Psukhai That Matter: The Psukhē in and Behind Clement of Alexandria’s Paedagogus

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Abstract
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PSUKHAI THAT MATTER: THE PSUKHĒ IN AND BEHIND CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA’S PAEDAGOGUS

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In memory of Donna

For Heather and Juniper
Acknowledgments

I owe a debt to Dr. Annette Yoshiko Reed that I will never be able to repay. She has been tirelessly available, a constant source of inspiration, an advocate, and a tremendously insightful reader. She has benefitted me as a scholar and improved this dissertation far beyond what I or it deserve. Her acumen and breadth of learning have challenged me to think and write with a wider mind. Whatever faults and shortcomings lie in this dissertation, they remain in spite of her best efforts to sharpen my thought and frames of reference. I am enormously grateful to her.

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me throughout the process, and to my daughter, who has lived out the first few months of her life with her daddy furiously typing away, trying to finish his dissertation. Heather has been such a wonderful source of joy, encouragement, and love as I read and wrote. She tells me that I mentioned this research topic on our first date, and I know she is eager for me to have a longer relationship with her than I have had with this project—and I am excited for that too.
ABSTRACT

PSUKHAI THAT MATTER:
THE PSUKHĒ IN AND BEHIND CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA’S PAEDAGOGUS

Phillip J. Webster
Annette Yoshiko Reed

This dissertation aims to investigate the ideology and mechanics of the ancient soul’s materiality as witnessed in Clement of Alexandria’s late second- or early third-century work, the Paedagogus. I focus on four ways in which Clement refers to the soul: (1) as an entity in need of punishment and healing, (2) as vulnerable to substances and the activities of the body, (3) as made visible through the body’s appearance, and (4) as an internal moral-core. Through the lens of the Paedagogus, this dissertation introduces recent theoretical work on “materiality” and “the body,” especially as developed in gender studies, into the broad scholarly conversation about the ancient soul. In the process, it shows how Clement uses the interactions between the ancient soul and the ancient body in his attempt to produce and police Christian subjects.
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# ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations for the work of Galen follow *The Cambridge Companion to Galen.*

All other abbreviations, except those listed below, follow *The SBL Handbook of Style.*

Others Abbreviations:

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<td>Ecl.</td>
<td>Philo of Larissa, <em>Eclogue</em></td>
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<td>Ep. ad Zen. et Ser</td>
<td>Ps.-Justin <em>Epistula ad Zenam et Serenum</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hist. Rom.</td>
<td>Cassius Dio, <em>Historia Romana</em></td>
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Citations of Heraclitus use the numbering found in Diels and Kranz.

Citations of Musonius Rufus use the numbering found in Lutz.
INTRODUCTION

Around 150–160 C.E. Galen of Pergamum discovered the location of the soul, or, more precisely, the location of the ruling part of the soul. Thanks to a renewal of interest in the arts of vivisection and dissection, Galen had been cutting bodies open. Slicing into the bodies of pigs, ox, sheep, and kids, as well as other live animals, Galen found that their bodies went limp and their voices silent as soon as he ligated or severed certain ventricles (κοιλίαι) near the brain. If he released or reattached the ventricles, the animals regained sensation, motor-control, voice, and breath. Since these ventricles ended with the nerves at the base of the brain, the experiment showed that the brain was the source of sensation, motion, voice, and breath—activities that everybody at the time agreed were controlled by the ruling part of the soul. Galen confirmed his hypothesis by cutting the ventricles around the heart. When he sliced those ventricles, the animals still flailed and screamed. The conclusion was undeniable: the ruling part of soul, the ἱερεμονικόν, was located in the brain, not in the heart.

Galen was convinced that his experiments had definitively proved the location of

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1 During the first half of the third century B.C.E., Herophilus and Erasistratus pioneered research into the internal anatomy of the human body and developed the art of dissection. According to Galen, the practice and knowledge of dissection and vivisections was revived by Marinus of Alexandria and his students Quintus and Numisianus in the late first and early second century C.E. (Loc.Aff. VIII.212; PHP VIII.1.6); Rocca, “Anatomy”; Nutton, Ancient Medicine, 130–41. For Galen’s indebtedness the anatomical models of soul and body proffered by Herophilus and Erasistratus, see von Staden, “Body, Soul, Nerves.”

2 Here and throughout this dissertation, I transliterate ἱερεμονικόν as well as the other parts of the soul (θυμειδές, ἐπιθυμητικόν).

3 Galen explains his experiments and the conclusions he draws from them in his large, multivolume On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato (PHP). Although the first part of the work is now missing, Galen summarizes and explains his experiment repeatedly throughout PHP. Two of his most clear descriptions are found at PHP I.6.1-12 and VII.3.14-36. For his detailed descriptions of his brain dissections, see On Anatomical Procedures (AA), IX.12; Rocca, Galen on the Brain. On his experiments on the locations of the soul, see Debru, “L’expérimentation chez Galien”; Hankinson, “Galen’s Anatomy of Soul”; Donini, “Psychology,” esp. 184–93. On these experiments as public demonstrations, see von Staden, “Anatomy as Rhetoric” and Gleason, “Shock and Awe.”
the hêgemonikon and thus settled an age-old debate over the location(s) of the soul and its parts. Galen could claim this because everybody agreed that the hêgemonikon controlled voluntary motion and sensation. If the animal’s flailing, breathing, and screaming could be switched off and on through ligating the brain’s ventricles, then the hêgemonikon had to be located in the brain, with the hêgemonikon communicating its powers to the rest of the body through the brain’s ventricles.

Hundreds of years before Galen, Plato had developed a tripartite model of the soul, with the rational part (the logistikon) located in the head, the spirited part (the thumoeides) located in the thorax, and the appetitive part (the epithumêtikon) located in the belly. In contrast, Aristotle held that the soul was the form of the body but nevertheless suggested that its seat could be found in the heart. In the third century B.C.E. Chrysippus defined the Stoic position, arguing that the soul was undivided and located in the heart. By Galen’s time, Plato’s view had become the minority position even among Platonists. Galen’s discovery was therefore an intervention. He had found proof that Plato was right. Aristotle and Chrysippus were wrong. The ruling part of the soul was located in the head, just as Plato had said. Galen produced similar anatomical proofs for locating the other parts of the soul, with the thumoeides being located in the heart and the

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4 Mansfeld, “Doxography and Dialectic.”
5 At least according to Galen: PHP VIII.1.1. Skepticism of Galen’s reliability is warranted, yet it should also be noted that, by premising his argument on this position, Galen assumes that his opponents will agree with him on this point.
6 Galen uses logistikon and hêgemonikon synonymously, with the latter term being preferred by Stoics; see Donini, “Psychology,” 186.
7 Plato, Resp. IV.435b–442d; Tim. 69c–72d; Phaedr. 253c–254e. Donini (“Psychology,” 204, n. 24) notes that Galen relies most strongly on the Timaeus 44d, 65e, 67b, 69d–70a, in addition to Phaed. 96b.
8 Aristotle devotes an entire work to the soul, De Anima; see Everson, “Psychology.” Galen shows his frustration with Aristotle’s lack of anatomical knowledge in PHP I.10.1–10.
9 Chrysippus’ work is no longer extant. Galen’s polemic against Chrysippus in PHP provides the majority of our evidence for Chrysippus’ positions; for a reconstruction of Chrysippus based the evidence found in PHP, see Tieleman, Galen and Chrysippus.
epithumētikon being located in the liver—also just as Plato had surmised.

Galen’s experiments on the soul, full of viscera, blood, and flesh, defy Cartesian expectations of where arguments about the soul take place. The Cartesian perspective presumes that the soul/mind is definitively immaterial and non-spatial, and it thus solves debates about the soul through abstract, propositional philosophy—it locates the soul with words, not scalpels. Galen and his second-century contemporaries, however, saw the soul entangled with the flesh and blood of the body, as almost certainly a fine-mattered substance itself. It even had a color. Arguments about the soul were thus

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10 See Donini, “Psychology” 191–93.
11 That said, as Donini (“Psychology,” 188) points out, Plato refers vaguely to the thorax and the belly as the locations of the spirited and appetitive parts of the soul, not to the heart or to the liver. On Galen’s use of Plato, see De Lacy, “Galen’s Platonism.”
12 For a succinct account of the assumptions and effects of Cartesian dualism, see Grosz, Volatile Bodies, 3–24.
13 Descartes “used the term ‘mind’ (mens, esprit) interchangeably with the terms ‘(rational) soul,’ ‘intellect,’ and ‘reason’ (anima, intellectus, ratio, ame, entendement, raison)” (Baker and Morris, Descartes’ Dualism, 70).
14 Even though Descartes might not have been quite the proponent of the sharp mind/body dualism with which his name is now synonymous, his name nevertheless identifies a form of dualism basic to the modern world; see Rozemond, Descartes’s Dualism, 172–213.
15 I want to distinguish between modern debates about the “soul” (ancient or modern) and debates in modern psychology and neuroscience about emotions and cognition. Whereas emotion and cognition may at times (in antiquity and modernity) be described as features of the soul, it does not follow that all discussions of emotions and cognition are about “the soul.” My claim that modern arguments about the soul are abstract and philosophical rather than anatomical and fleshy, thus, is not contradicted by the psychology’s or neurology’s interest in physiology and “the body,” since it would be incorrect to describe either field’s object of study as “the soul.” These fields’ interest in emotions and cognition suggest instead that the distance between antiquity and modernity is even greater than a simple disagreement about “the soul,” inasmuch as modern science does not even frame itself with reference to the soul.
16 Galen repeatedly notes his doubts about the soul’s οὐσία (substance): Foet/Form. 6; Ut.Resp. 1.5; UP. 7.8; PHP 7.7.25 26, 9.9.3; SMT 5.9; Hipp.Epid. 5.5; Prop.Plac. 3.1, 7, 15.5 (Smith, “Very Thin Things,” 57, n. 64). Galen sometimes questions whether pneuma (a fine-mattered substance) is the substance of the soul, or if the soul is incorporeal (ἀσώματος), with pneuma being the soul’s “first instrument.” When discussing his experiment in PHP VII.3.19–21, for example, Galen suggest that his experiments might, at first glance, suggest either that (1) if the soul is incorporeal (ἀσώματος), then pneuma is its first instrument, or that (2) if the soul is a body (σώμα), then the pneuma that passes in the ventricles from the brain is itself the soul. Galen, however, says that neither option is correct, since animals can regain their sensation and motion after the experiment, once the severed ventricles have been sealed. On the basis of these experimental results, Galen concludes that the soul resides in the very body of the head (βελτίον ὑπολαμβάνει ἐν αὐτῷ μὲν τῷ σώματι τοῦ ἑγκεφάλου τῆς ψυχῆς οἴκειν; PHP VII.3.21). Note, however, that Galen’s doubts about the whether or not the soul is corporeal or made of pneuma do not necessarily imply
carried out on and through the body’s movement, appearance, and anatomy.

This dissertation makes an inquiry into the second-century soul’s materiality. To focus this task, I examine a single text, the *Paedagogus*, a late second- or early third-century manual for Christian living by Clement of Alexandria (c. 150–c. 215), a contemporary of Galen (c. 129–c. 200/216). The *Paedagogus* is a work that is full of paraenetic advice, encouraging its readers to eat, drink, and dress according to reason. Its close connections with Greek moral philosophy, especially in its most detailed admonitions, make the *Paedagogus* an ideal text for studying the ancient soul. The *Paedagogus* provides us with a glimpse of the soul that is shared between Clement and other Greek and Roman philosophers, an object familiar to Clement, Galen, and their contemporaries.

that the soul would be immaterial if it is neither fine-mattered *pneuma* nor a body, as a Cartesian perspective might assume. First, as Smith (“Physics and Metaphysics” 548, n. 83) notes, the Greek term for “immaterial” (*άυλος*) is not even attested before Plutarch (c. 46–120); *άνυλος* is even later, while the Latin *immaterialis* is extremely rare in antiquity, appearing only once in Ambrose of Milan and possibly a second time in Jerome. The absence of the word “immaterial” does not prove that Greek and Latin speakers would not have recognized the concept, but it should make us hesitate before we presume that they easily divided reality into a material realm and an immaterial realm, as Cartesians do. Second, the term “incorporeal” (*άσώματος*) did not necessarily mean immaterial, as Smith further shows (“Physics and Metaphysics,” 528). The soul could be composed of such a fine substance that it would be considered incorporeal yet still be material; see also Donini, “Psychology,” 185–86. Additionally, close inspection of Galen’s comments about the soul suggests that, despite his doubts about its nature, he at least implicitly assumed it to be functionally material. Thus, as Smith notes: “Following Aristotle, Galen recognized that *ousia* (substantia in the Latin translation of Prop.Plac.) could be equivocal (An.mor. [QAM] K 4.783; [Ἀριστοτέλεος] λεγομένης γὰρ οὔσας καὶ τῆς ὕλης καὶ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ τοῦ συναφτέρου την κατὰ τὸ εἴδος οὐσίαν ἀπεφιάματο φυχὴν ὑπάρχειν), but his own usage in the context of *psychē* almost always suggests the physical, material aspects of the word (‘substance stuff’), rather than the ontologically restricted sense of ‘a real entity’ . . . [In] a particularly clear case, see [PHP]. 7.4.12 for an *ousia* that physically ‘fills’ the pupils and ‘distends’ their membrane” (Smith, “Very Thin Things,” 56–57, n. 63). Von Staden too stresses the soul’s implicit materiality in Galen’s system: after admitting that Galen, even in his late work, *On My Own Opinions* (Prop.Plac.), “cannot answer the question what *psychē* [the soul] is or how it appears in the body, or exactly why soul is separated from body under various conditions,” von Staden observes, “Yet Galen freely deploys the word *psychē*, making the soul central to his conception of the living body, and he offers numerous detailed comments on interactions between soul and body and, similarly, on the structure, capacities, activities, dysfunctions, and instruments of the soul” (“Body, Soul, and Nerves,” 106). Thus, while Galen does not unequivocally state that the soul is a material substance, not only does the soul function and dwell within a physical world according to Galen, his doubts about its substance do not necessarily need to be read as doubts about its materiality; see Smith, “Very Fine Things,” 36–80, esp. 55–69.

peers. Additionally, because the *Paedagogus* is not a treatise on the nature of the soul, such as Aristotle’s *De Anima* or the *De Anima* of Tertullian (c. 155–c. 240), nor a report of anatomical experiments on the soul as Galen gives his readers in *PHP*, but a manual for living, it gives us a picture of the ancient soul as an object in action. The *Paedagogus* presents us not with a theory about the soul, but with an object that is being used. Through the *Paedagogus*, we can thus see the soul as an object with practical uses, rather than being just a topic of theoretical speculation.

Building on previous scholarship that has drawn attention to ancient ideas about the soul’s materiality, this dissertation examines the ancient soul’s objective and material presence upon the ancient body. I use the *Paedagogus* as a test-case for exploring the problematics and effects of the soul’s materialization—to ask how and with what effects the soul became an objective thing in and on the body. In the process, I seek to contribute to research on Clement of Alexandria in early Christian studies by illuminating how attention to the soul’s bodily presence and materiality affects our understanding of Clement’s ethics. At the same time, this dissertation attempts to show how implicit Cartesian perspectives have biased the modern study of the ancient soul, both within and beyond scholarship on early Christianity.

**Clement of Alexandria and the Paedagogus**

Clement of Alexandria is generally studied as one of the key representatives of early Christian thought. According to Eusebius of Caesarea (c. 260/5–339/40), the historian who provides a large amount of our evidence for Christianity in the second and third centuries, Clement was the head of an important Alexandrian catechetical school (*Hist.*
In this role, he is remembered in Christian tradition as a major figure in the history of Christianity in Alexandria, which was one of the few centers of Christianity that could rival Rome in authority and status. Although not the focus of as much modern scholarship as Justin Martyr (c. 100–c. 165), Tertullian (c. 155–c. 240), or Origen (184/85–253/54), Clement is widely acknowledged as important for providing our earliest evidence for Alexandrian Christianity and as among the first Christian thinkers to harmonize Christianity with Greek philosophy.¹⁸

We know very little about Clement himself. Eusebius’ *Church History* is our only significant ancient source on his life (*Hist. eccl.* 6.1.1–6.14.9). Even there, most of Eusebius’ comments about Clement are made in passing, added to fill in context for Origen’s life, Alexandrian Christianity, and the alleged Christian school in Alexandria.¹⁹ On the basis of these comments, scholars have suggested that Clement was born around 150 and began to study in Alexandria under the Christian teacher Pantaenus around 180.²⁰ Clement, a brilliant student, eventually succeeded Pantaenus as the head teacher of some type of school in Alexandria.²¹ Clement’s most important student was Origen (*Hist.

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¹⁸ In his large 1914 two volume work on Clement’s life, *Clement of Alexandria: A Study in Christian Liberalism*, Tollinton set the tone for much of twentieth century scholarship on Clement, seeing his use of Greek philosophical material positively, as part of a generous and “liberal” Christianity; see more below.

¹⁹ We have no firsthand references to of this school, only Eusebius’ account. Clement never mentions it, and its very existence is a debated topic in modern scholarship. Van den Hoek (“‘Catechetical’ School”) is the most recent defender of the view that Eusebius’ references to this school have significant credibility. Much of the scholarly debate concerns how formal such an institution would or could have been at this time. See further Ashwin-Siejkowska, *Clement of Alexandria*, 31–37; Cosaert, *Text of the Gospels*, 7–9; Ferguson, “Introduction,” 9–10; Le Boulluec, “école d’Alexandrie”; idem, “Aux origines”; Osborn, *Clement of Alexandria*, 19–24.


²¹ I.e., either an informal school or an ecclesiastically commissioned catechetical school. Notably, even those scholars who do not hold to a strict view of the existence of an ecclesiastical catechetical school usually believe that Clement was Pantaenus’ student.
eccl. 6.6.1), who would become one of the most influential thinkers for forging Christian theology, even despite the controversy surrounding him.

According to the conventional scholarly reconstruction of Clement’s life, he fled Alexandria in 202/3 in the wake of Severus’ persecution. On the basis of a letter by Alexandria of Cappadocia, preserved only in Eusebius’ *Church History* (6.11.6), Clement is generally believed to have fled to Caesarea in Palestine and then at least traveled to Antioch. In this letter, which would have been written in 211, Alexander refers to Clement with the term πρεσβύτερος, but it is unclear whether this should be taken as a technical term for a church office. Clement himself never mentions holding any official title in the church. In a second letter, this one from Alexander to Origen—and, again, preserved only in Eusebius’ *Church History* (*Hist. eccl.* 6.14.8–9)—Alexander describes Clement as having passed away. This letter is generally dated to 215/16, thus providing a provisional *terminus ante quem* for Clement’s death.

Unfortunately, apart from Eusebius, we know almost nothing about Clement of

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22 A problem for those following Eusebius here is that Origen never mentions Clement, which one would expect him to do if he was Clement’s student. Furthermore, in an alleged letter from Alexandria to Origen that is preserved in Eusebius (*Hist. eccl.* 6.14.8–9), Alexander describes Clement as his [Alexander’s] master and teacher, but not as “our” master and teacher, which it seems he would have done if Origen was also a student of Clement; see Karavites, *Evil, Freedom, and the Road to Perfection*, 4–5.

23 Eusebius himself was closely linked to Origen, which is perhaps one reason why he stresses a long line of continuity and authority in Alexandrian teaching and tradition. If Eusebius can position himself as a legitimate heir to a long and respectable line of authoritative Christianity, one not rooted in Rome, then his own orthodoxy is in more stable a condition, even if it is linked to Origen and questionable Christological positions; see Grant, *Eusebius as Church Historian*, esp. 45–59.

24 According to Eusebius, this would be the same persecution that Origen’s father, Leonides died under (*Hist. eccl.* 6.1.1), thus giving scholars a possible reason why Origen, if he was Clement’s pupil, makes no mention of him: Clement not only fled persecution and martyrdom, but fled the very persecution under which Origen’s father died.


26 Cosaert, *Text of the Gospels*, 10; in the second letter, Alexander only refers to him as “holy” (6.14.8–9) perhaps suggesting that “presbyter” is also more a generic reference than a technical term.
Alexandria, not even whether he was actually Clement of Alexandria. Epiphanius of Salamis (c. 310/20–403) says that while some called him Clement of Alexandria, others called him Clement of Athens (Pan. 32.6.1). It is Eusebius who tells us that, according to the title of his Stromateis, Clement’s full name was Titus Flavius Clemens (Hist. eccl. 6.13.1). The origins of his Latin name, if it was his name, are unknown. Perhaps his family had, at some point, been made Roman citizens by the Flavians. Jerome (c. 347–420) makes two short comments about Clement’s vast knowledge (Vir. ill. 38, Epist. 70.4), and Cyril of Alexandria (c. 378–444) praises his knowledge of “Greek history” (Adv. Iul. 6.215). Yet these are the only significant references to Clement within the first hundred or so years of his life.

Our lack of knowledge about Clement and his life is due in part to Clement’s near total reticence about himself. He tells us almost nothing about his background in his writings. Toward the beginning of the Stromateis, however, Clement does list his

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27 Cosaert (Text of the Gospels, 4–5) suggests that Clement’s full name may come from “T. Flavius Clements, a distinguished Roman aristocrat of the imperial Flavian family, who was put to death by the emperor Domitian, his cousin, on the charge of ‘atheism’ [asebeia]. The charge may suggest his sympathy with Judaism or a conversion to Christianity; it is impossible to know for sure”; see Cassius Dio, Roman History 67.14.

28 See Ashwin-Siejkowski (Clement of Alexandria, 90–91) on Clement’s limited influence on later Christian thinkers. See Stählin, Clemens Alexandrinus vierter Band; Register, 59–65 for later references to Clement and L. Früchtel, et al., Clemens Alexandrinus, 3.195–230 for “fragments” of Clement that have been preserved by later authors, most coming from Eusebius or much later.

29 To be sure, some have claimed to find hints about Clement’s past in his writings. Karavites, for example, reads Clement’s discussion of the Eleusinian Mysteries (Protr. 2.22) as a first-person account, and therefore as evidence that Clement was born outside the faith (Évil, Freedom, and the Road to Perfection, 4). John Ferguson, in his introduction to his translation of the Stromateis (“Introduction,” 3), cites Paedagogus 1.1.1; 2.8.62 as evidence that Clement was a convert and “knew the pagan religions from within.” Similarly, Karavites (Évil, Freedom, and the Road to Perfection, 4) cites Paed. 1.1.2 as evidence that Clement was a convert: “He [Clement] had probably finished his basic study when he accepted Christianity, something that we surmise from his statement that the new religion made him feel young once more (Paed. 1.1.2).” This seems a particularly strained reading of Paed. 1.1.2. These passages provide only the thinnest of evidence for reaching any such conclusion about Clement’s life. Eusebius does claim that Clement was a convert (Dem. ev. 2.2.64). Yet Clement himself never states directly in his extant writings that he was a convert, or, conversely, that he grew up in the faith.
teachers: “One of these [teachers], the Ionian, came from Greece; others from greater Greece: one from Coele-Syria, another from Egypt. Others were from the East: one from among the Assyrians, another from Palestine, born a Hebrew” (Strom. 1.1.11.2). But he was not satisfied with these teachers until he found the last one, who was “hiding” in Egypt. Clement indicates that all of his teachers were Christian, claiming that they preserved the tradition of Peter, James, John, and Paul (Strom. 1.11.2). Ferguson, Osborn, and Cosaert take this list of the geographical origins of his teacher as Clement’s travelogue, and Karavites and others have further speculated about whom his teachers might have been (e.g., Melito of Sardis, Bardeus, Tatian, Theophilus of Caesarea, Theodotus). It is worth noting, however, that such lists of teachers were a stock part of philosophic self-presentation in Clement’s time; the variety of the teachers he lists might be less the product of his biography than a literary trope, not least because he chooses to describe them by their geographic origins only, leaving out their names and affiliations.

In another work, Clement does refer by name to Pantaenus, describing him as “our Pantaenus” (Ecl. 56.2), but only there and only in that one instance. In his list in

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30 Clement, Strom. 1.1.11.2: τούτων ὁ μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς Ἑλλάδος, ὁ Ἰωνικός, οἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τῆς Μεγάλης Ἑλλάδος (τῆς κοιλῆς θάτερος αὐτῶν Σωρίας ἦν, δὲ ἀπ’ Αἰγύπτου), ἄλλοι δὲ ἀνὰ τὴν ἀνατολὴν· καὶ ταύτης ὁ μὲν τῆς τῶν Ἀσσυρίων, δὲ ἐν Παλαιστίνῃ Ἑβραῖος ἀνέκαθεν. Eusebius (Hist. eccl. 6.13.8) ignores this lineage of teachers for Clement, preferring instead to highlight Clement’s proximity to the successors of the apostles, which Clement himself alludes to in the next line (Strom. 1.1.11.3).

31 There is no reason to doubt that Clement was residing in Egypt, in Alexandria. Nevertheless, it should be said that we do not even know this for sure. Even in this passage (Strom. 1.1.11.1–2), where Clement claims to rest upon finding his final teacher in Egypt, Clement does not necessarily say that he settled permanently in Egypt, only that he stopped traveling in search for a master teacher.

32 Ferguson, “Introduction,” 3; Osborn, Clement of Alexandria, 1; Cosaert, Text of the Gospels, 6; Karavites, Evil, Freedom, and the Road to Perfection, 3.

33 E.g., Josephus, Vita 2; Justin Martyr, Dial. 2; Galen, Aff.Dig. 5.41–42.

34 Eusebius says that he mentions Pantaenus in the Hypotyposeis, a work that is no longer extant (Hist. eccl. 6.13.2).
the *Stromateis* (1.1.1.2), however, Clement describes his final teacher only as “a real Sicilian bee, plucking flowers from the prophetic and apostolic meadow, he generated in the souls of those listening a treasure of pure knowledge” (*Strom. 1.1.1.2*). Many scholars correlate this reference to Eusebius’ description of Pantaenus as Clement’s teacher and predecessor as head of the catechetical school in Alexandria (*Hist. eccl. 6.6.1*). It remains, however, that we know very little about Clement’s life apart from Eusebius’ later account of it, which is significantly shaped by the aim of retrospectively constructing a lineage of scholastic succession that parallels the apostolic succession of bishops and connects Alexandria to Caesarea.

We do, however, have ample evidence for Clement’s writings, which are mentioned in ancient sources but also preserved and copied well into the Middle Ages. Eusebius ascribes ten works to Clement (*Hist. eccl. 6.13.1–6.14.7*), and five of them have survived in some substantial form: (1) the *Stromateis* (*Miscellanies*), a lengthy work on Christian teaching, (2) the *Protrepticus* (*Exhortation to the Greeks*), a treatise that condemns much in Greek thinking and teaching in favor of Christianity, (3) the *Paedagogus* (*Tutor, or Instructor*), an exhortation focused upon practical living, (4) *Quis dives salvetur* (*Who is the Rich Man Who is Being Saved?*), a homily on Mark 10:17–31; and (5) *To the Recently Baptized*, a shorter work. The five other works Eusebius describes are lost or survive only in small fragments: (6) *Hypotyposes*, (7) *On the

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35 Clement, *Strom. 1.1.1.2*: Σικελικὴ τῷ ὄντι ἵνα μέλιται προφητικὸ τε καὶ ἀποστολικὸ λειμὼν τὰ ἀνθρωπόμος ἀκήριτών τι γνώσεως χρήμα ταῖς τῶν ὁμολογών ἐνεγέννησεν φυσικά.


37 See Grant, *Eusebius as Church Historian*. 
Pascha, (8) On Fasting, (9) On Slander, (10) Against the Judaizers (Ecclesiastical Canon). In addition, Clement himself seems to refer to two other works that are no longer extant, namely: On Resurrection (Paed. 1.6.47.1) and On Continence (Paed. 2.10.94.1). Three other works also circulated with some association to Clement in a capacity as commentator or composer of an introduction, namely: Excerpts of Theodotos, Eclogues of the Prophets, and a letter claiming to contain a secret version of the Gospel of Mark.

In the case of the Paedagogus, it survives in a cluster of related manuscripts from the tenth century and following: Codex Arethae, Parisinus gr. 451 (P), Mutinensis Misc. gr. 126: α. S. 5.9 (M), and Laurentianus V 24 (F).38 Codex Arethae was likely an exemplar for the other two, and it is most telling with respect to this work’s reception. According to the notations on fol. 401v, the manuscript was copied between September 913 and August 914 by a scribe named Baanes (P1) for Arethas, the archbishop of Caesarea in Cappadocia, who corrected Baanes’ text (P2). Arethas (ca. 850–post 932) was a leading Byzantine scholar of his time, and he commissioned the copying of many ancient Greek manuscripts, including selections of Plato, Aristotle, Lucian, Aelius Aristides, Dio Chrysostom, and Plutarch.39 This particular manuscript includes multiple early Christian writings, including many reflecting on the relationship between Christianity and Hellenism: Clement, Protrepticus (1r–56v); Clement, Paedagogus (57r–154v); Ps.-Justin, Epistula ad Zenam et Serenum (155r–163v); Ps.-Justin, Cohortatio ad Graecos (163v–187v); Tatian’s Oratio ad Graecos (no longer extant but originally placed between what is now 187v and 188r); Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica (188r–322r);

38 See the Appendix for a full description of these manuscripts and modern editions based upon them. 39 On Arethas and tenth-century Byzantine manuscripts, see Pontani, “Scholarship in the Byzantine Empire,” 342–45, as well as further details below in the Appendix.
Athenagoras, *Legatio pro Christianis* (322\textsuperscript{v}–348\textsuperscript{r}); Athenagoras, *De resurrection mortuorum* (348\textsuperscript{v}–367\textsuperscript{r}); Eusebius, *Contra Hieroclem* (368\textsuperscript{r}–401\textsuperscript{v}).\textsuperscript{40}

The context of this Byzantine interest in Clement thus presages a major theme in modern scholarship about him, namely, his relationship to Greek philosophy. Piotr Ashwin-Siejkowski, for instance, describes debates over Clement’s use of Greek philosophy as the “classic dilemma” in studying Clement’s philosophy:

The classic dilemma facing scholars in their approach to Clement’s philosophical legacy may be summed up by the two following questions. Was Clement of Alexandria a Platonist, who, like Philo before him expressed his faith in a Platonic/Hellenistic form and language? Or, was he a profound Christian who “baptized” Platonism much as Aquinas later “baptized” Aristotelianism?\textsuperscript{41}

This is the dilemma that has more broadly defined modern scholarship on Clement. As Eric Osborn has shown, questions about Clement’s philosophy have dominated scholarship about him for a hundred years.\textsuperscript{42} In addition, this concern has also shaped the other dominant line of inquiry in research on Clement, namely, the task of mapping and understanding Clement’s quotations of, allusions to, and borrowing from other works, “pagan,” Jewish, and Christian alike.\textsuperscript{43} This latter interest derives in part from the most salient feature of Clement’s writing: his extensive use of other texts. He quotes, borrows from, and alludes to other literary, philosophical, theological, and scriptural works widely and frequently. He not only employs Christian texts, but also Jewish and non-Christian Greek writers. Accordingly, over one hundred years of scholarship on Clement has been driven by interest in his use of “pagan” material, particularly Greek philosophy.

\textsuperscript{40} Marcovich, “Codex Arethae and Tatian,” 307–12; Bailey, “Arethas of Caesarea,” 18, n. 62.
\textsuperscript{41} Ashwin-Siejkowski, *Clement of Alexandria*, 3.
\textsuperscript{42} Osborn, “One Hundred Years.”
\textsuperscript{43} See van den Hoek, *Clement of Alexandria and His Use of Philo*, 1–19, esp. 1–4.
Osborn counts Clement as quoting or referencing “the Old Testament” 3,200 times and “the New Testament” more than 5,000 times, along with 348 different “classical authors.” To get a better sense of the salience of Clement’s quotation practices, especially when compared to other early Christian authors, I borrow from Wilhelm Krause’ helpful list, which shows the number of times Clement directly quotes another text to the number of times that other early Christian authors directly quote from other texts. As can be seen below, this chart not only demonstrates the sheer number of times Clement quotes from other authors, but also demonstrates how much more he does so in comparison to other early Christian authors:

![Direct Citations Table]

44 Osborn, “Clement and the Bible,” 121.
45 As van den Hoek counts it, Stählin’s index lists 462 sources referenced in Clement’s corpus: 42 Old Testament, 25 New Testament, 32 early Christian, and 363 non-Christian; in terms of volume, van den Hoek uses Stählin’s index to count 1273 references to Paul, 618 to Plato, 279 to Philo, 243 to Homer, 183 to Plutarch, 117 to Euripides; others like Chrysippus and Herodotus also fill columns of Stählin’s index; see van den Hoek, “Techniques of Quotation,” 227.
46 Krause (Stellung der frühchristlichen Autoren, 126–29) provides the numbers, but I borrow from the charts that van den Hoek (Clement of Alexandria and His Use of Philo, 1–2, n. 1) and Dinan (“Fragments in Context,” 2) make from Krause’s statistics. This chart is useful insofar as it highlights the massive quantity of Clement’s quotations as well as how much more he uses quotations from sources that are not Christian or Jewish in comparison to other early Christian authors. On the other hand, the chart is highly problematic. As van den Hoek notes, Krause’s numbers are based on indices of various editions, each of which employ different methodologies for determining what counts as a quotation. Furthermore, the distinction between the New Testament and Christian writing is not altogether tenable at this early date, nor is the “Old Testament” an entirely clear category in the first centuries of the Common Era.
This theme, Clement’s use of other works, has paced scholarship on Clement since at
least 1592, when Friedrich Sylburg added a list of authors cited by Clement to his
“virtual copy” of the 1550 editio princeps of Clement’s writings. Sylburg’s list was
updated and replaced in Potter’s 1715 edition of Clement’s writings with an extensive
Quellenforschung, which grew further in Stählin’s magisterial edition of Clement,
published in three volumes in 1905, 1906, and 1909. Stählin, in addition to adding a
greatly expanded Quellenforschung in the text, also published an index of Clement’s
citations in 1936 as the fourth volume to his edition of Clement’s works. Marcovich, in
his 1995 edition of the Protrepticus and 2002 edition of the Paedagogus further refined
Stählin’s Parallelbelege.

It is not just the modern editions of Clement’s writings that evince a fascination
with the relation between Clement and his sources of thought and writing. The history of
modern research on Clement is a story of the slow uncovering of Clement’s complex

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47 Sylburg separated Greek authors from “the holy scriptures,” the New Testament, Christian apocrypha,
heretics, heretical sects, and epitomists.
48 Marcovich, Clementis Alexandrini: Paedagogus, x.
49 Stählin classifies the types of citations that Clement makes as coming from the “Old Testament,” the
50 For a fuller review of the modern editions of the Paedagogus, see the Appendix.
debts to and uses of “pagan,” Christian, and Jewish literature.\footnote{This line of scholarship shifts from an initial focus upon Clement’s sources and his use of Greek philosophy (Scheck, De fontibus Clementine Alexandrini [1889]; Barnard, Biblical Text of Clement of Alexandria [1899]; Stählin, Clemens Alexandrinus Und Die Septuaginta [1901]) to being primarily interested in how Clement Christianized or deployed this “pagan” material for his Christian purposes (de Faye, Clément d’Alexandrie [1898]; Patrick, Clement of Alexandria [1914]; Tollinton, Clement of Alexandria: A Study in Christian Liberalism [1914]; Claude Mondésert, Clément d’Alexandrie, [1944]; Quatember, christliche Lebenshaltung [1946]. Völker, wahre Gnostiker [1952]; Osborn, Philosophy of Clement of Alexandria [1957]; Bernard, apologetische Methode [1968]). P.J.C. Gussen (Het leven in Alexandrië [1955]) breaks with this conversation, to ask whether Clement’s quotations of classical authors reflected life in the second century, or if the quotations were primarily literary and rhetorical. S. R. C. Lilla’s 1971 study (Clement of Alexandria) challenged the trend of interpreting Clement as employing Greek philosophy and sources for his own purposes, proposing instead that Clement was heavily indebted to “Jewish-Alexandrine philosophy,” Middle Platonism, and “Gnosticism.” Lilla, however, did not end the conversation; Dietmar Wyrwa, (christliche Platonaneignung [1983]) and Ulrich Schneider, (Theologie als christliche Philosophie [1999]) continued to probe into Clement’s use of Greek philosophy, with the former interested particularly in Clement’s use of Plato in the Stromateis and the latter in the structure of Clement’s thought. Arkadi Choufrine (Gnosis, Theophany, Theosis [2002]) also set out to refute Lilla’s depiction of the influence of Greek philosophy on Clement’s thought. Anniewies van den Hoek, in a book (Clement of Alexandria and His Use of Philo [1988]) and a series of articles (“Clement and Origen” [1995]; eadem, “Techniques of Quotation” [1996]) returns to some of the more basic questions about Clement’s borrowing, namely his techniques and methods of quotation. Two technical studies on biblical texts in Clement’s writings have appeared in the past thirty-five years: Mees, Zitate aus dem NT bei Clemens von Alexandria (1970); and Cosaert, Text of the Gospels (2008).}

As early as 1886, Paul Wendland demonstrated loud echoes of Epictetus, Lucian, and Musonius Rufus existed in Clement’s writing, with the latter two bearing particularly acute influence on Books 2 and 3 of the Paedagogus.\footnote{Wendland, Quaestiones Musonianae, 3–37; see Dinan (“Fragments in Context,” 1–5) for a fuller list of studies on Clement’s citations.} So convinced is he of Clement’s dependence on Musonius Rufus, Wendland even attempted to use one of Clement’s chapters (Paed. 3.6) to reconstruct part of the lost work of Musonius.\footnote{Wendland, Quaestiones Musonianae, 64–66.} Wendland, in one of the first monographs on Clement, thus shows the striking parallels that exist between Clement’s writing and that of other first- and second-century moral philosophers, especially between Musonius Rufus and the second and third books of the Paedagogus.\footnote{In 1906–1909 Johannes Gabrielsson (Über die Quellen, 2 vols.) found further evidence of Clement’s use of “pagan” authors; Gabrielsson points to similarities between Plutarch’s writings and Clement’s admonitions in the Paedagogus (vol. 1 80–85).}
Significantly, for my purposes, many of these parallels pertain to the soul. Confirming and expanding on Wendland’s work, for instance, S. R. C. Lilla draws attention to the connections between Clement’s ethics and those of Middle Platonists such as Albinus, Apuleius, Plutarch and Philo (if Philo should be classified as a Middle Platonist), as well as that of Aristotle. Lilla finds one particularly dense moment of agreement among several usually very different ancient philosophers when discussing Clement’s comments about the logos’ power to heal the pathē of the soul, which clust most densely in the Paedagogus. The unlikely coalition of Plato, Chrysippus, Posidonius, Galen, Philo, and Clement all agree that the soul needs to be healed of its pathē.

Similarly, Teresa Shaw has shown how Clement’s ethics are based, in part, on an idea he shared with Epictetus, Musonius Rufus, the unknown authors of the so-called “Cynic Epistles,” Plutarch, and Galen: the notion that the soul is subject to the physiological processes of the body. Shaw has demonstrated that Clement holds in common with these first- and second-century thinkers the belief that ethical behavior is dependent upon the body’s physiology, at least to a degree. Diet and exercise can make the soul good or bad. In a recent article focusing on Clement’s Paedagogus and Quis dives salvetur, H. Michael White bolsters and furthers Shaw’s argument by establishing the centrality of the soul’s need for healing in Clement’s ethics, positing Clement’s

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55 Lilla, Clement of Alexandria, 60–117.
56 Lilla, Clement of Alexandria, 96.
57 Lilla, Clement of Alexandria, 96-103.
58 Shaw, Burden of the Flesh, 27–63.
dependence for this idea on previous Greek moral philosophers, especially Musonius Rufus.\textsuperscript{59}

My dissertation builds upon these past studies, which have charted the intersections between the \textit{Paedagogus} and first- and second-century moral philosophers, highlighting commonalities that center around shared assumptions about the soul, particularly its physicality and need for healing. Even though these past studies are largely framed in terms of the search for “parallels” and “influence,” their results invite us to rethink Clement’s relationship to his “pagan” contemporaries. It is clear that he reads and quotes a number of other authors. At least in the case of the \textit{Paedagogus}, however, this “borrowing” might be best understood in terms of a common object, the physically-affected and diseased soul.

The \textit{Paedagogus’} close links to Greek moral philosophy makes it an especially interesting site for investigating the materiality of the soul as it operates in practice, not just in theories about the soul. Conversely, the thick web of assumptions about the soul’s physicality and need for healing invite us to think about the soul in terms of how and why so many of the ancient moral philosophers in the first and second centuries shared so many assumptions about it. Past scholarship on Clement has amply proven the depth of connections between his thought and Stoic, Platonic, and Middle-Platonic philosophies. The very difficulty in trying to pinpoint the precise lodestar that determines Clement’s connections to Greek moral philosophers, however, raises questions about what is shared between them. In addition to beliefs, I suggest that they shared an object: the material

\textsuperscript{59} White, “Moral Pathology”; White counts forty-three direct quotations of Musonius Rufus in \textit{Paedagogus} Books 2–3 (“Moral Pathology, 301).
soul.

The Material Soul

To understand this material soul, I suggest that it is necessary to set aside those Cartesian assumptions that have shaped modern scholarship on the soul, in general, and in early Christianity, more specifically. Galen was far from the only ancient thinker to place the soul in a nexus of physical causes and effects that defies Cartesian dualism. As Teresa Shaw has demonstrated, ancient moral philosophy, especially in the first and second centuries C.E., was largely premised upon the effects of diet and exercise upon the soul. Epictetus, Musonius Rufus, the unknown authors of the so-called “Cynic Epistles,” Plutarch, Galen (again), and Clement of Alexandria each saw the soul as subject to the physiological processes of the body.60

Meat, for example, was commonly thought to weigh the soul down and inhibit its functioning. This view was not confined to a particular school. Musonius Rufus, a Stoic, taught that

[Meat] is heavy (βαρυτέραν) and an impediment to reasoning and thinking, for the muddy vapor61 from it casts a shadow over the soul. Consequently, those who use much of it, appear slower in thought. (Musonius Rufus, frag. 18a.17–20)

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\text{βαρυτέραν καὶ τῷ νοεῖν τι καὶ φρονεῖν ἐμπόδιον· τὴν γὰρ ἀναθυμίασιν τὴν ἀπ’ αὐτῆς θολωδετέραν ὡσεὶ ἐπισκοτεῖν τῇ φυχῇ· παρὸ καὶ βραδυτέρους φαίνεσθαι τὴν διάνοιαν τοὺς πλείον ταῦτῃ χρωμένους.}
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Plutarch, a Platonist, also believed that the heaviness of meat “dulls” (ἀμβλύνω) the soul’s reason, which “is kindled by plain and light matter” (ὠσπερ ἐκ λιτῆς καὶ ἐλαφρᾶς

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60 Shaw, Burden of the Flesh, 27–63.
61 On vapor (ἀναθυμίασις), cf. Aristotle, Meteph. 365b22; Porphyry, Abst.1.47; Heraclitus, 12; Galen, UP 11.14.
It was not just meat that affected the soul. Stoics, Platonists, and Cynics all assumed that “bodily behaviors, regimen, and lifestyle” affected the condition of the soul. Claiming that a physician is better suited to inculcate virtue in the soul than a philosopher, Galen even wrote an entire work, *The Faculties of the Soul Follow the Mixtures of the Body (QAM)*, on how the mixtures of the body, determined themselves by diet and regimen, affect the capacities and virtue of the soul.

Those who do not think that the soul is either benefitted or harmed by the mixtures of the body have nothing to say concerning the differences in behavior and affection of soul between children, nor do they have any reason to give for the benefits we derive from diet, nor the differences in character between those who are hot-tempered and those who are not, those who are smart and those who do not appear to be. (*QAM* K 819–20)

Assumptions about the impact of physiological processes and physical states upon the soul ran deep throughout antiquity. Even Plato, famous today for his dualism, depicts the soul as possessing physical qualities. As Gregory A. Smith notes, this is true even in Plato’s most dualistic work, the *Phaedo*:

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63 Shaw, *Burden of the Flesh*, 42.
64 As Smith (“Very Thin Things,” 59, n. 74) notes, “Throughout *An.mor. [QAM]* Galen advances the proposition that the soul’s οὐσία—including (perhaps) even the rational part—is a κράσις or ‘mixture’, whether of the four qualities of matter (K 4.774) or of the body or specific parts thereof (K 4.782, 4.785, 4.787, etc.).”
65 See *QAM* K 768.
66 Brooke Holmes gives a helpful list of passages in which Plato depicts “The body as that which contaminates or defiles or maims the soul”: *Resp.* 611b–c; *Phaed.* 67a–b, 80e–81c, or *Tim.* 86d–e, where “people are involuntarily bad because of bodily constitution”; Holmes, “Body, Soul, and Medical Analogy,” 379, n. 95.
For the idea that souls could be weighed down by immoderate living, later authors could rely in part on the authority of Plato, who had advanced the theory that some people allow their souls to become so “permeated with the corporeal” by overindulgence in food and sex that the soul itself becomes “heavy,” “dragged back to the visible region.” Evidence for this was as close as a graveyard, where the shadowy apparitions people sometimes see lurking around the tombs are just these wretchedly ponderous and visible souls [Plato, *Phaedo* 81B–D]. This account, from the mouth of Socrates in no less “dualistic” a dialogue than the *Phaedo*, remained current if not precisely popular throughout later antiquity. Origen, Porphyry, Iamblichus, Gregory of Nyssa, Proclus, and John Philoponus cite or allude to it with approval. 67

Far from existing in a distinct and separate world from that of the body, therefore, the soul, even as it was often named as the body’s opposite, was nevertheless widely assumed to be intimately linked to the body’s physiological processes. Perhaps the only description of the soul that could offend Cartesian sensibilities more than the idea that the body’s physiology affects the soul’s character is the claim that the soul is materially constituted. Once again, ancient ideas about the soul defy modern expectations: the ancient soul was widely and regularly understood to be a fine-mattered substance.

Despite hints of the dualism familiar to Cartesians in the writings of Plato, Plotinus, and then Augustine, 68 philosophers and physicians before Plotinus commonly assumed that the soul was composed of a fine-mattered substance, as Gregory A. Smith has convincingly demonstrated. Smith surveys a wide range of second-century sources, including literary works by the physician Galen and by Christian authors like Tatian, Athenagoras, Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, and Origen, and the *Corpus Hermeticum* and the Chaldean Oracles, as well as “magical” materials. From this synchronic survey, he corrects the widespread assumption that materialist ideas about the

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soul were limited just to a few philosophical positions. Smith shows how these materialist ideas were “fundamental and ubiquitous throughout Roman and later antiquity” and appealed “with surprising consistency across conventional religious and intellectual boundaries,” even among Platonists and Christians.

