece for the Macedonians, Aetolians, Athamanians, Seleucids, and Romans.

Thessaly was not viewed in antiquity as a singular area, but divided into four geographic districts, as Strabo describes:

Due to its natural features, Thessaly was divided into four parts. One part was called Phthiotis, another Hestiaeotis, another Thessaliotis, and another Pelasgiotis. Phthiotis occupies the southern parts which extend alongside Oeta from the Maliac, or Pyliac, Gulf as far as Dolopia and Pindus, and widen out as far as Pharsalus and the Thessalian plains. Hestiaeotis occupies the western parts and the parts between Pindus and Upper Macedonia. The remaining parts of Thessaly are held, first, by the people who live in the plains below Hestiaeotis (they are called Pelesgiotae and their country borders on Lower Macedonia), and, secondly, by the
Thessaliotae next in order, who fill out the districts extending as far as the Magnetan sea-coast.

Τοιαύτη δ’ οὖσα εἰς τέτταρα μέρη διήρητο· ἐκαλεῖτο δὲ τὸ μὲν Φθιώτις τὸ δὲ Ἑστιαώτις τὸ δὲ Θετταλιώτις τὸ δὲ Πελασγιώτις. ἔχει δ’ ή μὲν Φθιώτις τὰ νότια τὰ παρὰ τὴν Ὀ榈ν ἀπὸ τοῦ Μαλιακοῦ κόλπου καὶ Πυλαίκου μέχρι τῆς Δολοπίας καὶ τῆς Πίνδου διατείνοντα, πλατύνομεν δὲ μέχρι Φαρσάλου καὶ τῶν πεδίων τῶν Θετταλικῶν· ἢ δ´ Ἑστιαώτις τὰ ἐσπέρια καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ Πίνδου καὶ τῆς ἄνω Μακεδονίας· τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ οἳ τε ὑπὸ τῇ Ἑστιαώτιδι νεμόμενοι τὰ πεδία, καλούμενοι δὲ Πελασγιώται, συνάπτοντες ἥδη τοῖς κάτω Μακεδόσι, καὶ οἱ ἐφεξῆς τὰ μέχρι Μαγνητικῆς παραλίας ἐκπληροῦντες χωρία. κἀνταῦθα δ´ ἐνδόξῳ οὐσίων ἔσται ἀρίθμησις καὶ ἄλλως [καὶ] διὰ τὴν Ὀμήρου ποίησιν· τῶν δὲ πόλεων ὀλίγαι σώζουσι τὸ πάτριον ἀξίωμα, μάλιστα δὲ Λάρισα.

(Strabo 9.5.3)

[Figure 4.2] Thessaly is divided by the Keradag ridge running northwest-southeast through the center of the plain. This ridge divides Thessaly into three landscape zones: two large plains and a hilly area. The entire plain north of the Keradag ridge, bound by the mountains to the north and Magnesia to the east, is Pelasgiotis. The plain west of the ridge bound by mountains to the north, the Pindus mountains to the west, and the hills of Dolopia to the south forms the regions of Hestiaeotis and Thessaliotis. The southeast quadrant of Thessaly, Phthiotis, is a much more hilly landscape compared to the two plains. This area extends east from where the western plain ends by Pharsalus and extends north to where the northern plain ends by Pherae.

Part I: 198 BC - 194 BC

After his victory at the Battle of the River Aous in 198 BC, Flamininus did not immediately do anything. Rather than follow Philip right away, Flamininus waited at the Roman camp at Tepelenë established before the Battle of the River Aous. This

287 For the events of the Battle of the River Aous in 198 BC, see chapter 3.
inaction allowed Flamininus to watch events develop before he took his own decisive action. This also suggests that Flamininus either did not have a plan in place for what to do if he dislodged Philip from his encampment at the Aous, or that Flamininus' plan was to stay put and further establish Roman control and protection of the Illyrian ports.

While Flamininus waited by the Aous, Philip fled across Thessaly leaving a path of destruction in his wake, and the Aetolians and Athamanians each ravaged a section of Thessalian borderland.

As discussed in Chapter 3, Philip retreated from his defeat at the Battle of the River Aous down the Aous valley towards Passaron, and then east into the Pindus Mountains. [Figure 4.3] When he reached the crossroads by the modern town of Metsovo, Philip chose to not continue north via the Grevena pass, the route he had taken from Macedon earlier that year. Instead, Philip continued east via the Zygos pass and emerged into the northwest corner of Thessaly.

This route via the Zygos pass was the only viable route for an army over the Pindus between Thessaly and Epirus from antiquity until 2009, with the completion of the building of the modern A2 highway (the Odos Egnatia).288 As a result, this route was also of prime economic importance. The value of this route for trade in the pre-modern era is perhaps best exemplified by the great effort and expense undertaken by Ali Pasha to build up a road here as well as establish and maintain a system of khans to control and support the trade along this corridor at the end of the 18th century.289 As Ali Pasha is

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288 The route was roughly similar to the modern A6 roadway.
thought to have only built upon and enhanced existing road networks, rather than create new ones, scholars believe there was previously a Roman road here and perhaps even an earlier predecessor; however, it is worth noting that dating the archaeological remains of roads is notoriously tricky.\(^{290}\)

Beyond trade, this would have been a crucial route for transhumant shepherds. While Thessaly is dedicated to agriculture today, Jason of Pherae's ability in 370 BC to requisition more than 1000 cattle and over 10,000 other herd animals from the cities of Thessaly with no delay, and without putting the onus on any particular city, indicates how much of Thessaly was devoted to pasturage in antiquity (Xen.\textit{Hell.6.4.28-9}). That this situation continued through the pre-modern era is indicated by Leake's statement that in the western Thessalian plains, "notwithstanding the fertility of these plains, cultivation is confined to the vicinity of the villages; the remainder supplies only winter pasture to sheep and cattle."\(^{291}\) The route of this transhumance is indicated today by the village at the eastern edge of the pass named Dhiava, named for the twice-yearly sojourn shepherds take from the mountains to the plains.\(^{292}\)

Livy reports that Philip, on his arrival in northwest Thessaly, first went to Tricca\(^{293}\) (L.32.13.5) and then:

\[\begin{align*}
\text{…from there he rapidly traversed the towns in his way. He summoned from their homes the men who could follow; the towns he burned. The owners were allowed to carry with them what they could of their possessions; the rest was booty for the army. Nor was there any hardship}\end{align*}\]

\(^{290}\) See e.g. Pritchett 1980; Makris & Papageorgiou 1990; Fachard & Pirisino 2015.

\(^{291}\) Leake 1835 I, p433.

\(^{292}\) Salmon, 1995; Salmon, 1997.

\(^{293}\) For ancient toponyms, I use the spelling Livy used, when possible. Talbert 2000, which I used as the base layer for some of my accompanying maps, employs a mix of Greek and Latin spellings, including Trikka instead of Tricca.
unexperienced, which an enemy could inflict, greater than what they suffered at the hands of their allies. Such actions were distasteful to Philip even as he did them, but he wished to rescue, from a land that was soon to belong to his enemies, at least the persons of his allies. So Phacium, Iresiae, Euhydrium, Eretria, and Palaepharsalus were destroyed. Excluded from Pherae, when he tried to take it, because it would require time if he wanted to capture it, and he had no time, he gave up that undertaking and crossed into Macedonia for it was rumored that the Aetolians were approaching.

inde obuias urbes raptim peragrauit. homines qui sequi possent sedibus excibat, oppida incendebat. rerum suarum quas possent ferendarum secum dominis ius fiebat, cetera militis praeda erat; nec quod ab hoste crudelius pati possent reliquam fuit quam quae ab sociis patiebantur. haec etiam facienti Philippo acerba erant, sed e terra mox futura hostium corpora saltem eripe saltem uolebat. ita euastata oppida sunt Phacium <P>iresiae Euhydrium Eretria Palaepharsalus. Pheras cum pateret exclusus, quia res egebat mora si expugnare uellet nec tempus erat, omissa incepto in Macedoniam transcendit; nam etiam Aetolos adpropinquare fama erat.
(L.32.13.6-9)

[Figure 4.4] This passage gives us information that enables us to determine Philip's route as well as to better understand his actions. Philip began at Tricca and ended in Macedonia. Tricca was located at the modern city of Trikala in the northwest corner of Thessaly and was the first city one would have come to after crossing the pass over the Pindus.294

The quickest way for Philip to reach Macedonia from Tricca would have been to go due east through the northernmost pass to Pelasgiotis. And, in fact, this is what Philip appears to have been doing when he proceeded from Tricca to Phacion, located in the Peneus valley between the ancient sites of Atrax and Pharcadon.295 However, from Phacion, instead of continuing east to Larisa and Macedon, Philip turned south and

moved along the southern edge of the Karadag ridge along the Enipeus river to Iresiae, Euhydrium, and Palaepharsalus.²⁹⁶ He then continued along the Peneus into the hills of Phthiotis and to Eretria and Pherae.²⁹⁷ Livy lists all these places in the geographic order that Philip would be expected to have encountered them on his route, except that Eretria and Palaepharsalus are reversed, as Livy ended the list of the five cities Philip sacked with Palaepharsalus to emphasize its evocative quality for Roman readers.

Philip's retreat was not an aimless path of destruction through his own allied settlements, but a carefully chosen, strategic maneuver. As Bequignon first proposed, Philip's route was designed to greatly hinder an invasion of Pelasgiotis.²⁹⁸ To invade Pelasgiotis, one had to use one of the routes across the Karadag ridge, marked with the black, dotted lines on Figure 4.4.²⁹⁹ Each of these routes was controlled by a Macedonian city (Atrax, Crannon, or Scotussa) that lay to the north of the Karadag ridge, and to invade Pelasgiotis successfully, one would have had to besiege one of these cities. However, Philip's destructive retreat along the southern side of the Karadag ridge greatly reduced the resources available for a besieging army to live off the land. Beyond destroying the cities themselves, Philip presumably destroyed or took whatever food and supplies were stored in the towns as well as laid waste the adjacent agricultural lands. Additionally, removing the existing population would prevent an invading army from selling them as slaves, enlisting them as recruits, or working them in the fields. Thus,

²⁹⁸ Bequignon 1928, esp. p445. The subsequent discussion of the mechanics of how this would hinder an invasion is my own analysis.
²⁹⁹ For the road network across Thessaly, see Hammond 1988, p62, passim.
Philip economically crippled the area to prevent it from being a resource for an invading army.

Looking at the relationship of the places Philip sacked to the cities of Atrax, Crannon, and Scotussa makes this even more clear: Phacion was in the region of Atrax; Iresiae was in the region of the western pass that controlled by Crannon; Euhydrion and Palaepharsalus were located in the region of the grain supplying lands for the eastern route that Krannon controlled and the route Scotussa controlled. Eretria did not control grain land, but controlled the route east through the Phthiotic hills.

Philip's action here in Thessaly can be compared to a similar strategy he (or his son Perseus) later adopted further north. Polybius reports that in 169 BC Perseus sent envoys through "the so-called Desert Illyria, which not many years previously had been depopulated by the Macedonians in order to make it difficult for the Dardanians to invade Illyria and Macedonia" (Plb.28.8.3; cp. L.43.20.1). The success of this Macedonian policy is seen here in that the envoys had trouble just crossing this region, much less leading an army through it (Plb.28.8.4; L.43.20.1). Both in this instance and in Thessaly in 198 BC, the Macedonians used a scorched earth policy with the goal of hindering an invasion.

After destroying Eretria, Philip started but then quickly abandoned a siege of Pherae, before returning to Macedon via the Vale of Tempe. Livy reports that Philip was influenced to abandon Pherae because "it was rumored that the Aetolians were close at hand." However, Livy's account of the concurrent Aetolian campaign, discussed below,

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300 Perseus took up the crown from Philip in 179 BC; it is unclear which monarch oversaw the creation of ‘Desert Illyria’ given the imprecise nature of Polybius’ phrase “not many years previously.”
indicates that this was indeed only a rumor, as the Aetolians were not campaigning near enough to threaten Pherae. Furthermore, examination of the landscape suggests other reasons that might have factored into Philip's decision. Pherae was not crucial to Philip for controlling the easternmost north-south route in Thessaly, because Phthiotic Thebes and Demetrias were already strong Macedonian cities on the route, and Philip's army by this time must have been swollen with civilian refugees and wagons of supplies from the previously sacked cities, making for a less than ideal situation for conducting a siege.

Livy stresses the speed of Philip's movements after the Battle of the River Aous across the Pindus to Thessaly. However, once in Thessaly Philip undertook a strategic course of action beyond just a speedy retreat home. By destroying the settlements along the southern side of the Karadag ridge, Philip acted to prevent an invasion of Pelasgiotis while simultaneously demarcating it as the area of Thessaly which he would fight to control.\textsuperscript{301}

\[\text{Figure 4.5}\] The Aetolians and Athamanians conducted their own Thessalian campaigns after they heard about Philip's defeat at the Aous. Livy presents the Macedonian, Aetolian, and Athamanian campaigns as "wasting Thessaly all at once" (L.32.14.4), and frames them as three parallel campaigns working together to achieve a singular outcome of "reaping, through plundering, the fruits of another's [Rome's] victory" (L.32.14.4). However, these three campaigns were also each serving to secure what each party considered was the key border zone in regards to Thessaly. The distinct goals of the three campaigns are indicated by the fact that they were not in competition.

\textsuperscript{301} As discussed below, this accords with the Macedonian holdings in Thessaly in 229 BC, which had been their smallest holdings in Thessaly in a long time.
with each other geographically. A unifying factor, however, was that all three campaigns were directly motivated by apparent Macedonian weakness revealed by the loss to the Romans at the Battle of the River Aous. However, rather than merely working for the same abstract goal of plunder, each party was campaigning in their own self-interest based on their own localized concerns.

Livy reports that the Aetolians heard of the Macedonian defeat at the Battle of the River Aous and as a result they began their Thessalian campaign (L.32.13.10). They began on the way to Thessaly by devastating the lands around Sperchiae and Macra Come (L.32.13.10) in the Sperchios valley at the western edge of the Malian plain. The Aetolians then continued north into Dolopia, the hill country north of the western Sperchius valley and west of lake Xynias, and captured the settlements of Cymene and Angeia (L.32.13.10). Continuing northwest, the Aetolians attacked and were repulsed from Metropolis and Kallithera (L.32.13.11-12), two towns at the southwestern edge of Thessaliotis where the plain meets the hills. Rather than advance from here into the Thessalian plain, the Aetolians then turned back southeast into Dolopia and sacked the villages of Teuma and Celathera, received the surrender of Acharrae (L.32.13.12), and intercepted and slaughtered the citizens of Xyniai as they fled towards Thaumaci (L.32.13.14). This indicates that the Aetolians went from Acharrae east, going north of Lake Xynias to the area between Thaumaci and Xyniai, before turning south and looting

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Xyniae (L.32.13.14). From here they turned back west and captured the fort Cyphaera before returning to Aetolia (L.32.13.14).³⁰⁶

Livy reports that this was "a swift campaign of only a few days" (L.32.13.15). During these few days, however, the Aetolians managed to ravage the territory of three settlements, capture seven other settlements, and unsuccessfullly attack two more, which begs the question of just how long "raptim intra paucos dies" means for Livy, a question to which we will return later in this chapter.

Livy's focus on the speed of the campaign, the brutality of the Aetolians against the Xyniaeans, and the fact that it was in Thessaly, frames the campaign as parallel to Philip's. However, close examination of the route the Aetolians took indicates that this was instead a well-designed and executed campaign to take control of Dolopia. The Aetolians started at the Malian plain south of Dolopia and then went in a clockwise circle up to the border with Thessaliotis to the north and Achaea Phtiotis to the east before returning back to Aetolia.

Livy reports that Amynander, the king of the Athamanians, also heard about the Roman victory at the Aous. However, instead of just waging an independent campaign as the Aetolians did, Amynander asked Flamininus for a "modicum praesidium" with which to do some raiding (L.32.13.15 - 32.14.1), exhibiting proper behavior for a Roman ally. With Roman permission and praesidium, Amynander then waged his own concurrent campaign with Philip's and the Aetolians'.

The Athamanians first assaulted the oppidum Phaecam, which sat between Gomphi and the pass (L.32.14.1).³⁰⁷ Phaecam must then have been in the area of the

³⁰⁶ Cyphaera (=Kypaira), see Helly 1992, pp79-80 & carte 1.
modern villages of Pyli and Paleomonastiro as these sit between Gomphi and the entrance to the pass across the Pindus that exits at Ambracia on the other end. The Athamanians then besieged Gomphi, which capitulated after nine days, followed by the surrender of six named settlements "and other insignificant forts in the vicinity" (L.32.14.1-3). The Athamanians thus quickly took control of an area at the western border of Thessaly focused on the key city of Gomphi. Gomphi had great strategic importance because it controlled the southernmost of the two passes over the Pindus from Thessaly. Livy similarly frames this campaign as parallel to Philip's and the Aetolians’ in that it is swift, brutal, and in Thessaly. Close examination of the route shows that the Athamanian's campaign was very localized in order to secure the area of most strategic importance to themselves, as it controlled their access - as well as Aetolian and Acarnanian access - to Thessaly via the pass that ran from by Ambracia to Thessaly.

The Aetolians waged their 198 BC campaign in a manner consistent with their behaviors and concerns over the past forty years. Looking at the history of Aetolian actions in Thessaly over that period thus helps us to better understand the events of 198 BC. This is not the first time that the Aetolians had made inroads into Dolopia and Thessaly. [Figure 4.6] In, or just before, 239 BC and the death of the Macedonian king Antigonus, the Aetolians gained control of much of the Sperchios valley and Dolopia. During the 230's BC, Aetolia moved into western Phthiotic Achaia, including Thaumaci, Melitaia, and Xynias. Joseph Scholten has used epigraphic evidence to prove that following the death of the Macedonian king Demetrius II in 229 BC, Aetolia aggressively

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308 Graninger 2010, p320; Scholten 2000, pp59-130; Grainger 1999, 105-146.  
expanded into Thessaly and claimed cities including "Limnaion, Trakka, Eurymenai, Phaloria, and Gomphoi in Hestiaiotis; Pharsalos in Thessaliotis; and Pteleon. Larisa Kremaste, Melitaia, Thaumakoi, and Thebes in Phthiotic Achaea"\textsuperscript{310} into the Aetolian League.\textsuperscript{311} However, in 228 BC Antigonus Doson promptly took back all of the gains made by Aetolia in Thessaly during 229 BC, with the exception of Phthiotic Achaea.\textsuperscript{312}

Upon the death of Macedonian king-regent Antigonus Doson in 222/221 BC, Aetolia again followed this already established pattern of aggressive offensive action whenever there was a change of kings at Macedon. This time, the resulting conflict was the Social War, which involved three successive Aetolian campaigns in Thessaly, each based out of Phthiotic Thebes. In 219 BC, the Aetolians marched from Phthiotic Thebes through Pelasgiotis, through Tempe, all the way into Pieria, and sacked Dion before marching back (Plb.4.62.1-4). Polybius asserts that the Aetolians only aimed to raid and pillage rather than gain territory in their campaigns, including this one (Plb.4.62.5). They made a further attempt in 218 BC, but the Macedonians were waiting for them in the plain and so the Aetolians stayed in the hills of Phthiotis (Plb.5.17.5-7). They raided again in 217 BC, this time inflicting serious damage on the people of Demetrias to the east at the border of Pelasgiotis and Phthiotis, Pharsalus to the west at the border of Phthiotis and Thessaliotis, and Larisa to the north (Plb.5.99.3-5). Philip responded by forcing Phthiotic Thebes to surrender and replacing the inhabitants with Macedonian colonists (Plb.5.99.1 - 5.100.8). The Aetolians and Macedonians then brokered a peace

\textsuperscript{310} Scholten 2000, p166. See p166n5 for epigraphic bibliography for the Aetolian claims to these cities. 
\textsuperscript{311} Scholten 2000, pp164-168, map 8. 
\textsuperscript{312} Scholten 2000, pp168-183.
with both parties retaining what they held at that moment (Plb.5.101.8 - 5.105.2, esp. 5.103.7-8), indicating that the Aetolians still held Phthiotic Achaea and Dolopia.

Livy reports that in 205 BC "Philip compelled the Aetolians to sue for peace and make a treaty on terms of his own choosing" (L.29.12.1) to end the Aetolian involvement in the Roman's First Macedonian War. The Aetolian 198 BC campaign in the Sperchius valley and Dolopia indicates that the Aetolians had lost those holdings in the 205 BC settlement.

The Aetolians continued their consistent behavior in the Second Macedonian War. In response to their brief, yet successful, 200 BC campaign season, the Romans gained the Athamanians as allies (L.31.18.1) and tasked them with bringing the Aetolians into the fold (L.31.18.3). However, the Aetolians had previously learned in the First Macedonian War that Roman alliance alone was not enough to keep them safe from the Macedonians. The Aetolians had learned from this that they were best served by waiting for perceived evidence of Macedonian weakness before making a treaty against them. Thus, it was after Philip lost the battle by Otolubus in 199 BC and was then distracted by a threefold attack on Macedonia by the Roman army from the west, the Dardani from the north, and the Roman navy from the East, that the Aetolians took advantage by invading Thessaly and joining the Roman alliance (L.31.40.9 - 31.41.1). (L.31.41.1). [Figure 4.7] Livy reports that a combined Aetolian and Athamanian force promptly sacked Cercinium, terrorized the inhabitants of the Boebe marsh district, and then moved to Perrhaebia, sacking Cyretiae and receiving the surrender of Maloea.

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313 As they had been compelled to sue Philip for peace in 205 BC, despite their Roman alliance (L.29.12.1).
They were then put to flight by Philip near Pharcadon, a city just west of Atrax, supposedly having been on their way to Gomphi, due to Amynander's influence. As Gomphi was key to Amynander's 198 BC campaign, it makes sense that he had wanted it assaulted in 199 BC as well.

The Aetolian's route is reminiscent of their 219 BC route: they came up north via Phthiotis along the eastern edge of Pelasgiotis and then raided one of the two routes between Thessaly and Macedon, the difference being that in 219 BC they went through Tempe and in 199 BC they focused on the route into Macedon through Perrhaebia.

Between 239 BC and 199 BC, the Aetolians had lost all the territory they had acquired as a result of expansion with regard to Thessaly, Dolopia, the western Sperchios valley, and Phthiotic Achaea. Additionally, since their territorial gains of 229 BC, their campaigns were reduced to only raids, and they lost more territory with each new conflict. However, in 198 BC the Aetolians again acted to gain territory. Perhaps they had gained an irredentist dream of looking beyond raiding and trying to regain their holdings from before the 205 BC settlement - or maybe even the 229 BC pinnacle of their expansion.

The Aetolians also showed a consistent propensity to invade Thessaly when they perceived weakness in Macedonia, such as at the deaths of the Macedonian kings in 239 BC, 229 BC, and 221 BC; as well as the Roman alliance against Macedon of 211 BC; and the military setback and new Roman alliance in 199 BC. These examples,

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315 Pharcadon: Stahlin 1924; Lauffer 1989, p535.
316 See discussion in chapter 5 on the importance of the route between Thessaly and Macedon via Perrhaebia.
317 On Greater Aetolia's vicissitudes and attempts at irredentism, see Scholten 2000, pp 131-234.
importantly, also demonstrate the Aetolian's hyper-awareness to perceived Macedonian weakness alongside their preparedness to respond instantly, even within the same campaign season. That the Aetolians, and now Athamanians, responded to perceived Macedonian weakness by promptly invading Thessaly indicated the importance to them of territorial gains in Thessaly.

The flipside of the previous account from the Aetolian perspective is that since Philip became king in 221 BC he had consistently acted to protect and increase Macedonian holdings in Thessaly, e.g. in the Social War campaigns and the 205 BC treaty. In 199 BC, Philip led his army to drive the Aetolians and Athamanians out of Thessaly. He was facing attack on three fronts at this time and chose Thessaly as the front he would deal with personally. Philip continued south from Pharadon, where he drove away the Aetolians and Athamanians, to Thaumaci at the edge of Phthiotic Achaea and the Thessalian plain but was driven away by Aetolian aid to the city (L.32.4.1-7).

Livy reports that while the Aetolians and Athamanians were plundering in Thessaly, "the consul marched into the country of Epirus through the pass which had been laid open by the enemy" (L.32.14.4-5). Livy tells us that Flamininus acted to secure the goodwill of the Epirotes for the future, rather than punish them for their past Macedonian alliance (L.32.14.5-6). Flamininus took this so far as to not forage from their fields (L.32.15.5) and presumably not requisition grain from the settlements either.

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318 The route of Philip's flight is discussed in detail in Chapter 3. For now what matters is that it is in Epirus.
319 Livy is potentially also foreshadowing a contrast here with Paullus' devastation of Epirus in 167 BC (L.45.34.2-6; Plut. Aem. 29; Strabo 7.7.3).
As a result, Flamininus needed a way to get food and supplies for his troops, if he wanted to continue the season's campaign.

Flamininus "sent messengers to Corcyra, that the cargo ships should proceed to the Ambracian gulf" (L.32.14.7). This action indicates a change in Roman policy, as this moved the Roman base of operations south from where it had been based previously. Moving the cargo ships could be understood to indicate that Flamininus intended to move his base of operations from Illyria and northern Epirus into Aetolia. This would indicate great trust in the Aetolians on Flamininus' part, as the Aetolians controlled movement into the Ambracian gulf. Flamininus apparently did not fully trust this alliance, however, as he later felt compelled to send scouts to see if the cargo ships had indeed been able to enter the gulf or had stayed just outside it at Leucas (L.32.15.5).

However, instead of marching south towards Ambracia, Flamininus made the unprecedented move of marching a Roman army east across the Pindus and "advanced by easy marches and on the fourth day encamped on Mount Cercetius" (L.32.14.7), and thus became "the first Roman who had crossed to Greece in command of an army" (Plb.18.12.5).

Crossing the Pindus was a momentous and unprecedented step. However, this did not mean that Flamininus would then necessarily campaign in Thessaly. It would have been consistent with Sulpicius' behavior in 200 BC and 199 BC to have secured the Thessalian side of the pass through the Pindus, left a garrison there, and returned to winter on the Adriatic coast. This would have served to extend the Roman buffer zone
around the Adriatic ports to the next major geographical boundary, as the two previous campaigns had.

Flamininus' arrival at Mt. Cercetius, the mountain ridge running north-south at the northwestern edge of the Thessalian plain, allows us to determine Flamininus' route.\textsuperscript{320} [Figure 4.3] The route from Passaron over the Pindus to Thessaly is just over 125 km, starting at roughly 480 m elevation and ascending to a maximum height of 1680 m elevation, but with roughly 3000 meters of total elevation gain due to the rugged terrain, and then descending to roughly 200 meters. This could have been completed in the four days Livy specifies, though they would have been more strenuous than "modica itinera" (L.32.14.7).

This was the same route over the Pindus that Philip had just taken, however, Flamininus did not proceed directly to the Thessalian plain as Philip had done. [Figure 4.8] Instead, Flaminius turned south roughly 9km before where the pass enters into the plain by the modern town of Kalabaka, and continued into the valley of the tributary of the Peneus there, the Kleinovitimos river. Continuing 6km down this valley put Flamininus in the western foothills of Mt. Cercetius. Flaminius could not enter Thessaly from here without returning to the Peneus valley, however it gave him a chance to prepare to enter Thessaly before he got to Philip's garrisons of Phaloria and Aeginion located by Kalabaka. Roughly 11km down the valley is a fitting spot for the Roman camp, with enough room for the encampment and with access to fresh water. Furthermore, this area was protected from any potential Macedonian garrisons in western Thessaly by Mt. Cercetius to the east.

\textsuperscript{320} Mt Cercetius (= Mt. Koziakas = Mt. Kerketio): Stahlin 1924; Hammond 1967, p284.
Livy reports that once Flamininus encamped here, he summoned Amynander (L.32.14.7). Amynander had been campaigning in the area of Gomphi, as discussed above, and would have traveled to Flamininus by entering the Pindus northwest of Gomphi by the modern village of Pili, continuing east roughly 5km and then cutting behind Mt. Cercetius and going due north to the Roman camp.

Livy reports that Amynander's troops, as well as some Epirote volunteers, were to guide the Romans into Thessaly (L.32.14.8). The part of the route into Thessaly for which one might have expected Flamininus to have needed guides was the segment that involved crossing the Pindus. From where Flamininus was at that point, all he needed to do was continue a short distance down the Peneus to enter Thessaly. However, Flamininus must have needed guides to explain the layout of the Macedonian garrison network in Thessaly, to lay out the loyalties of the local communities and regions, and to provide council on how an advance into Thessaly could proceed and what the logistics would involve. Amynander would also have been able to report how his own campaign in Thessaly around Gomphi had gone, which had included Roman troops.

Once reunited with Amynander, Flamininus marched back north to the Peneus valley and then fought his way into Thessaly. Livy reports that "the first city of Thessaly to be attacked was Phaloria. It had a garrison of two thousand Macedonians" (L.32.15.1).

[Figure 4.9] Phaloria sat on the west bank of the Peneus across the river to the south from where the modern city of Kalabaka, the site of ancient Aeginium, sat in the foothills.321 Philip had left a significant garrison of 2000 men at Phaloria and an unknown

321 Phaloria and Aeginium: Stahlin 1924, esp. pp121-4. Hammond 1967, pp 681, 284 argued that Aeginium was 20 miles north-west of Stahlin's placement at the modern village of Koutsoufliani. However, this
number at Aeginium presumably with the intention of controlling this pass, and
protecting his rear as he fled from here across Thessaly.

Phaloria was besieged, captured, burned, and destroyed (L.32.15.1-3). This led to
the immediate surrender of Metropolis and Cierium (L.32.15.3), to the south, on the
western edge, and in the middle of, Thessaliotis respectively. Metropolis had successfully
resisted the Aetolian assault earlier in this 198 BC campaign season. Perhaps the arrival
of the Romans after the flight of the Macedonians convinced them that now was the time
to switch allegiances. Cierium was roughly 13km east of Metropolis by the modern
village of Pyrgos Kieriou.

Livy reports that Flamininus then gave a token attack against Aeginium, but
"seeing as the place was very strong and almost impregnable, with even a small garrison,
he hurled a few weapons against the nearby outpost and turned his course towards the
region around Gomphi" (L.32.15.4). Flamininus abandoned an assault in Aeginium, as
his attack on the Phaloria had already caused cities in Thessaly to start capitulating, and
he had opened the pass sufficiently to be able to move his army into Thessaly. He could
not have a long siege because he was short on provisions.

[Figure 4.8] Flamininus continued past the Macedonian garrisons into Thessaly,
but instead of continuing southeast to Tricca, as Philip had done, Flamininus turned south
to Gomphoi (L.32.15.4), a city, and region, recently taken by the Athamanian and Roman
allied force (L.32.4-5).

placement makes less sense in the narrative - as it would have involved Flamininus having marched right
by it with no issue to Mt Cercetius and then marching back to it. Hammond's placement makes less sense
archaeologically too, as the inscription identifying Aeginium was found at Kalabaka. Hammond's assertion
that Kalabaka was an unfit location for a fortified town is mistaken.
Livy reports that Flamininus, upon entering Thessaly, was short on provisions because "he had spared the fields of the Epirotes" (L.32.15.5). Presumably he did this to gain their goodwill, as they had been allied to the Macedonians in 198 BC (L.32.14.5-6). Not requisitioning their food supply (and raw materials for trade) would have created a stark contrast for the Epirotes, as Philip had been getting directly supplied by the Epirotes for the 198 BC campaign.

