Deregulation: A Return to the Primitive | Deregulacija: Povratak Načetak

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DEREGULATION: A RETURN TO THE PRIMITIVE

SUMMARY: argues that deregulation of buses means taking one public transport mode in isolation from others and from overall urban needs, against the tide of world trends.

KEY WORDS: Transit, Deregulation of buses, Transit modes.

DEREGULACIJA: POVRATAK NA POČETAK

REZIME: Vukan R. Vučić dokazuje da deregulacija autobuske sredine predstavlja izdvoravanje ovog voda javnog prevoza od drugih, i od ukupnih gradskih potreba, nasuprot svakom trendovima.

KLJUČNE REČI: Javni gradski prevoz, deregulacija autobusa, vidovi javnog gradskog prevoza.

For a number of years one could hear a steady criticism of transit and of public investments in its improvements. Some economists in Great Britain and the United States have been particularly vocal in their criticism of capital investments in public transit (especially rail), operating assistance to transit and of public transit agencies in general. They have claimed that rail modes are obsolete and "expensive", that even operation of large buses by transit agencies is wasteful compared to privately operated buses and minibuses.

This criticism has been based on the claim that the efforts to improve transit have been a failure: operating expenses have been increasing, service deteriorating and ridership decreasing. Increasing public subsidies have been, it is claimed, mostly absorbed by excessively high wages obtained through blackmail of labor unions against managements. The solution to this problem is privatization, which eliminates the problem of labor unions, and deregulation which would bring free market forces and thus result in numerous innovations in services and increased profitability.

As examples of profitability transit services in deregulated environment their promoters have quoted cities in the developing countries such as Bogotá, Damascus and Manila. Recent developments in transit in most countries have run contrary to the claims of these critics. Since mid-1960s, when several economists began to develop theoretical (and incorrect) models "proving" that rail transit should not be built, the number of cities with rapid transit in the world has more than doubled. And light rail transit is being built by an increasing number of cities.

But services have been increasingly concentrated into networks. The financial situation has stabilized and improved in many cities without destruction of transit agencies. Many cities with deregulated transit, such as Mexico and Manila, have taken private systems over to enable introduction of high capacity bus and rail systems and improve service quality.

Veće nekoliko godina stalno slušamo kritike o javnom prevozu i državnim ulaganjima u njegovo poboljšanje. Neki ekonomisti u Velikoj Britaniji i Sjedinjenim Američkim Državama su naročito glasi u svojim kritikama o investicijama ulaganja u javni prevoz (suvremeno "elektro"), ponižavanju funkcionalnosti javnog prevoza i u obli- kmu prevozima javnog prevoza nepoštovanje njihovih prava. One tvore da su površine državne dotacije većinom utrošene na prekomerno visokih plaća, koje su dobijene unacrtavanjem pregovora preduzima i strane radnički sindikati. Po njima, regulacija ovog problema je privatizacija, koja bi dovela do radničkih sindikata i deregulaciju koja bi donela prednosti slobodnog uživatka i pročelje profitit.

Kao primjer profitabilnog javnog prevoza u uslovima deregulacije, njuh površine su naveli gradove zemlje u razvoju, kao što su Bogotá, Damask i Manila.

Skupljanje razvoja javnog prevoza u svom zemlji, pokazuje se suprotnim ovim kritikama. Od sredine sedamdesetih godina, kada je nekoliko ekonomista počeo da razvija teorijske (i nepravilne) modele "dokazujući" da finske sistema ne bi trebalo graditi, onaj gradovi u svetu su metrom sa sebe, a sve veće broj gradova odlično primjeri.

Izvještanje je izvrsno kompresivna studija za razvoj autobuskog sistema. Finansijska situacija se stabilizirala i u mnogim gradovima poboljšala, kao i propadanje javnih prevoznih prava. Mnogi gradovi su deregulirali javne prevoznike i za razvoj javnih pravila, kao što je Meksiko i Manila, preuzeli su privatne modele kako bi omogućili uvedenje autobusa visokog kapaciteta u finskim sistemima, i poboljšali kvalitet usluga.