The soul’s presumed materiality, however, did not prevent Greek thinkers from pitting the body against the soul. They too were dualists. This has led to much confusion, in as much as ancient soul/body dualism has often been mistaken for modern Cartesian dualism. Yet, the difference between the two dualisms is that ancient Greek soul/body dualism was not based upon opposing material substances to immaterial entities. The defining difference between the body and the soul was the density of the matter that composed each. Souls were composed of a thinner, lighter matter than the heavy matter of which bodies were made (hence Musonius Rufus’ worries about the effects of “heavy” meat upon the light soul). In antiquity, therefore, the soul was the body’s opposite, not because it was immaterial, but because it was composed of a different type of matter.

All of this—Galen’s experiments, the moral philosophers’ warnings about physiological dangers to the soul, the practice of physiognomy, the widespread belief in the soul’s materiality—resists Cartesian frames, where the soul is either defined as categorically opposed to the physical, material world, or assumed to be a primitive way of describing the neurological mind. Yet such a perspective has nevertheless shaped the modern study of ancient references to the soul. In particular, it has contributed to the

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71 MacDonald, History of the Concept of Mind, 279–361.
assumption that the study of the ancient soul is the study of an *idea*, where the chief tasks are to identify and outline ancient theories of the soul, to delineate lines of influence between these theories and ideas about the soul, and to identify key moments of innovation when new theories and ideas about the soul were first formulated and proposed.

Erwin Rohde initiated the modern study of the soul by opening his seminal 1894 work on the subject with this telling sentence: “Dieses Buch will, indem es die *Meinungen* der Greichen von dem Leben der menschlichen Seele nach dem Tode darlegt, einem Beitrag zu einer Geschichte griechischer Religion geben.”

Rohde and his later followers focused on ancient opinions, ideas, and theories—the *Meinungen*—about the soul. It is in this sense that Cartesian perspectives on the nature of the soul have led scholars from the very beginning of modern research on the soul on a quest to map and define the history of ancient ideas about it.

To be sure, theories of the soul do play a prominent role in all of the most important Greek philosophers and schools. The scholarly attention given to the ideas of Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, Chrysippus and the Stoics, and Plotinus about the soul

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72 Emphasis mine. Rohde, *Psyche, Seelencult und Unsterblichkeitsglaube*, viii. (The quote comes from the preface to the first edition (1894), although I have cited it from the more widely available 1903 third edition).


74 Plato’s references to and discussions of the soul are extensive. The classic study of the topic is Robinson, *Plato’s Psychology*. Important recent works include Bolotin, “Life of Philosophy and the Immortality of the Soul”; Bobonich, *Plato’s Utopia Recast*; Lorenz, *Brute Within*; Moss, “Pleasure and Illusion in Plato.”

is thus unsurprising. Modern scholarship on the soul in early Christianity has followed a similar pattern, mapping early Christian ideas about the soul and comparing them to the ideas and theories of the soul held by Greek and Latin philosophers and schools.

Among ancient “pagan” and Christian thinkers, it is clear that the soul was a topic of theorization and speculation. Something is missed, however, when the ancient soul is approached solely from the perspective of the history of ideas. The epistemological frame used to approach the ancient soul determines a priori that the soul is (only) an idea, that the self and/or “the subject” are not things or objects, and that they do not possess corporeal presence. When the soul is approached as solely an idea, the potential ways in which subjects and objects, ideas and matter, intersect and constitute one another are thus obfuscated. By selectively focusing on ancient theories and ideas about the soul, we thus risk underwriting the modern soul/body dualism, which categorically separates ideas and things, subjects and objects, thoughts and bodies.

As a result, modern scholarship has skewed its attention to the most philosophically abstract discussions about the soul in antiquity, ignoring or downplaying...
references to the soul’s materiality and its place in the body. Those few studies that have attended to ancient conversations about the soul’s embeddedness in materiality and the body’s physiology are still largely carried out under the banner of Descartes. These studies approach ancient references to the materiality of the soul and its place in the body as abstract philosophical propositions about the soul’s materiality, as theories about the soul and its relation to materiality. This is a Cartesian frame, where the soul is essentially a thing that is thought, a thing that is theorized (even if it is a theory about the soul’s materiality), as opposed to a thing that has a physically objectivity, sometimes even bloody, presence in and on the body.

The ancient soul, however, does not have to be studied within a tacitly Cartesian framework. Despite the widespread influence of Descartes’ work—so much so that Cartesian dualism is almost synonymous with modernity—there has long been alternative constructions of the relationship(s) between matter, thought, bodies, agency, normative ideals, and selves, even in modernity. In particular, Baruch Spinoza, Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud, Jacques Lacan, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty have provided stimulating alternative perspectives on how matter relates to thought and bodies to selves. In addition, newer tides of critical theory, especially within gender studies, have further challenged the still pervasive mind/body dualism of Descartes, calling for the

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81 Pierre Hadot (Philosophy as a Way of Life) has critiqued the modern scholarly assumption of the abstract nature of ancient philosophy, arguing that ancient philosophy was practical in its aims, more a way of living than a quest for abstract propositional truth. Although influenced by Hadot, I here focus upon the problematics of the soul’s materialization, rather than upon the practices of philosophy.

82 E.g., von Staden, “Body, Soul, Nerves”; Gill, Naturalistic Philosophy; idem, “Philosophical Therapy”; Hankinson, “Galen’s Anatomy of Soul”; Donini, “Psychology”; see further below.

relationships between materiality, the self, thought, the body, agency, normative ideals, and objects to be rethought. Overlapping with these efforts to rethink the body/soul relationship, as well as with each other, “new materialists” and those working within what has been called “object-oriented ontology,” such as Jane Bennett, Bruno Latour, and John Law, have drawn attention to the power of non-human objects over humans, upsetting the primacy of place Cartesian dualism gives to the human mind and the subject’s proprietorship of agency. 84

Despite the promising potential of these alternative constructions of the relationships between matter, thought, bodies, agency, normative ideals, and selves for studying the ancient soul, however, these perspectives have been neglected in modern scholarship on the ancient soul. This dissertation seeks to bring them into conversation, both to illumine the ancient soul and to bring early Christian sources to bear on contemporary theoretical conversations about the self.

84 I cite the works that have been most influential for this dissertation: Bennett, Vibrant Matter; Latour, Reassembling the Social; idem, “Where are the Missing Masses”; idem, Inquiry into Modes of Existence; idem, “Technology is Society Made Durable”; Law, Aircraft Stories. Bialecki provides a helpful summary of “object-oriented ontology”: “What is central [for object-oriented ontology] is the idea that what the world is composed of is not, say, subjects on one hand and noumenal objects on the other but rather of nothing but objects, animate and inanimate, human and nonhuman, all of which have to be taken as agents (occasionally glossed as ‘actants’). This is usually taken at the crude level as an imperative to include material objects and nonhuman actors into accounts of human society . . . A common presumption here is that all objects are composed of other constitutive elements. However, it is important to understand that these constitutive elements are themselves categorized as objects with all the associated autonomy. At the same time, these constitutive objects neither completely control the nature of the larger object (in that there could be specific and irreducible aspects of the larger total element absent from any of the comprising objects), due to emergent properties nor the smaller composing elements being automatically governed by the larger system in which they are imbedded (as each of these objects always has the potentiality to offer its own resistances and surprises). Several things follow from this presumption. First, this entails a flat ontology in which all objects are said to “exist” equally or at least being granted the dignity of being named objects, regardless of compositional and scalar differences. This also implies a suspicion of ‘reductionist’ (or alternately, onto-theological) accounts, which would privilege one strata or framework as either an explanatory site or engine; this would foreclose, for instance, explanations centered entirely on concepts such as discourse, society, or any kind of biological or psychic naturalism” (“Does God Exist in Methodological Atheism?,” 35–36).
I suggest that two modern phenomena—race and the sexed body—can be analogical resources for thinking about the materialization and functioning of the soul in early Christianity. To begin, the questions raised by the presence of the soul on the ancient body are not so different from the questions examined in critical race theory about race. Race may not be “real,” if, by “real,” what is meant is undeniable biological types of humanity (as, at the very least, nineteenth-century and twentieth-century race “science” would claim about the “reality” of race). Even so, race has possessed an effective material, even biological, presence in modernity, despite the social constructedness of its materiality and biology. It has contributed to the making of bodies, selves, and identities. It has justified and enforced certain normative ideals, and various communities have been constituted by its putative facticity. Race has wielded enormous power, and it is quite pressing to understand the causes and effects of its presence, if we want to understand much of anything about life and society in the modern world.

Similarly, according to some approaches within gender studies, the sexed body—the male body and the female body—are not anatomical givens, but materialized effects of (culturally constructed) norms. The regulatory norms of “sex” work in a performative fashion to constitute the materiality of bodies and, more specifically, to materialize the body’s sex, to materialize sexual difference in the service of the consolidation of the heterosexist imperative. In this sense, what constitutes the fixity of the body, its contours, its movements, will be fully material, but materiality will be rethought as the effect of power, as power’s most productive effect. And there will be no

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85 See below.
86 Judith Butler is probably the most widely cited of those making this argument about the contingency of the sexed body; see esp. *Gender Trouble* and *Bodies that Matter*. 

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way to understand “gender” as a cultural construct which is imposed upon the
surface of matter, understood either as “the body” or its given sex. Rather, once
“sex” itself is understood in its normativity, the materiality of the body will not be
thinkable apart from the materialization of that regulatory norm. “Sex” is, thus,
not simply what one has, or a static description of what one is: it will be one of
the norms by which the “one” becomes viable at all, that which qualifies a body
for life within the domain of cultural intelligibility.\footnote{Butler, \textit{Bodies that Matter}, xii.}

It would be a mistake to study either of these phenomena, race or the sexed body, solely
from a Cartesian perspective. A strict dualism between ideas and matter does not provide
a strong framework for understanding the power and function of race or the sexed body.
If race is not really a pre-given biological feature of body-types, describing race as a
theoretical idea does little to clarify or illuminate its role in the modern world. If sexual
difference is an effect of power, rather than a pre-cultural biological given, then it is not
just a theory, but a materialization of power. Addressing sexual difference as idea or its
power as theoretical would surely mischaracterize its presence and functioning in modern
society.

Even if one is not fully convinced that these constructionist theoretical models are
the best tools for understanding race and the sexed body, I suggest that these perspectives
prove fruitful for thinking about presence and power of the soul in Clement’s
\textit{Paedagogus}. The soul, I will argue, had a presence on the body analogous to the presence
of race or sex on the modern body. Its materiality may have been constructed, but that
does not mean that soul was primarily an idea. To study the soul solely as an idea is to
misunderstand the significance of its material presence and power in antiquity.

The hypothesis that this dissertation seeks to demonstrate, therefore, is that the
ancient soul possessed a presence analogous to race and gender today, including an
entanglement with the body through which it materialized various systems of power. Previous scholarship has looked at ideas about the soul’s presence, but not at its presence itself. We do not understand the soul or its impact on early Christianity unless we examine its corporeal power. It appeared as a material “fact” on and through the body, even as it named an interior essence, similar to how the “truth” of race becomes real through its alleged appearance on the body, and gender in the body’s ostensibly self-evident sexed anatomy. Reliant upon a line of scholarship that has shown the putative facticity of race and the anatomy of the sexed-body to be illusionary yet fully materialized, I seek to explore the links between the ancient soul’s ostensible banality in antiquity (and now in modern scholarship on antiquity) and its relation to the body, power, and knowledge. How did the soul come to seem such a self-evident thing, and what power did it wield as such?

The comparison of the ancient soul to modern race and gender proves fruitful in part because the ancient soul, far from being an innocent, if imagined, feature of the body, was loaded with power, similar to how race and gender today manifest and ordain certain configurations of power. I consequently hope that my close examination of the place and function of the soul in Clement of Alexandria’s Paedagogus can be useful for understanding a key component in the mechanics of power in Greek and Roman

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antiquity, or at least in early Christianity. Just as the materialization of race or gender on the body corresponds to and gives a material instantiation of the regulatory norms of race and gender today, so too,

91 I suggest the materialization of the soul on the body corresponded to and materially instantiated regulatory norms. The corporeal soul materialized the regulatory ideals of “moderation” and “reason.” With this comparison in mind, I propose that the soul’s significance was not primarily theoretical in nature. Rather, its import lay in its corporeal power, its potential for shaping and policing subjects in and through the body. A key premise for my study then, is that, as the presence of race and gender in modern American society is best understood not solely through attention to elite theories of race or gender,

92 so too the presence and power of the soul in antiquity is not best understood solely through attention to elite theories about the soul in antiquity.

My approach to Clement’s references to the soul has been most directly shaped by three scholars working in gender studies: Judith Butler, Elizabeth Grosz, and Gayle Salamon.93 I draw from their uses and applications of Foucauldian theory, psychoanalytic

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91 Here, I follow Butler: “What I would propose in place of these conceptions of construction is a return to the notion of matter, not as site or surface, but as a process of materialization that stabilizes over time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface we call matter. That matter is always materialized has, I think, to be thought in relation to the productive and, indeed, materializing effects of regulatory power in the Foucaultian sense. Thus, the question is no longer, How is gender constituted as and through a certain interpretation of sex? (A question that leaves the ‘matter’ of sex untheorized), but rather, Through what regulatory norms is sex itself materialized? And how is it that treating the materiality of sex as a given presupposes and consolidates the normative conditions of its own emergence?" (Bodies that Matter, xvii–xix).

92 Seales, Secular Spectacle.

93 Butler, Gender Trouble; eadem, Bodies that Matter; eadem, Psychic Life of Power; Grosz, Volatile Bodies; Salamon, Assuming a Body.
theory (particularly Sigmund Freud, Paul Schilder, and Jacques Lacan), and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology to explore the soul’s presence upon the body as well as its potential power. The significance of matter and materialization in these three thinkers has also led me to recent “new materialist” approaches, including feminists ones such as Stacy Alaimo and Susan Hekman, and “object-oriented ontology” such as espoused Bruno Latour, John Law, and Annemarie Mol. Insofar as these perspectives are reacting, in part, to (1) the Cartesian split between matter and ideas, and (2) what they perceive to be an over-emphasis upon disembodied discourse in a post “linguistic-turn” humanities world, they offer particularly fecund perspectives for exploring the materiality of the ancient soul.

Particularly through the influence of Elizabeth Clark and her students, feminist and gender studies approaches have been a major source for the introduction of theoretical approaches to the study of early Christianity, especially those stemming from Foucault’s work. Clark and those interested in gender studies have also played a key

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95 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception.
96 See their co-edited volume, a landmark rejection of the “social-constructivist” frame in feminist scholarship in favor of a return to materiality, Material Feminisms; also see Alaimo, Bodily Natures; and note that Grosz’ Volatile Bodies, although pre-dating the explicit “new materialist” feminist turn, anticipates and influences it.
97 Latour, Reassembling the Social; Latour, “Where are the Missing Masses”; Latour, Inquiry into Modes of Existence; idem, “Technology is Society Made Durable”; Law, Aircraft Stories; Mol, Body Multiple; see above for a description of “object-oriented ontology.”
100 Cameron, “Redrawing the Map”; Clark, “Foucault, the Fathers, and Sex.” A major source for the introduction of feminism and theory into the study of early Christianity has been Elizabeth Clark, in part through the students she has supervised and overseen; e.g., Leyerle, “Ascetic Pantomime”; Schott, “Pagan Polemics”; Rackett, “Sexuality and Sinlessness”; Brower, “Ambivalent Bodies”; Shaw, “‘Burden of the Flesh’”; Shoemaker, “Mary and the Discourse of Orthodoxy”; Crites, “Power Shifts”; Schroeder, “Disciplining the Monastic Body”; Jacobs, “Imperial Construction”; Penn, “With a Chaste and Closed
role in demonstrating the importance of literary theory for the field, as the study of
gender in early Christianity has largely shifted from a search for early Christian women
to an exploration of the way early Christian texts construct gender.\textsuperscript{101} Thus, one major
trend in the study of early Christianity over the past thirty years has been a theoretical
approach, largely introduced through scholars interested in gender studies. Inflecting
Foucault’s interest in power, knowledge, and bodies with literary theory, this diffuse set
of approaches has focused attention upon discourse, the construction(s) of knowledge,
and links between knowledge and power in early Christianity. These approaches have
stimulated many insights into the construction of Christianity and Christian power,\textsuperscript{102}
often through paying keen attention to the genealogies of ideas and discourses in early
Christianity,\textsuperscript{103} and the function of bodies within the world of early Christianity.\textsuperscript{104}

My contribution lies in expanding this conversation by borrowing from
approaches in gender theory that have yet to be fully employed in the study of early
Christianity. I apply these approaches, not to questions about early Christian gender-
sexuality-anatomy complexes \textit{per se}, but to an analogous issue, the ancient soul-virtue-
anatomy complex. By doing so, I hope first to highlight an important, if neglected,
component of the early Christian power-body-knowledge complex: the corporeal soul

\textsuperscript{101} Martin, “Introduction,” \textit{Cultural Turn}. Outside of this circle of influence, also see, for
example, Pagels, \textit{Gnostic Gospels}; Kramer, \textit{Her Share of the Blessings}; Nasrallah, \textit{Ecstasy of Folly}; King,
\textit{Gospel of Mary of Magdala}.

\textsuperscript{102} E.g., Cameron, \textit{Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire}; Buell, \textit{Making Christians}; Castelli, \textit{ Martyrdom and
Memory}; King, \textit{What is Gnosticism}; Jacobs, \textit{Remains of the Jews}; Schott, \textit{Christianity, Empire, and the
Making of Religion}; Drake, \textit{Slandering the Jew}. Dunning, \textit{Aliens and Sojourners}. I would suggest that a
new publication series at Penn State Press, “Inventing Christianity,” is a result of this trend.

\textsuperscript{103} E.g., Gaca, \textit{Making of Fornication}; Harper, \textit{From Shame to Sin}; Boyarin, \textit{Border Lines}.

\textsuperscript{104} E.g., Brown, \textit{Body and Society}; Schroeder, \textit{Monastic Bodies}; BeDuhn, \textit{Manichaean Body}. 
and its relation to certain regulatory norms. Second, I aim to identify what I believe has been a latent Cartesian frame for the broad, loosely Foucauldian, conversation about power in early Christianity.

By focusing upon the materiality of the soul, I aim to highlight the importance of material power and in the formation of early Christianity. In my view, the field has become too reliant upon the significance of disembodied discourse. Thus, for example, even though “the body” has been a major topic of interest in early Christian studies, I suggest that the study of “the body” has been framed in largely Cartesian terms. The soul has been left out of the study of “the body.” “The body” has also been framed as a passive medium, written upon and inscribed by discourse/culture. Finally, since I rely upon three approaches that have been under-employed in early Christian Studies—psychoanalysis, phenomenology, and “new materialism”—I aim for my dissertation be a suggestive model for using the insights of Freud, Schilder, Lacan, Merleau-Ponty, and new materialists to understand the shape and nature of early Christianity.

My dissertation thus contributes to the broad coalition of loosely Foucauldian approaches to the study of early Christianity, first by introducing a new object for study, the soul, and then by using this object to rethink our approach to issues of power and the body in early Christianity. A latent Cartesianism has been especially manifest in the application of “theory” to the study of early Christianity. Therefore, by examining the

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105 E.g., Brown, *Body and Society*. Here, I am following Butler’s critique of concepts of the body in certain applications of Foucauldian theory: “This body often appears to be a passive medium that is signified by an inscription from a cultural source figured as ‘external’ to that body. Any theory of the cultural constructed body, however, ought to question “the body” as a construct of suspect generality when it is figured as passive and prior to discourse” (Butler, *Gender Trouble*, 175–76).

106 See Glancy, *Corporal Knowledge*, for another attempt to use the work of Merleau-Ponty in the study of early Christianity.
materiality and materialization of the soul under the influence of Butler, Grosz, Salamon, and “new materialists,” my study brings new questions and perspectives to the study of the soul in the field of early Christian studies.

**Chapter Summary**

In Chapter 1, “Heal and Punish the *Psukhē*,” I examine Clement’s claim that the soul needs to be healed and punished—two overlapping domains for Clement. Many of these references come in the opening paragraphs of the *Paedagogus*, allowing us to see how Clement deploys the soul materially, specifically in its need for healing, to frame and justify the *Paedagogus* and its instructions. This chapter sets up some of the problems that the rest of the dissertation attempts to resolve, namely, how the soul could function so effectively as part of the body.

In Chapter 2, “A Part of the Body,” I examine Clement’s references to the things, actions, and substances that damage the soul. Drawing upon gender studies approaches that have used psychoanalytical and phenomenological perspectives to examine the makings of the modern sexed and gendered body, I look at what Clement says damages the soul to gain insight into the shape and extent of the ancient felt body. Furthermore, insofar as the material shape of the body intersects with systems of power, this chapter lays the groundwork for my claim that the soul’s materiality gave it its own powerful place and agency in early Christianity.

In Chapter 3, “A Material Fantasy,” I look at those passages in which Clement identifies a correlation between the body’s appearance and the state of the soul. While including those passages in which Clement describes the performance of specific deeds
or actions as linked to the state of the body, this chapter is primarily focused upon the many passages in which Clement uses the specter of the deformed soul to denounce the wearing of fancy clothes, jewelry, cosmetics, and other “material addenda” to the body. Using Judith Butler’s work on how the acts and appearance of the body can produce the effect of a gender-core, I examine the ways in which the body’s external appearance worked to fabricate the presence of an internal core, the soul.

In Chapter 4, “Psukhē-Core,” I direct my attention to those instances in which Clement seems to use the term soul as a way of referring to “the self,” “life,” or “the dead.” Because the soul is so often studied as part of the “history of the self,” I look at these passages to explore the benefits of reviewing these types of references to the soul apart from a “history of the self” frame. Tying these references to the wider field of references to the soul, I highlight how Clement discursively constructs the soul as a specific type of self-possession and moral core.

**Conclusion: A Study of the Psukhē, not the Soul**

The soul appears in the *Paedagogus* as an object whose material presence and significance is assumed. Clement just uses it. He points to its presence, its health, and how it appears on the body to shape Christian behavior. In being the reason to eat, drink, or dress in one way and not another, the soul functions as a site where the self, materiality, and the normative ideals of reason and moderation converge. The *Paedagogus* thus offers the perfect opportunity for investigating the soul’s material presence and functioning at the end of the second century and beginning of the third.

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107 Butler, *Gender Trouble*; eadem, *Bodies that Matter*. 34
It may be tempting to dismiss Clement’s references to an objective, corporeally present soul by asserting that the ancient soul, of course, did not actually appear on, in, or through the body, but instead was only believed or thought to appear on the body by Clement and his contemporaries. This has been much of modern scholarship’s default assumption about ancient references to the soul’s presence and appearance on the body. References to a corporeally present soul can be explained away as the result of the naïveté of ancient beliefs about the soul. Galen merely believed that the location of the soul’s parts could be revealed through vivisection. People only thought that the soul could be affected by physiological processes, or that it had color and weight.

Accordingly, although occasionally forced to admit that many ancients believed the soul to be physically present and materially constituted, modern scholars continue treating ancient references to the soul as theoretical ideas about an abstract entity. But to do so is to perform a sleight of hand. Referring to two distinct objects, the ancient soul and the modern soul, with the term “soul” induces pervasive misrecognition. This linguistic act switches the object to which ancient references to the soul refer—an object that is materially and physically present, especially through the body—for an object to which moderns refer when talking about the soul—an object that is supernatural, or at least non-spatial, and certainly not a thing with weight and color. Through this linguistic trick, the ancient soul is confused with the modern soul. To help avoid the anachronism that results from this confusion of ancient and modern objects, I will here use the English word “soul” only to refer to modern conceptions of the soul. The Greek word that is usually translated as soul, ψυχή, will be transliterated as psukhē (plural: psukhai) instead
of translated, and I will use it when referring to the ancient object denoted by that word in Greek.

Once we break with Descartes, becoming open to approaching ancient references to the *psukhē* as references to a corporeally present object and making use of perspectives that challenge Cartesian mind/body ontologies, a whole host of questions about the *psukhē* become quite promising for the study of early Christianity. What does the *psukhē*’s presence upon the ancient body teach us about the relationships between objects, normative ideals, materiality, bodies, agency, and selves in early Christianity? How did the *psukhē* function for early Christians both as a corporeally present object and as the self, and what does this imply about the nature of the ancient self, the self’s relation to the body, and the body’s sensations? What power did it have in the formation of Christianity, and how could an object like the *psukhē* possess and wield power?

When we take a close look at the references to the *psukhē* in Clement’s *Paedagogus*, we see that its material presence raises pressing questions regarding Clement’s specific project and those like it. We become attuned to the effect its presence has on the formation and shape of Christian selves, bodies, and identities, making the *psukhē* a key to whatever power a text like the *Paedagogus* might have wielded. To the degree that the majority of scholarship on Clement and other early Christian authors has focused upon asking about the content or power of the ideas found in the text, such approaches subtly underwrite Descartes’ mind/body dualism, where words and ideas are categorically distinct from the realm of bodies, actions, and objects, where power and agency lie in subjects, not objects. Once we view the *psukhē* as a powerful object that is
manifest upon the body, we see how necessary it is to understand the causes and effects of the psukhe’s presence if we wish to understand Clement’s project and the nature of his Christianity.
CHAPTER 1 – HEAL AND PUNISH THE PSUKHĒ

Once the ancient psukhē’s corporeal presence is recognized, I suggest that the nature of Clement’s project in the Paedagogus becomes much clearer. We see that his project was based on an object, and that the exhortations, commands, and counsels he gives throughout the Paedagogus are referencing a thing, rather than piety, morality, or “ethics,” even as these abstractions were enmeshed in and materialized through the psukhē. Thus, instead of the proposing ideas or exhorting rational wills, Clement raised the specter of a defective material thing, the sick psukhē. Once we view his project as dependent upon an object, we can see how this object affected and determined Clement’s work, rather than being determined by it. Clement himself was subject to its presence and its spatial and physical limitations.\(^\text{108}\) It was not a product of Clement’s own reasoning, but a thing he tried to use toward his own ends. Whether ever “successful” or not, Clement’s project in the Paedagogus (and those like it) was thus much more objective (in the plain sense of “about an object”) than commonly recognized.\(^\text{109}\)

Having argued in the Introduction that the psukhē possessed a corporeal presence in antiquity, I thus now seek to explore the psukhē’s power as an objective thing. Here I draw attention to how the psukhē, as an object, could affect and be affected by other objects. By describing the psukhē as an object and a thing, I mean to suggest it possessed both spatial and physical presence and limits for Clement and his readers. We see these

\(^{108}\) Latour, “Where are the Missing Masses”; idem, Reassembling the Social; Coole and Frost, “Introducing the New Materialisms.”

\(^{109}\) Approaches that treat Clement as essentially a Christian philosopher seem to miss this point; e.g., Lilla, Clement of Alexandria; Osborn, Clement of Alexandria; Ashwin-Siejkowski, Clement of Alexandria.
types of qualities in Clement’s references to the things and actions that damage the *psukhē*. I also suggest that Clement’s constant depiction of the qualitative status of the *psukhē* suggests at least an object-like quality.

The *psukhē* was not just a Cartesian mind. It was subject to physical manipulation. Like other objects, it also possessed its own power, including to manipulate other objects. Investigating the *psukhē*’s power as an object enables me to highlight and challenge latent assumptions in early Christian studies that power is located primarily if not solely in (willed) authorial linguistic discourses. I suggest that the power operating in and behind Clement’s *Paedagogus* was the possession and product of objects at least as much as it was the product Clement’s rhetoric, ideas, and discourses. According to Latour, investigating the *psukhē* as an object, this chapter examines Clement’s references to the *psukhē*’s need for healing and punishment. The two overlap. Clement claims that punishments can be used to correct, fix, and heal the *psukhē* and its *pathē*:

Many of the *pathē* are healed by punishment (τιμωρία), by a command (προστάξει) of austere precepts (παραγγελμάτων), and, indeed, also through the teaching of some propositions (θεωρημάτων). Correction (ἔλεγχος) is like surgery.

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110 The suggestion that the objects in and behind the *Paedagogus* were at least as potent as Clement’s rhetoric and ideas does not necessarily reiterate the presumed fundamental distinction between words and things. See Butler’s discussion of Derrida’s comments on Austin’s *How to Do Things with Words*; Derrida, “Signature Event Context”; Butler, *Bodies that Matter*, 169–85; also see Latour, *Inquiry into Modes of Existence*, 17–19, passim; and Butler’s discussion of Althusser’s concept of “interpellation” in *Psychic Life of Power*, 106–131; Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses.” I should note, as well, that my interpretation of the *psukhē* as an object need not preclude it from also being a self and a subject (see Chapter 4).
(χειρουργία) on the pathé of the psukhē, the pathé are a departure from truth, which need to be exposed (διελέγχειν) by separating (them) through a surgical incision. (Paed. 1.8.64.4)

Θεραπεύεται δὲ πολλὰ τῶν παθῶν τιμωρία καὶ προστάξει αὐτοπροτέρων παραγγελμάτων καὶ δὴ καὶ διὰ τῆς ἐνίων θεωρημάτων διδασκαλίας. Ἡστὶ δὲ οἴονει χειρουργία τῶν τῆς φυχῆς παθῶν ὁ ἔλεγχος, ἀπόστασις δὲ τὰ πάθη τῆς ἀληθείας, ἀ χρὴ διελέγχειν διαιροῦντα τῇ τομῇ.

As we will see, these references to the psukhē’s need for healing and punishment present the psukhē as a specific type of object, one that is body-like.

This chapter focuses on the two main places where Clement references the psukhē’s need for healing and punishment. The majority of these references cluster in the first two chapters of the Paedagogus. There, Clement turns to the psukhē’s need for healing when giving his initial description of his project. The counsels that constitute the bulk of the work, Clement explains, are meant to heal the psukhē. References to the psukhē’s need for healing therefore play a critical role in Clement’s description and justification of his project right from the very beginning. A second cluster of references occurs in chapters 8–9 of Book 1, where Clement justifies the reasonableness of punishment, partially in terms of punishment’s therapeutic effects. I use these passages to argue against a position that takes references to the psukhē as practically identical with the modern self, engaging with more recent critical theories on materiality to show what is at stake in the materiality of the psukhē in the project of the Paedagogus.

The Sick Psukhē

In the first and second chapters of the Paedagogus, Clement gives an opening description and defense of his project. From his comments there, it is clear that the title, Paedagogus,
is an important metaphor of the work. The logos, who is the son of God and God in the
form of a human, is “our” pedagogue (1.2.4.1), according to Clement. Clement thus
addresses his readers as “children” (παιδείας) from the beginning (1.1.1.1; 1.2.4.1), even
if rarely so directly after that.

Much has been written about the Clement’s use of Greek paideia, the role of
the figure of the pedagogue in this work, and whether the aim of the book is
determined by its putative position as the second piece of a planned trilogy by
Clement. There is no doubt that the metaphor of the pedagogue looms over the work as
a whole. When we focus on the psukhē, we further notice how Clement justifies his
project in these opening chapters by appealing to the psukhē’s need to be healed.

After a tortuous opening sentence, in which Clement addresses his audience as
children in whom God has aroused the desire for eternal life through persuasion
(προτροπή), Clement declares that individuals consist of three things: manners (ἠθη),
actions (πράξεις), and pathé (πάθη) (1.1.1.1). He then explains that a person’s manners
are subject to the persuasive (προτρεπτικός) logos, that the hortatory (ὑποθετικός) logos presides over actions, and that the consolatory (παραμυθητικός) logos heals pathé

(1.1.1.1–2):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Logos</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Persuasive (προτρεπτικός) logos</td>
<td>over manners (ἠθος)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hortatory (ὑποθετικός) logos</td>
<td>over actions (πράξις)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consolatory (παραμυθητικός) logos</td>
<td>heals pathé</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Clement then informs his readers that these three types of logoi are one and the same (1.1.1.2). Clement says that this “heavenly ruler” (οὐράνιος ἱγεμόν), the logos, takes the name “Persuasion” (προτρεπτικός) when he calls individuals to salvation, but that the logos is also therapeutic (θεραπευτικός) and hortatory (ὑποθετικός) (1.1.1.3–4):

1. Named “Persuasion” (προτρεπτικός) when the logos calls individuals to salvation
2. The logos is also therapeutic (θεραπευτικός)
3. and hortatory (ὑποθετικός)

Clement then orders the logos’ activities sequentially, stating that, after persuading (προτρέπω), the logos advises (παραινέω), principally through healing pathé (1.1.1.4).

A bit later (1.1.2.1), Clement explains that the logos teaches after he has advised and healed.

1. The logos persuades (προτρέπω)
2. The logos advises (παραινέω) (principally through healing pathé)
3. The logos teaches by explaining and revealing doctrines (δογματικός)

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120 Clement’s logic here becomes confusing, because he reverses and mixes his earlier order, which, in addition to the persuasive logos, had an hortatory (ὑποθετικός) logos and a consolatory (παραμυθητικός) logos that heals pathé.

121 Again, Clement seems to be shifting the terms of his division of the logos’ roles. Now, the persuasive logos (which has remained a constant) prepares a person for the logos by giving parenetic advice through healing. Is paraenesis the activity of the consolatory logos (παραμυθητικός) who heals pathé? What has happened to the hortatory (ὑποθετικός) logos? When does it act? Is it actually distinct from the consolatory or therapeutic logos?
In its second role,\textsuperscript{122} Clement suggests that the \textit{logos} should be called “Pedagogue”:

Let us call this \textit{logos} with a single fitting name, “Pedagogue”; for the Pedagogue is practical, not systematic, so that his aim is to improve the \textit{psukhē}, not to teach it, and to lead the way to a life of self-control, not to one of idle reasoning. \textit{(Paed. 1.1.1.4)}

\textit{Κεκλήσθω δ’ ἡμῖν ἐνὶ προσφυγὸς οὕτως ὄνοματι παιδαγωγός, πρακτικός, οὐ μεθοδικός\textsuperscript{123} ὃν [ὁ παιδαγωγός], ἢ καὶ τὸ τέλος αὐτοῦ βελτιώσαι τὴν ψυχήν ἔστιν, οὐ διδάξαι, σώφρονὸς τε, οὐκ ἐπιστημονικοῦ καθηγήσασθαι βίον.}

The Pedagogue’s aim is practical; that is, it aims to improve the \textit{psukhē}. After this, Clement explains that this same \textit{logos} also teaches, but not now (ἄλλ’ οὐ νῦν; 1.1.2.1).

When the \textit{logos} does acts as a teacher, the \textit{logos} explains and reveals with doctrines (δογματικός; 1.1.2.1).\textsuperscript{124} In contrast, as a pedagogue, “the \textit{logos} is practical (πρακτικός): first he persuades (us to) certain disposition of character. Then he exhorts (us) to the performance of obligations” (πρακτικός δὲ ὃν ὁ παιδαγωγὸς πρῶτερον μὲν εἰς διάθεσιν ἠθοποιίας προοτρέφατο, ἤδη δὲ καὶ εἰς τὴν τῶν δεόντων ἐνέργειαν παρακαλεῖ) (1.1.2.1).

By issuing pure counsels and presenting pictures of those who wandered in error

\textsuperscript{122} The first role of the \textit{logos}, of persuasion, names the \textit{logos} in that role, which has been constant role throughout the opening chapter. Clement’s second name for the \textit{logos}, “pedagogue”, however, introduces a new term. Given his confusing mixture of descriptions of these other roles—e.g., as discussed above, first, also an hortatory (ὑποθετικός) \textit{logos} and a consolatory (παραμυθητικός) \textit{logos} who heals, then also a therapeutic (θεραπευτικός) and a hortatory (ὑποθετικός) \textit{logos}, and then a \textit{logos} who advices (παραινέω) through healing—it is not exactly clear what the exact roles of this pedagogue are. Is the Pedagogue hortatory, consolatory, and healing? Does it also give paraxenic advice? As will be discussed below, Clement does add a third role for the Pedagogue at the end of this passage, but that role, teaching, has not even been mentioned yet. Furthermore, when describing the Pedagogue, Clement may also attribute to it the role of persuader (1.1.2.1). The most pressing division between roles is clear, however. Clement distinguishes between the practical and the academic, even if he may be assuming that persuasion has already occurred.

\textsuperscript{123} I suggest that μεθοδικός (“speculative”) may have been the original reading instead of μεθοδικός (“methodical” or “systematic”); there is no direct textual evidence for this reading, but it makes much more sense contextually, as the opposite of πρακτικός (practical). On my suggested reading, Clement would therefore be contrasting the practical with the speculative, rather than the practical with the methodical/systematic. The text as it stands makes less sense semantically than my suggested reading, even if its grammatical morphology produces a more satisfying contrast (μεθοδικός/? πρακτικός) than my proposed reading (μεθοδικός/πρακτικός). As noted above, the textual evidence for the \textit{Paedagogus} is thin, especially here, in Book 1.

\textsuperscript{124} On the opening paragraphs of the \textit{Paedagogus}, see Méhat, \textit{Étude sur les ‘Stromates’}, 72–74.
the practical actions of the Pedagogue heal the pathē (1.1.3.1). According to Clement, the Pedagogue’s “philanthropic counsels,” therefore, act like mild drugs, strengthening the psukhē into a complete knowledge of the truth (1.1.3.1)

To define and clarify this difference between the aims and purpose of knowledge against the Pedagogue’s practical aims for the psukhē, Clement deploys a well-worn analogy.126 He compares the psukhē to the body and makes his point through referencing mutual need of the body and the psukhē for therapy.127

Health and knowledge are not the same; the one prevails from study, the other from healing. Anyone who is sick would not learn anything academic first, before completely healing. Nor, likewise, is each word of instruction (παραγγελμάτων) always spoken similarly to those who are learning or those who are sick, but to the former for knowledge, and to the latter for healing. Just as, therefore, the body of those who are suffering (τοῖς νοσοῦσι) needs a doctor, so to the psukhē of those who are sick (τοῖς ἄσθενοντι) needs a pedagogue, in order that our passions might be healed, and we might be led by a teacher who makes the psukhē most fit for knowledge, pure, and able to contain the revelation of the word. (Paed. 1.1.3.1–3)

125 Clement suggests the images of those who wandered in error function as negative exempla.

126 On the medical model of salvation in Clement, see Lagrée, “Wisdom, Health, Salvation.” The bibliography, ancient and modern, on the analogy between body and psukhē in terms of medicine is large. Holmes provides a helpful bibliography on Plato’s use of medical terms and concepts (“Body, Soul, and Medical Analogy”). She also notes that “Discussions of Plato’s ideas about punishment have paid particular attention to the analogy between vice and disease,” citing MacKenzie, Plato on Punishment, esp. 158–78, among others; Holmes, “Body, Soul, and Medical Analogy,” 368, n. 3. Holmes also provides a helpful list of other the early Greek uses of this analogy (“Body, Soul, and Medical Analogy,” 374, n. 47). For a summary treatment that extends to Hellenistic philosophy, see, Gill, “Philosophical Therapy.”

127 Holmes (“Body, Soul, and Medical Analogy”), provides a valuable discussion of how ancient assumptions about the body, especially in Greek medicine, framed discussions of the need to care for the psukhē.
To review, Clement begins the *Paedagogus* with a division between habits, deeds, and *pathē*, and then explains how the same singular *logos* acts on each.\(^{128}\) While the *logos* is the same, it has different names when it performs its respective tasks. It is called the *Protrepticus* when it persuades. It is the Pedagogue when it works to improve the *psukhē* and heals is *pathē* through *paraenesis*.\(^{129}\) All of this is in contrast to the *logos*’ activity as teacher. According to Clement, the *logos*’ aims as teacher logically (and sequentially) follow the *logos*’ aims of persuading and healing. Here, Clement will focus upon the *logos*’ practical aims.

While Clement does introduce a confusing mix of the *logos*’ roles and aims, the primary division that stands out in the first chapter is between (1) the *logos*’ role as a pedagogue, whose focus is practical, on the *psukhē*, and (2) his role as teacher, where he reveals and explains doctrines. The practical activity that defines the *logos*’ role as

\(^{128}\) Clement’s basic divisions of the *logos*’ roles, his concern with the differences between practical activity and theoretical activity, as well as the difference between the aim and function of precepts versus the aim and function of dogma would have been familiar to ancient readers. Clement’s opening division between manners (*ἦθος*), actions (*πράξεις*), and *pathē* (*πάθη*) (*Paed.* 1.1.1.1) can be found in Aristotle (e.g., *Poet.* 1447a28; see Nussbaum’s helpful discussion of theory and practice in Aristotle in *Therapy of Desire*, 48–77). Concern about the tension between precepts and dogmas seems to have been a concern to the Stoics, as evinced in Seneca’s letters 94–95, parts of which closely parallel Clement’s divisions. Even the broader three-part structure is found elsewhere. Philo of Larissa, in a passage preserved in Stobaeus, even lists the three-part structure that Clement seems to use (*Eclogue* ii 39.24–41.7; see Brittain, *Philo of Larissa*, 277–80; Annas, “Philosophical Therapy,” 188–22), using the medical analogy to describe the logic of each stage. Philo has the healing occurring through reasoning rather than precepts, but the similarities between the two programs are nevertheless striking, including their dependence upon a medical analogy. Clement’s division of the *logos*’ roles in the opening of the *Paedagogus* has been taken as a reference to his three major works (*Protrepticus*, *Paedagogus*, and *Stromateis*) and his overarching plan for the three works. The suggestion has been widely debated, especially regarding whether the *Stromateis* is this third work of such a trilogy; see Osborn, *Clement of Alexandria*, 5–15.

\(^{129}\) Given the flexibility with which Clement describes the Pedagogue’s roles, I am here using the term *paraenesis* broadly to summarize the *logos*’ activities, his hortatory and consolatory roles, as well as his giving of injunctions and images.
pedagogue is defined by his therapeutic work on the psukhē, with his aim explicitly being “to improve the psukhē” (1.1.1.4).\(^{130}\)

In the short second chapter, Clement continues to focus upon the condition of psukhē, returning to the language of therapy several times. He begins by explaining that the Pedagogue, “is like his father.” He is “faultless, blameless, and without pathé of psukhē” (ἀναμάρτητος, ἀνεπίληπτος καὶ ἀπαθῆς τήν ψυχὴν) (1.2.4.1). Clement now shifts to give a Christian depiction of the logos:

God being in the form of a human, a servant to his father’s will, God the Word (λόγος), who is in the father, who is from the right hand of the father, with the form of God also. (Paed. 1.2.4.1)

\[θεός ἐν ἀνθρώπων σχήματι ἁραντος, πατρικῷ θελήματι διάκονος, λόγος θεός, ὁ ἐν τῷ πατρί, ὁ ἐκ δεξιῶν τοῦ πατρός, σὺν καὶ τῷ σχήματι θεός.\]

But it is not just the appearance of the stock Stoic term apathē that highlights Clement’s use of the psukhē. He follows his praise of the divine Pedagogue as God the logos, by declaring that, “we must try with all our strength to become like him in psukhē” (τούτῳ πάντι θείῃ πειρατέον ἐξομοιώσων τὴν ψυχὴν; 1.2.4.2). Clement identifies the psukhē as the place where he and his readers can, and indeed should, be like the divine Pedagogue.\(^{131}\)

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\(^{130}\) The opening chapters of the Paedagogus have received little scholarly attention. Yet, the little attention it has received is emblematic of the general absence of interest in the psukhē as being a particular important or complex feature of Christian discourse. For example, Lavalle, notes, correctly, that “Clement of Alexandria frames his text [the Paedagogus] on proper Christian comportment in terms of medical treatment” (“Divine Breastfeeding,” 322). She even mentions that, for Clement, “Christ the Physician is concerned not only with the body but also with the soul” (“Divine Breastfeeding,” 323). Yet, she never takes an interest in the “soul” again, even as she highlights the how Clement mixes medical theories of pneuma with Christian ideas about the transformative effects of baptism and Christian formation. Méhat probably has the lengthiest discussion of the opening of the Paedagogus, but he too takes no interest in the psukhē per se (Étude sur les ‘Stromates,’ 72–74).

\(^{131}\) See Buell, Making Christians.
Clement goes on to discuss the need for “deliverance from pathé and diseases (νοσημάτων)” (1.2.4.2). He first describes the pedagogue as free from any human pathé and alone being blameless (ἀναμάρτητος) (1.2.4.2). Clement then weighs the severity of different types of transgressing (ἐξαμαρτάνω), from errors (ἀδικημάτων) done unwillingly to transgressions (ἁμαρτήμασι) that are delayed only momentarily (1.2.4.2–3). In the midst of this discussion, Clement returns to the psukhē. He reads involuntary error (ἀκούσιον ἁμαρτίαν) as “staining (κηλιδοῦντα) the psukhē” (1.2.5.1). The pollution can find a “cure” (θεραπεία) in reason, which leads to repentance. All of this comes out of a seemingly gratuitous allegorical interpretation of the instructions in Numbers 6:9 to the Nazarite to shave his head if anyone suddenly dies in his presence. Clement ties the whole interpretation together through taking Numbers 6:9’s reference to “the head” to refer to the logistikon—the logical part of the psukhē—which Platonists believed resided in the head (1.2.5.1).132

Clement then returns again to the Pedagogue’s ability to heal the wounded psukhē: “Our Pedagogue, therefore, is the logos, who is a healer of the unnatural pathé of our psukhē” (Ἔστιν οὖν ὁ παιδαγωγὸς ἠμῶν λόγος διὰ παραινέσεως θεραπευτικὸς τῶν παρὰ φύσιν τῆς ψυχῆς παθῶν; 1.2.6.1). Contrasting the human art of medicine with the work of the logos, Clement declares that it is the logos alone who is the physician of human infirmities, and who is the “holy charmer of sickness of psukhē” (ἐπιφόδος ἁγίος νοσοῦσης ψυχῆς; 1.2.6.1). Clement cites Democritus to validate his point: “‘For medicine,’ says Democritus, ‘heals the disease of the body, but wisdom deprives the

132 Plato, Resp. 435b–442d; Tim. 69b–72d; Phaedr. 253c–254e.
"psukhē of its pathē" («Ἰατρικὴ μὲν γάρ» κατὰ Δημόκριτον «σώματος νόσους ἀκέεται, σοφὶ δὲ ψυχὴν παθῶν ἀφαιρεῖται») (1.2.6.2). According to Clement, however, the Pedagogue can do both: “he heals both body and psukhē” (σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴν ἀκεῖται) (1.2.6.2). Clement then refers to two of “the savior’s” healing miracles—the healing of the paralytic (Matt 9:6–7) and the resurrection of Lazarus (John 11:43)—to confirm the Pedagogue’s power to heal the body (through words alone) (1.2.6.3).

