The Satrap Of Western Anatolia And The Greeks

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Abstract
This dissertation explores the extent to which Persian policies in the western satrapies originated from the provincial capitals in the Anatolian periphery rather than from the royal centers in the Persian heartland in the fifth century BC. I begin by establishing that the Persian administrative apparatus was a product of a grand reform initiated by Darius I, which was aimed at producing a more uniform and centralized administrative infrastructure. In the following chapter I show that the provincial administration was embedded with chancellors, scribes, secretaries and military personnel of royal status and that the satrapies were periodically inspected by the Persian King or his loyal agents, which allowed to central authorities to monitor the provinces. In chapter three I delineate the extent of satrapal authority, responsibility and resources, and conclude that the satraps were supplied with considerable resources which enabled to fulfill the duties of their office. After the power dynamic between the Great Persian King and his provincial governors and the nature of the office of satrap has been analyzed, I begin a diachronic scrutiny of Greco-Persian interactions in the fifth century BC. Chapter four centers on a particular challenge the Persians faced in western Anatolia. On the one hand, the Persian conquest of Ionia in the middle of the sixth century BC triggered a gradual increase in the willingness of mainland Greeks to intervene in the affairs of Asia Minor, while on the other, Xerxes’ failure to subjugate European Greece resulted in a dramatic shift from a policy of westward expansion to a policy of entrenchment. The focus of chapter five is the limited interest of Artaxerxes I (r. 465-423 BC) in respect to the western satrapies. The last chapter deals with the machinations of the satraps Tissaphernes, Pharnabazus and Cyrus the Younger. I show that the alliance between Persia and Sparta was the outcome of satrapal action rather than royal initiative or intent. Accordingly, the satraps sought to exploit the power struggle between Athens and Sparta for their own favor while King Darius played a relatively secondary role in this conflict.

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THE SATRAPS OF WESTERN ANATOLIA AND THE GREEKS

Eyal Meyer

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in

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Eyal Meyer
To my parents
ABSTRACT

THE SATRAPS OF WESTERN ANATOLIA AND THE GREEKS

Eyal Meyer

Jeremy McInerney

This dissertation explores the extent to which Persian policies in the western satrapies originated from the provincial capitals in the Anatolian periphery rather than from the royal centers in the Persian heartland in the fifth century BC. I begin by establishing that the Persian administrative apparatus was a product of a grand reform initiated by Darius I, which was aimed at producing a more uniform and centralized administrative infrastructure. In the following chapter I show that the provincial administration was embedded with chancellors, scribes, secretaries and military personnel of royal status and that the satrapies were periodically inspected by the Persian King or his loyal agents, which allowed to central authorities to monitory the provinces. In chapter three I delineate the extent of satrapal authority, responsibility and resources, and conclude that the satraps were supplied with considerable resources which enabled to fulfill the duties of their office. After the power dynamic between the Great Persian King and his provincial governors and the nature of the office of satrap has been analyzed, I begin a diachronic scrutiny of Greco-Persian interactions in the fifth century BC. Chapter four centers on a particular challenge the Persians faced in western Anatolia. On the one hand, the Persian conquest of Ionia in the middle of the sixth century BC triggered a gradual increase in the willingness of mainland Greeks to intervene in the affairs of Asia Minor, while on the other, Xerxes’ failure to subjugate European Greece resulted in a dramatic shift from a policy of westward expansion to a policy of entrenchment. The focus of chapter five is the limited interest of Artaxerxes I (r. 465-423 BC) in respect to the western satrapies. The last chapter deals with the machinations of the satraps Tissaphernes, Pharnabazus and Cyrus the Younger. I show that the alliance between Persia and Sparta was the outcome of satrapal action rather than royal initiative or intent. Accordingly, the satraps sought to exploit the power struggle between Athens and Sparta for their own favor while King Darius played a relatively secondary role in this conflict.
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BM  British Museum (siglum for tablets in the British Museum)


FGrH  Fragmente der griechischen Historiker

IG  Inscriptiones Graecae, Berlin 1893-.


PBerlin  Berlin Papyri


SEG  Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum.


VS  Vorderasiatisches Museum (Berlin)


INTRODUCTION

The encounter of the ancient Greeks with the Achaemenid Persian Empire had an enduring effect on the trajectories of Greek and Persian histories and their legacies. From the middle of the sixth century BC, following the Persian conquest of the Greek city-states of Asia Minor, the Greeks interacted, collaborated and at times waged war against the Persians. But while Greco-Persian relations have been explored from as early as the 19th century, our knowledge on the history of ancient Persia has improved dramatically only in recent decades. This most welcome achievement occurred primarily due to the Achaemenid History Workshop series, which began in the early 1980s and centered on various facets of the Persian Empire. The overarching goal of this scholarly effort was to adopt an interdisciplinary approach to the study of Achaemenid Persia instead of the predominantly Greek-centered approach. Consequently, distinguished scholars from various fields of study, e.g. Assyriology, Egyptology, archaeology, Biblical studies, and more, have broadened and deepened our understanding of the history, economy, administrative mechanism, ideology, along with numerous other aspects and themes of the history of ancient Persia.

The Misconception

But despite the outstanding work that has been done, a vast majority of seminal studies on Greco-Persian relations were produced at a time when our knowledge on the nature and character of the Persian Empire was incomplete. As a result, a particular misconception gained prominence in Achaemenid studies, whose origin can be traced back to the biased ancient Greek literary traditions. It is widely held that the Great Persian Kings were the driving force behind instances in which the Persians intervened in Greek affairs, both in Asia Minor and mainland Greece. This assumption, however, fails to take into consideration the nature of the Persian administrative mechanism and is predicated on a faulty understanding of the attitude of the Achaemenid Kings toward the western periphery of their Empire. On the one hand, the considerable reliance on the comparatively abundant literary sources, which originated almost exclusively from the Greek world, has obscured the fact that the western provinces of Asia Minor constituted a relatively unimportant frontier region, situated on the most western edges of the Persian Empire. On the other hand, Persian royal ideology, as articulated in royal inscriptions commissioned by the Persian Kings and put on display in Achaemenid royal capitals, demonstrates that the Persian Kings’ interest in the regions beyond the Persian heartland was limited to and centered on the demand for unquestioned obedience and tribute. Albeit these shortcomings,

the above mentioned misconception continues to function as an underlying assumption in numerous studies concerned with Greco-Persian relations, and as such has facilitated the production of inaccurate interpretations of the motives, aims, and interests of the Persian Kings and their officials in western Anatolia.

The Aim
Consequently, the present study endeavors to challenge and correct this misconception and to offer a reappraisal of Greco-Persian relations in the fifth century BC. In order to do so I suggest a different model for the power-dynamics between the Great Persian Kings and their satraps. While the relations between the Persians and their subject nations had been thoroughly explored,² the extent of satrapal independence has been acknowledged but has yet to be systematically studied.³ Accordingly, my primary goal is to explore and assess the extent to which Persian policies in the western satrapies originated from the satrapal capitals in the Anatolian periphery rather than from the royal centers in the Persian heartland.

The Model
The model offered herein assumes that the satraps of western Anatolia had the prerogative to effect foreign policy as long as it acted in accordance with the interest of the Great Persian King. The satraps are envisioned as much more than obedient and unimaginative administrators who blindly followed royal directives. On the contrary, those appointed by the Persian King to administer the provinces were ambitious members of the Persian elite who wielded great power, economically and militarily, and sought to win over and maintain the King’s favor while promoting their own interests. The Great Persian Kings, on their part, were far from indifferent in respect to the state of affairs in the provinces. As we shall see, royal intervention, i.e. a scenario in which the Great King actively directed the particulars of a certain action, occurred when the satrapal authorities proved to be inadequate or incapable of solving a particular problem. Royal directives issued by the Great King were to be followed without hesitation. But royal decrees, more often than not, did not always specify the manner in which the Great King wanted a certain issue to be resolved. The scenario in which a certain satrap received orders which entailed specific aims but empowered the satrap to figure out how to accomplish his mission had been termed by Waters as ‘applied royal directive’.⁴ This term can be used to explain independent satrapal conduct at times when a royal directive was issued. Therefore, satrapal initiatives could occur whether a royal decree was issued or not. Therefore, as long as the tribute kept flowing and the King’s authority remained unchallenged, the satraps enjoyed considerable leeway which enabled them to act independently.

The Approach
In order to substantiate the suggested model for King-satrap relations, I apply a novel approach, one which places the satraps and their own particular viewpoint at the center. Such an approach allows us to differentiate the satraps’ viewpoint from that of the Great

⁴ Waters 2010.
King instead of treating them as similar if not identical. The view from the satrapal seats at Sardis and Dascylium was very different from that of the royal court at Susa and Persepolis. We should not forget that the Great Persian King ruled a gigantic kingdom which stretched from the Indus Valley to western Asia Minor. The Persian Kings must have been preoccupied with problems in other parts of their vast empire which were not recorded by the ancient sources, and their attitude to events which occurred in the western fringes of his vast domains was almost certainly different than that of officials who governed these regions. It cannot be denied that the satraps shared similar goals with the Persian central authorities, i.e. the Great King and those at the royal court who advised him on matters of policy and strategy. Still, the local circumstances of each satrapy must have created particular challenges which with the satraps had to grapple. Nevertheless, the Great King had presumably little interest in or patience for a satrap who failed to fulfill his duties, regardless of the conditions of his office.

The Western Satrapies
The validity of the suggested model is demonstrated by a thorough analysis of the conduct of the satraps of western Anatolia in the fifth century BC. The Persian governors of the western satrapies, i.e. Lydia and Hellespontine Phrygia, had to cope with a particular challenge. While western Anatolia was situated on the western fringes of the vast Persian Empire, its coastal districts were inhabited by subject Greek communities which shared a bond of kinship with the dwellers of mainland Greece. Interestingly, the ties of kinship between the Asiatic and European Greeks were the main cause, or justification, for interventions of the latter in the affairs of western Anatolia, which undermined Persian authority in the region. As a result, the Persian governors of the western satrapies were expected to fulfill their satrapal duties while containing incursions staged by mainland Greeks with minimal support from the relatively unconcerned central authorities. Such particular geopolitical circumstances encouraged and at times forced the satraps to become more proactive by formulating and executing policies which were either independent or elaborations of Persian royal policies. In essence, the distinct conditions of western Anatolia provide us with an ideal case-study to examine King-satrap relations and the extent of satrapal independence.

The Chronological Timeframe
The chronological purview of the present study spans from the foundation of the Persian Empire by Cyrus the Elder to the end of the Peloponnesian War in 404 BC. Since the first three chapters endeavor to delineate and define satrapal prerogatives and royal supervision over the satrapies, it became necessary to utilize traditions which recount the history of the Persian Empire from its inception. The decision to end the discussion in 404 BC stems from the design to demonstrate a continuation in the attitude of the Persian central authorities toward the western satrapies throughout the fifth century BC. Accordingly, the last three chapters are devoted to the reign of a specific Achaemenid King, namely Xerxes, Artaxerxes I, and Darius II. I argue that the failed attempt to subjugate mainland Greece led Xerxes and his two immediate successors to abandon Persian imperialistic aspirations in the west, a strategic decision which had a profound impact on the conditions in which the satraps of western Anatolia operated. But the attempt of Cyrus the Younger to seize the throne in 401 BC must have triggered a change in the attitude of Artaxerxes II toward the
western satrapies. Therefore, since the rebellion of Cyrus constitutes an internal Persian affairs which was not the product of the circumstances in western Anatolia, I decided to end the present study before this watershed moment in Achaemenid history. Even still, I do draw on events and episodes which fall well outside the stated chronological scope, but it is done only in instances in which the particular historical context of the fourth century is not dominant.

**The Sources**
The formidable source problem with which modern historians of the Achaemenid Empire cope should also be addressed. Since there is no extant continuous Persian historical narrative, if such ever existed, we are compelled to rely on other imperfect categories of evidence. A good number inscriptions, which were commissioned by the Achaemenid Kings and inscribed in Old-Persian, Elamite, and Akkadian, have been preserved. In addition, we have at our disposal a rich archeological data, which derives primarily from the palatial complexes at Susa, Persepolis, Pasargadae, Ecbatana, and the royal necropolis at Naqsh-i Rustam. On the one hand, the Achaemenid royal proclamations, palaces, and awe-inspiring tombs constitute an invaluable source on Persian royal ideology. On the other hand, there is little that that these monuments were used by the Achaemenid Kings as a medium to disseminate royal propaganda. Therefore, we have to be cautious when mining them for information. Furthermore, the available Achaemenid epigraphic record as well as the relevant archeological discoveries reveal very little on satrapal prerogatives or King-satrap relation.

The discovery of thousands of clay tablets inscribed in Elamite and Aramaic, better known as the Persepolis Fortification and Treasury, has enabled the reconstruction of Achaemenid imperial institutions, protocols, and practices, including the office of satrap. The knowledge contained by the administrative documents found in Persepolis is supplemented by additional private archives discovered in Babylonia, namely in the cities of Babylon, Nippur, Sippar, and Borsippa, as well as papyri in Aramaic from Egypt, especially the documents discovered at the site of the Jewish garrison of Elephantine. While these documents, which record commercial transactions, allocation of resources, and various other administrative interactions, reveal that the Persian imperial administration exercised a high degree of control over the provincial periphery and as such are indispensable for a better understanding of the interaction between the Persian authorities, royal and satrapal, with the subject peoples, they offer little information on the extent of satrapal authority and independence.

The biblical sources are also a useful source for Ancient Persia. The books of Ezra, Nehemiah, I Esdras, Haggai, and Zechariah cover a considerable period of Persian dominance in ancient Yehud. Accordingly, these sources allow us to learn how the Persians were perceived by the Jewish community of Yehud and the manner in which the local ruling class interacted with the Persian King and his representatives. But while the satraps are mentioned on several occasions, the information that can be gleaned on their relations with the Persian central authorities is fairly limited.

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5 For a succinct survey of the extant sources on the Achaemenid Persian Empire, see: Wiesehöfer 1996, 7–28.
The Greek sources are by far the primary literary source on the Persian Empire. But the image of the Persians in the ancient Greek traditions is predicted on prejudice, lack of knowledge, and numerous misconceptions. Even the meaning of the term ‘satrap’ varies from one source to the other, which underlines the limited knowledge of the ancient Greeks when it came to Persian customs, traditions, and institutions. But despite these shortcomings, any scholar who takes upon himself to study the history of Achaemenid Persia is compelled to base his reconstruction on the testimony of the ancient Greeks. Therefore, I follow Briant who suggests that “in reading the classical authors, we must distinguish the Greek interpretative coating from the Achaemenid nugget of information.”

But when seeking those nuggets of information, one must be cautious. In some cases the information provided by the Greek sources is partially corroborated by non-Greek accounts. But the similarities should not overshadow the differences, and it is necessary to carefully evaluate not only the extent to which the Greek account constitutes a distorted version of its Near-Eastern parallel but also the biases and limitations of the Near-Eastern source itself. When an episode which is recounted by the Greek sources cannot be corroborated by a non-Greek parallel, several factors must be taken into consideration: (1) the subject matter of the discussed episode, (2) the temporal proximity of the author to the event which he recounts, (3) the manner in which the author could have obtained knowledge on Persian matters, and (4) how the particular perspective and biases of the author may have distorted his account. For instance, Herodotus may have conversed with several witnesses who shared their own knowledge on Persian matters, while Xenophon had the opportunity to learn much about Persian institutions and customs when he accompanied the pretender Cyrus the Younger. But both authors provide extensive and fanciful accounts on the upbringing, rise to power, and reign of Cyrus the Elder. Therefore, it seems best to assess the historicity of any given episode on the basis of the aforementioned considerations and to adopt a minimalistic interpretation when the account seems probable but external validation is lacking. Fortunately, since I focus on the western satrapies, the information that can be gleaned from the biased Greek sources on the deeds and exploits of the satraps of Lydia and Hellespontine Phrygia is considerably more reliable and could be validated, in some case, by non-Greek traditions.

It should also be noted that the Greek authors show a general tendency to ascribe agency to the Great Persian Kings whenever the Persians assumed an active role in the events which they recounted. The ancient Greeks, mainly due to their Hellenocentric perspective and limited understanding of the power dynamics between the Great King and the satraps presupposed that any Persian action was the outcome of a royal directive. Therefore, it is imperative, on the one hand, to tread carefully when consulting the Greek traditions and to be mindful of the agendas, biases, and intentions of each Greek author as well as the historical, political, and cultural contexts in which he composed his account on Persian affairs. On the other, when the King is mentioned, one must examine the evidence.

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6 On the various terms employed by the ancient Greek authors to designate the satraps, see: Schmitt 1976, 379–83; Weiskopf 1982, 5–12; Petit 1990, 15–20; Tuplin 1987a, 114 with n. 22; Klinkott 2005, 28–37; Dusinberre 2013, 34–35.
7 Briant 2002, 256. For a more cautious view, see: Harrison 2011, 19-37.
available to discern whether the King is mentioned since he was actually involved in the discussed episode or because the Greek author assumed that he was.

Summary
I begin by establishing that the Persian administrative apparatus was a product of a grand reform initiated by Darius I. This massive overhaul of the imperial administration, I argue, was a response to the chaos which engulfed the Persian Empire in the early years of Darius’ reign and was aimed at producing a more uniform and centralized administrative infrastructure. The new measures applied by Darius had a profound impact on the power dynamics between the Great King and his satraps, since the aforementioned reforms were also aimed at ensuring satrapal fidelity.

In the following chapter I demonstrate that the Persian central authorities invested considerable resources and manpower in monitoring the satrapies. The Great Persian King kept a close eye on the state of affairs in the provinces through various means, e.g. the presence of military and civic officials of royal status in the satrapal courts and key strategic locations, regular inspections of the satrapies by the King or one of his trustworthy agents, and a network of royal informants. These measures facilitated a flow of reliable information from the provinces to the royal court regarding the security and welfare of the satrapies and allowed to Persian King to know whether royal directives were followed or not. The royal mechanism of provincial supervision enabled early detection of any signs of insubordination not only among the subject nations but also among the satraps.

In chapter three I delineate the extent of satrapal authority, responsibility, and resources. The overarching aim of the chapter is to obtain a better understanding of the Great King’s expectations of his provincial governors and the categories by which satrapal performance was evaluated. By establishing the standard point of reference by which satrapal conduct can be compared and assessed, we can explain (1) why a certain satrap preferred a specific course of action or policy over another and (2) why the consequences of such actions were perceived as failure or success by the Persian royal authorities. In essence, I conclude that a satrap who wanted to garner and preserve royal favor had to maintain the peace, protect the King’s land, keep the tribute flowing, and pay the soldiers and administrators serving in his domain. In order to fulfill these duties, the satraps were furnished with considerable financial resources in addition to substantial civic and military manpower.

After the power dynamic between the Great Persian King and his provincial governors and the nature of the office of satrap have been analyzed, I begin a diachronic scrutiny of Greco-Persian interactions in the fifth century BC. Chapter four centers on two opposing processes which produced a particular challenge to Persian rule in the western satrapies. On the one hand, the Persian conquest of Ionia in the middle of the sixth century BC triggered a gradual increase in the willingness of mainland Greeks to intervene in the affairs of Asia Minor on behalf of their Ionian brethren. On the other hand, Xerxes’ failure to subjugate European Greece resulted in a dramatic shift from a policy of westward expansion to a policy of entrenchment. Consequently, the satraps of western Anatolia were expected to fulfill their satrapal duties while grappling with incursions staged by mainland Greeks with minimal support from the disinterested Persian central authorities.
The focus of chapter five revolves around the continuation of the Achaemenid royal policy of disengagement in respect to the state of affairs in the west during the reign of Artaxerxes I (r. 465-423 BC). The limited nature of the Great King’s responses to the Athenian involvement in the Egyptian uprising and Cimon’s Cypriot campaign demonstrates that Artaxerxes’ interest in western Anatolia continued to be confined to the issues of peace and tribute. Moreover, I argue that the conclusion of the peace treaty between Athens and Persia in 449 BC (the so-called Peace of Callias), which is envisioned as an unofficial agreement, resulted in a modus vivendi in western Anatolia. The truce between the Great Persian King and the Athenians endured throughout the reign of Artaxerxes I, albeit the attempts of Pissuthnes, the satrap of Lydia, to exploit political rivalries in several Ionian city-states to increase his influence, and small scale Athenian incursions.

In the sixth and final chapter I argue that the detachment of the Persian royal authorities from the affairs of western Anatolia in the reigns of Xerxes and Artaxerxes I provided the satraps with considerable leeway to formulate and execute policies which were either independent or elaborations of Persian royal policies. I maintain that the limited scope of Persian royal interventions in Greek affairs serves as an indication that King Darius II, just like his predecessors, was unconcerned in regard to the western frontier of his empire. Accordingly, I demonstrate that the machinations of the satraps Tissaphernes, Pharnabazus and Cyrus the Younger, who inserted themselves into Greek politics by promising to provide financial assistance to the Peloponnesians in their war against the Athenians, were satrapal initiatives through and through.
1. THE REFORMS OF DARIUS I

The Achaemenid Empire came into existence through the conquests of Cyrus the Great. The ancient sources, however, name Darius I, son of Hystaspes, as the great reformer who consolidated the Empire and devised its administrative apparatus. But this grand reform occurred only after Darius eliminated his immediate rival Gaumāta, whether the true brother of Cambyses or not, and ruthlessly suppressed numerous rebellions in the core regions of the empire. In what follows I demonstrate that the massive overhaul of the imperial mechanisms was the outcome of Darius’ struggle for supremacy and that it had a profound impact on the power dynamics between the Great King and his satraps. More importantly, I argue that this pivotal and tumultuous period shaped and molded the nature and character of satrapal responsibilities and prerogatives.

1.1 The Main Sources

The Account of Herodotus

The main source for the measures and regulations enacted by Darius is Herodotus. The Halicarnassian historian ascribes the establishment of the imperial tributary system and satrapal division to Darius, claiming that under Cyrus and Cambyses there had been no fixed assessment of tribute. He then provides what seems to be a catalogue of satrapies coupled with the enumeration of the annual tribute of each unit. There are, however, many discrepancies between the Herodotean catalogue and the list of tributary peoples in Darius’ Bisitun inscription. Therefore, the reliability of Herodotus’ Persian sources is at least questionable. It has been suggested that Herodotus derived his information directly from a written text of the Bisitun inscription rather than an oral tradition. This postulation

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9 Hdt. 3.89.1-2.

10 Hdt. 3.88-97. It is widely held that Herodotus provides a list which represents a fiscal division into tributary or taxation districts rather than political units. See: Toynbee 1954, 583–84; Hornblower 1982, 19 n. 108; Graf 1985, 86–87; Balcer 1988, 1–2; Balcer 1989, 4; Stolper 1989b, 293; Descat 1989a, 79–80. In contrast, Cook (1983, 77–81) assumes that the Herodotean catalogue contains satrapies in a political rather than a fiscal sense.

11 DB §6/1.12-17. For a comparison between Herodotus’ catalogue of satrapies and the Lists of peoples in Achaemenid royal inscriptions, see: Asheri, Lloyd, and Corcella 2007, 538–9 with references to previous scholarly discussions.


is at least possible since copies of Achaemenid royal inscriptions were certainly in circulation, as we know of two Neo-Babylonian copies of the Bisitun inscription that were discovered on stelae in Babylon along with two fragmented Aramaic copies which were found in the Jewish military colony of Elephantine in Egypt. Nevertheless, due to the aforementioned discrepancies it is more likely that Herodotus obtained the information recounted in the Bisitun inscription indirectly, relying on oral traditions conveyed by informants who had access to official Achaemenid documents. A Persian exile named Zopyrus might have constituted such a valuable source. This Zopyrus was the son of Megabyzus, the Persian general who defeated the Athenians in Egypt, and grandson of another Zopyrus, who aided Darius in his recapture of Babylon. The younger Zopyrus, as reported by Herodotus, fled to Athens, probably because he had joined his father’s rebellion against Artaxerxes I. If a high ranking member of the Persian elite such as Zopyrus was willing to share his own experience and knowledge with Herodotus, it probably enhanced Herodotus’ accuracy in regard to Persian matters, assuming that Herodotus’ critical capacity drove him to utilize all of the available sources to produce a more reliable account of Darius’ rise.

The Account of Darius in Bisitun
In any case, the office of satrap was not an innovation of Darius but preceded his accession. Two satraps are mentioned in the Bisitun inscription, and the overall impression is that these officials were already in office when Darius seized the throne, and had dutifully followed Darius’ directives in squashing the many uprisings against Persian rule. We are also informed that Hystaspes, the father of Darius, suppressed a revolt in Parthia, and it is possible that his actions against the rebel forces were probably because of his capacity as the satrap of the region. This assumption is partially corroborated by Herodotus, who states that when Darius joined the conspiracy against the Magi, Hystaspes was the ὑπαρχως of Persis, a designation which, in this instance, denotes a satrap. Similarly, Nicolaus of Damascus, who probably derived his information regarding Eastern affairs from the

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14 For the copy of the Bisitun inscription found in the form of a fragmentary stele in Babylon, see: Seidl 1999. For the Aramaic copy found in Elephantine, see: Greenfield and Porten 1982. The wide circulation of the text of Bisitun inscription is noted by Darius himself (BD §70), who says that the text of the inscription was copied onto clay tablets and parchment for the purpose of distribution. Shortly before (BD §60-61) Darius encourages his reader to spread the content of the inscription among his subjects.
15 Balcer 1987, 22; Briant 2002, 896; Tuplin 2005, 236 with n. 47.
16 Thuc. 1.109.3-4.
17 Hdt. 3.150-159.
18 Hdt. 3.160.
19 Ctes. FGrH 688 F14 §45.
20 Burn (1984, 109) believes that Zopyrus was Herodotus’ main source for Persian affairs.
21 For a recent assessment of Herodotus’ account on Persian matters, see: S. R. West 2011; Rollinger 2012.
22 DB §38/3.13-14 (Dādarshi, the satrap of Bactria); DB §45/3.55-6 (Vivanā, the satrap of Arachosia).
23 DB §35/2.92-8.
account of Ctesias,\textsuperscript{26} states that Cyrus appointed Darius’ father, whose name was Artadates, as the satrap of all the Persians.\textsuperscript{27} In addition, Herodotus names two additional satraps who were appointed by Darius’ predecessors, Oroites, the satrap of Lydia, who was appointed by Cyrus,\textsuperscript{28} and Aryandes, the satrap of Egypt, who was appointed by Cambyses.\textsuperscript{29} Therefore, it seems almost certain that the office of satrap was not an innovation of Darius but predated his rise to power.

1.2 The Reformation of the Tributary System

Darius’ Primacy

Darius’ primacy in the establishment of the imperial tributary system is asserted by a slew of ancient sources.\textsuperscript{30} As mentioned above, Herodotus claims that Darius was the first to exact tribute according to a fixed assessment.\textsuperscript{31} Polycitus of Larissa, a historian who flourished in the fourth century BC, states that Darius was the first to exact tribute.\textsuperscript{32} According to Plato, it was Darius who divided the Achaemenid Empire into seven parts and regulated the collection of tribute.\textsuperscript{33} Similarly, Polyaenus claims that Darius was the first Great King to impose taxes on the subject nations and casts Darius as a moderate and just monarch who, after the taxes had been collected by the satraps, gave back half of the sum to his subjects.\textsuperscript{34} Lastly, according to the \textit{Chronicon Paschale}, a work dated to the first half of the seventh century AD, Darius was the first to impose tribute.\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{26} Cf. Jacoby 1926, 251; Wacholder 1962, 67; Drews 1974, 391; Bigwood 1976, 5 with n. 17; Bigwood 1980, 196 n. 9; Stronk 2007, 29–31; Stronk 2010, 73–84.

\textsuperscript{27} Nic. Dam. \textit{FGrH} 90 F66 §10.

\textsuperscript{28} Hdt. 3.120.1.

\textsuperscript{29} Hdt. 4.166.1.

\textsuperscript{30} The terminology used in Greek sources for tribute is somewhat nuanced. The term φόρος denotes tribute paid by subjects (as a collective) to a ruling state which constitutes an acknowledgment of submission. The designation δασμός signifies a compulsory payment, e.g. taxes, which was usually imposed by a certain authority upon individuals for public purposes. ταγή should be understood as a stipulated amount which is to be delivered. The Old-Persian term for tribute is \textit{baji}, which is defined by Sancisi-Weerdenburg (1998, 23) as the ‘King’s share’, a definition which comprises (1) taxes for the maintenance of Persian officials and garrisons in the satrapies and (2) tribute and gifts, which were addressed to the Great King. Waters (2014, 99) adds that tribute may include additional elements such as troop levies for satrapal or royal armies.

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\textsuperscript{32} \textit{FGrH} 128 F3a [=Strabo 15.3.21]: τὸν δὲ διατάξαντα τοὺς φόρους Δαρείου ἔλαβε. Polycitus also provides an elaborate description of the ways in which the Achaemenids stored the collected revenues.

\textsuperscript{33} Pl. \textit{Leg.} 696c–d: καὶ τὸν τοῦ Κύρου δασμόν, ὥν ὅσον ἐπηκεῖτο Πέρσαις, εἰς τὸν νόμον ἐνέδρα. Plato adds that Cyrus had made a promise to regulate the tributary system but apparently failed to fulfill his promise. Thus, I agree with Tuplin (1987a, 140) who states that in spite of the fact that Plato is not as explicit as Herodotus, he implies that Darius was responsible for the first tribute assessment in the history of the Persian Empire.

\textsuperscript{34} Polyaen. \textit{Strat.} 7.11.3. A similar tradition is recorded by Plutarch (\textit{Mor.} 172f), who claims that Darius summoned the senior officials in the provinces (τοῖς πρῶτοις τῶν ἐπαρχῶν), presumably the satraps, and asked them whether his tribute assessment was fair. After they replied that it was a moderate demand, he asked them to reduce it by half.

\textsuperscript{35} \textit{Chronicon Paschale} [=Dindorf 1832, I 272]: Δαρείος φόρους ἔταξεν τοῖς ὑπηκόοις πρτόρος.
The Contribution of Darius’ Predecessors: Cyrus the Great

In spite of the dominant tradition which claims that Darius was the first to impose tribute, there is considerable evidence that a tributary system existed under Cyrus. In the famous Cyrus Cylinder, the founder of the Achaemenid Empire claims that while in Babylon he received tribute from the kings of all the subject nations, and as such indicates that a tributary system was in effect before the reign of Darius. But a different interpretation can be made in respect to Cyrus’ claim when taking into consideration the Babylonian context. For instance, Harmatta points out that the royal protocol employed by Cyrus and the titles he claims for himself rely heavily on the traditions and royal ideology of his Babylonian predecessors, especially Ashurbanipal. Moreover, Kuhrt maintains that the physical shape, the literary genre of Mesopotamian building text and the tradition of royal inscriptions, all position the Cyrus Cylinder well within Babylonian tradition. Accordingly, Tuplin convincingly argues that Cyrus presented himself as the king of Babylon, and that his demand for universal acknowledgment, which was articulated through the payment of tribute, followed a preexisting Mesopotamian tradition.

Another source which attributes such a system to Cyrus is Xenophon. The Athenian historian credits Cyrus not only with the establishment of the tributary system but also with the appointment of satraps and garrison commanders, the setting of customary etiquette of both royal and satrapal courts, the institution of a royal inspection service and the establishment of the famous relay postal service. To ward off any doubts that Cyrus was the founder of the Achaemenid imperial apparatus, Xenophon declares time and again that the numerous institutions and regulations which were established by Cyrus were still in effect in his own time. In spite of Xenophon’s confidence regarding the role of Cyrus in the establishment of the various imperial institutions, his claim is probably far from accurate. First of all, Xenophon himself reluctantly acknowledges the possibility that the sources which claim that the present regulations go all the way back to Cyrus might be

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36 The Achaemenid taxation and tribute system, of course, was not an ex nihilo creation, but rather relied heavily on preexisting Near Eastern traditions and practices. On the forms of taxation the Persians inherited from their imperial predecessors, see: Zaccagnini 1989a; Zaccagnini 1989b.


38 Ehtécham 1946, 92.

39 Harmatta 1971.


41 Tuplin 1987a, 140.

42 Xen. Cyr. 8.6.1-16. It should be added that Xenophon (Cyr. 8.1.9.) states that Cyrus appointed the tax-collectors as well.

43 Reisert (2009, 307–8) compiled a catalogue of Achaemenid institutions and practices which Xenophon claims to have been innovations of Cyrus the Elder and endured until his own days: the equipment of the Persian cavalry (Cyr. 7.1.46); the usage of scythe-bearing chariots (Cyr. 6.1.30, 7.1.47); golden eagle with outspread wings as the mark of the Great King (Cyr 7.1.4); the employment of eunuchs as the King’s bodyguard (Cyr 7.5.70); the obligatory presence of courtiers at the royal court (8.1.6, 26); a daily sacrifice to the gods directed by the Magi (Cyr. 8.1.23-4); the custom in which the King’s favorites sat closest to him at the table (Cyr. 8.4.5); the custom in which the King gives a portion of his food to his favorites (Cyr. 8.2.4); the royal practice of giving with extreme generosity (Cyr. 5.21, 8.2.7); the procession from the royal palace (Cyr. 8.3.34); the appointment of garrison commanders in the satrapies (8.6.4); the establishment of a yearly inspection of the satrapies (Cyr. 8.6.11-16).
wrong. Second, the historicity of Xenophon’s account on the upbringing and exploits of Cyrus is doubtful. Since Cyrus is presented as a wise and just king, who was deeply concerned with the wellbeing and prosperity of his subjects, several scholars have argued that Xenophon fashioned a Greek model of ideal kingship, even at the expense historical accuracy. Therefore, Xenophon was probably more inclined to cast Cyrus as the founder of the Empire and author of its institutional regulations, whether it was true or not.

Further evidence can be found in Arrian’s *Indica*. The Nicomedian historian reports that the Indians paid tribute to Cyrus. This seems to be an explicit attestation that tribute was exacted by Cyrus. Arrian’s account, however, is dubious since the Achaemenid conquest of the Indus valley took place during the reign of Darius.

**The Contribution of Darius’ Predecessors: Cambyses and Bardiya**

In the case of Darius’ immediate predecessors, Herodotus seems to contradict himself when he notes that Cambyses imposed tribute on the Libyans and Cyreneans and even demanded gifts, and that the usurper Bardiya, upon his accession, proclaimed that all of the subject nations were exempt from tribute and military service for a period of three years. These attestations seem to establish once again that an Achaemenid tributary system existed before the rise of Darius.

**Solving the Discrepancy: Revision rather than Creation**

How could one resolve the discrepancy in the ancient sources regarding the identity of the founder of the Achaemenid tribute system? Herodotus’ lack of consistency might reflect two separate traditions that found their way into his account, and it is possible that later sources ascribed the imposition of tribute to Darius simply because they followed the more explicit tradition in Herodotus’ account.

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44 Xen. *Cyr.* 8.6.16: κατενοήσαμεν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ὡς Κύρου κατάρξαντος, ὡς φασὶ, καὶ νῦν ἐτι διαμένει.
46 Tuplin 1987a, 140; Petit 1990, 107–8. Conversely, Briant (2002, 62–63) suggests that the Achaemenid institutions described by Xenophon may have been a timeless outline of the imperial apparatus and as such could be attributed to the actions of Cyrus the Elder.
47 Arr. *Ind.* 1.3: καὶ φόρους ἀπέφερεν Κύρο ὁ Καμβύσεω ἐκ τῆς γῆς σφόν, οἷς ἔταξε Κύρος.
48 Tuplin 1987a, 140. The Indians (Sind) are absent from the catalogue of nations in the Bisitun inscription (DB §6/1.12-17), but they begin to appear regularly in later inscriptions (DPe §2/17-18, DSe §24, DMA §10, and DNa §25). Darius’ Indian campaign is mentioned by Herodotus (4.44), and Briant (2002, 140) suggests 518 BC as the year in which the Indus Valley was subjugated by the Achaemenids, though he notes that it is unknown whether Darius himself led the expedition.
49 Hdt. 3.13.3, 4.165.
50 Hdt. 3.37.3.
51 Ehtécham 1946, 92–93.
52 Tuplin 1987a, 141.
53 For instance, Petit (1990, 104) argues that this is exactly the case in regards to the reports of Polyaeus and the *Chronicon Paschale*. This argument is somewhat problematic since the later sources contain content which is absent from Herodotus’ account. It is possible that this additional information is the product of embellishment or rationalization, but it remains equally possible that there were other independent and now lost sources who credited Darius with the consolidation of the imperial mechanism.
process rather than a creation *ex-nihilo*. Cyrus, it should be noted, forged a new political entity in a relatively short time span. His new domain constituted an amalgam of Near-Eastern kingdoms (e.g. Media, Babylon) in addition to numerous other regions, each with its own preexisting domestic traditions, *inter alia* the obligation of royal tribute. The subject nations probably acknowledged the supremacy of the Persian Great King by paying tribute, but they may have done so according to the various local customs.\(^{54}\) Consequently, some have argued that up until the reign of Darius, the Achaemenids received unregulated gifts rather than tribute in the form of precious metals,\(^{55}\) while others have claimed that the tribute exacted by the Persians consisted of both gifts and taxes.\(^{56}\)

If that was the case, it is reasonable that Darius was remembered as the creator of the tributary system because it underwent large scale reforms during his reign. Cook suggests that there must have been “some fiscal innovation” in the reign of Darius, though he provides no explanation regarding the nature of such innovation.\(^{57}\) Tuplin argues that Darius’ main contribution was in asserting uniformity between the various districts of the empire by setting a fixed assessment of tribute.\(^{58}\) This interpretation is shared by Briant, who adds that this action led Herodotus to claim that Darius was the first to establish a tributary system.\(^{59}\) Similarly, Sancisi-Weerdenburg claims that Darius brought into effect a shift from “an economic system as ‘embedded’ in personal relations under Cyrus and Cambyses” to “a more ‘economic’ form.”\(^{60}\) In sum, it seems likely that later sources inaccurately acknowledged Darius as the founder of the tributary system rather than the first Achaemenid King who regulated the tribute and imposed uniformity.

The notion that Darius’ reign was marked for its revision of the tributary system is corroborated by a colorful comment made by Herodotus. On the basis of his anonymous Persian sources, Herodotus claims that while Cyrus received the epithet ‘father’ (πατήρ) and Cambyses was branded as ‘despot’ (δεσπότης), Darius was known as the ‘shopkeeper’ (κάπηλος).\(^{61}\) How can we explain the origin of Darius’ reputation? Burn suggest that Darius’ awareness to economic matters was detrimental to his reputation among the Persians.\(^{62}\) Similarly, Tuplin claims that the term suggests an unfavorable view of Darius, since it equates the reciprocal relationship between a king and his subjects to a process in which the king sells something to his clients, possibly protection, in exchange for a fixed price.\(^{63}\) Conversely, Olmstead maintains that this moniker indicates that the Greeks perceived Darius as an excellent financier.\(^{64}\) A more neutral interpretation is offered by Wallinga, who maintains that the Greeks deemed the negotiations between Darius and the

\(^{54}\) Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1980, 173; Wiesehöfer 1987, 120; Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1989a, 130.

\(^{55}\) Junge 1941, 5; Tuplin 1987a, 140.

\(^{56}\) Murray 1966, 150; Dandamaev 1976, 135; Wallinga 1984, 411.

\(^{57}\) Cook 1985, 271.

\(^{58}\) Tuplin 1987a, 140.

\(^{59}\) Briant 2002, 60.

\(^{60}\) Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1989a, 130–3 with n. 5.

\(^{61}\) Hdt. 3.89.3: λέγουσι Πέρσαι ως Δαρείος μὲν ἦν κάπηλος, Καμβύσης δὲ δεσπότης, Κῦρος δὲ πατήρ, δὲ μὲν ὃτι ἐκατήλευε πάντα τὰ πρήγματα, ὁ δὲ ὃτι χαλέπος τε ἦν καὶ ὀλίγωρος, ὁ δὲ ὃτι ἐπιός τε καὶ ἀγαθὰ σφί πάντα ἐμψυχήσατο.

\(^{62}\) Burn 1984, 108.

\(^{63}\) Tuplin 1997, 374–82.

\(^{64}\) Olmstead 1948, 185.
subject peoples regarding the final assessment of tribute equal to the commercial interaction between a trader and a client. In a similar fashion, Descat postulates that Darius was envisioned as a shopkeeper because he gave value to tribute, i.e. he monetized the tributary system. In any case, Tuplin connects Darius’ reputation to his reforms by stating that “the description of the king as a kapêlos is probably sufficiently striking and unexpected to guarantee that it is a response to a real perception of change.” Moreover, since this tradition groups Cyrus, Cambyses and Darius while differentiating their reigns by particular attributes, it seems plausible, as Briant concludes, that though the establishment of the Achaemenid administrative apparatus is ascribed to Darius, one should recognized that he was building on the efforts of Cyrus and Cambyses, who created a system which combined the various local traditions of the subject nations.

The Causes for Darius’ Reform of the tributary system

One wonders why such a reform was needed. Dandamaev argues that prior to Darius’ reforms taxes were exacted, whether in kind or coin, without taking into consideration the economic potential and output of the fiscal districts. A disproportional burden of taxes inevitably resulted in discontent among the subject nations. Dandamaev even posits that the aforementioned exemption from tribute and military service granted by the usurper Bardiyâ was not a pure act of demagoguery. While there is no doubt that the rival of Darius sought ways to garner support by generous benefactions, the substantial tax relief could have been motivated by a desire to alleviate tax-related dissent among the subject peoples. Similarly, Wallinga suggests that the above mentioned flaw in the tributary system was identified by Cambyses, who sought, apparently without success, to monetize the tributary system by attaching cash value to gifts presented as tribute.

Therefore, the available evidence render it plausible that a tributary system existed before Darius, a system that was inefficient. The actions of Cambyses and Gaumâta to enact reforms probably encountered a certain degree of resistance and were probably incomplete when Darius rose to power. It seems that, as Tuplin states, it was up to Darius to find a more permanent solution to ensure economic and political stability.

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65 Wallinga 1984, 411.
66 Descat 1989a, 80. In a later study Descat (1994) adds that Darius’ reputation as a retailer signifies that he was perceived as someone who extracted profit from an operation of exchange.
67 Tuplin 2011a, 53.
69 Dandamaev 1976, 134–35. This act was not a novelty since, as Wiesehöfer (1989, 184) points out, Gaumâta could have followed a preexisting royal custom in which the new king demonstrated his benevolence by waiving all debts owed to his predecessor.
70 Wallinga 1984, 409–10. The monetization of the tributary system entailed a particular challenge. As outlined by Sancisi-Weerdenburg (1989a, 131–41), there are two aspects of gifts given as tribute. The first is the obligatory character, which is common with tribute paid in precious metals and possibly with gift-giving, while the other is the social value attached to the gift itself, which is absent when taxes are paid in cash. In other words, the monetization of the tribute system meant that the social value of the tribute was lost. The strongest attestation for gifts being given to the Great King as tribute are the reliefs in Persepolis, cf.: Walser 1966, 20–26; Root 1979, 282–84; Cahill 1985. For further reading, see: Briant 2002, 191–94, 932; J. L. Wright and Hollman 2014.
71 Wiesehöfer 1989, 184.
When did Darius’ Reform Took Place?
Another important aspect of Darius’ reforms is the date in which the aforementioned regulations were brought into effect. Scholar have offered several suggestions in regard to the date in which the reforms began has been made, e.g. 520 BC, 519 BC, and 518/17 BC. But despite the disagreement regarding the exact date in which the reforms were initiated, it is widely acknowledged that their implementation took several years. This interpretation has been elaborated by Balcer who argues that Darius put into motion an extensive reorganization program which began in 519 BC and went through a process of development and change. He adds that the unique circumstances in each regions resulted in a different pace in which the new regulations were applied. For instance, Balcer argues that in Egypt the application of Darius’ reforms was completed in 503 BC and only three years later in Babylon, while the organization of the satrapy of Lydia was completed only in 493 BC, in the aftermath of the Ionian revolt. Though it is difficult to assess when Darius’ reforms began and the dates when they were finalized in the numerous satrapies, it seems reasonable to assume that it was indeed a long process.

Darius as the First and Only Reformer
Darius is not only the first but also the last Achaemenid King who is known for executing a large scale overhaul of the imperial apparatus. Accordingly, it is possible that the Achaemenid administrative apparatus, both the tributary and satrapal system, which was set up or at least reorganized by Darius endured until the end of fifth century BC and perhaps even until the end of the Achaemenid Empire. Even though we have ample evidence that the satrapal territorial division underwent continuous changes and that taxation systems in certain regions were reformed, these modifications occurred on a local scale, were probably the outcome of domestic circumstances, and were by no means a part of a grand reform on the imperial level. The notion that Darius’ imperial machinery long endured is accepted by Petit, who points out that though later sources might evoke

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73 Dandamaev 2005, 271.
74 Poebel 1939, 121–31; Junge 1941, 5 n. 3.
75 Shahbazi (1982, 233 with n. 218) argues Darius had an opportunity to reorganize the empire only after the Persian conquest of the Indus valley but prior to his Scythian expedition. The problem is that the exact date of both campaigns is uncertain. As noted above, Briant (2002, 140) suggests 518 BC as the date of Darius’ Indian campaign, while the date of the Scythian campaign is debated, cf. Balcer 1972; Cameron 1975; Georges 1995; Tuplin 2010.
78 Although Artaxerxes I enacted several significant changes following his coronation, i.e. the appointment of new provincial governors (Diod. 11.71.1-2; Joseph. AJ. 11.6.1), and the introduction of new court protocols (Plut. Them. 29.4; Plut. Mor. 173d-3, 565a, these actions, as noted by Briant (2002, 572), reflect the desire of a new monarch who sought to confirm his position and nothing more.
79 Dandamaev 1984b, 41.
80 For instance, the taxation system in Babylonia was reformed in the 480s BC. See: Jursa and Waerzeggers 2009.
81 Kuhrt 2014, 5. For instance, Xerxes had the former Neo-Babylonian kingdom divided into two separate entities, the satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia emerged as an independent administrative unit in the 470s BC, while Lycia and Caria were reorganized as satrapies in the fourth century BC.
contemporary conditions when describing the institutions of the Persian Empire, some traits reflect earlier times. Consequently, the Achaemenid tributary system and probably the imperial administrative apparatus as a whole, after they had been refashioned and reformed by Darius, saw only minor adjustments throughout the existence of the Achaemenid Empire.

**Conclusion**

Despite the scarcity of evidence several points can be made in regard to the origins of the administrative apparatus of the Persian Achaemenid Empire. First, a large scale reform was initiated by Darius after he cemented his position as the new Great King and reasserted order throughout the Empire. Second, Darius’ measures probably constituted a reorganization on a grand-scale, whose implementation took a decade and perhaps even more before it was finalized. Third, the application of the new regulations was gradual and probably dependent on the various local traditions and customs, which offered different degrees of resistance to the changes enacted by the Persian authorities. Fourth, a tributary system of some capacity operated under Cyrus and Cambyses, but Darius introduced, or at the very least, regulated the collection of tribute. Fifth, due to his effort to consolidate his kingdom Darius was remembered as the reformer and consolidator of the Persian Empire. This is definitely the case regarding the Greek traditions, and there is no reason to think that it did not correspond with the Persian perspective.

### 1.3 Centralization of Power

**The Unknown aspects of Darius’ Reform**

As we have seen, the lack of uniformity and regulation rendered the Achaemenid tributary system before the reign of Darius defective. These deficiencies, however, were resolved by Darius who became known as the Great King to reorganize and consolidate the institutions of the Achaemenid Empire. But are we to believe that such a grand operation focused solely on the economic sustainability of the Achaemenid Empire? The contemporary ancient sources make no explicit remark regarding further regulations and measures employed by Darius. For instance, the Bisitun inscription and other royal inscriptions commissioned by Darius do not mention Darius’ reforms. Nevertheless, a hint can be found in Herodotus’ account, when the Greek historian admits that he glossed over other issues which were pertinent to the reorganization of the Achaemenid Empire. Herodotus, so it seems, chose to focus on the satrapal division and the tributary system while omitting additional aspects of Darius’ grand enterprise. Presumably, Darius identified other defects and shortcomings in the imperial institutions and made the necessary adjustments to rectify them. Despite the limitations of the ancient sources, these supplementary measures can be reconstructed by taking into consideration the challenges Darius faced during and after his struggle for supremacy. There is little doubt that the numerous threats and challenges to Darius’ rule posed by powerful men, either local dynasts or Persian satraps, made it apparent that a centralization of power was crucial not only for the survival of Darius’ regime but also for the endurance of the Empire as a whole.

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82 Petit 1990, 108.
83 Hdt. 3.89.3: παραπλήσια ταύτη ἄλλα.
When Darius was confronted with the threat of political fragmentation, he must have realized that it was imperative to design a mechanism which would enforce obedience and loyalty to the Great King.

1.4 The Dangers to the Stability of the Empire I: Separatist Factions

The Rebel Kings
In spite of eliminating his main rival Gaumāta fairly quickly, Darius’ position as the new Great King was far from secure. The succession war encouraged separatist sentiments among the conquered nations, which resulted in multiple and at times simultaneous rebellions led by those who proclaimed to be the descendants of the numerous dynasts and kings deposed by Cyrus and Cambyses. Darius, with the assistance of his generals and satraps, managed to suppress revolts in Persia (twice), Elam (thrice) Babylon (twice), Media, Armenia, Sagartia, Parthia, Hycania, Margiana, and Arachosia. All in all, Darius boasts that he defeated no less than nine kings who dared to stand against him. These leading men must have had considerable influence within their respective domestic political spheres, which allowed them to rally substantial support against Persian rule. It is not unreasonable to assume that these local dynasts might have held some sort of position within the imperial apparatus, perhaps as a reward for their willingness to cooperate with the previous regimes of Cyrus and Cambyses. If that was the case, Darius must have realized that conferring great power and influence upon non-Persians was too dangerous, especially at times when the Persian central authorities were weak and vulnerable.

The Jewish Revolt against Darius
The dangers of relying on local dignitaries is recounted an expanded upon in the biblical sources. By the power of a royal decree, issued by Darius no later than 520 BC, a group of Jewish exiles travelled to Achaemenid Yehud. The leaders of this expedition were Zerubbabel son of Shealtiel and Joshua son of YehoZadak, the former was appointed as the

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84 Stolper 1985, 6.
85 For the rebellions crushed by Darius and recounted in the Bisitun inscription: Persia (DB §8-14 [Gaumāta], §40-43); Elam (DB §16-17, §22-23; §71-72); Babylon (DB §18-20, §49-50); Media (DB §24-25, §31-32); Armenia (DB §26-30); Sagartia (DB §33); Parthia and Hycania (DB §35-6); Margiana (DB §38); Arachosia (DB §45-47). It should be noted that additional nations are mentioned in the inscription (DB §21) as rebellious, namely Assyria, Sattagydia, Scythia and Egypt. No information is provided regarding the leaders of these revolts or how they were suppressed. It is possible that these revolts were squashed only after the first regnal year of Darius, which is the chronological framework for the account given in the Bisitun inscription.
86 DB §52: Gaumāta/Smerdis (Persia), Âçina (Elam), Nidintu-Bēl/Nebuchadnezzar III (Babylon), Martiya (Elam), Phraortes/Khshathrita (Media), Tritantaechmes (Sagartia), Frāda (Margiana), Vahyazdāta/Smerdis (Persia), Arakha/Nebuchadnezzar IV (Babylon).
87 An alternative date, namely 538 BC, has been suggested, but it contradicts the evidence from I Esdras 4, which states that the permission was granted by Darius and not by Cyrus. For a discussion on the date of Zerubbabel’s expedition, see: W. H. Rose 2000, 33–4 with n. 67.
88 Olmstead (1931, 560–61) argues that the impetus for the restoration of the Jewish exiles was probably Darius’ desire to win the support of the Jewish communities throughout the empire, some of which were under the rule of the rebel kings.
civic governor, i.e. *paḥat* (泩), while Joshua was to preside as the High-Priest. Although the seniority of Zerubbabel’s office remains ambiguous, it is certain that he was a Persian appointee. Even more revealing is the fact that the identity of the High Priest was decided, or at least sanctioned, by the Persian authorities.

The Jewish community in Jerusalem was reinvigorated by the new arrivals, and soon after the building of the temple in Jerusalem commenced. The construction works, however, were disrupted by Tatnai, the Persian governor of the satrapy Beyond-the-River (נַּהֲרָה עֲבַּר פַּחַּת). Tatnai, we are told, arrived with a cavalry squadron and a multitude of infantry and tried to hinder the builders. The satrap demanded to know who sanctioned the construction of the temple and who the overseers of the project were. Since he was unable to bring the works to a complete stop, Tatnai sent a letter to Darius to inform him about the situation in Yehud. In response, the Jews dispatched an embassy of their own to the royal court. When the Jewish ambassadors were given audience with Darius, they claimed that they had the right to build the temple, stating that it was commanded by God, and that a Jewish temple stood in that location many years before, having been built by the great king of Israel, i.e. Solomon, though it was later destroyed by the Babylonians. The Jewish representatives added that Cyrus himself gave his permission to the construction of a new temple via a royal decree, and even promised to restore the golden vessels that were robbed by the Babylonians. Darius, so it seems, was more impressed by the mention of Cyrus’ name than the directive of the Jewish god or the history of the Jewish people. He ordered his secretaries to locate Cyrus’ decree, and a copy was found in Ecbatana (אַחְמְתָא). It corroborated the Jewish claim and Darius instructed his subordinates to facilitate a speedy completion of the temple.

In spite of the fact that the episode ends with Darius sanctioning the construction of the temple, it had been suggested that the intervention of the Persian authorities was due to a revolt led by Zerubbabel. It is quite possible that the Jewish community in Yehud, like many other subject nations throughout the empire, recognized the apparent weakness of the Persian central authorities and saw an opportunity to liberate itself from Persian rule. Zerubbabel, a descendant of King David according to the biblical sources, seems like the ideal candidate to exploit the chaotic circumstance surrounding the rise of Darius by proclaiming himself as the legitimate king of Jerusalem.

This hypothesis is predicated on three lines of argumentation. First, it has been argued that the prophecies of Haggai (2.22-3) and Zechariah (4.9), which advocate the

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89 Zerubbabel as the civil governor: Hag. 1:1, 14, 2:2, 21. Joshua as the High Priest: Hag. 1:1, 2, 12, 14. On the expedition led by Zerubbabel and Joshua to Jerusalem: Ezra 2:1, 3:8; Neh. 7:7; I Esdras 4.
90 M. Smith 1971, 109. The term *paḥat* in the biblical sources is derived from the Assyrian *paḥatu*, which denotes ‘province’. In the biblical sources it usually designates a governor though the same term is employed to denote both satraps and their viceroyy. On the terminology of Achaemenid administrative personnel in the biblical sources, see: Schmitt 1976, 374–75; Dandamaev and Lukonin 1989, 103; Petit 1990, 16–17.
91 Ezra 5:5; I Esdras 2:30.
92 Ezra 5:1–5.
94 Balcer 1984, 138 with notes 87–8; and Balcer 1987, 149 with references to earlier literature. See also: Fried 2000; Fried 2004; Fitzpatrick-McKinley 2015. On the Davidic, hence royal, origin of Zerubbabel, see: Ezra 3:2, 5:2; Neh. 12:1; Hag. 1:1, 12, 14, 2:2, 23; Matt. 1:12; Luke 3:27. See also: W. H. Rose 2000, 33 n. 65; Fulton 2011, 231–2 with n. 17.
overthrow of kingdoms, should be interpreted either as a call for a revolt against the Persians or as a universal call for political independence. As such, it does not reflect the contemporary political background in Yehud.\footnote{Ackroyd 1958, 13–17; Dandamaev 1989, 127–28; O’Kennedy 2014. For Haggai and Zechariah as political agitators: Olmstead 1931, 560–69; Olmstead 1938, 409–12; Morgenstern 1949, 185–86; Waterman 1954, 73.} Since Haggai and Zechariah were zealous supporters of the rebuilding of the temple in Jerusalem,\footnote{Ezra 5:2.} the intervention of the Persian authorities can be perceived as a response to subversive activities which were somehow associated with the restoration of the religious and political center of the Jewish community in Yehud.

Second, it is quite possible that the disorder that surrounded the construction works in Jerusalem was due to seditious activity. We should not forget that despite being accompanied by a considerable force, Tatnai was unable to bring the construction works into a halt. Moreover, in his letter to Darius, Tatnai states that the project was formidable and that the construction was proceeding quickly. This description seems to reflect a sense of urgency and perhaps even anxiety due to the state of affairs in Jerusalem.\footnote{Ezra 5:8.} In addition, the Jewish ambassadors who were sent to Darius claimed that the temple was once built by a king, in an era when Yehud was politically independent. This statement could be another implicit indication of a Jewish attempt to overthrow Persian rule. Lastly, despite the amicable response of the Persian central authorities, the temple was completed only in the sixth regnal year of Darius, i.e. 515 BC. Such a delay may indicate that the project suffered a considerable setback before it was finalized.\footnote{Ezra 6:15.}

Third, the involvement of Zerubbabel in anti-Persian activities can explain his sudden disappearance of from the ancient sources. It has been suggested that Zerubbabel vanished because he died of natural causes,\footnote{Beyse 1972, 49.} or that he was assassinated by a priestly party led by the aforementioned Joshua.\footnote{Garbini 1994, 182.} But it seems likelier that he was eliminated by the Persians or at least removed from office due after the Persian authorities heard rumors about his role in the political unrest in Yehud.\footnote{Olmstead 1948, 142; Waterman 1954, 73, 78.}

The amicable resolution of the tension in Yehud makes it difficult to assert with certainty if an actual rebellion transpired in Yehud, its extent, and the manner in which it was suppressed.\footnote{Japhet 1982, 26–27; W. H. Rose 2000, 34–35; O’Kennedy 2014, 528.} If a revolt actually occurred, it seems that Darius preferred leniency, either because he wanted to avoid being perceived as opposing the policies of Cyrus, the founder of the Achaemenid Empire,\footnote{Olmstead 1931, 570.} or since he aimed at ensuring the future support and obedience of the Jews.\footnote{Morgenstern 1938, 184–86.} When taking into consideration the available evidence and the contemporary political context, there are two plausible reconstructions. First, the succession struggle had an impact on the state of affairs in Yehud, and rumors of subversive
activities reached the satrapal court of Tatnai. Since the empire was engulfed with rebellions, Tatnai acted swiftly to suppress a revolt which was still in an early stages. Second, the disturbances in the construction of the temple might have been caused by an administrative miscommunication between Tatnai and his subordinates. In the chaos that followed Darius’ ascension, such misunderstanding seems understandable, as does the relatively harsh reaction of the satrap. In any case, the confusion was easily resolved by royal intervention.

In sum, the circumstances in Yehud seems similar to those in the regions which revolted against Persian rule: the perceived weakness of the Persian authorities, the presence of a local dignitary with royal blood, and a mild response of the Persian central authorities to purported disobedience. All of these may have encouraged separatist sentiments. But while the rebellions in the core regions are poorly documented, the necessity of quelling multiple revolts must have taught Darius that if his reign was to endure, his hold on the provinces must be tighter.

1.5 The Dangers to the Stability of the Empire II: Powerful Satraps

Oroites, Satrap of Lydia

A real and immediate threat to Darius’ position as the new Great King was posed by ambitious and powerful satraps who oversaw vast resources and exercised considerable influence under Cyrus and Cambyses. The exploits and grim end of Oroites, the satrap of Lydia who was reluctant to acknowledge Darius’ supremacy, demonstrate the dangers of unchecked satrupal power.

Insubordination I: Oroites’ Refusal to assist Darius

According to Herodotus, Oroites’ was reluctant to side with Darius in his war against the Magi. When a royal envoy came to Sardis, carrying a message from Darius, Oroites responded positively in public, but later on the satrap had the ambassador assassinated and erased all traces of his treacherous deed. Herodotus’ account is not detailed and many questions remain unanswered. For instance, Herodotus is silent about the content of Darius’ message. Tuplin points out that just before we are informed about the arrival of Darius’ ambassador at Sardis, Herodotus mentions the war between Darius and the Magi. He maintains, therefore, that at this point the Magi were still in control and that Darius sought Oroites’ assistance against them. Similarly, Immerwahr postulates that Darius asked Oroites to come to Susa to participate in the conspiracy against the Magi. Others assume that the struggle against the Magi and their supporters was already public, and that Darius sought Oroites’ military support against rebel forces in Media and Armenia, or possibly

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105 Hdt. 3.120.1. Herodotus employs the term Σαρδίων ὕπαρχος, a term which Herodotus uses to designate satraps. Petit (1990, 41, 83) suggests that Oroites was the first satrap of Lydia, appointed in c. 545 BC after the conquest of Asia Minor was carried out by Mazares (Hdt. 1.156-57, 160-61) and finalized by Harpagus (Hdt. 1.162, 164, 168-71, 174-76). Conversely, Briant (2002, 351) posits that Oroites began his term in office in 525 BC, i.e. under Cambyses.
106 Hdt. 3.126.1.
107 Tuplin 1997, 393.
108 Immerwahr 1966, 33 n. 57.
109 Burn 1985, 298.
in eastern Anatolia. Conversely, Burn and Petit speculate that Oroites, thinking that Darius was still too weak to enforce his will, withheld taxes, and that Darius’ envoy came to urge Oroites to renew the flow of tribute. Another suggestion was made by Briant, who claims that Oroites was summoned to the royal court, an invitation which was meant to test Oroites’ loyalty. All of the above mentioned explanations have one thing in common, namely that Darius wished to obtain Oroites’ acknowledgment of his position as the new Great King and support. When considering that Oroites exhibited deference in public while ordering the assassination of the royal ambassador in secret, it seems evident that Oroites was determined to oppose Darius, but, at least at this point, wished to refrain from publicly defying him.

One wonders, then, why Oroites was unwilling to acknowledge Darius as his superior. As mentioned above, the succession struggle have shaken the control of the Persian central authorities in the Persian heartland and probably even more so in frontier satrapies such as Lydia. Therefore, it is possible that when Darius’ envoy arrived, Oroites had already made up his mind to secede and establish his own principality. Alternatively, under the assumption that the whole Gaumâta affair is a product of Darius’ propaganda, Vargyas argues that Oroites sided with Gaumâta, who was Cyrus’ son Bardiya and the legitimate Great King against the usurper Darius. Either way, Oroites became a threat from Darius’ viewpoint.

**Insubordination II: Oroites and Mitrobates**

Another possible act of defiance on Oroites’ part was the elimination of Mitrobates, the high-ranking Persian official who governed Daskyleion. It is not clear whether it happened before or after Oroites had Darius’ envoy murdered, since Herodotus simply notes that Oroites took advantage of the tumult caused by the succession struggle and had Mitrobates and his son Cranaspes assassinated. The problem with Herodotus’ account is that it contains an anachronistic detail, namely the mention of the satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia, which did not exist as a separate administrative entity until the 470s BC. How could Mitrobates govern a satrapy that did not exist in the last quarter of the sixth century?

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111 Burn 1985, 298; Petit 1990, 41 n. 118.
112 Briant 2002, 65. He relies on Ctesias (FGrH 688 F13 §11), who reports how a courtier advised Cambyses to summon his brother Bardiya (Tanyoxarces in Ctesias’ account) to the court as a test of his fidelity, stressing that a refusal would had been deemed as a clear indication that the Great King was being challenged by his brother.
113 Balcer 1987, 148.
115 Vargyas 2000, 158.
116 Hdt. 3.126.2.
117 Petit (1990, 181–86) argues in favor of 476 BC. Descat (1989a, 79–80) suggests that Hellespontine Phrygia had been reorganized as a separate satrapy with its capital at Daskyleion by 465 BC. Bakir (1995, 274–77), the director of the excavation in Daskyleion, argues that from the beginning of the fifth century to the middle of the fourth century BC, a period which she calls ‘middle Achaemenid phase’ (Mittelachämenidische), the site climaxed in terms prosperity and wealth. It is evident that her findings correspond with the opinion that Daskyleion became a satrapal seat at the beginning of the fifth century BC at the earliest.
BC? This anachronism led Petit to argue that Mitrobates was invented by Herodotus, but in a more recent study he accepts that historicity of Mitrobates while maintaining that he was not a satrap but a viceroy of Oroites.\textsuperscript{118} Vargyas adds that even if an anachronistic term was used to designate the position of Mitrobates, it does not necessarily mean that he was a figment of Herodotus’ imagination.\textsuperscript{119} Therefore, it seems prudent to follow Briant’s injunction, namely that we should accept the possibility that extensive satrapies were divided into smaller administrative units, even if there is no undisputed evidence for such subdivision.\textsuperscript{120} In sum, Mitrobates was probably the chief official of an administrative sub-unit, whose center was in Daskyleion and a subordinate of Oroites.

But what drove Oroites to eliminate his underling? It has been suggested that the assassination of Mitrobates facilitated the absorption of his domain into that of Oroites.\textsuperscript{121} But such a suggestion fails to realize that Mitrobates’ domain was already a part of Oroites’ satrapy. An alternative explanation is offered by Vargyas, who claims that while Oroites sided with Gaumāta, Mitrobates joined forces with Darius, for which he was murdered.\textsuperscript{122} Alternatively, if Oroites was aiming at secession, Mitrobates might have been a victim of his loyalty to the Great King since the rogue satrap must have sought ways strengthening his hold over his satrapy by eliminating Persian officials who refused to profess their loyalty. In any case, the seemingly unsanctioned murder of a fellow Persian nobleman and his son must have been perceived as an act of defiance by Darius.

**Insubordination III: Oroites and Polycrates**

The episode in which Oroites eliminates the Samian tyrant Polycrates reveals another possible aspect of Oroites’ pattern of insubordination. In essence, Herodotus reports that the satrap of Lydia lured Polycrates to Magnesia under false pretenses, where the latter was seized, tortured, and executed.\textsuperscript{123} Herodotus proposes two possible motives for Oroites’ actions against Polycrates. According to one of his sources, Oroites was taunted by the above mentioned Mitrobates, who pointed out that while Oroites had failed to subjugate Samos, Polycrates managed to do so with a force of fifteen hoplites.\textsuperscript{124} Alternatively, Herodotus recounts an incident in which Polycrates, either on purpose or by accident, offended Oroites by insulting the satrap’s envoy.\textsuperscript{125}

Personal grudges, which are key in Herodotus’ account, probably played a minor role in the downfall of Polycrates. Balcer argues that the elimination of Polycrates was a preliminary step in an Achaemenid attempt to subjugate Samos and perhaps additional islands in the Aegean.\textsuperscript{126} Indeed, the notion that under Cyrus and Cambyses the satraps were expected to expand their domain through conquest is implied in the sarcastic remark

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\textsuperscript{118} Petit 1985, 85; Petit 1990, 185 n. 332.
\textsuperscript{119} Vargyas 2000, 155–56 n. 4.
\textsuperscript{120} Briant 2002, 64.
\textsuperscript{121} Cook 1985, 219; Burn 1985, 298.
\textsuperscript{122} Vargyas 2000.
\textsuperscript{123} Hdt. 3.122-125. White (1954, 36–37) dates the assassination of Polycrates to about 522 BC, since Herodotus (3.120.1) mentions that it occurred about the time of Cambyses’ illness. Compare: Cic. *Fin.* 5.92; Strabo 14.1.16; Ath. 522B.
\textsuperscript{124} Hdt. 3.120.2-4.
\textsuperscript{125} Hdt. 3.121.
\textsuperscript{126} Balcer 1987, 147; Balcer 1995, 120.
of Mitrobates. Hence, it is possible that Oroites “slew Polycrates to prove himself a worthy expansionist of the empire in the Persian tradition.” Since Samos was eventually conquered by the Persians, it is reasonable that the actions of Oroites against Polycrates were in accord with the expansionist Persian policy in the west.

In contrast, the increasing power of the Samian tyrant may have led to his demise. Herodotus claims that Polycrates aspired to establish his own thalassocracy by asserting his dominance not only on the islands of the Aegean but also on the coastline of western Anatolia, i.e. Ionia. Polycrates’ ambition is implicitly corroborated by Diodorus, who says that several Lydians fled from Oroites’ grasp and found refuge in Samos, an insult that provoked Oroites to seek ways to eliminate Polycrates. Briant assumes that these Lydians were in fact aristocrats who were unhappy with the overbearing policies of Oroites. If that was the case, Oroites was acting as a dutiful satrap who was mindful of the growing power of the adjacent Samian tyranny and sought ways to keep Polycrates’ power in check. The execution of Polycratc, therefore, was meant to protect Persian interests in the west. If we accept that Oroites was aiming at blocking Samian expansion, one wonders why the assassination of Polycrates is presented by Herodotus as a hasty act of a proud, cruel and overly ambitious satrap. It is possible that even if Oroites got rid of a dangerous neighbor his action was not sanctioned by Darius. As a result, he incurred the hostility of the Great King, who deemed the Lydian satrap as too independent and perhaps a potential challenger.

There are several potential challenges to this interpretation. First, there is no record for a Persian attempt to capture Samos after Polycrates was eliminated. Second, even if Samos was ready to fall, it is difficult to believe that the subjugation of a single island at the fringes of the gigantic Persian Empire disheartened Darius. Surely, the resources of the former Lydian kingdom, which were at the disposal of Oroites, vastly overshadowed those of Samos. Third, there is no mention of trouble in Lydia in the royal inscriptions commissioned by Darius. This silence does not necessarily mean that all was quiet in the west, but that any event that took place in Lydia was of minor importance. Moreover, the silence of the official Persian records in regard to Oroites indicates that Herodotus had to rely on alternative sources when seeking to recount the downfall of Polycrates. Accordingly, since the reign of Polycrates was a formative period in Samian history, it is more likely that Herodotus derived his information from Samian informants and traditions, though he might have embellished his account during the process of composition.