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Consequently, for a long time the arguments for deregulation of transit were not taken seriously. Now, however, these extreme views have been adopted as the basic policy in Great Britain, triggering an intensive discussion of the complex problem of urban transportation.

It is highly relevant for the present debate to review briefly the reasons for deregulation and then takeover of private transit companies which occurred in most large cities several decades ago.

Regulation of transit services with respect to safety, fares and, in some cases, lines and schedules, was introduced to protect interests of the riding public. Control of entry, which was also introduced in most cities in various forms, had the goal not only to secure reliable and regular services, but also to protect transit operators from unfair competition which tended to create new lines and public competition services. Strong cut-throat competition resulted in oversupply of services on major routes, but very poor services, if any, on lightly travelled ones.

Public takeover of private transit companies had the following major reasons.

1. When private automobiles came into wide use, transit companies experienced lower revenues (due to loss of passengers) and increased costs (due to street congestion). Financial difficulties reduced ability and interest of companies to improve or even maintain services.

2. Private operators generally could not offer such an integrated city-wide service, coordinated routes, modes and different companies, as public agency which operates a unified system.

3. It was much more difficult for cities and other governmental bodies to provide preferential treatments, construct infrastructure and give subsidies to many private operators than to the public agency, which is integrated and subject to public control.

All modern high-quality transit systems which offer coordinated urban or regional services competitive with the private automobile have been created by public agencies in cities with rational transport policies and substantial financing of transit. Examples among large cities are Brussels, Hamburg, Paris and Toronto, medium-size cities include Gothenburg, Zurich, Rotterdam, Cali и many others. In most of these cities one finds the following features:

1. Transit agencies have competent, forward-looking management which cooperate with city and regional authorities in planning future developments - a phenomenon rare to find in private transit companies in recent decades.

2. Long-range planning and availability of public assistance for capital improvements have enabled these agencies to construct partially or fully separated rights-of-way, a sine qua non for achieving speed, reliability, capacity and image needed to make transit competitive with automobile and to influence city's land use developments, form and character.

3. Related to separate rights-of-way and the need for high-quality transit, all these cities have built advanced rail transit systems - light rail and metros.

4. Agencies have generally had cooperation of cities' authorities in introducing various traffic engineering and transportation system management measures.

Slobodna tema, dugo vremena argumenti za deregulaciju javnog prevoza nisu bili izbližno slažeći. Međutim, sada su u Velikoj Britaniji ova ekskrenna gledišta usvojena kao osnovna politika razvijanja intenzivne rasprave o složenosti problema javnog gradskog saobraćaja.

Vezama je bitno da ovaj raspravni tekst načrtuje razaralno reguliranje sa potom prevozom prevoza od privatnih prevoznih predueža koje se dogovorilo u većini velikih gradova poslednjih nekoliko decenija.

Regulacija prevoznih usluga, uzimajući u obzir bezbednost, tačne, i u nekim slučajevima, linije i redove vožnje, uvedena je da zaštiti interese putnika.

Kontrola uvedenja regulacije koja je u različitim oblicima uvedena u većini gradova, imala je za cilj samo prevozno usluga. Iako se to moglo dešavati od nekoliko razloga, prevozni predueži, sa svojim prevoznikama od nekoliko postupaka i pretnjenih nadmećenima i ali niskom kvalitetom prevoznih usluga. Jaka bespobožno konkurencija dovela je da prevozne ponude usluga na glavnim koridorima, a veoma malu ponudu, ako je upuste i ima, na slabije opterećenim koridorima.

Prevozne usluge u svakom smislu prevoznih predueža od strane države imalo je sledeće glavne razloge:

1. Kada su privatni automobili ušli u širok upotrebu, javni prevoz je prekoročio smanjenje prihoda (usled pobožnosti putnika) i povećanje troškova (usled zadržavanja ulica). Financijske poteklo su smanjile sposobnost i interes predueža da ponudi nova usluga koje je važno za razvoj.

2. Privatni prevoznici su generalno posmatrani, nisu mogli da povuče integrisan račun po čitavom gradu, koordinisane linije, velike prevozne i različite preduzeća, kao javno preduzeće koje deluje kao jedinstven sistem.