Clement ends this section by again asserting the Pedagogue also heals the psukhē—which is not quite as clear from the gospel accounts he just cited. The Pedagogue heals the psukhē “with commandments and by his gifts” (ἐντολαῖς καὶ χαρίσμασιν). It might be likely, Clement suggests, that he would use “precepts” (ὑποθήκαις), “Yet, abounding in gifts, he says to us sinners, ‘Your sins are forgiven’” (χαρίσμασι δὲ πλούσιος «ἀφέωνται σοι αἱ ἁμαρτίαι» τοῖς ἁμαρτωλοῖς ἣμῖν λέγει) (1.2.6.4). Clement does not clarify what this means, or how exactly such a statement or enactment heals the psukhē. What he does says is that, “At once, we become infants in thought, partaking in the best and most certain order by his arrangement” (Ἡμεῖς δὲ ἄμα νοήματι νύσσοι γεγόναμεν, τὴν ἀρίστην καὶ βεβαιοτάτην τάξιν παρὰ τῆς αὐτοῦ ἐπταξίας μεταλαμβάνοντες) (1.2.6.5). This arrangement, Clement explains, has ordered the world and the heavens, setting the sun’s orbit and the movements of other heavenly bodies. This order “leads his psukhē to understanding and self-control, and it composes the body with beauty and harmony” (ψυχὴν μὲν αὐτοῦ φρονήσει καὶ σωφροσύνῃ κατιμῆθων, τὸ δὲ σῶμα κάλλει καὶ εὐφυθμίᾳ συνεκεράσατο) (1.2.6.6).
Clement therefore spends the first paragraphs of his work promising his readers that the Pedagogue operates on the *psukhē*. Because the Pedagogue is *apathē* in *psukhē*, we should strive to resemble him in *psukhē*. Yes, he can heal the body, but he also heals the *psukhē*, through his gifts and through his commands.\(^{133}\) Clement never again mentions how his readers’ *psukhai* can be healed through gifts, but he does spend most of the work, especially Books 2–3, on the Pedagogue’s commands and counsels. The *Paedagogus*’ instructions thus hinge upon that premise that the counsels, commands, and advice of the Pedagogue can heal the wounded *psukhē*. The specter of the sick *psukhē* therefore frames the work as a whole. Its ailing condition is the reason Clement writes and the reason Clement’s readers must listen and obey.

The *psukhē*’s condition is also the reason that the Pedagogue’s severe commands and/or punishments are justified. In chapters 8–9 of Book 1, Clement defends the Pedagogue’s prerogative to punish and rebuke by invoking the medical analogy. Just as the body, at times, potentially needs to be subjected to painful medical procedures for its own benefit, so too a *psukhē* may, at times, need painful correction:

Why, they ask, does the Lord, if he loves humanity and is good, become angry and punishment people? . . . Many of the *pathē* are healed by punishment (τιμωρία), by a command (προστάξει) of austere precepts (παραγγελμάτων), and, indeed, also through the teaching of some propositions (θεωρημάτων). Correction (ἐλεγχος) is like surgery (χειρουργία) on the *pathē* of the *psukhē*, the *pathē* are a departure from truth, which need to be exposed by separating (them) through a surgical incision. Similar to a purgative drug (Φαρμακεία), reproach (ὀνειδισμὸς) loosens the knots of the *pathē* and the filth of life, that is, lusts; moreover it smooths out the swelling of arrogance (τύφου);\(^{134}\) purging for the sake of restoring the health and integrity of the upset person. Admonition (νοεθέτησις) therefore is like a prescribed regimen for the ailing *psukhē*, advising what should be taken and prohibiting what should not. And all these things are conductive to deliverance

\(^{133}\) Cf. Paed. 3.12.98.2.

\(^{134}\) In Hippocrates, τόφος is a name of one of the four kinds of fever (Int. 39).
and eternal health. When a general fines those who do wrong, or punishes the body with chains and the most extreme indignities, even with death, it is for a good end. He is a general of his subjects through admonitions. Similarly, when that great general of ours, the word, ruler of all, admonishes those breaking his law, (he does so through) their release from slavery, deception, and the captivity of the enemy for the subjugation of the pathé of the psukhē. He leads them in peace to a holy, unified commonwealth. (Paed. 1.8.64.3–65.3)

Clement returns to this basic line of reasoning throughout his defense of the Pedagoge’s harsh actions and commands, referring specifically to the psukhē five more times in these two chapters. As seen in the above passage, where Clement quickly switches from medical analogies to military comparisons, in these passages, the medical metaphor merges and overlaps with claims about the salutary effects of punishment. He quotes Plato, for example:

Plato teaches beautifully, “For all” he says, “the ones who receive punishment, truly suffer the good, for, in being punished justly, they are benefitted by becoming better in psukhē (Gorg. 477a).” (Paed. 1.8.67.1)\(^{135}\)

καλῶς καὶ ὁ Πλάτων μαθῶν «πάντες μὲν γὰρ» φήσιν «ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθά

\(^{135}\) Mackenzie, Plato on Punishment, esp. 187.
He also compares “administration of rebukes” (λοιδορέω) to medicine (φάρμακον), but then talks about wounds, stating that there is occasion to wound the calloused ἐν (τὴν ἀπηλγηκοίαν ψυχήν), “not to death, but to deliverance” (οὐ θανασίμως, ἀλλὰ σωτηρίως). In such cases, the Pedagogue may “inflict some pain, but (the ψυχή) avoid(s) eternal death” (ἀλλίγης ἀλγηδόνος ἀίδιον κερδάναντα θάνατον) (1.8.74.2).

Following the same logic, that some pain may save the ψυχή, Clement cites “Solomon” approvingly: “You shall strike your son with a rod, so that you will save his ψυχή from death” (σὺ μὲν ῥάβδῳ πάταξον τὸν υἱόν, τὴν δὲ ψυχήν αὐτοῦ ἐκ θανάτου ῥάσαι) (1.8.92.1; cf. Prov 23:14), explaining that

Censure and punishment, just as their names suggest, are blows against the ψυχή, they recall from transgressions and keep from death. They lead into self-control those who had succumbed to licentiousness. (Paed. 1.9.82.2)

Ἔλεγχος γὰρ καὶ ἐπιπληξίς, ὡσπερ οὖν καὶ τούνομα αἰνίττεται, αὕται πληγαὶ ψυχῆς εἰσίν, σωφρονίζουσοι τὰς ἀμαρτίας καὶ θάνατον ἀπείρουσας, εἰς δὲ τὴν σωφροσύνην ἀγωνίας τοὺς εἰς ἀκολασίαν ὑποφερομένους.

At the end of Chapter 9, Clement summarizes his point:

Thus, the one who rebukes is not disaffected with the one who is ill in ψυχή. He does not implant the offenses. Rather, he points out the transgressions that are there, so as to avert similar ways of life. (Paed. 1.9.88.1)

οὗτος οὐδὲ ὁ ἐλέγχων δύσνοις τῷ κάμνοντι τὴν ψυχὴν· οὐ γὰρ ἐντίθησι τὰ πλημμελήματα, τὰ δὲ προσόντα ἐπιδείκνυσιν ἀμαρτήματα εἰς τὴν τῶν ὀμοίων ἐπιπεθεμάτων ἀποτροπίν.

While references to the ψυχή do not pervade the lengthier chapters 9–10 of Book 1 to the extent that they do in the first two chapters of the Paedagogus, Clement’s dependency on the ψυχή and its potential need for correction in chapters 9–10
demonstrates the depth of his assumptions about the analogy’s self-evidence. He does not argue that there is such a thing as the psukhē\(^{136}\) or that it is a thing that can be in qualitatively different states.\(^{137}\) He draws on the self-evidence of its need to be in a good and healthy stage as the basis of his argument that “the Lord” (the Pedagogue) is good (1.8.62.1)\(^{138}\) and his instructions necessary.

As we have seen, Clement’s references to the psukhē’s need to be changed, whether through the analogy of healing or of punishment, cluster in two places: the first two chapters of the work and Chapters 8–9 of Book 1. In the latter case, Clement employs analogies of antidotes and surgeries to argue that the psukhē, just like the body, sometimes needs to receive painful treatment for its own good. Blending in with these medical analogies, Clement cites the potential benefits of punishment. Spare the rod, spoil the psukhē. My primary interest lies in the first two chapters, however, since that is where Clement first describes and justifies his project. There, as we saw above, Clement focuses upon the psukhē, repeatedly referring to its practical need for healing. The Pedagogue’s essential goal is to improve the psukhē. Clement further refines his point by employing the medical analogy, comparing the psukhē to a body in need of healing. Just as lecturing a sick body does it no good, so too, Clement argues, lecturing a sick psukhē does it no good. Before learning about medicine, the body needs to be healed. So too, before learning divine doctrines, the psukhē needs to be healed. That is the Pedagogue’s job. That is the purpose of his precepts, counsels, and commands: to improve the psukhē.

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136 Donini notes that the same is true for Galen; Galen assumes that there is no need to argue for the psukhē’s existence as such (“Psychology,” 184).
137 Although see Buell, Making Christians, 106-79.
138 Clement’s opponents here may be Marcionites (as suggested in Wood, Christ the Educator, 56, n. 1), but this is speculative, and for my purposes Clement’s opponents here—real or imagined—are unimportant.
The Psukhē: Not an Empty Category

It might be tempting to read past these references to the *psukhē*, accepting them as a normal feature of ancient Christian or ancient ethical thought. After all, it is difficult to think of a trope or analogy more pervasive in antiquity than the philosopher’s claim that he can heal the *psukhē* just as a physician can heal the body. Furthermore, since this is a Christian author, the reference to the *psukhē* may seem even less significant. What is surprising about a Christian philosopher or theologian referring to the *psukhē*? After all, the *psukhē* and references to it occur pervasively throughout ancient Christian as well as Greek philosophical thought. It might seem to signal nothing more than a kind of generic reference to the self. Could all of these references to the *psukhē* not just as well be translated as “self”? Or even “individual”? Does Clement, or do the Greek philosophers, mean anything more by their references to the *psukhē* than that they can help people out? That, just as physicians attempt to heal the body, that they use reason (*logos*) to help people, whether emotionally or ethically?139

Martha Nussbaum, in her influential work on the therapy of the *psukhē* in Greek philosophy, takes this position, quickly dismissing the possibility that ancient Greek

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139 For example, Mayer (“Persistence in Late Antiquity”; eadem, “Shaping the Sick Soul”) and Kolbet (*Augustine and the Cure of Souls*) each draw attention to the centrality of psychagogy—therapy for the *psukhē*—in ancient Christianity. Yet neither, in my opinion, pays attention to the historical specificity of the *psukhē*, treating it instead, as simply another word for “the self,” or the individual, generally conceived. Mayer, for example, quotes Gill generic depiction of the *psukhē* approvingly: “As Christopher Gill points out, this particular therapeutic approach [Hellenistic therapy of the emotions] to disorders of the psyche [sic], *like modern cognitive therapy* [emphasis added], addresses ‘the patient . . . as a responsible agent, capable in principle of understanding the causes of her own current distress and of relieving this by a deliberate programme of actions or thoughts’” (Mayer, “Persistence in Late Antiquity” 339; her quotation of Gill comes from Gill, “Philosophical Therapy,” 340). Here, the *psukhē* is just another word for “patient” and refers to the same object as treated by “modern cognitive therapy”; also see my note on LaValle (“Divine Breastfeeding”) above.
thinkers were discussing a different object than the self. In a footnote on the first page of the first chapter, she states,

The word “soul,” here and elsewhere, simply translates Greek psuchē, and, like that term, does not imply any particular metaphysical theory of the personality. It stands, simply, for all the life-activities of the creature; in the case of Hellenistic contrasts between body and psuchē, it is especially important to insist that no denial of physicalism need be involved, since both Epicureans and Stoics are physicalists. The contrast is simply between the material constituents of the organism and its life-activities, its states of awareness, and so forth.140

By translating psukhē as “soul” and defining it as a generic, implicitly transhistoric, referent to an organism’s “life-activities, its states of awareness,” Nussbaum dismisses the importance of the particularities of the ancient psukhē. The word “soul” is a simple translation of the Greek psukhē. Specifically, although noting that both Epicureans and Stoics were “physicalists,” she maintains the self-evidence of the contrast between an organism’s “material constituents” and its “life-activities, its states of awareness, and so forth.” A Cartesian dualism thus remains fundamental for Nussbaum, even as she acknowledges that many of the thinkers she discusses are “physicalists,” holding that the psukhē was a physical object.

I do not single out Nussbaum because she is particularly egregious in her assumptions about the transhistoricity of references to the psukhē, but because of how typical her assumptions are in the scholarship, even in a book that is specifically focused upon examining ancient therapies of the psukhē’s desire. Of the three basic terms defining the scope of her study (therapy, desire, and psukhē), at least one of them needs no precise definition: “and so forth”! From Nussbaum’s perspective, there is apparently no need to delimit the meanings of ancient references to the psukhē, for, since we all

know so well what such references mean, we the readers can be trusted to understand what is meant by “soul” that finishing the definition with anything more than a “so forth” is simply unnecessary. Although Nussbaum states her case more explicitly than most, the basic assumption she makes pervades the scholarship on the ancient philosophical therapy of the \textit{psukhē}.\(^{141}\)

From such a vantage point, Clement’s opening is little else other than banal. He mentions the \textit{psukhē}. We all know what he is talking about. That is what Christian theologians and ancient Greek philosophers do. They think they can help people. It is a reference to the spiritual self. Clement, as was typical for his age, described his philosophy as therapy for the self. From this perspective, Clement’s basic point is that his instructions are meant to be practical. He is concerned with reforming and reshaping the self or the person, or of curing the sufferings produced by desire.

This is the position taken by three scholars of early Christianity who have examined Clement’s opening justification of his project in the \textit{Paedagogus} or, more broadly, his references to “the self.” Harry Maier, looking at Clement’s corpus as a whole, but especially at the \textit{Stromateis} and the \textit{Paedagogus}, repeatedly reads \textit{psukhē} as self, following the lead of Michel Foucault.\(^{142}\) Judith Kovacs, focused upon Clement’s use of \textit{paideia} and the figure of the pedagogue in his works, overlooks the significance of

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\footnote{141}{Also see my discussion in Chapter 4. Holmes takes the same position, and provides a useful citation of the accompanying scholarship: “The care for the soul is here interchangeable with the care for oneself suggests, as Eric Havelock pointed out over thirty years ago, that Socrates’ commitment to the soul was founded in large part on the equation of the soul with the person. Like Burnet and others before him, Havelock insisted that Socrates’ call to care for the soul was a radically new phenomenon in Greek society. He emphasized, too, the novelty of using the reflexive pronoun to create the self as an object of care”; Holmes, “Body, Soul, and Medical Analogy,” 354; see Havelock, “Socratic Self”; Burnet, \textit{Socratic Doctrine of the Soul}.}
\footnote{142}{Maier (“Clement of Alexandria”) builds on Foucault, \textit{Use of Pleasure}; idem, \textit{Care of the Self}; and idem, \textit{Technologies of the Self}.}
\end{footnotesize}
the *psukhē* in these opening passages, where Clement names the improvement and healing of the *psukhē* as the aim of the Pedagogue.143 Dawn LaValle, in a recent article on Clement’s medical thought reads Clement’s opening passage and comments on Clement’s aiming to offer a therapy of the *psukhē* (for her, “soul,”) but reads past the *psukhē* as possessing particular significance for understanding these passages or the nature of Clement’s project.144

An alternative perspective would emphasize the *psukhē* as a theological category: Clement aims for the moral self, which will, from his Christian perspective, either be saved or damned. This is the typical language of the piety and moralism. From this perspective, Clement’s focus is upon the interior, true, and moral self, a self which receives judgment.145 Such a perspective, however, is still misleading, inasmuch as it ignores the body and its externals.

In my view, these ways of approaching ancient references to the *psukhē* totally efface the work the *psukhē* does in Clement’s project, which he himself explicitly acknowledges, as well as the significance of its materiality for the instructions Clement gives in the *Paedagogus*. The *psukhē* functioned as a very specific way of envisioning the self and its relationships to the body and normative ideals.146 The *psukhē* was the seat of morals and emotions, but it was also physically vulnerable and objectively visible.

In explicitly approaching it as an object, we can see and understand it better. At least for my purposes, naming the *psukhē* as an object highlights its spatial and physical

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145 A view which aligns well with the more theological approaches to Clement, e.g., Ashwin-Siejkowska, *Clement of Alexandria*; Osborn, *Clement of Alexandria*.
146 See my Introduction and Chapter 4, also below.
delimitations, as well as its ability to influence and be influenced by other objects. It was an object that was subject to the unwilling manipulation of other objects, yet, precisely because it was an object, it possessed its own ability to affect other objects. As such, we need to rethink not only Clement’s references to the psukhē, but also the relationship between the ethical or moral precepts that constitute the core of the Paedagogus and the materiality of the psukhē. That is, if Clement’s references to the psukhē do not function simply to signal Clement’s commitment to a pious depiction of the universal self, then his instructions cannot be based upon an inherently interior, subjective, and immaterial self that responds to theology or philosophy. Instead, the psukhē, by appearing as an object in need of healing—as a body-like object, as a part of the body—shapes notions of interiority, exteriority, the self, and the body and how such configurations of self and body found certain types of ethical subjects and naturalize specific normative ideals. Its apparent normalcy is precisely the root of its power and the reason Clement is able to employ it as a tool, attempting to wield it for his own ends.

The Psukhē’s Power as an Object, or Morals and Matter

To this point I have noted that Clement begins the Paedagogus by defining and justifying the project at hand in terms of the psukhē and its need for healing. Comparing the psukhē to a sick body, Clement claims that the Pedagogue can heal it through his counsels and commands. Only after it is healed is the psukhē able to receive teaching and the revelation of the divine logos. The practical task of healing the psukhē precedes academic instruction.
Clement’s descriptions of the psukhē as a body-like object that is sick and in need of healing cannot be passed over simply because such descriptions are common among ancient philosophers. The ubiquity of the psukhē-as-sick-body trope demands attention in its own right.

Before we investigate ancient therapies of the psukhē, therefore, we need to determine the contours and functioning of the medical analogy that compares the sick body to the psukhē. Before accepting that the psukhē was, like a sick body, in need of healing, we need to ask what such an analogy achieves. What work was it performing? How does such an analogy construct the nature of the psukhē? What were the rhetorical effects of the metaphor itself? What was gained and what was changed by framing ancient philosophy in terms of medical therapy? What was at stake in defining philosophy in terms of a practice on the body. By asking these questions, we learn not only about how the psukhē functioned for Clement, but also why Clement employs the medical analogy and the language of healing to frame his project and introduce the work of the Paedagogus as a whole.

First, and most importantly, it frames the psukhē as an object that can be acted upon by specific types of forces and agents. The analogy places the psukhē in a world of cause and effect. If Clement repeatedly rejects speculative knowledge and the Pedagogue’s duty to teach, it is because he has placed an object before the Pedagogue, an object upon which the Pedagogue can act.

But the medical analogy does more than just invoke the psukhē as an object subject to cause and effect. It reveals the psukhē as a very specific type of object, as a
medical object akin to the body-as-medical-object. For Clement and other Greek philosophers, the *psukhē* as a body-like medical object was a thing subject to a whole system of agents, causes, effects, signs, states, and imperatives. As such an object, it was subject to and affected by its own kinds of pathologies, drugs, and therapies, as well as the expertise and operations of the object-expert, the Pedagogue. As a body-like medical object, therefore, the *psukhē* implied an entire logic according to which Clement and others could act. It provided an imperative to act and the structure according to which agency and action could operate.147

As such, the analogy suggests that the *psukhē* is subject to a specific nexus of medical-like causes and effects, of states of health and illness, subject to the implicit medical imperative: be healthy. It is also subject to the knowledge and operations of the physician. In other words, by comparing the Pedagogue’s work on the *psukhē* to that of a physician on the body, Clement invokes a particular type of relationship between the Pedagoge and the *psukhē*, a relationship structured by the implicit logic and imperatives of the body-as-medical object.

Clement’s medical analogy, the comparison between the sick body and to the *psukhē*, not only indicates Clement’s commitment to a practical transformation of the

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147 Holmes argues that, at least in Plato’s time, the analogy provided a specific way of thinking about the nature of the *psukhē*’s ailments: “[Medical explanations of the body] implicate the physical body in disease in two major ways. First, because it is constituted by powerful and highly labile stuffs or humors, the body is susceptible to an innate ‘badness’ that easily spirals into disease. The second problem is epistemic. The body described in early Greek medicine is enmeshed in impersonal forces that require specialized knowledge to comprehend. Given that people lack an intuitive grasp of how their bodies work, they fail to take proper care of them, thereby becoming unwitting catalysts and allies of disease; when diseases strike, they are helpless”; Holmes, “Body, Soul, and Medical Analogy,” 346. As such, just as the body in early Greek medicine is defined as a vulnerable entity, subject to invisible internal forces that cause it harm once they become unbalanced, so too the *psukhē* appears as a vulnerable entity, susceptible to the imbalance of forces such as desire and pleasure. Furthermore, just as the body is subject to expert knowledge, so too the *psukhē* requires expert knowledge; Holmes, *Symptom and Subject*, 192–227; eadem, “Body, Soul, and Medical Analogy.”
self, it also conjures up a specific type of self to reform—the body-like psukhē—and a specific logic of reform. Most scholarship on ancient philosophy’s self-conception as medicine for the psukhē has missed this point and conflated ancient references to the psukhē with references to the self. The word “psukhē” may be translated as self, or even soul, but, at least in classical philosophical discourse, it was a very specific type of self or soul to which reference was made, one subject to the specific structures of ancient medical logic. Through the medical analogy, therefore, the subject, the ethical self, or the “soul” is delimited into a specific type of object, one subject to certain laws of cause and effect, certain types of agents, and certain types of authority. The medical analogy makes the self an object, subject to disease and cure, dependent upon expert knowledge and power.

The point has notable ramifications for reading Clement. His entire project in the Paedagogus depends upon the psukhē’s status as body-like object, subject to a nexus of causes and effects comparable to the physical body. The Pedagogue is only needed if the psukhē is subject to external agents of health and illness. The Pedagogue only has authority because he has the power to heal the psukhē. Clement bases his effort to manage Christian lives (in the name of the Pedagogue)—to tell Christians how to walk, eat, burp, laugh, style their hair, drink, and dress—by appealing to the Pedagogue’s ability to affect the psukhē as a physician would a body, by healing it through his drug-like admonishments, counsels, and advice.

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Even Holmes, who has written the most astute account of how ancient Greek medical ideas affected philosophical models of psukhē-therapy, fully endorses the conflation of the psukhē and the self (Holmes, “Body, Soul, Medical Analogy,” 354 and passim). I address this problem more fully in Chapter 4, but my underlying point, as I also hope to demonstrate in this chapter, is that much is potentially lost by making this move. When we take the psukhē on its own terms, instead of importing our notions of “the self” and “the person” onto it, we can see much that is otherwise obscure.
In what follows, I look more specifically at three components of the nexus invoked by Clement’s comparison of the psukhē to the medical body: (1) how the medical analogy constructs the pathē as a threat to the psukhē; (2) how the analogy constructs the relationship between the Pedagogue’s counsels, advice, and admonitions and the psukhē; (3) how the analogy structures the psukhē’s relationship to knowledge. Taken together, these components help to show how the medical analogy constructs the Pedagogue’s power and authority.

Clement repeatedly refers to the psukhē’s need to be cured of pathē. Four times in the opening chapter alone Clement mentions them and the Pedagogue’s power to heal them. It is one of the defining features of his role as Pedagogue. The pathē were also the primary target of much ancient philosophical therapy. Given the common philosophical consensus that the psukhē needed to be healed of its pathē, Clement does not need to explain to his readers what the pathē are or why they should be considered pathological agents. What I do want to note is how the language of medicine structures authority and power over the psukhē and its pathē. If the psukhē is a body-like object, it is subject to states of illness and vulnerable to agents of illness. It is possible that there are things that can harm it. Enter the pathē. They are the agents of illness, the things that cause the psukhē to be ill. Moreover, the medical infrastructure of Clement’s argument not only makes agents such as the pathē possible, it also defines their roles and supplies its own imperatives. If the pathē are agents of illness upon the psukhē, the psukhē must be healed of them.
The language of healing therefore provides its own logic, its own imperative. Clement does not appeal to the logic of virtue and vice. He does not tell his readers that *pathé* are bad or to be avoided because the Pedagoge said so. He does not say that the reader will be good, virtuous, or even holy if they renounce the *pathé*. Although Clement appeals in later chapters to scripture as well as the writings of canonical Greek thinkers, he does not base his condemnation of the *pathé* on the authority of either. He later also appeals to the Pedagoge’s divine authority, but he does not cite it when renouncing the *pathé*. The *pathé* are a scourge because of how they affect the *psukhē*. The *psukhē*’s status as body-like object means that it is vulnerable to agents of illness. The *pathé* are therefore threatening because of their power to act upon the *psukhē* as agents of illness. No other explanation is necessary. The *psukhē* simply must be healed of them.

Fortunately, if the *psukhē* is a vulnerable object, subject to pathogenic agents, the *psukhē* as medical object is also subject to cures, therapies, regimens, and medications.

The healing of the *pathé* follows as a consequence when the Pedagoge strengthens *psukhai* according to the exhortations (παραμυθίαι) of images (εἰκόνων). The Pedagoge strengthens *psukhai*, and, just as with palliative drugs, he regulates hurting individuals with philanthropic counsels (ὑποθήκαις) into all true knowledge. (Paed. 1.1.3.1)

"Ἰασίς οὖν τῶν παθῶν ἐνθένδε ἐπεταί, κατὰ τὰς παραμυθίας τῶν εἰκόνων ἐπιρρων- νόντος τοῦ παιδαγωγοῦ τὰς φυχὰς καὶ ὠσπερ ἡπίος φαρμάκοις ταῖς ὑποθήκαις ταῖς φιλανθρώποις εἰς τὴν παντελῆ τῆς ἀληθείας γνώσιν τοὺς κάμνοντας διαιτωμένον.

Just as drugs affect the body, the Pedagoge’s counsels and regimens affect the *psukhē*, healing and strengthening it. The Pedagoge’s counsels, such as his eventual dictates about proper hairstyles, are not apodictic commands, nor are they instructions on how to be good, virtuous, or holy. Instead, they are depicted as possessing their own
agency. They cure the psukhē’s pathē. One does not follow the Pedagogue out of piety, but because the sick psukhē, just like the sick body, demands treatment.

Clement repeatedly returns to this line of logic when justifying the actions of the Pedagogue, even in later chapters:

Many of the pathē are healed by punishment (τιμωρία), by a command (προστάξει) of austere precepts (παράγγελμα), and, indeed, also through the teaching of some propositions (παραγγελμάτων). Correction (ἐλεγχος) is like surgery (χειρουργία) on the pathē of the psukhē, the pathē are a departure from truth, which need to be exposed by separating (them) through a surgical incision. Similar to a purgative drug (Φαρμακεία), reproach (ὀνειδισμὸς) loosens the knots of the pathē and the filth of life, that is, lusts; moreover, it smoothes out the swelling of arrogance; purging (ἀνακαθαίρων) for the sake of restoring the health and integrity of the upset person. Admonition (νουθέτησις) therefore is like a prescribed regimen for the ailing psukhē, advising what should be taken and prohibiting what should not. (Paed. 1.8.64.4–65.2)

Clement justifies the Pedagoge’s punishments, austere precepts, correction, reproach, and admonition, all in terms of the health of the psukhē. No other appeal, no other logic is necessary. The psukhē is ill; it needs the Pedagogue’s medication, his surgical extractions, and his therapeutic regimens. One must submit to his therapy, must obey him.

If the psukhē’s status as body-like object founds the logic by which the Pedagogue’s role is defined as the practical aim of healing the psukhē through his
precepts, counsels, punishments, and injunctions, then the psukhē’s status as body-like object also institutes a specific relationship between the psukhē and knowledge. The psukhē as medical object is not to be taught, but healed. The psukhē as object does not possess knowledge. It is not the subject of knowledge, it is an object subject to the knowledge of the expert, the Pedagogue who knows what will harm it and what will heal it (eventually preparing it to be “fit” for knowledge). Clement could not be any clearer:

Health and knowledge are not the same; the one prevails from study, the other from healing. Anyone who is sick would not learn anything academic first, before completely healing. Nor, likewise, is each word of instruction (παραγγελμάτων) always spoken similarly to those who are learning or those who are sick, but to the former for knowledge, and to the latter for healing. Just as, therefore, the body of those who are sick needs a doctor, so too the psukhē of those who are sick needs a Pedagogue, in order that our pathē might be healed, and we might be led by a teacher who makes the psukhē most fit for knowledge, pure, and able to contain the revelation of the logos. (Paed. 1.1.3.1–3)

In other words, Clement uses the medical analogy to structure the psukhē’s relationship to knowledge. As a medical object, the psukhē does not know; it is not a thinking subject—at least not yet. Before it can learn, before it can be taught, it is subject to the admonitions, exhortations, counsels, and advice of the one who knows it, the one who can act on it: the Pedagogue. If the psukhē needs to be healed, why lecture it? It is an object to be acted upon, begging to be healed, to be improved.
If the *psukhē* needs to be healed, if it is vulnerable to the *pathé*, subject to illness, but also treatable, the *psukhē* must be subject to the one who can heal it, to the one who knows it and has the power to heal it. The Pedagogue relates to individuals, as subject to object, as physician to body. The object has no knowledge of its own. The medical analogy, the comparison of the *psukhē* to a sick body, therefore structures the *psukhē*’s relationship to the Pedagogue. The Pedagogue’s power and authority comes from the nature of his relationship to the *psukhē*. The *psukhē* needs to obey the Pedagogue, to follow the Pedagogue’s commands and counsels, because the *psukhē* needs to be healed. Just as a physician has authority over the sick body, so too the *Paedagogus* has authority over the sick *psukhē*. Just as the physician has the power to act upon and manipulate the body, so too, the *Paedagogus* has the power to act upon and manipulate the *psukhē*.

Clement thus uses the analogy to claim that the Pedagogue too, just like the physician, has an object to act upon, namely, the *psukhē*. As stated above, previous scholarship has largely noted how the analogy points to the practical aims of ancient philosophers, but the analogy works at least as much to suggest that the *psukhē* is an object like the body, capable of receiving practical action. The analogy therefore works to objectify the *psukhē*, to reveal it as an object. Through the objectifying work of the analogy, Clement can thus structure his project as an objective one, as a project defined by the possibilities and limitations of an object. When Clement points to the sick *psukhē*, claiming that he (or, the Pedagogue at least) has the means to fix it, his logic is objective as opposed to subjective. In other words, as I will explain in more detail below, Clement does not appeal to subjective qualities of the individual (e.g., virtue, piety, happiness), a
Kantian will, or a Cartesian self. Instead he points to an object. In comparing the psukhē to a sick body, the analogy reveals the psukhē as an object, capable of receiving (practical) action. It is not much different than any other type of objective logic.

All of this may seem a bit redundant, or maybe just pointless. What changes if we understand Clement (and other Greek philosophers) to be using the medical analogy as a way to describe the psukhē as an object? What is the payoff for Clement of discussing the psukhē as a body-like object? Approaching the psukhē as an object helps us rethink the nature of Clement’s counsels and advice. More broadly, it helps us rethink the relationship between material objects and “ethics,” that topic in modern studies of the ancient world that so often turns attention to the psukhē.149

The first thing the medical analogy achieves for Clement, after all, is that it places an object before the reader. This object replaces appeals to philosophical or theological ideals. Rather, Clement points to the psukhē, claiming that he knows how it can be healed, just as a cardiologist might point to the heart to justify her advice to exercise regularly (instead of advocating exercise through appealing to moral ideals). The medical analogy substitutes an object for an argument, allowing Clement to point to the psukhē as an object, thereby enabling him to employ objective rather than aesthetic, moral, or divine reasons for his paranetic advice.

In a post-Cartesian world, where the soul is, if anything, not an object, it can be especially difficult to focus on and pay attention to references to the psukhē that assume it is an object. It is all too easy to read over such passages. It is here, however, where insights from “new materialism” can prove useful. To further explore the possible

149 See my Introduction.
intersections between the counsels and commands Clement would have his readers follow and his claims regarding the object-like status of the *psukhē*, I will draw from an essay by Bruno Latour where Latour considers, among other things, the impact of objects upon human moral action. The essay helps us see how objects function in morals. Latour is useful insofar as the Cartesian frame he is arguing against is the same frame that I have argued obscures our understanding of how the ancient *psukhē* worked. He has suggested that modern “ethics” has ignored the agency and significance material objects in a parallel fashion to the way that I have argued the ancient *psukhē* as a material object has been ignored in modern readings of the *psukhē*.

Latour begins his essay by describing the impact of his car’s seat belt alarm on him:

Early this morning, I was in a bad mood and decided to break a law and start my car without buckling my seat belt. My car usually does not want to start before I buckle the belt. It first flashes a red light “FASTEN YOUR SEAT BELT!,” then an alarm sounds; it is so high pitched, so relentless, so repetitive, that I cannot stand it. After ten seconds I swear and put on the belt. This time, I stood the alarm for twenty seconds and then gave in. My mood had worsened quite a bit, but I was at peace with the law—at least with that law. I wished to break it, but I could not. Where is the morality? In me, a human driver, dominated by the mindless power of an artifact? Or in the artifact forcing me, a mindless human, to obey the law that I freely accepted when I get my driver’s license? Of course, I could have put on my seat belt before the light flashed and the alarm sounded, incorporating in my own self the good behavior that everyone—the car, the law, the police—expected of me. Or else, some devious engineer could have linked the engine ignition to an electric sensor in the seat belt, so that I could not even have started the car before having put it on. Where would the morality be in those two extreme cases? In the electric currents flowing in the machine between the switch and the sensor? Or in the electric currents flowing down my spine in the automatism of my routinized behavior? In both cases the result would be the same from an outside observer—say a watchful policeman: this assembly of a driver and a car obeys the law in such a way that it is impossible for a car to be at the same moving AND to have the driver without the belt on . . . I cannot be bad anymore.
I, plus the car, plus the dozens of patented engineers, plus the police are making me be moral.\footnote{Latour, “Where are the Missing Masses?,” 151–52.}

Latour thus challenges the notion that “morality” is a thing only, or best, achieved by the human will. The exhortation: “wear your seat belt” can depend entirely upon the human subject’s will or virtue, her decision and drive to follow the exhortation and “be good.” It can also depend, as he notes, upon the subject being disciplined into routinized behavior. As Latour shows throughout the essay, however, moral exhortations are much more effectively followed when they depend not (solely) upon the will or moral drive of human subjects. Exhortations are much more likely to be followed when non-human objects make humans behave in certain ways. The alarm makes Latour put on his seat belt. It does not so much make him moral, but it does make him behave morally.\footnote{Latour makes the same point through a discussion of hotel keys (before the invention of disposable electronic hotel keys). There he notes how hotels would physically shape the (moral) behavior of their clients through giving them keys attached to large, weighted objects. Attached to the large, weighted object, the keys would be too unwieldy to steal or accidental forget in one’s purse or pocket. Latour compares this practice against the effectiveness of the exhortation, “Please leave your room key at the front desk before you go out” (Latour, “Technology is Society,” 104–10).}

Clement’s goal in the Paedagogus, as he is very clear about in the opening chapters, is to give exhortations and advice on how to live properly as a Christian, which he does with striking detail in the second and third books of the work. Clement’s exhortations—cut your hair a certain length and in a certain way, eat this type of food and not that type—are similar to the exhortation to wear a seat belt. Latour suggests that merely telling people to follow such exhortations does not work very well. And this is where an ostensibly glaring absence becomes notable in Clement’s argument. Clement, at least in the opening here, does not appeal to moral sensibilities. He does not simply tell his readers what to do. Nor does he simply tell them that the Pedagogue has a list of
instructions/injunctions that they must follow, or should follow if they want to be good, virtuous, happy, holy, or pious. Given common modern (i.e., post-Kantian) assumptions about morality, we might expect Clement to make this type of argument, but he does not. He does not rely on subjective values or appeal to them in his efforts to get people to follow the injunctions of the *Paedagogus*. Latour suggests our inattention to the agency of non-human objects is what precludes us from seeing how involved non-human objects are in affecting morality. If we pay attention only to humans, to their moral drive, and their moral wills, their subjective inner states, their disciplining, then the only way to think about morality, it would seem, falls upon a subject’s willingness to obey exhortations. From this perspective, we can look at the injunctions Clement gives (and compare them to other injunctions given by other people), but we cannot know whether anybody was willing to follow the instructions.

In the opening Clement does not appeal to the authority of the Pedagogue. The Pedagogue is cited as an authority, but not as an ultimate police authority. Instead, by comparing the Pedagogue’s authority to that of a physician’s over the sick body, the medical analogy cites the Pedagogue as having the same justification for his authority as a cardiologist has for hers. The Pedagogue is to be obeyed because he knows how to fix an object, the *psukhē*. Similarly, as a cardiologist’s instructions to exercise regularly, eat certain foods, and avoid other foods is to be obeyed, not because she will punish you if you do not, but because the heart will otherwise fail if the instructions are not obeyed. So too, the instructions Clement gives are not given in the name of the Pedagogue’s police power, his power to punish, but instead are given in terms of the functioning of an object,
the psukhē. This is especially important to note considering that, even if the notion of a divine-eye panopticon might be somewhat effective for understanding the logic of early Christian power,¹⁵² or the possibility that Clement expects Alexandrian Christians to be under constant surveillance by other Christians, Clement does not have the power of a state behind him. He (presumably) does not have the resources to train and pay a police force to enforce his exhortations. He needs some other force if he wishes for the exhortations to be followed.¹⁵³

Latour notes several other forces that may work on drivers, using the example of driving in construction zones. What slows drivers down? For my purposes, I want to focus upon two of these forces. First, the stop sign and second, the speed bump. A stop sign does not force drivers to stop in the same way that a speed bump does. Latour is most interested in the sheer efficacy of objects such as speed bumps, how they make us moral:

Drivers if they are circumspect, disciplined, and watchful will see for themselves that there is work in progress [on the road] and will slow down. But there is another radical, nonconfigurative solution: the road bumper, or speed trap . . . It is impossible for us not to slow down, or else we break our suspension. Depending on where we stand along this chain of delegation, we get classic moral human beings endowed with self-respect and able to speak and obey laws, or we get stubborn and efficient machines and mechanisms; halfway through we get the usual power of signs and symbols [e.g., stop signs].¹⁵⁴

¹⁵² Reis, “Surveillant Discipline.”
¹⁵³ Latour also accepts that moral subjects can be made to behave correctly in terms of ideology and in terms of being disciplined. He admits, for example, that ideas about the duty to slow down and even the unconscious internalized body-behavior of slowing down or buckling one’s seat belt—where a moral subject is not so much consciously choosing to be moral, but acting either on the impulse of ideology or disciplining—do work. Nevertheless, he insists such techniques are not nearly as effective as the non-human objects that force the subject to act morally. The car siren works more efficiently to make people moral than exhortation, conscience, ideology, or discipline.
¹⁵⁴ Latour, “Where are the Missing Masses,” 166.
What I want to suggest is that Clement, at least in his opening two chapters, instead of relying upon what Latour calls “classic moral human beings endowed with self-respect able to speak and obey laws,” invokes the medical analogy and speaks of healing the *psukhē* in order to bring the self (envisioned as the *psukhē*—see Chapter 4) into the world of objects, which can be forced to be moral by other objects. Morality, at least in the opening chapter, obeying the Pedagogue’s injunctions, is not a matter of the will, but is set up as a matter of objective reality. This is Clement’s logic, the reason that he uses the medical analogy, and the work the medical analogy performs. The self, viewed as the *psukhē*, is an object, and, just like other objects, is affected by objects, made to act in certain ways.

The reason to slow down for a speed bump, as Latour notes in the above passage, is because failure to slow down will break the car’s suspension. What Latour fails note is why this is a problem. I will suggest that it is because certain objects carry with them implicit imperatives. The imperative of a car is: function. A car with a broken suspension does not function well. The morality therefore is not solely a product of objects acting upon other objects, but also relies upon the moral imperatives carried in certain objects: work well. The cardiologist has authority over the heart only because the heart needs to work. It needs to be healthy.

By comparing the *psukhē* to the medical body, Clement suggests that the *psukhē* possesses the same imperative as does the medical body: be healthy. The *psukhē*, if it is not a certain type of object, does not carry an imperative to function well, or to be well. The medical analogy, by presenting the *psukhē* as a body-like object, reveals the *psukhē*
as an object that, like the body, carries the implicit imperative: be well, be strong, be healthy. The medical analogy, the constant references to healing and strengthening the psukhē, functions to give the psukhē as an object a specific imperative: be healthy. It also suggests that the psukhē, as a body like object, is subject to illness and disease.

To this point, I have suggested that Clement, by introducing the psukhē as a body-like object through his use of the medical analogy and medical language, has introduced a car-like object, subject to things like speed bumps (which damage the object). I have drawn from Latour to note the (moral) power and agency of things like car alarms and speed bumps. Latour renders these objects and mechanisms as especially effective in producing morality, much more so that police figures, disciplined selves, or signs. Clement defines the psukhē as an object that would be subject to certain ill effects. His exhortations, therefore, could be said to function like the stop sign Latour mentions. The stop sign is textual, just like Clement’s instructions (and warnings about what will happen to the psukhē). The stop sign works not so much because of how it physically slows a car down (as a speed bump does), but because of how it warns about the “imagined collisions with other cars” that will occur if the drive does not stop. The driver is worried about the physical damage to her car if she does not stop, the damage caused by another object. So too with Clement’s reader and the psukhē.

Conclusion
By examining Clement’s references to the psukhē’s need for healing and punishment, we gain insight into the fundamental nature of and justification for the Clement’s project. Contrary to the common assumption that the “soul” is a propositional idea or a dogma of
theology, we see that the whole project of the *Paedagogus* hinges upon the *psukhē* as object. The *psukhē*’s materiality, its presence as a part of the body as well as its visibility in the body and the body’s material addenda, play an integral role both in giving the *psukhē* an objective presence and in empowering it. Accordingly, the *Paedagogus* stands as an example of what is missed when scholars like Nussbaum treat references to the *psukhē* as if simply identical to modern senses of “self.”

Inasmuch as *psukhē* is an object for Clement, the insights of “new materialists” like Latour may be useful for understandings its workings and effects. Experimenting with such an approach in this chapter, I have suggested that Clement’s admonitions work like a stop sign. It is textual, and it relies upon the specter of damage that would happen to the *psukhē* if the advice is not followed. Clement, armed only with words (at least as far as our evidence allows us to see), does not enforce his morality by placing moral objects that can force humans to act in certain ways. Clement is not laying out types of speed bumps. He is instead pointing to what harm will happen to the *psukhē* if his advice is not followed. Just as with the stop sign, the specter of actual harm is the mechanism which enforces Clement’s injunctions. In the next chapter, therefore, I shall turn to explore Clement’s warnings about the substances and bodily activities that damage the *psukhē*. 
CHAPTER 2 – A PART OF THE BODY

When Clement says that a light diet makes the psukhē “clean (καθαρὰ), dry (ζηρὰ), and radiant (φωτοειδής)” and that heavy drinking leads to a psukhē that is “drenched (κάθυγρος), embodied (σωματοποιουμένη) in the vapors (ἀναθυμιάσεσιν) of a cloud (νεφέλης) of wine” (Paed. 2.2.29.3),155 we have a problem. How do we read and interpret Clement’s citation of such a seemingly strange body, a body where diet affects the purity, humidity, and radiance of its psukhē? Teresa Shaw, Gregory Smith, and L. Michael White have shown that these were no mere metaphors.156 The psukhē could be drenched with cloudy vapors. The psukhē was widely believed to be a substance, subject to the “mixtures” of the body, with the body itself being understood as a veritable stew of the four substances (blood, phlegm, black bile, yellow bile) and the four qualities (“the cold,” “the hot,” “the wet,” and “the dry”).157

In the Introduction, I called for scholarship to examine the psukhē in its materiality. But what does it mean to examine the psukhē’s materiality? Does it mean to treat ancient ideas about the psukhē’s materiality as correct? To assume that there was a wildly different body and accompanying materiality in antiquity? That the consumption of wine actually drenched a fine-mattered substance with heavy vapors? That there was

155 See below for more on this passage (Paed. 2.2.29.3), but note that it is lifted straight from Musonius Rufus (frag. 18a.18–32), although Clement never acknowledges the debt. The reasoning is also paralleled in Philostratus (Vit. Apoll. 1.8; 2.36–37). The middle of this passage, which I omit above but discuss below, is a quotation from Heraclitus (frag. 74). This type of thick allusion and intertextual reference is typical for Clement; see van den Hoek, “Techniques of Quotation.” For my purposes here, these parallels are mostly significantly inasmuch as they support the conclusions of Shaw, White, and Smith, that such ideas were pervasive in the first centuries of the Common Era.

156 Shaw, Burden of the Flesh; White, “Moral Pathology”; Smith, “Very Thin Things”; idem, “Physics and Metaphysics.”

157 I review ancient ideas about the body in more detail below.
an airy thing in the body that can be “clean, dry, and radiant” or dirty, wet, and dull? That
demons, souls, and celestial bodies were all made of roughly the same kind of fine-
mattered substance, a substance that no longer exists?  

However one is inclined to answer, Clement’s citations of such a body raise
questions about materiality itself. Even if we cannot quite accept that ancient physiology
was entirely accurate in its description of the body, in its belief in the humors, blood-
letting, and pneuma, in a psukhê that could be drenched with the vapors produced by the
consumption of heavy foods, such as meat, or fiery foods, such as wine, we still have to
explore how the material psukhê Clement invokes materialized. How did its presence
manifest itself in such a way that Clement could premise so many of his admonitions
upon the materiality of the psukhê?

It is not enough, I suggest, to explain Clement’s appeals to the materiality of the
psukhê in his admonitions in the Paedagogus by noting that beliefs about the psukhê’s
vulnerability to physical processes and material substances were widespread and long
held in his time. Such an observation may help contextualize Clement, clarifying that his
references to a material psukhê would not have appeared particularly strange to his
contemporaries. But the fact that Clement was not alone in his ideas does not help explain
them. It confuses what needs to be explained with the explanation itself. To be sure,
philosophical and medical “knowledge” of the psukhê’s physical features (like the
knowledge produced by Galen in his experiments) lent such references to the soul’s
material presence credibility. Yet, not only is this “knowledge” itself what needs to be
explained, there is also a much richer, more potent explanation available. People did not

158 Smith, “How Thin is a Demon?”
merely believe in the materiality of the *psukhē*; they felt it.\textsuperscript{159}

In this chapter I argue that the *psukhē* was materialized through its corporealization as a felt part of the body. It was not only *thought* to be a part of the body. It was also *felt* as part of the body. The passages in which Clement warns about the damage that can be done to the *psukhē* by certain substances, especially food and wine, and activities show how certain substances and bodily activities materialized the *psukhē* through the sensations that they produced.