Once in Thessaly, Flamininus continued this policy, neither reaping in the fields nor requisitioning from settlements, again directly contrasting himself with Philip who had just sacked many of his own allied Thessalian settlements. Flamininus' army would not have been the destructive force and economic burden that Philip's had just been, as had the Aetolian and Athamanian destructive raids earlier in the campaign. Flamininus' behavior in Epirus and upon his arrival in Thessaly created an important contrast between himself and Philip.

Flamininus' novel behavior here is different and worth noting - Flamininus appears to have been concerned with winning the hearts and minds - or at least the stomachs and pocketbooks - of Greeks he viewed as potential allies from the beginning. As a result of this policy, though, Flamininus needed a way to get provisions for his army.

Livy reports that, Flamininus, once at Gomphi, chose to supply his troops by marching them in relays across the Pindus to Ambracia and back (L.32.15.5). While this might at first seems a strange choice, i.e. to cross the Pindus then promptly recross the

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322 Additionally, The Epirotes had brokered the Peace of Phoenice in 205 BC and allied with Philip in the treaty (L.29.12).
323 See chapter 3 discussion.
Pindus in order to cross the Pindus again, this move makes strategic sense. Livy's narrative of events indicates that Flamininus developed and executed a plan after the Battle of the River Aous to secure both routes across the Pindus from Thessaly and establish Roman control at the Thessalian side of both routes. Building on the campaign of 199 BC, Rome would now have cut off all the routes between Macedonia and the Adriatic coast, i.e. the two passes between Macedonia and Illyria, as well as, now, the two passes west out of Thessaly.

A brief review of the events shows how early Flamininus set into motion the events that led to his second crossing of the Pindus:

1) Flamininus gave Roman troops to Amynander to secure the area around Gomphi, the Thessalian side of the pass across the Pindus between Gomphi and Ambracia.

2) Flamininus sent the cargo ships to Ambracia.

3) Flamininus crossed the Pindus via the more northerly Zygos pass to a safe spot near the Thessalian border.

4) Flamininus had Amynander come meet him to help him invade Thessaly. This served a) to make sure Amynander was not switching sides, as well as b) to get information on Amynander's campaign, and c) to get intelligence on the state of Macedonian defenses between the Roman position and Tricca.

5) Upon entering Thessaly, Flamininus went straight to Gomphi, and crossed the Pindus to the Ambracian Gulf.

One could reasonably expect that if Flamininus were marching the army to Ambracia, he was planning to stay there for the winter: the supply fleet was there, all the
routes west from Thessaly had been secured, and wintering on the Adriatic coast had been the Roman behavior in the east up till then. Instead, however, Flamininus brought the supplies from Ambracia back to Gomphi. Livy reports:

> the route from Gomphi to Ambracia although difficult and hard to travel is yet a very short distance. And so in a few days, the supplies having been transported from the fleet, the camp was full of an abundance of all things

> et est iter a Gomphis Ambraciam sicut impeditum ac difficile, ita spatio perbreui. intra paucos itaque dies transuectis a mari commeatibus repleta omni rerum copia sunt castra.

(L.32.15.6-7)

Livy's brief description of an apparently simple act, in fact, points to a significant undertaking. First of all, this is a significant mountain crossing. This route across the Pindus started by the modern village of Paleomonastiro, by ancient Gomphi, and ended 143 km later at the modern city of Arta, located on top of ancient Ambracia. This ancient route roughly followed the modern A30 roadway. [map]

Although this was a rugged route, close examination of HMGS topographic maps along with personal autopsy make clear that this pass was the route of least resistance across these mountains. This route starts at 167 m elevation and climbs to a maximum height of 1210 meters, with a net loss of 137 m. However, the ruggedness of the terrain makes for 3252 m of total ascent over the route. This route is then longer (140 km vs. 126.8 km) than the Zygos pass route, and while it does not rise to as high a maximum elevation (1210 m vs. 1680 m), the ruggedness of the terrain makes for a greater total elevation gain (3252 m vs. 3000 m).
The second factor that points to this having been a significant undertaking was that the Romans would have needed to bring back a substantial amount of food across the Pindus to make this exercise worthwhile. This operation would have employed mule trains at least, but presumably wagon trains also would have been involved. Flamininus would have required at least enough food for his impending campaign on Atrax.

We do not know how many days Flamininus originally planned for his Atrax campaign, but we can work backwards from how many days it took him to get from Thessaly to the port of Anticyra, where he was planning to get resupplied. To travel the roughly 60 km between Gomphi and Atrax would have taken three days due to the logistical issues of traveling with a siege train. Livy does not specify the length of the aborted siege of Atrax, reporting only that "the siege took longer and was more difficult than anyone had expected" (L.32.17.4). However, as there were a series of stages to the siege and Livy reports that Flamininus thought success in this siege important, fourteen days seems a reasonable estimate. To travel the roughly 200 km from Atrax to Anticyra involved passing through enemy territory (by Pharsalus), crossing two passes (into the Malian plain and into Phokis), and then successfully assaulting Phanotea and Anticyra. As Flamininus would have been driven on by the knowledge that he was running out of food, 10 days seems a reasonable estimate. Thus, for his Atrax campaign, Flamininus would have brought at least 27 days of food across the Pindus.

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324 See Roth 2012, pp 79-90, 198-211 for the difference between mule trains and wagon trains, including the relative cost/benefit of each, as well as for the basic logistic requirements for all kinds of military trains.
325 See Roth 2012, p91 on siege trains and their specific logistical complications.
326 Details of Flamininus' Phokian campaign will be discussed below.
Flamininus' army consumed 17.9 tons of grain per day, which required 36 wagons to carry it.\footnote{See Roth 2012, pp 7-43 for discussion and estimates of Roman military food requirements and food weights, and pp 208-212 for discussion of Roman military wagons and wagonloads.  
660 modii x (2 legions + equal number of allies) = 2640 modii of grain per day.  
6.78 kg per modius x 2640 modii = 17.9 tons of grain per day.  
17.9 tons of grain / 500 kg per wagon = 36 wagons per day.} For the minimum 27 days of food Flamininus that brought on his Atrax campaign, Flamininus would have required roughly 483 tons of grain, transported in nearly 1000 wagons. 1000 carts was a reasonable amount for a Roman army to bring on campaign, as Perseus later seized 1000 carts of grain from the Romans on campaign in Thessaly in 171 BC (L.42.65.2-5), and 30 days seems to have been the maximum amount of food that the Romans regularly brought with them into the field in the middle Republic.\footnote{Roth 2012, pp 68-116, esp. pp 68-71.}

Although Livy says that the route was short and that the whole operation only took a few days, it would have taken a good number of days to get men and mule trains to Ambracia and back to Gomphoi. This pass is longer and more rugged than the northern (Zygos) pass route, which Livy says took four days. It seems reasonable to assign four days each way for this route as well, with an additional day to load up and deal with logistical concerns at Ambracia. Each round trip would then have taken nine days. Livy reports that Flamininus "sent the cohorts in relays to Ambracia to get foodstuffs" - \textit{frumentatum Ambraciam in vicem cohortes misit} (L.32.15.5), meaning that there were multiple trips, presumably so that the wagon trains would not be too large when going over the rugged mountain pass. Five relays each taking 200 wagons seems a reasonable estimate, which would have resulted in the whole affair taking about two weeks (13 days...
= 5 trips (each taking 9 days) leaving on successive days and each bringing back 200 wagons). However, had a need for smaller trains required more relays, this crossing could have taken significantly longer.

The third factor that points to this having been a significant undertaking is the Romans' need to rely on the Athamanians for guidance and protection. This route across the Pindus went through the heart of Athamania, and Livy had specified earlier that the Athamanians were acting as guides for the Romans. A brief survey of two earlier examples and two later examples will serve to illustrate to what degree the Athamanians held control over this mountain crossing.

Livy reports that Philip, in 207 BC, gave the island of Zacynthos to Amynander "as payment to induce him to permit Philip to lead his army through Athamania into the upper part of Aetolia" (L.36.31.11). Amynander is able to extract a substantial payment from a much more powerful monarch in exchange for safe passage; the Athamanians seem to wield disproportionate power in negotiations here with the Macedonians compared to their respective military sizes and might.

In 199 BC, when Philip flushed the combined Aetolian and Athamanian force out of Thessaly, "the Athamanians, being knowledgeable of the routes, led the Aetolians back to Aetolia over the high mountains on paths unknown to the pursuing enemy" (L.31.42.8). The Athamanians are shown to have been able to grant their allies safe and quick passage, and prevent their enemies from following.

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329 That Livy is referring to Philip's 207 BC campaign, see Walbank 1967, p 278. Philip's route took him from Gomphoi across the mountain pass in question, but at the modern village of Panagia roughly 12 km northeast of Ambracia, he turned southeast along the Inachos river and then south along the Achelous to the western shore of lake Trichonis before proceeding to Thermon (Plb.11.7.2). See Walbank 1967, p 278 for further discussion of Philip's 207 BC Aetolian campaign and support of this route.
Without Athamanian help, however, crossing the Pindus by the southern route no longer appeared to be as simple a process as Livy describes for 198 BC. Livy supplies a quite different description of this same route when the Romans took it in 171 BC: "The Roman consul, being on his way to Thessaly with his army during these same days, first made a rapid march through Epirus; then, after he crossed into Athamania, a land of rough and almost pathless terrain, with great difficulty by small roads he barely got through to Gomphi" (L.42.55.1-2). The help of the Athamanians is what turned this route from "difficult and hard to travel" but still "a very short distance" that the Romans could cross back and forth in "a few days" in 198 BC to a route the Romans "barely got through" going in one direction in 171 BC.

How a smaller and weaker army such as the Athamanians could control the movements across the Pindus of much larger and more powerful armies can be better understood by looking at Philip's Athamanian campaign of 189 BC, Manlius Vulso's march through Thrace in 188 BC, as well as the logistics of mountain warfare in the Pindus in the Greek civil war of the 1940's.

In 189 BC, Philip invaded Athamania with an army. The Athamanians took advantage of the rugged terrain and their superior knowledge of the landscape to employ guerrilla warfare tactics to harry and terrify the invaders, causing them to flee without a battle.

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330 After the Aetolians had helped Amynander expel the Macedonians from Athamania (L.38.1.9-11).
331 The Macedonians had advanced into Athamania and were moving towards Argithea (L.38.2.5). Argithea was located on a secondary, and more difficult, southern route between Gomphi and Ambracia, roughly 16km southwest of Gomphi, but taking approximately 30km of mountain track and 800m net elevation gain to get there (For Argithea, see Hammond 1967, pp252-3, map 11). Livy reports that "suddenly as they were advancing the Athamanians appeared, hurrying towards hills that commanded the route" (L.38.1.6). The Athamanians were thus able to appear suddenly yet also conspicuously take a threatening position. The
Conceptually similar behavior can be seen in Livy's report of the Roman proconsul Manlius Vulso's march from Asia in 188 BC through a "difficult route" of "ten miles of wooded, narrow, and rough terrain" in hostile territory (L.38.40.6). A significantly smaller force of Thracians was similarly able to harry and repeatedly ambush the Romans specifically on account of their superior knowledge, and strategic use, of the terrain (L.38.40.7-12). The Thracians also gained extra advantage specifically because the Romans were hindered by their wagon train (L.38.40.6-38.41.3). Similar to their situation in Athamania, the Romans had formerly had safe passage across this area due to different political relations with the locals.

Much about the logistics of warfare in the Pindus can be gained from studying the campaigning in the Pindus during World War II and the Greek Civil War (1941-1949). In his account of the Greek civil war, C.M. Woodhouse compares the respective forces of the Democratic and National armies at the end of 1948: the Democratic army had "in the neighborhood of 25,000 men and women" while the National army had "over 200,000" soldiers far stronger in equipment and weaponry. Yet, Woodhouse viewed as "inconclusive" which army had the advantage. General Papagos, the commander of the National army, also viewed the National army as not large enough to win the war and

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332 Only when the Romans got out of the wooded and difficult terrain was the Thracian force no longer an issue (L.38.41.5-10). The Thracians, however, had briefly stopped harassing the Romans during their passage when the Thracians had "got tired of so many spoils" (L.38.40.15).
333 Such protection having been acquired, and then removed, by Philip (L.37.7.9-16; 38.40.8).
335 Woodhouse 2002, p258. However, the Partisan army was in the end eliminated, as, likewise, "the Athamanians became extinct" (Strabo 9.4.17).
was demanding an increase to 250,000 men.\textsuperscript{336} 25,000 men were equal to 200,000 men because those 25,000 men were holed up in the Pindus Mountains. Much as the Thracians' advantage was neutralized in 189 BC by the Romans getting out of wooded terrain, the National army pioneered the use of napalm to deforest sections to try to create a similar effect.\textsuperscript{337} Woodhouse, reflecting on his time fighting with the Greek resistance in German-occupied Greece in WWII, signaled the importance of the Pindus for a smaller force: "Thanks to the nature of these mountains, we could travel at will, without precautions, many days at a time in a single direction, throughout great tracts of Greece which the Germans could only occasionally penetrate (and never hold) even with the most strongly held expeditions."\textsuperscript{338} Smalls bands of resistance fighters could prevent the German army from holding the Pindus due to the nature of the landscape, much as the small army of Athamanians could control the movements of the great powers of their day in the Pindus.

Flamininus was thus heavily relying on his recent alliance with the Athamanians for this resupply mission over the Pindus to succeed. The Romans' 171 BC campaign showed how difficult this crossing could be with no local guides, while Philip's 189 BC campaign showed how hostile locals could prevent passage, and the Roman 189 BC campaign showed the additional liability of a wagon train in hostile, rugged terrain. The Romans had no great reason to trust the Athamanian loyalty. They had only been allies

\begin{footnotes}
\item\textsuperscript{336} Woodhouse 2002, p237.
\item\textsuperscript{337} Woodhouse 2002, p237.
\item\textsuperscript{338} Woodhouse 2002, p xix.
\end{footnotes}
since winter 200/199 BC and the Athamanians had offered alliance apparently only due to the Romans' recent show of strength. Flamininus' choice was a risk, but it worked. Similarly, this plan relied on Flamininus also heavily relying on his recent alliance with the Aetolians. The Aetolians could have prevented the Roman fleet access to the Ambracian gulf - a possibility Flamininus clearly considered as he later "sent scouts in advance to ascertain whether the supply-ships had headed for Leucas or the Ambracian gulf" (L.32.15.5), as Leucas sits just outside of the Ambracian gulf and is where the supply-ships would have docked had they been denied access to the gulf. The Aetolians had only recently joined the Roman cause after the Roman victory at Otolobum in 199 BC after they previously refused to choose sides. Their open behavior of waiting to see who was winning and then joining that side (eg. L.31.32.5) could have reasonably caused Flamininus not to trust them.

I discussed earlier that Flamininus displayed novel behavior by not ravaging the fields of potential new allies. We can now pair that behavior with a surprisingly high level of trust in his Aetolian and Athamanian allies - trust that seems based on little evidence and with risk that could come with great costs.

We return now to Flamininus at Gomphi and freshly provisioned. Livy reports that Flamininus marched east to the city of Atrax at the northwestern entrance to Pelasgiotis (L.32.15.8). [Figure 4.10] As discussed above, Atrax controlled access for the most direct route into Macedonian-controlled Pelasgiotis. Beyond control of this route, control of Atrax would also have given Flamininus a bridgehead from which to continue the attack eastward to Larisa. Larisa was the key Macedonian holding for maintaining

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339 The Athamanians would, in fact, already be fighting against the Romans in 192 BC.
control over Pelasgiotis as well as an ideal place from which to launch a campaign into Macedon. In fact, the Romans later based their attacks into Macedon in the Third Macedonian War on Larisa.

The Roman assault on Atrax was a major operation involving battering rams (L.32.17.6) and a "tower of great height" (L.32.17.10). Moving these specialized weapons as well as other materials required for siege warfare would have involved bringing a siege train from Gomphi to Atrax. For comparison, Plutarch reports that Antony needed 300 wagons to carry his siege equipment and battering ram on his Parthian campaign in 36 BC (Plut. Ant. 38.2). The use of this train, the preparation of the rams, and the preparations for building the tower (presumably built on site but with timber harvested and prepped for this purpose from the forests by Gomphi) reveal that this siege of Atrax was no ad hoc operation, but instead one methodically planned by Flamininus.

Livy reports that Flamininus was unable to take Atrax quickly (L.32.17.4-17) and "realized that there was no immediate prospect of capturing the town nor any way to winter his troops far from the sea and in a region wasted by the calamities of war" (L.32.18.1-2). Flamininus knew that he had not brought over from Ambracia sufficient provisions for a protracted siege. To get more provisions, Flamininus had two options: to continue to resupply via Ambracia or to forage from the surrounding district. The route between Atrax and Ambracia was secure and the Roman supply ships safely at port at Ambracia were able to resupply Flamininus' army, as well as be resupplied themselves.

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340 See Roth 2012, p91 on siege trains and their specific logistical complications.
341 On carrying rams, rather than sourcing them on-site, because of their special size, see Roth 2012, p91; Plut. Ant. 19.2. Athamania is, and was, a heavily forested region.
from Italy and North Africa. However, soon the difficult mountain route between Thessaly and Ambracia would be expected to start receiving heavy snow and could not be counted on for the regular crossings for resupply that would be required were Flamininus to attempt to continue to use this method to resupply his forces.\footnote{342 See discussion of regional weather patterns in chapters 1-3.}

Flamininus' next option was to forage from the surrounding fertile Thessalian plain. However, here is where the brilliance of Philip's scorched earth strategy from earlier in the 198 BC campaign season is revealed. As discussed above, Philip's route across Thessaly went from Tricca due east across the northern edge of the plain to Phacium and then south to Iresiae burning the towns and removing all the people on his way (L.32.13.5-9). We learn here that Philip also devastated the grain land, as Flamininus understood that he would not be able to forage provisions from the area to winter his troops - which this area of the Thessalian plain should otherwise have been more than able to supply.\footnote{343 While Flamininus had been loath to use local crops to supply his army up to now, he seems to have had no such concerns concerning the territory of an actively hostile city.} We should understand that Philip devastated the fields to such an extent between Tricca and Phacium as well as the areas around and between Phacium and Iresiae, while also burning or taking away all of the stored provisions of the settlements, so that this fertile area could no longer supply an army. As a result, Philip left any army besieging Atrax in a bind: they could not forage east of Atrax as that was hostile, Macedonian controlled territory, and they could not forage to the west or south either; Philip had made an extended siege of Atrax untenable.

Turned away from Atrax and in need of provisions, Flamininus could reasonably have been expected to move his army one last time this season across the Pindus and
winter at Ambracia since this would put him in allied territory, with the supply fleet, and would accord with recent consular behavior as at the end of the 200 BC and 199 BC campaign seasons the consul had returned to winter quarters on the Adriatic coast. This allowed, among other things, for easy handover of command to the incoming consul.

Although Livy says that "there was no harbor on the whole coast of Acarnanian and Aetolia which could both accommodate the fleet which brought supplies to the army and at the same time provide shelter for wintering the troops" (L.32.18.3), Ambracia had already been housing the supply fleet and could have wintered the troops. One is left to assume that Livy either was trying to make sense of Flamininus' unexpected action or that the Aetolians were unwilling to let the Romans winter in Acarnania or Aetolia.

Flamininus, instead, went south all the way to Anticyra a port on the Corinthian gulf in Phocis. This was a significant march of roughly 200 km that involved crossing the mountains between the Thessalian plain and the Malian plain and then from the Malian plain into Phocis.

Anticyra was not chosen at random by Flamininus, but was a known entity to the Romans, as they had previously sacked it and replaced its inhabitants in 211 BC during the first Macedonian War (L.26.26.1-3). This port had the capacity to house the Roman supply fleet and Phocis had the capacity to winter the troops. Anticyra fulfilled Flamininus' immediate needs, but also looked ahead to the following year's campaign. Livy reports that "Anticyra was not far from Thessaly and the enemy's country" (L.32.18.3-5), which would allow Flamininus to campaign more easily against Philip.

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344 It was a large enough city with a large enough hinterland to have had room for Flamininus' army.  
345 Philip was able to dock his fleet at Anticyra in 207 BC (L.28.8.7), indicating that the replacement inhabitants either were not hostile to Philip or had, themselves, been replaced.
than if he had wintered on the Adriatic coast. Additionally, if Flamininus wanted to campaign the following season, he had learned from Sulpicius' and his own treatments of Villius' consulship, that it was more difficult to replace a consul in the field the further they were from Rome.

Once in Phocis, Flamininus conducted a quick and effective campaign that both secured safe winter quarters for the Roman army and shored up the southern boundary of Thessaly by securing the land routes approaching Thessaly from the south. Livy reports that Flamininus took control of, in order, Phanotea, Anticyra, Ambrysus, Hyampolis, Daulis, and Elatia, and 'other unimportant castella' (L.32.18.6-9; 32.24).\footnote{For the six settlements in Phocis, see McInerney 1999, esp. pp295-6 (Phanotea (=Panopeus)), pp71-76 & 323-4 (Anticyra), pp313-5 (Ambrysus), pp290-2 (Hyampolis), pp297-9 (Daulis), p287 (Elatia).} Analysis of the locations of these settlements, when taken alongside the order in which Flamininus took them, reveals that this was a well-executed campaign to quickly control all routes through Phokis.\footnote{For the network of fortifications in Phocis, see De Staebler 2016; Laufer 2016. For the state of the field on fortifications and fortification networks, see Frederiksen et al. 2016.} This campaign relied on effective use of knowledge the topography.

The first city taken, Phanotea, was centrally located at the crossroads of the pass leading northeast to the coast of the Malian gulf, the route southwest to Anticyra, and the Kephisos valley running northwest-southeast. This city was at a key crossroads at the center of the Kephisos valley, offering control of the main northwest-southeast corridor of the Kephisos valley, as well as the routes northeast to the coast, and southwest to the port Anticyra. The next city taken, Anticyra, was southwest of Phanotea and the key port the Romans needed for resupply. Next was Ambrysus which sat between Phanotea and
Anticyra and controlled movement between the port up the steep incline to the central Phokian plain, past which the Romans would need to move provisions from Anticyra to their eventual winter quarters at Elatia. Hyampolis was northeast of Phanotea and controlled movement along the important pass from the coast at Opous. Daulis sat southwest of Hyampolis and further secured the corridor that ran from Kephisos valley to Anticyra as well as worked together with Phanotea to control the central plain.

Finally, Elatia lay north of Daulis at the northern edge of the Kephisos valley and was understood in antiquity to have held "the most advantageous position, because it is situated in the narrow passes and because he who holds this city holds the passes leading into Phocis and Boiotia" (Strabo 9.3.2) and "commands the passes from Thessaly" (Strabo 9.3.15). In fact, Philip II (Dem.18.169) and Philip V (Plb.5.27.1) had previously held Elatia for this reason.

When the Romans went into winter quarters in 198 BC, they controlled both passes over the Pindus from Thessaly, and the land routes into Thessaly from the south, had obtained a safe port for their supply fleet, established winter quarters, and secured a safe line of communication between that port and their winter quarters.

Livy's account, however, omits when Flamininus told the supply fleet to move to Anticyra from Ambracia. This is important, because it would shed light on Flamininus' plans for his 198 BC Thessalian campaign due to the fact that it would have involved significant time to move the fleet.

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The first option to explore is that Flamininus ordered the fleet to Anticyra right when he finished resupplying from his base at Gomphi, but before he moved on Atrax. This seems most unlikely, though, as Anticyra was yet not a friendly port. If, then, Flamininus had not yet told the fleet to move when he moved from Gomphi, it follows that Flamininus did think he could take Atrax and potentially winter there. This would mean that the siege of Atrax was not a feint. This then points to a situation in which Flamininus sent a messenger, or messenger party, from Atrax to cross the Pindus and tell the fleet to move. Flamininus then raced to take Anticyra before the fleet got there.

This plan was risky on two counts: first, because the messenger needed the Athamanians to help his passage over the Pindus. Since the Athamanians had only recently become Roman allies on account of a Roman show of force, the more recent show of Roman weakness at Atrax could reasonably be expected to weaken their support. If that messenger were waylaid en route, Flamininus would have arrived at Anticyra and not been met by the fleet and run out of provisions. Second, because the timing of the operation would have been delicate. If the fleet had arrived at Anticyra before the Romans had managed to take control of it, the fleet might have been turned back to Ambracia or otherwise compromised, and Flamininus would have run out of provisions. Flamininus' plan to meet the fleet at Anticyra again displayed high-risk behavior that involved trusting his allies.

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350 The Roman messenger(s) should have been able to get from Atrax to Ambracia, with Athamanian assistance, in four to five days; and the fleet should have been able to get from Ambracia to Anticyra in roughly three days (Casson 1991, pp 292-6). As discussed above, Flamininus took approximately 10 days to get from Atrax to Anticyra.
When Flamininus wintered the troops, he did this he did not yet know if he would be prorogued for the next campaign season. Before finding this out, Flamininus held a conference at Nicaea on the Malian gulf with Philip (L.32.32.9 - 32.36.10). Similarly to the conference at the Aous, they came together to discuss peace terms at Philip's request; Flamininus gave his demands, and Philip refused them. Neither conference resolved anything: the failed conference at the Aous immediately led to a battle and this failed conference led to ambassadors being sent to the senate.

Livy's report of each conference, however, does work to foreshadow the 197 BC campaign. At the Aous, Philip had a violent reaction to Flamininus' demand for Thessaly (L.32.10.7-8), and, at Nicaea, Philip was unwilling to cede specifically Phthiotic Thebes (L.32.35.11). As we will see, the 197 BC campaign would take place in Thessaly and Flamininus first attacks Phthiotic Thebes. If the conferences transpired as Livy reports, one could conclude that Flamininus used them to learn directly from Philip just what Philip was willing to fight for.

Livy posits that Flamininus' negotiations at Nicaea were designed to leave the situation open for war with Philip if he were prorogued, but for peace if he got replaced (L.32.32.6-8). And, indeed, the senate did prorogue Flamininus to continue the war

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351 This is where Polybius' narrative begins. The Ides of March in 197 BC occurred in the Gregorian calendar on either December 15th or January 6th (Briscoe 1981, pp 17-25). This means that this council occurred between wintering the troops, presumably in early November, and mid-January at the latest as Flamininus should have heard the news quite close to the decision on the Ides. Anticyra would have given Flamininus ready access to information from abroad and having his brother in charge of the military fleet would only have increased this.

352 Livy does accent details that pair the conferences: at each conference, Flamininus and Philip were separated by water, exchanged in witty banter, discussed details of Greece's political geography, and Philip got mad, and nothing was resolved.
(L.32.28.1-9, 32.37.5-6; Plb.18.12.1) and Livy reports that, once prorogued, Flamininus would not meet again with Philip to discuss peace (L.32.37.6).

Beyond merely extending Flamininus' command, the senate voted to send him reinforcements, demonstrating the senate's resolve to continue this war.\footnote{The senate voted for troops for both the Spanish and Macedonian fronts, demonstrating a generally active commitment to war in 197 BC. See Potter 2012. Livy reports that the senate at this time also sent both Sulpicius and Vilius, the two consuls in command of the previous two years of the Macedonian War, as legates to Flamininus (L.32.28.12). This was probably confusion on Livy's part with when they both were sent from Rome to Flamininus in 197 BC as part of the Ten Legates to assist with arranging the peace with Philip after Cynoscephalae (L.33.24.7).} This contrasts with the senate's behavior during the First Macedonian War, when they kept continuing Sulpicius' command, but did not prioritize the war.

Repeatedly we have seen that Flamininus was willing to take risks in the field, put great trust in his allies, and change his plans to react to situations. Importantly, his risks had all paid off so far: arriving early in his province was high-risk that he would be violating unwritten, agreed upon behavior that the consuls had been engaging in during the previous years, but high-reward in defeating Philip; forcing the position at the Aous, leading a Roman army across the Pindus for the first time, moving the fleet to Aetolia, resupplying through Athamania, besieging Atrax, and racing the supply fleet to Anticyra were all successfully executed risks.

Now that Flamininus had his command extended, he had one campaign season to win a decisive battle against Philip and receive the resulting triumph in order for his consulship and succeeding proconsulship to be considered a success (At the least, Flamininus had to show such gains in the war that he could not be replaced). It follows
that this situation would compel Flamininus into a high-risk/high-reward strategy and that understanding this could help us interpret his actions.

At the beginning of spring (*initio veris* (L.33.1.1); *primo vere* (L.33.3.1)), Flamininus and Philip each took action to prepare for the upcoming summer's campaign. Livy frames the 197 BC campaign as a series of paired actions of Flamininus and Philip, with this as the first. While we do not know if this was originally Polybius' framing device or a technique of Livy's, maintaining these pairings shapes Livy's narrative.

Flamininus took advantage of his position at Elateia to make a sudden, surprise appearance at Thebes that resulted in his securing Boiotia (L.33.1-2). This allowed Flamininus to invade Thessaly with no worry of land attack from the rear on himself or on his stronghold at Elatia and its supply route to Anticyra. With the Achaeans, Aetolians, Athamanians, Athenians, and Boiotians all now allied to the Romans, Flamininus could focus his attention on forcing Philip into a confrontation. Additionally, Numidia, Sicily, and Sardinia sent grain to cover Flamininus' needs for the upcoming campaign (L.32.27.2), resolving this logistics issue from the previous year.\(^\text{354}\)

During this same period, Philip conducted a major levy through his kingdom, even drafting men normally considered too young or old (L.33.3.1-5). Just after the spring equinox (*secundum vernum aequinoctium*) Philip mustered his troops at Dion for daily drilling (L.33.3.5), and *per eosdem ferme dies* Flamininus moved his army north out

\(^{354}\) Livy says that Masinissa sent 200,000 modii and that "*item ex Sicilia Sardiniaque magni commeatus et vestimenta exercitui missa.*" 200,000 modii at 2640 modii/day for Flamininus' army would cover 75 days. If Sicily and Sardinia sent an equal amount, Flamininus would have 225 days of grain, which would be more than enough for the campaign season.
of Elatia (L.33.3.6). The spring equinox falls between March 19th-21st in the Gregorian calendar, placing these actions sometime in late March.

Livy specifies that Flamininus went via Thronium and Scarphea to Thermopylae and Heraclea (L.33.3.6-7). The first part of this route would have been the same route that Flamininus took from Elatia to the conference at Nicaea: after going roughly 7 km west from Elatia, he turned due north and crossed the pass that starts at the modern village of Modi and ends roughly 18 km later at the modern village of Rengini. This is a steep pass, climbing from 163 m elevation to 692 m elevation in only 8.7 km (6% grade) and then descending at the same grade. He continued north roughly 7 km and then turned northwest at Thronium and continued in a westerly direction along the ancient shoreline roughly 28 km past Scarphea, Nicaia, and Thermopylae to Heraclea.

Livy reports that Flamininus met with the Aetolians at Heraclea to discuss the proper Aetolian contribution to the war effort, then led the Roman army to Xyniae "in three days" and waited there for allied reinforcements (L.33.3.7-8).

This gives us a good opportunity to explore Flamininus' speed of movement. From Heraclea to Lamia is roughly 10 km of relatively flat agricultural land. The route from Lamia to Xyniae is roughly 33 km, but involved crossing a pass, climbing 17 km at a steady 4.5% grade, from 83.8 m elevation to 765 m elevation, and then descending at the same grade to 466 m elevation before leveling out. Flamininus thus covered 43 km with one roughly 700 m climb in three days; 14.3 km per day is slower than one might expect.

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355 See Pritchett 1982, pp130-8 and map fig. 6.
At this rate, it would have taken Flamininus five days to go from Elatia to Heraklea (60 km with a larger climb).

Livy reports that the Aetolians promptly arrived at Xyniae with 6000 infantry and 400 cavalry and Flamininus immediately broke camp (L.33.3.9). 500 Cretans, 300 Illyrians, and 1200 Athamanians joined Flamininus on the march from Xyniae to Phthiotic Thebes (L.33.3.10).