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127 Petit 1990, 41.
129 Hdt. 3.139-47.
130 Diesner 1959, 215; Vargyas 2000, 158; Briant 2002, 139.
131 Hdt. 3.122.1-2.
132 Diod. 10.16.4.
135 Myres 1953, 161; Wallinga 1991, 182 with n. 13. In Addition, Wallinga rejects the unfavorable image of Oroites as described by Herodotus and brands it as a product of Darius’ propaganda and Herodotus’ own imagination.
136 It is generally agreed that Herodotus derived his information on the Samian tyranny from reliable Samian sources. Cf. Parke 1946, 105; Barron 1964b, 212; Mitchell 1975, 75; Hart 1982, 57; Abramenko 1995, 37–
Moreover, the portrayal of Oroites, as Vargyas convincingly argues, was shaped by Herodotus’ focus on the murder of Polycrates and the desire to demonstrate that the Lydian satrap committed additional crimes which led to his just demise. In other words, Herodotus’ Samian sources and his literary intentions can explain the negative portrayal of Oroites’ actions rather than Darius’ propaganda.

**Polycrates as a loyal Persian vassal**

An alternative suggestion stipulates that Polycrates was a Persian vassal rather than a threat to Persian interests. This argument is predicated on the military contingents Polycrates supplied to Cambyses’ Egyptian campaign. But how did Polycrates become a servant of the Great King? Mitchell suggests that the ambitious Polycrates exploited the turmoil in Ionia during the Persian conquest, as he managed to seize control of several islands in addition to urban centers on the coastline, including Miletus. In the end, however, the Persians were able to recapture the Ionian cities, thus curtailing Samian influence in the region. Balcer adds that after his failed attempt to establish a *thalassocracy*, Polycrates had no choice but to acknowledge Persian supremacy by paying tribute and supplying military levies to the King’s campaigns. In exchange his tyranny was allowed to continue under Persian suzerainty. Polycrates’ vassal status is implicitly corroborated by the abrogation of the alliance between Samos and Egypt. According to Herodotus, an alliance was forged between the Egyptian king Amasis and Polycrates, but it was soon dissolved when Amasis, having noticed the good fortune of the Samian tyrant and dreading his inevitable downfall, decided to end the alliance. Balcer, however, rejects Herodotus’ fanciful explanation for the sudden break between Egypt and Samos and argues that Polycrates ended the alliance since Amasis became an enemy of the Persians. The new state of affairs dictated that there could be no collaboration between a Persian vassal state and a nation which was branded as an enemy of the Great King. Conversely, Rahe argues that when Polycrates realized the magnitude of the Persian preparations for the imminent expedition against Egypt, he defected to the Persian side. Either way, if Polycrates was

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38; S. R. West 2004, 81. Harvey (2014, 4–5) maintains that as a native of Halicarnassus who spent some time on Samos early in his life, possibly in the 470s or 460s BC, Herodotus was in a great position to obtain information from Samian friends and acquaintances, in addition to his own observations and impressions. One should also note that to our best knowledge in spite of Herodotus personal ties to the island and its dwellers, the Greek historian did not abandon his critical faculties when retelling the history of the Samians. See, for example, Herodotus’ treatment of the interactions between Samos and Sparta, which is deemed by Jeffery and Cartledge (1982, 247) as “a valuable reminder that Herodotus need not be the slave of his informants, even informants who he was bound by close ties of personal obligation and political sympathy.” This is particularly true in regard to the discussed episode since Herodotus notes the contradictions between the versions he obtained from his sources (3.120.4–121.2), and even encourages his readers to be cautious when deciding which version they deem more believable (3.122.1).

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137 Vargyas 2000, 155–56 n. 4.
138 Hdt. 3.44.
139 Mitchell 1975, 81–82.
140 Balcer 1984, 105. He suggests that the Ionian and Aeolian contingents in Cambyses expeditionary force to Egypt, mentioned by Herodotus (3.1.1) were likely to have been drafted in a similar manner.
141 Hdt. 2.182, 3.39.1.
142 Hdt. 3.43. Compare: Diod. 1.95.3.
143 Balcer 1984, 108.
144 Rahe 2015, 52.
in fact a vassal of the Great Persian King, his elimination by Oroites constituted a rebellious act.\footnote{Balcer 1987, 147; Abramenko 1995, 39. Vargyas (2000, 156) posits that Oroites had Polycrates murdered since he sought to consolidate his control in the region in preparation for the inevitable confrontation with the Persian central authorities.}

**The Resources of Oroites**

The available evidence prevents us from reaching an irrefutable conclusion concerning the motives and intentions of Oroites. Nonetheless, it is certain that the conduct of the satrap of Lydia led Darius to contemplate and finally bring about his death. When taking into consideration that Oroites was the overlord of a vast satrapy which comprised Phrygia, Lydia and Ionia,\footnote{Hdt. 3.127.1.} it is only expected that any hint of insubordination on the satrap’s part caused much anxiety at the royal court. To begin with, we are told by Herodotus that Oroites had at his disposal 1,000 Persian soldiers,\footnote{Ibid. *ibid.*} a fighting force which may have constituted the core of the military contingents under his command, as the satrap was probably able to levy troops from the numerous subject nations which dwelled within his extensive domain.\footnote{Petit 1990, 41 n. 118; Briant 2002, 66.} Next, Oroites’ military might was augmented by his access to considerable funds. The revenue of the Lydian satrapy was relatively high. Lewis points out that according to Herodotus (3.90), the income of Oroites’ domain constituted the 500 talents of the second *nomos*, and probably the greater part of the 400 talents of the first *nomos*.\footnote{Lewis 1977, 52–53 n. 19. In the first *nomos* Herodotus includes the Ionians, Magnesians of Asia, Aeolians, Carians, Lycians, Milyans, and Pamphylians. The second is composed of the Mysians, Lydians, Lasonians, Caballians, and Hytennians.} Further implicit indication for the wealth of Oroites can be found in his ability to deceive Polycrates by promising financial support for the tyrant’s ambitious endeavors. The whole ruse is predicated on the notion that the satrap was, or at least had the reputation of being, a man of considerable means.\footnote{Hdt. 3.123.} In the same vein, Diodorus mentions that the Lydians who were displeased with the policies of Oroites, fled from Samos to Polycrates and brought with them considerable wealth, so considerable that the tyrant had them executed and their possessions confiscated.\footnote{Diod. 10.16.4.} It is possible that it was the burden of taxes which drove the wealthy individuals to seek asylum on Samos, which renders it possible that Oroites had garnered extensive funds through taxation in the period which preceded his elimination. Furthermore, if Oroites had stopped sending tribute to the royal treasury while Darius was distracted by the numerous rebellions in the core satrapies, the satrap may have been able to accumulate substantial wealth. Lastly, the succession struggle and the suppression of multiple rebellions must have brought the military capacity of Darius into a state of exhaustion.\footnote{Briant 2002, 340.} Hence, it should not come as a surprise that, as Herodotus recounts, Darius was well aware of the considerable resources at Oroites’ disposable and must have realized that the satrap of Lydia had the potential of becoming a formidable
enemy if openly challenged.\textsuperscript{153} A failure in suppressing Oroites could have exposed Darius as weak, which might have reignited multiple rebellions throughout the Empire.\textsuperscript{154}

\textbf{The Elimination of Oroites}

But, as noted above, Oroites was himself reluctant to openly challenge Darius and preferred to show deference in public while undermining Darius’ authority in secret. Nevertheless, one can only assume that if Herodotus knew about the treachery of Oroites, so did Darius. The hesitation of Oroites, so it seems, created the opportunity for Darius to ensnare the rogue satrap. Herodotus reports that the Great King made an appeal to his loyal Persians, asking for a volunteer to kill or capture the rebellious satrap. Thirty men stepped up, and after lots were drawn, the task was given to Bagaius son of Artontes.\textsuperscript{155} Shortly after Bagaius arrived at the satrapal court in Sardis. Herodotus says that the King’s envoys brought with him letters bearing the Great King’s seal which he ordered to be read out loud, thus turning the Persians present at Oroites’ court against the satrap.\textsuperscript{156} The exact date in which Oroites was eliminated is disputed, but it is widely agreed that it occurred before Darius initiated his grand reform.\textsuperscript{157}

\textbf{The Shortcomings of Herodotus’ Account}

Since Herodotus is our only source for Oroites’ exploits, it is difficult to assess his reliability on this matter. Balcer, for example, deems Herodotus’ account as “confused and historically unreliable and fitting more readily into his pattern of literary form and thought rather than historical cause and effect.”\textsuperscript{158} Similarly, Wallinga concludes that we cannot trust Herodotus in respect to Oroites’ motives in eliminating Polycrates or his policies during Darius’ rise to power.\textsuperscript{159} These caveats are valid but should be qualified. As stated above, the Polycrates episode is probably based on fairly reliable Samian sources and on Herodotus’ familiarity with the history of western Anatolia. It is safe to assume, therefore, that we have trustworthy information regarding the historicity of Oroites and the nature of his office.\textsuperscript{160} Furthermore, though we can only speculate about the motives and aims of Oroites and Darius, there is no reason to deem the account of the satrap’s actual deeds and actions, along with the historical framework within which he operated as unreliable.

\textbf{Explaining Oroites’ Absence from Bisitun}

One of the main arguments that is used to undermine the historicity of the exploits of Oroites as recounted by Herodotus is the absence of any trace of trouble in Lydia in the Bisitun inscription. This argument is even more compelling when taking into consideration that Darius included a report about the grim end of Açina, a Persian rebel who had been seized by his own partisans and delivered to Darius.\textsuperscript{161} Vargyas points out the similarities between this Açina and Oroites and wonders why Darius omitted another example which

\textsuperscript{153} Hdt. 3.127.1.
\textsuperscript{154} Petit 1990, 40–41.
\textsuperscript{155} On Bagaius, see: Balcer 1993, no. 71; Bichler 2000, 289 n. 81.
\textsuperscript{156} Hdt. 3.127.2-128.
\textsuperscript{157} Several dates have been suggested by modern scholars: 522 BC (Vargyas 2000, 152), 520 BC (Petit 1990, 40 with n. 113, 178; Briant 2002, 139), and 518 BC (Balcer 1987, 146–47; Balcer 1995, 118–20).
\textsuperscript{158} Balcer 1987, 148.
\textsuperscript{159} Wallinga 1991, 182.
\textsuperscript{160} Petit 1990, 39.
\textsuperscript{161} DB §17.
could have demonstrated the Great King’s capacity to garner loyalty and to eliminate powerful challengers, thus enhancing his own prestige while deterring other ambitious satraps from imitating Oroites. Several cogent solutions have been offered. Balcer claims that Oroites is not mentioned in the Bisitun inscription due to Darius’ inability to suppress the dissent in Lydia within his first regnal year, the chronological framework of the inscription, and because the subjugation of Judah and western Anatolia was not as critical as the pacification of the core regions of the Empire and the adjacent regions. A supplementary explanation is predicated on the fact that the Bisitun inscription deals exclusively with vanquished rebels who proclaimed themselves as kings. Accordingly, the rebellion of Oroites, a Persian satrap, did not fit into this category and was thus omitted. Conversely, it is possible that Darius omitted any mention of Oroites since he wished to conceal the fact that he eliminated a highborn Persian and an old companion of Cyrus, a problematic act for the new Great King who wanted to present himself as a legitimate ruler rather than a usurper. All in all, though we cannot know with certainty why the elimination of Oroites does not appear in the Bisitun inscription it should not be used as an argument against the historicity of Herodotus’ account.

Conclusion

Whether Oroites was contemplating political independence or merely refused to acknowledge Darius as the new Great King, his actions were clearly deemed by Darius as subversive, and thus had to be dealt with. As such, the case of Oroites constitutes a paradigmatic demonstration of the potential threat posed to the Great King’s authority by powerful satraps. It is also an excellent example of how the King’s authority was restored and upheld by royal representatives in the satrapal court. Although the dire consequences of Oroites’ insubordination are evident, it seems that the solution employed by Darius was based on Persian loyalty to the Great King rather than a preexisting mechanism of royal control. Therefore, it seems likely that after Darius consolidated his power, the reforms which he initiated included measures which were aimed at reducing satrapal power in order to deter overly ambitious satraps, now and in the future, from challenging the Great Persian King.

Aryandes, Satrap of Egypt

Aryandes’ Initial Loyalty

Another satrap who defied Darius was Aryandes, the governor of Egypt. Like Oroites, Aryandes was appointed by a predecessor of Darius I, this time Cambyses. But unlike his colleague, Aryandes chose to accept Darius as his new master. This is exemplified by the fact that Aryandes suppressed an Egyptian uprising on Darius’ behalf. According to

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162 Vargyas 2000, 157 with n. 12.
166 Waters 2014, 78.
167 Petit 1990, 40.
168 Hdt. 4.166.1: ὁ δὲ Ἀρυάνδης ἦν οὗτος τῆς Ἁγύπτου ὑπαρχός ὑπὸ Καμβύσεω κατεστείως.
Polyaenus, it was the cruelty of Aryandes which drove the Egyptian to rebel, but the rebellion was brought to an end by Darius, who won back the loyalty of the Egyptians by showing homage to the Apis Bull. While Polyaenus’ claims concerning the causes of the Egyptian revolt and the manner in which it was suppressed cannot be corroborated, the historicity of the rebellion is beyond any doubt. Egypt is listed among the rebellious nations in Darius’ Bisitun inscription, and an Egyptian hieroglyphic text inscribed on the naophorous statue of Udjahorresne mentions unrest in Egypt dated to the reign of Darius. This inscription recounts the exploits and achievements of Udjahorresne, an Egyptian courtier, scholar, and priest, who served the last two Egyptian kings, Amasis (570-526) and Psammetichus III (526-525), and witnessed the Persian conquest. After Egypt lost its independence, Udjahorresne managed to maintain his lofty position under Cambyses and Darius I. Interestingly, Udjahorresne claims that during a great disaster, which affected not only his nome but the entire land, he did whatever he could to save and protect his compatriots. Though it has been suggested that Udjahorresne is referring to the Persian invasion, Cameron points out that Darius is mentioned by Udjahorresne immediately after he recounts the aforementioned hardships, and concludes that the calamitous event he notes was therefore the rebellion recorded in the Bisitun Inscription.

A number of suggestions have been made regarding the date of the Egyptian uprising. Several scholars argue that the Egyptian revolt erupted in the winter of 522/1 BC, when Darius was still scrambling to put down revolts in the Persian heartland. It seems logical that the Egyptians, like many other subject peoples throughout the Persian Empire, saw the apparent weakness of the Persian central authorities as an opportunity to liberate themselves from Persian rule. Supposedly, the revolt ended sometime in 520 BC, after Darius pacified the empire.

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169 Briant (1988, 142) speculates that the cruelty of Aryandes was the heavy burden of taxes imposed by the Persians.
170 Polyaeus, Strat. 7.11.7.
171 DB §21. Schmitt (1991, 56 n. 7) notes that while Egypt is absent from the Old-Persian version of the Bisitun inscription, it is mentioned in its Elamite version.
172 See: Posener 1936, no. 1 for the hieroglyphic text coupled with a French translation. For an English translation, see: Brosius 2000, nos. 20 and 54; Kuht 2007, no. 4.11.
173 Kuht 2007, no. 4.11, sections (h) and (j).
174 Posener 1936, 169; Baines 1996. Lloyd (1982, 176–78) argues that the term used by Udjahorresne to designate the disaster, nšn, means ‘destructive power’.
175 Cameron 1943, 310. Since the numerous inscriptions which adorn the statue are self-contained and several equally plausible arrangements had been suggested (Cf. Baines 1996), it is difficult to conclude with certainty whether Udjahorresne refers to an Egyptian revolt which occurred during the reign of Darius or Cambyses’ conquest of Egypt. Nonetheless, the attestations in Polyaeus’ account and the Aramaic copy of the Bisitun inscription are sufficient to conclude that there was a rebellion against Persian rule.
176 Cameron 1943, 310–11; Yoyotte 1972, 223; Biant 2002, 115. Tuplin (1989, 77; 1991, 264–65), who also argues that the revolt took place during Darius’ ascension, maintains that since we have no information in the Bisitun inscription on the revolt or its suppression, it was dealt with only after Darius first regnal year.
177 Tuplin 1989, 77; Tuplin 1991, 265–66. Biant (2002, 115) asserts the same timetable while adding that the rebellion was led by Petubastis III, a local dynast who disappeared in 520 BC. He concludes that the revolt erupted in 521 BC and that Petubastis was eliminated by Aryandes due to his subversive actions. For a recent study on Petubastis, see: Kaper 2015.
There is, however, a chronological difficulty in such a reconstruction. Darius’ visit to Egypt is mentioned by Polyaeus (7.11.7), Herodotus (2.110) and Diodorus (1.58.4). Polyaeus notes that Darius’ arrival happened at the same time as the death of the Apis Bull. Coincidently, the Apis Stele commemorates the death and burial of the Apis Bull in the fourth year of Darius reign, i.e. 518 BC.\(^\text{178}\) Hence, Darius probably came to Egypt in 518 BC, i.e. too late to subdue the uprising in person. Moreover, with the exception of Polyaeus, the accounts of Darius’ visit to Egypt fail to mention any sort of disturbances, while the actions of Darius in Egypt indicate that he aimed at cementing Persian rule due to the recent uprising by exhibiting his deference to Egyptian traditions and customs. Polyaeus emphasizes Darius’ piety by stating that the Great King promised to give a hundred talents to the man who would produce a new Apis.\(^\text{179}\) Herodotus recounts how a priest of Hephaestus refused to set up a statue of Darius in front of the statues of the Egyptian king Sesostris and his wife, presumably since the Persian King, unlike his Egyptian predecessor, had failed in his attempt to conquer Scythia.\(^\text{180}\) While Herodotus remains silent regarding Darius’ response, Diodorus claims that Darius was pleased with the honesty of the priest and asked to be judged again when he reached the age of Sesostris and later on he even joined the Egyptian priests in learning about the ancient kings of Egypt so he could imitate their righteous conduct.\(^\text{181}\) Even when Darius encountered resistance to his directives, there is no sign for coercive measures.\(^\text{182}\) Furthermore, Tuplin argues that it is difficult to believe that an Egyptian rebellion lasted until 518 BC and that such an event was unknown to Herodotus.\(^\text{183}\) This problem can be resolved by accepting the possibility that it was Aryandes rather than Darius who squashed the rebellion with the satrapal contingents under his command.\(^\text{184}\)

**The Aryandic Coins**

The loyalty of Aryandes was not everlasting. Herodotus recounts that the satrap of Egypt lost Darius’ favor after he had minted coins of the purest silver, an imitation of the royal daric, hence positioning himself as equal to the Great King.\(^\text{185}\) Shortly after, Herodotus

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\(^\text{178}\) See: Posener 1936, no. 5 for the hieroglyphic text coupled with a French translation. For an English translation, see: Brosius 2000, no. 51.

\(^\text{179}\) Polyae. Strat. 7.11.7.

\(^\text{180}\) Hdt. 2.110.

\(^\text{181}\) Diod. 1.58.4, 95.4-6.

\(^\text{182}\) Another impressive accomplishment of Darius was the codification of Egyptian Law. Diodorus (1.95.4) hints that Darius associated himself with the Egyptian priests in order to make amends for the atrocities committed by Cambyses. This effort is corroborated by a decree of Darius, preserved in the Demotic Chronicle (Bibliotheque Nationale no. 215), dated to the latter half of the third century BC, which recounts that in his third regnal year (518/17 BC) Darius ordered the satrap of Egypt to codify the laws of Egypt. This document had been published by Spiegelberg (1914). For an English translation, see: Brosius 2000, nos. 24 and 55; Kuhrt 2007, 4.14. Kuhrt 2007, no. 4.14, (B). Further reading on the nature of Darius’ effort to codify Egyptian law, see: Bresciani 1989, 360–61; Johnson 1994, 157–58; Redford 2001. The satrap who was instructed by Darius codify Egyptian law was in all likelihood Aryandes, see: Tuplin 1989, 76–77; Brosius 2000, 48; Briant 2002, 137–38; Asheri, Lloyd, and Corcella 2007, 692. Contra: R. A. Parker 1941, 373–74; Cameron 1941, 311; Balcer 1987, 145–6 with n. 26.


\(^\text{184}\) Tuplin (1989, 77) rightly notes that as a representative of Persian rule in Egypt, Aryandes had to suppress this nationalistic uprising regardless of his position in respect to the legitimacy of Darius’ claim.

\(^\text{185}\) Hdt. 4.166.1: παρισούμενος Δαρείῳ διεφθάρην.
claims that Darius had Aryandes executed on a different charge, namely that he rebelled against his master.\textsuperscript{186} Nevertheless, several scholars argue that the elimination of Aryandes is connected to the Aryandic coins. For instance, Milne maintains that Aryandes exploited the fact that the ratio of silver to gold was thirteen to one throughout the Empire, but significantly higher in Egypt. Therefore, Aryandes used his silver coins to purchase the King’s golden darics, which he had melted and sold as bullion. As a result, the satrap made a considerable profit. The problem was, Milne argues, that melting the King’s coins was perceived as an act of treason, since Aryandes was mindfully destroying the royal figure which was imprinted on the royal daric.\textsuperscript{187} Contrarily, it has been suggested that by minting his own satrapal coins, which supposedly bore the satrap’s image rather than the King, Aryandes incurred the animosity of Darius by usurping what was apparently a royal prerogative. In addition, these coins, presumably fashioned according to Egyptian values, weights, and designs, created unnecessary difficulties to the imperial financial system.\textsuperscript{188} Briant sums it up by stating that “the king wished to punish the excesses of a satrap who had tried to become his rival in the very area Darius considered the defining characteristic of his reign and his power.”\textsuperscript{189} Yet, the emphasis on the role the Aryandic coins played in the execution of the satrap who minted them is problematic. Cameron observes that according to Herodotus Aryandes was condemned to death not for minting satrapal coins but for staging a revolt.\textsuperscript{190} Similarly, Tuplin maintains that the issuing of coins was not necessarily beyond satrapal authority and was probably far from a critical matter from Darius’ viewpoint, even if Aryandes imprinted his own image on the coins for self-glorification.\textsuperscript{191} It seems, therefore, that the connection between Aryandes’ satrapal coins and his death as a traitor is fairly weak and probably coincidental.

**The Libyan Campaign**

An alternative explanation for the condemnation of Aryandes as a rebel was the supposedly unsanctioned campaign the satrap launched against the Libyan Greeks. Herodotus recounts how Arcesilaus III, who received Cyrene as a reward for his services to Cyrus and Cambyses, was murdered by his political rivals in Barce. His mother Pheretime fled to Egypt and asked Aryandes to avenge her son’s death, since, so she claimed, he was murdered because of his loyalty to the Persians. Aryandes was convinced and soon after he began gathering forces. Soon after, the Persians besieged Barce and eventually captured it through trickery.\textsuperscript{192} Petit argues that Aryandes, in a similar fashion to Oroites’ attempt to subjugate Samos, was expected to expand the territory of his satrapy with the resources at his disposal.\textsuperscript{193} In fact, Herodotus notes that if the campaign had succeeded the Libyans

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{180} Hdt. 4.166.2: αἰτίην οἱ ἁλλην ἐπενείκας ὡς οἱ ἐπανίστατο, ἀπέκτανε.
\item \textsuperscript{187} Milne 1938. This line of argumentation is followed by Descat 1989a, 27–28; Descat 1989b, 85–87; Petit 1990, 75.
\item \textsuperscript{188} Le Rider 2001, 167–68; Klinkott 2005, 245.
\item \textsuperscript{189} Briant 2002, 409–10.
\item \textsuperscript{190} Cameron 1943, 310.
\item \textsuperscript{191} Tuplin 1989, 66–67. Further on coins issued by the satrapal authorities which bore the image of the satrap, see: Harrison 1982; Moysey 1986; Cahn 1989; Mildenberg 2000; Bodzek 2014.
\item \textsuperscript{192} Hdt. 4.165, 167, 200-1. Compare: Polyæn. Strat. 8.47.
\item \textsuperscript{193} Petit 1990, 41, 74 with n. 256. He underscores Herodotus’ statement (4.167), namely that in case of success the cities will be added to the empire or at least become tributary. Cf. Balcer 1995, 119.
\end{itemize}
cities would have been added to the empire or at least became tributary, which suggests that Persian imperialism was the real driving force behind Aryandes campaign and that the murder of Arcesilaus provided the pretext for Persian expansion.\(^{194}\)

In contrast, several scholars have argued that the Libyan campaign was not approved by Darius, and that its successful conclusion led Darius to deem Aryandes too independent.\(^{195}\) There are, however, two objections to this interpretation. First, the success of the rebellion was not as complete as it seems. Boedeker points out that while Pheretime got her opportunity to exact vengeance against those who murdered her son,\(^{196}\) Aryandes’ forces were harassed by the Libyans on their return journey to Egypt.\(^{197}\) It seems that Persian authority was reasserted in Cyrene and its immediate environs, but the adjacent regions remained independent.\(^{198}\) Second, Menecles of Barce notes that Pheretime not only persuaded Aryandes to assist her but that she also acquired an army from the King.\(^{199}\) While it is highly unlikely that Pheretime travelled to the royal court, the mention of the King may imply that he sanctioned the campaign.

**When Was Aryandes removed?**

The available evidence does not allow us to conclude whether it was the Aryandic silver coins, the allegedly unsanctioned Libyan expedition, or some unknown event which led to the unnatural death of Aryandes. We only know that Aryandes was charged and executed for unknown subversive activities. It is also uncertain when Aryandes was eliminated and how. The only concrete evidence is three Demotic texts dated to 493 and 492 BC which commemorate an exchange between Pherendates, the contemporary satrap of Egypt, and the local priests in the sanctuary of the god Khnum in Elephantine.\(^{200}\) Accordingly, it has been argued that Aryandes was eliminated by Darius when the latter came to Egypt in 518 BC and replaced by Pherendates.\(^{201}\) This interpretation is predicated on two assumptions. First, that the Egyptian uprising mentioned by Polyaenus continued until 518 BC. Second, that it was a satrapal revolt led by Aryandes rather than a domestic rebellion against Persian rule. As we have seen above, both assumptions are highly unlikely, and, therefore, the removal of Aryandes probably took place later on. Tuplin and Briant speculate that

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\(^{194}\) Hdt. 3.167.3, 4.167.

\(^{195}\) Burn 1984, 112; Petit 1990, 76. Balcer (1984, 138; 1987, 146–47) argues that the invasion to Libya was an act of rebellion, as Aryandes was seeking to consolidate his independent rule in the region. Tuplin (1989, 77) points out that Polyaenus uses the term ὠμότης to describe the cruelty of Aryandes, a term which Greek authors usually associate with tyrants. This might be another implicit indication that Aryandes conducted himself as if Egypt was his personal domain and failed to show sufficient deference to Darius.

\(^{196}\) Hdt. 4.202.

\(^{197}\) Hdt. 4.203.

\(^{198}\) Boedeker 2011, 218.

\(^{199}\) FGrH 270 F5: λαβοῦσα δὲ δύναμιν παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως. Briant (2002, 141) assumes that the Libyan campaign was in fact approved by Darius, but supplies no evidence for this assumption.

\(^{200}\) For the texts, see: PBerlin 13539 (December 493 BC); PBerlin 13540 (21 April 492 BC); PBerlin 13572 (7 June 492 BC). These document were published by Spiegelberg (1928). For English translation, see: Kuhrt 2007, no. 17.30.i–iii.

\(^{201}\) Petit 1990, 74; Balcer 1995, 118.
Aryandes was removed from office sometime during the last decade of the sixth century, while Descat proposes a later date, namely during the first decade of the fifth century BC.

**Conclusion**

Though much remains confused in respect to the circumstances regarding the rebellion and elimination of Aryandes, it seems clear that even after the immediate resistance to Darius’ accession was squashed, his rule was not unchallenged. The similarities between the rise and fall of Oroites and Aryandes are revealing. Both were powerful governors of frontier satrapies and both were appointed by Darius’ predecessors. The common theme is excessive satrapal independence which was perceived as a threat by the Great King. Consequently, the necessity to maintain obedience, especially among the satraps stationed far away from the royal court, must have been apparent to Darius.

Conclusion

The scarcity and brevity of the contemporary evidence on the imperial system which emerged during Darius’ reign renders it almost impossible to reconstruct each and every aspect of the measures and regulations which constituted Darius’ grand reform. We have seen, however, that numerous sources recount a watershed moment in the history of the Achaemenid Empire. For instance, when analyzing the site of Pasargadae, Stronach concludes that the contributions of Darius to the complex were probably “more drastic than has hitherto been realized”, and it seems that the same can be said regarding the Achaemenid imperial mechanism as a whole. We can conclude with confidence that Darius “revitalized the earlier controls to produce a strong imperial centralization”, and that this new apparatus was “more vibrant and intricate than that of Cambyses or Cyrus.”

The circumstances under which the satrapal system emerged were unique. Darius was the new Great King, whose status was far from undisputed. There is little doubt that disobedience among the subject nations and the aforementioned satraps, whether only in appearance or in actuality, was a direct outcome of Darius’ precarious position. Consequently, it seems highly likely that a central aspect of Darius’ reforms was a response to the chaos that engulfed the Persian Empire in the first years of his reign and that Darius’ aim was to ensure deference to the central authorities. This should not be interpreted as if there was a vacuum before Darius. I completely agree with Briant, who notes “neither Cyrus nor Cambyses had the simple aim of ruling in name only over some sort of loose federation.” Nevertheless, as noted by Cook, there are no indications for the existence of a uniform infrastructure of Achaemenid rule in the satrapies or a tributary system.

The revolts in Egypt and Lydia made it clear that satrapal power must be limited to prevent further instances of disobedience. This should be taken into consideration when

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203 Descat 1989a, 87.
204 Stronach 1997, 50.
205 Balcer 1984, 123.
207 Cook 1983, 173. This conclusion is accepted by Tuplin (1987a, 158), who still expresses hope that new evidence might allow us to acquire better understanding of the “of the manifold varieties” of the Achaemenid administrative apparatus.
208 Petit 1983, 44–45; Dandamaev 1984b, 41; Petit 1990, 40, 76.
seeking to assess the nature and character of the office of satrap and the royal measures which were aimed at securing satrapal fidelity. Such an assessment is difficult to achieve due to the scarcity of evidence dated to the reign of Darius. Nevertheless, we have seen that the Achaemenid institutions which were established by Darius persevered, as only minor changes took place in the subsequent generations. Thus, later sources, such as Xenophon’s *Oeconomicus* and the *Cyropaedia* to name two, are of the highest importance to the study of the imperial mechanism established by Darius in general, and the satrapal duties, responsibilities, military and financial capacity along with additional aspect of the office in particular.\(^{209}\) Of course, while broadening the documentary base is essential, we must follow Briant’s injunction, as we “must be mindful of the diachronic perspective, and see that any piece of evidence should “fit into a logical and coherent whole.”\(^{210}\) A careful analysis of sources dated to the fifth centuries BC can produce a valid reconstruction of the powers and maneuverability granted to the satraps by the Achaemenid Kings.

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\(^{209}\) Petit 1990, 108.

\(^{210}\) Briant 2002, 389
2. ACHAEMENID ROYAL SUPERVISION

The satrapal revolts of Oroites and Aryandes exposed a critical flaw in the Achaemenid imperial mechanism. The possibility that an overly ambitious satrap might exploit his access to the considerable resources which were at his disposal to challenge the Great King became a reality. Darius, therefore, must have realized that it was too risky to rely solely on the loyalty of the Persian elite and that additional measures were needed to ensure satrapal obedience. As we shall see, the Persian central authorities kept a close eye on the state of affairs in the satrapies through various means, e.g. the presence of military and civic officials in the satrapies who were appointed by the King, regular inspections of the satrapies by the King or one of his trustworthy representatives, and a network of royal informants. It is difficult to reconstruct the exact timeframe in which these regulations and institutions were inaugurated. Nevertheless, the challenges Darius faced during his rise to power and the subsequent reforms he implemented serve as a suitable framework for the emergence, or at the very least expansion, of the Achaemenid royal surveillance network in the satrapies.

2.1 Royal Personnel in the Satrapies

Garrison Commanders

Xenophon’s Model

One way to effectively monitor the satrapies was the placement of royal personnel in the satrapal administration. According to Xenophon, the Great King himself appointed the garrison commanders in the provinces. This practice, Xenophon claims, began with Cyrus the Elder, who, having installed garrisons in citadels, urban centers, and strategically important locations throughout the Empire, 211 personally appointed the garrison commanders, namely phrouarchs and chiliarchs, along with the soldiers under their command. 212 Xenophon also states that the purpose of this royal policy was to ensure satrapal compliance with royal directives since these officers were expected to inform the King whenever one of the satraps was growing too powerful or engaging in treasonous activities. In addition, if a satrapal revolt had erupted, the royal contingents in the satrapies were instructed to offer immediate opposition to the rebel forces. 213 Cyrus, Xenophon continues, was well aware that the presence of independent military forces in the satrapies was likely to be interpreted by the soon-to-be-satraps as a sign of distrust. Therefore, he sought to mitigate the anticipated disaffection by informing his newly-appointed governors about the conditions of their office before they were dispatched to their respective satrapies. 214 In essence, Xenophon envisions this measure as a way to curtail satrapal military power. 215

211 Xen. Cyr. 8.6.3. For a comprehensive survey of the literary and archaeological records on Achaemenid garrisons, see: Tuplin 1987c; Tuplin 1988.
212 Xen. Cyr. 8.6.1, 9.
213 Xen. Cyr. 8.6.1.
215 Petit 1990, 111. In addition, Petit (1990, 112–13) postulates that the rebellions of Oroites and Aryandes were partially due to Darius’ effort to reduce satrapal military power. While this suggestion might be pertinent
In the *Oeconomicus*, Xenophon claims that the Great Persian King was first and foremost concerned with the economic well-being of the satrapies and the readiness of the military satrapal contingents. To this end, he appointed two classes of officials with discrete areas of responsibility: 216


And the officers who are appointed to each of these [areas of responsibility] are not the same men. On the one hand, there are those who govern the inhabitants and the workers, and they exact tribute from them. On the other hand, there are those who command the men-at-arms and the garrisons. If the garrison commander fails to adequately secure the land, the civic governor who is in charge of the workers files a complaint against the garrison commander, because, due to lack of defense, it is impossible to cultivate the land. If, however, the garrison commander provides peace for the workers, while the civic governor has a thinly populated land and scarcely toiled fields, the former can lodge a complaint against the latter. Generally, those who cultivate the land ineffectively can neither maintain the garrisons nor pay tribute. But whenever a satrap is appointed, he is responsible for both.

The historical accuracy and even authenticity of the information Xenophon provides on various aspects of the Persian Empire has been rightly criticized. 217 Nevertheless, it is generally accepted that while Xenophon’s statements on Persian matters are imperfect they still constitute a useful historical source for Persian traditions, institutions and practices. 218

to Oroites’ revolt, I find hard to believe that it was connected in any way to the grim end of Aryandes. First, as we have seen, Aryandes was eliminated at least a decade after Darius’ rise to power. Second, while there are several possible explanations for Darius’ decision to execute Aryandes, the only possible provocation on the satrap’s part was the series of satrapal coins he minted without royal approval. Third, if Aryandes was determined to retain his military might, one might have expected Herodotus to include at least a hint regarding a military clash between the Great King and his disobedient satrap.


218 Cf. Knauth 1975, 7–63; Briant 1982a, 34 n. 6; Briant 1982b, 185; Hornblower 1982, 147–48; Frye 1984, 95, 112–14; Walser 1984, 114; Hirsch 1985, 61–85; Dandamaev and Lukonin 1989, 102–3, 111, 222–23, 395; Petit 1990, 108; Pomeroy 1994, 237–38, 244; Masaracchia 1996; Briant 2002, 7; Tuplin 2004, 182–83; Klinkott 2005, 34; Gray 2010, 24 n. 63; Gruen 2011, 54. On the matter of the reliability of Xenophon’s *Cyropaedia*, I agree with Briant’s (2002, 7) suggestion, namely that “it is necessary, then, at each step, to distinguish the kernel of Achaemenid facts from the Greek interpretation—not always an easy task.” Moreover, Pomeroy (1994, 8 with n. 58) reminds us that since “inscriptions and the visual arts of the Achaemenids corroborate Xenophon’s reports about Persian culture in general, Iranologists have long accepted this testimony and pay as much attention to the *Cyropaedia* and *Oeconomicus* as they do to the *Anabasis*.” On Xenophon’s Persian sources, see: Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1985; Gera 1993, 13–22. Even those who expressed their doubts about Xenophon’s overall reliability admit that his accounts should not be utterly disregarded due to his first-hand knowledge of the Persian Empire: See: Cook 1983, 20; Cook 1985, 207;
In regard to the information provided by Xenophon in the *Cyropaedia* and the *Oeconomicus* on the satrapal administrative apparatus, Tuplin observes that it is “far from identical but quite consistent.” Such consistency suggests that this passage was not a mere figment of Xenophon’s imagination but his own understanding of the satrapal administrative institutions gained during the time he spent in the court of Cyrus the Younger and on his march to and from the Persian heartland. As such, it should be taken into consideration.

It is evident that Xenophon describes two specific offices in the satrapal hierarchy: the civic governor, who was responsible for effective exploitation of the agricultural potential of royal domain; and the garrison commander, who functioned as the commander-in-chief of the satrapal military contingents and whose primary duty was to protect to King’s land. Xenophon’s final remark in the cited passage seems to contradict his statements in the *Cyropaedia*, namely that the garrison commanders were appointed by and directly responsible to the Great King. A cogent explanation is offered by Pomeroy, who argues that Xenophon says that not all of the regions in the Persian Empire were administered by satraps, (e.g. Cyprus) but whenever a satrap was appointed, he was responsible for the civic and military aspect of the satrapal administration. In fact, it is widely held that the aforementioned specialized officers reported directly to the satrap rather than the King.

**Royal Garrisons**

Nevertheless, since Xenophon’s description of the satraps’ position of the vis-à-vis the garrison commanders is unclear, it becomes imperative to seek additional evidence. The only explicit instance of a garrison commander being appointed by the Persian Kings is recounted by Arrian, who reports that Hegesistratus, the garrison commander in Miletus in 334 BC, was appointed by Darius III. Yet, royal affiliation can be found in other instances. Xenophon, for example, states that the garrison on the Syrian side of the Cilician Gates in 401 BC was under royal authority. Xenophon also claims that Orontes, the commander of the garrison in Sardis, was following Artaxerxes II’s orders when he attempted to hinder the eastward advance of Cyrus the Younger, the satrap of Lydia who rose in revolt and presumably Orontes’ superior. The loyalty of Orontes to the Great

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Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1985; Tuplin 1987a; Tuplin 1987c; Tuplin 1988. The limitations of Xenophon’s personal experience are highlighted by Cawkwell (2005, 16), but they are far from enough to completely discredit Xenophon’s testimony.

219 Tuplin 1988, 67.
220 For instance, Cawkwell (2005, 16) asserts that Xenophon simply contradicts himself, and the apparent lack of consistency was caused by the limited knowledge he could have accumulated during his travels in the Persian Empire and later under the service of Agesilaus.
223 Arr. *An.* 1.18.4: Ἡγεσιστράτος γάρ, ὃς ἔφεσά την Ἑλληστικὸν ἐκ βασιλέως ἐπέτραπτο. Tuplin (1988, 69) notes that this is the only known historical account of a garrison commander being appointed by the Persian King.
224 Xen. *An.* 1.4.4: τὸ δὲ ἔξοδο τοῦ πρὸ τῆς Συρίας βασιλέως ἐλέγετο φυλακῆ φιλάττειν.
225 Xen. *An.* 1.6.6-7. Weiskopf (1982, 47) argues that Orontes’ motivation to defy Cyrus was predicated on personal enmity rather than administrative separation of powers. Such interpretation is flawed since,
King has led some to argue that his actions suggest that he answered directly to the King rather than to Cyrus.\textsuperscript{226} Indeed, his machinations correspond with the aforementioned protocol according to which royal forces in the satrapies were expected to oppose a revolting satrap.\textsuperscript{227}

The presence of non-local levies in the satrapies might be an implicit indication of the existence of garrisons which were under direct royal authority. For instance, Herodotus states that the Achaemenid garrison stationed in Memphis was composed of Persians and their allies.\textsuperscript{228} The Persian spearmen in the satrapal court of Oroites, who eventually turned against him, were probably a part of the garrison of Sardis.\textsuperscript{229} The grave goods from the cemetery in Deve Hüyük, which was in use in the first quarter of the fifth century BC, reveal that it was used predominantly by Persian soldiers rather than native Syrians.\textsuperscript{230} But the foreign element in Achaemenid garrisons was not limited to soldiers of Persian origin. The numerous documents discovered at Elephantine in Egypt reveal that the soldiers serving in the local Achaemenid garrison consisted of troops of local descent, i.e. Jews and Egyptians,\textsuperscript{231} as well as foreigners, e.g. Arameans,\textsuperscript{232} Caspians,\textsuperscript{233} Medes,\textsuperscript{234} Chorasmians,\textsuperscript{235} Babylonians\textsuperscript{236} and Persians.\textsuperscript{237} Doubtlessly, these soldiers were transported from their homelands by the Persian central authorities and installed in foreign territories to ensure obedience to the Persian authorities. Thus, it is not out of the question that these were the royal garrisons described by Xenophon and that their officers were appointed directly by the King.\textsuperscript{238}

\textsuperscript{226} Lewis 197, 53 n. 21; Briant 2002, 617-18.
\textsuperscript{227} IT should be noted that after Orontes was captured by the rebel prince, Cyrus described him as his subject (ὑπήκοος), a designation which implies that Orontes was, at least from Cyrus’ viewpoint, his immediate subordinate.
\textsuperscript{228} Hdt. 3.91: Περσαέων τε τούς ἐν τῷ Λεωκῷ τείχεϊ τῷ ἐν Μέμφι κατοικήμουσι κατακατεμετρέουσι καὶ τοὺς τούτους ἑπακούοντο.
\textsuperscript{229} Hdt. 3.128.
\textsuperscript{230} Culican 1965, 146–47; Moorey 1975.
\textsuperscript{232} Porten et al. 1996, B23, B28-30, B32, B33, B36, B41-42, B45, B49, and B50-51. Interestingly, those who are denoted as Arameans in the documents were also Jews of Aramean ethnicity. On the distinction between those who are identified as “Jews of Elephantine” and those designated as “Arameans of Syene”, see: Porten et al. 1996, 153 n. 4.
\textsuperscript{233} Porten et al. 1996, B29, B37-38, B45.
\textsuperscript{234} Porten et al. 1996, B24, B29, 39, B50, B77.
\textsuperscript{235} Porten et al. 1996, B24. Klinkott (2005, 297 n. 65) suggests that the designation ‘Caspian’ was not ethnic in nature but territorial and adds that those identified as Caspians may have been equated with those who came from Parthia.
\textsuperscript{236} Porten et al. 1996, B23-25, B31.
\textsuperscript{237} Porten et al. 1996, B10, B24-26, B28-30, and B50.
\textsuperscript{238} During his short reign, Alexander the Great personally appointed garrison commanders on numerous occasions: Sardis (Arr. An. 1.17.1), Memphis and Pelusium (Arr. An. 3.5.2-3), Susa (Curt. 5.2.16-17; Arr. An. 3.16.9), Persepolis (Curt. 5.6.11), and Babylon (Diod. 17.64.5; Curt. 5.1.43; Arr. An. 3.16.4). Accordingly, several scholars (e.g. G. T. Griffith 1964, 29; Badian 1965, 173 n. 5; Anson 2004, 159 n. 35; Anson 2013, 140–41) have argued that Alexander’s habit of appointing high-profile military officers in the
Garrisons Commanders as Satrapal Appointees

Despite the above, there are several known instances in which garrison commanders were appointed by satraps. According to a trilingual inscription from Xanthus dated to c. 337 BC, Pixodaros son of Hecatomnus, the satrap of Lycia, appointed a certain Apollodorus as the επιμελητής of Xanthus Artemelis, a term which, in this context, should be understood as a garrison commander. Moreover, in the second half of the fifth century BC Nehemiah, the governor (pehā) of Yehud, appointed his brother Hannaniah as the overseer of the newly fortified city in Jerusalem (sar habira), a position which probably denotes the chief of the castle, i.e. the garrison commander. In Egypt, several documents recovered from the site of the Achaemenid garrison at Syene-Elephantine contain the term rab-ḥaylā (‘chief of the army’), which corresponds with the Greek phrouarch. The rab-ḥaylā is described as a subordinate of the frataraka (‘superintendent’), a deputy of the satrap whose post combined military and civil prerogatives. In a similar fashion to the biblical sources, the garrison commander is described as a subordinate of the satrap’s viceroy, which suggests that he was under satrapal authority. Furthermore, a letter dated to the late fifth century BC contains a response of Arsames, the satrap of Egypt, to a complaint issued by one of his subordinate clerics (פקדיא) Psamshek, an Egyptian, against a garrison commander named Armapiya. It seems that Armapiya and the soldiers under his command refused to follow the orders of Psamshek, and for that the officer was reproached by the satrap. This correspondence serves as another indication that the garrison commander in Elephantine was responsible to the satrap. All in all, these instances give the

satrapies was predicated on a well-established Persian practice. While this hypothesis might be true, it remains speculative due to lack of substantive evidence.

239 R&O no. 87. Hornblower (1982, 147) demonstrates that the term epimeletes designates garrison commanders by pointing out several similar employments of the term in other instances. See: Xen. Hell. 3.2.11; IG XII (8) 5 line 6 (Lemnos, 4th century); Syll. 3534 lines 5-6 (Delphi, 218/17 BC); Polyb. 4.80.15.

240 Neh. 7:2. The appointment of Hannaniah occurred during Nehemiah’s first term as the governor of Yehud, which spanned from the 23rd until the 32nd regnal year of Artaxerxes I, i.e. from 445 to 433 BC. See: Neh. 5:14. The case of Hannaniah is rather striking since Nehemiah was the underling of the satrap who governed the satrapy Beyond-the-River. It seems reasonable to assume that since Jerusalem was neither a satrapal seat nor a key strategic position, the satrap may have delegated the appointment of the garrison commander to his underling.

241 For example, an Aramaic document (AP no. 1), dated to 495 BC, mentions a certain Ravaka who presided as the garrison commander (rab-haylā) in Elephantine. For additional appearances of the term rab-haylā in Aramaic documents from Egypt, see: AP no. 16, line 7 (an appeal to a higher court, c. 435 BC); AP no. 20, line 5 (a settlement of a claim, 420 BC); AP no. 20, line 5 (a settlement of a claim, 420 BC); AP no. 25, lines 2 and 4 (a renunciation of a claim, 416 BC); AP no. 38, line 3 (a letter of recommendation, before 411 BC); AP no. 54, line 14 (fragments, unknown date). Moreover, Spiegelberg (1928, 621–22) suggests that the Persian Artabanes, who is mentioned in a document concerning grain transport sent to Pherendates the above mentioned the satrap of Egypt, was the garrison commander of Syene.

242 See, for instance, the case of Waidrang/Vidarnga, the son of the above mentioned Ravaka. Cowely (1923, 51) observes that Waidrang/Vidarnga presided as rab-haylā (AP nos. 16, 20, 25, 38) under a frataraka named Nephayan, and that sometime before 411 BC he was promoted to the position of frataraka (AP no. 30).


244 AD no. 4; TADAE I, A6.8.
impression that the garrison commanders, whether appointed directly by the Great King or not, were under the authority of the satrap.\footnote{Even if there were garrisons which were nominally under the King’s authority, the fact that the satraps functioned as paymasters (e.g. Xen. \textit{Cyr.} 8.6.3, 11; \textit{Oec.} 4.5-6, 11) meant that they had considerable leverage to enforce obedience. Furthermore, the wages of the military personnel were financed by satrapal revenue (Xen. \textit{Oec.} 4.11; Xen. \textit{Cyr.} 7.5.69; Hdt. 3.91), over which the satrap exercised control. Lastly, the satraps had the authority to levy troops for the protection of their satrapy (e.g. Xen. \textit{Cyr.} 8.6.10-11; Xen. \textit{An.} 1.1.6), which suggests that these forces answered directly to the satrap.}

**Solving the Discrepancy**

The discrepancies regarding the status of the garrison commanders in the satrapies have led to various scholarly interpretations. Several scholars have simply accepted the notion that the Achaemenid Kings exercised direct control over the garrison commanders.\footnote{Ehtécham 1946, 113–14; Olmstead 1948, 59; Weiskopf 1982, 47; Cook 1985, 273; Wiesehöfer 1996, 62; Klinkott 2005, 289–94.} Others, mindful of the inconsistency in the ancient sources, offered alternative explanations. Petit, for instance, argues that satrapal military authority gradually increased during the fifth century BC and by the end of the century the satraps exercised full control over military affairs in their respective provinces. In addition, he postulates that Xenophon, who was mindful of the contemporary state of affairs, refers to an earlier period when satrapal military power was still limited.\footnote{Petit 1990, 106–7. For a discussion on the extent of satrapal power in regard to military matters, see p. 56 below.} Such interpretation, however, seems problematic since Xenophon explicitly says that garrison commanders were appointed by the Persian King in his own time.\footnote{Xen. \textit{Cyr.} 8.6.9.} Therefore, even if satrapal authority increased during the fifth century BC, the Achaemenid kings continued to personally appoint garrison commander well into the fourth century BC. An alternative explanation is offered by Dandamaev and Lukonin, who argue that it was Darius I who stripped the satraps of their military command by personally appointing the garrison commanders in the satrapies. But Darius’ new protocol was not strictly observed by the Great King’s successors, which caused the discrepancy in the ancient sources regarding satrapal military authority.\footnote{Dandamaev and Lukonin 1989, 101.}

A more cogent explanation, in my view, is offered by Lewis, who convincingly argues that the inconsistency in the ancient sources demonstrates that there was no uniform procedure and that there is no reason to expect that all Achaemenid garrisons were under direct royal authority.\footnote{Lewis 1977, 53 n. 21.} Similarly, Hornblower argues that Xenophon’s account is not false but rather too schematic, and as such provides a rigid description of Achaemenid practices.\footnote{Hornblower 1982, 147–48. In addition, Kuhrt (1983a, 148, 150) and Briant (2002, 70, 507) has questioned the notion that the Achaemenids had ever imposed the same administrative structure in each satrapy and that such a monolithic structure ever existed. It is rather certain that the Achaemenids applied a slimier approach in regard to the garrisons in the satrapies.} It is quite possible, as Briant suggests, that the Achaemenid Kings appointed garrison commanders, who presumably reported directly to the central authorities, only in critical locations as satrapal capitals and treasury deposits.\footnote{Briant 2002, 343.} Moreover, several scholars have
pointed out that neither Xenophon nor any other source explicitly claims that the garrison commanders, even when they were appointed by the Great King himself, were exempted from satrapal directives.\(^{253}\) One must admit that it would have been very difficult for any satrap to carry on his duties with success if the garrison commanders were not obligated to follow his commands.\(^{254}\) Therefore, it is more than plausible that while in theory the garrisons were under royal authority, in practice they were still obligated to follow satrapal orders,\(^{255}\) though the garrison commanders probably had the discretion to disobey a satrap if it was apparent that his actions were against the King’s interests.\(^{256}\) In sum, the Persian protocol regarding the garrisons in the satrapies was fairly flexible. Notwithstanding the obligation of the garrison commanders and their soldiers to follow satrapal orders, they were ultimately expected to safeguard royal interests. Accordingly, royal appointments were clearly designated to enhance loyalty to the King, and as a result rendered it considerably more difficult for any satrap to rally sufficient military might to challenge the Great King.

**The Origin of the Measure**

While we can neither refute nor corroborate Xenophon’s claim that this practice was established by Cyrus the Elder, the satrapal revolts of Oroites and Aryandes probably led Darius to the conclusion that it was imperative to curtail satrapal military prerogatives.\(^ {257}\) Indeed, the cautious conduct of Bagaius when appearing before Oroites reveals that Darius and his emissary had their doubts regarding the fidelity of the Persian officials present at Sardis to their new Great King. Therefore, these circumstances may have prompted a change in the manner in which garrison commanders were appointed, but despite the official change in policy, in actuality it may have been implemented only in regions which demanded tighter royal control.

**Royal Chancellors**

Royal personnel in the satrapies were not limited to the military hierarchy. Ample evidence demonstrates the presence of royal chancellors and scribes in the provinces. Herodotus, for example, notes the presence of a royal secretary (τὸ γραμματεῖο τῶ βασιλείων) in Oroites’ court and adds that each satrap had a royal scribe at his disposal.\(^ {258}\) According to Xenophon, during his stay in the Cappadocian city of Dana, Cyrus the Younger put to death a Persian named Megaphernes, a wearer of the royal purple (φοινικιστήν βασιλείων),\(^ {259}\)

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\(^ {254}\) Briant 2002, 340, 343.

\(^ {255}\) Porten 1968, 43; Klinkott 2005, 301–2.

\(^ {256}\) Tuplin 1987c, 171; Dusinberre 2013, 87.

\(^ {257}\) Petit 1990, 112–13. In contrast, Lewis (1977, 25 n. 21) argues that the independence of the garrison stationed in Sardis was the outcome of the more recent satrapal revolt led by Pissuthnes (see p. 147 below), which took place in c. 420 BC. Nevertheless, Lewis’ argument relies mainly on the chorological proximity of Pissuthnes’ revolt rather than substantive evidence.

\(^ {258}\) Hdt. 3.128.3.

\(^ {259}\) Xen. An. 1.2.20. Lendle (1995, 25) connects this event to the ravaging of the region of Lycaonia by Cyrus’ Greek mercenaries. He argues that Megaphernes and his accomplice staged a revolt in Lycaonia against Cyrus, an act which led Cyrus to deem Lycaonia as hostile territory.
and it has been argued that this title designates a royal scribe.\textsuperscript{260} Official documents from Achaemenid Egypt corroborate the existence of a satrapal chancellery, which was apparently supervised by an official who might have been the royal chancellor mentioned in the Greek sources. For example, three officials are named in the subscript of a Demotic letter dated to 492 BC, which was sent by the satrap of Egypt Pherendates to the Wab priests of Khanum at Elephantine. The first, a Persian named Satibar, was “cognizant of this order”, the second, an Egyptian named Peftuaneith, was “the one who wrote (the letter)”, and the third, another Egyptian by the name of Wahipre, “wrote (this letter)”.\textsuperscript{261} Satibar probably presided as the satrapal chancellor, and as such had the authority over routine business and the satrap’s official correspondence, while Peftuaneith and Wahipre functioned as secretaries in the satrapal chancellery responsible for translating official documents into Aramaic and Demotic.\textsuperscript{262} A similar administrative protocol is attested in two Aramaic letters dispatched by Arsames, also a satrap of Egypt. The first letter, addressed to Armapiya, an Anatolian man who was an officer commanding a company of troops, is signed by Bagasravi, a Persian who presided as the chancellor, and Ahpepî, an Egyptian who functioned as the scribe.\textsuperscript{263} The second letter is signed by the chancellor Anani, a Hebrew name, and Nabuaqab, the scribe.\textsuperscript{264} Though we are not explicitly told that these official were of royal status, their senior position and foreign origin has led scholars to identify them as a royal element in the satrapal government.\textsuperscript{265}

Similarly, there is a Babylonian clay tablet signed by Liblut and Gadalama, who are recognized as sepiru, scribes who wrote Aramaic on parchment, and \textit{bēl ţemi}, i.e. chancellors.\textsuperscript{266} This dual title, which clearly designates a high ranking official in the satrapal hierarchy,\textsuperscript{267} seems to be equivalent to the chancellor mentioned in the Egyptian sources. Moreover, the biblical sources mention two Samaritans, Rehum and Shimshai, who wrote to King Artaxerxes I against the rebuilding of the temple in Jerusalem. Rehum was acting as \textit{בְעֵל תְעֵם}, the Aramaic equivalent of the Akkadian \textit{bēl ţemi}, i.e. chancellor,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Lewis 1977, 25 n. 143; Tuplin 1987a, 118; Asheri, Lloyd, and Corella 2007, 510–11. The Greek term ποινικαστάς is attested in a Cretan inscription, in which it denotes the term ‘scribe’ or ‘recorder’. Cf. Lilian H. Jeffery and Morpurgo-Davies 1970, 132–33; Raubitschek 1970, 155; Virgilio 1975, 83–84. In contrast, Weiskopf (1982, 26) argues that the title ascribed to Megaphernes indicates that he held some title in the court hierarchy of Susa. Such interpretation is problematic since one wonders why Megaphernes was in Cappadocia far away from the royal capital. It is more probable that he was sent to Sardis as a royal scribe, perhaps after he held a position of some importance at the royal court.
\item PBerlin 13540. Published by Spiegelberg (1928, 605–6). For an English translation, see: Porten et al. 1996, C1; Kuhrt 2007, no. 17.30.ii.
\item Hughes 1984, 83; Porten et al. 1996, 291 ns. 15-17; Kuhrt 2007, 854 ns. 7-8.
\item AD no. 4; TADEI, A6.8. The letter is dated to the late fifth century BC. For an English translation, see: Kuhrt 2007, no. 16.60.iii.
\item AP no. 26; TADEI A6.2. The document is dated to 411 BC. For an English translation, see: Kuhrt 2007, no. 14.44.
\item Stolper 1989b, 298–303; Kuhrt 2007, 729 n. 8.
\item This legal document (BM 74554) was published and translated by Stolper (1989b, 284–86). Further on the office of \textit{bēl ţemi}, see discussion at Luukko 2007, 231 n. 18.
\item Stolper 1989b, 299; Briant 2002, 447. For an English translation, see: Brosius 2000, no. 130; Kuhrt 2007, no. 16.60.i.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
while Shimshai was the סָפְרָא, which is translated as scribe.\textsuperscript{268} The formulation and titles suggest that the chancellery of the satrapy Across-the-River resembled that of Egypt in structure and procedure.\textsuperscript{269} More importantly, the fact that the addressee of their petition was the Great Persian King himself indicates that they were prominent officers who had direct access to the royal court. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the satrapal chancelleries were supervised by senior officials who were either appointed by the King or were affiliated in some way with the royal court.\textsuperscript{270}

The chancellor, it seems, had considerable power and influence. In spite of the technical nature of the functions and duties of the satrapal chancellery, namely reading, writing, and dispatching official documents, the chancellor held a critical position in the administrative hierarchy.\textsuperscript{271} He was probably a permanent member of the satrapal entourage whose duties included management of the administrative and financial day-to-day affairs in the satrapy as well as supervising official correspondence, including letters sent from the royal court.\textsuperscript{272} Accordingly, they could and probably were expected to inform the King when a certain satrap was not fulfilling his duty or even plotting against the great King.\textsuperscript{273} As a result, it must have been extremely difficult for any satrap to keep the central authorities in the dark regarding the true state of affairs in his province.

**Royal Judges**

Royal judges constituted another class of royal administrators who were present in the satrapies. According to Herodotus, these royal judges (βασιλήιοι δικασταί) were exclusively Persian, appointed for life, and members of the royal entourage.\textsuperscript{274} Their duties

\textsuperscript{268} Ezra 4:8-9. Rehum is also mentioned in 1 Esdras (2:17, 27) and in Josephus’ Antiquities (11.26), where he is described as he who records/writes down the affairs that happen (Ράθμος ὁ τὰ προσπέπτοντα).

\textsuperscript{269} We have seen before how the satrap Tatnai sent a letter to Darius to complain about the allegedly unauthorized construction of the temple in Jerusalem. Unfortunately, the sources provide only the gist of his accusations, but one can speculate that the letter was signed by two of his aides who held similar positions to Rehum and Shimshai’s.

\textsuperscript{270} Lewis 1977, 25 n. 143; Weiskopf 1982, 47; Burn 1984, 107; Tuplin 1987a, 120; Stolper 1989b, 298–303; Asheri, Lloyd, and Corcella 2007, 510; Kuhrt 2007, 817 n. 3. Interestingly, numerous documents from Persepolis (e.g. PF 654-662, 665-669, 672) feature a subscript which is signed in a similar manner to the official documents found in Egypt and Babylon, i.e. ‘X wrote (the text)’; ‘Y communicated its message’. The predominance of this feature led scholars to conclude that the individuals who signed these documents were senior officials in the royal chancellery, which plausibly resembled in structure and function to the satrapal chancellery, e.g.: Lewis 1977, 10; Stolper 1984, 305 with n. 17; Tuplin 1987a, 118. For the various formulae employed in the Persepolis Fortification and Treasury Texts, see: Lewis 1977, 10 n. 38.

\textsuperscript{271} The technical nature of these secretaries is attested in Herodotus (7.100.1), who recounts how during a review of his invasion force, all of the interactions of Xerxes with his subordinates were recorded by the scribes (οἱ γραμματσταί). Moreover, when Xerxes was watching the battle at Salamis, Herodotus (8.90.4) reports, whenever the Great King observed a gallant deed performed by one of his ships, he asked for the name of the trierarch, his patronymic and city of origin, information which, again, was recorded by the scribes.

\textsuperscript{272} Porten 1968, 55–56.

\textsuperscript{273} Tuplin 1987a, 120.

\textsuperscript{274} Herodotus (3.14.5) reports that royal judges accompanied Cambyses during his Egyptian campaign and were responsible for deciding the punishment of the Egyptians who participated in a massacre of a crew of a Mytilenian trireme. Moreover, Herodotus (3.31.2-4) recounts an episode in which Cambyses, wanting to legitimize his marriage to his sister, turned to the royal judges. The latter, wishing to refrain from antagonizing their master, proclaimed that while there is no law that sanctioned a marriage between a man
included interpretation of ancestral ordinance and institutions and giving judgement when asked.\textsuperscript{275} But the responsibilities of these officials were not limited to the royal court. An Aramaic papyrus from Elephantine dated to 495 BC notes the presence of royal judges (דינ
\textsuperscript{276} in the region, which demonstrates that the Royal judges travelled to the satrapies.\textsuperscript{276} The impetus for sending the royal judges to the provinces is clarified by several documents from Babylon which mention the office of \textit{dayyānu ša rēš šarrī}, also abbreviated as ša rēšī, a term which means ‘judge of the king’.\textsuperscript{277} These officials, who were clearly of royal status,\textsuperscript{278} had various areas of responsibilities, e.g. members of the royal, satrapal and military administration in addition to tax collection duties.\textsuperscript{279} Furthermore, in the book of Ezra we are told that Artaxerxes II sent a letter to Ezra which granted him the power to appoint judges for all the peoples of the satrapy Beyond-the-River.\textsuperscript{280} The fact that these judiciary officials were appointed not by the satrap but by a special delegate empowered by the King implies a royal status of some sort,\textsuperscript{281} and even if these officials were obligated to obey the satrap,\textsuperscript{282} the presence of an independent judiciary authority must have come and his sister, there was a law which stated that the Great King of the Persians was allowed to do whatever he wanted. Kuhrt (2007, 604 n. 7) observes that a similar episode occurs in Plutarch’s biography of Artaxerxes II (\textit{Art. 23}), in which Parysatis persuaded her son to marry his daughter Atossa by arguing that it was the divine prerogative of the Great King to judge what is good and bad.

\textsuperscript{275} Hdt. 3.31.3. Diodorus (15.8.3-5, 10-11) adds that they presided as judges in high-profile trials and bring as an example the trial of Tiribazus, the former satrap of Lydia. It should be noted that royal judges were harshly punished by the Great Kings for accepting bribes, see: Hdt. 5, 25, 7,194; Diod. 15.10.1.

\textsuperscript{276} AP no. 1; TADAE II B5.1. For an English translation, see: Greenfield and Porten 1982, 106–7; Kuhrt 2007, no. 17.29. The royal status of these judges becomes even more evident in light of evidence for other officials in Egypt who bore judiciary titles which lacked any royal affiliation. For instance, a fragmentary Aramaic papyrus from Elephantine, dated to the reign of Artaxerxes I, which mention ‘provincial judges’ (אמדנתא). See: AP no. 16; TADAE I A5.2. For an English translation, see: DAE no. 18; Kuhrt 2007, 14.36. In addition, two Aramaic fragments from Saqqara dated to the fifth century BC mention the title ‘judges’ or ‘law-officials’ (Ar. ḏ[ḥ]bry = OP ḏătabara) without mentioning any royal affiliation. See: Segal nos. 13-14.

\textsuperscript{277} The component šarrī means ‘of the king’ or ‘royal’.

\textsuperscript{278} Dandamaev 1999a, 54; Bongenaar 1997, 99–100; Fried 2004, 31. For instance, in the archives of the temple of Eanna in Uruk the title ša rēšī šarrī bēl piqitti Eanna is well attested throughout the duration of the archive. Two of these royal officials presided at the treasurer (ša muḫḫī quppi ša šarrī ina Eanna) and as the supervisor (ša-rēš šarrī bēl piqitti ša Eanna) of the temple. Fried (2004, 31) notes that the title of ša rēšī šarrī bēl piqitti appears in documents dated to the reigns of Cyrus the Great, Cambyses and Darius I, and therefore it is certain that this office was adopted by the Achaemenids when Babylon was converted from an independent kingdom into a Persian satrapy. For the ša-rēš šarrī as a member of the Eanna temple administration in the reigns of Cyrus and Cambyses, see: Jursa 2011a, 161–63. For the reign of Darius I, see: BM 25660, Borsippa, dated to 494 BC (see: Jursa and Waerzeggers 2009, 256 with n. 104); BM 31572, Babylon, dated to 497 or 496 BC (see: Abraham 2004, no. 31); BM 30980, Babylon, dated to 496 BC (see: Abraham 2004, no. 31); BM 3059, Babylon, dated to 487 BC (see: Abraham 2004, no. 16).

\textsuperscript{279} Jursa 2011, 163. On the Neo-Babylonian origin of this office along with a survey of the available evidence and their duties, see: Holtz 2009, 27–47, 55–62; Holtz 2010.

\textsuperscript{280} Ezra 7:25.

\textsuperscript{281} Fried 2004, 217. Grabbe (1994, 293) postulates that Ezra may have been appointed as the governor of the satrapy Beyond-the-River. Such reading seems a bit too far reaching since Ezra’s area of activity was clearly confined to Yehud and, to our best knowledge, those who were appointed as satraps were exclusively of Persian origin.

\textsuperscript{282} Grabbe 1994, 293; Fried 2004, 217. For further reading on the judiciary institutions and protocols of the Achaemenid Empire, see: Fried 2001.
at the expense of the authority of the satrap.\textsuperscript{283} Since these officers were royal agents, they were probably predisposed to observe the actions of the satrap and inform the central authorities about any satrapal misconduct.\textsuperscript{284}

### 2.2 Yearly Royal Review

Periodic inspections constituted another measure designed to facilitate effective royal supervision. Xenophon claims that an annual royal review (ἀπόδειξις) was instituted by Cyrus the Elder.\textsuperscript{285} This inspection focused on two primary aspects. The first was the readiness of the satrapal military contingents. Xenophon says that the Persian central authorities assigned a fixed quota of horsemen, archers, slingers, and light-armed troops to each satrapy for the protection of the King’s land.\textsuperscript{286} and every year the King conducted an inspection of the preparedness of these forces.\textsuperscript{287} The review took place at the place of muster (σύλλογος), a specific location which functioned as a mobilization center for satrapal forces.\textsuperscript{288} During the review the troops marched in full battle gear before the great King, who inspected the condition of the various regiments. Garrison commanders, chiliarchs and satraps whose troops were well-equipped were rewarded, while those who neglected their duties were punished.\textsuperscript{289} The yearly royal review of the satrapal military contingents as described by Xenophon is not mentioned elsewhere, but there are two instances which illustrate the mechanism of this practice. Xenophon reports that while Cyrus the Younger camped in Cilicia, he held a review of his army. The armed forces marched in battle array, while Cyrus gazed upon them from his war-chariot.\textsuperscript{290} A similar description is provided by Herodotus, who recounts the manner in which Xerxes reviewed his army and navy at Doriscus. The infantry and cavalry were inspected as he rode through the camp on his chariot. Then, he boarded a Sidonian ship and surveyed the fleet.\textsuperscript{291}

The second aspect of the yearly review focused on the economic well-being of the satrapies. The aforementioned civic governors and their immediate superiors, the satraps, were punished if their domain was insufficiently cultivated and thinly populated due to poor judgment or excessive severity. But additional territory, gifts and various other honors were given to those whose domain flourished and prospered.\textsuperscript{292}

\textsuperscript{283} Hornblower 1982, 150.
\textsuperscript{284} Fried 2004, 214.
\textsuperscript{285} Xen. Cyr. 8.6.15.
\textsuperscript{286} Xen. Oec. 4.5.
\textsuperscript{287} Xen. Cyr. 8.6.15.
\textsuperscript{288} Xen. Oec. 4.6. According to Xenophon (An. 1.1.2, 1.9.7; Hell. 1.4.3) the Castolus Plain was the designated muster place of the Lydian satrapy and its immediate environ. Moreover, Xenophon mentions the plain of Cayster in Hellespontine Phrygia (Cyr. 2.1.5), and a location called Thymbrara (Cyr. 6.2.11) as rallying points for Persian forces. Thymbrara is identified by Petit (1990, 134 n. 115) as the Castolus Plain while Briant (2002, 411) suggests a location in Syria. Ecbatana (Diod. 14.22.1), Susa (Diod. 11.2.3) and possibly Babylon (Xen. Cyr. 5.3.45) functioned as muster places for the royal armies. It should be noted that the Aramaic term that designates the rallying point of Achaemenid forces is hndz or hndyz. See: AP 13, line 4 and AP 27, line 7. For a discussion on the Aramaic term, see: Petit 1990, 134 n. 116.
\textsuperscript{289} Xen. Oec. 4.6-7.
\textsuperscript{290} Xen. An. 1.2.14-18.
\textsuperscript{291} Hdt. 7.100.
\textsuperscript{292} Xen. Oec. 4.6-8.
However, the effectiveness and extent of these yearly royal reviews must have been limited. Xenophon claims that the garrison troops were not obligated to present themselves for inspection at the muster place.\(^{293}\) On the one hand, there is little doubt that leaving numerous key strategic positions unguarded at the same time meant that the satrapy was unnecessarily exposed. On the other hand, it is highly improbable that the garrison troops were not liable for inspection. Tuplin suggests that the King or his proxy could have reviewed the readiness of the garrison troops \textit{in situ}.\(^{294}\) Yet, reviewing each and every garrison post in a given satrapy was an arduous and probably unfeasible task. Perhaps Xenophon’s description is again too schematic, and only important garrisons were visited on site. Conversely, since Xenophon does explicitly list the garrison commanders and their troops among those who appeared in full battle gear for inspection\(^{295}\), one can speculate that each garrison sent a delegation headed by an officer to the muster place to participate in the royal review, while a sufficient number of troops was left behind to guard the King’s land.