To think about the materiality of the *psukhē* in these terms requires us to break from Cartesian assumptions that the body is pre-cultural and bounded. The pervasiveness of these assumptions within scholarship on early Christianity, even in very theoretically sophisticated studies, I suggest, is the reason that the “turn to the body” in early Christian studies has not included a turn to the *psukhē*. As Gregory Smith has argued, despite a massive shift of interest to “the body” within the field of early Christian studies, the *psukhē* has remained all but ignored, at least by those interested in “the body.” Thus Smith begins the Preface to his dissertation on the soul by explaining that the dissertation is a “half-serious, half-frustrated homage to the body people,” asking: “Might it be possible to write a cultural history of the soul in Roman or late antiquity, borrowing from some of the questions, methods, and sources put to such fruitful use by scholars writing about the body?”\textsuperscript{160}

\textsuperscript{159} I do not mean to suggest that our texts permit direct access to the private feelings and sensations of the ancient Mediterranean body. But just because our primary evidence for early Christianity comes from texts, it does not follow that early Christianity was essentially linguistic, a disembodied discourse. To focus upon texts alone is to forget that we do have material evidence for early Christianity and the world of Roman Egypt and also to forget about the materiality of texts themselves, not just as products of physical acts of writing and objects with specific physical forms (e.g., scrolls, codices) but also in what their language did.\textsuperscript{160} Smith, “Very Thin Things,” ix.
I share with Smith the instinct that the ancient *psukhē* can and should be studied with the resources developed by “body people.” In what follows, I build upon two of the major conclusions of his study: first, that in antiquity, before Plotinus, the *psukhē* was widely believed to be a fine-mattered substance, and second, that a major problem with modern studies on the *psukhē* is the depth of Cartesian assumptions that they implicitly make about the *psukhē*. In similarly drawing attention to the corporealization of the *psukhē*, I thus hope further to spark a conversation within early Christian studies about the *psukhē*s place and functioning within the ancient body.

In this task, I also extend upon a line of recent studies within the field of early Christian studies that has highlighted the perniciousness of Cartesian assumptions in the study of the ancient body. I develop these approaches in three ways. First, I argue that the *psukhē* was a part of the ancient body. Thus, borrowing some methodological insights of these studies, I show that the *psukhē* was an important, if largely unrecognized, part of that body that is crucial for understanding the nature and power of early Christianity.

Second, by engaging a line of theorists in gender studies that have been underused in the study of the ancient body, I suggest that the *psukhē* was made part of this body materially through bodily sensations. I thereby not only introduce new scholarship into the conversation about the ancient body with early Christian studies, but I also offer a new way of thinking about the shape and contours of the ancient body and its materiality, namely, through its felt-sense. Finally, my third contribution to this circle of scholarship

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161 On this latter point, see especially Smith, “Physics and Metaphysics.”

in early Christian studies is to examine the material power of the *psukhē*. By insisting that the *psukhē* be approached as a corporealed material fact in antiquity, this and the following chapters open up new ways of thinking about the power of the *psukhē* as material. In this, I challenge analyses that would locate the power of early Christianity primarily in the ideas of early Christian authors such as Clement.

The work of Judith Butler, Elizabeth Grosz, and Gayle Salamon on the sexed body

proves very suggestive for examining the *psukhē*’s material corporealization. Each of these scholars has challenged the self-evidence of the material basis for bodily sexual difference, arguing that the materiality of the sexed body is less a pre-cultural given than it is fantasmic. Drawing from psychoanalytic, phenomenological, and Foucauldian models, they suggest that the sexed body is socially and psychologically materialized, as Salamon explains in a critique of some theories of transgenderism and gender dysphoria:

In a number of works theorizing transgenderism and gender dysphoria, discussions of the nature, origin, and meanings of the body have tended to treat the materiality of the body as self-evident and given, aligning the body with substance and presence, thought in simple and stark opposition to that which is absent, immaterial, or ideal. Such accounts produce a theory of embodiment in which both gender and gender dysphoria are considered to be the products of bodies whose presence is asserted as an indisputable fact and whose materiality is thought to secure both identity and subjectivity. And yet, those immaterial structures which subtend the body’s materiality, such as the felt sense that delivers the body to consciousness, cannot be accounted for within a theory that understands the body to be a plenitude of materiality and meaning, a substance without rupture or discontinuity, nor can the problem of correspondence between a subject’s felt sense of the body and its corporeal contours be addressed within a

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163 Butler, *Gender Trouble*; eadem, *Bodies that Matter*; eadem, *Psychic Life of Power*; Grosz, *Volatile Bodies*; Salamon, *Assuming a Body*. I have found these theorists’ readings of Sigmund Freud, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Paul Schilder especially illuminating. Each of these authors pulls from one or more of these theorists to show how ideas about the malleability and limits of “the body” can be put to practical use in understanding the possible limits and contours of the felt body.
strictly materialist framework.\textsuperscript{164} This fantasmic materiality, however, does not make the sexed body any less powerful. Much of these thinkers’ attention is focused on the power of such materiality, especially in the sexed-body’s relation to sexism and heterosexism.

When examining the corporealization of the ancient \textit{psukhē}, we face a similar problem as the one Butler, Grosz, and Salamon face: the material presence and power of a fantasmic entity. The difference is that we are approaching the problem from the opposite direction. Whereas much of their task is to convince readers that the sexed-body is not a pre-cultural given and is instead a performed, imagined, or assumed body, we have to work to think of the \textit{psukhē} as a seemingly “natural” part of the material body, as it appears to have been for Clement and his contemporaries. Only by viewing the ancient body as including a corporealized \textit{psukhē}, suspending any disbelief that the \textit{psukhē} was not “really” there, not “really” a part of the body, can we start to understand why Clement would premise his whole manual for Christian living on it. As a felt part of the body, it possessed tremendous power.

This chapter explores what it meant for the \textit{psukhē} to be a felt part of the body by re-reading references to the \textit{psukhē} in the \textit{Paedagogus} as references to a felt part of the body by examining three passages in which Clement cites the drunken body—a body that, at least in these passages, includes the \textit{psukhē}—as the reason not to drink too much wine. I look at the power this body would have had wielded in enforcing normative ideals. Considering his treatment of eating and drinking, I show how the \textit{psukhē} functions for Clement as a potential source of power, especially insofar as it works to materialize

\textsuperscript{164} Salamon, \textit{Assuming a Body}, 3.
normative ideals such as excess and moderation.

**The Drunk Body’s Psukhē**

I begin my analysis of Clement’s references to the substances and activities that damage the *psukhē* by reviewing three passages in the *Paedagogus* in which Clement discusses the effects of alcohol upon the body, including its *psukhē* (i.e., *Paed. 2.2.28; 2.5.48; 2.2.20.2–2.2.21.1*). In these passages, I suggest that we see Clement citing what happens to the body as a good reason for not drinking too much. On one level, we might liken his instructions to how a physician today might describe the effects of alcohol on the body to a patient. The difference between Clement and a modern physician, however, is not in their respective rhetorical positioning, but rather in the body described by each, a body which for Clement, as these passages reveal, includes a *psukhē*.

In *Paed. 2.2.28.2*, Clement quotes “poetry” to make this point:

> When wine, which has might like fire, enters a man (*ἄνδρας*), it swells (*κυμαίνει*) (him) like the north and south winds do the Libyan Sea;**165** talking at random (*ἄμαρτοεπής*), it reveals everything that has been hidden; wine slips up (*ὁλισθος*) those who drink: wine is *psukhē*-beguiling (*ψυχαπάτης*). (*Paed. 2.2.28.2*)**166**

Clement then notes that wine floods the heart and then the human mind (*ὁ νοῦς ὁ*...**165** Clement quotes here from Eratosthenes (*frag. 36*), but the analogy of the person being like a ship is also favorite of Plutarch’s (*Tu. san. 4, 123e; 10, 127c–d; 11, 128b; 13, 128f; 22, 134c*); see Shaw, *Burden of the Flesh*, 43–44.

**166** The second half of the quotation of “poetry” comes from a now unknown poet. A little later (2.5.48.3), Clement repeats the notion that wine makes people talk without self-control. There he follows Plutarch closely, using the same quotes from the *Odyssey* and making the same point as Plutarch does (*Quaest. Conv. III, 645a–b*).
ἀνθρώπινος). Like a ship’s captain overwhelmed by a stormy sea, the heart and mind are “turned around in the waves of the excess wine” (περιφέρεται τῷ κλέδωνι ὑπερεχώσης τῆς μέθης) (2.2.28.3).

When wine enters the body, the body floods. The psukhē gets deceived, and everything is revealed. The heart and mind are also overwhelmed. Clement does not explain to his readers exactly how the psukhē is deceived by the consumption of wine—or even what that means precisely. He writes as if they just know that the heart and mind, two traditional locations for the psukhē, are overwhelmed.  

Clement’s argument here, his reason for not drinking, is thus based on the body, a body which includes the psukhē. If we follow Grosz and Salamon in their theorizations of the body, we can see how this body might have included the psukhē: “The biological body, if it exists at all, exists for the subject only through the mediation of an image or series of (social/cultural) images of the body and its capacity for movement and action.” Grosz, borrowing from Lacan, labels this image or series of images, an “imaginary anatomy.” The psukhē could have been part of the body’s “imaginary anatomy,” contained within a series of cultural images of the body and its parts. Adding

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167 The heart was described as the seat of one part of the psukhē in Platonic tripartite model of the psukhē (Resp. 435b–442d; Tim. 69b–72d; Phaedr. 253c–254e). Clement subscribes to this tripartite model at the beginning of Book 3 (3.1.1.2), but he never (at least in the Paedagogus) explicitly ties these part of the psukhē to the parts of the body to which they were traditionally tied in the Platonic model. The mind’s (νος) relationship to the logical (λογιστικόν) part of the psukhē is also confusing. As Smith notes (“Very Thin Things,” 22–23), νος “almost always” refers to the ruling or logical part of the psukhē, Plutarch’s argument to the contrary in On the Face of the Moon (28.943a) being the exception which proves the rule. In the passage where he employs the tripartite model, Clement refers to one of the parts as the “intellectual” (νοερός) part of the psukhē, but notes that it is called the logical (λογιστικόν) part, even if Clement never explicitly says that the mind (νος) is the ruling part of the psukhē.

168 Grosz, Volatile Bodies, 41.

169 Grosz, Volatile Bodies, 39-46; see Lacan, “Some Reflections on the Ego.” Salamon relies on similar notions about body images, although she relies more directly on Paul Schilder’s notion of the “body schema” as well as Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s theories of embodiment; see Salamon, Assuming a Body, esp. 1-68; Schilder, Image and Appearance.
to Grosz’ account of the “imagined body,” Salamon suggests that this imagined body can also be the body that is felt by the subject.

Accordingly, we cannot easily separate ideas about the body from the body itself if the body is, at least in part, culturally and psychologically imagined, even in its materiality. Furthermore, it is important to note that Clement’s comments about the body and the effects of alcohol on it are so general that Clement cannot be said to be trying to impress his readers with his knowledge of the body nor introduce them to a specific new theory of the body, with the aim of convincing them to hold to an idiosyncratic or Christian understanding of the body. Instead, the body features in these comments as the reason not to drink too much. Too much drink floods and overwhelms the body. The psukhē is just a part of this body. Its importance, its function for Clement, lies in what can be done to it, the damaging effects caused to it by the flooding of the body with wine.

The body Clement references seems to be less the body he is trying to convince them of than it is the body he assumes them to have, to feel with and through.

A few chapters later, this time quoting from the *Odyssey*, Clement argues that wine “leads those without sense ‘to laugh softly and to dance’ [Od. 7.212; 5.463], (thereby) changing a manly character into a soft (effeminate) one” (Paed. 2.5.48.1). In the same passage, he again avers that wine exposes people through making them talk aimlessly (2.5.48.2–3), and he explains that reason (ὁ λόγος) is lulled to sleep (κατακοιμίζεται), “since it is heavy with wine in the psukhē itself” (ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ καρηβαρήσας τῇ μέθῃ) (2.5.48.3). Wine also “arouses perverse (ἐκτράπελα) passions

170 Clement, *Paed.* 2.5.48.1: τοῖς ἄνοιξτοις ὁ οἶνος καὶ θ’ ἀπαλόν γελίσαμε καὶ ὁρχήσασθαι ἀνώγει, εἰς μαλακιὰς ἐκτρέπων τῷ ἀνδρόγυνῳ ἵθες.

171 Clement quotes the *Odyssey* (5.465) a second time here to support this point.
that oppress (καταδυναστεύοντα) the weakness of thought (λογισμοῦ)” (2.5.48.3).

Again, Clement’s argument is that drinking too much wine will affect the body, with the psukhē appearing as part of this body. His readers see that wine changes character and causes people to talk aimlessly because reason is “lulled to sleep” and the psukhē itself is “heavy with wine.” But Clement does not give them detailed information about how the psukhē is physically affected by wine. Clement does not present himself as one specialist talking to other specialists, nor does he seem to be aiming to impress his readers with his deep knowledge of the body. He is not trying to convince them that he has new or better knowledge about the body. Instead, he intertwines other authorities (in the first passage “poetry,” in this passage Homer) into his instructions about drinking, so as to present his instructions as based on well-established knowledge about the processes of the body.

In another passage, where Clement warns “youth” about the effects of drinking wine, we see a fuller picture of the psukhē’s bodily presence emerge:

I admire those who practice a strict way of life, desiring water, which is self-control’s (σωφροσύνης) preferred drug (φάρμακον), and running from wine as much as possible, just as they would the threat of fire. It is good, therefore, that boys and girls stay away from this drug (φαρμάκου) (wine) as much as they can. For it is not right to pour the hottest of liquids—wine—on smoldering (ζεούσῃ) youth. This would be akin to pouring fire upon fire. Out of this combustion, wild impulses (ὁρμαί), inflamed desires (ἐπιθυμίαι), and a red-hot manner (ἦθος) are set ablaze. Internally heated, the teenagers turn to rash desires, which are manifest in the damage that is exposed on their bodies; that is, the lustful parts mature sooner than they should. The shamelessness caused by the scalding wine ripens, and breasts and genitals swell, displaying to all a picture of sexual offense (πορνείας). The psukhē’s wound (τραύμα) inflames the body, and the obscene pulsations chase idle curiosity to transgression—and these teenagers were once called well-balanced. Thereafter sweet youth pass over the boundaries of modesty. As much as possible, however, it is necessary to try to quench the impulses (ὁρμῶς) of teenagers by removing the fuel—the threat of Bacchus—and pouring the antidote
transgression) at the end of the chapter. snacks, and weakens the provocation of trembling desires. (Paed. 2.2.20.2–2.2.21.1)

Once again, Clement appeals to the material state of the body, this time in an attempt to dissuade “youth” from drinking alcohol. Water affects the body one way, wine another. Heating the body, wine swells breasts and genitals, inflaming illicit desire. The psukhē is a part of this body. Its wound inflames the body. (Clement, however, does not describe how exactly it was wounded, whether directly by the wine or indirectly, through another part of the wine-affected body). The ensuing “obscene pulsations” lead to transgression.172 On the other hand, deprived of wine, the body’s impulses die out. The antidote (presumably water again)173 extinguishes the “smoldering psukhē, stops the swelling genitals, and weakens the provocation of trembling desires.”

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172 I will later turn to the question of the intersection between bodily states and moral ideals (e.g., obscenity, transgression) at the end of the chapter.

173 The scholion suggests that the antidote (ἀντιφάρμακος) is water; Wood, Clement of Alexandria, 112.
Clement does not cite an external authority in this passage, but the body he describes, a stew of temperatures, desires, fluids, and moral states, is the type of body described in contemporary canonical medical and philosophical texts.\(^{174}\) This body was not a strongly bounded body, like the modern body, which is vulnerable primarily to discrete foreign agents that would breach the body’s boundaries (e.g., viruses)\(^{175}\) or to the failure of distinct internal organs.\(^{176}\) Instead, the body, at least as it was described by ancient physicians and philosophers, was essentially a fluid mixture of substances and qualities.\(^{177}\) Thus, for example, Clement warns his readers about how “frequent spitting

\(\text{174}\) Clement’s comments about the dangers of mixing hot youth with wine are striking similar to comments made by Plato in the Laws (664e–666c), a passage which is discussed by Galen explicitly (QAM 809), and it also contains parallels with Aristotle (Rh. II.12; 1389a18–19, 24–28). Clement will at times name Plato if he is citing him (e.g., Paed. 2.1.18.2; 2.3.36.3), but, as in this passage, he also quotes or alludes to Plato without explicitly citing him (e.g., 2.2.32.1; 2.3.35.2). The general premises—that wine is a hot substance and that youth possess hot body mixtures—might have seemed too obvious to need substantiation from an authority like Plato. On the other hand, perhaps Clement wants to present his claims about wine as too self-evident to be argued over. When compared to medical authors in the Hippocratic Corpus or to Galen’s comments elsewhere, we see that Clement keeps his comments about the physical properties of wine very simple, with only general claims. In the Hippocratic text, Regimen in Acute Diseases, for example, the author details the different effects of sweet, strong, white, or red wine on different types of bodies (50–52). Sweet wine, for example, is not suitable for those with bitter bile, for it makes them thirsty. Galen also proves his mastery of the body by describing the different effects of different types of wine (Vick. Att. 11). Nevertheless, Galen usually keeps his comments general, along the lines recognizable in Clement. Clement, therefore, avoids technical arguments. He shows no interest in getting into debates about the effects specific foods or specific wines, but he does refer to the body as commonly depicted by physicians and other ancient philosophers. But in this he matches the other comparable moral-philosophers, such as Musonius Rufus, who also keeps his comments rather general and vague, at least in comparison to Galen and other medical authors.

\(\text{175}\) Buell, “Microbes and Pneuma.”

\(\text{176}\) Flemming, Medicine, 95.

\(\text{177}\) Ideas about the body, of course, were not homogenous, whether among philosophers or physicians. There was debate about whether the body’s basic substances were fire, earth, water, and air (Empedocles’ fifth-century B.C.E. theory, more famously held by Aristotle [e.g., Gen. Corr. 330b30–330b7] and Plato [e.g., Tim. 82a]), or whether they were better conceived of as qualities “the hot,” “the cold,” “the wet,” and “the dry,” (the position of Petron of Aegina [according to Anon. Lond. 20.1–24] and Athenaeus of Attaleia [according to Ps.-Galen, Def. Med. 31]; Flemming, Medicine, 92–93; also see Lloyd, “Hot and the Cold”). Hankinson highlights Galen’s claim (MM X 463–3) that “the doctrine that ‘all bodies are composed of hot, cold, wet and dry’ is ‘common to virtually all the most reputable doctors as well as to the best philosophers’” (“Philosophy of Nature,” 211). Others, or even the same authors in other places, argued that it was best just to look at the four basic bodily humors: blood, phlegm, black bile, yellow bile (e.g., Nat. hom. 5; Plato, Tim. 83b–d). See the depiction of these debates in the Hippocratic On the Nature of Man (Nat. hom.). As Flemming notes, the models often intersected and overlapped. According to Diogenes
and nose-blowing and hurrying about (to release) secretions are signs of a bad mixture caused by unmeasured increase of liquids overflowing the body” (2.2.21.3). In describing the effects of food and wine upon the body, Clement is not worried about increased susceptibility to pathogens, nor about the health of bodily organs. Instead, as his ancient readers would have expected, he focuses on the mixtures of the body, the fluids and airs that bring heat or cold, dryness or moisture, into and around the body.\(^{178}\)

The balance of the body’s mixture was widely thought to depend upon managing the intake of the foods, liquids, and environmental conditions.\(^{179}\) Whether hot, cold, dry, or wet to the touch, the constitutive elements of a food or drink were viewed as carrying these qualities to one degree or another. Thus, as Shaw explains, Galen taught that “foods can be classified . . . as heating, cooling, drying, moistening, or a combination of these.

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\(^{178}\) For summaries of ancient medical and philosophical ideas about the body, see Martin, *Corinthian Body*, 3–37, 139–97; Shaw, *Burden of the Flesh*, 27–78; Flemming, *Medicine*, 92–109; King, *Greek and Roman Medicine*. On how Clement’s depictions of the body (one that includes the *psukhē*) intersect with this broader tradition, see Shaw, *Burden of the Flesh*, 48–52; White, “Moral Pathology.”

\(^{179}\) For example, while the Hippocratic treatise *Regimen in Acute Diseases* does less classifying of the qualities of foods than Galen does in *On the Properties of Foodstuffs*, the basic premises of both are the same: the hot/cold and wet/dry mixtures of food determine the hot/cold and wet/dry mixtures of the body and thus the body’s health. Environment could also play a factor. The Hippocratic treatise *Airs, Waters, Places* argues that different geographic regions produce different types of bodies due to regional differences in air-temperature, water-quality, and dryness or moistness of the soil (cf. *Nat. Hom.*. 7). Clement does not make such sweeping claims about the effects of environmental geography on bodies, but he does describe the effects of cold and hot baths by using the same type of logic: “The unending use of bathing cancels (a person’s) strength (δυνάμεις) and slackens (the body’s) physical forces (τόνους), often leading to feebleness (ἐκλύσεις) and fainting. For bodies drink in a certain way, just as trees, not only through the mouth, but also with pores through all of the body when in the bathhouse (λουτρόν). A proof of this is that oftentimes when people enter water when thirsty, their thirst is quenched . . .” (Paed. 3.9.46.2–3; cf. Plutarch, *Quaest. conv.*, VIII.734A; Galen, *MM*, X.10; Musonius Rufus, frag. 18a.18–31).
To cite just a few examples, the parsnip (ἐλαφόβοσκον) is classified as heating, thinning, and drying [SMT 6.5.6]; wheat (πυρός) is heating, while barley (κριθή, πτισάνη) is cooling [Alim.Fac. 1.9]; and wine (οἶνος) is heating and moistening [San.Tu. 1.11; 5.5]. Similarly, the chemico-physical reaction Clement describes happening within and on the surface of the body is a reaction of the mixtures of the body to the consumption of wine. Bodies that had been “well-balanced” in their mixtures are now in disarray. The combination of a hot substance (wine) and hot-bodies (those of youth) leads to a combustion, out of which181 “wild impulses (ὁρμαί), inflamed desires (ἐπιθυμίαι), and a red-hot manner (ἡθος) are set ablaze” (Paed. 2.2.20.3).

Scripting the Body

We have seen how Clement does not so much offer a theory of the psukhē and its relation to the body and alcohol, but rather points to the felt effects of alcohol upon the body and its psukhē as a reason not to drink too much wine. He does so, moreover, in very detailed and evocative terms, using richly varied language of heat, sensation, and inflammation. Such language, I suggest, is not just a rhetorical flourish. It contributed to making the felt body to which he refers, a body that included a psukhē. On their own, such instructions probably would not have had that much effect upon his readers’ experience of their bodies. Yet, insofar as Clement’s descriptions of the body and its sensations resonate with deep and long-held views about the body, Clement could assume that the body he described was the body felt by his readers and frame his instructions accordingly. As a

180 Shaw, Burden of the Flesh, 56.
181 In contrast to youth, Clement encourages older people, whose bodies are not as hot, to drink wine to warm themselves (Paed. 2.2.22.3). Clement also suggests that wine should be drunken in the evening or in the winter, to keep people warm (2.2.22.2; 2.2.29.2). See below.
result, moreover, close attention to the language of his instructions can thus help modern readers to recover a sense of the ancient felt-body thereby assumed, including the place of the *psukhē* therein.

In his references to the substances and bodily activities that damage the body, as we have seen, Clement does not so much describe or theorize the *psukhē* as a part of the body; rather, he instructs his readers to feel a body that, when drunk, was inflamed with swollen genitals and wild desires, and he scripts these feelings as “the *psukhē*’s wound (τραύμα).” Feel desire, feel the *psukhē*. Feel arousal, feel the *psukhē*’s wound. Sense the body swelling, pulsating, and heating, feel the wounded *psukhē*. Clement need not convince a person intellectually that drinking can harm the body’s *psukhē*. He only needs people to feel a damaged *psukhē*. By reading Clement’s logic in reverse, then, we see that his description of the effects of alcohol upon the *psukhē* provides a script for interpreting the sensations of drunkenness—the loss of inhibitions and mental acuity—as products of a damaged *psukhē*. Rather than isolating the *psukhē* as a singular part of the body, he includes it within the eruption of bodily swellings, desires, temperatures, and pulsations. The drunken body, according to Clement, is an inflamed body, with a “smoldering *psukhē*,” swollen genitals, and trembling desires. It is also an instrument for feeling and manifesting the heated *psukhē*. The embodied *psukhē* here materializes, thus, through its links to the body’s sensations.182

182 Any body, of course, produces various sensations in the process of reacting to food or other substances and bodily activities. Without instructions on the meaning or significance of these sensations, however, there is no inherent reason for a person to pay attention to them, or perhaps even notice them. They have no inherent coherence and meaning. But when certain sensations are selected, noted as important, and scripted as revealing certain truths, then these sensations take on a new life for the subject, beyond that of the biological body alone, a body to which consciousness has no direct access. An example might prove helpful. Pains in the chest on their own mean nothing. They might be painful, but a person could easily pay
The materiality of the food and the physiological reactions to it, when coded as the sensations of the *psukhē*, work to materialize the *psukhē*. The *psukhē* manifests itself in the materiality of wine, food, and the body’s physiological processes. Thus the *psukhē* materializes on the body through the body’s sensations. It is in this sense that we can also interpret Clement’s warning that overeating produces “deep affliction (δυσπάθειαν), forgetfulness (λήθην), and folly (ἀφροσύνην) in the *psukhē*’ (2.1.17.3) as a script—in this case, for perceiving and interpreting certain corporeal sensations that are sensations produced through eating as the *psukhē*. Insofar as these sensations can be read backward to the *psukhē*, they thereby work to produce a sensed or felt *psukhē*. Since these sensations are located in the *psukhē*, the sensations produced by eating can be used to feel the *psukhē*, at least in its affliction, forgetfulness, and folly.

The connection between sensations, pleasures, and the *psukhē* had been speculated about at least since Plato. Plato’s suspicion toward matter and pleasurable things comes from what he believes they do to the *psukhē* and its desires.\(^{183}\) This problematic lies at the heart of the bifurcated or polarized understanding of the body/soul relationship in much Greek moral philosophy, as marked by the aim to separate the soul from the temptations of the desires produced by the body.\(^{184}\) Clement shares this concern,
and some passages of the *Paedagogus* include expressions of worry about the ways in which the *psukhē* can become twisted with desire through the senses:

Do you not know that perfume, a soft oil, can make noble habits (τὰ ἡθητὰ γεννικὰ) soft and effete? Indeed, it can. Similarly, we must also shut out the indulgence (τρυφήν) of taste, so too we must ban extravagant (ἡδυπάθειαν) sights and smells (ὄσφρήσεων). Lest we unknowingly give the licentiousness (ἀκολασίαν) that we banished a pass into the *psukhē* through the senses (τῶν αἰσθήσεων), as if through unguarded doors. (*Paed.* 2.8.66.2–3)

Μαλθακὸν δὲ ἔλαιον τὸ μέρον ὅν οὐκ οἴεσθε τὰ ἡθητὰ γεννικὰ ἐκθηλώνειν δόνασθαι; μᾶλλον. Ὡσπερ δὲ τὴν τροφήν καὶ τῆς γεύσεως ἀποκεκλείκαμεν, οὕτως ἀμέλει καὶ τῶν ὀφειν καὶ τῶν ὀσφρήσεων τὴν ἡδυπάθειαν ἐξορίζουμεν, μὴ λάθωμεν ἣν ἐφογαδεύσαμεν ἀκολασίαν, κάθοδον αὐτὴ διδόντες εἰς φυχὴν διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, αἴνει διὰ θυρῶν ἀφρουρίτων.

Clement here describes “the senses” as having special access to the *psukhē* and as able to introduce “licentiousness” into the *psukhē*. They are therefore particularly perilous. In a similar passage, focused upon the sense of hearing and seeing, he writes:

In reference to hearing or seeing shameful things, to those of his children wrestling with these very things, the divine educator bestows thoughtful words—just like the ear-caps worn by boxers—so as he would not harm their ears, lest the notes of sexual indulgence (πορνείας) are able to reach for the destruction (θραύσιν) of the *psukhē*. (*Paed.* 2.6.49.2)

Πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀκοήν τῶν αἰσχρῶν καὶ τὴν θέαν τῶν ὀμοίως ἐχόντων ὁ θείος παιδαγωγὸς κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ τοῖς παλαιοῦσιν τῶν παιδίων, ὡς μὴ τὰ ὀτρὸ ἱδόντες αὐτῶν, τοὺς σώφρονας περιτίθησι λόγους καθάπερ ἀντιτίθεται, ὡς μὴ δένασθαι ἐξικνεῖσθαι εἰς θραύσιν τῆς φυχῆς τὸ κρούσμα τῆς πορνείας.

These passages show us how harm to the *psukhē* could have been felt in several different ways. Overeating produces affliction. Forgetfulness and folly and the indulgences in the senses—soft taste, extravagant sights and smells, and the hearing of shameful things—are scripts for feeling the engorged and licentious *psukhē*.

But it is not only through negative sensations that the *psukhē*’s presence can be
sensed. Just as eating too much produces certain negative sensations and dispositions in the *psukhē*, the consumption of wine can produce positive feelings in the *psukhē*:

For, being warm and having pleasant humors, mixed correctly, it thaws stuck secretions (of food) with its heat; while, on the other hand, it dilutes the pungent and base humors with its sweet fragrance. Well, indeed, it is said “from the beginning, wine was created to be drunk with self-sufficiency for the great joy of the *psukhē* and the heart” (ben Sirā 31:28). (Paed. 2.2.23.3)\(^{185}\)

\[\text{θερμός γάρ ὄν καὶ χυμοῦς ἔχων ἡδεῖς, κεκραμένος ἐμμελώς τὰ μὲν γλύσχρα τῶν περιπτομάτων διατίκει θερμότητι, τοὺς δὲ δρμεῖς καὶ φαίλους ταῖς εὐοδίαις κεράννυσι χυμοῦς.} \]

\[\text{Εὖ γοῦν ἐκείνο εἴρηται • «Ἀγαλλίαμα φυχῆς καὶ καρδίας οἶνος ἐκτιστά ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς πινόμενος ἀυτάρκης.»}\]

The sensations of warmth, the feeling of happiness, and perhaps sensations associated with digestion, are here interpreted as “joy of the *psukhē*” (and of the heart, one of the primary locations of the *psukhē*).\(^{186}\) Feel happiness when drinking wine? That is the *psukhē*.

As a part of the body, the *psukhē* is also intimately connected to the actions of the body. We already saw this above, in how the effects of wine ripple across the body. The consumption of wine wounds the *psukhē*, and its wound inflames the body. So too,

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\(^{185}\) Comparing Clement’s text to the text of ben Sira raises many problems. The text of the *Paedagogus* comes essentially from one manuscript (Codex Arethaei, Parisinus gr. 451), which itself was dependent upon “an exemplar full of textual corruptions, lacunae, interpolations and dislocations” (Marcovich, *Clementis Alexandrini*, ix). See the Appendix. We are thus already standing on thin ground for reconstructing the text of the *Paedagogus*. On the other hand, the texts of ben Sira are multiple, but also diverse and polyglot. The “original” Hebrew survives only in part (Skehan, *Wisdom of Ben Sira*, 51–53). The Greek exists in multiple manuscripts, which witness to two different Greek versions (GI and GII) (Skehan, *Wisdom of Ben Sira*, 55–56). According to Skehan, “of all the books of the LXX, Sirach [ben Sira] has the greatest number of emendations and conjectures” (*Wisdom of Ben Sira*, 55). The task of comparing Clement’s quotation of ben Sira with our text of ben Sira is therefore particularly fraught. Clement is the singular witness to his version of the text. For full list of variations in this passage, see Ziegler, *Sapientia Iesu Filii Sirach*, 273.

\(^{186}\) In the two extant Hebrew witnesses (Cairo Genizah MSS B & F) to this passage (31:27–28), only one term occurs, the Hebrew term (*lev*), which is often translated as heart. Although *lev* is regularly translated into Greek as *psukhē* (in addition to being translated into the Greek term for heart, *καρδία*), the Greek translator of ben Sira (ben Sira’s grandson) seems to think it best to emphasize both the *psukhē* and *καρδία*. Instead of translating *lev* either as as *καρδία* or as *psukhē* alone, he includes both terms in his translation.
Belching, wheezing, snorting, all intestinal rumblings inhibit the *psukhē*’s functioning by clouding thought. The mechanics are not clear, but mechanics are not the point. Again, this is not a theory of the *psukhē*. Instead, Clement, in pointing to the distressed *psukhē* as a reason not to eat too much food, also gives his readers a manual for interpreting the body’s responses to food and drink in terms of the *psukhē*. Sensations function to map the presence of the *psukhē*.  

Clement also warns about how “agitations, sleepiness, stretching, and yawning distress the unstable *psukhē*” (2.9.82.5). If we assume that *psukhē* is just another

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187 Compare Clement’s quotation of Plato to the text of Plato in Burnet’s edition: ὑπνόσ γιρ δὴ πολές οὔτε τοῖς σώμασιν οὔτε ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἠμῶν οὐδ’ ἀδ’ ταῖς πράξεσιν ταῖς περὶ ταῦτα πάντα ἄρμόττων ἐστιν κατὰ φύσιν. Clement may well be misquoting Plato, but even if we assume that Burnet’s text of Plato represents a verion of the text to which Clement had access, given the state of the manuscripts of the *Paedagogus*, there is reason to think that Clement’s “original” has become corrupted here, given the now confused nature of the Greek syntax.

188 On how maps and scales relate to the things they map, see Latour, *Inquiry into Modes of Existence*, 74–95.

189 Clement, *Paed.* 2.9.82.5: Ἀλλες <δὲ> καὶ νυσταγμοί καὶ διεκτάσεις καὶ χάσμαι δυσαρεστίας ψυχῆς εἰς ταῖς ἀβεβαιοῖς.

190 Instruction against indulgence in sleep is Clement’s basic theme in *Paed.* 2.9. As with his instructions on eating and drinking, not all of his argument against sleep explicitly invoke the *psukhē*. For example, Clement begins this chapter on sleeping by railing against soft bed-clothes and bedding (2.9.77.1–3). But even in these warnings against soft bed-clothes and bedding, he invokes the state of the body, claiming that such comforts “prohibit digesting food, rather burn it up, destroying (its) nourishment” (οὐδὲ ἐπιτρέπει δὲ
way of saying “self” or “mind,” then it is easy to read Clement’s instructions in these types of passages as rather vague moralizing: “if you eat too much, you will feel bad.”

But if the _psukhē _was a distinct thing with distinct functions, a specific part of the body, then these instructions read much differently. First, we see that Clement is not making vague pronouncements, but warning against damaging a specific, tangible part of the body. Second, we can see how such passages use the body’s sensations and involuntary movements to materialize the _psukhē_. One could feel the _psukhē_, sense it being damaged, feel it not working properly.

Thus, Clement’s instructions use the threat of damage to the _psukhē _to curtail certain actions. One should not eat or drink too much, because the _psukhē _will be damaged. Oversleeping is not good for our _psukhē _either. By paying careful attention to what these sensations do, we see a whole host of actions that not only reveal the _psukhē_’s close connections to the body, but also provide a means for sensing a distressed _psukhē_. The body’s wheezing or snorting, its yawns and sleepiness, are the sensations distressed _psukhē_. In the claim that these bodily responses to eating and drinking damage the _psukhē_, Clement’s comments also corporealize the damaged _psukhē _in the body’s wheezing, snorting, yawns, and sleepiness.

Clement also warns about the “_psukhicle_ (ψυχικῆς) softness/effeminacy (μαλακίας)” wrought by luxurious living upon those who are seemingly robust, namely

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πέττεσθαι στίς καὶ συγκάιει μάλλον, ὅ δὲ διωθείρειν τὴν τροφήν; 2.9.77.2). Later in this chapter, Clement quotes Plato: “For an abundance of sleep brings benefit neither to our bodies nor to our _psukhēi_, nor does it coincide in any way with the actions aiming for truth, even if sleep does accord with nature (Leg. 808b)” («Τὸνος γὰρ δὴ πολὸς οὔτε τοῖς σώμασιν οὔτε ταῖς φυκταῖς ἡμῶν ὑφέλειαν ἐπιφέρον οὐδ’ αὐταίς ταῖς περὶ τὴν ὑφέλειαν πράξεις πάντα ἀρμόττων ἐστίν, εἰ καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἔστιν.») (2.9.81.2). See Plato’s broader argument in _Laws_ 807d–808c, where he argues mostly about the practicality of avoiding sleep for business, for the safety of the city, and for setting an example to the servants in one’s house.
by “being pushed uphill and then down again by one’s servants”\(^{191}\) (3.11.73.5). Clement is emphatic: “a noble (غننايوي) man should not have any sign of softness/effeminacy (μαλακίας) appear on his face, nor on another part of his body, nor unbecoming unmanliness (اناندرية) of motion (κινήσεσιν) or expression (σχέσεσιν)” (3.11.73.5–74.1). Does softness of psukhē have a feeling, a sensation, or just a look?\(^{192}\) Is the laziness of being pushed up and down the hill a way of feeling one’s psukhē?\(^{193}\)

In a similar passage directed to women, Clement warns about the effects on women of having work done for them by maidservants. Clement writes that women should be engaged in sewing, spinning, weaving, or other feminine work and household chores (3.4.27.2). He worries about (rich) women listening to stories instead of working, because “people who tell love stories (μύθους ερωτικοὺς) wear out (διακναίοντες) the body and the psukhē with their (tales of) false deeds and words” (3.4.27.2). Such tales, especially erotic ones, should be banished.\(^{194}\) Quoting from Proverbs 10:19 first and then from the Wisdom of ben Sira, Clement warns that talking too much can also damage the

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\(^{191}\) Clement, Paed. 3.11.73.5: Οὐδὲ ὑπὸ οἰκετῶν ἀναστρέφεσθαι χρὴ πρὸς τὸ σημὸν ωθουμένους.

\(^{192}\) I address the links between appearance and the psukhē in Chapter 3. On the psukhē and physiognomy, see Gleason, Making Men, 29–37, 55–81.

\(^{193}\) Clement never clarifies how his warnings against activities that lead to effeminacy of psukhē apply to women, even though his instructions do include advice for women specifically (e.g., Paed. 3.4.27.2). Are women, in contrast to men, supposed to be effeminate? Or are women also supposed to be manly? While Clement never gives an answer to these questions in the Paedagogus, in another work, the Stromateis, he says, “Neuter psukhai, being neither female nor male are themselves equal psukhai in accordance to themselves, at the time that they are not married or given in marriage. And is not the woman transformed (μετατίθεται) into the man, when she becomes equally not womanish (αθήλυντος), but manly (ανδρική) and complete (τελεία) ἐπί ἱστις καὶ ἀνδρικῆ καὶ τελεία γεγομένη) (Strom. 6.12.100.3). Cf. Meeks, “Image of the Androgyne”; Henery, “Early Christian Sex Change”; Wallace, “Androgyny as Salvation.”

\(^{194}\) Clement’s general theme in Book 2, Chapter 6 is on obscene (αισχρολογίας) speech. As we should expect by now, damage to the psukhē is not the only reason to refrain from obscene speech, even if it is an important one.
"The babbler is tedious, even to himself: ‘He who is excessive in word causes his psukhē to be loathsome (ben Sira 20:8)’" (2.6.52.4).

These passages, I suggest, use sensations, feelings, and emotions to make the psukhē a felt part of the body. Thus, while the psukhē may not have been a fine-mattered substance that would have become drenched by the vapors produced through the consumption of alcohol, with the aid of Grosz’s and Salamon’s theories of the divergences between a “felt body” and the “biological body,” I argue that the psukhē could have been felt and thereby corporealized. The sensations produced in the body through its contact with the material world produced the psukhē materially. The psukhē thereby gained a fantasmic material presence on the body.

From this perspective, when reading Clement’s *Paedagogus*, we see that his instructions participate in a much more complicated cultural phenomenon than simple moralizing. First, Clement points to a body which includes the psukhē, using it as the reason his readers should act in certain ways and not others. Secondly, these instructions subtly work to corporealize the psukhē as a felt part of the body. The psukhē comes into its own through these types of instructions—it, in its materiality and corporeality, is the reason to act one way and not the other—as such it wields its own forms of agency and power.

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195 Clement thus turns warnings from Proverbs and the Wisdom of ben Sira about talking too much into an admonition against recounting evil or erotic deeds.
196 Clement, *Paed.*, 2.6.52.4: Ἡδὴ καὶ αὐτῶς αὐτῷ ὁ ἀδολόστης προσκορής: «πλεονάξων γὰρ λόγον βδελύττεται τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ.» The quoted passage is not extant in Hebrew. The Greek editions of ben Sira do not include the psukhē in the text; see Ziegler, *Sapientia Iesu Filii Sirach*, 216.
Food, Drink and the Power of the Psukhē

The ancient felt-body (one that includes a psukhē that produces sensations) is inextricably linked to the normative ideal of moderation. It is not just any kind of eating that produces such sensations, or any kind of sensations that are produced. Overeating, the violation of the normative ideal of moderation, is what produces one set of sensations. Eating plainly and light, another set of sensations. The sensations are either signs of dysfunction or health. Negative sensations are to be avoided, because of the damage to the psukhē that they portend. On the one hand, the felt-psukhē is produced through sensations of eating. On the other hand, the normative ideal of moderation is produced on this felt body, in the psukhē.

If the overheated psukhē is a damaged psukhē and the stuffed psukhē a source of affliction, normative ideals such as moderation exist as corporeal shapes and sensations. In what follows, I hope to show that they are also states of the body—a body that includes the psukhē. By attending to how the psukhē held a material corporeal presence, I suggest that we can gain a better sight of the nature of Clement’s arguments and the function of the psukhē as well. Here too, we see that the materiality of the psukhē was not just a rather curious fact about ancient ideas about the body. Instead, this materiality functioned as a key locus of power. The psukhē, as a material object, possessed power. That is why Clement references it and holds up the specter of a damaged psukhē in his efforts to affect behavior in the Paédagogus. By examining the psukhē as a material part

198 The ideal of drinking in moderation was not limited to Greek philosophers. Arnold Wieder has shown how ben Sira shares with the rabbinic benediction over wine a teaching about the importance of temperance when drinking; see “Ben Sira,” 162–63. Clement also quotes the Wisdom of ben Sira frequently: seventy times according to a Biblindex search, with seven of those quotations being found in Clement’s chapters on eating and drinking, 2.1.8.2; 2.2.23.3; 2.2.26.3; 2.2.31.3; 2.2.33.2; 2.2.34.3; 2.2.34.4.
199 See Chapter 1.
of the body, then, we have the opportunity to open up a new conversation about the functioning of power in early Christianity and ancient moral philosophy, shifting the discussion from ideas to matter.

Clement’s instructions in the *Paedagogus* themselves raise the issue of power. He is trying to shape people’s behavior. We may not be able to tell whether Clement succeeded in his efforts to police behavior, but the terms of his argument, what he argues with and upon, can be quite revealing. In this final section of the chapter, I thus look more broadly at one area in which Clement aims to dictate behavior: his instructions on eating and drinking. By looking at his instructions in general at first, and then zooming in to examine how the *psukhē* fits into his efforts to wield power, we will start to gain a better sense of the material *psukhē*’s functioning in Clement’s world.

Book 2 of the *Paedagogus* begins with a long chapter on eating, followed by a long chapter on drinking. After general remarks at the beginning of Book 2, where Clement stresses the importance of “cleansing (*ἐκκαθαίρειν*) . . . the eye of the *psukhē*,”—as opposed to attending to the body and “externals” (*τὰ ἐκτὸς*)—Clement uses the first chapter to give pages and pages of detailed instructions about eating, including comments on the Christian Agape meal (2.1.4.3–2.1.8.2), food sacrificed to idols and the related problems of eating at banquets (2.1.8.3–2.1.12.3), and Jewish dietary restrictions (1.1.17.1–2). Although his discussion is wide-ranging, if not rambling, its premise is simple: eat simply, for health, not excessively or luxuriously:

Food should be plain (*Ἁπλῆ*) and simple (*ἀπερίεργος*), fitting with truth, appropriate for plain (*ἀπλοῖς*) and unpretentious (*ἀπεριεργοῖς*) children (*παιδίοις*);

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200 “Externals” were a key category in Stoic ethical theory; see Stephens, *Stoic Ethics*, 47–80.
201 I discuss *Paed.* 2.1.1.2 more fully detail in Chapter 3.
At the Christian Agape meal, Christians should eat simply. At banquets, they should act respectably and avoid meat sacrificed to idols, for they should be masters of food and not its slave (2.1.9.2). But Clement is not giving instructions only on what and how Christians, as Christians, should eat. For him, the division is between those who have reason (λόγος) and those who do not. Christians may have the Pedagogue, who is reason (λόγος) (1.2.4.1), but Greeks and Jews have at least partial access to reason (λόγος). Thus, Clement states, “Frugality (εὐτέλεια) is proclaimed to Jews through the most efficient Law” (διὰ τοῦ νόμου οἰκονομικῶτατα) (2.1.17.1). And he explains that the Pedagogue forbade them from eating certain animals:

For, since it is impossible for the one using pleasing things to withdraw from enjoying them, he [the Pedagogue] opposed this way of living with the opposite way of life, until he could free (them) from the attack by the habits of comfort. (Paed. 2.1.17.2)

Ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀμήχανον χρώμενον τοῖς ἡδέσιν ἀποστίηνα τῆς ἀποδοχῆς αὐτῶν, τὴν ἐναντίαν ἀντέθηκεν ἀγωγήν, μέχρις ἂν ἐκλύῃ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἐθους ἐπὶ τὴν ἤδυπάθειαν καταδρομήν.

But why not “use pleasing things” and “enjoy them?” Because self-indulgence wreaks
havoc upon the body.\textsuperscript{203} The ensuing damage is a medical matter, and Clement cites a physician to backup this point: “Antiphanes, the Delian physician, has said that one of the causes of illnesses (νόσοι) is variety (πολυειδία) of foods” (2.1.2.3).\textsuperscript{204}

The damage to the body is not purely medical. The havoc wrought upon the body also produces a spectacle of the corporeally grotesque:

To me, this sort of person is nothing but a jaw. “Do not desire the foods of the rich,” the scripture says, “for these are of both false and also shameful life” (Prov 23.3). These people cling to dishes, which, after a little while, lie at the privy . . . (Paed. 2.1.4.1–2)\textsuperscript{205}

Καί μοι δοκεῖ ὁ τοιοῦτος ἄνθρωπος οὐδέν ἄλλ’ ἡ γνάθος εἶναι. «Μηδὲ ἔπιθυμε», φησὶν ἡ γραφή, «τῶν ἐδεσμάτων τῶν πλουσίων· ταῦτα γὰρ ἔχεται βίον φειδοὺς τε καὶ αἰσχροῦ.» Ο’ μὲν γὰρ ἔξεχονται τῶν ὁψιῶν, ὃ μετ’ ὀλίγον ἐκδέχεται κοπρῶν . . .