Now that all Flamininus' forces had assembled, it is necessary to determine the numbers of troops involved in the Roman and Macedonian armies in order to understand the logistics required in moving the armies through the landscape and the scale of the campaign. Livy supplies us with the numbers for Philip's army: 16,000 phalanx troops, 2000 peltasts, 2000 Thracians, 2000 Illyrians, 1500 axillaries - making for a total of 23,500 infantry in a roughly 2:1 ratio of phalanx troops to other infantry (16,000:7500) - and 2000 cavalry (L.33.4.3-5). Livy reports that "the Romans had about the same number because of the arrival of the Aetolians their numbers were superior," (L.33.4.6). Plutarch reports that "Flamininus had over 26,000 soldiers, of whom six thousand infantry and four hundred cavalry were furnished by the Aetolians. Philip's army also was about the same size" (Plut. Flam. 7.2). There has been scholarly debate about how to use

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357 While earlier editors had the Aetolians bringing 600 infantry, Briscoe and Walbank have each convincingly argued that this number is too small for the role the Aetolians later claim to have played. The larger Aetolian numbers (6000 and 400) also accord with the numbers supplied in Plutarch (Plut. Flam. 7.2), who had probably also derived them from Polybius.

358 This text of this passage is debated and was emended by Gronovius to read "the number of their cavalry was superior." See Briscoe 1973, pp253-4 for the history of textual criticism here. I follow Briscoe's reading, even if he does find the Latin "extremely inelegant."

359 Walbank 1967, p584-5 argues that both Livy's and Plutarch's number derive from the same lost section of Polybius.
these passages to determine both the Roman troop numbers and the composition of the Roman army.\footnote{Hammond 1988, p66, n13 assigns Flamininus' army here 32,000 men. Hammond 1988, p66 and Briscoe 1973, pp253-4 each summarizes the question and its bibliography. For further discussion, see Kromayer 1907, p103n3; Pritchett 1969, p135; Walbank 1940, p167; Walbank 1967, p585.}

According to Polybius, the standard Roman legion was 4200 infantry and 300 cavalry (Plb.6.20.8-9), with "the total number of allied infantry being usually equal to that of the Romans, while the cavalry are three times as many" (Plb.6.26.7). Flamininus had two legions, which would make for, in the system Polybius describes, 19,200 troops, composed of 9000 Roman troops and 10,200 allied troops. However, as Dobson notes, "These ratios given by Polybius must have been only theoretical" as Polybius and Livy each cite instances of allied and Roman forces that do not fit these distributions, e.g. only 500 allied cavalry per legion (Plb.2.24.3; L.21.17.5).\footnote{For further discussion, see Dobson 2008, pp51-52} If the allies were roughly equal in number to the Roman troops, there would have been 18,000 troops with Flamininus to which 6400 Aetolians and 2000 other Greeks joined between Xyniae and Thebes, making for 26,400 total troops, which aligns with the number in Plutarch and Livy.

Upon leaving Xyniae, Flamininus had a two-stage plan to force a land battle with Philip which, if successful, would end the Second Macedonian War and get Flamininus his triumph. The first stage was a surprise move on Phthiotic Thebes and Demetrias. This was intended to create a threat that would compel Philip to move into Thessaly to fight. Flamininus could reasonably think that an aggressive move into Thessaly, especially one that threatened Demetrias, would induce Philip to fight for several reasons.
First, Livy reports that at the conference at the Aous control of Thessaly was the point over which Philip broke off negotiations and at the conference at Nicaia Phthiotic Thebes was the city over which Philip would not negotiate. However, we should rely on the content of these conferences that left no record, as reported by Livy and Polybius, only with great caution. The contents of these conferences could have been fabricated whole cloth by Polybius and Livy. The historians knew how Philip did later act, and the content of the conferences made it so Philip gave clues to the reader about what he would fight over. The conferences then do represent the reality of the importance of Thessaly to Philip, but the question remains whether Flamininus learned this at the conferences.

Second, that Philip, the Aetolians, and the Athamanians all responded to Philip's loss at the Aous by immediately campaigning in Thessaly indicated the importance of controlling Thessaly to all three parties. When half way across the Pindus, Philip could have turned north and taken the Grevena pass back to Macedon, but instead he went to Thessaly and his campaign there appeared to stake out the line he intended to defend. Additionally, Philip has demonstrated over the past twenty years that he was quick to defend his control of Thessaly from the Aetolians.

Third, within Thessaly, Demetrias was one of Philip's "three fetters" of Greece - the only three places Philip had said that he needed to hold to control all of Greece. These three fetters became part of the narrative in Polybius and Livy in the winter of 198/197 BC on the senate floor in the speeches of the Roman allies against Philip (L.32.37.3-4; Plb.18.4-5). However, the Roman and allied naval campaigns of 200 BC and 199 BC had
demonstrated that Rome already understood the importance of Demetrias, Chalcis, and Corinth to Philip.\textsuperscript{362}

If this first stage of the plan did not work, Flamininus planned to establish a camp just south of the Karadag ridge - along the line of Philip's trail of destruction through Thessaly after the Battle of the River Aous. Flamininus could then shut off Macedonian access to the lucrative harvest at the beginning of June, in about a month.\textsuperscript{363} This harvest was a source of food for Macedonian cities and a source of revenue for Macedon.\textsuperscript{364}

The Thessalian economy worked in such a way that the cities each controlled a large hinterland of the most fertile agricultural land in Greece, e.g. the cities Philip destroyed in 198 BC each controlled significant tracts of agricultural land. A Roman camp just south of the Karadag range would control access to the grain from Hestiaeotis and Thessalitis from Macedon, as well as control the movement of grain from western Thessaly to Macedon, or perhaps more importantly, to Demetrias for movement by ship to Macedon or elsewhere for trade. This second stage would be intended to disrupt the Macedonian economy so much that Philip would be compelled to come down and fight.

The combination of the Roman senate dismissing the Macedonian envoys, the senate extending Flamininus' command to finish the war, and Flamininus' subsequent refusal of peace negotiations would have made clear to Philip that Flamininus would be waging war on Macedon in spring 197 BC. A war on Macedon could be reasonably understood to consist of an invasion of Macedon, in this case likely beginning with a

\textsuperscript{362} On the Roman naval campaigns of 200 BC and 199 BC, see Thiel 1946, pp 223-239.
\textsuperscript{363} On timing of the harvest in ancient Greece, see Halstead 2014, pp 71-77, esp. p 73, "both cereals and pulses may be cut or grazed well before the seed fills and even in a vegetative state." Flamininus could have begun reaping as soon as he encamped in central Thessaly.
\textsuperscript{364} Hatzopoulos 1996, pp 431-442; Graninger 2010, pp 318-324.
move on Larisa, the strongest city in Pelasgiotis and a suitable bridgehead from which to base an invasion of Macedon. The route of such an invasion would have followed the central north-south route across Thessaly: **Figure 4.4** the extant road network from Xyniae north past Macedonian-controlled Pharsalus to Larisa.\(^{365}\) This would have been the most efficient route to get from Flamininus' winter quarters at Elatia deep into Thessaly to mount an invasion on Macedon. This is the route, for example, that Paullus took in 168 BC from Anticyra to get to the Roman army as fast as possible before launching his invasion of Macedon.\(^{366}\)

**Figure 4.12** But instead of moving towards Macedon, in what was surely seen as a surprise move by Philip, Flamininus marched NE cross-country via the Enipeus valley and appeared at the walls of Phthiotic Thebes (L.33.5.1). Phthiotic Thebes was a Macedonian controlled city (Plb.18.3.12), whose inhabitants, in fact, had been entirely replaced by Macedonian colonists in 217 BC (Plb.5.99.1 -5.100.8), located on the hill by the modern village of Mikrothives.\(^{367}\) Phthiotic Thebes offered a strategic point to threaten, or base an attack on, Demetrias, as well as to control the easternmost north-south route across Thessaly. As such, Flamininus moving on Phthiotic Thebes could be expected to have a high chance of drawing Philip down from Macedon, allowing Flamininus to try to force a land battle with him. King Perseus similarly employed this tactic in 171 BC, but with the parties reversed, when he devastated the area around

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\(^{365}\) Macedonia controlled Pharsala and Larisa at this time (Plb.18.3.12; L.32.35.11). On the road network of Thessaly, see Hammond 1988, *passim*, summarized in map fig. 1. On Greek roads and road networks more generally, see Pritchett 1980, pp 143-196, as well as pp197-288 on the routes of the Peutinger Table.

\(^{366}\) This route is discussed later in this chapter.

Pherae to try to draw out the Roman army that was near Larisa and force them to commit to a decisive land battle (L.42.56.8-9).

Flamininus took two days to march the roughly 60 km through flat valley from Xyniae to Phthiotic Thebes. Speed would have been of the essence to maintain the element of surprise, and his marching times should reflect that. The route through the Enipeus valley has no road network through it today, but not because it is impassable. Instead, the valley is currently actively cultivated agricultural land, and as is the way of agricultural land-poor areas, roads are minimized or go around the valuable agricultural areas. The urban survey at Kastro Kallithea has explored the road networks in this area through time and concluded that there was a viable ancient route that went northeast through the Enipeus valley from Xyniae. When the route reached the part of the valley just northwest of the settlement of Kastro Kallithea, there is evidence of three possible options: a route that ran due east indicated by the archaeological remains of a medieval road; a central route through the valley in a more southeast direction; and a more southern route that hugged a line of Aetolian-sympathizing forts, including Kastro Kallithea. All three routes continue northwest to Phthiotic Thebes. The southernmost route is the most likely one that Flamininus took, due to its protection by the fort system.\(^\text{368}\)

My personal experience supports the idea that this cross-country route was a viable one for the Roman army. On February 20, 2014, I spoke with several men in a gas

\(^{368}\) I thank Dr. Laura Surtees for extensive discussion of this system of routes and of the Kastro Kallithea project. For more on the Kastro Kallithea project, the Aetolian controlled system of forts in the area, and the regional route networks, see Chykerda, C. M., Haagsma, M., & Karapanou, S. (2014); Surtees, L., Karapanou, S., & Haagsma, M. (2014).
station in the village of Metallio near ancient Xyniae about the viability of travelling by bicycle to Thebes via the Enipeus valley. All agreed that this route was doable, i.e. the landscape would not obstruct the route, but that I would never be able to navigate the labyrinth of dirt roads the farmers had constructed. I took their advice and did not attempt the route, however Laura Surtees from the Kastro Kallithea Survey assures me that she and other members of the project have walked this route.

Livy reports that Flamininus had hoped for Phthiotic Thebes to be turned over to him by a certain city leader, but instead the city defended itself (L.33.5.1-3).

Let's return now to Philip. Philip was at Dion with his army when Flamininus left Elateia (L.33.3.5-6) and Livy reports that he was still there when he learned that Flamininus had left Elateia (L.33.3.11). At some point between when Flamininus left Elatia and arrived at Phthiotic Thebes, Philip led his army to Larisa, as Polybius reports that when Philip heard that the Romans were at Thebes, Philip led out his army from Larisa (Plb.18.19.3). That Philip waited at Larisa reinforces the idea that Philip did not anticipate Flamininus' move on Thebes, as Philip would then have moved to Demetrias immediately after he heard that Flamininus left winter quarters.

Livy reports that Flamininus, while at Phthiotic Thebes, learned that Philip was now somewhere in Thessaly (L.33.5.4). Incidentally, this is the moment where our surviving text of Polybius picks up the narrative (Plb.18.18.1). After reporting that Flamininus did not know where in Thessaly Philip was, Polybius supplies a substantial digression on the differences between Roman and Macedonian camp spikes (Plb.18.18.1-18). This digression demarcates the beginning of Polybius' narrative of the battle of
Cynoscephalae, which then lasts until another substantial digression, this one on the differences between the Roman and Macedonian militaries, demarcates its end. For now, what matters is that Livy also follows his statement of Flamininus' ignorance of Philip's position in Thessaly with a slightly condensed version of Polybius' stake digression, then follows Polybius' order of events, thus indicating that he is following Polybius as his source here. As such, I will be following Polybius as my main source for the battle of Cynoscephalae.  

[Figure 4.13] Flamininus now knew that he had effectively pulled Philip into Thessaly. In another surprise move, Flamininus promptly abandoned Phthiotic Thebes and "advanced slowly/by foot with his whole force and established his camp at a distance of about fifty stades from Pherae" (Plb.18.19.1; cp. L.33.6.1-2).  

Abandoning Phthiotic Thebes and moving towards Pherae would have been a surprising move to Philip for two reasons: First, Flamininus sustained his attack on this Macedonian controlled city that was strategically placed to both control an important north-south corridor as well as base a sustained attack on Demetrias for less time than it would have taken to even properly set up siege equipment. Second, instead of moving east towards Demetrias directly, Flamininus moved north towards the independent city of Pherae.

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369 That Livy followed Polybius for the following narrative, see Trankle 1977; Walbank 1967, ad loc., and Briscoe 2009.
370 That Flamininus did not press the fight or prepare for a siege but instead quickly gave up on the venture, indicated that Thebes itself was not important to Flamininus for itself.
Pherae lay just west of the modern town of Velestino, roughly 14km due north of Phthiotic Thebes. Livy consistently converts 8 Polybian stadia into one Roman mile, as he does here, converting "περὶ πεντήκοντα στάδια" to "sex ferme milia" (i.e., 50/8 = 6.25). One Roman mile is 1480 meters, which indicates that Flamininus camped roughly 9km south of Pherae.

For Flamininus to end up roughly 9km from Pherae would mean that he only moved his army about 5km. Such a march would have given Flamininus virtually a full day to scout the region and place his camp in a position he considered advantageous, i.e. Flamininus had the time and opportunity to choose the location of a potential battle.

Philip now expected to encounter Flamininus at Phthiotic Thebes, south of where Flamininus now was, and Flamininus has had the opportunity to choose the location for this surprise meeting.

Polybius reports that, while Flamininus moved his camp,

Philip, at the same time, learning that the Romans encamped near Thebes, left Larisa with his whole army and set out, making the journey towards Thebes. When he was about thirty stades away, then having encamped there *in good time*, he ordered everyone to take care of their persons.

Φίλιππος δὲ [καὶ] κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν πυνθανόμενος τοὺς Ῥωμαίους στρατοπεδεύειν περὶ τὰς Θῆβας, ἐξάρας ἀπὸ τῆς Λαρίσης παντὶ τῷ στρατεύματι προῆγε, ποιούμενος τὴν πορείαν ὡς ἐπὶ τὰς Φερᾶς ἀποσχοῦν δὲ περὶ τριάκοντα στάδια, τότε μὲν αὐτοῦ καταστρατοπεδεύσας ἐν ὧρᾳ παρήγγειλε πᾶσι γίνεσθαι περὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος θεραπείαν (Plb.18.19.3-4; cp.L.33.6.3)
From Larisa to Philip's new campsite roughly 6km north of Pherae was a journey of nearly 40km. This is an exceptionally long march for a single day, even if on flat ground - especially for a march into potentially hostile territory. While doable in a day, it would not have been possible to have completed such a march and then established camp with enough time left in the day that Polybius commented on it (ἐν ὥρᾳ) and specified how they filled it. While it is possible that they established camp at the end of one long day of marching and that Polybius mentioned Philip telling the men to get their bodies ready to focus the reader on the Macedonians' focus and preparation for battle rather than as a telling detail relating to the march itself, it seems more likely that the Macedonians took two days to make the march, which would have enabled them to establish camp in the afternoon on the second day.

The Roman and Macedonian camps were now about 25 km apart, with the Macedonian army encamped roughly 6km north of Pherae and the Roman army roughly 9km south of Pherae.

Polybius reports that early the next morning, Flamininus sent out scouts to find where the enemy was camped, since he still only knew that Philip was somewhere in Thessaly (Plb.18.19.2; cp.L.33.6.2). At the same time, Philip sent out advance troops to "cross the hilly country above Pherae", while he led the rest of the army out of the camp (Plb.18.19.5; cp.L.33.6.4).

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376 Livy reports that Philip encamped four miles north of Pherae, which is consistent with his previous conversion of 8 Polybian stades to the Roman mile (i.e., 30/8 = 3.75), in each case Livy rounds to the nearest whole number. Four Roman miles (4 x 1480m) is 5.9 km and 8 Polybian stades is 5.56 km.
Philip was not scouting for where Flamininus was as Philip thought him to be at Thebes still. Instead, Philip was likely attempting to gain a surprise advantage over Flamininus by cutting southwest across the hills directly to the west of Pherae before turning east by Eretria and appearing behind where he thought Flamininus was camped at Phthiotic Thebes. This tactic would have cut off Flamininus' supply and escape routes to the south as well as served to get Philip's army into more open country which would benefit his phalanx tactics. This plan would also explain why Philip led all his men out of the camp, i.e. to cross the hills once the advance troops had determined the best route.

Polybius specifies that Flamininus and Philip sent out their advance troops "early in the morning," in each case using the same phrase "ὑπὸ τὴν ἐωθηνήν" (Plb.18.19.2, 18.19.5). However this phrase indicates a time of the day earlier than one might think, as Philip after sending out the advance troops moved the rest of his forces at first dawn, "τής ἡμέρας διαφαινούσης". It follows that both armies sent out their advance troops in the dark, before the dawn.

Polybius reports:

The advanced sections of both armies very nearly came into contact at the pass over the hills; for when they caught sight of each other in the darkness, they halted when already quite close and sent at once to inform their respective commanders of the fact and inquire what they should do.

παρ' ὅλιγον μὲν οὖν ἠλθὼν ἀμφοτέρων οἱ προεξαπεσταλμένοι τοῦ συμπεσεὶν ἀλλήλως περὶ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς· προϊδόμοιν γὰρ σφᾶς αὐτοὺς ὑπὸ τὴν ὀρφνὴν ἐκ πάνυ βραχέος διαστήματος ἐπέστησαν, καὶ ταχεώς ἐπεμπόν, ἀποδηλοῦντες ἀμφότεροι τοῖς ἠγεμόσι τὸ γεγονὸς καὶ πυνθανόμενοι τί δέον εἴη ποιεῖν. (Plb.18.19.6-7; cp.L33.6.4-5)

377 Contra Livy 33.6.3: Philip had not learned any new news about the Roman movements. If he had, he would not have changed his intended movements and returned to camp after just seeing some scouts.
Scholars have interpreted this passage to mean that the advance troops searched all day from dawn to night and then found each other just a few km from the Macedonian camp. This would imply that the Roman scouts were unable to find the Macedonian camp in a day of searching and that the Macedonian army sat outside their camp waiting for their advance troops to return all day, both of which seem improbable. If, instead, we understand the darkness to be the morning darkness, then the Roman scouts promptly moved towards the north, from where they expected the Macedonians to come, and sought out high ground to better view the landscape - both sound strategic moves. The Macedonian advance troops had quickly found the pass and were determining the best route. The main body of the army was outside of the camp because they were expecting to soon follow.

Both advance forces sent back for instruction, and both were told to retire to their respective camps (Plb.18.19.8; L.33.6.6). Neither scouting party had to opportunity to learn where the other was camped.

Polybius reports that the next day both commanders sent out 300 each of cavalry and infantry who then met on the north side of Pherae for an inconclusive skirmish before retiring back to their respective camps (Plb.18.19.9-12; cp.L.33.6.6) As the skirmish was north of Pherae, the Roman advance troops had travelled further from their camp than the Macedonian advance troops had; the Romans were aggressively looking for the enemy camp.

Paton 2006 (1926) translates "ὑπὸ τὴν ὀρφνην" as "in the early dusk"; Walbank 1967, p575: "'in the darkness'; Paton's 'early dusk' is wrong." Walbank seems to imply a time later in the evening than Paton's. Hammond 1988, p63 combines both this day's skirmish with the next day's into one event.
Polybius reports that on the next day both armies left the area due to mutual dissatisfaction with the terrain (Plb.18.20.1; cp.L.33.7.7-8).

However, while Philip had reason for dissatisfaction with this terrain, Flamininus had reason to want a conflict here. Flamininus had had time to explore his options and choose where he wanted his camp and his future encounter with Philip to happen, and he chose this location to intercept Philip's expected march to relieve Phthiotic Thebes. Flamininus had demonstrated his willingness to use his allies' knowledge of local topography to his strategic advantage: in 198 BC, he relied on local allied shepherds for his surrounding tactic at the Battle of the River Aous, on Epirote and Athamanian guides for his repeated crossings of the Pindus, on what were presumably Aetolian advisors for his very efficient Phokian campaign; in 197 BC he had repeatedly demonstrated use of scouts, "including Aetolians owing to their acquaintance with the area" (Plb.18.19.2, 9). It follows that Flamininus would have also taken advantage of these resources when he was planning the strategic location for this campsite.379 Additionally, terrain in general is less likely to have been an issue for Flamininus, as a later passage in Polybius says that the Roman maniple system is adaptable to all terrains (Plb.18.32.10-11).

On the other hand, the Macedonian Phalanx can only succeed on one terrain - flat and obstacle-free (Plb.18.31.2-7). The terrain that Polybius describes here, "all under cultivation and covered with walls and small gardens (Plb.18.19.1)" would be too rough for the phalanx as Polybius specifies that "the phalanx requires level and clear ground with obstacles such as ditches, clefts, clumps of trees, ridges and water courses, all of

379 As well as when he was planning the general geographic and topographic details of this season's campaign at Heracleia and Xyniae.
which are sufficient to impede and break up such a formation (Plb.18.31.5-6)".

Additionally, Philip had not encamped in a spot to hold and fight from, as the Romans had, but one from which he planned on moving the next day. It follows that it was only Philip who did not want to get caught in a major land battle here.

This helps explain Philip's next move, described by Polybius.

Philip began to march towards Scotussa, hoping to procure supplies from that town and afterwards when fully furnished to find ground suitable for his own army. But Flamininus, suspecting Philip's purpose, put his army in motion at the same time as Philip with the object of destroying the grain in the territory of Scotussa before his adversary could get there.

Polybius says that Philip and Flamininus both headed west at the same time. However, this is unlikely. It makes sense for Philip to have left before Flamininus realized he was leaving in order to prevent his being attacked while on the move, especially on terrain he believed to be disadvantageous. Additionally, as Hammond has pointed out, if Flamininus were to leave the area at the same moment as Philip, Philip could cut back and get to Demetrias. If the threat to Demetrias had indeed pulled Philip into Thessaly, this could potentially eliminate any need for him to fight with Flamininus. If Philip got to Demetrias, it would certainly change the method of fighting and relevant tactics, in part by removing Flamininus' advantage gained by his initial surprise move,

380 Hammond 1988, p63. Hammond's reason is that if Flamininus had moved at dawn, irrespective of Philip's move, Philip could have proceeded to Demetrias.
and would put Flamininus into a position of having to react to Philip. Thus, it is extremely probable that Philip left before Flamininus, and that Flamininus did not leave until Philip had at least a half-day's start.\textsuperscript{381}

We also learn from Polybius that Philip had a two-stage plan: First, "to procure supplies from Scotussa"; and second, "when fully furnished to find ground suitable for his own army". This means that Philip also wanted a land battle instead of waiting out the season, but a battle on terrain advantageous for the Macedonian phalanx. As discussed above, we know from Polybius that such terrain is flat, such as the Thessalian plain west of the central N-S route, in central Thessaly. Scotussa was located in the hills about 1km west of the modern village of Aghia Triada, east of the modern village of Skotoussa.\textsuperscript{382} It follows that Philip planned to first move northwest and then circle counterclockwise around Mt. Mavrovouni to get near enough to Scotussa to resupply, and then proceed west across the Karadag range into central Thessaly. Philip had previously gathered his forces at Scotussa in 207 BC before campaigning (L.28.5.12), indicating this to be familiar country for Philip and a logical place to move his army.

Polybius specifies that Flamininus, for his part, planned to destroy the grain in the territory of Scotussa. There is little arable land around Scotussa and what is there is not very productive. Scotussa would instead be getting supplied from the exceptionally fertile grain lands to the west, in central Thessaly. Flamininus should then be heading

\textsuperscript{381} Perhaps the compression of events is due to Polybius maintaining his narrative framing device for this episode of paired simultaneous actions of Philip and Flamininus.
somewhere on the southwestern side of the Karadag ridge to destroy or prevent access to grain for Scotussa.

Returning to Polybius:

As there were high hills between the two armies in their march neither did the Romans perceive to where the Macedonians were marching nor the Macedonians the Romans.

(Plb.18.20.4)

For this to be the case, the armies have to be on either side of a view-blocking hill. To get near Scotussa, Phillip must be heading west to the north of the Karadag ridge and then Flamininus is heading west to the south of the Karadag ridge.

But if Flamininus did not know where Philip was going, why was he trying to cut off the grain to specifically Scotussa? Flamininus might not have known where Philip was going, but Flamininus wanted to separate Philip from the grain supply from the Thessalian plain. A camp in central Thessaly in the area marked on the map would cut off the grain supply from the Thessalian plain for all Macedonian Thessaly, including for Scotussa. It is only coincidence that where Flamininus is going happens to be where Philip is also going.

In fact, Philip's movement north from his camp by Pherae, from Flamininus' perspective, could have indicated that Philip was going back to Larisa. Philip would have then demonstrated that he could quickly get to Pherae/Phthiotic Thebes/Demetrias, and then returned to his base of operations. In this situation, Flamininus, understanding that
Philip was returning to Larisa, was moving to central Thessaly to try the second stage of his plan as outlined earlier to draw Philip back down to commit to a decisive battle.

Polybius reports:

After marching all that day, Flamininus having reached the place called Eretria in Phthiotis and Philip the river Onchestus, they both encamped in those spots, each ignorant of the position of the other's camp.

ταύτην μὲν (οὖν) τὴν ἠμέραν ἐκάτεροι διανύσαντες, οὐ μὲν Τίτος ἐπὶ τὴν προσαχορευομένην Ἐρέτριαν τῆς (Φθιώτιδος χώρας), οὐ δὲ Φίλιππος ἐπὶ τὸν Ὀγχιστόν ποταμόν, αὐτοῦ κατέζευξαν, ἀγνοοῦντες ἁμφότεροι τὰς ἀλλὰ ἡμῶν παρεμβολάς

(Plb.18.20.5)

[Figure 4.14] The ancient path of the river Onchestus, and thus Philip's camp, is uncertain. Philip's camp needs to be close enough to have been directly supplied by Scotussa, within one day's travel distance, in a well-watered area to supply his troops and horses, and potentially where the river Onchestus was. The location of the modern village of Kalo Nero fits these requirements: it lies less than 7 km due north of Scotussa at the northern edge of the Karadag ridge, is a roughly 18 km march from Philip's camp, the modern name indicates the presence of good water, and is near enough to be within reason to all proposed locations of the Onchestus.

Flamininus encamped at Eretria, located on the ridge just southwest of the modern day village of Eretria. [Figure 4.15] Impressive remains of the curtain wall stand today, demonstrating this location's defensible position and clear view over the immediate landscape [Figure 4.16]. Eretria would be expected to be friendly to the

383 Walbank 1967, p576; Kromayer 1907, p68; Pritchett 1969, pp 135–9; and Hammond 1988, pp 64, 64n9 have all proposed courses for the ancient Onchestus. None are certain, and all are within reason for Philip's camp at Kalo Nero to have been near them.

384 Eretria: Blum 1992, with maps, plans, drawings, and bibliography.
Roman army, as it was one of the cities Philip had sacked the previous year (L.32.13.9). Flamininus traveled 12 km, which his army could have traveled in half a day considering how flat this route is. And, this makes sense if he left half a day after Philip.

Polybius is again explicit that neither camp knows where the other is. As one can see on the map and I verified by autopsy, the part of the Karadag ridge between the two campsites indeed blocks the sightline between the two camps.

Polybius continues:

Next day they again advanced and encamped, Philip at the place called Melambium in the territory of Scotussa and Flamininus at the Thetideum in that of Pharsalus, being still in ignorance of each others' whereabouts.

τῇ δ' ὑπερτεραίᾳ προελθόντες ἐστρατοπέδευσαν, Φίλιππος μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ Μελάμβιον προσαγορεύομενον τῆς Σκοτουσσαίας, Τίτος δὲ περὶ τὸ Θετίδειον τῆς Φαρσαλίας, ἀκμὴν ἄγνωστον ἀλλήλους.

(Plb.18.20.6)

[Figure 4.17] First, let's look at Flamininus's encampment. Strabo reports that the Thetideum was "near the two Pharsaluses, the old and the new" (Strabo 9.5.6), meaning Pharsalus and Palaepharsalus. Pharsalus was located at modern Farsala. Although the location of Palaepharsalus is still disputed, J.D. Morgan convincingly argued that that Palaepharsalus was modern Krini [Figure 4.18], moving the location of Palaepharsalus further west than Kromayer, Pritchett, and Bequignon had placed it. Decourt has summarized all past arguments for Palaepharsalus, and argued that two issues disproved Morgan's placement: first, Krini was not on the route between Pharsalus and Larisa;

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second, the Thetideum was east of Pharsalus, so Palaeharsalus must be even further east rather than north.\textsuperscript{387}

To defend his first point, Decourt says that "la route directe, approximativement la meme qu'aujourd'hui, par Kalkhiades, devait exister, car la distance est beaucoup plus courte, et la relief bien moins rude." However, autopsy and close examination of maps prove this incorrect as the two routes are less than 5km difference in length and both have to climb only over the Karadag ridge over an equivalent distance - with the highest point in Decourt's "much less harsh" route only about 20m lower than the other.

We know that a Thetideum was a sanctuary of Thetis, but we do not know what one looked like. Scholars have proposed locations for this Thetideum based on what they considered to be a distinctive feature of the landscape or concentration of pottery fragments.\textsuperscript{388} However, we have no description of this or any other Thetideum and cannot know what appearance it had - it might have been a spring or a grove of trees lost to the archaeological record. In fact, since the site was known in antiquity from its mention in Euripides' play \textit{Andromache} (E.Andr.17-20), one can imagine in the 220+ years since Euripides' play something (perhaps something archaizing) having been built or even, say, a sign put up identifying an area as the Thetideum by locals to drive religious tourism.\textsuperscript{389} Every reader of Pausanius understands the value of religious tourism to the ancients, and to the ancient economy. In sum, we have no idea what this Thetideum entailed, except for

\textsuperscript{387} Decourt 1990, p219-220
\textsuperscript{389} See Russell 2012 on ancient religious tourism in the second century BC.
Strabo's report that it was near the two Pharsaluses. Discounting both of Decourt's objections leaves no objections to Morgan's placement for Palaepharsalus.

Hammond, following Morgan's placement of Palaepharsalus, proposed a location near the two Pharsaluses as the site for the Roman camp. He placed the camp at the modern village of Zoodochos Pigi based on its water source and an outcrop that he suggested was the Thetideum. [Figure 4.19] However, there is no evidence that this outcrop is the Thetideum or that a Theitideum would involve an outcrop. Hammond theorized that a water source would be an essential component for a shrine to Thetis, since Euripides called her "Thetis of the sea". The idea of a "remarkable source of water" being part of a shrine to Thetis is intriguing, but perhaps more important is the need for a water source for a camp for 26,000 men with their horses and elephants, especially if one might be staying at this location for an extended period of time, i.e. until Philip can be drawn into battle.