3. Bilo je mnogo veća preduzeća i organizama uprave da brojnim privatnim prevoznicima obezbede povećanje preduzeća, izrade infrastruktura i daju dotacije, nego javnom preduzeću koje je uvedeno i nalaži se pod kontrolom državnih organa.

Svi moderni visokokvalitetni sustavi javnog prevoza koji obezbeđuju koordinisan prevoz na gradskom i pripragom području, konkurentni privatnim automobilima, stvoreni su od strane javnih preduzeća u gradovima sa racionezalom, politikom transporta, sa sigurnim izvorima finansiranja javnog prevoza. Među velikim gradovima primjeri su Brisk, Hamburg, Pariz i Toronto; gradovi srednje veličine uključuju Getsebrop, Cirih, Rotterdam, Kalgari i mnoge druge. U većini ovih gradova namijenjene su sledeće karakteristike:

1. Javna preduzeća imaju sposobne, dalekuvide uprave koje sadrže sa gradskim i regionalnim vlastima u planiranju budućeg razvoja - što je fenomen koji se retko sreće poslije decenija u privatnim prevoznim preduežima.

2. Dugoročno planiranje i pomoć države u investiranju, omogućila je ovim preduzećima da izgradite delimično ili potpuno izolovane linije, kao uslov za uspešno poređenje vozničke, puno značajnosti, kao i atraktivnosti, što je neophodno da bi se javni prevoz učinio konkurentnim automobilima, i da bi se time uticalo na korišćenje gradskog zemljišta, razvoj, izgradnju i strukturu grada.

3. Kroz izvođenje trasa i potrebe za visokokvalitetnim javnim prevozom, svi ovi gradovi su izgradili moderne široke prevozne sisteeme - lakočini železnicu i metron.
which improve flow of buses and other street transit vehicles.

3. The primary goal of these agencies has been to meet the needs of present and potential transit passengers. A great number of innovations have been introduced for this purpose, including full coordination of services on different lines and modes; convenient transfer facilities; integrated information; city-wide fares; marketing and public relations, etc.

The main problem transit has been facing is that few cities have made a serious effort to introduce realistic charges for use of the private automobile. In the city which would reflect the congestion it imposes, environmental and safety damage. These indirect, as well as direct subsidies of the automobile such as free parking and company-paid cars, have forced cities which want to have balanced transportation into transit subsidies. In cities without adequate financial support for transit, agencies have had to face continuous struggle for survival. These agencies have suffered from lack of adequate planning, disintegration of personnel and deterioration of services. Internal problems in transit agencies have been in some cases included lax management, blackmail by labour unions, and obsolete regulatory requirements (particularly in rail systems). However, the rapidly deteriorating operating ratios which appeared uncontrollable 10-15 years ago have in many cases been halted or even reversed.

Cost increases have often been controlled by introduction of high-capacity bus and rail vehicles, speed increases on separate rights-of-way and self-service fare collection, all of which increase labour productivity. Revenues have been enhanced through reasonable fare increases, monthly fares, new types of transit-dedicated taxes, and joint developments.

The term "privatisation", popular at present, is used very loosely. To evaluate it, one must define its different meanings.

Many transit agencies have found it convenient and economical to subcontract a number of functions, such as station cleaning, fare collection and even vehicle maintenance, to private companies. There is not much controversy on this issue: under certain conditions this leasing has been very effective.

Leasing individual bus lines to private operators is subject of many discussions. So far there have been some successes and some failures in such endeavours. The experiences so far have led to these conclusions.

1. Leasing individual transit lines can result in lower costs and better, or at least equal service, if transit agency determines schedule, reliability, service quality and other elements and controls their implementation. A major positive effect of this leasing is control of the labour unions where they have irresponsible attitudes. However, "busting the union" should by no means be considered desirable as a general policy, because responsible unions have played a very significant and positive role in transit.

2. Leasing of many bus lines to different operators tends to lead to diseconomies of small-scale operations, major difficulties and hidden costs in supervision. Prevention of abuses is difficult. In some cases, for example, Westchester County north of New York,
one operator has already bought out others, repeating the developments from half a century ago.