The next chapter of the Paedagogus, Book 2, Chapter 2, focuses on drinking.

Here too, the main concern is with curbing excess: “I admire those who practice a strict (αὐστηρόν) way of life, desiring water, which is self-control’s (σωφροσύνης) preferred drug (φάρμακον), and running from wine as much as possible, just as they would the threat of fire” (2.2.20.2).\textsuperscript{206} Although he suggests here and elsewhere (2.2.19.2) that the best drink is water, Clement is no prohibitionist. He even starts this chapter with “the

\textsuperscript{203} I discuss the comments Clement makes immediately following this passage (2.1.17.2) below, where the psukhē is included as part of the body that can be damaged by the consumption of foodstuff.

\textsuperscript{204} The quote is otherwise unattested. The practice of citing physicians was common, however. Porphyry, who also discusses the effects of food and taste upon the psukhē, bolsters his argument in a similar way, by citing “a certain physician” (Abst. 34).

\textsuperscript{205} Cf. Matt 15:17. The quotation from Proverbs and the allusion to Matthew follow a broader pattern of intertextual reference in Clement’s work, on which see van den Hoek, “Techniques of Quotation.” In this chapter alone, for example, Clement regularly quotes or alludes to the words of “the scripture” (ἡ γραφή) (2.1.4.2), “the apostle” (i.e., Paul; e.g., 2.1.6.2), “Wisdom” (quoting from either Wisdom of Solomon or Wisdom of ben Sira) (e.g., 2.1.7.1; 2.1.8.2), “Isaiah” (2.1.8.1–2), the Acts of the Apostles (2.1.16.2), “the Lord” (e.g., 2.1.4.4–5), and the “Gospel” (e.g., 2.1.9.2). But he also quotes such Jewish and Christian textual authorities alongside a “pagan” physician (2.1.2.3), an anonymous comic poet (2.1.5.1), Homer (e.g., 2.1.8.3), and Plato (2.1.18.2).

\textsuperscript{206} Clement, Paed. 2.2.20.2: Ἀγαμίμα τοίνυν τοῖς αὐστηρών ἐπηγιαμένοις βιον καὶ τῆς σωφροσύνης τὸ φάρμακον ἐπιποθηθέντας τὸ ἔδωρ, φειγόντας δὲ ὡς μᾶλλον παρρωτάτω τῶν οἴνον οἶνον πυρός ἀπελέην.
apostle’s” (i.e., Paul’s) advice to Timothy that he should “use a little wine on account of your [Timothy’s] stomach (1 Tim 5:23)” (2.2.19.1). Clement, quick to temper any potentially libertine readings of the passage, clarifies pseudo-Paul’s position, making sure his readers know that the author is not giving a blanket endorsement of wine:

Rightly, [the apostle] applies the appropriate application of aid to the body in need of medical attention (νοσηλευομένῳ) and limp (πλαδῶντι); but he approves (only) a little of this, lest it happen that the aid, being too much, itself needs treatments.

παγκάλως νοσηλευομένῳ καὶ πλαδῶντι σώματι κατάλληλον τὸ ἐπιστύφον βοήθημα προσφέρων, ὅλων δὲ ἐγκρίνων τοῦτο, μὴ λάθῃ τὸ βοήθημα διὰ πλήθος ἄλλης θεραπείας δεόμενον.

Clement also allows his readers to drink in the evening and in the winter so that they can warm themselves when the temperature cools (2.2.22.2; 2.2.29.2). He also encourages older people—whom he presumes to be colder by nature—to drink wine for warmth (2.2.22.3). Additionally, lightly echoing Plato, Clement writes that “wine first makes

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Cf. Tertullian, *Jejun.*, 9, who, generally arguing against the consumption of wine, references this passage (1 Tim 5:23) in an admittance that wine may be consumed out of necessity. It is difficult to ascertain with whom exactly Clement is debating. Later in the chapter (Paed. 2.2.32.1–2.2.33.1) Clement quotes Matt 11.19 (Ἡθέν γάρ, φησίν, ὁ ὑιὸς τοῦ ἄνθρωπου, καὶ λέγουσιν ἵδον ἄνθρωπος φάγος καὶ οἰνοπότης, τελευτῶν φίλος;) (2.2.33.4), writing that this passage can be used against “those called the Encratites” (2.2.33.1). Other than this, Clement does not name his opponents. Given the state of our evidence, it is difficult to speculate about which Christian, Jewish, and/or “pagan” groups Clement might be positioning himself against. In Brown’s survey of early Christian authors in *Body and Society*, he positions Clement as a moderate against Christians such as Tatian and other Encratites; also see Ashwin-Siejkowski, *Clement of Alexandria*, 109–44. By claiming the middle way between extremes, by using the rhetoric of “moderation,” Clement is also using common tropes and laying claim to favorite philosophical position. On the influence of Aristotle’s ideal of moderation on Clement, with particular reference to Clement’s fight against “Gnosticism,” see Clark, “Clement’s Use of Aristotle”; for reading Clement against Basilideans and Valentinians, see Procter, *Christian Controversy in Alexandria*.

As L. Michael White observes, although fond of citing “classical authors,” Clement does not name any contemporaries, even though he is clearly dependent, virtually verbatim, upon some (“Moral Pathology” 318, n. 115). In this comment on the value of wine’s heating properties for older men—who are presumed to be colder—Clement adheres to widespread ideas about the body’s constitution being a balance of “the cold,” “the hot,” “the wet,” and “the dry” (see above). His comment also matches to a specific passage in Galen’s *The Faculties of the Soul Follow the Mixtures of the Body* (*QAM*). Compare Clement, Τοῖς δὲ ἠδυνητικῶν ἀλατομηκῶν ἔπρεπεν μεταλαμβάνειν τὸ χρόνος, τὸ καταφερόμενον τῆς ἡλικίας, οἷον μαρανομένον ὑπὸ χρόνου, ἀναζωοποιοῦντας ἀβλαβίας τῷ τῆς ὑμέλου φαρμάκῳ, οὐδὲ γάρ ὡς ἐπὶ πλείστον

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the one who drinks it kinder to himself, more gracious to his drinking companions, gentler to his slaves, and more pleasant to his friends” (2.2.23.2). Even with all of these positive benefits, the threat of wine is ever-present. Clement, therefore, follows this observation by noting that, “when that person becomes drunk, he switches into violence (δῆμα)’” (2.2.23.2).

But it is not just wine that should be consumed in moderation; any liquid, even water, is dangerous in excess:

Regarding those in their prime, when they eat their daily meal—those who have such a meal—let them keep wholly away from liquids. Let them taste only bread, so that they may absorb the excessive moisture (of their bodies), (which can be) sopped up by the consumption of dry food. For frequent spitting and nose-blowing and hurrying about (to release) secretions are signs of a bad mixture caused by unmeasured increase of liquids overflowing the body. If someone does become thirsty, let them heal this passion with water, but only a little; for it is not proper to be filled freely with water, so that the food would be washed away; let it be grinded down for assimilating into digestion, into a bulk of food, and only quite a small amount goes out as excrement. (Paed. 2.2.21.2–3)210

Oí δὲ ἀκμάζοντες μεθ’ ἠμέραν μὲν ἀρίστου μεταλαβόντες, οἷς κατάλληλον τὸ ἀριστὸν, ἄρτου μόνον ἀπογευσάμενοι ἀπεχέσθων πάμπαν τοῦ ποτοῦ πρῶς τὸ ἀναπίνεσθαι τὴν περιττὴν ὑγρότητα αὐτῶν ἀνασφογγιζόμενην ὕπορφαγία. Καὶ ἔγκεκαμίνονται ἐτὶ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων αἱ ὀρέξεις περὶ τὰ τῆς μέθης ναιάγα (Paed. 2.2.22.3), το Galen: ἐμμακὴ μὲν γὰρ εἶναι φησὶ τὴν τῶν μερακίων <φόσιν>, αὐστηρὰν δὲ καὶ δεσθεμὸν καὶ σκληρὰν τὴν τῶν γερόντων, οὐ δήποτε διὰ τῶν ἀριθμῶν τῶν ἐπὸν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τῶν σωματικῶν ἑπανάγουσα ἡ τῆς ἡλικίας ψυχρότητα, τοῖς δ’ αἰξιανομένους ἐναντιωτήτι· ἔχουσαν γὰρ αὐτῶν τὴν φῶσιν καὶ σφοδρὰς κινομένης υπερ-θερμαίνει τε καὶ εἰς ἄμετροις καὶ σφοδρὰς ἐκβαίνει κινήσεις (QAM: K 810). On Galen’s ideas about how the cold, hot, wet, or dry properties of foodstuffs affects the mixture of the body, see Hankinson, “Philosophy of Nature,” esp. 217–223. Galen’s primary treatise on the issue is De temperamentis. See above for more on the physiological ideas behind Clement’s reasoning about the effects of wine.

210 Clement’s comments about the ways in which frequent spitting, nose-blowing, and bathroom secretions signal a bad bodily mixture match comments found in Xenophon’s Cyropaedia (8.8.5), where Xenophon describes such activities as affecting the body’s mixtures and thus its strength. Clement does not quote from the passage, however, and there is no reason to think he expects his readers to catch any allusion to the work, faint as the allusion is. Nevertheless, the parallels suggest at least the strength of Clement’s ideas about the effects of excessive liquids in the body.
As in the passages discussed above, directions about drinking are framed in terms of the health of the body and a general horror at the grotesque corporeal effects of excess:

The tongue becomes entangled by unmeasured wine, the lips become slack, and the eyes are turned aside, its vision, a sort of swimming in a great pool of moisture. The eyes are forced to deceive; they believe that everything is going round in a circle, and are unable to count things that are far away as single. (Paed. 2.2.24.1)\(^{211}\)

Clement’s instructions on eating and drinking have struck some scholars as empty moralizing. Gluttony is bad because it is gluttony. For example, Simon Wood, in the otherwise admiring introduction to his translation of the *Paedagogus*, complains that the instructions Clement gives “descend to details that become tiring.”\(^{212}\) Peter Brown, calls them “egregiously fussy.”\(^{213}\) Yet a closer look at Clement’s reasoning shows that gluttony is essentially a bodily state. Gluttony is not to be avoided because moderation is an abstract moral imperative. Gluttony is to be avoided because it wrecks the body. The seemingly abstract moral ideal of moderation, or its opposite, gluttony, is not only abstract, but also a bodily state. Gluttony names the body that is in disarray. Moderation,

\(^{211}\) Aristotle also describes the effects of wine in similar language, noting circular vision and the difficulty of seeing distant objects clearly (*Probl. 9.20, 872a18–23, 874a5–10*).

\(^{212}\) Wood, “Introduction,” xiv; cf. Osborn’s (*Clement of Alexandria*) studied reticence on Clement’s actual instructions in the *Paedagogus*.

\(^{213}\) Brown, *Body and Society*, 126.
a body that is well ordered. The body, its material and physical condition, is a moral condition.

In the two chapters on eating and drinking in Book 2 of the *Paedagogus*, the *psukhē* appears only intermittingly. The term occurs seventeen times total: six in the chapter about eating and eleven in the chapter about drinking. Although Book 2 is framed by opening comments about the need to purify the eye of the *psukhē* rather than attend to the body and external things (2.1.1.2), only twelve of the references to the *psukhē* in the first two chapters are directly about the effects of eating and drinking upon the *psukhē*; the other five references are unrelated. Like other parts of the body—such as the stomach (2.1.2.2), the tongue (2.2.24.1), the jaws (2.2.24.1), the eyes (2.2.24.1), and the face (2.2.26.1)—the *psukhē* was affected by excessive food or liquid (see below). It could also benefit from eating and drinking (see below). The body that Clement knew included a *psukhē*. The sporadic character of these references suggests that Clement is not working out and then applying a theory of the *psukhē* to the issue of eating and drinking. Like the tongue, jaws, or eyes, Clement just refers to the *psukhē* here and there throughout his discussion of the effects of food and wine upon the body.

Nevertheless, like many other Greek thinkers, Clement does at times oppose the

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214 I discuss *Paed*. 2.1.1.2 more fully in Chapter 3.
215 These other five references reflect how frequently Clement references *psukhē* in a non-systematic manner. He opens the book, as described above, in terms of the need to cleanse the eye of the *psukhē*. In the two chapters in which he discusses eating and drinking, as noted above, he mentions the effects of eating and drinking upon the *psukhē* twelve times. The other four references in these two chapters on eating and drinking include a quote from Homer, where *psukhēi* are described as ghost-like, flying to blood (2.1.8.3); a reference to the shame of the *psukhē* being made visible through the ragged clothes a drunkard inevitably ends up wearing (2.2.27.3); and two references to the *psukhē* in a complex discussion of the Eucharist (2.2.20.1). This last references certainly could be viewed as an instance where the *psukhē* is discussed in terms of the effects of eating and drinking, but the reasoning of the passage is ambiguous enough that I have decided not to include it in my discussion of the effects of eating and drinking upon the *psukhē*. (I do discuss this passage in Chapter 4.)
psukhē and the body in a way that does not make sense if Clement thinks that the psukhē is a part of the body in a manner akin to the eyes or the stomach. For example, in one passage Clement distinguishes between the damage done to the body and the stomach, but he does not oppose the two (2.1.2.2). Later on in the same chapter (2.1.7.3), however, Clement juxtaposes the effects of diet on the person, describing what happens to the psukhē, on the one hand, and to the body, on the other hand:

Self-sufficiency (αὐτάρκειαν), which sets the portion of food at the right amount, healthily provides for the body . . . But if the diet passes (the regulations of) self-sufficiency (αὐτάρκειαν), it afflicts the person, on the one hand making the psukhē slow (νωθῆ), and, on the other hand making the body prone to illness (ἐπισφαλὲς). (Paed. 2.1.7.3)

. . . τὴν αὐτάρκειαν, ἢ δὴ ἐφεστῶσα τῇ τροφῇ δικαίᾳ ποσότητι μεμετρημένη σωτηρίως τὸ σῶμα διοικοῦσα . . . ἢ δὲ ὑπερβλάζουσα τὴν αὐτάρκειαν διὰ τὸν ἀνθρωπόν κακοῖ, νωθῆ μὲν τὴν ψυχήν, ἐπισφαλὲς δὲ εἰς νόσον ἐργαζομένη τὸ σῶμα.

The psukhē is somehow separate from the body, at least conceptually, in a way that the eyes, for example, were not. On the one hand, the psukhē is affected, on the other hand, the body.

Clement’s contemporaries made the same assumptions about the separateness of the psukhē from the body. These assumptions are why Cartesian dualism so easily maps on to so many statements about the psukhē’s relation to the body. Yet, often the psukhē’s separateness from the body was based upon the presumption that the psukhē itself was a body. Heinrich von Staden has shown that the dominant presumption of

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216 In this passage (2.1.2.2), Clement lists multiple negative effects from an excessive diet: “an indisposed (καχεξίους) body, an upset (ἀνατροπός) stomach, and a seduction of taste (ἐκπορνευόσις τῆς γεύσεως).”
217 Cf. Galen, Ars medica K 1.322; Ps.-Justin, Ep. ad Zen. et Ser 512c.
218 Galen, for example, wrestles very explicitly with this issue in QAM, even though such a position, that the psukhē is separate from the body, contradicts his overall point (see esp. QAM K 779).
Hellenistic philosophers and physicians was that psukhē was a body itself. Similarly, Smith draws our attention to a passage in the Excerpta ex Theodoto in which Clement (if it is actually Clement commenting there) says that the psukhē must be a body, since otherwise the psukhē would be incapable of receiving punishment in the next world.

I propose that Clement’s comments about the psukhē make the most sense when we rethink the shape and limits of the body and view the body Clement describes as including prosthetic parts, namely, the psukhē. In appealing to the notion of “prosthesis,” I do not mean to imply that the psukhē was replacing a missing or dysfunctional body part. Instead, I mean it in the sense of how prosthetics augment the “natural body” as described by Grosz in her interpretation and citation of Freud’s famous remark about “man” as a “prosthetic god”:

The ego is not simply bounded by the “natural” body. The “natural” body, insofar as there is one, is continually augmented by the products of history and culture, which it readily incorporates into its own intimate space. In this, “man” must be recognized as a “prosthetic god,” approaching the fantasy of omnipotence, or at least of a body well beyond its physical, geographical, and temporal immediacy.

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219 “The belief cluster shared by Hellenistic philosophers and physicians includes, for example, that all psukhē is sōma but not all sōma is psukhē; that only what is spatially extended, three-dimensional, and capable of acting or being acted upon exists; that the soul meets these criteria of existence; that this corporeal psukhē, like the rest of the body, is mortal and transient, that the psukhē is generated with the body; that it neither exists before the body nor exists eternally after its separation from the body—that is, the soul does not exist independently of the body in which it exists” (von Staden, “Body, Soul, and Nerves,” 79). Von Staden also quotes from three ancient authors at the beginning of the piece to make the point: Epicurus: “psukhē is sōma”; Cleanthes and Chrysippus “The psukhē therefore is a sōma”; and Zeno of Cilium “Corpus est anima” (“Body, Soul, and Nerves,” 79).

220 The passage reads: “The demons are called “incorporeal” (ισοματα), not because they do not have a body (for they have a form [σχήμα] and for this reason the sensation [συναισθήσειν] of punishment), but in comparison with the pneumatic bodies of the saved ones, they are shadows (σκιά), and thus called incorporeal. And the angels are bodies—they are seen. And even the psukhē is a body. As even the apostle says, ‘For they are sown in a psukhē-type body, and raised in a pneumatic body (1. Cor 15.44).’ How would psukhai sense (συναισθάνομαι) punishments if they did not have bodies? (Ex. Theo. 1.14.1–3) (Τὰ δαιμόνια «σωματα» είρηται, οὐ γὰρ σώμα μὴ ἔχοντα ἔχει γάρ καὶ σχήμα· διὸ καὶ συναισθήσθην κολάσεως ἔχει), ἀλλ’ ὡς πρὸς σύγκρισιν τῶν σωμάτων σωμάτων πνευματικών σκιά ὧντα ἄσωμα είρηται. Καὶ οἱ Ἀγγέλοι σωματα εἰσίν· ἔρωνται γὰρ. — Αλλ’ καὶ ἢ φερχή σώμα. Ὁ γὰρ ἀπόστολος «απείρεται μὲν γὰρ σώμα φερχόν, ἐγέφρεται δὲ σώμα πνευματικόν». Πῶς δὲ καὶ αἱ κολαζόμεναι φερχὴ συναισθάνονται μὴ σώματα οὖσαι; See Smith, “Very Thin Things,” 274–78.

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If the ego is a mapping of the body and if the body is able to incorporate a host of instrumental supplements, the ego (or at least its ideal) aspires to a megalomania worthy of gods.\textsuperscript{221}

It is in this sense that we might describe the ancient psukhē as prosthesis to the body, in a manner reversing Descartes’ depiction of the body as the prosthesis of the soul.\textsuperscript{222}

There is no reason that the body cannot include separable parts, separable bodies, and this is perhaps especially the case for the ancient contexts that informed Clement, in which bodies were not marked by a modern sense of complete self-enclosure. Seen from this perspective, the body is not defined by strict hermetic boundaries. It can include prosthetics, phantoms, and the many materials constantly moving in and out of the body, including food, wine, air, and other environmental elements. These prosthetic and phantom parts can be both incorporated into the body and distinct from the body. They can be felt-parts of the body and the self.

In the above passage, we see both the psukhē and the body affected by diet, the former being made slow, and the latter prone to illness. That passage does not show us the psukhē as part of the body necessarily, but its description of the psukhē being harmed by food is suggestive. The psukhē is affected by the body’s consumption of food. It seems to be connected to the body’s digestive processes.

In another reference to the effects of eating in Book 2, Chapter 1 (a reference that we reviewed in part earlier in this chapter), Clement states:

Pleasure (ἡδονή) causes people much harm (βλάβην) and pain (λύπην). Excessive food (πολυτροφία) births deep affliction (δυσπάθειαν), forgetfulness (λήθην), and folly (ἀφροσύνην) in the psukhē. And it is said that the bodies of youth become quick growing in height when they are deprived of nourishment. For the pneuma,

\textsuperscript{221} Grosz, Volatile Bodies, 38; cf. Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, 90–92.
\textsuperscript{222} See Babb, “Prosthetic Body”; Wills, Prosthesis.
which causes the spurt of growth, is not stopped by the mass of food blocking its airway (εὔπνουν). (Paed. 2.1.17.3)

Ἀνθρώποις δὲ τὰ μὲν πολλὰ βλάβην καὶ λόσιν ἐνεγέννησεν ἥδονή, δυσπάθειαν δὲ καὶ λήθην καὶ ἀφροσύνην ἢ πολυτροφία ἐντίκτει τῇ φυχῇ. Εὐαυξηθὲ καὶ τῶν παιδῶν τὰ σώματα γίνεσθαι φαινεῖ εἰς μήκος ἐπιδιδότων ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλλειπούσης τροφῆς· οὐ γὰρ κωλεῖται τὸ ἀνατρέχον εἰς αὐξήν πνεῦμα τῆς πολλῆς τροφῆς ἀντιφραττούσῃ τὸ εὔπνουν τοῦ δρόμου.

While pleasure causes harm, the specific mechanics of that harm are physical or chemical (rather than spiritual or immaterial). It is the excess of food that does the damage. The psukhē is harmed, the body stunted. Similarly, Clement argues earlier in this chapter (2.1) that “turbid vapor” (ἀναθυμίασις θολωδέστερα) from meat and wine “darkens” (ἐπισκοτεῖ) the psukhē, thereby inhibit its functioning (2.1.11.1). The heavy vapors within the body, produced through the consumption of meat and wine, affect the psukhē’s functioning through darkening it.

The problems, although material, are the result of excess:

But if anyone does have such things (meat or wine), he does not err (ἁμαρτάνει), but let him partake only with discipline (ἐγκρατῶς), neither clinging (ἐξεχόμενος) to them, nor depending (ἀπηρτημένος) on them. Nor being greedy (ἐπιλαμαργῶν) for (this) dish. (Paed. 2.1.11.1)

Εἰ δὲ τις καὶ τούτων μεταλαμβάνει, οὐχ ἁμαρτάνει, μόνον ἐγκρατῶς μετεχέτω, μὴ ἐξεχόμενος μηδὲ ἀπηρτημένους αὐτῶν μηδὲ ἐπιλαμαργῶν τῷ ὀψι.

In these passages we repeatedly see the psukhē placed in a nexus of physical and material causes and effects, the same matrix of physical and material causes and effects in which “the body” exists. Even if the effects on the psukhē also include sensations and mental

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223 Plutarch has similar reasoning about youths growing tall when they consume only a little food (Lyc. 17.4).
224 Pneuma was associated with the psukhē, often being considered either the substance of the psukhē (the position of the Stoics, among others), or the first instrument of the psukhē. See Lloyd, “Pneuma Between Body and Soul”; Smith, “How Thin,” passim; Debru, “Physiology” 271–73; Donini, “Psychology” 201.
225 Clement, Paed. 2.1.11.1: ἢ ἅτι αὐτῶν ἀναθημάσις θολωδέστερα οὖσα ἐπισκοτεῖ τῇ φυχῇ. Clement here is all but quoting Musonius Rufus (frag. 18a.18–32; cf. frag. 18b).
functioning—effects that might seem less corporeal—they too are a part of the physical, material world for Clement.

In Book 2, Chapter 2, where Clement discusses wine and water, we again find the psukhē acting and being acted upon by the physical and material world it shares with the body. For example, Clement states:

And if we do thus [eat and drink in moderation], our psukhē will be clean (καθαρὰ), dry (ζηρὰ), and radiant (φωτεινής): “a bright (αὐγή) psukhē is dry (ζηρὰ), full of light (σοφωτάτη), and virtuous (ἀρίστη)” [Heraclitus, frag. 74]. Thus capable for contemplation (ἐποπτική), it is not drenched (κάθυγρος), embodied (σωματοποιούμενη) in the vapors (ἀναθυμίασιν) of a cloud (νεφέλης) of wine. (Paed. 2.2.29.3)²²⁶

Οὔτω δὲ ἂν καὶ ἡ ψυχή ἡμῶν ὑπάρξαι καθαρὰ καὶ ζηρὰ καὶ φωτεινής, «αὐγή δὲ ψυχή ζηρὰ σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη». Ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἐποπτική, οὐδὲ ἐστὶν κάθυγρος ταῖς ἐκ τοῦ οἴνου ἀναθυμίασεσιν νεφέλις δίκην σωματοποιοῦμενη.

The psukhē’s physical state, created by the body’s diet, determines whether it is good, or just bogged down with water and unable to function. In another passage, in the midst of noting that wine can be beneficial because it “thaws stuck secretions (of food)” (τὰ μὲν γλίσχρα τῶν περιττωμάτων διατίκει) while it also “tempers/dilutes the pungent (δριμεῖς) and base (φαύλους) humors (χυμοῦς) with its sweet fragrance” (2.2.23.2),²²⁷ Clement notes that

Well, indeed, it is said “from the beginning, wine was created to be drunk with self-sufficiency for the great joy of the psukhē and the heart [cf. ben Sira 31:27–28].” (Paed. 2.2.23.3)

Εἶ γοὰν ἑκεῖνο εἰρήτατο· «Αγαλλίαμα ψυχῆς καὶ καρδίας οἶνος ἐκτίσται ἄπ’ ἀρχῆς πινόμενος αὐτάρκης.»

²²⁶ This passage (2.2.29.3) is also lifted straight from Musonius Rufus (frag. 18a.18–32), although Clement never acknowledges the debt. The reasoning, however, is also paralleled in Philostratus (Vit. Apoll. 1.8, 2.36–37).

²²⁷ Clement, Paed. 2.2.23.2: θερμὸς γὰρ ὃν καὶ χοιρὸς ἔχων ἰδεῖς, κεκραμένος ἐμελός τὰ μὲν γλίσχρα τῶν περιττωμάτων διατίκει θερμότητι, τοὺς δὲ δριμεῖς καὶ φαύλους ταῖς εὐωδίαις κεράννυσι χημοῖς.
In sum, Clement discusses eating and drinking in terms of their corporeal effects. Some of these effects, positive and negative, are familiar, and we can easily identify them as the corporeal effects of eating and drinking (e.g., excessive eating makes “the body” more prone to illness). Clement also locates these effects in the psukhē, but this does not mean that these effects are “psychological” in the modern Western sense of the term instead of being corporeal. Too much food will make the psukhē slow and cause it pain, while also bringing lethargy, and shallow-mindedness to it. The consumption of meat, along with wine, creates turbid vapors that darken the psukhē. Too much drinking saturates the psukhē with misty-water. Drinking wine in moderation affects the psukhē in other ways, making it clean, dry, and radiant. And this physical state of the psukhē portends a virtuous psukhē, with virtue presented as an ethical effect of the physical changes made to the psukhē through action.

Conclusion

Clement’s moralizing is corporeal and material, even when it includes the psukhē. Even “psychological”—seemingly non-corporeal—effects, such as shallow-mindedness, joy, or pain, appear in Clement’s instructions as part of a material matrix of corporeal cause and effect. The virtuous psukhē is bright, dry, and full of light, or bogged down in water and dark vapors. His images of virtue and vice are corporeal, even when explicitly mentioning the psukhē. We thus see the psukhē as part of the body, as affected by the internal mixture of liquids and foodstuffs that the body consumes. It is included in the body’s reactions to food and drink. It may not have been theorized as just another part of the bounded body, but even as it was separable from the body—a prosthetic—we see
Clement describe its felt effects and functioning as part of the body. His argument therefore, rather than relying upon moral ideals—putatively the realm of the modern Western soul—is instead thoroughly about a material body that includes a material *psukhē*.

Clement was not alone. Shaw, White, and Smith have shown how assumptions about the *psukhē*’s material corporeality were widespread in the first centuries of the Common Era. In this chapter, I attempted to extend their observations about widespread notions concerning the *psukhē*’s corporeality by introducing Grosz’s and Salamon’s twin theories of the body’s “imaginary anatomy” and the felt body. Grosz’s work, building off of Lacan, suggests that the body is not immediately available to the self, but comes to it through culturally mediated images. I suggested that, like the sexed body, the *psukhē* materialized on the body through culturally produced images. Clement participates and relies upon those images when giving instructions on the things and activities that damage the *psukhē*. Salamon, building off of Schilder and Merleau-Ponty, suggested that this body image or “imaginary anatomy” was also made available to the self through culturally interpreted sensations and feelings. I proposed that the *psukhē* was part of the ancient felt-body. Clement’s instructions, and those like them, on the substances and actions that damaged the *psukhē* provided a script for interpreting bodily sensations and feelings as those of the *psukhē*. Sensations grounded the *psukhē* in the body’s materiality, giving it a powerful presence that Clement and others could try to draw upon and use for their own purposes.

Clement and his contemporaries were not merely theorizing about the *psukhē*’s
materiality or physical presence, but relying on it to make their arguments. At least in the passages that we have reviewed so far, Clement’s moralizing relies on the corporeal and the material. This dependency on the psukhē, especially on its physical vulnerabilities, in moral admonitions raises questions about the psukhē’s relation to power. Through reviewing Clement’s descriptions of the things and actions that damage the psukhē, we saw that a key to the power of these admonitions was the psukhē’s felt presence. As I have shown, Clement relies less on appeals to piety or authority than to the physical status of the psukhē, a status that is made plain to the subject through the sensations and feelings produced by the psukhē and felt by the person.

In this chapter, I focused on the privately felt or sensed body. In the next chapter, I turn to the publically visible body, examining passages in the Paedagogus in which the psukhē gains visibility through the body’s material addenda. In order to further explore the material power and presence of the psukhē, I therefore seek to shed light on its material presence in the shoes, hairstyles, faces, clothing, and cosmetics of the ancient Mediterranean world.
CHAPTER 3 - A MATERIAL FANTASY

The psukhē as an internal moral core may be the psukhē with which we are most comfortable and familiar in the modern West. It seems to match modern Cartesian assumptions about the nature of the self or soul. In antiquity, however, a trained physiognomist could discern the character of a soul just by seeing a person’s face, eyes, or the features of his or her body. Even gait, voice, and gestures could be signs of the soul’s character. In addition to its interactions with anatomy and physiology, the ancient soul thus also appeared on the surface of the body, again contradicting modern sensibilities as well as de facto scholarly assumptions—in this case: about the soul’s essentially internal and invisible nature.

By Clement of Alexandria’s time in the end of the second century and the beginning of the third, physiognomists had been around for centuries. Two of the first Greek treatises written on physiognomy appeared towards the end of the fourth century B.C.E., circulating together under Aristotle’s name by Clement’s time. Loxus, probably active between 323–350 B.C.E., wrote on physiognomy and was still being read six hundred years later, as a fourth-century C.E. anonymous Latin Treatise attests.228 The most influential physiognomic treatise in antiquity was written in the second century C.E. by Polemon.229 Physiognomy might have been a rather esoteric science even in antiquity, but its general claims nevertheless made a broad impact, as Maud Gleason has shown in

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228 Boys-Stones, “Physiognomy and Ancient Psychological Theory.”
229 Swain, “Introduction.”
her study of the making of masculinity in second-century public competitions.\textsuperscript{230}

If, from a Cartesian perspective, Galen’s surgical proofs of the soul’s locations seem ridiculous and ancient ideas about the soul being weighed down by meat confused at best, then the claims of physiognomy are almost offensive. The very idea of physiognomy surprises modern common sense about the soul and its relationship to the body. The soul is the definitively internal and invisible object according to Cartesian dualism. Its character cannot be read physiognomically on the contours of the body, for that would make modernity’s essentially private and inviolable self public and subject to the contingencies of the physical world.

It should not come as a surprise, therefore, that some of the most important and influential work on the ancient \textit{psukhē} takes the \textit{psukhē}’s internal, non-corporeal status, as well as its role as the seat of morals, as a starting point for analysis. This is especially true of the relatively recent understanding of the \textit{psukhē} as an object of therapy for ancient philosophy developed by Pierre Hadot and André-Jean Voelke,\textsuperscript{231} and expanded by Michel Foucault and Martha Nussbaum in their own ways.\textsuperscript{232}

Harry O. Maier has applied some of these lessons, especially from Foucault, to Clement of Alexandria.\textsuperscript{233} Maier discusses Clement’s instructions on dress, placing them in their a larger “Greco-Roman tradition of sartorial reflection”\textsuperscript{234} and asking what ancient instructions on dress reveal about the history of the self. Yet, insofar as his primary topic of interest lies in the history of the self, his work is also instructive for how

\textsuperscript{230} Gleason, \textit{Making Men}, esp. 55–81.
\textsuperscript{231} Hadot, \textit{Philosophy as a Way of Life}; Voelke, \textit{Philosophie comme thérapie de l’âme}.
\textsuperscript{232} Foucault, \textit{Use of Pleasure}; idem, \textit{Care of the Self}; Nussbaum, \textit{Therapy of Desire}.
\textsuperscript{233} Maier, “Clement of Alexandria and the Care of the Self”; idem, “Dressing for Church.”
\textsuperscript{234} Maier, “Dressing for Church,” 66.
it elides any distinction between \textit{psukhē} and self—or between \textit{psukhē} and (the modern) soul.\footnote{I discuss the \textit{psukhē}’s relation to the self in Chapter 4. Note that the same elision is found in other recent works in early Christian studies on the therapy of the \textit{psukhē}; Kolbet, \textit{Augustine and the Cure of Souls}; Meyer, “Shaping the Sick Soul.”} In what follows, I build on Maeir’s insights into Clement, but I ask instead how they speak to a materialized \textit{psukhē}, felt on the body but also publically visible.

If the \textit{psukhē}’s immateriality and distinction from the body should not be presumed, even if our modern instincts tell us otherwise, neither should we take its internality or function as moral-core for granted—especially because, as we saw in the last chapter, the \textit{psukhē}’s relation to regulatory norms and power in ancient sources often diverges quite sharply from Cartesian expectations.\footnote{As we saw in Chapters 1-2, the problem with damaging the \textit{psukhē} was not just theoretical, but practical, not just a matter of morals, but physical. The damaged \textit{psukhē}, heavy and wet, no longer functioned correctly. The body was no longer rational. The wound caused to the \textit{psukhē} by too much drink, for instance, unleashed havoc upon the body (\textit{Paed.} 2.2.20.2–2.2.21.1).} In this chapter, I suspend any assumption that the \textit{psukhē}’s status as internal or as a moral core is self-evident. I am particularly interested in how it maintained its status as a thing with enough coherence and permanency that it could function as a stable reference point. Even if it could change from dry to wet, reason to lechery, healthy to sick, it was a singular object that was changing. How and why did disparate impulses, desires, rationalities, and selves unite together as products of a singular internal core, the \textit{psukhē}?\footnote{In Chapter 4, I explore the apparent contradictions between the image of the \textit{psukhē} as a moral core and the image of the \textit{psukhē} as a physical part of the body.}

I suggested in the previous chapter that the \textit{psukhē} possessed a felt bodily presence for Clement and his peers—that one could discern one’s \textit{psukhē} somatically. Similar to what modern theorists like Gayle Salamon claim now for the sexed body, the \textit{psukhē} materialized on the body through its association with certain sensations and
feelings. The last chapter, by investigating the psukhē’s material manifestation as a sensually and physically affected object (and not just as a self/subject), showed how the specifics of its material manifestation were productive of and the products of certain regulatory ideals. Seeing the psukhē as a materialized part of the body, we saw that moderation and excess were bodily states. Indulgence, a bodily state. Regulatory power, therefore, operated not solely or primarily through appeals to a disembodied rational self, mind, or soul, but through the materialization of the body itself, a body which included the psukhē.

Clement and his peers, however, did not teach that the psukhē itself was on the surface of the body. Like the heart, other internal organs, or blood, the psukhē was thought to be internal. Its job was to lead and guide the body to act virtuously, according to reason. As such, it was supposed to function as an internal moral core and the seat of rationality. It was the center of reason (ὁ λόγος). As Clement explains in the opening of Book 3, “The intellectual (part) (τὸ νοερόν) of the tripartite psukhē—also called the rational (part) (λογιστικὸν)—is the inner person (ὁ ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν ὁ ἔνδον) and the ruler of the visible (φανορέννοι) person” (3.1.1.2). Or, as Clement writes

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238 Clement even notes in an aside that some people believe that the blood is the psukhē: “For blood is the first-created substance in the person, for this reason, some even dare to say that it is the substance of the psukhē” (Πρωτόγονον γάρ τὸ αἷμα εὑρίσκεται ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ, ὃ δὴ τινος οὐδὲν εἰπεὶν φυσῆς τετολμήσαν) (Paed. 1.6.39.2).
239 Clement repeatedly contrasts the psukhē’s internal status to the external features of the body (e.g., Paed. 2.12.121.2; 3.2.1.3; 3.2.9.2). See further below.
240 In some passages in the Paedagogus, Clement describes the psukhē as in charge of the body (e.g., 1.13.102.3). In other passages, he is more precise: the rational part of the psukhē controls the body through controlling the two irrational parts of the psukhē with reason (3.1.1.2–5). See below. There was also a large philosophical discussion in antiquity about the psukhē’s functions and powers; Debru, “Physiology,” 265–68.
241 Clement, Paed. 3.1.1.2: Τριγενοῦς ὁν ὑπαρχούσης τῆς φυσῆς τὸ νοερόν, ὃ δὴ λογιστικὸν καλεῖται, ὁ ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν ὁ ἔνδον, ὃ τοῦ φαινομένου τοῦ ἄρχον ἀνθρώπου. Clement goes on to describe the other two parts of the psukhē, with one part being the irascible part (θυμικός) and the third part being desire.
And the action (πράξις) of the Christian psukhē is the working of logic (λογικῆς) according to the good (ἀστείαν) judgment and desire for truth, completed through the (psukhē's) congenitally attached (συμφυοῦς) fellow-worker: the body. (Paed. 1.13.102.3)

καὶ ἔστιν ἡ μὲν πράξις ἡ τοῦ Χριστιανοῦ ψυχή ἐνέργεια λογικῆς κατὰ κρίσιν ἀστείαν καὶ ὀρέξειν ἀληθείας διὰ τοῦ συμφυοῦς καὶ συναγωνιστοῦ σώματος ἐκτελομένη.

When the psukhē is taken for granted as an internal moral-self, as a way of referring to a real or true self that transcends the body, it is easy to read past the specific features of the psukhē as well as the complex ways in which it existed and gained power through its public appearance on the body. It is easy to assume that, of course, Clement and his peers would think that people have an internal moral-core that is the true self. Yet, if we do not start with the assumption that the psukhē is self-evidently an internal moral-core, or that the true self is self-evidently an internal object with coherence and stability through time, then Clement’s comments suddenly become valuable evidence for the process by which the psukhē came to appear internal, real, self-evident, and coherent through time, a thing that had enough coherence to change states while still being the same thing.

Through his comments on the body’s appearance and material addenda (e.g.,

(ἐπιθυμητικός) (3.1.1.2). The latter two parts need to be kept in check by reason/the first part of the psukhē (3.1.1.5). All of this relates to the divine word, the Pedagogue, who controls this part of the psukhē and is reason itself (3.1.1.2; 3.2.1.1). In another explicit allusion to Plato’s tripartite model (cf. Phaedr. 246a–254e), Clement makes the same move: “For indulgence (τρυφή) drives headlong into decadence (κόρον), leaping, becoming wild, and throwing off the charioteer, the Pedagogue, who, restraining (ἀνακόπτων) the reins from afar, leads and carries the human horse to salvation. The irrational part of the psukhē becomes wild—beast-like—around pleasures, shameful desires, precious stones, gold, fancy dress, and other luxuries” (δεινὴ γὰρ ἡ τρυφὴ εἰς κόρον ἐξοκείλατο σκυρτήσας καὶ ἀνακόπτων καὶ τὸν ἅμισυ, [καὶ] τὸν παιδαγωγόν, ἀποσείσασθαι, δὲ πάρρωθεν ἀνακόπτων τὰς ἰδίας ὤγει καὶ φέρει πρὸς σωτηρίαν τοῦ ἡμῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, τὸ ἄλογον μέρος τῆς θυρήματος τὸ πέρι ἤδονης καὶ ὀρέξεως ἐπίφορον καὶ λίθους καὶ χρυσοῦ καὶ ἔσθήτα ποικίλην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην χλιδήν ἐκθηρισμένον) (Paed. 3.11.53.2).
jewelry, cosmetics, shoes), we see how this object, the *psukhé*, works materially to make subjects and police the appearance of the body. The body that was not governed by a rational *psukhé*, the out-of-control body, was plain to see: “The shamelessness caused by the scalding wine ripens, and breasts and genitals swell, *displaying to all* a picture of sexual offense (*πορνείας*). The *psukhé*’s wound (*τραύμα*) inflames the body, and the obscene pulsations chase idle curiosity to transgression” (*τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ τραύμα φλεγμαίνειν ἀναγκάζει τὸ σώμα σφυγμοῖ τε ἀναιδεῖς περιεργίαν διώκουσιν εἰς παρανομίας*) (2.2.20.4). So too, the belchings, wheezing, and snortings of the drunk and stuffed body that “bury the clear-sighted eye of the *psukhé*” (2.9.81.1–2) would also be visible (and audible). The bodily laziness (being pushed uphill and downhill by one’s servants) that caused “*psukhicle* (*ψυχικής*) softness/effeminacy (*μαλακίας*)” would also have been quite noticeable: “And a noble (*γενναίου*) man should not have any sign of softness/effeminacy (*μαλακίας*) appear on his face, nor on another part of his body, nor unbecoming unmanliness (*ἀνανδρίας*) of motion (*κινήσεις*) or expression (*σχέσεις*)” (3.11.73.5–74.1). The *psukhé*’s appearance in “belchings,” “swollen genitals,” “obscene pulsations,” or luxurious clothing not only makes the state of the *psukhé* plain to see, it also allows the *psukhé* to regulate the specific areas in which it appears. If clothes make the *psukhé* visible, then they are what is subject to regulation in the name of the *psukhé* as well. What makes the *psukhé* visible is also the site of its power.

By examining how his instructions implicitly made the *psukhé*, or at least its state, publicly visible through the body and its material addenda, we learn how such a sight also constituted the nature of “character” in material terms, thereby loading it with a powerful
material presence. This is not to say that this was Clement’s plan or strategy. If we follow Clement on his own terms, we end up stating that Clement thinks that luxurious clothes are incompatible with a healthy psukhē (possibly noting how typical his moral senses were about clothing). But such a statement simply begs the question. How and why was the psukhē a thing that Clement could refer to as having a lasting presence, be it a sick or healthy one? By investigating the effects of linking the state of the psukhē to the body’s appearance and material addenda, we see that Clement’s instructions would not have functioned merely to regulate the actions of individuals, but also simultaneously to produce the object in need of regulation, the psukhē.

In this chapter, I look to investigate the effects of these and other publicly visible signs of the psukhē’s presence. I say “publicly,” because the specific visual presence of these indicators of the psukhē works to make the state of a person’s psukhē visible to any passer-by. I will argue that, since these signs of the psukhē and its states would have been conspicuously visible, the psukhē also became conspicuously, even publicly, visible, even as its functioning was ostensibly internal. Instead of seeing these corporeally visible signs of the psukhē’s state as incidental to Clement’s descriptions of the state of the psukhē, I aim to show that such visibility fabricated the psukhē as a publicly knowable object. Its visibility was not an accidental effect of its presence, but the cause of its presence. Therefore, while the last chapter focused upon the ways in which the psukhē could have

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242 Maier (“Dressing for Church,” 66) offers a helpful bibliography of works in Classics on ancient clothing and cosmetics: Colburn and Heyn, Reading a Dynamic Canvas; Edmondson and Keith, Roman Dress; Cleland, Harlow, and Llewellyn-Jones, Clothed Body; Stout, “Jewelry as a Symbol of Status.” In early Christian Studies, see Upson-Saia, Early Christian Dress; Upson-Saia, Daniel-Hughes and Batten, eds., Dressing Judeans and Christians in Antiquity.

243 Thus, I am less interested in whether Clement’s instructions “worked” (i.e., whether people obeyed him), than I am in the logic he employs and the material context of that logic.
materialized privately through bodily sensations, this chapter looks at how the psukhē was constituted as a public object through its illusory, yet publicly visible, effects and presence on the body and the body’s material addenda. The psukhē, in addition to being a felt part of the body, was produced on the surface of body.

I begin the next section of this chapter by discussing passages in which Clement comes closest to reflecting upon the psukhē’s relationship to the body. Here, we will see Clement founding his instructions about the body on the nature of the psukhē. I then highlight how the links Clement posits between the body and the internal psukhē would have made the psukhē publicly visible. The final section of the chapter explores potential effects of the psukhē’s public visibility, namely the ways in which the constant visibility of these materials made the psukhē a constant thing and the ways in which the psukhē gained power through its visibility.

The Psukhē’s Appearance Versus the Body’s Appearance

As noted above, if the ancient psukhē-body dualism was not predicated upon the same terms as Cartesian soul-body dualism, we need to rethink not only the nature of the psukhē’s relationship to the body, but also the nature of the psukhē’s internality. In this subsection, I review Clement’s most explicit comments on the body-psukhē relationship. Hardly the opposite of the body, the psukhē was the product of the movements and materials of the body, even as it appeared to be an internal moral core. Rather than exploring these passages for what they tell us about a moment in intellectual history (a moment that would be rather insignificant if we are looking for influential

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244 Clement’s instructions in the Paedagogus on the body’s appearance and material addenda largely occurs in two large blocks: 2.8.61–76; 2.10.102–3.3.25.
innovations), to look at these passages for the type of thing made visible through these commonplace notions about the body-\(psukhē\) relationship.

At the beginning of Book 2, Clement shifts from his general introduction and defense of his project (Book 1) to the core of his project in the final two books, namely, his focus upon “that which is useful for life (\(τὸ βιωφέλὲς\)),” that is, “... how each of us conduct (\(προσφέρεσθαι\)) ourselves regarding our bodies, or, rather, how it is necessary to direct (\(κατευθύνειν\)) it” (2.1.1.1,2). Perhaps contrary to our expectations, far from leaving the \(psukhē\) behind, this turn to the body and “that which is useful for life” actually focuses Clement’s attention on the \(psukhē\) all the more. In fact, Clement makes his turn to the body by explaining that since reason draws one away from the “condition of the body” (\(τῆς τοῦ σώματος ἁγωγῆς\)), instead of being eager for “external things” (\(τὰ ἔκτος\)) (e.g., such as clothes or food), one’s purpose should be to “cleanse the thing that is a person’s own—the eye of the \(psukhē\)—and purify the flesh itself (\(τὸ τε ἵδιον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, τὸ ὤμα τῆς φυχῆς, ἐκκαθαίρειν, ἀγνίζειν δὲ καὶ τὴν σάρκα αὐτῆν\)” (2.1.1.2).