With the outcrop put aside, the only reason Hammond specifically chose Zoodochos Pigi as the campsite was because it has a water source. However, in the area that can reasonably be called "near the two Pharsaluses" there are a whole cluster of villages with modern names reflecting the fact that they have access to water sources besides Zoodochos Pigi (life-giving spring): the aforementioned Krini (spring), Dendraki (little trees), Mega Evidrio (Big Good-Water), Mikro Evidrio (Little Good-Water), and Polyneri (Much-Water). In fact, Zoodichos Pigi is the only one of these names that might not indicate the presence of a spring, as the name can have a religious meaning beyond its

\[391\] Hammond 1988, p67.
\[392\] For Roman military water requirements, see Roth 2012, pp 119-123.
practical one: it is a name, and common iconographical image, for the Virgin Mary in the Greek Orthodox Church.

With the presence of a water source near the two Pharsaluses being the criteria for placing the camp, any of these other sites could suffice. To supply 26,000 troops with water it makes more sense for the camp to have been placed in the midst of several water sources rather than relying on just one. Placing the camp west of Zoodochos Pigi puts the camps near the two Pharsaluses and close to many water sources that fulfill the practical requirements.393

Following Polybius' detailed description of a Republican military camp (Plb.6.27.1 - 6.31.14), we know that the camp must have been about 775 meters by 775 meters, and this flat area where the camp is marked on the map is large enough to accommodate the camp.394 This high concentration of water sources, paired with access to grain-land and a resupply route from allied Aetolia to the south (including Xyniae and the Roman base at Anticyra), makes this an ideal place for a camp. The Roman army could have covered the 30km from Eretria in a day's march and a camp here prevents Macedonian access to the fertile Thessalian plain. [Figure 4.20]

We have no archaeological evidence for Philip's camp "at the place called Melambium". Hammond suggested the modern town of Chalkiades for the location of Philip's camp.395 [Figure 4.21] I find Hammond's proposal convincing because

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393 If Hammond is correct and the Thetideum did require a spring, then this location fulfills the religious requirements as well.
394 For detailed exegesis of Plb.6.27.1 - 6.31.14, see Walbank 1957, pp709-716; Dobson 2008, pp67-72. See Dobson 2008 for the relationship of this passage to archaeological evidence for Republican Roman military camps.
395 Hammond 1988, p65
Chalkiades is less than 12km from Scotussa, making it qualify as "Melambium in the territory of Scotussa" and because it seems to be the best well watered location between Philip's previous camp and the flat plain towards which Philip is aiming. Philip would have travelled roughly 12km from Kalo Nero, and a half day's march seems reasonable if Philip had spent the morning preparing supplies from Scotussa.

Although it might not appear so on a map, autopsy demonstrates that it is indeed hilly enough that you could not see an army on the other side of the ridge between the camps nor when both armies were en route.

Polybius reports that in the night were violent rain and thunder storms and "at early dawn all the mist from the clouds descended on the earth, so that owing to the darkness that prevailed one could not see even people who were close at hand" (Plb.18.20.7).

This fog could be reasonably read as a literary device of Polybius, not reflecting reality, with the fog perhaps showing divine disfavor for the Macedonians, or perhaps a Polybian predecessor to Clausewitz's now proverbial "fog of war". However, thick fog is a regular occurrence in Thessaly. I was in Thessaly in mid-October 2013 and it rained all night and in the morning thick fog indeed descended on the earth. In early March 2014 Morgan Condell witnessed this fog on the highway between between Pharsala and Larisa in the direct vicinity of where the battle of Cynescephalae occurred. In both cases, the fog was so thick that vision was greatly limited, just as Polybius describes. While these events were in October and March, and the fog in question in 197 BC was in May, in each case I asked many Thessalian natives about this fog and all agreed that this thick fog
was a normative occurrence after rain all year long, including May, and that the fog can be much worse than what I witnessed.

Returning to Polybius:

Philip, being in a hurry to effect his purpose, broke up his camp and advanced with his whole army, but finding it difficult to march owing to the mist, after having made but little progress, he encamped his army in a palisaded camp and sent off his covering force with orders to occupy the summits of the hills which lay between him and the enemy. Flamininus lay still encamped near the Thetideum.

Since Polybius was explicit that Philip did not know where the Roman army was (Plb.18.20.6), [Figure 4.22] Philip's march must have kept the Keradag ridge between the armies, and thus Philip must have been continuing northwest before he stopped. Polybius' report of Philip's command "to occupy the summits of the hills which lay between him and the enemy" helps the reader understand the armies' relationship to the topography rather than indicating that Philip knew where the enemy was.

Flamininus, in contrast, did not attempt to move from his camp, and no mention is made that the weather influenced this decision. Not moving made sense if Flamininus was where he wanted to be because his location was strategically and intentionally chosen.

Let's step back briefly before the battle. Flamininus was able to begin the campaign season by drawing Philip into east Thessaly. Philip avoided a battle near
Pherae on terrain unfavorable for his phalanx and headed west towards land favorable for his phalanx. Flamininus also headed west, his aim being to block Philip's access to the grain from the Thessalian plain, wherever Philip might be - and Polybius is explicit that Philip and Flamininus have been completely ignorant of each other's whereabouts or movements from the moment they left their camps by Pherae.

And at this moment in the narrative, the Roman and Macedonian armies, each ignorant of the other's presence, were encamped only a few kilometers from each other on either side of the Karadag ridge. [Figure 4.23] As Philip established the new camp and sent out his covering force, his ignorance of the proximity of the Roman army was further shown by the fact that he sent out a significant portion of his army to forage (Plb.18.22.1). Polybius reports the number of men sent to forage as "most of the men in the camp" -- πλείους ἐκ τῆς παρεμβολῆς (Plb.18.22.1), although Philip was later able to then draw up "the majority of the army" -- τὸ πλέον μέρος ἡδη τῆς ἑαυτοῦ δυνάμεως (Plb.18.24.1), at a time when "the majority of the phalangites" -- τῶν πλείστων μερῶν τῆς φάλαγγος (Plb.18.24.7) were still not ready for action. Although Polybius' numbers are not precise, it seems safe to assign half of Philip's 16,000 phalangites to this foraging expedition. Flamininus simultaneously sent out roughly 300 cavalry and 1000 light-armed infantry to scout the ridge to the north of his camp (Plb.18.21.1). 396

[Figure 4.24] These Macedonian and Roman advance forces encountered each other in the hills unexpectedly (Plb.18.21.2), as they had four days earlier near Pherae, and sent messengers back to their commanders (Plb.18.21.3), again as they had by Pherae. In contrast to that earlier event, though, these advance forces then fought: the

396 For the numbers of men, see Walbank 1967, p575, 580; Dobson 2008, p50.
Macedonians drove the Romans from the ridge down to the plain (Plb.18.21.4, 18.22.6). Then, Flamininus sent 500 cavalry and 2000 infantry reinforcements (making for a total of 800 cavalry and 3000 infantry now involved) who turned the tide and pushed the Macedonians back up the hill (Plb.18.21.5-8). After which Philip, "as the mist began to clear," sent significant reinforcements of his own who drove the Romans back down from the ridge and almost to the plain (Plb.18.22.2-6).

As the Roman camp was at roughly 120m elevation on the plain and the Macedonian camp was at roughly 250m elevation, the ridge between the camps at roughly 350m elevation was high enough to obscure the two camps from each other. This area of the ridge marked on the map would have given a scouting force the best view of the area. The Roman retreat would have been down the gentle slope towards their camp.

Polybius reports that Flamininus then "led out all his forces and drew them up in order of battle close to the hills" (Plb.18.22.7), and Philip "ordered his army to be led out of the palisaded camp" (Plb.18.22.10). The Romans losing the skirmish independently prompted both Flamininus and Philip to commit all their troops.

Importantly, though, many of Philip's troops are not in the camp but out foraging. [Figure 4.25] Philip ordered a man nicknamed "The Elephant" to assemble these troops, including the entire left wing of the phalanx, and advance as soon as they were able (Plb.18.24.2). Flamininus, on the other hand, ordered the right wing of his infantry and his actual elephants to stay put (Plb.18.23.7).

[Figure 4.26] Polybius reports that Flamininus then absorbed his retreating advance troops into his maniples (Plb.18.23.1, 18.24.10), advanced with the Roman left
wing (Plb.18.23.7-8), and began driving the Macedonian advance troops back up the ridge (Plb.18.23.8, 18.24.4-5). Meanwhile, Philip led the right wing of the phalanx and the peltasts (Plb.18.24.1) up the ridge between the camps (Plb.18.24.1), and "when the leading ranks reached the top of the pass, he wheeled to the left, and occupied the summits above it" (Plb.18.24.3).

The Romans drove the Macedonian advance forces back up the hill to where Philip was, and Philip received them and placed them "towards the right wing" -- ἐπὶ τὸ δεξίον κέρας (Plb.18.24.8). Philip placed them on the right of his phalanx. 397 [Figure 4.27] Polybius reports that, at this point, Philip made a curious tactical decision:

Philip ordered the peltasts and the phalangites to double their depth and tighten up on the right.

τοὶς δὲ πελτασταῖς καὶ τοῖς φαλαγγίταις παρῆγγελε διπλασιάζειν τὸ βάθος καὶ πυκνοῦν ἐπὶ τὸ δεξίον.
(Plb.18.24.8)

This tactic has confused scholars. Walbank argued that this meant that "they were to change from a marching depth of eight men to the battle line of sixteen men .... to reduce the space occupied by each man from 6ft to 3 ft." 398 However, Philip, when he climbed to the top of the ridge, had already "drawn the phalanx up in battle order from the left" (Plb.18.24.3). 399 [Figure 4.28] This means that Philip already drew up his men...

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397 For standard Macedonian placement of light-armed troops and allies to the sides of the phalanx, see Sekunda 2013, pp 88-126.
398 Walbank 1967, p582; Kromayer 1907, p81n1. Polybius reports that the normative phalanx was 16 men deep (Plb.18.30.1) and each soldier took up 3 feet of space (Plb.18.29.2).
399 LSJ translates παρεμβάλλω as "draw up in battle order" in Polybian usage. Walbank 1969, p582 translates this phrase "formed them into line from the left." There is an important contrast here with Philip's left wing, which never changed from marching formation into 16 man deep phalanx formation after it climbed the ridge (Plb.18.25.6).
from marching depth into the 16 man deep battle formation and can't do it again. Instead, we should understand that Philip here doubled the depth from 16 men to 32 men.

Hammond has argued that Philip here drew up his phalanx 32 men deep, but his reasoning is confusing: Hammond says that the 32 man deep phalanx "gave an additional impetus at the moment of impact." However, Hammond bases this assertion on Polybius' claim that the Macedonian phalanx derives its superior impetus at impact over Roman forces from the 16 man deep phalanx. If the 16 man deep formation was already superior to the Roman army, a 32 man deep phalanx against a Roman army would be unnecessary.

Additionally, Hammond confuses his argument by saying that "in making his analysis of the Macedonian phalanx Polybius was thinking not of this battle [Cynoscephalae] but of the battle of Pydna, when the two battle-lines did engage in an orthodox manner." Hammond's evidence for Macedonian tactics at Pydna is not from Polybius (whose description of Pydna is lost) or even Livy (whose narrative of Pydna was derived from Polybius) but from Frontinus, who said only that Perseus drew up his troops in a *phalangem duplicem* (Frontinus *Strat.* 2.3.20). It is not clear what this *phalangem duplicem* was. Rather than double-deep it was probably double-tight, as this was a tactic Antigonus used at the battle of Sellasia when he turned the tide of the seesaw battle by packing his phalanx double-tight for the decisive push (Plb.2.69.7-9).

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400 Hammond 1988, p74 n28.
401 Hammond 1988, p74 n28.
402 Briscoe 2012, pp 2, 537.
403 Hammond 1984, p42.
In sum, Polybius says that a 16 man deep phalanx had a stronger force at impact than the Roman maniple system and that a 16 man deep phalanx with the men packed twice as close together has a stronger force at impact than a standard 16 man deep phalanx. Polybius does not say anything about the merits of a double-deep phalanx, and we have no other attestations of a double-deep phalanx.

So where does that leave us? Polybius reports that Philip drew up his men into a 16 man deep phalanx when he got to the ridge, and then drew them into a 32 man deep phalanx after he received his retreating advance forces. However, we still need a reason why Philip's doubling up of the phalanx makes sense, other than fulfilling the narrative role of making it easier to defeat his phalanx later - i.e. there must be a strategic reason for this maneuver.

Adapting to the landscape, especially in light of the importance of the landscape to Polybius' discussion of the phalanx, is a plausible strategic reason. Polybius makes clear that generally the more level the terrain, the more successful the phalanx will be (Plb.18.29.1, 18.31.2-6, 18.31.11) and that specifically in this case Philip had anxieties about fighting on the terrain on in the vicinity of the ridge between the two camps (Plb.18.22.9-10). Additionally, Polybius tells us that a phalanx cannot move laterally, the hedge of long spears that is the phalanx's strength prevents it from any movement besides straight ahead. It follows that Philip doubled up his line to avoid having to march over this hill marked on the map but instead to go in a straight line to the east of it.

Philip had one wing of his phalanx and all his peltasts with him on the top of the ridge, roughly 8000 phalangites and 2000 peltasts. Polybius's discussion of the
Macedonian phalanx (Plb.18.29-30) supplies a guide to determine the size of Philip's phalanx: 10,000 soldiers drawn up 16 men deep would be 625 men across, with each man taking up three feet in breadth. When describing the Roman camp in book 6, Polybius's 'foot' indicated a Hellenistic foot of length .355m, and I understand Polybius' foot to be the same length here.\(^{404}\) 625 men each requiring three Polybian feet would be 665.6 meters across (= 3x.355x625). If each man took up roughly three Polybian feet front to back as well, then the 16 man deep phalanx would be 17 meters deep. Once Philip then doubled their depth, his phalanx became 312 men across and 32 men deep, making for a phalanx 332.3 meters across and 34 meters deep. An unspecified number of advance cavalry and light armed troops, but likely less than 4000 and perhaps significantly less so, were packed as close as possible to the right of the phalanx.\(^{405}\) However, as these were light-armed troops and cavalry, even packed closely we should expect them to be further apart from each other than the phalanx (3 feet per man) and perhaps even the maniple (6 feet per man) due to the nature of their weapons and horses. These men would then extend 265 - 310 meters to the right of the phalanx ((maximum 4000 men / 32 men deep) x (6-7 feet per man X .355 m per foot).

\[\text{Figure 4.29}\] Polybius reports that the Macedonian right wing charged into the advancing Roman left wing (Plb.18.24.9-10), and started pushing them back down the

\(^{404}\) Dobson 2008, p71. See Leake 1839 for the consistency of measurements in Polybius.

\(^{405}\) Following Livy's numbers allows us to make an estimate. During the preliminary skirmish Philip committed "all the mercenaries except those from Thrace" and the Macedonian and Thessalian cavalry units, which implies a high percentage but not all of the cavalry (Plb.18.22.2). Philip had 3500 mercenaries that were not Thracian and 2000 total cavalry. Flamininus had turned the tide by sending 500 cavalry and 2000 infantry (Plb.18.21.6), so Philip's larger numbers, but numbers within the same skirmish ballpark, seem within the range of probability. Taking into account deaths and wounds in the losing skirmish, 4000 men seems a plausible maximum. It could be significantly less if many of these were out foraging.
slope (Plb.18.25.2, 18.25.4). However, the Macedonian light-armed troops, stationed to the right of the phalanx, did not advance as far as the phalanx did (Plb.18.25.3).

**[Figure 4.30]** The doubled-up phalanx thus avoided the hill and pushed back the Roman line. The light armed troops climbed the hill to the right of the phalanx in order to shoot missiles down at the Roman infantry during the phalanx charge - a strategically sound maneuver - and stayed on the hill as the phalanx pushed the Roman left beyond the hill towards the plain.

**[Figure 4.31]** The Macedonian left wing now arrived at the top of the ridge and stopped (Plb.18.25.3, 5). Flamininus at this point sent the Roman right wing and elephants, from where they had been waiting, up the hill towards the Macedonian left (Plb.18.25.5). Polybius gives two accounts of what then happened to the Macedonian left. In the first account, the Macedonian left fled before the Roman right finished climbing the hill (Plb.18.25.7). In the second account, the Macedonian left were nearly all killed when they tried to surrender (Plb.18.26.9-12).

**[Figure 4.32]** Polybius reports, and this could apply to either situation with the Macedonian left, that while most of the Roman right chased toward the Macedonian left (Plb.18.26.1), a Roman Tribune from the Roman right with "not more than twenty maniples", i.e. not more than 2400 men, saw the Roman left in trouble and swung around behind the advancing Macedonian right (Plb.18.26.2-3). He got behind 10,000

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406 The Roman maniples were more flexible in arrangement and thus harder to predict the size of - but since no author makes issue during the battle of outflanking by the heavy infantry - I take each wing of the Roman army to be roughly the same width. For logistics of the Roman maniple system, see Livy 37.39.7-13; Plb.18.29.5-8, 18.30.5-11, 18.32.2, 18.32.10-11.

407 See Dobson 2008, p48 for the size of a maniple and for Polybius' terminology for the Roman maniple.
men in a rectangle 32 people deep who were all unable to turn around (Plb.18.26.4-5). It was a slaughter, with the surviving Macedonians fleeing (Plb.18.26.5).

Polybius reports a great disparity in casualties (Plb.18.27.6), which accords with his description of events: the Romans lost about 700 men, and presumably the majority of these were lost when the Macedonian right was successfully pushing back the Roman left. The Macedonians lost about 8000 men with at least 5000 captured, with the Macedonian right presumably almost completely killed or captured once it was attacked from behind and most of the remainder coming from the broken Macedonian left.

Philip escaped from the Macedonian right a short distance from the action and watched the end of the battle (Plb.18.26.7). Since the Romans were to Philip's east, it follows that Philip escaped to the west, and this elevated ground marked on the map would have offered a fitting place to survey the scene. Philip then fled north, spending the night at a place called "Alexander's Tower" before waiting at Gonnoi to gather the troops and return to Macedon via the Vale of Tempe (Plb.18.27.1-2).408

Gonnoi, at the mouth of Tempe, was nearly 70 km from the battle.409 Philip would have wanted to go as far as possible the first day because he did not want the Romans to overtake him during his flight. Presumably Alexander's Tower was a natural feature of the hills not a man-made tower.410 The hills to the west and northwest of Larisa offer a likely place for such a feature and Philip probably camped there the night of the battle.

408 There are distinct similarities to Philip's behavior after the Battle of the River Aous: the immediate retreat before the losses are total, Philip's waiting for the men to gather, Philip's stopping at a place named for a Hellenistic general/king, Philip's safe return to Macedon.
410 Philip had similarly stopped at an area called Pyrrhus' Camp, not thought to have contained an actual camp of Pyrrhus, on his retreat after the Aous (L.32.13.2). Alexander's Tower is otherwise unattested (Walbank 1967, p584), and Livy did not include it in his narrative of Philip's flight to Gonni (L.32.10.6).
Philip and the men with him would have been on horseback and could have covered this roughly 35 km after the battle. Philip then probably waited at Gonnoi for a couple of nights for his men to make the 70 km walk.

Polybius reports that, in the immediate aftermath of the battle, tensions arose between the Romans and the Aetolians over who was responsible for the victory and who should receive what plunder (Plb.18.27.4). In terms of the larger narrative, this was the beginning of the split of the Roman/Aetolian alliance that culminated in the Syrian-Aetolian War.

The troop movements that led to the battle of Cynoscephalae resulted, in essence, from two generals repeatedly trying to outmaneuver the other while relying on poor intelligence: Flamininus made a surprise cross-country march from Xyniae to Phthiotic Thebes. This drew Philip from Larisa towards Thebes. While Philip was en route, Flamininus moved north to place himself in Philip's path. Neither knew where the other was at this moment and their scouts stumbled upon each other. Philip moved west, but gave the impression of returning north to Larisa. Flamininus then moved west. As a result, Philip thought Flamininus was by Pherae, and Flamininus thought Philip was by Larisa. Both generals were putting plans into action based on false intelligence when their scouts again stumbled upon each other (which this time escalated into the battle). Both generals took action to draw the other into a battle on terms they considered advantageous, but based their plans on faulty intelligence. As a result, the armies stumbled into a battle.
Scholars have proposed alternate locations. [Figure 4.33] These are based on their interpretations in which they differ from me, and from each other, on the locations of Palaepharsalus and the Thetideum, as well as in their understanding of Polybius, and the logistical requirements of an army on the march.\footnote{Kromayer 1907; Stahlin 1924; Pritchett 1969; Hammond 1988. Each has bibliography and critique of previous scholarship.}

Polybius marks the end of his Cynoscephalae narrative two ways: first by saying "Such was the result of the battle at Cynoscephalae between the Romans and Philip" (Plb.18.28.1) and then, directly following this statement, by giving a lengthy discourse on the differences between the Roman maniple and the Macedonian phalanx (Plb.18.28.1 - 18.32.13). This discourse should be seen as paired with Polybius' discourse on the difference between Roman and Macedonian camp stakes, with these two discourses working together to demarcate the beginning and end of Polybius' Cynoscephalae narrative.\footnote{These two discourses are incompatible on a fundamental level as the first discourse says that Romans have a better system than the Macedonians because it is such a rigid system, and the second discourse says that the Romans have a better system than the Macedonians because it is so much more adaptable. Further analysis of the relationship between these two discourses is beyond the scope of this paper, but relevant to a separate analysis of Livy's critique of Polybius.}

There is a potentially troubling relationship between Polybius' discourse after the battle and his narrative of the battle itself. In his discourse after the battle, Polybius says that the phalanx will lose to the Romans in the following situations, in order: if the ground is not suitably flat and devoid of obstacles; if the phalanx attacks with less than its total force at once; and if the Romans initially attack with less than their total force and then employ these reserved troops once the phalanx has exposed its flank or rear, such as
by pursuing a retreating enemy. Finally, the phalanx can only operate as a wing-sized mass while the Romans can work independently as smaller units.413

Rather than a conceptual discussion of Roman and Macedonian fighting systems, this could be read as a discussion of the specific circumstances that led to Philip's defeat at Cynoscephalae: Polybius specified, in order, that the ground was too rough for the phalanx (Plb.18.22.9-10), Philip initially attacked with only roughly half his troops, Flamininus intentionally kept half his troops in reserve and then attacked with them once the Macedonian phalanx' right was pursuing the Roman retreating left, and a Roman tribune with a subdivision of the battle line was able to make a decisive tactical move in the battle.

If Polybius crafted his theoretical analysis to match his specific account, then there is no problem. The problem would be if Polybius shaped his narrative of the battle to match his theoretical analysis. This is an intractable problem, yet since Polybius' narrative aligns with the realities of the landscape, I feel confident trusting Polybius' account of the battle.

After the battle of Cynoscephalae, the Second Macedonian War was over and the Romans were able to dictate their peace terms to Philip (L.33.13.3-7; 33.30). At the Isthmian games of 196 BC, these peace terms were made public when Flamininus famously 'declared the freedom of the Greeks' (Plb.18.46.5; L.33.32.5, 33.34.6-7).414

413 L.44.41.6-9, in a passage so similar in tone to this Polybian passage that it must derive from Polybius, explains that the Romans won at Pydna only because their many independent smaller units could break up the unity of the Phalanx. The most telling Polybian detail is that Livy reports that the Romans would have lost had they attacked the phalanx head on en masse.
414 Flamininus' declaration of the freedom of the Greeks can be seen as part of Flamininus' larger program of attempting to behave in Greece in a manner fitting for a Hellenistic king, based on the model initially established by Demetrius Poliorcetes. In addition to fighting for, and declaring, the freedom of the Greeks,
Relevant to this chapter, this involved the Thessalians, Perrhaebians, Magnesians, Phthiotic Achaeans, and Dolopians were all declared to be "free, independent, and subject to their own laws."\textsuperscript{415}

The Roman army then wintered at Elatia (L.33.27.5), and garrisoned the 'three fetters' - Corinth, Chalcis, and Demetrias - as well as Oreus and Eretria (L.33.31.3-4). The Romans maintained these positions through the next two years (L.34.48.2). In 194 BC, Flamininus sent the army wintering at Elatia through Thessaly and the northern pass over the Pindus to Oricum (L.34.50.10), while he, himself, led the troops out of Corinth, Chalcis, Oreas, Eretria, and Demetrias, across Thessaly and the northern pass over the Pindus to Oricum as well (L.34.50.8, 34.51.1-4, 34.52.1). Flamininus then sent the entire Roman army back to Italy (L.34.52.2), and there were no longer any Roman soldiers in Greece.

\textbf{Part II: 191 BC - 190 BC}

The Roman army next returned to Thessaly in 191 BC.\textsuperscript{416} Whereas the Romans previously had fought Philip in Thessaly, the Romans were now called into Thessaly by Philip to help him against the combined forces of the Aetolians and the Seleucid king Antiochus III. Philip alerted the Roman propraetor Marcus Baebius Tamphilus, who was

\textsuperscript{415} The Phocians were initially freed, then annexed to the Aetolians. However, the Romans maintained winter quarters in Phocis for the next two years.

\textsuperscript{416} Rome has had ambassadors, including Flamininus and Villius, involved in Greece, but no land army (L.35.34, 39).
stationed at Apollonia, that the Seleucid king Antiochus III was campaigning in Thessaly (L.36.8.6). Baebius, whom the senate had sent to Apollonia with 4-5,000 men the previous year in preparation for Antiochus potentially invading the west (L.35.20.11, 35.24.7), agreed to meet Philip in Dassaretia (L.36.10.10), which was then the eastern boundary of Roman controlled territory due to their control of Pelium. After their conference, Baebius sent Appius Claudius with 2000 men east through Macedon and down into Thessaly via the Vale of Tempe to Gonnoi (L.36.10.10-11; App.Syr.16), and thus the Roman army returned to Thessaly.

In 192 BC, the Aetolians had invited Antiochus to come and liberate Greece from the Romans, even though there were currently no Roman troops in Greece (L.35.33.8). The Aetolians then took control of Demetrias (L.35.34.5-11), and Antiochus arrived there with 10,000 infantry (L.35.43.6-7). [Figure 4.34] Antiochus was joyously received at Phalara and Lamia, indicating Aetolian control of the Malian gulf and Malian plain (L.35.43.8-9). Antiochus then gained the Athamanians and Boiotians as allies (L.35.47.7-8, 36.6.5), before taking Chalcis by force, causing the rest of Euboea to capitulate (L.35.51.6-10). Antiochus now controlled the two fetters that related to control of Thessaly and central Greece, as well as the southern access to Thessaly. The Aetolians,

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417 It is unclear how many men Baebius brought with him due to confusion with the names in the manuscript tradition in Livy, as well as inconsistencies of numbers over the course of Livy's narrative of the war. See Briscoe 1981, pp175, 37-8 with bibliography on the issue. I follow Briscoe's number for Baebius' men.
418 For Roman control of Pelium, as well as its geographically strategic role, see chapter 2 discussion.
419 Phalara: Lauffer 1989, p533.
420 A Roman force of 500 soldiers from their allied naval campaign tried to stop Antiochus' assault on Chalcis and was slaughtered at Delium (L.35.51.1-5). That these were soldiers from the naval campaign, see Briscoe 1981 p216 and Thiel 1946, p288.
Athamanians, and Antiochus met in late 192 BC in Demetrias to plan their upcoming campaign (L.36.6.6-10).

Livy supplies our fullest narrative for their 191 BC campaign, albeit not in the most straightforward manner. Livy gives an account of Antiochus' campaign followed by an account of the Roman reprisal campaign of the same year in which Livy reports that the Romans took back many cities that Livy had not mentioned in his account of Antiochus' campaign. Since all the cities of Thessaly were free before Antiochus' arrival, we can safely say that all the cities that the Romans attacked had recently been taken by Antiochus. Combining Livy's two narratives gives a fuller picture of Antiochus' 191 BC campaign [compare Figure 4.38 with Figure 4.39].

In early 191 BC, the Aetolians, Athamanians, and Antiochus gathered their forces at Pherae (L.36.8.2, 36.9.1), and then managed to take Pherae by siege (L.36.9.12), as well as Scotussa (L.36.9.13) and Crannon (L.36.10.1) within ten days (L.36.10.1). [Figure 4.36] Antiochus' allied forces had moved west from Demetrias along the Karadag ridge, methodically taking the cities that controlled three of the four routes into Pelasgiotis across the Karadag ridge. Antiochus' campaign so far seemed to have been modeled on how Philip had attempted to control Thessaly in 198 BC: hold the fetters and control the Karadag ridge to secure the southern border of Pelasgiotis. Comparing Antiochus' campaign with Philip's 198 BC campaign [Figure 4.5] shows the similarities in their behaviors. Antiochus understood what cities were important to control movement across Thessaly.
Antiochus then moved further west and "took Cierium, Metropolis and the castella around them" (L.36.10.2). Antiochus had now moved through the fertile region of Thessaliotis, advancing all the way to the border with Dolopia. In 198 BC, the Aetolians were able to quickly take control of Dolopia, a region that had been under Aetolian control from at least 239 BC to 205 BC. Part of the way that the Aetolians took Dolopia in 198 BC was by securing key castella, to which Livy could be referring to here. Metropolis and Cierium resisted the Aetolians then, instead offering their surrender to the Romans. One can reasonably infer that Antiochus and the Aetolians retook control of Dolopia in 191 BC, and exhibited retribution worthy of note on the cities that had resisted them seven years earlier.

With Thessaliotis and the southern boundary of Pelasgiotis secured, the Aetolians, Athamanians, and Antiochus split their forces. Antiochus went northeast and besieged Larisa, the main city of Pelasgiotis (L.36.10.3-4), and the Athamanians and Aetolians went north towards Perrhaebia.

The Aetolians and Athamanians took Phacium, Limnaeum, and Phaestum (L.36.13.3, 36.13.7-9) all located in the region just west of Atrax. They did not assault Atrax (L.36.10.2), which understandable as Atrax had been able to resist a Roman siege seven years earlier, and this current campaign seems focused on speed. The Athamanians and the Aetolians then split up.

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The Athamanians first took Pellinaeum and Ericinium near Atrax (L.36.10.5, L.36.13.6). They then continued west and took Aeginium, Silana, Meliboea, Phaloria (L.36.13.6), four settlements which controlled the Thessalian access to the northern pass across the Pindus. The Romans had campaigned against Aeginium and Phaloria in 198 BC in order to complete their crossing of the Pindus. The Athamanians then turned south and took Gomphi (L.36.13.6), as they had done in 198 BC, which controlled the Thessalian access to the southern pass across the Pindus. They continued northeast to take Tricca (L.36.13.6), the large city centrally located between these two passes, before continuing east to meet Antiochus at Larisa (L.36.10.6).

There are two, not mutually exclusive, ways to interpret this Athamanian campaign: that the Athamanians were taking advantage of the opportunity to shore up their own personal interests in Thessaly, and that the Athamanians were serving a strategic role within the larger Antiochan campaign of securing the passes over the Pindus to prevent Roman interference. Either way, the Athamanians now controlled access to crossing the Pindus to or from Thessaly.

The Aetolians continued north from the Atrax region into Perrhaebia and took Malloea, Eritium, and Cyretiae and laid waste the fields of Tripolis (L.36.10.5, 36.13.4), before also moving to meet Antiochus at Larisa (L.36.10.6).

423 Silana: "Not otherwise known" Briscoe 1981, p240; BA places Silana tentatively in the "Trikka and Aigion area". Meliboea: Otherwise unknown, BA places tentatively "near Aigion and Trikka".
424 Eritium: Otherwise unknown, Stahlin 1924 thought it to have been close to Cyretiae, which makes logistical and geographic sense. Tripolis: "The Tripolis consisted of the towns Azorus, Pythium, and Doliche in the north of Perrhaebia" Briscoe 1981, p234. See chapter 5 discussion.
The Aetolian campaign suggests the same two interpretations as the Athamanian:
That this a reprisal of previous Aetolian raids in Perrhaebia, such as the Aetolians' Perrhaebian campaign against Malloea and Cyretiae in 199 BC (L.31.41.5), or that the Aetolians were serving a strategic role within the larger Antiochan campaign of laying of the groundwork for invading Macedon via Perrhaebia.