The Circuit Commissioners

A more serious challenge was offered by the vastness of the Achaemenid Empire. Xenophon states that the royal circuit was limited to the regions adjacent to King’s residence, doubtlessly the royal capitals in the core satrapies, and the regions which he passed through in his travels.\(^{296}\) The satrapies further away, Xenophon adds, were visited by trustworthy proxies,\(^{297}\) designated as the circuit commissioners (οὐσίων ἑφόδου), royal agents who inspected the condition of the satrapies on the King’s behalf. Their responsibilities were as follows:\(^{298}\)

\[\text{ἐφοδεύει γὰρ ἀνὴρ κατ’ ἕναντι ἄεὶ στράτευμα ἔχον, ὡς ἂν μὲν τὰς σταθμὰς ἐπικούριας δέπηται, ἐπικούρια, ἢ δὲ τὰς ύβρίζες, σοφρονίζει, ἢ δὲ τὰς ἄδειας ψυχῆς ἀμελεῖ ἢ τῶν ἐνοικίων φυλακὴς ἢ ὑπὸς ἢ χώρα ἐνεργός ἢ ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τεταγμένων παραλίπῃ, ταῦτα πάντα κατευερεσίζῃ: ἢ δὲ μὴ δύνηται, βασιλεῖ αὐτὴν ἐπαγγέλῃ: ὃ δὲ ἄκουὼν βουλεύεται περὶ τοῦ ἀπαγόρευτου. καὶ οἱ πολλάκις λεγομένοι ὃτι βασιλέως υἱὸς καταβάται, βασιλέως ἀδέλφος, βασιλέως ὕφθαλμος, καὶ ἐνίοτε σὺς ἐκφανάμενοι, οὗτοι τῶν ἑφόδων εἰσίν: ἀποτρέπεται γὰρ ἐκαστὸς αὐτῶν ὅπως ἄν βασιλέως κελευθ.}\

For on a yearly basis a man would visit (the satrapies) with an army. If a certain satrap is in need of assistance, he provides him with such, but if a satrap becomes arrogant, he corrects him. Moreover, if anyone might be careless regarding the collection of tribute, the protection of the inhabitants, the cultivation of the land or any other area of responsibility that was assigned to him, [the commissioner] restores everything back into order. But if he is unable to do so, he reports to the King, who, after learning about the situation, devises a solution regarding the one who is insubordinate. Often times there are those who say that the King’s son is coming or the King’s brother or the King’s eye. Sometime the circuit

\(^{293}\) Xen. \textit{Oec.} 4.6.

\(^{294}\) Tuplin 1987c, 173. Conversely, Petit (1990, 116 n. 51) believes that in spite of Xenophon’s articulation, all of the troops in any given satrapy were liable for inspection, a claim which I find highly unlikely.

\(^{295}\) Xen. \textit{Oec.} 4.7.

\(^{296}\) Xen. \textit{Oec.} 4.6. 8.

\(^{297}\) Xen. \textit{Oec.} 4.8: ἢτι δὲ ὡς ὑπὸσθιν μὲν τῆς χώρας διελαύων ἑφόρας αὐτὸς, καὶ δοκιμᾶται, ὡς ὑπὸσθιν δὲ μὴ αὐτὸς ἑφορά, πέμπον πιστοὺς ἐπίσκοπεῖται.

\(^{298}\) Xen. \textit{Cyr.} 8.6.16.
commissioners would not make an appearance, for each of them would return [to the royal court] whenever he is summoned by the King.

In essence, the circuit commissioners saw that the satrapies were administered effectively and with good judgement. In addition, these inspectors travelled with an army, which was presumably deployed whenever a satrap needed assistance to counter potential external threats or in times when a satrap failed to adhere to royal command. In addition, Xenophon notes a possible scenario in which a circuit commissioner found himself unable to restore order in a given satrapy, which would result in direct royal intervention. Xenophon might refer to a satrapal revolt or a local uprising which proved to be too much for the forces which accompanied the royal inspector and as such demanded direct royal intervention.299

Interestingly, Xenophon says that the advent of the ephodoi was preceded by rumors that the King’s immediate kin or the King’s Eye was en route.300 According to this passage, the office of royal inspector, doubtlessly a highly sensitive position, was manned by the closest confidants of the Great King.301 We know of several high-profile dignitaries who visited the western satrapies, and they may have done so in the capacity of a circuit commissioner. For instance, after being accused of conspiring against his brother, Cyrus the Younger did all he could to win the loyalty of the dignitaries who were sent to his satrapy from the royal court.302 One or more of these senior delegates might have been one of Xenophon’s commissioners. Another plausible member of the ephodoi is Tithraustes, who was sent to Sardis by Artaxerxes II to eliminate Tissaphernes and restore order in the western satrapies. Tithraustes initiated peace talks with Agesilaus303 and sent Timocrates of Rhodes to bribe several Greek cities to declare war on the Spartans.304 The actions of Tithraustes suggests that his mission was to resolve the military crisis in the west, which corresponds with the duties of the circuit commissioners.305 In addition, we know that Tithraustes did not stay long in the west since Xenophon notes that by 392 BC Tiribazus was the satrap of Lydia,306 and there is no indication that he ever assumed the office of satrap after the execution of Tissaphernes. Furthermore, while we are not explicitly told that Tithraustes was accompanied by an army, the fact that Agesilaus was willing to accept the terms offered by Tithraustes after the decisive Persian defeat at the battle of Sardis suggests that the Persian forces were quick to recover, perhaps due to the fresh forces Tithraustes brought with him from the Persian heartland. In short, the limited time Tithraustes spent in the west, the absence of any indication that he assumed the office of

299 Even if the royal inspector had a considerable military force at his disposal, it was by no means as formidable as a fully furnished royal army. For instance, Artaxerxes I had to deploy a royal army to suppress an Egyptian uprising in the 460s (see p. 122 below), while Artaxerxes II had to do the same to defeat the rebel army of his brother Cyrus the Younger.

300 For a discussion on the King’s Eye, see p. 47 below.

301 E.g. Ehtécham 1946, 57; Tuplin 1987a, 120.

302 Xen. An. 1.1.5.

303 Xen. Hell. 3.4.25.

304 Xen. Hell. 3.5.1.

305 Though we are not told that Tithraustes came to the west with an army, the fact that Agesilaus was willing to accept the terms offered by Tithraustes shortly after the decisive Persian defeat at the battle of Sardis suggests that the Persian forces were quick to recover, perhaps due to the fresh forces Tithraustes brought with him from the Persian heartland.

satrap, and his actions to restore order in the Lydian satrapy suggest that he may have presided as one of the circuit commissioner on his mission in western Anatolia.

**The Satrapal Inspection Service**

It should be noted that the existence of an Achaemenid inspection service on the satrapal level is well attested in non-Greek sources. Officials designated as *gaušaka* (‘Listeners’) are attested in an official document from Egypt.\(^{307}\) and Briant argues that they conducted inquiries when summoned by local communities.\(^{308}\) In the Book of Ezra were are told about the existence of the treasurers (*gyzβria*)\(^{309}\) and the inspectors (*aphrskia*)\(^{310}\) of the satrapy Beyond-the-River. The Persian King addressed these officials directly through a decree, which should be seen as an indication of their importance and that they may have been affiliated with royal court in some way. Tuplin argues that their title suggests that they held responsibility over the entire satrapy, though it is impossible to know if they were a part of the central satrapal treasury or spread throughout the satrapy’s treasuries.\(^{311}\) In essence, these officials monitored the activities in the satrapies on the King’s behalf while being an integral part of the satrapal administrative machinery. Their area of responsibility was clearly limited to a particular administrative aspect rather than the wellbeing of an entire satrapy, and as such supplemented the more general periodic reviews which focused on the wellbeing of an entire satrapy.

In sum, the evidence for the existence of royal inspectors, on the satrapal and inter-satrapal levels, reflects another measure which allowed the Achaemenid Kings, through loyal agents who reported directly to the King, to acquire a real and accurate picture of the condition in the satrapies and ensuring that royal interests are safeguarded.

**2.3 The Achaemenid Surveillance Service**

**The King’s Eye**

*The King’s Eye in the Greek Sources*

One of the most intriguing institutions which facilitated royal surveillance is the elusive King’s Eye. The Greek sources provide various descriptions of this Achaemenid office. Aeschylus mentions the King’s Eye as the one who reviewed the Persian forces that took part in Xerxes’ expedition,\(^{312}\) a responsibility which depicts the King’s Eye as a senior official who functioned as a muster officer or the King’s chief-of-staff.\(^{313}\) Herodotus recounts how during a game of pretend Cyrus the Elder assumed the role of king and assigned various offices and tasks to his playmates. One of them was given the title of the King’s Eye.\(^{314}\) Apart from the fact that the office was held by a single official, Herodotus does not include any additional information regarding the function or importance of this office.

\(^{307}\) AP no. 27.

\(^{308}\) Briant 2002, 343. On the *gaušaka*, see: AP no. 27 and discussion on p. 51 below.

\(^{309}\) Ezra 7:21: κυβηριά.

\(^{310}\) Ezra 5:6, 6:6: ἀφρσκία.

\(^{311}\) Tuplin 1987a, 116.

\(^{312}\) Aesch. Pers. 978-980: ἢ καὶ τὸν Περσαῖν αὐτὸν τὸν σών πιστὸν πᾶντ’ ὀφθαλμὸν μυρία μυρία πεμπαστάν.


\(^{314}\) Hdt. 1.114.2: τὸν δὲ καὶ τινὰ αὐτῶν ὀφθαλμὸν βασιλέως εἶναι.
Another reference to the King’s Eye is found in Aristophanes’ *Acharnians*. In a scene which takes place at the Athenian Pnyx, Pseudartabas, the Eye of the Great King, is given audience. Pseudartabas, who presumably came to Athens on a diplomatic mission, is described as wielding a gigantic eye while mumbling gibberish and being accompanied by two eunuchs, who turn out to be a pair of debouched Athenians in disguise. There is little doubt that Aristophanes chose to depict this Persian ambassador as the King’s Eye not due to his actual prerogatives but rather due to the playwright’s desire to gain the most effective impact on his audience through word puns and the absurd presentation of a Persian dignitary wielding a huge eye. Therefore, besides the possible existence of such an office, nothing can be deduced with regard to the character and nature of the King’s Eye.

In the biography of Artaxerxes II Plutarch recounts how Artasyras, who is identified as the King’s Eye, discovered the body of Cyrus the Younger in the aftermath of the battle of Cunaxa. This passage stands out, as noted by Hirsch, since it is the only known reference the King’s Eye in a proper historical context. Artasyras son of Aroandus, of Bactrian origin, was the satrap of Armenia who became a member of the Achaemenid household after he married Rhodogoune, the daughter of Artaxerxes II. Thus, one can

315 Ar. Ach. 100-133.
316 Olmstead (1948, 59 with n. 6) suggests that the King’s Eye was acting as a royal messenger by referring to two anecdotes in Herodotus (3.34, 77). Conversely, Balcer (1977, 258 with n. 17) rejects this claim by pointing out the distinction made by Herodotus (1.114.2) between the King’s Eye and the royal messenger.
317 Lenfant 2015, 115. Several suggestions have been made in regard to the comedic effect of the name Pseudartabas. Bivar (1985, 631–32) argues that it should be translated as ‘false-measure’, which, on the one hand, resonated with the notorious reputation of the infamous usurper Pseudo-Smerdis, while on the other criticized the greed of the Athenians who expected to receive bribe from the Persian ambassador. Indeed, according to Herodotus (1.129.3) the ἄρταβη is a Persian unit of measurement of dry capacity, greater than an Attic medimnus by three Attic choenixes, i.e. about 47 litters. Another appealing interpretation places an emphasis on the inclusion of the Persian element arta, which means ‘truth’ or ‘cosmic order’. For instance, Mayrhofer (1973, 163 no. 8.576) translates Ṛtabānuš as ‘with the splendor of Ṛta’, while Ṛta is translated as ‘active truth’, ‘order’ or ‘righteousness’. The Greeks were quite familiar with this element in Persian names, e.g. Artaxerxes, Artaphrenes (Aesch. Pers. 21; Hdt. 5.25.1), Artabazus (Thuc. 1.129.1). If this was the case, as Balcer (1977, 257) and Olsen (2002, 101) believe, the Greek audience was entertained by a Persian ambassador called ‘false-truth’ or ‘false-justice’.

319 Hirsch 1985, 106. It is generally agreed that Plutarch derived his information on this episode from Ctesias, who was Artaxerxes II’s physician at the time of battle of Cunaxa. See: Lommel 1953, 324; Balcer 1977, 257; Binder 2008, 213 with reference to earlier literature; Lenfant 2004, 282 n. 688; Lenfant 2015, 113. For Ctesias’ account on the battle of Cunaxa, see: Ctes. FGrH 688 F16 §64, F18-23. On the possibility that Dinon and Heraclides were Plutarch’s sources for the battle of Cunaxa, see: Hirsch 1985, 106.
320 For the sources which mention Artasyras by name, see: Xen. An. 4.3.4; OGIS 390.7, 391.7-10. On Artasyras’ marriage to Artaxerxes’ daughter: OGIS 391.7-10, 392.10-15. For Artasyras’ Bactrian background: OGIS. 2644-8. Moreover, Artasyras’ son Orontes succeeded him as the satrap of Armenia (Xen. An. 3.5.17), and like his father before him, he also married a daughter of Artaxerxes (Xen. An. 2.4.8, 3.4.13). A fragmented chronicle from Pergamum (OGIS 264.4-8) reveals that Orontes revolted against Artaxerxes II, briefly occupied Pergamum, and eventually capitulated and died. For further reading on Orontes’ revolt, see: Osborne 1973; Weiskopf 1989, 69–93.
infer from this passage that the King’s Eye was a close associate of the King and possibly an Achaemenid by blood or marriage.\textsuperscript{321}

The common feature in all of the aforementioned sources is the depiction of the King’s Eye as a single high ranking official in close proximity to the Great Persian King.\textsuperscript{322}

This representation is challenged by Xenophon, who provides a lengthy account concerning the King’s Eye:

\begin{quote}

\[10\] In addition, we have observed that [the Persian King] acquired those who are called the King’s Eyes and the King’s Ears exclusively by conferring gifts and honors. For, since he rewarded greatly those who reported the things which were advantageous to him to be aware of, he encouraged many men to eavesdrop and to spy so that they could provide the King with a useful report. [11] Consequently, many are acknowledged as the eyes and ears of the King. And if anyone thinks that the King chooses a single eye, his is wrong. For a single man would see and hear very little. And if this responsibility was assigned a single individual, it would be just like ordering the others to be negligent. Moreover, if people would come to know that there was a certain Eye and who he was, they would surely guard themselves. But this is not the case, but instead the King listens to all those who say that anything which is detrimental to the King, if he could hear them, or doing anything subversive, as if he could see them. Therefore, being in a state of mind as if each and every one of those present were the King’s eyes and ears, no one dared speaking disparagingly of Cyrus.

It is evident that Xenophon is describing an Achaemenid policy of rewarding informants, a practice which brought about an informal surveillance network by which the Great King

\[321\] Balcer 1977, 258.
\[322\] The King’s Eye is attested, explicitly and implicitly, in several postclassical sources, though they offer little to no new information regarding this institution. Dio Chrysostom (\textit{Or.} 3.118) claims that the King’s Eye was a low-ranking official rather than a close associate of the King. Lucian (\textit{Merc. Cond.} 29; \textit{Ind.} 23) claims that the ‘eyes of the king’ were royal informers. Hesychius of Alexandria, (s.v. βασιλέως όφθαλμος) reports that the King’s Eye functioned as an overseer (ἐπίσκοπος). Philostratus (\textit{VA} 1.21) mentions a satrap who was a eunuch and functioned as the ‘eye of the king’, and later (1.28) makes notice of the ‘ears of the king’. Themistius (\textit{Orations} 21.2.550) asserts that ‘the eyes of the king’ functioned as local judicial magistrates. For a comprehensive survey of sources, classical and post classical, which refer to the King’s Eye, see: Hirsch 1985, 108–113 with appendix 1.
tightened his control over the satrapies. Apparentl
y, this network of informants was so
effective that the King’s subjects did not dare making
seditious utterances in fear of being
reported to the Persian authorities. More importantly, Xenophon seeks to refute a
contemporary *communis opinio* that the King’s Eye was an office held by a single
individual. Xenophon, however, makes another reference to the King’s eye. When he
describes the duties of the circuit commissioners Xenophon says that whenever one of
*ephodoi* was about to visit a province, rumors circulated regarding the identity of the
dignitary who was about to arrive, whether the King’s son, brother or the King’s Eye. On the face of it, Xenophon seems to contradict himself, because instead of a great many ‘eyes’ and ‘ears’, the King’s Eye is described as a single office holder who functioned as one of the royal inspectors. Conversely, Hirsch argues that Xenophon’s *ephodoi* were simply high ranking royal dignitaries whose arrival was preceded by rumors. Hence, he asserts that there is no discrepancy since Xenophon’s intention was to refute popular misconceptions concerning the King’s Eye, and that the unsubstantiated rumors which preceded the advent of the circuit commissioners were probably predicated on such false beliefs. Such interpretation is compelling but the ambiguity of Xenophon’s remark renders is difficult to determine with certainly whether the appellation ‘the Eye of the King’ signifies an actual office or a misplaced honorary title.

**The King’s Eye in the Old-Persian Record**

In addition, the King’s Eye is absent from the Old-Persian record. Nevertheless, several attempts have been made to suggest a plausible Old-Persian term which might have corresponded with the Greek ὀφθαλμός βασιλέως. Schaedler, for example, postulates that the hypothetical Old-Persian term *spadāka* (‘observer’, ‘overseer’, ‘watcher’) existed in the fifth and fourth centuries BC as an equivalent to the Greek King’s Eye. Eilers suggests the term *kasaka* (‘good seer’), which is derived from the Ossetic (eastern Iranian language) term *kāsag*, as a possible parallel. Ehtécham advocates that the Old-Persian term *spadak* (‘supervisor’) designated a chief official who presided over numerous agents, whose duty was to monitor and regularly inspect the administrative departments in the satrapies. Under the assumption that the Sassanid kings sought to revive the glories of the Achaemenid Empire, Pagliaro suggests the term *patyaxš* (‘supervisor’, ‘procurator’, ‘overseer’), a designation which is based on a title of a senior official in the Sassanid court.

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323 Olmstead 1948, 59; Frye 1972, 89. Tuplin (1987a, 120) adds that the mutual criticism of the civil and military officials in the satrapy, described by Xenophon (*Oec*. 4.9) is another example of informal surveillance. I tend to disagree, since complaints issued by these officials about the misconduct of their colleagues do not strike me as informal.

324 Aristid. *Or*. 27.29.

325 Hirsch 1985, 103; Briant 2002, 343.


327 Oppenheim 1968, 173; Lenfant 2015, 114.


329 This remark also suggests that the Great King was in the habit of sending his immediate relatives as circuit commissioners along with other trustworthy associates, who, whether correctly or not, were identified as the King’s Eye.

330 Schaedler 1934, 16–19.

331 Eilers 1940, 23 n. 2.

332 Ehtécham 1946, 57 with n. 1.
who bore the title bitaxš/bidyaxš. Another alternative is offered by Hinz, who notes that the Elamite tablets in Persepolis refer to an official called ti-ti-kaš or ti-ti-ya-kaš-be, and suggests the hypothetical Old-Persian term ditaka or didiyaka (‘one who sees’ or ‘overseer’). Such imaginative and at times ingenious reconstructions are more than impressive. They remain, however, in the realm of conjecture.

The gaušaka

Interestingly, a royal ‘Ear’ is attested in a petition dated to 410 BC addressed to Arsames, the satrap of Egypt. This document, written in Aramaic, includes the plural masculine noun gaušaka (גועסקה), which resonates with the Old-Persian verb gūš (‘to hear’) and the noun gauša (‘ear’), hence translated as ‘listeners’. Cowley argues that this is the equivalent Aramaic term to the Greek King’s Eye. Similarly, Lommel maintains that the term gaušaka was the source of a Greek distorted translation of the already familiar concept of the King’s Eye. Other scholars were more concerned by the fact that these officials were marked by the action of hearing rather than seeing. Accordingly, it has been suggested that the gaušaka functioned as chiefs of the local police, intelligence officers, royal emissaries who represented the central authorities in legal cases, low ranking public functionaries, the aides of the royal inspectors of the satrapies (i.e. the ‘eyes’), and officials who functioned similarly to Xenophon’s circuit commissioners but on the satrapal level. All of the above suggestions are speculative, but it is certain that the gaušaka operated in the outermost borders of Egypt and probably throughout the Persian Empire. Moreover, it is rather clear that the gaušaka were not the informants mentioned by Xenophon. Yet, if these officials were indeed royal agents, it is reasonable to assume that their presence contributed to the King’s ability to supervise the satrapies and ensured a flow of reliable information from the provinces to the royal court.

There was no King’s Eye

The silence of the Old-Persian testimonies, the numerous discrepancies in the Greek sources, and the seemingly unreliability of the post classical sources led Hirsch to conclude that there was no King’s Eye. He postulates that this ahistorical Achaemenid institution originated from Iranian mythology. In the tenth Yasht, an Avestan hymn, the Zoroastrian God Mithras is described as having one thousand ears, ten thousand eyes and ten thousand

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333 Pagliaro 1954, 144–45. Followed by Schmitt 1967, 140. Frye (1972, 89) argues that the patiyaxš was more of a satrapal viceroy or perhaps a chief inspector who was under the satrap’s authority. This title also correlates with the Greek πατιάξεις (‘overseer’, ‘guardian’).
335 For a summary and the shortcomings of the above mentioned etymological reconstructions, see: Hirsch 1985, 115–19.
336 AP no. 27.
337 Cowley 1923, 102. See also: Eilers 1940, 22–3 with n. 5.
338 Lommel 1953, 324–27.
339 Schaeder 1934, 5; Ehtécham 1946, 56–58.
342 Oppenheim 1968, 178.
343 Balcer 1977, 257.
344 Lommel 1953, 334.
spies, spread throughout the land ever watchful of any acts of insubordination. Hirsch suggests that the Great Persian Kings exploited this Iranian mythological motif to encourage their subjects to subscribe to the idea that, just like the god Mithras, they too had a legion of secret agents listening and watching for any indication of subversive activity. Presumably, these rumors circulated throughout the Achaemenid Empire and eventually made their way into the accounts of Xenophon and others.

In spite of the many merits of Hirsch’s argument, there are two objections to his conclusions. First, the absence of the King’s Eye from the Old-Persian record is all but expected. Achaemenid royal inscriptions bear little to no information regarding the administrative apparatus of the Achaemenid Empire. Moreover, the documents found in various archives throughout the Empire are concerned primarily with commercial transactions and redistribution of resources. More importantly, the available Old-Persian sources are official in nature and therefore the fact that there is no mention of a secret intelligence service should not come as a surprise. Second, it is possible that the Achaemenids drew inspiration from the representation of Mithras in Iranian mythology to spread the notion that the Great King was the god’s earthly equivalent. Yet, the effectiveness of the rumors addressed by Xenophon could not have endured for long unless they were confirmed by actual instances in which the central authorities demonstrated their capacity to gather intelligence and act upon it. It seems likelier that the Achaemenids implemented concrete measures to maintain and augment the fear of being associated with treasonous acts. The policy of rewarding informants, mentioned by Xenophon, was likely to be one of these measures. Furthermore, Sancisi-Weerdenburg points out the uncertainties concerning the extent of Achaemenid adherence to Zoroastrianism, and the primacy of Ahuramazda, the god of the kings and kingship, in Achaemenid royal ideology, which renders Hirsch’ emphasis on the centrality of Mithras as problematic.

Parallel Institutions

Another way in which scholars sought to corroborate the historicity of the King’s Eye was by pointing out the existence of similar institutions in other ancient royal regimens. On the one hand, it has been suggested that the Achaemenids borrowed the office of the King’s Eye from their Near-Eastern predecessors. In Egyptian sources we find the earliest known reference to officials designated as the King’s ‘eyes’ and ‘ears’, dated to the first half of the first millennium BC. There is a possible Assyrian parallel attested in a document

345 YT 10.7: “We sacrifice unto Mithra, the lord of wide pastures, who is truth-speaking, a chief in assemblies, with a thousand ears, well-shapen, with ten thousand eyes, high, with full knowledge, strong, sleepless, and ever awake”; YT 10.24: “he, of the ten thousand spies, the powerful, all-seeing, undeceivable Mithra”; YT 10.45: “as spies for Mithra, on all the heights, at all the watching-places, observing the man who lies unto Mithra, looking at those, remembering those who have lied unto Mithra, but guarding the ways of those whose life is sought by men who lie unto Mithra, and, verily, by the fiendish killers of faithful men”. It should be noted that the Avestan term for spy is the aforementioned spatha or spas(a). For the English translation of the Avesta hymn, see: Darmesteter 1882, 121, 125, 130.


349 Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1989b, 189–90.

350 Oppenheim 1968, 173 with n. 1.
dated to the seventh century BC that features an idiomatic usage of two verbs *amāru* (‘to see’) and *šamū* (‘to hear’). Moreover, it has been suggested that the regular employment of a formulaic command – “write me whatever you see and hear” – in the letters of the Sargonid kings (721-627 BC) may attest the existence of Assyrian royal officials who functioned as royal overseers or inspectors.\(^{351}\) As noted above, Herodotus recounts how Cyrus the Elder, while the Median Empire was still the ruling empire, chose one of his playmates to be the King’s Eye in the midst of a game of pretend.\(^{352}\) Another intriguing Median episode narrated by Herodotus recounts the exploits of Deioces, the Median King who had spies and informants scattered throughout Media, which enabled him to apprehend and punish with due measure disloyal subjects.\(^{353}\) Balcer highlights the fact that both episodes are set in a reality in which the Persians have yet to take over the Median kingdom and deduces that the Persians adopted the office of the King’s Eye from the Medians.\(^{354}\) Yet, since these anecdotes are almost certainly fictive, it seems highly likely that they depict Persian court practices, e.g. the eyes and ears of the king along with personal guard and an audience ritual, which were projected into the Median past by later generations.\(^{355}\)

On the other hand, it is possible that the Achaemenid King’s Eye inspired the emergence of similar institutions employed by empires which existed in parallel to the Achaemenids or rose centuries after their demise. A good example is the well attested Athenian imperial magistrate called the *Episkopos* (ἐπίσκοπος), an essential component in the Athenian imperial mechanism. These officials were dispatched to the subject states in order to ensure proper administration and to enforce obedience to Athenian directives. Balcer maintains that this Athenian imperial institution was predicated on an Achaemenid model.\(^{356}\) Shahbazi places an emphasis on the account of Philostratus\(^{357}\), in which the ‘eyes’ and ‘ears’ of the Parthian King are mentioned. He claims that these titles were appropriated during the Parthian era and later transmitted to the Sassanid Empire, whose ruling dynasty was known for its tendency to follow the footsteps of the Achaemenids.\(^{358}\) Another possible parallel appears in Indian documents dated to the beginning of the second century AD which mention five imperial censors who are referred to as the five senses of the government.\(^{359}\) Another royal Indian official called *adhyaksha* (‘inspector’, ‘overseer’)

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\(^{351}\) Oppenheim 1968, 174. Eilers (1962, 211 n. 14) considers the existence of an Assyrian officials designated as ‘royal ears’. In a comprehensive study of the duties of the Neo-Assyrian offices of ‘chief scribe’ and palace scribe’, Luukko (2007) demonstrates that in addition to their scribal work these officials supervised the use of precious metals, oversaw building projects, rituals and commercial activities, and administered the collection of tribute. These scribes were powerful officials in the Neo-Assyrian administrative hierarchy and most likely members of the royal inner circle. Thus, one can hypothesize that they also served as the king’s inspectors, i.e. eyes and ears, beyond the royal court.

\(^{352}\) Hdt. 1.114.

\(^{353}\) Hdt. 1.100.2.

\(^{354}\) Balcer 1977, 256–57. Shahbazi (1988, 181–84) argues that the Medes borrowed the office of the King’s Eye from their Aryan ancestors.

\(^{355}\) Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1994, 55; Briant 2002, 26; Lenfant 2015, 112 n. 96.

\(^{356}\) Balcer 1977, 252–63. For the features, duties and responsibilities of the Athenian *Episkopos*, see: Balcer 1976. For the Athenian adoption of Achaemenid imperial institutions, see: Root 1985; Raaflaub 2009a.

\(^{357}\) Philostratus VA 1.21, 28.

\(^{358}\) Shahbazi 1988, 176–82.

\(^{359}\) Oppenheim 1968, 174 with n. 3.
may have been based on the Achaemenid King’s Eye.\textsuperscript{360} Lastly, a similar institution is attested in seventh century China, which constituted an official designated as the ‘ear-and-eye’ and operated as a censor.\textsuperscript{361}

The aforementioned examples demonstrate that trustworthy royal officials who supervised the state of affairs in the provinces were a critical component in any imperial framework. This principle is discussed by Aristotle, who highlights an inherent weakness of any monarchic regime. Since the king is just one person, Aristotle argues, he is dependent on others to maintain his position of prominence. Consequently, it becomes necessary for a king to assign to his most eminent companions the task of listening and watching, which enabled the king to see and hear everything.\textsuperscript{362} This passage seems to reflect Xenophon’s aforementioned passage on the Persian King’s eyes and ears, as both point out the necessity to form a web of spies and informants through which any sign of dissent can be treated before it endangers the stability of the domain or the position of the monarch. The Achaemenid Empire was no different. Briant has no doubt that the Persian central authorities took measures to facilitate firm control over the satrapies and to ensure that those who governed them followed royal directives without hesitation.\textsuperscript{363}

In light of the available evidence, several conclusions can be made. First, the account of Xenophon demonstrates that the Achaemenids established a semiofficial intelligence gathering network that was predicated on voluntary informants that informed the Persian authorities about disloyal utterances and activities. Second, the numerous parallel institutions in other imperial settings does not unquestionably prove the existence of the office of the King’s Eye in the Achaemenid Empire, but it renders it more probable that the Achaemenids invested efforts to monitor the provinces officially and unofficially. Third, it is plausible that the Greek sources may have misunderstood or distorted the functions of the office of the King’s Eye,\textsuperscript{364} but these discrepancies are not sufficient to reject its historicity. Accordingly, the scholarly consensus suggests that a sort of secret service existed, which relied on a large number of paid informants, i.e. ‘ears’ and ‘eyes’, and was directed by a senior overseer, possibly the King’s Eye, who reported about the affairs of the empire directly to the King.\textsuperscript{365} In my view, the existence of a high ranking court official who was responsible for processing the massive flow of information coming

\textsuperscript{360} Frye 1963, 98.
\textsuperscript{361} Autran 1950, 290–91; Oppenheim 1968, 174 with n. 4.
\textsuperscript{363} Briant 2002, 343.
\textsuperscript{364} Lenfant (2015, 116) deems the appearance of the King’s Eye in the Greek sources as a newly coined expression which was a translation which designated a Persian institution and that the considerable discrepancy is the outcome of the Greeks reinterpreting this office into a Greek term in a way that would make sense from their own perspective.
\textsuperscript{365} Oppenheim 1968, 173; Frye 1984, 108–9 with n. 79; McNeal 1986, 156; Tuplin 1987a, 120; Pomeroy 1994, 241–42; Cataldo 2009, 59–60. A slightly different interpretation is offered by Balcer (1977, 261), who suggests that there may have been at least one Eye for each satrapy, since the singularity of the office, as described by Aeschylus, Herodotus and Aristophanes, is far from certain. Shahbazi (1988, 183–84) argues that many security officials, whose identity was kept in secret, were called the ‘eyes of the King’. They functioned as the chiefs of the bureau of security, and as such were assigned to perform various tasks, inspection of the satrapies to name one.
from the ‘eyes’, ‘ears’ and ‘listeners’ in satrapies and deciding which reports demanded the King’s attention is more than likely.

**Conclusion**

It is evident that the central Persian authorities invested considerable resources and manpower in monitoring the satrapies. Satrapal administration consisted of chancellors, scribes, secretaries and military personnel of royal status, while periodic inspections were conducted by the King or his loyal agents. These measures facilitated a flow of information from the provinces to the royal court regarding the security and welfare of the satrapies, while establishing firm control over the satrapies and ensuring that royal directives were executed. The capacity to gather intelligence could be used not only to detect signs of insubordination among the subject nations but also among the satraps. The royal personnel in the satrapies in general and in the satrapal court in particular constituted a continuous reminder that nothing can escape the King. Consequently, since the local government was constantly scrutinized, the chances that a satrapal rebellion or a local uprising were checked at an early stage increased considerably.

It is difficult to determine when this royal surveillance array was established. Xenophon’s claim, namely that the entire imperial apparatus was established *en masse* by Cyrus the Elder, seems highly unlikely and it is more probable that royal supervision, just like many other branches of the Achaemenid imperial government, developed gradually over time. The rise of Darius, however, and the challenges he overcame must have prompted an effort to expand and empower the institutions which were responsible for supervising the satrapies.\[^{366}\] In this way, the Persian royal authorities kept a close eye on the state of affairs in the satrapies and the conduct of the satraps. But while the satraps were closely monitored by the Great Persian King, they were given considerable resources and conferred with extensive executive power which corresponded with the numerous satrapal duties they were expected to fulfill. Satrapal responsibilities and prerogatives are the subject of the following chapter.

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\[^{366}\] Balcer (1977, 261) postulates that if there was only one royal ‘eye’, it was during the reign of Cyrus, and that Darius must have expanded this office during the reorganization of the empire, resulting in numerous eyes instead of just one.
3. SATRAPAL DUTIES AND RESOURCES

The office of satrap entailed numerous and diverse duties and functions. For successful fulfillment of these satrapal obligations, the satraps had access to ample financial and military resources. In the following, the emphasis is placed on the responsibilities of the satrap vis-à-vis the central Persian authorities and the resources allocated to the satraps for the successful completion of the tasks assigned by the Great Persian King. By surveying the various satrapal obligations and resources we can obtain a better understanding of the Great King’s expectations of his provincial governors and how satrapal performance was evaluated. Consequently, the extent and limitation of satrapal power, authority, and jurisdiction are also clarified and contextualized. In this way, one can explain (1) what motivated a certain satrap to prefer a specific course of action or policy over another and (2) whether the consequences of such action were perceived as failures or successes by the Persian royal authorities.

3.1 Satrapal Duties

Satraps as Protectors of Royal Domain

The Old-Persian Record (xšaçapāvā)

The term xšaçapāvā in the Old-Persian record is used to designate the Persian provincial governors, whom the Greek authors call satraps. This designation, which appears twice in the Bisitun inscription, constitutes a composite of two Old-Persian words: (1) xšaça which is generally translated as ‘dominion’ or ‘monarchy’, and (2) pāvā, which means ‘guardian’. The exact nature of the term xšaça is contested. Briant argues that it is closely connected to the abstract notion of kingship, as it “connotes first and foremost the total loyalty to the king of the person described by it.” Conversely, several scholars claim that xšaça contains a geographical element. Herrenschmidt, for instance, maintains that it signifies not royal power but the Persian kingdom itself, i.e. the totality of the countries through which the rule of Persian King extends. In a variant of this interpretation, Tanck argues that the concept of kingship existed not only as a pure abstraction but signified a specific territory as well. Through an analysis of the context in which the term xšaça appears in Achaemenid royal inscriptions, she argues that the terms xšaça and dahyu are

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367 On the Greek terminology concerning the office of satrap, see n. 6 above.
368 DB §38/III.13-14: Dādarshi, a Persian, the satrap of Bactria (Dādṛšī šā Pārsa… Bāxtriy xšaçapāvā); DB §45/III.55-6: Vivāna the satrap of Arachosia (Vivāna nāma Pārsa… Harauvatiyā xšaçapāvā). For the appearance of the term in the Elamite and Babylonian versions of the Bisitun inscription, see: Schmitt 1976, 374–75.
369 Additional Old-Persian vocabulary stemming from the same word groups are: Xšay (‘dominion’ or ‘reign’), xšayadha (‘dominion’ or ‘monarchy’, though it literally means ‘belong to the dominion’) and xšayaθiya (‘king’ or ‘overlord’).
370 pāvā constitutes the substantive participle present active of the Old-Persian verb pā, which means ‘to protect’.
synonyms, and that the former denotes Persis and the latter the subject lands. Tanck’s interpretation is widely favored as the term xšaçapāvā is generally translated as ‘protector of the realm’. According to a more expansive definition, the xšaçapāvā, i.e. the satraps, were keepers of Persian interests and order, both in Persis and the provinces.

The emphasis on protecting the royal domain is corroborated by the actions of the satraps mentioned in the Bisitun inscription. Darius recounts how Dādarshi, the satrap of Bactria, was ordered to march to the adjacent Margiana in order to crush a rebel army led by a Margian named Frāda. The satrap emerged victorious and Margiana was pacified.

Similarly, Vivāna, the satrap of Arachosia, marched against a rebel army who had invaded his satrapy on the orders of Vahyazdāta, allegedly another false Smerdis. Vivāna vanquished the rebel forces twice and eventually captured and promptly executed Vahyazdāta. These two satraps are portrayed as a loyal servants who protected the royal domain on behalf of their King. The loyalty of Dādarshi and Vivāna is emphasized by the thematic contrast in the Bisitun inscription between those who remained true to Darius and those who were branded as liars for claiming to be the legitimate kings. We should not forget, however, that the Bisitun inscription provides us with a mere glimpse of the Great King’s expectation of his satraps. It is imperative, therefore, to consult other sources when seeking to elucidate the nature and character of satrapal duties.

The Hebrew, Aramaic and Babylonian Sources

The Hebrew term ahashdarpan (אחשדרפָּן), probably the Hebrew parallel for the Old-Persian xšaçapāvā, makes several appearances in the biblical sources. Overall, these officials are described as officers who received their orders directly from the Persian King. This procedure may serve as an indication of their senior position in the satrapal hierarchy, but we cannot conclude with certainty that this term is used to denote the provincial governors. Similarly, the Babylonian texts pose a problem since the designation aḥšadrapānu seems to signify either a provincial governor, i.e. satrap, or a lower-ranking local administrative officer. The ambiguity becomes more prominent since the term bēl piḥāti is also frequently employed to designate satraps. In short, the overall scanty evidence, the ambiguous context of the available documents and the problematic

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373 Tanck 1997, 231–32; Jacobs 2011. For instance, in DSf §3a/9-1373, DPd §2/6-9, and DPe §2/6-8 the term denotes the kingdom bestowed upon Darius by Ahuramazda. Even in places when it seems to be used in an abstract form, e.g. DB §13/L.48-50 where Darius recounts how Gaumāta the magus snatched the royal power or kingship, Tanck argues that the territorial meaning of the term is implicit, since in the previous section (DB §12/L.46-47) Darius blames Gaumāta for despoiling Cambyses of Persia and Media as well as the other countries. Weiskopf (1982, 6) merges both elements in a single definition, namely ‘upholder/supporter of the crown/kingdom’.
375 Herrenschmidt 1976, 44–45; Petit 1990, 16.
376 DB §38/III.10-19. It remains unclear whether Margiana was a part of the province governed by Dādarshi or perhaps by an unknown satrap who was overwhelmed by the rebel forces.
377 DB §45-48/III.53-76.
378 Esther 3:12, 8:9; Daniel 3:2-3: Ezra 8:36.
379 Esther 3:12, 8:9; Daniel 3:2-3, 27, 6:2-5, 7; Ezra 8:36.
380 E.g. ROMCT 2 n. 48. Cf. Stolper 1987, 399 with n. 47; Stolper 1988, 150–51; Stolper 1989b, 291 n. r.
terminology renders it difficult to use Aramaic, Hebrew, and Babylonian sources to shed additional light on the attributes of the office of satrap.\(^{382}\) Fortunately, the Greek sources provide copious information on satrapal duties and responsibilities.

**The Greek Sources**

The duty of protecting the royal domain, the same duty which is embedded in the Old-Persian designation of Achaemenid provincial governors, is well attested in the Greek sources. According to Xenophon, it was Cyrus the Elder who proclaimed that he would honor satraps who would become valuable protectors of his kingdom.\(^{383}\) But what was the nature of the threats a satrap was expected to contain? An answer is provided by Xenophon:

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\[\text{τὸν μὲν γὰρ πολεμικὸν ἔργον ὁμολογοῦμεν αὐτὸν ἑγεμόνα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, ὅτι ἐξ ὁπόσονιπερ ἑθῶν λαμβάνει <τε>, τέταρτον ἄρχοντι ἐκάστῳ εἰς ὀπόσους δεῖ διδόναι τροφῆν ἱππέως καὶ τοξοτῶς καὶ σφενδονήτας καὶ γεροφόρους, οίπερ τὸν τε ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ ἄρχομένων ἱκανοὶ ἐσονται κρατεῖν καὶ ἄν πολέμου ἐπισω ἀρήσουσι τῇ χώρᾳ.}

For we agree that [the Persian King] is strongly attentive to warfare, because regarding all of the nations from which he exacts tribute, he orders each governor to provide maintenance to as many horsemen, archers, slingers and light-armed troops as necessary, so that [the governors] would be sufficiently capable to rule over their subjects and to protect the land in case an enemy attacks.

Xenophon’s compressed account seems to entail two types of threats: (1) a local uprising against Persian rule and (2) an incursion staged by a foreign entity. While the Achaemenids had to suppress domestic rebellions on numerous occasions, the second type of threat is somewhat ambiguous. Who were the enemies the satraps were expected to ward off? One possibility is a foreign invasion force, such as the incursions staged by the Delian League in the aftermath of Xerxes’ invasion, the Spartan military operations in Asia Minor in 401-395 BC, and the invasion of the Greco-Macedonian army of Alexander the Great in 334 BC. Another potential enemy that posed a challenge to the authority of the Great King was a rogue satrap. The insubordinations of Oroites and Aryandes have been discussed in detail chapter 1, but while their audacity did not lead to open war, the revolts of Pissuthnes and Cyrus the Younger were resolved only after an armed conflict. A satrapal rebellion probably required direct royal intervention that is assigning the task of eliminating a disobedient satrap to the governors of neighboring satrapies.\(^{384}\) An alternative threat that the satraps had to grapple with were occasional raids staged by seemingly autonomous peoples who dwelled within Persian territory and refused to acknowledge the sovereignty

\[^{382}\text{In general, Schmitt (1976) offers a comprehensive survey of the title satrap in all of the pertinent sources.}]
\[^{383}\text{Xen. Cyr. 8.6.11: τὸῦ τοῖν ἐγὼ ὄς ἀγαθὸν σύμμαχον καὶ ὄς ἀγαθὸν συμφύλακα Πέρσαις τε καὶ ἔμοι τῆς ἀρχῆς τιμήσω.}]
\[^{384}\text{This seems to be the case in the matter of the rebellion in Margiana as recounted in the Bisitun inscription.}]

The above mentioned Dādarshi, the satrap of Bactria, was commanded by Darius to lead the forces at his disposal to confront a revolt in adjacent Margiana. Another illuminating example is the prolonged revolt led by Amarges, the illegitimate son of the rebel satrap Pissuthnes. According to Thucydides (8.5.4.), Darius II sent a letter to Tissaphernes, the satrap of Lydia, in which he was instructed to apprehend Amorges, who was still undermining Persian rule in the Carian coast. Though at this point Pissuthnes was already dead and the rebellion was fairly contained, it is evident that Tissaphernes was responsible for bringing this satrapal rebellion to an end.
of the Great King. In Asia Minor, for example, the tribes dwelling in the mountainous hinterland of Mysia, Pisidia, and Lycaonia frequently attacked royal domain.\textsuperscript{385} The Persian response to the menace of the rural tribes of Asia Minor was military retaliation.\textsuperscript{386}

**Maintenance of the Armed Satrapal Forces**

Since the satraps were expected to contain and suppress any military threat to Persian rule, Persian supremacy in the satrapies was safeguarded through the presence of substantial military forces. As noted above, Xenophon claims that when Cyrus the Elder dispatched his satraps to their respective provinces he ordered them to muster cavalry and chariot units from the Persians and allied nations.\textsuperscript{387} In addition, Cyrus instructed his governors to maintain a sufficient number of horsemen, archers, slingers and light infantry\textsuperscript{388} and the combat readiness of the satrapal forces was inspected on a yearly basis by the central authorities.\textsuperscript{389} In essence, the satraps functioned muster-officer, quartermaster, and paymaster since they were obligated to train, equip, and provision these contingents.\textsuperscript{390}

**Satrapal Contribution to Royal Campaigns**

*The Composition of Achaemenid Royal Armies*

The satraps were also expected to supply levies to royal campaigns. On numerous occasions the Great Persian Kings issued a decree which ordered the subject peoples throughout the Empire to contribute levies for the royal army. Cambyses, for instance, marshaled an army for his Egyptian campaign in c. 525 BC that included various subject nations, including the Ionian and Aeolian Greeks.\textsuperscript{391} Darius I issued a similar decree in preparation for his campaign against the Scythians in c. 513 BC,\textsuperscript{392} and the same goes for Artaxerxes I regarding the expedition he dispatched to retake Egypt in the 460s.\textsuperscript{393} The best example, however, is provided by the Herodotean catalogue of Xerxes’ invasion force, which exhibits the multi-ethnic composition of the royal armies deployed by the Achaemenids. Herodotus provides a detailed account on the composition of Xerxes’ army, which was comprised of no less than sixty-seven distinct ethnic units.\textsuperscript{394} These levies were

\textsuperscript{385} Xen. *An.* 3.2.23. The autonomy of the Anatolian hill-tribes is well attested. Tuplin (1987a, 114 n. 26) observes that while Herodotus (3.90.1) does not lists that Pisidians and Lycaonians as tributary in his catalogue of nations ruled by the Persians. The author of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* (Hell. Oxy. 21.1.) claims that the majority of the Mysians were independent, while Xenophon (*Mem* 3.5.26) states the Mysians and Pisidians strove to preserve their freedom.


\textsuperscript{387} Xen. *Cyr.* 8.6.10. Xenophon (*Cyr.* 8.6.15) adds that Cyrus provided each satrap with an army, though it seems likelier that the satraps were given command over forces which were already in the provinces.

\textsuperscript{388} Xen. *Oec.* 4.5: ἵππεας καὶ τοξότας καὶ σφενδονήτας καὶ γερροφόρους.

\textsuperscript{389} Xen. *Cyr.* 8.6.15.


\textsuperscript{391} Hdt. 3.1.1, 25.2-7.

\textsuperscript{392} Hdt. 4.81.1.

\textsuperscript{393} Diod. 11.71.6.

\textsuperscript{394} The nations which contributed infantry contingents (Hdt. 7.61-80) were as follows: Persians, Medes, Cissians, Hyrcanians, Assyrians, Chaldaeans, Bactrians, Amyrgian Scythians (Σκύθας Ἀμυργίους/Σάκας), Indians, Arians, Parthians, Chorasmians, Sogdians, Gandarians, Dadicae, Caspians, Sarangae, Pactyes, Utians, Mycians, Paricarians, Arabians, Ethiopians who dwell above Egypt (τῶν μὲν ὄρη ἀπὸ Αἰγύπτου Αἴθιοπος), Ethiopians of the east (οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ ἧλιον ἀνατολέων Αἴθιοπες), Libyans, Paphlagonians, Matieni, Mariandyni, Ligyes, Syrians, Phrygians, Armenians, Lydians, Mysians, Thracians of Asia (i.e. Bithynians),
mobilized from six different satrapies, stretching from Ionia to the Caucasus, and assigned to ten different divisions. When seeking to convey the enormous size of Xerxes’ invasion force Herodotus rhetorically asks “for which nation did Xerxes not lead from Asia to Greece?”

One may contest the level of accuracy of Herodotus’ list, but the abundant ethnographic detail, the probability that Herodotus had access to veterans who served in Xerxes’ army, and the compatibility with the catalogue of nations as recounted in the Bisitun inscription, means that it is highly unlikely that Herodotus fabricated this list. This does not mean, of course, that we should take it at face value. Nonetheless, we should acknowledge that Herodotus’ sources regarding this matter were generally accurate.

Another compelling example is the royal armies mustered by Darius III to ward off the army of Alexander the Great. Curtius Rufus (3.2.1-10) reports that the royal army that fought at the battle of Issus was mustered in Babylon in 333 BC and consisted of numerous ethnicities. Curtius adds that the urgency to stop Alexander’s progress hindered the enlistment of Bactrians, Sogdians, Indians and the dwellers of the Red Sea. The second royal army that was routed in Gaugamela was even more ethnically diverse. In sum, the ethnic diversity of the contingents that served in the armies of the Great Kings clearly demonstrates that the subject nations were a crucial drafting pool for military manpower.

**What Was the Role of the Satraps?**

The satraps were instrumental in the process of mobilization of royal armies. Herodotus reports that immediately after Xerxes decided to invade Greece, the Persians who had assembled at Susa departed to their respective provinces to facilitate the enlisting of

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Pisisiers, Cabeles, Milyae, Moschi, Tiberani, Macrones, Mossynoei, Mares, Colchians, Alarodians, Saspires and the island tribes that came from the Red Sea (τὰ δὲ νησιωτικὰ ἔθνα τὰ ἐκ τῆς Ἑλλάδας ἔθνων). The nations which contributed cavalry contingents were as follows (Hdt. 7.84-86.2): Persians, Sagartians, Medes, Cissians, Indians, Bactrians, Casprians, Libyans, Paricians and Arabians. The nations which contributed ships and crew to Xerxes’ fleet (Hdt. 7.89-96): Phoenicians, Syrians, Egyptians, Cyprians, Cilicians, Pamphylians, Lycians, Dorians, Carians, Ionians, Ionian islanders, Aeolians, Greek settlers from Pontus, Persians, Medes and Scythians.

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395 Burn 1984, 113.
396 Hdt. 7.21.1: τί γὰρ οὐκ ἤγαγε ἐκ τῆς Άσιῆς ἔθνος ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα Ξέρξης. Similarly, Diodorus (11.2.3) claims that Xerxes collected both infantry and cavalry divisions from all of the satrapies.
398 For a different view, see: Armayor 1978.
399 It has been suggested that the catalogue of Xerxes army was partially predicated on a Persian document and on information derived from the works of Hecataeus of Miletus. For a discussion regarding the veracity of the Herodotean list of Xerxes’ army, see: Armayor 1978; Lewis 1984, 601–2; Barkworth 1993, 156–59; Armayor 2004, 329–305; S. R. West 2011, 261–65.
400 Arrian (An. 3.8.3-6, 113-17) mentions Indians, Bactrians, Sogdianians, Sacians (Scythians of Asia Minor), Arachosians, mountaineer Indians (τοὺς ὀρείους Ἱνδοὺς καλοῦμένους), Areians, Parthians, Hyrcanians, Tapirian Medes, Cadiians, Albania, Arians, Sacesinian, men who dwelt near the Red Sea, Uxians, Susians, Babylonians, Carians, Sitaceniens, Armenians, Cappadocians, Syrians from the vale between Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon (i.e. Coele-Syria), and the men of Syria which lies between the rivers.
401 Tuplin 1987c, 193. For further examples of multinational royal armies mustered by the Achaemenids, see: Hdt. 4.1.1 (the army of Darius I’s in his campaign against the Scythians); Diod. 11.71.6 (the army mustered by Artaxerxes I to suppress the revolt of the Libyan Inarus in Egypt in the late-460s BC); Xen. An. 1.8.9-10 (the royal army of Artaxerxes II at Cunaxa); Diod. 14.19.6 (the quasi-royal army of Cyrus the Younger, composed of levies from Asia Minor and Greek mercenaries).
troops. Though Herodotus does not spell out who these Persians were, it seems reasonable to assume that they were the King’s satraps. Moreover, if we are to believe Herodotus, the Achaemenid procedure regarding an official declaration of war required preliminary deliberation in a war council assembled by the King. This forum must have included the most prominent members of the royal court and plausibly several satraps though certainly not all of them. In any case, Herodotus notes that after Xerxes announced his final decision a sort of competition took place, as each satrap sought to win royal favor by mustering the best equipped contingents.

The satraps’ role in royal campaigns was not limited solely to the mustering phase. Though the role and position of the satraps in the above mentioned examples is not specified, it is reasonable that certain satraps may have assumed an active command post as officers of the divisions levied from their satrapies, especially if the campaign took place in a neighboring region, as exemplified in the role of the satraps in the Battle of the Granicus River. Moreover, on various occasions satraps were promoted to lead the King’s armies on large scale campaigns, an appointment which serves as an indication that the appointed satrap had considerable military experience which merited such a prestigious command.

Collection of Tribute
One of the primary civic duties of the satraps was the collection of tribute. Tribute held a central role in Achaemenid royal ideology, as attested by Achaemenid royal inscriptions, and its importance is attested in the Greek sources as well. Fortunately, the Greek sources are more explicit in respect to the role of the satraps in regard to the collection of tribute. Xenophon explicitly notes that the collection of tribute constituted a satrapal duty. Furthermore, Thucydides recounts a letter sent by Darius II to Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus in 413 BC, in which the satraps were notified that the Great King wondered why they failed to send the tribute as expected. This notification clearly demonstrates

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402 Hdt. 7.19.3: Περσέων τε τῶν συλλεχθέντων αὐτίκα πᾶς ἀνήρ ἐς τὴν ἄρχην ἑωντοὶ ἀπελάσας.
403 Briant 2002, 343.
404 Since Xerxes apparently mustered his army in the vicinity of Susa (Diod. 11.13), it is possible that only the governors of the core satrapies were present.
405 Hdt. 7.26.
406 Concerning the role of the satraps in the battle of the Granicus River, see p. 86 below.
407 For instance, Pharnabazus II, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, was appointed as one of the generals in the expedition against the Egyptian rebels shortly after the conclusion of the King’s Peace in 387 BC (Isoc. 4.140-41), and again in 373 BC (Diod. 15.29.3-4, 41-44; Nep. Dat. 3.4-5). Concerning the date, preparations and execution of the first Persian attempt to recapture Egypt during the reign of Artaxerxes II, see: Ruzicka 2012, 66–76.
408 DB I.17-20/§7; DNa 15-30/§3; DPe §2/5-18; DPh §3/13-28. The centrality of tribute in Achaemenid royal ideology is best exemplified by the monumental relief on the eastern stairs and southern wall of the Apadana at Persepolis, which depicts a procession of numerous delegations bringing tribute and bearing gifts to the Great Achaemenid king. Cf. Walser 1966; Root 1979, 227–84; Koch 1993, 117–35.
409 For example, Herodotus (1.192.1) explicitly notes that the Great King received regular tribute (φόρος) from each of the lands that he ruled, a claim which is expanded upon in his detailed catalogue of satrapies (Hdt. 3.89-97).
410 Xen. Cyr. 8.6.3, 6, 16; Xen. Oec. 4.5, 11.
411 Thuc. 8.5-6.
that the regular collection of tribute was a satrap’s responsibility. A successful collection of tribute was facilitated through an effective exploitation of the agricultural potential of the conquered territories. This explains why Xenophon points out that the satraps were expected to see that their domain was prudently utilized, and that satraps who were able to show a flourishing and densely populated satrapy were given additional land and other honors, while those who failed to do so could have been removed from office.

**Imitatio Regis**

According to Xenophon, the satraps were also expected to imitate Achaemenid royal customs and practices. This was, once more, a directive that was allegedly issued by Cyrus the Elder, who bid his satraps to follow his example and in turn to encourage their subordinates to follow their examples. Accordingly, the satraps were instructed to reign with moderation and self-restraint, to grant those who were worthy a seat at the satrap’s table, to share the wealth of their satrapy with loyal subordinates, and to honor those who exhibited noble character. The satraps maintained their own satrapal court, which was to a great extent a miniature version of the royal court, and just like the Persian King, they were expected to give audience to those who sought consultation. Furthermore, the satrapal court was the place in which the satrap’s sons and sons of other Persian nobles present in the region were educated. Xenophon also notes that the satraps were expected to maintain extravagant gardens, a setting which allowed them to exercise hunting and warfare, two skills that the Persian King and his nobles were expected to hone. The purpose of these requirements, as Briant convincingly argues, was “to conserve the political and cultural homogeneity of the Persians of the imperial diaspora.”

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412 Xen. Oec. 4.11.
413 Xen. Oec. 4.8.
415 Xen. Cyr. 8.6.10. Interestingly, Nehemiah (Neh. 5:15) claims that while he presided as the governor of Yehud, he remitted the obligation of his subjects to supply for his table, a custom which was enacted by his predecessors. It seems that his purpose was to demonstrate that he, in contrast to his predecessor, was a moderate ruler and that his conduct benefited the Persians and their subjects.
416 Xen. Cyr. 6.11.
417 Xenophon (Hell. 1.5.3) mentions the throne of Cyrus the Younger, presumably his seat while giving audience. Moreover, Athenaeus (13.570c) jokingly claims that one could get an interview with Pharnabazus quicker than with Lais, probably the famous Corinthian hetaera who flourished in the second half of the fifth century BC.
418 Xen. Cyr. 8.6.10; Isoc. 4.152. Briant (1994, 298–302) suggests the possibility that the Macedonian institution of royal pages was an appropriated Achaemenid custom.
419 Xen. Cyr. 8.6.10, 12.
421 Briant 2002, 347.
Conclusion
In essence, the satraps were expected to keep the peace and ensure that the tribute kept flowing. As long as the King got his share of the revenue and his authority was unchallenged, the satrap’s performance must have been regarded as adequate. More importantly, a satrap who successfully met the King’s expectations received honors and gifts.422 The Achaemenid Kings had a vast empire to rule and administer but the impressive apparatus of royal supervision, as surveyed in the previous chapter, enabled a close watch on the state-of-affairs in the satrapies. Even still, the King’s attention to matters of a specific satrapy must have been limited, while the nature of satrapal duties reveal that only in times of crisis, when the local satrap failed to contain, direct royal intervention was likely to occur. As we shall see, the response of the Persian central authorities varied from limited interventions such as issuing a royal decree or a change in personnel to the deployment of a fully equipped royal army.

3.2 Satrapal Financial Resources
The Great King’s expectations of his satraps were numerous and demanding. A satrap who wanted to maintain royal favor had to maintain the peace, to protect the land, to keep the tribute flowing, and to pay the soldiers and administrators. In order to accomplish these royal directives, the satrap was furnished with considerable financial resources in addition to civic and military manpower. In what follows, a survey of the various sources of satrapal revenue is offered. It is followed by a description of the mechanism through which the Persians ensured the availability of capable manpower for military and civic purposes. By outlining the scope and limitations of satrapal resources, we can contextualize the decisions and policies enacted by the satraps of western Anatolia and achieve a better understanding of the possibilities and necessities which led the satraps to prefer a specific course of action or policy over another.

The Aristotelian Model
One of the most detailed accounts that are concerned with satrapal sources of revenue is the Aristotelian Oeconomicus. This treatise provides a highly detailed description of the financial resources which were at the disposal of the satraps. In contrast to the Herodotean catalogue of satrapies, which merely quantifies the amount of tribute paid to the Great King in silver talents, the Aristotelian economic manual enumerates no less than six types of satrapal revenue:423

οἰκονομίαι δὲ εἰσὶ τέσσαρες, ὡς ἐν τῷ ποιό διελέσθαι (τὰς γὰρ ἄλλας εἰς τοῦτο ἐμπιστούσας εὑρίσκομεν), βασιλικὴ σατραπικὴ πολιτικὴ ἰδιωτικὴ... δεύτερον δὲ τὴν σατραπικήν. ἐστὶ δὲ ταύτης εἰδή ἐξ τῶν προσώπων ἢ γῆς, ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν ἔν τῇ ἁρα ἱδίων γενομένων, ἢ ἀπὸ ἐμπορίων, ἢ ἀπὸ τελῶν, ἢ ἀπὸ βοσκημάτων, ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων. αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν πρῶτων πρῶτος μὲν καὶ κρατίστη ἢ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς (αὐτὴ ἡ δὲ ἐστὶν ἢν οἱ μὲν ἐκφόριοι, οἱ δὲ δεκάτην προσαγορεύονται), δεύτερα δὲ ἡ ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν ἱδίων γενομένη, οἱ μὲν χρυσίοι, οἱ δὲ ἄργυριοι, οἱ δὲ χαλκοί, οἱ δὲ ὀπόσα δύναται γίνεσθαι, τρίτη δὲ καὶ ἡ ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐμπορίων. τετάρτῃ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων, ἐπικεφαλαίων τε καὶ χειρωναξίων προσαγορευομένη.

422 Starr 1975, 82.
423 [Arist.], Oec. 2.1.1-4/2.1345b-1346a.
There are four types of administrations that can be classified (for we shall see that the rest will fall into this classification): royal, satrapal, civic and private... The second type is the satrapal administration. For this type there are six sources of revenue: from land, from those who inhabit the land, from trade, from taxes, from cattle and from other sources. The first and most important of these is revenue from land (which some call produce tax, while others tithe). The second [source of revenue] is generated from the particular (sources of a specific region), either gold, silver, copper or anything else that is available. The third is revenue from trade stations. The fourth is revenue from dues imposed on land and markets. The fifth comes from cattle, which is called revenue or tithe. The sixth is generated from other sources, called poll-tax and craftsman-tax.

Since this work was probably composed in the last quarter of the fourth century BC or even later⁴²⁴, it is uncertain to what extent this model reflects Achaemenid practices and institutions. The apparent centrality of the provincial administration is an important indicator⁴²⁵, but certainly not a definitive one. Aperghis, for instance, argues against the view that the author incorporated Achaemenid elements into his model. He claims that the Achaemenid decentralized monetary policy allowed satraps, cities and local dynasts in Asia Minor and the Levant to mint their own coins. Aperghis points out that coinage is not mentioned in the in the Aristotelian model and concludes that is was not predicated on the Achaemenid Empire.⁴²⁶

There are, however, several objections to Aperghis’ conclusion. First, the economy of the Achaemenid Empire was markedly flexible. While the financial system in the western satrapies was fairly monetized, the commercial transactions in the core satrapies, as attested in the Persepolis Fortifications tablets, were conducted in kind as well as in coin. Furthermore, the Babylonian record reveals that taxes, dues and other commercial activates had been discharged either in silver or in kind,⁴²⁷ while silver payments are also attested in Egypt⁴²⁸ and in the Persepolis Archives.⁴²⁹ Second, there is little doubt that the main focus of the discussed passage is the sources of satrapal revenue. Yet, the manner in which the satraps exacted their imposts and dues seems secondary, and as a result it is not discussed in detail. Hence, to deduce from the absence of coinage that the described model does not reflect Achaemenid practices is far from convincing. Third, Aperghis himself claims that “the financial administration of the Seleukid Empire inherited a great deal from that of the

⁴²⁴ According to Philodemus (On Property Management, col. 7 lines 38, 44 and col. 27 line 14), Theophrastus was the author of the Aristotelian Oeconomicus. Conversely, Pomeroy (1994, 68 n. 2) suggests that the work was composed by a student of Theophrastus or perhaps one of Theophrastus’ colleagues in the Lyceum. In any case, most scholars (e.g. Wartelle 1968, XIII; Descat 2003, 154) agree that the second book was composed in the last quarter of the fourth century BC, but Aperghis (2004, 135) argues that of the second book could be dated to 275 BC. For a survey of past scholarship regarding the date of the second book, see: Aperghis 2004, 129–34.
⁴²⁶ Aperghis 2004, 131.
⁴²⁷ E.g. a Babylonian tablet from Nippur (BE X 97, translation: Dandamaev 1979, 103–5), dated to 420 BC, demonstrates that taxes were paid in silver and goods. Another document from Babylon (BM 33928, translation: Abraham 2004, no. 75), dated to 487 BC, mentions a payment that was made in silver shekels.
⁴²⁸ A key Aramaic document from Elephantine, which is discussed in further detail in p. 69 below, recounts how the majority of dues and taxes imposed on trade ships that were carrying cargo to and from Egypt was levied in silver.
⁴²⁹ E.g. PT 7, 27, and 52.
Achaemenids". Later on he adds that the challenges the Seleucids grappled with were essentially similar to those the Achaemenids faced, and that the Seleucids could not but adopt the various Achaemenid administrative institutions, regulations, and practices that proved themselves to be effective for over two centuries. In other words, even if Aristotelian model is based on the Seleucid taxation system familiar to its author, it still probably reflects certain Achaemenid elements that were appropriated by the Seleucids. As we shall see, there is a considerable body of evidence that shows that the majority of the sources of revenue that are described in this passage were well in use during the Achaemenid era.

The Classes of Satrapal Revenue

(1) Revenue from Land

The first type of satrapal revenue mentioned in Aristotle’s Oeconomicus is the income generated from agricultural exploitation of the territories dominated by the Persians. Two designations are ascribed to this type of revenue: ἐκφόριον and δεκάτη. Such articulation may imply that these terms are in fact synonyms that signify the same type of income. Yet, Descat argues that these classifications corresponded to two distinct systems of revenue extraction. The ἐκφόριον refers to a fixed rate set by the Persian government on the basis of estimated agricultural productivity, while the δεκάτη denotes a levy of 10% on the actual harvest. Furthermore, through an analysis of the Mnesimachus inscription, dated to the early Hellenistic period, Descat offers a reconstruction of the method by which the Persians assessed the agricultural potential of a given territory. He maintains that the Persian tribute assessment was calculated on the basis of one mina of gold (about 500 gr.) per, presumably squared, parasang (a tract of land of about 1.5 km²).

There is little doubt that the taxes generated by agricultural production, whether in kind, bullion or coin, were of the utmost importance. Herodotus states that the Great King received regular tribute from each of the lands he ruled, along with provisions for his

430 Aperghis 2004, 132.
431 Aperghis 2004, 263.
432 Already in antiquity Appian (Syr. 55) and Plutarch (Demetr. 32.7) envisioned the Seleucids as heirs of Persian power. For further reading on the Seleucids as the successors of the Achaemenids, see: Bickerman 1938, 197–207; Bickerman 1966; Sherwin-White 1987; Briant 1990; McKenzie 1994. For a different view, see: Tuplin 2008.
433 It is unclear whether the author refers to royal land, private land or both. Aperghis (2004, 123) argues, correctly in my view, that the general sense of the term γῆ refers to all categories of land, namely land belonging to the King, cities, temples in addition to subject dynasts and peoples (both individuals and corporate groups). For a discussion and alternative interpretations, see: Aperghis 2004, 123 n. 5.
434 For example, Rostovtzeff (1910, 241–42) suggests that in Egypt the designation for land tax was ἐκφόριον, while in other regions it was called δεκάτη.
435 Descat 1989a, 82. Aperghis (2004, 123) arrives at a similar conclusion, apparently independently.
436 For the text and translation of the Mnesimachus inscription, see: Aperghis 2004, 320–23. For a recent discussion regarding the information the Mnesimachus inscription can provide regarding the Achaemenid economic administration, see Roosevelt 2009, 112–14.
437 Descat 1985. The employment of the parasang in the process of the Persian tribute assessment is corroborated by Herodotus (6.42), who recounts that in the aftermath of the Ionian revolt, Artaphernes, the satrap of Lydia, ordered the Ionians to measure their land by parasangs, and according to this measurement he set the amount of tribute that was owed to the Persian authorities.
army. Moreover, according to Xenophon, the satraps were expected to maximize the production of foodstuff in their respective domains, which resulted in greater income. It should also be noted that numerous administrative documents found in Persepolis demonstrate that produce of various types (e.g. grain, wine, fruits, and sesame) were levied in the adjacent villages and stored in warehouses before being transported to an unknown destination, though probably some sort of royal centers. The enactment of a tithe is also well attested in the Persepolis archives. Several tablets from Persepolis, dated to the reign of Darius I, constitute receipts for distribution of wine. Each of these documents recounts a certain quantity of wine, of which one tenth is designated as a tithe (El. rit/riut).

Another source which sheds light on levies in kind which were imposed by the Persian authorities is the Book of Nehemiah. When seeking to illustrate his just and humble conduct as the governor of Yehud, Nehemiah boasts that he stopped the levies of bread, wine and cattle in addition to taxes (in silver shekels), which were exacted by his predecessors, and whose purpose was to provide for the various expenses of the governor of Yehud. Since Nehemiah was merely the underling of the governor of the satrapy Beyond-the-River, the satrap must have enacted similar levies only on a grander scale.