3. In all cases services provided by individual operators must be dictated precisely by the transit agency to ensure continuation of coordinated services.

The changes now planned in transit in Great Britain take privatisation to its extreme: deregulation, with uncontrolled entry, is planned on the basis of a belief that free market forces can bring more benefits in efficiency and innovations than harm in disintegration of transit systems. Chaotic services, reduced stability, safety and quality of service. The most complete set of arguments for deregulation has been presented in the white paper report Buses, issued by the British Department of Transport. This report has served as the basis for the 1985 Transport Act legislation which is presently restructuring transit services in Great Britain.

The Urban Mass Transportation Administration (UMTA) of the United States Department of Transportation is similarly preoccupied with privatisation in various forms, based on the same ideological dogma that private organisations are always more desirable than public. Yet, most of these efforts in the United States differ from those in Great Britain in one very significant respect: privatisation is intended to be introduced within the structure of an overall coordinating agency, so that the offered service remains integrated. The British reorganisation is aimed at deregulation, that is, transformation of transit services to their most primitive form, without planning, coordination and system integration.

Every professional study of urban transport during the last several decades has found that technology and modes of transport interact strongly with the form, structure and environment of the city: maximum reliance on public transport, as in Paris or Tokyo, results in drastically different cities from those based on the private automobile such as Detroit or Los Angeles. Therefore neither can transport be planned without consideration of urban character, nor can private and public transport be studied separately from each other.

Deregulation promotes not only neglect the city-to-transport relationship, but they completely ignore the main problem of urban transport: the relationship between private auto and transit. It is the heavy subsidy of the automobile in cities and failure of cities to provide transit with separate rights-of-way, that prevents transit from commercial operation and successful competition with automobile. Moreover, these promoters ignore all other modes of transit but buses - since such modes as rail transit cannot fit well their proposed model of “free market”.

Thus, the report issues looks at the systems of urban transport, ignores the main cause of its financial and operational problems - the subsidised private automobile and proposes that “free market” should be introduced for one of the most complex public systems in modern society - urban transport. The extremely complex relationships among modes, major social economic and environmental impacts of transport not reflected in direct monetary aspects are either ignored or explained away by a naive belief in unlimited adjustability and responsiveness of the “free market”.

Traditional transit supporters consider that the main goal of transit is to provide the best service for public

oblima doveća do neekonomičnosti, velikih potroša i prihvaćanja na što je u nedouštanju. Prevencija zah te potrebo je komplikovan. U nekim slučajevima, na primjer u ovom ustanovljenu, se na osnovu utvrdevanja da će preduzeti slab odabir, doneti vreme kroz efikasnost i mučenje, nego što se nastupa zbog dezintegracije prevoznih sistema, haužе ponude, smanjenja pouzdanosti, bezbednosti i kvaliteta usluge.


Uprava za javni gradski putnički prevoz pri Ministarstvu saobraćaja SAD-a, na slicom način obuzet različitim oblicima privatizacije, bazirano na istoj ideološkoj dogmi privrede, na privatnu organizaciju ukvrženoj od javnih, i tako, se u SAD-u seti iz velikom većinom značajnom segmentu, manevara se uvedenje privatizacije unutar struktura koordinisanog javnog prevoza, tako da ponude usluga ostane integrirana. Reorganizacija u Britaniji usmerena je na deregulaciju, i transformaciju prevoznih usluga na njihov najučinkovitiji oblik, bez planiranja, koordinacije i integracije sistema.

Svaka stručna studija javnog gradskog prevoza u pro tekših nekoliko decenija, otkrila je da između tehnologije i vidova prevoza, jedne strane, i forme, strukture grada i okruženja s druge strane, postoji jak međusobni veza: masovno oslanjanje na javni gradski prevoz, kao što je to u Parizu i Tokiju, što rezultirala drastičnom razlikom u odnosu na grada koji su bazirani na privatnim automobilima, kao što je Detroit ili Los Angeles. Zbog toga, niti se prevoz ne može planirati bez uzimanja u obzir karaktera grada, niti se privatni i javni prevoz mogu prouzrokovati odvojeno jedan od drugog.