Antiochus' combined forces at Larisa received the surrender of Pharsalus (L.36.10.9) and now controlled almost all of Thessaly. As Livy specifies that Antiochus did not hold Gyrton at this time (L.36.10.2), we can infer that Antiochus had waged an unsuccessful campaign in the areas near Tempe while he was besieging Larisa. This is important, as it shows that Antiochus had made attempts to control the Thessalian side of Perrhaebia and Tempe, the routes of invasion between Macedon and Thessaly.

At some point during Antiochus' campaign, Philip wrote to Baebius both to report that Antiochus had invaded Thessaly, and to request a meeting (L.36.8.6). While Antiochus was at Larisa, Philip met Baebius in Dassaretia (L.36.10.10). As discussed above, Baebius then sent Appius Claudius with 2000 men east through Macedon under Philip's protection and through Tempe to Gonnoi (L.36.10.10-11; App.Syr.16). Claudius' sudden appearance frightened away Antiochus, the Aetolians, and the Athamanians into their respective winter quarters. Claudius then installed a Roman garrison at Larisa (L.36.10.10-14).

425 During his narrative of the campaign, Livy reported that now "everything in that region except Atrax and Gyron was in Antiochus' power" (L.36.10.2). This has caused scholars, most aggressively Walsh 1990, p86, to doubt Livy's understanding of geography, as Atrax and Gyron were not adjacent (Gyron: Stahlin 1924; Lauffer 1989, p242; Helly 1999, p113). Combining Livy's two narratives makes clear that Livy meant all of Thessaly rather than the region around Atrax, and that this statement accords with Livy's narrative.
Livy presents Antiochus' 191 BC campaign as an ineffectual and haphazard affair, that came about as a result of Antiochus failing to form an alliance with Philip. However, analysis of where Antiochus' 191 BC campaign took place reveals it to have been a well-planned campaign to lay the groundwork for an invasion of Macedon. Antiochus had come to Greece in order to take Philip's kingdom and add Macedon to his own realm.\(^\text{426}\)

Antiochus began from Demetrias, which Philip had said was all he needed to hold Thessaly, and first secured the southern border of Pelasgiotis, restricting Macedonian influence. Had Antiochus had time to take Larisa and not been scared away by the unexpected appearance of the Romans, then Antiochus would have begun the proper 191 BC campaign season based at Larisa, the ideal place from which to launch an invasion of Macedon via the Tempe, as well as established a bridgehead to launch an invasion of Macedon through Perrhaebia - the Romans will later successfully invade Macedon by just this method in the Third Macedonian War.\(^\text{427}\) In addition to laying the groundwork to invade Macedon, Antiochus secured both the mountain passes into Thessaly from the west, assuring that the Romans would be unable to interfere, should they want to.

Beyond his strategic tactics in Greece, Antiochus, who called himself 'The Great', had spent the previous year making public gestures that indicated that he intended to invade Macedon.\(^\text{428}\) When beginning his campaign, he went and sacrificed at Troy

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\(^{426}\) Livy should be understood to have been giving a commentary on how Antiochus' campaign could have been successful, as gained by Livy's benefit of hindsight, rather than a portrayal of an actual potential alliance. In Livy, the strongest case for this this alliance is made by Hannibal (L.36.7.2-16). In his fourth decade, Livy uses Hannibal as his authorial mouthpiece to give comment on how things could have developed if different choices had been made, seen with the benefit of hindsight.

\(^{427}\) See discussion in chapter 5.

\(^{428}\) Antiochus had demonstrated that he did not believe in maintaining the balance of power between the Hellenistic kingdoms when he took advantage the death of Ptolemy IV to try to carve up and end the Ptolemaic kingdom (Plb.15.20; L.31.14.5).
(L.35.42.3) as Alexander had before his campaign (Plut. *Alex.* 15.7), thus directly linking himself with Alexander, king of Macedon. He sacrificed at Delphi (L.36.11.6), and while it can be difficult to know just what the valences of this act were, when Perseus did this in 174 BC, the Achaeans interpreted it as an open play for kingship over all Greece (L.41.23.13-18). Additionally, Antiochus displayed open hostility towards Philip before he had even begun his 191 BC campaign at Pherae, as seen in his propping up of Philip of Megalopolis as a rightful descendant of Alexander and heir to the throne of Macedon (L.35.47.5-8), even sending this Philip to collect the bones of the Macedonians from Cynoscephalae and give them a new and "proper" burial (L.36.8.3-5; App. *Syr.* 15), giving public censure to Philip V's treatment of his dead and calling attention to Philip's defeat. Antiochus' support of this pretender was so public that Philip V knew of it before Antiochus' campaign began (L.36.8.5, L.36.14.3-4). Even after his 191 BC campaign, Antiochus did not aim for alliance as he publicly boasted of his having taken Thessaly from Philip (L.36.17.10).

What Antiochus did not anticipate was that Philip would call in the Romans for help - as the Tarentines had called in Pyrrhus against the Romans or the Athenians the Romans against Philip - and give the Roman army safe passage across Macedon and through Tempe into Thessaly. This key play on Philip's part disrupted Antiochus' strategically laid plans.

429 The Aetolians and Athamanians had been at war intermittently with Philip for more than 20 years at this point and one could suppose they would never have called in Antiochus in order to team up with Philip. However, the Aetolians and Athamanians were nothing if not opportunistic. If Antiochus had wanted alliance with Philip, offering Demetrias to Philip would have been a logical move.
While Antiochus, the Aetolians, and the Athamanians were all still away from Thessaly, the Romans and Macedonians "at the beginning of spring joined their forces and marched down into Thessaly" (L.36.13.2). [Figure 4.40] They entered Thessaly via the Vale of Tempe and continued southwest towards Atrax. Philip then split off and went northwest into Perrhaebia and besieged Malloea (L.36.13.3). This valley in Perrhaebia served as an entrance into Macedonia and was thus a logical place for Philip to initially focus his energies, as it most related to his kingdom's safety.

Baebius took back the settlements near Atrax (Phacium and Phaestum) (L.36.13.3) before stopping at Atrax (L.36.13.4). He then turned north and retook the Aetolian gains in Perrhaebia (L.36.13.4), before he joined forces with Philip and they together caused Malloea to capitulate (L.36.13.5). The Roman-Macedonian campaign thus first dealt with the most direct threats to Macedon, Larisa and Perrhaebia.

[Figure 4.41] The Romans and Macedonians then went together to the west to retake all the towns that the Athamanians had taken (L.36.13.5-6), before returning to the Atrax region to besiege Pellinaeum and Limnaeum (L.36.13.7-9).

Now that the Thessalian access to the northern pass had been secured, Manius Acilius led a new Roman army across it. Acilius marched east from the pass, keeping the cavalry at Limnaeum and then Pellinaeum, causing each to capitulate, and sending the infantry on to Larisa (L.36.14.1). Metropolis and Cierium offered their surrender to the arriving Romans (L.36.14.6), just as they had in 198 BC.

The consul then went to Larisa for a war council, presumably with Philip and Baebius (L.36.14.6), after which the Romans and Macedonians split up and led separate
campaigns. Philip marched on Athamania (L.36.14.7), and soon "all Athamania came under the sovereignty and power of Philip" (L.36.14.9).

[Figure 4.42] Acilius led the Roman army south to Crannon, and received the surrender of Pharsalus, Scotussa, and Pherae (L.36.14.10-11). Now, of all Thessaly, only Demetrias was not under Roman control. Thessaly was now more firmly under Roman control than it had ever been, with garrisons now potentially placed in all 18 named settlements recently taken, as well as possibly in more.


At some point during this Roman campaign, Antiochus moved his army from Chalcis to Lamia to join forces with the Aetolians (L.36.15.1-3). [Figure 4.43] Upon Acilius' march towards Lamia from Larisa, Antiochus led his army from Lamia to the pass of Thermopylae (L.36.15.5), roughly 12 km to the southeast.\footnote{The bibliography on the topography of Thermopylae is immense, in great part due to interest in the 480 BC campaign. See e.g. Kromayer 1907, 1922; Bequignon 1934, 1937; Burn 1951, 1977; Pritchett 1958, 1965, 1982, 1985, 1989, 1991, 1992, 1994, 2001; Mackay 1963; Koder 1976; Wallace 1980; Chaplin 2010; Sanchez-Moreno 2013.} Livy reports that, once at Thermopylae, "Antiochus pitched his camp within the gates to the place and besides blocked the pass with fortifications, and he strengthened everything with a double rampart and a ditch and, where the situation demanded, with a rampart of stones which were scattered all about" (L.36.16.1-3).
The pass of Thermopylae consists of three choke-points, or gates: The west gate is located just south of km 201 on the Athens-Lamia highway;\textsuperscript{432} the central gate is less than 3km to the east of the west gate and is marked by the Colonus hill and Phokian wall;\textsuperscript{433} the east gate is situated just south of km 197 on the Athens-Lamia highway.\textsuperscript{434} The ancient coastline is understood to have run roughly equivalent to where the roadway runs today.\textsuperscript{435} In 480 BC, for comparison, the Greeks had encamped at the central gate, and the Persians were to their west. 

\textbf{[Figure 4.44]} Livy reports that in 191 BC, however, Antiochus encamped at the east gate (L.36.17.10-11), where the archaeological remains of a wall from his fortifications stands today.\textsuperscript{436} The remains of the wall today extend roughly .4 km north-northeast and .1 km southeast from where the walls join, but earlier accounts indicate that the remains used to extend for 1800 meters.\textsuperscript{437} The remains of the wall have become so much smaller, and continue to keep shrinking, due to demolition for road construction and agriculture, and erosion. The accompanying map indicates where the remains are today and how the wall would have extended in antiquity.\textsuperscript{438} Each of these walls served distinct strategic functions: The wall that ran north-northeast extended to cut off the pass and faced the direction from which the Roman attack would come. The wall that ran southeast ran along the edge of a ditch and extended until it turned to a steep face. This

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{432} Bequignon 1937, esp. fig 1; Sanchez-Moreno 2013, pp342-3. See Hdt.7.216.
  \item \textsuperscript{433} Sanchez-Moreno 2013, pp343-5, with bibliography. See Hdt.7.225, 228.
  \item \textsuperscript{434} Sanchez-Moreno 2013, p347. See Hdt.7.216.
  \item \textsuperscript{435} The alluvial plain extending north of the gates had already begun forming in a swampy fashion by Livy's and Strabo's day.
  \item \textsuperscript{436} Dated to 191 BC by Bequignon 1934. See Bequignon 1937; Sanchez-Moreno 2013, p347; Pritchett 1965, p73. I visited the wall on March 29, 2015.
  \item \textsuperscript{437} Pritchett 1965, p73.
  \item \textsuperscript{438} My proposed extensions for the walls make for a total of 1800-2000 meters of wall.
\end{itemize}
wall prevented the Romans from attempting to go around the other wall and get to the camp by cutting southeast up the wash. This southeast running wall was well placed to take advantage of the natural defenses of the valley descending on the other side of it.\footnote{See chapter 3 discussion on Hellenistic Greek field fortifications as described by Livy and Polybius and evident in the archaeological record and how these different from contemporary Roman practice.}

As depicted in Figure 4.44, Antiochus' encampment sat at the corner of these two fortification walls. As discussed in chapter 3, a Hellenistic military camp required roughly 7.5 square meters per man. Antiochus' 10,000 men would then have required roughly 75,000 m\(^2\). A square roughly 275 m by 275 m would have fulfilled that requirement.

Livy reports that while Antiochus completed the fortifications of his encampment at the east gate, the Romans were ravaging the area around Hypata (L.36.16.4). From Thermopylae, Antiochus then sent the entire Aetolian force of four thousand men to fortify Heraclea and Hypata (L.36.16.4),\footnote{Heraclea: Bequignon 1937, pp 244-252 with map; Pritchett 1965, pp81-2; Leekley 1980, 122-3; Lauffer 1989, 264-5.} but the Aetolians, instead, only "shut themselves up in Heraclea" and did not prevent the Romans from devastating the fields of both cities (L.36.16.5).\footnote{While the number of Aetolians present is disparaged in Livy, 4,000 Aetolians is not so much less than the 6,400 sent to the Romans in 197 BC, and that number enabled the Aetolians to feel justified to a large amount of the credit for that victory.} In 207 BC, the Aetolians had also holed up in Heraclea rather than fight to hold Thermopylae when Philip came to force his passage through (L.28.7.3).\footnote{Livy reports that Philip was able to drive the Aetolians out of Thermopylae as just part of a long one-day march (L.28.7.3). Additionally, the Aetolians escaped from Philip's approach towards the same direction from which Philip was approaching. It follows that the Aetolians offered no resistance at Thermopylae in 207 BC, but instead stayed in Heraclea.}
Livy reports that the Romans then "encamped within the pass itself near the springs of the hot water facing the king" (L.36.16.5). The Roman camp was at the middle gate, extending west to the eponymous hot springs.

Antiochus then told the Aetolians to occupy the summits of the mountains to the south to prevent the Romans from going around (L.36.16.6-8). Livy reports that 2000 Aetolians instead stayed at Heracleia, but that 2000 Aetolians did come to help Antiochus (L.36.16.9-11), and these latter two thousand, "divided into three parts, occupied Callidromum and Rhoduntia and Tichius - these are the names of peaks" (L.36.16.11).

Livy reports that Acilius sent 2000 men under Lucius Valerius Flaccus to take Tichius and Rhoduntia as well as 2000 men under Marcus Porcius Cato to take Callidromum (L.36.17.1-2). As Pritchett has pointed out, "the key to the study of the topography of the battle of 191 BC lies in the identification of the three forts, Kallidromos, Teichious, and Rhoduntia, garrisoned by Aitolian troops serving under the Seleucid Antiochos III."

To establish the location of the three Aetolian garrisons, we need to determine the three peaks that can be designated Callidromum, Rhoduntia, and Tichius (haec nomina cacuminibus sunt), and then the location on each one of these peaks for each of the three castella Aetolorum.

The Asopus gorge (Hdt.7.199, 216; Strabo 9.4.14) opens up just west of the central gate and extends south into the hills. Strabo informs us that the mountain due south of the gates, east of Asopus gorge, was named Callidromum (Str.9.4.13).
To locate Tichius, we turn to linguistics and archaeology. Appian spells Livy's
Tichius as Τειχίους, and scholars have understood this name to derive from the Greek
word τείχος, meaning 'wall', which seems an appropriate name for a location that held a
fortification wall.\footnote{Pritchett 1965, pp 76-7, with bibliography; Pritchett 1994, p280.}
On the hill forming the west side of the Asopus gorge, there are remains of an extensive wall built with many phases of construction, indicating
that this location was understood to be a strategically important place for a wall for many hundreds of years.\footnote{Mackay 1963.}
The hill forming the west side of the gorge is Tichius, labelled
Liaditsa on the Hellenic Military Geographical Survey (HMGS) map. The wall extends
from Tichius across the low point between Tichius and the next hill to the south.

There is a strategic reason for placing a wall here, at the low point between
Tichius and the hill to the south of it. Since the narrow gates are difficult to attack, an
alternate strategy is to go around Callidromum to get around the gates and behind
whomever is blocking them. \footnote{Pritchett 1965, pp 74-5.}
As one cannot go directly up the gorge itself, due to the hostile nature of the terrain, the path of least resistance to get to the ridge
behind Callidromum starts by the modern village of Dhamasta and goes through this
wall. The Aetolian garrison placed here at this wall prevented the easiest Roman route for
going around Callidromum.

The placement of Rhoduntia is complicated by its varying treatment in the ancient
sources.\footnote{Appian omits it, saying that there only two peaks at Thermopylae, Tichius and Callidromus (App. Syr. 4.18); Strabo's discussion of the locations of Rhoduntia, Teichius,
and Heraclea is open to varied scholarly interpretation (Strabo 9.4.13); and Plutarch makes no mention of the assault on Tichius and Rhoduntia.

Working under the understanding that there was a Rhoduntia, i.e. that Livy's account of Flaccus assaulting Tichius and Rhoduntia depicted real events, Rhoduntia needs to have been near enough to Tichius for Flaccus to have be able to assault both Rhoduntia and Tichius at once with a contingent of only 2000 men, but to also have been its own peak. [Figure 4.47] The hill directly south of Tichius fulfills these requirements. This hill rises in two distinct steps: The first rises from the location of the Tichius wall at roughly 550 meters elevation to a height of roughly 860 meters, where it flattens out, before rising to the second peak of roughly 1240 meters. The flattened area at the top of this first step would be a strategically sound place for a garrison.\footnote{This might be where Pritchett 1965, pp77-8; 1994, pp 288-9 suggests Rhoduntia was. Pritchett's description of his location for Rhoduntia is confusing, with neither map nor even reference to a map.} This area fulfills the practical minimum of being large enough to hold the approximately 600 Aetolians (needing only to be roughly 70 m by 70 m).\footnote{Using my camp requirements of 7.5 square meters per soldier, as discussed in chapter 3, a 70 meter square would be 4900 square meters, which could hold 650 soldiers. The absence of archaeological remains where I predict the fort to be could be from the extensive reuse of ancient blocks in later construction, as well as from never having been properly looked for.} [Figure 4.48] This location has important strategic value for a fort: a garrison here adds help to the Aetolians at the wall at Tichius, helping control that route; it protects against an approach from the west from where the Monastery sits today, and the remains from two later defensive walls between the monastery and this point demonstrate that this route from the monastery was a route to be protected against;\footnote{Mackay 1963.} and a garrison here would have views of the greater landscape that a garrison at the Tichius wall would not have.
[Figure 4.49 and Figure 4.50] For someone standing at the mouth of the gorge, by the hot springs themselves, these are the three most visible and striking peaks.

[Figure 4.51] Flaccus mounted an unsuccessful assault on these two Aetolian garrisons (L.36.19.1), presumably taking the direct route from Dhamasta against the two garrisons.

It remains to establish the Aetolian position on Callidromum. Livy, however, gives us no information about where the Aetolians positioned themselves to protect Callidromum. Livy only reports that the Roman frontal assault would have failed, Had not Marcus Porcius, having dislodged the Aetolians from the heights of Callidromum and killed a large part of them - for he had caught them off their guard and many of them asleep - shown himself on the hill which overlooked the camp.

ni M. Porcius ab iugo Callidromi deiectis inde Aetolis et magna ex parte caesis – incautos enim et plerosque sopitos oppresserat – super imminentem castris collem apparuisset.
(L.36.18.8)

Livy's brief account of Cato's assault on the Aetolian position leaves many topographic questions unanswered. Plutarch, however, gives an alternative and much more detailed account of Cato's actions.

Plutarch's account derives authority from the fact that it likely derives from Cato's own account of events. That Plutarch was using Cato's own account for Cato's actions at Thermopylae rests on three points: First, that Plutarch cites Cato as his source for Cato's boastings about the events of the battle (Plut.Cato.14.3).

Second, Plutarch has an extended thesis in the 'Life of Cato' and in the 'Comparison of Cato and Aristides' that

\[450\] Livy claims that for the events of 195 BC he had access to Cato's own account, and references its boastful nature (L.34.15.9).
Cato always presents himself one way but is in reality the opposite. Plutarch first presenting Cato's own grandiose account for his battle exploits, but then later denigrating all Cato's military achievements as insubstantial (Plut. *Comp. Cato&Arist.* 5) would accord with this thesis. Third, and most important, Plutarch's account accords with the realities of the landscape so accurately as to suggest that it is Cato's firsthand account.\(^{451}\)

I will break up Plutarch's narrative of Cato's exploits and analyze how each section relates to the topography of the area.

Cato, calling to mind the famous compass and circuit of the pass which the Persians had once made, took a considerable force and set out under cover of darkness.

τὴν δὲ Περσικὴν ἑκείνην περιήλυσιν καὶ κύκλωσιν ὁ Κάτων εἰς νυκτὶ βαλόμενος, ἑξώδεσε νύκτωρ, ἀναλαβὼν μέρος τι τῆς στρατιάς.
(Plut. *Cato* 13.1)

We learn here that Cato left at night, after it was fully dark.\(^{452}\) In Greece, between June 15th and July 15th, the sun sets at about 8:50 pm. Based on personal experience, it does not get fully dark during that time before 9:30 pm. As such, it is safe to assume that Cato left about 10 pm.

They climbed the heights, but their guide, who was a prisoner of war, lost the way, and wandered about in impracticable and precipitous places until he had filled the soldiers with dreadful dejection and fear. Cato, seeing their peril, bade the rest remain quietly where they were,

ἐπεὶ δὲ ἄνω προελθόντων ὁ καθοδηγὸς αἰχμάλωτος ἑξέπεσε τῆς ὁδοῦ καὶ πλανώμενος ἐν τόποις ἀπόροις καὶ κρημνώδεσι δεινὴν ἀθυμίαν καὶ φόβον ἐνειργάσατο τοῖς στρατιώταις, ὁρῶν ὁ Κάτων τὸν κίνδυνον ἐκέλευσε τοὺς ἄλλους ἀπαντας ἀτρεμεῖν καὶ περιμένειν,
(Plut. *Cato* 13.2)

\(^{451}\) This is based on my personal autopsy experience hiking in the area as research for this chapter on November 22, 2014 and on March 28 and 29, 2015.

\(^{452}\) In 195 BC, Cato had similarly led a night mission to surround the enemy position (L.34.14.1-2, 34.16.1-2), as well as nighttime marches (L.34.13.3), and daytime surrounding missions (L.34.20.5, 34.21.5).
Cato climbed to the ridge that ran east-west behind Callidromum, understandably called here "the heights" as it is a ridgewalk at an elevation higher than Callidromum. Cato began climbing from Ano Damasta, near from where Flaccus will begin his assault the next morning. While Flaccus will take the Damasta Spur route, Cato will instead take a parallel route southeast but on a line roughly 1.5 km southwest from Flaccus' route. Cato's movements were protected from sight from Rhoduntia by intervening the hill to Cato's east. Cato continued to where the monastery sits today before he turned southwest and continued to where the modern village of Eleftherochori sits at the saddle.

Cato then crossed over the saddle at Eleftherochori climbed east for two more kilometers. Cato was now on the ridge ("the heights"), roughly 950 m elevation above where he started.

Cato then continued along the ridge east along the route that cuts behind Callidromum. Cato turned east until he got lost in 'impracticable and precipitous places'. Two things happened to make this so: First, Cato missed the turn to the north that one needs to take to go north to come out by the east gate. If one misses this turn, one has to walk very far east before one has the opportunity to turn north again. However, this turn north that Cato missed is much earlier than one would expect, as after the turn one still needs to continue east for a significant distance. Second, Cato continued following the ridge after missing the turn north, however this ridge then gradually turns south, which

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453 e.g. I missed this turn north, myself, and got quite lost.
led Cato the wrong direction. Cato was now in a thickly forested area full of ravines, and going the wrong way.

The key detail that explains how this happened is that Cato's guide was a POW rather than a local. In 480 BC, Ephialtes was a local Malian (Hdt.7.213), and as such could be expected to have known the mountain routes in the area. As discussed in chapter 3, nobody knows local topography as well as shepherds, and shepherds are used to long walks in the middle of the night. These hills behind Thermopylae have been used, and are used today by shepherds, including use as summer pasture for shepherds who used the Malian plain as winter pasture. As such, Ephialtes could have been expected to be an effective guide, even in the dark. An Aetolian POW, though, could understandably get lost in this confusing terrain at night.

Cato realized, presumably from the stars, that he was going the wrong way and stopped.

while Cato himself, with a certain Lucius Manlius, an expert mountain climber, made his way along, with great toil and hazard, in the dense darkness of a moonless night, his vision much impeded and obscured by wild olive trees and rocky peaks, until at last they came upon a path. So they put marks and signs towards some conspicuous cliffs which towered over Mount Callidromus αὐτὸς δὲ Λεύκιόν τινα Μάλλιον, ἀνδρὰ δεινὸν όρειβατεῖν, παραλαβὼν ἐξώρει πολυπόνως καὶ παραβόλως ἐν ἀσελήψις νυκτί καὶ βαθείᾳ, κοτίνισι καὶ πάγοις ἀνατηπάμενοις διασπάσματα πολλὰ τῆς ὄψεως καὶ ἀσάφειαν ἔχοσις, ἐκεῖ ὀπλαλότεις εἰς ἄτραπόν, ὡς ὄφεν τὸ κάτω περαίνουσαν ἐπὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον τῶν πολεμίων, ἐθελοντὸ σημεία πρὸς τινὰς εὐσκόπους κεραίας ὑπὲρ τὸ Καλλίδρομον ἀνεχούσας.
(Plut. Cato 13.3)

Cato worked his way back north through the forest until he got to an elevated point, marked on Figure 4.53, from which he could see Callidromum below him to the
north and cliffs that rose up higher than he was to the northeast. A shepherd's path went east-west through the swampy area to the south of those cliffs. He marked his way to get back to that hill and that path and returned to his men.\textsuperscript{454}

We also learn here the date, as the possible new moons in 191 BC were June 13th or July 13th;\textsuperscript{455} June 13th accords better with Livy's narrative.

and then made their way back again to the main body. This too they conducted to the marks and signs, struck into the path indicated by these, and started forward. But when they had gone on a little way, the path failed them, and a ravine yawned to receive them. Once more dejection and fear were rife. They did not know and could not see that they were right upon the enemy whom they sought. But presently gleams of daylight came, here and there a man thought he heard voices, and soon they actually saw a Greek outpost entrenched at the foot of the cliffs.

\textit{oútō dē pálin ἐπανελθόντες ὁπίσω, τὴν στρατιᾶν ἀνέλαβον, καὶ πρὸς τὰ σημεῖα προάγοντες ἤμαντο μὲν ἐκείνης τῆς ἀτραίπου καὶ κατεστήσαντο τὴν πορείαν, μικρὸν δὲ προσέλθουσιν αὐτοῖς ἐπέλυε φάραγγος ὑπολαμβανούσης, καὶ πάλιν ἦν ἀπορία καὶ δέος, οὕτω ἐπισταμένων οὐδὲ συνορώντων ὃτι πλησίον ἐτύγχαν τῶν πολεμίων γεγονότες. ἤδη δὲ διέλαμπεν ἡμέρα, καὶ φθογγῆς τις ἔδοξεν ἐπακούσα, τάχα δὲ καὶ καθόραν Ἑλληνικὸν χάρακα καὶ προφυλακὴν ὑπὸ τὸ κρημνώδες.}

(Plut. \textit{Cato} 13.4)

\textbf{[Figure 4.54]} Cato returned to his men and then led them back to the path he had sighted. They proceeded east but lost the trail in the darkness, which is understandable as the only trail that would be here would be a shepherd's trail and there is no reason to expect it to be continuous. Cato continued northeast rather than due east and ended up at the edge of a steep ravine and he stopped. This is an understandable mistake, as Cato wanted to get north.

\textsuperscript{454} I understand this to mean that Cato made cairns and slashes in trees that were sighted off of the cliffs to the northeast.

\textsuperscript{455} Goldstine 1973, p68.
At this point the sun rose and daylight came. We know that sunrise in Greece in mid-June is just about 6am. If Cato had left at 10pm, roughly eight hours would have gone by until when he stood on this cliff. This length of time accords with my personal experience. For comparison, I climbed the 13.9 km from the west gate to Eleftherochori in three hours and ten minutes climbing to 765 m elevation. I then covered the 8.23 km from Eleftherochori to the turnoff off the path to the north in two hours and thirteen minutes, climbing to a max elevation of 1129 m, and being at 1099 m elevation at the turnoff. From the turnoff to the point where Cato saw the sunrise, including getting lost in a potentially similar way as Cato, took 3 hours and fifteen minutes. Thus, I covered a similar distance to what Cato covered in roughly equivalent length of time of eight and a half hours. While I did this in daylight, I am no Roman soldier when it comes to walking. Taking into account the distances and elevations involved and the time constraints, this indicates that Cato did not spend much time being lost.

Once daylight came they saw a Greek fortified camp at the base of the cliffs. Figure 4.55 is a photo taken from where Cato stood and shows where the Aetolian camp was located. The Aetolians had not occupied an existing *castellum* on Callidromum, as Livy had said, nor had they occupied the strategic location that the Phocians had in 480 BC. Instead, consistent with all their activity in 191 BC, they had expended the minimum amount of effort and exposed themselves to the minimum amount of danger. They had only gone up the valley from Antiochus' camp to the flat area at the eastern end of Callidromum.\footnote{Just east of 'Strongylovouni' on the HMGS map.} [Figure 4.54] Here they encamped and waited, planning to intercept the potential Roman route via the Anopaia path, which they did. This location would have
been closer to the main Syrian camp than a hilltop location would have been and thus allowed them to run back to it should the Romans appear.

It is worth briefly comparing this Aetolian position with the Phokian position in 480 BC. [Figure 4.56] A Phokian detachment had been assigned to prevent the Persian movement on the Anopaia path around Callidromum (Hdt.7.212, 218), and we know from the work of previous scholars that the Phokians took their position just west of a seasonal lake called Nevropolis today.\(^{457}\) The Persians, as Cato did 289 years later, headed east from Eleftherochori along the ridge behind Callidromum.\(^{458}\) The Phocian position was well chosen to intercept the Persian route, as Herodotus reports that the Persian route did indeed pass right them, causing the Phokians to flee (Hdt.7.218).

At first look, this might seem a strange location to place a defense of Callidromum, being further west than one might expect and perhaps randomly placed. However, anyone walking the area immediately realizes that this is in fact the key choke point. The Phokians were locals who knew where to place their defensive stand. From wherever else the Persians started from, they had to pass through Eleftherochori in order to get to the north of the ridge labeled Agorasia on the HMGS map and then between the ridges marked Kalambokia and Koryphi on the HMGS map. At the east end of this section of the route lay Nevropolis. The spot would have been well known to the Phokians as well, due to the fact that it directly controlled the route going south from here, the only southern route from this ridge, which led one into the northern borders of

\(^{457}\) See e.g Burn 1951, 1977; Kromayer 1907; Mackay 1963; Pritchett 1958, 1982, 1985, 1994; Sanchez-Moreno 2013; Wallace 1980.

\(^{458}\) How far west the Persians began their climb into the hills is a source of scholarly dispute, however all agree that they have to of started west of the west gate in order to avoid the notice of the Greeks at the central gate. See e.g. Burn 1951, 1977; Pritchett 1958, 1982; Wallace 1980.
Finally, in contrast to the Aetolians, the Phokians were prepared to fight to the death (Hdt.7.218), even if they were similarly ineffectual. They were positioned so far from the main Greek camp that they had no possibility of running back to it for safety as the Aetolians later did.

So then Cato halted his forces there, and summoned the men of Firmum to a private conference

οὗτος οὖν ἐπιστήσας ἐνταῦθα τὴν στρατιὰν ὁ Κάτων, ἐκέλευσεν αὐτῷ προσέλθειν ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων τοὺς Φιρμιανοὺς
(Plut. Cato 13.5)

Cato sent these Firmian troops down on the Aetolian camp and they captured one sentinel (Plut. Cato.13.6). Cato learned the layout of the enemy forces and led the Roman troops down the cliff into the valley, causing the Aetolians to flee back to Antiochus (Plut. Cato 13.7). [Figure 4.57 and Figure 4.58] Cato poured down the cliffs towards this camp, the Aetolians ran back towards Antiochus, and Antiochus' men were thrown into confusion. Once Antiochus' men are thrown into confusion by Cato's actions, our different ancient narratives re-converge. Acilius' charge with the main body of the army caused Antiochus' shaken army to flee (Plut. Cato.14.1; L. 36.19.3). The battle of Thermopylae was over.