(2) Mines

Mines are the second type of revenue that is mentioned, and there is plenty of evidence that indicates the availability of numerous mines, mineral deposits and other valuable materials during the Achaemenid era. Herodotus reports that the Elamite site at Ardericca, located about eighty km from Susa, was a source of bitumen, salt, and oil, while in Phrygia a lake near the city of Anaua yielded salt. He also notes the existence of naphtha fields in the vicinity of Susiana. Strabo reports that in the vicinity of Syspiritis, an Armenian city, a gold mine existed as well as a deposit of sandyx, an arsenic ore that was used to produce red and purple dyes. Strabo also notes that both deposits were well known in the time of Alexander the Great, and therefore were likely to be exploited by Alexander’s Achaemenid predecessors.

In addition, Strabo reports that Onesicritus, the Cynic philosopher who

438 Hdt. 1.192: γῆ πᾶσα δοσή ἄρχει.
439 Xen. Oec. 4.8, 11.
440 PF 546-653. For evidence for the transportation of produce levies, see: PF 48-49, 388-396, 428.
442 Neh. 5:14-18.
443 On the duty of the subject nations to provide for the King’s table: Simpson 2005. A vivid example of this custom is provided by Herodotus (7.118-19), who recounts the considerable provisions supplied by the subject nations to Xerxes during his march against Greece.
444 Herodotus 6.119.2-3. Also, Wright and Carter (2003, 65) Note another major bitumen source at Mamatain-e Bala, about 13 km north-west of Ram Hormuz on the eastern edge of Khuzestan plain, which was imported to and used at Achaemenid Susa.
445 Hdt. 7.30. In the book of Ezra (7:22), salt is mentioned among the resource allocated by Artaxerxes I to Ezra, which implies that another source of salt existed, probably located within the boundaries of Ezra’s assigned region of Yehud.
446 Hdt. 6.119.
448 On the exploitation of these mines during the Achaemenid era, see: Bernard 1999. For the Egyptian eastern desert in the Roman period, see: Gates-Foster 2012.
accompanied Alexander in his eastward march, claimed to have seen a river in Carmania that produced gold dust in addition to mines of silver, copper, ochre, arsenic, and salt.\footnote{449} In a passage that was predicated on the work of the fourth century historian Polycleitus of Larissa, Strabo maintains that the Achaemenid Kings levied silver, gold, dyes, and other goods that each province produced.\footnote{450} Ctesias claims that there were silver mines in Bactria and that the rivers in India produced gold.\footnote{451} The latter claim is corroborated by Herodotus who reports that the Indians send a tribute of 360 talents in the form of gold dust to the Great King.\footnote{452}

In Egypt, ten Hieroglyphic rock inscriptions dated to the reign of Darius I are concerned with the operations and workers in the stone quarries in Wadi Hammamat, which was located in the mountains of the eastern desert. These quarries were exploited continuously as early as the Early Kingdom and well into the Roman period.\footnote{453} Furthermore, Cypriot copper was also fairly popular in the Achaemenid period. Stager and Walker address several items that were fashioned from copper that originated from Cyprus and were found in Achaemenid imperial centers such as Persepolis and Pasargadæ.\footnote{454}

The wealth of precious metals and other minerals is best exemplified by the Susa Foundation Charter, a trilingual inscription which commemorates the construction of a palace during the reign of Darius I. In this striking document, Darius provides us with an account of the various minerals, precious metals, and other raw materials which were gathered and used by the builders. He notes that cedar wood that was brought from Lebanon, \textit{yaka}-wood (i.e. North Indian Rosewood) from Gandara and Carmania, gold from Lydia and Bactria, lapis lazuli and carnelian from Sogdiana, turquoise from Chorasmia, silver and ebony from Egypt, and ivory from Nubia, India, and Arachosia.\footnote{455} The wealth of the satrapies and the capacity of the Great Kings to harness and effectively exploit it is impressive.\footnote{456} In short, there is little doubt that the Great Persian Kings had notable access to a considerable variety minerals and precious metals.

The lack of evidence, however, prevents us from obtaining a precise understanding of the actual income generated by mines, that is, the frequency and amount of the levies imposed by the Persian authorities in respect to these operations. Briant postulates that the owners of these sites were required to submit periodic accounts regarding their production to the local Persian officials, which were used to exact a certain amount from each operation according to an unknown rate.\footnote{457} Such a hypothesis, despite the striking scarcity of documentation, is reasonable. Aperghis, who is also well aware of the difficulty posed by the absence of sources, points out the distinction in the Aristotelian \textit{Oeconomicus}

\footnote{449} Strabo 15.2.14.  
\footnote{450} Strabo 15.3.21.  
\footnote{451} Ctes. \textit{FGRh} 688 F45 §26.  
\footnote{452} Hdt. 3.94.2.  
\footnote{453} Posener 1936, nos. 12, 14-16, 18-23. Egypt was also known for its gold deposits, see: Moorey 1999, 220.  
\footnote{454} Stager and Walker 1989, 332–36.  
\footnote{456} For evidence on Iran and Anatolia as regions rich in silver deposits, see: Moorey 1999, 234–35.  
\footnote{457} Briant 2002, 401.
between the first type of revenue, namely revenue from land, and the second, which is the income from mines and other natural resources. He argues that there is little doubt that the Seleucid kings extracted significant revenue from natural resources, not only mines but also forests, irrigation canals, industrial products, and so forth. Moreover, while the evidence for Seleucid access to silver and gold ores is scarce, the availability and exploitation of other precious metals, minerals, and products is well attested. Therefore, the possibility that such lucrative resources were not exploited by the Achaemenids is simply incredible, and it is difficult to believe that profiteering from natural resources was a Seleucid innovation rather than a continuation of Achaemenid practices. The considerable treasuries captured by Alexander, which consisted of massive amounts of precious metals, should be seen as another, albeit indirect, attestation for Achaemenid access to precious metals deposits.

One question remains: to what extent did the satraps benefit from the availability of precious metals and other natural sources that were found in the provinces? Gold and silver mines were probably of crucial importance, and it is not unreasonable to assume that the Great King might have preferred to exercise direct control over these and other lucrative operations in the satrapies. Yet, there is a strong possibility that the satraps were in charge of such operations. First, revenue from mines is explicitly classified in the Oeconomicus as of the satrapal sort, hence under the supervision of the satrap himself. Since the satraps were responsible for the King receiving his fair share of the revenue, whether goods or cash, it seems plausible that the income from mines and other similar operations was also supervised by the satraps and their underlings. Second, Xenophon provides clear proof that the natural resources in the satrapies were well under satrapal authority. In 410 BC, after the Peloponnesians lost an entire fleet in the battle of Cyzicus morale was low, and it was Pharnabazus, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, who exhorted Peloponnesian soldiers by proclaiming that there was plenty of wood in the King’s lands, and later on he provided them with timber and funds to rebuild their fleet. The implication is clear: not only that the satraps had control over the natural resources in their domain, in this case a resource of clear strategic importance, but they also had the discretion to use the resources in their domain as they saw fit as long as the King received his tribute. Therefore, it is reasonable for us to conclude that mines and other mineral deposits were managed by the satrapal administration. This also means that the availability of natural resource probably meant a substantial increase in revenue not only for the King but for the satraps as well.

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458 Aperghis 2004, 124.
460 The Alexander historians report that numerous Achaemenid treasuries were captured by Alexander, but often omit the actual quantity that was captured. In the case of the royal treasury in Susa, however, we are told that Alexander discovered in the treasury either 40,000 coined talents (Plut. Alex. 36.1-2) or 50,000 silver talents (Arr. An. 3.1.7), either a phenomenal sum.
461 Aperghis (2004, 264–66) notes that the Achaemenid administrative protocols, as reflected in the Persepolis fortification tablets, demonstrate that Parnaka (or Pharmaces), the senior Persian administrator, was the highest authority in regard to satrapal and royal administration. Aperghis envisions Parnaka as the de facto satrap of Persis due to his overarching authority as presented in the documents. Regardless of the status of Parnaka, the fusion of royal and provincial administrations in Persis probably reflects the state of affairs in the rest of the satrapies.
462 Xen. Hell. 1.1.24-5.
(3 & 4) Trade Posts, Lands and Markets

The third and fourth categories, i.e. taxes on trade posts, lands, and markets can be interpreted as taxation on commercial activities. Regarding the taxes on trade posts, an Aramaic palimpsest papyrus from Elephantine recounts the traffic of trade ships to and from Egypt over an entire year. This document includes the ships respective destinations, ports of origin, along with manifests of the crews, captains, and cargoes. It also enumerates the taxes levied on the shipments carried by these ships, including entry and exit dues in addition to taxes on itemized cargo. The payments were made to the ‘house of the king’, i.e. the local Persian treasury. Similarly, tax imposts on harbors are attested in a bilingual inscription from Xanthus, which commemorates a decree issued by Pixodarus, son of Hecatomnus, who presided as the satrap of Caria from 341 to 335 BC. Though highly fragmentary, it is evident that Pixodarus granted the people of Xanthus, Tlos, Pinanra, and Candaya a tithe of the harbor dues (δεκάτην τῆς ἐμπορίας).

There were additional commercial activities which were taxed by the Persian authorities. Babylonian administrative texts recount the legal obligation to register slave-sales in the local royal tax office, and that a certain amount was levied on the transaction as tax. Main traffic routes were also liable for taxation. A Babylonian tablet, dated to 496 BC, shows that those who sailed up and down the Euphrates River and used the riverine installations, such as bridges and quays, were regularly taxed by the officials of the Persian government. Another source of revenue was tax which was imposed on administrative appointments. According to a Demotic papyrus from Elephantine, a certain Paimbs made a payment in two installments for the appointment of his son Djedhor as the second Wab-priest of Khanum. It seems clear, therefore, that the Persian authorities exacted revenue from the appointments of a priest in the local temple, and quite possibly from additional institutions with similar administrative hierarchy in Egypt and elsewhere.

(5) Tax on cattle

The tax on cattle that is mentioned by the author of the Aristotelian Oeconomicus was probably calculated according to the increase of herds. Several documents from Persepolis contain receipts for sheep and goats which were handed over as payment for a tax called baziš. These documents note the name of the official to whom the payment was

463 TADAI III, C3.7. The two possible dates for the document are 475 and 454 BC. Porten and Yardeni (1993, 292), followed by Briant and Descat (1998, 61–62), are more inclined to date the document to 475 BC. For further scholarship regarding this important document, see: Yardeni 1994; Lipinski 1994; Briant and Descat 1998.
467 TLC 13, no. 196. Translation: Abraham 2004, no. 142. Moreover, this document reveals that the right to collect dues could be leased out in exchange for a fixed sum that was paid to the governor of Babylon on a monthly basis.
469 Kuhrt 2007, 673 n. 10.
made, the number of animals, their kind, age, and sex.470 Additional documents list the number of animals received by those who were sent to round up cattle, presumably state officials,471 designated as the bazikara, i.e. the collectors of baziš.472 Another possible subcategory of this tax type was levies of horses. Herodotus reports that the tribute the Cilicians paid to Darius I constituted 360 silver talents in addition to 360 white horses.473 Moreover, Arrian states that upon the arrival of Alexander in the winter of 334/3 BC, the people of Aspendus agreed to pay tribute to the Macedonian King, which included horses, as they did for the Persian Kings.474 Strabo notes that the region of Cappadocia provided the Persians, in addition to silver tax (ἀργυρωτὸν τέλος), i.e. the regular tribute, no less than 1,500 horses, 2,000 mules, and 50,000 sheep. Strabo adds that the Medes paided twice as much.475 Moreover, Strabo claims that the people of Media and Armenia were famous horse breeders,476 and he even mentions a disagreement in regard to the origin of the Nisaean horses, which were famously used by the Persian Kings themselves, as some say that it was Media while others Armenia. Herodotus, for example, states that the Nisaean plain was located in Median territory,477 a claim which is possibly corroborated by the Bisitun inscription where Nisaya is identified as a place in Media.478

(6) Pol-Tax or Craftsman’s Tax
Regarding the poll-tax that is mentioned in the Oeconomicus, there is no known source that can corroborate that such a tax existed. The abovementioned Aramaic palimpsest papyrus might elude to such a tax, since it includes the phrase 'silver of the men' (כספ גבריא), which might denote some kind of toll,479 and possibly a sort of poll-tax.480 Yet, the ambiguity of this term renders it impossible to determine whether a poll-tax was actually employed by the Persians or not.

Conclusion
Xenophon claims that Cyrus the Elder instructed his satraps to dispatch from each of their provinces a fair share of the things which were fine and good back to the royal court.481

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470 PF 267-73.
471 PF 2000, 2025.
473 Hdt. 3.90.3.
475 Strabo 11.13.8.
476 Strabo 11.13.7. Xenophon (An. 4.5.34) also recounts that Armenia was a renowned horse breeding country.
477 Hdt. 3.106.2, 7.40.3.
478 DB §13/1.48-61.
479 Briant and Descat 1998, 86.
480 Kuhrt (2007, 710 n. 10) points out that a similar term, namely 'tax of the men' (מכס גבריא), appears in an Aramaic ostracan from Memphis (Segal 1983, no. 19).
481 Xen. Cyr. 8.6.6. Interestingly, the term Xenophon employs to describe the wealth of the satrapies is καλὸν ἡ ἄγαθόν. This term resembles the known phrase καλὸς κάγαθος, which can be understood as the equivalent to the modern 'gentleman'. In the discussed passage, however, it refers to an object rather than a person, a usage which might strike the Athenian reader as somewhat odd. Xenophon uses this term in two additional instance. The first appears in the Cyropaedia as well (8.8.4), in which the term denotes an act of beneficence on behalf of the Great King accomplished by one of his subjects. In the second instance (Hier (11.10), a
We are left to wonder what portion of the collected taxes was deemed the King’s share.\textsuperscript{482} It is evident, however, that the satraps presided over a diverse and multifaceted taxation system, which facilitated a continuous flow of funds. Indeed, some of which were sent to the Great King as tribute, while the rest was used for the military, administration and other satrapal expenditures. The conditions, of course, were singular in each satrapy, and it is rather certain that while certain satrapies were wealthy in natural resources, others were not as fortunate. The satrapal sources of revenue were considerable but not limitless, and we shall see in the following chapters that in times of crisis the satraps had to appeal to the King for financial aid.

3.3 The Achaemenid Conscription System

The Persian authorities were in constant need of manpower. Various civic projects required capable workers and skilled craftsmen while the armies of the Great King demanded fresh levies of soldiers to fight the King’s wars and to maintain Persian military supremacy. When seeking to understand the mechanism which enabled the Persians to acquire capable laborers and soldiers, the Babylonian records provide us with ample evidence. The archives of the Murašu family of Nippur\textsuperscript{483}, the Egibi family of Babylon,\textsuperscript{484} and that of Bel-Rêmanni of Sippar,\textsuperscript{485} along with the archives of the Ebabbar Temple in Sippar\textsuperscript{486} and that of the Ezida Temple of Borsippa\textsuperscript{487}, to name only a few, consist of numerous administrative documents which shed light on the various aspects of the Achaemenid conscription system.\textsuperscript{488}

The Mechanism

According to the Babylonian records, the Persian authorities were able to meet the various requirements for manpower by distributing crown lands. These lands granted to numerous groups who dwelled in Babylonia, often of non-Babylonian descent, in exchange for services and dues. Those who received these land grants were subjected to various taxes in kind or silver along with the obligation to take upon themselves manual labor or military service on demand. The allocated crown estates were divided into three categories: chariot-land (\textit{bīt markabti}), horse-land (\textit{bīt sīsī}) and bow-land (\textit{bīt qašti}). These designations indicate the type of military service the grantees took upon themselves. Bow-lands were expected to supply archers and infantry soldiers, owners of horse-land furnished cavalry

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third adjective (σοφὸν) is attached to the term, though it again described a noble act. It is possible that Xenophon sought to draw on the positive connotation of this phrase when he used it to describe characteristics of objects rather than persons.

\textsuperscript{482} Klinkott (2005, 272–74) argues that the regular tribute (φόρος) constituted only a small portion of the various revenues (in kind and other) levied in the satrapies and that it was converted into silver before being transported to royal treasuries. The remainder was used by the satraps for various purposes, e.g. to pay of the wages of the satrapal administrators and to maintain the military contingents stationed in the satrapy.

\textsuperscript{483} Cardascia 1951; Stolper 1985.

\textsuperscript{484} Abraham 2004.

\textsuperscript{485} Waerzeggers 2014.

\textsuperscript{486} Bongenaar 1997.

\textsuperscript{487} Waerzeggers 2010. For additional evidence from Borsippa, see: Joannès 1989a; Jursa and Waerzeggers 2009.

\textsuperscript{488} Additional pertinent documents were discovered in Šahrinu, Šatir, Ur, and Uruk.
soldiers, and chariot lands were to fit out chariots and charioiteers. These taxes and services owed by the occupants of crown land are identified in the Babylonian texts as *ilkû*, which is generally translated as ‘service’. In essence, the *ilkû* tax constituted an annual silver payment ranging from ten shekels (about 50 gr) up to 17 minai (about 8.5 kg), depending on the size of the land held by the grantee. As noted above, this tax could also be traded for other obligations, including corvée labor and military service when such services were required. A certain function of the *ilkû* tax, whose purpose was to ensure the availability of unpaid, unfree labor, is designated as an *urašû* service. Another aspect is denoted as *upiyâta* tax, which signifies the obligation to pay tax in-kind to the Great King.

Traditionally, a number of land holders were grouped into an administrative unit called *ḥatru(s)*, which was headed by a *šaknu*/*šagnu*, i.e. the foreman of the group. The duties of the *šaknu* included the allocation of the land parcels among the members of the *ḥatru*, ensuring that the all of the available land was allocated and used, collection of owed dues and taxes, and making sure that any service obligations, military or otherwise, were adequately fulfilled. These duties were imposed on individual real-estate owners, the administrative personnel of temples that received land grants from the Persian authorities, and probably other similar corporate organizations.

Through this mechanism, the Persian government was able to intensify agricultural exploitation of crown lands and consequently maximize revenues. More importantly, a large pool of potential conscripts was created, ensuring the availability of able-bodied men for manual labor and military service.

**Civic Applications**

**Babylonian Record**

There are several instances which demonstrate the effectiveness of the Achaemenid conscription system in regard to civic projects. In a document from Babylon, dated to 517 BC, we are informed that a certain Bultaya, probably a seasoned if not professional sailor, received a monthly salary of eight shekels from Marduk Nāṣir Apli of the Egibi family to transport cress, oil, and flour by boat to Babylon. This service is denoted as a ‘service on behalf of the King’ (*kanšu*), an obligation to the Persian authorities that the Egibi firm

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491 Briant (2002, 401) notes that the officers in charge of *ilkû* were the same officers who had the duty of requisitioning manual labor, i.e. to impose the *urašû* service. Therefore, he concludes that the *urašû* service should be perceived as one of the many financial obligations collectively called *ilkû*. For further reading and additional examples on the *urašû* service, see: Joannès 1989a, 151–59.
493 Further reading on the *ḥatru* and *šaknu* institutions: Stolper 1985, 70–103; Briant 2002, 485–86.
495 Dar 158, translation: Abraham 2004, no. 94. The same Bultaya was hired again by the Egibi family (Dar 215, translation: Abraham 2004, no. 101), though we are not told what was the labor he performed for a yearly salary of a third of a silver mina.
incurred as the legal owner of crown land. A Babylonian tablet found in Borsippa, dated to 488 BC, recounts a demand issued by the Persian authorities to haul boats to a quay near Susa. These boats were appropriated for the collection of the abovementioned upiyāta tax, and the service, denoted as usrašu, i.e. liability for manual labor, was provided by an owner of a bow-land. Similarly, another document of unknown date or origin reveals that eighteen registered owners of bow-land, who were members of the hatru of the Kirkaeans, were conscripted by a certain garrison-commander named Edarni-Bel to haul two boats to an unknown location.

The obligation incurred by owners of crown lands enabled the Persian authorities to finance and supply laborers for routine governmental operations and infrastructure development. A document from the Egibi family archive, dated to 507 BC, recounts that the abovementioned Marduk Nāšir Apli paid a debt of one and a half mina of silver, and that the money was used to finance the construction of a royal canal in Elam, possibly to pay the wages of the laborers hired to dig the canal. There are additional documents concerned with unspecified projects that reveal similar financial obligation along with salaries and rations, paid in kind or silver by Marduk nāšir apli. It has been suggested that these financial payments were made due to ilku tax the Egibi family took upon itself as the legal owner of crown estates. In any case, an additional document dated to 535 BC that was found in Sippar records the obligation of a certain Kinaya to the temple administer (šangu) of the Ebabbar temple to monitor a nearby canal and to prevent it from overflowing and damaging the royal road. Since a high ranking official in the temple hierarchy seems to have been responsible for the wellbeing of the royal road in the region, one can infer that the maintenance of roads and canals was imposed on local temples, almost certainly in exchange for land grants. A similar case is recounted in a document from the same year and place. This time we are informed that six spades and four sickles were brought to Bunene-shimanni and ten spades to Bel-silim at the sluice canal of the Cyrus River Canal. The equipment was clearly intended for a large group in charge of digging and maintaining the canal. Since this document belongs to the archive of the Ebabbar temple in Sippar, the maintenance of the canal was probably assigned to the priests serving in the temple. If that was the case, it seems reasonable to assume that such an obligation was the result of a land grant given to the priests from the Persian government. Road measurement was another task that the Persian authorities imposed on receivers of
land grants. In Sippar, for example, the šaknu of the ‘temple-enterers’ (sing. ērib bīti) of the Ebabbar temple, as recounted in a document dated to 530 BC, was obligated to measure a road. 506

**Other Sources**

There are numerous examples in non-Babylonian sources for corvée labor that was furnished by the subject peoples on behalf of the Persian authorities. Regarding the province of Yehud, the author of the Book of Nehemiah mentions that some of the subjects of the King had to mortgage their lands and vineyards in order to be able to pay the tribute. 507 Another possible attestation appears in Herodotus’ account. After the Persian fleet suffered heavy losses following the failed attempt to circumvent Mount Athos, Xerxes ordered to dig a canal through the isthmus of the promontory to facilitate a safe passage for his armada. 508 Briant points out that in addition to Xerxes’ troops, the inhabitants around Mount Athos also participated in the project, probably the denizens of the five cities mentioned by Herodotus. 509 The local workers were probably conscripted to participate in the project, which is reminiscent of the practices recorded in the Babylonian sources. Similarly, several sources report that the Suez Canal, whose construction was initiated by the Egyptian King Nacho, was completed by Darius I. 510 It is reasonable to assume that the canal was constructed by conscripted workers from the neighboring settlements in a manner that resembles the mechanism described in the Babylonian records. 511 Moreover, in the aforementioned Aristotelian *Oeconomicus*, we are informed that Antimenes, having been appointed by Alexander to preside as the supervisor of roads, ordered the satraps to see that the storehouses along the royal roads were adequately stocked. A possible implication that can be deduced, assuming that this was a continuation of Achaemenid practice, is that the satraps were responsible for road maintenance, including the supply of provision and routine upkeep of the roads, probably by means of corvée labor. 512 This impression seems to be corroborated by a fairly colorful anecdote recorded by Aelian, who claims that a certain stretch of road from Susa to Media was filled with scorpions. Accordingly, every time the Great King’s entourage was about to use this route, the road was cleared. 513 Since we are only told that the King issued the order to clear the road three days before his journey, it seems reasonable to assume that this task was assigned to the satraps, who saw that a local workforce was collected for the execution of this labor.

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506 BM 79746, translation: Kuhr 2007, no. 14.22.i. The ‘temple-enterers’ were participators in the temple cult and as such were allowed to enter sections of the temple which were forbidden to others. More on the ‘temple-enterers’, see: Bongenaar 1997, 147–65.
507 Neh. 5:4–6.
508 Hdt. 7.22; Diod. 1.33.
509 Briant 2002, 402. The cities Herodotus names are Dion, Olophyxus, Acrothooi, Thyssus, and Cleonai.
510 Hdt. 2.159; Diodorus (1.33.8–12) claims that Darius left the canal unfinished, and that it was Ptolemy II Philadelphus who finalized this monumental project. Yet, in the Suez Canal inscriptions (DZa, DZb, DZc; Cf. Kuhr 2007, 485–86), Darius proclaims that he commissioned the digging of the canal, which creates the impression that it was completed in Darius’ time. It is possible that the Ptolemies upgraded the Persian canal, and therefore were thought to be those who finished it. For Darius’ Suez Canal inscriptions, see: Tuplin 1991, 242–43 (with references to translations and scholarship).
512 Ibid. *Ibid*.
Lastly, the Susa Foundation Charter provides us with a clear demonstration that the Persians were able to employ specialists from numerous satrapies for their building projects. Babylonian workers dug the foundations, Cedar wood was transported by Assyrians, Carians and Ionians, Ionian and Sardian masons fashioned the stone columns, Mede and Egyptian goldsmiths produced decorations, Egyptians carpenters also participated in the works, and Babylonian workers fashioned the bricks.  

It is evident, therefore, that the satraps, either on behalf of the King and probably for the sake of their own operations, had the capacity to enlist and employ capable and skilled manpower for various projects and other services, and that civic projects and operations were financed and maintained through the obligation incurred by holders of crown lands.

Military Applications
As noted above, the occupants of crown estates were liable for military service. In a similar fashion to corvée labor, the conscription of soldiers was based on the needs of the Persian central authorities. In other words, in times of peace the holders probably cultivated the land and paid taxes in kind or coin, though the military obligation did not lapse but simply was not implemented. Moreover, the sources show that crown land owners were able to hire replacements when seeking to discharge themselves from military service. This means that the Persian officials did not care about the identity of the person who reported for duty, as long as the quota was met.

Babylon
Again, the Babylonian administrative archives shed light on how the military applications of the Achaemenid conscription system operated. A Babylonian document dated to 513 BC lists the equipment provided for twelve squires who accompanied cavalry soldiers for a period of three years. The equipment was supplied by three individuals, who were probably liable for this military service but hired replacements to take their place and furnished them with the provisions appropriate for their task. Moreover, in a letter which recounts an argument over jurisdiction between a certain Guzanu, an owner of a chariot-land, and an unnamed officer of the citadel in Sippar, we learn that the former was deprived of his chariot driver, shield-bearer, i.e. the third man on the chariot, along with several militia men. This example demonstrates a correlation between being the owner of

514 DSf § 8, 9, 12, 13.
515 Note also the Ionian, Lydian and Anatolian influences in the masonry techniques employed in Cyrus’ tomb at Pasargadæ (Stronach 1978, 39–43; Boardman 2000, 53–60), which might indicate the involvement of masons from these regions in the construction works. Furthermore, the Persepolis archives attest to the presence of Lycian workers and craftsmen (PF 1049; PFa 30), a possible Assyrian woodcutter (PF 1799), Lydian blacksmiths (PF 873), and workers from Egypt (PF 1557), Skudra/Thrace (PF 1542; PFa 18), Cappadocia (PFa 30), Caria (PF 1123), Bactria (PF 1947), Sogdiana (PF 1118), and Syria (PT 15). An additional tablet (PT 15) mentions a payment in silver given to Syrian, Egyptian and Ionian workers. Lastly, for the employment of Babylonian workers in the construction of a royal palace in a royal site in the Persian heartland called Matannan, see: Henkelman and Kleber 2007.
516 Briant 2002, 598.
517 Dar 253, translation: Kuhrt 2007, no. 14.31.i. The list includes: a mule, 36 shekels for the mule’s fodder, twelve blankets, twelve cuirasses, twelve helmets, twelve travel bags, twelve pairs of shoes, one pi of oil, two pi of salt, and two pi of cress. The unit pi, or panu, corresponds with 36 litters.
chariot-land and the obligation to serve as a charioteer. Another document, dated to 487 BC, recounts how a certain Babylonian businessman made a payment of silver to discharge himself from the obligation to supply military equipment and travel provisions.\(^{519}\) Similarly, holders of bow-land in Nippur in 422 BC were forced to take a loan in order to obtain clothing and additional unspecified military equipment.\(^{520}\) Another document, dated to 421 BC, also from Nippur, constitutes a contract between Rimut-Ninurta, who owed cavalry service in Uruk, and Gadalyama, who received payment and equipment to take upon himself this obligation.\(^{521}\) Lastly, the responsibility of holders of bow-land in Nippur to furnish soldiers is attested in a document dated to 421 BC.\(^{522}\)

**Darius’ Bisitun Inscription**

The numerous examples provided by the Babylonian record should not be taken as an indication that these administrative practices and regulations were exclusive to Babylonia. Similar taxation and conscription systems are attested in other satrapies, albeit not as frequently.\(^{523}\) To begin with, the term bow-land (bīt qašti) appears in the Babylonian version of the Bisitun inscription,\(^{524}\) while in the parallel section in the Old-Persian version, Darius boasts that he restored the farmsteads, livestock, houses and slaves which Gaumāta stole from the people.\(^{525}\) This phrase may indicate that the actions of Gaumāta, which allegedly disrupted the order of things, were reversed by Darius, and also that, just like in Babylon, crown land was parceled and granted to the King’s subjects in return for taxes and services throughout the Empire.

**Asia Minor**

The conscription system which is depicted in the Babylonian record is also corroborated by the Greek sources. Apparently, this system was known to Herodotus, who reports that the King’s land was parceled out to provide for his army, though he does not specify what was to be provided.\(^{526}\) This is clarified by Herodotus’ report regarding the immediate Persian response to the burning of Sardis by the Ionian rebels in 498 BC. According to Herodotus, the Persians who dwelled in the districts west of the Halys River were able to muster an army and to defeat the Ionians near Ephesus.\(^{527}\) Such an immediate and effective response was impossible without a well-established system similar to the one described in the Babylonian sources. Another interesting and revealing episode is recorded by Xenophon. An estate that was owned by a Persian named Asidates, situated in the vicinity of Pergamum, was attacked by Xenophon and his men. After the Persian noble and his men were able to withstand the attack, they signaled to their neighbors that they were in distress. Shortly after several forces came to the rescue. Xenophon reports that these forces included

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\(^{519}\) BM33928, translation: Abraham 2004, no. 75.
\(^{520}\) BE X no. 61, translation: Kuhrt 2007, no. 14.31.ii.
\(^{521}\) This document has been published by Lutz 1928, and it includes a detailed list of the standard equipment of cavalry contingents, namely a neck-cover, a hood, a quiver, 120 arrows, a sword and a scabbard, two iron lances, and one mina of silver for provisions.
\(^{522}\) BE X no. 69, translation: Dandamaev 1979, 103–4.
\(^{523}\) Cardascia 1977, 10; Picard 1980, 46; Briant 1982b, 195–97.
\(^{524}\) Von Voigtlander 1978, 17, 55.
\(^{525}\) DB §14.
\(^{526}\) Hdt. 1.192.1.
\(^{527}\) Hdt. 5.102.
a band of men-at-arms led by a certain Itamenes, an unspecified number of Assyrian hoplites and eighty Hycanian cavalrymen from Comania, 800 peltasts and cavalry troops from Parthenium along with a contingents that came from Apollonia and other adjacent districts. The Assyrian and Hycanian soldiers are identified by Xenophon as troops who received their pay from the King, and their maintenance and wages were probably financed through revenues generated by crown estates. In any case, the quick response coupled with the diversity and impressive size of the Persian reinforcements demonstrate not only the dense settlement pattern under Persian rule, but more importantly the readiness of the local communities to provide levies to ward off raiders. It is highly likely that the troops that came to the rescue were holders of crown estates who answered when duty called.

In 396 BC, while campaigning in western Anatolia, the Spartan King Agesilaus realized that he was at a tactical disadvantage due to lack of sufficient cavalry forces in comparison to the Persian contingents under the command of Tissaphernes. Therefore, he compiled a list of the wealthiest men in the region and ordered them to provide horses, weapons and trained cavalry troops. The Spartan king’s demand was quickly met. Again, this indicates that the local population was already capable of furnishing cavalry soldiers in a relatively short time span, probably due to the well-established institutions and procedures similar to those described in the Babylonian records. Lastly, it has been suggested that the non-local detachments that were deployed at the battle of Granicus were also recipients of crown estates.

Egypt
The presence of available military personnel, facilitated through the allocation of crown land, is also well attested in Egypt. An Aramaic Papyrus, dated to 495 BC, shows that land parcels were allocated by the Persian authorities and that at times there were disagreements between landholders, which were resolved by the imperial administration. That the occupants of these lands probably incurred an obligation to serve in the Persian army is demonstrated in a document dated to 461 BC, which shows that an Aramaean soldier stationed in the garrison of Elephantine was the legal owner of a plot of land. Interestingly, an additional record from Elephantine, composed after 434/3 BC, recounts a dispute between a soldier serving in the garrison and a woman. According to the petitioner, named Nattun, in spite of the fact that the discussed tract of land that was owned by his detachment was ploughed, he did not receive his share of the revenue. Another illuminating Aramaic document, dated to the late fifth century BC, records the satrap

528 Xen. An. 7.8.8-9, 12-15.
531 Xen. Hell. 3.4.15.
532 Diod. 17.19.4. Petit 1990, 130. In addition, Petit postulates that the Armenian contingent under the command of Orontes, the satrap of Armenia (Xen. An. 3.4.3), and the Bithynian force who was assisted by Pharnabazus (Xen. An. 6.4.24), were local units which were mustered through the same conscription system.
533 AP no. 1; DAE no. 2.
534 AP no. 7; DAE no. 9
535 AP no. 16; TADAE I, A5.2.
Arshama’s (i.e. Arsames) reaffirmation of a hereditary lease.\textsuperscript{536} Interestingly, in his reply, Arshama reminds the grantee that he will have to pay tax for the land he inherited from his father. Another letter dispatched by Arshama mentions thirteen Cilicians, whom the satrap ordered to release from custody after he had concluded that they were not deserters but rather captured by Egyptian rebels.\textsuperscript{537} It has been suggested that since these men were captured after they were unable to make it safely into the garrison, they probably served in a non-local detachment in Egypt, and were probably given crown land as a source of income.\textsuperscript{538} Similarly, a document discovered in Saqqara mentions ‘fields of the garrison’ and ‘things that ought to be brought to the house of the King’, i.e. the treasury.\textsuperscript{539} It is certain that the estates occupied by foreign garrison soldiers in Egypt were land grants distributed by the imperial administration in order to provide for the soldiers in return for their services.

**Conclusion**

The Great Persian King expected much of his satraps, and in order to successfully meet these expectations, the satraps were furnished with ample resources. Satrapal financial resources and manpower were considerable. Satrapal sources of revenue were numerous and lucrative while the Achaemenid conscription system guaranteed that there would be no shortage of laborers and soldiers. All of the above instances give a strong impression that the satraps must have had considerable military forces at their disposal. Therefore, the extent and limitation of satrapal military capacity is the focus of the following section.

### 3.4 Satrapal Military Capacity

**The Types/Categories of Satrapal Forces**

As we have seen, the Great King expected his satraps to keep the peace, to suppress local uprisings, and to ward off external threats. Accordingly, the satraps had considerable military forces at their disposal.\textsuperscript{540} The ancient sources allow us to identify three types of military forces in any given satrapy: (1) elite units that consisted of soldiers hailing from the core satrapies, often of Persian origin, (2) non-local contingents which were drafted and transplanted by the Persian authorities, often times occupants of crown estates, and (3) local contingents which were levied as a part of the subject nations’ obligation to contribute a certain number of troops in addition to regular tribute.\textsuperscript{541}

**Royal vs. Local**

Klinkott makes a distinction between ‘royal troops’ (“Reichstruppen”), a term which he employs to denote non-native soldiers who served in a given satrapy, and ‘satrapal’ or ‘administrative’ troops (“Satrapen- oder Verwaltungstruppen”), a term which he ascribes to the local contingents conscripted by the satrap himself.\textsuperscript{542} Such categorization, however,

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\textsuperscript{536} AD 8; TADAE I, A6.11.

\textsuperscript{537} AD 5; TADAE I, A6.7.

\textsuperscript{538} Petit 1990, 130.

\textsuperscript{539} Segal no. 31.

\textsuperscript{540} Previous surveys of satrapal military power has been offered by Tuplin (1987c), Petit (1990, 109–32) and more recently Klinkott (2005, 284–305).


\textsuperscript{542} Klinkott 2005, 285, 295.
is somewhat problematic. On the one hand, all of the forces stationed in the satrapy were ‘satrapal’. On the other, we have seen in the previous chapter that in spite of the fact that Xenophon identifies certain units and officers in the satrapies as ‘royal’, all of the satrapal forces, of local and foreign origin, were under satrapal authority. Even if the involvement of the central authorities in the appointment of officers and placement of garrisons constituted an effective measure to cultivate obedience among the provincial governors, each satrap was the senior officer in his domain in regard to civic and military affairs. For this reason, the terminology employed by Klinkott creates an unnecessary confusion in respect to the authority of the satrap vis-à-vis the military personnel in his satrapy. The distinction between ‘royal’ and ‘satrapal’ or ‘administrative’ troops insinuates that only a portion of the military forces in the satrapy were subordinate to satrapal authority. If the title ‘royal’ is irrelevant in respect to satrapal jurisdiction, it seems reasonable to conclude that this designation was used by Xenophon to distinguish non-local contingents, i.e. Persian and other, from local levies, and nothing more.

**The Various Satrapal Units**

**Satrapal Land Army**

The ancient sources provide ample information regarding the units which comprised the forces stationed in the satrapies. Xenophon mentions horsemen, archers, slingers, light infantry, and even chariot units. The types of units mentioned by Xenophon are well attested. Cyrus the Younger, for instance, deployed twenty scythed chariots in the battle of Cunaxa. Sling-bullets inscribed with Tissaphernes’ name found at Gördes, located in northern Lydia, suggest that the satrap of Lydia had slingers at his disposal. Moreover, there are numerous instances of satraps in command of cavalry squadrons, infantry detachments and sometimes both. For example, Thucydides reports that in 412 BC Tissaphernes came to Miletus with infantry and cavalry forces, and shortly after he moved on to Iasus with an infantry contingent. Xenophon reports that Thibron dreaded the superior cavalry forces of Tissaphernes. Another satrap with a formidable cavalry force at his disposal was Pharnabazus, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia. Moreover, the joint armies of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, deployed in 397 BC in Ionia against the Spartan General Dercylidas, consisted of infantry and cavalry divisions, and a similar satrapal army was deployed in the battle of Sardis in 395 BC. According to Diodorus, this army amounted to ten thousand cavalry and fifty thousand infantry. In sum, the

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543 Xen. Oec. 4.5: ἰππάς καὶ τοξότας καὶ σφενδονήτας καὶ γερροφόρους.
544 Xen. Cyr. 8.6.10.
545 Xen. An. 1.7.10.
546 Foss 1975.
547 Thuc. 8.25.2.
548 Thuc. 8.28.2.
549 Xen. Hell. 3.1.5. Diodorus (14.36.3) also notes the considerable cavalry forces of Tissaphernes.
550 Xen. Hell. 3.2.14.
551 Xen. Hell. 3.2.14; Diod. 14.39.4-5.
552 Xen. Hell. 3.4.12; Hell. Oxy. 11(6).3.
553 Diod. 14.80.1.
military forces deployed by the satraps of western Anatolia were formidable and fairly diverse.554

**Satrapal Fleet**

There are several attestations for the existence of satrapal fleets. The expedition of Aryandes against the Libyans included unspecified naval forces.555 In c. 500 BC the governor of Sardis was able to furnish 200 ships for a military campaign against the island of Naxos.556 Pharnabazus, together with Conon the Athenian, was the supreme commander of the Persian navy that defeated the Spartans near Cnidus.557 Later on, Pharnabazus and Conon sailed to Greece, occupied Cythera, and used it as a base of operations to raid the Laconian coastline.558

**Mercenaries**

Just like the Achaemenid Kings, the satraps were ready and able to augment their armies with mercenaries whenever necessary.559 It should be noted that despite the fact that the available sources recount numerous instances in which the Persians hired soldiers of fortune, almost all of known instances are concerned with Greek mercenaries.560 In 441/0 BC the satrap of Lydia Pissuthnes supplied 700 mercenaries to Samian exiles who planned to retake the island after it was captured by Athens.561 In 427 BC Pissuthnes dispatched Arcadian and barbarian mercenaries to assist the pro-Persian party at Notium.562 Probably in the late 420 BC the same Pissuthnes, now in a state of open revolt, employed Greek mercenaries against the King’s forces. Eventually the Greek mercenaries defected to the King’s side and brought about the downfall of the rogue satrap.563 Pharnabazus too supplied the Peloponnesians with mercenary soldiers in 411 BC.564

One of the most famous Persian employers of Greek mercenaries was Cyrus the Younger. According to Xenophon, when Cyrus travelled to the royal court after he had

554 Xenophon (Cyr. 5.3.24) makes a distinction between plain cavalry troops (ἱππαῖς) and mounted archers (ἱπποτοξόται). According to Xenophon, these mounted archers were Scythians. Herodotus too mentioned Scythian mounted archer (4.46.3) and reports that Mardonius deployed mounted archers at Plataea (9.49.2). Nevertheless, I am not aware of any evidence for these units being deployed by satraps, especially those of western Anatolia.

555 Hdt. 4.167.1.

556 Hdt. 5.30-32.

557 Ctes. FGrH 688 F30 §74; Diod. 14.81.4-6; Nep. Con. 2.2, 4.1; Polyaen. Strat 1.48.3.

558 Xen. Hell. 4.8.7-11; Diod. 14.84.4, 85.2.3-5; Philoch. FGrH 328 F146.

559 There are many instances in which the Great Persian Kings employed mercenaries. For example, Xenophon (An. 7.8.15) identifies the Assyrian hoplites and Hyrcanian horsemen he and his men engaged in Mysia as mercenaries of the King (βασιλέως μισθοφόροι). According to Polyaenus (Strat. 7.14.3) Artaxerxes III employed 10,000 Greek hoplites against the rebel satrap Autophradates, and according to Nepos (Iphe. 2, 4) he appointed the Athenian Iphicrates as commander of a force of 12,000 mercenaries which was sent to fight in Egypt. In addition, Darius III used Greek mercenaries when he tried to ward off Alexander (Plut. Mor. 181a; Plut. Alex. 16.13; Arr. An. 3.21.1; Curt. 5.8.3, 11.1-11, 12.4).

560 There are only a few known reports on non-Greek Mercenaries. Strabo (1.15.1) states that the Persians hired the Hydracides, mercenary troops from India. Thucydides (3.34.2) reports on barbarian mercenaries operating in Notium. Xenophon (An. 7.8.15) mentions Assyrians and Hyrcanian mercenaries in Mysia.

561 Thuc. 1.115.4; Diod. 12.27.3.

562 Thuc. 3.34.2.

563 Ctes. FGrH 688 F15 §53.

564 Diod. 13.51.2-4.
been summoned by his father Darius II, he was escorted by 300 Greek bodyguards.\textsuperscript{565} Later on, when Cyrus decided to overthrow his brother Artaxerxes II, he issued a command to the garrison commanders stationed in the Ionian cities to enlist as many Peloponnesian mercenaries as possible and of the best quality.\textsuperscript{566} According to Xenophon, the pretext for such action was the need to counter Tissaphernes’ purported design to recapture the Ionian city-states.\textsuperscript{567} Later on, Cyrus began enlisting barbarian and Greek mercenaries, while publicly declaring that he was making preparation for a campaign against the Pisidians.\textsuperscript{568} The overall impression is that the enlistment of mercenaries was a well-established satrapal prerogative. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that even when Cyrus’ ploy was finally detected by Tissaphernes, it was due to the overly extensive size of Cyrus’ army rather than the mustering itself.\textsuperscript{569} Moreover, after Cyrus was killed at the battle of Cunaxa, Clearchus, the leader of the Greek mercenary contingent, informed Tissaphernes that he and his men were willing to switch sides and to fight the King’s war against the Mysians, Pisidians, and Egyptian rebels.\textsuperscript{570} Such an offer, if we are to believe Xenophon, indicates once more that the deployment of mercenaries in times of necessity was nothing but ordinary.

Another interesting example is that of Mania, the wife of Zenis of Dardanosu, a viceroy of Pharnabazus and the Persian governor of Aeolis. After Zenis passed away, Mania administered her late husband’s domain with much success. She even conquered several coastal Greek cities by using Greek mercenaries.\textsuperscript{571} Similarly, Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus employed Greek mercenaries when they were seeking to ward off the Peloponnesian army led by Dercylidas in 397 BC.\textsuperscript{572} Xenophon also reports that the preparations of Pharnabazus and Conon to raid the coastline of Laconia included fitting ships and hiring unspecified mercenaries.\textsuperscript{573} In the late 350s BC Artaxerxes III was mustering an army to recapture Cyprus. On the Great King’s demand, Idreius, of the Hecatomnid household and the satrap of Caria at the time, supplied forty triremes and 8,000 mercenary troops to the Persian expedition.\textsuperscript{574} Moreover, due to the growing power of Philip II, the same Artaxerxes ordered his satraps to assist the Perinthians, who were besieged by Philip in 340 BC. In response, the satraps sent to Perinthus a force of mercenaries along with funds, food, weapons and other necessary provisions.\textsuperscript{575} In short, the satraps of western Anatolia, and doubtlessly satraps

\textsuperscript{565} Xen. An. 1.1.2.  
\textsuperscript{566} The emphasis on the descent and quality of the mercenary soldiers Cyrus wished to obtain might indicate, as suggested by Brunt (1984, 566), that the imperial land-tenure system did not produce good soldiers. In this particular case, there is little doubt that the battle-hardened veterans of the Peloponnesian War were better soldiers in comparison to the average Anatolian conscript. Xenophon (An. 1.8.13) even claims that Cyrus himself placed his hope to defeat the King’s army on the Greek mercenary contingent.  
\textsuperscript{567} Xen. An. 1.1.5-7; Diod. 14.22.5-6.  
\textsuperscript{568} Xen. An. 1.2.1.  
\textsuperscript{569} Xen. An. 1.2.4.  
\textsuperscript{570} Xen. An. 2.5.13.  
\textsuperscript{571} Xen. Hell. 3.10-12.  
\textsuperscript{572} Xen. Hell. 3.2.15.  
\textsuperscript{573} Xen. Hell. 4.8.7.  
\textsuperscript{574} Diod. 16.42.7.  
\textsuperscript{575} Dem. 11.5; Diod. 16.75. According to Pausanias (1.29.10), the commander of this mercenary force was an Athenian named Apollodorus, and that he was dispatched by Arsites, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia.
in other regions throughout the Empire, had access to an extensive pool of hired soldiers, in addition to funds and the permission to enlist mercenaries to resolve problems in their satrapy or when commanded by the King.\(^{576}\)

**Military Personnel from the Core Satrapies**

Xenophon ascribes to Cyrus the Elder, once again, the Achaemenid practice of enlisting Persian soldiers to serve in the provinces.\(^{577}\) There are numerous instances in the ancient source of military personnel hailing from the core satrapies, namely Persia, Babylonia and Media, in the satrapies. Herodotus, for example, reports that Oroites had 1,000 Persians under his command,\(^{578}\) and that Persian troops were stationed in the citadel of Memphis along with allied contingents,\(^{579}\) which, according to Thucydides, were Medes.\(^{580}\) Persian and Babylonian troops and more frequently officers appear on multiple occasions in the Elephantine papyri.\(^{581}\) The aforementioned garrison in Deve Hüyük in Syria was manned by soldiers of Persian origin.\(^{582}\)

The presence of Persian soldiers and officers in the satrapies is far from surprising. On the one hand, these units were more inclined to remain loyal to the Persian authorities, which explains why many of the Persians who appear in the archives of Elephantine served as commanding officers. On the other, the Persians were renowned warriors. The Persian warrior code is clearly articulated in an inscription found in Naqsh-I Rustam, in which Darius I proclaimed that he was a good horseman, and could use the bow and spear on a horseback and on foot.\(^{583}\) At Persepolis, Darius set another inscription in which he claims that Persis produced good horses and good men.\(^{584}\) The Persian warlike nature and military capacity were well known to the Greeks. Herodotus states that the Persians saw that their youth were capable of riding a horse, hurling a spear and shooting arrows.\(^{585}\) Xenophon claims that Cyrus the Younger surpassed all in horsemanship, archery and javelin throwing to such a degree that he was able to overcome a bear he encountered while hunting.\(^{586}\) Similarly, Xenophon reports that Persian boys who reached the age of ten were expected to have mastered the usage of a bow, a javelin and a sabre.\(^{587}\) Moreover, the Greeks witnessed the battle hardened Persians in action on multiple occasions. Herodotus, for instance, takes special notice to the famous force of 10,000 Persian soldiers known as the Immortals.\(^{588}\) He also states that at the battle of Plataea Mardonius’ elite guard of 1,000 Persians proved to be a formidable enemy and that only after Mardonius and his Persians

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\(^{577}\) Xen. *Cyr.* 8.6.10.

\(^{578}\) Hdt. 3.127.

\(^{579}\) Hdt. 3.91.3.

\(^{580}\) Thuc. 1.104.2.

\(^{581}\) See p. 77 above.

\(^{582}\) See p. 37 above.

\(^{583}\) DNb 40-45/§2h. Compare: Strabo 15.3.8.

\(^{584}\) DPd 5-12/§2.

\(^{585}\) Hdt. 1.136.2.

\(^{586}\) Xen. *An.* 1.9.5-6.

\(^{587}\) Xen. *Cyr.* 1.2.9. In Xenophon’s *Oeconomicus* (21.7), Ischomachus, Socrates’ interlocutor, states that a good soldier acquires the abovementioned capabilities.

\(^{588}\) Hdt, 7.83.
perished the rest of the barbarian army broke into flight.\textsuperscript{589} Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the Persian contingents stationed in the satrapies were well-trained and well-equipped, especially in comparison to locally conscripted units, and as such formed an elite fighting force which was at the disposal of the satrap.

**Functions**

According to Xenophon, Persian occupation troops were stationed in two types of garrisons: (1) those serving in the citadels of urban centers and (2) those stationed in key locations in the countryside. The former were commanded by \textit{phrouarchs} (φρούραρχοι), hereinafter designated as garrison commanders, while the latter were commanded by the \textit{chiliarchs} (χιλιαρχοι).\textsuperscript{590} It is generally agreed that Xenophon makes a distinction between the small detachments stationed in the citadels of fortified urban centers and the widely scattered and thinly spread satrapal militia stationed in the countryside.\textsuperscript{591} As such, the units which were under the authority of the \textit{chiliarchs} probably included the garrisons placed along the royal road, as reported by Polyaenus.\textsuperscript{592} Tuplin makes another observation regarding Xenophon’s account, namely that Xenophon employs the general term φρουροί to denote soldiers stationed in the citadels of the urban centers, while the soldiers stationed in the countryside are identified as φυλακοί.\textsuperscript{593} It is evident that the purpose of such distribution of the military satrapal forces was to secure Persian hold over the administrative, commercial, and strategic centers in the provinces while providing protection to the periphery from various immediate threats, such as incursions staged by the aforementioned hill tribes.\textsuperscript{594}

**Function of the Elite Soldiers**

While the overarching objective of the satrapal military forces was to protect the provinces, the sensitive duty assigned to the forces installed in the citadels and key locations was clearly of greater importance. Accordingly, Klinkott postulates that the elite Persian and royal detachments were placed in such essential locations.\textsuperscript{595} This postulation seems reasonable since the Persian authorities must have implemented various measures to maintain control in case of a local uprising, one of which was to install soldiers of unquestioned loyalty in strategically important locations. As noted above, Herodotus recounts the presence of Persian military personnel in the provincial capitals of Memphis\textsuperscript{596} and Sardis.\textsuperscript{597} Key strategic locations were also held by Persian troops. For example, the

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\textsuperscript{589} Hdt. 9.63, 71.1.

\textsuperscript{590} Xen. Cyr. 8.6.1: τούς μέντοι ἐν ταῖς ἄκραις φρουράρχοις καὶ τούς χιλιάρχοις τῶν κατὰ τὴν χώραν φυλακ ὄν; Xen. Cyr. 8.6.9: εἰσίν αἱ ἐν ταῖς ἄκραις φυλακαί καὶ οἱ χιλιαρχοί τῶν φυλακῶν. See also: Xen. Oec. 4.7.


\textsuperscript{592} Polyaen. Strat. 7.7.40.

\textsuperscript{593} Tuplin 1987c, 169–72. E.g. Xen. Cyr. 8.6.1. Conversely, Polyaenus (Strat. 6.10) mentions a certain Alexanderos who is identified as the garrison commander (φρουράρχος) of the estates in the regions of Aeolis, an articulation which seems to contrast the division described by Xenophon. Tuplin (1988, 68) argues that Polyaenus’ description of Xenophon’s system is only partial, and as such there is no actual disagreement.

\textsuperscript{594} Briant 1976, 187–88.

\textsuperscript{595} Klinkott 2005, 284.

\textsuperscript{596} Hdt. 3.91.3.

\textsuperscript{597} Hdt. 3.128. When the Ionian rebels burnt Sardis in 498 BC, we are told by Herodotus (5.100) that Artaphrenes, the satrap of Lydia, was able to defend the acropolis with a large force. When taking into
aforementioned site of Deve Hüyük, which was manned by Persian troops, constituted a crucial checkpoint on the road which connected northern Mesopotamia to the Syrian heartland. According to Xenophon, the garrison which was installed on the Syrian side of the Cilician Gates, an important passageway that connected the low plains of Cilicia to the Anatolian Plateau, was under royal authority in 401 BC. Since Xenophon notes royal involvement regarding this particular strategic point, it is plausible that the soldiers serving in this post hailed from the core satrapies. Furthermore, the senior officer of garrison in Elephantine, which was situated on the southern border of Achaemenid Egypt, had military jurisdiction over Upper Egypt as far as Memphis. Therefore, it is significant to note that the persons who presided as the garrison commanders were exclusively Persians, and many of the soldiers were of non-local origin.

In sum, the placement of royal troops, whether Persian or other, in sensitive strategic points had two objectives: (1) to protect the satrapies from potential external threats and (2) to contain and suppress local uprisings, with or without the assistance of satrapal forces of local origin. If a rebellion proved to be too much for the Achaemenid garrisons, the loyal Persian forces in the satrapies were presumably expected to maintain control over key positions and to hold the line until the arrival of reinforcements from the King or from the adjacent satrapies. A similar scenario occurred in Sardis at the beginning of the Ionian revolt and once more in Egypt in the 460s BC. In the latter case, after a local uprising spun out of control, the Achaemenid garrison in Memphis was besieged by the Egyptian insurgents and their Athenian allies. The siege was lifted eventually and the garrison was relieved due to efforts of Megabyzus son of Zopyrus, who was dispatched by Artaxerxes I with an army to restore Persian rule in Egypt.

Function of the Local Levies

In spite of some reservation in regard to their loyalty to the Persian authorities, the local levies still constituted an important element not only in the Persian royal armies but also in the satrapies. Conscripted soldiers, whether local or foreign, could be drafted and used in routine security details as well as in times of crisis. The local Jewish community at

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598 Moorey 1975, 115.
599 Xen. An. 1.4.4. Diodorus (14.20) provides a detailed description of this mountain pass and the tactical challenges it caused for any army that wished to pass through it. In addition, the importance of this route is demonstrated by the decisions of Alexander in 333 BC (Arr. An. 2.4.2) and Septimius Severus in 194 AD (Cassius Dio 75.7.1-8) to lead their armies through the Cilician Gates when advancing against their enemies.
601 Persian officers: Porten et al. 1996, B28-30 (Varyazata), B24 (Artabanu and Atropharna), B25-26 (Haumadata), B37 (Namasava). Babylonian officers: Porten et al. 1996, B31 (Iddinnabu). Briant (2002, 481) points out that all of high ranking officials, whether satraps, governors or garrison commanders, were Persians. He also names the garrison of Elephantine along with the governors of Coptos and the military officers sent against Libyan Barce in 513 BC. As Klinkott (2005, 284 n. 20) notes, there is no evidence for garrison commanders of local descent.
602 Thuc. 1.104, 109-110; Ctes. FGrH 688 F14 §36-38; Diod. 11.71.3-6, 74-5, 77.1-3.
Elephantine, for example, supplied troops for the local Persian garrison. Similarly, we have seen that the Babylonian documents surveyed above recount numerous instances in which holders of crown land in Babylon and the adjacent settlements furnished manpower and equipment for military purposes. Since there is no indication that these services were rendered in times of crisis, one can conclude that the soldiers and provisions supplied by the inhabitants of Babylonia were intended to be used in routine security tasks.

Furthermore, conscription was also employed to augment satrapal forces in special circumstances. For instance, when seeking to convey the formidable military might of Oroites, Herodotus reports that while the satrap of Lydia had 1,000 Persian troops at his disposal, he was also able to muster forces from Phrygia, Lydia, and Ionia. The distinction between the Persian elite guard stationed at the satrapal court and the forces that could be potentially levied from the provinces which comprised Oroites’ domain indicates that Herodotus was referring to local levies which were ready for recruitment. According to Xenophon, when Cyrus the Younger decided to rebel he took special care that the barbarian contingents in his satrapy were adequately trained as soldiers, and when he began his march upwards he commanded a force of 100,000 barbarians. Even if the figure supplied by Xenophon is inaccurate, the army of Cyrus was formidable, since the Persian prince must have realized that a clash with a fully equipped royal army was inevitable. These soldiers must have been levied from the regions under Cyrus direct control, namely Lydia, Greater Phrygia, and Cappadocia.

The Versatility and Capacity of the Satrapal Forces
The various types of land and sea forces along with an extensive pool of conscript soldiers and mercenaries indicate that the military capacity of the satraps was quite formidable. Numerous examples demonstrate that the satraps were able not only to effectively protect their domain but also to launch military campaigns independent of royal support.

The account of Darius I in the Bisitun inscription demonstrates the impressive extent of satrapal military capacity. The events recounted in the inscription reveal four ways by which Darius suppressed the multiple rebellions against his rule: (1) to personally lead an army against a rebellious nation; (2) to intimidate the locals, thus inducing them to handover the ringleaders of the revolt; (3) to appoint a general by a special

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603 Porten et al. 1996, 31B, B34, B39, B49 ("Jew of Elephantine the fortress") and B24 ("Jew who is in Elephantine the fortress"). An additional document (Porten et al. 1996, B50) records a complaint filed against a Jewish soldier.
604 See p. 75 above.
605 Xenophon (Cyr. 8.8.20) notes an ancient Persian custom according to which those who held lands were expected to furnish cavalymen for the protection of the country while those who performed outpost duty in defense of the country received pay for their services. It is easy to detect a clear distinction between forces in charge of a routine protection, i.e. those serving in the outpost in contrast to seemingly reserve cavalry forces that were levied for other purposes, probably due to a local crisis or a royal demand for troops.
606 Hdt. 3.127.
607 Xen. An. 1.1.5.
608 Xen. An. 1.7.10.
609 Xen. An. 1.9.7.
610 DB §16-20 (Babylon); DB §31-32 (Media); DB §40-44 (Persis).
611 DB §22-23 (Elam).
commission and to send him with an army to crush a rebellion;\textsuperscript{612} (4) to order a satrap to suppress a revolt with his own contingents. The fourth type of response is crucial to the present discussion. Darius proclaims that his father Hystaspes, most likely the presiding satrap of Parthia, squashed a revolt that engulfed Parthia and Hyrcania.\textsuperscript{613} Only after Hystaspes made his first attempt to suppress the rebels, we are told that Darius sent reinforcements to his father.\textsuperscript{614} Similarly, Dādarshi, the satrap of Bactria, was sent to suppress a revolt in the adjacent Margiana,\textsuperscript{615} while Vivāna, the satrap of Arachosia, was ordered by Darius to crush a local uprising.\textsuperscript{616} Darius explicitly mentions the instances in which he himself furnished armies to a specially commissioned general, but there is not even a hint that he sent reinforcements to these satraps. Hence, it seems reasonable to conclude that the absence of any mention of royal military support indicates that the satrapal contingents were sufficient to deal with the threat posed by the local insurgents.

Satrapal mobilization was capable of producing sizable armies. The army collected by Cyrus the Younger to repel Tissaphernes was capable of laying siege to Miletus, a formidable task which must have required a large force.\textsuperscript{617} As noted above, when the Persian crown prince began he march into the Persian heartland, he was able to muster 100,000 barbarian troops in addition to 13,000 Greek mercenaries.\textsuperscript{618} While Xenophon’s figure cannot be taken at face value, it still serves as an indication that Cyrus non-Greek forces were considerable. Similarly, in their attempt to ward off the Peloponnesian land army commanded by Dercylidas, Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus were able to muster from their respective satrapies a joint force of 20,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry.\textsuperscript{619} Another revealing example is the aforementioned raid staged by Xenophon and his men on an estate of a local nobleman in Mysia. The Greek mercenaries were warded off by considerable forces that came to the rescue from the nearby settlements.\textsuperscript{620} This instance serves as a clear demonstration that the satrapal force were able to provide almost an immediate response to such threats.

**Granicus**

There are two events which, although occurred in the last quarter of the fourth century, shed light on satrapal military might. There are the battle of the Granicus River (334 BC) and the battle of Gaugamela (331 BC). According to Diodorus, the Persian army that engaged Alexander at the battle of Granicus was commanded by generals and satraps.\textsuperscript{621} It seems reasonable to assume that this force did not constitute a fully equipped royal army

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\textsuperscript{612} DB §25 (Hydarnes in Media); DB §26-28 (Dādarshi in Armenia); DB §29-30 (Omises in Armenia and Assyria), DB §33 (Takhmaspāda in Sagartia); BD §49-50 (Intaphernes in Babylon).

\textsuperscript{613} DB §35.

\textsuperscript{614} DB §36.

\textsuperscript{615} DB §38.

\textsuperscript{616} DB §45-48.

\textsuperscript{617} Xen. *An*. 1.1.7. In the following passage (*An*. 1.1.8), Xenophon adds that Cyrus sent a letter to his brother Artaxerxes II, in which he demanded that the Ionian cities should be taken from Tissaphernes and given to him. At no point in this communication Cyrus requests reinforcements, which implies that his army was raised by using the resources he had at his disposal without any royal assistance.

\textsuperscript{618} Xen. *An*. 1.7.10.

\textsuperscript{619} Diod. 14.39.4-5.

\textsuperscript{620} Xen. *An*. 7.8.15.

\textsuperscript{621} Diod. 17.18.2: οἱ δὲ τῶν Περσῶν σατράπαι καὶ στρατηγοὶ.
similar to those Alexander was destined to meet at Issus and Gaugamela, but rather a joint force of various contingents hailing from the adjacent satrapies. The mustering of a royal army usually took considerable time, as it is best exemplified by Xerxes’ preparation for his Greek campaign, which, according to Herodotus, took no less than four years.  

Therefore, the army that was ordered to ward off the Greco-Macedonian invasion force in the spring of 334 BC was probably scrambled quickly by the satraps of Anatolia along with additional forces that were able to make it in time to provide assistance.

Diodorus provides a detailed description of the satraps who participated in this battle, their position in the Persian battle array, and the forces under their command. On the left flank we find first Arsamenes, the satrap of Cilicia, who led an unspecified cavalry contingent, then there was Arsites, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, who commanded a Paphlagonian cavalry contingent, and finally Spithrobates, the satrap of Ionia, who led a Hycranian cavalry contingent. On the right flank Diodorus names Rheomithres, the satrap of Persis, who commanded 1,000 infantry and 2,000 horses from Media and a similar number of Bactrian forces. Oddly enough, Diodorus omits the names of the generals who participated in the battle.

The ancient sources also provide different figures for the size of the satrapal army that was routed by Alexander. According to Diodorus, the satraps deployed 10,000 cavalry and about 100,000 infantry. Justin, on the other hand, states that the Persian army constitutes no less than 600,000 strong, a figure which one cannot accept. In contrast, Arrian records more reasonable figures, as he reports that the satraps mustered 20,000 infantry and a similar number of cavalry. Either way, the battle of the Granicus River provides us with clear proof that the satraps had access to impressive military sources and that they were also eligible to take on active command duty on the battlefield.

Gaugamela
As noted above, the satraps were also expected to dispatch levies for the King’s army, and the satrapal component within the royal army is again exemplified in the case of the forces deployed by Darius III at Gaugamela. Fortunately, Arrian recounts in detail the nationality and commanding officers of the different units of Persian army. Thus, we are

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622 Hdt. 7.20. Diodorus (11.2.1) claims that the preparations took three years.
623 Diod. 17.18.4.
624 Diodorus (17.19.4) only states that Arsamenes was a satrap, but Curtius (3.4.4) notes that Arsames, probably the same Arsamenes mentioned by Diodorus, was the satrap of Cilicia. This is corroborated by Arrian (An. 2.4.5-6) who reports that Arsames, who seemingly managed to survive the defeat at the Granicus River, upon hearing that Alexander was advancing with all speed to Tarsus, abandoned the city and fled to the King Darius.
625 Arrian, who calls Spithrobates Spithridates, claims that he was the one who was slain by Cleitus when he made an attempt to kill Alexander during the battle. See: Arr. An. 1.15.8. For additional mentioning of Spithrobates/Spithridates, see: Arr. An. 1.12.8-10, 1.16.3.
626 It is possible that among them were the three Persian dignitaries who, according to Arrian (An. 1.15.6-8), were killed in the engagement: Mithridates, Darius’ son-in-law, Rhoisaces, and Dropides.
627 Diod. 17.19.4-5.
628 Just. 11.6.11.
630 See p. 59 above.
631 Arr. An. 3.8.3-7.
informed that three of the senior commanders were satraps: Bessus, the satrap of Bactria, commanded the Indians, Bactrians, and Sogdians; Barsaentes, the satrap of Arachosia, commanded the Arachosians and the mountaineer Indians (τοὺς ὄρειοὺς Ἰνδοὺς καλομένους); lastly, Satibarzanes, the satrap of Aria, commanded the Arians. Just like in the battle of the Granicus River, the satraps presided as generals in a large scale engagement.

**Satrapal Naval Campaigns**

We have seen that Aryandes, the satrap of Egypt, was capable of mounting a seemingly independent expedition by land and sea with the intention of subjugating the Libyans. The same goes for the naval campaign of Artaphrenes against Naxos, and Pharnabazus’ attack against the Peloponnesians coastline. Another example is recounted by Ctesias, who reports that before Darius I launched his campaign against the Scythians, he ordered Ariaramnes, the satrap of Cappadocia, to cross over to Scythia in order to capture male and female prisoners. The force dispatched by satrap was rather small, only fifty *penteconters*. Even still, if we believe Ctesias, this anecdote demonstrates once more that the satraps could, and at times were ordered to, conduct independent military campaigns and raids, well beyond Persian domain. The same goes for the forces deployed by Pharnabazus and Cyrus the Younger against the disobedient hill tribes of Asia Minor. These campaigns, although limited in scale, exhibit the mobility and versatility of the satrapal forces of the governors of the western satrapies.

**The Limits of Satrapal Military Capacity**

Satrapal military might, however, was not without limitations. Often in times of crisis the satraps had to turn to royal military assistance. This notion is expressed in the *Cyropaedia* when Cyrus the Elder justifies his demand for tribute by underscoring that whenever a province is threatened, it is the Great who would provide protection. Similarly, Xenophon claims that the aforementioned circuit commissioners were furnished with an army which they could deploy when necessary. At times, local uprisings proved to be too much for the satrapal forces in the provinces. The best example is the Egyptian revolt against Persian rule in the late 460s BC. Achaemenid military presence in Egypt was considerable. Achaemenid garrisons were stationed in Memphis, Pelusium, Daphnai, Mareia, and Elephantine, and there is evidence for two additional garrisons in the eastern edges of the Nile Delta, namely Migdol and Tell al-Maṣūta. In addition, after Xerxes

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633 Hdt. 4.167, 200-201.
634 Hdt. 5.30-32. Even if the number of ships deployed by the satrap was smaller than the figure reported by Herodotus, it was certainly considerable.
635 Ctes. *FGrH* 688 F30 §74; Diod. 14.81.4-6; Nep. *Con.* 2.2, 4.1; Polyae. *Strat.* 1.48.3.
637 See p. 58 above.
639 See p. 45 above.
640 Hdt. 3.91.
641 Hdt. 2.30.2-3.
suppressed an Egyptian revolt in c. 485 BC, a more oppressive policy was implemented. The only specific detail Herodotus provides is the appointment of Achaemenes, Xerxes’ brother, as the new satrap of Egypt. Even still, the placement of the King’s brother as satrap probably indicates that the Persian King was keen on keeping a close eye on the affairs of Egypt and it seems plausible that Persian military presence in the region was also augmented. Nevertheless, in spite of the considerable Persian military presence in Egypt, the rebel forces led by a Libyan named Inarus, were able to overwhelm the local satrapal forces.

There are several additional examples which demonstrate that satrapal forces could not withstand a fully equipped army in a pitched battle. During the campaign season of 395 BC Agesilaus roamed and pillaged the countryside of western Anatolia almost unchallenged, and when he was finally opposed at the battle of Sardis, he utterly defeated the forces of Tissaphernes. Xenophon even claims that prior to the Persian defeat near Sardis, Tissaphernes deceitfully exploited the truce concluded with Agesilaus to ask the King for reinforcements, but the satrap was defeated at the battle of Sardis nonetheless. Lastly, despite the sizable satrapal forces deployed at the battle at the Granicus River, the Persian contingents were routed by Alexander.