His instructions about the body, therefore, aim to move the reader away from the body and its external things. One should not wear too much or too luxurious perfumes and oils (2.8.61–69), flowers (\(ἄνθος\) (2.8.70–76), precious stones and metals (2.12.118–

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245 Maier, “Dressing for Church.”
246 Maier, “Dressing for Church.”
247 Clement, Paed. 2.1.1.1-2: ὁποῖον τινα τῷ ἐαυτοῦ σώματι ἐκαστὸν ἤμων προσφέρεσθαι, μᾶλλον δὲ ὅπως αὐτὸ κατευθύνειν χρῆ.
248 The concept of “external things” was a major topic of discussion among Stoics; Stephens, Stoic Ethics, 47–80.
249 Clement, Paed. 2.1.1.1–3.
250 Clement even notes how perfume indexes a person’s character: “Just as dogs track down animals by their scent, so also the self-controlled (\(οἱ σώφρονες\)) track the licentious (\(τοῖς ἀσελγεῖτις\)) by the superfluous
scents of perfumes (μέρων)” (Καθάπερ δὲ οἱ κόινες ῥινιλατούντες ἐκ τῆς ὀδηγήθησι τὰ θηρία, γαρ καὶ τῆς περέρας τῶν μέρων εὐωδίας θηρίσουσιν οἱ σώφρονες τοὺς ἀσέλγεις) (Paed. 2.8.69.5). While not all of Clement’s instructions are framed with reference to bodily health, it is a frequent motif, even in discussing plants and flowers, e.g., “Just as with roots and plants, thus also flowers (fragrance of flowers) have their own qualities, helpful, harmful, or dangerous. Ivy cools. Hazel (καρύα) releases a soporific air (πνείμα), as its etymology shows. The narcissus is a flower with an oppressive odor. Its name reveals that it numbs the nerves. The smells of roses and violets, being mildly cool, subdue and draw out heaviness in the head (καρυμβρίας). But (such solutions) do not give us permission to get drunk” (Καθάπερ δὲ αἱ ῥίζαι καὶ αἱ ρινιλατούνται, γαρ καὶ τὰ ἀνθῆ ἢδαι ἔχει ποιότητισ καὶ τὰς μὲν ἐπωφελεῖς, τὰς δὲ ἐπιβλαβεῖς, ἐστὶ δὲ άς καὶ ἐπισφάλεις. Οὐχὶ ήδη τὸ ἐμφέρει, ἢ δὲ καρυά πνεύμα ἀφίσει καρυτικόν, ὡς ἐμφαίνει καὶ τοῖνοις ἐπτυρολογούμενον. Νάρκοσσος δὲ βαρέοδμον ἔστιν ἄνθος, ἐλέγχει δὲ αὐτὸ ἀπὸ προσηγορία νάρκαν ἐμποιοῦν τοις νεύροις. Αἱ δὲ τῶν ῥόδων καὶ τῶν ἵνων ἀποφοραὶ ἡμική ἔσται φυχραὶ συνέτλεουσι καὶ ἐπιστᾶμεσι τὰς καρυμβρίας· ἤμεν δὲ οὐκ ὀσωστὶς συμμεθεῖσιν, ἀλλὰ οὕδε οἰνοεσθαί ἐπιτέτραπτοι) (Paed. 2.8.71.3–4). Later, he summarizes his logic in this section: “Since they work as a drug (φαρμάκου), healing (ἰάσεως) or offering self-controlled relaxation, we must not reject the enjoyment (τέρφειν) of flowers and the uses of their perfumes and fragrances.” (Ὡς μὲν οὖν ἐν φαρμάκου μιᾷ ἰάσεως ἐνέκει, ἐσθ’ ὅπῃ δὲ καὶ διαχύσεις σώφρονος, οὐκ ἀποβλητέον τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνθῶν τέρφην καὶ τὴν (2.) ἀπὸ τῶν μέρων τε καὶ θειμαρμάτων ὀψφέλειαν, δεδηλώκαμεν) (2.8.76.1).
If a person focuses upon the body and external things, s/he is not paying enough attention to the psukhē. Conversely, however, if one attends to the psukhē first, s/he is not necessarily neglecting the body, for the psukhē is to regulate the body, rather than simply flee it:

So then, nor should we seek after pricey clothes, just as we should not pursue fancy foods. For the Lord himself divided (his) instructions between the psukhē and the body and a third thing, externals, and counsels (us) to provide externals for the body, and to administer (διοικεῖν) the body with the psukhē, and train (παιδαγωγεῖ) the psukhē. “Do not worry” he said, “about your psukhai, what you will eat, or about your body, what you will wear. For the psukhē is more important than food and the body than clothes” [Luke 12:22–23]. (Paed. 2.10.2.2–3)

Οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ἐσθήτος ἀντιποιητέον πολυτελοὺς καθάπερ οὐδὲ τροφῆς ποικίλης. Διότι γοῦν ὁ κύριος διαιρών τὰς ὑπόθήκας εἰς τε φυχήν καὶ σώμα καὶ τρίτον τὰ ἑκτὸς, διὰ μὲν τὸ σῶμα τὰ ἑκτὸς πορίζεσθαι συμβολεύει, διοικεῖν δὲ τὸ σῶμα τῇ φυχῇ, παιδαγωγεῖ δὲ τὴν φυχήν, ἡ μὲν μεριμνάτε» λέγων «τῇ φυχῇ ὑμῶν τί φάγητε, μηδὲ τῷ σώματι ὑμῶν τι ἐνδύσησθε· ἢ γὰρ φυχὴ πλείων ἐστὶ τῆς τροφῆς καὶ τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἐνδύματος.»

The relationship between psukhē and body is therefore not fundamentally dualistic, but hierarchical. While “pricey clothes” are to be avoided, the psukhē should still clothe the body. Same too with food: “fancy foods” should be rejected, but the psukhē needs to provide the body with food. “External things” therefore—material things—need to be regulated by the psukhē for the body, not simply rejected. The psukhē should be in charge of the body, governing which things it (really) needs, not fleeing it. Problems occur, according to Clement, when the psukhē pays too much attention to the body and the external things it needs:

The irrational part of the psukhē\textsuperscript{253} becomes wild—beast-like—around pleasures,

\textsuperscript{252} In Chapter 4, I dive more deeply into the relation between the psukhē and the self.
\textsuperscript{253} Clement only mentions the psukhē being divided into parts one other time in the Paedagogus. In 3.1.1.2–5, he divides it into three parts, rather than the implicit two-part model referenced in this passage
shameful desires, precious stones, gold, fancy dress, and other luxuries. (*Paed.* 3.11.53.2)

τὸ ἄλογον μέρος τῆς φυχῆς τὸ περὶ ἔδονας καὶ ὀρέξεις ἐπιφόνους καὶ λίθους καὶ χρυσίον καὶ ἐσθήτα ποικίλην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην χλιδήν ἐκθημοῦμεν·

Insofar as the *psukhē* is responsible for the body’s appearance, the body’s appearance reveals the state of the *psukhē*. Thus, certain aspects of the body’s appearance could function as an index of the *psukhē* and its health. Clement even makes the point explicit:

Just as a hand that is bandaged or an eye that is smeared over indicate by their appearance a deeper meaning (*ὑπόνοιαν*)—disease—so too, cosmetics (*ἐντρίμματα*) and dyes (*βαφαὶ*) reveal (*αἰνίττονται*) that the *psukhē* is sick to its core. (*Paed.* 3.2.9.2)

Ὡς δὲ ἡ καταπεπλασμένη χεῖρ καὶ ὁ περιαληλιμένος ὀφθαλμός ὑπόνοιαν τοῦ νοσοῦντος ἐκ τῆς ὀφθαλμοῦ ἐνδείκνυται, ὡς τὰ ἐντρίμματα καὶ αἱ βαφαὶ νοσοῦσαν ἐν βάθει τὴν ψυχὴν αἰνίττονται.

Even though it is the quintessentially internal object, the *psukhē*’s status as an internal core is not hidden behind the surface of the body, but actually revealed and produced through it.\(^{254}\) The more Clement insists that the interior beauty of the *psukhē* is more important than the external beauty of the body, the more the external appearance of the body makes the internal *psukhē* visible:

On the whole, then, we must reject ornaments (*κόσμια*), as we would girlish toys (*κοροκόσμια*), entirely repudiating ornamentation itself. For it is necessary to be

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ornamented within (ἐνδοθεν). A woman should show beauty (καλήν) on the inside (ἐσω)—for beauty and ugliness are visible (καταφαίνεται) in the psukhē alone. (Paed. 2.12.121.2)\(^{255}\)

Καθόλου μὲν οὖν τὰ κόσμια ὀσπερ κοροκόσμια ἀποσκορακιστέον ὅλον καὶ αὐτὸν παραιτουμένας τὸν κόσμον. Χρή γὰρ εἶναι κοσμίας ἐνδοθεν καὶ τὴν ἐσω γυναῖκα δεικνύει καλήν· ἐν μόνη γὰρ τῇ φυχῇ καταφαίνεται καὶ τὸ κάλλος καὶ τὸ αἰσχὸς.\(^{256}\)

Types and styles of clothing, perfume, and hairstyles thus all correlate to reason, or lack thereof. Clement describes, for example, when it is rational to use perfumes (e.g., for the health of the body) and when perfume is excessive.\(^{257}\) Fancy shoes thus indicate a psukhē that is not controlling the body. So too fancy hairstyles, extravagant food, and expensive clothes display an ill-functioning psukhē. Perfumes, flowers, fancy shoes, precious stones, cosmetics, dyes, and the like thus act as a sign system that makes the otherwise hidden and invisible psukhē visible.

The state of the psukhē would have been publicly available, because the specific visual presence of expensive clothes, hairstyles, cosmetics, gold, jewels, and dyes especially, but even “fancy foods,” publicize the state of a person’s psukhē to any passer-by. If you see a person consuming “fancy foods,” you know her or his psukhē is sick. If you see cosmetics or dyes, you know the psukhē is sick. If you see gold, jewels, and other luxuries, you know that the psukhē is sick. Fancy shoes, hairstyles, perfumes, etc., all publicize the state of the psukhē. Conversely, the absence of jewelry, gold, extravagant

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\(^{255}\) Clement is especially vigilant in policing women’s use of jewelry and cosmetics (Paed. 3.1–2), but he also worries about how men produce artificial appearance (3.3); Maier, “Dressing for Church,” 79–85. For an overview of the ancient discussions of clothing and women, see Olson, Dress and the Roman Woman.

\(^{256}\) Similarly, Clement argues that, although “the Lord” was not beautiful in appearance (citing Isa 53:2), he still “displayed the true beauty of both the psukhē and the body; beneficence for one and immortality of the flesh for the other” (τὸ δὲ ἀληθινὸν καὶ τῆς φυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἔνεδειξατο κάλλος, τῆς μὲν τὸ ἐνεργετικόν, τὸ δὲ ἀθάνατον τῆς σαρκός) (Paed. 3.2.1.3).

\(^{257}\) Although finding a use for most things, whether food or perfume, Clement never has any comments on gold or jewelry being useful.
dishes, or expensive clothes showed that one had a reasoned psukhē. The body’s material addenda made the state of the psukhē publicly visible. One could have seen it. Because clothes, jewelry, and cosmetics and the other bodily material addenda Clement describes, are conspicuously visible (on the body), the psukhē, because of its relation to these things, also becomes conspicuously visible (on the body).

Even when Clement’s instructions on bodily appearance do not mention the psukhē explicitly, the psukhē still frames his discussion of bodily appearance. Both Books 2 and 3, where Clement justifies the types of instructions he gives, begin with explicit discussions of the psukhē. The state of the psukhē can thus regularly be seen on the body, for “the intellectual (part) (τὸ νοερὸν) of the tripartite psukhē—also called the rational (part) (λογιστικὸν)—is the inner person (ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐστὶν ὁ ἐνδον) and the ruler of the visible (φαινομένου) person” (3.1.1.2).

If Clement’s ideas about the psukhē’s relationship to the body and the body’s material addenda were unique, then we would be exploring little more than the idiosyncratic ravings of a fringe intellectual. Interesting, perhaps, but not particularly revealing. As it stands, however, Clement’s references to the psukhē reflect not so much his own particular theories about the psukhē as much as they do widely available

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258 The word psukhē appears twenty-one times in the sections of the Paedagogus in which Clement discusses the body’s appearance and material addenda (2.8.61–76; 2.10.102–3.3.25).
259 For example, Clement does not explicitly mention the psukhē in his instructions on shoes (Paed. 2.11.116–117). But, instead of being evidence for the lack of importance of the psukhē, I read these absences as evidence for its pervasive influence. Just as sex or race does are not always mentioned when present in modern society—so too the psukhē did not have to be the subject of explicit reflection to be present. We can see its importance though, when we recognize that Clement opens Book 1 (see Chapter 1), closes Book 1, opens Book 2, and opens Book 3 with framing conversations about the psukhē. Thus, analysis of the psukhē’s power and presence in Clement’s instructions need not be strictly limited to explicit discussions of the psukhē, even if they will remain the focus of my study. Understanding of the psukhē’s functioning thus illuminates the Paedagogus as a whole, even when the psukhē is not explicitly invoked.
260 I discuss the beginnings of both Books 2 and 3 below.
knowledge about the psukhē. Clement was not issuing forth specialist knowledge, nor providing his readers with a secret key to interpret the appearance of the body. Instead, he was repeating consensus views, tropes of moralists. In this sense, I again suggest that the psukhē had a presence more like modern race does on the body—a presence that is not authored by any single individual.

Thus, even we are reading a single text, it makes little sense to assume that the author of the text is authoring the ideas in it, especially when those ideas are widely paralleled elsewhere. Therefore, to shift the conversation from (authored) discursive construction to effective material power, I seek to emphasize the ways in which Clement’s instructions reflect the material presence of a powerful thing (even as I also claim that that thing’s presence was “imaginary”).

As noted above, the practice of physiognomy was alive and well in Clement’s day.261 Polemon (c. 88–144), a near-contemporary of Clement, became famous, in part, due to his expertise in discerning the character of a person’s psukhē through that person’s appearance.262 Physiognomy had a long-standing tradition in antiquity as well as moments of popularity. Only highly trained experts could really see the state of the psukhē through the eyes, limbs, or other bodily features. Even the possession of a detailed tractate on the art of physiognomy did not provide enough practical “know-how” for a person to practice the ancient art.263 Nevertheless, just as in Clement’s instructions about gold and jewelry, people did not need to practice the technical arts of physiognomy to be able to see the psukhē on the body and its material addenda.

261 Also see Swain, “Introduction.”
263 Barton, Power and Knowledge, 95–132.
This goes back at least to Plato, who singles out clothing, shoes, and “other ornamentation on the body” as inversely correlated to the state of the *psukhē*:

“And what about the other cares (θεραπείας) of the body [in addition to food and sex]? Does it seem to you that such a person [a wise person] would consider them important—such as possession of distinguished clothes or sandals, or other ornamentation on the body? Does it seem to you that such a person would respect these things or disregard them, except only as much it is necessary to have them?”

“I think that he disparages them,” he said, “as much as he is truly a philosopher.”

“And does it not wholly seem to you,” he said, “the business of such a person would not be concerning the body, but, rather, he would distance himself (ἀφεστάναι) from it as much as possible, turning toward his *psukhē*?”

“I do.”

First, then, it is clear in such things that the philosopher frees the *psukhē* particularly from fellowship with the body, thereby differentiating himself from other people.” *(Phaed. 64d–65a)*

Τί δὲ τὰς ἄλλας τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα θεραπείας; δοκεῖ σοι ἐντίμους ἤγεισθαι ὁ τοιοῦτος; οἷον ἰματίων διαφερόντων κτίσεως καὶ ὑποδημάτων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους καλλωπισμοὺς τοὺς περὶ τὸ σῶμα πότερον τιμᾶν δοκεῖ σοι ἢ ἀτιμᾶζειν, καθ’ ὅσον μὴ πολλῇ ἀνάγκῃ μετέχειν αὐτῶν; Ατιμάζειν ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ, ἔφη, ὅ γε ὡς ἄλληθρως φιλόσοφος. Ὁκουθ’ ὅλως δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, ἢ τοῦ τοιούτου πραγματείας οὐ περὶ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι, ἄλλα καθ’ ὅσον δύναται ἀφεστάναι αὐτῶν, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν τετράβθη; Ἐμοίγε. Ἀρ’ οὖν πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις δήλος ἐστιν ὁ φιλόσοφος ἀπολόγων ὅτι μᾶλιστα τὴν ψυχῆν ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ σώματος κοινωνίας διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων;

In Clement’s own time, Galen (c. 129–c. 200/216) teaches in his treatise, *Affections and Errors of the Psukhē*, that “affections” and “errors” of the *psukhē* are highly visible:

For just as in every part of life and in all skills, great superiority and distinction of matters is recognized by all, while small differences are only noticed by those who are thoughtful or skilled technicians. It is the same way with errors (ἁμαρτημάτων) and affections (παθῶν). Whenever someone becomes violently angry and he bites and kicks his domestic slaves, it will be clear to you that he has come into a state of affection, just like the one who has busied himself with strong drinks, prostitutes, and large feasts. The instance where the *psukhē* is moderately (μετρίως) stirred by great financial calamity or a disgrace is not similarly evident.
if he is in a type of affection. So too, it is not so evident if one has no power over flat cake (ἐπικακώνα), but these things become very clear to the person who has trained (προμελετήσαντι) his psukhē. (Aff.Dig K 5.4–5)

καθάπερ γὰρ ἐν ὁλίῳ τῷ βίῳ καὶ κατὰ πάς τις τέχνας τὰς μὲν μεγάλας ὑπεροχὰς τῇ καὶ διαφορὰς τῶν πραγμάτων ἄπαντος ἀνδρὸς ἡτι γνώναι, τὰς δὲ μικρὰς τῶν φρονίμων τε καὶ τεχνῖτων, οὕτω κατὶ τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων ἔχει καὶ παθὼν. δετίκε μὲν ἐπὶ μικροῖς ὁργιζόμενοι εὐθυρρὸς δάκνει τῇ καὶ λακτίζει τοὺς οἰκέτας, οὕτως μὲν καὶ δήλῳ ἐστὶν ἐν πάθει καθεσθικῶς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὀστιτὶ ἐν μέθαις ἑταίραις τε καὶ κώμιοις καταγίνεται. τὸ δ’ ἐπὶ μεγάλῃ βλάβῃ χρημάτων ἢ ἀτιμίᾳ μετρίῳς ταραχθῆναι τὴν ψυχήν ὀψεκόθ’ ὁμοίως ἐστὶ φαινον, εἰ τοῦ γένους τῶν παθῶν ὑπάρχει, ὀστερ ὀδὸς τὸ πλακοῦντα φαγεῖν ἀκυρώτερον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῦτα κατάδηλα γίνεται τῷ προμελετήσαντι τὴν ψυχήν.

Galen highlights the visibility of the psukhē’s affections because his entire program in this treatise is premised upon the possibility of a third party being able to see the state of one’s psukhē. Introspection, trying to determine the state of one’s own psukhē, is not reliable, because of the inherent possibility of self-deception. What people need, according to Galen, is somebody to watch them. This person should be honest, and his/her psukhē trained. That person will see the state of one’s psukhē and inform one about it. As such, the psukhē must be visible.

Just as we saw in Clement’s comments above, for ancient moral philosophers talking about properly regulating the body and its material addenda meant talking about the psukhē. And just as surely as Clement’s comments about the relationship between the body and its material addenda would have worked to make the psukhē visible, so too

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264 Galen’s note that anybody can detect someone greatly affected by errors or pathé, whereas it takes more skill to detect someone who is moderately or slightly affected by something is suggestive for reading Clement’s instructions. In the Paedagogus, Clement does not present himself as giving special training for detecting the psukhē on the surface of the body. It seems anybody should have been able to recognize that ostentatious luxury signals a deprived psukhē. Nevertheless, those who read Clement specifically, will be especially aware of these links.

265 For a broader overview of the philosophical discussion of how Clement’s comments about clothing relate to broader philosophical trends, see Maier, “Dressing for Church.”
these widespread assumptions about the psukhē’s relationship to the appearance of the body functioned to make the psukhē conspicuously visible. It was therefore not only Clement that saw the psukhē on the body. It was not an idiosyncratic idea. It was a publicly visible “fact.”

Effects of the Psukhē’s Visibility

To this point I have argued that the relationship between the psukhē and body, including the body’s material addenda, functioned to make the state of the psukhē publicly visible. One could have seen the state of the psukhē of the person walking by on the street. This is true not only according to Clement’s own logic. This was a broad feature of the psukhē’s presence in antiquity. For all of the apparent similarity between the modern soul and the ancient psukhē, this is something that is strikingly different about the psukhē’s presence and constitution in comparison to the soul or self’s presence and constitution today.

Today, the soul has little or no visual presence, at least not in clothes or shoes. Nevertheless, the way in which the psukhē became visible on the body in antiquity is comparable to how gender and sexuality today is made visible through clothing, hairstyles, and other material addenda to the body as well as the body’s postures and movements. But there is something very familiar about the logic of the relationship between external appearance and internal core, whether it be a gender-core or a moral-core. Just as with gender today, I suggest, in Clement’s world, everyone knew that the body mapped the state of the psukhē. If the psukhē was controlled by reason, so were the body’s actions. If the psukhē was out of control, so too were the body’s actions. The

266 Meyer, Archaeology of Posing, esp. 53–72.  
267 Butler, Gender Trouble, 33.
body’s relationship with material addenda, whether dinnerware, hair, shoes, cosmetics, or
jewelry, was also taken to be determined by the *psukhē*.

Having established this point, I now want to shift my attention to the effects of
such visibility. In the last chapter we saw that certain abstract virtues (e.g., moderation)
were states of the body (a body which included the *psukhē*). Here, I want to suggest that
the state of the *psukhē* was not just uncovered or revealed through the body and its
material addenda, but fabricated through it. As I stated at the beginning of this chapter,
the visibility of the *psukhē* was not an accidental effect of its presence, but the cause of its
presence. The intersection between abstract virtues, regulatory ideals, and the body and
its material addenda worked together to produce a *psukhē* that appeared relatively
cohesive and stable through time, a thing that could change, but still be the same thing,
even in a different state. Thus, instead of taking the stability of such an internal core for
granted, as if we all know this is a feature of the self or the soul, I want to suggest that
this feature of the *psukhē* was produced by the visual nature of the material signs
(allegedly) indexing it.

If material signs were producing the *psukhē*, they were producing it according to
their own material features. Consequently, in this section, I seek to explore the
relationship between material features of the signs that indexed the *psukhē* and the nature
of the *psukhē*. In the passages that I will review in this section, we will see that the state
of the *psukhē* is not just reflected in specific moments, or actions (virtuous or vicious),
but because of the constant and conspicuous presence of clothing, cosmetics, and jewelry
(or the lack of cosmetics and jewelry), the state of the *psukhē* is made *constantly* visible.
on the body. Clothing, cosmetics, and jewelry, therefore, do not just work to make the

*psukhē* constantly visible. By constantly displaying the state of the *psukhē*, they create the

illusion of the constant *psukhē*, of a stable, coherent object through time.

Thus, for Clement and his contemporaries, the *psukhē* was not an ever-changing

series of decisions or impulses, flashing or pulsating this way or that. Like the body, it

possessed coherence through time, even as it changed from being healthy to sick. I

suggest that this was not just an idea or an assumption, but the effect of the specific

nature of the material means by which the *psukhē* was produced. The stability of the

*psukhē* has been presumed in at least most of the passages we have discussed to this

point. I will now review these passages as well as several others to uncover how this

presumption is the effect of the material production of the *psukhē*.

Jewels, gold, and precious garments, as we saw, reveal that “the irrational part of

the *psukhē*” is “wild around pleasures, shameful appetites, precious stones, gold, fancy
dress, and other decadence” (*Paed.* 3.11.53.2). This was not necessarily a permanent

state; the “irrational part of the *psukhē*” seems to be “wild” for only as long as the desire

for “precious stones, gold, fancy dress, and other decadence” is indulged. The Educator
can regain control over this part of the *psukhē*. Yet, the *psukhē* (or at least one part of it—

see Chapter 4) has enough coherence as an entity to be something that is controlled or out

of control. To state the obvious, there is no reason the wearing of clothes, fancy or not,

has to be interpreted with reference to a coherent object that controls the appearance of

the body. There is no reason that “precious stones, gold, fancy dress, and other
decadence” cannot just be condemned in its own right as over-indulgent or luxurious. Yet
Clement chooses to interpret these as reflections not of passing fancies or desires, but in terms of a singular thing, the psukhē. Even as the psukhē might shift from being healthy to sick, or sick to healthy, it maintains its status as a singular thing.

In the same passage, Clement says

The Pedagogue therefore instructs us to wear clothing that is plain and bright white in appearance, as we have said, so that we are suited to created nature, and not the artifice of embellishment. Rejecting everything as much as it is deceptive or lies about the truth, we embrace the plain and direct truth. Sophocles, reprimanding a spoiled (Ἁβροδίατον) young man, said: “You are conspicuous, clothed like a woman (γυναικομίμοις)” [frag. 702]. For, like a soldier, a sailor, or a ruler, so too the self-controlled (σώφρονος) person's garment is simple, proper, and clean. (Paed. 3.11.53.4–5)

In his instructions to wear white clothes instead of expensive clothes, Clement again assumes that the psukhē possesses a relatively stable state (at least insofar as the psukhē is the locus of character). By correlating dress to a singular object, the psukhē, Clement depicts virtue and vice not in terms of momentary actions, lasting only as long as the action is being committed (or clothing worn), but as possessing some degree of permanence. Men live daintily or not. They are self-restrained or not. Self-control is not a momentary thing, but a state with relative permanence.

This is why Clement, in another passage, insists that

The nobility (εὐγενές) of truth, appearing (ἐξεταζόμενον) with natural beauty in the psukhē, discerns (διακέκρικεν) that (a person is) a slave not through the selling
He explicitly rejects the idea that slaves can be recognized due to the occurrence of a single event (when they are bought or sold). Instead, he insists those who are enslaved are recognizable—at least to those with a nature that is noble of psukhē—because of their disposition. A “disposition,” of course is less saliently visible than ostentatious clothing or cosmetics, but the point remains. Clement, even though he is not intentionally or explicitly developing a program for recognizing the psukhē through the visibility of the body’s appearance, recognizes that, since the psukhē determines character, a “slave” is so made not through a one-time event (being bought or sold), but through a relatively constant “disposition.” As such, the psukhē appears as a relatively constant and stable object, behind a recognizable disposition.

In two separate passages, Clement even describes the body itself as a garment or covering for the psukhē. He thereby presumes that the psukhē possesses enough coherence as an object to be a thing that is covered:

The Pedagogue explicitly counsels “Do not boast/glory in clothing, nor praise any transient glory” [ben Sira 11:4]. Making fun of those dressed with soft clothes, he says in the gospel: “Behold, those living in palaces in glorious dress and luxury” [Luke 7:25].268 He speaks of earthly palaces, perishable ones, where vanity, thirst of fame, flattery, and deceit are. Those serving in the heavenly courtyard of the king of all, they purify (ἀγιάζονται) the flesh, the uncontaminated clothing of the psukhē, and they clothe it with immortality. (Paed. 2.10.109.3)


But deceitful (δολεραί) women and womanly men rage without moderation over deceitful (δολεράς) dyes so they can dye their luxurious woolen robes. Not importing linens from Egypt alone, but also getting them from the land of the Hebrews or of the Cicilians. I say nothing about purple and fine linen, for their indulgence exceed words. It is necessary, I think, for a covering (σκέπην) to display the covered thing better than itself, as statue is by a temple and the psukhē is by the body and the body is by clothes. (Paed. 2.10.115.2–3)

Ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς λόγοις ὕψησαν ἐγκαταστάσεις αἱ δολεραὶ γυναῖκες καὶ τῶν ἄνδρων οἱ γυναικώδεις τὰς δολερὰς βαφὰς μαργαρίνουσιν περὶ τὴν ἀμετρίαν, οὐκετὶ τὰς ὑθόνας τὰς ἄπ’ Ἀγάπτου, ἅλλας δὲ τις ἡ γῆ Ἐβραίων καὶ Κυλίκων ἐκποριζόμενοι γῆς. Τὰ δὲ ἀμύργινα καὶ τὰ βύσσινα σιωπῶν ἀπερεκπέπαικεν ἢ τροφῇ καὶ τὴν ὀνομασίαν. Δεῖ δὲ τὴν σκέπην, οἴμαι, αὐτὸς αὐτῆς κρείττον ἀποφαίνειν τὸ σκεπόμενον, ὡς τὸ ἄγαλμα τοῦ νεῶ καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ σώματος καὶ τῆς ἐσθήτας τὸ σῶμα.

In these two passages, as we have seen in other passages, the reader is given a code for determining the state of the psukhē. Luxurious apparel, soft clothes, finely woven and dyed wool robes all reveal a corrupted psukhē. Clement even states that the purpose of a covering is to make that which it covers more conspicuous. The body should make the psukhē more visible than itself.

But we also see more here. The body is called a garment and a covering of the psukhē. This way of talking about the psukhē shows how helpful the body is for thinking about the psukhē. The psukhē has to be a stable enough object to wear a garment or have a covering, just as the body is stable and coherent enough to wear a garment. The subtleties of the metaphor construct the psukhē as a stable and coherent object through

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time, like the body. The body is used to think with about the psukhē.

In the third chapter of Book 3, where Clement upbraids men who artificially enhance their appearance, he complains about men who dye their hair to prevent it from becoming grey:

How then, do the godless compete with God, or rather viciously oppose God, transforming hair that God made grey? “A crown of the old is great experience (πολυπειρία)” [ben Sira 25:6], scripture (ἡ γραφή) says. And the grey hair of their countenance is the blossom of their experience. But some dishonor the privilege of age—grey hair. (Paed. 3.3.17.1)

Πῶς οὖν ἀντιδημιουργοῦσι τῷ θεῷ, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀντικείσθαι βιάζονται οἱ ἄθεοι τὴν ὑπ’ αὐτῶν πεπολιωμένην παραχαράττοντες τρίχα; «Στέφανος δὲ γερόντων πολυπειρία», φησίν ἡ γραφή, καὶ τοῦ προσώπου αὐτῶν ἡ πολια ἄνθος πολυπειρίας; οἱ δὲ τὸ πρεσβεῖον τῆς ἡλικίας, τὸν πολιαν, καταισχύνουσιν.

Even if Clement did not make an explicit mention of the psukhē, the reader would probably know that, after such comments, Clement would be able to make a snap judgment about the psukhē of anybody whose hair was dyed. But we do not have to speculate about Clement’s judgment, for Clement states it explicitly:

But it is not, it is not (possible) to display (ἐνδεικνύναι) an honest (ἀληθινὴν) psukhē, when one has an adulterated head. “You did not so learn Christ,” he says, “if indeed you heard him and been taught by him, as the truth is in Jesus, you put away the former way of life, the old person,” not gray hair, but “the corruption according to desires caused by deception. Renew”—not dyes and ornaments—but “the spirit (πνεύματι) of your mind (νοῦς), putting on the new person, created by God in righteousness and the holiness of truth [Eph 4.20–24].” (Paed. 3.3.17.1–2).

Οὐκ ἔστι δὲ, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθινὴν ἐνδεικνύναι τὴν ψυχὴν τῶν κύβνηλον ἔχοντα κεφαλῆν. «Τιμεῖς δὲ οὐχ οὕτως», φησίν, «ἐμάθετε τὸν Χριστὸν, εἴ γε αὐτὸν ἤκούσατε καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐδιδάχθητε, καθὼς ἔστιν ἀληθεία ἐν τῷ Ἰησοῦ, ἀποθέσθαι ἕμας κατὰ τὴν προτέραν ἀναστροφὴν τῶν παλαιῶν ἄνθρωπον», οὐ τῶν πολιῶν, ἀλλὰ «τῶν φθειρομένων κατὰ τὰς ἐπιθεμίας τῆς ἀπάτης· ἀνανεοοῦσθαι δέ», μὴ βαφαῖς καὶ καλλωπίσμασιν, ἀλλὰ «τῷ πνεύματι τοῦ νοῦ ἕμας καὶ ἐνδύσασθαι τὸν καιόν ἄνθρωπον τὸν κατὰ θεόν κτισθέντα ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ ἀσιώτητι τῆς ἀληθείας.»
Grey hairs testify to experience, but dyed hair makes it impossible to show that the psukhē, a stable object with coherence through time, adheres to the truth.

These connections between outward appearance and a stable inner-core are not coincidental. In fact, almost every time Clement refers to the psukhē as an “inner person,” he does so through references to the body and its appearance. Thus, in the above example, Clement’s quote from Ephesians, which mentions putting aside “the old person” and being renewed in the “spirit of your mind” and putting on “the new person,” comes immediately after his comments about hair-dyes making it impossible to prove the truthfulness of the psukhē (which has to be a relatively stable and coherent entity). The psukhē is the old person or the new person, and as such it is one way or another, just like hair dyes. It can be changed, actually quite similarly to how hair color can be changed. Hair can be “truthful” or not, so too the psukhē is “truthful” or not. In other words, the material appearance of the body is “good to think with” because it is good to see with.

Just as we saw above that Clement cannot talk about the body without talking about the psukhē, again and again, we see that when Clement wants to focus upon the psukhē, he does so by talking about the body. So, when reading about Samuel’s anointing of David (1 Kings 16), Clement can state that “the lord” looked at his psukhē, in contrast to his bodily appearance:

“When he [Samuel] saw see his [David’s brother’s] beauty and size . . . The Lord” it says, “said to him: ‘do not look at his appearance (ὄψιν) or his great height, because I have rejected him. For people see the eyes, but the Lord sees the heart’” [1 Kings 16:7]. And he [Samuel] did not anoint the one with the beautiful body, but the one with the beautiful psukhē. If, then the Lord thinks that the natural beauty of body is inferior to the beauty of the psukhicle (ψυχικοῦ). What does he think about fake (νόθος) (beauty), when he totally rejects falsehood (ψεύσιμο)?
Reading the passage backwards, as it were, we again see that “artificial beautification” functions as a sign of bad psukhē. And, since the body, and particularly its “artificial beautification,” are publicly visible, so too is the state of the psukhē. The psukhē also resembles the body and its material appearance insofar as it is either beautiful or not. The nature of the psukhē seems determined by the nature of the body and its material addenda. The psukhê gains presence through the ways in which the visibility of the body and its material addenda make the psukhē visible. Insofar as that visibility is constant, the psukhē is made constant. The psukhē is as changeable or unchangeable as the body and its appearance—it possesses coherence through time. And, finally, the psukhē is described in terms of the aesthetic appearance of the body—the psukhē is beautiful or not.

Clement uses the same logic in another passage:

For the truth calls its own those who belong to it, but the love of ornamentation seeks that which is strange, being outside of God, reason, and love. Isaiah gives witness through the spirit that the Lord himself was shameful in appearance: “And we saw him and he was not beautiful in form; his form was despised, inferior according to human (perception)” [Isa 53.2]. But who is better than the Lord? He displayed not a beautiful appearance of flesh, but true beauty of the psukhē and of the body, of the former beneficence, and of the latter immortality of the flesh. (Paed. 3.1.3.2–3)
The *psukhē* corresponds to the body’s appearance, and its nature determined by the nature of the bodily appearance. Artificial beautification reveals a vain *psukhē*. True beauty of body and *psukhē* are the body of immortality and the *psukhē* of good deeds. The ideological work is so subtle that it is hard to notice, but the *psukhē* is made a public fact through its visibility, while being constructed in the terms made available by the nature of material appearance: coherence, true or false representation, beautiful or ugly. Thus Clement elsewhere says:

*It is not the (πρόσοψις) appearance of the outer (ἐκτός) person that is fit to be adorned, but the *psukhē* with the ornament of beautiful character. It should also be possible to speak about the flesh, with the ornament of self-control.* *(Paed. 3.2.4.1)*

*Οὐκ ἡ πρόσοψις τοῦ ἐκτός ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλὰ ἡ ψυχὴ καλλωπιστέα τῆς καλοκαγαθίας κοσμήματι· εἰπ’ δ’ ἂν καὶ τήν σάρκα εἰπεῖν τῷ τῆς ἐγκρατείας κόσμῳ.*

Again, Clement seems only able to talk about the *psukhē* as an inner-self by talking about the external appearance of the body. As such, the material features of the body’s appearance are determining the features of the nature of the *psukhē*.

To this point I have argued (1) that the body and its material addenda made the *psukhē* publicly visible and (2) that the specific visual nature of the material that rendered the *psukhē* constantly visible resulted a constant *psukhē*, constant not in its state, but in its thing-ness. In short, gold shoes both showed the state of the *psukhē* and made the *psukhē*, or at least its state, as constant and coherent through time as gold shoes. The nature of the body and its material addenda determined the nature of the *psukhē* and its states.
If the state of the *psukhē* was constituted through the body and the body’s material addenda, how was the nature of the *psukhē*’s functioning as moral and rational seat of the person connected to its material makeup? In other words, if my claim is correct, that the *psukhē* was an illusionary effect of the material appearance of the body and its material appearance—if it was the effect and not the cause of gold shoes—then how does its external material constitution enable it to act as the seat of morals and logic? How do we take its material and visual fabrication seriously? How does this understanding of the *psukhē*’s presence cause us to rethink its place in ancient “ethics”?

It may seem like the *psukhē*, in its function as the seat of morals and logic, would be responsible for ensuring that the person (through the body) performs moral-rational actions. Thus, for example, Clement may consider certain types of sexual actions wrong, such as “adultery” (e.g., *Paed.* 3.1.1.2). It would be the *psukhē*’s responsibility to prevent the body from performing such immoral deeds. This model fits well with the Kantian model of ethics with which we are all familiar and which often stands behind scholarship on the *psukhē*. The rational self makes decisions about which actions or deeds to perform. Clement may even seem to advocate for this model, when he emphasizes the *psukhē* as the seat of rationality previously in the same passage (3.1.1.2).

While this depiction of the *psukhē* in its role as a moral center is not exactly wrong, it intellectualizes and dematerializes the *psukhē*’s functioning. But if the *psukhē*’s presence as an internal moral core depended upon its visibility on the body and the body’s material addenda, we need to think about how it functioned through the body and the body’s material addenda, through its visibility (not its decisions). I want to suggest,
therefore, that the differences between the modern immaterial soul and the ancient material psukhē are not merely theoretical, but material, and therefore materially alter their respective operations and presences as well. The psukhē’s material constitution—its fabrication upon the body and the body’s material addenda—prevented the psukhē from functioning essentially as an internal moral decision maker. It is not a coincidence that the Kantian soul-as-rational-decision-maker soul is immaterial. Matter matters.

In other words, if the psukhē operated in the world through the body and the body’s materiality, then we need to shift the typical scholarly habit of writing about Clement’s ideas about the psukhē—about the psukhē and ethics—and discuss instead how it operated through its visibility on the body. It means that Clement’s references to the psukhē are not theoretical, but references to a visually present thing. The specifics of its material visibility determined the uses to which Clement could try to put it.

Because its presence was produced by things that were constantly visible—whether in their presence or absence—the psukhē was also nearly constantly visible. As such, I suggest the psukhē as Clement describes it would have been an effect and instrument of panoptic power, as famously described by Michel Foucault.\(^\text{270}\) In a panopticon, persons are always potentially visible. Foucault describes the effects of putting criminals in a panopticon, as opposed to hiding them in a dungeon, where they are largely invisible, and thus parallels the differences between a visible psukhē and an invisible soul:

Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of

\(^{270}\) For a review of panoptic power and rhetoric in early Christian literature, see Reis, “Surveillant Discipline.”
power. So to arrange things that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its actions; that the perfection of power should tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary; that this architectural apparatus should be a machine for creating and sustaining a power relation independent of the person who exercises it; in short, that the inmates should be caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the bearers.²⁷¹

The idea is that power does not need to operate through physical coercion (such as occurs in a dungeon). Instead, it can operate through sight. The inmates are always visible, even if they do not know who, if anyone, is actually watching. They are forced to police themselves, to behave as expected.

The *psukhē* enables a similar form of control. Clement even says as much:

*The one not escaping notice likes to shrink from sins because of the shame of being exposed.* Just as a hand that is bandaged or an eye that is smeared over indicate by their appearance a deeper meaning (ὑπόνοιαν)—disease—so too, cosmetics (ἐντρίμματα) and dyes (βαφαί) reveal (αινίττονται) that the *psukhē* is sick to its core. (*Paed.* 3.2.9.1–2)

Φιλεί δὲ πως τὸ μὴ λανθάνων δὲ αἰσχύνην τῶν ἐλέγχων ἀφίστασθαι τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων. Ὡς δὲ ἡ καταπεπλασμένη χείρ καὶ ὁ περιαληλιμένος ὀφθαλμὸς ὑπόνοιαν τοῦ νοσοῦντος ἐκ τῆς ὁφεως ἐνδείκνυται, οὕτως τὰ ἐντρίμματα καὶ αἱ βαφαὶ νοσοῦσαν ἐν βάθει τὴν φυχήν αἰνίττονται.

Clement knows that, because appearance indicates the state of the *psukhē*, not only is the *psukhē* made visible, but its visibility may keep people from acting in certain ways.²⁷²

The *psukhē* would have power through its visibility. Its power may not be unchecked.

Women may still wear cosmetics. Men may still dye their grey hair black. But if Clement and his contemporaries believed that cosmetics and dyes revealed the state of the *psukhē*, we can see how powerful that visual presence would have been. According to this logic, people should wear certain things and not wear other things because of what those things

²⁷¹ Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 201.
²⁷² Cf. *Paed.* 2.7.27.3.
revealed about the *psukhē*.

**Conclusion**

On the surface, Clement’s arguments about the body’s appearance seem to rely upon a simple equation: if you have a good *psukhē*, you will wear appropriate clothes, shoes, etc. If you have a sick *psukhē* then you will wear inappropriate, needlessly decadent, clothes, shoes, etc. In this chapter, I suggest that we cannot take the *psukhē* for granted as a stable entity that precedes the material signs allegedly indexing its state. We cannot assume that it was a subject with its own self-possessed stability that could be in control or out of control. The *psukhē*’s alleged presence raises a pressing problem for us. How was its presence created? I have suggested that the illusion of its presence was created materially, through the clothes, cosmetics, jewelry, and the like that Clement and his peers said signaled the state of the *psukhē*.

According to this model, the *psukhē* is thus born in materiality and made powerful in that materiality’s conspicuous visibility. But it is not just constituted in materiality, it is made in the regulatory matrix of good clothes and bad clothes. It comes into existence in the moment normative ideals materialize through the body and the body’s material addenda. Like the materialization of sex or race, the *psukhē*’s presence, constituted in loaded terms, is a manifestation of power. It cannot be untangled from the power that sustains it and is sustained by it. The *psukhē* is not solely a subject, but neither is a neutral object. It is always good or bad and the reason to act one way instead of another. Its presence polices the body’s appearance. Yet, because its presence is constituted by the body’s appearance, its police powers are largely limited to policing appearance. In the
previous chapter, we discussed the ways in which moderation and indulgence were felt bodily states. Here we see moderation and indulgence being pieces of clothing, precious stones, and shoes—or their absence. We need to explore further the *psukhē*’s status as self and its ability to wield power as an object. In the next chapter I explore the *psukhē*’s role as the self, examining the passages in which *psukhē* seems to mean “self,” “life,” or “the dead.”
CHAPTER 4 - PSUKHĒ-CORE

So far, I have been holding at bay questions about what the *psukhē*’s sensations or visibility may or may not mean about the ancient “self.” I have described how the *psukhē* was felt, seen, and normatively coded, but what was it? The answer that has often been given is that the *psukhē* was (just) “the self.” Is this right? In some sense, this question gets to the heart of this dissertation—is the *psukhē* itself worthy of investigation as the *psukhē*? Or was it only another way of saying “the self”? Should the *psukhē* be approached primarily in terms of the history of the self?273

As I noted in the Introduction, one of my aims in this dissertation is to draw out the objective and delimited nature of the ancient *psukhē*. By highlighting the *psukhē*’s corporeal, sensual, and visual presence in Mediterranean antiquity, I mean to show how different the ancient *psukhē* was from modern notions of the “soul” or “self,” even given the diversity of modern ideas about the “soul” and “self,” including potential overlaps

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273 An assumption that is often implicit, e.g., Meyer, “Dressing for Church”; Long, *Greek Models of Mind and Self*, and one that I view as foundational for Hadot (*Philosophy as a Way of Life*), Foucault (*Care of the Self*), and Nussbaum (*Therapy of Desire*) in their influential studies of the ancient self. Sorabji, to his credit, acknowledges that “the self in the ancient philosophers is seldom identical with the soul,” but his focus upon the self prevents him from studying the *psukhē* (“soul”) on its own terms. Thus, while Sorabji acknowledges that “the self” is “often . . . only one aspect of soul, its reason or will, for example, or a part of soul to be distinguished from the shade or ghost,” he never turns his focus to the *psukhē* as an object worthy of attention in its own right; Sorabji, “Graeco-Roman Varieties of Self,” 17; see also Sorabji, *Self: Ancient and Modern*.

274 Long’s recent work, *Greek Models of Mind and Self*, is a paradigmatic example of history of ideas approach to the self/soul in antiquity that presumes that the self/soul is a stable historical entity about which different cultures have different ideas. Accordingly, his justification for his study is that ancient Greek ideas about the self/soul might help moderns think better about that same object: “What I mean is that we can enlarge and enrich experience by recognizing how Greek authors, prior to modern science, represented the thing (my emphasis) that is both closest to us and yet is still, in some sense, quite mysterious—our own essence as a human self” (1–2). For approaches that focus upon the history of the self (rather than ideas about the self), see below.
with ideas about the “mind.”

This disparity is why I have decided to transliterate ψυχή as psukhē, rather than translate it as “soul,” “mind,” or “self,” as is often done in most books that emphasize the contrary.