The question remains, why did Antiochus go to Thermopylae, since he had enough time to have left Greece, or even holed up at Eretria, once he realized that the

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459 This is an area of shepherds today, and has been in the recent pre-modern past, as indicated on older maps by Eleftherochori being designated Kalyvia Eleftherochori, Kalyvia being a toponym traditionally used to demarcate seasonal shepherd huts. We should understand that this was an area of shepherds in 480 BC and in 191 BC as well, as it is at an ideal altitude for summer pasture with the Lamian plain as well as the lowland sections of Phokis nearby for winter pasture. No one understands topography as well as shepherds and the Phokians' choice of defensive position reflected this knowledge.

460 Plutarch says that the retreating Aetolians threw Antiochus' forces into confusion; Livy says that it was Cato's troops but that Antiochus' forces first thought that they were Aetolian troops (L.36.18.8 - 36.19.3).
combined Roman and Macedonian armies were waging war on him with overwhelming comparative force? Antiochus went to Thermopylae for the theatrical gesture of it, consistent with his past behaviors at Troy, Delphi, and Cynoscephalae. Since Demetrius Poliorcetes, kings had been competing to grant the Greeks freedom and Antiochus gambled that the Romans would not be willing to be cast in the role of the invading Persians against Antiochus' metaphorical Spartans protecting this Greek freedom. A stand at Thermopylae just might endear him to the Greeks and salvage this campaign, as well as potentially alienate the Greeks from the Romans.\footnote{Since Antiochus did not believe that the Romans would attack, he did not build a wall covering the eastern side of his camp. The lack of defensive works here was part of the reason that the sudden arrival of the fleeing Aetolians caused so much panic to Antiochus' men, i.e. they were coming from an essentially undefended direction.}

Before continuing, an aspect of Livy's understanding of Greek geography needs to be addressed. After Livy first mentions Thermopylae, he gives a description of how Thermopylae fits into the geography of Greece (L.36.15.6-12). Scholars have faulted this description, using it as evidence that Livy did not understand Greek geography.\footnote{e.g Briscoe 1981, p242; Sage 1935, p204.} However, Livy's presentation of the geography is consistent with Strabo and with map portrayals of the region up until fairly recently. Additionally, Livy's presentation shows a firm grasp of the political geography relevant to his narrative.

The geographical concept in Livy's geographical digression most censured by scholars is that Greece is cut in two by one mountain range that runs east west from Thermopylae to the Adriatic Sea opposite Aetolia. However, Strabo also refers to "one mountain that extends from Thermopylae in the east to the Ambracian Gulf in the west" (Str.9.4.12), showing that this perception of Greece's geography was not held by Livy.
alone, but even Greek speaking geographers. Additionally, a survey of maps from the 15th to 19th centuries shows that this single east-west mountain chain was a common way to represent the topography of Greece.  

Livy's digression also shows a remarkable grasp of Greek topography as it relates to his own narrative. On one side of the pass are, in order, Epirus, Perrhaebia, Magnesia, Thessaly, Phthiotic Thebes, and the Malian Gulf; on the other side are Aetolia, Acarnania, Phocis with Locris, Boeotia, Euboea, Attica, and the Peloponnese. Starting in the west, where the Romans landed when coming to Greece, lies Epirus. Moving east, and not naming the Pindus mountains, but crossing at the Zygos pass and staying in the mountains rather than descending into the plain (as the most recent Roman campaigns are portrayed as doing) one comes to Perrhaebia. Continuing around Thessaly clockwise one comes to Magnesia. Thessaly lies to the west of Magnesia and south of Perrhaebia. South of Thessaly in Achaea Phthiotis and south of that is the Malian gulf. This is essentially Acilius' route into Greece, not including Macedonia - fittingly, as it was not then considered part of Greece. The Romans, at this moment in Livy's narrative, controlled all of these lands. Antiochus holds Thermopylae. On the other side of Thermopylae sit the lands not in Roman control starting from the west with Aetolia and Acarnania and then continuing with Phocis with Locris, Boiotia, Euboea, Attica, and the Peloponnese in the order geographically of how you would come upon them after you came through Thermopylae. Livy's geographical digression established the relationship of the political landscape to the geographic landscape and demonstrated that Thermopylae was the key to controlling the rest of Greece, politically and geographically.

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463 See Navari 2013 and Livieratos 2012 for a survey of maps of Greece from the 15th - 19th centuries.
After his defeat at Thermopylae, Antiochus fled via Elatia to Chalcis and then back to Asia (L.36.19.9-10; L.36.21.1). The Aetolians holed up in Heraclea (L.36.19.6-7), which the Romans then successfully besieged in 25 days (L.36.23.6 - 36.24.11).

Philip took advantage of Roman absence from Thessaly to retake Demetrias (the last remaining Aetolian/Antiochus holding in Thessaly), as well as the regions of Dolopia, Aperantia, Perrhaebia, and Athamania (L.36.33, 36.34.9). Philip's control of Thessaly now rivaled what he had in 205 BC.

In 190 BC, the consul Lucius Cornelius Scipio, together with his brother Scipio Africanus, disembarked at Apollonia, took the northern pass to Thessaly, as the southern pass was not available due to continuing Aetolian hostilities (L.37.6.1). They brokered a truce at Amphissa, ending the Roman siege of the Aetolians there (L.37.7.6-7), and then led their army through Thessaly, into Macedonia via the Vale of Tempe, and through Thrace to Asia (L.37.7.7). Thessaly had become an area the Roman army marched through on its way somewhere else, rather than a place to fight in or fight over.

There was a related distinct change of Roman foreign policy in 189 BC, as one consul was assigned to Asia and one to Aetolia (L.37.50.1-2). The Romans were taking their armies directly into their enemies' lands instead of fighting over, and in, middle zones, as they had in the wars and battles discussed so far in chapters 1-4.

With the Romans gone, the Aetolians and Macedonians returned to warring over Thessaly and its borderlands. By the end of 189 BC, the Aetolians had taken back Athamania (L.38.1, 38.2.1-11), Aperantia and Dolopia (L.38.3.3-5, 38.5.10, 38.7.1, 38.8.2). However, in their peace dealings with the Romans at the end of the year, the
treaty terms appear to have made Dolopia and Aperantia again free of Aetolian control (L.38.11.9; Plb.21.32.13)

The Romans left Greece again in 188 BC, as they had in 194 BC. However, the threat the Romans were still able to wield from afar was shown in 185 BC, when Philip was forced to concede his holdings in Perrhaebia, Athamania, Magnesia, and significant parts of Thessaly and Dolopia by decree alone - no military force was required (Macedonian holdings: L.39.24.6-8, 39.24.11, 39.26.1; treaty terms: L.39.26.14, 39.28.4).

Part III: 172 BC - 168 BC

In fall 172 BC, Rome again sent an army to Illyria (L.42.36.8). After sixteen years, the Romans returned to Greece, in part because they feared that if a military alliance between Antiochus IV, Perseus, and Prusias II were allowed to develop, Roman supremacy in the Mediterranean could be threatened. This time, however, instead of planning to fight the Antigonids and Seleucids in the neutral areas of Thessaly and Illyria, the Romans aimed to invade Macedon.

A potential alliance between these three kings was not beyond the realm of possibility or probability in 172 BC. These three men had all ascended to kingship within a brief time (Prusias in 182 BC, Perseus in 179 BC, and Antiochus in 175 BC); were all relatively young (in 175 BC Prusias was 45, Antiochus was 40, and Perseus was 37); had close personal ties (their fathers all had interpersonal relationships) that had recently been

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464 Rome also sent five envoys each with 200 soldiers to travel around Greece, including one who went through Thessaly. These 'envoys with troops' were part of new Roman activity in Greece that lay somewhere between military and diplomatic activity, one that involved 'occupying cities' with small garrisons 'for the protection of those cities', (L.42.37.5-6). The envoys in Thessaly, Marcius and Atilius, met with Perseus at Larisa to discuss possible peace terms before a potential outbreak of war, resulting in Perseus sending envoys to Rome (L.42.39-42), as Philip had done in 198 BC before the battle of Cynoscephalae.
reaffirmed (in 178 BC Perseus married Antiochus' sister and Prusias married Perseus' sister); had recently made extravagant displays of wealth (Antiochus had just begun an unprecedentedly large building program in at least seven cities around Greece and Asia in 174 BC, including the Olympieion (L.40.20; Plb.26.1)); and demonstrations of influence and alliance at Delphi (at sometime after 182 BC Perseus and Prusias had paired columns on either side of the temple of Apollo at Delphi dedicated to them by the Amphictyonic council (SIG 632), in 178 BC Perseus was on the Amphictyonic council, and in 174 BC Perseus marched with great fanfare to Delphi and back from Macedon). Additionally, these kings appeared to have been popular in the Greek-speaking world.\textsuperscript{465}

Antiochus' great displays of wealth in 174 BC must have shocked and surprised the Romans since they had taken away so much of the Seleucid Kingdom in 188 BC kingdom as well as imposed giant indemnities. That he could still have this much money for gifts must have hinted at enormous reserves and capabilities for the future. A military alliance of Antiochus' wealth with the military experience of Perseus and Prusias would, indeed, have been a potent 'triumvirate'. Rome reacting with maximum force to perceived threat by a Hellenistic king and using this as reason for military action in Greece would be consistent with their behavior in 200 BC and 191 BC.

In late 172 BC, the Romans installed a garrison at Larisa (L.42.47.10), and in late March/early April 171 BC the Romans crossed an army to Apollonia (L.42.49), continued through Epirus, took the southern pass through Athamania to Gomphi in Thessaly (L.42.55.1-2), and then joined the garrison at Larisa (L.42.55.5-6).

\textsuperscript{465} For details of Perseus' popularity in Greece in the 170s, see Eckstein 2010, p240.
[Figure 4.59] Meanwhile, Perseus invaded Perrhaebia from the north, and took cities including Cyretiae (L.42.53.9). This same area of Perrhaebia had been involved in the 199 BC, 198 BC, and 191 BC campaigns due to the fact that it offers the only route into Macedon from Thessaly besides Tempe. Shoring up this corridor was a logical first step for Perseus' program of defense against invasion. Perseus then took Mylae and Phalanna at the border of Pelasgiotis and Perrhaebis before turning northeast towards Tempe and taking Gyrton (L.42.54.1-6), which caused Elatia and Gonnoi surrender (L.42.54.7, L.42.54.8). Perseus now controlled the Thessalian access of both routes into Macedon. Perseus then moved to Sycurium to wait for the Roman attack (L.42.54.9-11).

Perseus then attempted to get the Romans to commit to a decisive battle in Thessaly. [Figure 4.60] First, Perseus devastated the area around Pherae to try to draw out the Romans (L.42.56.8-9), mirroring Roman behavior from 197 BC, as I discussed above. The Macedonians then marched to the Roman camp (L.42.57.6), where there was a small skirmish (L.42.57.8-9), after which Perseus returned to Sycurium (L.42.57.9). After a series of failed attempts to draw out the Romans (L.42.57.10-12), Perseus moved his camp closer to the Roman camp (L.42.58.1). This did indeed induce the Romans to fight (L.42.59), and Perseus won the battle - but not so effectively as to end the war (L.42.60.1-3). Romans moved camp across the Peneus river at night to diffuse the situation (L.42.60.3-4), and Perseus moved camp back to Mopselus (L.42.61.11) then Sycurium (L.42.62.15).

[Figure 4.61] In response to Perseus' threats on their camp, the Romans moved southwest to Crannon (L.42.64.7); Perseus in turn moved to Mopselus (L.42.65.1); and
the Romans then moved to the Phalanna area (L.42.65.1). In a series of events reminiscent of the Roman victory at Otolobus discussed in chapter 2, the Romans relaxed their discipline while out reaping and as a result got surprised by Perseus while out in the fields, which then escalated into a bigger battle which the Romans won (L.42.65.6 - 42.66.10). In response to this defeat, Perseus garrisoned Gonnoi and returned to Macedonia (L.42.67.1). [Figure 4.62] The Romans mounted a brief assault on Gonnoi, before abandoning it to instead take Malloea, Tripolis and the rest of Perrhaebia, before returning to Larisa (L.42.67.6-7).

171 BC was a campaign season full of camp movements and feints, but nothing substantial was accomplished. At the end of the season, Rome still held Perrhaebia and all of Thessaly except for Tempe.

The 170 BC campaign remains largely enigmatic because Livy's text for 170 BC is mostly missing. Rome seems to have lost ground in Thessaly over the course of the year, as indicated by the fact that Perseus was able to march an army across Thessaly and Athamania to Stratus and back.

In 169 BC, the Roman army moved from winter quarters at Palaepharsalus (L.44.1.5) and promptly invaded Macedon through Perrhaebia. The Romans again garrisoned Larisa, from where they also launched an invasion of Macedon via Tempe (L.44.7.1). At this point, Thessaly largely disappeared from the narrative as Rome moved their theater of war to Macedon. This is perhaps best exemplified when, in 168 BC,

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466 Perseus siezed 1000 laden carts of grain (L.42.65.2-5) in the first stage of this conflict.
467 See discussion of Roman activities in Macedon in chapter 5.
Paullus was able to move unhindered from Anticyra through Thessaly and then on through Tempe to meet the Roman army (L.45.41.3-4; App. Mac.19).

**Part IV: Conclusions**

In the thirty years between Rome's first appearance in Thessaly in 198 BC and their defeat of Macedon in 168 BC, the value and role of Thessaly developed and changed for Rome and for the peoples Rome fought there.

When Flamininus crossed the Pindus into Thessaly in 198 BC, Rome did not have the same economic or strategic needs to be in Thessaly that they'd had to be in Illyria. Since 229 BC, Rome had specific economic concerns, i.e. maintaining control of shipping through the Adriatic, for using the military to establish and maintain control over the Illyrian ports. Since 215 BC, Rome had specific strategic concerns, i.e. preventing Macedon using the Illyrian coast as a launching point for an invasion of Italy, for using the military to maintain control the Illyrian ports. Rome had used offensive military force in Illyria to protect against what could be reasonably understood to be direct economic and military threats. In the two and a half campaign seasons from 200 BC through the Battle of the River Aous in 198 BC, Rome had maintained her military focus on these Illyrian ports and these defensive concerns.

However, Rome had no similar pre-existing economic concerns in Thessaly and faced no direct military threat. Instead, the military threat came from Macedon, and Thessaly was merely the battleground on which to fight them. Desire for decisive battle with Macedon pulled Flamininus, and with him Rome, into Thessaly in pursuit of Philip. As Philip crossed the Pindus after the Battle of the River Aous, if he had turned north into
Macedon via the Grevena pass, Flamininus would have retraced Sulpicius' route and aimed to compel Philip to fight at the western borders of Macedon. Instead, Philip went into Thessaly, Flamininus followed him, and thus Flamininus shifted the theater of war. When Rome did not recall Flamininus back to the Adriatic coast but rather sanctioned this shift, Rome effectively began a new foreign policy in the east.

While Rome was not fighting over her own territory in Thessaly in 198 BC - 197 BC, neither was anyone they were fighting with or against; none of the combatants in Thessaly were fighting in or over their homeland. However, all acknowledged that control of Thessaly was on some level control over Greece. When Rome defeated Philip, they won Thessaly, not Macedon, but gaining control of Thessaly allowed them to grant freedom to the Greeks.

During the war in Thessaly in 191 BC - 190 BC, however, the role of Thessaly had changed. Thessaly had become a locus of competing narratives of irredentism and liberation. In the vacuum of power created by Rome's removal of external rule from Thessaly, followed by the removal of her own armies, Thessaly had become conceptually important to the imperial dream of many peoples. The Aetolians wanted to regain the control of Thessaly they had held in 229 BC. The Athamanians wanted control of western Thessaly as they had it at the end of 197 BC, as well as to act on new, outsized dreams of gaining the throne of Macedon through an obscure bloodline. The Macedonians wanted to take it back as they had it in 199 BC. Antiochus wanted both to rule Macedon as the true heir of Alexander the Great's empire, and wanted credit and control over the idea of
the "Freedom of the Greeks". Rome simply wanted to control the narrative of the "Freedom of the Greeks" for their own benefit.

In 198 BC - 197 BC, Rome had aimed to fight a decisive battle in Thessaly. In 191 BC - 190 BC, Rome aimed to fight over control of every city in Thessaly. However, by 172 BC, Thessaly had become merely the gates of Macedon and Rome fought only over access to the routes into Macedon of Perrhaebia and Tempe. There was no aim to fight a major battle in Thessaly; there was no longer need to fight over the cities in Thessaly. Thessaly had become simply the border to Macedon.
CHAPTER 5: MACEDON

Introduction

Rome had been at war against Macedon between 214 BC and 205 BC, but did not invade Macedon. Rome declared war on Macedon again in 200 BC, and in 199 BC, Sulpicius marched an army east from the Illyrian coast to within 30 km of the entrance to Macedon at Edessa, but did not invade Macedon. In 198 BC, Flamininus defeated Philip at the Battle of the River Aous, but did not follow this up by invading Macedon, but rather Thessaly. Philip, newly allied, escorted the Roman army from the western edge of Macedon to Tempe in 191 BC, and from Tempe east across Macedonian territory to Asia in 190 BC. In neither situation did Rome take advantage of the opportunity to wage war inside Macedon. In 188 BC Manlius Vulso led an army back across Thrace and into Macedon, and faced great difficulties thought to have occurred because Philip had removed his protection, but Vulso still did not wage war in Macedon when he was in its territory.

After 26 years of peace, Rome again declared war on Macedon in 171 BC, and in 169 BC Rome took the unprecedented step of invading Macedon. This chapter covers the two successive years of Roman invasion of Macedon in 169 BC and 168 BC that centered on the routes between Thessaly and Macedon of Perrhaebia and Tempe and the region of Pieria in southern Macedon. This invasion culminated in the decisive Roman victory at Pydna in 168 BC and the end of the Macedonian empire.
Part I: The 169 BC campaign

Figure 5.1] Livy reports that, in 169 BC, the new consul Quintus Marcius Philippus took control of the army encamped at Palaepharsalus (L.44.1.5-8), ordered his troops to take with them grain for a month (L.44.2.4), and nine days later broke camp and moved north to invade Macedon (L.44.2.2-3, L.44.2.4).

After a day's march, Philippus summoned the guides for various routes, bade each explain before the council the route by which he would guide them, and then after dismissing the guides, laid before the council the question of which route to choose.

et unius diei progressus iter conuocatis itinerum ducibus cum exponere in consilio iussisset, qua quisque ducetur esset, summotis iis, quam potissimum <uiam> peteret, rettulit ad consilium. (L.44.2.5)

This passage makes clear that Philippus had loaded his men with thirty days of grain and broken camp before deciding on a plan for exactly where to go, much less how long it would take.

A thirty-day supply of grain for Philippus' two-legion army would have weighed roughly 537 tons. This would have resulted in logistical issues beyond each soldier carrying a very heavy pack. Roman soldiers ground the grain they carried and baked it into bread while on campaign; this required each tent group of eight men to be accompanied by at least one donkey in order to carry the necessary food-processing.

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468 See Briscoe 2012, pp 468-9, for menstruum here being "a term of the military register" meaning "corn for a month." Livy describes Roman soldiers carrying 30 days frumentum with them in two other places (L.43.1.8, Per.57). Madvig had emended frumentum into the line after menstruum, which was subsequently removed by Briscoe 1986. See Roth 2012, p 68-71 for discussion of how much grain and equipment soldiers carried and were issued, including Philip V distributing 30 days grain to his men (Plb.4.63.10).

469 This land invasion would be supported by a concurrent naval campaign against the Macedonian coastline (L.44.2.3).

470 Roth 2012, pp 22-3.
equipment including the stone mill (27 kg) and cookpot.\textsuperscript{471} Donkeys, and likely carts as well, were also employed to carry the grain itself.\textsuperscript{472} Furthermore, on this campaign Philippus brought cavalry and elephants (L.44.5.1-9, 44.5.12-13), which would have had their own significant food requirements that required more pack animals.\textsuperscript{473} Thirty days of grain was not just a great quantity of supplies, but the maximum amount that Roman commanders regularly took into the field.\textsuperscript{474} Thus, Philippus had set out from Palaepharsalus with more than just a considerable pack train, but as large a train as possible. We can infer from this choice that Philippus was not intending to rely on supply lines, and that he was not intending to move quickly or through particularly harsh terrain.

Philippus' one-day march north from the Roman camp by Palaepharsalus, located at the modern town of Krini, would have put him near Larisa, which lay roughly 25 km north on an established and secure route.\textsuperscript{475} Larisa was the major city of Pelasgiotis and strategically located as a base from which to invade Macedon through either Perrhaebia to the northwest or Tempe to the northeast.

Once at Larisa, Philippus employed local guides to lay out the possible routes into Macedon. It is understandable that local Perrhaebians would have been inclined to help the Romans. Flamininus had freed Perrhaebia from Macedonian control in 196 BC (L.33.34.6) and established Perrhaebian cities' law codes and governments (\textit{IG IX}^2 338; L.34.51.4-6). More recently, Rome had freed Perrhaebia immediately after attacks by

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{471} Roth 2012, pp 44-51, 77-8.
\item \textsuperscript{472} Roth 2012, pp 68-90. At roughly 500 kg/cart, this would amount to at least 1000 carts and 2000 donkeys to transport the grain alone for Philippus' troops.
\item \textsuperscript{473} Roth 2012, pp 78, 125-9, 144-5.
\item \textsuperscript{474} Roth 2012, pp 68-116, esp. pp 68-71.
\item \textsuperscript{475} Palaepharsalus: Morgan 1983. Larisa is at the modern city of Larisa. For the road network through Thessaly, see Hammond 1988, p62.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Antiochus and the Aetolians in 191 BC (L.36.13.4) and then Perseus in 171 BC (L.42.67.1). Nevertheless, Philippus still demonstrated proper wariness of these guides, dismissing them before discussing their proposed routes in council.\footnote{For proper wariness to be shown to guides and the hazards of trusting guides too much, see discussion in chapter 3.}

Livy reports the council's debate:

Some preferred the road via Pythous; others the one over the Cambunian Mountains used the preceding year by the consul Hostilius; others, a route past Lake Ascuris. For a certain distance yet there was no divergence in the routes; therefore the discussion as to this choice was postponed until they should encamp near the point of separation of the roads. Thence the consul led his army into Perrhaebia and settled down between Azorus and Doliche for further conference as to the road to take.

\begin{verbatim}
aliis per Pythoum placebat uia, aliis per Cambunios montes, qua priore anno duxerat Hostilius consul, aliis praeter Ascuridem paludem. restabat aliquantum uiae communis; itaque in id tempus, quo prope duoritium itinerum castra posituri erant, deliberatio eius rei differtur. in Perrhaebiam inde ducit, et inter Azorum et Dolichen statiu habuit ad consulendum rursus, quam potissimum capesseret uiam.
\end{verbatim}

(L.44.2.6-8)

Notably, all three proposed routes went through Perrhaebia; going through Tempe was not presented as an option by the guides, nor suggested by the council itself. This follows the precedent set in 171 BC, when the Romans had deemed Tempe too well protected by its garrisons and likewise focused their attentions on Perrhaebia (L.42.67.6-7).

\[\text{Figure 5.2}\] The first route proposed was via the settlement Pythous, located in the northeast corner of the central Perrhaebian plain by the modern village of Pythio at
western foot of Mt. Olympus.\textsuperscript{477} Pythous anchored the southern end of the route that went north into Macedon via the Petra Pass (Plut.\textit{Aem}.15.2).\textsuperscript{478} This route was understood to have had the most difficult terrain of the three proposed (Plut.\textit{Aem}.15.2; Zon.9.23).

The second route over the Cambunian Mountains entered Macedon at Elimia, located at the modern city of Kozani, significantly further west than the first route.\textsuperscript{479} This was the most often used military route of the three; e.g. Perseus used this route in 171 BC to invade Thessaly from Macedon (L.42.53.5 - 42.54.6), and the consul Hostilius had used it to invade Elimia from Thessaly in 170 BC (Plut.\textit{Aem}.9.4). The strategic importance of this route was further attested to during the First Balkan War, when the Greeks attempted to invade Ottoman-controlled Macedon. At the outbreak of war in the Macedonian theater, the Turkish army focused all their defenses to control this same pass, while the Greek army simultaneously focused all their energies on breaking through it.\textsuperscript{480} The successful Greek attack on Oct. 9, 1912 led directly to the Greek capture of Thessaloniki and control over the Macedonian theater.\textsuperscript{481}

The third route, by Lake Ascuris, was the easternmost route. Lake Ascuris was later called Lake Nezero and subsequently drained between 1907-1911 to create agricultural land.\textsuperscript{482} This route extended east from the Roman camp to the Karya plain and Lake Ascuris. Pritchett convincingly argued that in 480 BC Xerxes established a route between the Pierian coast and Lake Ascuris when he employed a full third of his

\textsuperscript{477} Pythous: Leake 1835 III, pp341-3; Stahlin 1924; Hammond 1972, pp 117-8, maps 11 & 12; Papazoglou 1988, maps 1 & 20, \textit{passim}; Lucas 1992. Pythous was from where Xenagoras measured the height of Olympus (Plut.\textit{Aem}.15.10).
\textsuperscript{479} Elimia: Papazoglou 1988, 177-80.
\textsuperscript{481} HAGS 1998, pp37-72.
\textsuperscript{482} Hammond 1972, p137; Lucas 1991, p135; Zoukas 2015 B, p34.
enormous army for "quite a few days" to cut a track west from the coast into Perrhaebia (Hdt.7.131). This track developed over time into the easternmost section of this third route, entering Macedon by the modern village of Skotina.

Pritchett's route between the drained Lake Nezero and Skotina is used by the local timber industry today and even housed a large timber camp in 1961. As the area between Lake Ascuris and the coast was called "Beautiful Pines", Callipeuce, in 169 BC (L.44.5.11), and pine played a key role in Macedon's economically vital timber industry, one could reasonably assume that the local timber industry maintained the easternmost part of this route in antiquity as well.

[Figure 5.3] Philippus delayed his decision of which route to take by entering Perrhaebia and encamping between Doliche and Azorus, a point from where he could choose any of the three routes. Doliche was located at the northwest corner of the central Perrhaebian plain by the modern village of Sarantoporo, and Azorus was located towards the southwestern corner of the central Perrhaebian plain by the modern village of Azoros. The settlements of Pythous, Azorus, and Doliche together formed Perrhaebian Tripolis (L.42.53.6), an area roughly coterminous with the central Perrhaebian plain.

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484 Pritchett 1961.
486 On the role of the timber industry to the Macedonian economy, see Hatzopoulos 1996, pp 431-442; Borza, 1987. On the role of pine in the modern Macedonian timber industry, see Zoukas 2015 A, p12. It would be worth investigating how the track cleared by Xerxes had potentially enabled an increase in exploitation of the timber in that region by the Pierian coastal communities.
487 Polybius himself joined the Roman camp at Tripolis as an Achaean envoy (Plb.28.13.1), and then marched with the Romans through their march east. Polybius' autopsy and account could account for the Polybian-like attention to mechanical detail in Livy's account of the Roman elephant-moving contraptions later in the narrative.
Perrhaebian Tripolis was strategically important for its role as a crossroads between Thessaly and three separate areas of Macedon: southern Pieria, central Pieria, and Elimia. Tripolis controlled the only entrances to Macedon from Thessaly apart from Tempe; thus, control of Tripolis, and the three towns that controlled the southern entrance to Tripolis - Chyretiae, Olosson, and Malloea, was key for controlling access to Macedon. As a result, in 191 BC the Aetolians and Antiochus had taken Malloea, Chyretiae, and Tripolis (L.36.10.5) as the first stage of their invasion of Macedon, and it had been Philip's primary concern to retake these towns as soon as possible (L.36.13.4). Similarly, in 171 BC Perseus took Tripolis, Malloea, and Chyretiae (L.42.53.9, 42.67.7) before securing Tempe (L.42.54.7-8) as part of his swift campaign to secure the entrances to Macedon in the face of the impending Roman invasion. The Romans then immediately responded by taking back the Perrhaebian cities (L.42.67.7). The resulting control of Tripolis enabled the Romans to encamp here in 169 BC while deciding what route to pursue.

[Figure 5.4] Furthermore, by encamping in Tripolis, Philippus not only postponed his own choice of routes, but, importantly, also prevented Perseus from learning by which route the Romans would invade Macedon.

During the same time, Perseus, knowing that the enemy was approaching, but unaware which route he would choose, decided to occupy all the passes with forces.

per eosdem dies Perseus cum adpropinquare hostem sciret, quod iter petiturus esset, ignarus, omnis saltus insidere praesidiis statuit.

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489 Chyretiae: TIB pp147-8; Leekley 1980, p136; Lucas 1995. Olosson: Lauffer 1989, 207-8. Malloea: Lucas 1995, p123. There were two approaches from Larisa to Olosson at the entrance of Tripolis: a lesser used route that involved a steep pass southeast of Olosson, and the longer yet easier and more frequented route that approached the pass from the southwest and passed by both Malloea and Chyretiae.
Livy reports that Perseus chose to defend all three routes, sending 10,000 men to the summit of the Cambunian mountains to prevent invasion by the westernmost route, and 12,000 men to hold the easternmost route by Lake Ascuris, while he himself encamped near Dium (L.44.2.10-12; Zon.9.22), from where he could guard the Petra Pass route. As Livy reports that Perseus had 30,000 troops after the 169 BC campaign (L.44.20.4), diverting 22,000 troops would have left Perseus with a force of only 8,000. Furthermore, Livy reports that Perseus raced (percurrebat) between Dium, Heracleum, and Phila (L.44.2.12); this passage should be understood as an attempt by Perseus to determine if the Romans were attacking via the Petra pass (Dion), Lake Ascuris pass (Heracleum), or Tempe (Phila), as well as if they were attacking by sea against Heraclion or Phila. Philippus had seized the initiative and compelled Perseus to split his forces and feel threatened by the prospect of an attack on multiple fronts.

Meanwhile the consul had settled on the plan of proceeding by the pass where the king's officer was encamped near Otolobus. It was decided, however, to send ahead 4,000 men to seize valuable positions; the commanders of the force were Marcus Claudius and Quintus Philippus, the son of the consul. Immediately the whole Roman army followed.

interim consuli sententia stetit eo saltu ducere, ubi propter Otolobum dux regius castra <habebat>. praemitti tamen quattuor milia armatorum ad loca opportuna praeoccupanda placuit, qui<bus> praepositi sunt M. Claudius, Q. Philippus consulis filius. confestim et uniuersae copiae sequebantur. (L.44.3.1-3)

Hammond and Briscoe understand that Perseus sent another unmentioned garrison to guard the Petra Pass. However, as that would have left him with very few troops with himself, I see no reason not to take Livy at his word here.

Philippus chose a route before knowing that Perseus had indeed split his forces to cover all the possible routes. Philippus used a feint to try to get Perseus to split his forces, but did not then wait to find out if it worked before he acted. In fact, as we will learn below, Philippus chose the Lake Ascuris route, the route that Perseus had sent the greatest number of men to guard, indicating that Philippus had no intelligence on Perseus' actions before committing to one of the routes.

Similarly, once Philippus had chosen a route, he sent out an advance force, but rather than wait for his advance force to report back to him on the viability of the route and the state of its Macedonian defenses, Philippus immediately followed with his whole army. In both situations, Philippus committed to action before getting full intelligence.