**Conclusion**

In essence, the military capacity of the satrap was considerable. Though Xenophon’s model seems to focus solely on the stationary garrison forces of the Achaemenid Empire, the ancient sources reveal that the satrapal forces could function as a standing army as well as a mobile fighting force. It seems highly unlikely, as noted by Tuplin, that the satrapal cavalry contingents were a part of the Persian provincial standing army. The same can be said for heavy infantry and chariots. The cavalry units must have been mobilized for planned raids while heavy infantry units were mustered for pitched battles. The ability to mobilize considerable forces on demand was enabled by a conscription system which allowed the Persian authorities to augment the garrisons when necessary. Consequently, in any given satrapy the subjects of the Great Persian King, both native and transplanted populations, were at the ready to furnished men, equipment and provisions whenever the Persian authorities demand it. The prerogative to muster an army was both royal and satrapal, though the conduct of Cyrus the Younger reveals that the satraps were expected to obtain royal approval. In short, in peacetime the satraps maintained a minimum number of soldiers in active service, while having access to a considerable number of reserve units of various types which were ready for deployment.

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643 Hdt. 7.1-7, 20.
644 Hdt. 7.7.
645 Thuc. 1.104.1; Ctes. *FGH* 688 F14 §36; Diod. 11.71.3.
646 See n. 552 above.
647 Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.6.
648 Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.11.
649 See p. 86 above.
650 Tuplin 1987c, 175.
651 Klinkott 2005, 284–86.
4. IONIA BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

Western Anatolia constituted a frontier region of the vast Persian Empire. The coastal districts of the western satrapies, however, were inhabited by Greek communities and as such were also an integral part of the Greek world. In the following, I intend to demonstrate that the geopolitical reality of western Anatolia served was the backdrop for two opposing processes which produced a particular challenge to Persian rule in the western satrapies. On the one hand, the Persian conquest of Ionia in the latter half of the sixth century BC triggered a gradual increase in the willingness of European Greeks to intervene in the affairs of Asia Minor on behalf of their Asiatic brethren. On the other hand, Xerxes’ failure to subjugate mainland Greece resulted in a dramatic change in Persian imperial strategy in the west. The actions of the Great Persian King suggest that the policy of westward expansion, ushered by Cyrus the Great and continued by Cambyses and Darius I, was superseded by a policy of entrenchment. More importantly, having discarded his plan to conquer the Greek homeland, Xerxes became less concerned in respect to the state of affairs in the western frontier in the later part of his reign. These pivotal developments meant that the governors of the western satrapies had to fulfill their satrapal duties while striving to contain the growing Greek threat with minimal support from the Persian central authorities.

4.1 Ionians and Greeks

Defining Ionia

The designations which are used in the ancient sources to denote the Greek communities of Asia Minor are somewhat ambiguous. At times the Ionians are identified as members of a particular Greek sub-group who shared customs, cults, tribal names, and a religious calendar. Such a broad definition includes all of the Greek communities, in Europe as well as in Asia, who identified themselves as Ionians. An alternative definition is based on geography. According to this comparatively narrow definition, the Ionians were exclusively the denizens of the twelve city-states that founded the Ionian League shortly before the Persian conquest of Asia Minor. In other words, the Ionians consisted of the Greek communities residing in the coastal district known as Ionia and the nearby islands. A third definition includes all of the Greek communities which inhabited Asia Minor, namely the Ionian, Dorian and Aeolian city-states in the Asiatic continent in addition to

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652 The Asiatic Greeks were subjugated by the Lydians (Hdt. 1.6.2; Strabo. 12.3.1, 3.9), but due to lack of evidence it is difficult to determine the attitude of the Asiatic Greeks toward their Lydian masters. It should be noted that Herodotus (1.76.3) claims that the Ionians refused to desert the Lydian king to the Persians.
653 Herodotus, for example, notes a common Ionian festival called Apaturia (1.147) and recounts the ceremonial importance of the Panionion, the sanctuary of Poseidon Heliconius on the promontory of Mt. Mycale (1.148). Similarly, Thucydides mentions the distinct luxurious Ionian lifestyle (1.6.3), a particular Ionian dating system (2.15.4), and pan-Ionian games held at Delos (3.104).
654 Hdt. 1.148. The twelve Ionian city-states are: Miletus, Myus, Priene, Ephesus, Colophon, Lebedus, Teos, Clazomenae, Phocaea, Erythrae, Samos, and Chios.
the islands adjacent to the Anatolian coastline. 655 While these various definitions are used interchangeably by the ancient Greek authors, 656 in the present study I adopt the third and last of the abovementioned definitions. I do so because the Greek communities of the Asiatic continent and the adjacent islands who were either Persian subjects or under Persian military pressure are the main focus of the present chapter.

**Ionians and Greeks**

The ancient Greeks believed that the Ionian city-states were founded by settlers who migrated from the Greek mainland shortly after the Trojan War during the so-called ‘Ionian Migration’. 657 The origin of these Greek colonizers is unclear. Traditions dated to the beginning of the Archaic period suggest that the Greek immigrants came from Messenian Pylos 658 and Boeotia 659, while in the sixth century BC the place of Athens became more and more predominant in Ionian ancestry. 660 According to Herodotus, the Athenians were perceived not only as of Ionian stock 661 but also as the most distinguished community among the Ionian Greeks. 662 But a significant shift occurred in the middle of the fifth century BC. The Athenians refashioned their Ionian descent, as they began to claim that

655 Alty (Alty 1982, 2 n. 9) suggests that the predominance of the Ionian element among the Asiatic Greeks may have led to the ancient sources to assign the designation ‘Ionians’ to all of the Greek communities of Asia Minor.

656 For instance, Herodotus notes that Croesus subjugated the Ionians, Aeolians and the Dorian of Asia (Hdt. 1.6.2), and that the Greek contingents in Xerxes’ navy consisted of Dorians, Ionians, Aeolians, Ionian islanders, and Greek settlers from Pontus (7.92-5). Conversely, when Herodotus recounts the events of Darius I’s Scythian campaign, he denotes the Greek contingents in the Persian expedition as Ionians, in spite of the fact that some of Greek units came from the Hellespontine region and Aeolis (Hdt. 4.136-42, 138, 7.52). Diodorus tends to name the Aeolians alongside the Ionians whenever he mentions the Asiatic Greeks (e.g. 11.37.1-3; compare Hdt. 9.106.2-4), probably, as Meiggs (1972, 414) suggests, because he may have been following Ephorus, a native of Cumae who mentioned his hometown and the Aeolian cities whenever he could.

657 For a succinct summary of the scholarship on the debate regarding the historicity of the Ionian Migration, see: Vanschoonwinkel 1991, 367–404; Greaves 2009, 10–11.

658 Strabo preserves two traditions which claim that the Ionians, or at least some of them, came from Messenia in the Peloponnese. According to Mimnermus (Strabo 14.1.4), an elegiac poet who flourished in the second half of the seventh century BC, Neleus, the mythic king of Messenian Pylos and the son of Poseidon, traveled to Asia and founded the city of Colophon. Similarly, Pherecydes of Athens (Strabo 14.1.3), who flourished in the fifth century BC, says that Neleus led a colonizing expedition to Asia Minor which consisted of Pylians and Ionians from Athens. One of the cities they founded was Miletus.

659 Wade-Gery (1952, 4–5) has suggested that there was a Boeotian element in the settlers who immigrated to Ionia, which is attested through the adoption of the Boeotian cult of Poseidon Heliconius. Roebuck (1955, 34) argues that since the Boeotian settlers were a small minority they subscribed to the influences of the majority, and as a result the evidence for the Boeotian origin of the Ionian cities is meagre. For a different view, see: J. M. Hall 2002, 69–70 with n. 60.

660 See, for instance, a Solonian fragment ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 5 [= Solon F4a]) in which Athens is described as the oldest land of Ionia (πρεσβυτὰτην ἐσορῶν γαῖαν Ἰονίης). In addition, Plutarch (Sol. 10.4) notes that in Solon’s time Salamis was identified by the Delphic oracle as Ionia. Nousia-Fantuzzi (2010, 270–71) connects the Solonian fragment to the claim, which appears in Herodotus (1.56.2), that Athens was the most distinguished Ionian city.

661 Thuc. 1.6.3, 2.15.4, 3.104, 7.57.2; Strabo. 8.1.2.

662 Hdt. 1.56.2, 143.2.
they were autochthonous. More importantly, the Ionians were recast as Greeks who originally dwelled in Achaea, from which they were driven out. After finding refuge in Athens, the homeless Ionians went on to colonize Asia, which transformed Athens into the mother-city of Ionia. It is generally agreed that the tradition which depicts the Ionian city-states as Athenian colonies was the product of Athenian propaganda, since it meant that the Ionians owed their metropolis certain obligations and as such facilitated tighter Athenian control over its fellow members of the Delian League.

Be that as it may, in spite of the discrepancies in the literary sources concerned with the origin of the Asiatic Greeks, there is no doubt that already at the beginning of the Archaic Period the Greekness of the Asiatic Greeks was well-established in Greece and Ionia. While this point might seem somewhat obvious, the fact that the Ionians were perceived as Greeks meant that they shared a bond of kinship with their European brethren. This bond is defined by Alty as ‘ethnic feeling’, that is “feelings (or opinions) arising from someone’s membership of an ethnic group.” Such a sentiment encouraged a sense of camaraderie between Greek communities on both sides of the Aegean, which was used by the Asiatic Greeks to garner the support of mainland Greeks on multiple occasions. As we shall see in the following section, while using kinship relations in order to gain support was not an uncommon phenomenon in the history of ancient Greece, the solidarity between the Asiatic and European Greeks gradually became a source of trouble for the Persian authorities in Asia Minor.

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663 The earliest attestation for the Athenians being autochthonous appears in Aeschylus’ *Agamemnon* (536), produced in 458 BC. See also: Hdt. 1.56.2; Thuc. 1.2.5-6, 2.36.1. On the Athenian motive to claim to be autochthonous, see: J. M. Hall 1997, 54–55. Further on the Athenian claim of autochthony: Rosivach 1987; Shapiro 1996; Blok 2009. On the concept of autochthony in the works of Herodotus and Thucydides: Pelling 2009.

664 Hdt. 1.145, 7.94; Paus. 7.1.2-4. Strabo (8.1.2, 7.1-4) presents a slightly different version in which the Ionians first migrated from Athens to Achaea and only then they were driven out by the Dorians.

665 Hdt. 1.146.2, 147.2, 7.51.2; Hellanicus *FGrH* F4 §125; Thuc. 1.2.6, 12.4, 95.1, 6.82.3-4; Diod. 11.37.1-3; Strabo 8.1.2, 9.1.5. Poll. *Onom.* 8.109. On Miletus as an Athenian colony: Hdt. 1.146.3, 9.97.2; Val. Pat. 1.2.1; Paus. 7.2.1-4. Colophon: Paus. 7.3.3. Myus and Priene: Paus. 7.2.10. Ephesus: Pherekydes *FGrH* 3 F155.

666 E.g. Barron 1964a; Nilsson 1986, 59–63; Smarzyk 1990, 318–84; Sakellariou 1990, 137; Hornblower 1992, 186, 195–96; J. M. Hall 1997, 55; R. Parker 1996, 142–51. Though this change was dramatic, several scholars have argued, rightly in my view, that Athens’ role as the mother-city of Ionia was enhanced rather than invented, see: Alty 1982, 9 n. 46; Meiggs 1972, 294; Sakellariou 1990, 137; Raaflaub 1998, 39; Tuplin 1999, 422. For a similar conclusion in regard to the Aeolian migration, see: B. C. Rose 2008.

667 The lack of unity regarding the origin of the Asiatic Greeks was well known in the time of Herodotus (1.146.1-2), who explicitly states that the Ionian population of Asia Minor was actually an ethnic mixture of numerous Greek peoples.

668 Hall (1997, 52) argues that these traditions reflect an active attempt of the Asiatic Greeks “to anchor their origins in the deeper mythical past of mainland Greece.”

669 Alty 1982, 1.

670 According to Herodotus (8.144.2), the Athenians proclaimed that they would not betray their fellow Greeks in their war against Xerxes since they shared a bond of kinship, common language, religious practices and gods, and followed a similar way of life. For additional instances in which one Greek nation used kinship to enlist the help of another, see: Thuc. 1.71.4, 124.1, 3.86.3, 6.6.2. For further reading of the role of kinship in Greek diplomacy, see: Jones 1999.
4.2 Ionian Appeals for Help

Cyrus, the Ionians, and Sparta

The earliest known occurrence in which mainland Greeks intervened in Persian affairs on behalf of the Ionians occurred shortly before the Persian conquest of Ionia. According to Herodotus, when the Lydian king Croesus began his eastward march to face the Persians, Cyrus tried to incite the Ionians, subjects of the Lydians at the time, to switch sides. The Ionians, however, rejected Cyrus’ proposition.\(^671\) But after Croesus’ army was driven back, it became clear to all that the arrival of Cyrus was imminent. Consequently, the Ionians and Aeolians dispatched an embassy to Cyrus, informing the Persian King that they were willing to acknowledge Persian supremacy in exchange for the same privileges granted to them by the Lydian kings. The Ionian diplomatic effort, however, was rebuffed by Cyrus.\(^672\)

Alarmed by Cyrus’ rejection, the Ionians made a unanimous decision to send emissaries to the Greek mainland to ask for Sparta’s support against the Persians.\(^673\) At Sparta, the senior Ionian delegate, Pythermus of Phocaea, donned a purple cloak and delivered a long speech in an attempt to move the Spartans into action. The Spartans, however, reluctant to make any concrete promises, decided to send scouts to examine the current situation in Asia. The Spartan embassy travelled to Sardis and had an audience with Cyrus. Herodotus reports that the brazen Spartan envoys informed the Great King that the Lacedaemonians would not allow any city which was on Greek soil to suffer any harm. In response, Cyrus warned the Spartans that they would have troubles of their own for trying to intervene in the affairs of Ionia. Ultimately, the Spartan threat proved to be hollow. The Persian armies swept across Ionia capturing one city after the other while the Spartans stood by.

The Greek city-states of Ionia are described in Herodotus’ report as situated on Greek soil,\(^674\) while in Diodorus’ account the Lacedaemonian envoys who approached Cyrus professed their blood ties to the Asiatic Greeks.\(^675\) From the Greek viewpoint, the claim that Ionia constituted Greek territory and the bond of kinship between the Spartans and Asiatic Greeks legitimized the Spartan intervention in the interactions between Cyrus and the Ionians. In other words, a sentiment of Greek solidarity was the main impetus for the Spartan diplomatic intervention in Asia Minor. The Spartan effort to assist to Ionians, even if limited to diplomacy, suggests that the Spartans, and possibly other Greek nations, were concerned with the wellbeing of the Ionians and were willing to take action in order to prevent the subjugation of fellow countrymen by non-Greeks.\(^676\)

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\(^{671}\) Hdt. 1.76.3.

\(^{672}\) Hdt. 1.1141. For a slightly different version, see: Diod. 9.35.

\(^{673}\) Hdt. 1.141.4, 152-3.

\(^{674}\) Hdt. 1.152.2: γῆς τῆς Ἑλλάδος.

\(^{675}\) Diod. 9.36.1: Λακεδαιμόνιοι συγγενεῖς δόντες τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν Ἑλλήνων.

\(^{676}\) Although the historicity of the Spartan embassy to Cyrus is far from undisputed, it is difficult to believe that this tradition is a late invention set to conceal the fact that the Spartans did not help the Asiatic Greeks in their time of need since, to cite Asheri (2007, 180), “the image of Sparta that emerges from this chapter is of a city extremely narrow-minded, patriotic, arrogant, Panhellenic in words but totally ineffective in practice.”
The Ionian Revolt

The Ionian Revolt was the pretext for greater involvement of mainland Greeks in Persian affairs. Herodotus is the only extant source for this rebellion against Persian rule, to which he devoted considerable attention. While the causes for and sequence of the events pertaining to the Ionian Revolt have been explored thoroughly, the manner in which Aristagoras, the acting tyrant of Miletus, won the military support of Athens is the main point of interest here.

Shortly after the Ionians rose in rebellion, Aristagoras travelled to Sparta in order to convince the Spartans to join the rebellion. The Milesian tyrant tried to provoke king Cleomenes’ greed by describing the great wealth of the Persian Empire, but as soon as the Spartan king learned that the distance between Ionia and the Persian heartland was equal to a three months journey, he declined. In light of his failure to mobilize the Spartans, Aristagoras quickly departed to Athens. Fortunately for the Ionians, Athenian attitude toward Persia had already turned hostile. Prior to the arrival of Aristagoras, Artaphrenes, the satrap of Lydia, ordered the Athenians to take back Hippias, the deposed Peisistratid tyrant, or to suffer the consequences. The Athenian response was to brand the Persians as their enemies. Under these favorable circumstances, Aristagoras gave a speech in front of the Athenian popular assembly, in which he mentioned the endless wealth of Asia and reminded his audience that Athens, the mother-city of Miletus, had the obligation to protect its colony. The Athenians were persuaded and soon after twenty Attic ships set sail to Ionia. The Ionian rebels and their mainland allies captured Sardis, with the exception of the citadel, and put the satrapal capital to the torch. The Greek momentum, however, was short-lived. The Persians rallied and decisively defeated the Ionians at the battle of Ephesus. As a result, the Athenians decided to return home, refusing to give heed to the repeating appeals of Aristagoras. Eventually, the revolt was crushed, Ionia was pacified, and Persian rule was reinstated.

677 Hdt. 5.30-6.33.
678 The reliability of Herodotus’ account of the Ionian Revolt has been criticized, especially due to his apparent bias against Histiaeus and Aristagoras, his portrayal of the rebellion as an endeavor that was doomed from the very first moment, and his misunderstanding of the mechanisms of the Persian Empire. For a summary of the shortcomings of the information provided by Herodotus, see: Cawkwell 2005, 61–72. Nonetheless, Herodotus’ report of the sequence of event is accepted as credible, e.g.: Lang 1968; Chapman 1972; Manville 1977; Keaveney 1988; Georges 2000. For modern accounts on Ionian Revolt, see: Hegyi 1966; Tozzi 1978; Lateiner 1982; Wallinga 1984; Murray 1988; Gorman 2001, 129–63; Briant 2002, 146–56; Thomas 2004, 31–41; Cawkwell 2005, 61–86.
679 Hdt. 5.49-51. It is evident that the Spartan refusal to provide assistance was based on the acknowledgment of the limited extent of Spartan military capacity. Since Xenophon and his ten thousand companions would make their march deep into the Persian heartland only a century later, not to mention Alexander’s successful campaign in the 330s BC, the notion of a Greek army marching into the core satrapies, let alone mounting a large-scale assault against the Persian Empire, must have seemed uncanny if not ridiculous in the fifth century BC.
680 Hdt. 5.96.
681 Hdt. 5.55. For Athens’ role in the foundation of Miletus, see: Hdt. 1.146.
682 Hdt. 5.97. Herodotus (5.99) adds that the Eretrians, wishing to repay the Milesians for their past support during their war against Chalcis, contributed five triremes of their own to the expedition.
683 Hdt. 5.102-3.
In the context of the Ionian Revolt a new precedent was set. Instead of limiting themselves to diplomacy, the Athenians sent troops to fight the Persians head on. Since the tradition concerned with the intervention of Artaphernes in Athenian politics is suspicious, the only remaining impetus for the Athenian decision to send an expeditionary force was their sympathy for their fellow countrymen. Equally important are the profound consequences of Athens’ unsuccessful attempt to assist the Ionians to regain their liberty. Darius retaliated by sending Mardonius to the northern Aegean to assert Persian supremacy in the region. This campaign was followed by an expedition to the Greek mainland, whose objective was to punish Athens and Eretria for the burning of Sardis. This punitive campaign, however, was only partially successful. Eretria was sacked but Athens remained unscathed due to the unexpected Greek victory at Marathon. Darius, so it seems, was not seeking to add new territories to his empire but to deter the European Greeks from meddling in the matters of Asia Minor.

We should be mindful of the literary function the role of the Ionian Revolt in Herodotus’ account, namely that the involvement of Athens and Eretria in the Ionian revolt was a crucial step toward the inevitable clash between Greece and Persia. Nevertheless, the historicity of Athens’ participation in the Ionian Revolt is rather certain, which means that the Persians must have realized that the bond between the European and Asiatic Greeks became a real and immediate threat to Persian rule in western Anatolia. One may hypothesize that Xerxes’ invasion to Greece was motivated not only by an imperial strategy of expansion but also by the need to put an end to the Greek problem in the west. In any case, Xerxes’ failed to subjugate mainland Greece, but this pivotal event highlighted Ionia’s problematic position, and the solution that was favored by the Greeks resulted in an even greater readiness of mainland Greeks to intervene in the affairs of western Anatolia.

**Deliberating the Evacuation of Ionia**

Like the rest of the subject nations, the Asiatic Greeks sent contingents to participate in Xerxes’ invasion to Greece. But the Persian defeat at Salamis reignited the Ionians’
desire to throw off the yoke of Persian subjugation. Herodotus recounts that after the naval battle a group of Chian envoys travelled to Sparta and Aegina and beseeched the Greek allies to liberate Ionia. The Greeks, however, refused to sail beyond Delos since they still feared the might of the Persian fleet. Sometime after, a Samian embassy arrived at Delos, where the Greek fleet was mooring. The Samian envoys implored the Greeks to save Ionia from servitude and states that the Ionians were ready and willing to revolt, that the Persians were cowards, and reminded their audience of their common gods. This time the Greeks were persuaded and so they set sail to the east. This campaign ended with a Greek victory at the battle of Mycale, in which the Samians and Milesians betrayed the Persians and joined forces with the mainland Greeks.

The victories at Plataea and Mycale marked the end of the Persian Wars. Nonetheless, though the Persians were pushed back for the time being, the Greeks feared the Persian King who was still looming in the east. More importantly, the recent experience taught the Greeks that they were more than capable of making a stand in the Greek homeland, but Asia Minor was an entirely different story. It was clear to all that as long as there were Greeks in the Asiatic continent, they would be vulnerable to Persian subjugation. Accordingly, shortly after the battle of Mycale the Greek allies assembled at Samos to deliberate the future of the Greek communities of Asia Minor. Herodotus recounts the debate between the Athenian and Peloponnesian delegates on this matter:

After they arrived at Samos, the Greeks deliberated the evacuation of Ionia and in which part of Greece, of which they were in possession, it would be right to settle [the Ionians], and [the possibility of] handing over Ionia to the Barbarians. For it seemed impossible for [the mainland Greeks] to continually keep watch over the Ionians, but without the former being present, the Ionians had no hope of being delivered from Persia’s reach. In regard to these matters, it seemed best to those of the Peloponnesians who were in office to give the land of the Greek nations which medized to the Ionians after their trade centers had

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689 There is a hint of Ionian ambivalence in respect to fighting against mainland Greeks in Herodotus. See: Hdt. 7.51-2, 8.10.2-3, 85, 90.
690 Hdt. 8.132. The conspiracy was led by a certain Herodotus son of Basileides. Hornblower (2003, 56) suggests that he was a member of a Basilidae, a priestly clan hailing from northern Ionia.
691 Hdt. 9.90-92.
692 Hdt. 9.103.2, 104; Diod. 11.36.2. The defection of Samos and Miletus led Herodotus (9.104) to proclaim that this event marked the beginning of a second Ionian revolt, but there is no evidence for a large scale Ionian uprising in the aftermath of the battle of Mycale.
693 Hdt. 9.106.2-4.
In spite of a few minor discrepancies, both Herodotus and Diodorus agree that the Greek allies sought a viable and permanent solution to the plight of the Ionians. Since the Ionians had appealed their mainland brethren for help on numerous occasions ever since the Persians conquered Asia Minor, the Spartan proclamation merely reiterated what was already known to all, namely that the geographical situation of Ionia vis-à-vis the Persian Empire meant that the Ionians were endemically unable to provide for their own defense. 

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694 Diod. 11.37.1-3.
695 For a summary of the differences between the accounts of Herodotus and Diodorus, see: Meiggs 1972, 414.
696 Munson 2007, 154. Migration as a solution for Persian military pressure was not a Spartan novelty (e.g. Hdt. 1.164-67, 168-169.1, 6.22, 33.2). Thus, the Spartan proposition was probably perceived as ambitious but not undoable. Further reading on relocating communities in ancient Greece: Demand 1988; Demand 1990.
While the Spartan proposition was imperfect, the Athenians thwarted the evacuation of Ionia by conjuring up their shared ancestry with the Ionians. By doing so the Athenians were successful at branding the Peloponnesian proposition as an illegitimate interference in what was an internal Ionian affair. Since the Athenians persuaded the Ionians to stay in Asia by pledging themselves and their allies to the defense of Ionia, one wonders what Athens had to gain by perpetuating Greek presence in western Anatolia. Diodorus notes that the Athenians were afraid that they might lose the advantages of Athens’ status as the Metropolis of Ionia, and it can be added that the presence of the Ionians in Asia ensured that they would continue to be dependent on Athens and its formidable navy for protection. Furthermore, by placing the emphasis on the common Ionian origin and framing the security of the Ionian-city states as an exclusively Ionian affair, the Athenian delegitimized future Spartan interventions in the affairs of Ionia. And so, while Sparta remained the leader of the Hellenic alliance, the Athenians used this debate to cement their prominence among the Ionians, which became useful later on, when Athens assumed the leadership in the war against Persia.

Conclusion
In summary, the interactions between the European and Asiatic Greeks in the context of Persian military pressure reveal that the former felt responsible for the safety, security, and liberty of the latter. This sentiment of solidarity was predicated primarily on ties of kinship and metropolis-colony connection. Prior to Xerxes’ invasion this bond drove the Spartans, Athenians, and Eretrians to interfere in the affairs of western Anatolia on behalf of the Ionians. But after the Persians were driven out of Greece, in the congress held at Samos, the Athenians claimed publicly that they would stand by Ionia’s side and guarantee its safety. This proclamation transformed what was, until that point, no more than a moral obligation based on the goodwill of the mainland Greeks into one of the ideological pillars of the soon to be formed Delian League. As we shall see, for the legitimacy of the Delian League to remain unchallenged, the Athenians, who assumed the role of guarantors of Ionian liberty, had to insert themselves further into the affairs of western Anatolia if they wanted to retain their position. Yet, Xerxes’ failed attempt to subjugate the European Greeks had an equally profound impact on Persian policies in the west, which is explored in the following section.

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697 By transplanting the Ionians into Europe the Aegean would have become a natural barrier, which would be safeguarded by the fleets of the Greek allies. But the evacuation plan seems impractical due to the necessity to expel the Greek nations which medized. We are told that a substantial number of Greek nations collaborated with Xerxes during his invasion (see: Hdt. 7.132, 172-74, 205.3, 233.1, 8.30.2, 31, 9.15.2, 17.1, 31.5, 40, 67, 86.1, 87.2, 88; Diod, 11.3.2). Even if the Greek allies were capable of forcing all of these communities into exile, how could they decide objectively who was compelled to medize and who did so willingly? What about the Ionians who fought on the Persian side?

698 See p. 101 below.
4.3 The Greek Counter-Offensive in the 470s

Xerxes’ Measures to Secure Persian Rule in Asia Minor

After the decisive defeats at Plataea and Mycale, Xerxes aborted his plan to conquer Greece and returned home.\(^{699}\) The Great King, however, may have anticipated a Greek counterattack of some sort since prior to his departure Xerxes took measures to safeguard Persian rule in western Anatolia. To begin with, Xerxes made sure that there were sufficient land forces in the region and that key positions were under firm Persian control. For example, Xerxes reinforced the garrison at Sardis, probably to ensure that the satrapal capital would not be captured once again by the Greeks.\(^{700}\) Moreover, the Great King ordered the construction of a fortified palace and a citadel at Celaenae, a Phrygian city adjacent to Pisidia which was located on the route that linked Ephesus to northern Syria.\(^{701}\) Due to the strategic importance of Celaenae, this measure probably echoes an attempt to bolster Persian military presence in this region.\(^{702}\) In addition, by fortifying Celaenae the Persians were able to monitor movement of enemy forces and prevent them from marching unchallenged into the Anatolian hinterland.\(^{703}\)

Another measure by which Xerxes cemented Persian rule in western Anatolia was the promotion of loyal Greek medizers to positions of power. Herodotus recalls that Theomestor son of Androdamas was appointed as the new tyrant of Samos, while Phylacus son of Histiaeus, also from Samos, was given the title ‘benefactor of the King’ (εὐεργέτης βασιλέως) and was granted vast estates, probably in Ionia.\(^{704}\) Moreover, sometime after Xerxes arrived at Sardis in 479 BC Xenagoras of Halicarnassus was appointed as the ruler of Caria,\(^{705}\) and it has been argued that this action should be interpreted as a Persian effort to reassert royal presence in Cilicia due to fear of a Greek attempt to subjugate Cyprus.\(^{706}\) In addition, several Greek cities were given by Xerxes to Greeks medizers for safe keeping,\(^{707}\) and Briant points out that almost all of these cities were located in the Troad, a

\(^{699}\) Hdt. 9.108.2; Diod. 11.36.7.

\(^{700}\) Diod. 9.36.7. It is also possible the Xerxes enhanced the fortifications of the satrapal capital, see: Dusinberre 2003, 47–56; Dusinberre 2013, 44.

\(^{701}\) Xen. An. 1.2.7-9. Dusinberre (2013, 54) maintains that by ordering the construction of a palace and acropolis at Celaenae Xerxes was sending an assertive statement of “continued imperial power at this time.”

\(^{702}\) Briant 2002, 559; Tuplin 2011b, 86; Dusinberre 2013, 54. For the importance of Celaenae as a staging post for military expeditions, see: Summerer 2011, 35; Tuplin 2011b, 74–75. For the importance of Celaenae as a staging post for armies and the evidence for Persian military presence in the region which goes back to Xerxes’ campaign, see: Summerer 2011, 36–48.

\(^{703}\) For example, Diodorus (14.80.5) reports that in 394 BC, while campaigning in western Anatolia, Agesilaus arrived at Phrygia and wished to move further inland in his war against the Persians. While Diodorus does not specify the exact objective of the Spartan King, the Oxyrhynchian historian (Hell. Oxy. 12.4) reveals that it was Celaenae. The inland march, however, was eventually aborted by Agesilaus due to unfavorable omens obtained by sacrifices. Bruce (1967, 87–88) rejects this explanation and argues that Agesilaus knew that by moving against Celaenae he was placing himself in danger of being cut off from the sea. Similarly, Briant (2002, 639) argues that the bad omens merely confirmed a decision that was made beforehand, as Agesilaus and his officers were well aware of the dangers that an attack against Celaenae entailed. For a different view, see: Pritchett 1979, 67–71.

\(^{704}\) Hdt. 8.85.

\(^{705}\) Hdt. 9.107.3.

\(^{706}\) Briant 2002, 560.

\(^{707}\) Xen. Hell. 3.1.6.
region in which important Persian naval bases were located, e.g. Cyme. As a result, loyalty to Persian rule in this region must have enhanced considerably.

All in all, it is not out of the question that the aforementioned defensive measures applied by Xerxes in western Anatolia provide us with a mere glimpse of the Persian effort to fortify western Anatolia in light of the defeat at Plataea and Mycale. Be that as it may, the counter-offensive of the Hellenic Alliance began shortly after the Great King returned to Persia. But while the Persian forces in the west were under attack, the response of the Persian central authorities suggests that Xerxes had not only abandoned his policy of westward expansion but expected the local satrapal authorities to contain the Greek assault and to protect Persian rule in the west with the resources at their disposal.

The Greek Advance
The Greeks did not wait long before they took the offensive. Soon after the victory at the battle of Mycale, the Athenians laid siege to the city of Sestos which was under Persian control at the time. The Persian defenders, however, held the line for several months until the city fell in the autumn of 478 BC. The attack on Sestos was only a prelude. In the spring of 478 BC the forces of the Hellenic Alliance, under the command of the Spartan regent Pausanias, landed on Cyprus. The extent of Pausanias’ success, however, remains unclear, and Persian rule on Cyprus was fully restored not long after the Greeks departed. Following the Cypriot campaign, probably in the autumn of 478 BC, the Greek fleet sailed northward and captured Byzantium.

Despite having the initiative, the Greek effort was still defensive in nature. The subjugation of Cyprus would have barred the Persians from using it as a base of operations, thus cutting short the range of the Persian fleet. The capture of Sestos and Byzantium, two cities which exercised control over the narrow straits between Asia and Europe, the Hellespont and the Bosporus respectively, was necessary to hinder a crossing of another

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709 Hdt. 9.116-120; Thuc. 1.89.2; Diod. 11.37.4-5. Vasilev (2015, 213) suggests that the Athenian impetus for attacking the Thracian Chersonese was their desire to reestablish control over this region which was dominated by Miltiades in the mid-490s BC.
710 Thuc. 1.94.2; Diod. 11.44.1-2; Plut. Arist. 23.1; Plut. Cim. 6.1. A Greek attack on Cyprus was strategically sound. Parker (1976, 32–33 with ns. 10-11) notes that Cyprus was the only island east of Rhodes that was capable of supporting and maintaining a large fleet due to its excellent harbors at Salamis, Cithium, Amathus-Neapolis, and Vouni. He adds that Cyprus was also rich in fresh water, grain, timber and metal, resources of tactical and strategic importance. Meiggs (1972, 39, 56–58) posits that the Greeks entertained the idea that a successful campaign could have resulted in the admission of the Cypriot cities into the Greek alliance. Moreover, Maier (1994, 308) observes that the recent military Persian defeats probably weakened Persian authority in Cyprus, a weakness which the Greek allies probably sought to exploit.
711 Thucydidides merely notes that the Greeks subjugated the majority of the island, while Diodorus and Plutarch add no information on this matter. Meiggs (1972, 39, 482) postulates that the Cypriot cities that are mentioned in Aeschylus’ Persians (892-3), namely Paphos, Soli, and Salamis, were likely to be among the cities taken by Pausanias.
712 According to Diodorus (11.60.5) by the time of the Eurymedon battle (469 or 466 BC) the Persian navy consisted of Cypriot ships, which reveal that the island was recaptured. Cf. S. T. Parker 1976, 32; Wiesehöfer 1990, 245; Petit 1991, 163–65; Kuhrt 2007, 289.
713 The exact date of this operation is contested. For a summary of the scholarly debate, see: Loomis 1990.
714 Thuc. 1.94.2, 128.5; Diod. 11.44.3.
Persian invasion force into Europe. All in all, it seems that the Greeks sought to keep the Persian fleet out of the Aegean and to prevent a second Persian land invasion into Europe.

**The Persian Opposition**

But what about the Persians? The relatively succinct accounts regarding the capture of Byzantium are interpreted by Meiggs as indication of lackluster Persian resistance.\(^{715}\) Yet, such an interpretation fails to consider the possibility that, just like the Greeks, the Persians were surprised by the defeat of Mardonius,\(^{716}\) and as a result were not fully prepared to withstand the Greek counterattack. The attack on Sestos, for instance, caught the Persians off guard, since Herodotus explicitly states that the city was not prepared to withstand a prolonged siege.\(^{717}\) This impression is bolstered by the fact that in spite of the long duration of the siege, no reinforcements came to relieve the besieged Persians.\(^{718}\) Moreover, the Persians launched a counterattack of their own, through which they managed to recaptured Sestos and Byzantium.\(^{719}\) But the Persians refrained from marching further into Thrace, as the Persian objectives were exclusively Sestos and Byzantium. The limited scope of the Persian counterattack suggests that the Persians were determined to prevent the Greeks from invading Asia Minor through the Bosporus straits, which could have destabilized the region and induced another Ionian revolt. The same can be said in regard to Cyprus. The reinstatement of Persian rule on the island was not followed by Persian naval operations in the Aegean, and one can infer that the Persians were satisfied with preventing the Greeks from using the island as a staging point for future raids against Persian coastal settlements in the eastern Mediterranean. In sum, the Persian central authorities sought to maintain stability in the west by containing the Greek offensive and refraining from further escalation.

**The Rise of the Delian League**

After the capture of Byzantium a dramatic development took place. Pausanias, the commander-in-chief of the Greek alliance, incurred the hatred of the Greek allies due to his abusive behavior and adoption of Persian attire and traditions.\(^{720}\) As a result, Pausanias was recalled to Sparta, reprimanded for his oppressive behavior but eventually acquitted.\(^{721}\) The Greek allies, however, became averse to Spartan leadership,\(^{722}\) and rejected the appointment of the Spartan Dorcis as the new general. Instead, they offered the leadership

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\(^{715}\) Meiggs 1972, 39.

\(^{716}\) For the Persians' confidence in Mardonius' chances of success, see: Hdt. 8.114, 130.4.

\(^{717}\) Hdt. 9.116.3.

\(^{718}\) Vasilev 2015, 214.

\(^{719}\) Plutarch (Cim. 9.2-3) recounts how Cimon told Ion of Chios during a dinner party that he presided as the arbitrator in the division of the spoils after Sestos and Byzantium were captured. Badian (1993, 86–87, 221 n. 43) points out that Cimon had nothing to do with the capture of Sestos in 478 BC, and rightly concludes that the city probably switched hands during the 470s. See also: Miller 1997, 11.

\(^{720}\) On Pausanias' excessively harsh conduct: Thuc. 1.95.1, 130.2; Diod. 11.44.5; Plut. Arist. 23.1-2. On the medism of Pausanias, see: Thuc. 1.130.1; Diod. 11.44.5. Further on Pausanias' interactions with the Persians, see discussion on p. 104 below.

\(^{721}\) Thuc. 1.95.3-6; Diod. 11.44.6.

\(^{722}\) Plutarch (Arist. 23.1) claims that Pausanias along with other Spartans officials treated the Greek allies with unwarranted severity, which may explain why the Spartan leadership as a whole was rejected by the Greek allies.
to the Athenians, who rose to the occasion while the Spartans acquiesced. The withdrawal of the Spartans facilitated the establishment of a new Hellenic coalition known as the Delian League. The official mission statement of the newly founded alliance varies in the ancient sources. Thucydides claims that the objective of the League was to seek restitution for the suffering the Greeks endured during the Persian wars by ravaging the Great King’s domain. Diodorus reports that the elected general of the allied forces, Cimon son of Miltiades, was instructed to assist the allied cities which were in Asia and to liberate other Greek city-states which were still garrisoned by the Persians. These two distinct goals can and should be seen as complementary. Be that as it may, the creation of the Delian League signaled the beginning of a new round of hostilities between Greeks and Persians. The capture of Sestos and Byzantium meant that the remaining Persians strongholds in Europe were cut off from Asia. Therefore, it was only natural that the first operations of the Delian League were aimed against the last pockets of Persian resistance in the northern Aegean.

The Operations of the Delian League in the 470s
The first target of the Delian League was Eion, a Persian stronghold situated on the mouth of the Strymon River. Eion was strategically important since those who controlled it were able to monitor the movements of armed force across Thrace. And so, the League’s forces laid siege to the city throughout the winter of 447/46 BC. Eion eventually fell after the Persian governor Bogas chose to set the city on fire instead of capitulating, causing
the death of his wife, children, and himself, an action for which, according to Herodotus, Bogas was praised by Xerxes.\textsuperscript{730} The next Persian stronghold in the northern Aegean that was overran by the forces of the Delian League was Doriscus, which dominated the crossing of the Hebrós River via the coast.\textsuperscript{731} We do not know when Doriscus fell. A hint is provided by Herodotus, who claims that the Persian governor of Doriscus, a certain Mascames, received many gifts from Xerxes for his success at withstanding numerous Greek attempts to capture Doriscus, and that his descendants were honored by Artaxerxes I for his courage.\textsuperscript{732} The ambiguity of Herodotus’ remark has led to the suggestion that Doriscus fell only after the accession of Artaxerxes I, possibly in the mid-460s BC.\textsuperscript{733} But others claim, correctly in my view, that the information provided to us by Herodotus is not sufficient to conclude with certainty how long the Persians maintained control over Doriscus.\textsuperscript{734} It is, however, highly likely that the Greek attacks against Doriscus began shortly before or after Cimon besieged Eion.\textsuperscript{735}

The capture of Eion and Doriscus were only the highlights of the Delian League’s operations in the northern Aegean. We are told by Herodotus that the Greeks captured all of the Persian fortresses in the region with the exception of Doriscus.\textsuperscript{736} The Greeks, so it seems, were determined to expel the Persians from Europe. But what were the Persians trying to achieve? The fierce resistance offered by the Persian forces in Eion and Doriscus, Xerxes’ positive reaction to the manner in which Bogas perished, and the royal honors awarded to Mascames suggest that the Great Persian King ordered his forces in Thrace to hold the line. One can speculate that Xerxes’ intention was to occupy the Greeks in Europe so to have the necessary time to adequately fortify western Anatolia. Such a suggestion is corroborated by the fact that the struggle for Thrace continued for three years after Xerxes’ retreat and that the Persian central authorities neither sent reinforcements to the northern Aegean nor made any attempt to recapture the lost Thracians strongholds.

\textsuperscript{730} Hdt. 7.107; Polyaeus, \textit{Strat.} 7.24; Plut. \textit{Cim.} 7.1-2.
\textsuperscript{731} Isaac 1986, 138. According to Herodotus (7.59.1), Darius I set up a royal fort (ἐν τῷ τεῖχῷ τε ἐξεύθεμος βασιλεία) at Doriscus during his Scythian campaign in c. 513 BC, which suggests that the strategic importance was known to the Persians.
\textsuperscript{732} Hdt. 7.106.1.
\textsuperscript{733} U. Köhler 1889, 87–92; How and Wells 1912, s.v. 7.106; Meiggs 1972, 69, 73, 82; Balcer 1984, 374. Dandamaev (1989, 231) argues that the Persians were able to control Doriscus well into the second half of the fifth century BC.
\textsuperscript{734} Gomme 1945, 281; Miller 1997, 11.
\textsuperscript{735} Meiggs 1972, 69.
\textsuperscript{736} Hdt. 7.106.2. Several postulations has been made in regard to other possible Persian bastions that were lost during the Greek attack in the 470s BC. The authors of the ATL (Meritt, Wade-Gery, and McGregor 1950, 216) suggest Abdera, while Miller (1997, 10 with n. 31.) posits that Achantus, whose people made a pact of guest-friendship with Xerxes (Hdt. 7.116-17), was also a Persian hyparchy. In addition, Herodotus reports that the Persians laid up stores of provisions in Doriscus, Eion, a Thracian settlement called White Point (Leuce Acte) and Tyrodiza in the territory of the Perinthians, and it is possible that Persian strongholds existed in the latter two locations as well.
4.4 Pausanias, Xerxes and Artabazus

Pausanias’ Machinations in Byzantium

The Persian effort to hold off the Greek offensive was not limited to military measures. Several sources report that shortly after the Hellenic Alliance captured Byzantium, Pausanias began conspiring with Xerxes. Allegedly, after the fall of Byzantium Pausanias saw that several high-profile Persian captives were released and given safe passage back to the Persian heartland. This act was accomplished in secret by a confidant of Pausanias named Gongylus, who was instructed to accompany the Persians and to deliver a letter to Xerxes. Thucydides includes what seems to be a verbatim account of this letter, in which Pausanias proposed to marry Xerxes’ daughter and to subjugate Sparta and Greece in the name of the Great Persian King.

Pausanias’ proposal, we are told, was well received at the royal court. Thucydides states that Xerxes dispatched Artabazus son of Pharnaces to supersede Megabates as the new governor of Hellespontine Phrygia and gave him a letter bearing the King’s signet to deliver to Pausanias. In his reply Xerxes expressed his gratitude for the release of the Persian captives, encouraged Pausanias to carry on with his plans, ensured the Spartan that he would lack neither funds nor manpower, and added that Artabazus was instructed to assist him. The nature of the assistance provided by Artabazus is clarified by Diodorus, who says that the newly appointed satrap gave Pausanias large sums of money with which he was to buy the allegiance of other Greek notables.

As noted above, Pausanias was recalled to Sparta, probably at the end of 478 BC, due to his abusive behavior, and, according to Thucydides, collaboration with the Persians. But shortly after his acquittal, most likely in the spring of 476 BC, Pausanias sailed back to the Hellespont without the approval of the ephors and expelled the Athenians from Byzantium. At some point the Athenians took back Byzantium, and Pausanias went to Colonae in the Troad. We are left to wonder what Pausanias accomplished during his

737 Thuc. 1.128.4-6; Diod. 11.44.3; Plut. Cim. 6.2, Them. 23.3-4.
738 Thuc. 1.128.7; compare: Diod. 11.44.3. In contrast, Herodotus (5.32) states that the Spartan’s marriage proposal was addressed to the daughter of Megabates, the contemporary governor of Hellespontine Phrygia. To our best knowledge, the daughters of the Achaemenid King were traditionally given to notable members of the Persian nobility as a reward for distinguished services (e.g. Plut. Art. 27.4; Xen. Hell. 5.1.28). Hence, it is hard to believe that Xerxes was willing to give one of his daughters to a non-Persian and no less an enemy general. I agree with Meiggs, (1972, 466), who deems Herodotus’ account more reliable mainly because marriage between Pausanias and a satrap’ daughter was “a much more plausible ambition.”
739 Thuc. 129.1. Diodorus (11.44.4) omits the appointment of Artabazus as the new satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia as he states that Artabazus, in his capacity as a general (στρατηγός), was sent to the west to negotiate the affair on behalf of Xerxes.
740 Thuc. 1.129.2-3.
741 Diod. 11.44.4.
742 It is generally agreed that Pausanias was recalled at the end of 478 BC or at the beginning of 477 BC. See: Loomis 1990, 488 with notes 11-13 for references to previous scholarship.
743 Such an accusation corresponds with the reports (Hdt. 9.82; Thuc. 1.130; Diod. 11.44.5) that Pausanias adopted Persian customs and traditions.
744 Thuc. 1.128.3, 131.1. Thucydides does not specify the exact date in which the Athenians retook Byzantium. The authors of the ATL (1950, 175) argue in favor of the summer of 477 BC, White (1964, 144) suggests the end of 477 BC, while Gomez (1945, 394) and Evans (1988, 3) date Pausanias’ expulsion to 476
time in Colonae, but we do know that his exploits prompted his second recall and ultimate downfall.\textsuperscript{745}

The authenticity of the purported collaboration between Pausanias and Xerxes has been contested.\textsuperscript{746} Even scholars who accept the accusation of medism as historical argue that these charges were unfounded.\textsuperscript{747} As it stands, the nature of the available evidence renders it impossible to resolve the scholarly debate regarding Pausanias’ exploits in the Hellespont. Nevertheless, the one uncontested historical fact in this episode is the appointment of Artabazus as the new satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia.\textsuperscript{748} While Thucydides credits the arrival of Artabazus to Pausanias’ machinations, it is far more likely that the loss of Sestos and Byzantium prompted this change in personnel. Artabazus, I argue, was the ideal candidate for this position. As a seasoned general who accumulated considerable military experience during Xerxes’ invasion\textsuperscript{749} and forged connections with men of worth in the west,\textsuperscript{750} Artabazus was the right man to rule a western frontier region that was under attack.

But what was Xerxes seeking to achieve through the appointment of Artabazus? I find it hard to believe that Xerxes entertained the notion of enslaving the Greek homeland,
with or without the assistance of Pausanias. Since Artabazus came to the west with gold rather than a massive army, his objectives must have been more attainable. In light of the Persian efforts to hold the line in Thrace, Artabazus was probably instructed to use bribes in order to ensure the collaboration of powerful men in the Aegean front. By garnering, or buying, support in the Hellespontine region, Artabazus was able to extend his influence beyond the borders of his satrapy with the purpose of hindering future attacks against Persian domain. Accordingly, the decision to appoint Artabazus as the new satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia and perhaps as the King’s representative in the negotiations with Pausanias are revealing. It suggests that Xerxes was aware of the problems in the western frontier and that he had full confidence that the local Persian forces were up to the task. Artabazus, so it seems, was mandated to ensure that the western borders of the Empire were secured while Xerxes turned his attention to other endeavors elsewhere.

4.5 Xerxes’ Campaign from the Persian Viewpoint
In the immediate aftermath of Xerxes’ abortive invasion to Greece, the Persians were expelled from Europe and even Cyprus was briefly occupied by the Greeks. On the face of it, the western satrapies were in a state of emergency whereas Persian responses to the Greek challenge constituted short-lived counterattacks in the Hellespontine region, the appointment of Artabazus, and the seemingly fruitless collaborations with influential Greeks such as Pausanias. One wonders why the Persian response to Greek aggression was limited in scope. The answer can be found in a tradition in which the Greco-Persian Wars ended with a Persian victory. This alternative version is visible not only in the ancient literary corpus but also in royal proclamations found in Achaemenid royal centers. Such a tradition, I argue, is highly likely to resonate Xerxes’ efforts to protect his own reputation and prestige in light of his failure to expand the borders of his realm. Yet, the promotion of such a version, a version that did not correspond with the actual reality in the western satrapies, had consequences which the satraps had to face.

The Greek and Persian Versions
The scarcity of Persian documentation renders it difficult to assess the impact of the unsuccessful attempt to subjugate Greece on Xerxes’ position. The Greek sources, of course, provide a heavily biased and therefore unreliable depiction of the Persian defeat and its catastrophic consequences. Accordingly, it is not unreasonable to assume that the

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751 For the motives of Pausanias, see discussion at: M. E. White 1964, 152; Blamire 1970; Cawkwell 1970, 53; de Ste Croix 1972, 172.
752 This *modus operandi* resembles the Persian custom of appointing local notables as tyrant in the Greek city-states in Asia and a continuation of Xerxes’ policy of promoting loyal Greek medizers to positions of power.
753 On the expansion of territory as a fundamental element in Achaemenid royal ideology see: Jacobs 2010; Haubold 2012; Waters 2016, 98–101.
754 Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1995, 1048.
755 The fact that Xerxes was assassinated 14 years after he retreated from Greece did not prevent the emergence of a tradition (e.g. Justin 3.1.1-2; Ael. VH 13.3) which attributes Xerxes’ assassination to the supposed contempt he incurred due to his misadventure in Greece. An additional attempt to inflate the scope of the Persian catastrophe is found in Aeschylus’ *Persians*, which includes several overly dramatic proclamation regarding the disastrous impact the Greek victory had on the Persian Empire. For instance, Aeschylus claims that the land of Asia was ravaged in its entirety (550), that Persian rule in Asia had utterly
Persian version of the war against the Greeks was radically different and equally biased as it was aimed at downplaying Xerxes’ military defeats while highlighting the more successful aspects of his Greek campaign.

In a succinct summary of the events of the Persian Wars, Dio Chrysostom claims that Xerxes defeated the Lacedaemonians at Thermopylae, sacked Athens and imposed tribute on the Greeks before returning home. One should admit that Chrysostom is not utterly wrong. The Greeks were in fact defeated at Thermopylae, Athens was sacked by the Persians, and the Greek communities in Asia remained subjects of the Persian Empire long after Xerxes’ departure. Accordingly, it is not unlikely that the Xerxes placed an emphasis on his accomplishments during his Greek campaign, regardless of its final outcome, and presented the expedition against the Greeks as a success. It is possible, as postulated by Briant, that Chrysostom’s account conveys a tradition which originated from the official Persian version of the events which transpired during Xerxes’ invasion, a version which was cultivated and disseminated by Xerxes after he returned to the Persian heartland.

The notion that the Persians accomplished their objectives can be found in Herodotus’ Histories as well. Herodotus claims that after the battle of Salamis Artemisia of Caria tried to persuade Xerxes to return home by pointing out that the primary objective of the campaign, namely the punishment of the Athenians for the burning of Sardis, was achieved. Now, the historicity of the content of Artemisia’s speech, if she ever gave a speech, is highly dubious. Yet, Herodotus, so it seems, acknowledges the possibility that Xerxes’ campaign could have been deemed as partially successful from a Persian viewpoint. But the Histories provide further evidence for the manner in which Xerxes’ campaign may have been presented by the Persian royal authorities. In his attempt to convince the Athenians to switch sides, Xerxes made a promise to rebuild the Athenian temples that had been burned down during the sacking of Athens. Briant argues that this promise implies that Xerxes despoiled the Athenian acropolis and took the loot back to Persia to be paraded as markers of a successful expedition. Briant’s postulation is corroborated by reports concerned with the restoration of the statues of the Athenian tyrannicides Hermodius and Aristogeiton, which were stolen by Xerxes. Additional monuments which Xerxes took with him back to Persia were a bronze statue known as the Water-carrier from the temple of the Mother in Athens, the foundation of the statue of

756 Dio Chrys. Or. 11.149.
757 On the Achaemenids as masters of propaganda, see: Kelly 2003.
758 Briant 2002, 542.
759 Hdt. 8.102.3. Moreover, in an earlier passage Herodotus (8.99) claims that the Persians at Susa celebrated when they heard that Athens was captured by Xerxes.
760 Hdt. 8.140.
761 Briant 2002, 541.
762 Arrian (An. 3.16.7, 7.19.2) claims that they were restored by Alexander the Great. Conversely, Valerius Maximus (2.10.ext.1) claims that the statues were returned by Antiochus, while Pausanias (1.8.5) ascribes this benevolent act to Antiochus, presumably Antiochus I Soter.
763 Plut. Them. 31.1.
Artemis of Celces,\textsuperscript{764} the bronze statue of Apollo from the Branchidae at Miletus, and the image of Brauronian Artemis from Brauron.\textsuperscript{765} That these spoils of war were used for propagandistic purposes is corroborated by Arrian, who states that Xerxes had all the statues, ornaments and votive offerings which he stole from the Greeks taken to Babylon, Pasargadae, Susa, and other cities in Asia,\textsuperscript{766} and it is highly likely that these artifacts were used to validate Xerxes’ claim that the war against the Greeks ended with a Persian victory.\textsuperscript{767}

**The Daiva Inscription**

Another possible manifestation of an alternative Persian version of the Persian Wars can be found in a trilingual inscription (Old Persian, Akkadian and Elamite) commissioned by Xerxes and known as the Daiva inscription.\textsuperscript{768} The Daiva inscription was preserved on five stone slabs which were discovered in Persepolis and Pasargadae though not in-situ.\textsuperscript{769} The date in which the Daiva inscription was produced is contested. Herzfeld has argued that the formulaic similarities between the Daiva inscription and inscriptions commissioned by Darius I indicate that it was produced early in the reign of Xerxes, i.e. before his invasion to Greece.\textsuperscript{770} Herzfeld’s initial dating of the inscription was widely accepted,\textsuperscript{771} but later on Herzfeld himself changed his mind and argued that the Daiva inscription was produced after Xerxes’ failed attempt to subjugate Greece but before Pausanias was expelled from Byzantium.\textsuperscript{772} Eventually Herzfeld settled on 478 BC.\textsuperscript{773} Presently, it is widely agreed that the Daiva inscription was produced after Xerxes’ invasion,\textsuperscript{774} and even if it was commissioned in the 480s, it is almost certain that it was on public display throughout Xerxes’ reign.

In light of the above, the Daiva inscription provides indirect proof of the manner in which Xerxes’ Greek campaign was presented in Achaemenid royal centers. In a similar fashion to other Achaemenid royal proclamations, the Daiva inscription includes a catalogue of tributary peoples in which thirty one peoples are listed.\textsuperscript{775} In comparison to

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\textsuperscript{764} Arr. An. 7.19.2.

\textsuperscript{765} Paus. 1.16.3, 8.46.3.

\textsuperscript{766} Arr. An. 7.19.2.

\textsuperscript{767} Briant 2002, 542.

\textsuperscript{768} For recent translations of the various versions of Daiva inscription, cataloged as XPh, see: Herzfeld 1937; Herzfeld 1938 (Akkadian); Cameron 1959 (Elamite); Kent 1997, 105; Schmitt 2000, 88–95 (Old Persian).

\textsuperscript{769} Sancisi-Weerdenburg (1980, 9) has argued convincingly that although the stone slabs were reused, it is highly likely that during the reign of Xerxes these inscriptions were placed at central locations in Achaemenid royal capitals. For the archaeological context in which the copies of the Daiva inscription were found, see: Schmidt 1939, 12; Schmidt 1953, 209 (Persepolis); Stronach 1978, 152 (Pasargadae).

\textsuperscript{770} Herzfeld 1937, 64–5.

\textsuperscript{771} E.g. Kent 1937, 305; Schmidt 1953, 14; Abdi 2007, 54.

\textsuperscript{772} Herzfeld 1947, 396. For the date in which Pausanias was expelled from Byzantium see n. 744 above.

\textsuperscript{773} Herzfeld 1968, 351.

\textsuperscript{774} E.g. Briant 2002, 541; Kuhrt 2007, 305 n. 5.

\textsuperscript{775} Media, Elam, Arachosia, Armenia, Drangiana, Parthia, Aria, Bactria, Sogdiana, Chorasmia, Babylonia, Assyria, Sattagydia, Sardis, Egypt, Ionians, those who are by the sea and those who are beyond the sea, Makans, Arabia, Gandara, Indus, Cappadocia, Dahae, the Amyrgian Scythians, the Scythians with the pointed caps, Thrace, the Akaufaka people, Libyans, Carians, and Nubians.
similar lists which appeared in inscriptions commissioned by Darius I, Xerxes’ catalogue includes a greater number of subject peoples.\textsuperscript{776} The message the catalogue conveys is clear: Xerxes expanded the borders of the Empire, a claim which depicted the Great King as an accomplished conqueror, a capable general, and a worthy successor of his predecessors.\textsuperscript{777} Interestingly, there are two or possibly three groups of Greeks which are mentioned in the Daiva inscription: (1) the Ionians (\textit{Yaunā}), (2) ‘[the Ionians] who dwell by the sea’ (tyaiy darayahiyyā dārayatiy) and (3) [the Ionians] who dwell beyond the sea’ (utā tyaiy paradraya dārayatiy).\textsuperscript{778} It is generally agreed that the \textit{Yaunā} were the Asiatic Greeks, but the other two designations are contested. In regard to the identity of ‘those who dwell by the sea’, it has been suggested that this term signifies the inhabitants of the satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia,\textsuperscript{779} the Asiatic Greeks in general,\textsuperscript{780} or the dwellers of the Aegean islands.\textsuperscript{781} Regarding ‘those who dwell beyond the sea’, it has been argued that this term denotes the territories of Thrace and Macedon, or at least part of them,\textsuperscript{782} while other scholars have argued that the term signifies the European Greeks.\textsuperscript{783} Sancisi-Weerdenburg has suggested a more inclusive definition by arguing that from the Persian viewpoint the nations beyond the sea included Greeks, Thracians, and Scythians.\textsuperscript{784}

If the term ‘those who dwell beyond the sea’ was used to denote the European Greeks or even the dwellers of the northern Aegean, it becomes evident that the official Persian version was that Xerxes successfully subjugated these peoples and exacted tribute from them, just as Dio Chrysostom claims. This interpretation is bolstered by the fact that the term Skudra, i.e. Thrace, is also included in Xerxes’ catalogue of nations.\textsuperscript{785} Accordingly, there is little doubt that Xerxes proclaimed that his control in the northern Aegean, and possibly mainland Greece, was unchallenged, a claim which utterly ignored the reality in the western frontier.\textsuperscript{786}

\textsuperscript{776} DB §6/12-17 (23 nations); DNa §6/15-30 (30 nations); DPe §2/10-18 (26 nations); DSaa (22 nations); DSab (24 nations); DSe 21-30 (30 nations); DSf (15 nations); DSm 6-11 (23 nations); DZ (21 nations).
\textsuperscript{777} Xerxes’ expanded catalogue of tributary nations can be taken as another indication that the Daiva inscription was commissioned after Xerxes’ Greek campaign. Xerxes managed to crush an Egyptian revolt that began at the end of his father’s reign, but the victory over the Egyptian rebels did not brought about any new territorial acquisition. Moreover, according to Herodotus (7.5, 7, 20) the Egyptian rebellion caused a delay in the preparation for the Greek campaign, and it is highly unlikely that another war of expansion took place between the revolt in Egypt and the Persian invasion to mainland Greece. Therefore, the war against the Greeks provided Xerxes the pretext for making a claim that he expand his father’s empire.
\textsuperscript{778} XPh §3/23-5. Briant (2002, 173) identifies three different groups of Greeks, as noted above, and thus he enumerated thirty two nations in the Daiva inscription. In contrast, Schmitt (2000, 92–93) and Sancisi-Weerdenburg (2001, 332) argue that there are only two groups of Greeks: (1) ‘Ionians beyond the sea’ and (2) ‘Ionians by the sea’.
\textsuperscript{780} Kent 1937, 304.
\textsuperscript{781} Lecoq 1997, 143.
\textsuperscript{782} Kent 1937, 304–5.
\textsuperscript{784} Sancisi-Weerdenburg 2001, 331.
\textsuperscript{785} XPh §3/27.
\textsuperscript{786} Several scholars (e.g. Root 1979, 309–11; Bridges 2014, 73–96) have argued that the artistic program employed by the Achaemenid Kings in Persepolis and other imperial centers was intended to convey a strong message of imperial order, unity and security. This was achieved through various means, e.g. motif of liars...
The possibility that Xerxes proclaimed that his Greek campaign was a success is nothing but expected. No Persian King in his right might would have dared to publicize his failures, an act which would undermine his authority and embolden potential pretenders. The fact that Xerxes continued to reign for additional fourteen years,\(^{787}\) during which he saw that the building program in the Achaemenid royal capitals, which was initiated by Darius I, continued as planned,\(^{788}\) suggests that the Persian defeats in the western frontier constituted “but a brief inconvenience in the history of the Persian Empire.”\(^{789}\) The Greek incursions, as seen from Susa or Persepolis, were not viewed as a threat to Persian rule in Asia Minor. But from the viewpoint of the satraps of western Anatolia the Greek attacks constituted a real and immediate problem which exacerbated when the anti-Persian Delian League was founded. Xerxes was not alarmed by the Greek incursions and was confident that his satraps were up for the task. Accordingly, the satraps of western Anatolia were expected, in accordance with their satrapal duties, to protect the King’s possessions in the west without royal assistance.

### 4.6 The Battle of the Eurymedon River

The battle at the Eurymedon River was a pivotal event in the history of the Delian League.\(^{790}\) In the early 460s BC a confederate fleet of about 200\(^{791}\) ships under the command of Cimon was campaigning in Caria and Lycia, subjugating several cities, some by persuasion and others by force.\(^{792}\) At some point, Cimon learned that Persian land and sea forces were being mustered nearby at the mouth of the Eurymedon River. The Athenian general decided to strike and a double engagement ensued. After defeating the enemy fleet

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\(^{787}\) Until the assassination of Xerxes, which occurred in 465 BC. See: Wiesehöfer 2007, 4; Depuydt 2008, 9–12; Abdi 2010.

\(^{788}\) On Xerxes’ contribution to the palace complex at Persepolis, see: Olmstead 1948, 272–88; Schmidt 1953, 34. 37. 41-2; Sancisi-Weerdenburg 1989c, 549–50; Yamauchi 1990, 338–39; Root 2015, 16-19. 27-8.


\(^{790}\) The primary sources for Cimon’s Eurymedon campaign are: Thuc. 1.100.1; Diod. 11.60.4-62.3; Plut. Cim. 12.4-13.4. See also: Plato, Menex. 242a; Nepos. Cim. 2.2; Lycurg. In Leocr. 73; Paus. 1.29.14; OP. Oxy. 13.1610, fr. 9-10 col. 1 [=Ephor. FGrH 70 F191].

\(^{791}\) Thucydides does not specify the size of Cimon’s fleet, but Plutarch (Cim. 12.2) reports that Cimon had 200 ships at his disposal. Diodorus (11.60.3, 5) claims that additional vessels joined the confederate fleet during Cimon’s advance and by the time of the clash with the Persians the confederate navy consisted of 300 ships. Meiggs (1972, 76–6) observes that the confederate fleets which were sent to Egypt in the late 460s (Thuc. 1.104.2) and to Cyprus in 450 BC (Thuc. 1.112.2) consisted of 200 ships and concludes that a fleet of 200 ships constituted the full force of the Delian League. Thus, he posits that this was the size of the fleet which was deployed at the Eurymedon battle.

\(^{792}\) Diod. 11.60.4; Plut. Cim. 12.1-4; Frontin. Strat. 3.2.5. The reliability of the evidence for Cimon’s campaign in Caria and Lycia has been challenged, but now the historicity of the events which preceded the battle Eurymedon are widely accepted. See: Keen 1997, 60 with notes 16-18 with reference to earlier scholarship.
Cimon and his men disembarked and routed the Persian land forces that were encamped on the river bank. There are several discrepancies in the ancient sources in regard to the size of the Persian fleet,\textsuperscript{793} the identity of the Persian generals,\textsuperscript{794} and the location of the first naval engagement.\textsuperscript{795} The exact date of the battle is also contested, as arguments have been made in favor of 469\textsuperscript{796} and 466\textsuperscript{797} BC. In spite of these disagreements, it is widely accepted that the mobilization of Persian land and sea forces at the Eurymedon constituted preparations for a large scale offensive that was intended to reassert Persian supremacy in the Aegean.\textsuperscript{798} In what follows I highlight the shortcomings of the Persian offensive hypothesis and demonstrate that the Eurymedon battle was nothing more than an engagement between a confederate fleet sent to ravage the King’s land and augmented satrapal forces which were mobilized to contain and repel the Greek invaders. Such interpretation corresponds with the detached attitude of the Persian central authorities toward the state of affairs in western Anatolia and strengthens the impression that Xerxes was unmoved by the Greek incursions in the west and had confident that his satraps were capable of protecting the western borders of his empire.

**The Persian Offensive Hypothesis**

The proponents of the hypothesis that Cimon’s Eurymedon campaign thwarted preparations for a Persian offensive make several seemingly compelling arguments. It has been argued that Xerxes, determined to avenge his past defeats, mobilized land and sea forces with the intention of reviving Persian preeminence in the west,\textsuperscript{799} and that Xerxes, aware of the Naxian revolt and the increasing dissent among Athens’ allies, decided to seize the moment and strike.\textsuperscript{800} In addition, the substantial size of the Persian fleet coupled with the mobilization of land forces were seen as indications of an ambitious offensive in

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\textsuperscript{793} Thucydides (1.100.1) and Nepos (\textit{Cim}. 2.2) mention 200 Persian ships but Diodorus (11.60.6) claims that the Persians had 340 ships deployed. Plutarch (\textit{Cim}. 12.6) includes two figure: 600 ships, as reported by Phanodemos, an atthidographer who flourished in c. 330 BC, and 350 ships, as reported by Ephorus.

\textsuperscript{794} Plutarch (\textit{Cim}. 12.4), citing Ephorus, reports that Tithraustes was the commander of the fleet and that Pherendates commanded the land forces. According to Callisthenes, who is also cited by Plutarch, Ariomandes son of Gobryas was the commander in chief of the entire force. Diodorus (11.60.5, 61.3) mentions only Ephorus’ account. Meiggs (1972, 72) argues, correctly in my opinion, that these accounts are not necessarily mutually exclusive since it is possible that Tithraustes and Pherendates were in charge of the sea and land forces respectively, but that both were subordinate to Ariomandes.

\textsuperscript{795} Thucydides and Plutarch set the sea battle at the Eurymedon River. In contrast, Diodorus claims that the naval clash took place near Cyprus. Since the distance between Cyprus and the Eurymedon River is about 200 km, it is impossible for Cimon to have been able to cover such a distance in order to fight two engagements on the same day. Accordingly, it is widely held that Diodorus confuses the Eurymedon battle with Cimon’s Cypriot campaign in 450 BC. See: Gomme 1945, 286; French 1971, 38 n. 40; Meiggs 1972, 75; Schreiner 1976, 20–25; Haillet 2001, 162–63 n. 5; Green 2006, 120 n. 230.


\textsuperscript{797} Meritt, Wade-Gery, and McGregor 1950, 160; Sealey 1976, 250; Cawkwell 2005, 225; Rhodes 2006, 20.

\textsuperscript{798} Curtius 1879, 140; Beloch 1921, 159–62; Bury and Meiggs 1975, 208; Sealey 1976, 251; Meiggs 1972, 78; Fine 1983, 344; Blamire 1989, 138; Davies 1993, 44–45; Briant 2002, 557; Buckley 2002, 183; Cawkwell 2005, 132–33; Rhodes 2014, 248.

\textsuperscript{799} Meiggs 1972, 78.

\textsuperscript{800} Briant 2002, 557.
the making. Furthermore, the size of Greek fleet, namely 200 vessels, had been deemed too large for a raiding party, which led to the conclusion that Cimon was in fact leading a preemptive strike. All of these arguments may seem convincing, but none of them is without flaws.

**The Greeks as the Aggressors**

A close reading of the sources reveals that the battle at the Eurymedon was preceded by Greek aggression. From the capture of Eion in 476 BC the war against Persia came to a standstill. The Athenians, so it seems, preferred to cement their position as the leaders of the Delian League, and one can infer that the Persians, still unchallenged in the Asiatic continent, were satisfied with the emergence of an unofficial truce. But the diminishing Persian threat and the failure of the Athenian leadership to follow the Delian League’s official objectives, namely to liberate Persian controlled Greek cities and to ravage the King’s land, were not without consequences. The Athenians witnessed a sharp decline in support for continuing the war against the Persians among the members of the Delian League, which corroded the justification for Athens’ demand for tribute, ships, and men. These developments probably led to the abortive attempt of the Naxians to secede from the Delian League, and for the first instance in the history of the Delian League in which the Athenians used force to compel a former member to rejoin the alliance. Thus, from an Athenian point of view, the Naxian secession attempt was a warning sign, a clear indication that the legitimacy of the Delian League was in decline. Since this was the background to Cimon’s campaign in Caria and Lycia, it seems reasonable to assume that the Athenians dispatched a fleet to south-western Anatolia in order to demonstrate to their allies and perhaps to the rest of the Greek world that the war against Persia was far from over.