Zapovijedi deregulacije se samo što zamensuju odnos grada prema prevozu, već potpuno ignorisati glavni problem gradskog prevoza: odnos između privatnog automobila i javnog prevoza. Oblici dotacije automobilima u gradovima i pružanje građana da obavezno izdvojene trase za javni prevoz, sprječavaju javni prevoz da razvio funkcionalnosti i uspostave se nadležne sa automobilima. Stavice, ovi pobohoci zamensuju sve ostale vidove javnog prevoza i autobusa po toki, što je šinski javni prevoz, ne mogu dobro da se uklaje u njihove predložene model "slabodnega tržaša".

Stoga, Izvesnici "AutoBUS" ponuđeno podsećali u gradskim prevoz, tako da zamenjuju glavni izuzet njegovih financijskih i operativnih problema - a to su dotirani privatni automobili i te predlaže uvedenje "slabodnega tržaša" u jedan od najkompleksnijih sistema u modernom društvu - gradski prevoz. Vrlo kompleksni odnosi između
possible within financial and other constraints. Deregulation promoters clearly consider that the maximum profit (or minimum subsidy) is the main goal of transit systems. Designation with “cross-subsidies” among bus services in the report Buses, a secondary problem if transit networks are considered as a system.

Although its financial aspects are extremely important, transit is such a basic public service, that is not on a par with financing, similar to that for public parks or libraries, is a means to the goal of good service, rather than the goal in itself.

It is remarkable that in the current debate about transit financing and regulation the strong critics of large investments in transit (particularly rail) never criticize much... The current analysis of “cross-subsidies” among bus services has not been applied to cross-subsidies among highways; the critics of national investments in urban transit projects never point out that a driver on local streets of Pittsburgh pays gasoline (petrol) taxes which can be used for construction of San Diego freeways, but not for improvement of other diesel vehicles or automobile user charges.

These and many other inconsistencies strongly compromise the arguments used for deregulation: they clearly show that much of the current criticism of transit is based on neutral economic principles, but it is heavily influenced by the strong pro-highway bias which has dominated transport policy in the United States. The Reagan administration criticises “overregulation” and excessive involvement of the federal government with local affairs. It encourages decentralisation of decision-making. But at the same time UMTA uses its financial assistance as a lever to force individual operators to privatise portions of their services. Is federal involvement then only bad when it does not follow the American way?

Similarly, the basic idea in the forthcoming transit reorganisation in Britain is to reduce drastically government intervention. Yet in the report Buses, many potential problems, including the common objection that monopoly bus drivers competing for passengers, are “solved” by a promise that licensing authorities will control them.

Checking driver behaviour on streets would represent a much deeper involvement of government in transit operations than is the case today.

Many solutions to potential problems of deregulation presented in the report Buses are unrealistic and naive. Several illustrations follow here.

1. It is claimed that deregulation will result in such increases in efficiency, that subsidies can be significantly reduced or eliminated; it may even be possible to obtain lower fares due to competition of many operators. First, this proposal is based on the assumption that there will be extensive competition on most bus routes. However, in a free market there is no competition for services which are unprofitable, which is the case with many routes.
Second, the most heavily used routes can be made profitable if they are considered separately. But if that is done and fares are lowered, subsidies required for lightly used routes would have to be increased, canceling the gains from the major routes. Or, if lighter routes are closed, reduction of transit network would result in passenger losses throughout the transit network, including major routes.

Third, routes could be made profitable to operators through subsidies. But even if subsidies to individual operators would be lower than new, it would certainly make little sense to subsidize mutually competing services.

2. The report expresses belief that the “free market” would always readily adjust services to passenger desires. Historical experience is that operators adjust services only if that results in higher profits; better services for passengers is by no means always coincidental with higher profits.

3. Services will be so drastically improved that new passengers will be attracted. Experience shows that transit ridership can be increased significantly only when services are made competitive with the automobile, that is, when transit is given partially or fully separated rights-of-way. But the deregulation would actually lead to a decrease in identity of transit services and no possibility for it to become independent of congestion.