This is alarmingly similar behavior to that which Philippus had displayed in 186 BC in Liguria. Livy reports that in that campaign,

While Marcus was following the Ligurians into secluded forests which had always been their hiding place and place of refuge, he was surrounded on unfavorable ground in a narrow pass which had been occupied in advance.

dum penitus in abditos saltus, quae latebrae receptaculaque illis semper fuerant, persequitur, in praecoccupatis angustiis loco iniquo est circumuentus. 
(L.39.20.6)

Once trapped in the pass, Philippus was soundly defeated and lost 4,000 men (L.39.20.7-8). Philippus had not acted to gather intelligence on where the Ligurians had hidden in the past or where their troops were then stationed before he committed to action. Since Livy reports that this pass was then named 'Philippus' (L.39.20.10), in order to point out that Philippus could not erase the memory of this defeat no matter what
action he might take, it is especially striking that, in Perrhaebia, Philippus again headed into enemy territory without advance intelligence of the area, similarly moving through mountain passes which the Macedonians in fact had occupied in advance. Philippus had not learned from his mistake, but was repeating it.

Livy reports on the Roman army's movements:

However, so steep, rough, and rugged was the road that the advance forces, travelling light, barely completed in two days a march of fifteen miles before pitching camp. The place they occupied is called + Dierus. From Dierus, on the following day they advanced seven miles, seized a hill not far from the enemy's camp, and reported by messenger to the consul that they were in contact with the enemy, that they had occupied a place safe and suitable for all purposes, and that he should follow them as rapidly as he could march. While the consul was worrying both over the difficulty of the journey upon which he had entered and over the fate of the small force which he had sent ahead into the midst of hostile garrisons, he was met by the messenger near Lake Ascuris.

ceterum adeo ardua et aspera et confragosa fuit <uia>, ut praemissi expediti biduo quindecim milium passuum aegre itinere confecto castra posuerint + fuerimque +. Dierum quem cepere locum appellant. inde postero die septem <milia> progressi, tumulo hau procul hostium castris capto, nuntium ad consulem remittunt peruentum ad hostem esse; loco se tuto et ad omnia opportuno consedisse; ut quantum extendere iter posset, consequeretur. sollicito consuli et propter itineris difficultatem, quod ingressus erat, et eorum uicem, quos pauros inter media praesidia hostium praemiserat, nuntius ad Ascuridem paludem occurrit.

(L.44.3.3-5)

We learn at the end of this passage that Philippus had chosen the Lake Ascuris route. [Figure 5.6] Pritchett proposed the route east from Tripolis to the Karya plain that takes the pass between the modern villages of Flampouro and Sikaminea, and Rizakis proposed the route via the pass between the modern villages of Olimpiada and Sikaminea.⁴⁹² Each of which covers roughly 24 km, and are thus equivalent to Livy's 15

miles. However, the terrain alone of either of these routes is not difficult enough to warrant such slow movement. Examining Rizakis' route more closely, from the Roman camp this route heads east for 10 km across the Perrhaelian plain before climbing 500 m of elevation over 9 km for an average grade of 5.5% and then descending into the plain 200 m of elevation loss over 5 km for an average grade of 4%. Using Naismith's Rule, this route should have only taken five hours and forty minutes. Even taking into account that the Romans were moving especially slowly due to the unknown and potentially hostile territory, this seems too long to travel this route, especially since the Romans had local guides.

However, these guides' knowledge of the topography was, in fact, responsible for the Romans taking a different route. [Figure 5.7] There was a Macedonian fort on the hill just west of the modern village of Karya. This fort had views of the entire Karya plain from the modern village of Sikaminea to the west, to the eastern edge of the plain [Figures 5.8 - 5.11]; from this fort the Macedonian garrison could have seen any movement in the plain. Additionally, this fort had a clear sightline with the Macedonian settlement Libethra on the Pierian coast, near the modern village of Leptokarya. This means that the Macedonians at the fort could have alerted the soldiers on the coast by fire signal that the Romans were coming this way. Local guides would have known of this fort and have led the Romans to avoid being seen. [Figure 5.12] To avoid being seen

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8 Polybian stades equal a Roman mile (Leake 1839). A Roman mile is .92 of a mile.  
Both routes are equivalent in distance covered, elevation climbed, and difficulty of travel. Naismith's Rule accounts one hour for every 5km traveled plus 1 hour for every 600 meters climbed, see e.g. Scarf 2008, and discussion in chapter 3.  
Philip was accustomed to use fire signals (Plb.10.42.7). On the use of ancient military fire signals, see Woolliscroft 2001.
from the Macedonian fort by Karya, the Romans would have had to stay south of the mountain ridge at the southern edge of the Karya plain. The extremely rugged nature of this route would account for the slow movement of the Roman army.

After two days of slow travel, the Roman advance party camped at a place called Dierus. We do not know what or where Dierus was, as we have no other attestation of this toponym and the verb *capere* can be used for occupying an area or a settlement, and *locus* could mean a settlement or an area. That there is no mention of a skirmish and that armies in the Second Macedonian War camped at named areas (e.g. Camp of Pyrrhus (L.32.13.2), Alexander's Tower (Plb.18.27.1)) suggests that Dierus was an area. The most likely candidate is an area on the south face of the hills at the southern edge of the Karya plain due south of the modern village of Sikaminea. This area lay roughly 15 miles from the Roman camp at Tripolis and could have warranted a toponym because it served as a crossroads for the only route south out of the central Karya Plain.

From Dierus, the Roman advance party advanced seven miles to a hill. [Figure 5.13] Roughly seven miles to the east of Dierus are the hills just east of Lake Ascuris. Once the advance party had seized a hill here, they sent a messenger back to Philippus, who was already at Lake Ascuris. This means that the entire Roman army was at that moment only three miles behind the advance force. This means that Philippus and the entire army with its elephants and thousands of donkeys had been so close to the advance

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498 For the argument that Dierus was a fort, see Pritchett 1991, with bibliography.
499 The toponym Dierus could conceivably have derived from the Greek *dieros*, meaning "wet, liquid" (LSJ), which would be appropriate for where I place Dierus, as a seasonal stream would have run through this pass. Another possibility is that it derived from *dierchomai*, meaning "to pass through" (LSJ), which would also be appropriate for this placement as it sits at a pass. It is worth noting that the manuscript is corrupt immediately before the mention of this toponym; the crux is the preceding word 'fuerimque', which bears some similarity to 'Dierum' in form, and given its position perhaps renders the toponym even less certain in the manuscript.
force on this third day as to suggest that they had been this close all along, perhaps
camping at Dierus the previous night as well. By moving this closely behind his advance
forces, Philippus was continuing to act without first gathering intelligence.

The Macedonian camp was near the Roman camp, and so was in the hills east of
Lake Ascuris as well. This camp consisted of the 12,000 men Perseus had recently sent to
block the pass (L.44.4.1). Previously, Livy had reported that this garrison was near
Otolobus (L.44.3.1), but we have no way of determining which hill that name would have
indicated. [Figure 5.14] Pritchett convincingly argued that this Macedonian garrison
ascended from the Pierian coast by roughly the same route that Xerxes had established in
480 BC, ascending from Skotina towards the modern village of Kallipefki. [Figure
5.15] A camp on the hill northeast above Kallipefke would have blocked this pass, as
well as had clear views of the Lake Ascuris district, the fort above Karya, and the Pierian
coast. This fort was thus in a strategic location to report by fire signal to the coast any
enemy movement in the Lake Ascuris district or the Karya plain, as well as to control the
pass itself. The wide, flat expanse at the top of this hill had ample room to hold the fort
for the 12,000 Macedonians.

Livy reports that once Philippus got his report from his advance troops, he
promptly acted.

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500 Pritchett 1967 (again in 1991, tentatively followed by Briscoe 2012) argued that there is one hill that,
when viewed from a specific angle, looks definitively more like an earlobe than any other hill in this
mountainous region, and thus must be this Otolobus. His photo and description fail to convince. I have
traveled through this area and many hills in the foothills of Olympus could be thought to look abstractly
earlobe-like.


502 Pritchett 1991 proposed this location, but for different reasons.

503 At 7.5 m² per man, 12,000 men required 90,000 m², which is a 300 m by 300 m encampment.
The consul therefore gained confidence, and after joining the advance force encamped on the slopes of the hill which had been seized, in the place where the lay of the land was most suitable. Not only the enemy camp, a little over a mile away, but the whole region to Dium, Phila, and the seashore was before their eyes from such a lofty ridge.

addita igitur et ipsi fiducia est, coniunctisque copiis castra tumulo, qui tenebatur, qua aptissimum ad loci naturam erat, sunt adclinata. non hostium modo castra, quae paulo plus mille passuum aberant, sed omnis regio ad Dium et Philam oraque maris late patente ex tam alto iugo prospectu oculis subicitur.

(L.44.3.6-7 - Chaplin assisted on this trans.)

[Figure 5.16] The Romans seized the hill roughly one mile south of the hill on which the Macedonians were encamped.\textsuperscript{504} [Figure 5.17] Once the Roman advance force had alerted the main body of the army as to the location of the Macedonian camp, the Roman army would have marched around the southern edge of Lake Ascuris and approached where they then camped with the Roman-seized hill between them and the Macedonian camp. The Roman advance forces on the hill would have protected the Roman army's approach. [Figure 5.18] The Romans camped on the western slope of this hill, an area large enough and at a gentle enough grade to have held the Roman camp.\textsuperscript{505} Additionally, there are numerous old spring houses today in the area east of Kallipefki, whose previous Slavic name had meant "spring", indicating that this area could have the supplied the Roman camp's water requirements.\textsuperscript{506}

[Figure 5.19] From the hill that the Romans seized one can see the Pierian shore, but from the next hill south, today called Mt. Metamorphosis and the largest hill in the vicinity, one could indeed see from the area around Dion to the area around Phila, if not

\textsuperscript{504} Pritchett 1969, 1991.
\textsuperscript{505} A Roman camp was roughly 750m by 750m. See discussion in chapter 3.
\textsuperscript{506} Zoukas 2015 B, pp 114-5.
the actual cities themselves. As the Roman camp lay between Mt. Metamorphosis and the Macedonian camp, the Romans would have had access to the view from Mt. Metamorphosis.

[Figure 5.18] Livy reports the Macedonians and Romans fought skirmishes for the next two days with light-armed troops on the ridge and slopes between the Macedonian camp and the Roman camp and Roman-held hill (L.44.4.1-6). We have previously seen similar situations in which the Macedonians and Romans fought skirmishes with light-armed troops while their main forces stayed in camp by the river Bevus in Dasseretia in 199 BC (L.31.34.9 - 31.34.7, L.31.36.1-3), at Pherae in 197 BC (L.33.6.6), and at the river Aous in 198 BC (L.32.11.6). Additionally, at Cynoscephalae in 197 BC (Plb.18.21.4), the initial skirmish escalated to a decisive battle. Both armies were thus accustomed to feel each other out by means of light-armed attacks, which then either led to one of the armies leaving the field (Bevus and Pherae), or committing to decisive battle (Aous and Cynoscephalae).

On the third day the Roman commander was at a loss; for he could neither remain on the ridge without supplies nor retreat without disgrace and even danger.

tertio die egere consilio Romanus imperator; nam neque manere in iugo inopi neque regredi sine flagitio atque etiam periculo (L.44.4.7)

Philippus could not stay on the ridge indefinitely as he had no line of supply, and retreat would be dangerous, especially taking into consideration his extensive train.

Philippus had originally set out this season before he had determined a plan, and in a

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507 The Romans would not have encamped on Mt. Metamorphosis as it does not have a large enough flat area at the summit to hold the Roman camp, and the sides are too steep to have held a camp.
manner not suited to quick movement or movement over harsh terrain. His retreat from this position would now require both.

Philippus conducted an organized retreat from his camp designed to offer as much protection as possible. Philippus left an unspecified number of Roman troops on the Roman-controlled hill to protect the Roman retreat (L.44.4.11). The retreat was then led by a unit of soldiers clearing a route, with African and Pergamene allied troops protecting the soldiers doing the clearing, followed by the cavalry and *impedimenta* - which here included all the baggage animals and elephants -, followed by the legions and Philippus (L.44.4.11-12).

However, Philippus offset this concern for safety by retreating from his position east into the 'pathless' hills rather than back towards the way he had come. Livy reports that "the toils of the descent and the damage to the baggage-animals and their loads cannot be put into words" (L.44.5.1), and great pains were taken to move the elephants through the rugged terrain (L.44.5.2-7). On this first day, the Romans advanced barely seven miles (L.44.8.1), but were not pursued by the Macedonians (L.44.4.9, 44.5.8, 44.5.10).

*Figure 5.20* The Macedonian camp prevented the Romans from taking the most direct northeast route to the coast by Skotina, the route by which the Macedonians had ascended. *Figure 5.21* Instead, the Romans went southeast and then east towards the modern village of Aigani. This route would have accounted for their slow movement as well as why the Macedonians did not pursue them. First, if the Romans had continued southeast, they would have ended up by the Macedonian garrison by Rapsani, which will
be discussed below. [Figure 5.22] Second, the Pierian coast is composed of four successive bottlenecks, from south to north, Tempe, by Heracleum, by the Elpeus, and by Pydna. If Philippus emerged on the southern side of the bottleneck by Heracleum, then he would have been trapped between the two southernmost and easiest to defend bottlenecks. His southeastern movement indicated that this was, indeed, where he would emerge.

Philippus then did not move for the entire second day but waited for the covering force left behind by their initial camp to catch up with them (44.5.10). While this indicates that the covering force they left behind was substantial and thus worth waiting for, these troops were also not pursued by the Macedonians (L.44.5.10). Presumably Philippus spent this day of inactivity discussing with his guides where they would go next and how they could still emerge north of the Heracleum bottleneck.

[Figure 5.23] Now with his entire army reunited, Philippus headed north, passing through the Callipeuce pass (L.44.5.11) on the third day of the retreat and [map] finally reached the plain between Heracleum and Libethrum on the fourth day (L.44.5.12). This route involved the Romans marching north-northwest for the third day, passing to the west of the modern village of Poroi and stopping southwest of the modern village of Panteleimonas. We do not know where the Callipeuce pass was, but its name ("beautiful pines") suggests the forested area on this route, and the valley crossing between Poroi and Panteleimonas is a likely candidate for the pass as it is the last especially rugged area of the route. [Figure 5.24] On the fourth day the Romans continued north and emerged into the plain well north of the Heracleum bottleneck. Once there, they encamped where the
hills meet the plain east of Skotina, with part of their camp in the hills and part in the plain (L.44.5.12-13).

[Figure 5.25] While encamped at Dion, Perseus heard that Philippus had bypassed the garrisons that Perseus had sent to stop him and entered Pieria north of the Heracleum bottleneck (L.44.6.1; Diod.30.10.1). Perseus promptly gathered the regional population and valuables from Dion and moved to Pydna (L.44.6.3).

Livy censures Perseus for this action, arguing that Perseus could have trapped the Romans between the Tempe and the pass at the Elpeus river (L.44.6.5-17; cp. Diod.30.11). However, as Perseus had sent a large percentage of his troops to guard the passes, Perseus could have reasonably believed that he could not hold the pass by the Elpeus with this limited number of men against the entire Roman army and was thus not willing to risk a decisive engagement.

Perseus' move is also reminiscent of his father's behavior after his defeat at the Battle of the River Aous, when he took the population and food supplies from certain strategically placed Thessalian towns with him on his retreat. By doing this, Philip made it so that the Roman army was unable to live off the land and had to leave Thessaly. Finally, if the Roman navy had attacked Pydna when Perseus was at the Elpeus, then Perseus would have been trapped between two bottlenecks himself. As it stood though, Perseus had removed himself to a more defensible position, made it more difficult for the Romans to live off the land in Pieria, and still left the Romans in a

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\[508\] See discussion in chapter 4.
position where they could not get resupplied due to the Macedonian garrisons at Tempe.509

[Figure 5.26] Livy reports that Tempe was protected by four garrisons, Gonnus, Condylus, Charax, and one in the middle of the Vale itself (L.44.6.9-11). [Figure 5.27] Gonnus was located at the western entrance to the Tempe and was a significantly sized, well-walled settlement that controlled access to Tempe from the Thessalian side.510

[Figure 5.26] Condylus was a permanent fortified garrison up the valley northwest from Gonnus.511 Condylus served to help control the western entrance of Tempe as well as control the easiest route by which to bypass Tempe, namely going directly north from Condylus to Lake Ascuris.

Charax, Greek for fortified camp, was on the hill northwest above the modern village of Rapsani, where impressive remains of its fortification wall still stand.512 Besides controlling the eastern access to Tempe, Charax served to control the easiest route to Lake Ascuris from Pieria, which ascended from just north of the eastern entrance to Tempe to Ascuris via Charax.

The most likely possibility for the location of the garrison within the Vale was on the southern bank, where the ruins of the Byzantine castle Kastro tis Oraias that used to control Tempe stand.513 The 1967 Blue Guide reports that beneath the ruins "are the remains of an ancient fortress," however those remains are no longer extant.514 However,

509 The Roman navy was unwilling to attempt a resupply by sea at this time (L.44.7.10).
514 Rossiter 1967, p479.
the ancient blocks could be associated with an alternate location on the opposite bank where a 13th century church to Aghia Paraskevi was built over an underground freshwater spring [Figure 5.28]. However, we cannot know if ancient blocks were incorporated into this Byzantine church, as it was razed and rebuilt in 1920 by the railway, although the underground spring was preserved.515

Philippus realized that he needed to open a supply line through Tempe before the 30 days of supplies he originally brought with him ran out, and so sent a messenger to the Roman garrison at Larisa to tell him to seize the forts controlling Tempe (L.44.7.1).516 We cannot be sure what route this messenger took, but retracing Philippus' route would have taken too long and going through Tempe would have been too risky for such an important message. It seems most likely that Philippus sent this messenger with one of his local guides through the northern foothills of Mt. Ossa (modern Mt. Kissavos), where today there is a network of hiking trails.517 This route would have been too rugged for an army but not for a messenger and a local guide.

Philippus' inability to resupply his army by sea at this point, even though the navy was at Magnesia with cargo ships full of grain (L.44.7.10), casts into stark relief how adept Flamininus had been in 198 BC at coordinating his movements with his grain fleet over much greater distances.518 Philippus' naval praetor Marcius Figulus (L.44.1.3) demonstrated competence both sailing in and landing in hostile areas in this region, but

515 Zoukas 2012 B, pp 121-2; Alexander Clapp [pers. comm.].
516 When Livy says here that the forts had been abandoned by the Macedonians, he does not mean they are without garrisons, as then he could bypass them himself. He means that Perseus has left them without hope for reinforcements.
517 Zoukas 2012 B, pp 182-8, passim.
518 See discussion in chapter 4.
still could not get supplies to Philippus at the critical juncture as Flamininus' naval praetor, and brother, had been able to do repeatedly for him.\textsuperscript{519}

\textbf{[Figure 5.25]} Having sent the messenger, Philippus sent an advance force to scout the approach to Dium (L.44.7.1), including the crossing of the Elpeus river. Similarly to his behavior at Ascuris, Philippus followed closely behind with the army and covered the roughly 25 km to Dium on the second day after sending the advance party (L.44.7.1). After a day's delay at Dium, Philippus marched north for two days, but did not approach Perseus' encampment by Pydna before returning to Dium (L.44.7.4-7). Since it is only 25 km of flat ground between Dium and the narrows in front of Pydna, Philippus was not covering much ground each day.

Knowing that Philippus set out with 30 days of food and has not had the opportunity to resupply, examining the events since he set out reveals that he was, indeed, out of food.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Philippus' action</th>
<th>Days involved</th>
<th>Total days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moves Palaepharsalus to Larisa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debates routes at Larisa</td>
<td>Approx. 2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March to Tripolis</td>
<td>Approx. 3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wait at Tripolis</td>
<td>Approx. 5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March to Dierus</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March to hills</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skirmishes</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retreat from hills</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At camp in Pieria and sends messenger</td>
<td>Approx. 2</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March to Dium</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{519} After Figulus ferried the army between Italy and Ambracia (L.44.1.3-4), he waged an effective campaign of terror on the Macedonian shoreline between Heracleum and Thessalonica (L.44.2.3, 44.9.2, 44.10.5), and on Pallene (L.44.10.11-12). On the psychological impact of Figulus' seaborne raids, see Bragg 2010, pp 52-7. For coordination between Flamininus and his supply fleet, see discussion in chapter 4.
March north and back to Dium
Wait at Dium

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>March north and back to Dium</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>29</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wait at Dium</td>
<td>At least 1</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4: Calendar of events for 169 BC campaign**

However, at this moment of crisis, Philippus received word that the forts around Tempe and Phila had been secured, and Marcus moved south to Phila to resupply (L.44.7.11 - 44.8.1).

[Figure 5.22] At that point, Philippus controlled the southernmost bottleneck of Pieria at Tempe, and Perseus controlled the northernmost bottleneck at Pydna. Each then acted to control the nearest central bottleneck, as Perseus moved south to Dium and then fortified a position on the Elpeus (L.44.8.5-7), and Philippus successfully besieged Heracleum (L.44.8.8 - 44.9.10; Plb.28.11). Once Heracleum had been taken, Philippus moved the army back to Thessaly for winter quarters (L.44.9.9-10) due to a lack of supplies in Pieria (Zon.9.22), and the Roman Macedonian campaign in 169 BC was over.

Livy reports that Philippus began the campaign *audacter* (L.44.4.8), which led to his getting trapped on the ridge above Lake Ascuris. Philippus remedied this with *pertinax audacia* (L.44.4.8) which he executed *audaciter* (L.44.4.11) and was able to reach the Pierian plain. However, Livy makes plain that Philippus succeeded in completing this route safely solely due to incompetence on the Macedonians' part (L.44.4.9, 44.5.10, 44.6.6-17), going so far as to say that Perseus' ineptitude turned

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520 The forts were secured by force (L.44.35.7).
521 After the capture of Heracleum, there is a substantial naval campaign in Macedon (L.44.10.5 - 44.12.8).
522 Philippus did still wage a small campaign in Thessaly before he went into winter quarters, unsuccessfully sending 5000 men to attack Meliboea while the fleet made a failed attempt on Demetrias (L.44.13.1-6).
Philippus' *temeritas* into *audacia* (L.44.6.4). Philippus was successful in the 169 BC campaign in that he did not lose a battle, but he was also not successful in that he did not win a battle either. At the end of the campaign he has gained only Tempe. Philippus' reliance on *audacia* led to a campaign that fizzled out due to lack of supplies and was not enough to defeat Perseus.

**Part II: The 168 campaign**

Livy reports Philippus' winter dispatches back to the senate concerning how he had forced the pass into Macedon, and had diligently coordinated the food supply for the troops for the winter, as well as his report of the army's needs for the upcoming season concerning grain supply, clothes, and horses (L.44.16.1-3). Philippus' stress on logistical preparation here seems striking compared to his more free-wheeling behavior during the 169 BC campaign. The narrative of the Macedonian campaign, in fact, now shifts its focus from boldness to careful preparations and concern over logistics.

Livy reports that during winter 169/168 BC, Lucius Aemilius Paullus was elected consul (L.44.17.4) and assigned Macedon by lot (L.44.18.10). Not willing to rely upon only Philippus' dispatches, Paullus requested the senate to send envoys to Macedon to gather intelligence and report back on logistical concerns for the upcoming campaign: 1) how many reinforcements the army required, 2) how many men the Macedonians had, 3)

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523 The senate acted to remedy all Philippus' stated needs (L.44.16.4), including arranging to pay for the grain Philippus had already purchased. It is worth noting that the 30,000 modii of grain mentioned as supplied by Epirotes was only eleven days worth of grain for Philippus' two legion army; substantially more grain had been purchased by Philippus for the winter.

524 Plutarch reports, in contrast, that Macedon was assigned to Paullus and that he was elected consul specifically to prosecute the war (Plut. *Aem.* 10.1-5). Livy, as well, hints at such a possibility (L.44.17.1-3).

525 Paullus' display of using the proper diplomatic channels here in notable in contrast with his inscription at Delphi which mentions neither the senate nor people of Rome.
what areas were under Roman control, 4) what areas were under Macedonian control, 5) what was the nature of the Roman camp in relation to the topography, 6) were the allies loyal, 7) what was the state of the food supply, and 8) what were the lines of supply between this food supply and the Roman camp (L.44.18.2-4).

19th and 20th century theorists of waging war, such as Clausewitz and Burne, have likewise focused on these same concepts of manpower, control of terrain, importance of allies, food supply, and lines of supply and communication as being crucial for military victory.\textsuperscript{526} Eric Marsden argued that since Polybius understood the importance of these very concepts, Polybius was an "advanced, even modern" military mind.\textsuperscript{527} This leaves the question whether Paullus also had such a military mind or whether Polybius and Livy had shaped Paullus' behavior to be more focused on logistics than it actually was. While this is an intractable problem, we can still look at this passage as at least a clarification of what Polybius and Livy thought were the middle Republican logistical concerns that directly led to military success.

Livy reports that Paullus refused to make or discuss with the senate his plans for the upcoming campaign until he had heard the intelligence report from the envoys sent to Macedon, going so far as to postpone his expected report to the senate on his upcoming campaign (L.44.19.1-3). This directly contrasts with Philippus' behavior, who began his campaign before he had a plan, repeatedly acted without gathering sufficient intelligence, and repeatedly sent out advance forces but then acted before they had reported back.

\textsuperscript{526} Clausewitz 1832-7; Burne 1944.
\textsuperscript{527} Marsden 1973, with a history of 19th century theorists of war on p275, and discussion of Burne's principles on pp 276-8.
The envoys report that the army has been led into Macedonia by trackless passes at a risk disproportionate to the gain. Pieria, which the army had reached, the king holds; the encampments are so nearly in contact that hardly more than the Elpeus river separates them. The king does not offer battle, and our forces have not the strength to compel him to do so.

L.44.20.2-3

The next section of the report is corrupt (L.44.20.4), but the sense seems clear that "the soldiers had to be fed at a time when they could not undertake foraging operations." The report concludes by reporting that the Macedonians had 30,000 troops (L.44.20.4), and that the Roman army at Lynchnidus was in danger, the Pergamene navy had gone home, and that the Sicilian allies had deserted the Roman fleet (L.44.20.5-7).

In their report, the envoys directly addressed all eight of Paullus' logistical questions: 1) The Romans did not have enough men to force battle, so we know that they needed significant reinforcements. 2) The Macedonians had 30,000 men. 3) The Romans had been in Pieria during the previous campaign, but 4) Perseus currently held Pieria. 5) The Roman camp was at the Elpeus. 6) Certain allies were wavering in their loyalty. 7) Although imprecise due to the state of the text, the food supply was neither bountiful, nor 8) its supply route secured, especially with the navy in disarray due to Sicilian defections.

The envoys were markedly successful in gathering the information Paullus had wanted. Additionally, they introduced their report with a censure of the previous year's

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528 Briscoe 2012, p528. See Briscoe 2012, p527-8 for full discussion of the passage and proposed emendations as well as Briscoe 1986, 227 for the app. crit.
529 cf. L.42.55.11 where the Macedonians have 43,000 troops. The difference is that many of those troops are stationed around the different active fronts.
campaign based on a cost-benefit analysis, i.e. the risk outweighed the gain. Excessive risk, one might say audacia, was deprecated on the senate floor compared to careful preparation, of the kind in which they, and Paullus, were then engaged.

However, one aspect of the envoys' report did not reflect the current circumstances in Pieria, as the Roman position on the Elpeus referred to a future situation. While the Romans had been in Pieria the previous season, as the envoys reported, they were at that moment not encamped on the Elpeus but in Thessaly. As discussed below, it was only after Paullus arrived there in the spring and moved the camp from Thessaly that the Romans encamped at the Elpeus.

The rest of the envoys' report did address the current situation, including the need for additional troops. In response, the senate decreed that each legion in the two-legion army in Macedon would be increased to 6,000 infantry and 300 cavalry (L.44.21.8), from its standard size of 4200 to 5000 infantry and 300 cavalry (Plb.6.20.8). According to Polybius' description of the Roman army, this would make for 26,400 land troops for the Macedonian war (Plb.6.20, 26), a number relatively close to Perseus' reported 30,000 troops.

Livy reports that Perseus spent the winter failing to secure alliances for military and diplomatic assistance with the Illyrians (L.44.27.8-12; App. Mac. 18.1; Dio 20.1), the Pergamenes (L.44.24.7 - 44.25.12, 44.27.13; App. Mac. 18.1; Dio 20.1; Plb.29.5-8) and...

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530 See Dobson for a survey of Middle Republican legion sizes in Polybius and Livy. It is worth noting that the senate did not panic and send a third legion, and in fact a limit of two legions was explicitly instituted (L.44.21.8). The senate was not yet making this an extraordinary military situation.
531 26,400 land troops equals two Roman legions at 6300 men each plus an equal number of allied infantry with three times as many allied cavalry as the legions supplied (6000 + 6000 + 6000 + 6000 + 300 + 300 + 900 + 900).
the Gauls (L.44.26; Plut. Aem. 12.3 - 13.1; App. Mac. 18.1-3; Diod. 30.19). While the ancient sources censure Perseus for miserliness for these failed alliances (L.44.26.1, 44.27.1,8; Plb.29.9; Plut. Aem. 12.3 - 13.3; App. Mac. 18; Dio 20.1; Diod. 30.19), Livy's report of Perseus' reasoning that having 10,000 Gallic cavalry and 10,000 Gallic infantry march from the northern border of Macedon through to the camp at the Elpeus in Pieria might result in the Macedonians "finding the Gauls more deadly as allies than the Romans were as enemies" (L.44.26.13) is a compelling and convincing reason for Perseus to have refused their help.

Livy proposes a campaign that Perseus could have had the Gauls wage, had Perseus not bungled the alliance. [Figure 5.1] The Gauls could have moved through Perrhaebia into Thessaly and then ravaged Thessaly so badly that the Romans would not have been able to forage from Thessaly to feed their troops, and thus would have had to retire from their camp at the Elpeus (L.44.27.4-6). This route from Macedon through Perrhaebia into Thessaly is the same route that Perseus had taken in 171 BC, but where that campaign was designed to secure the routes between Thessaly and Macedon, this proposed campaign was designed to disrupt the Romans' line of supply. Cutting off their line of supply from Larissa through Tempe would have, indeed, forced the Romans back into Thessaly and out of Pieria as there was not enough arable land to forage in Pieria to support an army. In fact, Appian censures Perseus for not adopting a similar strategy himself, arguing that "Perseus was so foolish that while wintering with a large army at Phila [in 169/168 BC] he made no incursion into Thessaly, which furnished supplies to the Romans" (App. Mac. 18.3). In the 169 BC campaign and then in the following winter,
Perseus did not act to move the theater of war out of Macedon, but acted to secure the Macedonian end of the routes by which the Romans would invade. In contrast, Philip had repeatedly taken the initiative to keep the Roman theater of war in Illyria and then Thessaly.

At some point during the winter of 169/168 BC, Perseus moved from Phila to the north bank of the Elpeus where he built a well-placed and extremely well-fortified encampment (L.44.32.10; Plut.Aem.13.5; Zon.9.23). However, fear of a Roman attack on multiple fronts again compelled Perseus to split his forces: at least 3,000 soldiers were sent to guard Thessalonica and the coasts (L.44.32.6-8) from potential naval assault, and 5,000 to garrison Pythous and Petra (L.44.32.9) to prevent a Roman surrounding movement through Perrhaebia.

In the spring, Paullus met the Roman camp in Thessaly after a rapid journey from Italy and took over control of the army (App. Mac.19; Plut.Aem.12.1). Livy reports that once Paullus was in control of the army, he continued his behavior of focusing on careful logistical preparation before taking decisive action. Paullus made the system of communications within the army more efficient (L.44.33.5-7, 44.34.2, 4-5), changed both the sentries' equipment and system of operation (L.44.33.8-11), and imposed new regulations concerning the soldiers maintenance of their personal health, equipment, and personal supply of cooked rations (L.44.33.4, 44.34.3). Paullus moved the Roman camp to Phila and found nearby freshwater wells for the camp's water supply (L.44.33.1-3), and scouted the area for a new camp by the Elpeus (L.44.33.4). As Livy and Appian report

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532 Polybius highly praises the Roman system of communications within the army as a key element of their military success in book 6.
that from when Paullus showed up at the camp until the battle of Pydna was only fifteen days (L.45.41.3-5; App.\textit{Mac}.19), these preparations and innovations were accomplished rather quickly.