That the Athenians were eager to reassert their position as the leaders of the war against Persia is reflected in the propagandistic frenzy that followed Cimon’s victory at the Eurymedon. Stelai in honor of the Athenians who fell at the Eurymedon were set up in Athens, celebratory epigrams commemorating the Greek triumph were inscribed on monuments set up by Cimon, and the spoils from the battle were used to beautify

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801 Sealey 1976, 251; Briant 2002, 557.
802 Cawkwell 2005, 132–33.
803 After the capture of Eion, Athens subjugated Scyros and Carystus. See: Thuc. 1.98.1-3; Diod. 11.60.2; Plut. Cim. 8.3-6.
804 Plut. Cim. 11.1.
805 Thucydides (1.99) claims that the rising dissent among the members of the Delian League was caused not by Persian inactivity but by the inability of Athens’ allies to withstand continuous labor and Athens’ severity in exacting tribute, vessels, and soldiers. Such explanation, however, is far from convincing since the allies had contributed their fair share diligently in the past and it is more likely that their change in attitude occurred once Athens began targeting Greek cities while the Persian threat became less and less tangible.
806 Thuc. 1.98.4.
807 Cf. Hornblower 2011a, 21. In addition, Grote (1846, 395) maintains that Cimon was sent to Asia due to an Athenian desire to obliterate the memory of Athens’ recent brutal treatment of Naxos.
808 Paus. 1.29.14.
809 There are three epigrams, each a four-line stanza, which were inscribed on monuments set up by Cimon in celebration of his victories. See: Aeschin. 3.183-5; Diod. 11.62.3; Plut. Cim. 7.3-8.1. Wade-Gery (1933)
Athens. In addition, the victory was commemorated at Delphi, depicted on vase paintings, and Athenians boys were named Eurymedon. By the time of Plutarch, the battle at the Eurymedon River was remembered as a pivotal moment in the war against Persia, a glorious achievement that overshadowed the triumphs at Salamis and Plataea. But when the actual consequences of the battle are taken into account, the claim that the battle was a watershed moment seems like a wild exaggeration. To being with, to our best knowledge cities from Caria and Lycia did not joined the Delian League. It is quite possible that several cities within the confederate fleet’s range might have joined the Delian League due to awe or fear, but the scarcity of evidence, mainly the information that can be derived from the Athenian tribute lists, suggests that the Delian League did not expand eastward. Moreover, it is difficult to believe that Cimon, having utterly defeated the Persian forces, decided to return home instead of capitalizing on his victory. Therefore, one can hypothesize that the Athenians were more interested in reminding their allies that the war against Persia was still ongoing and that the existence of Delian League was

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810 Plut. Cim. 13.6-8.
811 Paus. 10.15.4-5. Moreover, Kebric (1983) has argued that the Lesche of the Cnidians at Delphi, a club-room for communal gathering, was constructed and adorned in response to the Athenian victory at the Eurymedon.
812 It is generally agreed that the famous Eurymedon Vase, a red-figure oinochoe dated to c. 460 BC, celebrates Cimon’s victory at the Eurymedon. On Side A there is a depiction of a mature bearded Persian, wearing a decorated jumpsuit, a soft cap, and a dangling empty quiver. The Persian is bending over with his hands held to the side of his head in a gesture of panic. On side B we find a naked Greek youth who seems to be chasing the Persian while brandishing not a spear but his penis. Between the two there is an inscription which says: “I’m Eurymedon, I stand bent-over”. The restoration suggested by Schauenburg (1975, 104 n. 38a) is the following: εὐρυμέδον εἰμ[ι] κυβά[δε] ἠστεκα. On the connection between the Eurymedon Vase and the Eurymedon battle, see: Dover 1989, 105; Pinney 1984; Miller 1997, 13; Castriota 2005, 99; Cohen 2011, 474–77.
813 The best example for this phenomenon is the Athenian general Eurymedon (e.g. Thuc. 3.80.2), who, as pointed out by Hornblower (1991, 154, 475), was almost certainly named after this battle.
815 Thucydides (2.9.4) reports that the allies of Athens in 431 BC included the coastal cities of Caria with its Dorian neighbors, but a thorough examination of the Athenian tribute lists (see: Keen 1993a) demonstrates that while Lycian and Carian settlements appeared inconsistently in the mid-450s BC, they are conspicuously absent after 440 BC. Therefore, it is clear that the Carian and Lycian cities were in a position to depart from the Delian League with impunity and it is not out of the question that they acknowledged Persian authority.
816 Rhodes (1992, 43) posits that at the very least Cimon could have made an attempt to recover Cyprus, as he did in 450 BC under less favorable circumstances. Moreover, it is puzzling why the Athenians did not cement their control over southwestern Anatolia, which entailed numerous strategic advantages. Cf. Keen 1993b; Keen 1997, 65–66.
imperative. Accordingly, it is not out of the question that the somewhat exaggerated reputation of the battle at the Eurymedon River was probably the outcome of Athenian propaganda.

The Persians were on the Defensive

The notion that the Greeks were the aggressors is bolstered by several indications which suggest that the Persians were on the defensive. First, there is no substantive evidence for Persian design to mount an assault on the Aegean. The three traditions which make such a claim are, as noted by Keen, highly dubious. Most importantly, it is hard to believe that the Persians were in a state of paralysis for at least a decade before they resolved to reassert Persian authority in the Aegean, or that Xerxes was motivated by a thirst for vengeance so long resolved after his failure to conquer Greece. In general, the assumption that the Great Persian Kings were aware of or cared for the political squabbles in mainland Greece is unrealistic. Accordingly, it highly unlikely that Xerxes was paying close attention to the changing dynamics between Athens and its allies from the moment he returned home and, when he learned about the Naxian revolt, he sprang into action seeking revenge. As we have seen, Xerxes was unaffected by the Greek incursions which preceded the Eurymedon campaign, so there is no reason to believe that he suddenly changed his mind and made plans to storm the Aegean once more. Xerxes, I argue, was not paralyzed but detached, and almost certainly preoccupied with other regions within his domain which demanded his attention. This was true before the Persians were defeated at the Eurymedon River, and, when considering the fact that the Greek victory had no substantial consequences, probably after.

Second, any argument that is predicated on the size of Persian land and sea forces cannot be accepted. The ancient sources are notorious for providing questionable if not

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818 Several explanations have been suggested for the seemingly abrupt ending of the Greek offensive. Plutarch (Cim. 13.4) implies that the Persians sued for peace after the defeat at the Eurymedon, but it is rather clear that the biographer is referring to the so-called Peace of Callias, which Diodorus (12.2.4-5) dates to 450/449 BC. Some scholars (e.g. Walsh 1981; Badian 1987) have argued that a peace treaty was concluded after the Eurymedon. Nevertheless, there are several problems with such a claim. First, Blamire (1989, 144) notes that the conclusion of a truce after the battle at the Eurymedon River is utterly absent from fourth century BC traditions. Second, if the Athenians and Persians came to terms, how could we explain the Athenian involvement in the Egyptian uprising in first half of the 450s BC and the Athenian attack on Cyprus in 450 BC? A more plausible explanation have been suggested by Meiggs (1972, 79), who maintains that Cimon decided to refrain from pushing forward because he had no reconnaissance on the potential threats that were waiting ahead and because the sailing season was close to its end.

819 Keen 1997, 58. Plato (Menex. 241d) merely mentions in passing that Xerxes planned a third invasion. Diodorus (11.58.2-3) asserts that Xerxes’ expected Themistocles to facilitate the reassertion of Persian power in the Aegean, but the death of Athenian general led Great King to abort his plan. This tradition, it should be noted, is utterly rejected by Thucydides (1.138.4). Justin (12.15.17-20) asserts that Xerxes began preparations for a second Greek campaign after he learned about the elimination of Pausanias, his alleged co-conspirator. All in all, the traditions concerned with a third Persian invasion should be envisioned as manifestations of Greek paranoia rather than actual Persian design. Cf. Fornara 1966, 271; Meiggs 1972, 467; Badian 1993, 87–88; Keen 1997, 58–59.

820 The portrayal of Xerxes in the ancient sources as preoccupied almost exclusively with court intrigue in the later part of his reign (e.g. Hdt. 9.108-13, Ctes. FGrH 688 F13 §32-33; Diod. 11.69.1-2; Just. 3.1.1-2) cannot be accepted as historical. It is far more likely that Xerxes had to attend to the needs of his vast empire, of which western Anatolia was only a small part.
dubious figures whenever Persian armies and navies are involved.\textsuperscript{821} In respect to the number of Persian ships deployed at the Eurymedon, the figures mentioned in the sources range from 200 to 600,\textsuperscript{822} while we have no concrete information regarding the size of the Persian land forces. On the contrary, there are several indications which suggest that the size of the Persian fleet that gathered at the Eurymedon was grossly inflated. Keen notes that Phanodemus’ claim that the Persians deployed 600 ships is dubious since it constitutes the sum of both Greek and Persian fleets as reported by Ephorus.\textsuperscript{823} Moreover, we are told that Cimon, with a fleet of at least 200 ships,\textsuperscript{824} had to force the Persians to engage as the latter tried to refrain from battle by sailing up river until the arrival of eighty Phoenician ships which were en route from Cyprus.\textsuperscript{825} In previous naval engagements in which the Persians had a numerical advantage there was no hesitation on the Persian side.\textsuperscript{826} The caution of the Persian admirals suggests that the Persian fleet may have been much smaller than reported and perhaps even smaller than Cimon’s armada.\textsuperscript{827}

In regard to the Persian land forces, a close reading of the sources reveals that the Greeks were probably far from outnumbered on land as well. Plutarch notes that Cimon’s fleet consisted of newly designed triremes, which were broader and were furnished with bridges between the decks. The new design meant that each trireme was capable of carrying a greater number of hoplites.\textsuperscript{828} In other words, Cimon’s fleet was carrying a large infantry force ready for deployment.\textsuperscript{829} In addition, though the reports on the land battle are succinct, all agree that the Persian land army was easily routed, which renders the possibility that the Persians outnumbered the Greeks even less plausible.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{821} Herodotus, for example, claims that Datis had no less than 600 triremes under his command (Hdt. 6.95.2), that the Persian fleet that crushed the Ionian rebels near Lade consisted of 600 ships (Hdt. 6.9.1, 95.2), that Xerxes’ fleet consisted of 3,000 various types of vessels (Hdt. 7.97), and that the Persian invasion force consisted a total of 5,283,220 men (Hdt. 7.184-6). The accounts regarding the Persian efforts to suppress an Egyptian uprising in the early 450s BC serve as another compelling example. Ctesias (\textit{FGrH} 608 F13 §36-7) recounts two Persian attempts to recapture Egypt: the first expedition consisted of 400,000 infantry and eighty ships, while the second 200,000 and 300 ships. The figure reported by Diodorus (11.74.1, 75.1-2, 77.1) are equally unbelievable: 300,000 infantry and cavalry for the first expedition and 300,000 coupled with 300 ships for the second.
\item \textsuperscript{822} See n. 793 above.
\item \textsuperscript{823} Keen 1997, 59–60.
\item \textsuperscript{824} See n. 791 above.
\item \textsuperscript{825} Plut. \textit{Cim.} 12.4.
\item \textsuperscript{826} For example, in the battle of Artemision (Hdt. 8.4-11) the Persians, who had a numerical advantage, charged headlong. Similarly, in the battle of Salamis the Persians attacked without hesitation (Hdt. 8.84) while the Greek counter-maneuvers were aimed at cancelling the Persian superiority in numbers by luring the Persians ships into a narrow strait (Hdt. 8.60a-b; Diod. 11.15.4; Plut. \textit{Them.} 12.3). The Persians at the Eurymedon, so it seems, tried to do the same by sailing up river, which suggests that they had a smaller fleet. Moreover, Herodotus (9.96-7) recounts how shortly before the battle of Mycale the Persian admirals preferred to beach their ships and fight the Greeks on land because they had fewer ships.
\item \textsuperscript{827} In addition, Keen (1997, 60) argues that even if we accept the possibility that the Persians assembled a fleet of 600 ships, it was still insufficient for a large-scale attack.
\item \textsuperscript{828} Plut. \textit{Cim.} 12.2.
\item \textsuperscript{829} The magnitude of Cimon’s land forces is demonstrated by the subjugation of the city of Phaselis shortly before the Eurymedon battle. Phaselis fell not due to a prolonged siege but after Cimon mounted a frontal assault against the city walls, which probably required the participation of considerable land forces. See: Plut. \textit{Cim.} 12.3.
\end{itemize}
Third, the considerable size of the Greek fleet does not necessarily mean that the Greeks launched a preemptive strike against a forming Persian invasion force. We should not forget that Cimon was the first Greek to sail deep into enemy waters since Pausanias’ attack on Cyprus in 478 BC. The proximity to the Persian naval bases in Cyprus, Phoenicia, and Cilicia meant that the chances of encountering a Persian fleet were considerable. Moreover, Athens influence in this region was non-existent before Cimon’s arrival, which explains why Cimon was not received as a liberator by the people of Phaselis. Accordingly, the Athenians and their allies must have been aware of the potential threats that Cimon would be facing during his campaign and therefore mobilized a force that was suitable for siege works, land skirmishes, and naval engagements. In addition, a large fleet constituted an effective demonstration of the Delian League’s might, which must have improved Cimon’s chances of success in persuading Carian and Lycian cities to revolt from the Persians and join the Delian League. In sum, the size of Cimon’s fleet had nothing to do with an imminent clash with a considerable Persian force but a necessary precaution in light of the dangers it could have encountered.

Fourth, if Cimon was instructed to attack the Persian forces at the Eurymedon, one wonders what drove him to disregard his orders and waste valuable time in assaulting several cities in Caria and Lycia. A prudent and seasoned general like Cimon must have known that it was best to attack before the enemy was in full strength. In addition, the accounts of Diodorus and Plutarch imply that Cimon learned about the Persian military presence at the Eurymedon in the midst of his campaign in Caria and Lycia. If the Persian forces at the Eurymedon were news to Cimon, the claim that he was leading a preemptive strike becomes impossible. So why was Cimon sent to Caria and Lycia? Diodorus frames Cimon’s exploits in southeastern Anatolia as a continuation of the overarching effort of the Delian League to liberate Greek cities garrisoned by the Persians. Thus, I completely agree with French, who maintains that “there seems no reason why we should not interpret the campaign as one of the more successful examples of the League’s original policy, i.e. as a punitive plundering raid upon the Persian domains.”

Fifth, the sequence of events demonstrates that the Persian mobilization at the Eurymedon was a response to Cimon’s advance. While it is unclear whether Cimon’s campaign in Lycia and Caria spanned over a single or several seasons, our sources agree that the Persian mobilization at the Eurymedon took place while Cimon was already operating in Caria and Lycia. Therefore, is seems unfathomable that the Persians were leisurely mustering a vast host to embark on another ambitious conquest expedition instead

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830 Diodorus (11.60.4) reports that Cimon had to reduce unspecified of Carian cities by siege, while Frontinus (Strat. 3.2.5) mentions an unnamed city that Cimon captured through a clever stratagem.
831 Diod. 11.60. 4-6; Plut. Cim. 12.2.
832 Diod. 11.60.
833 French 1971, 38 n. 40. For a similar interpretation of the origin of Cimon’s campaign, see: Grote 1846, 395; Walker 1923, 55; Steinbrecher 1985, 104–6; McGregor 1987, 40.
834 Diodorus dates all of Cimon’s achievements in Caria and Lycia to 470/69 BC, and Plutarch’s narration gives the impression that Cimon’s assault in the region occurred in a single and continuous campaign. While this timeline is accepted by Keen (1997, 61–62), Meiggs (1972, 74) and Blamire (1989, 138) have argued that the many achievements of Cimon were more likely to have been accomplished over several seasons.
of moving against the Greek invaders who were roaming in Caria and Lycia. A more reasonable explanation for the presence of the Persian forces at the Eurymedon is that the Persian mobilization began as a response to Cimon’s exploits. In other words, only when the Persian authorities received reports about the presence of a sizable Greek fleet that was operating in Caria and Lycia they began mustering land and sea forces with the intention of preventing the Greeks from advancing further to the east. Time was pressing and when Cimon attacked the Persians were still building up their strength, which explains the hesitation of the Persian navy.

Sixth, the usage of the Eurymedon as the mustering site for the Persian forces validates the notion that the Persian mobilization was defensive and reactionary in nature. The traditional staging point for Persian land forces in Asia Minor was not the banks of the Eurymedon River but Sardis, while the naval bases in Cilicia and Phoenicia were the conventional mustering places for Persian navies. Furthermore, the Eurymedon was not a suitable starting point for a westward campaign since there was no good coastal road for quick transportation of troops in the area and it had no easy access to the Anatolian hinterland. The only seemingly tactical importance of the Eurymedon was that it was in the path of Cimon’s fleet, which again indicates that the Persians were aiming at blocking the advancing Greek fleet.

Steinbrecher 1985, 105–6. A similar response of the satrapal authorities in western Anatolia occurred when Alexander invaded to Asia, as the local satraps gathered their forces and engaged the Macedonians at the Granicus River. See n. 844 below.
Cawkwell (1970, 47–48) points out that the assembling of a fleet was a prolonged endeavor and argues that the forces at the Eurymedon began mustering two years prior to the battle. Conversely, Keen (1997, 63) notes that while there are several instances of long preparations which preceded a campaign (e.g. Hdt. 726.1; Xen. Hell. 3.4.1; Diod. 15.14.2, 38.1), if the Persian preparations began two years before Cimon’s arrival, they should have been much larger in scale than reported.
For instance, Sardis served as winter quarters for Xerxes’ army prior to the crossing of the Hellespont (Hdt. 7.37.1). Similarly, when Cyrus that Younger was gathering an army before he tried to usurp the throne, the Greek officers were instructed to assemble at Sardis with the men under their command (Xen. An. 2.2-5). Sardis was also the site in which reinforcements from the east joined Tissaphernes’ satrapal contingents in 396 BC (Xen. Hell. 3.4.5-11).
For examples, in 492 BC Mardonius marched with his army to Cilicia, where a fleet was waiting for him. From there he sailed along the Anatolian coastline to Ionia (Hdt. 6.43.2-3). Two years later Datis assembled his navy in the Aleian plain in Cilicia in preparation for the expedition against Athens and Eretria (Hdt. 6.95). Similarly, when Egypt rebelled in the late 460s, Artabazus and Megabyzus, the generals who were ordered to retake Egypt, marched with their land army to Cilicia and Phoenicia, where they rested their forces and commanded the Cyprians and Cilicians to supply provisions and ships (Diod. 11.75.2-3).
Meiggs (1972, 78) suggests that the land route was not critical since the Persians intended the ships to carry the land forces. In contrast, Keen (1997, 61) points out that since the Athenians dominated all that was west of the Eurymedon River, the Persian fleet needed to advance in parallel with the land forces in order to ensure control of the coastline, a basic and necessary tactic in ancient maritime warfare. Similarly, Cawkwell (2005, 133–34) argues that the Persians planned to march along the coast with the army and navy moving along each other, thus capturing city after city just like Alexander did in 333 BC, albeit in the opposite direction. Such a plan, however, does not necessarily mean that the Persian design was to launch a large scale offensive, and it could also be argued that they simply intended to reclaim all the cities that were lost to the Greeks in Caria and Lycia.
It should be noted that Thucydides (8.87) reports that in 411 BC a Persian fleet sailed as far as the city of Aspendus, which was situated on the Eurymedon River, in readiness to sail westward. At no point, however,
In summary, the battle of the Eurymedon River was by no means the outcome of a Greek preemptive strike that was intended to prevent a Persian offensive. It was a clash between a confederate fleet that was instructed to liberate the Greek cities in Caria and Lycia and Persian forces that were hurriedly gathered to protect the King’s land from the pesky Greeks. Such reconstruction becomes evident when taking into consideration the rising dissent among the members of the Delian League in the late 470s, Cimon’s exploits prior to the battle, the unusual usage of the Eurymedon as a site for mobilization of Persian land and sea forces, and the maneuvers of the Persian fleet during the naval engagement.

On the one hand, Cimon’s main objective was to reignite the war against Persia in order to legitimize Athens’ demand for tribute, ships, and men, and by extension to discredit potential secession attempts from the Delian League. It is not out of the question, therefore, that the battle at the Eurymedon River was an unexpected development, an opportunity which Cimon was prudent enough to exploit. The Athenians, I argue, neither planned nor were able to extend their authority further to the east and in any case they were probably more interested in reminding their fellow countrymen that the Delian League was a Panhellenic coalition that spearheaded the war against Persia rather than an instrument of power abused by Athens.

On the other hand, it is clear that the Persian actions were reactionary in nature. The absence of any hint that the Persians were planning to reassert their dominance in the Aegean since Xerxes’ retreat suggests that the Great King was content with the status quo which emerged in the mid-470s BC. The assumption that a sudden and dramatic shift in Persian policy in the west occurred due to personal grudge is highly improbable. To our best knowledge, there was no Persian retaliation following the battle of the Eurymedon, which seems expected when considering the limited effect of Cimon’s achievements in Caria and Lycia. Consequently, the forces which Cimon encountered at the Eurymedon were probably satrapal forces scrambled from Caria, Lycia, and the neighboring satrapies along with available ships that were harboring nearby. The notion that the Persian forces at the Eurymedon were satrapal is expressed by Grote, though he left this important observation underdeveloped. I should point out that Diodorus provides a hint that these forces were of local origin when he notes that when the Greek surprise attack began, the Persian infantry thought that they were attacked by the Pisidians who dwelt in neighboring territory and were hostile to the Persians, an assumption that soldiers who were familiar with the region and probably served nearby could have made. As we have seen, one of the most important duties of the satrap was to protect his domain from local and foreign threats, and Cimon and his men were clearly of the latter sort. The Persians were defeated

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Thucydides explicitly claims that the Persian fleet that was present at Aspendus was mustered at that specific location. The only fact that Thucydides is ready to sanction is that 147 Phoenician ships came as far as Aspendus, which implies that the armada was mobilized elsewhere and sailed to Aspendus.

842 Grote 1846, 395.
843 Diod. 11.61.4.
844 All of the Persian generals at the Eurymedon were of noble if not royal descent. Pherendates was most likely the son of Megabazus who was an honorable member in the royal court of Darius’ I, and was tasked to lead the Persian attack in Thrace after the Scythian campaign (see: Balcer 1993, no. 49). Pherendates himself was one of Xerxes’ generals (Hdt. 7.67.1) and we know that he presided as the satrap of Egypt in the late 490 BC (see p. 41 above). Not much is known about the career of Tithraustes, but Diodorus (11.60.5)
once more, but the consequences of this defeat were insignificant, and as such made royal intervention redundant.

**Conclusion**

The Greek communities which inhabited the coastal districts of western Anatolia played a key role in the interactions between Greeks and Persians. The bond of kinship between the Asiatic and European Greeks was the main cause, or justification, for the interventions of the latter in the affairs of western Anatolia. Before Xerxes’ invasion, however, the responses to Ionian appeals for help were limited to diplomacy or small scale military expeditions. But the willingness of the mainland Greeks to intervene on behalf of the Ionians increased dramatically in the aftermath of the Persian Wars. The foundation of the Delian League constituted a well-organized Panhellenic effort to guarantee the safety, security, and liberty of the Asiatic Greeks. Athens and its allies carried on the war against Persia under the slogans of Greek liberty and vengeance, which led to several military operations against Persian targets throughout the eastern Mediterranean. The war against Persia validated the Delian League, and the Athenians knew that as long as they can demonstrate that Persia remained a real and immediate threat to the Asiatic Greeks, they would be able to justify the existence of the Delian League and by extension Athens’ dominance within this political framework.

Xerxes’ failure to enslave the European Greeks had an equally profound and to some extent opposite impact on the attitude of the Persian royal authorities toward the western satrapies. The apparent disengagement of the Great King in respect to the Greek offensive in the 470s BC suggests that following the conclusion of Xerxes’ Greek campaign the official Achaemenid policy in the west shifted from a policy of expansion to a policy of entrenchment. Such policy, which presumably remained unchanged throughout Xerxes’ reign, became viable due to the fact the Delian League was primarily a maritime power. While the Greeks managed to expel the Persians from Europe and raided the Anatolian coastline and Cyprus, at no point Persian rule in the Asiatic continent was truly jeopardized. But while the Greeks remained an ongoing threat to Persian authority, the dissonance between the reality in the west and its misrepresentation in Achaemenid royal inscriptions meant that the Persian governors of the western satrapies were expected to fulfill their satrapal duties while dealing with the Greek challenge on their own. Such an interpretation, I argue, is much more compelling than the assertion that Xerxes simply decided to concede the coasts of western Anatolia to the Greeks. The Achaemenids, as we shall see in the following chapter, never officially relinquished their claim over Ionia, although Artaxerxes I adopted his father’s approach toward the western frontier. The fact that the Great King remained unconcerned regarding the western satrapies encouraged

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says that he was Xerxes’ bastard son. Ariomandes was the son of Gobryas, a high ranking Achaemenid, a spear-bearer of Darius I (See: Balcer 1993, no. 41), and his brother was the renowned Mardonius. In sum, the generals at the Eurymedon were seasoned commanders and connected in some way or the other to the Achaemenid royal household. Since there is no mention that they were appointed by the Great King through a special commission, it is not out of the question that they were the satraps of the adjacent provinces who formed a joint force to repel the Greek invaders, in a similar fashion to the satrapal coalition that Alexander the Great faced at the battle of the Granicus River.

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satrapal initiative. Consequently, while the exploits of the satraps during the reign of Xerxes are underreported, their presence in the ancient sources becomes more and more dominant, which reflects their growing agency in the interactions between Greeks and Persians.
5. DISINTEREST AND EQUILIBRIUM

In contrast to Xerxes, his son and successor Artaxerxes I played a rather secondary role in Greek historical sources. In the early part of his reign, Artaxerxes’ interactions with the Greeks were infrequent and reactionary in nature, and after the conclusion of the so-called Peace of Callias in 449 BC, Greco-Persian relations were limited to diplomatic exchange coupled with limited military conflicts in western Anatolia. Nevertheless, modern interpretations envision almost every Persian intervention in Greek affairs as an outcome of a royal directive dictated by Artaxerxes. Consequently, the aim of the present chapter is to challenge and correct the apparent misconception regarding the agency of the Persian royal authorities during the reign of Artaxerxes I.

I begin by demonstrating that Artaxerxes adopted his father’s policy of entrenchment in the western frontier. On the one hand, Artaxerxes neither showed expansionist aspirations toward the west nor sought to actively challenge Athens in the Aegean. On the other hand, Athenian aggression in the eastern Mediterranean basin was met with lukewarm Persian response. Accordingly, I argue that Artaxerxes’ lack of concern regarding the Athenian threat can be explained by a consideration that often goes unnoticed, namely that while there is no doubt that Athens constituted a formidable maritime power, its reach was limited to the coastal regions of the eastern Mediterranean. Therefore, Athens was never constituted a real and immediate threat to Persian authority, and as such the Great King expected the satrapal authorities in the west to resolve, or at the very least contain, the Athenian problem. By taking into consideration the true balance of power between Athens and Persia as well as the Great King’s position and interest, I offer a reappraisal of the extent and impact of the achievements of the Delian League vis-à-vis Persia, and conclude that the depiction of Cimon’s Cypriot campaign as a glorious triumph which coerced Artaxerxes to sue for peace must be rejected in favor of a more balanced account.

The second point of interest is the conclusion of the Peace of Callias and the subsequent status quo between Athens and Persia. I demonstrate that the scholarly debate concerning the historicity of the alleged treaty negotiated by Callias can be resolved by accepting the notion that the Peace of Callias constituted an informal agreement rather than an official treaty. I then offer an analysis of the factors which allowed the modus vivendi in western Anatolia to endure throughout Artaxerxes’ reign. Most importantly, I argue that the unofficial nature of the equilibrium in the west and the measures which allowed it to continue created favorable conditions for independent satrapal initiatives.

Lastly, I focus on the interactions between Greeks and Persians in the context of the Archidamian War. These interactions manifested in two forms. On the one hand, there was an ongoing exchange of embassies between Susa, Sparta, and Athens, as both Spartans and Athenians sought to obtain Persian support in order to win the war. Though the Great King opted to remain neutral, the vibrant diplomatic interchange shows that the relations between Artaxerxes and the two Greek superpowers were amicable. On the other hand, a series of skirmishes took place in western Anatolia as Athenian forces clashed with various local contingents, some of which were affiliated with the satrapal authorities. I argue that the discrepancy between the ongoing diplomatic exchange and the skirmishes occurring in
the west was the outcome of the contrast between the position of the Great King and that of the satraps of western Anatolia. From the Great King’s viewpoint blatant Persian intervention in the war could have jeopardized the status quo in the west, but for the satraps of western Anatolia the ongoing war in the Greek mainland created an opportunity. When the members of anti-Athenian factions in Ionia, who wished to throw off the yoke of Athenian rule, appealed the satraps for assistance, the latter, in spite of or perhaps due to Artaxerxes’ do-nothing policy, were willing to intervene in hope of increasing their influence and power.

5.1 The Disinterest of Artaxerxes I

The Embassy of Megabazus

The earliest known instance in which Artaxerxes I interacted with the Greeks was prompted by an Egyptian uprising that erupted shortly after Xerxes’ death. In essence, shortly after the Egyptians rose in revolt against Persian rule, they appealed to the Athenians for assistance. The Athenian authorities ordered a confederate fleet that happened to be operating in Cyprus to join the fighting. At first, the Greco-Egyptian coalition managed to overwhelm the Persian garrisons, but eventually Artaxerxes dispatched a vast army that suppressed the rebellion, and only a handful of Greeks who participated in the Athenian expedition to Egypt made it home alive. But before the Great King mobilized his forces, a Persian embassy led by a certain Megabazus arrived at Sparta and offered to finance a Peloponnesian invasion to Attica. The Persian design, we are told, was to force the Athenians to recall their fleet from Egypt. Despite the Persian appeal, the Spartans remained inactive. In a sharp contrast to Darius I’s response to Athens’ involvement in the Ionian revolt, Artaxerxes made no attempt to punish the Athenians for meddling in Persian affairs in Egypt. The Great King, so it seems, was unconcerned with Athens’ encroachment. But the diplomatic effort to induce a war between Sparta and Athens suggests that Artaxerxes was aware of the animosity between the two Greek city-states. Yet, it is hard to believe that the Great Persian King was familiar with the contemporary state of affairs in mainland Greece and the rising hostility between two minor polities which resided well beyond the borders of his empire. A possible explanation can be found in a tradition concerned with a certain Arthmius of Zeleia who, according to an inscription mentioned by several fourth century sources, was branded as an enemy of the Athenian people for conveying Persian gold to Greece. While the historicity of the decree has been challenged, arguments in

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846 Thuc. 1.104, 109-110; Ctes. FGrH 688 F14 §36-38; Diod. 11.71.3-6, 74-5, 77.1-3. See also: Hdt. 3.12.4, 7.7; Justin, prolog. 3.
847 Thucydides (1.109.3) reports that the money was spent without results, but Diodorus (11.74.6) claims that the Spartans refused the money. Walker (1923, 78) argues that the Spartans took the Persian money but the failed to keep their side of the bargain. In contrast, Lewis (1977, 62 n. 84) and Hornblower (1991, 175) argue that Diodorus’ assertion is mere guesswork. On the strategic considerations behind the Spartan inactivity, see: de Ste Croix 1972, 190–91; Holladay 1977, 54–63; Lewis 1981, 70–78. Conversely, Rung (2008, 31) suggests that the Spartans had no desire “to discredit themselves by cooperation with the Persians”.
848 Dem. 9.41-2, 19.271; Aeschin. 3.258; Din. 2.24; Krateros FGrH 342 F14; Plut. Them. 6.3; Aristid. Or. 1.369, 3.334-6, 650-1. Hofstetter (1978, 32–33) provides a bibliography of previous studies concerned with Arthmius of Zeleia.
favor of authenticity seem more compelling,\(^{849}\) and it has been suggested that Arthmius was a member of the entourage that accompanied Megabazus in his journey to Sparta.\(^{850}\) The notion that a Greek facilitated a Persian attempt to manipulate Greek politics by distributing funds reveals a possible channel of communication through which the satraps of Hellespontine Phrygia monitored Greek politics and conveyed valuable information to the Persian central authorities.\(^{851}\)

We should not forget that throughout the fifth century BC the satraps of Hellespontine Phrygia found themselves in the forefront of the ongoing conflict with the Greeks. One way to face the Greek threat was to forge connections with powerful and influential men in the Hellespontine region in order to create a defensive bulwark that would safeguard their satrapy from Greek incursions. The earliest instance in which this tactic was used occurred in 478 BC, in the context of the collaboration between Artabazus and Pausanias.\(^{852}\) It is rather likely that this tactic was adopted by Arhabazus’ successors, who went on to create a network of guest-friendships and other types of connections with Greeks and Thracian elements in the neighboring regions.

Accordingly, the satraps of Hellespontine Phrygia must have established a working relationship first and foremost with the Greek communities within their satrapy. In exchange for the satrap’s favor, which probably constituted material rewards, prominent Greeks acted as facilitators of potential collaborations between the satrap and various Greeks cities, communities, and individuals in Asia as well as in Europe. The Persian ambassadors, whether sent by the satrap or the Great King himself, were in need of Greek collaborators to arrange meetings with high ranking Greek functionaries and politicians as well as acting as translators to enable effective communication.\(^{853}\) Arthmius, an Athenian proxenus and a native of Zeleia, which was in close proximity to the satrapal capital at Dascylium,\(^{854}\) was the ideal candidate to represent the interest of the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia in the Greek mainland.

The Hellespontine connection hypothesis becomes even more compelling when considering the familial background of the Persian ambassador Megabazus. While is it


\(^{850}\) Colin 1933, 254–55; Kolbe 1938, 259–60; Gomme 1945, 327 n. 1; Connor 1967, 71 n. 15; Famerie 1992, 198–99. It should be noted that several scholars (Wallace 1970, 200–202 with n. 15; Run 2008, 30–31) argue that the arrival of Arthmius occurred in the context Xerxes’ invasion, while others (Cary 1935, 177–80; Meiggs 1963, 10; Meiggs 1972, 511–12; Frost 1980, 95–98; Briant 2002, 563) connect it to Pausanias’ machinations in Byzantium in the 470s BC. Wade-Gery (1945, 222 n. 22) suggests that Arthmius could have brought Persian gold to the Greek mainland only after 451/0 BC.

\(^{851}\) A similar instance occurred sometime before the summer of 395 BC when Timocrates, a Rhodian, was sent to Greece with encourage Athens, Corinth, Thebes, and Argos to declare war on Sparta. See: Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.1–2; *Hell. Oxy.* London Fragments 7.2–3 [=McKechnie and Kern 1988, 48–51]; Diod. 14.81.4–82.4; Paus. 3.9.8; Polyaen. *Strat.* 1.48.3; Plut. *Ages.* 15.6. Cf. Cook 1990; Run 2004; Schepens 2002; Schepens 2012. See p. 104 above.

\(^{852}\) Right before recounting the condemnation of Arthmius, Plutarch (*Them.* 6.2) mentions how Themistocles ordered the execution of an unnamed Greek translator (δίγλωσσος) who accompanied Persian envoys presumably to Athens to demand earth and water, i.e. recognizing the authority of the Great King.

\(^{853}\) Meiggs 1972, 511.
almost certain that Megabazus was a high-ranking Persian noble, his name suggests that he was related to an accomplished Persian general of the same name who subjugated the Thracian coast in the name of Darius I and later on presided as one of the commanders of the Persian fleet under Xerxes. The father of the general Megabazus was Megabates, the aforementioned satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, who was also a cousin of Darius I. The likelihood that the ambassador Megabazus came from a family whose leading members served in the west in key positions suggests that Artaxerxes chose a delegate who had preexisting family-ties in the west, ties which could have increased the embassy’s chances of success.

Therefore, it is more likely that the driving force behind the diplomatic effort to incite a war between Athens and Sparta was the contemporary satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia. It is not out of the question that after the rebellion in Egypt span out of control, the satrap of Hellespontine informed the Persian central authorities about the deteriorating relationship between Athens and Sparta and proposed a plan to persuade the Spartans to attack the Athenians as a way to compel the Athenians to pull out their forces from Egypt. Although the evidence for such a reconstruction is circumstantial, it seems more convincing than assuming that the Great King was particularly attentive to the contemporary political atmosphere in European Greece. Accordingly, the satraps of western Anatolia and their Greek proxies as middlemen who allowed the flow of information from west to east, we can explain the mechanism by which the Achaemenid Kings gathered intelligence on events which occurred far away from their royal capitals.

Cimon’s Cypriot Campaign
The catastrophic conclusion of the Athenian expedition to Egypt did not deter the Athenians from further interventions in Persian affairs. In 450 BC, after peace was established on the home front, the Athenians dispatched a fleet to Cyprus under the

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855 Lewis 1989, 230.
856 For Megabazus’ Thracian campaign, see: Hdt. 5.2, 10, 14-15, 7.108.1; Plut, Mor. 869b. For his commanding post in Xerxes’ navy: Hdt. 9.97.
857 Megabates led the abortive Persian attempt to conquer Naxos (Hdt. 5.32-33, 35.1), and later on acted as the supreme commander of the Persian fleet at Artemision (Diod. 11.12.2-3). Burn (1984, 335) argues that Megabazus the ambassador and Megabazus the general were the same person. Conversely, while accepting the notion that Megabazus the ambassador was a relative of Megabates, Balcer (1993, 138, 158) advocates that Megabazus the general was the unnamed son of Megabates who, according to Aeschylus (Pers. 983), was killed in Salamis.
858 The likeliest candidate is Pharnabazus I, who is mentioned by Thucydides (2.67.1) as the acting satrap in 430 BC. This Pharnabazus was either Artabazus’ son (Balcer 1993, 85) or his younger brother (Beloch 1921, 145–46). Artabazus could not have been the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia at this time since, according to Diodorus (11.75.1-3), he commanded the Persian army that was sent to suppress the Egyptian uprising. It should be added that Plutarch (Them. 30.1) reports that a Persian named Epixyes was the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia shortly before the battle of the Eurymedon River, but Balcer (Balcer 1993, 163) argues that he was not the satrap but a low-rankings official in the satrapal administration.
859 Just before recounting Cimon’s exploit in Cyprus Thucydides (1.112.2) notes that the Athenians kept away from a Hellenic war (καὶ Ἔλληνικοῦ μὲν πολέμου ἐσχον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι), which implies that the Athenians were no longer encumbered by a local war and were therefore free to further their interests in the eastern Mediterranean.
command of Cimon.860 The Athenians, however, were not received as liberators by the locals. Several cities, as Marium, Citium and Salamis are mentioned by name,861 were subjected to Athenian siege. But the manner in which the campaign ended is unclear. Thucydides reports that Cimon died during the siege of Citium, and that soon after the Athenians defeated the Persians in a naval engagement.862 Such sequence of events suggests that the death of Cimon prompted an Athenian retreat, and that the Athenians encountered a Persian navy off Salamis on their way home.863 In this way, Cyprus was not subjugated, but the Athenians were able to claim another victory over the Persians. In contrast, Plutarch places the naval battle before the siege of Citium, though he agrees with Thucydides that Citium was the place of Cimon’s demise.864 If Plutarch’s account is followed, it becomes much clearer that the death of Cimon led the Athenians to abort the campaign. Diocles’ account is rather puzzling since he states that the Athenians left Cyprus only after the Persians sued for peace and only then he mentions in passing that Cimon died on Cyprus.865 While it is possible that the tradition in which Cimon presided as the commander in chief throughout the entire or at least the majority of the campaign was fueled by his posthumous glorification,866 the overall impression is that the campaign ended with mixed results. The Athenians vanquished the Persians once again, but Persian rule on Cyprus endured. As such, it is difficult to accept Diocles’ statement, namely that it was the Athenian operations on Cyprus that drove the Persians to sue for peace.867

On the contrary, the Cypriot campaign highlighted the limits of Athenian military capacity. The Athenians forged their Aegean empire by the might of their fleets, but their capacity to undermine Persian rule in the eastern Mediterranean was inherently limited. Athens’ navies posed a threat to the Anatolian and Levantine coastal regions as well as

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860 The sources for Cimon’s Cypriot campaign: Thuc. 1.112.2-4; Diod. 12.3-4; Plut. Cim. 18.4-19.1. See also: Isoc. 8.86; Aristodemus FGrH 104 F13; Nep. Cim. 3.4; Ael. VH 5.10. I follow Diodorus’ chronology, who sets the beginning of the campaign at the spring of 450 BC and its conclusion at the spring of 449 BC. This timetable is widely accepted, see: Gomme 1945, 325; Meritt, Wade-Gery, and McGregor 1950, 178; Badian 1993, 58–60; Green 2006, 179–80 n. 10. Conversely, Meiggs (1963, 11–31; 1972, 124–26) has argued in favor of 451 BC as the year in which Cimon arrived at Cyprus.
861 Interestingly, Cimon had to reduce by force not only Citium, which was an important Phoenician center (Cf. Gomme 1945, 329; Demetriou 2001; Cawkwell 2005, 131), but also Greek cities such as Marium (Gomme 1945, 330; Meiggs 1972, 480) and Salamis. It has been argued (Seibert 1976, 24–25; Maier 1985, 36) that the opposition Cimon met at Marium was due to the possibility that the city was ruled by a pro-Persian Phoenician dynasty. Miller (1997, 21) points out that the hostility of the Cypriot Greeks toward Athens can be explained by the fact that they were already ‘liberated’ and promptly deserted in 478 BC, and that this sentiment must have been augmented by the aborted Cypriot campaign in c. 462 BC.
862 Thuc. 1.112.4.
863 It should be noted that while Thucydides and Plutarch report that the sea battle took place off Salamis, Diodorus claims that the naval engagement happened in Cilicia. It is generally agreed that the fault is with Diodorus, who mashed together the events of Cimon’s exploits on Cyprus together with the Eurymedon campaign (e.g. Gomme 1945, 330; Barns 1953; Briant 2002, 579). It is also possible, as suggested by Schreiner (1997, 50–59), that Hellenicus, the source of Ephorus and by extension Diodorus, was responsible for the inaccurate information.
865 Diod. 12.4.6.
866 Gomme 1945, 330; Meiggs 1972, 128; Badian 1993, 59.
867 Diod. 12.4.4-5.
Cyprus, but the lack of an equally capable land army meant that the hinterland was beyond Athenian reach. Cimon’s misadventure on Cyprus proved that defeating the Persians armies and navies was a necessary first step, but without garnering local support, such victories had a fleeting effect. Consequently, it is not out of the question that from a Persian viewpoint the operations of the Delian League constituted a problem with which the satrapal authorities were expected to deal. Be that as it may, the attempt to takeover Cyprus made it evident that the Athenians were determined to continue operating in the eastern Mediterranean. But the inconclusive outcome of the Cypriot campaign created an alignment of interests which rendered a peaceful resolution of the conflict between Athens and Persia beneficial to both parties.

5.2 Equilibrium

The Peace of Callias

In the wake of Cimon’s Cypriot campaign, the war between Athens and Persia came to a halt. In the following decades the Athenians stopped operating in Egypt, Cyprus, and the Levant while the Persians stayed out of the Aegean. According to the ancient sources, this period of peace was the outcome of the so-called Peace of Callias which was purportedly concluded in 449 BC. But while the silence of the ancient sources suggests that a status quo was established in western Anatolia, the authenticity of the Peace of Callias has been debated. The crux of this scholarly debate is the fact that while the Peace of Callias is mentioned by several fourth century Attic orators, it is utterly ignored by fifth century traditions. As it stands, both lines of argumentation, i.e. in favor or against authenticity, remain imperfect. On the one hand, if a peace treaty had been concluded, the Athenians would have followed their practice by commemorating the decree which announced the end the war with Persia on a slab of stone or marble and set it up on the acropolis for all to see. However, there is no evidence for the existence of such a formal document and none of the available fourth century sources seems to have had access to such a document. On the other hand, it is unlikely that the abrupt cessation of hostilities following Cimon’s death on Cyprus was the outcome of an independent yet simultaneous decisions made by the Athenians and the Great King.

The Informal Agreement Hypothesis

Most scholars have been inclined to accept or reject the peace. Yet, an alternative reconstruction, one which constitutes a middle ground between these two mutually

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868 According to the Erechtheid casualty list (IG I3 1147 [=ML 33]), the Athenians operated in Cyprus, Egypt, and Phoenicia in the early 460s BC.

869 Meister (1982, 6–22) offers a comprehensive list of no less than 162 studies concerned with the authenticity of Peace of Callias, beginning in the early 19th century down to 1982. Interestingly, Badian (1999, 187 n. 5) observes that out of the 151 scholars who explicitly state their stance on the subject, 141 argue in favor of authenticity while only 29 reject it. The tendency to accept the Peace of Callias as historical has remained dominant in later studies, e.g. Stylianou 1989; Lewis 1992b, 121–29; Badian 1993, 1–72, 188–201; Cawkwell 1997a; Samons 1998; Cawkwell 2005, 139–46; Wiesehöfer 2006, 659; Rung 2008, 31–34. See also the observations of Hornblower (1991, 180–81), who provides evidence from the work of Thucydides that seem to outweigh the author’s silence concerning the Peace of Callias.

870 For a comprehensive catalogue of the direct and indirect evidence for the Peace of Callias, see: Meister 1982, 6–22; Fornara 1983, 97–103.
exclusive hypotheses, has received relatively little attention. It has been suggested that the Athenians and Persians made an informal agreement according to which the former acknowledged Persian superiority in Cyprus and Egypt while the latter agreed to refrain from intervening in the affairs of the Greek city-states of Asia.\textsuperscript{871} The informal agreement hypothesis, which is implied by Callisthenes, who rejects the claim that the Athenians concluded a peace treaty with the Persian King, but he admits that the latter acted as if a treaty was concluded because he was afraid of the Athenians.\textsuperscript{872} Regardless, the informal agreement hypothesis is far more attractive since it resolves the problematic issues which challenged interpretations offered by both supporters and detractors of the Peace of Callias.

To begin with, the informal agreement hypothesis explains the nature of the evidence regarding the Peace of Callias. If there was no formal treaty, we should not expect the sources to recount the occurrence of formalities such as mutual oath-taking,\textsuperscript{873} the ratification of the treaty in the Athenian assembly,\textsuperscript{874} or the public display of an inscribed copy of the treaty on the Athenian acropolis. Moreover, the informal nature of the agreement explains, on the one hand, the suspicious silence of Thucydides.\textsuperscript{875} On the other, it clarifies why Herodotus, when referring to the embassy of Callias, states that Callias and his colleagues were sent to Susa ‘on account of some business’ (ἐτέρου πρήγματος εἶνεκα),\textsuperscript{876} an ambiguous articulation which, as argued by Holladay appropriately describes not a conclusion of a formal peace treaty but an informal understanding.\textsuperscript{877} An unofficial agreement can also account for the contradictory fourth century versions of the specific terms of the treaty,\textsuperscript{878} and the puzzling absence of any references to an official document in fourth century sources.\textsuperscript{879}

\textsuperscript{871} The first to express the possibility of an unofficial understanding is Habicht (1961, 25–26), who rejects the fourth century traditions but acknowledges a reality of peace (Realität des Friedens), which implies that some sort of understanding was reached. He was followed by Knight (1970, 2 with n. 9), who maintains that the emergence of the peace in 449 BC was the outcome of “no more than an unwritten understanding.” The same opinion has also been expressed by Lewis (1977, 50–51), but the first to develop this line of argumentation was Holladay (1986), whose conclusions, in my view, provide the most likely and cogent solution to the controversy regarding the Peace of Callias. The informal agreement hypothesis has continued to gain traction, see: Podlecki 1998, 69; Briant 2002, 558, 580; Samons 2004, 343–44 n. 67; Brock 2006, 88; Azoulay 2014, 52–53; Waters 2014, 164–66; Samons 2016, 111–15.

\textsuperscript{872} Callisthenes FGrH 124 F16 [=Plut. Cim. 13.5]. Bosworth (1990) argues that what Plutarch meant to say is that Callisthenes was not denying the actuality of Peace of Callias but merely failed to mention it in his account. Be that as it may, Bosworth agrees that Callisthenes “drew attention to the actual behavior of the King,” which sits well with the informal agreement hypothesis.

\textsuperscript{873} Lewis 1977, 51; Samons 2004, 343–44 n. 67.

\textsuperscript{874} Samons 2004, 343–44 n. 67.

\textsuperscript{875} Holladay 1986, 506.

\textsuperscript{876} Hdt. 7.151.

\textsuperscript{877} Holladay 1986, 504.

\textsuperscript{878} Samons 2004, 343–44 n. 67. Holladay (1986, 506–7) suggests that the actual source for the unofficial agreement was Callias himself, whose descendants kept passing down the story about his diplomatic achievement in service of the Athenian people, a tradition which became important following the conclusion of the King’s Peace in 387/6 BC since it could have been used as an effective propagandistic weapon against Sparta.

\textsuperscript{879} Holladay 1986, 506.
Next, an informal understanding meant peace without its negative implications for both parties. On the one hand, the conclusion of the war against Persia would have freed to the Athenians to tighten their hold on their empire and to prepare for a possible clash with Sparta. But an unofficial agreement would have allowed the Athenians to carry on with the collection of tribute under the pretext that the funds were necessary for war against the Persians. On the other hand, from the Great King’s viewpoint, a peaceful resolution of the Greek problem must have been more than welcomed, especially since Egypt was not completely pacified, and the Athenians, shortly before Cimon’s arrival at Cyprus, were gradually gaining ground in Ionia, as Erythrae, Miletus and Sigeum acknowledged Athens’ authority. But a formal peace treaty meant that Artaxerxes was required to officially agree to restrictions on the movements of Persian armies and fleets and to publicly renounce any claims to the Greek city-states in Asia Minor. The mere appearance of bowing to Athenian demands would have been humiliating and harmful to King’s authority and prestige. All of these difficulties, however, are averted if we accept the notion that Artaxerxes merely publicly proclaimed that he had no intention to launch another offensive against Athenian domain in the foreseeable future while promising to refrain from intervening in the internal affairs of the Greek cities of Asia, at least those who were Athens’ allies.

880 Briant 2002, 579.
881 Holladay 1986, 504; Samons 2004, 343–44 n. 67. Meister points out (1982, 99) that ending the war with Persia would have rendered the existence of the Delian League, the primary source of Athenian political power, obsolete.
882 Holladay 1986, 504.
883 On the rebellion of the Egyptian Amyrtaeus, see: Thuc. 1.110.2, 112.3; Plut. Cim. 18.4.
884 The Erythrae decree (ML 40), firmly dated to 453/2 BC, records the regulations Athens imposed on the Erythrians, which included the appointment of inspectors and the installment of a garrison. Moreover, in lines 26-27 there is a clause which states: “nor shall I be persuaded to take back any of those who have fled to the Medes” ([- -] τὸν φυγόν [καταδεχόμαι οὐδὲ ἡνα οὐτ[---------] | [ἀλλο]ι πείσομαι[α]ι τὸν ἐς Μέδος φε[ῦ]ν[τοι]ν) which suggests that before Athens captured the city it was dominated by a pro-Persian faction.
885 The city of Miletus is absent from the tribute list of 454/3 BC and instead ‘the Milesians in Leros’ (Μιλέσιοι [ἐκ Λέρου] and ‘the Milesians of Teichoussa’ ([Μι]λέσιοι [ἐκ Τειχισσας] are recorded among those who sent tribute to Athens. But in 451 BC only the city Miletus appears as tributary, which led several scholars (e.g. Meiggs 1943, 26; Barron 1962, 1; Meiggs 1972, 112) to suggest that Miletus was still under Persian control in 454 BC, and that the pro-Athenian Milesians who had taken refuge in Leros and Teichoussa continued to pay tribute to Athens. By 451 BC, however, Athens recaptured Miletus, which explains the (re)appearance of Miletus in the Athenian tribute lists.
886 An Athenian decree (IG I3 17) commemorates Athens’ commitment to protect Sigeum from enemies hailing “from the mainland”, a designation which almost certainly refers to the Persians (e.g. Briant 2002, 580). Sigeum paid tribute to Athens in 450/49 BC but not in the previous recorded years. Accordingly, Meritt (1936, 362) and Balcer (1984, 374) maintain that the people of Sigeum were eager to secure Athenian protection to block a Persian attempt to take over the city by joining the Delian League. It should also be noted that while the orthodox date of the Sigeum decree is 451/0 BC, Mattingly (1996, 347–51) argues in favor of 418/17 BC.
887 Holladay 1986, 504. Samons (2004, 343–44 n. 67) adds that in light of Xerxes’ attempt to enslave the Greeks Artaxerxes would have regarded this treaty as “tantamount to an admission of failure to expand the empire in the face of Greek opposition”. See also: Samons 2016, 112.
888 Holladay 1986, 505. Briant (2002, 580) posits that Artaxerxes viewed the concessions to the Athenians as limited and temporary.
Keeping the Peace
Mutual Interest

The peace between Athens and Persia endured until the outbreak of the Ionian war in 412 BC. But how the status quo in western Anatolia was able to persevere for so long? In Athens, the unexpected death of the pro-Spartan Cimon allowed Pericles to garner support for a policy which branded Sparta instead of Persia as the true enemy of the Athenian people, and as long as Pericles dominated Athenian politics his anti-Spartan policy endured. Thus, since the Athenians had no desire to fight on two fronts, it became imperative to refrain from provoking the Persians.

Furthermore, a strong indication that both Athenians and Persians were content with the détente can be found in the apparent demilitarization of Ionia after 449 BC. The Athenian orators of the fourth century boast that the Great King was not allowed to mobilize an army past the Halys River. Although such a claim cannot be taken seriously, the lack of Persian military activity in the coastal regions is more likely to be the outcome of the unofficial truce, according to which Artaxerxes instructed his satraps to set their defenses in the Asiatic hinterland, probably in the satrapal seats at Sardis and Dascylium as well as in key locations such as Celaenae. This was by no means a unilateral action. To our best knowledge, the Athenians refrained from installing garrisons in Ionia after 449 BC and before the outbreak of Peloponnesian War. The silence of the sources is validated by Thucydides, who describes Ionia as ‘unwalled’, and goes on to attach this designation to a number of Ionian cities. It is hard to believe that the dismantling of the fortifications of several Greek city-states in Asia and the Persian decision to keep their forces out of Ionia were coincidental. Instead, they should be envisioned as reciprocal measures taken by the Athenians and the Great King, as both sides apparently agreed that demilitarizing Ionia was a necessary step which would allow the cessation of hostilities to continue.

As we shall see below, although several local skirmishes between the Athenians and forces affiliated with the Persians occurred in the 420s BC, they did not escalate into open war between Athens and the Great King. Holladay adds that even after Pericles’ death the Athenians were eager to remain on friendly terms with Persia due to the Spartan efforts to forge an alliance with Persia due to the outbreak of the Archidamian War. See discussion on p. 137 below.

Isoc. 4.118, 7.80; Dem. 19.273; Lycurg. Leoc. 73; Diod. 12.4.5; Livy 33.22.2; Plut. Cim. 13.4; Aristodemus, FGrH 104 F13.


Gomme 1945, 381.

Thuc. 3.33.2: ἀταγόμενων γὰρ ὁδοῦ τῆς Ἰονίας.

For ‘unwalled’ Ionian cities in Thucydides: Clazomenae (8.31.3), Cnidus (8.35.3), Lampascus (8.62.2), Cyzicus (8.107.1).

Wade-Gery 1958, 219–20 with n. 2 for previous scholarship; Cawkwell 1973, 54 n. 3; Lewis 1977, 153 n. 118; Amit 1975, 39–40; Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1981, 36; Hornblower 1991, 180–81; Badian 1993, 53; Hornblower 1996, 414–15; Lee 2016, 263. In contrast, several scholars (e.g. Brunt 1966, 84, 92 n. 54; Meiggs 1972, 149–50; Raafflaub 2009b, 110) have argued that the Ionian city-states were deprived of their walls due to an Athenian decision, since a similar policy was implemented in the Aegean islands, for instance.
What about the tribute?

The issue of tribute must have posed a serious difficulty. On the one hand, the Athenian tribute lists demonstrate that the Athenians exacted tribute from numerous Greek cities of Asia, some of which irregularly. On the other hand, the Great King never relinquished his demand for tribute from Ionia even after the conclusion of the truce in 449 BC. Accordingly, when Isocrates celebrates Athens’ achievements in the war against Persia, he notes that the Athenians successfully set limits to the Great King’s domain and imposed tribute on some of his subjects. From the viewpoint of Isocrates, the struggle between Athens and Persia in Asia Minor was a zero sum game. If Athens captured a city, its denizens were to pay tribute to Athens instead of Persia and vice versa. Yet, the earliest dispute regarding the tribute occurred, to our best knowledge, in 413/12 BC when Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus II were called upon by the King for the tribute from their provinces, for which they were in arrears since the Athenians prevented the satraps from collecting tribute from the Greek cities. One can infer that (1) the conclusion of an unofficial peace in 449 BC must have entailed some sort of arrangement concerning the division of the tribute generated by the Greek city-states of Asia, and (2) that whatever the precepts of the agreement between the King and the Athenians were, it was up to the

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in Cos (Thuc. 8.41.2), Cameiros (Thuc. 8.44.2), Samos (Thuc. 8.50.5), and Thasos (Thuc. 8.64). Yet, the fact that the Athenians applied a similar measure in the Aegean does not exclude the possibility that this policy constituted an Athenian concession to Persian demand.

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898 Thuc. 8.5.5, 6.1, 18, 36, 43.2-3, 58; Xen. Hell. 5.1.31. In addition, according to Herodotus (6.42), after the suppression of the Ionian Revolt the satrap of Lydia Artaphernes measured the land of Ionia to determine the tribute which was to be exacted from each city. Herodotus adds that Artaphernes’ assessment remained fixed until his own days (ἐκ τούτου τοῦ χρόνου αἰτί ἐπὶ καὶ ἐξ ἐμὲ ὡς ἐπάρθησαν ἐξ Ἀρταφρένως). Several scholars have taken this statement as another indication for the enduring Persian claim to Ionia. See: Wade-Gery 1958, 212; Cook 1961; Murray 1966, 142, 146; Meiggs 1972, 61–62; de Ste Croix 1972, 313; Lewis 1977, 87; Hornblower 1982, 22 with n. 126. Scott (2005, 193) adds that Herodotus may have sought to remind his audience that “the Athenians, whose efforts rendered the Great King incapable of imposing tribute on the Ionians, deserved their hegemonic position in the Aegean.” A slightly different interpretation is offered by Cary (1945, 90) who argues that Herodotus was referring to the few Greek cities that were still under Persian control.

899 Isoc. 4.120. The authors of the ATL (1950, 275) argue that in 450 BC Athens “was able through her power and influence to interfere in the affairs of the King sufficiently to restrict his powers of taxation over Greeks within his own realm,” that is “to dictate some of the tributes which the king should receive” from cities that were will within Persian domain such as Magnesia on the Maeander and the Cypriot Greek cities. While I am inclined to accept the notion that Athens was in a position to negotiate the status of the Ionian city-states, I find it hard to believe that the Persians would have allowed the Athenians to interfere in regions that were well beyond Athens’ reach. We should not forget that Athens’ influence was limited to coastal cities of Anatolia while its achievements beyond the Aegean were ephemeral. Therefore, an attempt to force a taxation policy on all of the Great King’s Greek subjects would have only antagonized the Persians, and as such is unlikely to have been made.

900 Thuc. 8.5.5, 6.1.

901 I agree with Hornblower (2008, 771), who maintains that this passage suggests that the Greek cities of Asia Minor paid tribute to both the Persians and the Athenians. Moreover, Meiggs (1972, 148) argues that the territorial dispute over Ionia could have been easily resolved by a Persian acknowledgement of the Greek cities in Asia as autonomous and tributary. In other words, each city would be allowed to regulate its own affairs without external intervention in exchange for tribute. According to Xenophon (Hell. 3.4.25), The Persians offered a similar arrangement to Agesilaus in 396 B5 in exchange for the evacuation of the Peloponnesian forces from Asia Minor.
Athenians and the satraps of western Anatolia to enforce them, especially in regard to the issue of tribute.

It should be emphasized that the satraps of western Anatolia were probably in favor of a truce with Athens. As we have seen in chapter three, peace and security were a prerequisite for a prosperous satrapy, which had a direct impact on the satrap’s ability to collect tribute and send the expected portion to the King. Since a timely collection of tribute was the first and foremost satrapal duty, the satraps of western Anatolia were likely ready to establish a workable arrangement with the Athenians in respect to the division of the revenue. But what would have been the nature and character of this hypothetical arrangement?

Several hypotheses have been offered regarding the manner in which the satraps and Athenians divided the tribute that was generated by the Asiatic Greeks. Cook points out that while the coastal cities of Ionia were allies and subjects of Athens, they also possessed substantial tracts of land which stretched deep into the Asiatic hinterland. Accordingly, Cook posits that each city paid tribute to Athens as a corporate body, but individual landowners paid a tithe or rent to the Persian authorities. While this model seems attractive, the impracticality of a mechanism designed for individual tribute assessment renders it highly unlikely. An alternative model has been offered by Murray, who suggests that several Greek cities preferred to send tribute to Athens and Persia in order to maintain amicable relations with the regional imperial powers. Murray adds an alternative scenario in which prominent Ionian oligarchs wanted to garner Persian support in their struggle against pro-Athenian democratic factions. Accordingly, when the oligarchs were in power, they may have thought that it would be politically prudent to demonstrate their allegiance to Persian rule by sending tribute.

Murray’s suggestion has been further developed by Balcer, who places an emphasis on the impact of local political strife on the issue of tribute. In cases of stasis, Balcer argues, one of the factions, whether oligarchic or democratic, was in control of the urban center (ἀστυ) while the rival faction established a power base in the rural districts (χώρα). Each faction could organize politically, militarily, and economically in these opposing nodes. The outcome was a political bipolarity, in which the urban and rural centers functioned as two distinct political units, each paying tribute to its political allies, either Athens or Persia. This seems to be the case in Miletus in the late-450s BC, when the pro-Athenian democrats, who established themselves in Leos and Teichioussa, continued to send tribute to Athens, while the city of Miletus was most likely controlled by oligarchic factions which may have been supported by the Persians. It seems rather likely that while in power the Milesian oligarchs sent tribute to the Sardis in order to gain Persian support. If that was the case, both Athens and Persia received a share of the Milesian tribute.

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903 Cook 1961.
904 Murray 1966, 143.
906 Balcer 1985. Hornblower (1994, 213) notes that “many of those cities also suffered in the fifth century from being squeezed between two tribute-levying empires, Athens as well as Persia; it seems likely that they were assessed for tribute simultaneously by both, and perhaps they actually paid twice over”.
907 See n. 885 above.
A reversed scenario is equally plausible. In the aforementioned Erythrae decree, dated to 453/2 BC, we are informed that there was a group of citizens who fled to the Mede, i.e. the Persians.\(^908\) It is almost certain that those who fled to the Mede were pro-Persian oligarchs who lost their power once Athens intervened and established a democracy. In a similar fashion to the pro-Athenian democrats from Miletus, the exiled oligarchs of Erythrae may have established themselves in the periphery and continued to send tribute to the Persians in hope of obtaining their support in a future attempt to retake Erythrae.\(^909\) Although the factional disputes in Miletus and Erythrae occurred before 449 CB, they set a plausible framework for Balcer’s political bipolarity model.

One must admit, as noted by Thomas, that the evidence for the double tax hypothesis remain circumstantial.\(^910\) Nevertheless, the feasibility of the aforementioned models for the division of tribute and the apparent peaceful resolution of the issue of tribute suggest that the Athenians and the satraps found a way to divide the revenue of the Greek-city states of Asia in a manner which satisfied both parties.

### 5.3 Satrapal Initiative and Royal Indisposition

Despite the above mentioned détente between Artaxerxes and Athens, the satraps of western Anatolia and the Athenians continued to play a central role in backing rival factions in several Ionian cities. Accordingly, several scholars have argued that the conclusion of the truce in 449 BC did not result in an equilibrium but in a cold war and that “the Persians hovered on the fringes, anxious to injure Athens, giving indirect assistance and support, acting just as those who break treaties by subterfuge should.”\(^911\) It has also been asserted that this policy originated from Artaxerxes himself, who instructed his satraps in the west to profit as much as possible from Athenian setbacks.\(^912\) Such interpretation, however, not only overstates the Great King’s involvement in the affairs of western Anatolia but also fails to recognize that Artaxerxes and his satraps had little to gain and much to lose from renewing the war against Athens. Therefore, in what follows I demonstrate that the series of clashes which occurred in western Anatolia after 449 BC were local and sporadic in nature, and that they were manifestations of satrapal opportunism rather than a cold war between the Great King and the Athenians. Such interpretation, I argue, can be explained by the unofficial nature of the peace, which created a grey area in which Persian and Athenian spheres of influence overlapped. The ambiguous distinction between Athenian and Persian domain in western Anatolia resulted in a limited struggle between the satraps and the Athenians, a struggle which was incited and fueled by the desire of ambitious Ionian individuals to assert their political dominance in their respective cities. In contrast to the Persian central authorities, which were interested in keeping the peace and in an uninterrupted collection of tribute, the satraps were willing to exploit the rise of anti-Athenian sentiment in Ionia to increase their power and influence.

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908 See n. 884 above.

909 Such a scenario is implied in the above mention Sigeum Decree (see n. 886 above), in which the Athenians promised to assist the people of Sigeum against enemies hailing from the hinterland, which could be the Persians or perhaps Persian-backed oligarchs.

910 Thomas 2000, 14.

911 Eddy 1973, 245. See also: Thonemann 2009, 173.

Pissuthnes and the Samian War (440/39 BC)

The earliest known instance in which a satrap sought to increase his power at Athens’ expense occurred in the context of the Samian revolt. In 441/0 BC Samos and Miletus, both members of the Delian League, vied for control over Priene. After the Samians defeated the Milesians, the latter appealed Athens for help, and the Athenians responded by sending Pericles with forty ships to Samos. The Athenians imposed a democratic constitution on the Samians, installed a garrison, and transported Samian hostages to Lemnos to ensure future obedience. But in spite of these measures, a group of Samian oligarchs fled to the Asiatic continent and forged an alliance (συμμαχία) with Pissuthnes son of Hystaspes, the satrap of Lydia. The oligarchs soon returned to Samos accompanied by 700 mercenaries supplied by Pissuthnes, rescued the hostages from Lemnos, recaptured the city and declared war on Athens. In response, the Athenians sent Pericles and nine of his colleagues with sixty ships, of which sixteen were dispatched to Chios and Lesbos to muster reinforcements and from there to sail to Caria to look out for a possible intervention of the Phoenician fleet. The Athenians defeated a Samian fleet off the island of Tragia and then laid siege to Samos itself. During the siege Pericles departed with sixty ships to Caria due to news about an incoming Phoenician fleet, but these rumors turned out to be false. While Pericles was away, the Samians launched a successful counterattack, but once he returned, the siege was reinstated, and after nine months the Samians capitulated.

The Athenian response to the clash between Samos and Miletus is not surprising. An armed conflict between two members of the Delian League posed a threat to the stability of the Athenian-led confederacy. Moreover, allowing Samos, a capable ship-providing ally, to grow stronger jeopardized Athenian superiority in the Aegean. Therefore, the Athenians had no choice but to force the Samians into submission. But what motivated Pissuthnes to side with the Samian oligarchs? According to one interpretation, by assisting the Samian oligarchs Pissuthnes was following a royal directive.

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913 On the Samian revolt, see: Thuc. 1.115.2-117.3; Diod. 12.27-8; Plut. Per. 25-8. Compare: Ar. Wasps 281-284; Duris of Samos FGrH 76 F66. For the chronological sequence of the war between Samos and Athens, see: Fornara and Lewis 1979; Meritt 1984.

914 It has been suggested that the rivalry between Samos and Miletus was prompted by a Samian attempt to exploit the weakened state of Miletus in order to take over the Peraia (See: Meiggs 1972, 188; Stadter 1989, 242-3). In addition, the ongoing dispute over the Aegean trade routes probably contributed to the animosity between the two cities (Cf. Waters 2010, 822 n. 22).

915 Quinn 1981, 12. Legon (1972, 148) suggests that the Athenians felt obligated to protect Miletus since they had confiscated the Milesian navy a few years earlier and because Miletus was democracy. He also posits that the Athenians anticipated that the conflict between Miletus and Samos might induce a Persian intervention.

916 Kagan 1969, 171; Balcer 1984, 344; Stadter 1989, 243; Green 2006, 206 n. 122. Thucydides (8.76.4) notes that Samos came close to depriving the Athenians of the command of the sea, while Plutarch (Per. 25.3) claims that the Samians were determined to contest Athens’ supremacy of the sea.