The best test of the drastic changes which deregulation is likely to bring is in real world situations. The numerous cities which have “free market” bus competition or extensive and rather consistent experiences which should not be ignored; in cities as diverse as Bogota, Manila and Nairobi, competition of numerous buses, minibuses and jitneys produces:

1. Services faster and more frequent than regular buses on major routes, but infrequent and unreliable on lightly travelled routes;

2. Comfort, safety and reliability far below those of rail and other systems with separate rights-of-way. Passenger information is typically very poor.

3. Upgrading of services through introduction of articulated buses, bus preferential treatments or rail systems are practically impossible without introduction of regulation or takeover of private services. Even in cities with private operations introduction of rail systems and coordinated services has necessitated strict controls and central coordination as in Hong Kong, or Cairo, rather than reliance on hopes that competing operators will not be “foolish”, as expressed in the report Buses.

4. Competing bus services generally do not require subsidies, but they are often financially unstable and cease operations on a short notice.

So Great Britain will not be the first country with deregulated bus services: it will only be the first to go from civilised, reliable bus/rail systems to primitive disintegrated transit services.

1. Predicted that deregulation would bring to撩 talk of the existence of a formal state of the system, the existence of such a state is not imminent. The state of the system is a result of the interplay of various factors, including the state of the economy, the state of the society, the state of the technology, and the state of the politics. The state of the system is not a static entity, but a dynamic one, evolving over time. The state of the system is not a formal state, but a informal state, evolving over time. The state of the system is not a formal state, but a informal state, evolving over time.

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Results of UPT deregulation in Great Britain

After many debates about suggestion for UPT deregulation, which was criticized by the majority of cities' and urban transportation experts, British Parliament, however, accepted that suggestion since the Conservative Party had the majority. Since 1986, deregulation was introduced in all cities. London was the exception: the changes were introduced considerably moderately because of its specific conditions. What are the attained results and who was right - the deregulation promoters or its opponents?

From the time the deregulation has been introduced, many studies have been made and many publications have been written in Great Britain about this drastic change. For the last nine years the major results of deregulation have been these:

- **Expansion costs of private lines have decreased for about 20% so the subsidies have decreased for corresponding amount.** However, these costs are increasing again after strong decrease during first years.
- **Fares have increased more than inflation, in many cities public transportation for low-income population have more.**
- **Minibuses have been introduced in many cities, frequency of appearance and the number of bus-km have increased, but mostly doubling the lines on the main routes not in new parts of town.**
- **Labour unions in UPT have been mostly destroyed.** Number of employees in UPT has considerably decreased and their wages have decreased more than in other industries.
- **The competition among various bus companies has not increased as the deregulation promoters predicted.** In many cities big companies bought out small companies by "price war": since the fares have not been regulated, big companies have introduced very low prices, so that the small companies have to go bankrupt. When this happens, big company is free to introduce very high fare and to increase its revenues on account of riding public that is not protected from this kind of monopoly misuse.
- **Companies with various modes of UPT, metros and buses for example, are forbidden according to the law! That way the integration of various modes, which is very important aim of UPT in many countries, is destroyed in Great Britain.**
- **Number of passengers has drastically decreased: in whole country it is about 30% lower than it was before deregulation introduction.**
- **Increased number of bus/km and decreased number of riding public resulted in great decrease of vehicle use: buses are considerably emptier than before.**
- **UPT services do not represent an integrated network and system any longer.** Services are not coordinated, there is no passenger information and its source, experiments and technical innovations are abolished and long-range planning of bus UPT has stopped.

The role given to the bus UPT in planning has decreased greatly. At the same time, financing of road construction has increased a lot.

In short, deregulation represents success to those who consider that the bus UPT is commercial company which main goal is to decrease its subsidies. Yet, those who

Tako Velika Britanija neće biti prema zemlja sa deregulisanom autobuskim prevozom; biće samo prava koja će preći sa civilizovanih, pouzdana autobuskih i željezničkih sistema na primitivni i razbijeni javni prevod.