\textbf{[Figure 5.29]} Livy reports that Paullus then moved the Roman camp from Phila to opposite the Macedonian camp at the Elpeus (L.44.34.10), in which camp Plutarch reports that Perseus still had almost 40,000 heavy-infantry as well as 4000 cavalry (Plut.\textit{Aem}.13.4).\footnote{This is the placement of the Roman camp to which the envoys' report had referred.} This is a significantly larger number than the 30,000 troops that the Roman envoys had reported to the senate. We are left to infer that either the envoys had deliberately reduced the number in their report - perhaps in order to make the war seem less of a risk -, or that Perseus had increased the number of troops at his camp through some combination of levy, allied reinforcements, and movement of troops from other Macedonian theaters of operations such as their northern and eastern borders. The latter option seems more likely as we have no evidence of such deceitful activity in the senate at this time, but we do know that Perseus knew that the Romans were going to try to engage him in a decisive battle in the upcoming season.

Plutarch reports that Perseus planned to use his fortified location to delay battle in order to force the Romans to abandon the area due to the expense of maintaining their army in Pieria (Plut.\textit{Aem}.13.4-5). This was a similar strategy to that employed by Philip at the Battle of the River Aous, namely embedding oneself in a secure location with a secure line of supply and trusting that the Romans could not, or would not, maintain an army in the field so far from Italy. Additionally, Perseus' plan to force the Romans to leave on account of the difficulties in maintaining their supply line aimed at the same
conceptual goal as the plans for cutting the supply line through Tempe that Livy and Appian had previously censured him for not enacting.

While encamped on opposite sides of the Elpeus, both armies heard of the Roman defeat of Gentius' Illyrian army (L.44.35.1-2). While Livy stresses the impact this had on the morale of both armies, in fact both generals knew Gentius was not coming. Perseus had alienated Gentius by not paying him, and Paullus knew that the Romans had committed a praetor with two legions to Illyria and that Gentius would have had to stay to deal with this.

Paullus now faced a situation similar to that faced by the Romans at the Aous in 198 BC and at Thermopylae in 191 BC. The enemy was encamped in a spot that the consul understood to have been "impregnable by nature and by fortification" (L.44.35.8), while the secure supply lines for each army suggested that the standoff could last indefinitely. Livy reports Paullus' dismissals of both a frontal attack on the Macedonian camp and combining a frontal attack with a naval attack on Thessalonica (L.44.35.6-9). Livy's reader understands Paullus was right to reject these plans as Livy had previously described Perseus' camp's extensive defensive works (L.44.32.10-11, 44.35.9) and reported that Perseus had already sent troops to Thessalonica to counter just such an attack (L.44.32.6-8).

Instead, Paullus chose a plan similar to that Flamininus had employed at the Aous, namely, to use local guides to lead a surrounding force around and behind the Macedonian camp by a route that the guides had revealed to him (L.44.35.10-13).

There are differences in the relationships of Paullus and Flamininus with their respective...
guides, in that Paullus summoned the guides to him, whereas it had been the guides' initiative to go to Flamininus, and that Paullus had previously known his guides and had already established a relationship of trust with them, whereas Flamininus had to check with the local headman Charopus on their trustworthiness. Just when it was that Paullus had met, and established this relationship, with these local Perrhaebian guides in the six days that he had been in Pieria is not explained. However, Paullus' behavior here is consistent with his previous focus on careful preparation to minimize risk with no reliance on luck. Whereas Flamininus had been at an impasse at the Aous and was saved by the fortuitous arrival of the local guides, Paullus took the initiative to get the local guides to solve his problem. Paullus' behavior here contrasts with Flamininus' similarly to how Paullus' behavior elsewhere in this campaign contrasts with Philippus'.

Livy reports that the guides told Paullus that the Macedonians had forces guarding the Petra pass (L.44.35.11) and this accords with Livy's earlier report that Perseus had sent 5000 men to guard Pythous and Petra. In contrast, Plutarch reports that the route via Pythium and Petra was unguarded (15.2).

Livy reports that Paullus ordered the fleet to sail to Heracleum with "tens days' cooked rations for 1000 men" (L.44.35.13), from the Roman naval base at Oreus (L.44.30.1). Paullus then sent 5000 men under his son Quintus Fabius Maximus and Publius Scipio Nasica from the Elpeus camp south to Heracleum (L.44.35.14). Plutarch, stating that he was using a letter of Nasica as his source, reports that Nasica

535 See below for a calendar of events for Paullus in Pieria.
536 The Roman naval positions at Oreus and Sciatheus (L.44.13.10-11) would have served, in part, to blockade the Macedonian port of Demetrias.
537 Both of these were one-day journeys.
instead took 8,000 infantry and 320 cavalry with him to Heracleum, in contrast to an unspecified number that Plutarch claims Polybius had reported (Plut. *Aem*. 15.5-7).

There is a potential way to reconcile these numbers. At the Aous, Flamininus had similarly sent 300 cavalry to act as an advance force for the first stage of the surrounding mission who were then not to continue into the rugged terrain (L. 32. 11.7). The 320 cavalry here could have served the same purpose for Nasica from Heracleum south to where they entered the mountains, and for the first part of their movement into the mountains to the west. 3,000 of Nasica's men could have been left with the fleet, as Zonaras reports that four days from Nasica's arrival at Heracleum the fleet sailed north from Heracleum along the Pierian coast (Zon. 9.23).

Livy reports that Nasica's 5000 men were to pretend to get on the ships at Heracleum in order to feign that they were mounting a naval attack (L. 44. 35.14), but instead pick up the cooked rations that the fleet had waiting for them and follow the guides on the overland surrounding route through Perrhaebia (L. 44. 35.15-16). Paullus' strategy of using a small raiding party with cooked rations was similar to that employed by Cato in Spain in 195 BC (L. 34. 12.7) and Scipio in Asia in 190 BC (37.37.5). Cooked rations weighed less and took up less volume than grain. Additionally, bringing cooked rations eliminated the need for food preparation equipment, mules to carry that equipment, the time needed to prepare and cook food, and cooking fires that could alert

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538 The path becomes too steep for the cavalry where the houses at the western end of the modern village of Pyrgetos end.
539 This strategy is pretty identical to that of Cato's in Spain in 195 BC (L.34.12.7ff). Additionally, there was a similar action before Magnesia in 190 BC (L.37.37.5).
540 Roman cooked rations were hardtack. For discussion of Roman cooked rations, see Roth 2012, pp51-3.
the enemy to one's presence. As a result, bringing cooked rations indicated that quick, decisive action would be taken.

Livy reports that "the guides were instructed to arrange to stages of the journey so that they could attack Pythous in the fourth watch of the third day" (L.44.35.15). Plutarch adds to this that the route went "through Perrhaebia past the Pythium and Petra" (Plut.15.2). 541 Ten days of food for 1,000 men is two days of food for 5,000 men, and as Paullus had recently established in his logistical innovations upon his arrival at the camp that each soldier was to always have a personal supply of cooked rations always prepared (L.44.34.3), we should understand that Nasica's force now had food for roughly four days. Since they were to arrive at Pythous on the third day and Petra was one day's march from there, Nasica had just the right amount of food for the mission. Paullus planned the route in advance and then arranged for the men to have exactly the amount of food they needed to complete the route, which was in direct contrast with Philippus' march through Perrhaebia for which he had brought 30 days of food and then later chose a route.

Nasia's force traveled the roughly 20 km to Heracleum to make a show of going to the fleet, picked up their cooked rations, and that night began their route through Perrhaebia (Plut.Aem.15.2). There were three potential routes for Nasica to get from Heracleum to Pythous. [Figure 5.29] The first route went southwest through Tempe and then turned northwest and entered Perrhaebia at the southern entrance to the central

541 Similar to his narrative of the Battle of Thermopylae in 191 BC, Plutarch gives an alternate account from Livy of the encircling mission and claims to rely on personal accounts that other historians had not used.
Perrhaebian plain. However, this route is just over 100 km and would have been very difficult to complete in the specified time.

The second route followed the track that the Macedonian garrison had taken in 169 BC from by Skotina to the Lake Ascuris district before continuing through the Karya plain to Pythous. This route was significantly shorter than the Tempe route, being less than 60 km, however this route still went through the rugged and heavily wooded north face of the foothills of Mt. Olympus.

However, there was a third route that offered a much less rugged passage between Pieria and Lake Ascuris to which the Romans had access due to their control of Tempe. Starting from Phila, the route ascends west to Charax and then continues northwest to Lake Ascuris, from where it then continues by the same route as the second potential route. [Figure 5.30] This route from Phila to Rapsani to Lake Ascuris is easy enough to today be a scenic hiking trail. Additionally, the Macedonian army at the Elpeus might have seen the Nasica's force setting off into the mountains, while they could not have seen any movement between Heracleum and Phila.

[Figure 5.31] Over the course of this night they ascended to Lake Ascuris and stopped at the western end of the lake.

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542 Supported by Leake 1835 III, p430; Kromayer 1907, p303. Pritchett 1969, p159 argues against this route.
543 Supported by Pritchett 1969, pp 159-160; Hammond & Walbank 1988, p545.
Livy reports that during the next day, while Nasica's force rested, Paullus attacked the Macedonian camp with light-armed troops to keep the king from "investigating the other projects" (L.44.35.16).\textsuperscript{544}

That night Nasica's force went west across the Karya plain, moved north to the northwest corner of the plain, and then crossed the low pass before stopping by the modern village of Olimpiada. At the end of this night's journey, Nasica's force had consumed the two days of cooked rations they had picked up at Heracleum and were now relying on their own prepared rations.

While Nasica's force rested the next day, Paullus again attacked the Macedonian camp with light-armed troops (L.44.35.21-22).

On this third night of their mission, Nasica's force was supposed to attack Pythous during the fourth watch, between 3am to 6am.\textsuperscript{545} This was only a roughly 12 km march, which would have allowed Nasica to surprise the garrison at Pythous before dawn. However, Livy's text breaks off here and we have only Plutarch's narrative for what happened, and Plutarch mentions no battle, focusing instead on Pythous' role in Xenagoras' measurement of Mt. Olympus. Plutarch's account has other anomalies, such as that Nasica marched from Heracleum to Pythous in one night (Plut.\textit{Aem.}15.8), an impossible journey.

\textsuperscript{544} Which is the opposite from Plutarch's account, in which Paullus keeps Perseus from suspecting an encircling maneuver by not attacking the Macedonian camp (16.1).

\textsuperscript{545} On the fourth watch being between 3 am and 6 am, see Hammond & Walbank 1988, p346.
The next day, while Nasica rested and presumably resupplied at Pythous, Paullus changed tactics and did not attack the Macedonian, but instead feigned a crossing of the Elpeus by the sea to hold Perseus' attention (L.44.35.23).\(^{546}\)

On the fourth night, Nasica marched roughly 25 km from Pythous to Petra where they successfully attacked the Macedonian garrison there. Plutarch reports that Polybius wrote that the Macedonians were asleep when the Romans attacked but that Nasica wrote that the Romans won a hard fought victory (Plut. 16.3). Plutarch and Livy differ in their reports of what Macedonians Nasica defeated. Livy had previously reported that the Perrhaebian guides had told Paullus that the pass was already protected, and that Perseus had sent 5000 troops to guard Petra and Pythous.\(^{547}\) However, Plutarch reports that while that Nasica was camped at Pythous a Cretan deserter told Perseus that the Romans were attempting this surrounding route (Plut. 16.1), and Perseus responded by sending 12,000 men to occupy the pass, a roughly 25 km march from the Macedonian camp. Either way, Nasica defeated a Macedonian garrison, forced the pass, and was now in the Pierian plain behind Perseus' camp on the Elpeus (Plut.\textit{Aem}.16.3).

\[\text{Figure 5.32}\] Once Perseus realized that the Romans had again gotten through the mountains and into the plain as they had the previous year, he retreated his position back towards Pydna (Plut.16.3-5; Z.9.23), as he had also done in the previous year. Zonaras reports that Perseus also saw the Roman fleet going north up the coast and that this factored into his decision to pull back to Pydna (Z.9.23). Perseus had to retreat to Pydna not because he was concerned that his camp at the Elpeus would be surrounded,

\(^{546}\) At this point in the narrative the text of Livy breaks off.
\(^{547}\) Zonaras also reports that the pass was already being occupied by a garrison (Zon.9.23).
but because Nasica and the fleet could each threaten his single line of supply through the Pydna bottleneck. Feeding more than 40,000 people required an enormous amount of food - on the order of 35 tons of grain a day. However, Perseus had stockpiled sufficient grain to feed an army this large for this campaign as well as for years to come (L.42.12.8; cp. Plut.\textit{Aem}.13.4). Perseus needed to protect his supply line through the Pydna bottleneck and thus immediately abandoned his impregnable position on the Elpeus when he thought Pydna to be threatened. Perseus' immediate abandonment of his position on the Elpeus was not cowardice but a swift and decisive strategic move.

Perseus moved from the Elpeus roughly 25 km north along the Pierian coast to the camp he had established the previous year, and perhaps even earlier, roughly 3.5 km south of Pydna and 2.5 km east of the modern village of Kitros. While this camp would have required a minimum of 330,000 m$^2$ at 7.5 m$^2$ per man, the larger the defensive works associated with the camp, the more that Perseus could block the bottleneck and make his position more impregnable. [\textbf{Figures 5.33 & 5.34}] As such, estimating Perseus' camp to have been the size of a double-consular Roman camp for approximately the same number of men seems reasonable, and would have then extended 1500 m by 750 m. Since Perseus promptly moved to this camp in 169 BC and in 168 BC when threatened, we should understand that Perseus had an established fortified camp there, as it already having a rampart and many towers built (L.44.39.8) would attest. This already prepared camp would have greatly aided the speed with which Perseus was able to reestablish his defensive position. Perseus was prepared to quickly march his troops north to his camp by Pydna should his supply line be threatened.
Perseus' camp by Pydna had the advantage over the camp at the Elpeus of having before it "a plain for his phalanx" (Plut.\textit{Aem}.16.8), as the phalanx needed a large flat plain, ideally 20 stades wide, to succeed (Plb.18). As shown on Figure 5.33, in front of the camp there was a flat plain 20 stades wide that ran northwest-southeast between the rolling hills to the west (Plut.\textit{Aem}.16.8) and the shore to the east. Plutarch mentions that two seasonal rivers ran through this area (Plut.\textit{Aem}.16.9), but a survey of the landscape shows that the rolling hills to the west channel seasonal streams from the high foothills of Mt. Olympus through this area that would have changed courses over time, making a definite identification of these rivers impossible, but confirming that this landscape accords with Plutarch's general description.

[Figure 5.32] Paullus did not attack the organized and efficient Macedonian retreat, but instead moved to rejoin with Nasica's forces (Plut.17.1). Paullus moved roughly 13 km northwest to the plain just north of the modern village of Vrontou and southwest of the modern village of Kondariotissa. After defeating the Macedonian garrison at Petra, Nasica continued east from Petra into Pieria and then turned north and to meet Paulus' army in the plain by Vrontou, covering a total of roughly 15 km. Paullus then took the rest of the day to allow Nasica's men to rest and to plan for the upcoming assault on Perseus' new encampment.

The next morning the Roman army marched northeast across the low rolling hills 20 km towards the Macedonian camp in roughly 4 hours, arriving in the heat of midday (L.44.36.1-2). [Figure 5.35] Perseus already had his phalanx drawn up in front of the camp (L.44.37.4, 44.38.5, 44.38.11; Plut.\textit{Aem}.17.2), and took advantage of the
topography and the direction of the Roman approach to align it at a northwest-southeast angle. The Romans approached from the southwest across the rolling hills to keep from walking directly into the phalanx and to stay on ground better fit for the maniples than the phalanx. Once the Romans were roughly 3.5 km west of the phalanx, they drew up into their battle formation (L.44.36.4-5) in a roughly north-south direction in the foothills. This was a strategic choice as it gave them two advantages: first, that they would be fighting downhill; and second, that lining up his army in these rolling hills meant that

Paullus had posted his forces in a position to which the phalanx could not be advanced, since even slightly unfavorable terrain makes a phalanx useless.

eo loco signa constituisset, quo phalanx, quam inutilem uel mediocris iniquitas loci efficeret, promoueri non posset.
(L.44.37.8)

Paullus managed to set up camp behind his troops to the west and withdraw into it and avoided battle that day, and Perseus made no attack while the Romans did this (L.44.36.6-8, 44.37.1-4, 11; Plut.Aem.17.5-6). Livy reports that Paullus gave an encomium to the Roman camp and explained to his officers the importance of securing food, water, and a palisade before committing to battle (L.44.38.5 - 44.39.5), which served to further emphasize how Paullus left nothing to chance and attempted to minimize risk at all times through continual careful logistical planning.

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548 Livy reports that at this point Nasica laments that if they did not attack immediately, they would have greater danger wandering about the wilderness chasing Perseus as previous leaders had done (L.44.36.10). This is reminiscent of Vilius' and Flamininus' choices at the Aous whether to take the more dangerous route or wander around in the wilderness after Philip as earlier leaders had done (L.32.6.3, 32.9.10), except that at Pydna delay leads to both choices from the Aous, i.e. danger and wandering.
The Battle of Pydna occurred the next day, which we know was June 21, 168 BC, as the previous evening there was an eclipse (L.44.37.5-9; Plut.Aem.17.7-9). Since Appian reports that it was fifteen days from when Paullus took over the army in the field to when he fought the battle of Pydna (App.Mac.19), we can determine a calendar of events for Paullus' activities in Pieria:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paullus' action</th>
<th>Days involved per action</th>
<th>Total days</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arrives in Thessaly</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>June 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moves to Phila</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>June 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutes military reforms</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>June 8-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moves to Elpeus</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>June 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News of Illyria arrives</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>June 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meets with guides</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>June 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Message to Oreus</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>June 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fleet to Heracleum</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>June 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nasica to Petra</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>June 15-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perseus retreats/ Romans join forces</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>June 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romans march to Perseus</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>June 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle of Pydna</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>June 21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Calendar of events for 168 BC campaign

This calendar of events makes clear that Paullus acted decisively and rapidly throughout these fifteen days, including instituting his military reforms in three days, and committing to Nasica's surrounding route only 8 days after arrival.

While we know what day the battle occurred, we have limited evidence with which to determine what actually happened in the battle. Neither army pressed for battle in the morning (L.44.37.10; Plut.Aem.17.12 - 18.1), and by the afternoon the sun

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549 See Briscoe 2012, pp 584-6 for discussion.
550 In contrast, Zonaras reports that after Paullus moved the Roman camp there was no fighting "for a good many days" (Z.9.23).
was no longer in the Romans' eyes (Plut. *Aem*. 17.13), meaning that the Roman line faced east from the Roman camp towards the Macedonian camp [Figure 5.36]. Late in the afternoon (L.44.52.9; Plut. *Aem*. 18.1), a small skirmish began across a seasonal river. Livy reports that a small number of Romans and Macedonian-allied Thracians began the fighting over a loose pack animal (L.44.40.7-9).

Plutarch acknowledges this same story, but gives an alternate account in which Paullus set loose a horse without a bridle to start the fighting (Plut. *Aem*. 18.1-2). [Figure 5.37] Paullus himself put up a relief at Delphi in 167 BC commemorating Pydna on which he clearly depicted a horse without a bridle in the middle of Roman and Macedonian soldiers. Paullus' self-presentation thus highlighted the role of this horse, perhaps a signifier of divine providence, as instrumental to his victory, rather than diligent preparation and focus on quotitian activities, such as are depicted on Trajan's column.

This is in sharp contrast to Livy's narrative that attributes Paullus' success to his methodical and careful preparation.

[Figure 5.35] The skirmish then escalated into a full-blown battle (L.44.40.7 - 44.52.6; Plut. *Aem*. 18.1 - 21.5), which the Romans won overwhelmingly (L.44.52.7-8; Plut. *Aem*. 21.6-7), in only an hour (Plut. *Aem*. 22.1). This was an incredibly short period of time for a battle involving so many men to both develop and be resolved and would

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551 Such undisciplined and reckless behavior by his allied troops would support Perseus' earlier reluctance to form further alliances to add more allies to his army.
552 For the Aemilius Paullus freize at Delphi, see Kähler 1965; Hammond & Walbank 1988, pp 613-7; Taylor 2016. Plutarch was a priest at Delphi 270 years later and one cannot shake the feeling that he was using this relief as a source for the events of the battle.
553 Perseus never even got to take advantage of his awesome anti-elephant troops (Zon.9.22).
not have allowed for time for changes of tactics or strategies, only disorganized conflict and slaughter. The Roman maniple was much better prepared for both disorganized conflict as well as gradual escalation of battle (Plb.18.31.12 - 18.32.5, 18.32.9-12), as seen previously at the Battle of Cynoscephalae. 554

The Macedonian army had been crushed, and with it, the Macedonian empire. All of Greece, Macedon, and Illyria was now in Roman control, should they choose to seize it.

**Conclusions**

In 198 BC, Philip encamped in the Aous valley in southern Illyria to force the Romans to deal with him there. The Romans had been advancing steadily eastward the past two years from the Adriatic coast into Macedonian territory and Philip acted to move the theater of war from Macedonian territory to Illyria.

In contrast, in 169 BC after the Romans had spent two years establishing control of northeastern Thessaly, Perseus encamped in Macedonian Pieria and sent out contingents to defend the Macedonian side of assorted routes into Macedon. Perseus and Philip both acted to defeat the Romans by encamping in unassailable locations, however, Philip had also managed to keep the war out of Macedon. In 171 BC, Rome had decided they were bringing the fight into Macedon and Perseus did not act to put that fight in a different place.

Like Flamininus at the Aous, Paullus showed up to a situation at a standstill and promptly forced the issue and won. The speed with which Paullus committed to actions,

554 See chapter 4 discussion.
e.g. getting to the army from Italy, moving the army into Pieria, committing to the surrounding route, and committing to the decisive battle, allowed Paullus to maintain the initiative and forced Perseus to always be reacting.

This chapter saw Rome open a new theater of war as well as a new policy for dealing with the defeated. Rather than leave Macedon intact in order to maintain the balance of power or to gain a client state, Rome reorganized the administrative structure of Macedon. Rome had imposed new administrative structures on peoples in Greece they had freed from someone else's control, as they had with the Thessalians, but had not done this to a people they had defeated. Rome's foreign policy in Greece after Pydna would prove to be distinctly different than it had been before.
CONCLUSION

This dissertation grapples with the period between 200 and 168 BC. Traditionally, this has been periodized into three wars: the Second Macedonian War (200 BC - 194 BC), the Syrian-Aetolian War (192 BC - 189 BC), and the Third Macedonian War (172 BC - 168 BC). Alternatively, some have viewed this as a single, unified period of Roman expansion governed by one policy.

The results of this study point to a new way to interpret this period, organized around two different but related concepts: theater of war and Roman policy. During the period from 200 to 168 BC the Romans operated in three distinct theaters of war. In turn, the transitions from one theater of war to the next coincide with the development of three distinct phases of Roman policy towards Greece, though as we have seen in one case the policy developed in response to the change in theater, and in the other the change in policy preceded the shift in theater of war by nearly two years.

The first theater of war was Illyria and within it were fought the campaigns of 200-198 BC, as dealt with in the first three chapters of this dissertation. The second theater of war, examined in Chapter 4, was Thessaly and remained so from the point when Flamininus crossed the Pindus into Thessaly in 198 BC all the way through the campaign in 170 BC. The third and final theater of war was Macedon, where the Romans fought during the 169 BC and 168 BC campaign seasons, as investigated in Chapter 5.

The three phases of Roman policy towards Greece and its surroundings can be defined in the following way. The first Roman policy was to protect the Illyrian ports and gradually extend the buffer zone to the east while waging a concurrent naval war
against Macedon in the Aegean. This concern with securing the Illyrian ports under Roman protection and establishing and extending an inland buffer zone around them continued a Roman policy seen since 229 BC in this region during the First and Second Illyrian Wars. The addition of naval campaigns in the Corinthian Gulf and Aegean Sea came about with the period of the First Macedonian War. The aspect that made Roman policy in 200 BC and 199 BC distinct was the use of a two-legion consular army to wage a land campaign extending the buffer zone east and then establishing a garrison at a natural boundary at the end of the campaign to demarcate how far Roman control extended. Following Philip, in 199 BC Sulpicius campaigned further east than his final garrison at Pelium, but notably did not invade Macedon when the opportunity presented itself. The 198 BC campaign was probably planned to extend Roman control either to Lynchnidus on the eastern side of Lake Ohrid or to Heracleia in western Pelagonia, fitting locations for garrisons at the next natural geographical boundary east between Macedon and Illyria. However, Philip acted to pull Roman attentions to the Illyrian border with Epirus to the south.

The second phase in Roman policy was brought about through the actions of Flamininus after the Battle of the River Aous. Flamininus crossed the Pindus into Thessaly, drawing the Romans into a new theater of war. As discussed at the end of Chapter 4, this was in no way inevitable and in fact was unexpected, as following in Sulpicius' footsteps would have made for a more direct route for invading Macedon or for continuing the policy of the two previous campaigns. This action on the part of Flamininus was not in line with Roman policy at the time he did it, however during the
winter of 198/197 BC, the senate voted for Flamininus to continue his war in Thessaly, sanctioning the new theater of war and signaling a new policy that would carry forward.

Rome did not already have extant economic or strategic concerns in Thessaly as they did on the Illyrian coast. No cities were already under Roman protection, no threats could be made on Roman trade, and thus Rome now chose to fight the Hellenistic kingdoms in the contested territory of Thessaly for control of Greece, and by proxy, Greek identity, the inheritance of Alexander the Great, and control of the Mediterranean world.

However, while Rome now fought to keep other powers from controlling Thessaly, Rome did not act to make Thessaly part of her own dominion. In 194 BC and then again in 190 BC, Rome pulled all troops out of Thessaly and Greece; there is a distinct difference between having influence from afar and maintaining armed garrisons. This second policy was focused on reducing the influence of each of the individual Hellenistic kingdoms, but then simply maintaining a balance of power in Greece and keeping any state from becoming too strong. The states Rome defeated were not eliminated but weakened and kept in place.

In 171 BC, Rome again returned to Greece and Thessaly, but this time with a new policy. Rome now for the first time planned to actually invade Macedon and permanently alter how it was administered. Rome spent two campaign years establishing their bridgehead in northeast Thessaly before mounting two successive similar campaigns and ultimately defeating the Macedonians at the Battle of Pydna. This third Roman policy looked towards future change in a way the other two had not - the previous two policies
had both acted to maintain some type of status quo in Greece, while this third policy looked to actively change it.

In Polybian terms, the first policy could have the prophasis that it was defensive and justified: protecting economic and strategic interests, and developing and then helping allies. There is basis here for a just war. The second policy could have a prophasis of first reducing the footholds of the Antigonid and Seleucid powers in Greece and then developing and helping allies. Rome is not acting defensively, but they are also not holding territory for themselves or acting to dismantle foreign powers. One could conceivably look to the divine honors given to Flamininus as an ex post facto moral defense of Rome's actions. The third policy, however, could only have a just prophasis on the basis of the perceived moral turpitude of Perseus and this could help explain his reputation as presented in our sources. Rome could not defend this invasion on other grounds.

My time spent traveling in Greece and seeing and studying the areas, landscapes, and locations discussed in this dissertation have taught me that autopsy is vitally important to the study of the ancient world. I have been continually amazed by our ancient authors' grasp of Greek topography and repeatedly surprised to find that something I had thought to be a narrative device was in fact an actual feature of the landscape.

There can be a tendency among scholars to see ancient narratives as merely collections of intertextual references with no basis in reality, e.g. seeing every surrounding maneuver as simply a reference to Herodotus' account of Thermopylae. It is
important to remember, however, that ancient authors are frequently referring to actual events and the actual landscape in which they occurred. That similar events recur can be exploited by an adept historiographer for narrative goals, but does not mean that such events did not happen.

For instance, the Battle of Pydna could be looked at as containing elements of all the previous Roman events from Hannibal and being some kind of summation event, a kind of closure for this 'first stage' of Roman expansion that contains the previous events within it: At Pydna, a surrounding maneuver forced the enemy to move from their impregnable position as the Romans had done at the Aous in 198 BC, Thermopylae in 191 BC, Vevi in 199 BC, Spain in 195 BC; At Pydna, the battle developed from a skirmish as at Cynoscephalae in 197 BC; the year before Pydna had the Romans lead a difficult crossing into enemy territory with such a train that it even involved elephants that did not lead to eventual victory because the enemy was able to stall them out like Hannibal's crossing to Italy in 218 BC; At Pydna the Romans changed the course of their history of warfare with the Macedonians by taking the war directly to the enemy's territory as the Romans had at Zama in 202 BC; the Battle of Pydna arose from skirmishes over a river as at Magnesia in 190 BC.

However, all the events of the Battle of Pydna align with the landscape in which it occurred and are all appropriate events for a major battle at this time. The historiographer could pick and choose elements from this to highlight to make what narrative points he wanted, but the events still happened.
I have been blinded by Thessalian fog near Cynoscephalae, been guided through obscure regions by local shepherds, and been turned back from high mountain passes closed by rock fall. I have seen the hill that Philip doubled up his phalanx to avoid at Cynoscephalae, gotten lost following Cato's route at Thermopylae where he too got lost, stood amid the ruins of Macedonian fort systems, and met people in the Pindus mountains that still identify with their Athamanian forbears. Traveling the routes and seeing the places described in the texts gets at the history buried inside the historiography.
FIGURES

Fig. 1.1

Fig. 1.2
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Fig. 3.13 (above)
Fig. 3.14 (below)
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Eastern of the two Macedonian Forts

Wall around Infantry barracks
Additional defensive works
Facing direction of Expected attack

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Fig. 3.23 (above); Fig. 3.24 (below)

Fortification Wall with Archaeologist Ina Myrtollari for scale
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Fig. 4.2 (above); Fig. 4.3 (below)
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Area devastated by Philip

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Fig. 4.32 (above)
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Fig. 4.34 (above)
Areas declared free in 196 BC

Fig. 4.35 (below)
Antiochus 192 BC campaign
Fig. 4.36 (above)
Fig. 4.37 (below)
Antiochus, Aetolian, and Athamanian Campaigns in 191 BC

Cities listed in Livy’s account of Antiochus’ 191 BC Campaign, not taking into account the additional cities mentioned in the account of the Roman campaign.

Fig. 4.38 (above)
Fig. 4.39 (below)
Roman reprisal campaign part 1 against Antiochus, Aetolian, and Athamanian Campaigns in 191 BC

Fig. 4.40 (above)
Fig. 4.41 (below)
Fig. 4.44 (above)
Fig. 4.45 (below)
Fig. 4.46 (above)
Fig. 4.47 (below)
Fig. 4.48 (above); Fig. 4.49 (below)
Fig. 4.52 (above)
Fig. 4.53 (below)
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Fig. 4.56 (above); Fig. 4.57 (below)
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Fig. 5.6 (above)
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The pass between Lake Ascuris and The Pierian coast

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The pass between Lake Ascuris and The Pierian coast

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Fig. 5.28 (above)  
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View from Paullus’ camp towards Perseus’ camp to the east

Frieze from Aemilius Paullus monument at Delphi
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