917 The ancient sources (Plut. Per. 24.1, 25.1; Athen. 13.589d; Duris of Samos FGrH 76 F65) record a tradition in which Pericles was accused by his political rivals for favoring Miletus over Samos due to the influence of his Milesian mistress Aspasia. Even if this tradition contains a kernel of truth, I agree with Green (2006, 206 n. 122) who concludes that “the relationship can only have encouraged the decision he took on other grounds.” For further discussion: Stadter 1989, 233–34; Martin 2016, 183–85.
which instructed the satraps to seek opportunities to weaken Athenian supremacy in the Aegean.\(^{918}\)

Yet, a close examination of the actions of Pissuthnes highlights the flaws of such interpretation. The ancient sources ascribe two actions to Pissuthnes. The satrap’s first action, according to Plutarch, was attempting to persuade Pericles to prevent the introduction of a democratic constitution in Samos through bribery,\(^{919}\) an offer that was clearly aimed at allowing the oligarchs to stay in power. The second action of Pissuthnes was making a pact with the disenfranchised Samian oligarchs and supplying them with 700 mercenaries.\(^{920}\) The direct involvement of Pissuthnes comes to an end at this point.\(^{921}\)

There is, of course, the issue of the Phoenician fleet. The deployment of the Persian navy on behalf of the Samian oligarchs would have been an unequivocal proof for that the Great King was behind Pissuthnes’ intervention.\(^{922}\) But there is no substantive evidence for the presence of a Phoenician fleet in the region. The sources merely tell us that the Athenians sent a small squadron to Caria to look out for the possibility of Persian interference and that ultimately the Phoenician fleet was nowhere to be found. But why did the Athenians dread such a scenario? It has suggested that there was a Phoenician fleet mooring near Phaselis as a ploy which meant to distract the Athenians prior to the Samian counterattack.\(^{923}\) In light of the available evidence, however, such a suggestion is mere speculation. Moreover, it is unlikely that the Persians were able to deploy their fleet so quickly,\(^{924}\) and that Artaxerxes would have embarked on such a costly venture in order to allow the Samian oligarchs to remain in power. And even if we accept the possibility that Artaxerxes wanted to detach Samos from the Delian League, how can we explain the inactivity of the Phoenician fleet?

The most cogent answer to this conundrum is that there was no Phoenician fleet. It is possible that the Samians expected that Pissuthnes’ support would constitute more than

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\(^{918}\) Stadter 1989, 245, 247; Briant 2002, 581; Klinkott 2005, 337 n. 131; Waters 2010, 824. Several scholars (e.g. Eddy 1973, 250 with n. 51; Rhodes 2006, 68; Rhodes 2014, 261) assert that the involvement of Pissuthnes in the Samian revolt constituted a breach of the peace between Athens and Persia.

\(^{919}\) Plutarch (Per. 25.2) notes that Pissuthnes added 10,000 staters to the bribe the anti-democratic Samian party had offered Pericles to hinder Athenian intervention in Samian politics.

\(^{920}\) Thucydides (1.115.4) employs the term ἑπίκουροι when referring to the soldiers furnished by Pissuthnes, while Diodorus (12.27.3) identifies them as στρατιῶται. On the nature of term ἑπίκουροι in Thucydides, see: Lavelle 1989.

\(^{921}\) Plutarch (Per. 25.3) says that Pissuthnes was directly involved in the liberation of the hostages from Lemnos, but Thucydides (1.115.5) and Diodorus (12.27.3) report that the Samian oligarchs retrieved the hostages from Lemnos themselves. Perhaps the hostages were rescued by the mercenary force supplied by Pissuthnes, which explains why Plutarch reports that the satrap was responsible for the successful rescue mission.

\(^{922}\) Meister 1982, 36 with n. 79 for references to earlier scholarship; Kagan 1987, 17.


\(^{924}\) The arrival of a Phoenician fleet would have to be preceded by back and forth exchange between Pissuthnes and Artaxerxes, perhaps only after Pissuthnes’ bribe attempt had failed, followed by deliberation at the royal court, the mustering of a fleet, and a westward voyage. Lewis (Lewis 1977, 59–60 with n. 60), who argues that there was no Phoenician fleet operating in the region, rightly notes that the arrival of the Phoenician at this point “would have been by far the fastest Phoenician naval mobilization on record.”
700 soldiers. It is equally plausible that either Pissuthnes or the Samians deliberately misinformed the Athenians about the whereabouts of the Phoenician fleet in order to weaken the Athenian siege prior to the Samian counteroffensive. Perhaps the reports concerned with the Phoenician fleet were the result of Athenian paranoia, since Pissuthnes’ attempt to bribe Pericles must have informed the Athenians about the collaboration between the Samian oligarchs and the satrap. Accordingly, the Athenians may have suspected that the Persians were planning to strike while they were preoccupied in Samos, and therefore chose to take the necessary precautions to prevent a Persian sneak attack. Be that as it may, the fact that no Persian fleet was deployed or even seen means that the Phoenician phantom fleet cannot be used to validate the notion that Persian central authorities were behind Pissuthnes’ intervention in the Samian revolt.

There is no other evidence, direct, indirect, or circumstantial, which suggests that the Great King instructed Pissuthnes to undermine the Athenians in the context of the Samian revolt. Furthermore, if the Great King was determined to reassert his authority in the Aegean, one wonders why he remained inactive for almost a decade since the conclusion of the truce and why such a feeble attempt was made while the Athenians were preoccupied in Samos. In fact, that the involvement of Pissuthnes did not end with an open war between Athens and Persia suggests that both sides were determined to maintain the peace. Accordingly, the Great King’s position regarding Athens seem to have remained the same, namely that Artaxerxes had no desire to see the renewal of Athenian operations in the eastern Mediterranean and was content with a pacified western frontier.

Therefore, it is far more likely, as Meiggs maintains, that Pissuthnes acted without the authority of Artaxerxes. Yet, the satrap must have known that his satrapy would probably be the first to suffer if the Athenians would renew their attacks against Persian domain and that he would have incurred the Great King’s resentment for destabilizing the peace in the west. Pissuthnes, I argue, acted independently in order to further his own interest, but he did so with caution and prudence which hindered the possibility of unwanted escalation. On the one hand, the objectives of the satrap were rather modest. The attempt to bribe Pericles reveals that the satrap’s primary objective was to hinder the downfall of the Samian oligarchy. Plutarch notes that Pissuthnes forged a relationship with the Samian oligarchs that was based on goodwill, which suggests that the satrap interacted

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925 This explains the actions of a Samian named Stesagoras who, according to Thucydides (1.116.3), evaded the Athenian blockade and went on to bring the Phoenician fleet. Furthermore, Thucydides (1.140.5) reports that the Samian oligarchs hoped that the Peloponnesians would join the fight against Athens, but such expectation, just like in the case of the Phoenician fleet, never materialized.
927 Gomme 1945, 352; Rhodes 2014, 261. Brock (2006, 88) maintains that the rumors and uncertainties regarding the possible involvement of the Phoenician fleet suggest a continuing fear of an outright attack from the east. Such a sentiment reflects, in my opinion, the mutual suspicion between Athens and Persia, especially if the peace was predicated on an unofficial agreement that lacked clear and concrete mechanisms of enforcement.
928 Rung (2008, 33) concludes that the absence of Persian naval forces is a clear sign for Artaxerxes’ reluctance to intervene in the Samian revolt.
with the Samian in the past.\footnote{Plut. Per. 25.2: ἔχων τινὰ πρὸς Σαμίους εὔνοιαν. Badian (1993, 33) argues that the agreement between the Samian oligarchs and Pissuthnes was not a formal treaty.} We have seen that cultivation of connections with men of note in the adjacent regions was the \textit{modus operandi} of Artabazus, the aforementioned satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia who collaborated with Pausanias. Any prudent satrap who ruled a frontier province must have sought to cultivate amicable relations with neighboring powers in order to better protect the borders of his domain. By forging a benign relationship with the oligarchic leadership of Samos, a capable maritime nation, Pissuthnes was probably seeking to achieve that very purpose.

On the other hand, Pissuthnes probably knew that siding with the Samian oligarchs would not be taken kindly by the Athenians. Pissuthnes’ caution is manifested in his initial attempt to resolve the conflict between Samos and Athens with money rather with troops.\footnote{Lewis 1977, 59 n. 65. Lewis adds that there is no tangible evidence that these mercenaries came from Pissuthnes’ territory.} When bribery failed, he tried to conceal his involvement in the restoration of the Samian oligarchy and to block potential escalation. The 700 mercenaries Pissuthnes provided were enough to enable the oligarchs to retake Samos, but this fighting force was far from sufficient to challenge Athens. Furthermore, it has been postulated that these mercenaries were of Greek origin,\footnote{Seibt 1977, 39–45; Miller 1997, 101.} a possibility which suggests that Pissuthnes employed Greek mercenaries in order to obscure his involvement and to allow himself to claim that he had neither knowledge nor responsibility for the actions of the Samians oligarchs.\footnote{Lewis 1977, 61. Moreover, several scholars (Roy 1967, 322 n. 141; Eddy 1973, 250 with n. 51; Badian 1993, 33) argue that Pissuthnes merely allowed the Samian oligarchs to hire mercenaries from his domain rather than mustering them himself. If that was true, it can be deemed as another way by which the satrap tried to distance himself from the Samian uprising against Athenian rule.}

The turning point, however, was the Samian decision to declare war on Athens. Pissuthnes must have failed to anticipate the determination of the Samian oligarchs to hold on to their position as well as the extent of Athens’ retaliation. From the moment matters escalated into open war, Pissuthnes backed down and the Samians oligarchs were left to fend for themselves. In addition, the fact that Pissuthnes’ early intervention did not merit an Athenian response indicates that the actions of the satrap were not perceived as a violation of the truce and that Pissuthnes was not regarded as an enemy of Athens.\footnote{Thucydides (1.115.5) reports that the Samians handed over the Athenian garrison to Pissuthnes. Badian (1993, 33–34) points out that, on the one hand, there is no reason to believe that they came to any harm, while on the other, there is no indication that this action led to any sort of Athenian retribution against Pissuthnes. Therefore, he posits that some sort of exchange occurred with Pissuthnes’ help, a possibility that is predicated on open communications between the satrap and the Athenian authorities. See also: Meritt, Wade-Gery, and McGregor 1950, 307–8.}

In sum, the cautious conduct of Pissuthnes, his calculated actions, his disappearance once open war was declared, and the absence of Athenian retaliation suggest that neither Pissuthnes nor the Athenians wished to violate the unofficial peace. If such analysis carries conviction, we can conclude that the Persian central authorities were not involved in this incident, and that Pissuthnes was neither following nor ignoring royal directives when he intervened on behalf of the Samian oligarchs. On the contrary, the actions of Pissuthnes were the outcome of his own initiative rather than a purported Persian policy of disruption.
Pissuthnes merely made a careful attempt to allow his allies in Samos to remain in power, but once his involvement became too dangerous, he preferred to cut his losses. In short, it would be better to envision the eruption of hostilities between Samos and Athens as a local power struggle between pro-Athenian democrats and pro-Persian oligarchs rather than an episode in the cold war between Athens and Persia.  

5.4 The Archidamian War

The durability of the peace between Athens and Persia was put to the test in the first phase of the Peloponnesian War, better known as the Archidamian War. From the moment it became clear that war between Athens and Sparta was imminent, both sides resolved to send embassies to the Great Persian King to ask for his support. But despite the fact that numerous Athenian and Peloponnesian delegations made the journey to the King’s court at Susa, the Persians remained neutral. But in contrast to the disinterest of Artaxerxes, Pissuthnes was willing to take advantage of the situation. Since the Athenians were preoccupied with the Spartan challenge in the Greek mainland, several Athenian subject states, discontent with Athens’ overbearing imperial conduct, were in a better position to regain their independence. Consequently, western Anatolia and the adjacent islands were in a constant state of flux, as anti-Athenian factions sought ways to cast away the yoke of Athenian rule. And just as in the case of the Samian revolt, the enemies of Athens appealed Pissuthnes, seeking his friendship and assistance in their struggle. The satrap of Lydia, once again, took calculated risks in order to strengthen his position vis-à-vis Athens.

The Reluctant Artaxerxes

The Abortive Peloponnesian Embassy (430 BC)

At the end of the summer of 430 BC a Peloponnesian embassy arrived at the court of the Thracian king Sitalces. The purpose of the embassy was to persuade Sitalces to abandon his alliance with Athens and to collaborate with the Peloponnesian League in relieving Potidæa, which was hard-pressed by an Athenian siege at the time. But the final destination of the delegation, was the Persian court. We are told that the Peloponnesian ambassadors hoped that Sitalces would supply them with means of transportation to cross the Hellespont, and that the arrangements for the remainder of the journey inland were made by Pharnabazus I, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia. The embassy, however, never made it to Asia. Athenian representatives who also happened to be present at Sitalces’ court convinced the king’s son Sadocus to hand the Peloponnesians over to Athenian custody. The envoys were promptly sent to Athens where they were executed without trial.

935 Holladay (1986, 505) defines the Samian revolt as “minor tensions that developed locally”.
936 Thuc. 2.7.1; Diod. 12.41.1. Moreover, According to Thucydidès (1.82.1-2), in the winter of 432 BC the Spartan king Archidamus encouraged the Peloponnesians to seek the alliances of both Greeks and Barbarians (βαρβάρων), an alliance which would allow Sparta and her allies to procure funds and ships. While the term βαρβάρων certainly includes the Persians (Brunt 1965, 262; Lewis 1977, 63), this designation probably encompasses all of the non-Greek nations that were involved in the conflict (Hornblower 1991, 127; Munson 2012, 256 n. 66).
937 Thuc. 2.67. Herodotus (7.137.2-3) mentions this incident as well. For an analysis of this episode in the context of Herodotus’ account, see: Munson 2001, 191–93.
The Intercepted Embassy of Artaphernes

But the Spartans were not discouraged. Several Peloponnesian embassies made it to the King’s court in the following years. The purpose of the Peloponnesian diplomatic effort becomes clear due to a diplomatic incident which occurred in 425 BC. According to Thucydides (4.50), the Athenians intercepted a Persian embassy in Eion while en route to Sparta. The embassy was redirected to Athens, where the Athenians got hold of a letter carried by the Persian ambassador Artaphernes, whose content revealed that many Peloponnesian embassies made it to the royal court, but because each told a different story Artaxerxes had no idea what the Spartans desired. If the Spartans wish to clarify their intentions, the Great King added, they should send ambassadors to accompany Artaphernes in his eastward journey.

The King’s confusion in regard to Spartan intentions demands clarification. It is generally agreed that Artaxerxes demanded the Spartans to relinquish any territorial claims in Asia Minor in exchange for money and ships and that the Great King’s confusion was caused by either deliberate Spartan ambiguity, or even self-contradiction, since the Spartans were uncomfortable with the price that Artaxerxes demanded for his support. It should be noted that collaborating with Persia, let alone abandoning the Asiatic Greeks, created a major difficulty for the Spartans. From the onset of the war, the Spartans appealed to the goodwill of their fellow countrymen by presenting themselves as the champions of Greek liberty who fought against the oppressive Athenian Empire. Consequently, collaboration with the Persian Great King would have rendered Sparta’s liberation propaganda as senseless and would have branded the Spartans as hypocrites who sold the Asiatic Greeks for Persian gold.

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938 For instance, in Aristophanes’ *Acharnians* (646-51), produced in 425 BC, a meeting between the Persian King and Spartan envoys is mentioned. Oddly enough, we are told that the Great King first asked the envoys whether Athens or Sparta were superior at sea and then demanded to know which of them was mocked by Aristophanes. Olsen (2002, 240) deems, rightly in my view, the claim that Artaxerxes was familiar with the work of a particular Attic playwright as “patent fantasy”, but it still reveals, as noted by Lewis (1977, 64), that the Athenians knew of at least one Spartan embassy which had got through before 425 BC.

939 Thucydides states that the script of the letter was in Assyrian characters. Conversely, Gomme (1956, 498) has suggested that the letter was actually written in Old Persian, but it generally agreed that the script was probably in Aramaic. See: Olmstead 1948, 354; J. A. O. Larsen 1958, 124; Nylander 1968, 112 n. 16; Momigliano 1975, 9; Lewis 1977, 2; Hornblower 1996, 207.

940 Thuc. 4.50.2: οὐ γιγνώσκειν ὅτι βούλονται: πολλῶν γάρ ἐλθόντων πρέσβεων οὐδένα ταύτα λέγειν.

941 de Ste Croix 1972, 154; Lewis 1992a, 390; Cawkwell 2005, 150; Munson 2012, 257.

942 Brunt 1965, 262.

943 Moxon 1978, 21.

944 For the Spartan liberation, see: Thuc. 1.122.3, 124.3, 139.3, 2.8.3-4, 3.13.7, 4.85, 87, 120-21, 8.46.3; Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.3-4. Hornblower (2011a, 159–60) adds that the Spartan claim to act as the guardians of Greek freedom related to the notion of Sparta program as the traditional opponent of tyranny. Further on Sparta’s liberation program see: Nichols 2015, 78–106.

945 For Athens as the oppressor of Greeks, see: Thuc. 1.124.3, 2.8, 2.63.2, 3.37.2, 5.85. Lewis (1992a, 383) notes that Thucydides uses “the language of subjugation” whenever he addresses Athens as an imperial power. Moreover, Tuplin (1985, 352–57) points out that in Archaic period tyranny was personified by individuals but the rise of Athens brought about the emerging concept of a tyrant city.

946 Hornblower 1991, 127; Hornblower 2011a, 102, 127; Munson 2012, 257. The problem of Spartan collaboration with Persia is addressed in the aforementioned speech of Archidamus. The potential alliance with the barbarians is described in the speech as ‘something that cannot be reproached’ (ἀνεπιφρόθων). Lewis
The complaint of Artaxerxes’ suggests the Spartans changed their mind that with each embassy. The Spartans’ frequent change of heart can be explained by the utter collapse of Archidamus’ war strategy, which consisted of period invasions to Attica. The Peloponnesians expected that these invasions would have provoked the Athenians to march out and meet their enemies in the field, a scenario in which the superior Peloponnesian land army would have surely won a decisive victory. Yet, in spite of the general expectation for a swift Peloponnesian victory, the Athenians demonstrated unprecedented determination to avoid a pitched battle, which rendered the Peloponnesian strategy as ineffective. The cumulative disappointments the Peloponnesians endured during the first years of the war made them realize that Athens could not be defeated as long as its maritime empire remained secure. Consequently, a change in policy took place as the Spartans were more inclined to make the necessary concessions in order to obtain sufficient funds to muster a sizable fleet. Nevertheless, it seems plausible that in 425 BC the Spartans were still hesitant to abandon the Asiatic Greeks.

But the fact that Artaxerxes encouraged the Spartans to make up their mind implies that he was interested in collaboration with Sparta against Athens. But what drove Artaxerxes to assume a more active stance in regard to Greek affairs? It has been argued that Artaxerxes took the initiative because he was alarmed by the Athenians’ success at Pylos and feared lest Sparta’s defeat would allow the Athenians to apply their expansionist aspirations in the east. This seems highly unlikely, since this suggestion is predicated on the belief that the Great King was well informed about each and every development in a war that took place well beyond the borders of his realm, and that he was unnerved by an Athenian victory on a relatively insignificant island off Pylos that was more coincidental than premeditated by any of the warring parties. Moreover, for two decades the Athenians refrained from operating in the eastern Mediterranean in spite of the fact that they were not embroiled in a total war against Sparta. Why, then, would the Great King be alarmed at the prospect of Athenian aggression? Therefore, it seems likelier that Artaxerxes was intrigued by the prospect of using the Spartans to push the Athenians out of Asia Minor rather than

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(1977, 63) suggests that such articulation makes it clear that collaboration with barbarians was far from a popular course of action. It is also possible, as argued by Gomme (1945, 248), that despite removing themselves from the war against Persia after the recall of Pausanias, the Spartans and their Peloponnesian allies were still reluctant to partner up with an old enemy. Yet, the diplomatic exchange between Sparta and Persia reveals that the Spartan authorities were ready to put past grievances aside due to the necessity to curtail Athenian ambition.

947 For the precepts of Archidamus’ war strategy, see: Thuc. 1.81.1, 82.4-5, 2.11.6-8. According to Thucydides (5.14.3, 7.28.3) Archidamus’ strategy was popular not only among the Spartans but also among the Peloponnesians allies.
948 Thuc. 4.85.2, 5.14.3, 6.11.5, 16.2.
949 de Ste Croix (1972, 207) points out that the Athenians “devised an entirely new strategy, which no Greek state that was not an island or situated right on the sea-coast had ever tried to employ before.”
950 For a detailed study of the failure of Archidamus’ strategy, see: Brunt 1965; Moxon 1978.
951 de Ste Croix 1972, 154; Lewis 1977, 63 with n. 86. In addition, the unexpected Athenian victory at Pylos and Sphacteria in the summer of 425 (Thuc. 4.3-23, 26-41) unnerved the Spartans, who sued for peace but were rebuffed by the Athenians (Thuc. 4.19.1, 21, 41). Since the Athenians had the advantage, the Spartans must have been even more eager to conclude an alliance with the Great King.
dreading an incoming Athenian assault. Furthermore, the fact that Artaxerxes made no effort to see that an alliance with Sparta came into existence suggests that his proposal was nothing more than “a diplomatic way of saying that if the Spartans wanted financial help, which was surely the object of the various embassies, they must make clear that they had no territorial claims in Asia Minor.”

The Athenian Diplomatic Effort

The Athenians, on their part, were not idle. In the decades following the conclusion of the truce in 449 BC, Athens kept an open channel of communication with Artaxerxes, and when war seemed certain they too approached the Persian King, as well as other barbarian nations, in their search for allies in the war to come. The frequent exchange of embassies strengthens the notion that the Athenians were on friendly terms with Persia throughout the reign of Artaxerxes, and it is more than reasonable to assume that the Athenians were utterly surprised when they learned that the Spartans were trying to negotiate an alliance with Persia, a sentiment which is confirmed by Athens’ decision to send their own embassy to Susa, probably with the purpose of expressing their disapproval. But the Athenian diplomatic delegation never reached its destination. Having arrived at Ephesus, the Athenian ambassadors received news that King Artaxerxes had died. So, they decided to return home.

The King’s Interest

Artaxerxes’ reply to the Spartan appeal and the fact that the Persians remained neutral until the winter of 413/2 BC makes it evident that the Persian central authorities were reluctant to intervene in the conflict between Sparta and Athens. From the Great King’s viewpoint, nothing had changed on the western frontier, and as long of the war in mainland Greece had no impact on Persian affairs, royal intervention was unnecessary. Moreover, as long as the Spartans refused to acknowledge Persian authority over the Greeks of Asia Artaxerxes had nothing to gain from siding with the Peloponnesians besides alienating the Athenians, who demonstrated time and again their capacity to threaten Persian possessions in the

953 Hornblower 2011b, 102.
954 In Aristophanes’ *Acharnians* (61-127), a play which was produced in 425 BC, an Athenian diplomat, who has just returned home after serving as an ambassador at the Great King’s court, accompanied by a Persian dignitary named Pseudartabas who is denoted as the King’s Eye. It has been argued (Raubitschek 1964, 155; Raaflaub 2009b, 90) that this passage reveals that regular diplomatic exchange with Persia was far from unusual. In addition, Strabo (1.3.1) recounts an Athenian embassy to Susa, led by a certain Diotimus, who participated in the expedition against the Corinthians in 433 BC (Thuc. 1.45.2), while Plato (Charm. 158a) mentions Pyrilampes, a friend of Pericles according to Plutarch (Per. 13.10), who frequently journeyed to the Persian royal court as a representative of Athens. For a possible connection between the Samian revolt and the embassy of Diotimus, see: Miller 1997, 23–24.
955 Thuc. 2.7.1. Munson (2012, 257) suggests that the Athenians sought to obtain financial support from the King. In contrast, Cawkwell (2005, 142–43, 145 n. 45) argues that “at the start of the War Athens needed neither Persian gold nor Persian naval power”, and that their diplomatic effort was aimed at persuading the King to remain neutral. See also: Kagan 1987, 19; Rung 2008, 34.
956 Hornblower 1996, 209.
957 Raubitschek 1964, 156.
958 For the problems regarding the date of Artaxerxes’ death, see: Lewis 1977, 69–76; Stolper 1983; Hornblower 1996, 207–8.
The Great King’s motive to stay out of Greek affair is logical, and the same can be said in regard to Pissuthnes’ opposite decision, namely to exploit the conflict in the Greek mainland for his own benefit.

The Brazen Pissuthnes
While Athenian and Spartan embassies made their way to and from the royal court at Susa, minor skirmishes took place in western Anatolia. These conflicts took the form of factional strife in Ionian city-states and clashes between Athenian contingents and unspecified local forces. But since Pissuthnes’ interventions in Ionian politics seem to have posed no threat to the status quo between Athens and Persia, Pissuthnes’ actions and motivation merit a reappraisal.

In 430 BC stasis broke in the city of Colophon. One of the warring factions took control over the city with the assistance of a Persian named Itamenes, while their political rivals fled to Notium. It has been suggested, correctly in my view, that Itamenes was a subordinate of Pissuthnes and that he was following the satrap’s orders. Soon after, Thucydides continues, at the beginning of winter 430/29, six Athenian triremes under the command of Melesander were sent to Caria and Lycia to collect tribute and to protect Athenian merchantmen from Peloponnesian privateers, who operated in these regions. At some point Melesander decided to march up into the Lycian hinterland. But the Athenian force was attacked and suffered heavy casualties, among them was Melesander.

In the aforementioned passage from Aristophanes’ *Acharnians* (646-51) the Persian King is depicted as utterly ignorant of Greek affairs since he did not know whether Sparta or Athens were stronger on the sea. It has been argued by Olsen (2002, 240) that such a question “leaves little doubt that the advantage in the war lies entirely with Athens and explains why he grants the Spartans nothing.” While Olsen’s emphasis on naval power is correct, I argue that Artaxerxes’ reply reveals that the Persian King could not care less about the conflict between Athens and Sparta but was aware of the challenge of Greek naval power. The deficiencies of the Spartan diplomatic effort are summarized by Munson (2012, 258).

While some scholars accept Thucydides’ identification of the privateers who terrorized Athenian merchant ships as Peloponnesians (e.g. Buschmann 1988, 6; Pritchett 1991, 328-29), others (Ormerod 1924, 111; Keen 1993a, 153) have argued that these privateers were in fact local pirates who were mistaken as Peloponnesians simply because their actions happened to be beneficial to the Peloponnesian war effort. An alternative explanation has been offered by Hornblower (1991, 355), who suggests that the attacks against the Athenian trade ships constituted “a Peloponnesian-sponsored piratical activity.”

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960 Thuc. 3.34.1. For the Mytilenian revolt, see: Thuc. 3.2-6, 18-19, 25-33.

961 Wade-Gery 1958, 219; Eddy 1973, 254; Lewis 1977, 61; Kagan 1987, 18; Chaumont 1990, 591; Badian 1993, 34. Hallock (1969, 391 n. 1389) has suggested that the Iddamana, which is attested in the Persepolis Fortification Tablets (PF 1389), might refer to the Itamenes mentioned by Thucydides, while Lewis (Lewis 1977, 61 n. 76) points out that a Persian man of the same name appears in Xenophon’s account (*An*. 7.8.15).

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963 Thuc. 2.69.1-2. This passage suggests an ongoing and free trade between Athens and the Levant. Despite the high probability that the Phoenike (Φοινίκης) mentioned by Thucydides was not Phoenicia but a Lycian port (Dickinson 1979; Buschmann 1988; Hornblower 1991, 355–56), the existence of trade relations between Athens and the eastern Mediterranean basin is confirmed by the Athenian playwright Hermippus (Athen. 27d-e), who mentions that in 425 BC one could find in Athens dates and semidalis from Phoenicia, hanging gear, sails, and papyrus cables from Egypt and frankincense from Syria. Accordingly, it has been argued (Miller 1997, 25; Briant 2002, 583) that in spite of the above mentioned skirmishes commerce between Athens and the eastern Mediterranean continued. Thus, one can infer that the Persian central authorities did not consider the limited clashes in western Anatolia to be significant.
The information from the Xanthus Pillar reveals the Melesander was attacked at Kyaneai by a Lycian dynast by the name of Trbbênimi of Lymeria.  

The next clash occurred in 428/7 BC when the Athenians who were sent to suppress the Mytilenian revolt on Lesbos dispatched a squadron of twelve ships under the command of Lysicles and four other commanders to collect money from their allies. After exacting tribute from several unspecified settlements, Lysicles marched up the country from Myus, across the plain of the Meander as far as the hill of Sandius, where he was attacked by certain Carians and the men of Anaia. Lysicles was slain along with many of his soldiers. 

It has been argued that the forays of Melesander and Lysicles into Caria and Lycia constituted an Athenian retaliation for the rise of the medizers in Colophon, and that Athens’ aim was to reassert its authority in the region and to deter the locals from siding with Persia through a demonstration of force. Yet, one wonders why the Athenians waited for three years to dispatch a relatively small fleet that could hardly exhibit Athenian military might. The notion that the Athenians wanted to retaliate for the events in Colophon is pure speculation, especially since Thucydides explicitly states that the primary objective of both expeditions was to collect tribute. Therefore, it seems likelier that Melesander and Lysicles, determined to collect sufficient funds for the war effort, made the ill-advised decision to march inland on their own accord. But what was the role of the Persians in these incidents? In contrast to the incidents in Samos and Colophon,

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964 TAM I 44a, lines 44-45. Cf. Thonemann 2009, 175–76.
965 Thuc. 3.19.1-2.
966 Robert (1959, 19–22) suggests that the hill of Sandius is probably the hill of Yürükli, north-east of the modern town of Söke.
967 Anaia was a coastal city south to Ephesus, and it has been argued (Shipley 1987, 35; Hornblower 1991, 405; Miller 1997, 25–26), that it was inhabited by Samian exiles who fled Samos after the Athenian victory in 440/39 BC, which explain their hostility toward the Athenians. Moreover, the participation of a Carian force suggests that they had some sort of Persian support. In addition, Thucydides (5.1.1) reports that sometime before the summer of 422 BC the Athenians expelled the Delians from Delos under religious pretext, while Diodorus (12.73.1) claims that the cause for the Delian expulsion was secret negotiations between the Delians and Spartans. In any case, some of the Delian exiles were settled by Pharmacæ, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, in Atramyttium, situated on the Asiatic continent opposite to Lesbos. It seems that the satraps of western Anatolia were happy to provide shelter to Greeks who had been wronged by Athens, and it is possible that the Samian exiles settled in Anaia after received permission and perhaps assistance from the Persians.
970 If the Athenians were trying to give a show of force, one would have expected the deployment of a fleet similar in size to the armada commanded by Cimon during the Eurymedon campaign. In addition, Kagan (1974, 97) points out that a squadron of six ships was unusually large for a tribute collection, and the same can be said regarding the fact that Lysicles commanded twelve ships. Yet, the size of these squadron can be easily explained by the presence of the above mentioned privateers that must have merited an augmented fleet.
971 According to Thucydides (3.19.1), shortly before these tribute collection expeditions took place the Athenians were desperate for money and consequently imposed a war tax (ἰσφορά) upon the citizens of Athens. This is the first instance in which Thucydides mentions a financial measure, which indicates that it was one of significance. Further on this tax, see: Thomsen 1964; J. G. Griffith 1977; Kallet-Marx 1993, 134–36. On the financial hardships the Athenians grappled with at this period, see: Kallet-Marx 1993, 137–38.
Thucydides does not mention Persian involvement, and in the case of Melesander, the involvement of the Lycian dynasts does not necessary mean that they were following Persian directives. Lysicles, however, probably encountered satrapal contingents. Thonemann convincingly argues that, according to information provided by the Xanthus Pillar (TAM 44a 54-55), Amorges, the illegitimate son of Pissuthnes (Thuc. 8.5.5), commanded the detachment which defeated Lysicles. But even if the satrapal authorities were directly involved in some way or the other, these incidents were not followed by further escalation. Hence, it seems reasonable to assume that while the King may have received reports regarding these events, he discounted them as a local problem that had been resolved by the satrapal authorities and required no further action on his part.

The last known clash between Athenians and Persians in the context of Archidamian War occurred in 427 BC. A pro-Persian faction tried to take over Notium, and this time the involvement of Pissuthnes is evident. According to the ancient sources, one faction took over the city with the assistance of the medizers who took over Colophon in 430 BC and a force of Arcadian and barbarian mercenaries supplied by Pissuthnes. But the rivals of the medizers appealed the Athenian general Paches for help. Paches captured the city through deception, ordered the execution of the mercenaries, and gave the city back to the pro-Athenian faction. In a similar fashion to the involvement of Pissuthnes in the Samian revolt, the satrap’s role in rise of the pro-Persian factions in Notium and Colophon has been considered to be another chapter in an alleged cold war between Athens and Persia. Such a conclusion, however, is not convincing. Again, the limited nature of Pissuthnes’ actions and the lack of escalation speak in favor of a local political struggle in which the satrap played a secondary role. As the opposing factions in Colophon and Notium were seeking to overpower their rivals, it was only natural that they sought to enlist the support of either Athens or Persia. Accordingly, it has been argued that all that Pissuthnes did was merely supporting one side in an internal strife. Moreover, that lack

972 Briant 2002, 583.
973 Thonemann 2009, 176–78.
974 Badian (1993, 34) states that the clash in Notium is “the clearest example of an incident of this kind which was not regarded as an act of war or a breach of any peace.”
975 It has been suggested (Meiggs 1972, 437; Keen 1993a, 155) that the failure of Melesander in Caria led to a revolt against Athenian rule Causus, an event which is reported by Ctesias (FGrH 688 F14 §45). Due to the role played by the Persian deserter Zopyrus in the suppression of the revolt, Hornblower (1982, 28 with n. 176) speculates that the Persians encouraged the people of Causus to rebel, while others (Eddy 1973, 255; Briant 2002, 975) assume that Pissuthnes was directly involved. Badian (1993, 36) notes that there is no evidence for the satrap’s involvement, and in any case the episode ended with minimal impact of the status quo between Athens and Persia. In a recent study Thonemann (2009, 176–82) employs information derived from the Xanthus Pillar (TAM 44a, lines 51-55) to argue that the Athenian attack on Causus occurred due to the use of the city as a Persian administrative center.
976 Thuc. 3.34.2-4; Polyae. Strat. 3.2.
977 Wade-Gery (1958, 219) speculates that the barbarians mentioned were definitely Persians, but it seems likelier that the barbarian element in this force consisted of soldiers of Anatolian stock that may have been under Persian service.
978 See n. 912 above.
of any evidence for Athenian retaliation against Pissuthnes indicates that Athens did not consider him to be an enemy in spite of the support he provided for the medizers in Colophon and Notium, and that Paches was content with regaining Notium and leaving Colophon to the medizers. Once again, matters seem to have cooled down rather quickly and the status quo endured.

In summary, the ongoing exchange of embassies between Athens and Susa indicates that the Persian central authorities ascribed little importance to the local skirmishes in western Anatolia. One must admit that Pissuthnes was actively involved in at least two power struggles in cities which were associated with the Delian League but the assertion that his actions were the outcome of grand Persian strategy to undermine Athenian supremacy in Ionia has little force. All in all, the clashes between Athens and Persia which were recorded after 449 BC are scarce, sporadic, limited, and local. There was no cold war, only an opportunistic satrap who could not pass on the opportunity of enhancing his position in the Ionians cities at Athens’ expense. Pissuthnes anticipated that his encroachments would not be taken kindly by the Athenians, and so he was cautious enough in his conduct, never fully committing himself or his armed forces. The Athenians, on their part, dreaded a scenario in which Persia joined the war on Sparta’s side and while they were not shy of reasserting their dominance in Ionia, they did not view the actions of Pissuthnes as violation of the truce, and therefore refrained from mounting a punitive attack against the satrap.

Conclusion

In spite of Athens’ role in the Egyptian uprising and Cimon’s Cypriot campaign, Artaxerxes showed little interest in reasserting Persian supremacy in the Aegean. The establishment of a détente in 449 BC, which suited the interest of the Great King as well as Athens, marked the beginning of a new era in Greco-Persian relations, one of peace and limited military friction. The peace in western Anatolia, however, was not absolute, as local clashes involving the Athenians and the satrapal authorities still occurred, but at no point was the modus vivendi between the two empires truly jeopardized. Despite the changing circumstances throughout the decades, the Athenians and Persians had little to gain and much to lose from renewing hostilities. In fact, the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War and the Peloponnesian attempt to conclude an alliance with Persia probably strengthened Athens’ desire to see that the peace with Persia continued. As for the Great Persian King, as long as the satraps of western Anatolia made sure that the tribute kept on flowing and

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981 Badian 1993, 34–35.
982 In addition, the reaffirmation of peaceful relations between Athens and Pissuthnes is corroborated by the arrival of the aforementioned Athenian embassy at Ephesus in 425 BC.
983 When assessing Eddy’s notion of a cold war between Athens and Persia, Cawkwell (2005, 142) points out the problematic reliance of this reconstruction of the Athenian tribute lists and rightly concludes that “if states did not pay, there is no reason to presume that Persia was egging them on or that every time an Athenian general is found seeking to collect tribute or in some other way enforcing imperial discipline, a technical breach of the Peace of Callias was being committed.” For similar assessment of Eddy’s hypothesis, see: Lewis 1977, 59–61; Badian 1993, 194–95 n. 45.
984 Cawkwell 2005, 142.
985 Badian 1993, 33.
that Persian authority remained unchallenged the Persian central authorities had no reason to intervene in local skirmishes that occurred in the far west.

The position of the satraps of western Anatolia, however, was different. The emergence of a détente which ended hostilities meant that the satraps could administer their domains in peace. But peace came with a price. As we have seen, the satraps and Athens presumably found a way to divide the revenue which was generated by the Greek city-states of Asia in a way that satisfied both parties. From the satraps’ viewpoint, a reduced income must have seemed as an acceptable alternative to a disastrous and expensive war against the Athenians. Still, the satraps probably had to meet the same tribute quotas even if their sources of revenue were cut short. Therefore, local disputes fueled by anti-Athenian sentiment brought about lucrative opportunities. Pissuthnes, who was a member of the Achaemenid royal household,\(^986\) demonstrated his inclination to act independently in an attempt to increase his influence and probably to create new sources of revenue. There was no overarching royal policy of disruption, only satrapal opportunism. Albeit these local clashes, the equilibrium in western Anatolia was able to last as long as the war in the Greek mainland had not spilled over the Aegean. In the following chapter we shall see that in spite of the fact that Darius II, the successor of Artaxerxes I, was willing to reaffirm the unofficial truce that was established in the reign of his predecessor, the equilibrium that held on for more than a quarter of a century came to an abrupt end. However, while the circumstances in western Anatolia changed dramatically, Darius II followed the footsteps of his predecessors and showed limited interest in the west. But the satraps could not remain idle. The causes for and the events of the outbreak of the Ionian War, the final phase of the Peloponnesian War, served as a backdrop for an unprecedented level of satrapal intervention in Greek affairs.

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\(^{986}\) According to Thucydides (1.115.4), Pissuthnes was the son of Hystaspes, and it is generally agreed that this Hystaspes was the son of Darius I and Atossa who commanded the Bactrians and Sacae in Xerxes’ Greek campaign (Hdt. 7.64). See: Lewis 1977, 55; Balcer 1984, 168, 176; Chaumont 1990, 591 with n. 82 for references to earlier literature. Dusinberre 2003, 39; Kuhrt 2007, 329 n. 3; Dusinberre 2013, 44.
6. THE SATRAPS AND THE IONIAN WAR

The accession of Darius II marked the beginning of a tumultuous period in western Anatolia. During his reign Pissuthnes, the satrap of Lydia, rose in rebellion, and even after the rogue satrap was dealt with, his bastard son Amorges continued to challenge Persian rule. At the same time, the war between Athens and Sparta had finally spilled over the Aegean. Ionia became the main theater of war in the last phase of the Peloponnesian War, better known as the Ionian War, which raged on from the winter of 413/12 BC until the annihilation of the Athenian fleet at the battle of Aigospotami in 405 BC.

While there is little doubt that Sparta’s victory in the war was facilitated by Persian financial support, it is less clear who was the guiding hand in respect to Persian policies in the west during this eventful period. At the present, it is widely held that it was Darius II who, in the wake of the Athenian disaster in Sicily, ordered his satraps to forge an alliance with Sparta with the intention of reasserting Persian authority over the Greek cities of Asia Minor.987 However, when taking into consideration how differently the conflict between Sparta and Athens was viewed from the Achaemenid royal court at Susa in comparison to the view from the satrapal capitals of Sardis and Dascylium, a different picture emerges. Accordingly, in the present chapter I argue that (1) the interest of Darius II in the western satrapies was similar to his predecessors, i.e. limited to the issues of peace and tribute, and (2) that the satraps of western Anatolia were the true driving force behind the decision to forge an alliance with the Spartans. I demonstrate that throughout this tumultuous period Tissaphernes, the satrap of Lydia, and Pharnabazus, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, were given considerable leeway to formulate and execute policies. The manner in which the war was to be pursued was to decided and altered by the satraps, while Darius remained largely in the background.

Two preliminary remarks should be made in regard to the role of the Great King and his satrap in the decision making process. First, satrapal actions, even those initiated by the aforementioned satraps, were well within the boundaries of royal policy and at no point went against the King’s wishes or interests. Second, the King was not ignorant of the state of affairs in the west. On the contrary, as we shall see, Darius was well informed of the developments in western Anatolia, probably due to regular reports sent by the satraps themselves. Even still, the actions of the Great King serve as a clear indication that he had full confidence that the satrapal authorities in the west were up to the task and that he expected his satraps to contain and resolve the problems in the western satrapies.

6.1 The Peace of Epilycus

The final diplomatic exchange between Athens and Persia in the context of the Archidamian War occurred early in the reign of Darius II. In a speech entitled ‘On the Peace’, which was delivered in 391 BC, the Attic orator Andocides recalls how Epilycus, his maternal uncle, brokered a treaty (σπονδαὶ) with Darius.988 Despite doubts regarding

988 Andoc. 3.29.
the reliability of Andocides, the authenticity of this speech, and the fact that no other source mentions such a treaty, the historicity of the so-called Peace of Epilycus is generally accepted, and it is widely held that it was ratified shortly after the coronation of Darius II, which occurred before February of 423 BC. But what were the terms of the treaty negotiated by Epilycus? Those who believe in the Peace of Callias argue that the embassy of Epilycus resulted in the ratification of the stipulations both sides agreed upon in 449 BC. Others have suggested that the Athenians sought to replace the Peace of Callias with a treaty that entailed a clause which prevented the Persians from aiding Sparta in the war. Both suggestions, it should be emphasized, correspond with the Athenian diplomatic effort to keep Persia out of the war. Accordingly, since the Peace of Callias probably constituted an unofficial agreement, it seems likely that the Athenians thought it was necessary to ensure that the new Great King intended to uphold the informal understandings concluded with his predecessor. Thus, just like in the case of the Peace of Callias, the informal nature of the agreement concluded with Darius II explains the silence of the sources and the absence of any public commemoration of the Peace of Epilycus in Athens.

6.2 Enter Tissaphernes

The Rebellion of Pissuthnes

After Thucydides mentions the abortive Athenian embassy to the Persian court in the winter of 425/24 BC, the Persians vanish almost entirely from the narrative until the winter of 413/12. Fortunately, Ctesias sheds some light on the dramatic developments in western Anatolia which were glossed over by Thucydides. The Cnidian physician reports

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989 Cf. de Ste Croix 1972, 245; Meister 1982, 76–94; Rutishauser 2012, 97 n. 98. In contrast, Steinbock (2013, 74–75) maintains that Andocides probably drew the information he used to compose his speech from his family memories, which led to the production of an account which was unsurprisingly different in comparison to the official Athenian version. Therefore, I agree with Meiggs (1972, 134), who argues that while it is clear that Andocides refashioned certain facts to suit his interests, it is difficult to believe that he would have fabricated an embassy to Persia.

990 Harris (2000) asserts that ‘On the Peace’ is a Hellenistic forgery.

991 The relevancy of Theopompus’ fragment (FGrH 115 F153) to the Peace of Epilycus has been generally denied, see: Krentz 2009. Moreover, Harris (1999) convincingly demonstrates that the treaty Athenians concluded with an unspecified king with the aid of Heracleides of Clazomenae, as recorded in IG I3 227 [=ML 70] and IG II2 65, not connected in any way to the embassy of Epilycus.


995 Holladay 1986, 506.

996 Thuc. 4.50.3.

997 The only exception occurs at the beginning of book 5 (Thuc. 5.1), where Thucydides notes that Pharnaces allowed the Delian exiles to settle in Atramyttium.
that Pissuthnes rose in rebellion sometime after the accession of Darius II, probably in the late 420s BC. Since the death of Artaxerxes I was followed by a violent dynastic struggle, it is quite possible that Pissuthnes, who was an Achaemenid by blood, may have thought that he could dethrone a bastard of Artaxerxes I who usurped the throne. Regardless of Pissuthnes’ motive, Darius II dispatched Tissaphernes, Spithrades, and Parmises with an army to suppress the rebellion. The Persian generals used bribes to persuade the Greek mercenaries who served under Pissuthnes to desert the rogue satrap. Shortly after, Pissuthnes was executed and his satrapy was given to Tissaphernes.

**The Embassy to Sparta**

Now let us return to Thucydides. When he begins recounting the events of the winter of 413/12 BC Thucydides reports the following:

[8.5.4] ὅ τε τοῖς Λεσβίοις ἔπρασσε, Χίοι δὲ καὶ ᾿Ερυθραῖοι ἀποστήνα καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐτοίμοι ὅντες πρὸς μὲν Ἀγίαν οὐκ εὕροντο, ἐς δὲ τὴν Λακεδαίμονα. καὶ παρὰ Τίσσαφρένον, ὃς βασίλευε Δαρείῳ τῶν Ἀρταξέρξεων στρατηγὸς ἦν τῶν κατὰ, πρεσβευτῆς ἤματε αὐτῶν παρῆν. [8.5.5] ἔπηγε τῷ γὰρ καὶ τῷ Τίσσαφρήνῃ τοῖς Πελοποννησίους καὶ ὑπισχνῄσκεστο τροφὴν παρέδωκεν. ὅπως βασιλέως γὰρ νεοστὶ ἐπήγαγεν παραγμένος τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ἐαυτοῦ ἀρχῆς φόρους, οὕς δὲ Ἀθηναίοις ἀπὸ τὸν Ῥωμαίον πόλεων οὐ δύναμεν προάσσεται ἐπομένως: τοὺς τε οὖν φόρους μᾶλλον ἐνόμισε κοιμηθῆναι κακόσως τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, καὶ ἀμφοῖν ἐξετάσας Λακεδαίμονις ποιήσας, καὶ Ἀμώργῳ τὸν Πισσοῦθνοῦ ὑὸν νόθον, ἀφεστώτα περὶ Καρίων, ὅπερ αὐτὸ προσέταξε βασιλεῖς, ἢ ξόντα ἄξεω ή ἀποκτενεῖν.

[8.6.1] οἱ μὲν οὖν Χίοι καὶ Τίσσαφρήν κοινὴν κατὰ τοῦ ἄντω ἐπράσσον ς, Καλλίγειτος δὲ ὁ Λαοφόντος Μεγαρεὺς καὶ Τιμαχαίος ὁ Ἀθηναγόρου Κυκληνός, φυγάδες τῆς ἐαυτῶν ἀμφότεροι παρὰ Φαρναμάζῳ τῷ Φαρνάκου κατοικοῦντες, ἀμφοῦ κατὰ τὸν Λακεδαίμονα πέμιαντος Φαρναβάζου, ἐπειδὴ ναὸς κοιμήθηκεν ὡς τὸν Ῥωμαίον, καὶ αὐτῶς, εἰ δύναται, ἀπερ οἱ Τίσσαφρῆνες προθυμεῖτο, τὰς τε ἐν τῇ ἐαυτοῦ ἀρχής πόλεις ἀποστήσας τῶν Ἀθηναίων διὰ τοῦ φόρους καὶ ἀρ’ ἐαυτοῦ βασιλεύειν τὴν βασιλείαν τῶν Λακεδαίμονις ποιήσειν.

While [Agis] was engaged with the Lesbians, the Chians and Erythrians, who were also ready to revolt, approached not Agis but the Spartan authorities. They were accompanied by an ambassador of Tissaphernes, the general of Darius son of Artaxerxes of the maritime

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999 For the turmoil which followed the death of Artaxerxes I, see: Ctes. *FGrH* 688 F15 §47–52; Diod. 12.64.1, 71.1; Paus. 6.5.7. For modern accounts, see: Lewis 1977, 70–79; Stolper 1985, 114–20; Kagan 1987, 20–23; Briant 2002, 588–91.


1001 The date in which Tissaphernes came to the west is unclear. It has been argued (e.g. Wade-Gery 1958, 222 n. 1; Andrews 1961, 5 with n. 2; Gomme, Andrews, and Dover 1981, 12) that Tissaphernes’ arrival occurred sometime before 421 BC. For a more cautious view, see: Lewis 1977, 80 n. 198; Hornblower 2008, 769.

1002 For the possibility that Tissaphernes was connected to the Achaemenid household, see: Lewis 1977, 83–84; Westlake 1985b, 43 n. 6; Jacobs 1994, 103 n. 61; Dusinberre 2003, 39 n. 45; Klinkott 2005, 56; Kuhrt 2007, 337 n. 3; Dusinberre 2013, 44.

1003 Thuc. 8.5.4–6.1.
districts, who invited the Peloponnesians [to Ionia] and promised to pay for their expenses. For just recently Tissaphernes happened to be called upon by the King for the tribute he owed, which he was unable to collect from the Greek cities within his domain because of the Athenians. He thought that after he would weaken the Athenians [by bringing the Spartans to Asia], he would be able to exact the tribute with ease; in addition, he would affect an alliance between the King and the Spartans and capture, dead or alive, Amorges the illegitimate son of Pissuthnes who was in rebellion in Caria, as he was instructed by the King.

[8.6] While the Chians and Tissaphernes acted jointly in regard to the same issue, Calligeitus son of Laophon of Megara and Timagoras son of Athenagoras of Cyzicus, both exiles who resided at the court of Pharnabazus son of Pharnaces, came at about the same time to Sparta having been sent by Pharnabazus in order to procure ships for the Hellespont. [Pharnabazus] was eager to achieve, if it was in his power, the very same objectives as Tissaphernes’, namely to induce the cities within his domain to revolt from the Athenians in order to receive tribute from them and to conclude an alliance between the King and the Spartans.

Persia, Athens, and Amorges
Amorges, so it seems, continued his father’s rebellion. But while there is no evidence that the Athenians assisted Pissuthnes, it is certain that by the summer of 412 BC they collaborated with Amorges. Still, it is unclear when exactly the Athenians entered into an alliance with Amorges. Due to Thucydides’ silence on the matter, two particular scraps of evidence have received ample attention. The first is a list of payments made from Athena’s treasury for public purposes, according to which a payment of unknown amount was made to a general stationed in Ephesus in the spring of 414 BC. Several scholars have suggested that the Athenian general was dispatched to Ephesus in order to assist Amorges. Conversely, it has been argued that the wavering loyalty of the Ephesians caused the Athenians to install a garrison in the city, or that the general arrived at Ephesus on a tribute collection mission. The other piece of evidence is a passage from Aristophanes’ Birds, in which an Athenian inspector (ἐπίσκοπος) hurries to the assembly in order to report on some interaction he had with Pharnaces, the satrap of Hellespontine

1004 While this title suggests that Tissaphernes was the highest ranking official in the western satrapies, his interaction with Pharnabazus shows that it was not the case. For further discussion on this matter, see: Lewis 1977, 86 with n. 21 for previous scholarship; Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1981, 13–16; Hornblower 2008, 776–768.

1005 Beloch 1914, 377; Wade-Gery 1958, 222. For a more cautious view, see: Lewis 1977, 86; Westlake 1977a, 321.

1006 The fact that Pissuthnes’ Greek mercenary contingent was led by an Athenian named Lycon led several scholars (e.g. Wade-Gery 1958, 222; Keen 1998b, 99; Wiesehöfer 2006, 660–61; Kuhrt 2007, 313; Hornblower 2011a, 168) to assume that Athens supported the rogue satrap. In contrast, Andrewes (1961, 4 n. 10) maintains, correctly in my view, that Lycon’s nationality cannot be taken as proof for Athenian policies. Cf. Westlake 1977a, 321; Cawkwell 2005, 145 n. 6.


1008 IG I² 320 = ML 77, line 79.


1010 Meritt 1936, 382; Westlake 1977a, 323.

Phrygia. Since the play was produced in the City Dionysia in early 414 BC, some commentators have argued that Athens’ dealing with a satrap who remained loyal to the King indicates that the relations between Athens and Persia at this point were still amicable and that the Athenians had yet to enter an alliance with Amorges. Others, however, have offered a different interpretation, namely that the Athenians were trying to persuade Pharnaces to join the rebellion. As it stands, we cannot conclude with certainty when the Athenians began collaborating with Amorges.

Despite the chronological ambiguity, one wonders what drove the Athenians to provoke Darius by joining forces with Amorges. Andocides blames the Athenians for making the disastrous decision to side with Amorges but he does not clarify why such a decision was made. Several scholars have hypothesized that Athens’ ill-fated decision was driven by anti-Persian sentiment, a false belief that the Persian Empire was weak, as well as Athenian arrogance and recklessness. Such explanations, however, strike me as unsatisfactory. Others have argued that Athens’ alliance with Amorges was a response to Persian aggression, manifested through the aforementioned proposition Tissaphernes made to the Spartans in the winter of 413/12. This interpretation is predicated on the assumption that Darius was emboldened after he learned about the Athenian disaster in Sicily and therefore instructed his satraps to recover the Greek cities of Asia Minor. Hence, once the Athenians learned about Tissaphernes’ proposition to the Spartans they had no choice but to ally themselves with Amorges.

Such a reconstruction suffers from two critical flaws. First, since we have no concrete information about the exact date in which Athens concluded an alliance with Amorges, the suggestion that the Athenians began collaborating with Amorges as a response to Tissaphernes’ proposition remains purely hypothetical. Second, the Athenians violated the truce well before the envoy of Tissaphernes arrived at Sparta. According to Thucydides, Darius sent a notice to Tissaphernes in order to remind him of the tribute he owed, probably the arrears accumulated either since his appointment as the satrap of Lydia, or perhaps the tribute that had not been collected in the two or three years prior to the arrival of the satrapal delegations to Sparta. Either way, it is clear that the Athenians were the first to breach the truce by preventing the Persians from collecting tribute from the Greek cities and that Athenian aggression began the chain of events which led to Tissaphernes’ attempt to effect an alliance with the Spartans.

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1014 Meiggs 1972, 586; Lewis 1977, 85.
1015 Andoc. 3.29.
1019 Murray 1966, 148–49; Lewis 1977, 87; Kagan 1987, 29 n. 18; Hornblower 2008, 771. If we believe Herodotus (6.59), any arrears which may have been accumulated prior to the accession of Darius II were remitted following his coronation.
1020 Cf. Wade-Gery 1958, 223; Andrewes 1961, 4. Gomme et al. (1981, 16–17) have placed an emphasis on the adverb νεωστὶ which suggests that something new had recently changed the situation.
But if the Persians were not the aggressors, why then did the Athenians decide to go back on their truce with Darius? As discussed in chapter 4, the conclusion of the truce in 449 BC must have entailed an agreement regarding the division of the revenue generated by the Greek city-states of Asia between Athens and Persia. Accordingly, the fact that the Athenians prevented Tissaphernes from exacting tribute from his Greek subjects suggests that they were presumably no longer satisfied with the previous arrangement and resolved to usurp the Persian share of the tribute as well.

The Athenians were not driven by greed but by financial stringency. According to Thucydides, the first Athenian expeditionary force to Sicily, which was dispatched in the summer of 415 BC, consisted of 100 triremes, 4,000 hoplites, and 300 cavalry. Thucydides proclaims that a vast amount of resources was spent and that the Athenian armada which set sail to Sicily was the most splendid expedition that had ever been sent by a single city up to that time. But while Thucydides does not provide concrete figures regarding the cost of equipping such a large armament, a fragmentary inscription suggests that the Athenians allocated no less than 3,000 talents in preparation for the Sicilian campaign. But despite the massive financial investment, the Athenians soon learned that additional forces were needed in order to subjugate Sicily. In the winter of 415/14 BC, shortly after an indecisive battle against the Syracusians and a failed attempt to capture Messana, the Athenian generals sent to Athens for cavalry and money, which arrived at the beginning of the summer of 414 BC. Later in the same summer Nicias sent for additional reinforcements, which were mustered during the winter of 414/13 BC and consisted of 75 ships, 1,200 hoplites, unspecified allied forces, and 120 silver talents. Notwithstanding the enormous investment of funds and manpower in the Sicilian front, the Athenians continued to carry out operations elsewhere.

In essence, severe shortage of money which jeopardized

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1022 Thuc. 6.25. The Athenian contingents were reinforced with fifty Lesbians and Chian ships along with numerous unspecified allied contingents.
1023 Thuc. 6.31.2-4.
1025 Thuc. 6.74, 93.4.
1026 Thuc. 6.94.4: 250 equipped horsemen but without horses, 30 mounted archers, and 300 talents of silver. See also: IG I 370, lines 73-74.
1027 Thuc. 7.8.
1028 Thuc. 7.16.2, 20.2; IG I 371, lines 6-8.
1029 In the summer of 414 BC Athenian forces were sent to raid Spartan territory (Thuc. 6.105), and an Athenian task force failed at retaking Amphipolis (Thuc. 7.9), which was an important source of ship-building timber and revenue (Thuc. 4.108.1). For Athenian operations which took place in the summer of 413 BC, see: Thuc. 7.17.2, 20.1, 31, 34.
1031 The financial difficulties created by the Sicilian expedition and the Spartan hold on Decelea probably caused the Athenians to change their system of taxation (Thuc. 7.28.4). Cf. Westlake 1977a, 323; Figueira 2005; Hornblower 2008, 594–96.
the entire war effort probably drove the Athenians to violate the truce in order to procure additional funds which were crucial for Athens’ survival.

According to Andocides, it was Amorges who appealed to the Athenians. Thus, we can assume that the Persian rebel had to entice the Athenians with a compelling offer in order to persuade them to provoke the Persian King. In the context of Athens’ financial difficulties, it seems reasonable that Amorges had offered the Athenians complete and undisputed control over the Greek cities of Asia Minor. In return, Amorges may have requested the Athenians to protect his position in Caria from hostile ships and the permission to use Athenian bases in Asia. Such a reconstruction, if accepted, explains (1) the lack of evidence for direct military cooperation between Amorges and the Athenians, and (2) the fact that Athenian operations against Persia were limited to the collection of tribute from the Greek cities of Asia. On the one hand, that the Athenians deprived Tissaphernes of considerable sources of revenue meant that the satrap had fewer resources available which could be used to suppress Amorges’ rebellion. On the other hand, it is not out of the question that the Athenians thought that as long as the Persians were preoccupied with Amorges, the consequences of their limited encroachment would not be severe. One can hypothesize that the Athenians deemed their actions as parallel to those staged by Pissuthnes in the 420s BC, and may have thought that Darius would send an embassy to protest rather than initiate an alliance with Sparta. The Athenians miscalculated and instead of a peaceful diplomatic resolution of a dispute over tribute, they watched as their old and new enemies joined forces.

6.3 The Appeal to Sparta as a Satrapal Initiative

Satrapal Competition at Sparta

It is widely held that it was King Darius himself who instructed Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus to reassert Persian authority over the Greek cities of Asia Minor and to assist the Spartans in their war against Athens. Presumably, in the wake of the Athenian disaster at Sicily the Great Persian King, driven by lust for vengeance due to Athens’ collaboration with Amorges, saw an opportunity to strike. The seemingly unanimous assumption that Darius was the driving force behind the alliance with Sparta is imprecise. The inception and execution of this initiative, I argue, was satrapal through and through. First, the alliance with the Spartans was clearly Tissaphernes’ brain child. Thucydides recounts two specific instructions Tissaphernes received from King Darius: (1) pay the

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1033 Keen 1993a, 156; Keen 1998b, 98–99 with n. 35.
1034 A possible parallel is the aforementioned Persian embassy to Sparta in 425 BC which was intercepted by the Athenians (Thuc. 4.50). Artaxerxes I sent his representative to ask the Spartans to clarify what exactly they wanted from him. Since the Athenians responded by sending their own embassy to the Persian royal court, probably to protest the King’s negotiations with the Spartans, it is not out of the question that they expected to King to react in the same way when he heard about their effort to prevent the satraps from collecting the tribute from the Greek cities of Asia Minor.
1035 Dundas 1934, 168; Olmstead 1948, 359; Brunt 1965, 263; Lewis 1977, 85, 87 with n. 25; Westlake 1977a, 328; Burn 1985, 343; Holladay 1986, 506; Kagan 1987, 28–32; Cawkwell 1997b, 48; Keen 1998b, 99; Briant 2002, 592; Rung 2008, 35; Ruzicka 2012, 35. Wiesehöfer (2006, 662), while maintaining that Darius ordered Tissaphernes to approach the Spartans, still concedes that “the satrap may well have had substantial leeway in carrying both of these orders out.”
arrears of tribute and (2) to apprehend Amorges. The intention to do damage to the Athenians by joining forces with the Spartans is presented by Thucydides not as a direct royal directive but as a consequence of it.\textsuperscript{1036} In other words, there was no change in royal policy. The satrap received notice that he was failing at fulfilling his satrapal duties, and that he was expected to renew the flow of tribute and to pacify his satrapy. As we have seen, collecting the tribute and maintaining the peace were the first and foremost duties of any given satrap. But the notification regarding the necessity to capture Amorges should be viewed as an applied royal directive, which is defined by Waters as an order issued by the King which allowed the satrap to figure out how to accomplish it within the means at his disposal.\textsuperscript{1037} Accordingly, while Darius knew that Amorges was still causing trouble and may have been informed that the Athenians were the cause for the disruption in the flow of tribute, he was content with sending a notice rather than replacing Tissaphernes or supplying him with funds or soldiers. Therefore, it is clear that Darius was confident that Tissaphernes, who had already proven his capabilities by successfully suppressing Pissuthnes’ revolt, was up to the task, and that the manner in which these issues were to be resolved remained at the satrap’s discretion. The appeal to Sparta, then, was Tissaphernes’ own solution to the troubles in his satrapy.

Second, the Persian envoys who came to Sparta represented particular regional interests rather than proper royal ones.\textsuperscript{1038} When Artaxerxes I wished to induce a war between Sparta and Athens in the early 450s BC, he dispatched an embassy to Sparta with an offer to finance a Spartan invasion to Attica. This was clearly not the case in the winter of 413/12 BC. Not one but two delegations arrived at Sparta. The satrap of Lydia was represented by an anonymous ambassador who accompanied Chian and Érythrian delegations,\textsuperscript{1039} while the satrap of Hellepontine Phrygia was represented by two Greek exiles, a Megarian named Calligeitus son of Laophon and Timagoras son of Athenagoras from Cyzicus. Both satraps invited the Peloponnesians to send their fleet to their respective satrapies with an offer to pay the wages of the sailors. Moreover, Thucydides states that Pharnabazus “was eager to achieve, if it was in his power, the very same objectives as Tissaphernes”,\textsuperscript{1040} an articulation which suggests that Pharnabazus approached the Spartans only after learning about Tissaphernes’ initiative and that he hoped to receive credit for affecting an alliance with the Spartans at the expense of his Sardian colleague. With the two offers set before them, the Spartans negotiated separately (χωρίς) with each satrapal delegation and a keen contest (ἁμιλλα) ensued. Eventually, the Spartans accepted the proposition of Tissaphernes.\textsuperscript{1041} If Darius himself desired to use the Spartans against the Athenians, we would have expected the arrival of a single royal embassy headed by a Persian dignitary who would have carried with him a letter bearing the King’s seal and which contained the King’s proposition. Instead, we hear of two separate embassies which hailed from Sardis and Dascylium and that at least one of them was headed by Greek

\textsuperscript{1036} Lewis 1977, 87, 89; Cartledge 1987, 187; Hyland 2004, 75.
\textsuperscript{1037} Waters 2010.
\textsuperscript{1038} Rung (2008, 36) maintains that “the two Persian satraps pursued rival policies.” But it seems to me that the term ‘particular’ would be more suitable.
\textsuperscript{1039} Thuc. 8.5.4.
\textsuperscript{1040} Thuc. 8.6.1: αὐτὸς, εἰ δύνατο, ἀπέρ ὁ Τισσαφέρνης προυθυμεῖτο… ποιήσειν.
\textsuperscript{1041} Thuc. 8.6.3-5.
envoys. Furthermore, the competition between the satrapal representatives serves as a clear indication that the satraps were not following a uniform policy dictated by the Persian King but were acting independently within the boundaries of their office.

Lastly, Thucydides reports that the anonymous representative of Tissaphernes came to Sparta and the same time when envoys from Chios and Erythrae informed the Spartans that the Chians and Erythrians were prepared to revolt against Athenian rule. It should be emphasized that the decisive factor which led to the Spartan decision to choose the Ionian option was not the promise of Persian gold but the possibility of procuring the powerful fleets of Chios and Erythrae. Tissaphernes knew that the war between Athens and Sparta had been renewed and was aware of the growing unpopularity of Athens in Ionia. Accordingly, the satrap probably concluded that under such circumstances the best course of action would be to procure the assistance of the Peloponnesian fleet and assumed that the Spartans would not refuse a promise of financial aid coupled with the prospect of considerable local support. In short, Tissaphernes’ appeal to Sparta was opportunistic in nature.

All of the above considerations indicate that the appeal to Sparta was a satrapal initiative. The Great Persian King expected his satraps to fulfill their responsibilities and gave them considerable leeway to devise a plan by which they were to live up to the King’s expectations. As we shall see, Tissaphernes had the ultimate authority to determine, execute, and reconsider Persian policies regarding the war against Athens while the Persian King continued to play a secondary role.

6.4 Tissaphernes and the Peloponnesians

The First Treaty

The alliance between Tissaphernes and the Peloponnesians became official in the summer of 412 BC when the first of a series of three treaties had been concluded. The first treaty, which is defined by Thucydides as an alliance (συμμαχία) between the Great King and the Spartans, was concluded by Tissaphernes and the Spartan nauarch Chalcideus. The terms of the agreement stipulated that both parties were (1) to join forces in the war against Athens, (2) to brand those who might revolt from the King or from the Peloponnesian League as enemies, and (3) to hinder the Athenians from exacting funds or anything else from the territories and cities which belonged to the King. While it seems highly unlikely that anyone expected Persian forces to be deployed against a rogue member of the

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1042 Since later on Tissaphernes used a bilingual Carian to interact with the Peloponnesians (Thuc. 8.85.2), it is difficult to determine if his representative was Greek or not. Cf. Cawkwell 2005, 157; Hornblower 2008, 773.
1043 It is more than plausible that Pharnabazus received a similar royal notice regarding the tribute he owed, which might suggest, as argued by Cawkwell (2005, 153), that the King’s policy was not specific but prescribed in broad terms.
1044 Thuc. 8.6.3-5.
1046 Thuc. 8.18.1: καὶ ἐκ τοῦτον τῶν πόλεων ὑπὸ σε Ἀθηναίους ἔφοιτα χρήματα ἢ ἄλλο τι, κολλώντων κοινῆ βασιλείας καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ ζύμμαχοι ὅπως μήτε χρήματα λαμβάνονσιν Ἀθηναίοι μήτε ἄλλο μηδέν.
Peloponnesian League, there is little doubt that the clause regarding insubordinate allies refers to Amorges.\textsuperscript{1047} Moreover, there is no mention of Persian financial aid, but the efforts to hinder the Athenians from extracting resources from Asia Minor were a necessary preliminary step aimed at enabling Tissaphernes to reassert his authority over the Greek cities of Asia.\textsuperscript{1048} Thus, the terms of the first treaty correspond closely with the objectives of Tissaphernes.

Soon after the conclusion of the first treaty, Tissaphernes deployed his own cavalry and mercenary contingents and fought alongside the Peloponnesians against the Athenians near Miletus.\textsuperscript{1049} Though the Athenians emerged victorious, the satrap demonstrated his commitment to his Peloponnesian allies. Not long after, the Peloponnesians demonstrated their gratitude when, at the request of the satrap, they attacked Iasus and captured Amorges and handed him over to Tissaphernes.\textsuperscript{1050} We do not hear of Amorges again though it is certain that Tissaphernes informed Darius about his recent success.

**The First Reduction of the Wages**

Early in the winter of 412/11 BC Tissaphernes fulfilled his promise by paying the wages of the Peloponnesian sailors at a rate of one drachma a day per sailor. The satrap, however, informed the Peloponnesians that future payments would be made at a rate of three obols, i.e. half of the previous rate,\textsuperscript{1051} and explained that giving a full drachma was pending on royal approval.\textsuperscript{1052} It has been argued that Tissaphernes was actually bluffing due to his reluctance to spend his own money,\textsuperscript{1053} and that he was in a position to renegotiate the terms of the treaty because Amorges had already been captured.\textsuperscript{1054} While these observations might be true, Tissaphernes was in need financial relief. We should not forget that Tissaphernes was already in arrears before he approached the Spartans. The commencement of the Ionian campaign meant that Tissaphernes was required to pay the wages of his own soldiers, including mercenaries, and provisioning the Peloponnesian fleet, which must have accumulated into a considerable financial expenditure.\textsuperscript{1055} Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that when Tissaphernes approached the Spartans in the winter of 413/12 BC he was of the opinion, which was prevalent throughout the Greek world, that the Athenians were at the brink of defeat due to the catastrophe in Sicily and that they would capitulate in the following summer.\textsuperscript{1056} But the determination of the resilient Athenians prolonged the war. Therefore, since the end of the war was not in sight and the Peloponnesian fleet kept growing in numbers, Tissaphernes was faced with unexpected expenses, which must have put a strain on his dwindling financial resources.\textsuperscript{1057}

\textsuperscript{1047} Lewis 1977, 91; Kallet 2002, 251 with n. 76; Wiesehöfer 2006, 662.
\textsuperscript{1048} Lewis 1977, 91.
\textsuperscript{1049} Thuc. 8.25.
\textsuperscript{1050} Thuc. 8.28.
\textsuperscript{1051} 30 talents = 1,080,000 obols. A month pay for sixty ships (200 men per ship) at a three obol rate: 3 [obols] X 60 [ships] X 200 [men per ship] X 30 [days] = 1,080,000 obols.
\textsuperscript{1052} Thuc. 8.29.1.
\textsuperscript{1053} Lewis 1977, 92.
\textsuperscript{1054} Rood 1998, 265.
\textsuperscript{1055} Hyland 2004, 91.
\textsuperscript{1056} Thuc. 8.2.2, 24.4-5; Plut. Lys. 3.1.
Realizing that his financial reserves were not sufficient to maintain the Peloponnesian fleet for long at a rate of one drachma, Tissaphernes decided that the wages had to be reduced until he received a reply to his request for financial aid.