In this chapter, I will review the passages in the *Paedagogus* in which Clement refers to the psukhē as a type of core self or moral agent. Moving from questions of how the psukhē gained particular presences—sensually or visibly—I now ask, what was it supposed to be? Does it mean anything particularly significant when Clement refers to the psukhē? Why pay attention when Clement includes the psukhē in instructions about the virtue or vice of wearing (or even desiring) certain clothes? When he says that “it is not (possible) to display (ἐνδεικνύναι) an honest (ἀληθινήν) psukhē when one has an adulterated head” (*Paed. 3.3.17.1*), why not just take him to be saying that it is wrong to dye one’s hair and leave it at that? When Clement says, “He [the Lord] displayed not a beautiful appearance of flesh, but true beauty of the psukhē and of the body, of the former beneficence, and of the latter immortality of the flesh” (*3.1.3.3*), why not just assume all that Clement really means is just that “the Lord, rather than being focused on his appearance, was focused upon being good”? Do Clement’s references to the psukhē play a meaningful role in his instructions on dress, dyes, cosmetics, and the like? Why pay attention to psukhē in all of this? That is the question of this chapter. What is the precise role and function of the psukhē in the interaction between bodies and normative regulations?

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275 As noted previously, Descartes uses the terms soul and mind interchangeably; Baker and Morris, *Descartes’ Dualism*, 70; also see Makari, *Soul Machine*, 20-35.

276 *Paed. 3.3.17.1*: οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθινὴν ἐνδεικνύναι τὴν ψευδὴν τῶν κύδηος ἐχοντα κεφαλήν.

277 *Paed. 3.1.3.3*: ἀλλ’ οὐ τὸ κάλλος τῆς σαρκὸς τὸ φαινειστικόν, τὸ δὲ ἀληθινόν καὶ τῆς ψευδῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἐνδεικτὸ κάλλος, τῆς μὲν τὸ εὐφρενικόν, τὸ δὲ ἀθάνατον τῆς σαρκὸς.
In the previous chapter, we saw the *psukhê* described as an interior core, necessarily juxtaposed against the external, visible world of body. Thus, for example, Clement contrasts external visible beauty with the inward beauty of the *psukhê*:

On the whole, then, we must reject ornaments (κόσμια), as we would girlish toys (κοροκόσμια), entirely repudiating ornamentation itself. For it is necessary to be ornamented within (ἔνδοθεν). A woman should show beauty (καλήν) on the inside (ἐσω)—for beauty and ugliness are visible (καταφαίνεται) in the *psukhê* alone. (*Paed.* 2.12.121.2)

Καθόλου μὲν οὖν τὰ κόσμια ὀσπερ κοροκόσμια ἀποσκορακιστέον διὸν καὶ αὐτὸν παραιτομέναις τὸν κόσμον. Χρῆ γάρ εἶναι κοσμίας ἔνδοθεν καὶ τὴν ἔσω γυναῖκα δεικνύαι καλήν· ἐν μόνη γὰρ τῇ φυσὶ καταφαίνεται καὶ τὸ κάλλος καὶ τὸ αἴσχος.

It is not the appearance (πρόσοψις) of the outer (ἐκτὸς) person that is fit to be adorned, but the *psukhê* with the ornament of beautiful character. It should also be possible to speak about the flesh, with the ornament of self-control. (*Paed.* 3.2.4.1)

Οὐκ ἀρα ἡ πρόσοψις τοῦ ἐκτὸς ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλὰ ἡ φυσικὴ καλλωπιστέα τῷ τῆς καλοκαγαθίας κοσμήματι· εἴη δ᾽ ἀν καὶ τὴν σάρκα εἰπεῖν τῷ τῆς ἐγκρατείας κόσμῳ.

As the seat of reason, it was the ruler of the visible person:

The intellectual (part) (τὸ νοερόν) of the tripartite *psukhê*—also called the rational (part) (λογιστικὸν)—is the inner person (ὁ ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν ὁ ἔνδον) and the ruler of the visible (φαινομένου) person. (*Paed.* 3.1.1.2)

Τριγενοῦς δὴν ὑπαρχοῦσι τῆς φυσικῆς τὸ νοερόν, ὁ δὲ λογιστικὸν καλεῖται, ὁ ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν ὁ ἔνδον, ὁ τοῦ φαινομένου τοῦ ἄρχων ἀνθρώπου.

As such, self-indulgence, revealed a *psukhê* that had succumbed to desire:

The irrational part of the *psukhê* is made savage around pleasures, shameful desires, precious stones, gold, fancy dress, and other luxuries. (*Paed.* 3.11.53.2)

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278 Clement is especially vigilant in policing women’s use of jewelry and cosmetics (Paed. 3.1–2), but he also worries about how men produce artificial appearance (3.3); Maier, “Dressing for Church,” 79–85. For an overview of the ancient discussions of clothing and women, see Olson, *Dress and the Roman Woman.*

279 Elsewhere Clement commits to the Platonic tripartite model of the *psukhê* (3.1.1.2). Here, his comment suggests a simpler divide between the rational part and the irrational part. In practice, this division seems more important to Clement and most Platonists.
Thus Clement holds that:

And the action (πράξις) of the Christian psukhē is the working of logic (λογικῆς) according to the good (ἀστείαν) judgment and desire for truth, completed through its congenitally attached (συμφυοῦς) fellow-worker: the body. (1.13.102.3)

καὶ ἔστιν ἢ μὲν πράξις ἢ τοῦ Χριστιανοῦ ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια λογικῆς κατὰ κρίσιν ἀστείαν καὶ ὁρεξὶν ἀληθείας διὰ τοῦ συμφυοῦς καὶ συναγωνιστοῦ σώματος ἐκτελουμένη.

I argued in the previous chapter that this internal/rational psukhē was constituted in part by the body’s appearance. The stable internal/rational psukhē, rather than being the cause of controlled or uncontrolled behavior and desire, was the effect of a certain way of reading the body’s behavior and appearance. In this chapter, I want to return to a further consideration of the psukhē itself. If Cartesian dualism does frame our approach to the psukhē, not only must the psukhē’s relation to the body be rethought, so too, we must re-think its function as an internal, reasoning core, controlling the actions of the body. If we cannot presume that the psukhē was a Cartesian soul, what was it?

I will argue that the psukhē possessed a presence and power that, like a modern gender-self or sexual-self, is easy to take for granted as self-evident, both in antiquity and in modern scholarship. My aim in this chapter, however, is to show that it is not an object that should be assumed to be ontologically self-evident. It was a highly peculiar and historically contingent object/core. Rather than being the way that the ancient Greeks described the self, which is just one more way of naming the “self,” “soul,” or “mind” that we all are familiar with, the psukhē, even as it overlaps with these things or

280 See Butler, Gender Trouble, 185–86, 191, passim.
categories, was a particular type of core, one that should not simply be conflated with “the self.”

As Charles Taylor notes in *The Sources of the Self*, his seminal work on the history of the self, the claim that modern notions of the soul or self are radically different than pre-modern notions, is not new. In some circles, it has almost become cliché. Yet, Taylor is right when he notes that his thesis—that the self has a history—nevertheless still bears the burden of proof.\(^{281}\) Modern concepts of the self are so strong, so deeply rooted, that it is hard not to accept modern inclinations about the self as intuitively accurate: “So we naturally come to think that we have selves the way we have heads or arms, and inner depths the way we have hearts or livers, as a matter of hard, interpretation-free fact.”\(^{282}\)

Taylor’s book on the history of the self is only one point in what is now a long-running scholarly conversation about the history of the self. Ishay Rosen-Zvi suggests in a recent article that this discussion began with Marcel Mauss’ 1938 piece, “A Category of the Human Mind.”\(^ {283}\) The debate picks up steam in the work of Norbert Elias, Pierre Hadot, and Michel Foucault, with Foucault introducing questions about “technologies of the self,” inspired in part by Mauss and Hadot.\(^ {284}\) Greek and Roman antiquity has functioned as particular important site for staking claims about the history of the self,

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\(^{281}\) Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, 111.

\(^{282}\) Taylor, *Sources of the Self*, 112.

\(^{283}\) Rosen-Zvi, “Mishnaic Mental Revolution,” 57–58.

because Greeks or Romans are often seen as providing a template for imagining a non-Christian form of the self that has taken over the Western world, particularly through the influence of Augustine’s notion of “the self.”

Insofar as discussions of the history of the self take ancient references to the psukhē to be one iteration of this history, histories of the self usually include the psukhē within their purview, often as the “soul.” To speak about the ancient psukhē, therefore, is taken to be in a conversation about “the self.” Thus my dissertation on Clement’s references to the psukhē in the Paedagogus is almost necessarily caught up into a conversation about the self and its history.

To this point in the dissertation, I have bracketed this scholarly conversation, preferring instead to focus only on Clement’s references to the psukhē and resisting any temptation to draw broader conclusions from them about the history of the self. This decision is partly strategic. The task is much too large for my limited project. Yet, it is now time to confess that I have also avoided this framework for my dissertation because I worry about the ways in which such a framework begs important questions, namely the historical continuity of an object—“the self”—upon which such a history can be built.

285 Sorabji, Self; Star, Empire of the Self; Gill, Structured Self; Long, Greek Models of Mind and Self; on the history of the ancient Mediterranean “religious” self, see Assmann and Stroumsa, eds., Transformations of the Inner Self; Brakke, et al., Religion and the Self; Rüpke and Woolf, eds., Religious Dimensions of the Self; Balberg, Purity, Body, and Self; Rosen-Zvi, “Mishnaic Mental Revolution.”


287 As noted above, histories of the self often conflate the psukhē and “the self,” e.g., Taylor, Sources of the Self; Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life; Foucault, Care of the Self. Nussbaum probably makes the most explicit admission of this conflation in the defining second footnote of her influential book, Therapies of Desire (13, n. 2), which I discuss in Chapter 1 above. As noted above, Nussbaum makes clear that the term psukhē can “simply” be translated as “soul,” and means little else other than the “life-activities” of a creature. This move to de-historicize and simplify reference of the term psukhē is absolutely key to her project of making ancient philosophical therapy relevant to today. I think her translation decision, as I have argued, marks a fundamentally anachronistic method. By exchanging the psukhē for the modern soul/self, the fundamental differences between the two are largely effaced.
As Rosen-Zvi notes in his article about the history of the rabbinic self, the history of the self project has been marked by a tension between universalizing “the self” on the one hand—making it a phenomenon that can be found across cultures and across time—and, on the other hand, localizing the self, that is, finding quite distinct and disparate notions of “the self” in different times and locations.\(^{288}\) Even in this latter iteration, however, where “the self” is depicted as a local phenomenon, I still worry about using a single category, “the self;” to approach diverse local manifestations of “it.”\(^{289}\) Does the ancient psukhē have to be studied in terms of “the self”?

Of course, decoding the psukhē’s relation to “the self” depends on how one decides to define “the self.”\(^{290}\) If “the self” is synonymous with the “I,” the “real person” or the core person, then the question concerns whether Clement’s references to the psukhē overlap with his ideas about the “I,” the “real person” or the “core person.”\(^{291}\) And these ideas do occur in Clement’s use of the term “psukhē.” For example, Clement quotes from Matthew 22:40, where Jesus identifies Deuteronomy 6:4 as the greatest commandment: “It is possible to comprehend (all) the commandments through two (of them), just as the Lord says: ‘Love your God with all your heart and with all your psukhē and with all your strength, and your neighbor as yourself’ [Matt 22:40]” (Paed.

\(^{288}\) Rosen-Zvi, “Mishnaic Mental Revolution” 57–58. The two most prolific and influential scholars working on “the self” in classical Greek and Roman philosophy, Richard Sorabji and Christopher Gill, have taken opposing viewpoints, with Sorabji arguing that “the self” is a relatively stable object through time and Gill finding it to be much more historically contingent: see Sorabji, \textit{Self: Ancient and Modern}; Gill, \textit{Structured Self}.

\(^{289}\) Also, as Rosen-Zvi (“Mishnaic Mental Revolution,” 58) points out, the driving force behind many of these histories is to identify the moment “the self” was born or invented, with the result that “the question ‘when was the self born?’ has no one answer, not only because each scholar tends to find it at the time that she happens to be studying, but rather because different ‘selves’ are born in different contexts.”


\(^{291}\) Plato (or at least “Plato”) seems to argue that the psukhē is the “I” or the “real self” in 1 Alcibiades 129–30.
3.12.88.1). Here psukhē seems to mean little more than “with the whole self,” with each aspect of the commandment being redundant, with the terms “heart,” “psukhē,” and “strength” meaning more or less the same thing, instead of identifying and emphasizing distinct aspects or ways of loving God. In another passage, where Clement is quoting from Jeremiah, we find the psukhē being used in a similar way, seeming to be another way of saying, or emphasizing “I”:

Rebuke is censure that reconciles shameful things to the good. This is what he demonstrates through Jeremiah: “They have become woman-mad horses, each neighing for his neighbor's wife. ‘Should I not attend (ἐπισκέψομαι) to these things?’ The Lord said, ‘Or should my psukhē not visit justice upon this people?’” [Jer 5:8–9].

Once again, it appears that “psukhē” simply means “I.” The passage would still make sense if translated as: “Should I not visit justice upon this people?” Yet this would be misleading, at least insofar as such a claim would render “psukhē” the equivalent of “I” or “the self”—flatly transformed into a certain type of thing—“the self,” a recognizable trans-historic entity. Why should we read psukhē as a specific thing, as something that is not the same as “the self”? Because in the very same passage Clement immediately complicates such a usage of psukhē:

He mixes in fear everywhere, because “fear is the beginning of perception (αισθήσεως)” [cf. Prov 1:7]. He also says this through Hosea, “Will I not attend

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292 Paed. 3.12.88.1: Δυνατὸν δὲ καὶ διὰ δεινὸν ἐμπεριλαβεῖν τὰς ἑντολὰς, ὡς φησιν ὁ κύριος: «Ἀγαπήσεις τὸν θεόν σου καὶ ἐν ὅλῃ καρδίᾳ σου καὶ ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ φυλή σου καὶ ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ ἰσχύ σου, καὶ τὸν πλησίον σου ὡς σεαυτόν.»

293 Davies and Allison, Critical and Exegetical Commentary, 235–48; France, Gospel of Matthew, 841–47.

294 In Jer 5:8–9, the LXX and Clement use psukhē for the Hebrew nefesh.
To them? Because they were mixed with prostitutes, sacrificed with initiates, and the people who understood (συνίον) were entangled with the prostitute” [Hos 4:14]. He shows their sin very clearly, declaring that they understood (συνέναι) that they were sinning willingly. Understanding (σύνεσις) is the sight of the psukhē. Wherefore, Israel means seeing God, that is, understanding (συνιόν) God. (Paed.1.9.77.1–2)

Παραπλέκει δὲ πανταχόθι τὸν φόβον, ὃτι «φόβος κυρίου ἀρχή αἰσθήσεως,» Καὶ πάλιν διὰ Ὡσιῆ «οὐκ ἐπισκέφθωμαι» φησὶν «ἀυτοὺς, ὃτι αὐτοὶ μετὰ τῶν πορνῶν συνεφύροντο καὶ μετὰ τῶν τετελεσμένων ἔθεον, καὶ ὁ λαὸς ὁ συνίων συνεπέλκετο πόρην». Δείκνυσιν αὐτῶν φανερώτερον τὸ ἀμάρτημα, συνέναι αὐτοὺς ὁμολογούν, ὡς ἐκόντας ἀμαρτάνοντας. Καὶ ἢ σύνεσις ὃς ἐστὶ φυσῆς. Διὸ καὶ ὁ Ἰσραὴλ ὁ ὁρῶν τὸν θεόν, τούτεστιν ὁ συνίων τὸν θεόν.

Here, Clement depicts the psukhē as a thing with a sight that is understanding. The metaphor raises interesting questions about whether the psukhē is interchangeable with “the self.” If the self is essentially the “I,” does it make sense do speak of the “I” as having eyesight? The metaphor, by comparing the psukhē to a discreet thing, the eye, with a discrete function, seeing, seems to suggest a discrete object, possessing discrete

295 The metaphor has clear Platonic resonances. See below.
296 Sorabji, for example, describes the definition of “self” he uses in his book, Self: Ancient and Modern: “A self, I suggested, is an embodied individual owner who sees himself or herself as me and me again” (emphasis original) (“Graeco-Roman Varieties,” 13). Rosen-Zvi, summarizing the state of the field as well as his own position, states the following: “The term ‘self’ is endowed with different meanings by different scholars in different contexts: thin or thick, essentialist or evolving, individualized or common, identified with the intellect or with the entire person, including more or less components of personality, etc. Nonetheless, ‘self’ is usually associated with one or more of the following: unity or core, will or agency, self-reflection or consciousness, individualism (‘I’ language or ‘me-ness’) and distinctions or boundaries between in and out . . . Scholars in the twentieth century began to acknowledge that this consciousness, like any other formation of the self, is culturally constructed . . . In fact, it may well be that the concept itself did not exist at all before Plato’s tripartite division of the soul . . . I use ‘self here in a rather minimalistic manner to denote the most basic consciousness of ‘me’ and ‘my’ boundaries, before any further discussion of ‘my’ identity and unity, let alone personality. Not everything I do defines ‘me’ or even feels like coming from ‘me’. Some (many) things could be deemed accidents, results of coercion, or simply, to use the Aristotelian concept, of weakness of the will . . . Similarly, in my study of Yetzer-Hara I have claimed that the rabbis were deeply concerned with the question of what is really ‘me’ and what is not [Rosen-Zvi, Demonic Desires, 127–34]. Note that such a conceptualization of the ‘self’ is much less ambitious than the Foucauldian concept of the ‘technologies of the self’, which assumes a process of self-fashioning and of becoming what you are not yet . . . It also does not require the notion of ‘interiority’ or ‘inwardness’, i.e., the assumption that this core is unique to ‘me’ and accessible only to ‘me’ . . . which characterized modern conceptions of the ‘self’ . . . It does not even demand a concept of one’s ownership of one’s body and psychological traits as per Sorabji, Self: Ancient and Modern (“Mishnaic Mental Revolution,” 44–45, n. 35).
functions. The “self,” the “I,” does not quite seem like a discrete thing with discrete functions. The oddity of speaking about the self’s sight becomes more apparent once we pair this passage with Clement’s later comment that the psukhē’s sight is materially impaired by the dense vapors produced by the consumption of meat and wine (2.1.11.1). Thus, even here, where psukhē seems to mean something pretty close to “self,” we see that it appears to be more of a delimited object with specific functions or capacities than a more generic or universal notion of “self.”

This tension between “the self” and the objective presence and functions of the psukhē becomes more apparent when Clement mentions the need to cleanse the eye of the psukhē:

For whenever someone is led by reason (λόγου) from externals (τῶν ἐκτός) and even the condition (ἀγωγῆς) of the body itself to thought (διάνοιαν), precisely learning a vision of what happens to the person (τὸν ἀνθρώπον) according to nature, he knows not to be eager about external things (τὰ ἐκτός), cleansing the thing that is a person’s own (τὸ ἰδίον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου)—the eye of the psukhē—and purifying the flesh itself. For when there is a clean (καθαρῆς) release of those things through which the person is still dust, what would someone have more useful than himself (ἑαυτοῦ) for going in the path to the apprehension (κατάληψιν) of God? (Paed. 2.1.1.2–3)

Clement’s triangulation between “external things,” the psukhē, and the person (τὸν ἀνθρώπον) complicates any attempt to fix the psukhē as “the self.” The psukhē is the

297 Cf. Musonius Rufus (frag. 18a.18–32; 18b); see my Chapter 2.
298 Cf. Epictetus Diatr. 1.4.18. “Externals” were a key category in Stoic ethical theory; see Stephens, Stoic Ethics, 47–80.
person’s own. Is the psukhē then the possession of the self? Can it be the self if it is the possession of the self? In the next sentence, Clement appears to equate the psukhē and the self, when he asks what would be more useful than the cleansed self for walking in the path to understanding of God. The psukhē does seem to have some sort of close, perhaps metonymic, relation to “the self.”

Clement’s contrast between external things/concern for the body on the one hand and understanding/reason on the other hand, the latter of which Clement locates in the body’s opposite, the psukhē, would seem to lend itself to a modernizing interpretation of Clement’s words. Here, external things and the body exist at one level, while thinking and the self (the soul) are ostensibly located interiorly at another level. In the last chapter I covered how relating the internal psukhē to external things and appearances provides a mechanism for creating an external visual presence. As noted, its role was to think, to apprehend, to control the body. It seems to be the near equivalent of the “mind” as described by Descartes. Clement’s comments might seem quirky, his understanding of the self a bit strange, but nevertheless identifiable as such.

Yet, as Hadot explains in Philosophy as a Way of Life, the Platonic emphasis upon the psukhē and its relation to reason was not internal before Plotinus, but external. Contra Kant, for Plato and thinkers like Clement, reason is not an interior possession of the individual, but an external reality. We do not have to take Hadot’s word for it. We can see it in the passage itself. Clement emphasizes the importance of the psukhē’s sight, because the psukhē needs to see (external) reason. The metaphor of the psukhē’s eye gained prevalence in antiquity and fails us today precisely because of this.

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300 Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 211.
disjunction over the location of reason. For us, at least insofar as we are Kantians, reason is an internal possession, even a process. For Plato reason is external, and even more so for Clement, who believes that divine reason became manifest in “the Lord,” the very same logos that serves as the master Pedagogue (e.g., 1.2.4.1).

Any question about reason’s ultimate location is clarified at the beginning of Book 3:

The psukhē being tripartite, the intellectual (part) (τὸ νοερὸν) of the tripartite psukhē—also called the rational (part) (λογιστικὸν)—is the inner person (ὁ ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν ὁ ἐνδόν) and the ruler of the external (φαινομένου) person. God, however, leads that one. The irascible part (θυμικὸν), being beast-like, dwells close to mania. And, third, the desiring part, is polymorphous, exceeding Proteas, the multiform sea daemon, changing shapes again and again, tempting into adulteries (μοιχείας), lusts (λαγνείας), and depravities. (Paed. 3.1.1.2)

Clement, referring to the commonly cited Platonic tripartite description of the psukhē, makes a clear distinction between the “inner person” and the “external person.” He

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301 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 111.
302 For passages in which Plato, for example, holds that the true self is reason or intellect, see Phaed. 63b–c; 115c; I Alc. maj. 133c4–6; Resp., 589a6–b6; Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, 211. Davidson, discussing Jean-Pierre Vernant’s conclusions in “The Individual within the City-State,” draws important conclusions about the difference between the modern inner-self and the ancient external self: “the Platonic psuchē is ‘a daimôn in us, a divine being, a supernatural force whose place and function in the universe goes beyond our single person.’ This psuchē, as impersonal or super personal force, is ‘the soul in me and not my soul’” (emphasis original); Davidson, “Ethics and Ascetics,” 35, quoting Vernant, “Individual within the City-State” 330. Sorabji also notes that Heraclitus, another author Clement quotes, said that “he [Heraclitus] went in search of himself and looked for the logos of the soul” (Heraclitus, Frag. 45); Sorabji, “Graeco-Roman Varieties of Self,” 17; on Clement’s use of Heraclitus, see Dinan, “Fragments in Context.”
303 The idea of a personified reason interacting with the person is, of course, not altogether foreign to Plato either. Cairns provides a useful list of such interactions in the Republic, for example: 553d, 571d, 588e–589b, 589d (Cairns, “ψυχή, θυμικός, and Metaphor,” n. 125).
304 This is the only passage in the Paedagogus where Clement explicitly describes the psukhē as tripartite.
describes “intelligence,” which he notes is also called “reason,” as the ruler of this “inner person.” Again, the idea of the psukhē as a non-material, internal self defined by its ability to reason seems a natural reading, at least to moderns. But Clement does not end there. He is quick to point out that this inner person is led by God. Furthermore, the tripartite model of the psukhē further undermines the suggestion that Clement’s psukhē is largely identifiable with the modern soul or self. Moderns never speak this way, and I do not think that this is accidental. The modern view of the self, constituted by consciousness and thought, simply does not cohere with a tripartite model of the psukhē.

All of which is to say, even in these examples, where the psukhē seems, at first glance, most closely aligned with our common sense notions about the soul or the self—at least insofar as we are the heirs of Descartes—something a little more interesting is happening. The psukhē is represented as some sort of internal object where reason resides. It is even called the internal person once. And it is opposed to external things, the body, and the “external person.” This is why I think it is distracting, at least for my purposes, to frame my discussion of the psukhē in terms of the “the self” or the history of the self. Assumptions about “the self” too easily slip into our analysis and affect our reading. It is more productive, at least in this instance, to keep the psukhē itself as the object of our analysis. At times, its functions certainly overlap with modern “common sense” ideas about what the self does. On the other hand, the way the ancient psukhē operates as well as its location(s) and presence so defy modern expectations of the self, that using “the self” as a category to analyze the psukhē becomes unhelpful. In the rest of the chapter, instead of dismissing these references to the psukhē as self or soul, I want to

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305 Cf. Plato, Resp. 589a.
take a closer look and think more carefully about exactly what is happening, what exactly
the psukhē is doing. How is it functioning as a sort of internal core? What are its roles or
functions as an internal core?

With this approach in mind, we can now review five other passages in which
psukhē might seem to mean little more than “the self.” By paying careful attention to the
functions ascribed to the psukhē in these passages, we can start to see the particularities
of how the psukhē acted as an internal core—what is located there and what it is doing.

In the first passage, the psukhē is the object that is humbled.

Concerning fasting, he says “‘for what reason do you fast?’ says the Lord. ‘I did
not choose fasting, a day for a person to humble (ταπεινοῦν) his psukhē’” [Isa
58:4–5]. (Paed. 3.12.90.1)306

Περὶ δὲ νηστείας ἔνα τί μοι, φησίν, νηστεύετε; λέγει κύριος. Ο袍 ταύτην τὴν
νηστείαν ἐγὼ ἔξελεξάμην, καὶ ἤμεραν ἄνθρωπον ταπεινοῦν τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ

At first glance, the simplest and best translation for psukhē in this passage might seem to
be “self”: “A day for a person to humble himself.”307 As Clement goes on to explain the
fuller context of his quotation of Isaiah, his readers see that Clement, following Isaiah, is
contrasting fasting, an action whereby the individual psukhē is abased/humbled to actions
that redress social ills: unfair contracts, hunger, homelessness, nakedness. Thus Clement,
through citing Isaiah, contrasts bodily fasting—as individual piety—to social justice.

What is the significance of the use of psukhē in this passage? It is not in contrast to the
actions of the body per se, for the act of fasting is the act of humbling the psukhē. I

307 The Hebrew of Isaiah 58:5a uses nefesh, which is often translated as psukhē. Interestingly, the JPS
English translation of this verse here translates nefesh as “bodies”: “A day for men to starve their bodies.”
Although the Hebrew is not relevant for my purposes, this translation decision suggests some of the
problems with rendering either nefesh or psukhē simply “soul” or “self.”
suggest, rather, that the presence of the *psukhē* here allows this physical act (fasting) to be transformed into a morally loaded act. It is still a physical act—the deprivation of food to the body, but it is, through reference to the *psukhē*, a qualitative act, even if here condemned in comparison to other morally charged actions (e.g., clothing the naked). The *psukhē*’s usefulness is primarily to give a space for placing the action of humbling/abasing. The *psukhē* thus here performs a specific function, with ideological import. It is the object which is humbled.

In the second passage in this set of passages where *psukhē* seems to mean something close to “self,” we find something similar:

“Be at peace among yourselves. We beseech you, brothers, instruct (νουθετεῖτε) the undisciplined, console/assuage the small-of-*psukhē* (ὀλιγοψύχους), support the weak, be patient toward all [1 Thess 5:13–15].” (Paed. 3.12.95.3)

«Ἐἰρηνεύετε ἐν ἑαυτοῖς. Παρακαλοῦμεν δὲ ὑμᾶς, ἀδελφοί, νουθετεῖτε τοὺς ἀτακτοὺς, παραμυθεῖσθε τοὺς ὀλιγοψύχους, ἀντέχεσθε τῶν ἀσθενῶν, μακροθυμεῖτε πρὸς πάντας.»

The small-of-*psukhē* is in contrast to the great-of-*psukhē* (μεγαλόψυχος)—something which Clement does not mention, but appears regularly in Greek philosophical discourse. Here, people are defined by the quality of their *psukhē*: small or great. The *psukhē* provides a means place of measuring the person. “Big self-ed” or “small self-ed” does not quite work as translations, because “the self” does not provide the same kind of qualitative connotations. “The self” does not produce the same ideological effects, the same opportunities for thinking that the *psukhē* does.

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308 The Greek term ὀλιγοψύχος is usually translated as “faint-hearted” or “feeble-minded,” but most literally just means “small-of-*psukhē*.”

309 The term, great-of-*psukhē* is especially important for Aristotle; see Howland, “Aristotle's Great-Souled Man.”
In another passage, Clement states:

And through Ezekiel [he says], life is subject to the commandments: “The psukhē that errs will die. But the person who is righteous, is the one doing righteousness. He does not eat upon the mountains. He does not put his eyes upon the inventions (ἐνθυμήματα) of the house of Israel, nor would he defile his neighbor’s wife. He does not approach the menstruating woman. He will not exploit a person. He recompenses the one owing a debt. He will not steal a windfall. He will give his bread to the hungry and he will cover the naked. He does not lend his money with interest, and he will not take the surplus. He will turn his hand away from unrighteousness. He will make righteous judgment between a man and his neighbor. He is well traveled in my commandments (προστάγμασι), and he keeps my regulations (δικαίωματα) to do them. This is the righteous person. He will live, says the Lord [Ezek 18:4–9].” These things comprise the model (ὑποτύπωσιν) of Christian conduct (πολιτείας), an important invitation into the happy (μακάριον) life, a reward for living well, eternal life. (Paed. 1.10.95.1–2)

Here, the psukhē is conflated with the person (ἄνθρωπος). The psukhē is still morally loaded. It is the agent of error. But the person also acts righteously or not, and commits error or not. This type of conflation of the psukhē with the person is important, because it shows how easily the psukhē as moral agent can be conflated with the person as moral agent. Nevertheless, we still see this conflation occurring in the context of moral action. We do not just have the psukhē as self here, but as the moral self.

In two more passages, we see the psukhē tied to moral status:
And again, through Jeremiah, he illuminates the truth to those who wander “The Lord says, ‘Stand in the ways and see, ask for the eternal paths of the Lord, which is the good path. Walk in it, and find purification in your psukhai [Jer 6:16].’” (Paed. 1.10.93.1)

ὄτι δὲ διὰ Ἰερεμίου φωτίζει τοῖς πλανωμένοις τὴν ἀλήθειαν. ‘τάδε λέγει κύριος: στῆτε ἐπὶ ταῖς ὀδοῖς καὶ ἱδέτε καὶ ἐρωτήσατε τρίβους κυρίου αἰωνίας, ποία ἐστίν ἢ τρίβος ἡ ἀγαθή, καὶ βαδίζετε ἐν αὐτῇ, καὶ εὐρήσετε ἀγνισμὸν ταῖς φυχαῖς ὁμόν.»

He says that we are young birds by her wings, as the scripture gives witness: “In the way that a hen gathers her young birds by her wings . . . [Matt 23:37]” Thus also we are the young birds of the Lord, a word that very marvelously and mysteriously indicates the simplicity of psukhē in childhood. (Paed. 1.5.14.4–5)

Ὅτι δὲ ἡμᾶς τοῖς νεοττούς λέγει, μάρτυς ἡ γραφή. «Ὅν τρόπον ὄρνις συνάγει τὰ νοσσία ὑπὸ τὰς πτέρυγας αὐτῆς», οὕτως ἐσμέν νεοττοί κυρίοι, θαυμαστῶς πάνω καὶ μοστικῶς τοῦ λόγου τὴν ἀπλότητα τῆς ψυχῆς εἰς ἡλικίαν ὑπογραφομένου παιδικήν.

The reader is promised to “find purification” in “psukhē” and is told about the “simplicity of psukhē” in childhood. In the first, the psukhē is the thing that needs to be in a specific state. In the second passage, we see the psukhē as the place, again, where a certain kind of state, “simplicity,” resides. The psukhē is the thing that is either pure or not, simple or not. Again, although not entirely incongruent with how the term “self” can be used, the psukhē names a specific site where moral status is located. As I will argue below, it provides a richer opportunity to think out moral action and culpability through naming a more distinct and location for morality than simple references to “the self” would.

Each of the above five passages appears relatively straightforward. The term “psukhē” seemingly could easily be translated as “self,” “person,” or just untranslated altogether: “I did not chose fasting, a day for a person to humble him/herself.” Or: “The person that sins will die”; “console/assuage the fainthearted”; “find purification in yourself”; and, “the simplicity of childhood.” If, as I would suggest, the semantics of
psukhé differ in these five passages from the rest of the *Paedagogus*, it is worth noting that all of these instances of “psukhé” occur only when Clement is quoting other authors, mostly what is now Christian scripture. Nevertheless, the above passages work discursively to produce a very specific type of core thing, one in which virtue is located. Insofar as this thing’s functions overlap with those of “the self,” we see that the psukhé is not just another name for the self-evident self that we all have, but a specific way of demarcating an object or a core that functions metonymically to produce a specific type of the self. What, in short, is at stake in these passages? Naming, and thereby interpellating, an object/subject that is demarcated in a particular way for the purposes of supporting the functioning of a specific ideological system. It is the production of a virtue/reasoning self that represents the real person, parallel to how the notion of a gender-core functions to support a system of bodies and heteronormativity. A certain gender core is required and produced by a system of heteronormative body-performances and a regulatory ideals of object-relations. So too, the psukhé functions as a virtue-core that is required and produced by a system of normative body-performances and regulatory ideals of object-relations. It provides a subject for a system of normative ideas. Without this subject, violations of the normative ideas are individual and momentary violations of that ideal, imputing no subject, casting no doubt on a person as such. With this moral-self, this space, this subject that can be either humble or not, big or not, sinning or not, pure or not, simple or not, Clement and his contemporaries have a subject to regulate, rather than momentary violations to police.
In what follows, I review more passages that indicate the psukhē functions as some sort of core, this time as “life.”

Psukhē and Life

In addition to passages in which the term psukhē might, on the surface, seem only to mean “self,” in several of the passages of the Paedagogus, the term appears to be (simply) synonymous with “life.”

Oh, the vain pursuits, the empty pursuit of celebrity! They pour out money like prostitutes, for shame. And the gifts of God they parody with their vulgarity, emulating the technique (τέχνην) of the evil one (πονηροῦ). The Lord plainly [speaks about] the one who stores up wealth for himself in the storehouse and says to himself, “You have many good things lying in storage for many years—eat, drink, and be happy!” He was foolishly broken: “For this night they will take your psukhē. The things then that you have prepared, will go to someone else [Luke 12:18–20].” (Paed. 2.12.125.1–2)

Ὢ τῆς κενῆς πολυπραγμοσύνης, ὦ τῆς ματαίας δοξομανίας· ἐκχέοσαν ἐταιρικῶς τὸν πλοῦτον εἰς ὅνειδος, καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ τὰ δωρήματα ἀπειροκαλὰ παραχαράττουσι ζηλοῦσα τὸν πονηρὸν τὴν τέχνην. Σαφῶς δὲ ὁ κύριος ἐν τῷ ἐυαγγελίῳ τὸν πλούσιον τὸν θησαυρίζοντα εἰς τὰς ἀποθήκες καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν λέγοντα· «Ἅχεις ἀγαθὰ πολλὰ ἀποκείμενα εἰς ἐτὶ πολλὰ· φάγε, πίε, εὐφραίνοι», ἄφρονα κέκληκεν, «ταῦτῃ γὰρ τῇ νυκτὶ τὴν ψυχήν σου παραλαμβάνουσιν· ἢ οὖν ἱτοίμασας, τίνος γένηται;»

And because the Word (λόγος) was the trainer (ἄλειπτης) both for Jacob and for the Pedagogue of all humanity, “he asked him” it says, “and he said to him ‘tell me, what is your name?’ And he said ‘Why do you ask my name?’” [Gen 32:30] For he was keeping the new name for the new, infant people. The Lord God was still nameless, not yet having been born a human. But, “Jacob called the name of the place ‘Sight (Εἴδος) of God,’ for ‘I saw God’ he said, ‘face to face and my psukhē was saved’ [Gen 32.31].” (Paed. 1.7.57.1–2)

310 Cf. Cairns’ useful list of metaphors and metonymies of psukhē as life in Plato: e.g., Euthyd. 287d, 302a; Crat. 399d; Resp. 353d, 590a; Pol. 261b–c, 292b-c; Tim. 91a–b; Leg. 869b, 873e, 959a; compare to the arguments at Phaed. 71c–72d, 77c–e, 80b, 105e, 106e–e; Phaedr. 245c–246a; Tim. 30a–72d, 73b, 74e–75a, 76e–77c, 81d, 87e, 89e–90b, 92c; Leg. 892a–897b, esp. 895c; Cairns, “ψυχή, θημικός, and Metaphor,” n. 25.

"Or the logos ἦν ὁ ἀλείπτης ἄμα τῷ Ἰακὼβ καὶ παιδαγωγὸς τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος, «μέτρησεν», φησιν. «αὐτὸν καὶ εἶπεν αὐτῷ· ἀνάγγελον μοι τὸ ὄνομά σου. Καὶ εἶπεν· ἵνα τοῦτο ἐρωτῆτε τὸ ὄνομά μου.» Ἐπείρετο γὰρ τὸ ὄνομα τὸ καίνον τῷ νέῳ λαῷ τῷ νηπίῳ· ἐτὶ δὲ ἀνυόνιστος ἦν ὁ θεὸς ὁ κύριος, μηδέποτε γεγενημένος ἀνθρώπος. Πλὴν ἄλλα ἢ Ἰακὼβ ἐκάλεσε τὸ ὄνομα τὸ τόπου ἐκεῖνον Εἴδος θεοῦ· εἶδον γὰρ», φησί, «θεόν προσώπων πρὸς πρόσωπον, καὶ ἔσωθη μοι ἢ φεχί».

Our Pedagogue is the type who is legitimately (ἐνδίκως) good. “He did not come” it says, “to be served, but to serve.” Because of this, the gospel introduces him as afflicted, afflicted for us and “giving his psukhē as a ransom for many [Matt 20:28].” For he alone, he declares, is the good shepherd [cf. John 10:11; 15:13]. Generous, he gave his greatest possession for our sake—his psukhē. Very beneficent and humane, he wanted to be the brother of humans, ceasing to be their lord. He was even so good that he died for us. (Paed. 1.9.85.1–2)

Τοιοῦτος ἦμων ὁ παιδαγωγός, ἀγαθὸς ἐνδίκως. «Οὐκ ἠλθον», φησί, «διακονήθηκεν, ἀλλὰ διακονήσατο.» Διὰ τοῦτο εἰσάγεται ἐν τῷ εὐαγγέλῳ κεκριμένος, ὁ κάμης ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν καὶ «δεῦτε τὴν φυγὴν τὴν ἑαυτῷ λότρον ἀντὶ πολλῶν» ὑπαχνοῦμενος. Τούτων γὰρ μόνον ὁμολογεὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι ποιμένα· μεγαλοδόρος ὁ ὁ τὸ μεγίστον ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, τὴν φυγὴν αὐτοῦ, ἐπιδιδοῦς, καὶ μεγαλοφελῆς καὶ φιλανθρωπος, ὅτι καὶ ἀνθρώπων, ἔξον εἶναι κάρυν, ἀδελφός εἶναι βεβούληται· ὁ δὲ καὶ εἰς τοσοῦτον ἀγαθὸς ὡστε ἡμῶν καὶ ὑπεραποθανεῖν.

Our divine pedagogue is trustworthy, adorned with three most beautiful ornaments: knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), benevolence (ἐννοία), and bold speech (παρρήσια)312. ... with benevolence, because he alone gave himself as a sacrifice for us, “For the good shepherd lays down his psukhē for the sheep [John 10:11]” and indeed he did lay down his life for them. (Paed. 1.11.97.3)

Ἀξίστησος ὁ θεῖος παιδαγωγός τρισὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις κεκοσμημένος, ἐπιστήμη, ἐννοία, παρρήσια ... ἐννοία δὲ ὅτι μόνος ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν ἱερεῖν ἑαυτὸν ἐπιδείκνυε, «ὁ γὰρ ἀγα- θὸς ποιμήν τὴν φυγὴν ἑαυτῷ τίθησιν ὑπὲρ τῶν προβάτων» καὶ δὴ ἐβηκεν.

Still now, silver legged couches are accusations of extreme pretension (ἄλαζονειας).313 “The ivory in beds, which has separated the psukhē from the body, is not unpolluted [Plato, Laws XII, 956A]” for holy people, being a lazy invention (τέχνασμα) of rest. (Paed. 2.9.77.3)

312 Cf. Plato, Gorg. 486e–487a: “For I know that the one who will adequately examine whether the soul lives properly or not needs to have three things, all of which you have: knowledge, benevolence, and bold speech” (ἐννοίο γὰρ ὅτι τὸν μέλλοντα βασανίζειν ἱκανὸς φρίκις πέρι ὑρθοῦ τέ ξώστις καὶ μή τρία ἄρα δεῖ ἐγειν ὅ συ πάντα ἐγεί, ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ εὐνοιαν καὶ παρρησίαν).
313 Cf. Musonius Rufus, frag. 20.
Not one of these references to psukhē as “life” comes in Clement’s own words. In the five passages, Clement quotes Genesis, Christian gospels, and Plato. This sense of the term, where psukhē seems only to mean “life,” only occurs in the Paedagogus in citations of other works. Just as significantly, the works that are cited, whether of the Septuagint, gospels, or Plato, are coming from relatively distant times and places. In the five above passages, four of the citations, although coming in Greek, may reflect Hebrew or Aramaic linguistics more than Greek semantics. In the fifth passage, where Clement cites Plato, while the meaning “life” can make sense, we are back to the predominate meaning we had seen earlier, where psukhē seems to be a discrete object, one that holds the potential to be a part of the body or separate from it.

For my purposes, the most important thing to note in these set of passages is that the psukhē is presented here as the possession of a person. It is something one can be saved, given, taken, or laid down. It is the greatest thing a person has, and it can be demanded of a person. Without the psukhē, bodies are only corpses. 

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314 Also note Paed. 3.6.36.2: “Righteousness is true wealth, and reason is more valuable than any treasure. This treasure does not increase from animals or land, but is given by God. It is wealth that cannot be taken away. The psukhē alone is its treasure, and it is the best possession acquired, making a person truly blessed” (Πλούτος γὰρ ἀληθινός ἢ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ὁ παντὸς θησαυρὸς πολυτιμότερος λόγος οὐκ ἀπὸ θρεμάτων καὶ χωρίων αὐξάνομενος, ἀλλ’ ἕπι τοῦ θεοῦ δωρούμενος, πλούτος ἀναφαίρετος—ἡ φυζῆ μόνη θησαυρὸς αὐτοῦ—, κτῆμα τῷ κεκτημένῳ ἄριστον, μικρότερον τῇ ἀληθείᾳ παρεχόμενον τὸν ἄνθρωπον). As I would suggest is typical, Clement describes the psukhē as a possession, linking it to the true wealth, righteousness, and reason. The emphasis, here, however, is not that the self takes care of, or works on, the self (cf. Foucault, “Technologies of the Self”), but that the psukhē, as the subject of reason and holiness, is an important thing, over which the self rules.

315 Galen, QAM K 772.
something that is laid down or given, it seems to be less the self than the possession of the self.\(^3\)

Thus, rather than necessarily being a vague term for self, we see that, when synonymous with “life,” the *psukhē* is a rather specific object, delimited, but also of first importance. These passages do not mean that *psukhē* was just a vague “self.” It is a specific thing that can be taken, given, or saved. Without it, a person cannot live, but that is why it is so important.

Any temptation to read the above passages flatly, as an indication that *psukhē* primarily means “life,” is obviated by two passages in which Clement presumes that the dead are *psukhai*:

> It is most fitting that those who are bright and not base-born within (ἐνδον) wear clothing that is white and simple. Daniel the prophet clearly and purely says “Thrones were set up and he sat upon them as the ancient of days, and his clothing was as white as snow [cf. Dan 7:9].” He saw the Lord in a vision wearing such a robe; the Apocalypse too says: “I saw the *psukhai* of the martyrs under the altar and each was given a white robe [Rev 6:9–11].” (Paed. 2.10.1–3)

Robinson discusses parallel problems in Plato’s thought. Rather than assume that Plato maintains a single, coherent notion of the *psukhē*, Robinson details the shifting descriptions Plato gives throughout his dialogues, whether it be a cognitive principle in *Charmides* and *Protogoras*, a principle of moral activity (*Gorgias* and *Meno*), the “true self” (*Charmides*, *Alcibiades I*, and *Protogoras*, or the “counter-person” in the myth of *Gorgias*). Robinson argues that in the “*Charmides*, *Alcibiades I* and *Protogoras* are united in asserting that self and soul are one and the same . . . In the *Protogoras* the body is simply a possession of the soul; in *Alcibiades I* it is likewise a possession and an ‘instrument’ of the soul . . . In the *Phaedo* soul as cognitive principle, moral principle, true self, and counter-person is once more evident, though now there are added the notions of soul as life-principle (or ‘life-carrier’) and soul as some sort of spatialistic fluid in the body, rather like ectoplasm . . .” (*Plato’s Psychology*, 158).

\(^3\) Robinson discusses parallel problems in Plato’s thought. Rather that assume that Plato maintains a single, coherent notion of the *psukhē*, Robinson details the shifting descriptions Plato gives throughout his dialogues, whether it be a cognitive principle in *Charmides* and *Protogoras*, a principle of moral activity (*Gorgias* and *Meno*), the “true self” (*Charmides*, *Alcibiades I*, and *Protogoras*, or the “counter-person” in the myth of *Gorgias*). Robinson argues that in the “*Charmides*, *Alcibiades I* and *Protogoras* are united in asserting that self and soul are one and the same . . . In the *Protogoras* the body is simply a possession of the soul; in *Alcibiades I* it is likewise a possession and an ‘instrument’ of the soul . . . In the *Phaedo* soul as cognitive principle, moral principle, true self, and counter-person is once more evident, though now there are added the notions of soul as life-principle (or ‘life-carrier’) and soul as some sort of spatialistic fluid in the body, rather like ectoplasm . . .” (*Plato’s Psychology*, 158).
Note here how the *psukhē* is described here as being seen, complicating any suggestion that *psukhē* is essentially similar to “life,” or even “the self.” Furthermore, however metaphorically we might be tempted to read the passage, there is no indication that Clement is troubled by the description of the *psukhai* receiving robes to wear.\(^{317}\)

In the second and only other passage in the *Paedagogus* in which Clement refers to the dead as *psukhai*, he quotes from the *Odyssey*:

> Here, we should discuss what is called “offered to idols” . . . those things seem to me to be abominable and loathsome: to the blood of which “*psukhai* from the darkness of corpses (*νεκύων*) of the dead fly [Od. 11.37].” (Paed. 2.1.8.3)

> Ἐνταῦθα ὑπομνηστέον καὶ περὶ τῶν εἴδωλοθύτων καλομένων . . . Μιαρὰ δοκεῖ μοι καὶ βδελυρὰ ἐκεῖνα, ὅν ἔφιππανται τοῖς αἵμασιν ψυχαὶ ὑπὲξ ἔρέβεως νεκών καταπεθενώτων.