Rezultati deregulacije JGP u Velikoj Britaniji

Posle mnogih debata u kojima je ogranak većina stručnjaka za gradove i gradski korisnici kritikovala predlog za deregulaciju JGP, Britanski parlament je ipak usvojio taj predlog, pošto je Konzervativna stranka imala veliku većinu poslanika. Deregulaciju je, pošto je od 1986., uvedena u svim gradovima. London je bio jedini izuzetak: zbog naručenih uslova u njemu, promene su bile znatno umetnice. Kakvi su rezultati sa poslednjih prošlog godine?

Od uvođenja deregulacije imaju velike studije su predhodne i mnoge publikacije napisane u Velikoj Britaniji o ovoj drastičnoj promeni. Za velike preteklih devet godina glavni rezultati deregulacije su bili sledeći:

- **Eksploatacija trušnih privatizovanih linija su suzrane za oko 20%, te su u većini suzrane za odgovarajući iznos. Međutim, postojao je novi iznosi iznosi, novi iznosi.**
- **Cene promene (mjesec) su povećane znatno mais nego inflacija, u mnogim gradovima su se javili problemi za stanovništvo sa hranilama.**
- **Minibusi su uvedeni u mnogo gradova; frekvencija na linijama i broj autobusa kilometara su porasli, ali većinom na glavnom pravcima linija, duplirajući, a ne u novim delovima grada.**
- **Radički sindikat o JGP u većini razbijen. Broj zapošljenih u JGP je znatno opao i njihove radnice su počela da upotrebljavaju druga industrije.**
- **Takmičenje među mnogo javni autobuskih kompanija se nije promenilo kako su pohotljivima, kao i u mnogo gradova, većina predhoda su u istim mjestima smeštene, bez promena "analognog" cene: pošto tarife su regulirane, velike predhode uvedu vrlo niske cene, aako da ne imaju korisničkog povjerenja na raznim putnikima koji su zaštićeni od ovakve žbuposr, trudever monopola.**
- **Preduzeća su svi vidovi JGP, npr. metra i autobusa, zadanom su znanostima, lično izvršavanje "lako je za terenci različitih vidova, većina većenih cilj JGP u svim gradovima, u Britaniji" potpuno uistinu.**
- **Broj putnika u JGP je drastično opao; za celu zemlju on je danas oko 30% niži nego što je bio pre uvođenja deregulacije.**
- **Povećali broj autobuskih i suzrane brojeva putnika rezultato u velikim parkovima, radnici sa zaposlenim u JGP, u Britaniji potpuno uistinu.**
- **Usluge JGP nisu pružavane više jednom integrisanu mrežu u sistemu; usluge nisu korisničke, poslužuju o broju putnika i njihovim zanimanjima, eksperimenti i tehnike novčani su unapred i dogradnja planiranje autobuskog JGP je prestalo.
consider that UPT should operate as integrated element of urban transportation and that its main goal is to do the maximum number of tours, all agree in one: deregulation of UPT in Great Britain has had the disastrous results.

Decreasing role of UPT has the negative effect on economical activities and quality of life in British cities. The whole policy of deregulation that is now threatening to destroy British rail as well, strongly is criticized in all country. It seems that the whole traffic policy will change drastically if there should come to the change of ultra-conservative government.

• Uloga koja se daje autobuskim JGP u planiranju je jako smanjena. U istovremeno inačiranje gradnje puteva je jako prisutno.

Ukratko rečeno, za one koji smatraju da je autobusiško JGP komercijalno predusloviće njegov glavni cilj da se smanji njegove dužnosti, deregulacija predstavlja uspeh. Međutim, oni koji smatraju da JGP treba da funkcioniše kao jedan integrisani element gradskog prevoza i njegov glavni cilj je da služi maksimalnom broju putovnika slažu da je deregulacija JGP u Vladi imala katastrofalne rezultate.

Uticaj opadanja uloge JGP na ekonomsku aktivnost i kvalitet života u britanskim gradovima je veoma negativan. Cela politika deregulacije koja sada preti da razori i britanske željeznice jako se kritikuje u celom zemlji i svi su izgledi da će se cela saobraćajna politika drastično promeniti ako dođe do promene sadašnje ultra-konzervativne vlade.

REFERENCES / LITERATURA