More importantly, Tissaphernes’ reply sheds light of the King-satrap relations in regard to policy-making in the west. The satrap clearly reported to the King about his agreement with the Spartans and requested for financial assistance. Thus, Tissaphernes’ reply indicates that the satrap had little to no doubt that the King would sanction his agreement with the Spartans, but that the prospect of receiving financial relief was not certain. In other words, the Lydian satrap seems to have had the authority to forge an alliance with the Spartans, or any other foreign entity on that matter, in order to protect Persian interests.

In any case, the Peloponnesians were not pleased to hear about the reduction of their wages, and after a push back a compromise was made. Tissaphernes agreed to pay thirty talents for fifty five ships, which equals to a rate of a little over three obols a day per sailor.1058 The fact that a compromise was reached suggests, on the one hand, that the Peloponnesians believed Tissaphernes and that the new rate was sufficient, while on the other, that Tissaphernes was willing to show flexibility in order to see that the collaboration with the Peloponnesians continues.

The Second Treaty

After Tissaphernes and the Peloponnesians agreed upon a reduced rate operations resumed. The satrap of Sardis sent Tamos, the hyparch of Ionia, to assist Astyochus, the new Spartan nauarch, in a Peloponnesian attack on Clazomenae.1059 Soon after Tissaphernes himself went to Cnidus and instigated a revolt against Athens.1060 Thucydides then reports that although the Peloponnesian fleet was sufficiently provisioned,1061 the Peloponnesians thought that the agreement Chalcideus made with Tissaphernes was defective (ἐνδεής) and asked Tissaphernes to renegotiate the terms of the alliance.1062 The second treaty, concluded by Tissaphernes and Therimenes, included several alterations: (1) the Great King and his sons were mentioned as participants in the treaty, (2) the Spartans were explicitly forbidden from exacting tribute from the territories and cities which belonged to the King, and (3) Darius’ responsibility to pay the wages of the troops who were operating in Persian domain had been stipulated.1063 But in spite of the fact that the King’s financial liability became formal, no hard figures are provided.1064 Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that Tissaphernes, although authorized to negotiated the clauses of the treaty, had yet to receive news from Susa about Darius’ willingness to furnish the funds needed for provisioning the Peloponnesian fleet, and therefore it was preferable to refrain from including fixed rates until the satrap received further instructions.

1058 Thuc. 8.29.2. Such a rate meant that each sailor received a little over three obols per month. Cf. Thompson 1965; Pearson 1985; Hornblower 2008, 836–38.
1059 Thuc. 8.31. Tamos was an Egyptian, a native of Memphis, in Persian service. See: Thuc. 8.87.1, 3; Diod. 14.19.5-6, 35.3-5; Xen. An. 1.2.21, 4.2. Cf. Lewis 1977, 92–93 with n. 48; Ruzicka 1999, 23–24.
1060 Thuc. 8.35.1.
1061 Thuc. 8.36.1.
1062 Thuc. 8.36.2.
1063 Thuc. 8.37.2-4.
1064 Lewis 1977, 94.
The Alliance under Crisis

The harmony, however, was soon disrupted. A delegation of eleven Spartan commissioners arrived at Cnidus and notified Tissaphernes that they demand to renegotiate the treaty he concluded with Therimenes. Tissaphernes was infuriated by the Spartan protest and departed without settling anything. As noted above, Tissaphernes reported to the King about his dealings with the Spartans, which was presumably framed as a means to resolve the problem with the flow of tribute and Amorges’ rebellion. Therefore, Tissaphernes’ reaction shows that he was fed up with Spartan indecisiveness, which compelled the satrap, who probably had sent the first and second treaties to be ratified by the King, to explain why the deal with the Spartans kept getting worse.

After the breakdown of the negotiations at Cnidus, both parties seem to have thought that the alliance was over. The Peloponnesians sailed to Rhodes with the intention of instigating a Rhodian revolt and procuring provisions from the Rhodians, thus ending their dependency on Persian money. Tissaphernes, presumably at the instigation of Alcibiades, began negotiating an alliance with the Athenians, who wanted to secure the satrap’s financial aid for their own purposes. An Athenian delegation travelled to Cnidus to negotiate with the satrap, but despite the fact that the Athenians were willing to make considerable concessions, inter alia acknowledging the Great King’s claim over the whole of Ionia, the talks never came to fruition. Thucydides recounts a tradition according to which Alcibiades sabotaged the talks by making unacceptable demands in the name of Tissaphernes. Alcibiades allegedly suspected that the satrap had no intention of concluding an alliance with the Athenians due to his fear of a Peloponnesian retaliation. Yet, since Thucydides himself states that at this point the Athenian fleet was still superior in comparison to his Peloponnesian counterpart, Thucydides’ claim appears less than persuasive.

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1065 The main point of contention was the clause which stipulated that Darius had claim over all the territories that belonged to his ancestors (Cf. Thuc. 8.18.1, 37.2). Lichas, the only Spartan commissioner who is mentioned by name, pointed out that such a clause meant that the Peloponnesians and their allies recognized Persian suzerainty over the island of the Aegean, Thessaly, Locris, and Boeotia, which were briefly occupied by Xerxes during his Greek campaign.

1066 Thuc. 8.43.2-4.

1067 Cawkwell 2005, 151.

1068 Nyvlt 2014, 42. Aidonis (1996, 100) suggests that Tissaphernes grew tired of being treated as a mere treasurer and wanted to remind the Spartans that his financial support should not be taken for granted.

1069 Thuc. 8.44.

1070 Thuc. 8.46.1-3.

1071 For the negotiations between Tissaphernes and the Athenians, see: Thuc. 8.47-54, 56.

1072 Thuc. 8.56.4.

1073 While the Athenians were willing to accept most the demands presented before them, they refused to allow the King’s fleet to sail along the coast of western Anatolia with no restrictions whatsoever.

1074 Thuc. 8.56.2-4. See also: Thuc. 8.48.4, 52, 56.2-3. Tissaphernes’ fear of a Peloponnesian backlash due to shortage of resources came true shortly before the Peloponnesian fleet sailed to the Hellespont (Thuc. 108.4-109).

1075 When Thucydides (8.57.1) attempts to explain why Tissaphernes sought to repair his relations with the Peloponnesians after the negotiations with Athens miscarried, the Athenian historian notes that the satrap feared a scenario in which the Peloponnesians, due to lack of provisions, would decide to engage the
An alternative explanation has been offered by Lewis, who postulates that Tissaphernes may have been reluctant to conclude an alliance with the Athenians because he was unenthusiastic to explain to Darius such a dramatic change in policy. Although such an argument seems compelling, it fails to consider the advantages of such a policy. Yes, the King would not have been pleased to hear about the rift between Tissaphernes and the Peloponnesians. Nevertheless, the King’s anger would have been mitigated when hearing that Tissaphernes made an agreement with the Athenians according to which they acknowledge Persian claim to the Greek cities of Asia Minor. We should not forget that the Athenians maintained diplomatic relations with Darius and his predecessor Artaxerxes I, and that Darius himself may have agreed to ratify the truce with the Athenians early in his reign. Moreover, the satrap must have been aware of the Spartan liberation propaganda and may have thought that an alliance with the Peloponnesians would become a liability in the long run.

In short, Thucydides’ assertion that Tissaphernes never meant to switch sides is nothing more than guesswork. Hence, as noted by several scholars, we cannot exclude the possibility that the satrap was genuinely thinking about concluding an alliance with the Athenians. Consequently, the notion that Tissaphernes could apply a shift in policy serves as another indication that the satrap had the liberty to decide which course of action would be most beneficial to Persian interests in the west.

The Third Treaty: Enter Darius
Immediately after the talks with the Athenians came to a dead-end, Tissaphernes sought to improve his relations with the Peloponnesians. The satrap travelled to Caunus and supplied the Peloponnesians with their wages. Consequently, a third and final treaty was concluded between Tissaphernes and the Peloponnesians. In this instance the involvement of the Persian central authorities is evident. In contrast to the previous treaties, the terms of the agreement are preceded by a prescript which states the date in which the treaty was concluded, namely in the thirteenth regnal year of Darius II, when Alexiippidas was ephor in Sparta. Moreover, the list of Persian participants includes not only Darius and Tissaphernes but also Hieramenes, Darius son-in-law, and the sons of Pharnaces, a phrase which almost definitely refers to the aforementioned Pharnabazus. That Pharnabazus, the governor of the satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia, and Hieramenes, a

Athenians and as a result would suffer a decisive defeat. It seems, therefore, that at this point the Athenians still posed a greater threat to Persian domain.

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1077 Thucydides (8.46.3) credits Alcibiades with informing Tissaphernes about the Spartan slogan of freedom to all Greeks. On the Spartan liberation program, see p. 138 above.
1078 Wiesehöfer 2006, 663.
1079 E.g. Hatzfeld 1951, 239; Lewis 1977, 102; Wiesehöfer 2006, 664.
1080 Thuc. 8.57-58.
1081 Xen. Hell. 2.1.9.
1082 Lewis 1977, 104; Erbse 1988, 60. The decision to mention the sons of Pharnaces instead of Pharnabazus suggests that his brother Bagaius may have been present as well, perhaps, as postulated by Krumbholtz (1883, 39 n. 3), as a witness. For Bagaius, see: Xen. Hell. 3.4.13; Plut. Alc. 39.1-2 (where he is called Μαγαίος); Nepos, Alc. 10.3. We cannot exclude the possibility, as pointed out by Gomme at al. (1981, 139), that Pharnaces had more than two sons.
member of the Achaemenid household and possibly the Great King’s representative, were involved in the conclusion of the treaty indicates that Darius had finally given his approval to the alliance with the Spartans. In addition, while Caunus seems to be the location in which Tissaphernes met the Peloponnesian representatives, the treaty was actually concluded in the plain of the Meander. Accordingly, it has been argued that while negotiations took place in Caunus, the official conclusion of the treaty occurred in the plain of the Meander after the terms of the treaty had been ratified by Darius and the Spartan authorities. Lastly, the clearest indication that the King was involved in the conclusion of the third treaty is the clause which stipulates that Tissaphernes was obligated to provision the Peloponnesian ships which were presently in Ionia until the arrival of the King’s fleet. Once the Persian armada had arrived at the scene, the Peloponnesians were expected to use their own resources to maintain their fleet or, if they wished, to receive funds from Tissaphernes which would be considered as a loan to be paid back at the end of the war. There is no doubt that Tissaphernes had to obtain royal approval before committing the King’s fleet to the war against the Athenians.

All in all, I am inclined to accept the widely held conclusion that the first two treaties were in fact drafts, which constituted “a preliminary working arrangement between the forces on the spot,” and that only the third treaty was properly sanctioned by Darius and the Spartan authorities. But in spite of clear royal involvement in the conclusion of the third treaty, the last clause states that Tissaphernes, together with the Spartans and their allies, shall carry on the war against Athens jointly and in the manner which they deemed best. The satrap was even given permission, pending on Spartan consent, to make peace with Athenians. In other words, Tissaphernes received full and complete mandate to carry out the war against the Athenians as he saw fit.

The Alliance in Crisis

Thucydides states that following the conclusion of the third Treaty the Peloponnesians were confident that Tissaphernes would bring up the Phoenician fleet and fulfill his other promises, presumably the payment of the wages. But the satrap proved to be a bad paymaster by providing insufficient funds irregularly. The satrap also hindered the

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1083 Lewis 1977, 104. In contrast, Badian (1993, 44, 97 n. 68) posits that Hieramenes held a permanent position in Asia Minor. It should also be noted that Hieramenes is mentioned in the Xanthus Pillar (TAM I 44c, line 12; cf. Thompson 1967, 105–6).
1084 Thuc. 8.57.1.
1085 Thuc. 8.58.1.
1086 Brunt 1952, 72 n. 2; Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1981, 138–39; Strassler 1996, 514 n. 8.57.2a; Cawkwell 2005, 148. Conversely, Wilamowitz (1908, 597–98) suggests that the discrepancy in the locale was the outcome of Thucydides obtaining access to the text of the treaty only after he wrote chapter 57. But see Erbse 1988 for the shortcomings of Wilamowitz’ hypothesis.
1087 Lewis 1977, 58, 104; Petit 1990, 140 with n. 138.
1090 Thuc. 8.58.7.
1091 Thuc. 8.59.1.
Peloponnesian fleet, which was mooring at Miletus, from engaging the Athenians by claiming that they should wait for the arrival of the Phoenician fleet. Short of provisions and forced to remain inactive, the disgruntled Peloponnesians sailors began accusing the Spartan nauarch Astyochus of conspiring with Tissaphernes to ruin the fleet and demanded to engage the Athenians. Astyochus finally caved under pressure and ordered the fleet to sail to Samos with the purpose of coercing the Athenians to fight. But after learning that Athenian reinforcements had arrived from the Hellespont, the Peloponnesian fleet returned to Miletus.  

The satrap’s alleged misconduct, however, was not without consequences. In light of Tissaphernes’ failure to fulfill his obligations, the Peloponnesians decided to send forty ships to the Hellespont to assist Pharnabazus. This decision was not surprising since the Hellespontine option had never been taken off the table. According to Thucydides, after the Spartans accepted Tissaphernes’ proposition, the representatives of Pharnabazus, the above mentioned Calligeitus and Timagoras, remained in Sparta in hopes of convincing the Spartans to send another expedition to the Hellespont. Accordingly, the Spartans resolved to send a fleet first to Chios, then to Lesbos, and lastly to the Hellespont. Then, in the winter of 412/11 BC, twenty seven Peloponnesian ships sailed to Ionia with the aforementioned commissioners, who were authorized to direct as many ships as they thought necessary to the Hellespont. Yet, Tissaphernes’ efforts to repair his relations with the Spartans seem to have led the commissioners to order the fleet to remain in Ionia. Nevertheless, in the summer of 411 BC Dercylidas, a Spartiate, marched by land with a small force and instigated revolts in Abydos and Lampascus. Eventually, the Spartan commissioners decided that it was time to send a portion of the fleet to the Hellespont. This decision was made not only because Tissaphernes proved to be unreliable but also because Pharnabazus’ offer to provision the fleet was still open and because the Byzantines informed the Spartans that they were eager to rebel against Athens.

Things got worse for Tissaphernes once the Peloponnesians who remained in Miletus learned about Alcibiades’ recall. They believed that the satrap was conspiring with the rogue Athenian general in order to undermine the Peloponnesian war effort. The crews of the ships threatened to desert, unless they received their pay, and rumors that Tissaphernes had bribed Astyochus began to circulate to the point that the Spartan nauarch was almost lynched by his own men. Matters escalated even further when the Milesians captured a fort which was built by Tissaphernes in Miletus and expelled its garrison. At this point, when the Peloponnesians camp was in a state of disorder, Astyochus was succeeded by Mindarus as the new nauarch. Soon thereafter, Tissaphernes informed the Peloponnesians that he was about to go to Aspendus to bring up the Phoenician fleet. But

\[1092\] Thuc. 8.78-79, 80.1  
\[1093\] Thuc. 8.80.1-2.  
\[1094\] Thuc. 8.8.1-2.  
\[1095\] Thuc. 8.38.1-2.  
\[1096\] Thuc. 8.61.1, 62.  
\[1097\] Thuc. 8.80.1-3.  
\[1098\] Thuc. 8.83.1, 85.2.  
\[1099\] Thuc. 8.83.3-84.1-3.  
\[1100\] Thuc. 8.84.4. Later on Thucydides (8.109) reports that a Persian garrison was expelled from Cnidus.
while the Peloponnesians were waiting for Tissaphernes provisions were not supplied by those Tissaphernes left in charge. Finally, after receiving another invitation from Pharnabazus and a report that the Phoenician fleet was still mooring in Aspendus, Mindarus decided to sail with the rest of the fleet to the Hellespont.\textsuperscript{1101}

It seems that the last straw was Tissaphernes’ failure to bring up the Phoenician fleet. The Peloponnesian disappointment was probably predicated on the belief that together with the Phoenician vessels they would be able to defeat the Athenians and win the war.\textsuperscript{1102} As noted above, although the Peloponnesians amassed a sizable fleet in Ionia, they still refused to engage the Athenian fleet after it received reinforcements,\textsuperscript{1103} and they must have been even more reluctant to face the Athenians in battle after forty Peloponnesians ships were redirected to the Hellespont. Therefore, it was clear to all that without the Phoenician fleet there could be no Peloponnesian victory, and the seemingly empty promises made by Tissaphernes earned him nothing but the hatred and suspicion of the Spartans and their allies.

6.5 Tissaphernes and the Phoenician Fleet

In contrast to the phantom Phoenician fleet which caused Pericles to sail with sixty ships to Caria during the Samian revolt, there is little doubt that a sizable Phoenician fleet was present as Aspendus in the summer of 411 BC. Thucydides claims with full confidence that 147 Phoenician vessels sailed as far as Aspendus.\textsuperscript{1104} But we need not rely solely on the authority of Thucydides. Before Tissaphernes departed to Aspendus he invited Lichas to accompany him so that the Spartan could personally witness the preparations of the fleet.\textsuperscript{1105} In light of Tissaphernes’ growing unpopularity among the Peloponnesian sailors such an invitation should be viewed as the satrap’s attempt to demonstrate to the Spartan high command that he was doing his very best to hasten the arrival of the Phoenician armada. In response to the satrap’s invitation a Spartiate named Philip was dispatched with two triremes to Aspendus.\textsuperscript{1106} While confirming that the Phoenician fleet was in fact in Aspendus, Philip reported that the ships, presumably at the instigation of Tissaphernes, remained inactive.\textsuperscript{1107}

The Explanations of Thucydides

The fact that the Phoenician fleet was never deployed is puzzling. Even Thucydides was unsure why Tissaphernes had not returned with the fleet from Aspendus. The Athenian historian recounts, in a Herodotean fashion, four explanations that he was aware of for Tissaphernes’ motives on this matter.\textsuperscript{1108} Thucydides begins by stating that some think that Tissaphernes was merely pretending to be earnest about deploying the Phoenician fleet and

\begin{footnotes}
\item[1101] Thuc. 8.99; Diod. 13.38.4-6. For Mindarus’ journey to the Hellespont, see: Thuc. 8.99, 101; Diod. 13.38.7-39.1.
\item[1102] Thuc. 8.46.5.
\item[1103] Thuc. 8.79, 80.1.
\item[1104] Thuc. 8.87.3. Plutarch (Alc. 25.3, 26.7) reports that the Persians mobilized 150 ships, Diodorus (13.36.5, 38.4, 41.4, 42.4) 300, and Isocrates (16.18) mentions only 90.
\item[1106] Thuc. 8.87.6.
\item[1107] Thuc. 8.99.
\item[1108] Thuc. 8.87.3-4.
\end{footnotes}
that he actually wanted to force the Peloponnesians to exhaust their own resources. That this was the intention of the satrap, Thucydides continues, is verified by the fact that Tamos, Tissaphernes’ viceroy who was in charge of paying the Peloponnesians while the satrap went to Aspendus, proved to be an even worse paymaster than the Sardian satrap.¹¹⁰

The second explanation also casts Tissaphernes as a liar who never intended to deploy the fleet, but the impetus was economic rather than strategic. Thucydides notes that there are those who assert that Tissaphernes’ ultimate goal in bringing the Phoenician fleet to Aspendus was to extort money from the sailors in exchange for their discharge. Such a hypothesis, however, is highly problematic. Although Tissaphernes must have looked for additional sources of revenue due to his financial stringency, it is hard to believe that that satrap asked the King to mobilize a fleet, a costly enterprise, just to make a profit.¹¹¹ Such a course of action is based on the assumption that Tissaphernes had decided to disregard completely the King’s Interest,¹¹² which would have certainly angered Darius and may have been followed by royal sanctions.

According to the third hypothesis, it was the Spartan hostility toward Tissaphernes which motivated the satrap to demonstrate to his allies that he was living up to his promises. But while it explains why Tissaphernes wanted to bring the fleet, it fails to explain why he was unable to do so.

The fourth and final explanation, which is considered to be true by Thucydides, rejects any explanation which assumes that Tissaphernes was sincere in his intention to fulfill the Persian promise to deploy the Phoenician fleet. The Athenian historian asserts that Tissaphernes never intended to bring the fleet because he was determined to weaken both Athenians and Peloponnesian by protracting the war. The promise to bring up the Phoenician fleet and the journey to Aspendus were all a ploy meant to deceive the Peloponnesians and to force them to waste away their resources.

**Keeping Both Sides Equal?**

Thucydides’ explanation for the Phoenician fleet conundrum, which is accepted by several modern commentators,¹¹³ fits well with his overarching assumption that Tissaphernes, allegedly through the influence of Alcibiades, decided to do whatever it takes to prolong the war in order to allow the Athenians and Spartans to exhaust each other. The first appearance of this hypothesis occurs in chapter 46 when Thucydides breaks the diachronic sequence of events with a flashback to an earlier point in the narrative. According to Thucydides, sometime after the battle of Miletus Alcibiades, having been condemned to death by the Spartans, fled to the court of Tissaphernes and became the satrap’s trusted advisor. The rogue Athenian general, Thucydides claims, persuaded Tissaphernes that his best course of action was to force Athens and Sparta to exhaust each other through continuous fighting. Accordingly, in order to keep both sides equal and prevent a Peloponnesian victory, Alcibiades told Tissaphernes to reduce the wages of the Peloponnesians sailors, to pay irregularly, to evade contributing to the defense of Ionian

¹¹⁰ See also Thuc. 8.89.
cities which revolted from Athens, and to refrain from deploying the Phoenician fleet, which was still being equipped at this point in the narrative. On the basis of this hypothesis, Thucydides asserts that (1) Tissaphernes never intended to conclude an alliance with the Athenians, that (2) he concluded the third treaty with the Spartans in order to hinder a rash Peloponnesian assault which could have ended with an Athenian victory, and (3) that the satrap never intended to deploy the Phoenician fleet. But what is the evidence Thucydides employs in order to substantiate his theory? It has been argued that one of Thucydides’ main sources for book 8 was Alcibiades himself or members of his entourage. Therefore, it is possible that Alcibiades or one of his confidants informed Thucydides that this was Tissaphernes’ intention and that the originator of such a policy was Alcibiades. Conversely, it has been argued that the entire conversation between Alcibiades and Tissaphernes constitutes a hypothetical reconstruction of Thucydides, which was, as the Athenian historian himself admits, predicated solely on the subsequent actions of Tissaphernes. In any case, while Thucydides expresses his critique about the motives of Alcibiades for urging the satrap to adopt such a policy, he still believed that he had sufficient evidence, i.e. the actions of Tissaphernes, to conclude that Tissaphernes had in fact adopted Alcibiades’ advice. In addition, Thucydides rejects the excuse Tissaphernes used to justify the inactivity of the Phoenician fleet, namely that the number of ships that had been fitted was less than Darius had ordered, and asserts that Tissaphernes would have enhanced his reputation in the eyes of Darius by accomplishing his objectives with a smaller fleet, since it would have reduced the King’s expenses.

On the whole, Thucydides’ entire theory about the satrap’s design to wear out both sides is ultimately predicated on Alcibiades’ word and the acts of Tissaphernes. But while the reliability of Alcibiades is questionable, the actions of Tissaphernes can be used to substantiate an alternative interpretation, one which takes into consideration the satrap’s immediate objectives as well as his financial constraints.

Thucydides’ determination to impose his preexisting theory on the matter of the Phoenician fleet exposes several critical flaws. First, it has been pointed out that Tissaphernes could not have expected to maintain the equilibrium between Athens and Sparta by making the Peloponnesians completely hostile to him. By the time

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1113 Thuc. 8.45-46.4. Xenophon (Hell. 1.5.9) seems to accept Thucydides’ theory wholeheartedly. See also: Isoc. 16.20; Diod. 13.37.4, 41.4, 42.4; Plut. Alc. 23.3-25.2, 25.7; Plut. Lys. 4.1; Nepos, Alc. 5.2.
1114 Thuc. 8.56.2.
1115 Thuc. 8.57.
1116 Thuc. 8.87.4.
1119 Erbse 1989, 36.
1120 Thuc. 8.46.5.
1121 Thuc. 8.47.1
1122 Thuc. 8.87.5. See also: Thuc. 8.45.6, 109.1.
Tissaphernes went to Aspendus the Peloponnesians had already dispatched forty ships to
the Hellespont, and the satrap must have known that he was at the brink of losing the entire
Peloponnesian fleet to Pharnabazus. Since it is difficult to believe that the satrap failed to
see that such a policy, if there was such a policy, was becoming detrimental to his
overarching objectives,\textsuperscript{1124} it seems likely that Tissaphernes had done whatever he could
to bring up the Phoenician fleet in order to appease his disgruntled allies.

Second, the protest of Lichas at Cnidus may have convinced Tissaphernes that he
could not rely on the fickle Peloponnesians.\textsuperscript{1125} Accordingly, the arrival of the Phoenician
fleet would have freed Tissaphernes from depending on Peloponnesian naval power and
which would have allowed the satrap to dictate the manner in which the war was to be
conducted.\textsuperscript{1126} Third, Athens’ success against all odds may have led Tissaphernes to
question the effectiveness of the Peloponnesian fleet, and the satrap probably thought that
the deployment of the Phoenician fleet became a strategic imperative in the war against
Athens. Fourth, as noted above, Tissaphernes was using his own resources to provision the
Peloponnesian fleet. But according to the third treaty, the arrival of the Phoenician fleet
meant that Tissaphernes would have been relieved of his financial liability to the
Peloponnesians. Therefore, with every day that the Phoenician ships remained at
Aspendus, Tissaphernes’ financial resources were being further exhausted.\textsuperscript{1127} It is evident,
therefore, that the deployment of the Phoenician fleet aligned perfectly with the interests
of Tissaphernes.

**Redeeming Tissaphernes**

At this point I would like to offer an alternative explanation for the reason behind
Tissaphernes’ deficiencies as a paymaster and his failure to deploy the Phoenician fleet.
The fact that the earliest instance in which Tissaphernes is accused of being a bad
paymaster occurred only after the conclusion of the third treaty has been largely ignored.
We have seen that from the onset of the campaign against the Athenians Tissaphernes was
using his own financial resources to provision the Peloponnesian fleet as well has his own
operations. Once the satrap began to realize that the war was to be longer than expected,
he reached a compromise with the Peloponnesians which kept both parties satisfied. The
capture of Iasus probably supplied the satrap with considerable financial relief,\textsuperscript{1128} and soon
after we are told that the Peloponnesian fleet was well provisioned,\textsuperscript{1129} which suggests that

\textsuperscript{1124} Keen 1998b, 100.
\textsuperscript{1125} Lewis 1977, 107.
\textsuperscript{1126} Hyland 2004, 89. The fact that Tissaphernes wanted to bring up the Peloponnesian fleet to Ionia is
predicated on the assumption that he had no access to Persian naval power.
\textsuperscript{1127} For instance, according to Thucydides (8.81.3), after the conclusion of the third treaty Alcibiades came
to Samos and told the Athenians that Tissaphernes was willing to coin his own silver couch in order to
provision the Athenian fleet. Such a phrase, which obviously meant to convey the satrap’s devotion to the
cause, implies that Tissaphernes’ cash reserves were running low.
\textsuperscript{1128} Thuc. 8.29. Tissaphernes paid the Spartans the figure of 1 Daric, i.e. 20 Attic drachmas (see: Xen. An.
1.7.18), per captive, which is significantly less in comparison to other recorded instances in which ransom
was given (see: Pritchett 1991, 247–48). The satrap, therefore, made a considerable profit, see: Lewis 1977,
91; Kallet 2002, 252.
\textsuperscript{1129} Thuc. 8.36.
the conclusion of the second treaty had nothing to do with the issue of wages.\textsuperscript{1130} Similarly, the objections of Lichas in regard to the treaties concluded by Chalcideus and Therimenes were about the territorial definition of the Persian Empire rather than the funds supplied by the satrap.\textsuperscript{1131}

The ambiguity regarding the exact time in which Alcibiades advised Tissaphernes to reduce the wages of the Peloponnesians sailors and to pay irregularly had spawned two conflicting interpretations. There are those who argue that the first (Thuc. 8.29) and second (Thuc. 8.46) reductions of wages were in fact the same.\textsuperscript{1132} Others, however, have pointed out the discrepancies between the two reductions and concluded that these were two distinct events.\textsuperscript{1133} But whether there was one reduction or two, the Peloponnesian sailors began complaining about their wages only after the conclusion of the third treaty.\textsuperscript{1134}

With all things considered, it seems more probable that Tissaphernes began paying insufficiently and irregularly because of the unexpected duration of the war rather than a sophisticated strategy instigated by Alcibiades.\textsuperscript{1135} To our best knowledge, the Persian central authorities provided Tissaphernes with neither financial nor military assistance, which indicates that Tissaphernes had limited resources at his disposal.\textsuperscript{1136} Keen suggests that Thucydides may have misinterpreted the intentions of Tissaphernes because of “his prejudices about Persian satraps’ wealth,” and therefore failed to consider the possibility that the satrap had finite financial reserves.\textsuperscript{1137} In other words, the satrap used his own resources to finance the Peloponnesian fleet and other operations for over a year. Since we know of numerous instances dated to the fourth century in which Greek cities and generals paid their soldiers irregularly due to financial difficulties,\textsuperscript{1138} Tissaphernes’ failure to furnish sufficient funds should not be deemed as different.\textsuperscript{1139}

It is not out of the question that Alcibiades may have overstated his influence over Tissaphernes. Accordingly, the Athenians general may have fabricated a story in which he urged the satrap to deprive the Peloponnesians of Persian gold. In this way Alcibiades depicted himself as an Athenian hero who made sure that his countrymen were given

\begin{enumerate}
\item[1130] Thuc. 8.37.
\item[1131] Thuc. 8.43.
\item[1132] Wilamowitz (1908, 588–89) argues that Thucydides added chapter 29, which was based on more complete information, only after he wrote chapter 45. Erbse (1989, 36) maintains that in chapter 49 Thucydides adds an additional motivation to the reduction of wages mentioned in chapter 29.
\item[1133] Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1981, 96–97; Rood 1998, 265 with n. 50; Hornblower 2008, 887.
\item[1134] Thuc. 8.78.
\item[1135] Keen 1998b, 100. Lewis (1977, 92; 1989, 231) acknowledges that Tissaphernes had “financial reasons for not giving the Spartans too much help.” Kagan (1987, 74) notes that Tissaphernes was experiencing financial hardships, but he still considers the strategic factor as primary in Tissaphernes’ decision to reduce the wages.
\item[1136] The Oxyrhynchian historian (\textit{Hell. Oxy}. 19.2 [=McKechnie and Kern 1988, 94–95]) claims that the Great King habitually provided his lieutenants with insufficient funds at the start of military campaigns. This principle seems to explain why Tissaphernes received not financial assistance from the Persian central authorities.
\item[1137] Keen 1998b, 100.
\item[1138] Pritchett 1974, 24–29.
\item[1139] Hyland 2004, 92.
\end{enumerate}
enough time to recover from the Sicilian expedition.\textsuperscript{1140} We cannot exclude the possibility that Tissaphernes was aware of the long term strategic benefits of allowing Sparta and Athens to waste away their resources by extending the war. Nevertheless, as noted above, by the time Tissaphernes went to Aspendus his alliance with the Peloponnesians was hanging by a thread and his financial resources were probably close to exhaustion. More importantly, the Great King’s interest should not be overlooked. The satrap had no new achievements to show for, and we can safely assume that the expensive campaign did not allow Tissaphernes to pay the arrears for which he received a notice from the King in the winter of 413/12 BC. Hence, it seems reasonable that by the summer of 411 BC Tissaphernes was eager to end the war and collect the tribute as he was ordered by the King.\textsuperscript{1141} In summary, since the cost of provisioning the Peloponnesian fleet was constantly on the rise, the end of the war was not in sight, and the Persian central authorities had yet to supply financial relief, Tissaphernes was forced to pay irregularly and below the agreed upon rate in order to postpone the complete exhaustion of his financial resources.

**Solving the Phoenician Fleet Conundrum**

If deploying the Phoenician fleet would have solved almost all of Tissaphernes’ problems, one wonders why it remained inactive at Aspendus. Several arguments have been made in favor of Tissaphernes’ claim that the delay in bringing up the Phoenician fleet was because the number of ships mobilized was still lower than the figure the King dictated. For instance, Grote has pointed out that according to Diodorus the Phoenician fleet at Aspendus consisted of 300 ships.\textsuperscript{1142} Accordingly, Grote suggests that the standard size of a given Persian fleet was 300,\textsuperscript{1143} and that Tissaphernes had to wait for the fleet to reach this figure before he received clearance to deploy it.\textsuperscript{1144} A supplementary explanation is provided by Lateiner, who argues that past naval engagements have proved that the Athenian fleets were vastly superior in comparison to their Persian counterparts, even in instances when the Persians had considerable numerical advantage. Lateiner concludes that the Phoenician fleet’s inferior fighting capacity led the King to order the admiral of the fleet not to engage the Athenians before the fleet was in full strength.\textsuperscript{1145} It is apparent that Tissaphernes had yet to receive direct command over the fleet, and even if he did the satrap was aware of the poor track record of the Phoenician fleet when engaging Greek fleets and must have dreaded a scenario in which the Phoenician fleet was prematurely deployed and defeated by the Athenians. If such a scenario had transpired, Tissaphernes would have faced dire consequences.\textsuperscript{1146}

But if Tissaphernes was waiting for additional ships, we can assume that at some point enough ships would have been mustered. How then can we explain the fact that the

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\textsuperscript{1141} Keen 1998b, 100.

\textsuperscript{1142} Diod. 13.38.4, 42.4, 46.6

\textsuperscript{1143} Cf. Ctes. FGrH 608 F13 §37; Xen Hell. 3.4.1; Diod. 11.77.1.

\textsuperscript{1144} Grote 1850, 135 with n. 1.

\textsuperscript{1145} Lateiner 1976 (esp. 281-85).

\textsuperscript{1146} Petit 1979, 69–70.
Phoenician fleet was never deployed? An explanation is provided by Diodorus, who reports that the Phoenician fleet was redirected to Egypt due to a rebellion, a claim which is corroborated by several contemporary documents which mention unrest in Egypt. Several scholars have accepted the developments in Egypt as the reason behind Tissaphernes’ inability to bring up the Phoenician fleet. Others, however, have argued that Thucydides would have mentioned an important event as an Egyptian uprising and therefore reject Diodorus’ account as a fourth century invention. But basing an argument on Thucydides’ silence on this issue is precarious. The general principal which Thucydides seems to follow is that events which occurred elsewhere in the Persian Empire and had no direct impact on the war between Athens and Sparta could be glossed over. Such a principal is understandable, but if Thucydides was inclined to ignore the problems the Persian central authorities grappled with beyond the Aegean, we should be careful of using his silences to automatically reject reports which are not narrowed to the boundaries of the Greek world. Furthermore, we should not forget that Thucydides believed that Tissaphernes was doing everything in his power to protract the war and that he deemed the satrap as ultimately responsible for the inactivity of the Phoenician fleet. Consequently, the centrality of Tissaphernes and his own motives in the narrative may have rendered Persian imperial considerations as secondary in Thucydides’ view.

As we have seen, the conduct of Artaxerxes I in the context of the Athenian alliance with the Egyptian rebels in the early 450s demonstrates that Egypt was more important to the Persian royal authorities in comparison to western Anatolia, and it seems to be considered as such in 411 BC. Therefore, we can conclude that Tissaphernes was willing to deploy the Phoenician fleet, but while the satrap was patiently waiting for enough ships to be mobilized, the Persian central authorities decided against him and redirected to fleet to Egypt. It is also important to note that even if the Phoenician fleet was never made available to Tissaphernes, the fact that Darius intended to send a fleet to western Anatolia suggests that the King was willing to make a considerable investment, in funds and manpower, in the western frontier. Yet, under the assumption that the third treaty was ratified by Darius, even if the Phoenician fleet had been deployed in Ionia, the Persian

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1147 Diod. 13.46.6.
1148 See: AP no. 27; AD nos. 5, 7, and 8. Several scholars (e.g. Briant 1988, 143; Briant 2002, 597; Cawkwell 2005, 155) have rejected the interpretation that these documents serve as an indication that Egypt was in a state of revolt.
1151 Hyland (2004, 91) suggests, correctly in my view, that Thucydides’ silence in regard to occurrences of some importance which occurred far from the Greek sphere may have been omitted due to “Thucydides’ focus on the Greek players in his narrative. It should be noted that in 410 BC Evagoras managed to seize the throne in Cyprus (Diod. 14.98.1; Lys. 6.27–28; Theopom. FGrH 115 F103 §1-2; cf. Costa Jr. 1974, 42 with n. 13), and a number of modern commentators (e.g. Olmstead 1948, 367; Munn 2000, 144) suggest that trouble in Cyprus may have been another factor in Darius’ decision to redirect the fleet from Ionia.
admirals would have answered not to the King but to Tissaphernes, to whom the mandate to pursue the war against Athens was explicitly granted in the third and final treaty.

6.5 War in the Hellespont

Pharnabazus and the Peloponnnesians

Upon hearing that the Peloponnesian fleet had sailed to the Hellespont, Tissaphernes rushed from Aspendus to Ionia, seeking to explain his actions. But it was too little and too late. Pharnabazus finally managed to snatch the Peloponnesian fleet from his colleague and rival. But Pharnabazus’ collaboration with the Spartans was far from a success. Preceded by minor skirmishes, the Peloponnesians engaged the Athenians near Point Cynossema. The Athenians not only defeated their enemies but also regained the confidence which they had lost following the debacle in Sicily. Immediately after, the Athenians captured Cyzicus, while Mindarus sent envoys to Sparta to ask for reinforcements. A few months later, in the winter of 412/11 BC, two naval engagements ended with an indecisive outcome, though in the latter engagement the Peloponnesians were saved by Pharnabazus, whose cavalry squadrons prevented the Athenians from cutting down the retreating Peloponnesians.

The Athenian string of military victories continued in the following year. At the battle of Cyzicus, the Athenians managed to completely annihilate the Peloponnesian fleet and to defeat the land forces of Pharnabazus. Soon after, the Athenians asserted their control over a number of cities in the region and even established custom houses in Chrysopolis with the intention of exacting a ten percent tax on all vessels sailing from the Black Sea.

The desperate position of the Peloponnesians in the aftermath of the battle of Cyzicus is succinctly described in a letter sent by the Spartan vice admiral Hippocrates to Sparta, which was intercepted by the Athenians: “Ships gone. Mindarus dead. The men are starving. We don’t know what to do.” Surprisingly, it was Pharnabazus who tried to lift the spirits of the Peloponnesian sailor by promising to provide the materials and funds needed for the construction of a new fleet. The satrap even supplied each man with a cloak, weapons, and two months’ pay. After his exhortation speech, Pharnabazus went to help the Chalcedonians against the Athenians.

In next campaigning season, that is the summer 409 BC, the Athenians dispatched Thrasyllus with a new fleet to assume command over the Athenian forces in the

1153 Thuc. 8.108.3.
1154 Thuc. 8.102; Diod. 13.39.2.
1155 Thuc. 8.104-106; Diod. 13.39.3-40.5.
1156 Thuc. 8.107.1; Diod. 13.40.6.
1157 Thuc. 8.107.2; Diod. 13.41.1-3.
1158 Xen. Hell. 1.1.1-7; Diod. 13.45-46.
1159 Xen. Hell. 1.2.6; Diod. 13.45.6, 46.5.
1160 Xen. Hell. 1.16-18; Diod. 13.49.5-51.8.
1162 Xen. Hell. 1.1.22; Diod. 13.64.2.
1164 Xen. Hell. 1.1.24-25. Pharnabazus saw that the construction of new ships commenced in Antandrus, though the Peloponnesians began building ships in the Peloponnesian as well. See: Xen. Hell. 1.4.11.
Hellespont.1166 Thrasyllus first sailed to Ionia and began ravaging the countryside in the vicinity of Ephesus. The Athenians then mounted a direct assault on Ephesus, but Tissaphernes gathered a large army and defeated the Athenian forces.1167 After the setback in Ephesus, Thrasyllus joined the rest of the fleet in Sestos and then moved to Lampascus, where the Athenians spent the winter.1168 Throughout the winter the Athenians repeatedly plundered the Persian King’s territory and even took over Abydos after they vanquished the forces of Pharnabazus which marched against them.1169

In the spring of 408 BC the Athenians resumed operations. A portion of the fleet besieged Chalcedon while the rest laid waste to the territory of Pharnabazus.1170 The Spartan garrison in Chalcedon, reinforced by a detachment sent by Pharnabazus, launched an abortive attack against the Athenian besiegers.1171 After seeing his forces being defeated by the Athenians again and again, Pharnabazus resorted to diplomacy. The satrap offered the Athenians twenty talents in exchange for breaking off the siege and promised to personally escort an Athenian embassy to the King.1172 After a truce had been established with Pharnabazus, the Athenians lifted the siege and began operations against Byzantium.1173 In the meantime, Pharnabazus met the Athenian envoys at Cyzicus, from which they continued to Gordium where they spent the winter of 408/7.1174 The string of military setbacks may have compelled Pharnabazus to bribe the Athenians to accept a truce, but his offer to escort an Athenian embassy to the Persian court suggests that he had no authority to negotiate a peace treaty with the Athenians. This can be explained by the fact that in the third treaty the mandate to conduct the war is given to Tissaphernes rather than Pharnabazus. The Athenians, on their part, probably aimed at persuading the King to order his satraps to pull out of the war, which would have doubtlessly crippled the Peloponnesian war efforts.

The Embassy of Boeotius
But the Athenians and Pharnabazus were in for a surprise. When the Athenian envoys and Pharnabazus were en route they encountered a Peloponnesian embassy, led by a certain Boeotius, which was returning from the Persian court accompanied by Cyrus the Younger, the Great King’s son.1175 The Spartan ambassadors boasted that “the Spartans had won

1167 Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.5-11; *Hell. Oxy.* Cairo Fragments [=McKechnie and Kern 1988, 30–33]; Diod. 13.64.1; Plut. *Alc.* 29.1.
1169 Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.16-17.
1170 Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.1-4; Diod. 13.64.3, 66.1; Plut. *Alc.* 29.3.
1171 Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.5; Diod. 13.66.2; Plut. *Alc.* 30.1.
1172 Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.8-12; Diod. 13.66.3. In addition, the people of Chalcedon agreed to pay tribute to Athens as they did in the past and the arrears they owed to the Athenians.
1173 Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.14-22; Diod. 13.66.4-67; Plut. *Alc.* 31.2-4; Nepos, *Alc.* 5.6
1175 Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.2-7. It should be noted that when Xenophon (*Hell.* 1.3.13) recounts the names of the members of the Athenian embassy which was escorted by Pharnabazus, he notes that at about the same time a Spartan embassy, led by a certain Pasippidas, also travelled to the King. Bommelaer (1981, 62–65) argues that this is in fact the embassy of Boeotius, which continued its journey to the King while the Athenians chose to spend the winter in Gordium. Conversely, Krentz (1989, 125) argues, correctly in my view, that there were two Spartan embassies, the earlier one, which was led by Boeotius, went to the King perhaps after
from the King everything they asked for," and that Cyrus, who was to be appointed as the general of all those by the sea who fought alongside the Spartans, intended to fight together with the Spartans. In addition, Xenophon notes that Cyrus was carrying a letter bearing the King’s seal, in which Darius proclaimed that he was sending down Cyrus as the κάρανος, i.e. commander-in-chief, of all those who must as Castolus. While it is generally agreed that Boeotius and his colleagues did not conclude a new treaty with Darius, the arrival of Cyrus entailed a considerable administrative reorganization of the western satrapies which had considerable implications on the trajectory of the Ionian War. Cyrus superseded Tissaphernes as the satrap of Lydia but the administrative district under the Persian prince’s authority was expanded to include Greater Phrygia, and Cappadocia. Tissaphernes was demoted to a lesser position, while Pharnabazus, who continued to preside as the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, had to answer directly to Cyrus.

Why was Tissaphernes replaced?
It is evident that the main impetus for the appointment of Cyrus was the failure of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus in the war against Athens. Darius must have been displeased to learn that the Peloponnesian fleet proved to be as ineffective as his Phoenician counterpart, and that his senior officials in the west were unwilling to collaborate against the Athenian menace. But why was Tissaphernes removed from office while Pharnabazus was allowed to continue governing his satrapy? It has been suggested that Darius sent Cyrus to the west as a way to mitigate the forthcoming succession struggle in the battle of Cyzicus in 410 BC, while the embassy of Pasippidas left at about the same time as the Athenian delegation. The rationale behind sending a second embassy, Krentz maintains, was that the Spartans would have wanted to send fresh representatives along with the Athenians, since they did not know what Boeotius had achieved, and feared lest the King would be persuaded to ally himself with Athens. Lewis have argued that following the misconduct of Tissaphernes, the Peloponnesians deemed the third treaty as nullified and that Boeotius and his colleagues concluded a new treaty with Darius. Although several scholars (e.g. Lotze 1980, 178; Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover 1981, 142; Andrewes 1992, 489) have accepted Lewis’ conclusion, Tuplin (1987b) convincingly refutes Lewis’ hypothesis and concludes against a new treaty between Sparta and the Great King. Following Tuplin’ conclusion: Cartledge 1987, 189–90; Keen 1998b, 103; Briant 2002, 981; Cawkwell 2005, 290–91.

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Lewis 1977, 131 with n. 136.
Achaemenid court. This hypothesis seems to be corroborated by the fact that Darius reorganized the administrative structure in western Anatolia in order to allow Cyrus to rule over a domain suitable for a prince. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable that Tissaphernes was held as responsible since, according to the third treaty, he was ultimately in charge of the war against Athens. In addition, the Spartan complaints against Tissaphernes may have contributed to the decision to remove him from office. Under the aegis of Pharnabazus we hear of no complaints concerning the wages of the Peloponnesians sailors while the satrap personally fought alongside his Greek allies on numerous occasions. We can assume that Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus sent reports to the royal court, in which each satrap reproached the conduct of his colleague. Therefore, it is possible that the accusations issued against Tissaphernes by Boeotius and his colleagues may have served as a tie breaker. Moreover, if Darius wanted to use the Peloponnesians against the Athenians, and there is no reason to think that he did not, replacing Tissaphernes became a necessity. Thus, by demoting Tissaphernes and assigning considerable executive powers to Cyrus the Great King repaired the relations with the Spartans, neutralized the satrapal competition which became detrimental to Persian interests in western Anatolia, and may have reduced dissension in the royal court.

6.6 Turning the Tide

Cyrus and the Peloponnesians

Cyrus pursued the war against the Athenians with impressive rigor and zeal. His first action was to order Pharnabazus to arrest the Athenian envoys he was escorting to the King. According to Xenophon, Cyrus wanted to prevent news of his arrival reaching his enemies. At the same time, the new satrap of Lydia may have been determined to block any Athenian diplomatic initiative which could have jeopardized his prestigious appointment. Soon after, Lysander, the new Spartan nauarch, arrived at Ephesus and hurried to Sardis to meet Cyrus. Lysander spoke against the actions of Tissaphernes and beseeched Cyrus to be earnest in the war against Athens. The Persian prince responded by stating that Darius had ordered him to do just that and even provided 500 talents to subsidize Spartan operations. Cyrus even expressed his willingness to use his own funds if necessary. We

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1184 Cf. Xen. *Hell* 1.5.2; Plut. *Alc.* 27.5.
1185 Xen. *Hell*. 1.4.5-7. The Athenian envoys were detained for three years and were eventually released due to the repeating entreaties of Pharnabazus.
1186 Xen. *Hell*. 1.5.1.
1188 Xen. *Hell*. 1.5.3. Andocides (3.29) says that the King supplied the Spartans with 5,000 talents, while Isocrates (8.97) claims that the sum was even higher. These figures, as Lewis (1977, 131 n. 138; 1989, 232) convincingly notes, are wild exaggerations. Diodorus (13.70) and Plutarch (*Lys*. 4.6) report that Cyrus gave Lysander 10,000 darics, the equivalent of 43.3 talents, on the spot. Busolt (1893, 1573 n. 1) have argued that this payment represents a month’s pay at a rate of 4 obols, but Lewis (1977, 131 n. 138) convincingly demonstrates that this sum was not enough to support Lysander’s fleet, which consisted of seventy ships at that time (Xen. *Hell*. 1.5.1; Diod. 13.70.2.). Therefore, I agree with Green (2010, 228 n. 81) who maintains that the 10,000 darics were either a down payment or Cyrus’ attempt to ensure Lysander that he would be a reliable ally.
are also informed that the King ordered Cyrus to pay thirty minae per month to each ship, i.e. a daily pay of three obols to each sailor, though there was no limitation on the number of ships the Persians agreed to provision. Lysander, however, was able to convince Cyrus to increase the pay to a rate of four obols, as the extra obol came from Cyrus’ private coffers. Consequently, the aforementioned 500 talents could support the Peloponnesian fleet for a limited period, but the fact that at the end of the war Lysander brought to Sparta a surplus of 470 silver talents, procured from Cyrus’ φόροι, makes it evident that Persian prince was true on his promise and that he committed the resources which were at his disposal for the Peloponnesian war effort.

The Athenians, on their part, tried to see Cyrus, but he refused to give them audience. Thus, with the generous financial support of Cyrus, Lysander led the Peloponnesians through a series of victories. But the collaboration with Cyrus encountered an obstacle when Lysander was superseded by Callicratidas. Nevertheless, in spite of being reluctant to provision the Peloponnesian fleet due to his disapproval of Callicratidas, Cyrus eventually transferred the funds. Then, in the campaigning season of 405 BC, following the bitter defeat at Arginusae, at the behest of the Peloponnesian allies and Cyrus, Lysander returned to western Anatolia as vice admiral. In a similar fashion to his first tour in Ionia, Lysander went to Sardis to ask Cyrus for funds. Cyrus informed his Spartan friend that the funds provided by the King had run out, but he still gave Lysander money. Furthermore, Lysander was also informed that the Persian prince was about to depart for the royal court due to his father’s illness. Nevertheless, Cyrus made arrangements which ensured that the Peloponnesian fleet was well provisioned during his absence: he gave to Lysander the tribute generated by unspecified cities which were considered to be Cyrus’ personal property.

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1189 Xen. Hell. 1.5.5.
1190 Xen. Hell. 1.5.6-7.
1191 Lewis (1977, 131 n. 138; 1989, 231–32) shows that the 500 talents would pay for a fleet of 100 ships for ten months at a rate of 3 obols, or 11 months for 70 ships at a rate of 4 obols. As noted above, Lysander had seventy ships when he conferred with Cyrus, but the Peloponnesian fleet grew in numbers as the war continued. For instance, according to Xenophon (Hell. 1.6.26) by the battle of Arginusae the Peloponnesian fleet consisted of 170 vessels.
1193 Xen. Hell. 1.5.8-9.
1194 In 406 BC Lysander defeated Antiochus, Alcibiades’ vice admiral, in a naval engagement near Ephesus (Xen. Hell. 1.5.11-14; Diod. 13.71; Plut. Alc. 35.4-6; Lys. 5.1-2). Soon after, Alcibiades led the Athenian forces into a failed operation at Cyme, which resulted in the removal of Alcibiades from his position as admiral (Xen. Hell. 1.5.16-17; Diod. 13.73.3-74.1; Plut. Alc. 36.1–2; Nep. Alc. 7.2–3).
1195 Xen. Hell. 1.6.1-5; Diod 13.76.2-3; Plut. Lys. 6.1-3.
1196 Xen. Hell. 1.6.6; Plut. Lys. 6.4
1197 Xen. Hell. 1.6.6-7, 18.
1198 Xen. Hell. 1.6.22-35; Diod. 13.97-100.4; Plut. Lys. 7.1.
1199 Xen. Hell. 2.1.6-7; Diod. 13.100.7-8; Plut. Lys. 7.1-2.
1200 Xen. Hell. 2.1.11-14; Diod. 13.104.3-4. Plutarch (Lys. 9.2) adds that Cyrus even promised that he would return with a fleet.
annihilate the Athenian navy as Aegospotami. Consequently, the Athenians had no choice but to surrender.

A Change in Policy?

According to Thucydides, the funds furnished by Cyrus allowed the Peloponnesians to emerge victorious in their long war against the Athenians. The omission of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus suggests that Thucydides deemed their contribution to the final outcome of the war as secondary in comparison to that of Cyrus. In the same vein, it has been argued that Cyrus’ arrival marked a change in Persian policy in the west, i.e. that Darius decided to abandon Tissaphernes’ strategy aimed at wearing out the Greeks by prolonging the war and ordered his son to provide unqualified assistance to the Spartans.

It seems likely that the string of Athenian victories in the Hellespont, especially those which led to Athenian forays against Persian territory, convinced Darius that the Athenians were the true obstacle to Persian rule in the west. Moreover, the King may have thought that the Peloponnesians, after they had lost their entire fleet at the battle of Cyzicus, would be more amenable to fulfill their promise to acknowledge Persian rule over all of Asia, as stipulated in the third treaty. Even so, the assertion that the appointment of Cyrus as the new satrap of Lydia signaled a dramatic change in Persian policy is not convincing.

I have demonstrated above that Tissaphernes probably turned into a bad paymaster not due to a long-term strategy set to exhaust the Greeks but due to an unfortunate outcome of his limited financial resources. In contrast, Cyrus came to the west with a substantial grant from the King and had access to far greater resources in comparison to his predecessor. Consequently, Cyrus was perceived as a true ally of the Peloponnesians while Tissaphernes was branded as deceitful and unreliable by the Spartans. Therefore, it seems reasonable that Cyrus was instructed to uphold the terms of the third treaty, i.e. to pursue the war against Athens in tandem with the Peloponnesians, which is exactly what Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus had been doing up to this point only with lesser resources. Interestingly, when Tissaphernes sailed to the Hellespont in the summer of 411 BC, as he sought to explain why he failed to bring up the Phoenician fleet, he was visited by Alcibiades. But the satrap imprisoned his former advisor and claimed that he received

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1201 Xen. Hell. 2.1.22-29.
1202 Xen. Hell. 2.2.10-23.
1204 E.g. Lewis 1977, 124, 131; Wiesehöfer 2006, 66. It should be noted that several scholars (e.g. Lewis 1977, 134; Keen 1998a, 90; Keen 1998b, 103) have argued that the fact that Cyrus received the satrapy of Lydia along with Greater Phrygia and Cappadocia instead of Hellespontine Phrygia indicates that Cyrus’ objectives were not confined to settling the war in the Aegean front and that the Persian prince was expected to move against the unruly tribes of the Anatolian hinterland.
1205 Xen. Hell. 1.2.4, 16, 3.3.
1206 Lewis 1977, 132.
1207 Lewis (1977, 133–34) has argued that the Spartans had considerable leverage because Darius was preoccupied with revolts in Media (Xen. Hell. 1.2.19), Cusadia (Xen. Hell. 2.1.13), Egypt (see p. 166 above), as well as Pisidia and Mysia (Xen. An. 1.2.1, 9.14). In addition, Briant (2002, 596) argues that there was unrest in Babylon in 407 BC. In contrast, Tuplin (1987b, 139–42) convincingly demonstrates that these disturbances had little to no effect on Darius’ policies regarding the situation in western Anatolia and observes that at this point the Spartans could not even threaten the King with a Greek coalition against Persia.
orders from the King to make war on the Athenians. Plutarch claims that Tissaphernes

turned his back on Alcibiades because he feared lest the Spartan accusations against him
would jeopardize his standing with the King and therefore sought to reconcile his
disgruntled allies. But even if Plutarch is right, his explanation does not exclude the
possibility that Tissaphernes had received explicit order from the King to support the
Spartans. The likeliest point in which the Athenian option was abandoned is the conclusion
of the third treaty, which was ratified by the King. The alliance with Sparta became official
and the subsequent Athenian incursions against Persian domain only emphasized the
necessity to collaborate with the Peloponnesians.

Thus, the only apparent difference between the conduct of Cyrus and Tissaphernes
is the fact the former had the financial resources to fulfill the promises made by the King
in the third treaty. Moreover, the embassy of Boeotius, as noted above, probably did
not result in a new treaty between Darius and the Spartans. Even still, since the Spartans
claimed to have received all they asked from the King, one can speculate that the terms of
the third treaty remained valid, while Darius, as compensation for failing to deploy the
Phoenician fleet as promised, agreed to allocate 500 talents for the Peloponnesian war
effort, gave Cyrus access to greater resources so as to be able to bankroll the Peloponnesian
fleet after the 500 talents had been spent, and obliged the Spartans by removing
Tissaphernes from his position as the satrap of Lydia. There was no new policy, but merely
a change in personnel coupled with an administrative restructuring of the western satrapies.

That there was no dramatic shift in Persian policy in the west is corroborated by the
fact that the appointment of Cyrus and the allocation of 500 talents sums up Darius’
intervention in the war. Indeed, Darius had sent his own son to deal with the troubles in the
west, but we should not forget that Cyrus was not the crown prince and, as suggested above,
the removal of Cyrus from the royal court had allowed Artaxerxes II to establish himself
as the successor without interferences. In addition, Cyrus was given money and authority
over additional local military forces, but Darius never sent additional land or sea forces.
The King, so it seems, was confident that the alliance with the Spartans would suffice to
bring the Athenians to their knees and that the military expenses would be financed by the
tribute extracted from the recovered territories. In sum, King Darius, just like his
predecessors, intervened in the affairs of western Anatolia in a limited fashion. It is true
that a pro-Spartan policy became considerably more conspicuous after the arrival of Cyrus,
but such a development was the outcome of Cyrus’ own ambition and the greater resources
which were at his disposal.

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1208 Xen. Hell. 1.1.9; Plut. Alc. 27.4-5. Cf. Lewis 1977, 114–15 n. 42.
1209 It has been suggested (e.g. Olmstead 1948, 369; Cawkwell 1997b, 49; Cawkwell 2005, 157–59) that
Cyprus’ zeal of to lend considerable financial assistance to the Spartans was driven by the Persian prince’s
hope of garnering the gratitude of the best professional army in the world before he was to make his bid for
the throne.
1210 Cawkwell (2005, 156–57, 159) argues that the real proof that Darius’ attitude toward the west had not
changed is the fact that the Great King never sent naval forces to aid Cyrus in his war against the Athenians.
1211 Briant 2002, 599.
Conclusion
The relative wealth of information on the deeds and exploits of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus in the context of the Ionian war is illuminating. We have seen that the satraps had the leeway to formulate, change, and execute policies not only within their satrapies but also beyond the borders of the Persian Empire. The limited role of the Great Persian King in the course of this conflict serves as another indication that the Persian central authorities expected the satraps of western Anatolia to resolve the problems created by the mainland Greeks. Since Tissaphernes miscalculated the time frame and costs of the war against the Athenians, Darius had to intervene. But the acts of the Great King were limited to financial assistance and administrative reshuffling. Yes, Darius intended to deploy the Phoenician ships in the western frontier, but the fact that the fleet was eventually redirected, presumably to Egypt, indicates that the situation in western Anatolia was not considered a crisis which demanded immediate royal intervention.

In contrast to the predominant assumption in modern scholarship, I find it hard to believe that the Athenian disaster in Sicily had a profound impact on Darius’ attitude toward the western fringes of his kingdom. Are we to believe that news about a naval engagement which occurred in faraway Sicily drove the Great King into action? That he was driven by lust for vengeance and that he himself ordered his satraps to retake a few coastal cities which were of little importance to the stability and security of the Persian Empire? To me the answer is clearly no. From Darius’ standpoint, trouble in the west probably manifested itself through lighter shipments of tribute. Hence, the King’s primary interest was to see that the tribute kept on flowing and that his authority remained unchallenged. The satraps were expected to fulfill their duties, and were given considerable leeway to do so, and when they did not, the King would notify them that they performance was inadequate. The King did not, and I believe that he was unable to, dictate to each and every satrap the manner in which they were to resolve problems which prevented them from fulfilling their satrapal duties. Only in times of crisis, e.g. when a local rebellion got out of hand, was a royal army mobilized, and only then would the Great King or one of his trusted lieutenants assume command. The actions of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus and those of Darius provide a clear demonstration that this principle determined the interactions between the Great Persian King and his satraps.

Tissaphernes, who was evidently well informed when it came to Greek politics, sought to use Sparta as an instrument to weaken the Athenians. But while the satrap was able to effect an alliance with the Spartans and to win the Great King’s approval, his inability to anticipate Athenian resilience resulted in the failure of a sound and prudent strategy. As the war continued Tissaphernes saw his financial resources waste away along with the Great King’s patience. After Pharnabazus provided a similar unsatisfactory performance, Darius, prompted by Spartan complaints, intervened and appointed his son Cyrus as the overlord of the western satrapies. The events which led to the decision to appoint Cyrus highlight the complexity of the diplomatic interaction between Greeks and Persians while demonstrating the key role of the satraps, who facilitated the exchange of embassies between the Persian royal court and the Greek mainland.
CONCLUSION

The tendency of both ancient authors and modern scholars to cast the Great Persian Kings as the originators of Persian policy in the west is convenient but misleading. Closer observation from the satraps’ viewpoint reveals that though royal and satrapal interests overlapped they were by no means identical. Therefore, a different model has been offered in the present study, one which aims to highlight the central role of the satraps in the interactions between Greeks and Persians.

The Great King’s Viewpoint
The notion that the Great Persian Kings were especially attentive to Greek affairs is not convincing. The depiction of an Achaemenid King sitting on his throne in one of his capitals, his gaze constantly turning to the west, eager to receive news regarding events which took place beyond the western borders of his vast empire seems improbable if not farfetched. Such an image is clearly the outcome of the Hellenocentric vantage point of the ancient Greek authors. But modern historians should not allow the predominance of the Greek literary traditions to obscure the fact that the Great Persian Kings had an enormous empire to rule, defend, and administer. Accordingly, envisioning Greco-Persian relations as a direct interchange between the Persian King and the various Greek polities is too simple. Such an image fails to reflect the agency of the satraps, who were the true driving force behind Persian policies in the west. A preferable model is based on the assumption that the satraps had the authority, the means, and the will to use the extensive prerogatives of their office to fulfill their duties. Thus, when necessary the governors of the satrapies were authorized to formulate, execute, and reformulate foreign and domestic policies.

Satrapal Independence
The difficulties Darius I experienced during his rise to power had consequences. The multiple rebellions and the audacity of Oroites made it evident that further measures were needed in order to ensure obedience and loyalty. Accordingly, the primary aim of Darius’ grand reform was to tighten the control of the Persian royal authorities over the satrapies. Through the presence of officials of royal status in the satrapies, yearly inspections, and an informal network of spies, Darius was able to monitor the provinces and to respond to subversive activities and any other issues which may have required the Great King’s attention.

Royal oversight, however, did not discourage the satraps from acting independently. There is no doubt that the institutions and protocols established or expanded by Darius I enabled an early detection of satrapal misconduct or lacking performance. This does not mean that the enhanced royal supervision deterred the satraps from showing initiative. On the contrary, it seems that a satrap who exhibited resilience and ingenuity was more likely to gain royal favor. The actions of Pissuthnes in the context of the Samian rebellion and the Archidamian War suggests that the satrap of Lydia wished to demonstrate his value by exploiting opportunities to further Persian interests in Ionia. Similarly, the impetus for the competition between Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus over Sparta’s friendship at the onset of the Ionian War was the eagerness of the satraps to impress the King.
But ambition was not the only motive for satrapal resourcefulness. Instances in which the King issued an applied royal directive encouraged the satraps to act. For instance, while Darius II instructed Tissaphernes to apprehend the rebel Amorges, he did not dictate a particular course of action which would bring an end to Amorges’ rebellion. Tissaphernes was shrewd enough to take advantage of the declining popularity of Athens in Ionia and the enmity between the Athenians and the Spartans for his own purpose. It is evident, therefore, that Tissaphernes was given a mission but that the manner in which this mission was to be accomplished was at the satrap’s discretion.

None will deny that the satraps received unlimited authority. The satraps had to follow royal directives when such were issued, were required to obtain of royal approval when they wished to use royal resources or when they concluded a binding agreement with foreign political entities. In other words, while the satraps were aware to the fact that the King was watching and knew that they should refrain from transgressing the boundaries of their office, they still had the discretion to decide which course of action served Persian interest best even and perhaps especially when explicit royal instructions were lacking.

The Circumstances in Western Anatolia
The satraps of western Anatolia operated under extraordinary Circumstances. The transition from a policy of expansion to a policy of entrenchment in the wake of Xerxes’ Greek campaign had profound impact on the attitude of the Persian Kings toward the western satrapies. As we have seen, royal intervention in the west was limited to diplomatic interchange, the removal (Megabates) or demotion (Tissaphernes) of satraps, the allocation of funds (500 talents), and administrative reorganization (the expanded satrapy governed by Cyrus the younger). The limited extent of Persian retaliation to Greek aggression in the northern Aegean, Egypt, Asia Minor, and Cyprus suggests that the Persian central authorities were not alarmed by Athenian operations against Persian domain and were confident that the satrapal authorities were up for the challenge. Such policy was reasonable since Athens was a maritime superpower and as such it lacked the capacity to truly undermine Persian rule in the eastern Mediterranean. With the exception of the northern Aegean, the impact of the campaigns of the Delian League in Asia Minor and beyond the Aegean was only ephemeral. Thus, since there is no evidence for the revival of Persian imperialistic aspirations in the west, a grand mobilization of troops and ships for the purpose of containing what was viewed by the King as a nuisance was neither financially nor strategically sound. The conclusion of a détente in 449 BC brought the war between Athens and Persia to an unofficial end, but political strife in several Ionian city-states contributed to the friction between Athens and Persia. Therefore, since the western satrapies were exposed to incursions staged by the European Greeks, Artabazus, Pissuthnes, Tissaphernes, Pharnabazus, and Cyrus the Younger were compelled to find a way to fulfill their satrapal duties while managing a continuous low-scale conflict with Athens and its allies.

The Impact of Satrapal Independence
In light of the above, it is evident that the satraps played a decisive role in Greco-Persian relations in the fifth century BC. In an ongoing effort to fulfill their duties, the satraps often acted on their own accord, seeking to capitalize on Greek infighting, both in Asia Minor and European Greece, with the purpose of furthering their interest. To some degree, each
satrap constituted an independent political unit, whose interests were framed by the necessity to govern the satrapy in a manner which pleased the Great King while at the same time determined by competition with other satraps and developments in mainland Greece which could have implications on the state of affairs in western Anatolia.

**So What?**

One question remains: does the conduct of the satraps of western Anatolia reflect the overarching nature of King-satrap relations in the Persian Empire? As I have noted above, the circumstances in western Anatolia were particular. But it is highly unlikely that the challenges the satraps of the western satrapies faced were unique. Though the Persians demonstrated impressive administrative flexibility as they absorbed preexisting institutions and practices to facilitate a peaceful establishment of Persian rule in various regions, the responsibilities that came with the office of satrap were probably identical regardless of the region which the appointed satrap governed. Thus, the case of the western satrapies provides us with a viable model for the problems and difficulties Persian governors of frontier satrapies faced and the attitude of the central Persian authorities toward trouble in the periphery. There is no doubt that in times of relative peace royal intervention in the provinces, whether on the frontier or not, was redundant since the duties and responsibilities assigned to the satraps already centered on the King’s demand for tribute and obedience. All the while, the satraps had the discretion to decide, especially when royal policy on a certain matter was lacking, which policies would safeguard and promote the King’s interest. The Great King may have prioritized certain regions over others. It is not out of the question, for instance, that Persian responses to news about dissent in the Persian heartland or wealthy Babylonia might have been more assertive. We know of numerous instances in which the Persian Kings sent armies to suppress local rebellions. To name a few, a major investment in resources and manpower was made in order to preserve Persian rule in Egypt, Media, Syria, Bactria, and probably other regions as well. Athens’ limited capacity to undermine Persian rule in the west never provoked the full wrath of the Persian Kings. Yet, the participation of a Persian fleet at the battle of the Eurymedon River and the Phoenician fleet as Aspendus demonstrate that the Persian central authorities were willing to divert significant forces for the protection of Persian interests in the west. A late but forceful demonstration of Persian determination to safeguard Persian rule in Asia Minor occurred in the last quarter of the fourth century, when the Persian response to Alexander’s invasion showed that Asia Minor was as viewed as an integral and important part of the Persian Empire. In summary, in spite of the particular challenge brought about by the bond between the Asiatic and European Greeks, the interaction of the satraps of western Anatolia can and should be viewed as a case study which reflects the true nature of King-satrap relations not only in the west, but in other satrapies which were located on the fringes of the Achaemenid Persian Empire.

**Prosthesis**

The events of the fifth century BC constitute only half of the story. The fourth century BC proved to be even more tumultuous for Greeks and Persians alike. The political fragmentation in mainland Greece exacerbated while several large-scale rebellions, some of which led by local satraps, impaired the authority of Persian King in the west. It is evident, therefore, that the extent of satrapal independence and the inner workings of the
Persian Empire in this pivotal period of crisis merits reinterpretation. The result of such study could strengthen the conclusions offered in this study and shed additional light on the nature and character of the Achaemenid Persian Empire.
**BIBLIOGRAHPY**