Here, Clement, using the *Odyssey*, describes the *psukhai* as flying from blood.\(^{318}\) The *psukhē* exists in the realm of the physical. It might mean “life,” but when these two passages are placed alongside the passages in which *psukhē* seems to mean “life,” it seems like we are closer to something like “ghost” or a “ghost in the machine,” with the body being the machine. Thus, without this “ghost in the machine” the body is lifeless, as in the passages discussed above, where Clement, citing Plato, describes ivory as having been separated from body’s *psukhē* (2.9.77.3).

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318 As Vernant notes, “Homer mentions the *psuchē* to mean that which leaves the person at the hour of his death to descend into Hades. A living man is never said to possess a *psuchē*, except in those rare cases where, in a temporary loss of consciousness, his *psuchē* momentarily deserts him as though he were dead. Men, therefore, do not have a *psuchē*; once they are dead, they become *psuchai*, flitting shades who lead an impoverished existence in the darkness of the underworld” (“Psuche: Simulacrum of the Body,” 186). For the use of *psukhē* in Homer, also see Redfield, “Sentiment homérique du Moi”; Claus, *Toward the Soul*, 9–47; and Cairns, “ψυχή, θημικός, and Metaphor,” 11–30. On the dead being *psukhai* in early Greek thought (including Homer), see Bremmer, *Early Greek Concept of the Soul*, 70–124.
With this in mind, when we review another seemingly innocuous reference to the
psukhē, a passage in which the psukhē is referred to as an object of redemption, we have
a clear image of a delimited thing, a thing that exists after the death of the body, and
perhaps animates the body:

Just as the foot is the measure of the sandal,319 so too the body is the measure of
the possessions of each. The superfluous, what they actually call ornaments, and
the furnishings of the rich are a burden—not a decoration of the body. The one
using violence to ascend into the heavens needs to carry the beautiful good-deed
stick, giving to the afflicted to have a share in the rest of truth. For the scripture
says that “one’s own wealth is the redemption of the person’s psukhē [Prov
13:8].” That is, if you are rich you will be saved through giving. (Paed. 3.7.39.1–2)

These passages, where psukhē seems to mean “life” or “the dead,” come almost
exclusively in quotation of other texts. Here I want to note that while I do think it is
important to distinguish between the references Clement makes to the psukhē through
quotations, these references still work to form a picture of how Clement references the
psukhē. For him, and he presumes for his readers, the psukhē is associated with life, even
the afterlife. When we put these uses of the term together, as we did with the references
to the psukhē as “life” and the references to the psukhē as “the dead,” we see something
more. In this combination, the psukhē seems to be like a (material) ghost.320 It is a distinct
material thing that can exist separately from the body, but also flows through the body. It

319 Cf. Epictetus, Ench. 39; Plutarch, Tranquill. an. 446f.
320 Cf. Phaed. 81b–d.
is essential to life. Without it the body lies dead. The psukhē as ghost, as we have already seen, is not the only meaning of psukhē in Clement or for his contemporaries. It rules the “inner person” (3.1.1.2). It participates, or is meant to participate, in divine reason. At its best, it is not weighed down by food and wine, but rises above them (2.2.29.3). It is separable from the body, yearning to leave it behind. It is also a person’s greatest possession (1.9.85.1–2). It is the center of morals, and a self that survives death.

The Psukhē: A Very Specific Thing

When we shift our focus from Clement’s statements about what can damage the psukhē, or how the condition of the psukhē is revealed through the body’s appearance, to passages in which Clement directly and transparently speaks of the psukhē as a specific object, we see how it functioned as a distinct entity. References to the psukhē are references to a distinct something. For example, when discussing the Eucharist, Clement explains it as follows:

The blood of the Lord is twofold. The one is of the flesh; we are redeemed from corruption with it. The second is pneumatic (πνευματικόν), we are anointed with it. To drink the blood of Jesus is to partake of the Lord’s incorruption. The pneuma (πνεῦμα) is the strength of the word/reason (λόγου), just as the blood is of the flesh. Similarly, the wine is mixed with water, the pneuma is mixed in the person (ἄνθρωπῳ), the mixture of the one feeds faith, and the other, the pneuma, leads to incorruption. The mixture of both, the drink and the word (λόγῳ), is

321 See more below.
322 In Chapter 2, I described how the psukhē could be both a distinct object and part of the body. In this I compared it to prosthetics, but I also noted how this is comparable to something like blood; a thing that is part of the body, but also distinct from the body. The analogy is especially apt, insofar as Clement mentions that some people think that blood is the substance of the psukhē: “For blood is the first-created substance in the person, for this reason, some even dare to say that it is the substance of the psukhē” (Πρωτόγονον γάρ τὸ αἷμα εὑρίσκεται ἐν ἄνθρωπῷ, δὲ δὴ τινες νῦν αἰών ἐισέχθης ἐφύη γῆς τετολμήκασιν) (Paed. 1.6.39.2). Contra Taylor, who repeatedly insists that we do not have “selves” in the way that we have hearts or livers (Sources of the Self, 34, 106).
323 I transliterate πνευματικόν and πνεῦμα because no English word adequately conveys their sense. See Lloyd, “Pneuma between Body and Soul”; Martin, Corinthian Body, 21–25;
called “thanksgiving” (ἐυχαριστία), a gracious and beautiful praise. Those partaking of it according to faith are sanctified in both body and psukhē. The divine mixture, the person (τὸν ἀνθρώπον), is a mysterious blend of pneuma and word, according to the will of the father. For the pneuma, truly, is joined (ὡρεώσται) to the psukhē, which is carried by it, and the flesh to reason (λόγῳ), through which “The Word was made flesh” [John 1:4]. (Paed. 2.2.19.4–2.2.20.1)

Διττὸν δὲ τὸ αἷμα τοῦ κυρίου· τὸ μὲν ἔστιν αὐτὸς σαρκικὸς, ὁ τῆς φθορᾶς λειτυρώμεθα, τὸ δὲ πνευματικὸν, τοῦτ’ ἔστιν ὁ κεχρίσμεθα. Καὶ τοῦτ’ ἔστι πείν τὸ αἷμα τοῦ Ἰησοῦ, τῆς κερικῆς μεταλαβεὶν ἀφθαρσίας· ἰσχῦς δὲ τοῦ λόγου τὸ πνεῦμα, ὡς αἷμα σαρκός. Ἀναλόγως τοῖνος κίρναται ὁ μὲν ὦν τῷ ἐδρατυ, τῷ δὲ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ πνεῦμα, καὶ τὸ μὲν εἰς πίστιν εὐωκεῖ, τὸ κράμα, τὸ δὲ εἰς ἀφθαρσίαν ὀδηγεῖ, τὸ πνεῦμα, ἢ δὲ ἅμοιον ἁμαρτίας κράσις ποτόν τε καὶ λόγου εὐχαριστία κέκληται, χάρις ἐπαινομένη καὶ καλή, ἢς οἱ κατὰ πίστιν μεταλαμβάνοντες ἀγάλζονται καὶ σῶμα καὶ ψυχήν, τὸ θεόν κράμα τὸν ἀνθρώπον τοῦ πατρικοῦ βουλήματος πνεύματι καὶ λόγῳ συγκρινόντος μυστικῶς· καὶ γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς μὲν τὸ πνεῦμα ὡρεώσται τῇ ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ φερομένῃ φυχῇ, ἢ δὲ σάρξ τοῦ λόγου, δι’ ἣν «ὁ λόγος γέγονεν σάρξ».

Clement describes the person (ἀνθρώπω), as a composite being of psukhē and flesh, infused with pneuma and, ideally, with reason. Relying upon contemporary understandings of the body, where the blood flows through and strengthens the body,\(^\text{324}\)

Clement compares pneuma to blood as the Word is to the Body. The Eucharist is the “union of both” wine and water, which eventually affects both faith and hope, meaning both body and psukhē are “sanctified.” The “pneuma” is closely joined to the psukhē,\(^\text{325}\)

while the flesh is joined to the Word. It is not an altogether tight analogy, but Clement premises his argument upon the composite nature of the person, and the similarity between psukhē and blood.

Clement uses a similar analogy in another passage where he talks about faith and hope:

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324 See Boylan, *Origins of Ancient Greek Science*.

325 Smith provides a helpful discussion and bibliography on pneuma being the instrument of the psukhē (Smith, “Physics and Metaphysics,” 533–538, n. 119, 549–50).
It is possible for us to consider preaching milk, poured out everywhere. Faith is food, condensed by instruction (κατακχίσεως) into a foundation, which, being denser than hearing, is compared to food, and given body in the psukhē itself. The Lord elsewhere, in the gospel according to John, brings out this nourishment through symbols: “Eat my flesh,” he says “and drink my blood” [John 6:55], clearly describing the edibility and drinkability of the faith and of the promise, through which the church, just as a person (ἄνθρωπος), is assembled out of many parts, and is watered and grows, being welded and condensed together [cf. Eph 2:21; 4:16], the body out of faith and the psukhē out of hope, just as the Lord, out of flesh and blood. For in reality, hope is the blood of faith, holding it together (συνέχεται), just as faith is held together by the psukhē. (Paed. 1.6.38.1–3)\(^{326}\)

Now Clement is talking about the Church through a double metaphor. The Church is made through body and psukhē (just as the Lord is made of flesh and blood). What does this metaphor mean? That body is like faith and psukhē is like blood. Psukhē /hope/blood hold body/faith together. Without hope/psukhē /blood, then the life/hope of the body/faith is extinguished, just as when blood is drawn from the veins.

The main point here, for my purposes, is that the psukhē is presumed to be an identifiable, delimited thing. It is like blood. It is not a solid object. It is separable from the body (i.e., it can be drawn out of the body through the veins). Without it, the body is lifeless. It is not some immaterial “spiritual” reality, another word for “will” or “self,” but a distinct thing that can be present, absent, healthy, or sick, just as we saw in Chapter 1.

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We see this same thing in many other passages. For example, when talking about the gymnasium and the baths, Clement argues that the former is better for body and psukhē than the latter:

The gymnasium is sufficient for boys (Μειρακίοις), even if a bath is available. And for men to choose these things [gymnastic exercises] over the baths is probably not bad, since they some health benefit for young men. They bring in (ἐντιθέντα) exertion (σπουδήν) and ambition, not just good health (εὔεξίας), but also to cultivate a good psukhē (εὐφυχίας). It is elegant and not without profit, if it is not dragging men away from better activities. (Paed. 3.10.49.1)

Μειρακίοις δὲ γυμνάσιον ἀπόχρη, κἂν βαλανεῖον παρῆ· καὶ γὰρ καὶ ταύτα τοῖς ἀνδράσι παντὸς μᾶλλον πρὸ τῶν λουτρῶν ἐγκρίναι oū φαιλον ἴσως, ἐγχοντά τι χρήσιμον τοῖς νέοις πρὸς ὑγίειαν, σπουδήν τε καὶ πιθοτιμίαν ἐντιθέντα οὐχὶ εὐεξίας μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ εὐφυχίας ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· ὁ δὲ γινόμενον ἀνευ τοῦ τῶν κρειττόνων ἔργων ἀποσπάσθαι χαρίεν καὶ ὦκ ἀλυσιτελές.

Again, distinct things. Body and psukhē. But they are not distinct because (as Descartes would expect) the psukhē is a separable reality, a “thing” that is immaterial. The psukhē is only as different from the body as blood is. It too benefits from the gymnasia.

All of this becomes even clearer when Clement compares the body’s need for sleep with the psukhē’s ever-present activity.

And it is necessary to know this, upon everything else, that the psukhē is not in need of sleep. For it is ever moving (ἀείκίνητος). But the body is relaxed when it has rests, and the psukhē no longer acts corporeally (σωματικῶς), reflecting according to itself. Wherefore, the true of dreams, rightly understood, are the thoughts of the self-controlled psukhē, being undistracted for the time concerning the corresponding affections (συμπαθείας) of the body, but giving itself the best counsel. Being still (ἀτρέμασαι) would destroy the psukhē. Wherefore, the psukhē, always having its thoughts on God, through continuous communion imparting wakefulness to the body, it makes the person equal in angelic grace, partaking in eternal life through the practice of wakefulness. (Paed. 2.9.82.1–3)

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327 Cf. Plato, Phaedr. 245c.
328 Cf. Clement, Strom. IV.140.1–2.
The psukhē is clearly distinct from the body. It was clearly a thing. “The psukhē no longer acts corporeally (σωματικῶς)” when the body is asleep, for it continues “reflecting according to itself.” We get a picture of it being an active, thinking thing. Dreams reveal the thoughts of the psukhē more clearly, because they are not distracted by or in sympathy with the body when the body is asleep. By focusing upon God, the psukhē is the thing that obtains eternal life.

**Emotional/Moral Core**

But the psukhē is not just a specific way of thinking or delimiting the self. It was not just a separate thing from the body, a “ghost in the machine” and an eternal self. It was a certain interior space for things like emotions and morals. At the beginning of the chapter, I reviewed passages in the *Paedagogus* in which the psukhē was depicted as the object of humility (3.12.90.1), as being the agent of erring (1.10.95.1–2), as being in need of purification (1.10.93.1) or simplicity (1.5.14.4–5). Clement repeatedly refers to the psukhē in this way. For example, in one passage, Clement refers to the psukhē as producing generosity and therefore being the true location of wealth:

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330 See *Paed*. 2.79.2.
330 Parel, “Disease of the Passions.”
So then, it is not the one who has or who keeps, but the one who gives that is rich. It is giving that makes happy, not possessions. The fruit of the psukhē is generosity; consequently, wealth is in the psukhē. (Paed. 3.6.35.5–36.1) 331

Ὅστε οὐχ ὁ ἐχὼν καὶ φιλάττων, ἄλλ’ ὁ μεταδιδόχος πλοῦσιος, καὶ ἴ μετάδοσις τὸν μακάριον, οὐχ ἴ κτήσις δείκνυσι· καρπὸς δὲ ψυχῆς τὸ εὐμετάδοτον· ἐν ψυχῇ ἀρα τὸ πλούσιον.

In another place, Clement mentions God showing his love for humanity through “giving (people) chances at repentance in the free will of the psukhē” (τῷ αὐτεξουσίῳ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀφορμάς μετανοίας χαριζόμενος) (1.9.76.3), placing “free will” in the psukhē also.

Elsewhere, Clement discusses the possibility of being “unlucky” (δυστυχεῖν) in psukhē (3.11.57.2–3).

In two other passages, Clement expects his readers to practice affection in psukhē, as opposed to the affection of a “licentious” mouth:

And some do nothing but make the assemblies (ἐκκλησίας) resound with the kiss, not having loving itself within. For indeed this thing, the licentious use of the kiss, causes shameful suspicions and blasphemies 332—it ought to be mystical; the apostle calls it “holy” [Rom 16:16; 1 Cor 16:20]. Let us be worthy citizens of the kingdom, showing forth affection of psukhē through a self-controlled mouth, through which it shows an especially kind way. (Paed. 3.11.81.2–3)

Οἱ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλ’ ἴ φιλήματι καταφοροῦσι τὰς ἐκκλησίας, τὸ φιλοῦν ἐνδον οὐκ ἐχοντες [αὐτό]. Καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ <πρός> τούτῳ ἐκπέπληκεν ὑπονοίας αἰσχρὰς καὶ βλασφημίας τὸ ἀνεδίδον χρῆσθαι τῷ φιλήματι, ὅπερ ἐχρῆν εἶναι μυστικὸν·<"ἄγιον"> αὐτὸ κέκληκεν ὁ ἀπόστολος, ἀποφαινομένης [ἀξίως τῆς βασιλείας πολιτεύμωμεθα] τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς εὐνοιαν διὰ στόματος σώφρονος καὶ μεμυκότος, δὲ οὐ μάλιστα δείκνυται τρόπος ἡμέρος.

“Let wives be subject to their husbands, as to the Lord, and let husbands love their wives, just as Christ loved the church.” Let those who are married, then, to love one another, “as their own bodies. Children, listen to your parents. Fathers, do not make your children angry, but raise them in the paideia and knowledge of the Lord. Slaves, listen to your lords in the flesh with fear and trembling in generosity your hearts as to Christ, serving with benevolence out of (your) psukhē. And

331 Cf. Quis div. 18.1; 18.6; 19.1.
332 Cf. Athenagoras, Leg. 32.4–5; Minucius Felix, Oct. 9.2; Tertullian, Apol. 39.7–10.
lords, treat your slaves well, letting go of threat, and knowing that the Lord of them and of you is in the heavens and that there is no partiality [cf. Eph 6:1–9]. 

(Paed. 3.12.94.5–95.1)

«Αἱ μὲν γυναίκες τοῖς ἱδίοις ἀνδράσιν ὑποτασσέσθωσαν, ὡς τῷ κυρίῳ, οἱ δὲ ἄνδρες τάς γυναίκας τάς έαυτῶν ἁγαπάτωσαν, καθὼς καὶ ὁ Χριστός ἤγαπησεν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν.» Ἀγαπάτωσαν οὖν ἄλληδος οἱ συνεζευγμένοι «ὡς τὰ ἱδία σώματα». «Τὰ τέκνα, ὑπακούετε τοῖς γονεῖσιν ὑμῶν. Οἱ πατέρες, μὴ παροργίζετε τὰ τέκνα ὑμῶν, ἀλλ’ ἔκτρέφετε αὐτὰ ἐν παιδείᾳ καὶ νουθεσίᾳ κυρίου. Οἱ δοῦλοι, ὑπακούετε τοῖς κατὰ σάρκα κυρίοις μετὰ φόβου καὶ τρόμου ἐν ἀπλότητι τῆς καρδίας ὑμῶν ὡς τῷ Χριστῷ, ἐκ φυσῆς μετ’ εὐνοίας δουλεύοντες. Καὶ οἱ κύριοι, εὐ ποιεῖτε τοὺς οἰκέτας ὑμῶν, ἀνιέντες τὴν ἀπειλήν, εἰδότες ὅτι καὶ αὐτῶν καὶ ὑμῶν ὁ κύριος ἐστιν ἐν οὐδανοίς, καὶ προσωποληψία οὐκ ἐστίν.»

In these passages, Clement locates “morals” in the psukhē. Generosity is the product of the psukhē. Repentance is the product of a “free will” of the psukhē. Clement calls for affection of the psukhē through a self-controlled mouth. Benevolence is located in the psukhē.

In each of these cases, although the psukhē is not the focus of the passage, we see it and morality juxtaposed against external action. The psukhē therefore functions here as a way of framing morals as essentially internal as opposed to external action. Generosity is not the product of actually giving things, it is the product of the psukhē. Generosity is not external, but internal and attached to a specific internal object, the psukhē.333 The psukhē, discursively constructed, provides Clement with a place to locate morals. Again, rather than normative ideals such as generosity and affection being the product of specific generous or affection actions, such ideals are located in the internal psukhē. The psukhē is

333 Cf. Judith Butler’s description of the soul’s relation to the body: “The figure of the interior soul understood as ‘within’ the body is signified through its inscription on the body, even though its primary mode of signification is through its very absence, its potent invisibility. The effect of a structuring inner space is produced through the signification of a body as a vital and sacred enclosure. The soul is precisely what the body lacks; hence, the body presents itself as a signifying lack. That lack which is the body signifies the soul as that which cannot show. In this sense, then, the soul is a surface signification that contests and displaces the inner/outer distinction itself, a figure of interior psyche space inscribed on the body as a social signification that perpetually renounces itself as such . . .” (Gender Trouble, 84).
generous or not, affectionate or not, benevolent or not. This is a very specific and historically contingent manifestation of normative power.

Similarly, as Clement rails against “licentious kissing” in the assembling, kisses which Clement claims bring slander against Christians, Clement seems to reject literal kissing, and calls instead for “mystical” or “holy” kissing, that, rather than being practiced with the lips, occurs in the *psukhē*.\(^{334}\) Again, external bodily actions are opposed to the *psukhē*. Clement laments the fact that many kisses are given without the right emotion/attitude in the heart (a conventional location of the *psukhē*). But Clement’s solution is not simply to kiss with more love, he wants to substitute literal kisses for “mystic” and “holy” kisses, which are the product of practicing affection in *psukhē*.

Interestingly, however, this internal practice or attitude of the *psukhē* nevertheless functions to make chaste character visible. Again, the *psukhē* functions to give a discreet internal location for specifying a particular type of practice. Giving things is not definitive of generosity, the state of the *psukhē* is. Giving kisses only gives rise to suspicions, but affection in *psukhē* (instead) reveals a self-controlled mouth. Character is both internal and simultaneously visible.

Finally, in the Ephesians passage that Clement quotes, slaves are told to obey their masters (according to the flesh) with fear and trembling, in the sincerity of heart, with good will in *psukhē*. Again, externals are not the most important thing, internal emotion or character matters, located in the *psukhē*. In each of the passages the *psukhē* seems superfluous at first, but that only makes its presence all the more interesting. It should not be read over as just unnecessary theological flourish, an anachronistic vestige

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\(^{334}\) For a study on the “holy kiss” in early Christianity, see Penn, *Kissing Christians.*
of a more theological way of thinking. Instead, we need to see the important function the psukhē plays here. It confines and delimits a certain internal space in which emotions and normative ideals are manifest. It works to convert external actions to a secondary status, dependent upon the real moral or emotional core of the psukhē. Moreover, morals and emotions are converted from individual actions to states of the psukhē, a permanent and stable core.

We see the same action at work in two more passages:

We have the Decalogue of Moses, intimated in a plain and singular principle, “Do not commit adultery. Do not worship idols. Do not corrupt boys. Do not steal, do not bear false witness, honor your father and mother” and the commands that follow these. We ought to observe these things and whatever other things he commands through the reading of the books. He commands through Isaiah “Wash and become clean! Remove the evils before my eyes from your psukhai [Isa 1:16].” (Paed. 3.12.89.1–2)

Here, Clement pairs two biblical passages. The first passage, ostensibly “the Decalogue,” involves external actions and makes no mention of the psukhē. Clement interprets this through citing another passage, one in which the psukhē is stressed, where the psukhē appears as the location of evil. The psukhē must be washed.

In the other passage, Clement states:

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335 Cf. Exod 20:12–15; Barn. 19.4.
336 Even if the psukhē would seem to be invisible because it is internal, the passage from Isaiah that Clement cites nevertheless suggests that the evil (or righteousness) of the psukhē can be seen, at least by God: “Remove the evils before my eyes from your psukhai.”
But to those allowed to marry, they need the Pedagogue, lest they perform the mystic rights of nature during the day, or, copulating like a rooster, after coming from the assembly (ἐκκλησίας), or after having come from the market in the morning, when the day is the time of prayer, reading, and good deeds. In the evening, it is fitting to rest after dinner, having given thanks for the pleasures (ἀπολαύσεσιν). Nature does not always grant time to perform the act of marriage, because the longer the delay, the more sex is desired. But they must not be out of control in the dark of night, but modesty must be enclosed in the psukhē, like reason. For we would not be different than Penelope's weaving, if we weave self-controlled teachings during the day, but undo them at night when we engage in sex. (Paed. 2.10.96.2–97.2)

In this passage, we see the same logic. Clement allows Christian couples to have sex, but he wants to restrain their participation in it. They should not have sex during the day, at dawn, after they have come home from the assembly, or even from the market. At those times, Christians should be praying, reading, or performing good works. But even at nighttime, they should not forget the normative ideal of modesty. This normative ideal must be in their psukhē. Thus, even when deeds cannot be seen, the state of the psukhē determines the quality of the deeds, whether they are seen in daylight or not. The psukhē thus functions as a location of morals that renders sight moot.

337 Cf. Plutarch, Quaest conv. III.645.
In other words, Clement thinks out his injunctions with the *psukhē*. The *psukhē* plays a critical role in linking actions to a subject. It is not just actions that are right or wrong, but that these actions are produced by a moral subject, the *psukhē*. Thus, Clement states:

Everything that is contrary to right reason is a transgression (ἀμάρτημα). So, indeed, the philosophers think fit to define the most general *pathē* (τὰ πάθη) thusly: desire (ἐπιθυμίαν) is longing (ὁρεῖν) disobedient to reason; fear is avoidance disobedient to reason; pleasure (ἡδονήν) is a swelling (ἐπαρσόν) of the *psukhē* disobedient to reason, “grief, a contraction of *psukhē* disobedient to reason.”

If, then, disobedience against reason produces transgression (ἁμαρτίας), how is obedience to reason, which we call faith, not necessary for the production of what is called “the fitting” (καθήκοντος)? For virtue (ἀρετή) itself is a disposition (διάθεσις) of the *psukhē*, harmonious with reason in all of life. Indeed, the highest thing of all, philosophy, is itself giving attention to right reason, so that, out of necessity, any error (πλημμελούμενον) in the calculation of reason is always called transgression (ἀμάρτημα).

Desire is longing disobedient to reason, and fear, avoidance disobedient to reason.

Normative ideals can be discussed without directly referencing the *psukhē*, but Clement dives in: pleasure is a swelling of the *psukhē* disobedient to reason, and grief a contraction of *psukhē* disobedient to reason. The state of the *psukhē* defines pleasure and

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340 Cf. *SVF*. 3.391,445; also *Strom*. 2.32.3.
depression. Virtue is defined as a disposition of psukhē. If the psukhē is “attuned to the dictate of reason in the whole course of life,” then we have virtue.

The centrality of the psukhē can be seen in an early passage, where Clement first directly describes the Paedagogus:

Our Paedagogue, O’ you children, is like his father, God, whose son he is. Faultless (ἀναμάρτητος), blameless, and without pathē of psukhē, God being in the form of a human, a servant to his father’s will, God the Word (λόγος), who is in the father, who is from the right hand of the father, with the form of God also. He is our undefined image. We must try with all our strength become like him in psukhē. He, however, is completely free from human pathē—because of this, he alone is judge, for he alone is faultless (ἀναμάρτητος).

341 Cf. SVF. 2.36.
342 Cf. Ign. Eph. 7.2; Ign. Pol. 3.2.
the self, the self that survived the death of the body, and as synonymous with life itself. But this subject should not be taken for granted, nor should it simply be conflated with the modern “self.”

By positing an essential moral core or inner person that is responsible for ruling the outer person through reason, the ancient discourse of the psukhē figured rationality and morality in terms of an abiding subject. By providing a subject of life, morals, and rationality, Clement and his readers would have also possessed an object capable of policing and regulation. Thus, for Clement, the rules, the moral code, is never absolute. We can see this, for example, in returning to a passage about the wearing of gold and luxurious clothing: “Thus, the wearing of gold and the use of very soft clothing ought not be entirely cut out” (Διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ χρυσοφορεῖν καὶ τὸ ἐσθήτη μαλακωτέρα χρῆσθαι οὐ τέλεον περικοπτέον) (3.11.53.1). The rule is not absolute, because ultimately at stake are (1) rationality and (2) the subject of that rationality, the psukhē. The passage continues:

One must curb the irrationalities (ἀλόγους) of the impulses (ὁρμῶν), lest, leading us, they plunge us into luxury, snatching us by great indulgence. For wantonness, driven headlong into satiety, jumps, throws, and shakes off the charioteer, the Pedagogue, who, from a distance, restraining the reins, guides the reins, leads and carries the human horse to salvation. That is, the irrational part of the psukhe becoming beastly around pleasures, shameful desires, gems, gold, fancy clothes, and other luxuries. (Paed. 3.11.53.1–2)
In Chapter 3, I suggested that by indexing the state of the *psukhē* through visible signs such as clothing, the *psukhē*, rather than being the cause of either modest or luxurious dress, was actually its effect. The *psukhē* was therefore, at least in part, an optical illusion. In this chapter, I have explored how Clement referred to it as the moral and rational core of the person and thus tried to interpellate Christians as subjects possessing a moral, rational core.
Conclusion

In this dissertation, I have argued that ancient references to the *psukhē*, especially to its materiality, status as an object, and appearance, invite scrutiny. The object referenced by this term is an object that should appear strange to us. Not because it is an inherently strange object, but because of how sharply this object departs from modern expectations of its alleged analogs: the soul, mind, and/or self. If we resist temptations to conflate the *psukhē* with the soul, mind, or self, the distinctiveness of the *psukhē* becomes quite salient. The uniqueness of its physical properties, moral functioning, and bodily presence emerges, and we see that a strange and unfamiliar object lies at the heart of much ancient moral instruction.

By arguing how foreign the *psukhē* is to modern perspectives, and that this foreignness needs to be the starting point of inquiries into the ancient *psukhē*, this dissertation suggested that the study of the ancient *psukhē* can greatly benefit from being placed in the context of wider questions about the body, the self, and materiality. While scholars like Teresa Shaw and Gregory Smith, in addition to L. Michael White, Heinrich von Staden, and Christopher Gill have correctly shown that belief in the *psukhē*’s materiality and its physical interaction with the body were widespread in Greek and Roman antiquity, especially among first- and second-century moral philosophers, their observations had yet to be put into conversation with models of the body, the self, and materiality that do not implicitly rely upon the body, the self, and materiality being relatively fixed things. The common assumption in this scholarship has been that references to the *psukhē*’s material presence, interaction with the body, and status as a
moral self are adequately described as beliefs about the psukhē, because it is implicitly understood that, given the historically static nature of bodies, the psukhē was not an actual part of the body. The psukhē is thus fundamentally understood to be an idea, an ancient way of thinking about the self or soul. Ancient references to its interactions with the body are assumed to be ancient theories of the body’s relation to the soul, mind, or self.

The modern biases of this theory—the theory that ancient references to the psukhē and its materiality and physicality can be explained as ancient ideas or beliefs—have gone undetected and undefended. I argued that this theory misframes the study of the psukhē insofar as it relies upon a particularly modern understanding of the body-soul relationship for examining the psukhē. It assumes that the psukhē is essentially equivalent to the soul. This assumption begs important questions. It positions the theory to presume a priori that the object commonly referred to in antiquity as material thing, more specifically a fine-mattered thing, was present only as an idea. If the soul is necessarily immaterial, existing in a categorically distinct ontological space than the body, then references to its ancient analog must be references to a thing that does not actually exist in space and is thus best understood as an idea. Or, if the psukhē is compared to the mind (as understood in modernity)—a potentially physical part of the body—references to the psukhē are treated as primitive, or at least inchoate, attempts to describe the ahistorical mind. In addition to being a problematic imposition of modern perspectives on ancient references to the psukhē, I also argued that this putative theory of the ancient psukhē’s status fails to account for the psukhē’s ostensibly power in antiquity.
To focus my task, I examined Clement of Alexandria’s references to the *psukhē* in his late second- or early third-century manual for Christian living, the *Paedagogus*. The *Paedagogus* has provided a particularly fecund set of references to the *psukhē* because Clement refers to it in his attempt to shape Christian behavior. As I showed, the opening to the *Paedagogus* is framed in terms of the *psukhē*, specifically its need for healing. Nevertheless, the *Paedagogus* itself is not “about” the *psukhē*. Clement only rarely and tersely reflects on it directly. Instead, he simply presumes its physical and material presence. Rather than evincing any anxiety about convincing his audience of the importance of the *psukhē* and its physical health, the frequent references to it suggest an agreed upon reality. Clement freely cites it as a reason to act one way and not another. We find in the *Paedagogus* an object that is used more than it is thought about, pointed at rather than theorized. Clement shows us the *psukhē* not only as an object of philosophical or even medical speculation, but instead as a thing capable of being the basis of moral admonitions.

Thus, by examining the *Paedagogus*, we saw a very different picture of the *psukhē* than if we looked a philosophical text—the usual type of text selected by scholars interested in studying ancient references to the *psukhē*—whether by Plato, Aristotle, Chrysippus, Galen, or Tertullian. In addition, the *Paedagogus* witnesses a form of early Christianity that was largely enmeshed with Greek philosophical thinking. It is thus particularly well suited for studying the *psukhē* as an object shared between (at least some) Christians and (at least some) Greek moralists.
I suggested that, in order to study the *psukhē* in its particularity, in its strangeness, as a materially present thing—not just as an idea—the problem we face is strikingly parallel to a problem described by some scholars in gender, queer, and transgender studies. Judith Butler, Elizabeth Grosz, and Gayle Salamon have suggested that while the modern western body is often assumed to be self-evidently and “naturally” (1) material, (2) sexed, and (3) correlated with an internal gender core, its matter, sex, and associated gender-core are less the product of nature than of history. Much of their argument, their task, is to convince their readers that the putative body of modernity is strange—that is neither natural, nor self-evident. Insofar as they show that a historically contingent body, contingent in its materiality, anatomy, and relation to a type of self, can appear to be a material, “natural” fact, they prompted me to ask how the *psukhē* and its materiality might have appeared in antiquity. Even though the body (including the *psukhē*) described by ancient moralist looks strange to modern eyes, that body could have seemed self-evident and “natural” to Clement and his readers. Seemingly odd claims about it (odd from the perspective of most modern scholars) were not necessarily idiosyncratic theories about the body and its *psukhē*. They could have seemed self-evident descriptions of the body. Thus, I have argued that the lessons taught us by Butler, Grosz, and Salamon show that the ancient *psukhē* could have been manifest, not just as an idea or a theory, but also as a “natural” part of the body.

These theories of the body based on gender, queer, and transgender studies thus offer help in approaching the *psukhē* as a strange object, one that could have been felt and seen on the body, an object that possessed physical, material presence, rather than just
hypothetical presence. I explored these issues in my second through fourth chapters. In Chapter 2, I argued that Clement’s instructions about the substances and activities that could damage the *psukhē*, especially in its materiality, provided hints of how the *psukhē* could have been a felt part of the body. Bodily sensations and feelings were registered as those of the *psukhē*. The *psukhē* could be felt in the sensations and feelings of the drunken body, to mention one example.

In chapters three and four, I turned my attention to the production of the *psukhē* as an internal core. In Chapter 3, I argued that it gained a certain durability as an object—the coherence of being a singular thing even as it changes states or conditions—through its near constant visibility on the body and the body’s material addenda, such as jewelry, hair, and shoes. I also suggested that through its constant visibility it became subject to a panoptic gaze, thus functioning as a key fulcrum of power. By being visible, it could be policed. More specifically, however, it was less the *psukhē* that was policed and more those things that made it visible. If shoes revealed the *psukhē*’s moral condition through their visibility, then it was shoes more than the *psukhē* that were subject to the policing gaze that Clement would inflict upon his readers.

In the fourth chapter, I examined this internal object itself. I argued that Clement’s comments about the *psukhē* reveal an internal core whose specific features could best be understood apart from conversations about the history of the self. Here we found an internal moral-core, described in terms of its rationality or lack thereof. In the *Paedagogus* Clement uses the *psukhē* to frame his moral instructions in terms of an internal core that is cohesive, delimited, and eternal.
Insofar as the gender, queer, and transgender studies approaches that influenced my approach to Clement’s comments about the psukhē might broadly be construed as “social-constructionist” approaches, where the body, anatomical sex, and gender are described as culturally constructed phenomena, I have tried to take critiques of social constructionism seriously in my study of the psukhē. Some of these positions, rooted in long-standing challenges to the Cartesian dualism that I argued have unduly influenced modern approaches to the study of the ancient psukhē, were especially helpful in thinking about the potential material power of the psukhē. Leaning most heavily upon Bruno Latour, I found in this line of critiques a resource for thinking about how the psukhē itself as a material entity might have possessed and wielded significant power. Its moral force was not just an appeal to piety, its physical features made their own demands. I see this as a useful reminder in a field that has all too often depicted writers like Clement as possessing tremendous power, whether as theologians or as authors of “discourses.” Clement might have been discursively constructing the psukhē, trying to wield it to his own ends, but he also would have been subject to it. The psukhē’s material presence was not fully malleable. It could have exerted its own power.

My admittedly preliminary borrowing from “new materialist” and “object-oriented ontology” models has suggested the potential use of these perspectives for the study of the psukhē, although there is still more that could be done. Most pressingly, I think that these studies point to the potential for examining pneuma from a new materialist and object-oriented ontology. While Clement himself, at least in the Paedagogus, rarely connects the psukhē to pneuma directly, pneuma was often thought
either to be the very substance of the *psukhē*, or at least its “first vehicle.” Insofar as my study opens up wider questions for the study of the materiality of the *psukhē* in antiquity, it points to the necessity of further engagement with *pneuma* as a related ancient type of materiality.

A particularly ripe place for investigating the materiality of the *pneuma* would be ancient Alexandria itself. Its location as a center of medicine in antiquity would make it an obvious choice for examining ancient Alexandrian medical discussions of *pneuma*. Yet, in Clement’s time, it might be just as useful to juxtapose his “common sense” ideas about the *psukhē* and Alexandrian medical ideas about *pneuma* with the discussions of *pneuma*, *psukhē*, and materiality happening in “gnostic” Christianity, which overlapped with Clement in time as well as in his Egyptian locale.

Thus, I hope the questions that this dissertation has raised could be widened both in the terms studied, not just the *psukhē*, but also *pneuma*, as well as the immediate geographic context of Alexandria and Roman Egypt, both in terms of medical discussion and “Christian” and Middle-Platonic influences. I also believe that this dissertation can be useful for others working on the *psukhē* in antiquity. It points to the need to further investigate the intersections between the *psukhē*’s materiality and the nature of ancient ethics. Important questions also remain about how the material *psukhē* worked to produce and verify intra-human difference. This is particularly relevant in thinking about “manly” versus “effeminate” *psukhai*, and the relationship between gender, *psukhē*, and virtue/vice. I think these questions intertwine with deeper fundamental questions about the ancient subject as interpellated moral *psukhē*. If my dissertation has raised these
questions and shown the need for further attention to the *psukhē’s* material presence in antiquity, then it has succeeded in its primary aims.
Our text of the *Paedagogus* depends upon a single tenth-century manuscript, Codex Arethae, *Parisinus gr. 451* (P), which is now available to view online at the Bibliothèque nationale de France’s digital library, Gallica.\(^{343}\) According to the notations on fol. 401\(^{v}\), the manuscript was copied between September 913 and August 914 by Baanes for Arethas,\(^{344}\) the archbishop of Caesarea in Cappadocia at a cost of 26 *nomismata*. Baanes’ text is commonly designated as P\(^{1}\). The codex is in relatively bad shape, now consisting of 393 leaves as opposed to the at least 476 leaves of the original. The manuscript is made of parchment, measures 24.5 x 18.5 cm, with a writing space of 14.5 x 11 cm, and twenty-four lines per page. The *Paedagogus* is found on folios 57\(^{r}\)–154\(^{v}\), although most of its first book is lost (P contains only 1.11.96.1 forward).\(^{345}\)

By Marcovich’s assessment the text was copied by “from an exemplar full of textual corruptions, lacunae, interpolations and dislocations.”\(^{346}\) Arethas corrected Baanes’ text (P\(^{2}\)), but the corrections appear to be based on Arethas’ own authority.

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\(^{343}\) *Parisinus gr. 451* can be found at: [http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b84701396/f1.image](http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b84701396/f1.image)

\(^{344}\) Arethas (ca. 850–post 932) was the leading Byzantine scholar of his time. He commissioned the copying of many ancient Greek manuscripts, especially profane prose. His manuscripts included selections of Plato and Aristotle, Lucian, Aelius Aristides, Dio Chrysostom, Plutarch, among others. His work came in a century that produced many of our most important manuscripts for ancient Greek authors, including Plato (*Vat. Gr. 1*), Lucian (*Vat. Gr. 90*), Thucydides (*Laur. 69.2*), Herodotus (*Laur. 70.3*), Aristotle (*Par. Gr. 1853*), Hippocrates (*Marc. Gr. 269*), Homer (*Marc. Gr. 454*), Hesiod (*Par. Gr. 2771*), to name only a few; on Arethas and tenth-century Byzantine manuscripts, see Pontani, “Scholarship in the Byzantine Empire,” 342–45.

\(^{345}\) The fullest discussion of the manuscript tradition behind Clement’s works is still Stählin, *Clemens Alexandrinus erster Band*, xvi–xxxix; on P, see Harnack, *Überlieferung der griechischen Apologeten*, 24–36; Stählin, *Clemens Alexandrinus erster Band*, xvi-xxii; Bailey, “Arethas of Caesarea,” 17–19.

\(^{346}\) Marcovich, *Clementis Alexandrini: Paedagogus*, ix.
Adding to the modern editor’s troubles, it is difficult to tell the difference between the hand of Arethas and the hand of Baanes, since each wrote with the same brown ink.\textsuperscript{347}

As noted above, its contents include: Clement, \textit{Protrepticus} (1\textsuperscript{v}–56\textsuperscript{v}); Clement, \textit{Paedagogus} (57\textsuperscript{r}–154\textsuperscript{v}); Ps.-Justin, \textit{Epistula ad Zenam et Serenum} (155\textsuperscript{r}–163\textsuperscript{v}); Ps.-Justin, \textit{Cohartatio ad Graecos} (163\textsuperscript{v}–187\textsuperscript{v}); Eusebius, \textit{Praeparatio evangelica} (188\textsuperscript{r}–322\textsuperscript{v}); Athenagoras, \textit{Legatio pro Christianis} (322\textsuperscript{v}–348\textsuperscript{r}); Athenagoras, \textit{De resurrection mortuorum} (348\textsuperscript{v}–367\textsuperscript{v}); Eusebius, \textit{Contra Hieroclem} (368\textsuperscript{r}–401\textsuperscript{v}). Tatian’s \textit{Oratio ad Graecos} is no longer extant, but was originally placed between what is now 187\textsuperscript{v} and 188\textsuperscript{r}.\textsuperscript{348}

The space taken up by the primary texts (14.5 x 11 cm of writing on a 24.5 x 18.5 cm folio) allows for significant margins. As a skim of the text quickly reveals, most of this large codex contains little to no scholia, although the margins around Athenagoras’ \textit{De resurrection mortuorum} (348\textsuperscript{v}–367\textsuperscript{v}) and Ps.-Justin’s \textit{Cohartatio ad Graecos} (163\textsuperscript{v}–187\textsuperscript{v}) are heavily annotated. The \textit{Paedagogus} is accompanied by heavy scholia in two stretches (69\textsuperscript{r}–71\textsuperscript{v}, 81\textsuperscript{v}–111\textsuperscript{v}), with the rest of the text receiving little to no comment in the margins. Clement’s \textit{Protrepticus}, coming immediately prior to the \textit{Paedagogus}, is accompanied with regular scholia throughout, with heavy scholia coming from 33\textsuperscript{r}–50\textsuperscript{v}. Stählin argues that these scholia may have fifth-century origins.\textsuperscript{349} Oddly, at the end of the codex (fol. 402\textsuperscript{r}–404\textsuperscript{v}) a lengthy scholion on \textit{Paedagogus} 1.5.15 is attached. This scholion is written in Arethas’ hand, in a large majuscule manuscript that is

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item\textsuperscript{347} Marcovich, \textit{Clementis Alexandrini: Paedagogus}, ix.
\item\textsuperscript{348} Marcovich, “Codex Arethae and Tatian,” 307–12; Bailey, “Arethas of Caesarea,” 18, n. 62.
\item\textsuperscript{349} Stählin, \textit{Untersuchungen über die Scholien zu Clemens Alexandrinus}, 45–48; Bailey, “Arethas of Caesarea,” 18, n. 64.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
uncharacteristic for the codex. Marcovich includes the scholia found in P, M, and F at the end of his edition of the *Paedagogus*.

As noted above, *Parisinus gr. 451* (P) does not contain most of the first book of the *Paedagogus*. We are therefore reliant on two apographs of P for this missing section: *Mutinensis Misc. gr. 126: a. S. 5.9* (M), which contains all of Clement’s *Protrepticus* and *Paedagogus*, and *Laurentianus V 24* (F), which does not include the Protrepticus. M is an early eleventh-century parchment, measuring 25.5 x 17 cm, with a writing space of 19 x 10 cm and 31 lines per page. It has 295 folios, with the *Paedagogus* appearing on 48v–171r. F is a twelfth-century parchment, measuring 24 x 20 cm, with a writing space of 14.7 x 11.7 cm, and 19 lines per page. It has 243 folios.

The most recent edition of Clement’s *Paedagogus* was published in 2002 by Miroslav Marcovich. Marcovich summarizes the previous modern editions of the *Paedagogus* in his preface, starting with P. Victorius’ 1550 edition, which was printed in Florence and based on F. Later editions include Fr. Sylburg’s 1592 edition (Heidelberg), which emended Victorius’ edition and included “an inventory of quotations from the Bible and from profane authors.” John Potter’s 1715 edition (Oxford) added an extensive *Quellenforschung*, which has grown with later editions. An amplified and improved version of Potter’s 1715 edition was published in Venice in 1757, with this

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355 Marcovich, *Clementis Alexandrini: Paedagogus*.
edition becoming the basis for Migne’s edition (PG VIII/IX, Paris 1857, reprinted 1890/91). In 1869, Wilhelm Dindorf published an edition with collations of P, M. and F (previous editions had been based on F). Marcovich calls these collations “totally unreliable,” however, and notes that Dindorf “failed to recognize P as the sole source for all the extant manuscripts of Paedagogus.”

In 1905, Otto Stählin published what became the standard edition of the Paedagogus in the twentieth century. Marcovich understands his edition to be an improvement upon Stählin. He credits Stählin with “considerably expand[ing] Potter’s Quellenforschung,” while also calling Stählin’s collation of P, M, and F “accurate and reliable enough.” (Marcovich does not mention the index volume of Clement’s references that Stählin published in 1936.) He criticizes Stählin, however, for not being “attentive enough to the meaning of Clement’s text and to the textual problems involved,” noting that Stählin published a 12-page long list of Nachträge und Berichtigungen to the second edition (1936), and that Ursula Treu and Ludwig Früchtel, editors of the third edition (1972) added a separate 7-page long list of their own corrections to the text. Marcovich’s aim is to improve Stählin’s “remarkable edition” by emending the text where it does not make sense, using the sources, lexicon and style of writing that Clement employs elsewhere in his corpus. Marcovich has also simplified Stählin’s Parallelbelege.

358 Van den Hoek, Clement of Alexandria and His Use of Philo, 2.
359 Marcovich, Clementis Alexandrini: Paedagogus x; also see Stählin, Clemens Alexandrinus erster Band, lxv–lxxvi.
360 Stählin’s edition was published three times: 1905, 1936, 1972; Stählin’s second edition is reproduced in the three volume French edition by Marrou, et al., Clément d’Alexandrie, Le Pédagogue.
361 Marcovich, Clementis Alexandrini: Paedagogus, x.
362 Stählin, Clemens Alexandrinus vierter Band: Register.
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